In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that "generalized assertions" of past racial discrimination could not justify "rigid" racial quotas for the awarding of public contracts. Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that the 30 percent quota could not be tied to "any injury suffered by anyone," and was an impermissible employment of a suspect classification. O'Connor further held that allowing claims of past discrimination to serve as the basis for racial quotas would actually subvert constitutional values: "The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs."


On October 29, 1983, 10-year-old David was abducted from a church carnival. The abductor molested and sodomized the boy, then returned him to the carnival an hour and a half later. David’s mother took him to the Kino Hospital, where a doctor examined him and used a sexual assault kit to collect evidence. The police collected the kit and the boy’s clothes. The evidence from the kit was refrigerated, but the clothing was not. Nine days after the attack, David positively identified Larry Youngblood as the abductor from a photo lineup. The next day, a police criminologist examined the sexual assault kit and determined that sexual contact had occurred, but he did not test the clothing at that time. Youngblood was indicted on charges of sexual assault, kidnapping, and child molestation. The state moved to compel him to provide samples to compare with those from the sexual assault kit, but the trial court denied the motion because there was not enough sample material in the kit to make a valid comparison. In January 1985, the police criminologist tested the boy’s clothing for the first time and received inconclusive data.
At trial, police witnesses testified as to what the tests might have shown had they been conducted closer to the time the evidence was gathered. The court instructed the jury to consider the facts “against the state’s interests” if they found the state had lost or destroyed evidence by conducting the tests later. The jury found the defendant guilty. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that, when identity is an issue at trial, the loss or destruction of evidence that could remove the defendant from suspicion is a denial of due process. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied the petition for review.

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No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant must show bad faith on the part of the police to prove that the loss or destruction of evidence was a denial of due process. Requiring the police to retain every potentially useful piece of evidence places an undue burden on the police, while the bad faith restriction limits the police’s duty to what serves the interests of justice. The Court also held that, in this case, the police’s failure to refrigerate the clothing could at worst be negligent, but not in bad faith.
In his opinion concurring in judgment, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that, even without the Court’s ruling, the state has a strong interest in properly preserving as much evidence as possible. He also argued that there was no way to definitively say what the evidence might have shown and the jury still ruled in favor of the prosecution, which suggests that the evidence would not have been sufficient to exonerate Youngblood. Justice Stevens also argued that, while he concurred in the judgment, he found the majority’s opinion much broader than necessary to decide this case.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, regardless of the state’s intent, police action that results in the defendant’s failure to receive a fair trial represents a denial of due process. He also argued that there is no bright-line distinction between good faith and bad faith police action, and therefore that guideline does not adequately protect the rights of criminal defendants. Without any way to know what the evidence would have shown, there is no proof that it would not have been enough to exonerate Youngblood, so the police’s failure to preserve the evidence effectively deprived Youngblood of his rights to due process. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent.
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The Kansas City Missouri School District hired lawyers to argue a major desegregation case against the state of Missouri in federal district court. When the lawyers won the case after years of litigation, they sought compensation from Missouri under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. The district court calculated the amount owed using current market rates for attorney's fees. Missouri objected to paying the lawyers at current rates for work they performed in the past when rates were lower. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled against Missouri. Missouri alleged that the federal courts violated its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity privileges by forcing it to pay higher rates.

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No and Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for a 7-1 court. The Court referred to its decision in Hutto v. Finney to establish that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply "to an award of attorney's fees against a State." Therefore "it follows that the same is true for the calculation of the amount of the fee." Charging current rates for lawyers compensated for the delay in payment to them. Further, charging current rates for legal assistants rather than their cost to attorneys during litigation took account of the entire service the lawyers provided. This constituted "a reasonable attorney's fee" under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.


Drug Enforcement Administration agents stopped Sokolow in Honolulu International Airport after his behavior indicated he may be a drug trafficker: he paid $2,100 in cash for airline tickets, he was not traveling under his own name, his original destination was Miami, he appeared nervous during the trip, and he checked none of his luggage. Agents arrested Sokolow and searched his luggage without a warrant. Later, at the DEA office, agents obtained warrants allowing more extensive searches and they discovered 1,063 grams of cocaine.

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The Court upheld the search and reasoned that the agents had a "reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in wrongdoing." Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the validity of such a stop should be based on the "totality of the circumstances," (United States v. Cortez, 1981), which, in this case, gave agents a clear reason to suspect Sokolow of drug trafficking.


A reporter for the Florida Star wrote and printed an article about Betty Jean Freedman’s rape, including her full name. The reporter obtained all of his information, including the victim’s name, from the police report. The police department did not restrict access to the pressroom or police reports, but there were several signs in the area instructing not to print victim’s names. The newspaper also had a policy of not printing the full names of victims. After the article ran, Freedman and her family received several threatening phone calls, and Freedman sought mental counseling and police protection. Freedman sued, claiming emotional distress. The district court found Florida Star guilty of negligence under a Florida law that prohibits publishing the name of a victim of a sexual offense in any instrument of mass communication. The court awarded Freedman compensatory and punitive damages. The district court of appeal affirmed and the Supreme Court of Florida denied review.

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No. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the civil damages imposed on Florida Star violated the First Amendment because the information was lawfully-obtained and truthful. The Court hinted that there may be a situation where a victim’s privacy interest outweighed a newspaper’s First Amendment rights. The Court also held that the Florida law prohibiting the printing of a victim’s name was under-inclusive because it did not limit the spread of a victim’s name through other means. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurrence, stating that the Florida statute was invalid because it did not protect a state interest of the highest order.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, expressing that the majority’s decision departs from past precedent. Justice White also rejected the majority’s assertion that the Florida law was under-inclusive. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


At 17 years old, Kevin Stanford was convicted by a Kentucky jury of murder, sodomy, robbery, and the receipt of stolen property. Stanford was sentenced to death under a state statute which permitted juvenile offenders to receive the death penalty for Class A felonies or capital crimes. Stanford appealed his sentence and his case was consolidated with that of Wilkins v. Missouri, involving a 16 year old's appeal of his death sentence following a conviction for murder in Missouri. Both Stanford and Wilkins alleged that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders as young as themselves violated their constitutional rights.

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No. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court held that in weighing whether the imposition of capital punishments on offenders below the age of eighteen is cruel and unusual, it is necessary to look at the given society's evolving decency standards. With respect to American society, there is no national consensus regarding the imposition of capital punishments on 17- or 16-year-old individuals. Of the 37 states which permit capital punishment, 12 prohibit the death penalty for offenders below the age of 17 while 15 states prohibit capital punishment for 16 year olds. Moreover, discrepancies in national opinion polls, interest group views, and professional association studies, all indicate a lack of unanimity concerning the acceptability of death sentences for such relatively young offenders. Thus, the decision whether to subject 17 or 16 year olds to capital punishment must be made locally by the states and cannot be categorically pronounced as cruel and unusual punishment at this time.


County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter

Two public-sponsored holiday displays in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union. The first display involved a Christian nativity scene inside the Allegheny County Courthouse. The second display was a large Chanukah menorah, erected each year by the Chabad Jewish organization, outside the City-County building. The ACLU claimed the displays constituted state endorsement of religion. This case was decided together with Chabad v. ACLU and City of Pittsburgh v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh.

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In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the creche inside the courthouse unmistakably endorsed Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause. By prominently displaying the words "Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ," the county sent a clear message that it supported and promoted Christian orthodoxy. The Court also held, however, that not all religious celebrations on government property violated the Establishment Clause. Six of the justices concluded that the display involving the menorah was constitutionally legitimate given its "particular physical setting."


The respondents, a class of indigent Virginia death row inmates who did not have counsel to pursue post conviction proceedings, sued various state officials and argued that the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution required that they be provided with counsel at the state’s expense for the purpose of pursuing collateral proceedings related to their convictions and sentences. The district court found that Virginia’s policy of either allowing death row inmates time in the prison law library or permitting them to have law books in their cells did not do enough to satisfy Virginia’s obligation to provide them some form of relief. That court also found the availability of attorneys to assist inmates was inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

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No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause requires states to appoint counsel for death row inmates looking for relief. States are not constitutionally obligated to provide relief post-conviction because the Constitution assures the right to counsel for an initial appeal from the judgment of the trial court. The Court also rejected the argument that capital cases require more legal assistance at collateral proceedings than non-capital cases.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that a post-conviction proceeding is not part of the criminal process but is a civil action that does not require the state to provide proceedings. Prisoners were still able to obtain counsel, despite Virginia not adopting procedures that are were as far-reaching as those of other states. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the concurrence.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent that claimed that Virginia’s procedure was unfair and did not provide indigent death row inmates an adequate opportunity to present their claims. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.


New York City, responding to complaints of high-decibel concerts adjoining residential neighborhoods, mandated the use of city-provided sound systems and technicians for concerts in Central Park. Members of rock group claimed that the inability to use their own sound equipment and technicians in a concert in a public forum interfered with their First Amendment rights of expression.

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No. The Court upheld the ordinance, giving broad deference to the government's interest in maintaining order. As long as "the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest," a regulation will not be invalidated because a court concludes that the government's interest "could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative."


The city of Dallas, Texas passed an ordinance regulating the ages of admitted patrons and the hours of operation for dance halls. Charles M. Stanglin, the owner of the Twilight Skating Rink in Dallas, in compliance with this ordinance, split his skate rink into two sections: one section for patrons ages 14-18 and the other for anyone who pays the cost of admission. Stanglin sued the city to be able to un-divide the Twilight Skating Rink and argued that the ordinance placing age restrictions on dance halls violated the First Amendment right to freedom of association and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court held that the ordinance did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments and that the ordinance's purpose was to benefit the welfare of teenagers in Dallas by limiting their exposure to illicit activities. The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but that the ordinance unconstitutionally infringed on the First Amendment right to freedom of association.

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No, no. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the ordinance was intended to protect the youth of Dallas against corrupting activity, which they may have access to when intermingling with adults. Therefore, the age restrictions on youth activities were reasonable under the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of association and equal protection under the law considering they are enforced to protect the youth from corrupt activities.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the opportunity to socialize was protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, but that this case presented an issue of due process rather than freedom of association. He concurred with the judgment that the city ordinance protects teenagers and allowed them an even greater ability to associate than if the ordinance was not enforced. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.


Wards Cove Packing Company, Inc. v. Atonio

Wards Cove Packing Co. employed primarily nonwhite workers for unskilled seasonal jobs canning fish. A group of nonwhite workers filed suit in federal district court alleging that Wards Cove practiced discriminatory hiring in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As evidence, the group compared the high percentage of nonwhites in unskilled work with the high percentage of whites in skilled work. The District Court rejected this claim because it found that Ward received unskilled workers through a hiring agency that enrolled primarily nonwhites. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Ward had the burden of proof to show that its hiring practices were not discriminatory after the claimants presented evidence of racial disparity.

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No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a 5-4 court. The fact that one class of jobs at a firm has a higher percentage of nonwhites than another class does not by itself prove that the firm practices discriminatory hiring. Comparisons of race percentages among different job classes could wrongfully blame the employer, since what appears to show racial discrimination could in reality reflect the racial differences that exist in the labor market at large. Instead, the Court held that "the proper comparison is generally between the racial composition of the at-issue jobs and the racial composition of the qualified population in the relevant labor market." If a substantial difference is found, then the claimants must show that it is the result of a hiring practice of the employer.


Davis v. Michigan Department of the Treasury

Paul Davis, a resident of Michigan, worked for the federal government and upon retirement received benefits. Michigan law exempts state retirement benefits from state taxes. Smith unsuccessfully petitioned for a refund on the state taxes he paid on his federal retirement benefits. He then filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims arguing that the state's tax policy violated 4 U.S.C. 111 by taxing benefits paid to federal employees but not to state employees. The court dismissed his suit and so did the Michigan Court of Appeals.

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Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for an 8-1 court. The Court emphasized the principles of intergovernmental tax immunity, which work to keep one part of the government from hindering the operations of another part. Section 111 allows a state to tax income paid by the federal government "if the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay or compensation." Because the Court found no "significant differences between the two classes [federal and state employees]," it held that the Michigan tax distinguished between employees solely on "the source of the pay."


In May of 1976, Jimmy Wayne Jeffers and his girlfriend, Penelope Cheney, were arrested for possession of narcotics and receipt of stolen property. Jeffers posted bond for Cheney but was unable to post bond for himself. While in jail, Jeffers learned that Cheney was cooperating with the police. He offered another inmate money to kill Cheney, but a detention officer seized the note. Jeffers was released on bond in October of 1976. He quickly contacted Cheney and invited her to his motel room to give her heroin. When Doris Van der Veer, the woman with whom Jeffers had been living since his release from prison, entered the room a few hours later, she saw Cheney comatose on the bed and Jeffers injecting liquid into her arm. Van der Veer reported seeing Jeffers choke Cheney to death and then beat her body while calling her dirty names. Van der Veer and Jeffers then wrapped the body in newspapers and plastic bags and buried it in a shallow grave.
A jury convicted Jeffers of first-degree murder. At sentencing, the court found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating factors, so Jeffers was sentenced to death under Arizona state law. On direct review, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. On a second direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the evidence and affirmed the death sentence. Jeffers petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus and argued that Arizona’s standard of an “especially heinous...or depraved” aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected Jeffers’ challenge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the standard was unconstitutionally vague as it applied to Jeffers and struck down the death sentence.

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No, no. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal habeas corpus relief is not intended to find error in state laws but rather to determine whether a state court’s finding was so arbitrary and capricious that it violates the Eighth Amendment. The reviewing court should use the “rational factfinder” test, which asks whether a rational trier of fact when viewing the evidence as most favorable to the prosecution could find reasonable doubt. The Court also held that the Arizona Supreme Court applied a narrow and clearly defined construction of the standard that sufficiently prevented arbitrary and capricious sentencing. Therefore the standard as it applied to Jeffers was not unconstitutionally vague.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the way a court constructs a standard does not change the fact that the standard is unconstitutionally vague. Because the majority’s opinion provided no analysis on how the Arizona Supreme Court had constructed this standard in the past, there was no evidence to support the idea that the standard was being consistently narrowly applied. He also argued that the majority’s opinion incorrectly focuses on federal habeas courts’ review of state law, when there are federal implications as well. The district court has to review habeas corpus cases in light of others in order to determine whether the standards are being consistently and appropriately applied, so the “rational factfinder” test is not solely sufficient. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.
In his dissent, which also applies to Walton v. Arizona, Justice Brennan argued that the death penalty is contrary to the ideals of human dignity upon which the Constitution rests and that the majority’s opinion makes it easier for states to execute individuals with little regard for Eighth Amendment doctrine. Justice Marshall joined in the dissent.


In 1989, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act which made it a crime to destroy an American flag or any likeness of an American flag which may be "commonly displayed." The law did, however, allow proper disposal of a worn or soiled flag. Several prosecutions resulted from the Act. Eichman set a flag ablaze on the steps of the U.S. Capitol while protesting the government's domestic and foreign policy. Another prosecution (United States v. Haggerty) resulted from a flag-burning in Seattle protesting the passage of the Flag Protection Act.Both cases (Eichman's and Haggerty's) were argued together.

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In a 5-to-4 decision, coming on the heels of a similar holding in Texas v. Johnson (1989), the Court struck down the law because "its asserted interest is related to the suppression of free expression and concerned with the content of such expression." Allowing the flag to be burned in a disposal ceremony but prohibiting protestors from setting it ablaze at a political protest made that clear, argued Justice Brennan in one of his final opinions.


A woman called police officers to a residence. She showed signs of having been beaten. She led police to another residence, where she said Edward Rodriguez was asleep inside. She alleged that he had beaten her earlier in the day. The woman had a key to the residence and referred to it as “our apartment” several times. She consented to a search of the residence and police entered without a warrant. Once inside, police found drug paraphernalia and containers filled with a white powder. Police arrested Rodriguez and he was later charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. At trial, Rodriguez attempted to suppress evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the woman did not have authority to consent to the search. The woman had moved out a few weeks before the incident and no longer lived at the apartment. With no valid consent, the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted the motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied leave to appeal.

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Yes, No. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that a warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the police reasonably believed that the person who consented to the search had the authority to do so. The case was remanded for consideration of whether the police officers reasonably believed that the woman had authority to consent to their search of the residence.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, arguing that police cannot ignore the Fourth Amendment when an individual did not voluntarily give others concurrent authority over their property. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California

California law required retailers to pay a 6 percent sales tax on in-state sales of tangible personal property and residents to pay a 6 percent use tax on such property if purchased out of state. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, incorporated in Louisiana, sold religious materials to California residents through several direct and mail-order "evangelistic crusades." After auditing his ministry, the California Board of Equalization ("Board") told Swaggart that under California law he had to register his ministry as a seller so the Board could collect the appropriate sales and use taxes. After paying the taxes, Swaggart petitioned the Board for a refund. When his petition was rejected, Swaggart challenged the Board in state court. Following two unfavorable rulings below, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Swaggart's petition for certiorari.

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No. Basing its unanimous decision on the fact that California's sales and use tax was not a flat tax, affected only a small portion of retail sales, and was neutrally applied, the Court found the taxes constitutional. Moreover, since the taxes were not imposed as a precondition to spreading any given message and were due regardless of registration, the Court rejected Swaggart's claim that California's no-fee registration requirement acted as a prior restraint on his religious organization. Finally, the Court held that any administrative burdens associated with the payment of taxes did not give rise to an establishment conflict since they did not cause excessive entanglement between the government and Swaggart's organization.


Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens By and Through Mergens

The school administration at Westside High School denied permission to a group of students to form a Christian club with the same privileges and meeting terms as other Westside after-school student clubs. In addition to citing the Establishment Clause, Westside refused the club's formation because it lacked a faculty sponsor. When the school board upheld the administration's denial, Mergens and several other students sued. The students alleged that Westside's refusal violated the Equal Access Act, which requires that schools in receipt of federal funds provide "equal access" to student groups seeking to express "religious, political, philosophical, or other content" messages. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Court of Appeals found in favor of the students. The Supreme Court granted Westside certiorari.

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No. In distinguishing between "curriculum" and "noncurriculum student groups," the Court held that since Westside permitted other noncurricular clubs, it was prohibited under the Equal Access Act from denying equal access to any after-school club based on the content of its speech. The proposed Christian club would be a noncurriculum group since no other course required students to become its members, its subject matter would not actually be taught in classes, it did not concern the school's cumulative body of courses, and its members would not receive academic credit for their participation. The Court added that the Equal Access Act was constitutional because it served an overriding secular purpose by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of philosophical, political, or other types of speech. As such, the Act protected the Christian club's formation even if its members engaged in religious discussions.


On November 30, 1986, a patrol officer saw Inocencio Muniz and another passenger in a car stopped on the shoulder of a highway. When the officer approached, he could smell alcohol on Muniz’s breath and saw that his eyes were bloodshot and his face was flushed. The officer advised Muniz to remain parked, but as he was leaving he saw Muniz drive off. The officer pulled Muniz over and had him perform three field sobriety tests, all of which Muniz failed. Muniz told the officer he failed them because he had been drinking. The officer arrested Muniz and took him to a booking center, where he was told that his actions and voice were being recorded, but no one read him his Miranda rights. Muniz answered a series of questions about himself and stumbled over an answer regarding the year he turned six. Muniz again failed three field sobriety tests and refused a breathalyzer test. The officer then read Muniz his Miranda rights, and Muniz signed a statement waiving them. In subsequent questioning, he admitted to being under the influence of alcohol.
At trial, the video and audio recordings of Muniz’s behavior at the booking center were admitted into evidence, along with the officer’s reports of Muniz’s failure of the field sobriety tests and his incriminating statements. Muniz was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. He filed a motion for a new trial and argued that the evidence of his behavior and statements prior to the Miranda warning should have been excluded from trial. The trial court denied the motion. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed and held that the testimony regarding Muniz’s behavior and the results of the field sobriety tests was physical in nature, not testimonial, but that the audio portion of the recording should have been suppressed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the application for review.

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No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment distinguishes between real or physical evidence and testimonial evidence, of which only testimonial evidence is protected under the Amendment. Based on this analysis, the incriminating evidence drawn from physical evidence is admissible, but evidence drawn from the content of statements that relate factual information is not. The Court also held that the Fifth Amendment does not require the suppression of information not elicited by an officer.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that answers to an officer’s questions should be admissible when the questions are meant to elicit responses to ascertain the suspect’s mental state. In such a case, the questions serve the same purpose as the field sobriety tests, and the answers are not testimonial. Justice Byron R. White, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. In his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that creating an exception for routine booking questions and their answers undermined the rights the Miranda warning was meant to protect. He argued that the questions the police asked Muniz were intended to elicit incriminating responses, and because the police asked the questions before reading Muniz his Miranda rights, the evidence of the questions and their answers should be suppressed.


While being held in jail, Perkins freely confessed to committing a murder to an undercover police officer who was posing as another inmate.

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The Court held that conversations between suspects and undercover officers are not afforded Miranda protection since they are not done in a "police-dominated atmosphere" where compulsion to confess is present. "It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation," argued Justice Kennedy. There was no danger of coercion in this case.


In November 1980, Governor James Thompson of Illinois issued an order that prohibited state officials from hiring new employees, promoting state employees, or recalling state employees after layoffs without the approval of the Governor's Office of Personnel. The Office of Personnel based hiring and promotion decisions on factors such as the applicant's contributions to the Republican Party, the applicant's record of service to the Republican Party, and the support of local Party officials. In the jointly decided case of Frech v. Rutan, Cynthia B. Rutan and a number of other potential and current state employees challenged this patronage system, alleging that the Governor was violating their First Amendment rights by practicing unfair political patronage and party-based discrimination.

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In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Governor Thompson's practices amounted to an unconstitutional patronage system. The Court found that employees would feel "a significant obligation to support political positions held by their superiors" in lieu of their true beliefs in order to progress up the career ladder. The Court thus held that "promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliations or support" were impermissible infringements on the right to free expression of public employees. The Court noted that while the First Amendment was not "a tenure provision" protecting employees from "constructive discharge," it nevertheless prevented the government from interfering with its employees' freedom "to believe and associate."


W.S. Kirkpatrick & Company, Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corporation, International

In 1981, the Republic of Nigeria was interested in building an aeromedical center at Kaduna Air Force Base. Both W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. (Kirkpatrick) and Environmental Tectonics Corporation International (Environmental Tectonics) bid for the contract. Kirkpatrick established a deal with a Nigerian citizen who would attempt to ensure Kirkpatrick received the contract. In exchange, Kirkpatrick would pay two Panamanian companies owned by the Nigerian individual 20% of the contract price, which would be distributed as bribes to Nigerian officials. Kirkpatrick succeeded in obtaining the contract, and Environmental Tectonics brought the issue to the attention of the authorities. The United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey brought charges against Kirkpatrick and its CEO, and both pled guilty.
Environmental Tectonics sued Kirkpatrick in district court and sought damages under anti-racketeering acts. Kirkpatrick moved to dismiss the complaint by arguing that the action was barred by state doctrine that prohibited courts from considering cases that would result in embarrassment for a sovereign nation or interfere with US foreign policy. The district court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted the motion in favor of Kirkpatrick. The district court held that Environmental Tectonics would have to prove that Nigerian officials accepted bribes and allowed the bribes to influence governmental decisions. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that Kirkpatrick had not met its burden to show that the case could not proceed.

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No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that state doctrine only applies when the case requires a US court to declare an act of a foreign sovereign nation invalid. The Court held that this suit only requires the district court to rule on the motivation underlying an action rather than the validity of the action itself. Since nothing in this case required the court to declare an action by Nigeria’s government invalid, state doctrine does not apply, and the case should be allowed to proceed.


On February 11, 1985, a Florida Highway Patrol officer stopped Martin Wells for speeding and smelled alcohol on his breath. Wells was arrested for driving under the influence and taken to the police station for a breathalyzer test. While in custody, police told Wells that his car would be impounded, and he granted permission to the officer to open the trunk. An inventory search of the car at the impoundment revealed two marijuana cigarette butts and a locked suitcase in the trunk. Under the direction of a trooper, impoundment employees opened the suitcase and found a garbage bag of marijuana.
Wells was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He moved to suppress the marijuana evidence by arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. Wells pleaded nolo contendere but reserved the right to appeal on the motion to suppress. The Florida District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District reversed the ruling on the motion to suppress, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.

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No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for five members of the court. The Supreme Court held that there must be a policy in place that determines whether inventory searches include opening closed containers or not. Such a policy allows the situation to be regulated. Absent such a policy, as in this case, the search is not regulated sufficiently to be permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment does allow police officers to use discretion in determining whether a container can be opened based on the nature of the search.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment where he argued that there must be a standard inventory search policy in place that limits police discretion to prevent the abuse of a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that the majority opinion went beyond the bounds of the case by allowing individual police discretion to determine whether to open a sealed container in an inventory search. Justice John Paul Stevens also wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment where he argued that the majority opinion represented blatant judicial activism by granting certiorari to a case that the Florida Supreme Court adequately handled. He also wrote that the majority’s opinion on the issue of police discretion extended beyond the question at hand.
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Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois

Gary Peel, an attorney licensed to practice in three states, received a "Certificate in Civil Trial Advocacy" from the National Board of Trial Advocacy (NBTA). This certificate is earned by compiling extensive trial experience, completing continuing legal education classes, and passing a day-long examination. In addition to listing the three states in which he was licensed to practice, Peel listed his NBTA certification on his letterhead. The Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois filed a complaint against Peel and argued that he was publicly presenting himself as a certified legal specialist in violation of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. At Peel's disciplinary hearing, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the Commission and held that Peel's letterhead was commercial speech that could be governed by the lawyer advertising regulations. The Illinois Supreme Court also held that Peel's letterhead amounted to an unwarranted claim of superior quality of service because it could lead the public to believe that his authority to practice trial advocacy was derived from his NBTA certification.

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No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the letterhead was neither actually nor inherently misleading because advertising an NBTA certification did not suggest a greater degree of qualification than could be inferred by evaluating the certification's requirements. Furthermore, the Court held that, whether or not the letterhead was misleading, Illinois' categorical prohibition on providing this type of information was "broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the perceived evil." Additionally, the concern about deception was insufficient to outweigh the "constitutional presumption favoring disclosure over concealment."
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that, because the letterhead may be deceiving, Illinois could enact regulations short of a complete ban to make sure the public is not misled by similar representations.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the letterhead could be potentially misleading and that the state should have the power to prevent these types of advertisements when they are not accompanied by a disclaimer aimed at avoiding the misconception. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which she argued that the Illinois rule barring this type of misleading speech is valid and that the public's comparative lack of knowledge justifies the state's interest in controlling this type of speech. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia joined the dissent.


Eli Lilly and Company v. Medtronic, Inc.

In 1983, the predecessor-in-interest to Eli Lilly & Co. sued Medtronic, Inc. for patent infringement to enjoin Medtronic’s research and marketing of an implantable cardiac defibrillator, a device used to treat heart problems. Medtronic argued that the information was used to develop and submit new information under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), and therefore it was exempt from the statutes governing patent infringement. The district court held that there was no such exemption and issued a permanent injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and held that Medtronic’s actions could not be considered patent infringement if they were reasonably related to obtaining approval under the FDCA.

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Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of a 6-2 majority. The Court held that, based on the phrasing of the FDCA, the exemption refers to all actions in the process of developing and submitting information to the FDA. Reading the statute in this way prevents distortions of patent law and allows the development of medical technology to logically proceed. The Court held that only the broader interpretation of the statute respects legislative intent.
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a dissent where he argued that the FDCA refers specifically to an exemption for drugs, not medical devices and/or technologies. He argued that to read the statute in any broader manner is to unnecessarily twist Congress’ words from their normal meaning. He also wrote that Congress’ distinction between drugs and devices would be a logical one, as the use of a patent holder’s devices for medical testing would infringe on the patent holder’s sales in a way that the use of a drug would not. Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


On September 24, 1985, a yacht owned by Everett Sisson caught fire while it was moored at a Lake Michigan marina. The fire destroyed the yacht and damaged several others in the vicinity. The owners of the other yachts sued Sisson for $275,000 for the damage to their yachts and the marina. Sisson filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief to limit his liability to $800, the value of his yacht after the fire. He argued that the district court had maritime jurisdiction, but the court disagreed and dismissed the petition. Sisson moved for reconsideration, and the district court denied the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

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Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of seven members of the court. The Court held that the district court has maritime jurisdiction when the incident in question represents a potential hazard to maritime commerce and bears a substantial relationship to maritime activity. In this case, although the fire caused minimal damage, it had the potential to be extremely destructive and disrupt the maritime activity of the marina. The Court held that such a determination should be made based on the nature of the incident rather than its actual result. The fire bore a substantial relationship to maritime activity because it stemmed from the maintenance of a vessel in a marina located on a navigable waterway, which is a part of traditional maritime activity.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the majority’s test is unnecessary because it merely proves that district courts have jurisdiction over all tort cases involving vessels in navigable waterways. He wrote that the use of such a test only adds confusion to an otherwise-settled area of law. Justice Byron R. White joined in the concurring opinion.


Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin

Dennis and Francie Burnham were married in 1976 and moved to New Jersey in 1977. In July of 1987, they decided to separate and agreed that Mrs. Burnham would take custody of the children, move to California, and file for divorce citing irreconcilable differences. In October of 1987, Mr. Burnham filed for divorce in New Jersey citing desertion. Mrs. Burnham successfully demanded that Mr. Burnham respect their previous agreement and filed for divorce in California in January 1988. Later that month, Mr. Burnham was in California on business and visited his children. While there, he was served with a California court summons and a copy of the divorce petition. Later that year, Mr. Burnham appeared before the California Superior Court and moved to quash the petition because the court lacked jurisdiction over him, as his only contacts with California were short business trips. The Superior Court denied the motion and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.

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No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that one of the most firmly established precedents in American judicial history is the fact that states have jurisdiction over nonresidents within their borders. As long as the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” are not offended by the state’s assertion of jurisdiction, there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the addition of a subjective jurisdiction determination to be made by a judge would make the process less fair.
Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that there is no evidence that the rule allowing states to have jurisdiction over nonresidents had arbitrarily or unfairly violated due process. In his opinion concurring in judgment, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that historical precedent is not the only factor that should determine whether the jurisdictional issue satisfies the Due Process Clause. He argued that, when a person visits a state, they knowingly and willingly avail themselves of the benefits of that state’s laws, and therefore are subject to them as well. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate opinion concurring in judgment where he argued that the majority’s opinion was unnecessarily broad, but he agreed with its conclusion.


The Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibited corporations from using treasury money for independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections for state offices. However, if a corporation set up an independent fund designated solely for political purposes, it could make such expenditures. The law was enacted with the assumption that "the unique legal and economic characteristics of corporations necessitate some regulation of their political expenditures to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption." The Michigan Chamber of Commerce wanted to support a candidate for Michigan's House of Representatives by using general funds to sponsor a newspaper advertisement.

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No. In making its case, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce argued that it should have been excluded from the act's restrictions since the Chamber was a "nonprofit ideological corporation" which was more analogous to a political association than a business firm. The Court disagreed and upheld the Michigan law. Justice Marshall found that the Chamber was akin to a business group given its activities, linkages with community business leaders, and high degree of members (over seventy-five percent) which were business corporations. Furthermore, Marshall found that the statute was narrowly crafted and implemented to achieve the important goal of maintaining integrity in the political process.


Laura Lee Wright and her ex-husband Louis Wright had jointly agreed that they would share custody of their daughter, while her half-sister would live with her parents, Laura Lee Wright and Robert Giles. In November 1986, when the girls were five years old and two years old, respectively, the older daughter told Cynthia Goodman, a friend of Louis Wright’s, that Giles had sexually assaulted her while Laura held her down and covered her mouth. The girl also said that she had seen the same thing happen to her younger sister. Goodman reported this information to the police and took the girl to the hospital where Dr. John Jambura examined her. Dr. Jambura found conditions highly suggestive of sexual intercourse that had occurred two or three days previously. Laura Wright and Giles were jointly charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor.
During the trial, the court conducted a voir dire examination of the younger daughter, aged three years at the time of the trial, to determine whether she was capable of testifying. The court found, and the parties agreed, that she was not. Over the objection of the defense, the court allowed Dr. Jambura to testify to certain statements the younger daughter made during the examination. Laura Wright and Giles were convicted on both counts, and they appealed on the conviction regarding the conduct with the younger daughter. They argued that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of Dr. Jambura. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the admission of the hearsay testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the testimony did not fall under a hearsay exception and the interview in question lacked procedural safeguards. The Idaho Supreme Court also noted that children are highly susceptible to suggestion and can easily be influenced by leading questions. Because the Idaho Supreme Court was not convinced that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had the testimony been excluded, it reversed the conviction.

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Yes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the state bears the burden of showing that the testimony of a witness who is unavailable for trial is sufficiently reliable to withstand scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause. Testimony is deemed reliable when it otherwise falls within a hearsay exception or shows “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” In order to meet this high standard of trustworthiness, testimony must be so reliable that adversarial testing under cross-examination would not alter its credibility. Corroborating evidence is not enough to establish the trustworthiness of testimony; it must be inherently reliable. Because the state could neither show that the testimony fit within a hearsay exception nor could they prove that it was inherently trustworthy, it was unreliable and therefore inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s opinion erred in establishing a rule that corroborating evidence is not sufficient to establish the trustworthiness of testimony. Because corroborating evidence is often the most commonly used and effective ways of determining the reliability of testimony, there is no reason for the majority to remove it as a method of determining whether testimony is sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause. Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Byron R. White, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.


Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health

In 1985 the Ohio legislature passed House Bill 319, which requires a physician to notify the parents of an unmarried minor who is requesting an abortion, unless the situation falls under one of the exceptions. Exceptions include: the minor providing a letter of parental consent; the physician providing the parents with actual notification 24 hours before the procedure or notification by mail 48 hours before the procedure; and a judicial bypass procedure that allows a minor to obtain the approval of a specified relative upon filing an affidavit with a juvenile court or receive a notification waiver from a juvenile court if parental notification would cause the minor emotional, sexual, or physical abuse. Before the law was put into effect, an abortion clinic, one of its doctors, and a minor seeking an abortion sued in federal district court and claimed that the judicial bypass procedures the law required violated a minor’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a preliminary injunction preventing Ohio form enforcing the statute. Ohio appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

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No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority in which the Court held that the bill did not violate a minor’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because it satisfied the four factors used to determine the constitutionality of this type of consent statutes. Those four factors are whether the minor was allowed to show that she was mature enough to make the abortion decision without her parents’ help, whether she was allowed to show that the abortion is in her best interest, whether the judicial bypass procedure took reasonable measures to ensure the minor’s anonymity, and whether the statute set reasonable time limits for judicial action. The Court ruled that requiring a minor to prove maturity by clear and convincing evidence is a fair evidentiary burden and that the requirement that the treating physician performs the notification is not an undue burden on the doctor or the minor.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he highlighted the importance of leaving abortion statutes such as this one to be decided by the majority-influenced state legislatures instead of by the “lawyerly dissection” of judicial precedent.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the judicial bypass procedure created a system that was a “tortious maze” and lacked the sensitivity required when dealing with such an intimate decision. Justice Blackmun also argued that the state lacked a sufficiently significant interest to interfere with the minor’s right to make this decision. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith

Two counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization ingested peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. As a result of this conduct, the rehabilitation organization fired the counselors. The counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related "misconduct." The state appellate court reversed the denial of benefits, finding that the denial violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The state supreme court affirmed the appellate court. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment against the disgruntled employees, and returned the case to the Oregon courts to determine whether or not sacramental use of illegal drugs violated Oregon's state drug laws (485 U.S. 660 (1988)). On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that while Oregon drug law prohibited the consumption of illegal drugs for sacramental religious uses, this prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause. The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in this new posture.

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Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that the Court has never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that government is free to regulate. Allowing exceptions to every state law or regulation affecting religion "would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind." Scalia cited as examples compulsory military service, payment of taxes, vaccination requirements, and child-neglect laws.


Guadalupe Montalvo-Murillo (Montalvo) was held in pretrial custody on federal criminal charges for attempting to enter New Mexico from Mexico with 72 pounds of cocaine. Montalvo cooperated with authorities and agreed to make a controlled delivery to the intended purchasers in Chicago. The authorities took Montalvo to Chicago where the purchase fell through, so they transferred Montalvo back to New Mexico where the criminal complaint charging him with possession of cocaine was originally filed. Montalvo’s detention hearing was not held until 13 days after his initial arrest in New Mexico because of the need to transfer him, the passage of two weekends, a federal holiday, and the fact that the government attorneys were unprepared. At Montalvo’s detention hearing, the district court determined that the delays violated the timeliness of proceedings required by the Bail Reform Act (Act). The district court also determined that Montalvo did not pose a flight risk and, to remedy the untimeliness of the pre-trial proceedings, released him. Montalvo fled upon his release. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that the government’s failure to uphold the Act’s directions for a timely hearing justified Montalvo’s release.

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Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Bail Reform Act (Act) does not require the government to remedy untimely proceedings by releasing someone who may pose a flight risk or endanger the community. Montalvo’s counsel argued that the government deviated from the time limits set forth in the Act; therefore, the hearing was not in accordance with the Act and the government should lose its authority to detain Montalvo. The Court rejected this argument and noted that no rule requires punitive sanction for every departure from a duty imposed upon the courts or government. The Court held that release in this and similar situations would defeat the Act’s purpose of providing fair bail proceedings, protecting the public, and assuring that defendants appear at trial.
Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the severity of pre-trial detention and its deprivation of personal liberty requires strict procedural safeguards that cannot be sacrificed in the name of community safety with impunity.


An anonymous caller told Montgomery, Alabama police that Vanessa Rose White had cocaine in an attaché case in her car. The caller gave certain specific details about the car and White’s future movements. Following that tip, police followed Vanessa Rose White as she drove from an apartment complex to Doby’s Motel Court, where they pulled her over. When asked, White gave the officers permission to search her car and an attaché case found in the car. Police found marijuana in the case and arrested White. During processing at the police station, officers also found 3 milligrams of cocaine in White’s purse. After being charged with possession of marijuana and cocaine, White moved to suppress evidence of the drugs. The trial court denied the motion and White plead guilty. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama reversed the motion, finding that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and search White’s car. This search violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

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Yes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote for the majority, reversing the lower court. The Court held that the totality of the circumstances provided a sufficiently reasonable suspicion that White possessed illegal drugs. Even though police had no way to confirm the credibility of the caller, police verified many allegations made by the caller about White’s car and movements. Because the police had a reasonable suspicion, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, stating that the majority’s standard allows anyone with enough knowledge of a person’s routine to cause police to search that person. The standard also gives officers too much freedom to claim that they received an anonymous tip to justify any search. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) challenged 1,250 land-use designations made by the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM). NWF filed suit under section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming that the actions were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." NWF argued that it had standing to sue because two of its members used public lands "in the vicinity" of lands affected by the BLM's decisions (four other members submitted affidavits claiming that they, too, used lands close to affected areas, but the District Court ruled that the affidavits had been submitted too late).
The BLM challenged the NWF's right to sue, and the District Court agreed. It found that the two affidavits filed in a timely manner did not show that the members had been sufficiently affected to have standing to sue. Furthermore, the court ruled that even if they had had standing to challenge those specific BLM decisions, they would not have had standing to challenge all 1,250.
On appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the initial two affidavits were enough to give them standing to challenge all 1,250 decisions. Moreover, the Court ruled that the District Court had abused its discretion by refusing to consider the additional four affidavits.

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No and no. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court held that NWF did not have standing to challenge the land-use designations. The two timely affidavits were not enough to show that the group members had actually been affected by the BLM decisions. Even if they had been, and if the four additional affidavits had been considered (which the Supreme Court ruled had not been necessary), the right to challenge the individual decisions would not have conveyed a right to challenge all of them. The decisions were not a single "agency action" but rather a series of actions which would have to be challenged individually. "The case-by-case approach that this requires is understandably frustrating to an organization such as [NWF], which has as its objective across-the-board protection of our Nation's wildlife and the streams and forests that support it," wrote Justice Scalia. "But this is the traditional, and remains the normal, mode of operation of the courts. ... Until confided to us, ... more sweeping actions are for the other branches."


Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

This case challenged the constitutionality of two minority preference policies of the Federal Communications Commission. Under the first policy challenged by Metro Broadcasting, Inc., minority applicants for broadcast licenses were given preference if all other relevant factors were roughly equal. The second policy, known as the "distress sale," was challenged by Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford Inc. This policy allowed broadcasters in danger of losing their licenses to sell their stations to minority buyers before the FCC formally ruled on the viability of the troubled stations. This case was decided together with Astroline Communications Co. v. Shurberg Broadcasting, in which Faith Center Inc. made a "distress sale" of its television license to a minority outfit owned by Astroline. Shurberg, a non-minority applicant for a similar license, challenged the FCC's approval of Faith Center's sale to Astroline.

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No. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that the FCC's minority preference policies were constitutional because they provided appropriate remedies for discrimination victims and were aimed at the advancement of legitimate congressional objectives for program diversity. The FCC's minority preference policies were closely related to, and substantially advanced, Congress's legitimate interest in affording the public a diverse array of programming options. The availability of program diversity serves the entire viewing and listening public, not just minorities, and is therefore consistent with First Amendment values. Finally, the Court noted that the FCC's minority preference policy did not unduly burden nonminorities. The FCC did not predetermine the number of distress sales, and could only invoke them in a small number of cases, when no competing bids were filed and the licensee elected to sell at a lower price rather than risk an FCC investigation (see also Adarand Constructors v. Pena).


In order to combat segregation in public schools in compliance with court directives, the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) sought to enhance the quality of schools and to attract more white students from the suburbs. The KCMSD's ability to raise taxes, however, was limited by state law. After determining that the District did not have alternative means of raising revenue for the program, federal district judge Russell G. Clark ordered an increase of local property taxes for the 1991-92 fiscal year. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision, but ruled that the courts should enjoin state tax laws that prevented the District from raising the necessary funds and allow the state to set tax rates.

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The Court held that the District Court "abused its discretion" by imposing a specific tax increase. The Court also held, however, that the modifications of the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals satisfied "equitable and constitutional principles governing the District Court's power...." The majority found that court orders directing local governments to levy their own taxes were "plainly" judicial acts within the powers of federal courts. When a constitutional justification existed, courts had the authority to order tax increases despite statutory limitations. The Court reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise would fail to take account of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them."


According to Arizona state law, after a person has been convicted of first-degree murder, there is a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether the punishment will be death or life imprisonment. The court must determine whether aggravating or mitigating factors were present. The judge imposes the death sentence if one or more aggravating factors are proven to exist.
On March 2, 1986, Jeffrey Alan Walton, Robert Hoover, and Sharold Ramsey went to a bar in Tucson intending to rob someone at random and steal that individual’s car. The three robbed Thomas Powell at gunpoint and forced him into his car that they drove into the desert. They later stopped the car, forced Powell to lie on the ground, and Walton shot him in the head. After the body was found, the coroner determined that the shot did not kill Powell, but rather that he died from dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia from being left in the desert. Walton was convicted of first-degree murder.
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution argued that two aggravating factors were present: the murder was committed in “an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner” and for the purposes of financial gain. The defense argued that mitigating factors were present in the form of Walton’s history of substance abuse, possible sexual abuse as a child, and the fact that he was 20 years old at the time of the trial. The court found that the aggravating factors were present, and the judge sentenced Walton to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.

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Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the Arizona method of death penalty sentencing is not arbitrary and does not place an undue burden on the defendant. The burden on the defendant to prove mitigating circumstances exist is not unconstitutional because it does not lessen the burden on the prosecution to prove that aggravating circumstances exist. The Court also held that a determination by a judge rather than a jury is constitutional because a judge has a great deal more legal expertise than even a well-instructed jury and is better able to make fair determinations. The wording of the statute itself is sufficiently clear to prevent arbitrary sentencing.
In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the judicial history of death penalty cases is based on contradictory lines of logic. The courts have attempted to reduce discretionary decision-making while at the same time affording each case individualized examination. Because the discretionary rule has less basis in judicial history, he argues that it should not be a consideration in the constitutionality of death penalty cases.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the death penalty is always a cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote that the Arizona statute places an unconstitutional burden on the defendant to prove that the mitigating factors are “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” A defendant can produce evidence of mitigating factors that will have no weight if a judge determines them to lack the necessary significance. He also argued that the wording of the Arizona statute was too vague to provide sufficient guidance to the sentencing judge. Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent where he argued that the Sixth Amendment requires death penalty sentencing to be conducted by a jury rather than a judge. He also argued that the individual facts of a case should have a bearing on sentencing decisions and that to ignore the role of discretion in such decisions would be unjust.


Sandra Ann Craig, the operator of a kindergarten and pre-school facility, was accused of sexually abusing a six-year-old child. Over Craig's objections, a trial court allowed the alleged child victim to testify via one-way closed circuit television. The child testified outside the courtroom while Mrs. Craig, through electronic communication with her lawyer, could make objections. The judge and jury also viewed the testimony in the courtroom. This was done in order to avoid the possibility of serious emotional distress for the child witness. The trial court convicted Craig, but the Maryland high court reversed.

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No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees criminal defendants face-to-face meetings with witnesses against them at trial, was not absolute. The Court found that "in certain narrow circumstances, 'competing interests, if closely examined, may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial." The State's interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of children, the Court held, could be sufficiently important to outweigh defendants' rights to face their accusers in court.


On January 13, 1985, Erwin Paul Wallaker, the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club, returned home with the proceeds from the annual coin convention, which Terry Brice Horton attended. Upon entering his garage, two robbers accosted Wallaker; one was armed with a machine gun and the other with an electric shocking device. They threw him to the ground, shocked him, bound him, and robbed him of jewelry and cash. During this interaction, Wallaker was able to identify Horton by the sound of his voice. The three witnesses who discovered Wallaker partially corroborated his identification of Horton. They saw someone leaving the scene carrying what looked like an umbrella.
Sergeant LaRault determined there was enough evidence to search Horton’s home, and obtained a warrant to do so. His affidavit for the search warrant described both the weapons and the proceeds of the robbery, but the warrant only granted permission to look for the stolen property. While searching Horton’s house, Sergeant LaRault did not find the property, but he did find an Uzi machine gun, a .38 caliber revolver, two stun guns, and a handcuff key, along with other items linking Horton to the crime.
The evidence was admitted into evidence at trial, and Horton was found guilty. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict, and the California Supreme Court denied the petitioner’s request for review.

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No. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 7-2 majority, held that the seizure of evidence in plain view does not constitute the invasion of privacy that the Fourth Amendment is meant to prohibit. Once an officer has a warrant to search a suspect’s house, that officer may seize any obviously incriminating evidence that the officer finds in plain view. The Court also held that the “inadvertent” limitation does not limit the scope of the search further than the warrant itself does. In this case, since the warrant was specifically for the stolen property, the officer had to limit his search to the likely places where the property might be kept. Since the officer also had probable cause to believe that certain types of weapons were used in the commission of the crime, he could legally seize the weapons if they were found in the course of that search.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Fourth Amendment requires police officers to obtain specific warrants from impartial judges and to limit their searches to the items described. He defines the “inadvertent” limitation much more narrowly. It applies only when the officer is legally in a location and did not anticipate the discovery of such evidence. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


The Charter of the Colony of Georgia described the Savannah River as its border with South Carolina. The Treaty of Beaufort (Treaty) further refined this boundary, which has since been disputed several times. This case was the third case since the Treaty that disputed this boundary. A Special Master was appointed to help resolve the dispute and filed two reports on the issue. This case was brought before the Supreme Court after Georgia and South Carolina filed disputes with the Special Master's reports .

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Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the majority opinion. The Court agreed with the portion of the Special Master's report that held that the disputed Barnwell islands (Hog Island, Long Island, and Barnwell Island No. 3) rightfully belonged to South Carolina because of South Carolina's history of taxing, policing, and prosecuting activities on those islands. The Court also held that the islands that emerged after the Treaty of Beaufort (Treaty) had no effect on the boundary line between the two states. These islands were granted to whichever state held the side of the existing boundary on which they fell. The Court ruled in favor of the Special Master's conclusion regarding the location of the mouth of the Savannah River and overruled Georgia's exception that would have granted that state possession of Oyster Bed Island. Additionally, the Court ruled in favor of Georgia's objection to the "right angle principle" that the Special Master used to determine the boundary when there was an island that would alter the assumed border from the middle of the river. The Court also found that the Special Master correctly gave Denwill, Horseshoe Shoal, and the entirety of Bird Island to Georgia. Finally, the Court approved the Special Master's recommendation regarding the lateral seaward boundary.
Justice White wrote an opinion dissenting in part in which he argued that the Special Master's use of the "right angle principle" was a reasonable approach that was consistent with the Court's prior decisions. Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion dissenting in part in which he argued that precedent favored South Carolina's exception to the lateral seaward boundary. In his separate opinion dissenting in part, Justice Scalia wrote that the facts do not support the Court's decision to award Denwill and Horseshoe Shoal to Georgia. Justice Kennedy also wrote a separate opinion dissenting in part in which he argued that every new island that is created by natural forces should belong to Georgia unless it has been specifically granted to South Carolina.


Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond

Charles Richmond worked as a welder at the Navy Public Works Center in San Diego, California until 1981, when the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approved his application to for a disability retirement. OPM determined that Richmond’s poor eyesight prevented him from performing his job and entitled him to receive the benefits for disabled federal employees who have completed five years of service. Before 1982, an individual was ineligible for disability benefits if, in each of the two succeeding calendar years, the individual earns at least 80 percent of the current pay of the position occupied immediately prior to retirement. In 1982, this requirement was amended so that an individual becomes ineligible if he earns at least 80 percent of the pay of the previous position in any succeeding calendar year. Until 1985, Richmond worked part time and his earnings were low enough to keep him eligible for disability benefits. In 1985, he had the opportunity to earn more money, so he contacted OPM to make sure he would remain eligible. OPM provided him with the old requirements but not the new ones. Richmond subsequently accepted overtime work, earned more, and became ineligible for disability benefits. He lost six months of disability pay.
Richmond appealed the denial of benefits to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and argued that the fact that he received incorrect information from OPM prevented them from denying his benefits. The MSPB denied Richmond’s appeal for review. Richmond appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the decision.

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No. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution explicitly states that no money can be paid from the Treasury unless specifically authorized by a statute. Since there is a statute that denies Richmond his benefits, and there is not one that provides an exception, the Court held that Richmond’s receipt of incorrect information cannot affect the non-payment of his benefits. Any precedent that would force the government to make a payment from the Treasury in contravention of a statute forbidding it would essentially nullify the Appropriations Clause. The Court also held that a ruling that made the government liable for the statements of all its agents would result in restrictions on public information that would be detrimental, especially to those of little means.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the majority’s opinion does not foreclose the possibility of statutory restrictions being overturned and government actions changed if they violate other commands of the Constitution. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in judgment. He argued that the majority opinion’s reliance on the Appropriations Clause is not relevant to the overall issues at hand in the case.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that there was precedent for the Court to interpret statutes loosely when a strict interpretation would produce results that Congress would not have desired. Since the legislative intent behind the creation of the federal disability benefit system was to provide for former government employees who are now disabled, the principles of equitability support Richmond’s continued receipt of his benefits. Justice Marshall also argued that the majority’s opinion refused to analyze the burden the government must bear because of the false information it provided. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was a citizen and resident of Mexico. In cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Mexican police officers apprehended and transported him to the U.S. border, where he was arrested for various narcotics-related offenses. Following his arrest, a DEA agent sought authorization to search Verdugo-Urquidez's residences for evidence. The Director General of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police authorized the searches, but no search warrant from a U.S. magistrate was ever received. At trial, the district court granted Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

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No. The text of the Fourth Amendment concerns "the people," suggesting a concern with persons who are part of the national community, as contrasted with aliens without any substantial connection to the U.S. Moreover, extraterritorial aliens are not even entitled to rights under the Fifth Amendment, which speaks in the relatively more universal term of "person." And non-"fundamental" rights are not even guaranteed to inhabitants of unincorporated territories under U.S sovereign control, much less aliens. Therefore, any restrictions on searches and seizures of nonresident aliens and their foreign property must be imposed by the political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty or legislation.


To qualify for federal funding under the Medicaid Act, states must submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services a plan that establishes a system by which healthcare providers will be reimbursed. Under the Boren Amendment, the reimbursement rates must be "reasonable and adequate" to meet the costs of efficiently operated facilities.
In 1986, a group of hospitals brought sought against the state of Virginia, arguing that its reimbursement rates (which had been approved in 1982 and again in 1986 by the Secretary) were not "reasonable and adequate." The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which allows individuals or organizations to bring suit for the "deprivation of any rights ... secured by [federal] laws." Virginia argued that the Boren Amendment had not been intended to create a an enforceable right, but simply to provide guidelines for the Secretary to follow, and that the hospitals therefore could not bring suit under 1983. The state also argued that Congress had intended to prevent private parties from bringing suit to enforce the provisions of the Amendment. The District Court disagreed, allowing the suit to proceed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Yes and no. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Boren Amendment clearly established a right to reasonable and adequate reimbursement rates for the hospitals. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for the majority, stated that a right exists if "the provision in question was intend[ed] to benefit the ... plaintiff." The requirement of reasonable rates was clearly intended to benefit the hospitals, so it amounted to a right under 1983. Without explicit language within the Amendment preventing private suits under 1983, or an alternative remedial scheme that would make such suits unnecessary, it was not reasonable to conclude that Congress had intended to prevent private suits to enforce the right it had created.


Around 6:30 p.m. on October 3, 1987, Thomas Corbin drove his car across the yellow line that separated lanes of traffic and struck two oncoming cars on Route 55 near LaGrange, New York. Assistant District Attorney Thomas Dolan arrived on the scene and learned that Brenda and Daniel Dirago, the driver and passenger of one of the cars, had been injured. Later that night, Dolan learned Brenda Dirago had died in the hospital. Corbin received two misdemeanor tickets, one for driving while intoxicated and one for failing to keep to the right of the median.
Corbin pled guilty to both misdemeanors. The judge was unaware of the fatality the accident caused. On January 19, 1988, a grand jury indicted Corbin on charges of manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and reckless assault. Corbin filed a motion to dismiss the charges by arguing double jeopardy, but the county court denied the motion. Corbin sought a writ of prohibition to prevent further prosecution, which the Appellate Division denied. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.

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Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars subsequent prosecution if the offenses share identical elements or if one is a lesser-included offense within the other. A second prosecution is also prohibited if the second trial would require a re-litigation of the same factual issues as the first one. Because the state would use the crimes of which Corbin had already been convicted in order to establish elements of the subsequent charges, the Court held that the secondary charges violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a dissent where she argued that the majority’s opinion was inconsistent with the Court’s decision in a previous case from that term and takes too broad a view of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the Double Jeopardy Clause only prevents double prosecution for the same offense, not necessarily the same action. He argued that the Clause had historically been interpreted as allowing multiple prosecutions if a single action violated multiple laws. He argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily complicated and limited the courts’ ability to try a person for multiple crimes stemming from the same action. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined the dissent.


Atlantic Richfield Company v. USA Petroleum Company

Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) is an integrated oil company that sells gasoline to consumers through its own retail stations as well as independent ARCO-brand stations. USA Petroleum (USA), a competitor of ARCO, is an independent retail marketer that purchases gasoline from major petroleum companies and resells it under its own brand name. USA sued ARCO under the Clayton Act in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that ARCO had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with the independent ARCO-brand stations to sell gasoline at below-market prices (the Clayton Act allows private parties to bring suit when they have been harmed by anticompetitive practices that violate the Sherman Act).
The District Court ruled for ARCO, finding that even if USA could prove the conspiracy, it would not be an "antitrust injury" to USA under the Clayton Act unless it could also prove that the pricing was predatory (that is, that it was intended to drive USA and other competitors out of business). It would be impossible to prove this, the District Court concluded, because ARCO was not dominant enough in the market to exert that sort of power.
A divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that it was not necessary to show predatory intent to prove an "antitrust inquiry." All that was necessary was a showing that the party bringing the suit had been harmed by price fixing carried out by the party being sued.

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Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that it was necessary to prove predatory intent in order for a competitor to establish a private cause of action under the Clayton Act. According to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.'s majority opinion, the standard for competitors is different than for affiliated dealers or consumers because competitors would only bring suit when the low prices that resulted from the price-fixing scheme hurt their business. As long as these prices are not predatory, however, they are actually good for consumers and increase competition. Allowing competitors to sue without showing predatory intent would therefore decrease competition, exactly the opposite of the intent of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.


In an effort to comply by its duty to promote programming diversity, under the Communications Act of 1934, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted two minority preference policies. The first policy awarded preferences to minority ownership bids for licenses for new radio or television broadcasting stations. The second policy allowed radio or television broadcasters with questionable license qualifications, to avoid an FCC investigation of their actions by making a "distress sale" of their licenses to a legitimate minority outfit. Upon FCC approval, Faith Center Inc. "distress sold" its television license to Astroline's minority-owned outfit. Shurberg, a nonminority applicant for a similar license, sought appellate review of Astroline's award. The appellate court agreed, and invalidated the distress sale policy as unconstitutional. Astroline appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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No. The Court, in the last opinion authorer by Justice William J. Brennan,Jr., held that the FCC's minority preference policies are constitutional because they provide appropriate remedies for discrimination victims and are aimed at the advancement of the legitimate congressional objective of program diversity. The FCC's minority preference policies were closely related to, and substantially advanced, Congress's legitimate interest in affording the public a diverse array of programming options. The availability of program diversity serves the entire viewing and listening public, not just minorities, and is therefore consistent with First Amendment values. Finally, the Court noted that the FCC's minority preference policy did not unduly burden nonminorities. The FCC did not predetermine the number of distress sales, and could only invoke them in a small number of cases, when no competing bids are filed and the licensee elects to sell at a lower price rather than risk an FCC investigation.


After obtaining a warrant, Ohio police searched the home of Clyde Osborne and found explicit pictures of naked, sexually aroused male adolescents. Osborne was then prosecuted and found guilty of violating an Ohio law that made the possession of child pornography illegal.

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The Court held that Ohio could constitutionally proscribe the possession of child pornography. The Court argued that the case at hand was distinct from Stanley v. Georgia, "because the interest underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley." Ohio did not rely on "a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne's mind;" rather, Ohio merely attempted to protect the victims of child pornography. The Court argued that regulations on production and distribution of child pornography were insufficient and could not dry up the market for pornographic materials. The Court also found that an error in jury instructions in the lower courts mandated Osborne be given a new trial.


On February 3, 1986, two men robbed a Godfather’s Pizza in Prince George’s County, Maryland. One of the men was wearing a red running suit. Later that day, the police obtained warrants for the arrest of Jerome Edward Buie and Lloyd Allen and put Buie’s house under surveillance. On February 5, the police arrested Buie in his house. Police found him hiding in the basement. Once Buie emerged and was handcuffed, an officer went down to determine if there was anyone else hiding. While in the basement, the officer saw a red running suit in plain view and seized it as evidence.
The trial court denied Buie’s motion to suppress the running suit evidence, and he was convicted. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed.

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