Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation

In 1974, Zenith Radio Corporation, an American manufacturer of consumer electronic products, and National Union Electronic Company (collectively referred to as Zenith) sued 21 Japanese-owned or -controlled manufacturers of consumer electronics and claimed that these companies conspired to drive the American companies out of the market. According to Zenith, the Japanese companies conspired to set artificially high prices for their products in Japan to offset the artificially low prices of their products in America, which was harmful to the American companies. Zenith claimed this conspiracy was a violation of several anti-trust laws intended to prevent price-fixing. The Japanese companies filed a motion for summary judgment. After finding the bulk of Zenith’s evidence inadmissible, the district court held that the admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact and granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the Japanese companies.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that most of Zenith’s evidence was admissible. On the merits of the case, and in light of the greater amount of admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals held that a reasonable factfinder could find evidence of a conspiracy and that the district court improperly granted the summary judgment in favor of the Japanese companies.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53263.xml


No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that evidence of alleged conspiracies is not sufficient to prove allegations of violating antitrust legislation unless there is evidence that the conspiracies in question injured American companies. To effectively oppose the motion for summary judgment, the evidence must show that the respondents suffered harm as a result of the petitioners’ illegal activity and that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court also held that all inferences drawn in a motion for summary judgment must be construed in the light most favorable to the side opposing the motion, but in antitrust cases those inferences are constrained by economic factors. In this case, the alleged conspiracy would be economically irrational and therefore cannot be inferred to exist.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily confuses the standard by which a motion for summary judgment should be adjudicated. In an antitrust summary judgment hearing, it is not the job of the judge to determine whether an inference of a conspiracy is more probable than not. In doing so, the Court invades the role of the finder of fact. He also argued that the Third Circuit was correct in holding that the evidence demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


Due to rising government budget deficits during the first term of the Reagan Administration, Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985. The act was designed to eliminate the federal budget deficit by restricting spending during fiscal years 1986 through 1991. Under the law, if maximum allowable deficit amounts were exceeded, automatic cuts, as requested by the Comptroller General, would go into effect. This case was decided together with O'Neill v. Synar and United States Senate v. Synar.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53267.xml


The Court found that the duties which the Congress delegated to the Comptroller General did violate the doctrine of separation of powers and were unconstitutional. A two step process led Chief Justice Burger to arrive at this conclusion. First, in exploring the statute defining the provisions of the Comptroller General's office relating to the Congress's power of removal, it was clear to Burger that this officer was subservient to the legislative branch. Second, in examining the functions that this officer would carry out under the Deficit Control Act, Burger concluded that the Comptroller General was being asked to execute the laws and, thus, was intruding on the prerogatives of the executive branch.


McCleskey, a black man, was convicted of murdering a police officer in Georgia and sentenced to death. In a writ of habeas corpus, McCleskey argued that a statistical study proved that the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia depended to some extent on the race of the victim and the accused. The study found that black defendants who kill white victims are the most likely to receive death sentences in the state.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53269.xml


The Court held that since McCleskey could not prove that purposeful discrimination which had a discriminatory effect on him existed in this particular trial, there was no constitutional violation. Justice Powell refused to apply the statistical study in this case given the unique circumstances and nature of decisions that face all juries in capital cases. He argued that the data McCleskey produced is best presented to legislative bodies and not to the courts.


On November 11, 1983, FBI Agent Russell Anderson, along with other state and federal officers, conducted a warrantless search of the Creighton family home based on the belief that Vadaain Dixon, a man suspected of robbing a bank earlier that day, was hiding in the house. The Creightons sued Anderson in Minnesota state court and filed a claim for monetary damages under the Fourth Amendment. The suit was removed to federal district court, where Anderson moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on his alleged qualified immunity from civil damages liability. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for certain violations of an individual’s constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for Anderson after finding that the search was lawful because Anderson had probable cause.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the case could not be decided on summary judgment because there were unresolved factual disputes regarding the legality of the search. The Court of Appeals also held that that Anderson did not have qualified immunity because the right he allegedly violated was the well-established Fourth Amendment right to protection from warrantless searches of a home.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53273.xml


No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that an officer of the law has qualified immunity from civil liability if the actions that officer took “could reasonably have been thought consistent” with the allegedly violated rights. Because Anderson could reasonably believe that his actions were legal, he is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court also held that the determination of whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity should be determined based on the reasonable belief of the legality of the search, rather than the actual legality of the search.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily expands the idea of qualified immunity beyond high political officials to police officers, whom it is in the public’s best interests to hold accountable for their actions. He also argued that the lower court was correct in holding that summary judgment cannot be granted without resolving the factual disputes regarding the constitutionality of the search. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


In the late 1970s, Renz Correctional Institution converted to a “complex prison”. Generally, female prisoners at Renz were medium and maximum security level offenders, while most male inmates were minimum security offenders. Leonard Safley was a male inmate at Renz, and P.J. Watson was a female inmate. They met at Renz, where they became romantically involved; Watson was then transferred to Ozark Correctional Center because of this relationship. Prison authorities rebuffed all of Safley’s attempts to directly contact Watson.
A Missouri Division of Corrections regulation permitted correspondence between inmates who were immediate family members, but correspondence between inmates who were not family members was only allowed if 1) it related to legal matters or 2) at the discretion of the classification/treatment team of both inmates. Another regulation only permitted inmates to marry with the permission of the prison superintendent, and specified that permission should only be given when there was a compelling reason to do so.
The district court certified plaintiffs as a class including inmates at Renz who desired to correspond with inmates at other prison facilities. This class also included persons who wished to marry inmates at Missouri correctional facilities and whose right to marry had been allegedly violated by the DoC. Plaintiffs filed an action against Renz's Superintendent William Turner and others for injunctive relief and damages. The district court applied strict scrutiny to both DoC restrictions. It held that the restriction on correspondence was overly broad and capriciously applied, and that the marriage restriction violated inmates’ constitutional right to marry. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, affirmed, further holding that neither restriction was the narrowest means of addressing the DoC’s security concerns.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53275.xml


No and yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Byron White, Justice Louis Powell and Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court upheld the Missouri Department of Correction’s restriction on correspondence between inmates. Justice O’Connor looked to the Court’s test for determining the reasonableness of restrictions on prison inmates’ expressive freedom. She argued that this particular content-neutral restriction on correspondence between inmates was logically connected to the DoC’s legitimate security concerns, noting the danger of coordinated gang activity in Missouri prisons. Justice O’Connor further reasoned that the restrictions did not deprive inmates of all means of expression, only limiting correspondence with a particular class of people. She argued that the Eighth Circuit failed to consider the impact easing the restriction might have on the liberty and safety of prison guards and other inmates. Finally, Justice O’Connor argued that there were no obvious, easy alternatives to the DoC’s restrictions.
Turning to the DoC’s marriage restriction, Justice O’Connor held that it was an unconstitutional violation of inmates’ fundamental right to marry. While acknowledging that prisoners’ right to marry is subject to restriction, she argued that many important aspects of marriage should not be altered by a person’s incarceration, including the potential emotional and religious impact of marriage to another. Hence, Missouri prisoners retained a constitutionally-protected right to marry. Justice O’Connor further held that the DoC’s marriage restriction was not reasonably related to its stated interest in preventing violence in prisons and in the rehabilitation of female prisoners.
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun, concurred in part and dissented in part. While agreeing with the majority’s holding that the marriage restriction was unconstitutional, he rejected the majority’s application of a reasonableness standard to the facts on record. Justice Stevens argued that the majority improperly accepted the DoC’s mostly speculative arguments with respect to the DoC’s security concerns about inmate correspondence, while rejecting the DoC’s similarly speculative concerns about marriage between inmates.


In February 1979, John Leroy Spring and a companion shot and killed Donald Walker during a hunting trip in Colorado. Shortly after, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) received information from an informant that Spring was involved in the transportation of stolen firearms across state lines. The informant also told the agents the Spring had been talking about killing Walker. The agents set up an undercover operation and arrested Spring on March 30. Spring was advised of his Miranda rights at the scene of the arrest and again at the police station. He then signed a document stating that he understood and waived his rights and was willing to make a statement. After asking Spring about the firearms transactions, the agents asked Spring if he had ever shot anyone, and if he had shot Walker in Colorado. Spring admitted to shooting someone but denied shooting Walker, and the interview ended. On May 26, Colorado police officers visited Spring in jail intending to question him about the Walker murder. They read Spring his Miranda rights, and he signed a document stating that he waived them. During the course of the interview, Spring confessed to the murder.
Spring was charged with first-degree murder in Colorado state court. He moved to suppress both the March 30 and May 26 statements by arguing that he invalidly waived his Miranda rights. The trial court held that the police’s failure to inform Spring of the topics that would be covered in questioning did not affect the the waiver, but the content of the March 30 interview was not relevant. The trial court suppressed the March 30 statement and admitted the May 26 statement into evidence. Spring was convicted. On appeal, Spring renewed his argument about the waiver of his Miranda rights for the March 30 statement and argued that the May 26 statement was the “illegal fruit” of the March 30 statement. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed and held that the March 30 statement was inadmissible because the ATF agents had a duty to inform Spring that he was a suspect in the Walker murder before questioning him about it. The Court of Appeals also held that the state failed to meet its burden to prove that the May 26 statement was not the product of the earlier illegal statement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53276.xml


No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence that Spring was in any way coerced into signing the waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights or that he was prevented from understanding his rights and the consequences of waiving them. The Constitution does not require that the suspect understand every possible nuance of the consequences of waiving his rights, but rather that he understand that whatever he says may be used against him. The Court also held that police silence regarding the topics of an interrogation is not an attempt to trick the suspect and does not affect the validity of the waiver. Because the interrogation on March 30 was not illegal, the May 26 statements cannot be considered “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
In his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the state failed to meet the heavy burden to prove that Spring’s waiver was valid and that the scope of the questioning was highly relevant to Spring’s decision. He also argued that the agents’ silence on the extent of their questions was an interrogation technique designed to draw Spring into confessing more than he would have otherwise. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


In response to a series of NAACP-initiated lawsuits in the 1970s, the Alabama Department of Public Safety was required to implement a promotion scheme in which half of the department's promotions to certain ranks would go to black officers if enough qualified blacks were available.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53286.xml


In a plurality opinion, the Court upheld the promotion plan. The scheme did not impose an "absolute bar" to white advancement, was narrowly drawn to include only specific ranks in the department, and, according to the four justices who voted to affirm it, was "required in light of the Department's long and shameful record of delay and resistance" in complying with past judicial decisions. It is important to remember that courts had first found the Department's practices unconstitutional in 1972.


Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.

The Board of Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles adopted an ordinance which prohibited all "First Amendment activities" in the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Alan Snyder, a minister with Jews for Jesus, was instructed by an airport officer to refrain from distributing free religious literature on a walkway in the central terminal of LAX.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53287.xml


Yes. Using the "First Amendment overbreadth doctrine," which allows an individual to challenge a statute on its face which is potentially threatening to others, the Court found that the ordinance violated the Constitution. Justice O'Connor argued that the rule was vague, overly broad, and would have effectively prohibited activities such as reading, talking, or wearing expressive shirts or political buttons in the LAX terminal. Allowing such an ordinance, which touched "the universe of expressive activity" in its totality, would have caused LAX to become a "First Amendment Free Zone," according to O'Connor.


In 1983, Francis Connelly approached a police officer and, without any prompting, confessed to murder. The police officer immediately informed Connelly that he had the right to remain silent, but Connelly indicated that he still wished to discuss the murder. It was later discovered that Connelly was suffering from chronic schizophrenia at the time of the confession. A Colorado trial court suppressed the statements on the ground that they were made involuntarily.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53290.xml


The Court held that because the taking of Connelly's statements as evidence did not involve any element of governmental coercion, no violation of the Due Process Clause occurred. The Court argued that suppressing statements in cases where suspects were not coerced would have no deterrent effect on future violations of the Constitution by the police. The Court noted that "Miranda protects defendants against government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that."


Anthony Tanner and William Conover were indicted on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of mail fraud. After the jury ruled, Tanner and Conover filed a motion for a new trial based on an affidavit stating that several jurors consumed alcohol during lunch breaks. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief, holding that juror testimony was inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict under Rule 606(b). There was insufficient evidence other than that testimony of juror misconduct. Tanner and Conover filed another motion, this time alleging juror use of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during the trial. The district court declined to hold another evidentiary hearing. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a second evidentiary hearing.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53291.xml


No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the majority opinion affirming in part and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the district court was right to refuse to admit juror testimony in the evidentiary hearing. There was insufficient non-juror testimony to substantiate the claims of juror misconduct. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration of the conspiracy claims.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a partial dissent, stating that juror testimony was admissible under Rule 606(b), and allowing the district court to ignore sworn affidavits from jurors violated the Sixth Amendment right to a competent jury. Justices William J. Brennan, Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent


In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. California and established a three-prong test for determining whether material is obscene. The test asks whether the material in question appeals to a prurient interest, describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, and whether the work as a whole lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”
On July 21, 1983, police detectives in Rockford, Illinois, purchased magazines from Richard Pope and Charles Morrison, both of whom were attendants in an adult bookstore. Pope and Morrison were subsquently charged under Illinois’ obscenity statute for the sale of those magazines. They each moved to dismiss the charges and argued that the statute was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it did not require that the value of the work in question be judged on an objective basis but instead allowed for judgment based on contemporary community standards. The trial courts denied the motions and instructed the juries to determine whether the material would be viewed as obscene by adults in Illinois. Pope and Morrison appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. The Illinois Supreme Court denied review.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53294.xml


No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, while the first two prongs of the Miller test may be determined based on contemporary community standards, the third prong must be determined based on whether a reasonable person would find value in the material. In this manner, the work in question is protected from needing to obtain majority approval to be deemed of value. Because the statute under which Pope and Morrison were convicted had already been repealed, the Court held that the case should be remanded for consideration of whether the error in this case was harmless.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed that the Miller test was meant to be adjudicated based on what a reasonable person would find valuable, but he also argued that art could not be judged objectively.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a partial concurrence and partial dissent in which he argued that the “harmless error” analysis proposed in the majority opinion was inappropriate in this case, but the majority opinion correctly protected a work from being judged solely by the value, or lack thereof, that a majority of community members might ascribe to it.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent in which he argued that the error in this case was harmful to Pope and Morrison because the jury evaluated their guilt based on unconstitutional instructions. Justice Stevens also wrote that the majority opinion’s attempt to clarify the definition of obscenity subjected the First Amendment’s protection of free speech to the whims of jurors who might believe that a majority view on the value of a work is more reasonable than a minority view. The difficulty in attempting to define obscenity reflects what Justice Stevens found to be the constitutional impossibility of criminalizing the creation or sale of obscene literature to consenting adults. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., and Justice Blackmun joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Brennan wrote that the concept of obscenity cannot be sufficiently defined to provide fair notice to the creators and purveyors of sexually oriented materials without also seriously undermining the First Amendment protection of free speech.


Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.

On January 26, 1973, Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts as a non-stock, non-membership corporation. Beginning in January 1973, MCFL distributed a newsletter to its contributors focused on MCFL’s political concerns. Prior to the September 19, 1978, primary elections, MCFL distributed a flyer to contributors, due-payers and to approximately 50,000 people MCFL considered sympathetic to its goals. This flyer encouraged readers to vote ‘pro-life’, listed candidates for state and federal office in every voting district in the state, and identified each candidate as either supporting or opposing MCFL’s views.
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibited corporations from spending general corporate treasury funds on any federal election; MCFL spent a total of $9,812.76 from its general treasury on the flyers in question. When conciliation proved unsuccessful, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) filed a complaint against MCFL seeking a civil penalty and other relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found for MCFL, holding that the flyers did not fit within the act’s definition of ‘expenditure’ and that the flyers fell under the act’s press exemption for news stories, commentaries, or editorials. The court also held that the act would violate the First Amendment if applied.
After examining the legislative history of the FECA, the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed. It held that the flyers fit within the act’s definition of ‘expenditure’ and did not fall under its press exemption. It did, however, affirm the lower court’s ruling that FECA would be unconstitutional if applied, holding that the government offered no substantial government interest.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53298.xml


Yes and yes. In an opinion written by Justice William J. Brennan, the Court held unanimously that Massachusetts Citizens for Life’s flyers violated FECA’s prohibition on expenditures. He pointed to the general definitions section of FECA, where ‘expenditures’ included the provision of anything of value made for the purpose of influencing a federal election. Justice Brennan also looked to the legislative history and determined that Congress did not intend to abandon its restrictions on expenditures to support candidates. Justice Brennan rejected MCFL’s argument that it did not expressly advocate for a candidate, noting that the flyers exhorted readers to vote for specific ‘pro-life’ candidates.
In a 5-4 majority, Justice Brennan also held that FECA was unconstitutional as applied to MCFL’s flyers. While acknowledging that FECA’s requirements were not an absolute restriction on MCFL’s First Amendment rights, he argued that they were a substantial restriction. He noted that MCFL was forced to comply with several burdensome requirements only because it was a corporation; these requirements potentially created a disincentive for engaging in political speech. Justice Brennan held that the state’s compelling interest in restricting corporate spending on elections did not extend to MCFL because 1) MCFL was formed for an exclusively political purpose, 2) it had no shareholders, and 3) it was not formed by a business corporation or labor union. He noted that even if FECA’s disclosure requirements no longer applied, MCFL was still required to identify anyone contributing over $200.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred with both of the majority’s holdings. She emphasized that the significant burden on MCFL arose from FECA’s additional organizational restrictions, and not from its higher disclosure requirements.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, dissented on the constitutionality of FECA. While acknowledging that the threat from corporate political activity varied depending on the characteristics of a particular corporation, he argued that these were distinctions in degree and not differences in kind. He described the majority’s three-part test as legislative in character.


Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes

The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE) is a union that represents railroad workers across the country, specifically the employees of Maine Central Railroad, a subsidiary of Guilford Transportation Industries (Guilford). After Guilford acquired Maine Central in 1981, Maine Central had to lay off 300 of the 400 employees that BMWE represented. The collective bargaining agreement between the two expired in 1984, before the parties were able to reach a satisfactory new agreement. For the following year, the parties attempted to reach a settlement using the procedures set out by the Railroad Labor Act (RLA), but they exhausted those options. On March 3, 1986, BMWE began a strike against Maine Central that expanded to encompass the other Guilford subsidiaries. Upon receiving information that other railroad companies were assisting Guilford, BMWE began picketing other railroads’ lines. On April 9, Burlington Northern Railroad Company sought and received a temporary restraining order from the district court to stop the picketing. Six other railroad companies filed petitions in the same court and received temporary restraining orders on April 11. On April 23, the district court consolidated the cases entered a preliminary injunction against BMWE.
The Court of Appeals reversed based on the understanding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents the use of injunctions to halt labor dispute protests. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not have the jurisdiction to enter the injunction and ordered it to dismiss the petitioners’ claims.
While these judicial procedures were pending, on May 16, 1986, the President issued Executive Order No. 12557, which convened an emergency board to investigate the dispute and report back to the President after 30 days. During that period the parties had to maintain the status quo that existed before the dispute. Congress also convened an advisory board that recommended that Congress enact legislation that would bind the parties to the recommendation of the President’s emergency board. Congress did so, and the President signed it into law.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53302.xml


No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act expressly to prevent courts from distinguishing between primary and secondary actors for the purposes of labor immunity in labor disputes. Additionally, since Congress did not provide any clear way to distinguish between primary and secondary actors in such cases, the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to make decisions based on a distinction that lacks a legislative basis. The Court also held that Congress meant the term “labor dispute” to be broad, so the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not only refer to employers who are substantially aligned with the primary employer.


The state of Illinois required all who sell or scrap motor vehicles or parts to obtain licenses. That law also required anyone with a license to allow police to inspect their records at any time without a warrant. Albert Krull, George Lucas, and Salvatore Mucerino operated a wrecking yard. During a routine records inspection, police found four stolen cars on the lot. The men were arrested and charged with several criminal violations of Illinois motor vehicle laws. The next day, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the law that allowed police officers to inspect records without a warrant.
Krull moved to suppress evidence found during the search because the law that police officers relied on was now unconstitutional. As a general rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search is excluded at trial. Illinois argued that because the police officer acted in good faith, the evidence was admissible. The trial court granted Krull’s motion. The state appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded. On remand, the trial court maintained its original position and granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53303.xml


Yes. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply because the officer acted in good faith. The officer’s reliance on the unconstitutional law was objectively reasonable when he conducted the search. Excluding the evidence in this case would not support the policy behind the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct. The Court followed United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897 (1984) where police conducted a search with a warrant that they later found out was defective.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a dissent, stating that United States v. Leon qs distinguishable from this case. She also asserted that the rule the majority adopted was inconsistent and difficult to apply. Justices William J. Brennan and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, joining in Justice O’Connor’s dissent, but expressing that her discussion of prior precedent was unnecessary.


The 1984 Bail Reform Act allowed the federal courts to detain an arrestee prior to trial if the government could prove that the individual was potentially dangerous to other people in the community. Prosecutors alleged that Salerno and another person in this case were prominent figures in the La Cosa Nostra crime family.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53307.xml


The Court held that the Act was constitutional because when the government's interest in protecting the community outweighs individual liberty, pre-trial detention can be "a potential solution to a pressing societal problem." The Act only applied to a specific list of serious offenses, placed heavy burdens on the government to prove that the arrestee posed significant threats to others, and did not prevent the accused from enjoying a speedy trial. The Court also dismissed Salerno's argument that the Act violated the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.


Until 1984, the statutes governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) allowed a family to exclude one member if that person had an income or is receiving benefits that would reduce the amount of government aid. In 1984, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which removed the option of excluding a family member. The new law required that the filing unit include all income from all members of the family. This might reduce the family’s total income by reducing the benefits the family is eligible to receive.
In 1970, Beaty Mae Gilliard, who had been receiving benefits from North Carolina through the AFDC since 1962, gave birth to her seventh child. Because Gilliard was receiving child support from the child’s father, the state deducted the child support from the benefits she was eligible for as the parent of an eight-person family. Gilliard sued, and the district court agreed with her reading of the statute that she was allowed to exclude the child who was receiving child support from her filing unit because the seven-person family benefits were greater than what she would receive from the eight-person family benefits minus the child support. The district court awarded class relief to anyone in Gilliard’s position. When North Carolina adopted regulations to comply with the 1984 Act, Gilliard and other members of the class filed a motion to reopen the case and obtain relief. The district court concluded that the new statutory scheme adopted by the 1984 Act violated the Due Process and Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53308.xml


No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the 1984 Act supported the federal government’s dual interests of reducing the deficit and distributing aid to needy families in the fairest way possible. Because some families receive income from sources other than the government, the Court held that it was reasonable for the government to be able to provide more aid to those families that have no other means of support. Based on the rational basis for this decision, the 1984 Act did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court also held that the 1984 Act did not violate the Takings Clause because the amount of money the child receives does not change, regardless of the amount of money the family as a whole receives from the government. The government is not taking anything away from the child without compensation, the type of government action the Takings Clause was meant to prevent.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that the government’s actions unduly harm the parent-child relationship. Because an increasing number of children live in a single-parent household headed by the mother, forcing the children to forego the financial support of the father in order to live with the mother and receive her government benefits can cut children off from a relationship with their fathers. He argued that the 1984 Act places an undue burden on the child and the familial relationship, which requires a higher level of scrutiny than merely proving the decision was a rational one. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice Harry A. Blackmun also wrote a dissent stating that he agreed with Justice Brennan’s arguments.


Board of Directors, Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte

When the Duarte chapter of Rotary International violated club policy by admitting three women into its active membership its charter was revoked and it was expelled. The California Court of Appeals, however, in reversing a lower court decision, found that Rotary International's action violated a California civil rights act prohibiting sexual discrimination.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53312.xml


No. Considering the size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusivity of Rotary's membership, the Court found that the relationship among the club's members was not of the intimate or private variety which warrants First Amendment protection. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Powell argued that because many of Rotary's activities (including their meetings) are conducted in the presence of strangers, and because women members would not prevent the club from carrying out its purposes, there was no violation of associational rights. Furthermore, even if there were a slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to associate, that minimal infringement would be justified since it "serves the State's compelling interest" in ending sexual discrimination.


In 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Prior to this act, tribal land was allotted to individual tribal members in trust. Individual owners would hold the land in trust and could convey the land to their heirs. If a tribal member who held land in trust died without a will, the land would be divided among all of the heirs of that tribal member. This eventually lead to heirs inheriting very small fractional interests in land. The Indian Land Consolidation Act contained a provision which would transfer certain minimal fractional interests in land away from the individual heirs and back to the tribal governments.
Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed, and Eileen Bissonette were enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe and were heirs or devisees of Tribe members who died in 1983. Each had inherited a fractional interest in land which they would lose to the tribal government under the Indian Land Consolidation Act.
Irving, Seed, and Bissonette filed suit in the district court claiming that the provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act resulted in taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court held that the statute was constitutional and that the complainants had no vested interest in the property of the decedents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court. It held that the complainants had standing and that the statute did violate the Fifth Amendment. The Secretary of the Interior appealed the appellate court's decision.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53323.xml


Yes. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court affirming the appellate court's decision. The Court held that the section of the Indian Land Consolidation Act which transferred ownership of fractional land interests to the respective tribe constituted an unconstitutional seizure of property without just compensation. The Court also held that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the provision.
Justice William J. Brennan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun joined. Justice Brennan emphasized that the ruling would not limit the Court's opinion in Andrus v. Allard, and that the property rights and expectations specific to this case made this case unusual.
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Lewis F. Powell joined. He stated that the Court's decision effectively limited Andrus v. Allard to its facts.
Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Byron White joined. He stated that Congress had failed to afford the affected Native Americans due process by failing to provide any opportunity to order their affairs in light of the new law.


After its Maryland synagogue was painted with anti-Semitic slogans and symbols, the Shaare Tefila Congregation brought a suit charging the white defendants with racially discriminatory interference with property rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1982. The Maryland District Court dismissed the claims, maintaining that white-on-white violence was not racially discriminatory.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53328.xml


Yes. The Court unanimously ruled that Jews can state a claim of racial discrimination since they were among the peoples considered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of U.S.C. Section 1982. The statute "was intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." The Jewish people most certainly suffered such discrimination and so were not barred from their claim simply because both they, like the defendants, were Caucasian.


The California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing to obtain a building permit to maintain a pathway on their property open to the public.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53333.xml


Justice Scalia held, in a 5-4 opinion, that the Coastal Commission could only place conditions on the Nollans’ development permit to rebuild their home where those conditions substantially furthered government interests that would justify denial of the permit entirely. Because the Nollans’ request to rebuild their home did not further the government’s interest in overcoming a perceived psychological barrier to using the beach, the condition was a regulatory taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.


Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida

Paula Hobbie worked for Lawton and Company, a Florida jewelry shop. She joined the Seventh-day Adventist Church and informed her employer that she could not work from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday since it was her new church's Sabbath day. Lawton soon dismissed her for refusing to work Friday evening and Saturday shifts. Hobbie filed for unemployment compensation with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. Lawton objected to paying benefits, claiming that she did qualify since she had been dismissed "for misconduct connected with her work." The Bureau of Unemployment Compensation agreed and denied her benefits. Hobbie claimed that this violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. She unsuccessfully appealed the decision in the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53334.xml


Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for an 8-1 court. Referring to its similar decisions in Sherbert v. Verner and Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., the Court maintained that a state cannot deny unemployment benefits to an employee dismissed for having religious conflicts with the employer. This violates the Free Exercise Clause by pressuring religious adherents to modify their religious views in order to retain work or benefits. The state cannot do this without a compelling interest. The Court did not find it relevant that Hobbie converted after she began working, and did not consider the fact that she still qualified for partial benefits a satisfactory remedy.


Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty.

On September 23, 1978, Gary Zurcher lost control of his Honda motorcycle while riding down Highway 80 in Solano County, California. His motorcycle collided with a trailer and killed his passenger and wife, Ruth Ann Moreno. A year later, Zurcher filed a liability suit alleging that the sudden loss of air and subsequent explosion of his rear tire caused the accident. His complaint named Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Company, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, as a defendant. Cheng Shin sued its co-defendant, Asahi Metal Industry Company, the Japanese manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly. Zurcher's claim was eventually settled, which left the suit against Asahi still outstanding.
Asahi filed a motion with the superior court to quash the summons by arguing that the court had no jurisdiction over the company. The Court denied the motion because Asahi does business internationally and therefore should be subject to international laws. The Court of Appeal of the State of California ordered the Superior Court to grant the motion because it was not reasonably foreseeable for Asahi products to end up in California. The Supreme Court of the State of California reversed and held that Asahi placed its components in a "stream of commerce" with the awareness that some of those components ended up in California.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53344.xml


No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that the state must show that the defendant company purposefully established "minimum contacts" by directing products toward a particular state. Although Asahi placed its products in a stream of commerce that eventually led to California, there was no evidence that the company marketed or in any way anticipated sales in California. The Court also held that the jurisdiction of the California court would be unreasonable for Asahi, given the distance and the fact that this dispute is purely between Asahi and Cheng Shin. The state of California had only a slight interest in this case that did not outweigh the burden on Asahi.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the decision of the Court that the California jurisdiction would place an unfair and unreasonable burden on Asahi, but he disagreed with the holding that Asahi did not purposefully interact with the California market. He argued that the ""stream of commerce"" is both predictable and profitable for companies, and the benefits of sales balance the potential burden of litigation. Justices Byron R. White, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence in part and in the judgment.
 In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the examination of whether or not Asahi had established ""minimum contacts"" was unnecessary. The test of minimum contacts only becomes relevant once a reasonable burden has been established. He also argued that the Court misapplied the test by not recognizing that such a high volume of Asahi parts reaching California can only be the result of purposeful business. Justices Byron R. White and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the partial concurrence and concurrence in judgment.


Ardith McPherson was a clerical employee in the Harris County, Texas constable's office. After hearing on the office radio that there had been an attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, McPherson, who thought she was alone with one other office worker, stated "if they go for him again, I hope they get him." Another co-worker overheard the comment and reported it to the Constable, Walter H. Rankin. Rankin subsequently fired McPherson.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53345.xml


In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Rankin's interest in discharging McPherson was outweighed by her rights under the First Amendment. The Court held that McPherson's statement, when considered in context, "plainly dealt with a matter of public concern." The Court found that there was no evidence that McPherson's speech interfered with "the efficient functioning of the office" and that her private comment had not discredited the office. The Court also noted that McPherson did not serve a "confidential, policymaking, or public contact" role, diminishing the impact of her speech on the agency's proper functioning.


Al-Khazraji, a professor and U.S. citizen born in Iraq, filed suit against his former employer and its tenure committee for denying him tenure on the basis of his Arabian race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The District Court held that while Al-Kharzraji had properly alleged racial discrimination, the record was insufficient to determine whether he had been subjected to prejudice.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53347.xml


Yes. The Court held that persons of Arabian ancestry were protected from racial discrimination under Section 1981. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Byron R. White maintained that section 1981 encompassed discrimination even among Caucasians. Justice White noted that history did not support the claim that Arabs and other present-day "Caucasians" were considered to be a single race for the purposes of section 1981. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in a separate concurrence, added that "Pernicious distinctions among individuals based solely on their ancestry are antithetical to the doctrine of equality upon which this nation is founded."


San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee

Currently unavailable.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53353.xml


Currently unavailable.


A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment below. To investigate the shooting, police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three weapons along with a stocking mask. During the search, which was done without a warrant, an officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment which he suspected had been stolen. The officer moved some of the components, recorded their serial numbers, and seized them upon learning from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53354.xml


No. The Court found that the search and seizure of the stereo equipment violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Citing the Court's holding in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), Justice Scalia upheld the "plain view" doctrine which allows police officers under some circumstances to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. However, critical to this doctrine, argued Scalia, is the requirement that warrantless seizures which rely on no "special operational necessities" be done with probable cause. Since the officer who seized the stereo equipment had only a "reasonable suspicion" and not a "probable cause" to believe that the equipment was stolen, the officer's actions were not reconcilable with the Constitution.


Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and Kareem Martin were charged with the assault of Cynthia Knighton and the murder of her four-year-old son, Koran, and her aunt, Ollie Scott. Despite Marsh’s objections, she and Williams were tried jointly. The prosecution entered Williams’ confession into evidence, although the confession was redacted to prevent any mention of anyone other than Williams and Martin being involved in the crime. In his closing argument, the prosecution admonished the jury not to use Williams’ confession against Marsh but linked her testimony to events in the confession. The judge also instructed the jury not to use the confession against Marsh. Marsh was convicted, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied the appeal.
Marsh filed a writ of habeas corpus and argued that the introduction of the confession violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause. The district court denied the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53356.xml


No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that not only did the jury receive instructions not to consider the confession in assessing Marsh’s guilt, but also the confession was redacted so that there was no incriminating evidence regarding Marsh’s actions. Without the implication that the evidence in the confession was incriminating, Marsh’s Confrontation Clause rights were not violated. The Court also held that joint trials, while not necessarily in either defendant’s best interests from the perspective of the Confrontation Clause, are a necessary part of the justice system.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent and argued that the Confrontation Clause regulates the introduction of any evidence from which the jury could infer the defendant’s guilt. Given the presentation of the confession in this case, the jury could only infer that Williams’ confession also enumerated Marsh’s guilt. He also argued that the legal system’s interest in joint trials from an efficiency standpoint should not outweigh the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


In February 1958, Master Sergeant James Stanley volunteered to participate in a military program ostensibly testing the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment against chemical warfare. He spent a month at the Army’s Chemical Warfare Laboratories and during that time was secretly administered doses of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). As a result of his exposure to LSD, Stanley began experiencing hallucinations, memory loss, impaired performance of his job, and he engaged in domestic violence without remembering it later. He was discharged from the Army in 1969. In 1975, Stanley received a letter from the military asking for his cooperation in a study to determine the long-term effects of LSD and referring to his previous “voluntary” involvement in the 1958 tests. This letter was the first notification that Stanley received regarding the true purpose of the 1958 tests. He sued the government under the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA) and argued that there had been negligence in the administration, supervision, and subsequent monitoring of the drug testing program.
The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and held that the government was not liable for negligence that occurred while Stanley was on active duty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed but also held that the district court should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On remand, Stanley amended his complaint to include claims that unknown officers violated his constitutional rights and argued that the constitutional claim did not fall under the service exception to the FTCA. The district court again dismissed the claim under the FTCA and rejected the government’s argument that the same exception barred Stanley’s constitutional claims. The government moved for partial final judgment because Stanley had not named individual defendants. Stanley filed a second amended complaint that named individual defendants, but before the court ruled on it, the Supreme Court decided Chappell v. Wallace, which held that enlisted military personnel may not file constitutional claims. The district court held that the Chappell decision did not bar Stanley’s constitutional claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that recent precedent did not require Stanley’s FTCA claim to be barred.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53357.xml


Yes, yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not have the jurisdiction to consider Stanley’s FTCA claims because they were not a part of the order that was originally appealed. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals took an unnecessarily narrow view of the Chappell decision by limiting it to an even greater extent than the FTCA waiver of governmental liability. Because the government is protected from suits arising from activities that occurred during the course of service under the FTCA, there is no reason to assume that the precedent set by the Chappell decision would provide less protection.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that members of the armed forces deserve the same constitutional protections from the government as those enjoyed by ordinary citizens. Previous federal immunity jurisprudence was based on the specific circumstances surrounding events and that the individuals named in the suit should be required to demonstrate absolute immunity. He also argued that the Chappell decision only barred constitutional claims when military discipline would suffer. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. In her separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued that both the Chappell decision and the FTCA exception prohibit civilian courts from considering suits that arise as the result of military service. However, because Stanley’s FTCA claims arise as the result of his involuntary conclusion in a military test, his claims should be allowed to proceed.


Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen were inmates in New Jersey’s Leesburg State Prison. The prison classified inmates depending on the security risk each posed. Due to their classification, Shabazz and Mateen were assigned to a prison job outside of the main prison building and were not allowed to return to the main prison building during the workday. Because of these restrictions neither men, both of whom were practicing Muslims, were able to attend Juamu’ah, a weekly religious service held on Fridays.
The two men sued the prison and argued that the work policies infringed on their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. The federal district court found in favor of the prison and held that the prison policies plausibly advanced the goals of security, order, and rehabilitation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling and held that the prison was required to show that there was no other reasonable method by which the inmate’s religious rights could be accommodated without creating actual security problems.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53360.xml


No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, while prisoners do not forfeit their constitutional rights after being convicted of a crime, being incarcerated does place necessary limitations on those rights. Because of the particular interests and dangers involved in prisons and the prison administration’s everyday experience with the operation of a prison, courts should largely defer to prison administrators on questions of policy or regulation. Therefore, even when an inmate alleges that a prison policy infringes on his or her constitutional rights, the policy is valid as long as it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective, as the policy in this case was. The Court also held that a prison is not required to adopt any alternative policy that may have “undesirable results,” as determined by the prison.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that a prison must demonstrate that the restrictions imposed on inmates were necessary to further an important governmental interest. He also argued that there should be a varying level of scrutiny depending on the nature of the right being asserted, rather than the general standard of deference in the majority opinion. Because the prison policy in the case in question acts as a complete ban that prevents some Muslim prisoners from attending Juamu’ah, an obligatory and important religious ceremony, the prison should be required to show the policy was necessary and no less extreme measures could serve the same purpose. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent,


Keystone Bituminous Coal Association. v. DeBenedictis

By passing the the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Act), the Pennsylvania Legislature empowered the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) to regulate underground coal mining that damaged structures on the surface. When implementing the Act, DER prevented coal miners from removing more than 50% of coal from mines located beneath buildings. Historically, coal miners acquired rights to "mining estates" separate from the property owned on the above "surface estates." The Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, a group of miners, complained that the Act created a "support estate" that effectively took away its property without compensation. Keystone relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon to allege that this state action violated the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court rejected both allegations and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the decision.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53361.xml


No and No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of a 5-4 court. Like in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court's decision depended upon the "particular facts" of the mining regulation in question. Unlike in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court found a valid public purpose behind the present Act and determined the Act would not make it impossible for the miners to profitably conduct business. Therefore the decision in Pennsylvania Coal did not apply. To refute alleged Takings Clause violations, the Court established that "the support estate has value only insofar as it is used to exploit another estate." Then the Court conducted a factual review of the effects of the new regulation. It concluded that "[b]ecause petitioners retain the right to mine virtually all the coal in their mineral estates, the burden the Act places on the support estate does not constitute a taking." The Court also dismissed alleged Contract Clause violations because the state acquired no property for itself, but rather used its police power to implement regulation which served valid public interests.


A Louisiana law entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act" prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools unless that instruction was accompanied by the teaching of creation science, a Biblical belief that advanced forms of life appeared abruptly on Earth. Schools were not forced to teach creation science. However, if either topic was to be addressed, evolution or creation, teachers were obligated to discuss the other as well.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53362.xml


Yes. The Court held that the law violated the Constitution. Using the three-pronged test that the Court had developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) to evaluate potential violations of the Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan argued that Louisiana's law failed on all three prongs of the test. First, it was not enacted to further a clear secular purpose. Second, the primary effect of the law was to advance the viewpoint that a "supernatural being created humankind," a doctrine central to the dogmas of certain religious denominations. Third, the law significantly entangled the interests of church and state by seeking "the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose."


Using electronic beepers and aerial photography, police tracked certain drug making supplies to Ronald Dale Dunn’s ranch. The ranch had a fence surrounding the perimeter as well as several interior fences. Law enforcement officers entered the property without a warrant and crossed several fences to get near Dunn’s barn. The barn was about 60 yards away from Dunn’s house and a fence separated the two buildings. Police smelled phenylacetic acid and heard a motor running in the barn. Police approached the barn but did not enter. The officers did shine a flashlight through netting above the door and observed what looked like a drug laboratory. The officers made several similar visits, not entering, but looking into the barn, before obtaining a warrant to search the barn and Dunn’s house. During this search, police seized chemicals and equipment use for making drugs.
At trial, Dunn unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. A jury convicted him on federal drug charges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the barn was “within the curtilage” of Dunn’s house, so the police officers’ warrantless visits to the barn violated the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals judgment and remanded in light of Oliver v. United States. This time, the court of appeals found that the warrantless searches of the barn violated Dunn’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53365.xml


No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that the barn and the area around it lay outside the protected area of curtilage around Dunn’s house. The barn was separated from the house by a fence and was a substantial distance away from the house, the officers had other data that lead them to suspect Dunn, and Dunn did little to protect the barn from observation. Even if Dunn did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the search still did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers never entered the barn. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, writing that the officers perception of the way Dunn used the barn was not as important as the way the barn actually was used.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented, arguing that the barn was within the area of protected curtilage, and the officers violated Dunn’s reasonable expectation of privacy because the barn was an essential part of Dunn’s business. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


Ricky and Raymond Tison, brothers, conspired with several other family members to help their father, Gary, escape from prison. Gary was serving life in prison for murdering a guard during a previous escape attempt. Smuggling in a cooler full of guns, the Tisons helped Gary and his cellmate Randy escape. The group made a safe exit, but a few days later their car got a flat tire. They decided to flag down and steal a passing car. The group ordered the family of four out of the car while they transferred their belongings. When Ricky and Raymond went to get the family some water, Gary and Randy shot the family multiple times, killing them all. Ricky and Raymond did nothing to help the family. They continued to run with Randy and Gary until the chase ended in a shootout with police. Gary died in the desert of exposure before the police found him, and another brother died in the shootout. Ricky, Raymond, and Randy faced four counts of felony murder through accomplice liability. All three received the death penalty.
The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the sentences, holding that while the Tisons had not specifically intended to kill the family, they conspired with known killers and did nothing to aid the family when they had the chance. The Court held that the son’s anticipation that lethal force might be used in their endeavor satisfied the “intent” requirement for the death penalty.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53373.xml


No. In a 5-4 decision Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, vacating the lower judgments. The Supreme Court remanded to determine whether the Tisons acted with a reckless indifference to human life. The Court held that anticipating lethal force is not enough to satisfy the “intent to kill” requirement, but the Tisons major participation in the felony along with a reckless indifference to human life may be.
Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, expressing that this case illustrates how arbitrary capital sentencing is. The death penalty is always cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and John Paul Stevens joined the dissent in part.


Ronald Calder was a native of Iowa working in Puerto Rico, He was charged with first degree murder and attempted murder. After posting bail, he fled to his home state. Puerto Rico submitted a petition to Branstad, Iowa's governor at the time, to extradite Calder for court proceedings. Branstad refused.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53375.xml


Yes. The Court overturned its decision in Kentucky v. Dennison (1861) which had rendered federal courts powerless to enforce the Extradition Clause. The unanimous Court concluded that the precedent in Kentucky was "the product of another age" and "fundamentally incompatible with more than a century of constitutional development."


This case concerned the retrospective application of judge-made rules. Specifically, the Court had to decide whether a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, combined with his call to the jury clerk, violated the black petitioner's right to an impartial jury. The Court was called upon to decide whether the previous decision in Batson v. Kentucky was applicable to pending litigation but not final when Batson was decided. This case was decided together with Brown v. United States.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53381.xml


The Court held that after a new rule had been decided in a particular case, "the integrity of judicial review requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review." The Court reasoned that selective application of new rules violated the principle of treating similarly situated defendants on an equal basis. The Court also refused to make an exception to the rule of retroactivity in cases where there was a "clean break" with past precedent.


Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty.

The Transportation Agency, Santa Clara, California promoted Diane Joyce to road dispatcher over Paul Johnson. Both candidates were qualified for the job. As an affirmative action employer, the Agency took into account the sex of the applicants in making the promotion decision.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53383.xml


The Court affirmed the promotion procedures of the Agency. Justice Brennan argued that it was not unreasonable to consider sex as one factor among many in making promotion decisions, and that the Agency's actions did not create an absolute barrier to the advancement of men (a quota system did not exist).


Pennzoil Co. obtained a jury verdict of $10.53 billion in a Texas state court suit. The suit alleged that Texaco Inc. tortiously induced a third party to breach its contract to sell stock to Pennzoil. Before the court entered a final judgment, Texaco sued in federal district court alleging that the Texas court proceedings violated its rights under the Constitution and several Texas statutes. Pennzoil argued that the district court should abstain from hearing the case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Younger held that a federal court must abstain from hearing challenges to a state court proceeding while that proceeding is still underway. The district court did not abstain and granted a preliminary injunction. The court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter and that Texaco was likely to succeed in its suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the district court had jurisdiction, but should not have evaluated the claims that were discussed in the state trial. Meanwhile, the state court proceedings continued, and reduced the judgment to $8.53 billion

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53385.xml


Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the district court should have followed Younger and abstained from issuing an injunction until the state court proceedings concluded. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, writing that a federal court need not abstain when it does not have to decide any issue litigated in the state court. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the concurrence.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the judgment, arguing that the district court did not have to abstain, but Texaco’s constitutional claims were without merit. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence. Justice Marshall separately concurred in the judgment, writing that venue was improper because the issues before the district court were inextricably linked to the Texas court proceedings. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the judgment, arguing that the district court should have abstained because unsettled questions of state law existed. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment, arguing that Younger did not apply. Justice Marshall joined in the concurrence.


William Bourjaily was arrested after receiving a quantity of cocaine in a parking lot from Angelo Lonardo. At Bourjaily's trial, the government introduced statements Lonardo made in a telephone conversation with an informant regarding a "friend" who had questions about the cocaine. The district court, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, found that the government had established that a conspiracy existed between Bourjaily and Lonardo, and that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53390.xml


No; preponderance of the evidence; and no. When the existence and membership of a conspiracy are disputed, the traditional standard applies: the party offering the statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) must prove these preliminary facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule 104(a) provides that, in determining preliminary questions concerning admissibility, the court "is not bound by the rules of evidence" (except those with respect to privileges). Therefore, hearsay, including the statements sought to be admitted, can be considered. Finally, since the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is rooted firmly in precedent, no independent inquiry into reliability is required by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.


California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians

Two federally recognized Indian Tribes had reservation land within Riverside County, California where they conducted bingo and card games open to non- Indians. The gambling industry provided employment to many Indians on the reservation, and most clients were non-Indians. The State of California wanted to apply state gambling laws to reservation gaming and Riverside County wanted to apply local ordinances. Together, these laws would ban the card games and put charitable organizations in charge of bingo games. The Tribes claimed that the imposition of gambling laws by the state government violated their sovereignty. They brought suit against the state of California and Riverside County in federal district court. The district court ruled that neither the state nor the county had the authority to regulate gambling on reservation land. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53392.xml


No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. State laws require the consent of Congress in order to apply to Indian reservations. While the federal government consented to states enforcing criminal laws on reservation land, gambling regulations are types of civil law and therefore not enforceable. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 did not grant states the authority to regulate gambling either. Although the Act incorporated certain state gambling laws into federal laws regulating gambling on reservations, this did not grant states authority to enforce the new federal laws on reservations. Absent explicit permission for regulation, states can only enforce laws on reservations if their interests in regulation outweigh the interests of the federal government and tribal authorities. In this case, gambling provided revenue critical to the economic self-sufficiency of the reservation. Accordingly, the federal government's interest to ensure Indian self-government outweighed state concerns about organized crime developing because of unregulated reservation gaming.


In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53393.xml


No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Congress, acting indirectly to encourage uniformity in states' drinking ages, was within constitutional bounds. The Court found that the legislation was in pursuit of "the general welfare," and that the means chosen to do so were reasonable. The Court also held that the Twenty-first Amendment's limitations on spending power were not prohibitions on congressional attempts to achieve federal objectives indirectly. The five percent loss of highway funds was not unduly coercive.


Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Groetzinger

Robert P. Groetzinger spent sixty to eighty hours a week placing bets on dog races. He had no other form of employment, and the winnings from these wagers were his only form of income. His net gambling loss for 1978 was $2,032. Groetzinger reported his loss in his tax return but did not compute it in his adjusted gross income. The Internal Revenue Service determined Groetzinger was subjected to the minimum tax since his gambling loss was an item of tax preference according to the Internal Revenue Code of 1964. The Internal Revenue Service sued Groetzinger and the tax court held that he was in the “trade of business” of gambling, which meant that no part of his gambling losses subjected him to a minimum tax. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53397.xml


Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that a taxpayer’s gambling activity does constitute a “trade or business” under the Internal Revenue Code of 1964. Since Groetzinger was in the “trade or business” of gambling, no part of his gambling losses was an item of tax preference subjecting him to a minimum tax. The Court held that the term “trade or business” has a broad definition within the statute. While a mere hobby does not constitute as a trade or business, activity with continuity and regularity with the purpose of making a profit or income is, so Groetzinger’s gambling activity qualifies.
Justice Byron R. White delivered a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that the 1982 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code made it clear that gambling was not a trade or business. Although the relevant year for this case is 1978, the later provisions indicate that the legislature did not intend to include gambling activity in constituting as a trade or business. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


John Booth was convicted of the murders of an elderly couple and chose to have the jury determine his sentence instead of the judge. A Maryland statute required that a victim impact statement "describing the effect of the crime on the victim and his family" be included in the pre-sentence report in felony cases. In this case, the victim impact statement described the victims, the impact of the crime on their family, and the family members' opinions of the defendant and the crime.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53402.xml


Yes. The Court found that the victim impact statement created "a constitutionally unacceptable risk" and violated the Eighth Amendment. Justice Powell argued that in a capital case, the jury's sentencing task is based on the defendant as a unique individual and not on the character or impact of the crime on the victim's family. Allowing the content of a victim impact statement to influence the jury could lead it to choose the death penalty for reasons which "were irrelevant to the [defendant's] decision to kill," thus diverting attention from the facts of the crime. Furthermore, concluded Powell, introducing the "emotionally-charged opinions" of family members into the process would erode the "reasoned decisionmaking" which is crucial in capital cases.


American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner

One of the types of fees that Pennsylvania used to finance the cost of its highway maintenance was lump-sum annual fees, also known as flat taxes. In 1980, Pennsylvania increased the fee for an identification marker required of every truck over a certain weight from $2 to $25, but exempted trucks registered in Pennsylvania from the fee _ the marker fee was "deemed" to be included in the registration fee that local truckers had to pay. In 1982, the marker tax was reduced to $5, but a new tax was introduced, taxing trucks by the axle. The axle tax applied to all trucks weighing more than 26,000 pounds, but the registration fee for Pennsylvania trucks was reduced in an amount calculated to offset that new tax for most trucks. These flat taxes were contested in two state court cases on the ground, inter alia, that they violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Since Pennsylvania-based trucks travel, on average, about five times as many miles in Pennsylvania as out-of-state trucks, the cost of the flat taxes was approximately five times as high per mile of road use for out-of-state vehicles as for local vehicles. For that reason, the lower courts in Pennsylvania found that both the marker tax and the axle tax violated the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered both cases together and reversed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53403.xml


Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the flat taxes violated the basic principle that the Commerce Clause created an area of trade free from interference by the states. One problem with the flat taxes is that they do not pass the "internal consistency" test, which is to say that they could not be applied by every state without interfering with free trade. If many states adopted them, truckers would pay more to go through those states than to drive the same distance in only one state. This would disrupt the market for interstate transportation services. In addition, because the cost to out-of-state truckers is approximately five times as heavy per mile, the taxes have a discriminatory effect. It is no defense that Pennsylvania's registration fee is fairly high, conferring a competitive advantage to trucks based in other states; the solution to that problem is to lower the level of the registration fee. It is also no defense to describe the flat taxes as user fees because such fees are acceptable only insofar as they are neither discriminatory nor excessive. Finally, Pennsylvania cannot appeal to administrative convenience because it has shown itself capable of administering taxes that reflect the quantity of highway use.


Baltimore police officers obtained a warrant for the apartment of Lawrence McWebb and “the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.” When they obtained and executed the warrant, the police mistakenly believed that there was only one apartment on the third floor. By the time they discovered there were two apartments, the police were already in the process of searching the apartment of Harold Garrison. During that search, police discovered heroin. Garrison was tried and convicted of violating Maryland’s Controlled Substances Act. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the heroin discovered during the search, but the trial court denied the motion. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53406.xml


Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the description of the place to be searched and the items to be seized in the original warrant was not unduly general given the information available to officers at the time. The fact that the officers found more information later did not invalidate the original warrant. The Court also held that the execution of the warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers proceeded only based on the knowledge they had and stopped their search immediately when they discovered their error.
In Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s dissent, he wrote that the Fourth Amendment values protection of the home above all else, and the actions of the police in this case violated the expectation of privacy. He argued that Court precedent required warrants to be specific when dealing with multi-tenant residences. He also found that the police officers’ mistake was not a reasonable one when there were several indicators that each floor of the building had multiple occupants. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


Vickie Rock was charged with manslaughter for the death of her husband, Frank Rock. Vickie and Frank had argued after Frank refused to let Vickie eat pizza and prevented her from leaving the apartment to get something else to eat. As the fight escalated, Vickie picked up a handgun and at some point Frank received a fatal gunshot wound to the chest. The police arrived and arrested Vickie. Because Vickie was unable to recall the shooting in any detail, on the advice of her attorney, she submitted to hypnosis in an attempt to refresh her memory. During one session, Vickie recalled that her finger had not been on the trigger and the gun had discharged accidentally when Frank had grabbed her arm. A gun expert examined the gun and found that it was defective and prone to fire when dropped or hit, even without the trigger being pulled, supported this revelation.
Because an Arkansas rule of evidence prohibited the admittance of any evidence obtained through hypnosis, the trial court barred Vickie from testifying to her memory of the shooting because it had been “hypnotically refreshed.” She was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Vickie appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed her conviction. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that, in the absence of a general consensus on the accuracy of evidence obtained through hypnosis, case-by-case inquiry into the accuracy of the evidence would be too burdensome on courts. In this case, the exclusion of Vickie Rock’s hypnotically refreshed memory did not infringe on her constitutional rights because her right to testify in her own defense was only limited by generally applicable rules of evidence intended to exclude confusing or misleading evidence.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53407.xml


Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment protect the right of the individual to testify on one’s own behalf at a criminal trial. Because the Arkansas rule was a blanket ban, it did not allow a trial court to consider the particular circumstances of individual cases. Although Arkansas has a state interest in preventing unreliable testimony from being admitted into evidence at trial, that interest does not justify a blanket ban on testimony that may be reliable in an individual case. Therefore the exclusion of the hypnotically refreshed testimony, without exploring the reliability of the testimony, infringed on the petitioner’s Constitutional right to testify in her own defense.
In his dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that an individual’s right to present evidence has always been subject to reasonable restrictions. Because Arkansas’s rule excluding evidence obtained by hypnosis is a reasonable attempt to ensure the reliability of evidence, he argued that it was appropriate to defer to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Justice Byron R. White, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent.


Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos

Two affiliate organizations of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints operated Deseret Gymnasium, a non-profit facility in Salt Lake City, Utah. These affiliates were the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB) and the Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (COP). Arthur Frank Mayson worked for the Gymnasium for sixteen years as an engineer, but CPB and COP fired him when he failed to obtain a certificate authorizing him to attend the Church's religious temples. He filed a class-action lawsuit in District Court alleging that CPB and COP violated Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by dismissing him from nonreligious employment because he did not satisfy certain religious conditions. In response, CPB and COP claimed that Section 702 of the Act, as amended in 1972, exempts religious organizations from the Act's ban in Section 703 on religious discrimination. Mayson then claimed that Section 702 violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by allowing religious organizations to practice discriminatory hiring for nonreligious jobs. The District Court agreed that Mayson's job was nonreligious. It also held that Section 702 violated the Establishment Clause because it allowed religious adherents exclusive participation in nonreligious activities.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53410.xml


No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Establishment Clause forbids the government from using state mechanisms to advance a religion. Section 702 passed a three-part test the Court established in Lemon v. Kurtzman for determining whether a state action violates the Establishment Clause. To be valid, the state action must first promote a "secular legislative purpose." The Court found that Section 702 satisfied this criterion, since it ensured that the government would not determine for religious organizations what they could count as religious activities. Second, the state action can neither "advance nor inhibit religion." The Court held that for a violation of this standard to occur, the "Government itself must have advanced religion through its own activities and influence." In this case, the government allowed for a church to advance its religion but did not directly intervene. Third, the state action must not "entangle" church and state. By allowing religious organizations to employ whom they pleased, they state became less entangled in religion.


Joseph Griffin, who had previously been convicted of a felony, was convicted in a Wisconsin state court of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and obstruction of an officer. He was put on probation. According to Wisconsin law, probationers are in the legal custody of the State Department of Health and Social services and must abide by that department’s rules and regulations of the department. One of the regulations permits the probation officer to search the probationer’s home without a warrant as long as there are “reasonable grounds” to believe illegal substances are in the premises. These grounds include: information provided by an informant, the reliability of that information and the informant, and the officer’s own experience with the probationer.
Griffin’s probation officer received information from a detective that there might be guns in Griffin’s apartment. When the police searched Griffin’s apartment, they found a handgun and Griffin was charged with the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Griffin moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. The trial court denied the motion and Griffin was convicted. Griffin appealed on the grounds that the evidence from the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53416.xml


No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence is “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted in accordance with a regulation that is a reasonable response to the “special needs” of a probation system. Supervision of probation is necessary to ensure the restrictions are followed and that the probation serves as a period of rehabilitation; therefore the state may depart from the usual warrant requirements. The “reasonable grounds” standard to search a probationer’s residence is an appropriate substitute for warrant requirements in this special situation, and in this case, the information received from the detective provided those reasonable grounds.


First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California

In 1979, the County of Los Angeles passed an ordinance which prohibited construction or reconstruction on land which had been devastated by a flood one year earlier. The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned a campground which was affected by this ordinance and it was not allowed to reconstruct buildings on this land which the flood had destroyed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53418.xml


The Court held that the ordinance violated the Constitution. Noting that the fate of the Church's property had been in limbo for over six years (the suit which it had filed in 1979 had been denied a hearing as late as October of 1985), Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that, because the church was unable to use its property during this time, a "taking" of the property had occurred. Thus, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment required the government to exercise one of a number of "options" such as amending the regulation or fair payment for the use of the property in order to protect the Church's constitutional rights.


In 1981, officials at a hospital, including Executive Director Dr. Dennis O'Connor, suspected improprieties in Dr. Ortega's management of a residency program. The officials conducted an investigation of Ortega, which included multiple searches of his office and seizure of a number of items. The items were later used in proceedings before the California State Personnel Board to impeach the credibility of witnesses that testified on Dr. Ortega's behalf.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\53422.xml


In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that "the realities of the workplace" made some expectations of privacy among public employees unreasonable when the intrusion was by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official. Work-related searches, the Court found, were "merely incident to the primary business of the agency," and a warrant requirement would "seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business." The Court thus held that a standard of "reasonableness" was sufficient for work-related intrusions by public employers.