The plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) and alleged that, during regular game play on the Xbox 360, the discs would come loose due to vibrations and scratch against internal components of the gaming system, which rendered them permanently broken. Because only 0.4% of consoles caused this issue with regular players, the district court determined that a class action suit could not be certified and individuals in the suit would have to come forward on their own. The parties then stipulated a dismissal with prejudice. The district court granted the dismissal, and the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that the district court had misapplied applicable law and, therefore, abused its discretion in striking the class action allegations.

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Federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that a voluntary dismissal of individual claims with prejudice did not count as a final judgment that allowed for denial of class certification to be reviewed even after the court of appeals denied interlocutory appeal on the issue. Generally, federal courts of appeals may only review final judgments from district courts, and denial of class certification was not considered a final judgment. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) allowed for an appeal of the denial of class certification with the permission of the court of appeals. If the court of appeals denied the appeal, the plaintiffs may continue to litigate their individual claims. Their options at that point were that the district court may reverse its denial of class certification at any point prior to final judgment on those claims, or the plaintiffs could appeal the denial of class certification after the final judgment. In this case, the individual plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice, which subverted the procedure laid out in Rule 23(f). The plaintiffs’ proposed approach would allow indiscriminate appellate review of interlocutory orders, which both the final judgment rule and Rule 23(f) were intended to prevent.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs had voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice because there was no longer a case or controversy as Article III required. Article III denied federal courts the ability to adjudicate cases that did not affect the actual rights of the litigants before them. Therefore, federal courts did not have jurisdiction over cases like the one in question here, in which the parties were no longer adverse to one another on any of their claims. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


Encino Motorcars, LLC (Encino) sold and serviced Mercedes-Benz automobiles. Hector Navarro was employed there as a service advisor, which involved him greeting customers and assessing their needs as they entered the business. Navarro, along with other similarly-situated plaintiffs, sued Encino for failing to pay overtime compensation when they worked more than forty hours a week. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, “service advisors” engaged in servicing automobiles are not entitled to overtime compensation, so the district court dismissed their overtime claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and held that Navarro and other employees were not exempted from overtime compensation. In reaching its decision, the appellate court relied on the Department of Labor’s 2011 determination that service advisors were not exempt under the FLSA, which was a reversal of the position that the Department had taken in 1987.

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Because the Department of Labor did not give adequate reasons for altering its position on whether service advisors are exempt from overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the case should be remanded for reinterpretation that does not give controlling weight to the Department’s 2011 position. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, while courts generally give deference to the determinations of agencies that Congress has authorized to administer statutes, courts should only do so when the agency’s rules are procedurally sound. A basic procedural requirement is that the agency must give adequate reasons for its determinations, and such reasons are particularly important when a change in the agency’s position may impact long-standing interpretations of the relevant statute. In this case, the Department of Labor did not provide adequate reasons for its 2011 change in position that affected a decades-long understanding of the FLSA. Therefore, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should not have afforded the 2011 determination the deference that it did, and the case should be remanded.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the majority’s opinion should not change how courts approach agency determinations, which well-established principles of administrative law still governs. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the case should not be remanded but rather that the Court should have decided the case based on the text of the FLSA. Because the text of the FLSA clearly exempts salesman, and service advisors are those who sell services related to automobiles, service advisors should be properly considered exempt from overtime compensation. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC. (Cuozzo) owns the 074 patent, “Speed Limit Indicator and Method for Displaying Speed and the Relevant Speed Limit,” and Garmin International, Inc. (Garmin) petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) for inter partes review of claims regarding the patent. The Board was established to process patent litigation faster by using inter partes review, and during that process, the Board uses the broadest reasonable interpretation when reviewing patent claims instead of the plain and ordinary meaning of patent claims. The Board found that claims 10, 14, and 17 were unpatentable. Cuozzo filed a motion to amend by replacing claims 10, 14, and 17 with claims 21, 22, and 23. The Board denied this request by applying the broadest reasonable interpretation standard to the term “integrally attached” regarding claim 14 on the components of the “Speed Limit Indicator.” Cuozzo appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that it lacked authority to review the Board’s finding under the broadest reasonable interpretation.

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The Patent Trial and Appeal Board may apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of patent claims during an inter partes review proceeding, and such a proceeding is not judicially reviewable. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-0 majority. The Court held that judicial review of the decision of whether to institute inter partes review would not only go against the express wording of the statute, but it would also undercut the congressional objective of giving the Patent Office the power to revisit and revise earlier patent grants. The strong presumption of judicial review can be overcome by clear and convincing language and legislative history, as there was in this case. Additionally, because Congress did not expressly establish a standard for the Patent Office to apply in reviewing a patent claim in inter partes review, the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is acceptable as long as it is a reasonable exercise of the Patent Office’s rulemaking authority. The Court held that the broadest reasonable interpretation standard was appropriate because it encouraged a patent applicant to draft the claim narrowly, which meant that the claim would not unnecessarily prevent further patents on related work, and also resembled the standard used in district court litigation as well as other patent proceedings.
In his concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that ambiguities in statutory text should not always be interpreted as a delegation of authority to the appropriate administrative agency, and that the Court should reconsider the line of precedent that established that presumption. In this case, however, because there was an explicit delegation of authority to the Patent Office to promulgate the rules governing its own proceedings, the majority opinion appropriately deferred to the Patent Office’s determination.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the strong presumption in favor of judicial review should apply in this case and that the agency’s final decision should be appealable. The relevant statutory language explicitly stated that the decision of whether to institute inter partes review was “nonappealable” rather than “not subject to review;” therefore, while judicial review could not stop the proceedings from going forward, it could certainly apply to the question of whether the institution of such proceedings was lawful. Allowing for judicial review of that decision is also consistent with the rule that judicial review of final agency decisions encompassed earlier rulings that were not expressly judicially reviewable on their own. In determining otherwise, the majority opinion held that the Patent Office need not adhere to the review structure that Congress put in place, which could not have been what Congress intended. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.


On November 3, 2009, Robert F. McDonnell was elected Governor of Virginia. At the time of his election, he and his family were experiencing economic difficulties; by September 2010, he and his wife had a combined credit card balance of $90,000, and by 2012 the business he and his sister operated had a loan balance of $2.5 million. Shortly after his election, McDonnell met with Jonnie Williams, the founder and CEO of Star Scientific, Inc. (Star), which was trying to market a product called Anatabloc that could be used to treat chronic inflammation. Star wanted the Food and Drug Administration to classify Anatabloc as a pharmaceutical, which would be more profitable than the alternative classification of nutraceutical. However, such a classification would require expensive testing, clinical trials and studies, and Star lacked the funds. Between 2009 and 2012, Williams and McDonnell met several times and agreed that “independent testing [of Anatabloc] in Virginia was a good idea.” Williams also provided expensive gifts to the McDonnells and “was willing to help” with their financial troubles. A launch event for Anatabloc was held at the Governor’s Mansion, and Mrs. McDonnell facilitated meetings between Star officials and officials at the University of Virginia and Virginia Commonwealth University to get the studies started. Mrs. McDonnell also purchased, sold, and gifted Star stock in such as way as to avoid reporting requirements, and McDonnell spoke to various government officials about the benefits of Anatabloc.
The McDonnells were eventually arrested and charged for corruption, under federal statutes that make it a felony to take “official action” in exchange for money, campaign contributions, or any other thing of value. On September 4, 2014, McDonnell was found guilty on 11 counts of corruption. McDonnell appealed his conviction and argued that the jury instructions given at trial did not properly define the term “official action.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction and held that the jury instructions in question were adequate.

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An “official act” is a decision or action on a question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy that involves a specific exercise of formal governmental power. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that arranging a meeting, contacting another official, or hosting an event -- on its own -- is not sufficient to rise to the level of an “official act” for the purpose of federal bribery statutes. This more limited reading of the statutory text gives each word a meaning that is proper in context and not superfluous, which is the best reading of the statute. Additionally, previous Supreme Court precedent has established that the existence of matters pending before a government official was not sufficient to find that any action related to those matters constituted an “official act.” Adopting a broader reading of the statutory language would likely chill public officials’ interactions with their constituents due to fears of prosecution and therefore make it more difficult for them to do their jobs. Based on this interpretation of the statutory language, the jury instructions at issue were impermissibly broad and did not provide enough guidance to the jury regarding whether the actions in question needed to be formal exercises of governmental power. Therefore, the conviction was vacated.


Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. (Trinity) operates a licensed preschool and daycare called The Learning Center that was initially opened as a non-profit corporation but merged with Trinity in 1985. The Learning Center has an open admissions policy and incorporates daily religious instruction into its programs. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants that provide funds for qualifying organizations to purchase recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. Trinity applied for such a grant but was denied because Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution states, “no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination of religion.” Trinity sued and argued that the denial of its application violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the First Amendment’s protections of freedom of religion and speech. The district court granted Missouri DNR Director Pauley’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Trinity moved for reconsideration and to amend its complaint to include allegations that such grants had previously been given to religious organizations. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and the denial of the motions to reconsider and amend the complaint.

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The exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and secular aid program violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of free exercise of religion. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protected the freedom to practice religion and subjects laws that burden religious practice to strict scrutiny. First Amendment precedent had established that laws that deny an otherwise generally available benefit because of religious status are unconstitutional, though laws that are neutral and generally applicable may be upheld even if they hamper religion. The distinction was whether the law in question discriminates against some or all religious beliefs. In this case, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources’ policy of denying religious organizations from its Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause because it discriminated against otherwise eligible organizations based solely on their religious character. The law did not need to prevent the religious organization from practicing its religious; it was sufficient that the law denied a religious organization the same opportunity to compete for a benefit that is otherwise available to all secular organizations. Because the state’s interest in using this policy was simply to draw a wide berth around religious establishment concerns, it was not a sufficiently compelling interest.
In his opinion concurring in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment clearly prohibited laws that facially discriminate against religion. To the extent that precedent suggested that a state may “disfavor” religion by placing minor burdens on religion in order to avoid state entanglement with religion, that precedent should be construed narrowly and did not apply in this case. Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in the opinion concurring in part. Justice Gorsuch wrote a separate opinion concurring in part in which he argued that the majority opinion’s suggested distinction between laws that discriminate based on religious status and those that do so based on religious use was untenable and unsupported by the Free Exercise Clause. Additionally, the majority opinion’s footnote that limited the opinion to addressing “express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing” risked making the opinion too case-specific and not based on general principles. Justice Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in part. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the First Amendment was clearly not meant to prevent religious organizations from accessing government-provided benefits such as police and fire services. The benefit here was for the health and safety of children and therefore was in the same class of government-provided services that religious organizations should be able to access.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that this case raised serious Establishment Clause concerns. The majority opinion required a state to directly fund a religious organization in a manner that assisted the spread of its religious message and views. This was precisely the sort of direct connection between church and state that the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent, as shown by extensive history of state disestablishment. Therefore, a prophylactic rule to prevent state funding of religious organizations was permissible, and many states had one. The majority opinion erroneously called this decision discriminatory, when it was actually a legitimate choice for states to make to avoid entanglement with religion. Even under the Free Exercise Clause, the doctrine allowed states to make exceptions to generally applicable laws based on an organization’s status as religious. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.


On March 8, 2013, police officers executed a warrant to search Richard Mathis’ house following allegations of sexual abuse from young men. The officers found a loaded rifle and ammunition. After he was arrested and while in custody, Mathis admitted to owning the rifle and ammunition, and he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because of his five previous burglary convictions in Iowa state courts. At trial, the district court used a modified categorical approach to determine that Mathis’ prior convictions constituted violent felonies because the elements of the offense were substantially similar to generic burglary and posed the same risk of harm to others. Therefore, Mathis was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment pursuant to the ACCA. Mathis appealed his conviction and argued that his Iowa convictions should not have constituted predicate offenses under the ACCA, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.

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A state crime cannot qualify as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) if the elements of the state offense are broader than those of a listed generic offense based on an “elements-only inquiry,” not a modified categorical approach. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority, which held that, if the elements of the state crime are broader than the generic offense listed under ACCA, the sentence cannot be enhanced, even if the actual conduct in question fits the generic offense listed under ACCA. The textual, elements-only approach is supported by the text of the ACCA as well as Supreme Court precedent, and this approach also avoids unfairness to the defendant. The alternative approach would raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns because it would allow a judge to conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of the crime apart from what the jury determined. In this case, because the elements of the state crime are broader than those of generic burglary, the conviction cannot give rise to a sentence enhancement under the ACCA.
In his concurrence, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that, while the majority opinion is correct that the Court’s statutory interpretation precedent controlled the decision in this case, Congress could not have intended for there to be vast sentencing disparities for defendants convicted in different jurisdictions based on substantially similar conduct. While Congress could and should resolve this problem through legislation, if it cannot do so, the Court may need to revisit its precedent. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurrence in which he argued that the interpretation of the ACCA that allows sentencing to be based on judge-determined, rather than jury-determined, facts violated the Sixth Amendment.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that, by distinguishing between the elements of a crime and the means by which it was accomplished, the majority opinion created a sentencing scheme in which two individuals who engaged in the same conduct could receive drastically different sentences. A state statute is not overbroad for the purposes of ACCA sentencing enhancement when the statute allows for alternative means of proving the crime, but the charging documents for the crime in question allege the version that matches the federal crime. The Court’s precedents allow for this type of interpretation. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the line of Supreme Court precedent that has limited courts’ ability to use the modified categorical approach has resulted in fewer convictions qualifying for ACCA sentence enhancement, which cannot be what Congress intended. In holding otherwise, the majority opinion moved further away from Congress’ intentions and ignored the real-world relevance of the facts of any given case.


Maher Kara joined Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking group in 2002, and began asking his older brother, Michael, who held a degree in chemistry, questions about certain aspects of his job. From 2004 to 2007 the Kara brothers regularly discussed mergers and acquisitions by Citigroup clients, though Maher suspected that Michael was using the information they discussed for insider trading. In the meantime, Maher became engaged to Bassam Yacoub Salman’s sister and Michael began to share some of the insider information he received from his brother with Salman. Salman did not directly trade through his own accounts but went through his brother-in-law, Karim Bayyouk. There were numerous occasions where Bayyouk and Michael Kara executed identical trades issued by Citigroup clients. As a result, Salman’s account reached $2.1 million. Salman was charged with conspiracy to commit securities fraud and insider trading in 2011 and found guilty. He applied for a new trial, but his request was denied. He then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued there was insufficient evidence that he knew the information used for trades was from insider information. The appellate court found that, because of the close family relationship, there was sufficient evidence that Salman knew he was trading on insider information.

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A close family relationship is sufficient to sustain a conviction for insider trading. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment and held that the close family relationship was sufficient evidence that Salman knew that he was imparting insider information. A person commits insider trading where they know that the person who made the tip stands to benefit from disclosing insider information. A personal benefit may be inferred where there is a personal relationship involved, such as one between a family member or a friend, because of the likelihood that the person being tipped will return the favor. Here, Maher tipped off his brother Michael, which established that Maher stood to benefit from the disclosure and had therefore violated his duty to Citigroup. Salman in turn committed insider trading because he knew that the information had been improperly given in the first place, and that Maher stood to benefit from its disclosure. Thus, the Court found that Salman’s knowledge of Maher’s potential for personal benefit from the tip supported his conviction for insider trading.


Police entered Gregory Welch’s apartment because they had reason to believe that a robbery suspect was on the premises. After obtaining Welch’s consent to search the apartment, the police located a gun and ammunition that Welch later identified as his own. Welch was subsequently arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he pleaded guilty. Because Welch had three prior felony convictions, the district court determined that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) required that he be sentenced to a minimum of 15 years in prison. Welch appealed his sentence and argued that one of his felonies, a conviction for “strong arm” robbery in Florida state court in 1996, did not qualify as a predicate offense for the purpose of the ACCA because, at the time he was convicted, Florida state law allowed for a conviction of robbery with a much lower level of force than the federal law required. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that Welch’s conviction for robbery under Florida state law was a predicate offense for the purpose of the ACCA because it involved force that was “capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”
In 2013, Welch filed a collateral challenge to his conviction and argued that his prior conviction for strong arm robbery vague and that his trial counsel had been ineffective in allowing him to be sentenced under the ACCA. He sought a certificate of appealability to the appellate court, which the district court denied. Welch then sought a certificate of appealability from the appellate court and noted that there was a challenge to the ACCA based on its vagueness pending in the Supreme Court, Johnson v. United States. The appellate denied the certificate of appealability.
Three weeks later, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States and held that the residual clause of the ACCA, which included action that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” in the definition of a violent felony, was unconstitutionally vague. The Court held that the residual clause violated the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments because it was so vague that it failed to give people adequate notice of the conduct it punished. In order to apply the residual clause to a case, courts had to assess the “hypothetical risk posed by an abstract generic version” of the crime in question, which made the application of the clause unconstitutionally arbitrary and unpredictable.

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The rule that the Supreme Court announced in Johnson v. United States regarding what constitutes a violent offense for the purposes of sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act applies retroactively. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the rule announced in Johnson, that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague, was a substantive rule of criminal procedure because it altered “the range of conduct or class of persons that the law punishes.” Unlike procedural rules that alter the permissible methods for determining whether conduct is punishable, substantive rules affect the reach of the statute itself rather than how it is applied. While procedural rules are generally not retroactive, substantive rules are; therefore, the rule the Court announced in Johnson should apply retroactively to this case.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that neither the Supreme Court nor the lower appellate court should have reviewed this case because Welch had failed to raise the Johnson vagueness claims at the district court level, and the higher courts should be reviewing only the decision that the district court made based on the issues presented there. Justice Thomas also wrote that the Johnson rule was not substantive because it did not place any class of persons or punishments outside of the statute’s reach, nor did it announce a new constitutional rule. Instead, the rule in Johnson should be properly understood as addressing the manner of Congress’ defining a sentencing enhancement, not the substantive conduct that triggers it. Therefore, the Johnson rule should not be given retroactive effect.


In April 2011, Apple Inc. (Apple) sued Samsung Electronics, Co., Ltd. (Samsung) and argued that certain design elements of Samsung’s smartphones infringed on specific patents for design elements in the iPhone that Apple holds. The jury held that Samsung had infringed on Apple’s patents and awarded over $1 billion in damages. The district court ordered a partial retrial on the issue of damages because some damages had been awarded for a period in which Samsung did not have notice of some of the asserted patents. On retrial, the jury awarded nearly $300 million in damages. On appeal, Samsung argued that the district court erred in allowing the jury to award damages based on Samsung’s entire profits, rather than the fraction of profits directly attributable to the infringed patents themselves. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of damages because Samsung did not argue that there was a lack of substantial evidence to support the award.

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For the purpose of calculating damages in a patent infringement action, the infringing “article of manufacture” may be defined as either an end product sold to a consumer or as a component of that product. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that the relevant text of the Patent Act encompasses both an end product sold to a consumer as well as a component of that product. The fact that a component may be incorporated into the larger end product does not place it outside the category of an “article of manufacture.” Therefore, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit erred in interpreting that phrase too narrowly to only refer to the end product. Under the proper reading of the phrase, an infringer will sometimes be liable for the total profit from the component of the end product, but the Court declined to determine whether that is the case here.


In May 2005, Juan Bravo-Fernandez, the president of a private security firm in Puerto Rico, and Hector Martinez-Maldonado, a member of the Puerto Rican Senate, traveled to Las Vegas to see a boxing match. Bravo-Fernandez and Martinez-Maldonado were later indicted on charges that Bravo-Fernandez’s payment for the trip was connected to Martinez-Maldonado’s support of legislation beneficial to the security firm. The charges included violations of the federal bribery statute, conspiracy, and the Travel Act, which prohibits travel in interstate commerce for a criminal purpose -- in this case, the violation of the federal bribery statute. The jury convicted the defendants of violating the federal bribery statute, but found the defendants not guilty of conspiracy to violate the statute or of violating the Travel Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the convictions for violating the federal bribery statute because the jury was improperly instructed about what the government needed to prove. The appellate court remanded the case.
Based on this holding, the district court entered an order that acquitted the defendants, but that order was vacated after the government clarified that the appellate court’s decision vacating the federal bribery convictions did not require the district court to enter an order of acquittal. The district court subsequently entered an order that clarified that the bribery convictions were vacated. The defendants moved to reinstate the initial order and argued that it was a judgment of acquittal that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, could not be rescinded. The district court denied the motion. The defendants then moved for acquittal and argued that the original acquittals for the Travel Act and conspiracy charges prevented the government from relitigating the bribery charges because a jury had already determined that the government failed to prove elements essential to conviction under the bribery statute. The defendants argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits relitigation of these issues. The district court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed.

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The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent the government from retrying defendants after a jury returns an irreconcilably inconsistent verdict of convictions and acquittals and the convictions are later vacated based on a different legal error. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court determined that retrial in this case would be precluded if the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had vacated the convictions (a) due to insufficient evidence or (b) to resolve the inconsistency of the jury’s verdicts. However, because the vacated judgment was due to a legal error, the petitioners may be retried. The Court also drew a distinction between a hung jury and the jury’s verdict in this case. A hung jury means a jury did not reach a decision at all; in this case, the jury supplied both an acquittal and a conviction, notwithstanding that the decision was vacated on appeal due to a legal error. Because it is unclear what the jury would have concluded without the legal error, the Government is not precluded from a new trial on the jury’s returned convictions.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Court should reconsider the precedents established in Ashe v. Swenson and Yeager v. United States. In Ashe, the Court found that the Double Jeopardy Clause sometimes precludes a successive prosecution when facts essential to conviction of the second crime have been “necessarily” resolved in an acquittal of the first crime. Justice Thomas argued that the Court erroneously extended Ashe in Yeager, which “bar[red] retrial on hung counts” after an earlier stage of the same proceeding, not a prior proceeding. However, because this decision did not extend the holding in those cases, Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion.


Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct and harassment in state trial court. After the entry of a guilty verdict, two jurors informed Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel that one of the other jurors made racially biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez and the alibi witness during jury deliberations. The trial court authorized Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel to contact the two jurors for their affidavits explaining what the “biased” juror said about Pena-Rodriguez or his alibi witness. Based on these affidavits, which related racially biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez’s likely guilt and the alibi witness’ lack of credibility because both were Hispanic, Pena-Rodriguez moved for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Colorado held the jurors’ affidavits were inadmissible under Rule 606(b) of Colorado’s Rules of Evidence, which prohibits juror testimony on any matter occurring during the jury deliberations. The Supreme Court of Colorado also held Rule 606(b) did not violate Pena-Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury because Pena-Rodriguez had waived that right by failing to adequately question jurors about their racial bias during voir dire.

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Rule 606(b) of Colorado’s Rules of Evidence may not bar evidence of racial bias which is offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that, if a juror makes a clear statement that he or she convicted a criminal defendant relying on racial stereotypes or animus, the trial court is permitted to consider evidence of the juror’s statements. The Court reiterated the sanctity of the jury to our criminal justice system and its reluctance to interfere with it. Rule 606(b), the no-impeachment rule, stems from the desire to prevent jurors from testifying about their deliberation after the verdict was entered, and it is a common law principle that is more lenient in some states than others. However, the Court noted that there was a possibility of an exception in the “gravest and most important cases.” In certain rare cases, when racial animus is apparent in a juror, the no-impeachment rule shall be set aside in an effort to protect the Sixth Amendment. Not every “offhand” racial comment from a juror will warrant setting aside the no-impeachment rule. The exception demands that a juror exhibit overt racial animus that calls into question his or her ability to make a fair and impartial judgment about the defendant. Although the Court noted that there were processes currently in place to prevent racial bias in juries, such as the process of voir dire--the preliminary examination and elimination of jury members--these protections were often not sufficient, and therefore this exception was necessary. In this case, the Court held that the juror’s statements were “egregious and unmistakable in their reliance on racial bias.” The juror in question also encouraged other jurors to join in his racially-motivated conviction.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion incorrectly interpreted the Sixth Amendment and its precedents. He explained that common law tradition does not permit impeachment of a verdict based on juror misconduct. If there is a reason to set aside the no-impeachment rule, it should be the legislature’s role to do so, not the role of the judiciary. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that barring the admission of juror testimony is deeply rooted in the criminal justice system’s history. He argued that, although racial bias is important to prevent, it should be treated no differently than other forms of impartiality by a juror for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.


Marcelo Manrique was convicted in federal district court of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to a life term of supervised release and mandatory restitution, though the final judgment did not include an amount for the restitution and stated that would be included in the amended judgment. Manrique filed his notice of appeal before the amended judgment was entered. When the amended judgment was entered while the appeal was pending, it included the details of the restitution award, and both parties subsequently included arguments regarding the challenge of the award in their briefs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the restitution award because Manrique did not file a second notice of appeal regarding the amended judgment that included the amount of the restitution award.

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Appellate courts may not review a restitution award where the amended judgment of the lower court granting restitution is entered after notice of appeal was filed. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, in order to secure appellate review of a judgment, a party must file notice of appeal from that particular judgment after that judgment has been entered. In this case, Manrique filed his only notice of appeal several months before the amended judgment granting restitution was entered. The Court rejected Manrique’s argument that the initial judgment deferring restitution and amended judgment granting restitution combined to form a single judgment. Instead, in cases of deferred restitution, the initial judgment and amended judgment qualify as two distinct appealable judgments. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment and held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit did not have jurisdiction to review the amended judgment.
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that the district court failed to notify Manrique of his right to appeal from the amended judgment. Additionally, because the district court clerk sent the record for the amended judgment to the appellate court without waiting for Manrique to file notice of appeal, the district court conferred jurisdiction on the appellate court. Such conferral, Justice Ginsburg contended, adequately substituted the requirement that Manrique file a second notice of appeal from the amended judgment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.
Justice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


Stanley Hsu, a Taiwanese business man, opened a Bank of America bank account while working in the United States. When he returned to Taiwan, he arranged for the daughter of one of his employees to receive his mail and forward it to him in Taiwan. Lawrence Eugene Shaw lived with the daughter and regularly checked her mail. When the Bank of America statements arrived for Hsu’s account, Shaw concocted a scheme in which he opened a PayPal account under Stanley Hsu’s name and used it to convince banks that he was Hsu for the purpose of transferring money from Hsu’s accounts to the PayPal account and from there to an account that Shaw controlled. Using this scheme, Shaw was able to transfer approximately $307,000 of Hsu’s money to himself before the fraud was discovered. Bank of America returned approximately $131,000 to Hsu, and PayPal returned approximately $106,000. Hsu lost about $170,000 by not notifying the banks within 60 days of the fraudulent transactions, as standard banking procedures require.
The government charged Shaw with violating the Bank Fraud Act of 1984, which criminalizes schemes “to defraud a financial institution.” Shaw requested a jury instruction that stated that the government had to prove that he intended not only to defraud the bank but also that he intended to target the bank as the principal financial victim. The district court refused to give the instruction and determined that the language of the Act required that the government prove only that the defendant intended to deceive the bank, not that he also intended the bank to bear the loss that resulted from the fraud. The jury convicted Shaw of 14 counts of bank fraud under the Act, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

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Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the statute at issue states deals specifically with property rights, and a bank has property rights in a bank account because the bank has the right to use the funds as a source of funds for loans that earn the bank interest. Therefore, any scheme that involves defrauding the funds from a bank account necessarily involves defrauding a bank. Although the statute requires that the government show there was a scheme to defraud, it does not require the government to show that the bank actually sustained a financial loss or that the intent of the scheme was to cause the bank to sustain a financial loss. Similarly, the defendant cannot argue that he didn’t have actual knowledge that the bank would be harmed.


Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc.

Varsity Brands, Inc. (Varsity) designs and manufactures clothing and accessories for use in various athletic activities, including cheerleading. Design concepts for the clothing incorporate elements such as colors, shapes, lines, etc., and do not consider the functionality of the final clothing. Varsity received copyright registration for the two-dimensional artwork of the designs at issue in this case, which were very similar to ones that Star Athletica, LLC (Star) was advertising. Varsity sued Star and alleged, among other claims, that Star violated the Copyright Act. Star asserted counterclaims, including one that alleged that Varsity had made fraudulent representations to the Copyright Office because the designs at issue were not copyrightable. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Star argued that Varsity did not have valid copyrights because the designs were for “useful articles,” which cannot be copyrighted, and the designs cannot be separated from the uniforms themselves, which also makes the designs impossible to copyright. Varsity argued that the designs were separable and non-functional, and therefore that the copyrights were valid and had been infringed. The district court granted summary judgment for Star and held that the designs were integral to the functionality of the uniform. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the Copyright Act allows graphic features of a design to be copyrighted even when those designs are not separable from a “useful article.”

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A feature of a useful article is copyrightable if it can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional artwork that is separable from the useful article and if it would be a protectable pictorial, graphical, or sculptural work on its own (or if applied to another medium, such as a canvas). Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the Copyright Act clearly requires that, to be copyrightable, a design element of a useful article must be able to be identified separately from the article and be capable of existing separately from the article. The separate identification prong of this test requires only that the decisionmaker be able to distinguish a two- or three-dimensional element that has pictorial, graphical, or sculptural qualities. To satisfy the independent-existence requirement, the decisionmaker must determine that the element can exist as its own pictorial, graphical, or sculptural work and not merely as a part of a replica of the useful article in a different medium. This interpretation is consistent not only with the text of the Copyright Act but also with its history. In this case, the decoration designs of cheerleading uniforms satisfy both prongs of the test because the decorations can be identified as having their own pictorial, graphical, or sculptural qualities, and they would be copyrightable on their own if separated from the uniforms. The Court determined that the fact that the designs on their own still retained the outline of the cheerleading uniforms did not prevent them from being copyrightable because artwork designed to fit a particular space or object does not replicate that object or space when applied to a different medium. The Court rejected alternative tests for separability as ungrounded in the text of the statute.
 In her opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that separability analysis was unnecessary in this case because the designs are themselves copyrightable and are merely reproduced on useful articles. The designs are clearly pictorial, graphical, or sculptural works, which are copyrightable. The copyright for such a work includes the right to reproduce the work on a useful article and exclude a would-be infringer from doing the same.
 Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that, although he agreed with the majority opinion’s analysis of the test that the statute required, the designs at issue in this case failed the test. A feature is not separable from the useful article if it cannot be extracted without necessarily replicating the useful article in another medium. Because the designs in this case could only be represented as pictures, and therefore replicas, of the uniforms, they were not capable of existing independently of the useful article. Based on the statutory text and relevant case law, the designs fail the second prong of separability test. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.


SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products

SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag (SCA) produces adult incontinence products, as does First Quality Baby Products, LLC (First Quality). In 2003, SCA notified First Quality that it believed First Quality was infringing on one of its patents, and First Quality responded by arguing that, because the SCA patent in question was essentially the same as a prior-filed patent, it was invalid and therefore First Quality could not be infringing. The two companies ceased communication on the issue, but in 2004, SCA requested that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) reexamine its patent in light of the prior-filed one, and in 2007, the PTO determined that the patent in question was valid.
In 2010, SCA sued First Quality for patent infringement. First Quality moved for summary judgment because SCA had unreasonably delayed litigation, and the district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion regarding the unreasonable delay because SCA should have been able to proceed with litigation after the reexamination and had not provided evidence to justify the delay. SCA requested a rehearing before the entire appellate court to reconsider the issue in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, which held that the unreasonable delay defense cannot bar suits for copyright infringement that occurred during the three-year limitations period, and argued that the same analysis should apply to patent suits like this one. Upon rehearing, the appellate court rejected SCA’s argument and held that the Petrella decision did not affect its precedent, which stated that an unreasonable delay defense may be used in patent infringement claims brought within the six-year statute of limitations, and courts must examine the circumstances underlying those claims and the defense.

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An unreasonable delay in litigation is not a defense against a claim for damages brought within the six-year statutory period of limitations in a patent infringement case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the reasoning of Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, which held that an unreasonable delay defense cannot bar relief within the three-year statute of limitations for copyright cases, also applies to a patent infringement case. Because the unreasonable delay defense was meant to be in place when there was no statute of limitations, applying the defense during the statute of limitations period would conflict with the purpose of the defense. The Court explained that, at the time of the Patent Act’s enactment, there was a well-established general rule that the unreasonable delay defense cannot be used to bar damages on a claim filed during the statute of limitations period and that First Quality did not properly consider this rule. Although the rule was established in the context of patent cases, there is no “unambiguous consensus of lower court decisions” to support that patent law cases should be treated differently than copyright cases for this purpose.
In his dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer argued that the language of the Patent Act does not explicitly contain a statute of limitations period. Instead, the language allows a patentee to sue any time after an infringement takes place and sue in hopes of recovering significant damages from the preceding six years. The unreasonable delay defense prevents a plaintiff from succeeding in this effort and therefore should apply to patent cases.


State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Rigsby

Many homeowners in the Gulf Coast area had two separate insurance policies: One that covered flood but not wind damage, and another that covered wind but not flood damage. These policies were frequently administered by the same private insurance company, but the company would be responsible for paying wind damage claims, while government funds would pay for flood damage claims; therefore, there was an incentive for the companies to classify damage as caused by flood rather than wind. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (State Farm) was one of these companies that administered such policies in the Gulf Coast area. Cori Rigsby was a State Farm claims adjuster who believed that State Farm was wrongfully seeking to maximize its policyholders’ flood damage claims and minimize wind damage claims after Hurricane Katrina. Rigsby sued State Farm under the False Claims Act (FCA). The district court determined that State Farm had submitted false claims in violation of the FCA. On appeal, State Farm argued Rigsby had violated the FCA’s seal requirement, which stated that the complaint cannot be disclosed until the court orders the complaint served on the defendant, and that violation of the FCA seal requirement warrants immediate dismissal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, although Rigsby violated the seal requirement by disclosing the existence of the suit, the violation of the seal requirement does not warrant immediate dismissal.

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The Court held that a violation of the False Claims Act’s seal requirement does not mandate dismissal of the complaint. The Court determines that the purpose of the requirement, in part, was the protect the government’s interests and therefore that a “rigid interpretation” of the requirement would undermine that interest. Furthermore, there is no legislative history to suggest Congress intended to condition a private right of action on compliance with a statutory mandate.


Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections

Based on the 2010 Census, the Virginia General Assembly sought to redraw the legislative districts for the Virginia Legislature. At the time the districting legislation was prepared, Virginia was subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and therefore any new districting plan must have ensured that there would be no “retrogression” in the ability of racial minorities to elect the candidate of their choice. Accordingly, the new districting plan contained 12 majority-minority districts. On December 22, 2014, the plaintiffs, each of whom resided in one of the twelve challenged districts, sued and argued that those districts constituted racial gerrymanders that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the plaintiffs did not establish that race was the predominant factor in the creation of 11 of the 12 challenged district. The district court also held that, although race was the predominant factor in the creation of one district, in doing so the General Assembly was pursuing a compelling state interest and its use of race was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.

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Race can still be shown to be the predominant factor in redistricting even when traditional principles are respected, and district courts must engage in a holistic analysis of alleged racial gerrymanders. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the six-justice majority. The Court held that the lower court erred in applying the controlling legal principles in this case. Challengers to an alleged racial gerrymander do not need to show an actual conflict between the enacted redistricting plan and traditional redistricting principles; while such evidence might be persuasive, it is not required. Racial predominance can be shown through other factors, such the circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape or demographics, or more direct evidence regarding legislative purpose. The Court also held that a court’s analysis of an alleged racial gerrymander must be a holistic view of the whole district rather than focusing on the extent to which individual lines may deviate from the traditional principles. Therefore, any explanation for a particular portion of the lines must take into account the context of the district as a whole. On the issue of House District 75, the Court determined that the predominant use of race was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest because the legislature engaged in a careful functional analysis in apportioning the district.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that, when a legislature creates a majority-minority voting district, the legislature is using race as a predominant motivation and therefore that action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Justice Alito therefore joined the majority’s opinion regarding the acceptability of House District 75 and agreed that the other districts should be reexamined, but under the same standard as House District 75. In his separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that, because the legislature clearly created majority-minority districts, race was the predominating factor in creating those districts. Therefore the creation of such districts must be shown to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority’s holding that House District 75 satisfied this standard because the state neither asserted a sufficiently compelling interest nor was its use of race in the districting process narrowly tailored to serve the interest it asserted.


In 1980, Bobby James Moore was convicted of capital murder for the shooting of James McCarble, a seventy-year-old store clerk, in Houston, Texas. Moore was sentenced to death, and his conviction and sentence were both affirmed on appeal. After a federal court granted habeas corpus relief, a new punishment hearing occurred in 2001, and Moore was again sentenced to the death penalty. His sentence was again affirmed on appeal. Moore sought state habeas relief and argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia should apply to his case; therefore, because he was intellectually disabled, he was exempt from execution. The habeas court granted relief based on the Atkins argument. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, however, reversed and held that Moore had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he had the requisite intellectual disability for the Atkins precedent to apply based on Texas case law that used a 1992 definition of intellectual disability.

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The use of an outdated medical definition of intellectual disability violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as well as Supreme Court precedent. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that, by rejecting the habeas court’s application of medical guidance, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas (CCA) applied the wrong standard when it denied Moore habeas relief and approved his execution. State standards for determining when a person is exempt from the death sentence because of mental disability cannot ignore current medical standards defining mental disability. The CCA standard differed from current medical standards in multiple respects. First, the CCA failed to consider the “standard error of measurement” for Moore’s IQ score, which indicated his IQ was likely to fall within a range that dipped into a level consistent with mental disability. Second, the CCA gave improper weight to Moore’s perceived strengths when evaluating his ability to navigate everyday life; medical standards instead focus on a person’s deficits. Third, the CCA also relied on ”evidentiary factors” from Texas case law based on stereotypes about mental disability that create an unacceptable risk that mentally disabled persons will be executed.
In his dissent, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., agreed that the evidentiary factors the CCA applied violated the Eighth Amendment, but he argued that Moore’s IQ score established he was not mentally disabled. More broadly, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the majority opinion gave states too little guidance on how to properly enforce the Eighth Amendment ban on executing the mentally disabled. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., joined in the dissent.


In July 1995, Duane Edward Buck was arrested for the murder of his ex-girlfriend, Debra Gardner, and her friend Kenneth Butler. Buck was convicted of capital murder for both of the deaths. During the penalty phase of trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Buck’s future dangerousness based on his criminal history, his conduct, and his demeanor before and after arrest. The defense presented the testimony of a clinical psychologist to evaluate the risk of future dangerousness. That expert stated that he considered demographic factors, including race, in his analysis and that, statistically, minorities are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. On cross-examination, the prosecution clarified that the expert’s opinion was that the race factor “black” increased the likelihood of future dangerousness. The jury found that there was sufficient evidence of Buck’s future dangerousness without any sufficient mitigating factors to justify a life sentence, so the jury sentenced Buck to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence.
Buck filed various claims for state and federal habeas relief that were denied, until the U.S. Supreme Court decided Trevino v. Thaler, which held that Texas’ procedural scheme made it almost impossible to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, and therefore that a procedural default on such a claim could be excused. While some of these claims were pending, the state attorney general admitted in a different case that the state should not have called an expert witness to testify about future dangerousness of a defendant based on race and named Buck’s case as one affected by similar testimony. Buck again sought federal habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel knowingly called an expert witness who testified that race was a factor in determining future dangerousness. The district court dismissed the claim because Buck failed to show that the outcome of his trial was prejudiced. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit similarly denied Buck’s request for a Certificate of Appealability by holding that Buck did not show sufficient extraordinary circumstances to justify relief from the lower court’s judgment.

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the wrong standard of review when it denied Buck’s Certificate of Appealability (COA) for failing to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority, which held that the proper standard of review in COA analysis was whether Buck’s claim was reasonably debatable. An appellate court should not consider the actual merits of an appeal unless it first determined that the claim was reasonably debatable. In this case, by essentially deciding the appeal on its actual merits and then denying Buck’s COA based on that adjudication, the Fifth Circuit inverted the COA analysis and imposed an undue burden on Buck. The Court also held that Buck successfully demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel. It reasoned that Buck received inadequate assistance of counsel because his attorney introduced evidence that Buck was liable to be a future danger because of his race, and that it was reasonably probable that without this testimony he may not have been sentenced to death. Finally, the Court held that the district court’s denial of Buck’s motion for habeas relief was an abuse of discretion and noted that there was a reasonable probability that Buck was sentenced to death in part based on his race. To punish someone based on an immutable characteristic, the Court noted, “is a disturbing departure from a basic premise of our criminal justice system: Our law punishes people for what they do, not who they are.”
Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority opinion misapplied settled law in order to reach the outcome it desired. Under the majority’s construction of the COA analysis, no COA could ever be denied. The proper construction of the COA analysis requires that, in order to deny a COA because the prisoner’s claim is not reasonably debatable, a court must first determine that it is meritless. Justice Thomas also argued that Buck failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel because he did not demonstrate that his counsel materially prejudiced his defense. Additionally, Justice Thomas wrote that the district court’s denial of Buck’s motion for habeas relief was not an abuse of discretion, and he criticized the level of deference shown by the majority towards the findings of the district court.


National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc.

In 1998, Congress enacted the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA), which provided that, if a position for which the President nominates and the Senate confirms (PAS position) becomes vacant, the first assistant automatically takes over as an “acting officer” for a period of 210 days. The President may also select a senior employee from the same agency or someone in a PAS position from another agency to serve as the acting officer. Pursuant to the FVRA, when the Ronald Meisberg resigned as the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a PAS position, the President directed Lafe Solomon, who held a senior position in the NLRB, to serve as the Acting General Counsel. Six months into his tenure, the President nominated him for the General Counsel position, but the Senate did not confirm him. On October 29, 2013, the Senate confirmed a different nominee, so by the time he stepped down, Solomon had served as Acting General Counsel from June 21, 2010, until November 4, 2013.
SW General, Inc. provides ambulance services to hospitals in Arizona. Its emergency medical technicians (EMTs), nurses, and firefighters, are negotiated by a union that had negotiated with SW General for “longevity pay,” which meant that employees who had been with the company for at least ten years were guaranteed annual bonuses. In December 2012, between the expiration of one collective bargaining agreement and the negotiation of a new one, SW General stopped paying the longevity pay. The union filed an unfair labor practices claim with the NLRB, which issued a formal complaint. An administrative law judge determined that SW General had committed unfair labor practices, and SW General filed a list of exceptions, among which was a claim that Acting General Counsel was serving in violation of the FVRA. A provision of the FVRA states that the acting officer may not become the nominee for the position, and the nominee to fill the position may not serve in an acting capacity unless that nominee was the first assistant to the vacant position for at least 90 days in the previous year. Solomon was briefly a nominee for the position, and he had not served as the first assistant to the vacant position. SW General petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, and the appellate court did not address the merits of the case because it determined that Solomon’s tenure as Acting General Counsel violated the FVRA.

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The limitation on nominees to vacant positions serving in an acting capacity under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) apply equally to all nominees. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the FVRA prohibits any person nominated for a position for which the President nominates and the Senate confirms (PAS position) from performing the duties of that office. The Court determined that that the statutory language of the FVRA applied equally to first assistants who automatically assume such duties under Act and individuals selected by the President. The language left no room for any other interpretation. Thus, Solomon violated the FVRA when he continued to perform the duties of NLRB General Counsel after the President nominated him for the position.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the appointment of NLRB General Counsel under the FVRA without Senate approval is likely prohibited by the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the FVRA’s prohibitions against nominees to a PAS position performing the duties of the office only applies to first assistants who serve as acting officials automatically under the Act. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.


Sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act require that noncitizens who are determined to be inadmissible to the United States must be detained during removal proceedings, though some may be released on bond if they can demonstrate that they are not a flight risk or a danger to the community. Alejandro Rodriguez and other detained noncitizens sued and argued that their prolonged detention without hearings and determinations to justify the detentions violated their due process rights. After litigation regarding class certification, the district court granted a preliminary injunction that required the government to provide each detainee with a bond hearing and to release that detainee unless the government could show, by clear and convincing evidence, that continued detention was justified. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that prolonged detention without a hearing raised serious constitutional concerns, and therefore that the relevant mandatory statutory language should be interpreted as having a time limitation; at the six-month mark, detainees are entitled to bond hearings. Because the plaintiff class proved that it was likely to succeed on the merits, the appellate court affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunction. The plaintiff class then moved for a permanent injunction, which the district court granted and the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court also determined that the duration of future detention and likelihood of eventual removal should not be considered in the bond hearings, and the noncitizens are entitled to bond hearings at six-month intervals throughout their detentions.

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No, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) do not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention, and the Ninth Circuit misapplied the canon of constitutional avoidance in holding otherwise. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II (for which there was a plurality). Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full, and Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II (regarding jurisdiction of the Court to hear the case).
In Part II-A, a plurality of the Court (Alito, Roberts, Kennedy) held that it had jurisdiction to consider the respondents' claims, despite potential obstacles from 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) and 1226(e). Section 1252(b)(9) limits the availablility of judicial review in removal proceedings to final orders only. The plurality noted that the "respondents are not asking for review of an order of removal; they are not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal; and they are not even challenging any part of the process by which their removability will be determined." Thus, that section does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction in this case.
In Part II-B, the plurality similarly found that Section 1226(e), which states that the attorney general's discretionary judgment in removal matters "shall not be subject to review." It found that a challenge to the extent of the government's detention authority is outside the scope of this provision and thus that exercise of jurisdiction is proper.
Writing for the majority (Alito, Roberts, Kennedy, Gorsuch, Thomas) in Part III, Justice Alito considered the merits of the arguments. In III-A, he looked directly to the statutory text of Sections 1225(b) and found nothing in the text from which to infer a six-month time limit on the length of detention. Without textual support, the canon of constitutional avoidance is inapplicable, and the Ninth Circuit was incorrect to rely on Zadvydas v. Davis as authority for inferring a time limit.
In Part II-B, the majority interpreted Section 1226(c), which allows aliens to be released "only if" the attorney general decides that certain conditions are met, as unequivocally prohibiting their release under any other conditions. Because release on bail is prohibited, a bail hearing (periodic or otherwise) is unnecessary.
In Part II-C, the majority and Justice Sonia Sotomayor found that Section 1226(a) authorizes the attorney general to arrest and detain an alien "pending a decision" on removal and permits the attorney general to release the alien on bond. Nothing in the text of this provision supports the imposition of periodic bond hearings or the consideration of the length of detention to determine whether an alien should be released.
Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined except for footnote 6. Justice Thomas opined that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) because claims challenging detention during removal proceedings fall squarely within the jurisdictional bar in that provision. Justice Thomas also wrote to say that the application of Section 1252(b)(9) does not violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution.
Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. The dissent highlights the fact that the case concerns "persons whom immigration authorities believe are not citizens and may not have a right to enter into, or remain within, the United States" but who "[n]onetheless ... likely have a reasonable claim that they do have such a right." The dissent looks to constitutional language, purposes, and tradition, to find that bail is most likely required in these instances of civil confinement, and that at the very least a bail hearing is required. Finally, the dissent finds that interpreting the statute to require bail proceedings in instances of prolonged detention does not run contrary to the plain language or purpose of the statute.
Justice Kagan took no part in the decision of the case.


After the 2010 Census, pursuant to the state Constitution, the North Carolina state legislature appointed House and Senate Committees to prepare a redistricting plan for U.S. House of Representatives districts. The heads of the respective committees hired a redistricting coordinator to design the new districts. The coordinator was given instructions orally; there were no written records of the precise instructions he received. The heads of the committees published public statements that highlighted certain criteria used in creating their proposed redistricting plan, such as the fact that, according to Supreme Court interpretation of the requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, districts must be constructed to have a “Black Voting Age Population” (BVAP) of 50% plus one. To comply with this criterion, two districts were altered to have a BVAP over 50%, which meant that there were two more majority-black districts than there were under the 2001 Congressional Districting Plan. The state legislature enacted the new plan and the Department of Justice granted it preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
David Harris and Christine Bowser are U.S. citizens registered to vote in the two districts at issue. They sued and argued that North Carolina used the Voting Rights Act’s requirements as a pretext to place more black voters in those two districts to reduce black voters’ influence in other districts. The district court determined that race was the predominant factor motivating the redistricting plan and therefore that the redistricting plan was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander that violated the Equal Protection Clause.

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The district court did not error in determining that North Carolina’s new districting plan constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, and neither claim nor issue preclusion based on the state court case dictate the outcome of this case. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the district court was presented with sufficient evidence to find that race was the predominant rationale for the redistricting. Additionally, North Carolina did not meet its burden of proving that it had a compelling interest to sort voters based on race that it met with narrowly tailored means. Although complying with the Voting Rights Act (VRA) might serve as a compelling reason, the state must demonstrate that it had good cause to think that it would transgress the requirements of the VRA if it did not draw race-based district boundaries. Because there was no evidence of “white bloc voting” prior to the new districting plan, there was no sufficient reason for the state to think there was a potential VRA violation that required race-based districting. The Court also held that, although issue or claim preclusion may arise when plaintiffs in two cases have a special relationship, the state never proved that such a relationship existed between the plaintiffs in this case and those in the similar state court case.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the relevant section of the VRA does not apply to redistricting and therefore could not be used to justify racial gerrymandering.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that, in evaluating a potential racial gerrymander, courts must assume the good intentions of the legislature. Therefore, the plaintiffs must meet the burden of showing that the legislature was improperly motivated by race and could have achieved any legitimate political objectives through another redistricting plan. The plaintiffs in this case failed to meet that burden by not submitting an alternative map of the districts in question. Although the majority opinion argued that the alternative map was only one method of showing that race was the predominant redistricting factor, Justice Alito wrote that the requirement was a sound one, based in precedent, that reflected the familiar allocation of burdens of proof. Additionally, Justice Alito argued that the lower court was not presented with sufficient evidence that considerations about race dominated the redistricting effort. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Justice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp.

Promega Corporation owned four patents and was the exclusive licensee of another one for technology used in kits that can conduct genetic testing. The kits are usually used for the purposes of identifying forensic or paternity matches. In 2010, Promega sued Life Technologies Corporation (LifeTech) for infringing on the patents in question, and LifeTech filed counterclaims that argued that the asserted claims of the patents were invalid. The district court determined that LifeTech had directly infringed on the patents and the case proceeded to damages. During the damages phase, there was a dispute about whether or not Promega had met its burden to prove that it was eligible for damages based on its worldwide sales. The jury determined that Promega was eligible for the worldwide damages, but the district court granted LifeTech’s motion to vacate the judgment because it determined that, as a matter of law, Promega had failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain that jury verdict. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and determined that there was substantial evidence that LifeTech was liable for worldwide damages.

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A single component cannot justify liability for the producer of the component.Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 7-0 majority. The Court held that, because the phrase “substantial portion” was attached to the phrase “of components of a patented invention” in the text of the statute, the word “substantial” was meant to be read as a quantitative measure. Further, the plural use of the word “components” indicated that a “substantial portion” must always be more than one component. Thus, a single component could never constitute a “substantial portion” of a multi-component invention. The Court also determined that Congress intended this reading because the statute was meant to fill a gap in patent law that prevented enforcement of patent rights on collections of components produced in the United States and sent overseas. Therefore, Lifetech was not liable because it only produced one of the five components required for the kits.
In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., noted that the majority opinion failed to identify what number of components constituted a “substantial portion.” Rather, the opinion only identified that one component is not sufficient.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., did not participate in the decision of this case.


On April 11, 2007, Travis Beckles was arrested because a sawed-off shotgun was located in his residence, and he had previous felony convictions, mostly for drug possession and sales. Beckles was convicted, and during the sentencing phase of his trial, the district court determined that Beckles was an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) who had been in possession of a firearm and was therefore subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, Beckles was eligible for a sentence range from 360 months to life imprisonment, and the court sentenced him to 360 months in prison, five months of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine. Beckles appealed and argued that the Sentencing Guidelines imposed an unreasonable sentence, that his prior convictions did not qualify as “violent felonies” subject to sentencing enhancement under ACCA, and that possession of a sawed-off shotgun was not a “crime of violence” subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Beckles’ conviction and sentence.
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. United States, which determined that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutional. On remand, the appellate court again upheld Beckles’ conviction and sentence because possession of a sawed-off shotgun was a “crime of violence.” The appellate court also held that the Johnson decision did not affect this case because Beckles was not sentenced under the residual clause of ACCA but rather under express language from the Sentencing Guidelines about sentencing enhancements for crimes of violence.

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The Court’s holding in Johnson v. US does not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 7-0 majority. The Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines were not unconstitutionally vague like the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the Sentencing Guidelines are a simply a guide to assist judges exercise discretion in sentencing. The Sentencing Guidelines are primarily advisory, and do not necessarily constrain judge’s discretion. While the ACCA provides notice of potential punishment by providing the range of potential imprisonment length, the Sentencing Guidelines need not do so, as they are meant to guide judges and therefore need not provide notice to people who might be prosecuted.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy noted that while Sentencing Guidelines are not necessarily immune from constitutional challenges, they may not be challenged for vagueness.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in judgment in which she stated that, since Beckles was already convicted of a crime of violence under the ACCA, he could not challenge the Sentencing Guidelines. She asserted that the Court should wait until a case better-suited for ruling on the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines was before it. In her separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Sonia Sotomayor agreed with Justice Ginsburg that the Court did not need to rule on the Sentencing Guidelines because Beckles had already been convicted under the ACCA. Additionally, Justice Sotomayor stated that, because the Sentencing Guidelines provided such strong guidance, they should be subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause.
Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the decision of this case.


Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corporation

Crystal Monique Lightfoot and Beverly Ann Hollis-Arlington sued the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) in federal district court and alleged numerous state and federal law claims arising out of the foreclosure proceedings Fannie Mae initiated against Hollis-Arlington’s home. The district court dismissed and held that the plaintiffs had failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding their claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
The plaintiffs then sued in California state court and alleged the state law equivalents of the claims in the earlier federal suit. Fannie Mae removed the case to federal court and argued that its federal corporate charter contained language that granted federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over cases in which it was involved as a plaintiff or defendant. The plaintiffs in this case moved for a remand back to state court, but the district court denied the remand and then dismissed all the claims as having already been litigated in the earlier case in federal court. The appellate court determined that the language in Fannie Mae’s federal charter conferred subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts and affirmed the dismissal.

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The “to sue or and be sued” language in the federal charter of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) does not grant federal district courts subject matter jurisdiction over case involving Fannie Mae, and American National Red Cross v. S.G. need not be overturned. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which examined previous cases in which the Court had decided whether a “sue and be sued” clause conferred federal jurisdiction. Although the language in Fannie Mae’s charter looks like language in charters that the Court held conferred federal jurisdiction, it also included the qualification “of competent jurisdiction,” which the other clauses lacked. Because this language was not identical to those in the charters that the Court had held established federal subject matter jurisdiction, the previous cases do not control the outcome of this case. Instead, the additional “competent jurisdiction” language means that only a court with existing subject matter jurisdiction can hear a case in which Fannie Mae is suing or being sued. The Court’s prior opinion in American National Red Cross v. S.G. does not require a different result because it confirmed the rule that a “sue and be sued” clause only confers federal jurisdiction if it specifically references federal courts. There was no reason to think that Congress intended a different result.


Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act protects foreign sovereigns from suits in American courts unless one of a set of specifically enumerated exceptions applies. One of these exceptions is when the foreign sovereign takes U.S. property (the expropriation exception), and another is when the action of the foreign sovereign has direct effect on U.S. commercial activity (the commercial activity exception).
Oklahoma-based company Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company owns a subsidiary that contracts with the Venezuelan state-owned corporation that controls the exploration, production, and exportation of oil in Venezuela. In 2007, the two companies executed contracts for the Venezuelan corporation to use Helmerich & Payne’s drilling rigs. By 2008, the unpaid debt from those contracts totaled more than $63 million, and when the debt was over $100 million in 2009, Helmerich & Payne announced it would not be renewing the contract and packed up its drills. Employees of the Venezuelan corporation, assisted by members of the Venezuelan National Guard blockaded the yards in which Helmerich & Payne was keeping its equipment, and then-President Hugo Chavez issued a Decree of Expropriation. Helmerich & Payne sued Venezuela and its state-owned corporation in federal district court under the expropriation and commercial activity exceptions to the FSIA. Venezuela moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion with respect to the expropriation claim but denied it with respect to the commercial activity claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that, because the expropriation claim was neither insubstantial nor frivolous, the district court should not have granted the motion to dismiss that claim.

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The “frivolous or insubstantial” standard is not consistent with the text and purpose of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that the expropriation exception to the FSIA was a threshold question of jurisdiction that did not require the court to delve into the merits of the case to determine whether the claim was frivolous or insubstantial. Although a court may take evidence to resolve factual questions, that should be limited to determining whether the allegations state a valid claim that the property at issue was taken in violation of international law. The Court held that this interpretation of the statute is consistent with its language and serves its purpose of preventing foreign sovereigns from being improperly entangled in court proceedings, which follows Supreme Court precedent and the relevant international law principles.
Justice Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


The Frys’ daughter, E.F., was born with cerebral palsy and was prescribed a service dog to assist with everyday tasks. Her school, which provided her with a human aide in accordance with her Individualized Education Plan (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), did not allow her to bring her service dog to school. The Frys sued the school, the principal, and the school district and argued that they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and state disabilities laws. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss because the claims necessarily implicated the IDEA, which required plaintiffs to exhaust all administrative remedies before suing under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The Frys appealed and argued that the exhaustion requirement did not apply because they were seeking damages, which is not the sort of relief the IDEA provided. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and held that the Frys’ claims were essentially educational, which are precisely the sort of claims the IDEA was meant to address, and therefore the exhaustion requirement applied.

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The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) does not require that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before suing under the Americans with Disabilities Act if the plaintiff’s claims are not based in, and seeking relief for, the denial of a free and appropriate public education (FAPE). Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the plain language of the exhaustion requirement in the IDEA only applies to remedies that are “available” under that statutory scheme, which is entirely structured around ensuring the provision of FAPE. If a lawsuit is not seeking relief for the denial of FAPE, then it is not seeking an available remedy under the IDEA, and the exhaustion requirement does not apply. Therefore, in determining whether the plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies, courts must examine the substance of the plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether the plaintiff is seeking relief for a denial of FAPE. Although this examination must do more than look at how the plaintiff labels the relief she seeks, it does not require that the court determine the plaintiff could have sought such relief. In this case, the Frys’ complaint alleges only disability-based discrimination and makes no allegations about the denial of FAPE, but the Court did not foreclose the possibility that a more in-depth examination would reveal something different.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that some of the indicators the majority opinion identified as helpful in determining whether a complaint sought relief for denial of FAPE would only confuse lower courts. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence in part and concurrence in the judgment.


Jevic Transportation, Inc. was a trucking company headquartered in New Jersey that in 2006 was purchased by a subsidiary of Sun Capital Partners. In 2008, Jevic filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; at that point, it owed about $53 million to its first-priority senior secured creditors and about $20 million to its tax and general unsecured creditors. Two lawsuits ensued in bankruptcy court: one was the truck drivers suing Jevic for violating federal and state Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Acts, which required 60 days’ notice to workers before they were laid off, and the other was a fraudulent conveyance action on behalf of the unsecured creditors. In March 2012, the parties to the fraudulent conveyance action negotiated a structured dismissal settlement that disposed of many of the claims, but left out the drivers. The drivers objected to the settlement because it distributed property to creditors of lower priority than the drivers, according to the priorities established in the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court rejected the objections and approved the proposed settlement. The federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed and held that the bankruptcy court had the discretion to approve a settlement scheme outside of the Chapter 11 proceedings that did not comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s distribution scheme.

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