No. The unanimous Court held that as long as officers have a reasonable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, they may stop any vehicle. In the present case, the officers had reasonable cause to stop the petitioners for a traffic violation since they sped away from a stop sign at an 'unreasonable speed' and without using their turn signal. Thus, since an actual traffic violation occurred, the ensuing search and seizure of the offending vehicle was reasonable, regardless of what other personal motivations the officers might have had for stopping the vehicle. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim that the anxiety, confusion, and haste which the petitioners experienced from the stop-and-search outweighed the government's interest in traffic safety. While the Fourth Amendment does require a balancing test between a search-and-seizure's benefits and the harm it might cause to the individual, such a test only applies to unusually harmful searches and seizures. There was nothing unusually harmful about this traffic stop.


The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the two programs would offer "substantively comparable" educational benefits. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.

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No. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. Because it failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's gender-biased admissions policy, Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Virginia failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to educational diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. Furthermore, Virginia's VWIL could not offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men. The VWIL would not provide women with the same rigorous military training, faculty, courses, facilities, financial opportunities, or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords its male cadets. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" between VMI and VWIL was misplaced. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" standard was a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard, requiring that "all gender-based classifications today" be evaluated with "heightened scrutiny." When evaluated with such "heightened scrutiny," Virginia's plan to create the VWIL would not provide women with the same opportunities as VMI provides its men and so it failed to meet requirements of the equal protection clause. [NOTE: Justice Ginsburg's announcement of the Court's opinion may be considered an address to the American public. It is a plain-spoken and forceful summary of the majority position.]


Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A.

Barbara Smiley, a resident of California, possessed credits cards issued by Citibank, a national bank located in South Dakota. Under certain circumstances, Citibank will issue late-payment fees. In 1992, Smiley brought a class action against Citibank on behalf of herself and other California holders of Citibank's credit cards, alleging that the late-payment fees charged by Citibank, although legal under South Dakota law, violated California law. In response, Citibank argued that a provision of the National Bank Act of 1864, which permits a national bank to charge its loan customers "interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State... where the bank is located," pre-empted Smiley's state law claims. After accepting Citibank's argument that late-payment fees constituted "interest," the California Superior Court ruled in its favor. The California Superior Court Supreme Court affirmed.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the National Bank Act of 1864 authorizes such charges because a regulation adopted by the Comptroller of the Currency, which defined interest to include late-payment fees, was a reasonable interpretation of the act and entitled to deference. The Court rejected arguments that late-payment fees do not constitute interest because they do not vary based on the payment owed or the time period of delay and because they are penalties.


O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake

O'Hare Truck Service was one among several towing companies employed by the city of Northlake. Northlake kept a list of available towing companies and would only remove a company from its list after a showing of cause. In the present case, however, Northlake removed O'Hare Truck Service from its list because O'Hare's owner did not support Northlake's mayoral candidate in his reelection campaign. Instead, O'Hare's owner supported the opposition candidate. Upon removal from Northlake's employment list, O'Hare Truck Service filed suit alleging that its dismissal was a retaliation for its lack of support for Northlake's mayoral candidate. The dismissal was the cause of substantial loss in income. On appeal from the District Court's dismissal for failure to state a First Amendment violation, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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Yes. The Court held, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, that independent contractors, such as O'Hare Truck Service, are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as those afforded to government employees. Accordingly, Northlake could not condition the towing company's employment on its political affiliations or beliefs unless Northlake could demonstrate that O'Hare's political affiliations had a reasonable and appreciable effect on its job performance. The Court held that Northlake neither attempted nor would it have been able to make such a demonstration. Therefore, Northlake's removal of O'Hare Truck Service from its employment list was unconstitutional.


Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. v. Calhoun

In 1989, 12-year-old Natalie Calhoun died in a collision in territorial waters off Puerto Rico while riding a Yamaha jet ski. Natalie's parents, invoking Pennsylvania's wrongful-death and survival statutes, filed a federal diversity and admiralty action for damages against Yamaha. Yamaha argued that, because Natalie died on navigable waters, state remedies could not be applied, and that federal, judge-declared maritime law controlled to the exclusion of state law. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the District Court held that the federal maritime wrongful-death action excluded state law remedies, but that loss of society and loss of support and services were compensable. Both sides ask for an appeal. After granting the interlocutory review petition, the appellate panel held that state remedies remain applicable in accident cases of this type and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful-death action.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that state remedies remain applicable in such cases and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful-death action recognized in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375. The Court rejected Yamaha's argument that Moragne's wrongful-death action covers the waters, creating a uniform federal maritime remedy for all deaths occurring in state territorial waters, which replaces all state remedies previously available to supplement general maritime law.


Brian Degen was indicted in 1989 for distributing marijuana, laundering money, and related crimes. On the same day the district court unsealed the indictment, it also unsealed a civil forfeiture complaint for properties allegedly worth $5.5 million and purchased with proceeds of Degen's drug sales or used to facilitate the sales. Degen is a citizen of both the U.S. and Switzerland, and in 1988 he and his family moved to Switzerland. He has not returned to the U.S. to face criminal charges and by treaty the Swiss are not obliged to extradite their nationals to the U.S. While residing in Switzerland, Degen filed an answer in the civil case, claiming that the forfeiture was barred by the statute of limitations and was an unlawful retroactive application of forfeiture laws. The district court did not consider his arguments. Instead, it entered summary judgment against him, holding that he was not entitled to be heard in the civil action because he remained outside the country, unamenable to criminal prosecution. On appeal, the government argued that the district court's inherent powers authorized it to strike Degen's claims under the "fugitive disentitlement doctrine."

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No. Principles of deference to the other branches of government require a court to invoke its inherent power only as a reasonable response to the problems and needs that provoke it. No sufficient reason justifies disentitlement here. Since the court's jurisdiction over the property is secure despite Degen's absence, there is no risk of delay or frustration in determining the merits of the government's forfeiture claims or in enforcing the resulting judgment. Also, the court has alternatives, other than disentitlement, to keep Degen from using liberal civil discovery rules to gain an improper advantage in the criminal prosecution, where discovery is more limited. Finally, disentitlement is an excessive response to the court's interests in redressing the indignity visited upon it by Degen's absence from the criminal proceeding, and in deterring flight from criminal prosecution in general; it is a response that erodes rather than enhances the dignity of the court.


Bennis's husband was convicted of gross indecency following his sexual activity with a prostitute in the couple's jointly-owned car. The local county prosecutor filed a complaint alleging the car was a public nuisance subject to abatement (i.e., to eliminate or confiscate the car). The Circuit Court entered the abatement order, but the Appeals Court reversed. After granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the appellate court's decision and re-entered the abatement order. Bennis appealed to the Supreme Court.

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Writing for a 5-to-4 majority, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist held that the abatement order against Bennis's car did not violate the takings clause. Her innocence and lack of knowledge concerning her husband's illegal and indecent activity, in the couple's jointly owned car, could not serve as a defense against her vehicle's forfeiture. Furthermore, under the present circumstances, the vehicle's forfeiture did not violate Bennis's property rights without due process. Michigan's abatement policy, aimed at deterring criminal uses of property, lawfully transferred her's vehicle to the state. As such, Michigan is not required to compensate Bennis for the vehicle's forfeiture.


An Exxon oil tanker, the Houston, broke free from a mooring facility under control of the respondents, Sofec, Inc. Exxon filed a complaint alleging negligence and breach of warranty in federal district court. Sofec, Inc. filed a successful motion to bifurcate the trial. The trial court considered whether the conduct of the ship's captain, Coyne, was the "superceding and sole proximate cause of the loss of the ship" after the ship had broken free of the moorings in order to determine if the tanker would have been lost despite Coyne's actions. The cause of the ship's release from the moorings became a secondary issue. The court found Coyne negligent, which was the primary cause of the Houston's grounding and subsequent loss. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Exxon petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a plaintiff in admiralty that is the superseding cause of its own injury, and thus the sole, proximate cause, cannot recover part of its damages from tort-feasors or contracting partners whose blameworthy actions were causes in fact of the injury.


The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) provides for "the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use," and classifies such devices based on their level of risk. Class III devices pose the greatest risk and, thus, are subject to a rigorous premarket approval (PMA) process. However, two statutory exceptions to this process exist. Because Medtronic, Inc.'s pacemaker is a Class III device found substantially equivalent to a pre-existing device, it can avoid the PMA process. In 1990, Lora Lohr's Medtronic pacemaker failed, allegedly according to a defect. Lohr and her spouse filed a Florida state-court suit, alleging both negligence and strict-liability claims. Medtronic removed the case to federal district court. The court then dismissed the case as pre-empted by 21 USC section 360k(a), which provides that "no State...may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under [the MDA] to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under [the Act]." Reversing and affirming in part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Lohrs' negligent design claims were not pre-empted, but that their negligent manufacturing and failure to warn claims were. (This case was decided together with 95-886, Lohr et vir v. Medtronic, Inc.)

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No. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals decision was reversed insofar as it held that any of the claims were pre-empted and affirmed insofar as it rejected any pre-emption defense. In a 9-0 vote, the Court allowed the lawsuit based on alleged defects in the pacemaker's design to proceed. In a 5-4 vote, the Court allowed the lawsuit to proceed on its claims of alleged defects in its manufacturing and failure to warn. Justice Stevens reasoned that the MDA was not intended to pre-empt "traditional common-law remedies against manufacturers and distributors of defective devices," as long as they paralleled federal requirements.


After purchasing cocaine, Juan Melendez was charged with violating federal drug laws. The law carried a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment. Melendez signed a plea agreement stating he would be cooperative. In turn the government agreed to give him a short sentence. The District Court thus sentenced Melendez to ten years in prison, the mandatory minimum. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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No. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, in the absence of a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district court to "impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence," a prison sentence must not violate the statutory sentencing minimum.


A general court-martial found Dwight J. Loving, an Army private, guilty of both premeditated murder and felony murder under Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The court-martial sentenced Loving to death based on the aggravating factors that the premeditated murder was committed during a robbery and that he had committed a second murder. The commander who convened the court-martial approved the findings and sentence. In affirming, the U.S. Army Court of Military Review and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces rejected Loving's contention that the President lacked the authority to prescribe aggravating factors in capital murder cases that enabled the court-martial to sentence him to death. Loving claimed that the separation-of-powers principle prevented the President from promulgating the Executive Order.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that not only does the Constitution require the aggravating factors of the military's death penalty, but that the President's prescription of the challenged aggravating factors did not violate the separation-of-powers principle. Justice Kennedy wrote, "[a]lthough it may not delegate the power to make the law...Congress may delegate to others the authority or discretion to execute the law under and in pursuance of its terms."


Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

Sections 10(a) and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act (the Act) empower leased access channel cable operators to control programming that they believe is indecent and obscene. Section 10(b) of the Act requires public access channel cable operators to restrict "patently offensive" programming to a single channel, access to which must be restricted to those subscribers who submit written requests. Petitioners, television access programmers and cable television viewers, filed suit alleging that the Act's empowerments and restrictions violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. This case was consolidated with Alliance for Community Media v. FCC.

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No and yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, The Court held that the Act's grant of authority to leased channel cable operators under 10(a) - allowing them to restrict the transmission of "patently offensive" or indecent programming - is consistent with the First Amendment. The authority's discretionary nature and ultimate objective of protecting young viewers from offensive programming, is a constitutionally permissible method of restoring editorial authority to cable operators. By contrast, the Court found provision 10(c), permitting cable operators to ban offensive or indecent programming on public access channels, to be unconstitutional. Public access channels are already supervised by both private and public elements and have never been edited by cable operators in the past. Furthermore, a "cable operator's veto" is likely to ban many programs that should have been aired, and the volume of "patently offensive" programming on public access channels has never been so high as to warrant severe restrictions on its content. Finally, with respect to Section 10(b), the Court held that its "segregate and block" requirements for public access channels is also unconstitutional. Section 10(b), by enabling cable operators to take as many as 30 days to respond to a consumer's request to unlock their restricted channel, is overly restrictive. Also, by blocking out an entire channel, 10(b) does not permit viewers or operators to discern between offensive and "patently offensive" programming.


Jason Richards and others, who are privately employed in Jefferson County, filed a state court class action suit claiming that the county's occupation tax violates the Federal and Alabama Constitutions. The Alabama trial court found that their state claims were barred by a prior adjudication, Bedingfield v. Jefferson County. The unsuccessful Bedingfield adjudication of the tax was brought by Birmingham's acting finance director and the city itself, consolidated with a suit by three county taxpayers. However, the court found that their federal claims had not been decided in that case. On appeal, the county argued that the federal claims were also barred. The State Supreme Court agreed, concluding that the doctrine of res judicata applied because Richard and others were adequately represented in the Bedingfield action.

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Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that because Richards and others received neither notice of, nor sufficient representation in, the Bedingfield litigation, that adjudication, as a matter of federal due process, may not bind them and thus cannot bar them from challenging an allegedly unconstitutional deprivation of their property.


Matsushita Elec. Industrial Company v. Epstein

In 1990, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. made a tender offer for the common stock of MCA, Inc., a Delaware corporation, which resulted in Matsushita's acquisition of MCA. Subsequently, two lawsuits followed. First, a class action filed in Delaware, alleged that, among other things, Matsushita and MCA conspired violating Delaware law. The second suit, filed in federal court, alleged that Matsushita's tender offer violated certain Securities and Exchange Commission Rules promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts in such suits. After Matsushita won the federal case, and while it was on appeal, the parties to the state action reached a settlement. The class-action settlement stated that class members who did not opt out of the class would waive all claims in connection with the tender offer, including those asserted in the federal action. As members of both state and federal plaintiff classes, who neither opted out of the settlement class nor appeared to contest the settlement or the representation of the class, pursued the federal appeal, Matsushita argued that the Delaware judgment was a bar to further prosecution under the Full Faith and Credit Act.

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No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, absent a partial repeal of the Full Faith and Credit Act by another federal statute, a federal court must give the judgment the same effect that it would have in the courts of the State in which it was rendered. Writing for the court, Justice Thomas said the federal Full Faith and Credit Act "is generally applicable in cases in which the state-court judgment at issue incorporates a class-action settlement releasing claims solely within the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Justice John Paul Stevens penned an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, and was joined in part by Justice David H. Souter.


Byron Keith Cooper was charged with the murder of an 86-year-old man in the course of a burglary. After an Oklahoma jury found him guilty of first-degree murder and recommended punishment by death, the trial court imposed the death penalty. Cooper's competence was considered on five separate occasions, whether he had the ability to understand the charges against him and to assist defense counsel. Oklahoma law presumes that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial unless he proves his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. Despite Cooper's bizarre behavior and conflicting expert testimony, he was found competent on separate occasions before and during his trial. In affirming the conviction and sentence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Cooper's argument that the State's presumption of competence, combined with its clear and convincing evidence standard, placed such an onerous burden on him as to violate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that because Oklahoma's procedural rule allows the State to try a defendant who is more likely than not incompetent, it violates due process. Justice Stevens wrote for the court that the stringent standard is "incompatible with the dictates of due process," and that criminal defendants must be allowed to avoid trial if they prove incompetence by a "preponderance of the evidence."


During 1987, Robert F. Lundy and his wife had $10,131 in federal income taxes withheld from their wages. This amount was substantially more than what the Lundys owed in taxes that year, but they did not file their 1987 tax return when it was due, nor did they file a return or claim a refund of the overpaid taxes in the following 2 1/2 years. In 1990, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed Lundy a notice of deficiency for 1987. Subsequently, the Lundys filed their joint 1987 tax return, which claimed a refund of their overpaid taxes. Lundy also filed a petition in the Tax Court seeking a redetermination of the claimed deficiency and a refund. The Commissioner contended that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund, arguing that if a taxpayer does not file a tax return before the IRS mails the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, the Tax Court can only award the taxpayer a refund of taxes paid within two years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. The Tax Court agreed, finding also that 2-year "look-back" period applies. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the applicable look-back period in these circumstances is three years and that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to award a refund.

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No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that in these circumstances a 2-year look-back period applies and the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award a refund. Finding that the Tax Court properly applied the 2-year look-back period to Lundy's case, Justice O'Connor noted that Lundy's taxes were withheld from his wages such that they were deemed paid on the date his 1987 tax return was due, which is more than two years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. The Lundy was thus seeking a refund of taxes paid outside the applicable look-back period. Justices John Paul Stevens and Clarence Thomas filed dissents.


Paula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton. She alleged that while she was an Arkansas state employee, she suffered several "abhorrent" sexual advances from then Arkansas Governor Clinton. Jones claimed that her continued rejection of Clinton's advances ultimately resulted in punishment by her state supervisors. Following a District Court's grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to the suit be suspended, pending a ruling on his prior request to have the suit dismissed on grounds of presidential immunity, Clinton sought to invoke his immunity to completely dismiss the Jones suit against him. While the District Judge denied Clinton's immunity request, the judge ordered the stay of any trial in the matter until after Clinton's Presidency. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial but reversed the trial deferment ruling since it would be a "functional equivalent" to an unlawful grant of temporary presidential immunity.

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No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not grant a sitting President immunity from civil litigation except under highly unusual circumstances. After noting the great respect and dignity owed to the Executive office, the Court held that neither separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level information can justify an unqualified Presidential immunity from judicial process. While the independence of our government's branches must be protected under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Constitution does not prohibit these branches from exercising any control over one another. This, the Court added, is true despite the procedural burdens which Article III jurisdiction may impose on the time, attention, and resources of the Chief Executive.


In 1995, Mississippi attempted to simplify voter registration in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). A "Provisional Plan" for registration replaced the "Old System," mandating that, among other things, driver's license applications could double as voter registration forms for state and federal elections. As required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), the U.S. Attorney General pre-cleared the Provisional Plan, confirming that it did not discriminate against minority voters. Mississippi abandoned the pre-cleared Provisional Plan in favor of a composite "New System," which used the Old System for state elections and both the Provisional Plan and Old System for federal elections. Mississippi assumed that the Attorney General's pre-clearance of the Provisional Plan extended to the New System. Thomas Young, a Mississippi citizen, filed suit against Governor Kirk Fordice, alleging a violation of the VRA. A three-judge District Court ruled in favor of Mississippi.

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Yes. The unanimous Court reversed the District Court and ruled that Mississippi must submit the New System to the Attorney General for pre-clearance. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that "the New System contains numerous examples of new, significantly different administrative practices [....]" Therefore, the Attorney General must ensure that the proposed policy does not discriminate against minorities.


Based on the 1990 census, the Florida Legislature adopted a reapportionment plan for State Senate and House districts. After the Justice Department refused to preclear the plan and it appeared as if the Governor, Senate President, and House Speaker would not convene a session, the Florida Supreme Court revised the redistricting plan itself. In 1995, C. Martin Lawyer, III, and other residents filed suit against state and federal parties, alleging that his district, Senate District 21, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District permitted the State Senate and House of Representatives to intervene and ultimately, all the parties, but Lawyer, agreed to a settlement that revised District 21 under a new plan. The District Court rejected Lawyer's argument that the court had to find the original reapportionment plan unconstitutional, because race seemingly determined District 21's contours, before the settlement could be approved. The court approved the settlement.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by David H. Souter, the Court held that the State exercised the choice to which it was entitled under our cases, that Lawyer had no right to block the settlement, and that he failed to point out any unconstitutionality in the proposed plan. The Court found that Lawyer's agreement to the provisional settlement did not require the District Court to adjudicate the constitutionality of the plan before approving the settlement and that the court, in redrawing the district, did not subordinate Florida's traditional districting principles to race. Justice Souter wrote that "the evidence amply supports the trial court's views that race did not predominate over Florida's traditional districting principles....[Lawyer] has provided nothing that calls that conclusion into question, much less that points to any clear error." Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, dissented.


Department of State v. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc.

Prior to 1989, Hong Kong automatically granted Vietnamese immigrants temporary refuge. Due to increasing immigration rates from Vietnam, Hong Kong revoked the privilege in 1989 and began requiring that Vietnamese immigrants prove refugee status or be "screened-out" (advised to leave Hong Kong).
The United States consulate continued to process visas for "screened-out" applicants until 1993, when the State Department specifically instructed the consulate to buttress Hong Kong's immigration policy by sending "screened-out" applicants back to Vietnam. Two applicants claimed that the department had violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by denying visas to a class of applicants on the basis of their nationality and place of residence (8 U.S.C. 1152(a)). A district court held that the case was moot and granted summary judgment to the State Department.
Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc. (LAVAS) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which reversed the decision and mandated that the foreign consulate continue to process the visa applications. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court and consolidated with Le v. United States Dept. of State.

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Unanswered. Before the Supreme Court could decide the case, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRA), which clarified that no provision in the INA "shall be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of State to determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications or the locations where such applications will be processed." The Supreme Court, in a unanimous per curiam decision, instructed the District Court to reconsider the case in light of the IIRA's clarification.


Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program took effect whenever the state prisons became overcrowded and authorized the conditional release of prisoners before their sentences expired. The Pardon and Parole Board determined who could participate in it, and an inmate could be placed on preparole after serving 15% of his sentence. An inmate was eligible for parole only after one third of his sentence had elapsed, and the Governor, based on the Board's recommendation, decided to grant parole. Program participants and parolees were released subject to similar constraints. Upon reviewing Leroy L. Young's criminal record and prison conduct, the Board recommended him for parole and released him under the Program. At that time, he had served 15 years of a life sentence. After he spent five months outside the penitentiary, the Governor denied him parole, whereupon he was ordered to, and did, report back to prison. Despite his claim that his summary reincarceration deprived him of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, he was denied habeas relief by the state trial court, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Federal District Court. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that preparole was sufficiently like parole that a Program participant was entitled to procedural protections.

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Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program, as it existed when Leroy L. Young was released, was equivalent to parole and therefore he was entitle to procedural due process safeguards.


After stopping Robinette for speeding, an Ohio deputy warned him, returned his license, and asked him if he had any illegal contraband, weapons, or drugs in his car. Robinette answered "no" but after agreeing to have his car searched, the officer found some marijuana and a pill that later proved to be a powerful drug. On appeal from the Ohio Court of Appeals' reversal of his lower court conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the Ohio Supreme Court Affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Ohio certiorari.

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No. After establishing its federal jurisdiction, despite a claim that the matter involved aspects of Ohio's Constitution, the Court held that when looking at the totality of the circumstances it may be reasonably concluded that if a defendant consents to be searched, even if not first advised that he is "free to go," the ensuing search will be recognized as voluntary. The Court also added that Robinette's arrest on drug possession charges was lawful, even though the arresting officer did not stop him on an initial suspicion of drug possession nor intend to even issue him a speeding ticket.


Isaac Boggs married Sandra Boggs, the petitioner, after the death of Dorothy, his previous wife. When Isaac retired in 1985, he received various benefits from his employer's retirement plans, including a lump sum savings plan distribution, shares of stock from the company's employee stock ownership plan, and a monthly annuity payment. In 1989, following Issac's death a dispute over ownership of the benefits arose between Sandra and Issac's sons, Thomas F., Harry M., and David B. Boggs. The sons' claim is based on Dorothy's purported testamentary transfer to them, under Louisiana law, of a portion of her community property interest in Isaac's undistributed pension plan benefits. Sandra contested the validity of that transfer, arguing that the sons' claim is pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The Federal District Court disagreed and granted summary judgment against Sandra. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Yes. In a opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts state community-property law allowing a non-participant spouse to transfer by a testamentary instrument an interest in undistributed pension plan benefits. Justice Kennedy said "ERISA's solicitude for the economic security of surviving spouses would be undermined" by allowing a previous spouse's heirs to claim a share of such benefits."


Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.

In 1937, Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) to promote fair pricing and uniform marketing conditions in the agriculture business. Exempted from antitrust laws, the AMAA mandated uniform prices, product standards, and other conditions; all of which had to be approved by at least two-thirds of the affected producers and implemented by producer committees appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. The AMAA's administrative expenses were to be covered by assessments imposed on activities such as product advertising and promotion. After suffering adverse rulings at the administrative, District, and Circuit Court levels, a group of California tree fruit growers, handlers, and processors appealed their constitutional challenge of the AMAA to the Supreme Court - which granted certiorari.

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No. Exempting its financial regulations from the heightened review standard appropriate in most First Amendment issues, the Court's 5-to-4 decision held that just because the AMAA's economic regulations may indirectly result in the reduction of the complaining parties' advertising budgets, they did not violate their free speech. The relevant assessments did not force the growers, handlers, or processors to repeat unsuccessful ads, to respond to negative ads when they preferred to remain silent, or to be publicly identified with messages other than their own. All the AMAA required of these parties were contributions for ad campaigns which were ultimately aimed at promoting their own welfare by encouraging customers to buy their products.


Several individual members of the 104th Congress, who voted against the passage of the Line Item Veto Act (Act) giving the President authority to veto individual tax and spending measures after having signed them into law, sued to challenge the Act's constitutionality. After granting them standing, the District Court ruled in the congressmen's favor as it found the Act unconstitutional. Direct appeal was granted to the Supreme Court.

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No. In a 7-to-2 decision, which avoided the question of the Act's constitutionality, the Court held that the individual congressmen lacked proper Article III standing to maintain their suit. The Court explained that the congressmen failed to show how the allegedly unconstitutional Act resulted in their personal injury, since it applied to the entire institution of Congress. Moreover, the congressmen based their claim on a loss of political power rather than a demonstration of how the Act violated one of their particularized legally protected interests. The Court concluded that, having failed to meet both of these standing requirements, the congressmen did not present the Court with a case-or-controversy over which it had jurisdiction.


Saratoga Fishing Company v. J. M. Martinac & Company

J. M. Martinac & Co. built the fishing vessel M/V Saratoga. Martinac installed a hydraulic system designed by Marco Seattle Inc. in the Saratoga. The initial user, Joseph Madruga, bought the ship new and added extra equipment. Madruga then sold the Saratoga to Saratoga Fishing Co., the subsequent user. Saratoga Fishing used the ship until it caught fire and sank. Saratoga Fishing then filed an admiralty tort suit against Martinac and Marco. Precedent stated that an admiralty tort plaintiff cannot recover damages for the physical damage that a defective product caused to the "product itself," but can recover damages for physical damage that the product caused to "other property." The District Court found that the hydraulic system had been defectively designed and awarded Saratoga Fishing damages, including damages for the loss of the equipment added by Madruga. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the added equipment was part of the ship when it was resold to Saratoga Fishing and, therefore, was part of the defective product that itself caused the harm.

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Yes. In a decision authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled that equipment added by the initial user before he sold the ship to the subsequent user is "other property," and as Justice Breyer wrote, "[e]quipment added to a product after the manufacturer . . . has sold the product to an initial user is not part of the product that itself caused the physical harm."


Richard J. Homar, a tenured policeman for East Stroudsburg University (ESU), was arrested for possession of illegal drugs. ESU, a Pennsylvania state institution, immediately suspended him without pay until his culpability could be determined. State police dropped the charges but the suspension continued. At a later hearing ESU demoted Homar to groundskeeper, relying on his confession to police. Homar argued that ESU president James Gilbert had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the suspension. A district court granted summary judgment to ESU. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the decision, holding that it was illegal to withhold pay without first providing a hearing.

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No. The Court ruled unanimously that a pre-suspension hearing is not necessary to protect the rights of a tenured employee who is suspended without pay. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia balanced three factors relevant to constitutional due process: 1) the weight of the private interest of the accused; 2) the chance of wrongfully depriving the private interest; and 3) the weight of the government's interest. The Court held that "[s]o long as the suspended employee receives a sufficiently prompt post suspension hearing, the lost income is relatively insubstantial."


In 1992, Charlie Frank Robertson filed a class action suit in an Alabama trial court, alleging that Liberty National Life Insurance Company had fraudulently encouraged its customers to exchange existing health insurance policies for new policies that, according to Robertson, provided less coverage for cancer treatment. The trial court appointed Robertson as class representative and certified the class pursuant to provisions of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure that do not give class members the right to exclude themselves from a class. The trial court then approved a settlement agreement that precluded class members from individually suing Liberty National for fraud based on its insurance policy exchange program. Guy E. Adams and other petitioners, who had objected to the settlement in the trial court, appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. The court's opinion only addressed state law issues and did not answer whether the certification and settlement of this class action suit violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the class members were not afforded the right to opt out of the class or the settlement.

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In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The Court noted that the Alabama Supreme Court did not expressly address the question on which certiorari was granted and that the petitioners had failed to establish that they had properly presented the issue to that court. Therefore, the Court concluded that it could not reach the question presented without unbalancing our dual system of government to "disturb the finality of state judgments on a federal ground that the state court did not have occasion to consider."


Stanley B. McGill, whose estate is administrated by Marion Brockamp, paid the Internal Revenue Service money he did not owe. McGill, or his representative, submitted an administrative refund claim several years past the end of the applicable filing period set forth in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. McGill asked the court to extend the statutory period for an "equitable" reason, namely that he had a mental disability that caused the delay. Although such a reason is not mentioned in the Internal Revenue Code, the Court of Appeals read the statute as if it contained an implied "equitable tolling" exception, which the court found justified, and therefore permitted the actions to proceed.

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No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled that Congress did not intend the "equitable tolling" doctrine to apply to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986's time limitations for filing tax refund claims. Justice Breyer wrote that allowing such exceptions to the filing deadline "could create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and perhaps litigate, large numbers of late claims."


The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local chief law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found the background-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could remain. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background-check provisions were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States.

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No. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. The Court added that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them.


At the penalty phase of Joseph Roger O'Dell's state trial on capital murder, rape, and sodomy charges, the government presented evidence that he had been convicted of numerous other offenses. The court, subsequently, denied O'Dell's request for a jury instruction that he was ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison. After the jury determined that O'Dell presented a future danger, he was sentenced to death. The District Court, in granting O'Dell habeas relief, found that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, which requires that a capital defendant be permitted to inform his sentencing jury that he is parole-ineligible if the prosecution argues his future dangerousness, was not a "new rule" and, thus, entitled O'Dell to resentencing.

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Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the rule was new, and that it could not be used to disturb O'Dell's death sentence, which had been final for six years when Simmons was decided. Justice Thomas reasoned that the rule was new within the meaning of Teague v Lane, 489 U.S. 288. Moreover, Justice Thomas wrote that the rule was not a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding, so as to fall within an exception to Teague, thus making it applicable to O'Dell. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, arguing that the rule was not new and, if it was, its importance to the accuracy and fairness of a capital sentencing proceeding placed it within an exception to Teague.


Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona

Maria Kelly F. Yniguez, an Arizona state employee, sued the state and various state officials alleging provisions of the state constitution, which declare English "the official language of the State," and allow state residents and businesses to bring suit to enforce the article, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Yniguez used both English and Spanish in her work and feared that the article would require her to face discharge or other discipline if she did not refrain from speaking Spanish while serving the state. The District Court dismissed the case against the state because of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, but held the article on English unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals accepted the case after Yniguez resigned and ultimately affirmed the District Court's ruling that the article violated the Free Speech Clause and announced that Yniguez was entitled to damages from the state.

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No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the dispute was moot due to the previous resignation of Yniguez. The Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the article.


After a Maryland state trooper stopped the speeding car in which he was riding, a nervous Wilson was ordered to step out. As he did, a quantity of cocaine fell on the ground. When arrested for possession with intent to distribute, Wilson challenged the manner in which the evidence against him was obtained. After the Baltimore County Circuit Court ruled to suppress the evidence against Wilson, Maryland appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals - which affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Maryland certiorari.

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No. The Court held that after lawfully stopping a speeding vehicle, an officer may order its passengers to step out. While burdening their personal liberty somewhat, officers must be permitted such authority over passengers if the overriding government's interest in officer safety is to be protected.


Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services of Central Arkansas

The Tax Injunction Act provides that federal "district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." In Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Act does not limit the power of federal courts if the U.S. sues to protect itself or its instrumentalities from state taxation. Four Production Credit Associations (PCA's), federally chartered corporate financial institutions organized by farmers primarily to make loans to farmers, sued, seeing a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting Arkansas from levying sales and income taxes against them. The PCA's argued that they constituted instrumentalities of the U.S. and that they were not subject to the Act's provisions. The District Court granted the PCA's summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Production Credit Associations are not included within the judicial exception to the Act by virtue of their designation as instrumentalities of the United States alone. Therefore, the Court continued, PCA's may not sue in federal court for an injunction against state taxation without the United States as co-plaintiff. "The Tax Injunction Act is grounded in the need of States to administer their fiscal affairs without undue interference from federal courts," wrote Justice Kennedy, "[a]s all parties concede, respondents have a 'speedy, plain, and efficient remedy' in state court."


Because Monterey County, California is a jurisdiction covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it must obtain federal preclearance of any voting practice different from its practices on November 1, 1968. Between 1972 and 1983, the County merged its nine separate and independent inferior court districts into a single, countywide municipal court served by judges whom County residents elected at large. In 1991, five Hispanic voters, who resided in the County, sued, alleging that the County had violated section 5 by failing to obtain federal preclearance of its judicial district consolidation ordinances. The County did not submit its ordinances after a three-judge District Court ruled against it. Rather, the County began to work with the voters to develop a new judicial election plan. Ultimately, the District Court ordered the County to conduct judicial elections under an at-large, countywide election plan.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the District Court had erred in ordering the county to conduct the election under a plan that had not received federal approval pursuant to section 5. The Court reasoned that the County had not discharged its obligation of gaining preclearance of its election plan prior to its enactment. On remand, the Court left it to the District Court to decide whether changes in California law transformed the County into a state plan, for which section 5 preclearance is not required.


Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison

Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. (Camps) operates a children's church camp in Maine and finances its operations through a $400 per camper weekly tuition charge. The majority of its campers are out of state children. Maine's tax scheme exempts charitable institutions incorporated in the state, and provides a more limited tax benefit for institutions which principally benefit non- Maine residents so long as their weekly service charge does not exceed $30 per person. Ineligible for any exemptions, Camps challenged the constitutionality of Maine's tax exemption statute. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari following a reversal of a favorable Superior Court ruling by the Supreme Court of Maine.

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Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that Maine's tax exemption statute violated the dormant commerce clause since it selectively awarded greater tax benefits to those institutions which served mostly state residents, while penalizing institutions that conducted mostly interstate business. By imposing such selective benefits on a commercial activity in which it did not directly participate, the Court found Maine's governmental tax regulations to be an unconstitutional form of economic protectionism favoring local consumers and business providers.


Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

The 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act required cable television systems to set aside some of their channels for local broadcast television. In 1994, the Supreme Court held that these must-carry provisions pass constitutional muster. (See Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, decided June 27, 1994). The Court then remanded the case to determine whether Congress had adequate factual support for its conclusion that the must-carry provision is necessary. A special three-judge district court held that there was sufficient evidence that the must-carry provision furthered important governmental objectives and that the provision was narrowly tailored to promote those interests. The broadcasters appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

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No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Congress "has an independent interest in preserving a multiplicity of broadcasters." The outcome supported Congress's right to judge what approach would best insure a competitive communications marketplace.


While testifying before a federal grand jury, which was investigating the disposition of proceeds from the alleged drug trafficking of her boyfriend Earl James Fields, Joyce B. Johnson testified that she had received a box of cash that she had used to fund home improvements. Subsequently, Johnson was indicted for perjury under federal law, which proscribes "knowingly mak[ing] any false material declaration" under oath before a grand jury. Johnson did not object when the District Court judge instructed the jury that materiality was a question for him to decide, and that he had determined that her statements were material. Afterwards, Johnson was convicted of perjury. However, before her appeal, the Supreme Court handed down a precedent that a jury, rather than a trial judge, must decide the materiality of a false statement. The Court of Appeals concluded the District Court judge had erred, but that any such error did not affect "substantial rights" because its independent review of the record showed that there was overwhelming evidence of materiality and that no reasonable juror could conclude that Johnson's false statements about the money's source were not material to the grand jury's investigation.

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No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William J. Rehnquist, the Court held that the trial court's action in this case was not "plain error" of the sort which an appellate court may notice under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). The Court reasoned that there was no basis, on the record, for concluding that the materiality error had seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, in that the evidence supporting materiality was overwhelming. "No 'miscarriage of justice' will result here if we do not notice the error and we decline to do so," concluded Chief Justice Rehnquist.


Vehicles driven by Gisela Fredericks and Lyle Stockert collided on a portion of a North Dakota state highway that runs through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. The stretch of highway within the reservation is open to the public, affords access to a federal water resource project, and is maintained by North Dakota under a federally granted right of way that lies on land held by the United States in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and their members. While neither driver was a member of the Tribes or an Indian, Fredericks filed a personal injury action in the Tribal Court of the Three Affliated Tribes against Stockert and A-1 Contractors, who owned the truck Stockert was driving at the time of the collision. The Tribal Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over Fredericks' claim and therefore denied A-1 Contractors and Stockert's motion to dismiss. The Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals affirmed. A-1 contractors and Stockert then filed a action in the District Court against Fredericks, the Tribal Court, and Tribal Judge William Strate, seeking a declaratory judgment that, as a matter of federal law, the Tribal Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate Fredericks' claims. A-1 Contractors and Stockert also sought an injunction against further Tribal Court proceedings. The District Court dismissed. It held that that the Tribal Court had civil jurisdiction over Fredericks' complaint. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

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No. In an unanimous decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that when an accident occurs on a public highway maintained by the State pursuant to a federally granted right of way over Indian reservation land, a civil action against allegedly negligent nonmembers falls within state or federal regulatory and adjudicatory governance; absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers driving on the State's highway, tribal courts may not exercise jurisdiction in such cases.


John Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan then filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits because of his increased earnings. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA only authorizes disability award modifications if there has been a change in an employee's physical condition. Later the appellate court reversed another order discontinuing compensation.

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No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that nominal compensation is proper when there is a significant possibility that the worker's wage-earning capacity will fall below the level of his pre-injury wages sometime in the future. The Court reasoned that a worker is entitled to nominal compensation under the LHWCA when a work-related injury has not diminished the worker's present wage-earning capacity under current circumstances, but when there is a significant possibility that the injury will cause diminished capacity under future conditions. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.


Beginning in 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted a series of statutes authorizing the award of early release credits to prison inmates when the state prison population exceeded predetermined levels. In 1986, Kenneth Lynce received a 22-year prison sentence on a charge of attempted murder. In 1992, he was released based on the determination that he had accumulated five different types of early release credits totaling 5,668 days, including 1,860 days of "provisional credits" awarded as a result of prison overcrowding. Lynce was re-arrested and returned to custody shortly thereafter when the attorney general issued an opinion interpreting a 1992 statute as having retroactively canceled all provisional credits awarded to inmates convicted of murder and attempted murder. Lynce filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution. The District Court rejected Lynce's argument dismissing the petition on the ground that the sole purpose of these credits was to alleviate prison overcrowding. The Court of Appeals denied a certificate of probable cause.

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Yes. In an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the 1992 statute canceling provisional release credits violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution.


Under Minnesota law, candidates for political office are prohibited from appearing on more than one party's ballot. When the Twin Cities Area New Party, a chapter of the national New Party, nominated someone for state representative who was already another political party's candidate, Minnesota election officials declined its petition. When the New Party challenged Minnesota's election laws the District Court upheld their constitutionality, but was reversed by the state's Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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No. In its 6-to-3 opinion, the majority weighed the character and magnitude of the burden imposed by anti-fusion laws on association rights against Minnesota's stated interest in the necessity of such laws. It upheld Minnesota's interest in ballot integrity and political stability. According to the Court, prohibiting political parties from naming another party's candidate as their own did not overly burden their association rights since they were still free to endorse the other party's candidate. The only thing they could not do was "fuse" another party's candidate to their own petitions.


John Papai was injured while painting the housing structure of the tug Pt. Barrow. The Pt. Barrow is operated by Harbor Tug & Barge Co., which hired Papai to do the work, which involved no sailing with the vessel. Papai had been employed by Harbor Tug on twelve previous occasions in the two months before his injury, receiving those jobs through the Inland Boatman's Union hiring hall, which had provided Papai with short term jobs with various vessels for about two years. Most of Papai's jobs were deckhand work, which Papai said involved manning the lines on and off board vessels while they dock or undock. Papai sued Harbor Tug, claiming negligence under the Jones Act, which serves to protect seamen or workers who face regular exposure to the perils of the sea. The District Court granted Harbor Tug summary judgment upon finding that Papai did not enjoy seaman status under the Jones Act. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a trial Papai's seaman status and his corresponding Jones Act claim. The court concluded that the relevant inquiry was not whether Papai had a permanent connection with the vessel, but whether his relationship with a vessel or an identifiable group of vessels was substantial in duration and nature, and found that this required consideration of his employment's total circumstances. Moreover, the court determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that Papai satisfied this test, for if the type of work a maritime worker customarily performs would entitle him to seaman status if performed for a single employer, he should not be deprived of that status simply because the industry operates under a daily assignment, rather than a permanent employment system.

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No. In a 6-3 decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that John Papai's record would not permit a reasonable jury to conclude that he is a Jones Act seaman. Jones Act coverage is confined to seamen, those workers who face regular exposure to the perils of the sea. Justice Kennedy wrote, "[a]n important part of the test for determining who is a seaman is whether the injured worker has a substantial connection to a vessel or to a fleet of vessels, and the latter concept requires a requisite degree of common ownership or control."


Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Yueh-Shaio Yang

Yueh-Shaio Yang and his wife, former Taiwan residents, executed elaborate fraudulent schemes to gain entry to the United States and, later, to obtain Yang's citizenship. While Yang's naturalization application was pending, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) learned of his unlawful entry and issued an order to show cause why he should not be deported at the time of entry. Yang conceded that he was deportable and filed a request for a waiver of deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act with the Attorney General. An Immigration Judge denied Yang's request. In affirming, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that Yang was statutorily eligible for a waiver, but denied it as a matter of discretion. In vacating, the Court of Appeals held that the Board had abused its discretion by considering the adverse factors of Yang's participation in his wife's fraudulent entry and, secondly, his fraudulent naturalization application. The court reasoned that Yang's actions in his wife's fraudulent entry were "inextricably intertwined" with his own efforts to secure entry and must be considered part of the initial fraud, while his application must be considered an "extension" of that initial fraud.

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Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that in deciding whether to grant a waiver under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General or her delegate, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, may take into account acts of fraud committed by the alien in connection to his entry into the United States. Justice Scalia wrote, the Act "imposes no limitations on the factors that the INS may consider in determining who, among the class of eligible aliens, should be granted relief."


Following a suit by Georgia residents challenging the constitutionality of a legislative redistricting plan (Miller v. Johnson, 515 US 900), and seeking an injunction against its further use, a District Court found the plan unconstitutional. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed - holding that race was a predominant factor in the plan's creation - and remanded it for redrafting. Shortly thereafter the composition of another of the plan's districts was challenged in a District Court which, after unsuccessfully deferring the matter to Georgia's Legislature for redrafting, drew its own plan creating one black-majority district in place of the proposed three. After the 1996 elections were held under the court's new plan, Abrams and several other voters challenged its constitutionality. Again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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No, in a five-to-four decision. First, the Court held that in re-drafting the plans, the District Court had no obligation to preserve all three of the old plan's black-majority districts, if this would result in racial gerrymandering. Second, the Court supported the District Court's decision not to preserve two black-majority districts as it held that the area's black population was not sufficiently compact to sustain such a plan. Third, the Court ruled that the plan's creation of only one black-majority district would not violate the 1965 Voting Rights Act by causing a retrogression in the political position of Abrams and his fellow plaintiffs. The Court, in addition to noting Abrams' failure to meet his retrogression claim's population density requirement, found that in the last election, held under the challenged plan, all three black incumbents won re-election, two of whom while running against white candidates from white-majority districts. Finally, the Court concluded that the District Court's redistricting plan did not violate the Constitution's guarantee of "one person, one vote." In addition to finding that the plan's overall and average population deviations were acceptable, the Court held that even if these deviations were slightly "off" they must be tolerated given their six year tenure in an area which has seen significant population shifts. Accordingly, any minor errors would be best corrected by the next census rather than by judicial intervention.


Aaron Lindh was convicted on multiple charges of murder and attempted murder in Wisconsin. Arguing that the Confrontation Clause was violated when the trial court barred him from questioning the motives of the State's psychiatrist, Lindh was denied relief on direct appeal. Lindh's subsequent federal habeas corpus application was also denied. After Lindh appealed again, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 amended the federal habeas statute. Following an en banc rehearing to consider the Act's impact, the Court of Appeals held that applying the new version of the law to pending cases would not have a retroactive effect because it would not attach new legal consequences to events preceding the Act's enactment.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the 1996 version of the federal habeas statute, as to standards affecting the entitlement of state prisoners to federal habeas corpus relief, does not to apply to non-capital habeas corpus cases that were pending when the Act was enacted. The Court reasoned that the statute's retroactive application was improper because new legal consequences attached. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined.


The volume and complexity of asbestos litigation led the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation to transfer all asbestos claims filed in federal courts, but not yet on trial, to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After this consolidation, counsel for the plaintiffs and the defendant manufacturers reached a partial global settlement: a class consisting of all individuals with potential asbestos claims who had not yet filed lawsuits would be certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(3) (FRCP) for purposes of settlement only. The proposed settlement created an administrative structure which provided set compensation for certain asbestos-related diseases. The District Court approved the plan, and certified the proposed class. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the lower court's order, finding that the requirements of class certification had not been met. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that while a class may be certified for the sole purpose of settlement, the certification requirements of FRCP 23 must still be met as though the case were going to trial. In this instance, the class failed to demonstrate that common issues predominated over other questions, FRCP 23(b)(3), or that the named plaintiffs would "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."

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Yes, but a limited one. While the court of appeals had erred by stating that settlement was not relevant to class certification determinations, the lower court had, in fact, closely examined the terms of the settlement, and remand was therefore not merited. A court considering a class for settlement need not consider whether certification would present intractable management problems at the trial stage, but the remaining requirements of FRCP 23 must be met. Here those requirements were not fulfilled. First, despite the over-arching issue of asbestos-related health problems, common issues did not predominate given the very different injuries suffered by the plaintiffs, and the fact that some class members had not yet manifested physical disease. FRCP 23(b)(3). Second, the named parties would not adequately represent the class because those currently injured had interests distinct from those who had been exposed to asbestos but had not yet exhibited any physical symptoms. FRCP 23(a)(4). In resolving the case the Court declined to reach the issue of whether the settlement proceeding was a justiciable case or controversy under Article III because, it held, determination of class certification was logically antecedent to these issues.


Jill Brown brought a damages action against Bryan County alleging that that its Deputy Stacy Burns had arrested her with excessive force, and that it was liable for her injuries because its Sheriff B. J. Moore had hired Burns without adequately reviewing his background. Burns had pleaded guilty to various driving infractions and other misdemeanors, including assault and battery. Moore, whom the county stipulated was its Sheriff's Department policymaker, testified that he had obtained Burns' driving and criminal records, but had not closely reviewed either before hiring Burns. The District Court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law, which asserted that a policymaker's single hiring decision could not give rise to municipal liability. Brown prevailed following a jury trial, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the county was properly found liable based on Moore's decision to hire Burns.

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No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that municipalities are not liable for hiring employees who violate someone's rights unless a reasonable policymaker would conclude that the "plainly obvious consequence . . . would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected rights. Thus, the county was not financially liable for Sheriff Moore's isolated decision to hire Burns without adequate screening because Brown had not proved that the decision reflected a conscious disregard for a risk that Burns would use excessive force in violation of her federally protected rights.


Charles T. Robinson, Sr., was fired by Shell Oil Co. Thereafter, Robinson filed an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While that charge was pending, Robinson applied for a job with another company, which contacted Shell for an employment reference. Robinson, claiming that Shell gave him a negative reference in retaliation for his having filed the EEOC charge, then filed suit under Title VII, which makes it unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment" who have availed themselves of Title VII's protections. The District Court dismissed the suit. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the term "employees" in Title VII refers only to current employees and therefore petitioner's claim was not justicible under Title VII.

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Yes. In an unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that because the term "employees," as used Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes former employees, Robinson may sue Shell for its allegedly retaliatory post-employment actions. Justice Thomas wrote for the court that barring such protection to former employees, while current employees have it, "would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring . . . claims" under Title VII.


Under a Georgia statute, all candidates for elected state office must pass a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to their qualifying for nomination or election. Chandler, on behalf of several state office nominees from the Libertarian Party, challenged the statute's constitutionality, naming Georgia's governor and two other regulatory officials as defendants. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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Yes. In an 8-to-1 opinion, the Court noted that while the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits officials from conducting search and seizures without individualized suspicion, there does exist a narrowly defined category of permissible suspicionless searches and seizures. The Court held, however, that Georgia's statute did not fall in this exceptional category, since it failed to show why its desire to avoid drug users in its high political offices should outweigh candidates' privacy interests. In addition to Georgia's failure to provide evidence of a drug problem among its state officials, the Court concluded that even if such a problem did exist, the affected officials would most likely not perform the kind of high-risk, safety sensitive tasks, which might justify the statute's proposed incursion on their individual privacy rights.


The Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, formerly the Coast Guard Court of Military Review, hears appeals from the decisions of courts martial, and its decisions are subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals' judges may be officers or civilians. During the time in dispute, two civilian members sat on the court. The General Counsel of the Department of Transportation originally assigned both civilian judges to the court. Afterwards the Secretary of Transportation issued a memorandum adopting the General Counsel's assignments as appointments of his own. Jon E. Edmond and others were convicted while one or both civilian judges participated on the court. Subsequently, their convictions were upheld on appeal. Edmond and others argued that the civilian judges' appointments were invalid due to the Appointments Clause, which holds "principle officers" must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

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Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the judicial appointments were valid. The Court unanimously found that Congress has authorized the Secretary to appoint civilian members of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the Court also reasoned that the Secretary's 1993 appointments of the two civilian judges in question were valid under the Appointments Clause, since such judges were inferior officers within the clause's meaning, by reason of the supervision of the judges' work by the General Counsel and by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Justice Scalia noted that the Appointments Clause gives the President the exclusive power to select principal officers by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, but authorizes Congress to "vest the Appointment of...inferior Officers...in the Heads of Departments." Justice David H. Souter filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.


Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages as well as the transmission of information which depicts or describes "sexual or excretory activities or organs" in a manner deemed "offensive" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions.

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Yes. The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment because its regulations amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. The Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communications, limit its restrictions to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact adults), provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of internet communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of "offensive" material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that since the First Amendment distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual expressions, protecting only the former, the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words "or indecent" from its text. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Justice O'Connor would invalidate the provisions only to the extent that they fail to adhere to the Court's principle that zoning restrictions may be valid if they do not unduly limit adult access to the material.


Police in Madison, Wisconsin, suspected Steiney Richards of drug possession, but failed to receive a magistrate's authorization for a "no-knock" entry into his hotel room. Instead, they obtained a conventional search warrant requiring them to knock on Richards' door and identify themselves as officers prior to resorting to forcible entry. After arriving on the scene, an officer knocked on Richards' door identifying himself as a hotel custodian. When Richards opened the door, he saw a uniformed officer and quickly slammed it shut. The officers broke through the door, grabbed Richards while trying to escape, and found cocaine and cash in his bathroom. At trial, Richards challenged the constitutionality of the officer's search but was denied. On appeal, Wisconsin's Supreme Court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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No. After noting the general importance of following conventional "knock-and-announce" procedures, the Court held that in those circumstances when police have good reason to suspect that announcing their presence and intentions may be dangerous, futile, or result in the destruction of evidence, a "no-knock" entry is justified. The Court added that by immediately closing the door after witnessing the officers outside it, Richards gave police sufficient justification for breaking into his room - especially considering the disposable nature of the substances they were seeking.


Miguel Gonzales, Orlenis Hernandez Diaz, and Mario Perez were convicted in New Mexico state court on charges arising from their use of guns to holdup undercover officers during a drug sting. After they began to serve their state sentences, they were convicted by a District Court on federal drug and firearm charges related to the sting. Federal law requires a five-year prison sentence for carrying a gun while committing a crime. A Court of Appeals vacated the additional firearms sentences on the ground that they should have run concurrently with the state prison terms.

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No. In a 7-to-2 decision delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court announced "[t]he plain language of (the law) forbids a district court to direct that a term of imprisonment under the statute run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, whether state or federal."


When the Fish and Wildlife Service was notified that the operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project might affect two endangered species of fish, it concluded that the proposed long-term operation of the project was likely to jeopardize the species and decided to maintain minimum levels of water in certain reservoirs. The petitioners, irrigation districts receiving project water and operators of ranches in those districts, filed suit against the Service's director, regional directors, and the Secretary, claiming the determination and imposition of minimum water levels violated the Endangered Species Act's requirement that the designated area's economic impact be considered. The District Court dismissed the compliant because it lacked standing; economic interests were not enough to constitute a lawsuit in this matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Yes. In the unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the petitioners had standing to ask for judicial review of the minimum water level setting under the Endangered Species Act. The Act explicitly allows "any person" to sue the government over an alleged violation. Justice Scalia asserted this applies to the Secretary's actions over enforcement.


The Bossier Parrish School Board is subject to the preclearance requirements of ?5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Therefore, the Board must obtain the approval of either the Attorney General or the District Court before implementing any changes to a voting "qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure." Based on the 1990 census, the Board redrew its 12 single member districts, adopting the redistricting plan that the Attorney General had precleared for use in elections of the parish's governing body. The Board rejected a plan proposed by the NAACP, which would have created two majority black districts. The Attorney General then objected to the preclearance, finding that the NAACP plan demonstrated that black residents were sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a majority in two districts and that the Board's plan unnecessarily limited the opportunity for minority voters to elect their candidates of choice, thereby diluting their voting strength in violation of ?2 of the Act. Subsequently, the Attorney General withheld preclearance to prevent a violation of ?2 of the Act. The Board filed an action with the District Court. A three-judge panel granted the Board's preclearance request. The court rejected the contentions that a voting change's failure to satisfy ?2 of the Act constituted an independent reason to deny preclearance under ?5 and that a court must consider evidence of a ?2 violation as evidence of a discriminatory purpose under ?5.

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No and no. In an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Conner, the Court ruled that preclearance under ?5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 may not be denied solely on the basis that a covered jurisdiction's new voting "standard, practice, or procedure" violates ? 2 of the Act. Additionally, evidence showing that a jurisdiction's redistricting plan dilutes minorities' voting power may be relevant to establish a jurisdiction's "intent to retrogress" under ?5 of the Act.


28 USC section 994(h) directs the United States Sentencing Commission to "assure" that its Sentencing Guidelines specify a prison sentence "at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of" adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime. Initially, the Guidelines failed to delineate whether the basic statutory maximum persons convicted of a particular offense or the enhanced penalty for career offenders convicted of that same offense should be applied. After the District Court used and the Court of Appeals affirmed the enhanced sentence for sentencing George LaBonte, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, and Stephen Dyer, who qualified as career criminals, the Commission adopted Amendment 506, which precludes the consideration of statutory sentence enhancements. When the District Court split over whether reduce LaBonte, Hunnewell, and Dyer's sentences, the Court of Appeals found that Amendment 506 was a reasonable implementation of section 994(h)'s directive.

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Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Commission's interpretation was inconsistent with section 994(h)'s plain language, and therefore "maximum term authorized" must be read to include all applicable statutory sentencing enhancements. "Congress surely did not establish enhanced penalties for repeat offenders only to have the Commission render them a virtual nullity," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Stephen G. Breyer in a dissent, in which Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, argued that the words "maximum term authorized" in section 994(h) were ambiguous, thus the Court should defer to the Sentencing Commission's interpretation.


The executors of Otis C. Hubert's substantial estate filed a federal estate tax return about a year after his death. Subsequently, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, claiming underreporting of federal estate tax liability caused by the estate's asserted entitlement to marital and charitable deductions. While the estate's redetermination petition was pending in the Tax Court, the interested parties settled on the use of the estate's assets. The agreement divided the estate's principal, assumed to be worth $26 million, equally between marital trusts and a charitable trust. It also provided that the estate would pay its administration expenses either from the principal or the income of the assets. The estate paid about $500,000 of its nearly $2 million of administration expenses from principal and the rest from income. It then recalculated its tax liability, reducing the marital and charitable deductions by the amount of principal, but not the amount of income, used to pay the expenses. The Commissioner concluded that using income for expenses required a dollar for dollar reduction of the deductions. The Tax Court disagreed, finding that no reduction was required by reason of the executors' power, or the exercise of their power, to pay administration expenses from income. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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No. In an opinion authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court ruled that a taxpayer does not have to reduce the estate tax deduction for marital or charitable bequests by the amount of the administration expenses that were paid from income generated during administration by assets allocated to those bequests. "When income is used . . . to pay administration expenses, this does not require the estate tax deductions be diminished," wrote Justice Kennedy.


Marvin Klehr purchased inadequate cattle feed containers from A. O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc. (Harvestore) in 1974. Over a long period of time, the containers damaged Klehr's cattle feed. In 1993, Klehr filed a civil claim against Harvestore under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO). The District Court dismissed Klehr's suit, ruling that the four-year time limit for bringing a civil RICO suit had expired. Klehr claimed that he was not at fault for failing to discover the injury within four years, because Harvestore purposely designed the containers to conceal their inadequacy.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower court. The Eighth Circuit held that Klehr should have discovered the pattern of racketeering activity much earlier. Since the statute of limitations began from the time Klehr could reasonably be expected to have discovered the pattern, Klehr was out of time. The Eighth Circuit's "pattern of activity" rule contradicted the Third Circuit's "last predicate act" rule, which allows a plaintiff to recover damages accumulated since the first injury as long as the last RICO violation ("last predicate act") happened within four years of the lawsuit.

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No and No. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. The "last predicate rule...lengthens the limitations period dramatically" and thereby contradicts Congress's intention of ensuring a time limit for civil RICO claims. Also, "the plaintiff cannot use an independent, new act as a bootstrap to recover for injuries caused by other predicate acts that took place outside the limitations period."
RICO intends "not only to compensate victims but also to encourage those victims diligently to investigate and thereby to uncover unlawful activity." To demonstrate "fraudulent concealment", a plaintiff must have failed to discover injuries inflicted upon him after acting with "reasonable diligence" to discover the source and pattern of the injuries.