Maurice A. Hutcheson, a president of a labor union, refused to answer eighteen questions before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. Although Hutcheson appeared to be concerned about the state using his words against him in a pending state criminal trial, he specifically waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, he argued that the Committee only wanted to expose his wrongful acts, and that this exposure would violate his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the Committee's questions acted as a "pretrial" of the state charges.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found the union president guilty of contempt of Congress. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment. Hutcheson appealed the appellate court's decision.

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No. In a 4-2 decision Justice John M. Harlan wrote for the majority and concluded that the Committee's questions were not outside the scope of the Senate investigation, nor were the Committee's questions asked simply to expose the union president's criminal acts. The fact that state prosecutors could have used the answers to the questions in a pending state criminal trial did not violate Due Process. The Court did not allow the union president to attempt to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because he had explicitly waived it in the Committee hearing.
Justice Earl Warren wrote a dissent stating that the opinion forced the union president to choose between invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, answering the questions truthfully and aiding state prosecutors, committing perjury, or refusing to answer and face contempt.


The New York State Board of Regents authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. A group of organizations joined forces in challenging the prayer, claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The New York Court of Appeals rejected their arguments.

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The state cannot hold prayers in public schools, even if participation is not required and the prayer is not tied to a particular religion.
In an opinion authored by Hugo L. Black, the Court held that respondent's decision to use its school system to facilitate recitation of the official prayer violated the Establishment Clause. Specifically, the policy breached the constitutional wall of separation between church and state. The Court ruled that the constitutional prohibition of laws establishing religion meant that government had no business drafting formal prayers for any segment of its population to repeat in a government-sponsored religious program. The Court held that respondent's provision of the contested daily prayer was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment on the ground that the state's financing a religious exercise violated the First Amendment.
Justice Stewart dissented, arguing that no "official religion" was established by permitting those who want to say a prayer to say it.


National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button

The NAACP was prosecuted for violating a Virginia statute which banned "the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business."

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Yes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the activities of the NAACP amounted to "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit." NAACP-initiated litigation was "a form of political expression" and not "a technique of resolving private differences," argued Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., who authored the majority opinion. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented, joined by Justices Potter Stewart and Tom Clark.


A jury found defendant guilty under a California statute that criminalized being addicted to narcotics. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Defendant sought further review from the United States Supreme Court.

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In a 6-2 decision authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that laws imprisoning persons afflicted with the "illness" of narcotic addiction inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court likened the law to one making it a criminal offense "to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease," and argued that the state could not punish persons merely because of their "status" of addiction. The Court noted that the law was not aimed at the purchase, sale, or possession of illegal drugs.
While joining the Court's opinion, Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion, elaborated the reasons why the statute was regarded as imposing a cruel and unusual punishment.
Justice Harlan concurred on the ground that the trial court's instruction permitted the jury to find defendant guilty on no more proof than that he was present in California while he was addicted to narcotics, and hence authorized punishment for a bare desire to commit a criminal act.
Justice Clark dissented, primarily on the ground that, properly construed, the statute provided a treatment rather than a punishment.
Justice White also dissented, expressing the view that it was within the power of the state to confine the defendant by criminal proceedings for the use of narcotics or for regular use amounting to habitual use.


On April 30, 1956, the Chicago Police Department arrested John E. Hodges on charges of armed robbery. On May 2, 1956, two members of the District of Columbia Police Department traveled to Chicago and interrogated Hodges for about an hour before producing a written statement. Hodges was returned to Washington, D.C., indicted, and pled guilty. Hodges later withdrew his plea and entered a plea of not guilty. On April 15, 1957, Hodges went to trial and was found guilty. He did not appeal.
Three months later, Hodges filed a motion in district court to vacate his sentence, arguing that his confession was coerced and should not have been admitted into evidence at trial. The motion was denied without a hearing. Hodges appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.

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No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court determined that the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted. The Court held that the district court was not required to hold a hearing because Hodges was not entitled to relief.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent and argued that the petitioner has a right to relief because he was essentially denied his right to appeal within the 10-day period following his conviction.


Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee

In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) received much criticism from state legislators as it pushed ahead with litigation to combat segregation. The State of Florida, in 1959, established a Legislative Investigation Committee to study what were called "subversive organizations." Gibson, president of the Miami branch of the NAACP, was subpoenaed before the committee and asked to produce a membership list of his organization. He refused and was found in contempt.

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Yes. In a close decision, the Court found that Gibson's rights had been violated. In his opinion, Justice Goldberg recognized the important right of states to inform themselves on "legitimate and vital interests." However, even though inquiring about the actions of a group such as the Communist Party may have been one of these legitimate interests, argued Goldberg, Florida did not prove that a "substantial connection" between the Miami NAACP and Communist Party activities existed. Thus, a "compelling and subordinating governmental interest" would not have been served by forcing Gibson to disclose his group's membership list.


Standard Oil Co. and two employees, Fong Foo and Robert Knupp were tried for conspiracy and concealing material facts within the jurisdiction of a governmental agency. The group allegedly falsified tests on goods manufactured at Standard Oil’s plant. Before the government finished presenting their case, the district court judge directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal for all parties on all counts. He then entered formal judgments of acquittal on the grounds of improper conduct by the Assistant U.S. States Attorney and a lack of credibility in the testimony of government witnesses. The United States filed for a writ of mandamus from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, asking the court of vacate the judgments and order a new trial. The court granted the writ, holding that the district court did not have the power to direct the judgment of acquittal.

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Yes, Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The Court held that vacating the acquittal and granting a new trial violated petitioners’ constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Justice John M. Harlan concurred, agreeing that double jeopardy barred a second trial, because the trial court did not base its decision solely on the Assistant U.S. Attorney’s misconduct. Justice Tom C. Clark dissented, arguing that the district court had no power to direct a verdict of acquittal. Justice Charles E. Whittaker did not participate


John Joseph Killian was an employee at the Allen-Bradley Company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a member of Local 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America. From October of 1952 to February 28, 1953, Killian served as an officer of Local 1111. On December 9, 1952, the president of Local 1111 ordered all officers to come to the union office to execute affidavits stating that they were not members of the Communist Party, in accordance with the Taft-Hartley Act.
As early as the fall of 1949, Killian was a member of the Communist party group on the campus of the University of Wisconsin and in the city of Madison, Wisconsin. Killian held a number of the group’s meetings in his home. Government witness Sullivan transferred his Communist Party membership to Madison in October 1949; Killian contacted him in his role assigning individuals to Communist Party groups or cells. In November of 1951, Killian and others formed a Communist Party cell to operate within the Allen-Bradley plant. Killian suggested to a government witness and co-worker, Ondrejka, that both should become stewards of Local 1111 to advance party aims within the union; both subsequently became officers and participated in union meetings.
Killian was charged with making false statements in an affidavit. At trial, both Sullivan and Onrejka testified that they joined the Communist Party at the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On cross-examination, Sullivan and Ondrejka testified that the FBI paid them monthly amounts for their services, and were reimbursed for expenses incurred in Communist Party activities. Killian moved for production of all statements given by Sullivan and Ondrejka to the FBI, with a particular focus on reports made by Ondrejka of his reimbursable expenses and receipts signed by Ondrejka; Killian requested this evidence to impeach the witnesses’ testimony. Killian also moved to strike both Sullivan and Ondrejka’s testimony. The government instead offered to produce a list showing the dates and amounts of payments to Ondrejka and whether each payment was for services or expenses. Killian refused this substituted evidence, and the district court denied Killian’s motions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld Killian's conviction, holding that the district judge properly excluded the requested reports and receipts because they were not related to the direct testimony of the witnesses.

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No, yes, and yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Charles E. Whittaker, the Court held that the district court must determine whether the documents requested by Killian were destroyed in good faith and in accord with normal practice, as suggested by the United States. If so, Killian would not be entitled to a new trial, because this would suggest that the information contained on the receipts was finally recorded elsewhere and already in evidence. The United States claimed that only two of Ondrejka’s receipts related to his testimony and that this information was contained in Ondrejka’s narrative statements; Justice Whittaker instructed the district court to make a final judgment for the government if it finds that this claim was true.
Justice Whittaker rejected Killian’s objection to the jury instruction’s subjective definition of membership in the Communist Party. He reasoned that the very nature of claimed membership in a secret or underground organization precludes the existence of objective proof of membership. Justice Whittaker also rejected Killian’s argument that the Communist Control Act (CCA) -- from which the jury instructions were largely drawn -- was unconstitutional. He noted that Killian was charged with lying about being a Communist in an affidavit, not with being a member of the Communist Party, the status prohibited by the CCA.
Justice Whittaker held that the district court properly defined “affiliation” for its jury instruction. He cited several decisions in the circuit courts using similar definitions of "affiliation" with the Communist Party. He rejected Killian’s narrow definition of “affiliation”, wherein the government would have to show that Killian was a member of an organization working with the Communist Party. He held that the district court’s definition was reasonable and properly outlined, vacating the judgment and remanding the case to the district court.
Justice Hugo Black dissented. He argued that compelling union officers to swear they are not Communists violated the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of belief and political association. He noted that test oaths are historic weapons against religious and political minority.
Justice William O. Douglas dissented, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Black. Justice Douglas argued that the jury could find Killian guilty only if he committed illegal acts in connection with his role in the Communist Party. As the record contained no evidence of Killian committing an illegal act, his conviction should have been reversed.
Justice William J. Brennan dissented. He took issue with the majority’s interpretation of “membership”, and would have required evidence of some objective act of association and admission, understood as such by the party and by Killian.
"


Herbert Goldblatt owned 38 acres of land within the Town of Hempstead (town) and often used the land for his business of mining sand and gravel. During excavation, water filled the crater, which widened and deepened. The town expanded around the excavation and later enacted a series of ordinances to regulate mining excavation within its limits. In 1958, the town amended an ordinance to prohibit excavation below the water table and impose a duty refill any excavation currently below the level. In 1959, the town sued Goldblatt for not complying with the ordinance. Goldblatt argued the ordinance is unconstitutional because it was not regulatory but rather represented the town confiscating his property without compensation. The Court of Appeals of New York held for the Town of Hempstead, allowing them to enforce the prohibition and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision.

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No. Justice Thomas C. Clark delivered the opinion of the 7-0 majority. The court held that regulation ordinances that take property previously used for personal profit are constitutional if the regulations are reasonable within due process of the law. The ordinance in this case was a valid exercise of the town’s police powers since it was passed as a safety measure to protect the general public of the town; therefore, the regulations are reasonable and do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Byron R. White took no part in the decision of this case.


Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc. v. United States

In accordance with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, the Secretary of Agriculture promoted milk-marketing orders in the New York/New Jersey region that included compensatory payment provisions. The provisions in question required those who buy milk elsewhere and bring it into the region to pay the farmers who supply that region a “compensatory payment.” The petitioners were milk processing plant operators in Pennsylvania who challenged the validity of the “compensatory payment” provisions by arguing that they failed notice requirements and conflicted with other provisions of the Act that required uniform prices. The district court held these provisions to be invalid, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and upheld the validity of the provisions as authorized by the Act.

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The compensatory payment provisions were invalid as inconsistent with Congress’ intent in enacting the Agricultural Market Agreement Act of 1937. Justice John M. Harlan, II delivered the opinion of the 6-1 majority. The Court held the Secretary of Agriculture exceeded his authority by creating the “compensatory payment” provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937. The provisions essentially forced non-regional milk producers to subsidize regional milk producers, which interfered with the competitive advantage the the cheaper, non-regional milk producers would naturally have. The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress intended it to prevent this type of creation of economic barriers to protect the prices of regional products. Therefore, the provisions conflicted with Congress’ intent and were invalid.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court should have affirmed the lower court’s decision upholding the Secretary of Agriculture. Black explained that the Secretary did not overreach, and he should be given the authority to impose the provisions at issue in order to protect farmers.


Six individuals were indicted and convicted for refusing to answer pertinent questions before a grand jury. Each of the individuals moved to squash the conviction because they were not told what the subject of the inquiry was, so had no basis for determining what questions were pertinent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the convictions.

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Yes. In a 5-2 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the majority reversing the lower court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the convictions could not stand because the grand jury failed to identify the subject of the inquiry at the time the individuals refused to answer questions. Justice William J. Brennan did not participate in the decision with respect to #10.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurrence stating that the investigation was to determine Communist infiltration in the press and that that investigation was unconstitutional. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent stating that the indictments were valid. Justice John C. Clark joined in Justice Harlan’s dissent and wrote a separate dissent criticizing this decision as a departure from previous law. Justices Byron R. White and Felix Frankfurter did not participate.


The Chicago police arrested and detained Frank Townsend, a drug addict, in connection with a murder. After several hours of questioning, Townsend began going into withdrawal and asked for a doctor. A doctor gave him a medicine Townsend alleges was a "truth serum." While under the influence of the medication, Townsend confessed to the murder. Townsend alleged that the medicine caused his confession and, therefore, was not admissible at trial. Defendants disputed most of the facts surrounding the confession. The Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois admitted the confession at a trial by jury. The jury found Townsend guilty and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction.
Townsend subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The District Court denied the writ without a hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that the District Court's inquiry should be limited to undisputed portions of the record.

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Yes, when the facts are in dispute and the petitioner did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in state court. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Earl Warren wrote for the majority. At the state level, several crucial facts, such as whether or not the medicine given to Townsend was a "truth serum," were not determined. The record did not provide sufficient information to make an accurate determination. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court was careful to note that it did not rule on the truth of the allegations in the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, stating that the District Court had made sufficient factual determinations and a new hearing was unnecessary. Justice Tom C. Clark, Justice John M. Harlan, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.


A Kansas statute made it a misdemeanor to enter into contracts for "debt adjusting" (a practice in which a debtor agrees to pay a monthly fee to an adjustor who then makes payments to the debtor's creditor). Skrupa was in business as a "Credit Advisor" and engaged in this practice. A lower court held that the Kansas statute was an "unreasonable regulation of a lawful business" and struck it down.

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No. The Court reversed the decision of the lower court and affirmed Kansas's right to regulate debt adjusting. The unanimous decision held that the question of whether the law was wise or reasonable was a legislative and not a judicial one. Justice Black argued that the lower court's ruling relied on old law; the Court had moved out of the business of using the "vague contours" of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down laws which it had deemed economically unwise. Those were issues for state and national legislatures to address and not the courts. As long as state regulations do not offend a "specific federal constitutional prohibition" or a "valid federal law," they are legitimate.


Since the beginning of the 20th century, the State of Georgia used a county unit system for counting votes in primary elections. Under this system, the candidate who received the highest number of votes in a county would receive all of that county's unit votes. The overall winning candidate would then have to receive a majority of the county unit votes statewide. This system ended up giving rural counties a majority of the unit votes, even though rural counties made up only about a third of the population as of the 1960s.
In 1962, James O'Hear Sanders, a voter in Georgia's most populous county, brought suit against several representatives of the Georgia State Democratic Executive Committee and the Secretary of State of Georgia. Sanders claimed that the county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Seventeenth Amendment. As a voter within one of the urban counties, Sanders claimed his vote had less of an influence on the nomination of candidates than that of a rural voter. A special three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed with Sanders and held that the county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause. However, the district court did not outlaw the county unit system entirely. The State appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.

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Yes. Justice William O. Douglas, in an 8-1 majority opinion, vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case with directions. The Court held that the weighing of votes through the county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by giving more voting power to residents of particularly small rural counties. Unlike the district court, the majority held that the county unit system was impermissible in its entirety. The Court reasoned that the longstanding concept of political equality requires elections to be governed by the rule of "one person, one vote." Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented, arguing that the case should be sent back for trial to establish a fully developed record for the Court to review.


S. H. Kress and Company operated a general variety store on Main Street in Durham, North Carolina. On the first floor, Kress had a stand-up counter where it served food and drinks to both black and white customers. On the basement floor, however, Kress operated a luncheonette department with signs posted stating that it was for employees and invited guests only.
On May 6, 1960, seven students tried to seat themselves at the luncheonette counter. Five, including John Thomas Avent, were black students at North Carolina College for Negroes in Durham. The other two were white students at Duke University. All seven were involved with civil rights student organizations to varying degrees. Before each sat down, the store’s manager W. K. Boger spoke with the students individually. He told them that the luncheonette department was for employees and invited guests only, and asked them to leave. Both white students, however, were only asked to leave when it became clear they were sitting with one or more black customers. When the students refused to leave, Boger called an officer of the Durham police department, who arrested the students and charged them with trespassing.
At trial, Boger testified that it was Kress’ policy to refuse service to black customers at the luncheonette department, and to refuse service to white people in the company of black people. The district court convicted all seven defendants of trespassing. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the ruling. Noting that North Carolina had no laws mandating the separation of white and black customers in restaurants, the court upheld proprietors’ common law right to exclude individuals on the basis of race.

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In a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the North Carolina Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decisions in Peterson v. City of Greenville and Patterson v. Alabama In Peterson, the Court held that states cannot use trespass laws to enforce discrimination mandated by a segregation ordinance. In Patterson, the Court held that it is bound to consider changes in law which supervene after a judgment is entered.
Justice John Harlan dissented in part. He pointed out that the City of Durham had a restaurant segregation ordinance in effect, but that the North Carolina Supreme Court proceeded under the assumption that no such ordinance existed. He would have instead remanded the case for reconsideration in light of this fact.


School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp

Under Pennsylvania law, public schools were required to read from the bible at the opening of each school day. The school district sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The district court ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment, even after the statute had been amended to permit a student to excuse himself.
The Court consolidated this case with one involving Maryland atheists who challenged a city rule that provided for opening exercises in the public schools that consisted primarily of reading a chapter from the bible and the Lord's Prayer. The state's highest court held the exercise did not violate the First Amendment. The religious character of the exercise was admitted by the state.

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Public schools cannot sponsor Bible readings and recitations of the Lord’s Prayer under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.
In an opinion authored by Justice Clark, the majority concluded that, in both cases, the laws required religious exercises and such exercises directly violated the First Amendment. The Court affirmed the Pennsylvania decision, and reversed and remanded the Maryland decision because the mandatory reading from the bible before school each day was found to be unconstitutional.
Justice Stewart dissented, expressing the view that on the records it could not be said that the Establishment Clause had necessarily been violated. He would remand both cases for further hearings.


On the evening of December 19, 1957, Spokane police officers arrested Raymond L. Haynes near a gas station that had just been robbed. Haynes admitted to the robbery as officers drove him to the police station, and he signed a written confession after he was told that he could not call his wife until he signed it. At trial, Haynes argued that the confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary and coerced. The judge admitted the confession into evidence, and the jury found Haynes guilty. Haynes appealed, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.

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Yes. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Spokane police officers extracted an involuntary confession from Haynes by threatening to hold him without allowing him to contact his family. The Court also held that such tactics were unnecessary because the police had sufficient evidence to charge Haynes with robbery even without the confession.
Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent in which he distinguished the officers’ refusal to allow Haynes to call his wife from the voluntariness of the confession. The oral confession that Haynes made within the first ninety minutes of his arrest bolstered Justice Clark’s view that the signed written confession was also voluntary. Justice Clark argued that the officers’ treatment of Haynes did not amount to threats or inducements and that Haynes was an unlikely candidate for coercion given his age, intelligence, and prior criminal record. Justice John M. Harlan, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.


Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with felony breaking and entering. When he appeared in court without a lawyer, Gideon requested that the court appoint one for him. According to Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant in capital cases, so the trial court did not appoint one. Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's decision violated his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief.

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The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a right to assistance of counsel applies to criminal defendants in state court by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court held that it was consistent with the Constitution to require state courts to appoint attorneys for defendants who could not afford to retain counsel on their own. The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is a fundamental and essential right made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions and requires courts to provide counsel for defendants unable to hire counsel unless the right was competently and intelligently waived.
Justice Douglas, while joining the Court's opinion, elaborated, in a separate opinion, the relation between the Bill of Rights and the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justices Clark and Harlan concurred in separate decisions.


On August 31, 1961, Internal Revenue Agent Roger S. Davis visited Clauson’s Inn, located in North Falmouth, Massachusetts, as part of an investigation into possible tax evasion. He spoke with German S. Lopez, who operated the inn, to determine whether there was any dancing or other form of evening entertainment. Lopez denied it, but when Davis returned later that night, he saw dancing in the lounge and bar. On October 21, Davis returned to tell Lopez that the Inn might owe a cabaret tax and requested the Inn’s financial records. Lopez suggested that the two could reach an “agreement” and offered Davis $420 with a promise of more money if he dropped the issue. In Lopez’s version of the events, the money was for Davis to prepare the paperwork and put the Inn’s books in order. Lopez agreed to file paperwork for the current quarter and asked Davis to come back on October 24. Davis reported the meeting and turned the money over to his superior. When he returned on October 24, Davis wore a recording device. As they discussed Lopez’s tax liability, Lopez emphasized that he wanted Davis “on [his] side” and gave him more money.
Lopez was charged with four counts of attempted bribery of an internal revenue agent. Prior to trial, Lopez filed a motion to suppress the recorded evidence, and the motion was denied. He was convicted on three of the counts in district court. Although the defense did not focus on entrapment, the trial court judge provided jury instructions on the issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

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No, No. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that entrapment only occurs when law enforcement professionals purposefully induce the commission of a crime. The petitioner’s offers of bribery happened before the agent responded in any favorable way, so the agent did not entrap the petitioner. Since the petitioner did not object to the jury instruction on entrapment at the time, he could not retroactively object. The Court also held that the wire recordings did not result from Davis misrepresenting himself. Lopez knew that Davis could use his statements against him if he chose to do so. The device only served to reliably record a conversation in which a government agent was a legal participant.
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the advances in recording technology required the Court to be vigilant about monitoring the constitutionality of their usage. In this case, he held that the recording only corroborated the legal testimony of the agent and was therefore admissible.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he stated that this case followed in the vein of On Lee v. United States, and both cases were wrongly decided. He argued that the recording was not merely a corroboration of earlier evidence but “independent third-party evidence.” He argued that the use of electronic recording devices revived the evils of the general warrant, which the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were written to prevent. He also argued that, in a conversation, the speaker assumes the risk that the other participant might repeat the conversation, but a wire recording adds a third party and another risk to the speaker’s privacy that he did not assume. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Arthur J. Goldberg joined the dissent.


Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul

California prohibited the sale or transportation within its borders of avocados that did not meet a certain standard of maturity, which was defined according to oil content in its Agricultural Code. The federal Secretary of Agriculture used a different system for determining the maturity of avocados that were grown in Florida. Oil content was not a factor in these standards. Florida avocado growers tried to prevent the enforcement of the California law against them with regard to avocados that met the federal standard for maturity but did not have the oil level required by the California law.

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Preemption does not arise if there is no direct conflict between federal and state laws, meaning that it is possible to comply with both of them simultaneously, and if the state law does not frustrate the purpose of the federal law.
In an opinion authored by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that federal law will preempt a state law if it is physically impossible to comply with both laws. In this situation, it would be possible to comply with both laws, since the Florida growers could have met the California standard if they had allowed their avocados more time to grow. This means that there was no inherent conflict between the two laws.
Justices White, Black, Douglas, and Clark dissented on the ground that the California statute was invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution.


Federal Power Commission v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Company

In 1959, Tennessee Gas Transmission Company filed a 7% proposed rate increase across all six of its zones with the Federal Power Commission. The rate increase was based on the expected cost of service and rate of return. The Commission imposed a five-month suspension period while hearings were conducted to determine whether the rate increase was reasonable. At the end of five months, the new rates would be applied, but they were subject to refund if the hearings found a reasonable rate lower than 7%. On August 9, 1960, the Commission found that only a 6 1/8% increase was reasonable and that Tennessee Gas must provide refunds.
Tennessee Gas challenged the ruling by arguing that requiring a refund prior to a final determination of cost made the company unable to recoup its 6 1/8%. Because Tennessee Gas spreads its rates differently across the different zones, there are certain zones in which the refund would be greater than the value of the new rate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found in favor of Tennessee Gas.

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Yes. Justice Tom C. Clark delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that it is the company’s responsibility to determine a rate schedule that is “just and reasonable” in order to prevent the Commission from ordering a change. Additionally, since the company cannot expect to be able to recoup the losses it accrues during the five-month suspension period, it should not expect to recoup the losses during the readjustment period either. The Court also held that the Commission acted properly in order to protect consumers from excessive rates and charges, because Tennessee Gas was attempting to collect on an illegally high rate.


McNeese v. Board of Ed. for Community Unit School Dist. 187

African American students in District 187 sued the school under the Civil Rights Act, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the school district contained an almost identical number of Caucasian and African American students, the petitioners alleged that the two races were taught in separate parts of the building and were compelled to use separate entrances and exits. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure exhaust administrative the remedies available under an Illinois law prohibiting segregation public schools. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

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Yes. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for an 8-1 majority, reversed the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court held that exhausting state remedies was not a prerequisite to bringing a suit under the Civil Rights Act. It was also unclear that the Illinois law provided an adequate administrative remedy to preclude a suit in federal court. Justice John M. Harlan dissented, arguing that the Illinois law provided an adequate remedy.


A Maryland jury found John Brady and Charles Boblit guilty of first-degree murder in the state Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County. Brady maintained that he participated in the preceding robbery, but not in the killing. At sentencing, both men received the death penalty. After trial, Brady learned that Boblit previously confessed to the murder, but the prosecution suppressed that evidence for Brady’s trial. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that suppression of the confession denied Brady due process and remanded the case to reconsider the question of punishment only.

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Yes, No. In a 7-2 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion affirming the state court. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's suppression of evidence violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that according the Maryland state law, the confession would not exonerate Brady, so a remand only for reconsidering his punishment was proper.


In order to gain immediate possession of public land needed to build a dam, the United States sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Northern Division to condemn any outstanding mining claims on the land. The complaint asked the court to allow the United States to have the validity of any claims determined through administrative proceedings before the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior. Respondents sued to enjoin the administrative proceedings, but the District Court granted the United States summary judgment, holding that the court should wait for the administrative determination before proceeding with any mining claim. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that because the United States initiated the condemnation suit in District Court, the validity of mining claims must be left to the judiciary.

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Yes. Justice William O. Douglas wrote for a unanimous court holding that the administrative proceedings were proper. Instituting the condemnation suit in District Court was an appropriate way to obtain possession and was not inconsistent with the administrative proceedings. The District Court was right to wait for the administrative determination.


Adeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was fired from her job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The Employment Security Commission ruled that she could not receive unemployment benefits because her refusal to work on Saturday constituted a failure without good cause to accept available work. Under South Carolina law, employers were not allowed to require employees to work on Sunday.

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The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from setting unemployment benefits eligibility requirements such that a person cannot properly observe key religious principles.
In a majority opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court held that the state's eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a significant burden on Sherbert's ability to freely exercise her faith. Furthermore, there was no compelling state interest which justified such a substantial burden on this basic First Amendment right.
Justices Douglas and Stewart concurred in separate opinions.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice White, dissented on the ground that Seventh-Day Adventist was unavailable for Saturday work just as anyone who refuses Saturday work for personal reasons is unavailable, and that the effect of the Court's decision was to require South Carolina to make an exception in favor of those whose unavailability for work stems from religious convictions.


On June 30, 1960, several white and black people picketed the private Glen Echo Amusement Park in Montgomery County, Maryland. The demonstrators protested against the park's policy "not to have colored people on the rides, or in the park." During the demonstration, William Griffin and four other Negroes entered the park to test its management's resolve. A state deputy, who worked as a security staff member in the park, soon observed them. After informing them of the park's racial policy, the deputy asked them to leave. When Griffin and his friends refused, they were arrested and later convicted for criminal trespass. State appellate courts affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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Yes. The Court held that the arresting deputy, despite working as a private park employee at the time, possessed and acted under state authority, imputing responsibility for his actions to Maryland. Therefore, to the extent that he sought to enforce a private policy of racial discrimination, the state of Maryland must be charged with racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.


187 black students were convicted in a magistrate's court of breach of the peace for peacefully assembling at the South Carolina State Government. Their purpose was to submit a protest of grievances to the citizens of South Carolina, and to the legislative bodies of South Carolina. During the course of the peaceful demonstration the police arrested the students after they did not obey an order to disperse. The students were convicted of breach of the peace. After their convictions were affirmed by the state supreme court, the students sought further review. They contended that there was a complete absence of any evidence of the commission of the offense and that they were thus denied due process of law.

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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows the Free Petition Clause to extend to the states as well as the federal government.
In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court reversed the criminal convictions of the black students. It was clear to the Court that in arresting, convicting, and punishing the students under the circumstances disclosed by the record, the state infringed the students' constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances.
Justice Clark dissented.


William Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid in 1959 by Hartford, Connecticut police. After pleading guilty to pool selling, a misdemeanor, he was sentenced to one year in jail and fined $500, but the sentence was suspended after 90 days and Malloy was placed on two years probation. Some 16 months following his plea, a Superior Court appointed referee ordered Malloy to testify about gambling and other criminal activities in Hartford County. When Malloy refused, "on grounds it may tend to incriminate [him]" he was imprisoned for contempt and held until willing to answer questions. Malloy filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his confinement. On appeal from the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors ruling, upholding an adverse Superior Court denial, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a state. When determining if state officers properly obtained a confession, one must focus on whether the statements were made freely and voluntarily without any direct or implied promised or improper influence. Noting that the American judicial system is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment secures defendants against self-incrimination and compels state and federal officials to establish guilt by evidence that is free and independent of a suspect's or witnesses' statements.


A group of 15-20 African-American students entered Hooper's restaurant in Baltimore to engage in a sit-in to protest the restaurant's refusal to serve African-American patrons. They refused to leave when requested to do so by the hostess on behalf of Mr. Hooper, the president of the corporation that owned the restaurant. Mr. Hooper called the police, who told him that they needed a warrant to be able to do anything. After Mr. Hooper swore out a warrant, the students were arrested for violating a Maryland statute prohibiting trespassing. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.

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No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, since the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions on January 9, 1962, Maryland had passed state and local laws that criminalized the conduct of Hooper's restaurant employees in refusing to serve the students because of their race. Under these statutes, the students' actions would not be illegal and their right to obtain service in the restaurant would be protected. The Court held that these laws supervened in this case because, although the convictions were affirmed in the Maryland Court of Appeals, the judgment was still not final as the case was before the Supreme Court. The Court reversed the ruling and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the new laws.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the majority opinion should have reversed the judgment and directed the dismissal of the indictment. He wrote that the case should be decided on the merits and argued that policies allowing people to be refused service based on their race creates a second class of citizens, which the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were enacted to prevent. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg partially joined in the concurrence. In his separate concurrence, Justice Goldberg wrote that the Constitution guarantees all Americans the right to be treated equally with respect to public accommodations. He argued that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments have the express purpose of preventing any group from being treated as second-class citizens due to their race. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Douglas joined in the concurrence.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent the application of a state's trespass laws in this case. He wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit a state from prosecuting crimes against a person or person's property, as in the case of a trespass. Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel a private business owner to trade with anyone against his will, it does not prohibit a business owner from establishing rules regarding which customers he will or will not serve. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.


Farr, Whitlock & Co. contracted to buy sugar from a Cuban corporation. The corporation loaded the sugar on to the S.S. Hornfels, but in response to President Eisenhower reducing the Cuban sugar quota, Cuba issued a decree taking possession of the sugar. The Cuban government would only allow the sugar to leave Cuba if Farr, Whitlock entered into a new contract with Banco Nacional de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban government. After the sugar left Cuba, Farr, Whitlock refused to pay Banco Nacional. Banco Nacional sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover payment. The court granted summary judgment for Far, Whitlock, holding that Cuba’s taking of the sugar violated international law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

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No. In an 8-1 decision, Justice John M. Harlan wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that it will not decide the validity of a decree by a foreign government absent a treaty or other agreement. It did not matter that the taking violated customary international law. The majority noted that a judicial decision on this issue without a treaty would strain U.S.-Cuba relations. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that he would decide the case on the merits, absent any specific objection to examining Cuba’s law under international law.


National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers

In 1956, the Attorney General of Alabama, John M. Patterson, filed suit against the NAACP, a New York corporation advocating for equal rights for black Americans. He filed the action as an attempt to oust the association from the state. The claim alleged that the NAACP failed to comply with Alabama statutes requiring foreign corporations to register with the Alabama Secretary of State, along with other acts more clearly related to the NAACP’s political mission. That same day, the Attorney General obtained a restraining order barring the NAACP from conducting business in the state or attempting to comply with the statutory requirements in question. Before the case was heard on the merits, the court found the NAACP to be in contempt, in part for failing to comply with a court order requiring the NAACP to produce records.
The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the NAACP’s petition for a writ of certiorari. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States held that requiring the NAACP to produce records including names and addresses of its members was a violation of those members’ freedom of association. The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, again affirmed the judgment of contempt, arguing that the Supreme Court’s judgment rested on the mistaken premise that Alabama had incorrectly interpreted its own procedural rules. The Supreme Court of the United States again remanded the case in a per curiam opinion, holding that the NAACP had satisfied the district court’s order even though the NAACP did not produce the membership lists.
The NAACP then filed an action in federal court, alleging that the Alabama courts were depriving the organization of its constitutional rights and seeking to enjoin enforcement of the trial court’s restraining order. The district court dismissed the action, but the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court, instructing the district court to retain jurisdiction only if Alabama state courts did not promptly try the NAACP’s case. The Supreme Court of the United States then ordered the district court to try the NAACP’s case unless the State of Alabama gave the NAACP a hearing before January 2, 1962. In December 1961, an Alabama circuit court decreed that the NAACP continued its activities in Alabama in violation of the laws and constitution of Alabama. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.

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In a unanimous opinion written by Justice John Harlan, the Court held that the form of the NAACP’s brief should not prevent it from obtaining a hearing in Alabama courts. Justice Harlan first determined whether the form of the NAACP's brief was a state question barring federal review. He noted that the Court had already ruled that most of the formal requirements deprived the NAACP of its federal constitutional rights. Justice Harlan cited the Court’s prior reasoning on the NAACP’s claim, confirming that novelty in state procedural requirements cannot prevent parties from seeking to vindicate their federal constitutional rights in state courts.
Justice Harlan also held that Alabama improperly applied the state registration requirements. He looked to the language of the statute, noting that the stated penalty for failure to comply was a forfeiture of one thousand dollars for each offense; there was no mention of permanent ouster in the statutory language. Justice Harlan determined that the purpose of the requirements was simply to ensure that foreign corporations would be amenable to suit in Alabama, and confirmed this interpretation through a brief overview of Alabama case law.
Turning to Alabama’s other allegations, Justice Harlan held that the vast majority of the NAACP’s actions did not violate any particular Alabama law, and all of its actions were constitutionally protected or controllable by other, more appropriate public remedies. Justice Harlan rejected Alabama’s contentions that the NAACP illegally 1) paid for two black students to attend the University of Alabama, 2) failed to disclose membership information, 3) made false allegations against state officials, 4) violated Alabama’s injunction, and 5) breached the peace, along with several other allegations. He argued that these activities were more related to the NAACP’s members’ freedom to associate for the collective advocacy of their ideas than to the NAACP’s privilege to do business in Alabama.


In 1955, Tennessee amended a statute that was based on the Atomic Energy Act and allowed the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its contractors to operate without paying sales tax. Under the amended statute, contractors must pay a contractor’s tax, regardless of the source or destination of the product. Union Carbide Corp, H.K. Ferguson Co. — both of which hold AEC contracts — and the AEC sued Tennessee to recover the sales and contractor’s tax.
The trial court dismissed the suit due to the existing statute, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld state’s right to collect a contractor’s tax, but found that the companies should be reimbursed for the sales tax.

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No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the Constitution creates immunity from state taxes for the federal government and its properties, but that protection does not extend to federal contractors. Although a contractor may provide goods only to the federal government, the company still enters into a contract that results in financial compensation. Therefore, the contractor always stands to benefit financially and should not be immune from taxation. In this case, the Atomic Energy Commission chose to contract to separate companies rather than hire its own employees, so it may not confer tax immunities onto those contractors.
In his concurring opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that this case might have been a good opportunity to reconsider the issue of federal immunity from state taxes. However, given the legislative history surrounding this case, he concurred in the judgment of the court.


A jury convicted Harold Fahy and William Arnold of willful injury to public property, for painting black swastikas on the Beth Israel Synagogue in Norwalk, Connecticut. The judge admitted a can of black paint and a paintbrush into evidence. A police officer obtained these items during a warrantless search of Fahy’s garage. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut found that the brush and paint were products of an illegal search and should not have been admitted. The court affirmed the convictions, however, holding that the error in admitting the evidence was harmless.

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No. Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed the convictions, holding that the error was prejudicial. The evidence itself was incriminating and the prosecution used it to corroborate opinion testimony that the brush matched the markings on the synagogue. Justice John M. Harlan dissented, expressing that the U.S. Supreme Court should not interfere with state court findings on harmless errors. Justice Tom C. Clark, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Byron R. White joined the dissent.


After Winston Massiah was indicted on federal narcotics charges, he retained counsel, pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. While on bail, Massiah had a conversation with one of his codefendants in the absence of counsel. Unknown to Massiah, the codefendant became a government informer and allowed police to install a radio transmitter under the seat of his car. A nearby government agent listened to the entire conversation by way of this transmitter. Massiah made several incriminating statements. At trial, the agent who listened to the conversation testified to the incriminating statements over Massiah’s objection. The codefendant never testified. A jury convicted Massiah and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

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No, No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that incriminating statements deliberately elicited by federal agents in the absence of counsel after the proceeding has begun violate the Sixth Amendment. The prosecution could not use these statements as evidence against Massiah. Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that the statements should be admitted because they were voluntarily made and not coerced. The absence of counsel was only one factor among many the court should consider in this situation.


The WMCA, acting on behalf of several New York City registered voters, challenged the constitutionality of Article III, Sections 2-5 of the New York State constitution alleging that its apportionment formula resulted in unfair weighting of both state legislature houses by favoring lesser populated rural areas over densely populated urban centers. On appeal from a dismissal of their complaint by a three-judge district court, the Supreme Court granted the WMCA certiorari.

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Yes. In a 7-to-3 decision, the Court began by noting that this case was property before it since no other political relief was available to the WMCA. The Court then held that New York's apportionment formula violated the Equal Protection Clause since it did not apportion the state's senate and assembly substantially on a population basis. Consequently, New York's legislative apportionment scheme significantly undervalued the weight of urban area voters as compared with their rural and less densely populated counterparts. This practice constituted a form of geographical discrimination that violated notions of equal protection.


James P. Wesberry resided in a Georgia congressional district with a population two to three times greater than that of other congressional districts in the state. He asserted that because there was only one congressman for each district, his vote was debased as a result of the state apportionment statute and the state's failure to realign the congressional districts. Wesberry sought to invalidate the apportionment statute and enjoin defendants, the Governor and Secretary of State, from conducting elections under it. The district court dismissed the complaint for non-justiciability and want of equity. Wesberry appealed.

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Congressional districts must have roughly equal populations if this is feasible.
In an opinion authored by Hugo L. Black, the 6-3 majority held that the district court had jurisdiction because debasement of the right to vote as a result of a state congressional apportionment law was justiciable and not subject to dismissal for "want of equity." The Court further held that the apportionment statute was invalid because it abridged the requirement of Article 1, section 2 of the Constitution that The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.
Justice Clark concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that the trial court erred in dismissing the case for nonjusticiability and want of equity, but stated further that Article 1, section 2, does not forbid disproportionate congressional districts and that the case should be remanded for a hearing to determine whether the apportionment statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that the Constitution expressly provides that state legislatures and Congress have exclusive jurisdiction over problems of congressional apportionment of the type involved in the case.
Justice Stewart stated that he joined with Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent except insofar as there might be implied in that dissent the view that the issues were not justiciable.


In 1961, M.O. Sims, David J. Vann (of Vann v. Baggett), John McConnell (McConnell v. Baggett), and other voters from Jefferson County, Alabama, challenged the apportionment of the state legislature. Lines dividing electoral districts had resulted in dramatic population discrepancies among the districts. The state constitution required at least one representative per county and senatorial district. However, the district in Jefferson County, which is near Birmingham, contained 41 times as many eligible voters as those in another district of the state. Sims and the other voters argued that this lack of proportionality prevented them from effectively participating in a republican form of government.

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Equal protection requires that state legislative districts should be comprised of roughly equal populations if possible.
In an 8-to-1 decision authored by Justice Earl Warren, the Court upheld the challenge to the Alabama system, holding that Equal Protection Clause demanded "no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens...." Noting that the right to direct representation was "a bedrock of our political system," the Court held that both houses of bicameral state legislatures had to be apportioned on a population basis. States were required to "honest and good faith" efforts to construct districts as nearly of equal population as practicable.
Justice Stewart concurred, agreeing with Warren that the Court could intervene to address egregious situations of misapportionment, Stewart sought to limit the application of this decision to clear violations of equal protection. He felt wary of imposing specific guidelines on states for how to redraw the district lines or setting a certain range of ratios that would be acceptable.
Justice Harlan dissented, applying an originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which in his opinion had not been meant by the drafters to protect voting rights. He suggested that the Court was intruding on federalism principles protecting the states in their control of local matters.
Justice Clark concurred in a separate opinion.


Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes

Under its 1867 Constitution, the State of Maryland's Senate has 29 seats, one for each of 23 counties and six for the City of Baltimore's legislative districts. The State's five most populous political subdivisions with over three-fourths of the 1960 population are represented by only slightly over one-third of the Senate's membership. In the House of Delegates, after temporary legislation in 1962, there existed a maximum population-variance ratio of almost 6-to-1. A group of residents, taxpayers, and voters brought suit, alleging that the legislative malapportionment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, the circuit court held that as to certain counties there was invidious discrimination in the apportionment of the House and that the senatorial apportionment was constitutional. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Yes. In an 8-1 opinion deliver by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that neither house of the Maryland Legislature is apportioned sufficiently on a population basis to be constitutionally sustainable, based on the Court's ruling in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Finding that the validity of the apportionment of both houses of the Maryland legislature were before it, the Court found that neither house could be sustained under the Equal Protection Clause because of the gross disparities from population-based representation in the apportionment of Senate seats. "Maryland's plan is plainly insufficient under the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause as spelled out in our opinion in Reynolds," wrote Chief Justice Warren. Justice John M. Harlan dissented.


Following the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 186) Richard Sincock and several other New Castle County residents, taxpayers, and qualified voters, challenged the constitutionality of Delaware's apportionment scheme. The suit alleged that under Delaware's 1897 state constitution, no provisions existed for reapportionment that would reflect the changing demographic face of New Castle County and the City of Wilmington. On a appeal from a three-judge district court ruling against the state of Delaware, the Supreme Court granted Mabel Roman, Delaware's elections clerk, certiorari.

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Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision the Court held that Delaware's apportionment practices, as codified in its state constitution both before and after a 1963 amendment, violated the Due Process Clause. Delaware's system of having one upper house apportioned on a geographical basis and one lower house apportioned on population basis was unconstitutional since population is the only permissible guide to apportionment.


During the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, the New York Times published an ad for contributing donations to defend Martin Luther King, Jr., on perjury charges. The ad contained several minor factual inaccuracies. The city Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, felt that the criticism of his subordinates reflected on him, even though he was not mentioned in the ad. Sullivan sent a written request to the Times to publicly retract the information, as required for a public figure to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama law.
When the Times refused and claimed that they were puzzled by the request, Sullivan filed a libel action against the Times and a group of African American ministers mentioned in the ad. A jury in state court awarded him $500,000 in damages. The state supreme court affirmed and the Times appealed.

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To sustain a claim of defamation or libel, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant knew that a statement was false or was reckless in deciding to publish the information without investigating whether it was accurate.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court ruled for the Times. When a statement concerns a public figure, the Court held, it is not enough to show that it is false for the press to be liable for libel. Instead, the target of the statement must show that it was made with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its falsity. Brennan used the term "actual malice" to summarize this standard, although he did not intend the usual meaning of a malicious purpose. In libel law, “malice” had meant knowledge or gross recklessness rather than intent, since courts found it difficult to imagine that someone would knowingly disseminate false information without a bad intent.


On November 2, 1962, Jim Garrison, the District Attorney for the Parish of New Orleans, held a press conference in which he issued a statement disparaging the judicial conduct of the eight judges of the Parish’s Criminal District Court. He attributed the backlog of pending cases to the judges’ inefficiency, laziness, and excessive vacations. Based on these statements, Garrison was tried and convicted of defamation under the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. Garrison appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and argued that the statute impermissibly infringed on his First Amendment rights to freedom of expression.

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Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that a criminal libel statute should conform to the same restrictions as civil libel statutes to protect the freedom of expression under the First Amendment. Therefore, such statutes may only criminalize statements that are knowingly false or made with a reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. This limitation on libel statutes is in line with the precedent the Court established in New York Times v. Sullivan, and there is no reason that the freedom of speech protections should apply differently to a civil libel statute than to a criminal one. Based on this standard, the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute is unconstitutionally broad and infringes on the First Amendment’s protections of free speech.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Hugo L. Black wrote that the First Amendment protects citizens from being punished by the government for expressing an opinion, and therefore there should be no law permitting criminal punishment for libel. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the concurrence. Justice Douglas wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he argued that that the standard the majority opinion seeks to apply to criminal libel statutes does not adequately protect the freedom of speech. Justice Black joined in the concurring opinion. In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Arthur J. Goldberg wrote that the Constitution protects the absolute right of citizens and the press to criticize official conduct.


The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, granted an order to arrest debtor, Morris Gotthilf. Gotthilf appealed the decision, arguing that the statute authorizing arrest to enforce collection of debts violated the New York State and U.S. Constitutions. The Supreme Court of New York dismissed the appeal, because the original order was not final. Gotthilf did not file for leave to appeal certified questions before appealing the the U.S. Supreme Court as is required by New York law for non-final orders.

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No answer. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The Court explained that it did not have jurisdiction because the original order was not a final judgment. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, writing that the majority’s result was unexpected and causes irreparable injury to Gotthilf because it is too late for him to appeal through the proper channels.


Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado

Acting on behalf of several voters in the Denver area, Andres Lucas sued various officials connected with Colorado's elections challenging the apportionment of seats in both houses of the Colorado General Assembly. Under Colorado's apportionment plan, the House of Representatives was apportioned on the basis of population but the apportionment of the Senate was based on a combination of population and other factors (geography, compactness and contiguity, accessibility, natural boundaries, and conformity to historical divisions). Consequently, counties with only about one-third of the State's total population would elect a majority of the Senate; the maximum population-variance ratio would be about 3.6-to-1; and the chief metropolitan areas, with over two-thirds of the State's population, could elect only a bare majority of the Senate. When a three-judge District Court upheld the plan, stressing its recent approval by the electorate, the Supreme Court granted Lucas certiorari.

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Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires all districts to be substantially apportioned on a population bases. While noting that some deviation from strict population considerations may be permitted to offset minor underrepresentations of one group or another, the wholesale neglect of population considerations is unconstitutional. The Court added that although a majority of the Colorado electorate approved its apportionment scheme, this cannot override even a single individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote. The apportionment of Colorado's Senate rendered population considerations virtually insignificant, and was therefore unconstitutional.


Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County

In 1951, a group of African American students in Prince Edward County, Virginia filed a complaint in district court alleging that the Virginia laws requiring segregated schools denied them their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law. When the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, this case and others like it were remanded to the lower courts to order desegregation. Prince Edward County resisted desegregation by refusing to levy and collect the school taxes for the 1959-1960 school year, which forced the public schools in the county to close. The Prince Edward School Foundation formed to ensure private education for the white students. African American students did not receive formal education from 1959 until 1963, when federal, state, and county authorities collaborated to hold desegregated classes in county-owned buildings. In 1960, the Prince Edward Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance providing tuition grants for the children attending the private schools of the Prince Edward School Foundation.
In 1961, the petitioners amended their original complaint to include new respondents and the elements of failing to provide public free schools in the county and using public funds to pay for segregated private schools. The district court held that the county could not pay the tuition grants as long as the public school remained closed, but the court refrained from making a decision regarding the closed public schools until the Virginia courts ruled on the issue. Later, without waiting for the decision of the Virginia courts, the district court held that the public schools must reopen. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decisions on the grounds that the district court should have waited until the state courts determined the validity of the tuition grants and the closing of the public schools.

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Yes. Justice Hugo L. Black authored the opinion of the 7-2 majority, in which the Court held that the closing of the county’s schools denied the African American children an education that was available to their white peers. Although the closing of public schools is not unconstitutional in itself, when schools are closed for the express purpose of denying education to a group of children based on race, the action violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the district court had the power to order the county to collect the necessary taxes and to reopen the public schools.
In a jointly filed dissenting opinion, Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice John M. Harlan disagreed with the holding that the district court could order the county to reopen the public schools.


Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over several hours, the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder. Escobedo appealed the affirmation of his conviction of murder by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which held that petitioner's confession had been admissible even though it was obtained after he had requested and been denied the assistance of counsel.

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As soon as someone is in the custody of law enforcement, he or she has a Sixth Amendment right to speak to an attorney.
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Goldberg, the Court ruled that Escobedo’s Sixth Amendment rights had been violated. The Court reasoned that the period between arrest and indictment was a critical stage at which an accused needed the advice of counsel perhaps more than at any other. A suspect who was being interrogated by police while in custody, who had not been warned of his right to remain silent, and who had requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, had been denied the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Any statement elicited under such circumstances could not be used against him at a criminal trial. The Court therefore reversed Escobedo’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Justice Harlan dissented, opining that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois should be affirmed because the majority's conclusion would unjustifiably fetter legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement.
Justice Stewart dissented on the grounds that the right to assistance of counsel should not attach until the formal institution of proceedings by indictment, information, or arraignment, and that the majority's holding would have an unfortunate impact on the fair administration of criminal justice.
Justice White, joined by Clark and Stewart, dissented on the grounds that the majority's decision will be applicable whenever the accused becomes a suspect, rendering admissions to the police inadmissible unless the accused waives his right to counsel and rendering the task of law enforcement more difficult.


On June 14, 1960 at around 1 a.m., Nathan Jackson and Nora Elliot entered a Brooklyn hotel and registered for a room. Jackson drew a gun and took money from the clerk, then ordered the clerk and others upstairs before leaving the hotel. Outside, Jackson encountered a policeman. Both men drew their guns, and in the ensuing altercation, the policeman was fatally wounded and Jackson was shot twice. When a police detective questioned Jackson at the hospital around 2 a.m., he admitted to the robbery and to shooting the police officer. Jackson received pain medication and was questioned again around 4 a.m. He again admitted to the robbery and the shooting. An hour later, Jackson was taken into the operating room.
Jackson and Elliot were indicted and tried together. His two confessions were admitted into evidence without objection. In his testimony, Jackson testified to being pressured into answering questions in the hospital, which the state denied. Consistent with New York practice, the question of the validity of the confession was submitted to the jury along with the other issues. The jury found Jackson guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Jackson submitted a petition for habeas corpus alleging that the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness of confession was unconstitutional and that his statement was involuntary. The district court denied the petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.

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No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the New York procedure did not allow for a reliable determination of whether or not the confessions were voluntary. Because the judge does not rule on the issue and the jury only reports on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, there is no way to determine whether the jury found he confession voluntary. Without this information, there is no way to ensure that the defendant’s rights are protected. The Court also held that, in cases where there is insufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty without the confession, the jury will take the defendant’s guilt into account when considering the voluntariness of the confession. Because there are issues of fact in question, the Court remanded the case to that state courts, rather than the federal court.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that the question of whether a confession is voluntary should remain in the hands of the jury, per the New York procedure. Allowing the judge to rule on the voluntariness of the statement prior to the jury could only distort the jury’s findings and downgrade the value of the trial by jury. He agreed with the majority that the statements in this case were involuntary. Justice Tom C. Clark joined in the opinion concurring part and dissenting in part.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Tom C. Clark argued that the New York procedure was not in question because no objection was raised when the evidence was introduced in trial. Because this objection was not raised, it was improper for the majority to rule on the issue. He also argued that the question of voluntariness of a statement is an issue for the jury to consider, not a trial judge.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent and argued that issues such as the voluntariness of a confession should be decided by the jury, as the jury trial is the cornerstone of the US judicial system. He also argued that the majority’s opinion was inconsistent with previous rulings that upheld that primacy of the jury. Additionally, Justice Harlan wrote that limits should only be placed on the states’ ability to prevent criminal conduct when their actions infringe on “rights fundamental to a decent society,” which he argues this issue does not. Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


Acting on behalf of residents, taxpayers, and qualified voters in Arlington and Fairfax County, Virginia, Harrison Mann challenged Virginia's 1962 amended statutory apportionment scheme as unrepresentative. Harrison called for a redistribution of legislative representation among the counties and independent cities of the state "substantially in proportion to their respective populations." When Levin Davis appealed an adverse three-judge district court ruling on behalf of Virginia's Secretary and State Board of Elections, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court noted that under the Fourteenth Amendment all bicameral state legislatures must substantially apportion both seats of their houses on a population basis. In Virginia's case, neither of its legislative houses was apportioned on a population basis. Virginia's claim that the underrepresented counties were composed primarily of military personnel and their families, who often only resided in the state for relatively short periods of time, did not constitute a defense to its actions. Instead, this amounted to discrimination against a class of individuals merely because of the nature of their employment.


The Taylor Street Pharmacy in Columbia, South Carolina, allowed both black and white customers to buy goods and purchase food, but only the white customers were allowed to sit and eat at the lunch counter. On March 15, 1960, the petitioners, five black college students, sat at the counter and waited to be served. The previous day, the store manager arranged for police officers to be present in case of such a situation. After announcing that he would not serve the students and requesting that they leave, the store manager and one of the officers spoke individually to each petitioner. When they would not leave, the petitioners were arrested and charged criminal trespass and breach of the peace. The Recorder’s Court convicted the petitioners, and the County Court affirmed, as did the Supreme Court of South Carolina.

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Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that there was no evidence that the petitioners’ conduct was anything other than polite and could not be construed as a breach of the peace. Given that the only evidence for a potential breach of peace was in the actions of hostile onlookers, there was no reason to arrest and convict the petitioners.
Justice William O. Douglas concurred and cited the reasons stated in his opinion in Bell v. Maryland. In his opinion in that case, Justice Douglas argued that the segregation of public places drastically and negatively affects the lives of black Americans. It is a relic of slavery and second-class citizenship that is antithetical to the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg concurred and cited the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in Bell v. Maryland. Chief Justice Earl Warren joined in the concurrence.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Hugo L. Black argued that the conviction for trespassing should stand, as the police acted correctly in removing the petitioners from the property after they had been asked to leave. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Byron R. White joined in the concurrence.


After a car accident in South Carolina, Hanna brought a claim against Plumer, the executor of the estate of the driver who hit him. Since Hanna was a resident of Ohio, and Plumer was a resident of Massachusetts, the case was heard by a federal court in Massachusetts sitting in diversity jurisdiction. Plumer was served by leaving copies of the summons with his wife, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Plumer successfully sought summary judgment at trial because Massachusetts law requires service to be delivered by hand.
The parties argued on appeal over how the Erie doctrine applied to this case. Plumer asserted that it would find a question to be substantive rather than procedural under the outcome-determinative test when applying federal law would alter the outcome of the case. He pointed out that applying federal law would change the outcome of the case, which otherwise would be dismissed, so the state procedural requirements and the grant of summary judgment should be upheld.

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In cases when it is rationally possible to classify a law as either substantive or procedural, the federal courts have the authority to control their own practice and pleading procedures.
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Warren, the Court ruled for Hanna. To raise the Erie doctrine, the Court reasoned, the effect of a procedural rule on the outcome of a case must abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive law. There was no change to a substantive right here because the plaintiff simply could refile the case or serve the defendant personally. This issue thus related only to procedural requirements, so applying the outcome-determinative test was not appropriate.


On June 7, 1960, Arthur Hamm, Jr. and Reverend C. A. Ivory, both black, entered McCrory’s Five and Ten Cent Store in Rock Hill, South Carolina. They made several purchases, then tried unsuccessfully to purchase food at the lunch counter. The store manager asked Hamm and Ivory to leave, but they refused to do so. The manager called the police, who again asked Hamm and Ivory to leave before finally arresting them.
The city of Rock Hill charged Hamm with willfully and unlawfully trespassing at McCrory’s, in violation of city and state laws. He was tried in district court without a jury, found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of one hundred dollars or serve thirty days in jail. The Court of General Sessions and the Supreme Court of South Carolina both affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court of South Carolina cited other South Carolina cases involving sit-down demonstrations, noting that those defendants consistently and unsuccessfully invoked the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections.
The Civil Rights Act, passed in 1964 while his appeal was pending, declared that all persons should be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation.

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Yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Tom C. Clark, the Court held in a combined case that sit-in demonstrations could not be the subject of federal or state trespass prosecutions, and that any such convictions on appeal must be reversed. Justice Clark noted that the Court historically gave weight to the common law doctrine of abatement, which applied changes in law that occur after a trial court’s judgment but before the decision of an appellate court to the original judgment. He explained that this rule did not depend on the explicit intention of Congress. As the Civil Rights Act clearly prevented the federal prosecution of individuals for attempting to make use of public accommodations, Justice Clark held that it must also prevent state prosecutions through the supremacy clause. He declined to answer the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment alone prevented similar prosecutions at the state or federal level.
Justices William O. Douglas and Arthur J. Goldberg concurred. Justice Douglas characterized the Civil Rights Act as a means of enforcing protections already enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, there was no real issue with applying it retroactively to already unconstitutional state prosecutions.
Justice Hugo Black dissented. He read nothing in the Civil Rights Act to suggest that Congress intended to reverse sit-in trespassing convictions that occurred before the act took effect.
Justice John Harlan dissented. He rejected the majority’s assumption that the doctrine of abatement required courts to apply a federal change in law to Hamm’s state conviction through the supremacy clause.
Justice Potter Stewart dissented. He argued that a state’s abatement policy was determined by that state, not by federal courts.
Justice Byron White dissented. He could not discern any constitutional problem with Hamm’s state court conviction, and was confident that Congress did not intent to abate similar existing convictions through the Civil Rights Act. He noted Congress’ silence on the issue.


On December 14, 1961, the Baton Rouge police arrested 23 members of the Congress of Racial Equality ("CORE") on a charge of illegal picketing. In response B. Elton Cox, a leading member of CORE, and others planned to march through parts of Baton Rouge, LA, ending with a demonstration at the courthouse. An estimated 1,500 to 3,800 protesters demonstrated during the hearings of the 23 jailed members.
Baton Rouge Police Chief Wingate White confronted the protestors when they arrived at the courthouse, telling them that they must confine the demonstration "to the west side of the street" within a designated period of time. After the group began their demonstration, a sheriff ordered them to disperse. Officers then forcibly dispersed the demonstration and arrested several demonstrators, including Cox.
Cox was charged with four offenses under Louisiana law: criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse. He was acquitted of criminal conspiracy but convicted of the other three offenses. In accordance with Louisiana procedure, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed his "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public passages" convictions on certiorari, and the "courthouse picketing" conviction on appeal, and the court affirmed all three convictions. Cox appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that all three statutes were unconstitutionally vague. This case (No. 24) addresses the "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public passages" statutes, while the second case (No. 49) addresses the "courthouse picketing" statute.

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Yes. Louisiana's "disturbing the peace" statute is unconstitutional on its face because it is vague in its overly broad scope, and the policy of Baton Rouge law enforcement of giving officers complete discretion in enforcing the "obstructing public passages" statute deprives Cox of his constitutional rights to freedom of speech and assembly. In a decision authored by Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, the Court was unanimous in finding the "disturbing the peace" statute unconstitutionally vague, and a majority of the Court (7-2) found that Cox's conviction for "obstructing public passages" violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Justices Hugo L. Black and Tom C. Clark each filed concurring opinions as to the "disturbing the peace" statute. Justices Black and Clark also concurred as to the "obstructing public passages" conviction, with Justice Byron R. White, joined by Justice John M. Harlan, dissenting as to that issue.