A federal district court convicted both Christopher Michael Dean and Ricardo Curtis Lopez in part for the discharge of a pistol during an armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), a sentencing enhancement statute. They appealed arguing that Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) only applies to the intentional discharge of a firearm.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) does not have an intent requirement. It explained, "The mere discharge of a firearm during any crime of violence... even accidental, is subject to the sentencing enhancement", requiring ten additional years imprisonment.

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No. The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) does not require proof of intent to discharge a firearm in order enhance a sentence. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the grammatical structure of the statute demonstrates that there is no intent requirement in order to enhance the convicted person's sentence.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He argued that criminal liability should not attach in cases where an accident causes no harm, as in Mr. Dean's case. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also dissented. He argued that 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) was sufficiently ambiguous that it should be viewed in favor of Mr. Dean, such that the statute provides "fair warning" to criminal behavior.


Summum, a religious organization, sent a letter to the mayor of Pleasant Grove, Utah asking to place a monument in one of the city's parks. Although the park already housed a monument to the Ten Commandments, the mayor denied Summum's request because the monument did not "directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove." Summum filed suit against the city in federal court citing, among other things, a violation of its First Amendment free speech rights. The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah denied Summum's request for a preliminary injunction.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and granted Summum's injunction request. The Tenth Circuit held that the park was in fact a "public" forum, not a non-public forum as the district court had held. Furthermore, Summum demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were to be denied, and the interests of the city did not outweigh this potential harm. The injunction, according to the court, was also not against the public interest.

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No. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit holding that the placement of a monument in a public park is a form of government speech and therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that since Pleasant Grove City had retained final authority over which monuments were displayed, the monuments represented an expression of the city's viewpoints and thus government speech.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a separate concurring opinion that largely embraced the majority's reasoning. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Agreeing with the Court's reasoning, he also noted that there were likely no violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment on the part of Pleasant Grove City. He argued that displays of the Ten Commandments had been construed by the Court as "having an undeniable historical meaning" and thus did not attempt to establish a religion. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that "government speech" should be considered a rule of thumb and not a rigid category. He stated that sometimes the Court should ask "whether a government's actions burdens speech disproportionately in light of the action's tendency to further a legitimate government objective." Justice Souter also wrote separately, concurring in the judgment, but warning that public monuments should not be considered government speech categorically.


While serving in the United States army in 1944, Woodrow Sanders had a bazooka explode near him, burning the right side of his face. Sanders also claimed that the explosion had damaged his right eye. However subsequent examinations by Veterans' Affairs ("VA") optometrists suggested that the cause of the condition was difficult to determine and was likely due to an infection. When Sanders appeared before the Board of Veterans' Appeals, arguing that the injury was service related and seeking cost-free treatment, the Board denied his claim, finding that the injury was not service related. On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Sanders argued that the VA failed to provide notice as to who was responsible for obtaining the evidence necessary to substantiate his claim, as required by the notice provision of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 ("VCAA"). The Veterans Court affirmed the Board, basing its decision on the fact that Sanders did not suffer any "specific prejudice" due to the VA's failure to notify.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court, finding that the VCAA does not require any showing of prejudice. Any failure to notify as required by the Act creates a presumption of prejudice that need not be alleged or proved by the veteran seeking medical assistance.

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Yes. The Supreme Court held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's framework for evaluating VA notice errors, conflicted with established law that the Veterans Court "take due account of the rule of prejudicial error.". With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the Federal Circuit's framework was too complex, rigid, and its presumption of prejudicial error imposed an unreasonable burden upon the VA. Rather, the Court stated the proper framework for the Veterans Court to apply is the "harmless-error" rule ordinarily applied in civil cases.
Justice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He disagreed that a veteran claimant bore the burden of persuasion when mounting a claim against the VA. He reasoned prior practice indicated congressional favoritism of veterans and that statutory doubt should be resolved in the veteran's favor. Moreover, he disagreed with the majority in its finding that the Federal Circuit's framework was "complex" and "rigid," rather viewing it as "workable."


Diana Levine filed this personal injury action against Wyeth, the drug manufacturer, in state court in Vermont. Ms. Levine had intravenously injected Phenergan, a drug made by Wyeth and used to prevent allergies and motion sickness, into her arm, and complications arising from the injection eventually led to the amputation of her arm. Ms. Levine brought this claim asserting that Wyeth had failed to include a warning label describing the possible arterial injuries that could occur from negligent injection of the drug. Wyeth argued that because their warning label had been deemed acceptable by the FDA, a federal agency, any Vermont state regulations making the label insufficient were preempted by the federal approval. The Superior Court of Vermont found in favor of Ms. Levine and denied Wyeth's motion for a new trial.
The Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed this ruling on appeal, holding that the FDA requirements merely provide a floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation. Therefore, states are free to create more stringent labeling requirements than federal law provides.

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No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Vermont holding that federal law did not preempt Ms. Levine's state-law claim that Wyeth's labeling of Phenergan failed to warn of the dangers of its intravenous administration. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice David H. Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court first rejected Wyeth's argument that by unilaterally changing its labeling of Phenergan, it would have violated federal labeling regulations. Rather, the Court asserted that the manufacturer bears ultimate responsibility for the content of its labels at all times. The Court then rejected Wyeth's argument that requiring it to comply with the state-law duty to provide a stronger warning would interfere with Congress' purpose of entrusting the FDA with drug labeling decisions. Rather, the Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to preempt state-law failure to warn actions when it created the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion noting that the FDA may create regulations that preempt state law tort claims, but such a regulation was not at issue in Ms. Levine's case. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately, concurring only in the judgment. He criticized the majority opinion for implicitly endorsing a "far-reaching implied pre-emption doctrine" where the Court invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts with federal statutes by extrapolating from evidence not found in the text of the statute itself. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin G. Scalia. He disagreed with the Court's holding that a jury, rather than the FDA is ultimately responsible for regulating warning labels for prescription drugs. He argued this is incompatible with the Court's precedent in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., which established the principles of conflict preemption.


Rodney Gant was apprehended by Arizona state police on an outstanding warrant for driving with a suspended license. After the officers handcuffed Gant and placed him in their squad car, they went on to search his vehicle, discovering a handgun and a plastic bag of cocaine. At trial, Gant asked the judge to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle because the search had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The judge declined Gant's request, stating that the search was a direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The court convicted Gant on two counts of cocaine possession.
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding the search unconstitutional, and the Arizona Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme Court stated that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement must be justified by concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. Because Gant left his vehicle voluntarily, the court explained, the search was not directly linked to the arrest and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. In seeking certiorari, Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard argued that the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling conflicted with the Court's precedent, as well as precedents set forth in various federal and state courts.

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Yes, under the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court held that police may search the vehicle of its recent occupant after his arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that "warrantless searches are per se unreasonable" and subject only to a few, very narrow exceptions. Here, Mr. Gant was arrested for a suspended license and the narrow exceptions did not apply to his case.
Justice Scalia wrote separately, concurring. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer. He argued that the majority improperly overruled its precedent in New York v. Belton which held that "when a policeman has made a lawful arrest... he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." Justice Stephen G. Breyer also wrote a separate dissenting opinion, where he lamented that the court could not create a new governing rule.
Learn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


Crawford v. Nashville and Davidson County, TN

Vicky Crawford, a government employee, took part in an internal investigation regarding sexual harassment claims against another employee. When the investigation concluded, Crawford was fired based on charges of embezzlement and drug use. When these charges were later proven untrue, Crawford filed suit against her employer in federal district court in Tennessee claiming retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act based on her participation in the investigation. The district court directed a verdict for her employer.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. Once again finding for the employer, the court stated that Crawford's participation in the investigation did not constitute "opposition" and her activity in that regard was not "protected" as those terms are defined in Title VII, making the Civil Rights Act inapplicable to her claim.

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Yes. In a unanimous decision with Justice David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. It held that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII extends to people who speak out, not just on their own initiative, but when prompted by an employer's internal investigation. The Court reasoned that the plain meaning of the statute includes people who "oppose" sexually obnoxious behavior by merely disclosing the violation and need not initiate the disclosure.
Justice Samuel A. Alito filed a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Alito noted that, while not addressed in the majority opinion, the plain meaning of "oppose" should not include "silent opposition." He argued it would open the door to plaintiffs who never expressed opposition to their employers, thus raising difficult factual determinations at trial.


Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to its film Hillary: The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president.
In an attempt to regulate "big money" campaign contributions, the BCRA applies a variety of restrictions to "electioneering communications." Section 203 of the BCRA prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication from their general treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when the communication is not authorized by the candidate it intends to support.
Citizens United argued that: 1) Section 203 violates the First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related advertisements, and that 2) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances.
The United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached that determination. The District Court also held that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was unfit for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 203 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its advertisements. The court reasoned that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors "might be unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause," but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's claim.

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No. No. Yes. Yes. The Supreme Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and portions of McConnell v. FEC. (In the prior cases, the Court had held that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity.) By a 5-to-4 vote along ideological lines, the majority held that under the First Amendment corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the majority joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Samuel A. Alito, and Clarence Thomas. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. The majority maintained that political speech is indispensable to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation. The majority also held that the BCRA's disclosure requirements as applied to The Movie were constitutional, reasoning that disclosure is justified by a "governmental interest" in providing the "electorate with information" about election-related spending resources. The Court also upheld the disclosure requirements for political advertising sponsors and it upheld the ban on direct contributions to candidates from corporations and unions.
In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, emphasized the care with which the Court handles constitutional issues and its attempts to avoid constitutional issues when at all possible. Here, the Court had no narrower grounds upon which to rule, except to handle the First Amendment issues embodied within the case. Justice Scalia also wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas in part, criticizing Justice Stevens' understanding of the Framer's view towards corporations. Justice Stevens argued that corporations are not members of society and that there are compelling governmental interests to curb corporations' ability to spend money during local and national elections.


Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of California's Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) cleaned a parcel of contaminated land at considerable expense. They sued the responsible parties for recovery. A federal district court held the responsible parties (Burlington Northern Rail Road, Santa Fe Railway Company, and Shell Oil Company) liable for only a minor portion of the cleanup costs. The EPA and DTSC jointly appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in its liability calculations. It reasoned that the recovery statute employed by the EPA and DTSC imposed strict liability on parties merely partly responsible for contamination. It explained that the statute's intention was to prevent taxpayers from bearing the burden of such cleanup costs.

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No and Yes. The Supreme Court held that Shell was not liable as an "arranger" for the contamination at issue in this case. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that Shell did not "intend" that at least a portion of its product be disposed by proscribed methods and thus was not an "arranger." The Court also held that the Ninth Circuit erred by reversing the district court's CERCLA liability calculations. Rather, it reasoned that the district court reasonably apportioned Burlington Railroad's share of liability at the contaminated site in question.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. She argued that Shell should qualify as an "arranger" because it "arranged for disposal... of hazardous substances" at the contaminated site. She also argued that the case should be remanded such that all liable parties could provide input as to the proper liability apportionment formula.


After Wayne Carlisle and his partners (Carlisle) sold their construction equipment business, they hired multiple consultants in order to set up a tax shelter for the proceeds. The IRS later determined the tax shelter was illegal, but offered amnesty under certain conditions. Carlisle was never informed of these developments and was ultimately required to pay taxes and penalties that exceeded $25 million. Carlisle filed suit in a federal district court against nine parties alleging fraud, negligence, civil conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty.
Before trial, one of the defendants motioned to stay the proceedings pending arbitration with Carlisle per a written agreement with Carlisle. Stay was granted. The remaining defendants motioned seeking their own stay arguing that allowing one party to arbitrate with Carlisle and not allowing the rest would be contradictory. The district court denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied it had jurisdiction to review the matter. The parties then appealed the denial of jurisdiction. They argued that Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies and makes available a stay of proceedings in order to arbitrate when there is a written agreement that directs litigated issues into arbitration. Section 16(a)(1) of the FAA then grants appellate jurisdiction over Section 3 motions.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Section 16(a)(1) did not confer jurisdiction in this case. The court recognized that the appellants were not signatories to the arbitration agreement with Carlisle. Thus, it reasoned there was no written agreement that could direct litigated issues into arbitration. Since the appellants' motion to stay was not rooted in Section 3, Section 16(a)(1) did not grant appellate jurisdiction.

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Yes and Yes. The Supreme Court held that a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction over an appeal from a motion to stay proceedings under Section 16(a)(1) of the Federal Arbitration Act, regardless of whether the petitioner is in fact eligible for a stay. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that Section 16 clearly and unambiguously views the underlying merits of the claim irrelevant, but rather looks to the category of order appealed from. In this case, an appeal from a motion to stay proceedings automatically granted the Sixth Circuit jurisdiction. The Court also held that the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that Section 3 of the FAA categorically prevents a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement from pursuing a stay in proceedings. Rather, "whenever the relevant state law would make a contract to arbitrate a particular dispute enforceable by a non-signatory," that person may pursue and obtain a stay under Section 3. Therefore, the Court remanded to the Sixth Circuit to determine whether relevant state law allows the non-signatories to enforce their agreement under state contract law and thus are allowed to pursue a stay in proceedings.
Justice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice John Paul Stevens. He argued that "longstanding congressional policy" limits the ability of parties to obtain interlocutory appeals. Accordingly, appeals from a denial of a motion to stay proceedings should not be available to those parties who have not even signed the relevant arbitration agreement.


Discover Bank filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in order to compel arbitration on certain counterclaims brought by Betty Vaden, a card member, in a state court suit against her. Discover had originally brought the state suit to recover on Vaden's outstanding credit card balance, but Vaden counterclaimed that certain fees and interest rates had been charged in violation of state law. The district court held that Vaden's usury claims were preempted by federal law and that the agreement clearly contained a provision compelling arbitration in such cases
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that Discover was the "real party in interest" and that Vaden's claims were therefore preempted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Furthermore, Vaden had failed to overcome the presumption that she received the properly mailed arbitration agreement. Based on these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit granted Discover's motion to compel arbitration.

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No and No. The Supreme Court held that a federal court may "look through" a Section 4 petition to determine whether the claim establishes federal subject matter jurisdiction. However in this case, the Court recognized the dispute did not bring itself under federal subject matter jurisdiction. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reasoned that Discover's claim against Mr. Vaden did not "arise under" federal law nor did Mr. Vaden's "preempted" counterclaims create federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts concurred in part and dissented in part, and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Samuel A. Alito. He agreed with the majority in that a federal court asked to compel arbitration should "look through" the dispute to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. However, he disagreed that federal subject matter jurisdiction was not found in this case, as the controversy between the parties was controlled by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.


Earth Island Institute, along with several other environmental groups, filed suit against the United States Forest Service in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California alleging that certain Forest Service regulations violated the Forest Service Decision Making and Appeals Reform Act (ARA). The ARA requires the Forest Service to establish an administrative appeals process providing an opportunity for notice and comment. Earth Island brought this claim when, in 2003, the Forest Service issued new regulations greatly limiting notice, appeals and public comment on certain categorically excluded activities. The district court found for the plaintiffs and issued a nationwide injunction against the Forest Service.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that if Congress intended to allow the Forest Service to limit notice, appeals and comment for categorically excluded activities (as the regulations did) it would not have enacted the ARA in the first place. In seeking certiorari, the Forest Service argued that the Ninth Circuit had overstepped its bounds in invalidating the regulations and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit because the case was not yet ripe for judicial review.

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No and not answered. The Supreme Court held that Earth Island lacked standing to challenge regulations of the U.S. Forest Service because Article III of the Constitution limits judicial power to extend only to cases and controversies that imminently threaten injury to persons caused by violation of law. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that Earth Island identified no application of the challenged Forest Service regulations that threatened imminent and concrete harm to its members' interests. As testament to this, the Court noted that Earth Island had voluntarily settled a portion of the lawsuit pertaining to any alleged members' interests and that it failed to show any of its members planned to visit sites where the challenged regulations were being applied in a manner that would harm a particular member's interests. Therefore, Earth Island lacked standing to bring its suit in the first place.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, agreeing that a procedural injury must also "impair a separate concrete interest" in order to grant a party standing. Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He disagreed with the majority's findings that Earth Island failed to show it suffered "concrete injury" by the challenged Forest Service regulations.


Edmund Boyle was convicted by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, bank burglary, bank burglary conspiracy, and attempted bank burglary. He was sentenced to 151 months imprisonment. Mr. Boyle appealed arguing that the government's case against him was factually contradictory. In his trial, the government charged that the robbery was an act of the Boyle Crew enterprise. However, in a previous case it had charged that the robbery was an act of the New Springfield Boys enterprise. Boyle maintained that this contradiction violated his right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the government's case was not factually contradictory. It reasoned that "[n]othing dictates that a single crime cannot be committed by two enterprises working together, each in furtherance of its own interests." Thus, the trial court did not violate Boyle's Fifth Amendment due process rights.

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No. The Supreme Court held that, under RICO, the association between criminal enterprises must be shown to have a "structure," but the relevant jury instructions need not spell out the precise elements which need be found. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that a jury need not be instructed to find an "ascertainable structure" in order to find the association of enterprises because such instructions would be redundant as the jury is already tasked with finding the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt from which it may infer a "structure" of criminal association.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented and was joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. He argued that Congress merely intended RICO to apply to "business-like entities," and thus the majority's ruling extended RICO liability far beyond Congress' intent.


Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. LinkLine Communications

LinkLine, along with several other internet-service providers (ISPs), sued Pacific Bell, claiming that the company was selling digital subscriber line (DSL) access at "a high wholesale price in relation to the price at which [it was] providing retail services." The ISPs condemned the scheme as price squeezing in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a piece of U.S. antitrust legislation designed to prevent the formation of monopolies. A price squeeze occurs when a company holding a monopoly on the production of certain goods sets its wholesale prices higher than the retail prices it charges directly to consumers, preventing the wholesale customers from competing with it at the retail level. The district court denied Pacific Bell's motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a valid claim but granted its motion for an interlocutory appeal, allowing the appellate court to determine whether such price squeezing claims are permissible before delivering a final judgment at the trial level.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the ISPs had stated a legitimate price squeezing claim under Section 2. The Ninth Circuit argued that prior Supreme Court precedent had not eliminated the application of traditional antitrust laws to partially regulated industries. While noting that the wholesale market is governed by a separate document, the 1934 FCC Act, the court stated that the retail market remains unregulated and is therefore subject to the antitrust laws. As far as the retail market was concerned then, the ISPs had stated a valid price squeezing claim under Section 2.

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No. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit holding that a "price squeezing" claim cannot be brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act when the defendant is under no duty to sell inputs to the plaintiff in the first place. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court relying on its decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, reasoned that since there was no duty on the part of AT&T to deal with its competitors and no support under existing antitrust doctrine that AT&T's retail prices were "too low", the plaintiffs' claim was barred under Section 2.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He argued that the Court should remand the case to the district court and allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include a "predatory pricing" claim.


In 1992, Michael Bies was convicted of kidnapping, rape, and murder and sentenced to death by an Ohio court. In his appeals to the Ohio Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Ohio, Mr. Bies argued that he was mentally retarded and this fact should mitigate his sentence. Both courts affirmed his conviction and sentence, but agreed that he was mentally retarded. While Mr. Bies proceeded with his post-conviction appeals, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Atkins stating that "death is not a suitable punishment for mentally retarded people." He subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in an Ohio federal district court relying on Atkins. In response, the state claimed that Mr. Bies was not mentally retarded. Mr. Bies argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the state from relitigating the fact of his mental retardation. The district court agreed and granted Mr. Bies' petition for habeas corpus relief and ordered that he be resentenced.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that the state was prevented by the Double Jeopardy Clause from relitigating the Supreme Court of Ohio's determination that Mr. Bies was mentally retarded.

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Yes. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, it held that the Ohio courts were not precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause from conducting a rehearing with respect to Mr. Bies' mental retardation. The Court reasoned that Ohio did not twice put Mr. Bies in jeopardy of conviction because he was never acquitted at trial. Rather, the Court stated that the Ohio courts merely attempted to discern the nature of Mr. Bies mental capacities in order determine whether his death sentence should be mitigated when weighed against other factors.


Thomas Lee Goldstein was released on habeas corpus from a California prison in 2004 after serving twenty-four years of a murder sentence. Goldstein then brought suit against the prosecutor and chief deputy from his trial alleging that he had been wrongly convicted. Goldstein argued that he had been prejudiced by the testimony of a jailhouse informant claiming to have heard Goldstein confess to the murder. The informant had stated that he had never, either before or during the trial, received benefits for cooperating with the government; in fact, the informant had worked with the government in the past and was getting reduced sentences in exchange for his testimony. Goldstein's claim alleged that the prosecutor and deputy had failed to fulfill their obligation to ensure that information regarding jailhouse informants was adequately shared among prosecutors. In response, the prosecutors argued that their actions during the trial were immune from suit.
The district court held that the actions were administrative rather than prosecutorial and were therefore not subject to immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, finding that the prosecutor had failed to show the necessary close association with the judicial phase of the trial in order to invoke immunity.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It reaffirmed its holding in Imbler that officers of the court are immune from liability "for actions intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Acknowledging that immunity does not apply when officers of the court engage in administrative tasks, the Court reasoned that in Mr. Goldstein's case, the defendant prosecutors' failure to share information regarding the testimony of a jailhouse informant was predicated on a decision, requiring legal knowledge, made by those prosecutors about what information to share, and was thus not administrative. Rather, the decision not to share the information was intimately connected to their roles as officers of the court and therefore they were not subject to prosecution.


Three consolidated cases center around whether or not the EPA surpassed its federal authority by weighing the pros and cons of systems to be used at water intake cooling structures rather than simply employing the most advanced technology available on the market. The claims, brought by environmental groups and corporations, allege that the EPA's cost/benefit analysis violated the Clean Water Act (CWA) by leading to the use of structures that were insufficient to protect aquatic organisms from being harmed or killed as required by the CWA.

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Yes. The Supreme Court held that the EPA was permitted to use a cost-benefit analysis in setting national performance standards for cooling water intake structures. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that under 33 U.S.C. 1326(b), the EPA has discretion to determine the extent of adverse environmental impact that should be reduced in setting national performance standards for cooling water intake structures. With this discretion, comes the authority to use a cost-benefit analysis in setting national performance standards.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed with the majority that the EPA was authorized to use a cost-benefit analysis in making its determinations. However, he noted that the drafting and legislative history of 33 U.S.C. Section 1326(b) indicate it was intended to restrict the use of cost-benefit analysis and consequently he found the EPA's reasoning deficient in employing its cost-benefit analysis. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented and was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He argued that the plain language of the relevant statute indicates that the EPA was required to set a standard that cooling water intake systems use the "best technology available" and therefore impermissibly used a cost-benefit analysis in setting the new standard.


This is the third habeas corpus appeal of petitioner Gary Bradford Cone after his 1982 conviction in a Tennessee state court on several felony counts including first degree murder and robbery by use of deadly force. The jury found that Cone had bludgeoned two elderly people to death while hiding out after a robbery. Cone's initial appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court soon following his conviction fell on deaf ears: the court ruled that although errors had been committed during the trial, each of them had been "harmless" and did not warrant overturning Cone's conviction. He responded by twice filing habeas corpus petitions alleging violations of several constitutional rights, appealing both all the way up to the Court but both times having his case remanded with, in his view, several of his claims still unresolved.
In his third appearance before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Cone raised two main points of contention. First, he claimed that he was entitled to relief because the jury in his trial had weighed invalid aggravating factors during his sentencing hearing, thereby entitling him to a new hearing. This argument was rejected by the Sixth Circuit, which found that the Tennessee Supreme Court had conducted a satisfactory harmless error test on the issue. The court pointed out that habeas petitions should be granted only after finding that a state court ruling has "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law." Because Tennessee had not abridged any federal laws, the Sixth Circuit denied Cone relief on this first issue.
Cone also argued that the Sixth Circuit had erred when, in a previous appeal, it had held that his claims relating to the prosecutor's improper withholding of evidence had been procedurally defaulted. Cone argued that his case met the Court's "exceptional circumstances" test as set out in Westside Mothers v. Olszewski for overruling the procedural default rule and rehearing the issue. The Sixth Circuit once again disagreed, ruling that Cone had failed to show "cause and prejudice" on the part of the prosecutor. The Sixth Circuit denied Cone's habeas appeal on all counts.

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Yes and No. The Supreme Court held that the Tennessee state courts' rejection of Mr. Cone's Brady claim, that the state had suppressed material evidence at his trial, was improperly denied review during post-conviction proceedings and had not been procedurally defaulted. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that Mr. Cone's Brady claim had in fact never been presented at the state court level and thus the Sixth Circuit erred in finding that Mr. Cone's claim had been defaulted for having been raised twice previously. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the documents withheld at Mr. Cone's trial were material to his sentencing and thus entitled him to federal habeas corpus review.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. Justice Samuel A. Alito also wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed that Mr. Cone's case was properly remanded for further review. However, he disagreed that Mr. Cone properly preserved and exhausted his Brady claim at the state court level because Mr. Cone never raised that claim at the state court level. Rather, he argued Mr. Cone's claim was either "not exhausted" or was "procedurally defaulted", appropriate for the Sixth Circuit to review, not the federal district court. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, dissented. He argued that Mr. Cone failed to prove that there was a "reasonable probability" that had the withheld evidence been disclosed at trial that his sentencing would have been different, and therefore his claim should not be granted federal habeas corpus review.


In March 2005, Jesse Montejo was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Lewis Ferrari. At his trial, the prosecution submitted as evidence a letter of apology he wrote to the victim's wife. Montejo wrote the letter at the suggestion of a detective who accompanied him in a search for the murder weapon. Before the search, Mr. Montejo was read his Miranda rights and wrote an explanation for his participation in the search. However, no one in the search party knew, including Mr. Montejo, that he had been appointed an attorney the same morning. Mr. Montejo contended under these circumstances that the Sixth Amendment barred the introduction of this evidence since his attorney was not present when he wrote and submitted the letter of apology.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the letter of apology Mr. Montejo wrote was valid evidence. It found that Mr. Montejo waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. It explained that when counsel was appointed Mr. Montejo remained mute and did not acknowledge it. The court reasoned that something beyond "mute acquiescence" is required to trigger the protections of the Sixth Amendment.

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Not necessarily. The Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in Michigan v. Jackson which held that evidence obtained through interrogation after the defendant has invoked his right to counsel was inadmissible. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the Jackson framework was unworkable in jurisdictions that appoint counsel regardless of a defendant's request. Instead, the Court stated that the protections afforded under Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick were sufficient to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights from police badgering that might elicit culpable evidence.
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, also filed a concurring opinion. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented and was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and in part by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. He argued that the majority correctly concluded that the Louisiana Supreme Court misapplied the Court's holding in Jackson, but disagreed that the Court should have overruled its precedent entirely. Rather, Justice Stevens criticized the Court for misinterpreting the rationale of Jackson and undervaluing the role of stare decisis in its decision making. Justice Breyer also wrote a dissenting opinion, highlighting the consistency of his reasoning with respect to stare decisis in several other cases.


The Coffee County, Alabama Sheriff's Department apprehended Bennie Herring in July of 2004. Upon searching Herring's vehicle, officers discovered methamphetamine in Herring's pocket and a gun under the seat of his truck. However, the situation was complicated by the fact that the initial search had been made on a faulty arrest warrant. The warrant, still active in the neighboring Dale County Sheriff's Office, was supposed to have been recalled five months prior, however someone had accidentally failed to remove it from the computer system. Herring filed a motion to suppress the allegedly "illegally obtained" evidence, however the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Herring's motion and sentenced him to 27 months in prison.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that illegally obtained evidence should only be suppressed when doing so could "result in appreciable deterrence" of future police misconduct. In his petition for certiorari, Herring pointed to an Arkansas case with nearly identical facts that had come out the other way, noting that "as policing becomes ever more reliant on computerized systems, the number of illegal arrests and searches based on negligent recordkeeping is poised to multiply." The Court granted certiorari on February 19, 2008.

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No. In a 5-4 decision with Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., the Supreme Court affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. It held that a criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when police mistakes that lead to unlawful searches are merely the result of isolated negligence and "not systematic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements." Evidence obtained under these circumstances is admissible and not subject to the exclusionary rule.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer. Justice Ginsburg argued that an intact exclusionary rule provides a strong incentive for police compliance with respect to the Fourth Amendment and its erosion in this case was not warranted. Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Souter. He argued that the Court should move away from its reliance on analyzing the degree of police culpability when determining whether the exclusionary rule applies, but rather draw a bright line between errors made by record keepers and those made by police officers.
Learn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


A group of cigarette smokers brought this claim against Altria, the cigarette manufacturer, in federal court in Maine. The smokers asserted that Altria's advertisement claiming that its product was "light" and had "lowered tar and nicotine" constituted misrepresentations under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted summary judgment in favor of Altria on the claim.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, reversed the lower court and found in favor of the plaintiff smokers. The court held that the Maine Act was not preempted, either explicitly or implicitly, by a similar federal act, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and that Altria's assertions did in fact constitute misrepresentations under the Maine Act.

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No. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) did not expressly or impliedly preempt all claims related to "smoking and health" under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (MUTPA). Adopting the reasoning it used in Cipollone, the court found that claims based on a common law legal duty ("predicate-duty" approach), like a manufacturer's duty not to misrepresent its products, were not preempted simply because they related to cigarette manufacturers and the labeling of its products.
Justice Clarence Thomas joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. dissented. Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority's adoption of the "predicate-duty" approach from Cipollone arguing it was confusing and unworkable. Rather, he argued that the Court should adopt a clear test that expressly pre-empts any state law claim that "imposes an obligation...because of the effect of smoking upon health."


In 2007, a federal district court convicted Salman Khade Abuelhawa in part for unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally using a communications facility (a telephone) in committing, causing, and facilitating a felony (distribution of cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 843(b). Mr. Abuelhawa appealed arguing that Section 843(b) does not apply because he purchased cocaine for personal use, which is not a felony.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Mr. Abuelhawa's conviction. It reasoned that Mr. Abuelhawa's use of a cell phone facilitated cocaine distribution because his telephone call made the distribution of cocaine "easier" for his dealer, which is a felony, thus Section 843(b) properly applies.

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No. With Justice David H. Souter writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, it held that using a telephone to make a misdemeanor drug purchase does not "facilitate" felony drug distribution. The Court concentrated on the "plain meaning" of the statute in order to reach its conclusion.


In June 2004 after 3 years awaiting trial, Michael Brillon was convicted in a Vermont court for felony domestic assault. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him for lack of a speedy trial. The Supreme Court of Vermont agreed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to set aside Mr. Brillon's conviction and dismiss the charges against him.
The court held that Mr. Brillon was not prosecuted within a time frame that satisfied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. It reasoned that the state was not relieved of its duty to provide Mr. Brillon with a speedy trial merely because the public defenders assigned him were mostly responsible for the delay. Rather, it considered the office of the public defender an arm of the state.

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No and No. The Supreme Court held that the Vermont Supreme Court erred when it categorized assigned counsel as a state actor in the criminal justice system and that it was not justified in treating Mr. Brillon's speedy-trial claims differently than if he had retained private counsel. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice David H. Souter, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that delay caused by a defendant's counsel is ordinarily charged against the defendant, as it should have been in this case.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented. He criticized the Court for granting certiorari here. However, as certiorari was granted, he would have affirmed the Vermont Supreme Court reasoning that it had authority to supervise the appointment of public defenders and therefore could determine when a defendant's delayed trial date should be properly attributed to them.


Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association

The plaintiffs in this case are comprised of labor organizations suing officials of the State of Idaho. The organizations claim that Idaho's Voluntary Contributions Act (VCA) violates their First Amendment free speech rights by restricting their ability to participate in any activities the VCA defines as "political." The State officials conceded the unconstitutionality of many of the VCA's provisions, however they argued for the validity of prohibiting payroll deductions for "political activities." The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho held the payroll deduction provisions constitutional as applied to the state government but unconstitutional when applied to private and local government employees. The State officials appealed, contending that the provisions should be equally applicable to both groups.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the payroll deduction provisions could not be applied to private and local government employees because the State had provided no "compelling justification" to do so. Furthermore, the court stated that the officials had failed to show that the case should be reviewed under the more relaxed standard for a "non-public" forum.

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No. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit holding that Idaho's Voluntary Contributions Act did not violate the free speech rights of local government employees. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in part, the Court reasoned that Idaho's law did not restrict political speech, but merely declined to promote speech by prohibiting public employees from directly contributing to partisan activities from their government issued paycheck. Using a rational-basis review, it recognized that the state had a reasonable interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety by banning the funding of partisan political activity from the state's payroll. Moreover, the Court held that this governmental interest applied equally to governments at the state and local level.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that rather than reverse the court of appeals, the case should have been remanded. Additionally, he argued that rather than apply a rational-basis review as the Court did here, he would utilize an "intermediate scrutiny inquiry" where the statute would be considered in light of whether it imposed a burden upon speech that was disproportionate to other interests the government sought to achieve. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented arguing that the Idaho statue was clearly intended to make it more difficult for government employees to finance speech and therefore was unconstitutional. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also dissented arguing that this case was a poor vehicle for refining the analysis of the First Amendment and therefore should have been denied review.


Edward Bell was convicted and sentenced to death in a Virginia state court for murdering a police sergeant. After unsuccessfully appealing his case through direct review and state habeas proceedings, Bell filed a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Bell argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, suggesting that his lawyer failed to investigate and present evidence from five witnesses that may have reduced his death sentence to life in prison.
The Supreme Court, in Strickland, has previously stated that a petitioner must show (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice in order to succeed on a claim for ineffective assistance. Based on these principles, the district court dismissed Bell's claim and, on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Fourth Circuit found that the conclusions of the Virginia state courts were reasonable and that Bell had failed to show that he had suffered actual prejudice. According to the court, the aggravating testimony from the witnesses outweighed any mitigating effects the missing testimony may have had.

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The writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.


The purported inventors of an anti-cancer agent, Jong-Wan park and Yang-Sook Chun through HIF Bio Inc., sued Carlsbad Technology, Inc. in a California court for various claims regarding ownership of the invention. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. After dismissing the federal claim, it declined supplemental jurisdiction on the state claims and remanded the case back to state court.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the remand order. It reasoned that when the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims in the case, it necessarily found that the claims lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction.

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No. The Supreme Court held that a district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim is not a dismissal for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction for which federal appellate review is barred. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for a unanimous Court, it reasoned that, in this case, the district court merely exercised its discretion to dismiss a state-law claim for which it had supplemental jurisdiction, and therefore its decision was not based upon lack of jurisdiction, which would have precluded federal appellate court review.
Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined by Justice David H. Souter, all wrote separate concurring opinions. Each highlighted the mess the Supreme Court's holdings have left this area of law and suggested statutory revision to clarify the law.


In 2005, the New York State Attorney General began investigating possible racial discrimination in the real estate lending practices of several national banks. The Attorney General requested that the implicated banks turn over certain non-public information to aid the investigation. The Clearing House Association (CHA), a consortium of national banks including several involved in the investigation, filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court to prevent the Attorney General from continuing his investigation. The CHA argued that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the federal agency charged with overseeing national banks, was appropriately responsible for regulating the banks' compliance with activities that fall under the National Bank Act (NBA) and therefore precluded state officials like the Attorney General from doing so. In response, the Attorney General argued that the Federal Housing Act (FHA) provided an exception to the OCC's sole stewardship of the NBA and therefore authorized his investigation. The district court granted the CHA's request for an injunction and stopped the Attorney General's investigation.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the injunction against the Attorney General's investigation, but used the decision in a separate case, filed by the OCC and utilizing different arguments, to do so. Here, the court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the FHA claim. It reasoned that since the Attorney General had not yet filed any lawsuits against the banks under investigation, the issue of whether the FHA provided an exception to the enforcement of the NBA was not ripe for adjudication.

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No. The Supreme Court held that the OCC's interpretation of the NBA that precluded state officials from regulating and enforcing banking activities was not reasonable. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court distinguished between a state's "visitorial powers" – its supervisory powers – and its enforcement powers. The Court stated that the NBA only prevented a state from exercising its visitorial powers over banks. Therefore, the Court reasoned that a state was not precluded from exercising its ordinary powers to enforce state laws.
Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part. He was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito. Justice Thomas argued that because the definition of "visitorial powers" was ambiguous, the courts should have deferred to the OCC's interpretation of the term in the NBA.


In 1964 the Navajo Nation entered into a contract with Sentry Royalty Company for the mining of coal on its land. The contract called for royalty payments to the Navajo Nation not to exceed 37.5 cents per ton of coal mined. However, the contract allowed for the Secretary of the Interior to adjust the royalty rate to a "reasonable" level after twenty years. At the end of twenty years, the Navajo Nation was being paid the equivalent of 2 percent of the proceeds from the mining operation. As stipulated by the contract, the Navajo Nation entered into discussions with Peabody Coal Company (formerly Sentry Royalty Company) to adjust the royalty rate. After discussions failed, the Navajo Nation asked the Secretary of the Interior to resolve the dispute. The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs reached an initial decision to set the royalty rate at 20 percent. This decision was delayed on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior. Unbeknownst to the Navajo Nation, the Secretary had been meeting with executives of the Peabody Coal Company who requested the delay. Facing dire economic circumstances, the Navajo Nation agreed to a royalty rate of 12.5 percent which was approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
In 1993, the Navajo Nation brought suit against the United States for violations of its statutory and fiduciary duties to the Nation. It sought damages of $600 million. This latest decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit represents the fifth chapter in the long running saga over the original dispute. Its decision comes in the wake of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims holding, on instructions from the Supreme Court, that the Navajo Nation did not provide sufficient evidence to seek damages from the United States.
The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the Navajo Nation marshaled sufficient evidence to show that the United States "controls the leasing of the [Navajo's] coal resources and that the government is responsible for the liabilities arising thereunder." It reasoned that the body of regulations and statutes that governed the Nation's resources were "reasonably amenable" to an interpretation that imposed liability on the part of the government for breach of its duties.

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No and No. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, the Court held that its decision in Navajo I had not definitively terminated the Nation's claim. In Navajo I it reasoned that the Nation's only avenue to sue the United States was by finding "specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions." The Court reasoned that since only three statutes were analyzed, there might exist a relevant statute that could provide the Nation a basis for its lawsuit. However, the Supreme Court also held that none of the sources of law cited by the Nation provided such a basis and therefore its suit should be dismissed.
Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote a separate concurring opinion. He admitted regretting that his dissenting opinion in Navajo I was not controlling authority, but recognized the Court must abide its precedent.


In July 2005, a jury in a federal district court acquitted F. Scott Yeager of conspiracy, wire fraud, and security fraud, but hung on 20 counts of insider trading and 99 counts of money laundering in relation to his involvement with Enron Broadband Services. The district court declared a mistrial on the counts the jury hung on. Thereafter, the United States again indicted Mr. Yeager on a portion of the mistried counts. On interlocutory appeal, Mr. Yeager argued that in acquitting him of securities fraud, the jury "necessarily found that he did not have insider information", and therefore collateral estopple prevents the government from retrying him for insider trading and money laundering.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that collateral estoppel does not bar retrial in Mr. Yeager's case. It recognized that Mr. Yeager had the burden of proving the jury necessarily found that he was not guilty of insider trading. He did not, as a jury that found him not guilty of insider trading and "acting rationally" would have acquitted him of insider trading and money laundering. The court reasoned that because it was unclear the jury's rationale for its decisions, Mr. Yeager's mistried counts did not prevent his retrial on those counts.

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Yes. The Supreme Court held that apparent inconsistencies between a jury's verdict of acquittal on some counts and its failure to return a verdict on other counts does not affect an acquittal's preclusive force. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, and in part by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court stated that in Mr. Yeager's case, "if the possession of insider information was a critical issue of ultimate fact in all of the charges [against him], a jury that decided that issue in his favor protects him from prosecution for any charges for which that [fact] is an essential element."
Justice Antonin G. Scalia dissented and was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito. He disagreed with the majority holding, arguing that it was a departure from not only the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause, but the Court's own precedent. Justice Alito also wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. While acknowledging his disagreement with the majority holding, he argued that in light of the decision, the courts should rigorously apply the doctrine of issue preclusion. Based on this, an acquittal on one charge only precludes indictment for a second charge if a "rational jury" could not have acquitted on the precedent charge without finding in the defendant's favor on the factual element necessary to convict on the second charge. Justice Kennedy also wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. While agreeing with much of the majority holding, he noted the validity of Justice Alito's concerns with the decision.


Alexandre Mirzayance was convicted of first-degree murder in a California state court. He was subsequently denied post-conviction relief by the trial court and the California Court of Appeals. Mr. Mirzayance then petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court. He maintained that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel because at trial, his attorney advised him to abandon his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). The federal district court denied Mr. Mirzayance's petition, but was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ordered an evidentiary hearing limited to determining whether "there were tactical reasons for abandoning the defense."
At the hearing, the Magistrate Judge found that Mr. Mirzayance's counsel had "nothing to lose" by going forward with the NGI plea and thus found his performance ineffective. The federal district court accepted this finding and granted Mr. Mirzayance's petition for habeas corpus relief. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Mr. Mirzayance's attorney's advice to withdraw his NGI plea was unreasonable because there was "reasonable probability" the jury would find Mr. Mirzayance insane. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision, and remanded the case for consideration in light of Carey v. Musladin. On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its decision stating that Mr. Mirzayance's attorney's failure to pursue the NGI defense constituted ineffective counsel because it "secured no tactical advantage."

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Yes and not answered. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the California Court of Appeals' decision to deny Mr. Mirzayance's petition for habeas corpus relief was not "an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit reached an erroneous result because it applied an improper standard of review when it found Mr. Mirzayance's counsel ineffective for abandoning the NGI plea because there was "nothing to lose" in pursuing it. Rather, the Court stated that in order to find counsel ineffective, the defendant must show both "deficient performance" and "prejudice." The Court reasoned that Mr. Mirzayance's counsel was not deficient when he abandoned an NGI plea that had "almost no chance of success." Therefore, the California Court of Appeals was not "unreasonable" in denying Mr. Mirzayance's petition for habeas corpus relief.


Keith Haywood, while incarcerated at the Attica Correctional Facility in Attica, New York, was charged with several misbehavior reports in 2003 and 2004, including assaulting a corrections officer, failing a urinalysis test, and improperly soliciting mail. After being found guilty of these charges, Haywood commenced actions in state court against two of the corrections officers responsible for reviewing the claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983), a federal statute protecting civil rights. He asserted that the guilty verdicts had been handed down without sufficient evidence, that the officers had tampered with the urinalysis test, and that they had conspired to fabricate the facts set forth in the misbehavior reports. The defendants moved to dismiss Haywood's claims, basing their argument on a New York law prohibiting civil claims such as Haywood's brought against corrections officers in their official capacities. Haywood responded by arguing that when Congress created Section 1983 it intended the statute to supersede any state laws contradicting it. Because Section 1983 allowed these claims, Haywood argued, the New York law prohibiting them violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court of New York (the state's lowest-level court) agreed with the defendants and dismissed Haywood's claim based on the New York law.
The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, finding that the Supremacy Clause permits states to deny enforcement of a federal right in a case where a state court lacks jurisdiction due to a neutral state rule regarding the courts' administration. Because Haywood's claim would be barred if brought under either Section 1983 or an applicable state law, the New York law barring the claim was valid and neutral and did not violate the Supremacy Clause.

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Yes. The Supreme Court held that New York's Correction Law Section 24, prohibiting civil claims brought against corrections officers in their official capacities, as applied in Mr. Haywood's case, violated the Supremacy Clause and thus was unconstitutional. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court noted that New York had passed Section 24 after determining most damages suits filed by prisoners against state corrections officers were frivolous. However, the Court reasoned that states may not relieve whole categories of federal claims from their courts merely to avoid congestion.
Justice Clarence Thomas dissented and was joined in part by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, and Samuel A. Alito. He argued that neither the Constitution nor Supreme Court precedent requires that states open their courts to Section 1983 claims. Thus, New York's law was not unconstitutional.


In 1998, Michael Rivera was convicted in an Illinois court on two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to 85 years in prison. Before the trial, Mr. Rivera's attorney moved to dismiss a potential juror. The judge did not allow it deeming the motion discriminatory towards the juror. On appeal after his conviction, Mr. Rivera argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the pre-trial motion and thus his conviction should be reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to specify how the motion was discriminatory. After the trial court found that gender discrimination was at issue, the Illinois Supreme Court continued its review.
It held that Mr. Rivera was improperly denied his pre-trial motion to dismiss the juror. It reasoned that there was no evidence Mr. Rivera's attorney aimed to dismiss the juror because of her gender. However, it also found that this was harmless error. It explained that there was no evidence that indicated Mr. Rivera was tried before a biased jury because of the improperly dismissed motion. Thus, Mr. Rivera's conviction should stand.

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No. A unanimous Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require the automatic reversal of a conviction because of the trial court's good-faith error in denying the defendant's preemptory challenge to a juror, provided that all the jurors are qualified and unbiased. In her opinion for the Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg reasoned that since there is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges, the mistaken denial of a preemptory challenge does not on its own violate the Constitution. Rather, states are free to decide as a matter of law whether the mistaken denial of a preemptory challenge is reversible error. In this case, the Court agreed that the Illinois Supreme Court acted within its powers in determining the mistaken denial of Mr. Rivera's preemptory challenge was mere harmless error.


The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denied Jean Marc Nken's petition to reopen his case regarding his deportation. He appealed arguing that the Board abused its discretion in denying his motion and should have used its sua sponte power to reopen his proceedings. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Board did not abuse its discretion. It also found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Mr. Nken's claim that the Board failed to use its sua sponte power in order to reopen his case. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted Mr. Nken's motion for a stay of his removal until further proceeding by the Court.

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The Supreme Court held that the traditional factors govern a court of appeals' authority to stay an alien's removal pending judicial review. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court elucidated the four factors that govern stays. First, there must be more than a mere possibility that relief will be granted. Second, irreparable injury must be more than a mere possibility. The third and fourth factors, which respectively determine whether the stay will injure the other party and where the public interest lies, merge when the Government is the opposing party, as in this case. Consequently, the Court vacated the order in Mr. Nken's case and remanded it to the Fourth Circuit for review in light of its decision.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a separate concurring opinion. He emphasized that stays are an extraordinary remedy and should not be granted lightly. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented and was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. He argued that the majority decision nullified statutory provisions adopted by Congress in 1996 that stated immigration removal orders were "self-executing" and "not dependent upon judicial enforcement."


Thomas Eugene Ice was convicted in state court in Oregon on two counts of first-degree burglary with intent to commit sexual abuse, as well as two counts of first-degree sexual abuse committed during those burglaries. Over Ice's objection, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences based on its own findings of fact. Ice appealed, raising the question whether the Oregon or U.S. Constitutions require a jury, rather than a judge, to make the factual findings upon which a court decides to prescribe consecutive sentences.
The Oregon Court of Appeals held that the consecutive sentences were not in violation of the State's Constitution because none of the factual issues reviewed by the judge were an "element" of the crime. However, the sentences did violate the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because the factual findings were not made by a jury but were used to increase Ice's punishment to more than what the jury had imposed.

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No. In a 5-4 decision with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not prevent states from assigning to judges rather than to juries fact finding responsibilities necessary to imposing consecutive sentences on criminal defendants. The Court drew its reasoning from the historical record. Since the nation's founding, judges have served in this capacity. Additionally, the Court reasoned that judges serving in this capacity do not infringe upon the traditional responsibilities of a jury in a criminal trial.
Justice Antonin G. Scalia dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Scalia argued that in Mr. Ice's case, the Court's opinion in Apprendi should control. There, the Court was clear that any fact finding necessary to the enhancement of a criminal sentence must be done by the jury.


In July 1998, a United States Navy court-martial tried Jacob Denedo on counts of conspiracy, larceny, and forgery. In exchange for his guilty plea, Mr. Denedo was offered a reduced sentence that included three months of confinement, a demotion, and a bad-conduct discharge. Eight years later, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services began proceedings to deport Mr. Denedo, a Nigerian immigrant and lawful permanent resident of the United States, based on his court-martial conviction. In light of these developments, Mr. Denedo filed a petition with the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief and requested review of his court-martial and a writ of error coram nobis in order to achieve his pre-conviction state. He argued that his counsel at the court-martial was ineffective because he had specifically stated during the proceeding that "his primary concern and objective" was "to avoid the risk of deportation" and was less concerned about the amount of time he spent in prison. At the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, the government motioned to dismiss Mr. Denedo's petition on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The court disagreed and found it had jurisdiction as provided by 28 U.S.C. Section 1651 - the All Writs Act. It then denied Mr. Denedo's petition. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces agreed that the Court of Criminal Appeals had jurisdiction to review the petition, but remanded the matter to the Court of Criminal Appeals for further fact finding in order to determine whether Mr. Denedo's counsel was deficient.

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Yes. The Supreme Court held that Article I courts, like the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA), retain jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to consider coram nobis petitions that allege a prior judgment of conviction was fundamentally flawed. With Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that since Mr. Denedo's coram nobis petition was simply a further step in his criminal appeal, the NMCCA retained jurisdiction to issue the writ, as the petition challenged the validity of the court's original ruling.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts dissented, oined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito. Roberts disagreed with the majority that Article I courts have jurisdiction to consider coram nobis petitions. Rather, he argued that military courts are severely restricted in their jurisdiction, which cannot extend beyond the precise limits granted them by Congress.


Michael Pulido was convicted of first-degree murder in a California state court for his involvement in the shooting of a gas station attendant during the course of a robbery. He claimed that he was only involved in the robbery after the shooting had taken place. On appeal, Mr. Pulido argued that the jury instructions were in error and allowed a jury to convict him as an accomplice in the robbery and murder, even if he only took part in the robbery. The California Supreme Court refused to overturn the conviction holding that the error was harmless because the jury had specifically found that Mr. Pulido aided the robbery during the murder.
Mr. Pulido sought and was granted habeas relief by a federal district court in California. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that instructing a jury on multiple theories of guilt, one of which was legally improper, was "structural error" entitling Mr. Pulido to automatic relief and exempted the instructions from "harmless-error" review.

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No. In a 6-3 per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit inaccurately categorized the type of jury instructions in Mr. Pulido's case as "structural error." It reasoned that one instructional error arising in the context of multiple theories of guilt does not necessarily spoil all the jury's findings, which would entitle the convicted individual to automatic relief. Rather, the Court found that the jury instructions in Mr. Pulido's case should be evaluated by whether they caused a "substantial and injurious effect" upon the jury reaching its verdict. The Court vacated Mr. Pulido's conviction and remanded the case to the court of appeals for proceedings consistent with the decision.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. They found the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit merely misused the term "structural error" in its opinion, while it actually utilized the analytical model advocated by the majority opinion. They reasoned that in the interests of efficiency, the Supreme Court should have affirmed the court of appeals rather than have it repeat largely the same analysis.


District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne

In March 1994, William Osborne was convicted of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault in an Alaska state court. After his conviction, Mr. Osborne sought access to biological evidence that was used to convict him. He intended to use DNA testing that was not available at the time of the trial to prove he was not the source. The District Attorney's Office (D.A.O.) in Anchorage denied access. Mr. Osborne subsequently filed suit in a federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the D.A.O. alleging that his 14th Amendment due process rights had been violated when he was denied post-conviction access to potentially exculpatory evidence.
The district court granted the D.A.O.'s motion to dismiss and Mr. Osborne appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed and remanded the case. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Mr. Osborne. The D.A.O. appealed arguing that Mr. Osborne need show the disclosure of evidence would "affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent" in order to gain access. Further, it argued that an oral confession given by Mr. Osborne after his conviction precluded him from pursuing post-conviction relief.
The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court. It held that Mr. Osborne had a limited due process right of access to the biological evidence for purposes of DNA testing. The court dismissed the D.A.O.'s arguments. It reasoned that Mr. Osborne need merely show that favorable DNA results would afford a "reasonable probability" that he could prevail in an action for post-conviction relief. Further, it found that Mr. Osborne's oral confession did not foreclose his pursuit of post-conviction relief, as exculpating evidence would raise serious questions about the validity of his confession.

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Maybe and no. The Supreme Court held that even assuming that Mr. Osborne could pursue his claims using § 1983, he had no constitutional right to obtain post-conviction access to the state's DNA evidence used against him at trial. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, the Court deferred to the legislative branch in establishing rules by which convicts can obtain DNA evidence to pursue postconviction relief. It recognized that while the Alaska legislature had yet to establish such procedures, its court system was making progress. Moreover, the Court held that Mr. Osborne's due process rights were not violated, reasoning that Alaska's postconviction relief procedures were adequate.
Justice Alito also wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Kennedy and in part by Justice Thomas. He agreed with the majority's opinion, but also stated that Mr. Osborne's claim failed for two other reasons. First, he argued that § 1983 was an inappropriate mechanism for pursuing a federal constitutional right claim when the claim had not been exhausted at the state court level. Second, he argued that Mr. Osborne's claim should be rejected because a defendant who chooses not to have DNA testing done at the trial level for tactical reasons should not have access to such testing in pursuing postconviction relief. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, and in part by Justice David H. Souter. He strongly disagreed with the majority holding that prevented Mr. Osborne from having access to evidence that could conclusively prove his guilt or innocence, and thus could ensure justice had been achieved. Justice Souter also dissented. He argued that Alaska had failed to provide sufficiently effective postconviction relief procedures to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Constitution and thus Mr. Osborne should have had access to the DNA evidence he sought.


Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection

In 1961, Florida enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation Act ("BSPA") to restore and maintain critically eroded beaches within the state. In 2003, under the BSPA, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection filed for an Application for a Joint Coastal Permit and Authorization to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands in order to dredge sand from a shoal to rebuild a beach. Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. ("SBR"), an association of homeowners, subsequently challenged the issuance of the permit and the constitutionality of the BSPA. The Florida court of appeals rescinded the permit, holding that issuance would have resulted in an unconstitutional taking.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida first rephrased the certified question to determine whether the BSPA was "on its face" constitutional. Then, the court held that the BSPA was not unconstitutional, reasoning that it did not deprive land owners of littoral rights without just compensation.

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No. The Supreme Court held 8-0 that the Florida Supreme Court did not take property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Antonin Scalia announced the judgment of the Court, and authored an opinion in which he maintained that there could be no taking unless property owners could show that they had rights to future exposed land and to contact with the water superior to Florida's right to fill in its submerged land. Here, there could be no showing. Scalia drew from Florida-law principles that (1) the state, as owner of submerged land adjacent to beachfront property, has the right to fill that land and (2) the exposure of land previously submerged belongs to the state even if it interrupts the beachfront property owners' contact with the water. Justice Scalia, with a plurality of the Court including Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito, also noted in Parts II and III of the decision that if a court declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property in violation of the Takings Clause.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court's holding, but disagreed that a plurality should reach the issue of whether or when a judicial decision determining property owners' rights can violate the Takings Clause. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, also concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court's holding, but, like Justice Kennedy, counseled that the Court should only address the issues before it.


A Florida state court convicted Albert Holland of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, attempted sexual battery, and armed robbery, and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Holland petitioned for federal habeas relief in a Florida federal district court. The district court denied the petition as untimely.
On appeal, Mr. Holland argued that his attorney failed to communicate with him about the status of his case, then failed to file a timely federal habeas corpus petition, despite repeated instructions by Mr. Holland to do so. Therefore, Mr. Holland contended that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that absent an allegation and proof of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, or mental impairment on the attorney's part, no mere negligence of the attorney's rises to the level of egregious misconduct that would entitle a habeas corpus petitioner to equitable tolling.

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Yes. The Supreme Court held that a state prisoner who has exhausted her state court appeals has one year within which to petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held that under certain "extraordinary circumstances," a court may relax that deadline. Those circumstances may arise from an attorney's misconduct, even if the attorney did not act dishonestly or in bad faith.
Justice Samuel J. Alito concurred in part and in the judgment, and Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, joined in part by Justice Clarence Thomas. In his dissent, Scalia criticized the court's statutory interpretation, stating that if Congress had intended for there to be equitable tolling in AEDPA, they would have explicitly stated so. He went on to criticize the court's application of the new standard


Catherine Ratliff was the attorney for Ruby Kills Ree in her successful suit against the Social Security Administration for Social Security benefits. The district court also granted Kills Ree’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Before paying the fee award, the government discovered that Kills Ree owed the government a debt that predated the fee award and accordingly sought to offset the fee award against the debt. Ratliff then intervened in the case to challenge the offset and argued that the fee award belonged to her and therefore could not be used to offset Kills Ree’s debt. The district court held that the offset was proper because the fee award goes to the “prevailing party,” not directly to the attorney. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that precedent established that EAJA fee awards go to the attorney.

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