Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board of California

California's "unitary business" income-calculation system for determining the State's taxable share of a multistate corporation's business income authorizes a deduction for interest expense. The system, however, permits use of that deduction only to the extent that the amount exceeds certain out-of-state income arising from the unrelated business activity of a discrete business enterprise. Hunt-Wesson, Inc. is a successor in interest to a nondomiciliary corporation that incurred interest expense. California disallowed a deduction for the expense insofar as it had received nonunitary dividend and interest income. Hunt-Wesson challenged the validity of the disallowance. The California Court of Appeal found the disallowance constitutional. The California Supreme Court denied review.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the provision violates the Due Process and Commerce Clauses. "California's statute does not directly impose a tax on nonunitary income. Rather, it simply denies the taxpayer use of a portion of a deduction from unitary income..., income which does bear a 'rational relationship' or 'nexus' to California," wrote Justice Breyer. "Because California's offset provision is not a reasonable allocation of expense deductions to the income that the expense generates, it constitutes impermissible taxation of income outside its jurisdictional reach," concluded Justice Breyer.


Grace Olech asked the Village of Willowbrook to connect her property to the municipal water supply. The Village conditioned the connection on Olech's granting of a 33-foot easement. Olech refused, claiming that the Village only required a 15-foot easement from other property owners seeking access to the water supply. Olech sued the Village claiming that the Village's demand of an additional 18-foot easement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff can allege an equal protection violation by asserting that state action was motivated solely by a "spiteful effort to 'get' him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective."

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Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Olech's allegations were sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis. "Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment," stated the unanimous, unsigned opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred.


Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.

Roger Reeves, 57, and Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, were supervisors in different Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. departments. Reeves' duties included making sure workers under his supervision were on time and at work and logging such data. Reeves' department was managed by Russell Caldwell, 45, who was responsible for reviewing Reeves' work. Caldwell informed the company's director of manufacturing, Powe Chesnut, that production in Revees' department was down because employees were often absent, coming in late, and leaving early. Chesnut ordered an audit, which revealed numerous timekeeping errors and misrepresentations by Caldwell, Reeves, and Oswalt. Chesnut recommended that Reeves and Caldwell be fired and, subsequently, their employment was terminated. Reeves filed suit, alleging that he had been terminated because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). At trial, Sanderson contended that Reeves was fired because of his failure to maintain accurate attendance records. Reeves attempted to demonstrate that this explanation was a pretext for age discrimination and introduced evidence that he had accurately recorded the attendance of employees under his supervision and that Chesnut had demonstrated age-related animosity when dealing with him. Ultimately, the case went to a jury, which returned a verdict for Reeves. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Reeves had not presented sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of age-based discrimination.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion deliver by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that "[a] plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, may be adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination under the ADEA." The ruling means that an employer is liable to a former employee under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 if a reasonable jury can find that the employer's explanation for the employee's dismissal was pretext for discrimination.


In 1997, Maria Ohler was arrested and charged with importation of marijuana and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, after a customs inspector noticed that someone had tampered with one of Ohler's van interior panels and discovered approximately 81 pounds of marijuana. Before the trial, the government filed in limine motions to admit Ohler's prior felony conviction as character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and as impeachment evidence under Rule 609(a)(1). Also before the trial, the District Court denied the motion to admit the conviction as character evidence. After the beginning of the trail, the court ruled that if Ohler testified, evidence of her prior conviction would be admissible under Rule 609(a)(1). While testifying, Ohler admitted on direct examination that she had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine in 1993. Subsequently, Ohler was found guilty. On appeal, Ohler challenged the District Court's in limine ruling, allowing the government to use her prior conviction for impeachment purposes. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Ohler waived her objection by introducing evidence of the conviction during her direct examination.

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Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error." Thus, federal defendants, who choose to acknowledge their prior convictions, waive the right to appeal the evidence's admissibility. Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice David H. Souter argued, [t]here is no reason to discourage the defendant from introducing the conviction herself, as the majority's waiver rule necessarily does."


Sam Wardlow, who was holding an opaque bag, inexplicably fled an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking after noticing police officers in the area. When officers caught up with him on the street, one stopped him and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons because in his experience there were usually weapons in the vicinity of narcotics transactions. The officers arrested Wardlow after discovering that he was carrying handgun. In a trial motion to suppress the gun, Wardlow claimed that in order to stop an individual, short of actually arresting the person, police first had to point to "specific reasonable inferences" why the stop was necessary. The Illinois trial court denied the motion, finding that the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. Wardlow was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. In reversing, the Illinois Appellate Court found that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, determining that sudden flight in a high crime area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop because flight may simply be an exercise of the right to "go on one's way."

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Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held, 5 to 4, that the police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they stopped Wardlow, because the officer was justified in suspecting that the accused was involved in criminal activity and, therefore, in investigating further. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that, "[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion" to justify a stop. The Chief Justice noted that "flight is the consummate act of evasion." Stevens, joined by three other justices, concurred in avoiding a per se rule but dissented from the majority holding.


In 1952, Arizona invoked the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to resolve a dispute with California over the extent of each state's right to use water from the Colorado River. The United States intervened, seeking water rights on behalf of five Indian reservations. Culminating in Arizona I, the Court held that the United States had reserved water rights for the five reservations. In a 1964 decree, the Court specified the water entitlements for the parties and the reservations, but held that the water rights for the reservations would be subject to adjustment in the event that the reservations' disputed boundaries were finally determined. Thereafter in Arizona II, the Court concluded that the reservations' boundaries had yet to be determined. Ultimately, the Quechan Tribe (Tribe) of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation and the United States entered an agreement returning land encompassing some 25,000 acres of disputed boundary lands not attributed to that reservation in earlier litigation. In 1983, the Court of Claims consented to the settlement. The Tribe and the United States then filed claims seeking increased water rights for the Fort Yuma Reservation. In 1989, the Court granted the motion of Arizona, California, and two municipal water districts (State parties) to reopen the 1964 decree to determine whether the Fort Yuma Reservation was entitled to claim additional boundary lands and, if so, additional water rights. The State parties asserted that the Fort Yuma claims of the Tribe and the United States were precluded by Arizona I and by the Claims Court consent judgment.

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No. In a opinion deliver by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court rejected both grounds for preclusion and remanded the case to a Special Master for a determination on the merits of the outstanding claims for additional water rights associated with disputed Fort Yuma Reservation boundary lands. "Those claims are the only ones that remain to be decided in Arizona v. California; their resolution will enable the Court to enter a final consolidated decree and bring this case to a close," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court.


"Kandyland," operated by Pap's A. M. in Erie PA, featured totally nude female erotic dancing. The city council enacted an ordinance making it an offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a "state of nudity," To comply with the ordinance, dancers had to wear, at a minimum, "pasties" and a "G-string." Pap's filed suit against Erie, seeking a permanent injunction against the ordinance's enforcement. The Court of Common Pleas struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional, but the Commonwealth Court reversed. In reversing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the ordinance's public nudity sections violated Pap's right to freedom of expression as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court explained that, although one purpose of the ordinance was to combat negative secondary effects, there was also an unmentioned purpose to "impact negatively on the erotic message of the dance." Additionally, because the ordinance was not content neutral, the court subjected it to strict scrutiny and found that it failed the narrow tailoring requirement of such a test. After the U.S Supreme Court granted certiorari, Pap's filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot, noting that Kandyland no longer operated as a nude dancing club, and that Pap's did not operate such a club at any other location. The Court denied the motion.

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No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Erie's public indecency ordinance did not violate any cognizable First Amendment protections of expressive conduct. In splintered voting that did not yield a majority opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that, "[e]ven if Erie's public nudity ban has some minimal effect on the erotic message by muting that portion of the expression that occurs when the last stitch is dropped, the dancers... are free to perform wearing pasties and G-strings." "The requirement... is a minimal restriction in furtherance of the asserted government interests, and the restriction leaves ample capacity to convey the dancers' erotic message."


Antonio Tonton Slack was convicted of second-degree murder in Nevada. In 1991, after an unsuccessful direct appeal, Slack filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. In federal court, Slack attempted to litigate claims he had not yet presented to the Nevada courts and was prevented from doing so. Slack, therefore, filed a motion to hold his federal petition in abeyance while he returned to state court to exhaust his new claims. The Federal District Court ordered the habeas petition dismissed and granted Slack leave to file an application to renew upon his exhaustion of state remedies. In 1995, after unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, Slack filed again in the federal court. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that Slack's petition raised claims that had not been presented to the state courts and that claims not raised in Slack's 1991 federal petition had to be dismissed as an abuse of the writ. The District Court granted the state's motion. Slack then filed a notice of appeal. The court denied Slack leave to appeal, concluding the appeal would raise no substantial issue. The Court of Appeals also denied Slack leave to appeal.

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No. In an 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that a federal habeas corpus petition filed by a state prisoner, after an initial petition was dismissed without adjudication on the merits, does not constitute a "second or successive" petition, subject to dismissal for abuse of writ. That "a vexatious litigant could inject undue delay into the collateral review process," wrote Justice Kennedy, can be countered, "the State remains free to impose proper procedural bars to restrict repeated returns to state court for postconviction proceedings."


The Ohio Cellular Products Corporation (OCP) sued Adams USA, Inc. (Adams), for patent infringement. After the District Court ruled in Adams' favor by dismissing the suit, Adams motioned for attorney fees and costs. In granting the motion, the court found that Donald Nelson, who was at all relevant times president and sole shareholder of OCP, had acted in a way that constituted inequitable conduct chargeable to OCP. Fearing it would be unable to collect the award, Adams moved under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend its pleading to add Nelson, personally, as a party from whom fees could be collected. Additionally, Adams asked the court, under Rule 59(e), to amend the judgment to make Nelson immediately liable for the fee award. The District Court granted the motion in full. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision simultaneously making Nelson a party and subjecting him to judgement.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the District Court erred in amending the judgment immediately upon permitting the amendment of the pleading. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[d]ue process, as reflected in Rule 15 as well as Rule 12, required that Nelson be given an opportunity to respond and contest his personal liability for the award after he was made a party and before the entry of judgment against him." Thus, the District Court's granting of Adams' motion to simultaneously make Nelson a party and personally liable violated due process.


After Terry Williams was convicted of robbery and capital murder; his punishment was fixed at death. In state habeas corpus proceedings a judge determined that his conviction was valid. However, the judge also found that Williams' counsel's failure to discover and present significant mitigating evidence violated his right to effective counsel and recommended that he be re-sentenced. Rejecting this, the Virginia Supreme Court held that Williams had not suffered sufficient prejudice to warrant relief. In habeas corpus proceedings under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal trial judge also found that the death sentence was constitutionally weak on ineffective-assistance grounds. The court, under the AEDPA, concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that it could not conclude that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision on prejudice was an unreasonable application of standards established by the Supreme Court.

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Yes and yes. In a judgment announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court, with different majorities of Justices for each holding, held that Williams had been deprived of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel and that the Virginia Supreme Court's refusal to set aside the Williams death sentence was a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Court. This conclusion followed from "'a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different' if competent counsel had presented and explained the significance of all the available evidence.'"


During questioning about a robbery he was connected to, Charles Dickerson made statements to authorities admitting that he was the getaway driver in a series of bank robberies. Dickerson was then placed under arrest. The timing of his statement is disputed. The FBI and local detectives testified that Dickerson was advised of his Miranda rights, established in Miranda v. Arizona, and waived them before he made his statement. Dickerson said he was not read his Miranda warnings until after he gave his statement. After his indictment for bank robbery, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress the statement that he made on the ground that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The government argued that even if the Miranda warnings were not read, the statement was voluntary and therefore admissible under 18 USC Section 3501, which provides that "a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." The District Court granted Dickerson's motion, finding that he had not been read his Miranda rights or signed a waiver until after he made his statement, but the court did not address section 3501. In reversing, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Dickerson had not received Miranda warnings, but held that section 3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary. The court held that "Congress enacted section 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court."

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No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Miranda governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture," wrote Rehnquist. "Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. We decline to overrule Miranda ourselves," concluded the Chief Justice. Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, blasted the Court's ruling, writing that the majority opinion gave needless protection to "foolish (but not compelled) confessions."


A Virginia jury found Bobby Ramdass guilty of murdering Mohammed Kayani, a clerk in the 7-Eleven he held up, and recommended the death sentence. At the time of the sentencing phase of his trial, final judgment had been entered against Ramdass for an armed robbery and he had been found guilty of a second armed robbery, but no final judgment had been entered. Under Virginia law, a conviction does not become final until the jury returns a verdict and the judge enters a final judgment of conviction and pronounces sentence. The Kayani judge paused and scheduled a future hearing to consider whether to impose the recommended sentence. During the interval between the jury trial and this hearing, final judgment had been entered on the second armed robbery conviction. At the sentencing hearing in the capital murder case, Ramdass, in arguing for a life sentence, claimed that his prior convictions made him ineligible for parole under Virginia's three-strikes law. The court sentenced Ramdass to death, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. On remand from the U.S Supreme Court, the Virginia Supreme Court again affirmed the sentence over Ramdass' argument that he should have been allowed to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. The court declined to apply a previous U.S Supreme Court holding that a jury considering imposing death should be told if the defendant is parole ineligible under state law. The court concluded that Ramdass was not parole ineligible when the jury was considering his sentence because the second armed robbery, in which no final judgment had been entered, did not count as a conviction for purposes of the three-strikes law. Ultimately, Ramdass sought federal habeas corpus relief. The District Court granted his petition, ruling that the jury should have been advised that he was ineligible for parole. In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that Ramdass was not, at the time of his sentencing proceedings, legally ineligible for parole.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Ramdass was not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief because he was not entitled to instruction on parole ineligibility at sentencing since conviction had not been entered yet on the earlier jury verdict making him parole ineligible. In a plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that the Virginia Supreme Court's finding that the state's three-strikes law did not cover the defendant until shortly after he was sentenced must be honored because it "was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application" of a decision in which the justices said that defendants have the right to tell jurors about their parole status in such cases.


Board of Regents , University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth

The University of Wisconsin, a public university, requires students to pay an activity fee. The fee supports various campus services and extracurricular student activities including the Future Financial Gurus of America; the International Socialist Organization; the College Democrats and Republicans; and the American Civil Liberties Union Campus Chapter. Scott Harold Southworth filed suit against the University, alleging that the fee violated his rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise under the First Amendment. Southworth argued that the University must grant him the choice not to fund registered student organizations (RSO) that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to his personal beliefs. In granting Southworth judgment, the Federal District Court concluded that the fee program compelled students to support political and ideological activities with which they disagree in violation of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The court declared the fee program invalid and enjoined the University from using the fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fee program was "not germane to the University's mission, did not further a vital University policy, and imposed too much of a burden on [Southworth's] free speech rights."

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the "First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[w]hen a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others." Justice David H. Souter, in an opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment only.


Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.

After Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. bought a wastewater treatment plant, it was granted a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The permit authorized Laidlaw to discharge treated water and limited pollutants. Laidlaw's discharge of mercury into the North Tyger River repeatedly exceeded the limits set by the permit. Ultimately, Friends of the Earth and others (FOE) filed a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Laidlaw, alleging noncompliance with the NPDES permit, seeking injunctive relief and an award of civil penalties. Laidlaw moved for summary judgement on the ground that FOE lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. The District Court denied the motion. Ultimately, the District Court found that Laidlaw violated the mercury discharge limitation. In issuing its judgment, the District Court concluded that a civil penalty of $405,800 would be adequate to forestall future violations, given that Laidlaw would have to reimburse the plaintiffs for a significant amount of legal fees and had itself incurred significant legal expenses. The court declined to order injunctive relief because Laidlaw, after the lawsuit began, had achieved substantial compliance with the terms of its permit. FOE appealed to the amount of the District Court's civil penalty judgment, but did not appeal the denial of declaratory or injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals ordered the case to be dismissed. The appellate court held that the case had become moot once Laidlaw complied with the terms of its permit. The court reasoned that the only remedy currently available to FOE, civil penalties payable to the Government, would not redress any injury FOE had suffered.

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No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a citizen suitor's claim for civil penalties need not be dismissed as moot when the defendant, after commencement of the litigation, has come into compliance with its NPDES permit. "A defendant's voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily does not suffice to moot a case," Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court. "Congress has found that civil penalties in the Clean Water Act cases do more than promote immediate compliance... they also deter future violations," concluded Justice Ginsburg. The Court also ruled that FOE had standing to bring the suit on behalf on its members.


In 1993, Jaime Castillo and other Branch-Davidians were involved in a violent confrontation with federal agents near Waco, Texas. Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder federal officers. A jury determined that Castillo, by using firearms in connection with the alleged conspiracy, had violated 18 USC Section 924(c)(1), which read in relevant part: "Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years... and if the firearm is a machinegun... to imprisonment for thirty years." During sentencing, the District Court found that Castillo had possessed machineguns and imposed the mandatory 30-year prison sentence. On appeal, the Courts of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of whether Castillo had used, rather than merely possessed, machineguns. The court also concluded that statutory terms such as "machinegun" did not state elements of a crime separate from that of using a firearm, but instead established factors enhancing a sentence and that the District Court could reimpose the 30-year sentence if it found that machineguns had been actively used. The District Court then reimposed the 30-year sentence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "Section 924(c)(1) uses the word "machinegun" (and similar words) to state an element of a separate, aggravated crime." Therefore, the federal law that subjects anyone who carries a machine gun during a violent crime to an additional 30 years in prison states an element of an offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury rather than determined by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence as are sentencing factors. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "our consideration of Section 924(c)(1)'s language, structure, context, history and such factors that typically help courts determine a statute's objectives leads us to conclude that the relevant words create a separate substantive crime."


United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.

In 1996, Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act, of which section 505 required that cable operators, providing channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming," either to "fully scramble or otherwise fully block" those channels or to broadcast those channels during the "safe-harbor" hours of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. - times when young children were unlikely to be watching. The purpose of section 505 was to protect non-subscribers, and their children, from "signal bleed," or when audio and visual portions of the scrambled programs might be heard or seen. In February 1996, Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. filed suit challenging section 505's constitutionality. A three-judge District Court panel found that section 505's content-based restriction on speech violated the First Amendment because the Government might further its interests in less restrictive ways. The court also found that the Act provided for a less restrictive alternative than section 505, in that section 504 stated that cable operators had an obligation to block channels at a customer's request.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that because the Federal Government failed to show that section 505 was the least restrictive means to further its interests, requiring cable television operators to fully scramble or limit time when sexually-oriented programming was transmitted violated the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. In finding section 505 a content-based regulation, Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that "[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative." In dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer maintained that the majority had not made a "realistic assessment of the alternatives."


Under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, the United States Customs Service is authorized to classify and fix the rate of duty on imports under rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury. Under the Secretary's regulations, any port-of-entry Customs office and the Customs Headquarters Office may issue "ruling letters" setting tariff classifications for particular imports. The Mead Corporation's imported "day planners," were classified as duty-free until the Customs Headquarters issued a ruling letter classifying them as bound diaries subject to tariff. Subsequently, Mead filed suit in the Court of International Trade. The court granted the Government summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that ruling letters should not be treated like Customs regulations, which receive the highest level of deference, because they are not preceded by notice and comment as under the Administrative Procedure Act, do not carry the force of law, and are not intended to clarify importers's rights and obligations beyond the specific case. The court gave no deference at all to the ruling letter at issue.

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No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the "administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for [the greatest level of deference accorded under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council] when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority." Justice Souter wrote that "a tariff classification has no claim to judicial deference under Chevron, there being no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law, but we hold that under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the ruling is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness."


Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.

Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., manufactures a multifunction pocket tool, the Pocket Survival Tool (PST). In 1996, Cooper Industries, Inc. used photographs of a modified PST to introduce a competing tool, the ToolZall. The photographs were used in posters, packaging, and advertising materials. Subsequently, Leatherman filed an action asserting claims of trade-dress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising under the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act). Ultimately, a trial jury awarded Leatherman $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages. The District Court then entered judgment, rejecting Cooper's argument that the punitive damages were grossly excessive. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, using an "abuse of discretion" standard, concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce the award.

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No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Courts of Appeals should apply a de novo standard when reviewing district court determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards. Because the Court of Appeals applied an "abuse of discretion" standard, a less demanding standard, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a determination on whether the award was grossly excessive under the correct standard.


Congress has provided the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) with the statutory authority to reduce the prison term of an inmate convicted of a nonviolent felony by up to one year, if the prisoner successfully completes a substance abuse program. The BOP's implementing regulation categorically denies early release to prisoners whose offense is a felony attended by "the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm." In 1997, Christopher A. Lopez was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Additionally, the court found that Lopez possessed a firearm in connection with his offense. While incarcerated, Lopez requested substance abuse treatment. The BOP found Lopez qualified for its residential drug abuse program, but was found him categorically ineligible for early release. The District Court, in ordering the BOP to reconsider Lopez for early release, held that the BOP may not, based on weapons possession, categorically count out inmates, whose underlying conviction was for a nonviolent crime. The Court of Appeals reversed.

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Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the categorically denial of early release to a prisoner who committed felony using firearm is a permissible exercise of the BOP's discretion, even if the prisoner has successfully completed a substance abuse program. "The Bureau reasonably concluded that an inmate's prior involvement with firearms, in connection with the commission of a felony, suggests his readiness to resort to life-endangering violence and therefore appropriately determines the early release decision," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the majority. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, dissented.


David A. Egelhoff designated his wife, Donna Rae Egelhoff, as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy and a pension plan provided by his employer and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Two months after the Egelhoffs divorced, Mr. Egelhoff died. His children then sued Donna Rae to recover the insurance proceeds and the pension plan benefits. The children relied on a Washington state statue that provides that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset - defined to include a life insurance policy or employee benefit plan - is revoked automatically upon divorce. Subsequently, the proceeds would pass to the children as Mr. Egelhoff's statutory heirs under state law. Under ERISA, the state trial courts granted Donna Rae summary judgment. In reversing, the Washington Court of Appeals found that the statute was not pre-empted by ERISA. In affirming, the Washington Supreme Court held that the statute does not "refer to" ERISA plans to an extent that would require pre-emption.

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Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that that the Washington statute has a "connection with" ERISA plans and is therefore pre-empted. "Differing state regulations affecting an ERISA plan's 'system for processing claims and paying benefits' impose 'precisely the burden that ERISA pre-emption was intended to avoid,'" wrote Justice Thomas. He continued: "The statute at issue here directly conflicts with ERISA's requirements that plans be administered, and benefits be paid, in accordance with plan documents." Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice John Paul Stevens joined.


In 1984, after firing two bullets at police during a car chase, Tony Bruce Bennett was convicted of attempted murder, among other crimes. Bennett moved pro se to vacate his judgment of conviction in 1995. A New York trial court orally denied Bennett's motion. Bennett claimed that he never received a copy of a written order reflecting the denial. In 1998, Bennett filed a federal habeas corpus petition alleging violations of his rights to present witnesses in his defense and to a fair trial, to be present at all material stages of the trial, and to the effective assistance of counsel. The Federal District Court dismissed Bennett's federal habeas corpus petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which set a 1-year period of limitation on federal habeas corpus applications by state prisoners. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Bennett's habeas petition was not time-barred because his 1995 motion was still pending, under the AEDPA's tolling provision, since he had never received notification of the state's decision regarding it. Thus, the time for appealing the denial of that motion had not yet expired. Additionally, the court found that the 1995 motion was a "properly filed" application, even though the claims contained in the motion were procedurally barred under two New York statutory provisions.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that an application for state postconviction relief containing procedurally barred claims is properly filed within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Antonin Scalia said that "[o]nly individual claims, and not the application containing those claims, can be procedurally defaulted under state law." "An application is 'filed,' as that term is commonly understood, when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record," noted Justice Scalia. "By construing 'properly filed application' to mean 'application raising claims that are not mandatorily procedurally barred,' [the Federal Government] elides the difference between an 'application' and a 'claim,'" argued Justice Scalia.


C. & L. Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma

The Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, a federally recognized Tribe, entered into a contract with C & L Enterprises, Inc., for the installation of a roof on a Tribe-owned building in Oklahoma. The property rests outside the Tribe's reservation and is not held in trust by the Federal Government for the Tribe. The contract contains clauses requiring disputes arising out of the contract to be decided by arbitration and a choice-of-law clause that reads: "The contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located." Thus, Oklahoma law governed the contract. After the contract was executed, but before performance commenced, the Tribe retained another company to install the roof. C & L then submitted an arbitration demand. The Tribe asserted sovereign immunity. The arbitrator awarded C & L a monetary award. Ultimately, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the Tribe was immune from suit. The court noted that the contract seemed to indicate the Tribe's willingness to expose itself to suit on the contract, but concluded that the Tribe had not waived its suit immunity with the requisite clarity.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that "under the agreement the Tribe proposed and signed, the Tribe clearly consented to arbitration and to the enforcement of arbitral awards in Oklahoma state court; the Tribe thereby waived its sovereign immunity from C & L's suit." Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "the Tribe agreed, by express contract, to adhere to certain dispute resolution procedures."


After an increase in the use of cocaine by patients receiving prenatal care, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) started to cooperate with Charleston to formulate a policy to prosecute mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth. MUSC obstetrical patients were arrested after testing positive for cocaine. They filed suit challenging the policy's validity on the theory that warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches. Among the District Court's actions was an instruction to the jury to find for the patients unless they had consented to such searches. The jury found in favor of the city. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the searches were reasonable, reasoning that special needs may, in certain exceptional circumstances, justify a search policy designed to serve non-law-enforcement ends.

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Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the diagnostic tests constituted an unreasonable search if the patient has not consented to the procedure. The interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine cannot justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant. Examining the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens wrote that a special need is "divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement," and that under the city's view "virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate...purpose."


In Shaw v. Hunt, the U.S Supreme Court found that North Carolina's legislature violated the Constitution by using race as the predominant factor in drawing its Twelfth Congressional District's 1992 boundaries. In 1997, after the State redrew those boundaries, the District Court found that the new boundaries had also been created with dominating racial considerations. In reversing, the Court found, in Hunt v. Cromartie, that the evidence was insufficient to show an unconstitutional race-based objective. On remand, the District Court again found that North Carolina's legislature had used race driven criteria in drawing the 1997 boundaries based on the district's shape, its splitting of towns and counties, and its heavily African-American voting population. The court newly found that the legislature had drawn the boundaries to collect precincts with a high racial, rather than political, identification. (Argued and decided with 99-1865, Smallwood v. Cromartie.)

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Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the District Court's conclusion that the state violated the Equal Protection Clause in drawing the 1997 boundaries is based on clearly erroneous findings. Justice Breyer wore for the Court that "the primary evidence upon which the District Court relied for its 'race, not politics,' conclusion is evidence of voting registration, not voting behavior; and that is precisely the kind of evidence that we said was inadequate the last time this case was before us." Justice Clarence Thomas's dissented, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.


In 1994, Earthy D. Daniels, Jr., was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence on anyone convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and who has three previous convictions for a violent felony, Daniels' sentence was enhanced. After an unsuccessful appeal, Daniels filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. Daniels argued that his sentence violated the Constitution because it was based in part on two prior convictions that were themselves unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the nonexistent or unsuccessful pursuit of available challenges to the constitutionality of prior state convictions, which were used to enhance a federal sentence, precluded such challenge to collaterally attack a federal sentence. "[Daniels] could have pursued his claims while he was in custody on those convictions," wrote Justice O'Connor for the majority. "As his counsel conceded at oral argument, there is no indication that [Daniels] did so or that he was prevented from doing so by some external force."


William Fiore and his co-defendant, David Scarpone, were convicted of operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit in violation of Pennsylvania State law after deliberately altering a monitoring pipe. Fiore appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the conviction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then denied further review of Fiore's case, and his conviction became final. Scarpone appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which noted the existence of a "valid permit" and set aside the conviction. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed and found that Scarpone's conduct did not constitute the operation of the facility without a permit because the law Fiore and Scarpone were convicted under does not apply to those who possess a permit but deviate radically from the permit's terms. Fiore had asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review his case after it had agreed to review Scarpone's case and twice more after it decided Scarpone. The court denied Fiore's requests.
Fiore sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the U.S. Constitution required that his conviction be set aside because his conduct was not criminal under the statutory section charged. The District Court granted his petition. .The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on the ground that it would require a retroactive application of a new rule of law.
Following oral argument, a unanimous court in an opinion by Justice Stephen J. Breyer certified the question whether the court's interpretation of the statute set forth in Scarpone's case stated the correct interpretation of Pennsylvania law on the date when Fiore's conviction became final. The Court also reserved judgment and further proceedings in the case pending a response by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "the answer to this question will help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in this case."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court replied that the decision "did not announce a new rule of law," but "merely clarified the plain language of the statute." The U.S. Supreme Court then took up the pending constitutional question.

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No. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that Fiore's conviction was unconstitutional. Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision was not a new rule, it governed Fiore's case even though the case was final before the decision was handed down. The Court found that since Fiore had a permit, his offense was not covered by the statute he was convicted under. The Court concluded that "Fiore's conviction fails to satisfy the Federal Constitution's demands."


The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) expressly precludes courts of appeals from exercising "jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against any alien who is removable by reason of "a conviction for certain criminal offenses, including any aggravated felony." Deboris Calcano-Martinez, Sergio Madrid, and Fazila Khan are all lawful permanent residents of the United States subject to administratively final orders of removal because they were convicted of aggravated felonies. Each filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals and a habeas corpus petition in the District Court to challenge the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that they were ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of deportation under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. The court also held that they could pursue their claims in a District Court habeas action.

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Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions for direct but petitioners can proceed with their habeas petitions if they wish to obtain relief. "As petitioners in this case were convicted of 'aggravated felonies' within the meaning of the relevant statutes," wrote Justice Stevens, "the plain language of [IIRIRA] fairly explicitly strips the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to hear their claims on petitions for direct review." Justice Stevens continued that "Congress has not spoken with sufficient clarity to strip the district courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions raising identical claims."


The Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act mandates that fresh mushroom handlers pay assessments used primarily to fund advertisements promoting mushroom sales. United Foods, Inc. refused to pay the assessment, claiming that it violated the First Amendment. Ultimately, United Foods sought review in the District Court. In granting the Government summary judgement, the court relied on Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., which held that the First Amendment was not violated when agricultural marketing orders, as part of a larger regulatory marketing scheme, required producers of California tree fruit to pay assessments for product advertising. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Glickman did not control because the mandated payments in this case were not part of a comprehensive statutory agricultural marketing program.

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Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the assessment requirement violates the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy wore for the Court that "the mandated support is contrary to the First Amendment principles set forth in cases involving expression by groups which include persons who object to the speech, but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or necessity." "We have not upheld compelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program where the principal object is speech itself," continued Justice Kennedy.


In 1949, Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact. Article IV-D provided that future development of the river basin could not materially deplete the usable quantity or availability to other users of the river's waters. In 1986, Kansas filed suit alleging that Colorado had violated the Compact. Ultimately, the Special Master found that post-Compact increases in groundwater well pumping in Colorado had materially depleted the waters in violation of Article IV-D. The Special Master, in his second report, recommended that damages be awarded to Kansas. In his third report, the Special Master recommended that such damages be measured by Kansas' losses attributable to Compact violations since 1950, be paid in money not water, and include prejudgment interest from 1969 to the date of judgment. Colorado filed four objections to the third report, Kansas filed one, and the United States submitted that all objections should be overruled.

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No, yes, no, no, and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court remanded the case to the Special Master for preparation of a final judgment consistent with its opinion. The Court unanimously concluded that the recommended damages award does not violate the Eleventh Amendment and that the Special Master properly determined the value of the crop losses attributable to Compact violations. In a 6-3 split, the Court ruled that the unliquidated nature of Kansas' money damages does not bar an award of prejudgment interest and that the Special Master determined the appropriate rate for the prejudgment interest award, which should begin running in 1969.


City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha

The City of Waukesha, Wisconsin requires sellers of sexually explicit materials to obtain and annually renew adult business licenses. City News and Novelty, Inc. (City News), owned and operated an adult-oriented shop in Waukesha. City News had first obtained a license in 1989. In 1995, City News applied for a renewal of its license. Waukesha's Common Council denied the application. The Council found that City News had violated Waukesha ordinances by permitting minors to loiter on the premises, failing to maintain an unobstructed view of booths in the store, and allowing patrons to engage in sexual activity inside the booths. Waukesha's refusal to renew City News's license was upheld in administrative proceedings and on judicial review in the state courts. Among other questions raised in its petition for certiorari, City News asked the Court to "resolve...whether the guarantee of prompt judicial review that must accompany [an adult business] licensing scheme means a prompt judicial determination or simply the right to promptly file for judicial review."

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The Court did not answer the question. In a unanimous opinion deliver by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari because City News was not properly situated to raise the question on which the Court granted review. The city of Waukesha had argued the case was moot after City News decided to withdraw its renewal application and close its business upon the city's grant of a license to another business, with which the Court agreed. "We do not doubt that an ongoing adult enterprise facing loss of its license to do business may allege First Amendment injuries. Such an establishment's typical concern, however, is not the speed of court proceedings, but the availability of a stay of adverse action during the pendency of judicial review, however long that review takes," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court.


Because it is a recipient of federal financial assistance, the Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department) is subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. Under section 602, the Department of Justice issued a regulation forbidding funding recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods having the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on the prohibited grounds. Martha Sandoval brought a class action suit to enjoin the Department from administering state driver's license examinations only in English. Sandoval argued that the English-only policy violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. Ordering the Department to accommodate non-English speakers, the District Court enjoined the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. James Alexander, the Director of the Department, unsuccessfully argued before both courts that Title VI did not provide a cause of action to enforce the regulation.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that there is no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI. "Title VI itself directly reaches only instances of intentional discrimination," wrote Justice Scalia, "[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under [section 602]." Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, which was join by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer.


Louisiana law authorizes the State to award nontransferable, annually renewable licenses to operate video poker machines. In 1992, Fred Goodson and his family formed Truck Stop Gaming, Ltd. (TSG), a video poker business. Carl Cleveland, a lawyer, assisted Goodson in preparing TSG's video poker license applications, each of which identified Goodson's children as the sole beneficial owners of the partnership. From 1992 through 1995, TSG successfully renewed its license. In 1996, Cleveland and Goodson were charged with money laundering under federal law, along with racketeering and conspiracy in connection with a scheme to bribe state legislators to vote in a manner favorable to the video poker industry. Acts supporting these charges came from federal mail fraud charges, defined as "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining...property by means of...fraudulent...representations." The indictment alleged that Cleveland and Goodson fraudulently concealed that they were the true owners of TSG in the license applications they had mailed to the State because they had tax and financial problems that could have undermined their ability to receive a video poker license. Before trial, Cleveland moved to dismiss the mail fraud counts on the ground that the alleged fraud did not deprive the State of "property." The District Court denied the motion, concluding that licenses constitute property even before they are issued. A jury found Cleveland guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that State and municipal licenses in general, and Louisiana's video poker licenses in particular, do not rank as "property," for purposes of federal law, in the hands of the official licensor. Thus, Cleveland's conviction for making false statements to obtain state video poker license was vacated. "Equating issuance of licenses or permits with deprivation of property would subject to federal mail fraud prosecution a wide range of conduct traditionally regulated by state and local authorities," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court.


After a final removal order is entered, an alien ordered removed is held in custody during a 90-day removal period. If the alien is not removed in those 90 days, the post-removal-period detention statute authorizes further detention or supervised release. After being ordered deported based on is criminal record, efforts to deport Kestutis Zadvydas failed. When he remained in custody after the removal period expired, Zadvydas filed a habeas action. In granting the writ, the District Court reasoned that his confinement would be permanent and thus violate the Constitution. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Zadvydas' detention did not violate the Constitution because eventual deportation was not impossible. Conversely, in ordering Kim Ho Ma's release, the District Court held that the Constitution forbids post-removal-period detention unless there is a realistic chance that an alien will be removed, and that no such chance existed here because Cambodia has no repatriation treaty with the United States. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that detention was not authorized for more than a reasonable time beyond the 90-day period.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "the statute, read in light of the Constitution's demands, limits an alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States" and "does not permit indefinite detention." "Based on our conclusion that indefinite detention of aliens in the former category would raise serious constitutional concerns, we construe the statute to contain an implicit 'reasonable time' limitation, the application of which is subject to federal court review," wrote Justice Breyer.


Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett

After Patricia Garrett, Director of Nursing for the University of Alabama in Birmingham, was diagnosed with breast cancer, her treatment forced her to take a substantial leave from work. Upon her return, her supervisor informed her she would have to give up her position. Milton Ash, a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services, who suffers from chronic asthma, requested that his employer modify his duties to accommodate him. Ultimately, none of Ash's requested relief was granted and his job performance evaluations fell. Both Garrett and Ash filed discrimination suits against their Alabama state employers, seeking money damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits the States and other employers from "discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of that disability... in regard to... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." The District Court disposed of both cases by ruling that the ADA exceeds Congress' authority to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages by reason of the state's failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Chief Justice wrote for the majority that "in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation." Rehnquist added that none of these requirements had been met. Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Stephen G. Breyer's dissent.


Department of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Association

The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) administers the Klamath Irrigation Project (Project), which uses water from the Klamath River Basin to irrigate parts of Oregon and California. In order for the Department to provide water allocations among competing uses and users, it asked the Klamath and other Indian Tribes (Basin Tribes or Tribes) to consult with Reclamation. A memorandum of understanding solidified this relationship. When the Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs (Bureau) filed claims on behalf of the Klamath Tribe in Oregon to allocate water rights, the two exchanged written memorandums on the appropriate scope of the claims submitted by the Government for the benefit of the Tribe. Afterwards, the Klamath Water Users Protective Association (Association), a nonprofit group, whose members receive water from the Project and, generally, have interests adverse to the tribal interest because of the scarcity of water, filed requests with the Bureau under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to gain access to communications between the Bureau and the Basin Tribes. Some documents were turned over, but the Bureau held other documents under the deliberative process privileges incorporated in FOIA Exemption 5, which exempts from disclosure "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." The Association sued to compel release of the documents. The District Court granted the government summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled out any application of Exemption 5 on the ground that the Tribes with whom the Department has a consulting relationship have a direct interest in the subject matter of the consultations.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court that there is no exemption under FOIA for the correspondence between the Tribes and the Bureau. Because the Klamath Tribe advocated its own positions in the water allocation proceedings, the communications between it and the Bureau did not equate to the role that personnel fulfils, in that personnel do not represent their own interests. Therefore, the documents were not exempt from public disclosure as inter-agency or intra-agency communications. "All of this boils down to requesting that we read an 'Indian trust' exemption into the statute, a reading that is out of the question," wrote Justice Souter for the Court.


Buckman Company v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) regulate medical devices. Under the MDA, Class III devices "present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury" and thus require the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) strictest regulation. In 1985, after a previously failed attempt, the AcroMed Corporation sought approval for its orthopedic bone screw device, a Class III device, for use in spinal surgery with the assistance of Buckman Company, a regulatory consultant to medical device manufacturers. The FDA also denied the second application. On the third attempt, instead of trying to show the bone screw device was "substantially equivalent" to similar devices already on the market and thus as safe and effective, AcroMed and Buckman split the device into its component parts, renamed them, and altered the intended use of the parts. Thus, the FDA approved the component devices for long bone surgery. Subsequently, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has directed over 2,300 civil actions related to these medical devices to the Federal District Court. Many actions claim, under state tort law, that AcroMed and Buckman made fraudulent representations to the FDA as to the intended use of the bone screws and that, as a result, the devices were improperly given market clearance, which injured the plaintiffs. The District Court dismissed the fraud claims as pre-empted by the MDA. The Court of Appeals reversed.

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Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the plaintiffs' state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflicted with, and were therefore pre-empted by, the FDCA, as amended by the MDA. "The conflict," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist for the Court, "stems from the fact that the federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud against the Agency, and that this authority is used by the Agency to achieve a somewhat delicate balance of statutory objectives. The balance sought by the Agency can be skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims under state tort law." Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the "FDA...has at its disposal a variety of enforcement options that allow it to make a measured response to suspected fraud upon the Agency." Justices John Paul Stevens and Clarence Thomas concurred.


In the wake of U.S Term Limits v. Thornton, Missouri voters adopted an amendment to Article VIII of their State Constitution, which "instructs" each Member of Missouri's congressional delegation "to use all of his or her delegated powers to pass the Congressional Term Limits Amendment" set forth in section 16 of the Article. The Article also directs the Missouri Secretary of State to determine whether a statement reflecting a candidate's position on term limits should be placed by his or her name on the general election ballot. Don Gralike, a non-incumbent House of Representatives candidate, brought suit to enjoin the Secretary from implementing the Article. The District Court, granting Gralike summary judgment, found that Article VIII infringed upon the Qualifications Clauses of Article I of the Federal Constitution by creating additional qualifications for Congress and that the Article burdened a candidate's First Amendment right to speak freely on the issue of term limits. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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No. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that Article VIII of the Missouri Constitution, which required the placement of negative labels next to state candidates for federal office, who failed to comply with voter-mandated support of federal term limits, was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate electoral outcomes, rather than a permissible regulation of state elections. Justice Stevens explained for the Court that Article VIII is designed to favor candidates who are willing to support a term-limits amendment and, "[t]hus, far from regulating the procedural mechanisms of elections, Article VIII attempts to 'dictate electoral outcomes.' Such 'regulation' of congressional elections simply is not authorized by the Elections Clause."


In 1995, Saint Clair Adams, who was hired as a sales counselor, signed an employment application with Circuit City. A provision in Adams' application required all employment disputes to be settled by arbitration. In 1997, Adams filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Circuit City in California state court. Circuit City then filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the state-court action and to compel arbitration of Adams' claims under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The District Court entered the requested order. The court concluded that Adams was obligated by the arbitration agreement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the arbitration agreement between Adams and Circuit City was contained in a "contract of employment," and thus not subject to the FAA under section 1 of the Act. Section 1 of the FAA excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" from the Act's coverage.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that section 1 exemption is confined to transportation workers. "The wording of [section 1] calls for the application of the maxim ejusdem generis, the statutory canon that 'where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words,'" wrote Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy continued that "[u]nder this rule of construction the residual clause should be read to give effect to the terms 'seamen' and 'railroad employees,' and should itself be controlled and defined by reference to the enumerated categories of workers which are recited just before it; the interpretation of the clause pressed by respondent fails to produce these results." Therefore, section 1 "exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers."


The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires a prisoner to exhaust "such administrative remedies as are available" before suing over prison conditions. Timothy Booth, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, Pennsylvania, initiated a suit in District Court, claiming that corrections officers violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in various ways. Booth sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages. At the time of Booth's suit, Pennsylvania provided an administrative grievance and appeals system, which addressed Booth's complaints but had no provision for recovery of money damages. After the prison authority denied his administrative grievance, Booth did not seek administrative review. Subsequently, the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Booth's argument that the exhaustion requirement was inapplicable because the administrative process could not award him the monetary relief he sought (At this point, Booth was only seeking money).

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that even though the prison grievance procedure did not provide for requested monetary relief, Booth was nonetheless required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit with respect to prison conditions. Justice Souter wrote for the Court, "we think that Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly enough, regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures."


Washington State's Community Protection Act of 1990 (Act) authorizes the civil commitment of "sexually violent predators," or persons who suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes them likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. After his imprisonment for committing six rapes, Andre Brigham Young was scheduled to be released from prison in 1990. Prior to his release, the state successfully filed a petition to commit Young as a sexually violent predator. Ultimately, Young instituted a federal habeas action. Initially, the District Court granted the writ, finding that the Act was criminal rather than civil, and that it violated the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees of the Constitution. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court denied Young's petition. The court determined that the Act was civil and, therefore, it could not violate the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the case turned on whether the Act was punitive "as applied" to Young.

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No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because the Washington Community Protection Act of 1990 had been found to be civil, it could not be deemed punitive as applied to Young for the purposes of double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges. Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority that an "as-applied" analysis would be "unworkable" because it would "never conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a final determination of the scheme's validity under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.


Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board

The 2000 presidential election remained in limbo with the outcome dependent on the winner of the popular vote in Florida. Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush held a slim lead in the tally. Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore challenged the decision of Florida's Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, to certify the results of the presidential election on November 14, the deadline provided by Florida's election law. Gore also challenged Harris's decision to ignore the outcome of manual recounts his campaign had requested in four Florida counties, recounts available under another provision of Florida's election code. The Florida Supreme Court heard Gore's challenges and held that Harris could not certify the outcome until November 26. The Florida Supreme Court also held that Harris must include the results of manual recounts in the certified results. Governor Bush intervened. Harris and Bush appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.

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In a per curiam opinion, a unanimous court held that there was "considerable uncertainty" as to the reasons for the Florida Supreme Court's decision. Accordingly the court did not review the federal questions presented by the case. Instead it vacated the Florida Supreme Court's decision and remanded the case for clarification of two questions. One, did the Florida Supreme Court think that the Florida Constitution circumscribed the plenary power of the Florida Legislature in election matters conferred by the US Constitution? And two, how much weight did the Florida Supreme Court give to 3 USC Section 5?


28 USC section 2244(d)(2) provides that the "time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection." In 1996, Sherman Walker filed a federal habeas petition under section 2254. The District Court dismissed the petition because it concluded that Walker had not exhausted available state remedies. In 1997, without returning to state court, Walker filed another federal habeas petition. Th District Court dismissed the petition because it had not been filed within a reasonable time from the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's effective date. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Walker's first federal habeas petition was an application for "other collateral review" that tolled the limitation period under section 2244(d)(2) and made his current petition timely.

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No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that an federal habeas corpus petition is not an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" within the meaning of 28 USC section 2244(d)(2). "Section 2244(d)(2) therefore did not toll the limitation period during the pendency of [Walker's] first federal habeas petition," wrote Justice O'Connor. "[I]f the statute were construed so as to give applications for federal review the same tolling effect as applications for state collateral review, then [section] 2244(d)(2) would furnish little incentive for individuals to seek relief from the state courts before filing federal habeas petitions," concluded Justice O'Connor.


Various freelance authors wrote articles for various print publishers. The publishers treated the authors as independent contractors under contracts. The publishers each licensed rights to copy and sell articles to LEXIS/NEXIS, owner and operator of a computerized database containing articles in text-only format. NEXIS does not reproduce the print publication's formatting. The authors filed suit alleging that their copyrights were infringed when the print publishers placed their articles in the electronic publishers' databases, such as LEXIS/NEXIS. In response, the print and electronic publishers raised the privilege accorded collective work copyright owners by section 201(c) of the Copyright Act. In granting the publishers summary judgment, the District Court held that the electronic databases reproduced and distributed the authors' works, under section 201(c), "as part of...[a] revision of that collective work" to which the authors had first contributed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the databases were not among the collective works covered by section 201(c), and specifically, were not "revisions" of the periodicals in which the Articles first appeared.

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Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that section 201(c) does not authorize the copying at issue. "The publishers are not sheltered by [section 201(c)], we conclude, because the databases reproduce and distribute articles standing alone and not in context, not 'as part of that particular collective work' to which the author contributed, 'as part of...any revision' thereof, or 'as part of...any later collective work in the same series.' Both the print publishers and the electronic publishers, we rule, have infringed the copyrights of the freelance authors," wrote Justice Ginsburg. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, argued that "[e]ach individual file still reminds the reader that he is viewing 'part of' a particular collective work. And the entire editorial content of that work still exists at the reader's fingertips."


Lackawanna County District Attorney  v. Coss

In 1986, after being convicted for simple assault, institutional vandalism, and criminal mischief, Edward R. Coss, Jr., filed a petition for relief, but the Pennsylvania courts never ruled on the petition. In 1990, after he had served the full sentences for his 1986 convictions, Coss was convicted of aggravated assault. Ultimately, the sentencing court did not consider Coss' 1986 convictions in determining his eligible sentencing range. In choosing a sentence within the applicable range, the court considered several factors including Coss' extensive criminal record, making reference to his 1986 convictions. Coss then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his 1986 convictions were constitutionally invalid. The Federal District Court denied the petition reasoning that Coss had not been prejudiced by his 1986 counsel's ineffectiveness. The Court of Appeals found that Coss would not have been convicted in 1986 but for the ineffective assistance. The court remanded the case ordering a retrial or resentencing without consideration of the 1986 conviction.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that "once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a [federal habeas petition] on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained." Justice David H. Souter filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion.


While officers were investigating marijuana sales at Florida home, Robert Thomas drove up to the house. An officer asked Thomas for his name and driver license. Thomas was arrested when a search on his license revealed an outstanding warrant. After taking Thomas inside the house, the officer searched Thomas' car and found methamphetamine. Subsequently, the trial court granted Thomas' motion to suppress. In reversing, the appellate found the search valid under New York v. Belton. In New York v. Belton, the U.S. Supreme Court established a "bright-line" rule permitting an officer who has made a lawful custodial arrest of a car's occupant to search the car's passenger compartment as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest. In reversing, the Florida Supreme Court held Belton did not apply because it is limited to situations where the officer initiates contact with a vehicle's occupant while that person remains in the vehicle.

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In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Florida Supreme Court's decision did not fit any of the categories where the Court "treated state-court judgments as final for jurisdictional purposes although there were further proceedings to take place in the state court." Thus, the Court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court's decision was not final.


United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Company

Under a grievance settlement agreement, the Cleveland Indians Baseball Company owed 8 players backpay for wages due in 1986 and 14 players backpay for wages due in 1987. The Company paid all of the back wages in 1994. No award recipient was a Company employee in that year. The Company also paid its share of employment taxes on the back wages according to 1994 tax rates and wage bases. The payments were subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and taxes on wages to fund unemployment benefits under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). Both tax rates and the amount of the wages subject to tax have risen over time. After the Internal Revenue Service denied the Company's claims for a refund of the payments, the Company initiated suit in Federal District Court. The court, bound by precedent, ordered the Government to refund FICA and FUTA taxes. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that back wages are subject to FICA and FUTA taxes by reference to the year the wages are in fact paid. "Although the regulations, like the statute, do not specifically address backpay, the Internal Revenue Service has consistently interpreted them to require taxation of back wages according to the year the wages are actually paid, regardless of when those wages were earned or should have been paid," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.


Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) selected an abandoned sand and gravel pit as a solid waste disposal site. Excavation trenches on the site had previously become ponds for migrating birds. Because some trenches would have to be filled in, the SWANCC contacted the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to determine if a landfill permit was required under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorizes the Corps to issue permits allowing the discharge of dredged or fill material into "navigable waters." Under the CWA, "navigable waters" are defined as "the waters of the United States" and the Corps regulations define such waters to include intrastate waters, of which damage could affect interstate commerce. Subsequently, the Corps denied the SWANCC a permit. The District Court found the Corps had jurisdiction over the site. The Court of Appeals held that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate waters.

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No and unanswered. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the provision of the CWA, which requires those discharging fill material into navigable waters to obtain a permit from the Corps, does not extend to isolated, abandoned sand and gravel pits with seasonal ponds, which provide migratory bird habitats. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that "[t]he term 'navigable' has...the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made." In answering the first question no, the Court did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent was joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.


The Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. Members of the tobacco industry filed suit challenging the regulations. Lorillard Tobacco Company and others asserted that under the Supremacy Clause the cigarette advertising regulations were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), which prescribes mandatory health warnings for cigarette packaging and advertising and that the regulations violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings that the cigarette advertising regulations are not pre-empted by the FCLAA and that neither the regulations prohibiting outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground nor the sales practices regulations restricting the location and distribution of tobacco products violated the First Amendment. Reversing the lower court's finding, the appellate court found that the point-of-sale advertising regulations requiring that indoor advertising be placed no lower than five feet from the floor were valid.

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Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the highly fractured Court held that the FCLAA preempts Massachusetts' regulations governing outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette advertising and that Massachusetts' outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations related to smokeless tobacco and cigars violate the First Amendment, but that the sales practices regulations related to all three tobacco products are constitutional. "We conclude that the Attorney General has failed to show that the outdoor advertising regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars are not more extensive than necessary to advance the State's substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use," wrote Justice O'Connor.


District of Columbia v. Tri County Industries, Inc.

Using a 1993 building permit issued by the District of Columbia, Tri County Industries, Inc. spent nearly $600,000 readying a site for a "soil remediation" facility, which would decontaminate soil tainted by hazardous wastes. After protests and a dispute over whether the company was violating its permit by storing contaminated soil on the site, the city issued a stop-work order. Tri County filed suit against the District of Columbia for suspending its building permit on the facility claiming its due process rights had been violated. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reinstated a 1998 jury's $5 million award. The appellate court rule that the District Court should have conducted a "more searching inquiry" than it had to preserve the Seventh Amendment right to jury trials in civil cases. The appellate court normally applies a "abuse of discretion" standard. Under the "more searching inquiry," the appellate court discounted the reasons the district judge had cited in ordering a new trial.

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In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The dismissal had the effect of leaving in place the ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that new-trial grants demand a "more searching inquiry" than the usual abuse-of-discretion review and reinstating the appellate court's decision that upheld the first jury's verdict that awarded Tri County $5 million in damages.


Dale G. Becker, an Ohio prisoner, instituted a pro se civil rights action to contest the conditions of his confinement. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Becker's complaint. In appealing, Becker, still pro se, filed his notice of appeal using a government-printed form, on which he filled in all of the required information. On the line labeled "Counsel for Appellant" Becker typed, but did not sign, his name. The form contained no indication of a signature requirement. The District Court docketed the notice, sent a copy to the Court of Appeals, and granted Becker leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, after notifying Becker that the court would not hold him to the same standards it required of attorneys in stating his case, dismissed the appeal on its own motion. The court held that the notice of appeal was fatally defective because it was not signed.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that when a party files a timely notice of appeal in district court, the failure to sign the notice does not require the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "if the notice is timely filed and adequate in other respects, jurisdiction will vest in the court of appeals, where the case may proceed so long as the appellant promptly supplies the signature once the omission is called to his attention."


While incarcerated in Montana State Prison, Kevin Murphy sent a letter to an inmate to assist him with his defense after he assaulted a correctional officer. In accordance with prison policy, the letter was intercepted. Based on the letter's content, the prison sanctioned Murphy for violating prison rules prohibiting insolence and interfering with due process hearings. Murphy sought relief, alleging that the disciplinary action violated his First Amendment rights, including the right to provide legal assistance to other inmates. Ruling against Murphy, the District Court, based on precedent, found that reasonably related penological interests allowed the prison regulations to impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that an inmate's First Amendment right to give legal assistance to other inmates outweighed the government's interests.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that inmates do not possess a special First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates that enhances the protections otherwise available. "Augmenting First Amendment protection for inmate legal advice would undermine prison officials' ability to address the 'complex and intractable' problems of prison administration," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Thomas added that "[p]risoners have used legal correspondence as a means for passing contraband and communicating instructions on how to manufacture drugs or weapons." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also wrote a concurring opinion.