Anthony Cooper was convicted of shooting a woman in the thigh and buttocks after missing a shot to her head. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned the conviction after Cooper claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. His lawyer told him not to take a plea offer, thinking that there could not be a finding that Cooper intended to murder his victim. But Cooper was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other charges. The appeals court said the incorrect advice equals unconstitutional ineffective assistance and ordered Cooper released. But Michigan officials argue that Cooper got a fair trial and that the verdict should not be thrown out because of his lawyer's mistake.

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Yes. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the majority opinion, vacating the Sixth Circuit judgment and returning the case for reconsderation. The Court held that the Michigan court applied the wrong standard when it rejected Cooper's claim to ineffective assistance of counsel. The proper test under Strickland v Washington is whether, absent the ineffective counsel, a defendant would have accepted an offered plea that was less severe than his eventual sentence, and the trial court would have accepted the terms of that plea. The majority also held that the proper remedy is not specific performance of the original plea. On remand, the prosecution should re-offer the plea and, if the defendant accepts it, the trial court can decide how to amend the original sentence.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, stating that there is no right to habeas relief when counsel's advice caused a defendant to have a full and fair trial. A criminal defendant has no right to a plea bargain, so rejecting the plea did not deprive Cooper of any procedural right. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the Scalia dissent. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. joined in the dissent except for Justice Scalia's assertions that the majority's decision elevates the plea bargain to a constitutional right. Justice Samuel A. Alito wrote a separate dissent criticizing the majority's "opaque discussion of the remedy...."


In 2004, the Federal Communications Commission said that TV stations could be fined for indecency violations in cases when a vulgarity was broadcast during a live program. That happened on Fox in 2002 and 2003 when Cher and Nicole Richie cursed during award shows and were not bleeped.
 The FCC never actually fined Fox, but the network took issue with the regulatory agency setting the stage for future fines and challenged the fleeting-expletive rules. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the FCC's rules were "unconstitutionally vague" and had a "chilling effect."

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Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for seven members of the court, vacated the lower judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held that the FCC's standards, as applied to the broadcasts in this case, were vague. The FCC did not give proper notice to broadcasters that they would be fined for fleeting expletives, so the practice violated due process. However, Justice Kennedy carefully noted that the Court did not decide whether the practice violated the First Amendment or that the indecency policy itself was unconstitutional. Only the way the policy was applied in this case was unconstitutionally vague. The FCC is free to modify its policy in light of this decision.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, stating her belief that FCC v. Pacifica was wrong when it was decided. Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.


In 1975, the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (ISDA) became law. Among other things, the ISDA directs the Secretary of the Interior, at the request of any Indian tribe, to enter into contracts which permit tribal organization to administer federal programs that would otherwise be directly administered by the Secretary. The ISDA further requires the Secretary to pay the tribe's reasonable contract support costs, or the costs that the tribe would incur operating the program that the Secretary would not incur. The payment of these costs was made subject to the availability of appropriations, and Congress had imposed a statutory cap on the appropriations available to pay such costs.
Ramah Navajo Chapter entered into multiple ISDA contracts for the administration a number of federally funded programs. The Ramah Navajo Chapter originally filed suit against the Secretary in 1990 on behalf of all BIA tribal contractors under the ISDA to challenge the methodology that Interior's Office of the Inspector General used to set indirect cost rates. In 1999 the district court granted the plaintiffs leave to add a new claim for the alleged underpayment of contract support costs due to insufficient appropriations. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court eventually granted summary judgment for the government, rejecting tribal demands for contract support costs in excess of the express statutory caps on the funds available to pay such costs.
The tribes appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed. The appeals court held that the government could be required to pay all of the contract support costs requested by every tribal contractor, even in excess of the statutory cap, because Congress appropriated sufficient funds to satisfy the demands of any single contractor considered in isolation. The government appealed the appellate court's decision.

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Yes. In a 5-4 majority opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor affirmed the Tenth Circuit decision. Despite the statutory cap within the ISDA, the government must pay each tribe's support costs in full. The Court stressed that the government's contractual obligation under the ISDA should be treated like any other contract. Even if a particular agency exhausts legally available funds that were originally appropriated to satisfy a particular contract, the government is still obligated to fulfill its entire financial obligation within the contract. The tribe was entitled to rely on the government's promise of payment, rather than run the risk that the ISDA lump-sum appropriation may not cover the full cost of all contracts.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. dissented, focusing on the current restrictions on governmental payment of support costs. Once the allocated funds were appropriated to the specific ISDA contracts, the money in the broader pool of funds became unavailable, relieving the government of any further contractual obligation. Since the situation in this case is hardly a typical government contracts case, it should not be resolved using typical contract principles. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


On August 5, 2008, Joel Perez and Carlos Cruz drove to a Shell station in Arlington Heights, Illinois, with Cruz at the wheel. They met with Alejandro Diaz, who was working with Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") officials. Diaz instructed them to meet him at a different location to complete the deal. Instead, Perez walked to a nearby Denny's, where Alexander Vasquez waited for him in the driver's seat of a black Pontiac Bonneville. Perez got into the passenger seat of the Bonneville and called Cruz, telling him that he was not willing to follow Diaz. Cruz walked to the Denny's where he was introduced to Vasquez. Diaz called Cruz to ask why they were not following him. Cruz informed him that they wanted to complete the deal in the Denny's parking lot, telling him, "We got the money here." Vasquez echoed this statement.
Diaz contacted his DEA handler, Agent James Chupik. Law enforcement agents surrounded the parking lot in their vehicles; several officers approached the Bonneville to arrest Vasquez, Cruz, and Perez. Cruz, outside the car, raised his hands in surrender. Vasquez, however, immediately put the Bonneville into reverse, striking two squad cars. He then shifted gears and headed for an agent. Agent Chupik stepped in front of the Bonneville and commanded Vasquez to stop, but was forced to dive out of the way. The Bonneville headed west on the eastbound lanes of Algonquin Road.
Several minutes later, police found the Bonneville abandoned in a Walmart parking lot. A bystander told the police that he saw two men run from the vehicle into a McDonald's. Vasquez and Perez ran into the McDonald's, through its kitchen, then split up. Arlington Heights police officers quickly apprehended them, however. They found a cell phone on Vasquez and several cell phones on the ground near Perez; records indicated several calls between Vasquez's cell phone and both phones apparently belonging to Perez. Police impounded the Bonneville, and later found $23,000 in cash hidden in a secret compartment.
A federal grand jury indicted Vasquez with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and with attempting to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. At trial, Agent Chupik testified that he instructed Diaz to have Cruz and his "customers" meet Diaz at a gas station in Arlington Heights. In a transcript of the call between Cruz and Diaz, however, Cruz only referred to a single customer. Vasquez's counsel attempted to impeach Agent Chupik on this point, but the judge found the difference to be trivial, limiting Vasquez's right to cross-examination and to refresh Agent Chupik's memory with the transcript. The government introduced Vasquez's previous drug conviction into evidence to demonstrate Vasquez's intent; he was convicted for dealing drugs with Perez in 2002.
Vasquez called Perez's wife Marina as a witness to testify. Marina Perez testified that she called Vasquez before the events in question to ask him to pick up Joel Perez at the site of the failed drug deal, implying that Vasquez was there by coincidence. In response, the government introduced transcripts and audio recordings of conversations between Marina Perez and her husband as evidence of bias. These indicated that Marina Perez spoke to her husband about a possible plea deal; Marina Perez also mentioned that Vasquez's attorney had told her that, "everybody is going to lose." The trial judge allowed these transcripts and recordings to be admitted to show Marina Perez's bias and for the truth of their contents.
The jury found Vasquez guilty on the charge of conspiracy but not guilty on the charge of attempting to possess cocaine.
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, held that Vasquez's previous drug conviction was properly introduced into evidence. The court rejected Vasquez's claim that the police's search of the Bonneville violated his Fourth Amendment rights, noting that Vasquez abandoned the car, and that the police had probable cause to believe that the money for the drug transaction was in the Bonneville. The court also rejected Vasquez's claim that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to elicit testimony through the cross-examination of Agent Chupik. The trial court found the distinction between "customers" and "customer" to be trivial, and the court held this finding to be within the trial court's discretion.
In a split decision, the court turned to the testimony of Marina Perez, holding that the evidence of conversations between Marina Perez and Vasquez's counsel were properly admitted to show bias and inconsistency with prior statements. While noting that the judge improperly instructed the jury that the recordings could be considered as evidence of the truthfulness of their contents, it held this instruction to be a harmless error. It pointed to other overwhelming evidence of Vasquez's guilt, including his attempt to escape capture and his previous conviction for drug dealing. It held that the jury would have convicted Vasquez absent the introduction of the transcripts and recordings in question.
Judge David Hamilton dissented on this point alone, describing the recordings as prejudicial and inadmissible. He reminded the majority that the error is only harmless if the court is convinced Vasquez would have been convicted absent the error. He used a different test than the majority, looking to whether or not the error contributed to the conviction. He noted that Vasquez was never directly recorded or mentioned by name in any of the recordings, and that government agents were not aware of his involvement until his arrest. Judge Hamilton argued that Marina Perez' testimony about Vasquez was thus plausible evidence of innocence without the recordings on record.

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Unanswered. After argument, the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted.


Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC

Cheryl Perich filed a lawsuit against the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Redford, Mich., for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act when they fired her after she became sick in 2004. After several months on disability, Perich was diagnosed and treated for narcolepsy and was able to return to work without restrictions. But she said the school at that point urged her to resign and, when she refused, fired her.
Perich filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which ruled in her favor and authorized a lawsuit against the school. Attorneys representing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School argued that the "ministerial exception" under the First Amendment should apply in their client's case. The exception gives religious institutions certain rights to control employment matters without interference from the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned that ruling and remanded the case back to the lower court for a full trial on the merits. The court held that Perich's role at the school was not religious in nature, and therefore the ministerial exception did not apply.

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Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that Perich was a minister for the purposes of the Civil Rights Act's ministerial exception, dismissing Perich's suit and her claims for damages. Chief Justice Roberts described the history of the "ministerial exception", established by courts to prevent state interference with the governance of churches, a violation of the First Amendment's establishment and free exercise clauses. He rejected the EEOC and Perich's argument that these clauses of the First Amendment are irrelevant to Hosanna-Tabor's right to choose its ministers.
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that Perich indeed functioned as a minister in her role at Hosanna-Tabor, in part because Hosanna-Tabor held her out as a minister with a role distinct from that of its lay teachers. He also noted that Perich held herself to be a minister by accepting the formal call to religious service required for her position. Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that Perich performed secular duties in her position and that lay teachers performed the same religious duties as Perich, but reasoned that Perich's status as a commissioned minister outweighed these secular aspects of her job. He also rejected the EEOC and Perich's suggestion that Hosanna-Tabor's religious reason for firing Perich was pretextual, explaining that the purpose of the ministerial exception is not limited to hiring and firing decisions made for religious reasons.


Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.

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No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg--writing for a 6-3 majority--reversed the lower court, holding that a determination of Vartelas' ability to travel abroad falls under the laws in effect at the time of his conviction. The Court applied the principle against retroactivity. Under this principle, courts will refrain from applying a law retroactively unless Congress expressly provides for it. The Court held that applying the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) imposed a new disability on Vartelas by effectively banning travel abroad. Vartelas also likely relied on the laws at the time, which would allow him brief international trips, when he decided to plead guilty.
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, stating that the applicable activity for deciding retroactivity is not Vartelas' conviction, but the act of leaving and then attempting to return to the United States. Vertelas' trip to Greece and return to the U.S. took place after the IIRIRA took effect, so he is subject to the law. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito joined in the dissent.


Michael Christopher and Frank Buchanan began working for GlaxoSmithKline LLC ("Glaxo") as pharmaceutical sales representatives ("PSRs") in 2003. Glaxo developed, produced, marketed and sold pharmaceutical products to distributors or retail pharmacies, which subsequently sell those products to consumers when authorized by doctors via prescription. The plaintiffs worked between ten and twenty hours outside of normal business hours each week. PSRs are compensated with a salary and additional incentive-based pay; they are not paid overtime for work done outside of standard business hours.
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") was enacted in 1938 to protect the well-being of workers. It imposed a baseline overtime wage on employers for employees who work over forty hours a week. There was an exception to the rule for "outside salesmen", defined by the Secretary of Labor ("Secretary") as an employee whose primary duty is making sales or obtaining contracts and who is primarily and regularly engaged outside of the employer's office. Christopher and Buchanan filed suit in August of 2008, alleging that Glaxo's practice of requiring overtime work without additional pay violated the FLSA's overtime provisions. Both parties filed for summary judgment, and the district court found for Glaxo, agreeing that the plaintiffs fell within the FLSA's "outside salesman" exception.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The Secretary filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Christopher and Buchanan's position, arguing that when a PSR promotes pharmaceutical products but does not receive items of value in exchange for those products, he does not fall within the "outside salesman" exception to the FLSA. The court rejected the Secretary's argument, however, reasoning that this definition is a simple parroting of the Congressional statute; such definitions require less deference by courts because they are not interpretive. Instead, the court pointed to Christopher and Buchanan's training in sales --and their experience in sales as a qualification for employment by Glaxo-- as evidence of their status as "outside salesmen." The court noted that the pharmaceutical industry self-regulated marketing to doctors much like other industries self-regulate direct-to-consumer marketing.

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No, Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that pharmaceutical sales representatives are "outside salesmen" under the FLSA. The Court did not defer to the Secretary's interpretation of the statute because it is directly contrary to the long held industry practice of treating PSRs as exempt. To follow the Secretary's interpretation now would unfairly burden the employers with liability for conduct that occurred long before the Secretary announced that interpretation. The text of the statute also supports the holding that PSRs are outside salesmen.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that PSRs do not actually sell anything because they merely obtain non-binding agreements from doctors to prescribe a certain drug when appropriate. If the PSRs do not make sales, then they cannot be outside salesmen under the FLSA. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


Plaintiffs Stephen R. Chandler and Robert L. Pierce were the sole shareholders of Home Oil and Coal Company, Inc. In 1999, Pierce contemplated selling his share of the business and sought professional advice in an effort to minimize tax liability generated by the sale of his interest in Home Oil. Each of the taxpayers initiated short sales of United States Treasury Bonds for $7,472,405. They then transferred the proceeds from that sale to Home Concrete as capital contributions. Home Concrete then closed the short sales by purchasing and returning essentially identical Treasury Bonds on the open market for $7,359,043. This transaction created "outside basis," or how much the partner's investment was worth according to tax rules, equal to the amount of the proceeds the taxpayers contributed.
Home Oil then transferred its assets to Home Concrete as a capital contribution. The taxpayers (except Home Oil) then transferred percentages of their partnership interests in Home Concrete to Home Oil as capital contributions. Home Concrete then sold substantially all of its assets to a third party purchaser for $10,623,348. The taxpayers timely filed their tax returns for 1999 in April 2000. Home Concrete elected to step-up its inside basis, or the amount that the partnership tax records compute for each partner, to equal the taxpayers' outside basis. Home Concrete again adjusted its inside basis to $10,527,250.53, including the amount of short sale proceeds earlier contributed by the taxpayers. As a result Home Concrete reported a $69,125.08 gain from the sale of its assets.
The IRS did not investigate until June 2003. As a result of their investigation, the IRS determined that the partnership was formed "solely for the purposes of tax avoidance by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its purported partners." On September 7, 2006 the IRS issued a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA), in which they decreased to zero the taxpayers' reported outside bases in Home Concrete. This substantially increased the taxpayers' taxable income. Plaintiff taxpayers brought action against Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seeking to recover the increase.
As a general matter, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has three years to assess additional tax if the agency believes that the taxpayer's return has understated the amount of tax owed. That period is extended to six years, however, if the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the taxpayer's return. During the trial the Treasury Department passed a regulation stating that the six-year period for assessing tax remains open for "all taxable years... that are the subject of any case pending before any court of competent jurisdiction... in which a decision had not become final." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and found in favor of the plaintiffs.

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No and no. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for a four-justice plurality, affirmed the Fourth Circuit decision. The Supreme Court held that Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner decides this case. It interpreted language almost identical to the statute in question. Also, the statutory history shows that Congress intended to exclude overstatements of basis from the extended statute of limitations period. A treasury regulation cannot change Colony's the interpretation of the statute.
Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed that Colony decides the case, but argued that the court should not have ruled on whether to give treasury regulations deference.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy dissented, arguing that the Treasury regulation only interpreted a statute that had no established meaning. He argued that courts should be open to new interpretations through regulations when Congress amends a statute. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky is a United States citizen born on October 17, 2002 in Jerusalem. In December 2002, Zivotofsky's mother filed an application for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and a United States passport for petitioner, listing his place of birth as "Jerusalem, Israel." United States diplomatic officials informed petitioner's mother that State Department policy required them to record "Jerusalem" as petitioner's place of birth, which is how petitioner's place of birth appears in the documents he received.
On his behalf, Zivotofsky's parents filed this suit against the Secretary of State seeking an order compelling the State Department to identify petitioner's place of birth as "Jerusalem, Israel" in the official documents. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the complaint after concluding that petitioner lacked standing, and that the complaint raised a nonjusticiable political question. United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that petitioner had standing and that a more complete record was needed on the foreign policy implications of recording "Israel" as Zivotofsky's place of birth.
On remand, the State Department explained, among other things, that in the present circumstances if "Israel" were to be recorded as the place of birth of a person born in Jerusalem, such "unilateral action" by the United States on one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians "would critically compromise" the United States' ability to help further the Middle East peace process. The district court again dismissed on political question grounds. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Zivotofsky's claim is foreclosed because it raises a nonjusticiable political question.

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No. In an 8-to-1 decision, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the Court vacating the judgment and remanding the case to the trial court for further consideration on the merits. Roberts argued that Zivotofsky's claim did not involve a political question and is thus justiciable. Resolution of Zivotofsky's claim would require the Judiciary to vindicate Zivotofsky's statutory rights, a matter within its competence to resolve. Reaching a decision is not simple, however. A full airing on the merits will frame the issues for further review.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stephen Breyer joined Part I of Justice Sonia Sotomayor's opinion. She wrote separately to emphasize that the inquiry required by the political question doctrine was more demanding than the majority suggested with its opinion.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. filed a special concurrence. He noted that determining the constitutionality of an Act of Congress could present a political question, but he did not think that the narrow issue before the court fell into that category of cases.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion. He wrote that a decision would touch upon several very sensitive foreign policy matters and that adjudication of the petitioner's claim would require the courts to answer a political question as defined by the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr.


Chantell and Mike Sackett own a half-acre lot in a residential area near Priest Lake, Idaho. In April and May of 2007, the Sacketts filled in about one-half acre of that property with dirt and rock in preparation for building a house. On November 26, 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued a compliance order against the Sacketts. The compliance order alleged that the parcel is a wetland subject to the Clean Water Act and that the Sacketts violated the CWA by filling in their property without first obtaining a permit. The order required the Sacketts to remove the fill material and restore the parcel to its original condition.
The Sacketts sought a hearing with the EPA to challenge the finding that the Parcel is subject to the CWA. The EPA did not grant the Sacketts a hearing and continued to assert CWA jurisdiction over the parcel. The Sacketts filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. They challenged the compliance order as (1) arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) issued without a hearing in violation of the Sacketts' procedural due process rights; and (3) issued on the basis of an "any information available" standard that is unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss, finding that the CWA precludes judicial review of compliance orders before EPA has started an enforcement action in federal court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.

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Yes. In a 9-0 decision, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the majority opinion holding that the EPA's compliance order is a final agency action, and there is no other remedy for the Sackett's other than judicial review. Justice Scalia rejected each of the government's arguments that the Clean Water Act precluded judicial review of compliance orders. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurrence, noting that the Court ruled only on whether the Sackett's can seek review of the EPA's authority to regulate their land, not whether they can challenge the specific terms of the compliance order. Justice Samuel A. Alito also concurred, stating that judicial review of compliance is better than nothing, but the only real solution is a clarification by Congress of the ambiguities in the Clean Water Act .


Pacific Operators Offshore v. Valladolid

Pacific Operations Offshore runs two offshore oil drilling platforms, the Hogan and the Houchin, both located more than three miles off the coast of California. Juan Valladolid worked for Pacific Operations as a roustabout, stationed primarily on the Hogan. He was killed, however, on the grounds of Pacific Operations's onshore oil-processing facility when he was crushed by a forklift. Following his death, his widow, Luisa, sought workers' compensation benefits under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA") and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). An administrative law judge denied Mrs. Valladolid's OCSLA claim on the grounds that her husband's injury had occurred outside the geographic site of the outer continental shelf. The judge denied the LHWCA claim on two grounds: (1) Valladolid was not engaged in maritime employment, and (2) he was not injured on a maritime situs. The Benefits Review Board upheld the judge's denial of the OCSLA benefits under the "situs-of-injury" test, and affirmed the denial of LHWCA benefits on the maritime situs ground.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, ruling that the OCSLA does not have a situs-of-injury requirement. The court of appeals held that Section 1333(b) extends Longshore Act coverage to workers injured on land where there is "a substantial nexus between the injury and extractive operations on the shelf." Two other circuits that have addressed the question have reached conflicting results.

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No. In a 9-0 decision, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court and remanding for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the "substantial nexus" test best represents the text of the OCSLA. The Court noted that persons injured on the Outer Continental Shelf would almost always satisfy this test. The outcome for persons injured in other locals, like Mr. Valladolid, would depend on the individual circumstances of the case. On remand the Valladolid's must show a significant causal link between Mr. Valladolid's death and Pacific's Outer Continental Shelf activities.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a special concurrence, stating that "substantial nexus" is just legalese with no established meaning. He felt this test would be impossible to apply. He would apply a proximate cause test, which has been defined by tort law. Justice Samuel Alito joined in the concurrence.


RadLAX Gateway Hotel v. Amalgamated Bank

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC., owned the Radisson Hotel at the Los Angeles International Airport as well as an adjacent parking structure. In November of 2007, RadLax sought to expand the Radisson Hotel. It therefore obtained a $142 million construction loan from the Longview Ultra Construction Loan Investment Fund, for which Amalgamated Bank served as trustee and administrative agent.
After taking out the loan, RadLAX was eventually forced to file voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Soon after, RadLax embarked on a campaign to sell the Radisson Hotel and adjacent parking structure.
On June 4, 2010, RadLAX filed a joint chapter 11 plan, which proposed the auction of substantially all of its assets and the distribution of proceeds to various creditors. The debtors specified that no secured creditor would be permitted to credit bid at the sale. Amalgamated Bank objected to the proposed bid procedures on the grounds that a sale of its collateral, free of liens, required the debtor to allow a lender to credit bid.
The Bankruptcy Court agreed with Amalgamated Bank and denied RadLax's proposal with regard to credit bids. The case was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. RadLAX subsequently appealed the appellate court's decision.

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No. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that RadLAX could not obtain confirmation of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that provided for the sale of its assets free from lien without permitting Amalgamated Bank to credit-bid at the sale. According to Justice Scalia, clause (ii) of § 1129(b)(2)(A) of the bankruptcy code specified that when property was sold free of lien, it was subject to Section 363(k) of the code. Section 363(k) in turn allowed the creditor to credit-bid at the sale, up to the amount of its claim.
Although RadLAX proposed to repay Amalgamated Bank with the proceeds of the sale, its plan to preclude Amalgamated Bank from credit-bidding at the sale violated the clear language of the act. Justice Scalia rejected RadLAX argument that clause (iii) allowed RadLAX's plan because the plan guaranteed Amalgamated Bank the indubitable equivalent of its claim. He concluded that the general language of clause (iii) did not control the specific matter dealt with in clause (ii). Justice Scalia also rejected RadLAX's argument that clause (ii) was not more specific than clause (iii) because (ii) provided procedural protections but (iii) provided substantive protections.
Justice Anthony Kennedy took no part in the consideration of the case.


The United States Census Bureau conducted a national census in 2010. In May and June of 2011, the Texas Legislature created a new electoral map based on changes in the state's population. Texas Governor Rick Perry signed the new map into law in July of 2011.
Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, either the Justice Department or a special three-judge district court must approve new electoral maps before state officials may enact the map. Texas officials submitted its map to the three-judge court in Washington. The Washington court determined that state officials had used improper standards with respect to two districts. It further held that a three-judge panel in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas must designate an interim redistricting plan for the 2012 election cycle.
The district court redrew 36 electoral districts. Governor Perry and other state officials appealed the district court's redistricting to the Supreme Court and requested that the Supreme Court stop the enactment of the lower court's new map. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and stopped the enactment of the lower court's new map until the Supreme Court could issue a further order on the matter.

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Maybe. In an unsigned, per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the interim maps and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that it was unclear whether the district court used the proper standards to create their interim plan. Portions of the district court's plan seemed to be based on State policy considerations, and portions had no relation to the outdated plan or the proposed plan. A district court may redraw districts, but it should look to the State's proposed plan and the policies surrounding it for guidance.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurrence, agreeing with the result, but stating that Section 5 is unconstitutional and should not be a prerequisite for approval of a redistricting plan. He would vacate the interim plans and remand only for consideration of the other issues.


On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.

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Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the Court of Appeals. Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny and are almost always invalid, except in rare and extreme circumstances. While categories of speech, such as defamation and true threats, present a grave and imminent threat, false statements alone do not present such a threat. Congress drafted the Stolen Valor Act too broadly, attempting to limit speech that could cause no harm. Criminal punishment for such speech is improper.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred, concluding that false statements of fact should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. However, as drafted, the Stolen Valor Act violates intermediate scrutiny because it applies to situations that are unlikely to cause harm. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the concurrence.
Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented. Congress could not draft the Stolen Valor Act more narrowly, while still preventing the substantial harm caused by false statements concerning military decoration. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


In 2007, the Freemans and two other couples, each secured a mortgage from Quicken Loans, an online mortgage lender. At the closing of the mortgage, Quicken charged the Freemans a "loan discount fee", and charged the other couples similar fees including a "loan origination fee" and a "loan processing fee". The three couples contended these fees were unearned fees in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).
In 2008, each couple filed suit separately in state court. Quicken removed the cases to a federal district court where the three cases were consolidated. Quicken moved for summary judgment, claiming that the claims were not actionable under RESPA because the fees were not split with another party. The district court noted a circuit split on the issue of whether RESPA did not apply where fees were not spit with another party. Nonetheless, the district court granted Quicken's motion. The couples appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's opinion. The appealed the Appeals Court's opinion.

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Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that a charge for settlement services must be divided between two or more people in order to be actionable under RESPA. The language of the statute is unambiguous and cannot be understood to cover the fee in this case. Use of the words "portion", "split", and "percentage" all lead to an understanding that a fee must be divided between two or more parties.


Juan Smith was convicted on five counts of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. The Louisiana state trial court, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and state Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for review. Smith contends that the Louisiana state courts reached this result only by disregarding established precedents regarding the suppression of material evidence favorable to a defendant and presentation of false or misleading evidence to a prosecutor in past Supreme Court cases, Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States and Napue v. Illinois.

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Yes and Yes. In an 8-1 decision Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion reversing Smith's conviction and remanding the case to the district court. The Supreme Court held that because the eyewitness testimony was the only evidence linking Smith to the murders, the witness' statements to the police were material to the jury's decision. The Court noted that contradictory statements will not always be material if there is enough other evidence to sustain confidence in the verdict. The Court found it unnecessary to consider other the undisclosed evidence Smith discovered.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent, stating that the Court should have considered the cumulative effect of all of the evidence. Justice Thomas felt that the undisclosed statements are not enough to establish a "reasonable probability" that the jury would change its verdict.


In April of 2001, the City of Indianapolis ("the city") sent a letter to property owners in the Northern Estates neighborhood informing them that their properties were part of the Brisbane/Manning Barrett Law Sanitary Sewers Project ("the project"). The project was designed to connect properties to the city sewer system, reducing or eliminating the use of septic tanks.
In July of 2004, the Indianapolis Board of Public Works ("the board") levied an assessment of $9,278 against each property subject to the project. Indianapolis offered each property owner the option of paying the assessment in its entirety or of paying in monthly installments, subject to an annual interest rate. The petitioners, Christine Armour and 30 other property owners ("property owners"), chose to pay the assessment in its entirety.
In 2005, the city abandoned the Barrett Law method of assessing owners' contributions in favor of the Septic Tank Elimination Program ("STEP"). As part of the transition to STEP, the board passed a measure forgiving all outstanding Barrett Law assessment balances owed as of November 1, 2005, including those assessed for the project. As a result, owners who chose to pay their assessment in monthly installments were forgiven from future payment. Owners who chose to pay their assessments in their entirety were given no reimbursement. The property owners requested compensation from the board in February of 2006 and were denied.
The property owners filed complaint against the city in July of 2007, alleging violation of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. All parties filed for summary judgment; the trial court granted the property owners' motion, and entered judgment against the city. On appeal, the property owners abandoned their due process claim, arguing that the city violated equal protection. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the city did not have a rational basis for only forgiving the debt of owners who chose to pay in installments. The Indiana Supreme Court granted the city's motion to transfer the case, vacating the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Justice Frank Sullivan, writing for a unanimous court, held that the city's tax policy survives rational basis review and does not violate equal protection. The city legitimately believed that 1) owners who fully paid their assessments were in a better financial position than those making monthly installments, 2) the benefits of simplifying funding for the sewer system outweighed the effort of continuing the previous taxation system and 3) the new taxation system would preserve city resources. He rejected the property owners' argument that they were a "class of one" --requiring heightened scrutiny of the city's action-- because the property owners were not singled out for discriminatory treatment.

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No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the Indiana court. The Supreme Court held that the distinction between homeowners who had paid the full amount and homeowners who had their balance forgiven had a rational relationship to the legitimate interest of reducing administrative costs. The Court used rational basis review because the classification between homeowners was not suspect and did not involve a fundamental right.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. dissented, writing that the extreme disparity in tax burdens between homeowners violated the equal protection clause under rational basis review. While administrative costs can play a role, they do not justify charging some taxpayers 30 times what other similarly situated taxpayers paid. Indianapolis even provided detailed records of how much each homeowner overpaid, so the only administrative cost would be cutting checks and mailing them to the homeowners. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


In 1999, shortly after Robert and Karen Capato were married in New Jersey, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer, and was advised that chemotherapy might render him sterile. Before beginning treatment, Robert deposited semen at the Northwest Center for Infertility and Reproductive Endocrinology so the couple could conceive a child in the future. Karen Capato conceived a child naturally, however, giving birth to a son in August of 2001. The Capatos wanted their son to have a sibling, but Robert's health deteriorated quickly, and he died in Florida in March of 2002. He was insured by social security when he died. His will named only his son and two children from a previous marriage as beneficiaries.
Shortly after Robert's death, Karen began treatment for in vitro fertilization using her husband's frozen semen. She gave birth to twins on September 23, 2003, eighteen months after her husband's death. In October 2003, Karen applied for benefits from the Social Security Administration on behalf of her twins. § 416(e) of the Social Security Act ("SSA") defined "child" as "the child or legally adopted child of an individual". In addition, the child must be dependent on an insured individual at the time of the qualified individual's death. § 416(h) provided an alternate method of determining a child's qualification, directing the Commissioner of Social Security to look to the intestate property laws of the domiciliary of the deceased insured individual.
The Social Security Administration denied her claim, and Karen requested a hearing in front of an administrative court. While noting that granting benefits would be consistent with the purpose of social security, the court held that the twins were not Robert's "child(ren)" for the purposes of the SSA. The district court affirmed, echoing the ALJ's interpretation of "child(ren)". The court also held that because Robert died while domiciled in Florida, Florida's law of intestacy applies. The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, held that the twins were clearly children under § 416(e) of the SSA because they were the biological children of a married couple. It rejected the district court's argument that Florida state intestacy law should apply before § 416(e), holding § 416(h) to be an alternate definition only used when a child's status is in doubt.

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No. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the Social Security Administration's denial of benefits to the Capato twins was a permissible interpretation of the Social Security Act. Justice Ginsburg rejected the Third Circuit's conclusion that § 416(h) was only relevant for determining the status of an applicant if that applicant was not clearly a child or legally adopted child of an insured individual under § 416(e). She argued that the sparse definition in § 416(e) was not enough to show that congress only intended "child" to mean the child of married parents. Capato's offered dictionary definitions were broader than this definition, and other contemporary statutes specifically differentiated between "children" and children who were specifically the biological offspring of married parents.
Justice Ginsburg also pointed out that there was no such thing as a scientifically proven biological relationship when the act was passed in 1939, that a biological parent was not necessarily a child's legal parent, and that marriage does not necessarily make the legal status of a child certain. Further, it was not absolutely clear that the Capato twins fell under Capato's interpretation of § 416(e) because under Florida law a marriage ended upon the death of a spouse.
Justice Ginsburg also noted that § 416(h) instructed the Commissioner to look to state intestacy law in determining the status of a child for the purposes of Title II; placing similar language in § 416(e) would be redundant. She also pointed out that the core purpose of the legislation was not to help needy people but to provide members of a wage earner's family with protection against the hardship caused by the loss of that wage earner's earnings. State intestacy law specified which children were likely dependant on those earnings.
Justice Ginsburg also rejected Capato's argument that the SSA's interpretation was a violation of the fourteen amendment's due process clause. Here, the SSA's interpretation was only subject to rational-basis review because the Capato twins did not share any of the characteristics that prompted the Court's skepticism towards other classifications involving the children of unwed parents. Justice Ginsburg finally concluded that the SSA's interpretation was reasonable, overruling the Third Circuit's holding.


A jury found Randall Fields guilty of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for the sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old child. Fields was in jail on a disorderly charge when Lenawee County, Michigan deputies questioned him about allegations of sex with a minor. The sex case was unrelated to the one Fields was in jail for at the time.
Fields filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals claiming that his statements were inadmissible because he had not been given his Miranda warnings before questioning. The state court reasoned that because Fields was free to return to the jail and was questioned on a matter unrelated to his incarceration, there was no obligation to provide him warnings under Miranda.
Fields then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated, and the U.S. District Court agreed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

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Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the Court reversing the lower court's decision. The Court stated that there was not yet any clearly established rule regarding what constituted Miranda custody. Mere imprisonment and private questioning about events in the outside world were not sufficient to create a custodial situation for Miranda purposes. Furthermore, the prisoner in this case was not in custody under Miranda because he was told at the outset of the interrogation that he could leave and go back to his cell whenever he wanted and because he was not physically restrained.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Ginsburg agreed that what constituted custody was not clearly established in Fields' favor. However, the justice disagreed with the Court's determination that Fields was not in custody because Fields was subjected to incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere, was placed in an inherently stressful situation against his will, and had his freedom of action curtailed in a significant way.


National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius

Amid intense public interest, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became effective March 23, 2010. The ACA sought to address the fact that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay.
The ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees.
Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown.
The plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty.
The District Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. It determined that Brown had standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because she did not have health insurance and had to make financial arrangements to ensure compliance with the provision, which would go into effect in 2014. The court further determined that Idaho and Utah had standing because each state had enacted a statute purporting to exempt their residents from the minimum coverage provision.
The court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit.
The District Court then addressed the constitutional questions. It ruled that the individual mandate provision was not a valid exercise of Congress' commerce or taxing powers. The court held the entire act invalid because the mandate could not be severed from any other provision. The court dismissed the states' challenge to the employer mandates and granted judgment to the federal government on the Medicaid expansions, finding insufficient support for the contention that the spending legislation was unconstitutionally coercive.
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 2-to-1 the District Court's holdings as to the Medicaid expansions and the individual mandate. But it also reversed the District Court, holding that the individual mandate could be severed without invalidating the remainder of the ACA.

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No; Yes, under the Taxing and Spending Clause; Unanswered; Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., largely joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, authored the majority opinion. The Court reached the following conclusions:
The justices unanimously agreed that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. Congress did not intend that the payment for non-compliance with the Individual Mandate be a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that the Individual Mandate penalty is a tax for the purposes of the Constitution's Taxing and Spending Clause and is a valid exercise of Congressional authority. The payment is not so severe as to be coercive, is not limited to willful violations like fines for unlawful acts, and is collected by the Internal Revenue Service by normal means.
As part of a jointly written dissenting opinion, Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito disagreed, arguing that because Congress characterized the payment as a penalty, to instead characterize it as a tax would amount to rewriting the Act.
Chief Justice Roberts, with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, concluded that the Individual Mandate was not a valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce. The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate existing commercial activity, but not to compel individuals to participate in commerce. This would open a new realm of Congressional authority.
Justice Ginsburg, as part of an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan disagreed with this conclusion, arguing that the Chief Justice's distinction between economic "activity" and "Inactivity" is ill-defined and unsupported by either the Court's precedents or the text of the Constitution. Furthermore, even if the distinction were permissible, individuals who fail to purchase insurance nonetheless frequently participate in the healthcare marketplace, substantially impacting healthcare commerce, and may therefore be regulated by Congress.
Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent, added that the "substantial effects test" has encouraged Congress to push the limits of its power.
The majority did not address the serverability question after concluding that the Individual Mandate was constitutional.
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito argued that the Individual Mandate and Medicaid expansion are inserverable, and that the entirety of the ACA is therefore unconstitutional. The provisions of the Act, they argue, are "closely interrelated," with the two unconstitutional provisions serving as "pillars."
Chief Justice Roberts, with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan, concluded that the Medicaid expansion provisions was unconstitutionally coercive as written. Congress does not have authority under the Spending Clause to threaten the states with complete loss of Federal funding of Medicaid, if the states refuse to comply with the expansion.
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor disagreed, arguing, "Congress' authority to condition the use of federal funds is not confined to spending programs as first launched. The legislature may, and often does, amend the law."
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that the remainder of the Medicaid expansion provision, without the unconstitutional threat to completely withdraw Medicaid funding, could stand as a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Spending Clause.
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito argued that the Court does not have the power to remedy the unconstitutional expansion as written. Such power should be vested exclusively in Congress.


In 2003, parents of Montana schoolchildren sued the owner of federally licensed hydroelectric dams on the Missouri, Madison and Clark Fork rivers within the state. The parents claimed that the owner, PPL, owed the state compensation because the riverbeds underlying its dams were part of Montana's "school trust lands." The State of Montana joined the suit in 2004, asserting that PPL also owed the state compensation pursuant to Montana's Hydroelectric Resources Act.
The federal district court eventually dismissed the action for lack of diversity, and PPL filed suit in state court. The state countersued, arguing that it obtained title to the relevant streambeds at the time of statehood pursuant to the "equal footing doctrine." The trial court dismissed PPL's affirmative defenses, held that the State obtained title to the riverbeds at issue because those rivers were navigable at the time of statehood and concluded that the state was entitled to retroactive lease payments under the HRA. Following a bench trial to determine damages, the court imposed approximately $40 million in back lease payments, as well as future lease payments imposed by the state.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the trial court must consider whether the relevant stretches of the Missouri, Madison, and Clark Fork rivers were navigable when the United States granted Missouri statehood, but it also determined that those stretches were not navigable at that time. While acknowledging that the equal footing doctrine grants a state title to navigable waters upon statehood, Justice Kennedy explained that navigability in fact is based on the "natural and ordinary condition" of the water.
Consequently, Justice Kennedy held that the Montana Supreme Court erred in its treatment of the question of river segments and overland portage. He noted that the Court considers the navigability of rivers on a segment-by-segment basis, rejecting the Montana Supreme Court's ruling that this approach does not apply to short interruptions of navigability. He also pointed to the physical characteristics of some of the segments in question, noting that the Great Falls reach, a seventeen mile long stretch with distinct drops also included five waterfalls and continuous rapids in between. Justice Kennedy rejected the Montana Supreme Court's reliance on the evidence of present-day, primarily recreational use of the Madison River. Evidence that initial explorers successfully portaged between segments was also not persuasive.


Akio Kawashima and Fusako Kawashima are natives and citizens of Japan. The Kawashimas were admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents in 1984. Nearly 10 years later, Akio Kawashima pleaded guilty to subscribing to a false statement on a federal tax return, and Fusako Kawashima pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting in preparing the false tax return statement.
Immigration officials began proceedings to deport the couple who had failed to report more than $245,126 in taxable income from two restaurants they own. Anything more than $10,000 is considered an aggravated felony, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld their deportation.

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Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, affirming the judgment of the appellate court. The Court held that filing a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. Section 7206 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act when the Government's revenue loss exceeds $10,000. The Court rejected the argument that crimes under Section 7206 do not involve the fraud or deceit required by the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion which Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg wrote that the Court's construction of the statute was dubious because it characterized a tax crime as a crime of fraud or deceit, which would render the portion of the statute which directly addressed violations of tax law meaningless.


Richard Lee Pollard, an inmate at a federal prison run by the private company GEO Group, slipped on a cart left in a doorway and injured both elbows. As GEO employees were preparing to transport him to an outside orthopedic clinic, he said they made him wear a jumpsuit and a "black box" wrist restraint, despite his claim that both would cause him excruciating pain. Pollard sued GEO and its employees for allegedly violating his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Pollard's suit. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action for injury caused by "a federal agent acting under his authority."

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No. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court. Breyer rejected Pollard's arguments and held that a prisoner can not assert an Eighth Amendment claim for damages against private prison employees.
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. In his concurring opinion the justice emphasized that he believed that the case law in Bivens, creating a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment, should be limited.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion. She stated that she would not deny Pollard relief merely for the fact that he was placed in a privately operated prison rather than a federal or state operated facility.


Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak

The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band ("the Band") is a Potawatomi Indian tribe in Michigan. In 2001, the Band petitioned the Department of Interior to construct and operate a casino in Wayland Township, Michigan, a small farming community with about 3,000 residents. In May 2005, the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior announced its plan to take 147 acres of land in Wayland Township –known as the "Bradley Tract"-- into trust for the Band under the Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA").
David Patchak, a resident of Wayland Township, filed suit against Ken Salazar, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior on August 1, 2008, taking advantage of a stay of the Secretary's action granted due to a separate suit against the Secretary by a Michigan anti-gambling organization. Patchak alleged that the Band's gaming facility would destroy the peace and quiet of his community, create pollution, and increase crime. The Band intervened as a defendant. At trial, the Secretary argued that the Quiet Title Act ("QTA") precluded any person from seeking to divest the United States of title to Indian land trusts; hence, because the Bradley Tract was in trust while Patchak's suit was pending, the district court did not have jurisdiction. The court, however, dismissed Patchak's suit on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge Palazar's authority under the IRA, holding that Patchak's interests do not fall within the IRA's zone-of-interests.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Patchak fulfilled the zone-of-interests test for standing. The court held that Patchak did not have to demonstrate that the statute was meant to benefit individuals in his situation, pointing to portions of the IRA tasking the Secretary with considering "affected members of the public" before using his trust authority. The court also rejected the Secretary's argument that the QTA barred Patchak's suit, reasoning that Congress intended the QTA to limit actions in which the plaintiff claims an interest in property contrary to the government's interest. In contrast, Patchak did not seek sole possession of title to the Bradley Track. Therefore, the court held that his suit fell within the general waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.

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No, No. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for an 8-1 majority, affirmed the lower court. The Court held that the US had waived its sovereign immunity and Patchak had proper standing to bring suit. While the government claimed that the QTA barred Patchak's relief under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), the Court held that the QTA only concerns individuals claiming a personal interest contrary to the government's interest in a property. Since Patchak's suit did not resemble a typical quiet title suit, the sovereign immunity waiver under the APA still applies. The Court further concluded that Patchak had standing to bring the suit because his claim falls within the zone-of-interests that the IRA regulates. The zone-of-interests standard is not intended to be particularly demanding, and merely requires a recognizable relation to the acquisition or use of territory for Indian tribes. Since Patchak's suit arguably concerns the acquisition and use of such territory, he has sufficient standing to proceed.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor was the sole dissenter. She expressed dissatisfaction with the majority's broad stroke limitation on sovereign immunity under the QTA. Under the majority's formulation, those with no personal interest in government owned property could bypass sovereign immunity to challenge the government's interest.


Sandy Williams was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Illinois' appellate court affirmed Williams' conviction but reversed the trial court's imposition of a consecutive sentence. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the testimony of an Illinois State Police forensic analyst, who relied upon a DNA report prepared by a nontestifying third-party analyst, lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation. Alternatively, Williams argued that this testimony concerning the report was hearsay presented for the truth of the matter asserted and violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. The state's high court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Williams' Sixth Amendment rights weren't violated.

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Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., writing for a four-justice plurality, announced the judgment of the Court. The Court affirmed that the testimony of an expert witness that is based on a test the expert did not personally perform is admissible and does not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. The Court held that, because the evidence of the third-party test was not produced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but merely to provide a basis for the conclusions that the expert reached, the prosecution had not infringed on the defendant's rights. The important issue was the conclusion that the expert reached, and that the expert was available to the defendant for cross-examination. Additionally, such a test does not fall within the bounds of the Confrontation Clause because the results were not directed to prove the guilt of the defendant. Williams was not even a suspect at the time the test was conducted.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred and found that such DNA tests and their results fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause so long as the lab procedures are reliable, and the defendant still retains the right to call employees of the lab as witnesses. If the premise of a lab report's accuracy were shown to be untrue, then the testimony of the expert would fall under the Confrontation Clause. Justice Clarence Thomas also concurred on the basis that the evidence of the test was not "testimonial," as it must to be governed by the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Elena Kagan dissented and found this case to be in the same vein as others where the Court found that, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, the defendant must have the opportunity to cross-examine an analyst who performed the test. Without such an opportunity, an unreliable report is assumed to be true. Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.


Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California

The California Legislature approved a series of cutbacks in the payments to physicians, hospitals and pharmacies to address the state's budget deficit. In each case, the providers have sued in federal court and won rulings from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which blocked the cutbacks on the grounds that they conflicted with the Medicaid law. The providers argued that if the cutbacks were approved, the state would not provide the level of care required under Medicaid.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear three separate appeals from the state, all of which raise the same issue. The lead case is Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of Southern California. The other two cases are Maxwell-Jolly v. California Pharmacists Association and Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital. David Maxwell-Jolly served as the director of California's Department of Health Care Services.

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Maybe. In a 5-4 decision Justice Stephan G. Breyer wrote the majority opinion vacating the judgment and remanding to the Ninth Circuit. Since the court granted certiorari, the federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMMS) approved many of the cutbacks as consistent with federal law. California withdrew all cutbacks that were not approved. In light of this development, the majority argued that the healthcare providers may need to seek review of the CMMS decision under the Administrative Procedure Act instead of maintaining a supremacy clause action. The Court remanded the case so the parties could prepare new arguments based on the new circumstances.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote a dissent, stating that he would reverse because the health care providers no longer have a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause. Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito Jr. joined in the dissent.


Barion Perry is in prison for breaking into a car in 2008. Nubia Blandon told Nashua, N.H., police that she observed Perry from her apartment window taking things out of a parked car. She identified Perry at the scene but later could not pick him out of a photo lineup or describe him to police. A second witness identified Perry from the photo lineup. Perry filed a motion to suppress the photo identification because it was "unnecessarily suggestive" that he was a criminal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld his conviction.

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No. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Supreme Court held that the due process clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness' identification unless the identification was procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances, arranged by law enforcement. The Court further stated that the Constitution does not protect a defendant against a conviction based on questionable evidence by not prohibiting introduction of the evidence, but by allowing a defendant to persuade the jury that the evidence should not be believed. Therefore, Due Process will only prohibit the introduction of evidence when inclusion of the evidence is so extremely unfair that its inclusion would violate fundamental concepts of justice. The Court also rejected Perry's argument that eyewitnesses are uniquely unreliable, and emphasized that the fallibility of eyewitness identification does not warrant a due process ruling requiring a trial court to screen evidence for reliability, unless there was improper state conduct.
Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas wrote separately because he would not have extended Stovall v. Denno, and subsequent related case law, which premised substantive due process rights on notions of fundamental fairness. Instead he believed that the Due Process Clause is not a general guarantee against unfairness but rather only a guarantee of process before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. She stated that it is not merely the act of suggestion, which creates a due process problem, but rather the effect of an act of suggestion on the reliability of a resulting identification. She maintained that the court's ruling would draw a distinction between intentionally suggestive conduct and inadvertently suggestive conduct, either of which could lead to the same unfair result.


In September of 1995, Azzam Rahim, an American citizen, was tortured and murdered while in the custody of Palestinian Authority intelligence officers in Jericho. The respondents, Jibril Rajoub, Amin Al-Hindi, Twfik Tirawi, the Palestinian Authority, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, never disputed liability for the torture and murder. The petitioners, Azzam Rahim's widow and children, filed suit against the respondents under the Torture Victim Protection Act.
The district court dismissed the petitioners' action against the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization on the grounds that the Torture Victim Protection Act permits actions against natural persons only. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.

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No. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court affirming the decision of the United States Court of Appeals. The Court held that the word "individual" in the Torture Victim Protection Act means a natural person and does not impose any liability against organizations. The Court ruled that a word in a statute will be given its everyday meaning unless Congress gives some indication that it intends the word to have a broader meaning. The Court further determined that legislative history supported its interpretation. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote no opinion but did not join the Court regarding its analysis of the legislative history.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a concurring opinion. He noted that the word "individual" is open to multiple interpretations and can mean natural persons, corporations, or other entities, making the word alone is insufficient to decide the case. Only the legislative history could make up for the interpretive inadequacies of considering language alone.


Marcus Mims sued Arrow Financial Services, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit both held that they lacked jurisdiction over Mims' TCPA claim because, in their view, the TCPA creates exclusive state-court jurisdiction over private actions.

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No. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg held that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over TCPA claims made by private individuals. Justice Ginsberg looked to the legislative history of the act, noting congress' concern about companies evading state law prohibitions on telemarketing through interstate operations. She also noted that, apart from the deletion of an amount-in-controversy requirement, the federal-question provision of §1331 has not changed since 1875. According to Justice Ginsburg, there is a deeply rooted presumption of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction rebuttable only by an explicit statutory directive, an implication from legislative history, or an incompatibility between state and federal court interests.
Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the TCPA's language is state-court oriented, but argued that it did not explicitly make state-court jurisdiction exclusive, citing other statutes where congress specifically excluded § 1331 claims. She contrasted the TCPA's language on claims made by private individuals with its directive on suits brought by state Attorneys General; these latter claims may be brought "exclusively" in federal district courts, but no such language appears in the statute's language on private actions. Justice Ginsburg explained that congress intended to remove any confusion about courts' concurrent jurisdiction over TCPA claims and to give states' flexibility over the venue for these claims.
Justice Ginsburg rejected Arrow's concerns over defendants removing $500-per-violation TCPA claims to federal court to unfairly pressure plaintiffs to settle. She pointed out that the federal district court filing fee is $350 and that only sixty five such cases have been so removed, all class action suits.


On June 16, 2006, Steven Howards saw Vice President Dick Cheney while strolling through Beaver Creek Mall. Howards decided to approach the Vice President to protest the President's polices regarding the Iraq War.
On that day, Gus Reichle and Dan Doyle were part of the Secret Service detail protecting the Vice President. Doyle heard Howards state into his cell phone "I'm going to ask him how many kids he's killed today." Howards approached the Vice President and told the Vice President that he disapproved of his policies in Iraq. When the Vice President turned to leave, Howards made unsolicited physical contact with the Vice President by touching the Vice President's right shoulder with his open hand.
Agent Reichle approached Howards, identified himself as a Secret Service agent, and asked to speak with Howards. After briefly questioning Howards, Reichle arrested him. Howards was initially charged with harassment under state law, but those charges were dismissed. No federal charges were filed.
Howards sued agents Reichle and Doyle under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the agents had violated his Fourth Amendment right with an unlawful search and seizure and his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The agents moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds. The district court denied their motion, ruling that fact issues regarding the agents' immunity defense precluded summary judgment. The agents took an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. They argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they had probable cause to arrest Howards and also asserted that they were entitled to heightened immunity by virtue of their status as Secret Service agents protecting the Vice President. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The panel unanimously rejected Howards' Fourth Amendment claim on the grounds that the agents objectively had probable cause to arrest Howards. However, the panel held that probable cause was not a bar to Howards' First Amendment retaliation claim and that Howards could proceed with his First Amendment retaliation claim notwithstanding the fact that the agents had probable cause for his arrest.

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No answer and Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the 10th Circuit and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the agents have qualified immunity from Howards' First Amendment claim because there is no clearly established right to protection from retaliatory arrest when there is probable cause for that arrest. For a right to be clearly established, every reasonable officer must understand that he or she is violating that right. The Court has never acknowledged the proposed right in this case, and 10th Circuit precedent is unclear. The Court did not decide whether there is, in fact, a right to protection from retaliatory arrests where there is otherwise probable cause for the arrest.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred, writing that she would not grant qualified immunity if the agents had been ordinary law enforcement officers. She would apply a different standard for officers charged with protecting public officials because they must make quick and decisive decisions to protect the safety of those officials. The agents' actions in this case were rational and should not expose them to civil damages. Justice Stephen H. Breyer joined in the concurrence. Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the decision.


Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington

Albert Florence was searched twice in seven days after he was arrested on a warrant for a traffic violation he had already paid. Florence filed a lawsuit against officials at the two jails, contending the jailhouse searches were unreasonable because he was being held for failure to pay a fine, which is not a crime in New Jersey.
U.S. District Court Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez ruled that the strip search of Florence violated the Constitution. However, officials representing both Burlington and Essex Counties appealed the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that it is reasonable to search everyone being jailed, even without suspicion that a person may be concealing a weapon or drugs.

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Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the lower court, holding that the strip searches for inmates entering the general population of a prison do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court concluded that a prisoner's likelihood of possessing contraband based on the severity of the current offense or an arrestee's criminal history is too difficult to determine effectively. The Court pointed out instances, such as the arrest of Timothy McVeigh, in which an individual who commits a minor traffic offense is capable of extreme violence. Correctional facilities have a strong interest in keeping their employees and inmates safe. A general strip search policy adequately and effectively protects that interest. The Court did note that there may be an exception to this rule when the arrestees are not entering the general population and will not have substantial contact with other inmates. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. joined the majority in its entirety. Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority except with respect to the potential exceptions to the rule.
Chief Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion, emphasizing that the majority opinion leaves open the possibility of certain exceptions to the rule. Justice Alito also concurred, writing that the majority did not decide whether strip searches are always reasonable, only that the searches in this case were. Justice Alito wrote that strip-searching may not be reasonable for inmates held for minor offenses for a brief period of time.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, expressing that strip searches of individuals arrested for minor offenses that do not involve drugs or violence are unreasonable unless the prison official has a reasonable suspicion that that individual possesses drugs or contraband. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.
Learn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


Patrick Wood filed pro se (on his own behalf) in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his convictions for felony murder and second degree murder violated the Sixth Amendment privilege against double jeopardy and challenging the validity of his jury trial waiver. The District Court denied relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit appointed Wood with an attorney and directed the parties to address the timeliness of Wood's petition. The appeals court found that Wood's habeas petition was untimely and affirmed the decision of the District Court.

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Yes and yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a 9-0 majority, reversed the lower decision and remanded. The Supreme Court held that under Day v. McDonough appellate courts have the authority, though not the obligation, to raise a forfeited statute of limitations defense on its own. The prosecution in this case, however, expressly waived the statute of limitations through its repeated refusal to raise the defense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit abused its discretion when it overrode the prosecution's express waiver of the statute of limitations.
Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, arguing that Day v. McDonough was wrongly decided so district and appellate courts should not have the authority to raise the statute of limitations on their own. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the concurrence.


Facts of the case: Kenneth Clair was sentenced to death in Orange County, Calif., in 1987 for the sexual assault, beating and strangulation of babysitter Linda Faye Rodgers. Clair filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court appointed the federal public defender as Clair's federal habeas counsel. The district court then stayed the federal proceedings to give Clair a chance to return to the California Supreme Court to "exhaust" his state remedies on some newly raised claims. Clair filed a second state habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied. Clair then returned to federal court. On June 16, 2005, Clair wrote a letter to the court, requesting that new counsel be appointed. The court was aware that Clair was having problems with his counsel; only three months earlier it had received from him a letter alleging a longstanding pattern of inattention to his case. In response to that letter, the district court made inquiry of Clair's counsel, who notified the court in April 2005 that they had spoken with Clair and that he was willing to have them continue to represent him for the time being.
The June 16th letter repeated allegations made in the previous letter, but also included a serious additional allegation: that a private investigator working on Clair's behalf had located important physical evidence from the crime scene that had never been tested, and that his counsel, despite having been informed of the evidence, had made no effort to obtain it, analyze it or present it to the court. Clair's private investigator sent the court a letter substantiating Clair's claims. The court received and opened the private investigator's letter, but returned it without filing it. Following receipt of Clair's June 16th letter, however, the district court made no inquiry into the truth of Clair's allegations or their potential impact on the case before it. The district judge without explanation denied the motion on the same day that he denied Clair's petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the district court abused its discretion.

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No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court reversing the lower appellate court's judgment. The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the prisoner's motion to replace court-appointed counsel. The Court further held that courts considering a motion to replace court-appointed counsel in capital cases should apply the same "interest of justice" standard applied in non-capital cases.


On February 24, 2002, Dana Roberts slipped on a patch of ice while working as a gatehouse dispatcher for Sea-Land Services Inc. As a result of his fall, Roberts suffered injuries to his shoulder and cervical spine. These injuries ultimately left Roberts permanently partially disabled and ended his longshore career. In accordance with the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Sea-Land's insurer paid Roberts compensation for temporary total disability for a period from 2002 to 2005. In May 2005, the insurer disputed Roberts' claim and stopped compensating him.
On October 12, 2006, an administrative law judge determined that Sea-Land continued to be liable under the Longshore Act for Roberts' on-the-job injuries after May of 2005. The Longshore Act required an employer to compensate a disabled worker at a rate based on the worker's average weekly wage at the time of injury. However, the act set an upper limit to compensation based on the average national weekly wage in the fiscal year that an individual was newly awarded compensation. The administrative judge determined that the applicable maximum rate for Roberts was $966.08 per week, based on fiscal year 2002, the year Roberts first became disabled. Roberts claimed that his maximum rate should be $1,114 per week, based on fiscal year 2007, the year the administrative law judge awarded Roberts compensation.
Roberts filed a motion for reconsideration, which the administrative judge denied. Both Sea-Land and Roberts appealed to the Benefits Review Board, which adopted the rationale that the maximum compensation rate was based on the year in which the disability began rather than the year compensation was awarded. Roberts appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the Benefit Review Board's interpretation. Roberts appealed that decision.

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The period is when an individual first becomes disabled. In an 8-to-1 decision, Justice Sonia Sotomayor writing for the majority held that the maximum compensation rate is set at the time that the worker becomes disabled no matter when a compensation order is entered. Given that most employers pay compensation voluntarily with no official award entered, the relevant section of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is meaningless as interpreted by the petitioner Roberts. The Court also held that this way of calculating maximum compensation gives employers more certainty in calculating liability, and eliminates disparate treatment of similarly situated employees. Setting the cap at the time of disability also prevents "gamesmanship" or unnecessary delays in the claims process.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in part and dissented in part. Ginsburg argued that the time of disability is not when the maximum compensation rate should be set. That rate should be set either when an employer voluntarily begins to pay compensation, or when a judge or other review board enters an order to pay.