The Court held that "the 12-man [jury] requirement cannot be regarded as an indispensable component of the Sixth Amendment." The Court found that the purpose of the jury trial was "to prevent oppression by the Government," and that the performance of this role was not dependent on the particular number of people on the jury. The Court concluded that "the fact that the jury at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly without significance 'except to mystics.'"


In November 1961, the Civil Rights Commission released the fifth volume of its report for the year. One section of it focused on police brutality and made reference to the Supreme Court case Monroe v. Pape. The case was based on allegations that Detective Pape and other officers broke into the Monroe apartment, assaulted the Monroes, and took Mr. Monroe to the police station where he was held for ten hours without being charged or advised of his procedural rights. A week after the report was released, Time Magazine published an article that quoted extensively from the report’s coverage of the allegations without ever explicitly stating that they were allegations rather than findings.
Pape sued Time, Inc. for libel in district court and Time moved for dismissal. The district court granted the motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case. In the intervening time, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, which stated that a public official may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his or her official conduct unless there is evidence the statements were made with actual malice. This decision became the basis for the district court granting summary judgment for Time, Inc. The Court of Appeals again reversed, and held that a jury must decide whether actual malice was present. After the third trial, the district court granted Time, Inc.’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed for a third time and held that the issue of actual malice was one for the jury to decide.

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No. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Time article was reporting on the Commission’s description of the allegations Monroe made against Pape, of which there was no inherent truth value. By not including the word “alleged” or a synonym, Time adopted one of multiple available interpretations, which is not enough to create a jury issue of “malice” under New York Times v. Sullivan. The Court held that the Time article reflected an error in judgment, not a reckless disregard of the truth, and the statements are protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that the Supreme Court’s judgment of the specific facts of this case is unwarranted. He argued that, if the Court were to treat each case in this way, it would quickly become ineffective as a judicial body. He also argued that doing so would result in an overreach of the Court’s power that would infringe on the states’ rights to regulate defamation laws.


Willie Griggs filed a class action, on behalf of several fellow African- American employees, against his employer Duke Power Company . Griggs challenged Duke's "inside" transfer policy, requiring employees who want to work in all but the company's lowest paying Labor Department to register a minimum score on two separate aptitude tests in addition to having a high school education. Griggs claimed that Duke's policy discriminated against African-American employees in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. On appeal from a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Court of Appeals found no discriminatory practices. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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Yes. After noting that Title VII of the Act intended to achieve equality of employment opportunities, the Court held that Duke's standardized testing requirement prevented a disproportionate number of African-American employees from being hired by, and advancing to higher-paying departments within, the company. Neither the high school graduation requirement nor the two aptitude tests was directed or intended to measure an employee's ability to learn or perform a particular job or category of jobs within the company. The Court concluded that the subtle, illegal, purpose of these requirements was to safeguard Duke's long-standing policy of giving job preferences to its white employees.


A group of black Mississippi citizens filed for damages against two white Mississippi citizens pursuant to 42 U.S.C Section 1985 subsection 3 which protects against conspirators interfering with the civil rights of others. R.G. Grady, a citizen of Tennessee, was driving the plaintiffs in the suit along a public highway, when the defendants, acting under the misconception that Grady worked for the organization Civil Rights for Negroes, allegedly pulled their truck into the path of Grady's car, causing him to stop. The defendants were accused of forcing Grady and his passengers to step out of the car and preventing their escape. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant James Calvin Breckenridge proceeded to beat Grady and the plaintiffs in the head with a club, injuring them. The defendants also threatened the plaintiffs verbally and pointed firearms at them. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, basing their decision on a previous case, Collins v. Hardyman. This case limited section 1985 subsection 3 to apply only to conspiracies somehow related to state laws or state officials, to avoid possible conflict with the U.S. Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed.

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In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court concluded that section 1985 subsection 3 covers conspiracy among private parties, uninvolved in official government business because three indicators pointed to that conclusion: the actual text of the law, the law in relation to the parent law upon which it was based, and the way in which the law had been interpreted in the past. The Court found that the conspirators must intend to deprive someone from a particular demographic group of equal rights to be in violation of section 1985 subsection 3. When these requirements are met, Congress can punish conspirators while acting in compliance with section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment without the limitations of Collins v. Hardyman. Finally, the Court ruled that, in the civil suit, the defendants did conspire to commit the assault with the purpose of infringing on the plaintiffs' legal rights because of their race. And, the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries as a result. Thus, the previous judgment is reversed.


The federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provided construction grants to church-sponsored higher educational institutions. The grants were to be used for the construction of non-religious school facilities. The Act also stipulated that twenty years after the grant had been given, schools were free to use the buildings for any purpose.

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In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that only the 20-year limitation portion of the Act violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court invalidated the 20-year clause, arguing that subsidizing the construction of facilities used for non-secular purposes would have the effect of advancing religion. The Court held that the church-related institutions in question had not used their federally-funded facilities for religious activities, and that the facilities were "indistinguishable from a typical state university facility." The Court also held that the Act did not excessively entangle the government with religion, noting that college students were less susceptible to religious indoctrination, that the aid was of "nonideological character," and that one-time grants did not require constant state surveillance.


In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co.

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Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.


Harris was arrested for making two sales of heroin to an undercover police officer. Before receiving the Miranda warnings, Harris said that he had made both sales at the request of the officer. This statement was not admitted into evidence at the trial. However, Harris later testified in Court that he did not make the first sale and in the second sale he merely sold the officer baking powder. Harris' initial statement was then used by the prosecution in an attempt to impeach his credibility.

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No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Miranda decision did not mandate that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case must be barred for all purposes from the trial. The Court reasoned that the shield provided by Miranda could not be "perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances." The Court found that the speculative possibility that police misconduct could be encouraged was outweighed by the value of admitting the statement into the impeachment process.


Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education

After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress had been made in desegregating public schools. One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. Lower courts had experimented with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court.

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In a unanimous decision, the Court held that once violations of previous mandates directed at desegregating schools had occurred, the scope of district courts' equitable powers to remedy past wrongs were broad and flexible. The Court ruled that 1) remedial plans were to be judged by their effectiveness, and the use of mathematical ratios or quotas were legitimate "starting points" for solutions; 2) predominantly or exclusively black schools required close scrutiny by courts; 3) non-contiguous attendance zones, as interim corrective measures, were within the courts' remedial powers; and 4) no rigid guidelines could be established concerning busing of students to particular schools.


A 19-year-old department store worker expressed his opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket emblazoned with "FUCK THE DRAFT. STOP THE WAR" The young man, Paul Cohen, was charged under a California statute that prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct." Cohen was found guilty and sentenced to 30 days in jail.

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Yes. In an opinion by Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Court reasoned that the expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; besides, there was no evidence that people in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words on his jacket. Harlan recognized that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." In doing so, the Court protected two elements of speech: the emotive (the expression of emotion) and the cognitive (the expression of ideas).


A judge issued a warrant to search Roosevelt Harris’ residence based on a federal tax investigator's affidavit. The affidavit stated that Harris had a reputation with the investigator for being a trafficker in illegal liquor, and a local constable located illegal whiskey on Harris’ property. The constable had purchased whiskey from Harris in the past and feared for his life if his name were revealed. When police searched Harris’ residence, they discovered illegal non-tax paid liquor. At trial, the district court admitted the evidence obtained during the search, and Harris was convicted of possession of non-tax paid liquor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the investigators affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search. This made the search illegal and any evidence obtained during the search inadmissible at trial.

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Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a 5-4 majority, delivered the opinion of the court. The Supreme Court held that the affidavit provided enough probable cause to issue a search warrant. In Part I, Chief Justice Burger expressed that the affidavit provided a factual basis for the search because of the investigator's personal knowledge of Harris. In Part II, Chief Justice Burger wrote that the investigator's knowledge of Harris’ reputation provided reliability for the constable’s information. In Part III expressed that the constable’s statements could be trusted because they were against his penal interest. Justices Hugo L. Black and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the entirety of the majority opinion and concurred, writing that they would overrule the cases the Sixth Circuit relied on. Justice Potter Stewart joined in Part I, and concurred in the judgment. Justice Byron R White joined in Part III, and concurred in the judgment.
Justice John M. Harlan dissented, writing that the investigator’s affidavit did not provide probable cause to issue a search warrant. Justices William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics

In 1965, six agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics forced their way into Webster Bivens’ home without a warrant and searched the premises. The agents handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and children and arrested him on narcotics charges. Later, the agents interrogated Bivens and subjected him to a visual strip search. Bivens sued the agents for $15,000 in damages each for humiliation and mental suffering. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

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Yes, No answer. Justice William J. Brennan Jr., writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the Second Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that Bivens does have a cause of action for damages arising from the federal agents Fourth Amendment violations. Bivens must provide proof of his injuries in order to recover. The Court did not reach the privilege question because the Court of Appeals did not consider the question. Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the judgment, writing that federal courts have the power to award damages for constitutional violations.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that the doctrine of separation of powers is better served by leaving the question to Congress. He also argued that the doctrine of suppressing evidence obtained in illegal searches is insufficient to deter law enforcement. Justice Hugo L. Black also dissented, arguing that Congress could create the cause of action Bivens stated, but has not, so the majority’s decision is an unconstitutional extension of judicial power. Justice Harry A. Blackmun dissented, supporting the idea that the question in this case is better left to Congress.


These cases involve juveniles brought to trial without a jury. The first involves Joseph McKeiver and Edward Terry, fifteen and sixteen year old boys charged with acts of robbery, theft, assault, and escape. At trial before the Juvenile Court of Philadelphia, each was denied a request for a jury trial. A Superior Court affirmed the order, and, after consolidation of their cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did likewise, saying there was no constitutional right to a jury trial for juveniles. In re Burrus concerns the consolidated cases of more than forty juveniles ranging in age from eleven to fifteen. Most of the juveniles faced misdemeanor charges stemming from protests of school consolidations that took place in November and December, 1968 during which, on six different occasions, they blocked traffic and refused to clear the roadway. Additionally, one sixteen-year-old juvenile faced charges of disorderly conduct for an incident that occurred at the local school. In each case, the judge denied a request for a jury trial. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of North Carolina both affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no constitutional requirement for a jury trial for juvenile defendants.

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No. In a 6-3 plurality opinion authored by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court concluded that the previous application of other criminal rights to juveniles, like rights to counsel and cross-examination, was done out of an emphasis on factfinding. "But one cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate factfinding." Additionally, the Court noted that, because juvenile prosecution is not considered either civil or criminal, the whole of the Sixth Amendment does not necessarily apply. As such, there is no requirement for a jury trial in juvenile cases.


In the wake of a "particularly brutal" murder of a fourteen-year-old girl, the New Hampshire Attorney General took charge of police activities relating to the murder. When the police applied for a warrant to search suspect Edward Coolidge's automobile, the Attorney General, acting as a justice of the peace, authorized it. Additionally, local police had taken items from Coolidge's home during the course of an interview with the suspect's wife. Coolidge was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.

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In a decision in which a number of justices chose to concur in part and dissent in part, the Court held that the searches and seizures of Coolidge's property were unconstitutional. Justice Stewart's opinion held that the warrant authorizing the seizure of Coolidge's automobile was invalid because it was not issued by a "neutral and detatched magistrate." Stewart also rejected New Hampshire's arguments in favor of making an exception to the warrant requirement. Stewart held that neither the "incident to arrest" doctrine nor the "plain view" doctrine justified the search, and that an "automobile exception" was inapplicable.


In 1970, Congress passed Voting Right Act Amendments that lowered the voting age in state and federal elections from 21 to 18, forbade the use of literacy tests at the polls, and forbade states from disqualifying voters in presidential and vice presidential elections based on state residency requirements. The states of Oregon, Arizona, Idaho, and Texas sued, and argued that these Amendments infringe on rights the Constitution reserves for the states.

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Yes in part and no in part. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress had the power to enact the amendments that changed the voting age for federal elections, abolish literary tests at the polling station, and abolish state residency requirements for presidential and vice presidential election. However, the Court held that lowering the voting age for state and local election was beyond Congressional purview.
The Court held that the Framers intended for Article I Section 4 of the Constitution and the Necessary and Proper Clause to grant the States the power to make the laws that govern elections and for Congress to have the power to alter the laws if necessary. The Court also held that the legislative history surrounding the enactment and enforcement of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments support the role that Congress plays in preventing racial discrimination in the electorate without denying the states their rights. Without evidence that the states use the 21-year-old voting requirement to discriminate based on race in state and local elections, Congress does not have the right to intervene. The Court held that the literacy test bans were constitutional under the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Justice William O. Douglas concurred in part and dissented in part. He disagreed with the majority’s ruling in regards to reducing the voting age in state and local elections. He argued that, because voting is a “fundamental right,” which Congress ensures under the Equal Protection Clause, Congress could legislate voting age at the state level as well as the federal.
Justice John M. Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority’s opinion that Congress could prohibit literacy tests but disagreed on the issue of Congress’ ability to impose regulations on voting age and state residency requirements. He argued that the legislative history surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment supported the preeminence of the right of the states to legislate voting. Since the Constitution does not explicitly grant Congress the right to legislate voting requirements, the right is reserved to the states. Without evidence that people between 18 and 21 and people who do not meet state residency requirements are being unconstitutionally discriminated against, Congress cannot intervene.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Byron R. White, and Justice Thurgood Marshall authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. They disagreed with the majority’s opinion that Congress cannot legislate voting age in state and local elections. They argued that, while the states have the right to determine qualifications for voting, Congress has the right to legislate the exercise of this power under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since 18-year-olds are treated as full adults under other aspects of the law, there is evidence that 18- to 21-year-olds are being denied voting rights to which they are entitled, and Congress has every right to intervene.
Justice Potter Stewart also wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He disagreed with the majority’s opinion that Congress could legislate voting laws in federal elections. He wrote that the Framers clearly intended the right to legislate voting to be reserved for the states and that the Constitution does not allow Congress to supersede that right without a compelling interest. He argued that the age qualification did not represent a compelling interest to allow Congress to enact legislation on the issue.


In 1959, Veron Atchley was convicted of murdering his wife by shooting her six times. The star witness at trial was Atchley’s insurance agent. The agent met with Atchley after his arrest to talk about the life insurance policy on his wife. During this conversation Atchley admitted to lying in wait for his wife with a gun, but said that the shooting was an accident. After notifying police, the insurance agent returned with a hidden recording device. Atchley made the same admission. Over Atchley’s objection the tape was admitted at trial. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction.
Atchley then sought habeus corpus relief in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that the tape was an unconstitutional involuntary confession. The district court agreed, ordering a new hearing on the issue of voluntariness. The district court held that the trial could not have reliably determined whether the confession was voluntary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

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Justice Potter Stewart, writing for eight members of the court, delivered the majority opinion. The Supreme Court held that an applicant for habeus corpus is not entitled to a new hearing on voluntariness unless he can show that his version of events, if true, would require the conclusion that the confession was involuntary. In this case, Atchley did not do that. He merely pointed to shortcomings in the trial court procedures. The trial court had given full consideration to the issue of voluntariness and applied the correct constitutional standard.
Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the judgment and substantially all of the opinion.


Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education

Plaintiffs, a group of parents of children in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District, sued the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (Board) in state court and argued that the state court should issue an injunction to prevent the Board from implementing a plan to assign children to public schools based on race. The plaintiffs claimed that this plan violated the children’s constitutional rights under the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education as well as a North Carolina state statute that prohibited districts from assigning children to schools based on race. The state court issued the injunction, and the defendants moved the case to federal court by arguing that, because the issues in the case dealt with the U.S. Constitution, the federal court had jurisdiction. The district court heard arguments in this case with a similar one, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, and subsequently struck down the state court injunction by holding that the state statute was unconstitutional.

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In a per curiam opinion, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because, at oral arguments, both litigants argued that the state statute forbidding the assignment of children to schools based on race was constitutional. Because the parties agreed, there was no actual case or controversy and therefore the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.


Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond

The requirements to be eligible for admission to the Bar in New York included that the applicant must be a citizen of the United States, have lived in the state of New York for six months, and passed a written examination. In addition, the Bar required the creation of Committees on Character and Fitness to determine whether an applicant “possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law.” The Committees required two affidavits in support of the applicant and a questionnaire filled out by the applicant. The petitioners were organizations and individuals representing a class of law students and recent law school graduates who sued two of the Committees by claiming that the vague and overbroad questions violated the applicants’ First Amendment rights. The questions related to the applicants’ political beliefs, membership in political association, and loyalty to the United States Constitution. A three-judge panel of the district court granted partial relief with respect to specific questions but sustained the validity of the New York system as a whole.

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No. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the character and fitness requirement has long been understood to refer to conduct which would be dishonorable in a legal setting and therefore is not overbroad. The Court also held that there was no burden of proof placed on the applicant, and there was no evidence of any intent to penalize political beliefs.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that a state had every right to refuse entrance to the bar to any applicant who professed a desire to overthrow the government or belonged to a group with those goals. While the First Amendment protects the applicants from being refused admission based on unpopular beliefs, it does not prevent them from being questioned about relevant issues.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that, when depriving an applicant of her right to practice law, a State must be held to a higher standard than when the state wishes to deprive someone of property. Because a state would never ask the same questions of a potential homeowner, the questions are not appropriate in a legal professional context either. Justice Black argued that, even if an applicant were to profess allegiance to a group that wishes to overthrow the government, those beliefs are protected by the First Amendment. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.
In his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the techniques the New York Committees use are intended to weed out political undesirables. He also argued that past practice illustrates that the understanding of the phrase is not narrow enough to prevent First Amendment violations.


North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann

Following a desegregation case that began in 1965, on February 5, 1970, the district court ordered the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system to implement a court-approved desegregation plan. Prior to this order, a suit had been filed in state court that sought an order enjoining the use of public funds for the transportation of students for desegregation purposes. In the midst of the extensive litigation, the North Carolina legislature enacted an anti-busing bill. Swann and other plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the statute, and a three-judge panel was convened to consider the issue. The three-judge panel declared the statute unconstitutional.

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Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that, while state officials have a great deal of discretion in formulating school policy, that discretion does not override federal constitutional guarantees. The anti-busing statute flies in the face of the Court’s holding in Brown v. Board of Education and the requirement to provide desegregated education. The Court also held that the anti-busing statute would actively prevent government authorities from remedying the constitutional violations that stem from segregation.


August Ledesma and several others were arrested and charged with violating both a Louisiana statute and a parish ordinance prohibiting display of obscene material for sale. The arresting officers seized the material in question. While the state court proceedings were underway, Perez, and the others arrested, sued in federal district court for a declaration that the statute and the ordinance were unconstitutional. A three-judge court convened and upheld the Louisiana statute, but found the arrests and seizure of materials invalid. The court prohibited use of the seized materials in the state criminal proceedings. The court noted that it had no jurisdiction to consider the ordinance, but expressed that it was probably invalid. A single federal judge later ruled the ordinance invalid. Local law enforcement officers directly appealed the district court decisions to the U.S. Supreme Court.

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Yes. Justice Hugo L. Black, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed in part and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s ruling on the validity of the arrests and seizure constituted improper federal interference with state criminal proceedings. The Court reversed that judgment. The Court also held that it had no jurisdiction to review the order declaring the ordinance invalid on direct appeal. Justice Potter Stewart concurred, citing several cases in support of his decision. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.
Justice William O. Douglas dissented in part, agreeing that the court had no jurisdiction to review the ordinance, but disagreeing on the district court’s arrest and seizure ruling. Justice William J. Brennan also dissented in part, agreeing with the majority on reversing the three-judge court, but disagreeing about the Supreme Court’s ability to review the decision on the ordinance. Justice Byron R. White and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in this dissent.


The state of Arizona restricts the distribution of welfare benefits to individuals who are either United States citizens or aliens who have lived in the country for at least 15 years. In 1969, Carmen Richardson, a resident alien of Arizona who met all requirements for welfare eligibility except the residency requirement, filed a class action lawsuit against the Commissioner of the State's Department of Public Welfare questioning the constitutionality of that requirement. The three-judge court in the District of Arizona found in favor of Richardson, but the Commissioner appealed. In the same year, a similar class action suit was filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In this case, resident aliens of Pennsylvania challenged state law which dictated that if a Pennsylvania resident did not qualify for federal aid then he or she could only receive welfare benefits from the state if he or she were a citizen or had applied for citizenship. This three-judge court also found in favor of the resident aliens. However, one judge disagreed, and the defendants, namely the Executive Director of the Philadelphia County Board of Assistance and the Secretary of the Commonwealth's Department of Public Welfare, appealed.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court asserted that to classify state residents solely based on alienage was inherently questionable, because aliens constitute a minority, separate from the rest of the population. The Court conceded that there had been instances in which state laws could treat citizens and non-citizens differently. However, it maintained that a state's aim to conserve welfare benefits for citizens would not legitimize the denial of welfare benefits to aliens. Their justification was that the aliens pay taxes and, consequently, contribute to the pool of money from which welfare benefits are drawn. As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that the welfare benefit restrictions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the Philadelphia area. Police arrested him at his home on obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines. A local news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on the arrest, but failed to use the words “allegedly” or “reportedly” in during one broadcast. In subsequent broadcasts, the reporters called Rosenbloom and other similar distributors “girlie look peddlers” and “smut distributors”. Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on the obscenity charges.
Rosenbloom then sued Metromedia for libel. The district court held that the First Amendment standard, which allowed recovery of damages only for knowingly and recklessly false statements, did not apply because Rosenbloom was not a public official or figure. The court instead instructed the jury to award damages where Metromedia did not use reasonable care to discern the truth before broadcasting. The jury awarded Rosenbloom general and punitive damages, although the district court reduced the punitive damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the knowingly and recklessly false standard applied.

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Yes, No. In a 5-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the judgment of the court affirming the Third Circuit decision. The Supreme Court held that the knowingly and recklessly false standard applied because the story was a matter of public concern. It did not matter that Rosenbloom was a private citizen. The Court also held that the evidence in the case did not support the damages award under the proper constitutional standard.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a special concurrence, stating that the First Amendment protected the news media from libel judgments even where the broadcaster knows their statements were false. Justice Byron R. White also wrote a special concurrence, asserting that the press have the privilege to comment on official actions of public servants, such as the police, in full detail.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, expressing that states should be free to impose a duty of reasonable care in defamation actions involving private citizens. He would remand the case for further consideration of whether Rosenbloom sustained actual harm and whether Metromedia acted with actual malice. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote a dissent, stating that the court should limit damages in libel actions by private citizens to actual losses. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.


Barbara James and her son Maurice lived in the Bronx, New York City. Shortly after Maurice's birth, Barbara James applied for assistance under New York State's Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). James began receiving assistance after a caseworker visited her apartment. Two years later, James was scheduled to be visited again by a caseworker. This visit was required under New York State law and would affect her benefits under AFDC. She refused to allow this visit. In a procedural hearing, she continued her refusal, and her AFDC assistance was terminated by New York State as a result. James then filed suit under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that the caseworker visit was a search and would violate her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court ruled in her favor. New York appealed.

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No. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court held that a caseworker visit was not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Harry A. Blackmun reasoned that "the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled," and as a result, "there is no entry of the home and there is no search." Even if the caseworker visit "does possess some of the characteristics of a search in the traditional sense," the visit still would not violate the Fourth Amendment, under the unreasonableness standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio. The Court concluded that the caseworker visit was not unreasonable, as the visit allowed the state to focus on the child and to ensure that its welfare funds were being used properly. Moreover, the visit was not confrontational and James' refusal did not lead to criminal prosecution. Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment.


The Louisiana State Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure allowed less-than-unanimous juries to convict defendants in criminal cases in which hard labor is considered as punishment. Nine of twelve jury members were needed to return a guilty verdict. Johnson was convicted of armed robbery by a jury split nine to three.

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The Court held that less-than-unanimous convictions did not violate the reasonable doubt standard embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Justice White argued that a minority opposing conviction does not prevent the other jurors from reaching their decisions beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the presence of dissenting jurors does not indicate that the state failed to uphold this standard. Finally, allowing less-than-unanimous decisions in certain cases serves a rational state purpose, not offensive to the Constitution.


Apodaca and two other defendants were convicted of assault, burglary, and grand larceny before three separate juries, all of which returned verdicts which were less than unanimous. Two of the cases were 11-1 and the other was 10-2 in favor of conviction.

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No. In a close decision the Court found that the accused's right to a jury trial does not require that juries return unanimous decisions in order to convict. After reviewing the history and function of juries in American society, the Court held that the most important function of the jury is to provide "commonsense judgment" in evaluating the respective arguments of accused and accuser. Requiring unanimity would not necessarily contribute to this function. A distinction was drawn, however, between capital and non-capital crimes.


In 1966 Martin Marietta Corp. (Martin) informed Ida Phillips that it was not accepting job applications from women with preschool-age children; however, at this time, Martin employed men with preschool-age children. Phillips sued and alleged she had been denied employment because of her sex in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment by holding that, because seventy-five to eighty percent of the applicants hired for the position for which Phillips applied were women, there was insufficient evidence that there was bias against women. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

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In the absence of evidence that having preschool-age children is demonstrably more relevant to female job performance than to male job performance, refusal to hire women with preschool-age children violates the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 required that persons with similar qualifications be given equal employment opportunities regardless of their sex. Because there was inadequate evidence to determine whether having preschool-age children was actually relevant to the business qualifications of the female candidates, the Court held that summary judgment was inappropriate in this case.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires uniform minimum qualifications for both male and female candidates. The exception for qualifications that may be different based on actual business necessity was only intended to apply to jobs that require specific physical characteristics; it was not intended to justify stereotypical characterizations of traditional gender roles.


Atlantic City Electric Co. v. United States

The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order increasing freight rates on several commodities, including bituminous coal. The increases were issued at the request of several railroads because of a need for revenue to offset increased operating costs. Seven public utilities, who use large amounts of bituminous coal, sued to enjoin and set aside the order, claiming that the rates were unreasonable and the ICC’s order deprived them of due process of law. Several state departments of agriculture intervened as parties plaintiff, and several railroads intervened in support of the ICC. The district court granted the ICC’s motion to dismiss, holding that the utilities failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available under the Interstate Commerce Act. This case was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on direct appeal.

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In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice William O. Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


Board No. 47, Louisville, Kentucky, denied the application of Cassius Clay, also known as Muhammad Ali, for classification as a conscientious objector. Clay then took an administrative appeal to the Kentucky Appeal Board, which tentatively classified him I-A, or eligible for unrestricted military service, and referred his file to the Justice Department for an advisory recommendation. The Justice Department concluded, contrary to a hearing officer's recommendation, that Clay's claim should be denied. The Department wrote that Clay did not meet any of the three basic tests for conscientious objector status; that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form, that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief, and that this objection is sincere. Subsequently, the Appeal Board denied Clay's claim, but without stating its reasons. When Clay refused to report for induction, he was tried and convicted of willful refusal to submit to induction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that since the Appeal Board gave no reason for the denial of a conscientious objector exemption to Clay, and that it was impossible to determine on which of the three grounds offered in the Justice Department's letter that board relied, Clay's conviction must be reversed. The Court reasoned that Clay satisfied the first two tests of conscientious objection. Regarding the third test, the Court concluded that whether or not Clay met the test of conscientious objection to war in any form, it was not clear that the Appeal Board relied on some legitimate ground in denying the claim, and therefore the conviction could not stand. In separate opinions, Justices William O. Douglas and John M. Harlan concurred. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.


Stella Connell applied for a teaching position with the Orange County school system, where James Higginbotham was the superintendent of the Board of Public Instruction. Connell was employed as a substitute teacher, and later dismissed from her position for refusing to sign the loyalty oath required of all Florida public employees. The oath stated that the employees “will support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida” and “do not believe in the overthrow of the government of the United States or of the State of Florida by force or violence.” The district court held that the provision of the oath that employees will support the Constitution is valid, but the provision not to overthrow the government is unconstitutional. Connell appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

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No, yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that requiring all employee applicants to pledge to support the federal Constitution and that of the state was valid because it demands no more than what is required of all state and federal employees. However, the Court held the dismissal from public employment for refusing to sign the oath without hearing or inquiry violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated the “overthrow” clause of the oath was invalid because the state could not show that an applicant believed in an overthrow. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence. Justice Potter Stewart wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he agreed the with the validity of the section of the oath that required support of the federal and state Constitutions. However, Justice Stewart would remand the case to discover the state’s meaning behind the “overthrow” clause.


Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.

After refusing to renew a patent licensing agreement, Zenith Radio Corp., a radio and television manufacturer, was sued by Hazeltine Research, Inc., for patent infringement in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Zenith counterclaimed, alleging anti-trust violations, misuse of patents, and a conspiracy to restrain trade in Canada, England, and Australia. Zenith asked for treble damages and injunctive relief. Zenith contended that Hazeltine's license forced them to pay for use of unpatented products and that Hazeltine had illegally conspired with foreign patent pools to prevent Zenith from expanding into those markets.
Before trial, Zenith had stipulated that Hazeltine and its parent corporation were one entity for the purposes of litigation. The District Court entered judgment against Hazeltine and its parent corporation, awarding Zenith treble damages and injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the damages award, but otherwise reversed the District Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals vacated all judgments against Hazeltine's parent corporation because Zenith's pretrial stipulation did not properly designate the parent corporation as a party to the litigation.

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No, Yes as to Canada. In a 7-1 decision Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the court, affirming the Court of Appeals decision to vacate the judgments against Hazeltine's parent corporation. The Supreme Court also held that damages were only proper with respect to the Canadian market because it was the only market in which Zenith had sustained injury. The Supreme Court reinstated the District Court's injunction against Hazeltine's conspiracy to restrict trade in foreign markets. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether Hazeltine conditioned the grant of its licenses on the payment of royalties for unpatented products.
Justice John M. Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part, objecting to the majority's apparent double standard that royalties provisions that measure royalties by a percentage of the licensees sales is lawful if included for the convenience of both parties, but unlawful if insisted on by the patentee.


These are two consolidated cases. In 81, Clarence Williams was arrested in his house in 1967. Police searched the house for an hour and 45 minutes, discovering heroin on a shelf in a bedroom. The heroin was admitted at trial and Williams was convicted of concealing illegally imported heroin. Williams appealed, arguing that the search of his house was illegal under Chimel v. California, a case decided on June 23, 1969 that narrowed the permissible scope of searches incidental to an arrest. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Chimel did not apply retroactively, and the search was valid under pre-Chimel standards.
In 82, Joseph Elkanich was convicted on three counts of selling narcotics in 1962. At trial, evidence included marked bills planted by a federal narcotics agent. The bills were seized during a search of Elkanich’s apartment after his arrest. The arrest and search were upheld at trial and on appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Elkanich then unsuccessfully applied for post-conviction relief in the district court. While the appeal of that decision was pending, Chimel was decided. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court.

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No. Though not agreeing on an opinion, six members of the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit in both cases. Justice Byron R. White delivered the judgment of the Court, holding that Chimel did not apply retroactively whether a conviction is challenged on direct review, as in 81, or in collateral proceedings, as in 82. Justice Potter Stewart concurred, writing that he would affirm 82 because the question presented was not permitted in post-conviction relief proceedings. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the result, agreeing that Chimel did not apply to searches conducted before June 23, 1969 following the three-factor analysis from Stoval v. Denno. Justice Hugo L. Black, concurred in the result, stating that Chimel was wrongly decided.
Justice John. M. Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part, writing that he would affirm the conviction on 82, but would reverse on 81 because Chimel could apply retroactively to a direct review. Justice Thurgood Marshall also concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.


The District of Columbia had an abortion statute that prohibits abortion unless “necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or health.” Milan Vuitch, a licensed physician, was indicted in federal district court for performing abortions that violated this statute. The district court held the abortion statute was unconstitutionally vague. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

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Yes, no. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to determine if the District of Columbia’s abortion statute is unconstitutionally vague because, although the law only applies to the District of Columbia, the law was enacted by both Houses of Congress and signed into law by the President. The Court also held that the word “health” in the statute refers to the state of being in body or mind and includes psychological wellbeing; therefore, the abortion law is not unconstitutionally vague.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case. However the statute leaves the physician too much discretion to determine what is necessary for the preservation for the mother’s health. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in par in which he argued that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over this case because the statute only applies to the District of Columbia. Justice William J. Brennan Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. In his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Potter Stewart agreed that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction but argued that the physicians who performed abortions should be wholly immune from being charged with criminal offenses under this law if they performed abortions in order to preserve the mother’s life or health.


Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-public elementary and secondary school teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island’s statute was passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of teachers’ annual salaries.
The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who believed that the statute violated the separation of church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court granted the state officials’ motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First Amendment.

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Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority as to the Pennsylvania statute and 8-1 as to the Rhode Island statute. The Court held that a statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither promotes nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster “excessive government entanglement with religion.” The Court held that both the state statutes in question had secular legislative purposes because they reflected the desire of the states to ensure minimum secular education requirements were being met in the non-public schools. The Court did not reach a holding regarding the second prong of the test, but it did find that the statutes constituted an excessive government entanglement with religion. In the Rhode Island program, the amount of oversight of teachers and curricula required to ensure that there is no unnecessary injection of religion into secular topics would require the government to become excessively involved in the nuances of religious education. The same danger holds true for the Pennsylvania statute, which additionally provides state funding directly to a church-related organization. Government financial involvement in such institutions inevitably leads to “an intimate and continuing relationship” between church and state. The Court also noted the potential political implications of public funding, as there is a risk of religious issues becoming politically divisive.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the intrusion of the government into the running of non-public schools through grants and other funding creates the entanglement that the Establishment Clause prohibits. He also argued that non-secular schools are so thoroughly governed by religious ideologies that any amount of public funding supports those doctrines, which the Framers of the Constitution dictated the government must not do. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the concurrence, and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the parts relating to case numbers 569 and 570. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate concurrence in which he argued that the danger was not only that religion would infiltrate the government, but also that the government would push secularization onto religious creeds. An analysis of the statutes in question shows that they impermissible involve the government in “essentially religious activities,” which the Establishment Clause is meant to prevent. In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the majority opinion goes too far and, in restricting the use of state funds in non-secular schools, creates an obstacle to the use of public funds for secular education. He argued that there was no proof that religion would invade secular education or that the government oversight of the use of public funds would be so extensive as to constitute entanglement.
Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the discussion or decision of case number 89.


Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo) operated a website that provided information about individuals such as contact data, marital status, age, occupation, and certain types of economic information. Thomas Robins sued Spokeo and claimed that the company willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by publishing false information about him on the website. However, Robins was unable to allege any “actual or imminent harm,” so the district court granted Spokeo’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and Robins’ lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Robins then filed an amended complaint in which he alleged that he suffered actual harm to his employment prospects due to the website falsely claiming that he was wealthy. The district court originally denied Spokeo’s motion to dismiss but later reconsidered its order and dismissed the complaint for failure to state an injury in fact. Robins appealed and argued that the district court could not reconsider its previous decision and that he had sufficiently alleged an injury in fact to qualify for Article III standing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, although the district court could reconsider its ruling, the allegation of a violation of a statutory right is sufficient injury to qualify for standing.

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Because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not properly address whether all the elements of standing were met, the Court vacated the case for reconsideration of whether the plaintiff alleged an injury in fact that was “concrete and particularized.” Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority, which held that, in order to have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must show that he has suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision in court. The injury-in-fact element is met when the plaintiff shows that he suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest and that the injury was concrete and particularized as well as actual or imminent. The Court held that the standing principles of Article III mean that a plaintiff cannot bring a claim that alleges a bare procedural violation, but in determining whether the plaintiff proved that an injury in fact existed, the lower court must examine the elements of injury-in-fact analysis. Because the appellate court in this case failed to do so, the Court remanded the case for further consideration.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the standing doctrine applies to both private citizens seeking to vindicate private rights as well as those who alleged violations of public rights. These limitations stem from how the common-law courts traditionally handled the two different types of claims. Therefore, Congress cannot create a new private right of action for the enforcement of public rights without such suits being subject to standing doctrine analysis.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that it was not necessary to remand the case because the evidence presented was sufficient to prove that the injury at issue was concrete, and the particularity requirement does not need to be considered separately. In this case, the plaintiff was not alleging a general harm but rather an injury that he suffered individually, so because it meets the concreteness requirement, it does not need to meet a separate particularity one, and there is nothing for the lower court to consider on remand. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.


Marvin Green began working for the United States Postal Service in 1973. In 2002, he became the postmaster at the Englewood, Colorado, post office. In 2008, a postmaster position opened in Boulder, and Green applied but did not receive the position. He filed a formal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) charge regarding the denial of his application, and the charge was settled. In 2009, Green filed an informal EEO charge and alleged that his supervisor and supervisor’s replacement had been retaliating against him for his prior EEO activity. Throughout that year, Green was subject to internal Postal Service investigations including a threat of criminal prosecution. He ultimately signed an agreement that he would immediately give up his position and either retire or accept a much lower paying position. Green chose to retire and filed subsequent charges with the EEO Office, which dismissed his claim. Green then sued in district court and alleged, among other claims, that he had been constructively discharged. The district court held that Green’s constructive discharge claim was barred because he did not contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of signing the agreement, which was the last allegedly discriminatory act, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

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Under federal employment discrimination law, the filing period for a constructive discharge claim begins to run only after the employee resigns. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the statutory language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act clearly states that the 45-day statutory limitation period begins to run on the “date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.” Although the text does not clearly define the “matter alleged to be discriminatory,” the default rule that a limitations period begins when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action applies here. To state a complete and present claim for constructive discharge, a plaintiff must prove both that his employer discriminated against him to the point where a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign and that he actually resigned. Because resignation is part of a complete and present cause of action of a constructive discharge claim, the 45-day period should begin when the employee resigns.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that judicial precedent establishes that Title VII claims require that the statutory discrimination period begin with the employer’s discriminatory act. In the case of a constructive discharge claim, if the employer intended for the employee to resign, then the employee’s resignation is tantamount to an intentional termination by the employer and gives rise a a new limitations period. Justice Alito also expressed the concern that the rule the majority opinion announced would disincentivize reporting of potential Title VII violations at the earliest possible opportunity based on the underlying acts of discrimination.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that only an employer’s discriminatory action can constitute a “matter alleged to be discriminatory” under the meaning of Title VII. If the employer’s actions took place more than 45 days before the plaintiff contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the claim must be considered untimely. The majority’s opinion expanded the constructive discharge doctrine by allowing it to have a different limitation period than other Title VII claims.


On May 11, 2006, Jose Gomez received an unsolicited text message advertising the U.S. Navy. The text message was the result of a partnership between the Navy and the Campbell-Ewald Company, a marketing consultant that the Navy hired to help with a recruiting campaign. The compilation of the list of targeted phone numbers and the actual sending of the message was outsourced to a company called Mindmatics.
Gomez sued and argued that that Campbell-Ewald violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by instructing or allowing a third-party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on the behalf of a client. After Campbell-Ewald’s motion to dismiss was denied, the company offered Gomez a settlement, which Gomez rejected. Campbell-Ewald again moved to dismiss the case and argued that Gomez’s rejection of the settlement offer made the claim moot. The district court denied the motion, and Campbell-Ewald moved for summary judgment based on the argument that the company had derivative sovereign immunity because it was acting on behalf of the government. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Campbell-Ewald was not entitled to the derivative sovereign immunity defense because the defense had only ever been applied in the context of property damage resulting from public works projects.

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An unaccepted settlement offer does not make a plaintiff’s claim moot, and a federal contractor does not have derivative sovereign liability from a suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an unaccepted settlement offer has no force and does not affect whether the case presents an actual case or controversy over which a court has jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution. Like unaccepted offers in other areas of law, such as contracts, an offer has no force and creates no obligation if it is not accepted. As long as the parties continue to have a concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation at hand, the case is not moot. The Court also held that government contractors only obtain immunity for actions they take pursuant to their contractual undertakings. When a contractor violates both federal law and the government’s express instructions, as occurred in this case, there is no immunity. In his concurrence in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that, because the common law of tendering offers dictates that an unaccepted offer, without more, is not binding and Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stemmed from this common law history, the majority opinion did not need to examine contract law to reach this conclusion.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, once relief for the plaintiffs’ claims is available, the plaintiffs no longer have a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, and there is no longer an actual case or controversy for the federal courts to adjudicate. Justice Roberts also argued that there was Supreme Court precedent establishing that the plaintiff’s acceptance of the offer was not required to moot the case. The fact that failure to accept an offer makes the offer null in contract law has no bearing on the analysis of whether the case remains an actual case or controversy under Article III. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. Justice Alito also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that a case is moot when there is no dispute as to whether the defendant would “make good” on the settlement offer if the case were dismissed. Because there was no such dispute in this case, the case was moot.


The Texas Constitution requires that the state legislature reapportion its senate districts during the first regular session after every federal census. After the 2010 census, the legislature created a redistricting plan that was signed into law. However, a three-judge panel of the federal district court found that there was a substantial claim that this redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act and issued an interim plan for the 2012 primary elections that was subsequently adopted and signed into law.
Plaintiffs Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenniger are registered Texas voters who sued and claimed that the interim plan that was adopted and signed into law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that the new districts do not adhere to the 'one person, one vote' principle, which the Supreme Court had previously held exists in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because they were apportioned based on total population rather than registered voter population, and while the new districts are relatively equal in terms of total population, they vary wildly in relation to total voter population. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim based on Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, which allows total population to be the basis for district apportionment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on the appeal.

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The “one person, one vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause allows a state to design its legislative districts based on total population. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the unanimous decision and the opinion for the six-justice majority. The Court held that constitutional history, judicial precedent, and consistent state practice all demonstrate that apportioning legislative districts based on total population is permissible under the Equal Protection Clause. Based on the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment and the legislative debates surrounding its adoption, the legislature at the time clearly intended for representation to be apportioned in the House based on total population, and it would be illogical to prohibit the states from doing the same within their own legislatures. In cases in which the Court has evaluated whether districting maps violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has consistently looked at total population figures to determine whether the maps impermissibly deviate from perfect population equality. Additionally, the total population approach has been used by all states and many local jurisdictions, and there is no reason to upset this accepted practice.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence has not established a single theory for how states should uphold the “one person, one vote” principle. Similarly, Justice Thomas argued that the Constitution does not prescribe a theory for states to use when apportioning representation. Although there is some preference for majoritarian rule, the Constitution also reflects concern about the tyranny of the majority by including counter-democratic checks. Given these conflicting theories present in the Constitution and the fact that the Constitution lets the states determine their own methods of apportioning representation, the Court should not impose a singular theory on the states. Because the total population method is a permissible method for states to use in creating legislative districts, Justice Thomas agreed with the majority, but noted that this was not the only permissible method. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that neither the text nor the legislative history of constitutional apportionment for legislative districts endorses one theory over another. Therefore, while the total population theory is permissible, it is not the only one. Justice Thomas joined in the concurrence in the judgment.


City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.

Plain Dealer Publishing challenged the constitutionality of a Lakewood city ordinance that authorized its mayor to grant or deny applications, made by publishers, seeking permission to place newsracks on public property. The ordinance merely required Lakewood's mayor to provide an explanation, in the event of a permit denial, while empowering him to subject all permit approvals to whatever "terms and conditions" which he "deemed necessary and reasonable." On appeal from a district court ruling that found the ordinance constitutional, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted Lakewood's request for certiorari.

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Yes. The Court held that the licensing ordinance was facially invalid since it gave Lakewood's mayor unbridled discretion to discriminate against permit seekers, based on the content of their publications and viewpoints. This, in turn, promoted self-censorship by publishers and other speakers who sought to curry favor with the mayor's officer in order to secure the approval of their licensing requests. The Court added that while cities may require the periodic licensing of newsracks on public property, even subjecting such procedures to reasonable restrictions, they may not use language which is so open-ended as to give city officials unlimited subjective discretion over permit approvals.


A lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a "parody" of an advertisement, modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming that Falwell, a Fundamentalist minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that public figures, such as Jerry Falwell, may not recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the offending publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice." The Court added that the interest of protecting free speech, under the First Amendment, surpassed the state's interest in protecting public figures from patently offensive speech, so long as such speech could not reasonably be construed to state actual facts about its subject.


On December 19, 1984, Michael Mose Chesternut saw a police car approach him while one a routine patrol, so he ran. After the police caught up with him and drove alongside him for a short distance, they observed him discarding a number of packets. Assuming the packets contained cocaine, the police arrested Chesternut and, after a search of his person, discovered heroin and a hypodermic needle. Chesternut was charged with possession of controlled substances in violation of Michigan law. The trial court dismissed the charge and concluded that Chesternut was unlawfully seized during the police pursuit preceding his disposal of the packets. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed and held that Chesternut’s freedom was restricted as soon as the officers began their pursuit. Michigan appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.

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No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, which held the officers’ pursuit of Chesternut did not constitute a seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment; therefore the charges against him were improperly dropped. The test of whether a seizure violates the Fourth Amendment is based off whether a reasonable man would have concluded that the police had restrained his liberty so that he was not free to leave. Under the reasonable man standard, Chesternut was not seized before he discarded the drugs because a reasonable person would not conclude the police attempted to chase Chesternut simply by accelerating to catch up with him, followed by a short drive alongside him.


Basic, Inc. (Basic) was a publicly-traded company engaged in manufacturing related to the steel industry. Combustion, Inc. (Combustion), a similar company, had expressed interest in merging with Basic but had not done so because of antitrust concerns. Beginning in 1976, Combustion representatives had conversations with Basic representatives regarding the possibility of a merger. Throughout 1977 and 1978, Basic made several public statements denying rumors that these conversations were taking place. On December 18, 1978, Basic asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading of its stocks because it had been approached about a merger, and on December 19 Basic’s board approved the offer from Combustion.
The respondents in this case are former Basic stockholders who sold their stock after Basic’s first denial of merger conversations. They sued Basic and its director for making false or misleading statements in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which has to do with material facts relating to the purchase or sale of stocks. The plaintiffs argued that these statements artificially depressed the market for Basic’s stock, which injured the sellers. The district court certified the plaintiffs as a class and granted summary judgment for the company. The court held that the statements were immaterial because the conversations were not necessarily destined to become a merger agreement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that a company cannot disclose misleading information and that the conversations, although they might not have been material on their own, became so because they made the company’s statements untrue.

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Yes, yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 4-2 plurality. The Supreme Court held that there was no reason to artificially exclude merger conversations from the definition of materiality simply because they do not include specific prices. Instead, the materiality of a fact depends on its significance to “the reasonable investor.” The Court also held that it was impractical to require individuals to show a specific reliance on misleading information within an impersonal market. Therefore, it is reasonable for courts to use a presumption of reliance for the purpose of adjudicating such cases, though the presumption can be rebutted.
Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the majority opinion’s support for the presumption of reliance, or “fraud-on-the-market” theory, represented the Court taking a stance on economic policies that were beyond its purview. He also argued that, because Congress has not addressed the issue, the majority opinion should have refrained from doing so. Additionally, the facts of the case in question make it a poor candidate for such analysis because they indicate that the plaintiffs did not believe the supposedly misleading statements. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Anthony Kennedy did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.


R. Foster Winans wrote a column for the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) entitled Heard on the Street (Heard) in which he reported on up-and-coming stocks. In 1983, Winans entered into a scheme that entailed him sending information about the stocks to be featured in Heard to two friends who worked at a brokerage firm. When Heard featured a stock, it generally affected the actual price and quantity of the stock in the market. Over a four-month period, the brokers used Winans’ information regarding stocks yet to be featured in Heard to make trades that resulted in profits of around $690,000. When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation, Winans and his co-conspirator Carpenter confessed.
The district court found that Winans had breached the duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and found him and his co-conspirators guilty of mail and wire fraud as well as securities violations. The petitioners appealed and argued that, because the WSJ—the only alleged victim of the mail and wire fraud charges—had no interest in the stocks being traded, the conviction should be overturned. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the petitioners’ misappropriation of the upcoming publication schedule was sufficient to establish a case for mail and wire fraud. The Circuit court reasoned that the use of mail and wire services had a sufficient nexus to Winans' knowing breach of his duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and that this breach harmed the WSJ.

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Yes, yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court was evenly divided as to whether or not the Wall Street Journal’s lack of interest in the securities traded cleared petitioners of the charged crimes, and because of that split, the Court deferred to the appellate court’s judgment. The Court unanimously rejected petitioners’ arguments that they did not obtain any money or property from the WSJ and therefore that the state did not prove the required elements of the mail and wire fraud statutes. The Court held that the publication schedule and the contents of the column while being intangible, were still property sufficient to warrant a conviction. In addition, the Court rejected petitioners’ arguments that Winans’ actions were simply a violation of workplace rules and could amount to defrauding. The Court determined that the dissemination of the column via mail and wire was an essential part of petitioners’ scheme, which satisfied the final element of the mail and wire fraud statute.


North Dakota was a sparsely populated state, and as late as the mid-20th century some children were educated in crowded one-room schools. Since 1947, the legislature encouraged thinly populated school districts to reorganize themselves into larger districts; once reorganized, districts could only charge for transportation provisions with voter approval. Dickinson Public Schools chose not to participate in the reorganization. In 1973, the district began charging a fee for door-to-door bus service; about thirteen percent of students rode the bus, and the district charged their parents ninety-seven dollars a year for one child or one hundred fifty dollars a year for two children. In 1979, North Dakota enacted legislation expressly indicating that non-reorganized school districts could charge fees for transporting students.
Sarita Kadrmas, her mother Paula, and the rest of her family lived about sixteen miles from Sarita’s school. In September 1985, the family’s annual income was at or near the poverty level. Until 1985, the Kadrmas family agreed each year to pay the busing fee for Sarita, but they refused to sign a contract for the 1985 school year and the bus no longer stopped for Sarita. The Kadrmas family then used private transportation, but the costs exceeded $1,000 per school year.
In September 1985, Paula Kadrmas and other parents in the district filed an action in state court seeking to enjoin the Dickinson Public Schools and various school district officials from collecting any bus service fees. The district court rejected their action on the merits. On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, rejected Kadrmas’ argument that the busing fee violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It characterized the statute as purely economic legislation, concluding that the charges authorized by the statute were rationally related to the legitimate government objective of allocating limited resources. In the spring of 1987, while her appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was pending, the Kadrmas family signed a busing contract for the remainder of the 1986 school year and paid part of the fee. They also signed a contract for the 1987 school year.

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No, no, and no. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the Court held that North Dakota’s statute allowing non-reorganized schools to charge busing fees did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice O’Connor first rejected the district’s contention that Kadrmas’ was barred from appeal because her daughter was enjoying the benefits of the district’s bus service. She noted that the legislature authorized bus service through a different statute, and characterized the fee as a burden to Kadrmas, not a benefit. She also held that the case was not moot, in part because a decision in Kadrmas’ favor would relieve them from future assessments for bus service.
Justice O’Connor interpreted Kadrmas’ argument to mean that the busing fee unconstitutionally placed a greater obstacle to education on poorer families. Justice O’Connor disagreed that the Court must subject the statute to heightened scrutiny, in part because the government did not penalize Sarita for her parents’ conduct. Justice O’Connor also rejected Kadrmas’ argument that North Dakota was constitutionally barred from withholding bus services from those unable to pay because those services were especially important. Unlike court access and court remedies, North Dakota did not maintain a legal or practical monopoly on the means of transporting children to school. Moreover, the Kadrmas family could and did find a private alternative to the public school bus service.
Justice O’Connor also held that the statute did not violate equal protection by only allowing fees for bus service in non-reorganized schools. She wrote that Kadrmas failed to demonstrate that the statute was both arbitrary and irrational. The purpose of the statute was to encourage reorganization through the expansion of districts’ tax bases, and the fees existed to encourage voters to approve school district reorganization. She noted that voters in reorganized districts could approve bus service fees as well.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan. He characterized the majority’s ruling as a retreat from the promise of equal education opportunity. He argued that North Dakota’s actions placed a special burden on poor families in their pursuit of education and discriminated on the basis of economic status.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justice Harry Blackmun. He argued that once voters in a district decided whether or not to reorganize, there was no longer a rational basis for denying free bus transportation to students in that particular district.


A provision in the District of Columbia Code prohibited the display of signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy which tended to "bring that government into public odium or public disrepute." Congregations of three or more persons within the 500 feet limit were prohibited as well. Boos and others were denied permission to display signs criticizing the Soviet Union in front of that country's embassy.

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The Court found that the Code's restriction on sign displays violated the First Amendment while the ban on congregations did not. First, Justice O'Connor argued that the prohibition on signs failed to meet the high standards that the Court uses when evaluating the content-based regulation of political speech in a public forum. The "dignity" standard that the Code used was similar to the "outrageousness" standard which the Court found unconstitutional in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988) because it was too subjective. Second, O'Connor reasoned that since the language of the ban on congregations was narrowly drawn and could only be acted upon by the police in situations where a threat to security or peace were present, it did not prohibit peaceful gatherings.


Richard Shapero submitted a client solicitation letter to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission for approval. Shapero directed the letter at individuals who were about to lose their houses to foreclosure. The Commission found nothing false or misleading with the letter, but denied approval under a Kentucky Supreme Court rule, which prohibited direct mail advertisements “precipitated by a specific event” such as foreclosure. Shapero then sought an advisory opinion from the Kentucky Bar Association’s Committee on Legal Ethics. The committee upheld the Advertising Commission’s ruling. On review, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed.

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Yes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion, holding the Kentucky Supreme Court rule unconstitutional. The Supreme Court did not decide whether Shapero’s letter required First Amendment protections. The Court remanded the case for further consideration of that issue. Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurrence, stating that the question of whether Shapero’s letter required First Amendment protections should be left to state courts.


Sandra Schultz and Robert Braun both strongly opposed abortion and gathered like-minded citizens together to picket in front of the home of a local doctor who performed abortions. In response, the city of Brookfield, Wisconsin passed a law against all picketing in front of residential homes except for labor disputes. Following the advice of the town attorney, the city amended the law to ban labor picketing as well. The stated purpose of the law was "the protection and preservation of the home." When enacted, Schultz and Braun stopped picketing and filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the law violated the First Amendment. The court declared it would issue a permanent injunction against the law unless it was narrowed in scope. The United States Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the law violated the First Amendment.

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No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Court held that since the street constituted a traditional public forum, the ban must satisfy strict standards in order to remain. Since the ban is "content neutral," "leaves open ample alternative channels of communication," and serves a "significant government interest," the Court ruled that it passed the strict standards and could remain. The city government had a legitimate purpose in protecting the homes of its residents, and did so without favoring one idea over another or eliminating the ability to communicate an idea.


On April 16, 1985, Ronald William Roberson was arrested at the scene of a burglary. The arresting officer read him his Miranda rights, and Roberson asked to see an attorney before answering any questions. On April 19, while Roberson was still in custody on the burglary charge, a different officer, who was unaware that Roberson had requested counsel, interrogated him regarding a robbery that happened on April 15. During this questioning, Roberson gave an incriminating statement. At trial, the trial court suppressed the statement and held that his interrogation without his attorney present after he had requested one violated his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review.

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Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that, once a suspect has requested counsel, police cannot interrogate him unless he initiates the contact. The Fifth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s previous rulings on it are meant to serve as a bright-line rule for police officers. The Court also held that Roberson’s request for counsel was because of his discomfort with answering the police’s questions, and there is no reason to assume that discomfort would be case-specific.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy argued that a suspect does not need to be made aware of his Miranda rights more than once. When he has been told that he has the right to an attorney, he can choose whether or not to invoke that right in any investigation. Justice Kennedy argued that the majority created an unnecessary dichotomy between always allowing such statements or always excluding them, when in fact there should be a balance that depends on the situations in each case. This approach would protect law enforcement’s ability to investigate and the suspect’s rights. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


Myrna Friedman, a resident of Maryland, was hired at a law firm located in the state of Virginia. Virginia law made permanent residency a requirement for admission to the Virginia bar without taking the bar examination. After Friedman's appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was turned down, her claim was upheld in federal district court.

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In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Virginia's residency requirement was unconstitutional. The Court held that "'one of the privileges which the Clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State,'" and that the practice of law was sufficiently basic to the economy to be deemed a privilege protected by the Clause. The Court found that the regulation discriminated among otherwise equally qualified applicants solely on the basis of residency, failing to bear a close relation to a substantial state interest.


A Pennsylvania law required illegitimate children to prove paternity before seeking support from their fathers. The statute of limitations on suits seeking to establish paternity was six years from the birth of the illegitimate child. However, the state allowed legitimate children to seek support from their parents at any time. Cherlyn Clark sought child support from Gene Jeter, whom she claimed was the father of her daughter, Tiffany. Blood tests indicated that there was a 99.3% probability that Jeter indeed was Tiffany's father. A state court dismissed Clark's suit because it was initiated after the statute of limitations had expired.

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The Court found that the statute violated the Constitution. Citing the test which the Court developed in Mills v. Habluetzel (1982) to evaluate equal protection challenges to statutes of limitations in paternity suits, Justice O'Connor held that the Pennsylvania law did not "provide a reasonable opportunity to assert a claim on behalf of an illegitimate child." Furthermore, since, in some circumstances, Pennsylvania permitted paternity suits involving illegitimate children to be initiated after six years, there was no reason why the law in question was necessary to deter the litigation of "stale or fraudulent claims," a legitimate state interest.