A group of Michigan residents who were injured after taking Warner- Lambert's Rezulin diabetes drug sued the company in Michigan state court. The plaintiffs invoked a Michigan tort reform statue immunizing drug makers' liability for FDA-approved products unless the drug makers made misrepresentations to the agency. The federal district court that eventually heard the case dismissed it, ruling that the Michigan "fraud on the FDA" cause of action was preempted by a federal law that empowered the FDA itself to punish misrepresentations. The appeals court reversed, reasoning that the Michigan law did not provide retribution for misrepresentations themselves, but merely created a window for consumers to bring product liability claims where the product reached the market solely through the manufacturer's chicanery.

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The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was affirmed by an equally divided Court without issuing a written opinion. Chief Justice John G. Roberts took no part in the decision.


Knight v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Trustee Michael J. Knight hired a firm to provide investment-management advice to the William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust. The Trust deducted all of the fees paid for the investment-advice service from its tax return, but the IRS rejected the deduction. A provision in 26 U.S.C. 67(e) allows trusts to fully deduct certain administrative costs, but the IRS maintained that fees for investment-advice services fall outside the statute's scope. The tax court agreed with the IRS and ruled the fees nondeductible. Federal Courts of Appeals had come to opposite conclusions on the question.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the tax court. The court cited Section 67(e)'s requirement that a trust's fees are only fully deductible when they "would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such trust." The provision was meant to exempt special administrative expenses that are incurred by trusts. Therefore, the court ruled, costs that could possibly be incurred by individual taxpayers as well as trusts were never deductible in full. Since an individual could pay for investment-advice services, and since the individual's payment would not be fully deductable, Section 67(e) did not exempt a trust's payment for the same services.

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Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling, holding that if an expense incurred by a trust is the type that would also be incurred by an individual taxpayer, the expense is subject to the same limits on deduction applied to individual expenses. Roberts reasoned that the tax statute at issue required a court to decide whether an individual customarily would spend money on the type of service at issue; if so, the expense would not be fully deductible by a trust. The case was remanded for further proceedings.


Klein & Co. Futures, Inc. v. Board of Trade of the City of New York

In his role as chairman of a settlement committee of the Board of Trade of the City of New York, Norman Eisler allegedly manipulated the daily settlement prices of commodities futures in order to conceal bad investments. During this period Eisler's company purchased futures contracts through its broker, the commodity futures merchant Klein & Co. Futures, Inc., but the alleged price manipulation distorted Klein's appraisal of Eisler's ability to pay. When the scheme unravelled, Eisler's company could not meet its obligations and Klein was forced to absorb the loss.
Klein sued Eisler and the Board of Trade under Section 22 of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), claiming that the Board of Trade failed to enforce rules that would have prevented the manipulation. The CEA requires boards of trade to set rules governing the market, and Section 22 allows private parties to sue for failure to enforce the rules as long as the party was "engaged in any transaction" subject to the board's rules.
The U.S. District Court dismissed Klein's claim for lack of standing to sue, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Second Circuit interpreted Section 22 as including buyers and sellers of futures contracts but excluding the commodity futures merchants who conduct the actual trades on behalf of their customers. The court ruled that Klein's financial loss was not sufficient to grant it standing, because the loss was suffered in the aftermath of the futures trading and not during the trading itself.

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Dismissed pursuant to Rule 46 as a result of settlement.


The Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground in Alaska's Prince William Sound in 1989 while under the command of Joseph Hazelwood, a relapsed alcoholic. Exxon knew that Hazelwood had resumed drinking but did not relieve him of his post, and the ship eventually spilled 11 million gallons of oil into the ecologically sensitive sound. The jury calculated compensatory damages at $287 million, and then awarded $5 billion in punitive damages. The punitive award has been reviewed three times by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ultimately settled on a $2.5 billion figure. In a dissent from the full court's denial of rehearing in the third review of the award, Judge Alex Kozinski posited that any award, no matter its size, violated the maritime law rule that a ship owner need not pay for the reckless actions of an employee.

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Maybe and yes. With Justice Samuel Alito taking no part in the decision because he owns Exxon stock, the Court split evenly 4-4 on the issue of whether judges may award punitive damages against a company for employee misdeeds. Therefore, the Court left the Ninth Circuit's ruling that they can undisturbed, but noted that this affirmation could not be used as precedent because it merely reflected an even split in the Court. On the second issue, a 5-4 majority held that judges are free to create remedies in maritime cases where Congress has not legislated in the area. However, this freedom can be lost if Congress passes legislation restraining such judicial activism. Justice David Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing with the Court's application of punitive damages precedent but arguing that those prior holdings were in error. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, stating that Congress, not the courts, should be the sole body entrusted with determining the permissibility of punitive damages. Justice Stephen Breyer also concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the punitive damages in this case should have been reduced.


Crawford v. Marion County Election Board

In 2005, the Indiana Legislature passed a law requiring all voters who cast a ballot in person to present a photo ID issued by the United States or the State of Indiana. Plaintiffs including the local Democratic Party and interest groups representing minority and elderly citizens argued that the law constituted an undue burden on the right to vote. At trial, the plaintiffs did not produce any witnesses who claimed they would be unable to meet the law's requirements. The district court and the court of appeals both upheld the law. However, the three-judge appellate panel was deeply divided. Dissenting Judge Terrence Evans claimed that the law was a thinly-veiled attempt to dampen turnout by those likely to vote for Democratic candidates.

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By a vote of 6 to 3, the Court upheld the law, concluding that the photo I.D. requirement was closely related to Indiana's legitimate state interests in preventing voter fraud. The slight burden the law imposed on voters' rights did not outweigh these interests, which the Court characterized as "neutral and nondiscriminatory." Although there was no majority opinion, the Court's decision included concurring opinions written by Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia. Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent.


Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.

In 2003, Piccadilly Cafeterias filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy petition in federal court in Florida asking the bankruptcy court for permission to auction off its assets in order to fund a reorganization plan. Piccadilly sought a tax exemption under 11 U.S.C. 1146(c) which states that certain asset transfers "under a [confirmed Chapter 11] plan may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax." Florida vehemently opposed this exemption and sought to collect $32,000 in taxes from Piccadilly.
The bankruptcy court, the district court, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit all found in favor of Piccadilly, holding that 11 U.S.C. 1146(c) allowed courts to exempt from taxes pre-confirmation asset sales that were essential to the completion of a reorganization plan. In urging the Court to grant certiorari, Florida pointed to both Third and Fourth Circuit decisions holding that such pre-confirmation asset sales were subject to state taxation, while Piccadilly Cafeterias contended that these so-called "circuit splits" only involve a small handful of cases and require no resolution by the Court.

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No. The Court held 7-2 that the plain meaning of the statute indicates that it only applies to confirmed asset sales, not "pre-confirmation" sales. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas noted Congress' use of the phrase "plan confirmed" in Sec. 1146(c), as well as the statute's placement in a sub-chapter titled "Postconfirmation Matters," to hold that the tax exemption should only be applied after a plan has been confirmed. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented, interpreting this same language to mean that the tax break should apply to asset sales that are subsequently confirmed, even if they were not confirmed at the time the sales were made.


Provisions of the District of Columbia Code made it illegal to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibited the registration of handguns, though the chief of police could issue one-year licenses for handguns. The Code also contained provisions that required owners of lawfully registered firearms to keep them unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or other similar device unless the firearms were located in a place of business or being used for legal recreational activities.
Dick Anthony Heller was a D.C. special police officer who was authorized to carry a handgun while on duty. He applied for a one-year license for a handgun he wished to keep at home, but his application was denied. Heller sued the District of Columbia. He sought an injunction against the enforcement of the relevant parts of the Code and argued that they violated his Second Amendment right to keep a functional firearm in his home without a license. The district court dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep firearms in the home for the purpose of self-defense, and the District of Columbia’s requirement that firearms kept in the home be nonfunctional violated that right.

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The ban on registering handguns and the requirement to keep guns in the home disassembled or nonfunctional with a trigger lock mechanism violate the Second Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the first clause of the Second Amendment that references a “militia” is a prefatory clause that does not limit the operative clause of the Amendment. Additionally, the term “militia” should not be confined to those serving in the military, because at the time the term referred to all able-bodied men who were capable of being called to such service. To read the Amendment as limiting the right to bear arms only to those in a governed military force would be to create exactly the type of state-sponsored force against which the Amendment was meant to protect people. Because the text of the Amendment should be read in the manner that gives greatest effect to the plain meaning it would have had at the time it was written, the operative clause should be read to “guarantee an individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” This reading is also in line with legal writing of the time and subsequent scholarship. Therefore, banning handguns, an entire class of arms that is commonly used for protection purposes, and prohibiting firearms from being kept functional in the home, the area traditionally in need of protection, violates the Second Amendment.
In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the Second Amendment does not create an unlimited right to possess guns for self-defense purposes. Instead, the most natural reading of the the Amendment is that it protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes but does not curtail the legislature’s power to regulate nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons. Justice Stevens argued that the Amendment states its purpose specifically in relation to state militias and does not address the right to use firearms in self-defense, which is particularly striking in light of similar state provisions from the same time that do so. Justice Stevens also notes that “the people” does not enlarge the protected group beyond the context of service in a state-regulated militia. This reading is in line with legal writing of the time that contextualizes the Amendment in relation to state militias and post-enactment legislative history. Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined in the dissent. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Second Amendment protects militia-related, not self-defense-related, interests, and it does not provide absolute protection from government intervention in these interests. Historical evidence from the time of ratification indicates that colonial laws regulated the storage and use of firearms in the home. Justice Breyer argued that the Court should adopt an interest-balancing test to determine when the government interests were sufficiently weighty to justify the proposed regulation. In this case, because the interest-balancing turns on the type of analysis that the legislature, not the court, is best positioned to make, the Court should defer to the legislature and uphold the restrictions. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined in the dissent.


Samson Dada, a Nigerian citizen, entered the United States in 1998 and overstayed his temporary visa. Dada married a U.S. citizen which made him eligible for permanent residence under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Dada's wife failed to provide the required documentation. In 2004 the government found Dada removable. An immigration judge granted Dada's request for voluntary departure. Before the window to leave the country closed, Dada filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In so doing, he asked that the voluntary departure order be withdrawn, to avoid the 10-year bar on future re-entry that accompanies a failure to leave the country within the allotted time. The Bureau of Immigration Affairs denied the request.
Dada appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It upheld the denial. Because Dada's voluntary departure period had expired, the appeals court found Dada subject to the 10-year bar on future re-entry.

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No. Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by four other Justices, stated that an alien has two options in such a case: he may abide by the terms of the voluntary departure and leave the country on time, maintaining the re-entry perks, or withdraw the voluntary departure request and remain in the country to pursue the motion to reopen. If the alien chooses the second option, he may become subject to deportation proceedings. While the Court acknowledged that the opinion still leaves a difficult decision for aliens, it prevents them from reaping the benefits of the voluntary departure option while evading its terms to pursue continuing legal action against the government. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, arguing that once an alien agrees to depart voluntarily he should have no right to withdraw that agreement. Justice Samuel A. Alito also filed a separate dissent suggesting that it should be within the discretion of the Board of Immigration Appeals, not the Court, to permit or deny the withdrawal of an alien's voluntary departure agreement.


Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn

During a company-wide reduction in force, Sprint fired fifty-one-year-old employee Ellen Mendelsohn. Mendelsohn sued, alleging that Sprint had discriminated against her on account of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. At the trial, Mendelsohn attempted to present evidence from other Sprint employees who alleged that they were also discriminated against by the company. This type of testimony by employees who are not parties to the case is sometimes called "me, too" testimony. The District Court judge refused to admit the testimony, citing the "same supervisor" rule. Since the other employees did not share a supervisor with Mendelsohn, their testimony was not relevant to the alleged discriminatory intent behind the decision to fire her.
The jury returned a verdict for Sprint, but on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial. The Tenth Circuit held that the "same supervisor" rule applies only to discriminatory disciplinary actions and not to suits alleging a company-wide policy of discrimination. The Tenth Circuit held that the "me, too" testimony was relevant because the other employees were similarly situated and fired around the same time, and it held that the testimony was important enough that its exclusion had denied Mendelsohn an opportunity to present her allegation of company-wide discrimination. The ruling conflicted with those of several other Circuit Courts which approved the exclusion of "me, too" testimony.

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In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Tenth Circuit, according to the Court, acted incorrectly when it engaged in its own assessment of the relevance and prejudicial effect of the witness testimony. Instead, the Court said, because the district court's basis for ruling on the evidence was unclear, the Tenth Circuit should have remanded the case for clarification before finding that a per se rule of exclusion had been applied. The Court sent the case back to the Tenth Circuit and instructed it to follow this procedure.


Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party

The State of Washington reconstructed its primary election system according to Initiative 872, which was passed into law by a majority general vote in 2004. The initiative was endorsed by the Washington State Grange and created a new "modified blanket primary" system where each candidate on the ballot could affiliate with the party of his choosing regardless of whether the party approved of his candidacy. Political parties claimed that this system violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free association, arguing that control over which candidates to endorse constituted an essential function of association. The Grange argued that the primary was nonpartisan.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a District Court decision, ruling that since "party designation is a powerful, partisan message that voters may rely upon in casting a vote," Initiative 872 "constitutes a severe burden upon the parties' associational rights." (The case was consolidated with Washington v. Washington State Republican Party for argument before the Supreme Court.)

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In a 7-2 opinion, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and held the party affiliation provision constitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas explained that the state law never referred to the candidates as nominees of any particular party. Rather, the nominees were simply asserting which party they preferred to be associated with, and the Court found no convincing evidence that this association would lead voters to believe that the particular party actually endorsed the nominee. Chief Justice John G. Roberts concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Samuel Alito. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy.


United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co.

In 2000, the IRS announced it was admitting the unconstitutionality of a 1978 coal export tax. In response, Clintwood Elkhorn Mining brought suit to recover funds paid, plus interest, under the unconstitutional tax scheme between the years 1994 and 1999. Clintwood sought recovery under the Export Clause of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C Section 1491, which applies a six-year statute of limitations to claims and makes no mention of interest payments. The government argued that such claims must be brought under the Tax Code, which allows interest but applies a three-year statute of limitations.
Both the Court of Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit allowed the Tucker Act claims, but the circuit court overruled the federal claims court's decision denying interest payments. In urging the Court to review both conclusions, the government contended that the Federal Circuit's ruling was at odds with other circuit decisions prohibiting Tucker Act claims under similar circumstances.

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In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., the Court refused to pay Clintwood refunds for the unconstitutionally levied taxes. The Court stated that the remedy for taxes imposed in violation of the Export Clause is the same as for any other unlawful tax: filing a timely administrative refund claim. Until taxpayers exhaust this avenue, they are prohibited from bringing a direct suit against the government.


Homero Gonzalez was tried with a co-defendant on several drug-related charges. He pled not guilty and opted for a jury trial. When jury selection began, a magistrate judge who had presided over several pretrial matters announced that she would conduct voir dire, and sought consent from the parties. Attorneys for the government and for Gonzalez expressly agreed. Gonzalez, who was being assisted by a translator, was not directly asked to consent, nor did he affirmatively object. He argued on appeal that he had the right to a new trial because he did not give his personal consent for a magistrate to conduct the jury interviews.

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The Court held 8-1 that express consent by counsel suffices to permit a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial, stating that such "scheduling matters" are among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. Seven Justices formed the majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy with Justice Antonin Scalia concurring in the judgment and Justice Clarence Thomas dissenting.


When Michael Greenlaw was convicted of several drug and firearm offenses in federal court, the prosecution argued that he should receive a mandatory minimum sentencing hike because he had been convicted of two counts under the federal gun law. The district judge, in a decision incorrect under the Supreme Court's holding in Deal v. United States, reasoned that the mandatory minimum should not apply because the second offense was not the result of a separate, pre-existing indictment.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit vacated the sentence and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to apply the mandatory minimum. In seeking certiorari, Greenlaw argued that the Eight Circuit had ignored substantial high court precedent holding that an appellate court may not order a higher criminal sentence without a government request to do so. Greenlaw further sought clarification of two related issues: whether the lack of a government appeal deprives the appellate court of authority as a matter of jurisdiction or merely as a custom of practice, and whether such appellate court discretion is allowable under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which allows courts to consider plain errors even when the parties do not raise them. The Solicitor General, while agreeing with Greenlaw that the Eighth Circuit erred, urged the Court to grant certiorari and remand the case for further briefing in order to give the appellate court an opportunity to revisit its holding.

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No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court stated that the Eighth Circuit could not order the district court to increase Greenlaw's sentence without a request from the government to do so. The Court pointed to several of its precedents for the rule that a remedy in favor the appellee, in this case the government, can only be justified if the appellee brings a cross-appeal. Because the government did not cross-appeal in this case, the Eight Circuit overstepped its bounds by ordering the sentencing hike. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens and in part by Justice Stephen Breyer, dissented, arguing that the cross-appeal rule was merely a rule of practice for the appellate courts, not a limitation on their power. Although Breyer joined parts of the dissent, he ultimately sided with the majority in a concurring opinion, recognizing that the cross-appeal rule is merely one of practice but finding no grounds on which to make an exception to that rule in this case.


In 2002 Lakhdar Boumediene and five other Algerian natives were seized by Bosnian police when U.S. intelligence officers suspected their involvement in a plot to attack the U.S. embassy there. The U.S. government classified the men as enemy combatants in the war on terror and detained them at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, which is located on land that the U.S. leases from Cuba. Boumediene filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging violations of the Constitution's Due Process Clause, various statutes and treaties, the common law, and international law. The District Court judge granted the government's motion to have all of the claims dismissed on the ground that Boumediene, as an alien detained at an overseas military base, had no right to a habeas petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal but the Supreme Court reversed in Rasul v. Bush, which held that the habeas statute extends to non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo.
In 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The Act eliminates federal courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas applications from detainees who have been designated (according to procedures established in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005) as enemy combatants. When the case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit for the second time, the detainees argued that the MCA did not apply to their petitions, and that if it did, it was unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause. The Suspension Clause reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the government on both points. It cited language in the MCA applying the law to "all cases, without exception" that pertain to aspects of detention. One of the purposes of the MCA, according to the Circuit Court, was to overrule the Supreme Court's opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which had allowed petitions like Boumediene's to go forward. The D.C. Circuit held that the Suspension Clause only protects the writ of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789, and that the writ would not have been understood in 1789 to apply to an overseas military base leased from a foreign government. Constitutional rights do not apply to aliens outside of the United States, the court held, and the leased military base in Cuba does not qualify as inside the geographic borders of the U.S. In a rare reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari after initially denying review three months earlier.

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A five-justice majority answered yes to each of these questions. The opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, stated that if the MCA is considered valid its legislative history requires that the detainees' cases be dismissed. However, the Court went on to state that because the procedures laid out in the Detainee Treatment Act are not adequate substitutes for the habeas writ, the MCA operates as an unconstitutional suspension of that writ. The detainees were not barred from seeking habeas or invoking the Suspension Clause merely because they had been designated as enemy combatants or held at Guantanamo Bay. The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's ruling and found in favor of the detainees. Justice David H. Souter concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia filed separate dissenting opinions.


CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Georgia State Board of Equalization

The Tax Injunction Act establishes a general rule that federal courts will not interfere with matters of state taxation, but the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act) provides an exception for railroads. In an effort to prevent state tax discrimination against railroads, Section 306 of the 4-R Act requires that the ratio of the assessed value to the true market value of railroad property not exceed by more than five percent the ratio of assessed value to true market value for all other commercial and industrial property in the assessment jurisdiction. This calculation requires that states determine the "true market value" of the railroads' property - a valuation that can be subjective. Using a new valuation methodology, the Georgia State Board of Equalization appraised the property of the railroad company CSX Transportation, Inc. at $8.2 billion. CSX filed a complaint under the 4-R Act, noting that the old appraisal methodology would have valued the property at only $6 billion. Despite CSX's argument that the 4-R Act allows railroads to challenge state valuation methods, the district court ruled that the only the state's methodology could be considered.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that in the absence of a clear statement in the 4-R Act, principles of federalism weighed against interpreting the Act to give railroads additional power to challenge the taxing authority of the states in federal court. The Circuit Court stood by the general principle that federal courts should not interfere with state taxation policies. Since the 4-R Act did not allow challenges to the state's choice of valuation method, CSX could not bring its arguments that Georgia's methodology was faulty.

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The Court reversed the 11th Circuit in a unanimous decision. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. stated that courts cannot blindly accept the states' market valuations without potentially endorsing the type of discriminatory tax practices that the 4-R Act was designed to thwart. The Court also rejected Georgia's state sovereignty argument, holding that tax valuation methods are technical tools utilized by state employees, not expressions of state policy.


Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture

Anup Engquist, a woman of Indian descent, brought this action against the Oregon Department of Agriculture alleging that a co-worker at the Department harassed her and eventually engineered her termination. Although Engquist asserted numerous claims, a jury in the federal district court only found in her favor on her equal protection, substantive due process, and intentional interference with employment claims.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck those jury verdicts. Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court had previously dealt with such "class of one" equal protection claims eight years ago in a case, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, involving a village resident suing the village for unjustified zoning decisions, it refused to apply that short, two-page opinion to Engquist's claim. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Olech opinion may only apply when the government is in the role of regulator and did not clarify whether it would also apply in an employment context such as this one. In seeking Court review, Engquist noted the pervasive splits in the circuits regarding the proper allocation of the Court's decision in Olech, while Oregon claimed that Olech should be construed narrowly so as to avoid a deluge of petty cases against the government. Oregon also pointed out that even if the case were to be heard, Oregon would have qualified immunity and Engquist would necessarily lose.

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No, it does not. The Court ruled 6-3 that the "class-of-one" theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context. The government enjoys significantly greater leeway in dealing with employees than it does with the public at large in its capacity as a regulator. Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote the majority opinion.Justice John Paul Stevens authored a dissent.


Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown

After the California legislature passed laws prohibiting the use of state funds to "assist, promote, or deter union organizing," a group of California companies brought suit claiming the state laws were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 7. The Act provides that companies' anti-labor speech can only be considered evidence of unfair labor practice if it threatens or coerces workers. The California companies argued that the state laws infringe upon their "safe harbor" for anti-labor speech embodied in the Act.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, after entering two panel decisions holding the California law preempted, issued a split en banc opinion holding that it was not. The Second Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion on similar facts. The Court's decision in this case will affect roughly a dozen other states currently considering adopting legislation substantially similar to the California law.

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Yes. In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held the California laws preempted by the National Labor Relations Act because the state laws regulated within "a zone protected and reserved for market freedom." Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Court, viewed the Act as showing a "congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management." Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the California laws dealt with funding, not regulation, and did not impermissibly discourage labor-related speech. Employers are still free under the laws to spend their own money on such speech.


A Louisiana court found Patrick Kennedy guilty of raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter. Louisiana law allows the district attorney to seek the death penalty for defendants found guilty of raping children under the age of twelve. The prosecutor sought, and the jury awarded, such a sentence; Kennedy appealed.
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of the death sentence, noting that although the U.S. Supreme Court had struck down capital punishment for rape of an adult woman in Coker v. Georgia, that ruling did not apply when the victim was a child. Rather the Louisiana high court applied a balancing test set out by the Court in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, first examining whether there is a national consensus on the punishment and then considering whether the court would find the punishment excessive. In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court felt that the adoption of similar laws in five other states, coupled with the unique vulnerability of children, justified imposing the death penalty.
In seeking certiorari, Kennedy argued that five states do not constitute a "national consensus" for the purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis, that Coker v. Georgia should apply to all rapes regardless of the age of the victim, and that the law was unfair in its application, singling out black child rapists for death at a significantly higher rate than whites.

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Yes. In a 5-4 decision the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars states from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the child's death. Applying the death penalty in such a case would be an exercise of "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of a national consensus on the issue. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, dissented. In his view, no national consensus existed prohibiting the death penalty in this case, and he vehemently opposed the majority's application of a "blanket rule" barring the death penalty in child rape cases regardless of the facts of the case, including the age of the child, the sadistic nature of the crime, and the number of times the child has been raped.


New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres

New York trial court judges are appointed by way of a "district convention system." Under this system, political party members elect delegates, who in turn vote for judicial candidates nominated at party conventions. Margarita Lopez Torres sought appointment to a New York Supreme Court but did not have a political party's endorsement. Lopez Torres claimed that the system unconstitutionally obstructed judicial appointments by making candidates reliant upon political parties. The New York Board of Elections defended the system, arguing that it did not bar voters from participating because they had the opportunity to elect delegates.
A District Court found that the system unnecessarily and excessively restricted elections. It cited the absence of a "single successful challenge to candidates backed by the party leaders." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that the system gave political party officials too much power and violated voters' and candidates' First Amendment rights to freedom of association.

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In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court reversed the Second Circuit, finding that the election scheme did not implicate Lopez Torres' rights under the First Amendment. What constituted a "fair shot" at obtaining the nomination, according to the Court, was a reasonable enough question for legislative judgment, which the Court would accept so long as it did not too much infringe upon a party's associational rights. The Court maintained that the First Amendment did not compel any substantive change in New York's practice of electing judicial officials.


Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.

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The Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, affirmed the Seventh Circuit and held that the ACCA amendment should be read literally and should apply only when civil rights had been rescinded and later restored. Although Ginsburg admitted the amendment might result in disparate treatment of criminals under the Act, she declined to offer a clarifying interpretation of the ACCA, stating that it was unclear what subset of criminals Congress intended to treat leniently by using the "civil rights restored" language.


When Keith Burgess pleaded guilty to a drug distribution charge in 2003, the government requested that his statutory minimum sentence be increased from ten to twenty years. The government based this request on 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(A), which requires such a sentencing hike for defendants with prior felony drug convictions. The statute defined "felony drug offense" as any felony under any provision of the statute or any other federal law. Burgess argued that this definition conflicts with 21 U.S.C. Section 802(13) which requires that a felony drug offense be punishable by imprisonment for more than a year. Therefore, any enhancement of his sentence must be barred unless both statutory definitions are fulfilled. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected Burgess' argument, the D.C. Circuit reached the opposite conclusion based on similar facts in 2004.

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The Court upheld the sentencing hike, stating that the definition of a felony drug offense in 12 U.S.C. 841 as punishable by imprisonment for more than one year was controlling regardless of whether South Carolina classified the offense as a felony or a misdemeanor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that the definition of "felony drug offense" in the statute does not incorporate any other definition of "felony" under federal or state law.


Humberto Fidel Regaldo Cuellar was apprehended in 2004 driving a Volkwagen Beetle crawling 30 miles below the speed limit on a main artery through Texas to Mexico. When police pulled Cuellar over, they discovered that he had logged about 1,000 miles in the past two days stopping in major cities along the way for just hours each time. When questioned, Cuellar acted nervously; he later turned over a large roll of cash that smelled like marijuana. When police examined the car, they found drill marks suggesting tampering with the gas tank, as well as mud splashings and animal hair typical of efforts to conceal the existence of contraband. Police found $83,000 in cash in a secret compartment beneath the floorboard. Cuellar was convicted of money laundering, but the appeals court overturned the conviction. The court ruled that the federal money laundering statute required the government to prove that Cuellar was attempting to portray the money he carried as legitimate wealth, rather than merely showing that he tried to hide it.

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Neither. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court answered this question by taking the middle ground, holding that the statute contains no "legitimate wealth" requirement but also holding that mere proof that the defendant was attempting to conceal the money is not enough to uphold a conviction. In reversing Cuellar's conviction, the Court relied on the language of the statute providing that the transportation's purpose must have been to conceal not just the money itself but its nature, location, source, ownership, or control. The Court found that prosecutors had failed to prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.


When Dwayne Giles was tried in state court for the murder of his ex-girlfriend, he claimed self-defense. Giles stated that he had heard her vow to hurt him and a friend, and that she had previously shot a man and threatened people with knives. The prosecution then introduced evidence of a conversation between Giles' ex-girlfriend and police in which she claimed that he had assaulted her and threatened to kill her. The district court eventually convicted Giles of murder.
On appeal, Giles argued that use of the police conversation violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, namely, his deceased ex-girlfriend. The California Supreme Court held that Giles had waived this right because he was the cause of his ex-girlfriend's absence. Although this exclusion was justified under common law rules of "forfeiture by wrongdoing", the Supreme Court had greatly constrained the admissibility of such evidence in its 2004 holding in Crawford v. Washington. Crawford essentially wiped out the admissibility of such out-of-court statements unless the testimony could be subject to cross-examination at trial, an option that would be impossible under these circumstances. This case gives the Court an opportunity to expand on its decision in Crawford and to apply it to a situation where the wrongdoing that kept the witness from appearing in court was not motivated by a desire to prevent the witness' testimony.

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Yes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception only applies to situations where the defendant causes the witness' absence with the intention of preventing that witness from testifying at trial. Without this intention, any act by the defendant making the witness unavailable does not waive that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witness, and therefore any out-of-court statements made by the witness are inadmissible as evidence. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion stressing his belief that statements such as those made by the witness in this case should not implicate the Confrontation Clause at all because the police questioning was not a "formalized dialogue." Justice Samuel Alito also wrote a concurring opinion suggesting that the witness' statements, in his view, did not fall within the Confrontation Clause but noting that neither party had made this argument before the Court. Justice David Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred in all parts of the majority opinion except one section denouncing the dissenting argument. Justice Souter stated that he did not find the dissent as wrongheaded as the majority suggested.
The dissent, written by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Anthony Kennedy, argued that a defendant loses his right to confrontation when he makes a witness unavailable due to his own wrongdoing, even if he did not act with the specific intention of preventing her from testifying at trial.


Quanta Computer, Inc., et al. v. LG Electronics, Inc.

LG Electronics owned patents for a group of products, including microprocessor chips used in personal computers. It licensed the patents to Intel, but in a well-publicized separate agreement excluded from the license any Intel customer that integrated the chip with non-Intel components. One purchaser disregarded the agreement and used the chips in computers made for Dell, Hewlett-Packard and Gateway. LG Electronics sued those who passed the chips down the line of commerce to companies that had not purchased licenses.

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The Court concluded unanimously that it could not. Writing for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas relied on the theory of "patent exhaustion," which provides that a patented item's initial authorized sale terminates all patent rights to that item, denying LGE royalties from companies down the line of commerce.


When Gino Rodriquez was released from prison on supervision, he promptly absconded and was later found with $900 cash, heroin and a gun. Prosecutors argued that Rodriquez was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which applies to those convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm if they have a total of three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. Rodriquez had two California burglary convictions. Prosecutors argued that the third required conviction was supplied by Rodriquez's Washington drug offenses. Although none of the three drug convictions, on their own, was considered "serious," the second and third were repeat offenses and therefore punishable by ten-year sentences sufficient to qualify as serious under the federal career criminal law.

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Yes. The Court held 6-3 that although the elements of a particular crime may not be considered "serious," a defendant's prior record will have a considerable bearing on making the determination. A crime's seriousness may be greatly enhanced when its maximum sentence is increased due to the defendant's prior convictions for similar or related crimes.


While a student at the University of Iowa, Brian Gall was involved in a drug ring distributing ecstasy (methylenedioxymethamphetamine, MDMA). He voluntarily left the drug conspiracy and moved to Arizona where he started his own business and led a crime-free life. When federal agents tracked him down, he turned himself in and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. The government argued for a sentence of 30 months in prison, which was the minimum sentence in the range recommended for the offense by the federal sentencing guidelines. Taking into account the mitigating circumstances in Gall's case, the judge instead decided to depart from the guidelines and impose a sentence of 36 months of probation. (The Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the sentencing guidelines to be merely advisory, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Eighth Circuit held that while the guidelines are not mandatory, sentences that fall outside of the recommended sentencing range must overcome a presumption of unreasonableness. Sentences varying from the guidelines must be justified based on the circumstances of the case, and larger variances from the guidelines require correspondingly more compelling justifications. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the district court had erred by using Gall's youth as a mitigating factor, by overweighing his rehabilitation, and by underweighing the seriousness of the crime. Since the "extraordinary variance" was not justified by a finding of extraordinary circumstances, the Eighth Circuit ordered a new sentence.

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The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 ruling, reversed the appellate court and held that, under Booker, federal courts have the authority to set any reasonable sentence as long as they explain their reasoning. The Court made clear that Booker had removed the Guidelines from their earlier status as the primary determinate of a defendant's punishment, reaffirming the Guidelines' advisory status. The opinion was penned by Justice Stevens, with Justices David Souter and Antonin Scalia filing opinions concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito were the sole dissenters.


Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis

When calculating gross income for tax purposes, the Internal Revenue Code exempts from taxation the interest earned on any state or local bond. However, Kentucky law requires that interest income earned on bonds issued by other states be taxed as part of an individual's adjusted gross income. George and Catherine Davis filed a class action complaint arguing that Kentucky's policy of taxing out-of-state bonds was in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause - the doctrine that the Commerce Clause forbids states from interfering with interstate commerce. The state trial court ruled in favor of the Kentucky Department of Revenue and declared the tax policy constitutional.
On appeal, the Davises stressed Kentucky's market discrimination against other states as a factor indicating that the policy was unconstitutional. In response, the Department of Revenue cited a similar policy that was upheld by state courts in Ohio. The Department also invoked the "market participant doctrine," which stands for the idea that only the state's actions as a regulator are subject to the dormant Commerce Clause. Actions undertaken as a market participant, such as the issuance of bonds, are not. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and struck down the tax policy. The Court of Appeals held that the tax discrimination rather than the bond issuance was at issue, and the taxation was indisputably undertaken in the state's capacity as a regulator. The court concluded that the Commerce Clause was incompatible with such a discriminatory state policy.

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No. The Court held 7-2 that Kentucky's differential tax scheme does not offend the Commerce Clause. No single opinion commanded a majority. Bond proceeds are a "quintessentially public function," the Court noted, and are therefore likely motivated by legitimate state objectives other than simple economic protectionism. These objectives outweigh any negative effect the tax may have on interstate commerce.


When British Petroleum (BP) wanted to build a natural gas transfer facility on the New Jersey side of the Delaware River, the State of Delaware objected that the pier construction would require the dredging of underwater lands it considered part of its coastal zone. Delaware denied BP a permit for the construction despite the fact that most of the construction would take place on the New Jersey side of the river. New Jersey granted the permit, arguing that a 1905 compact between the States settling a boundary dispute placed the construction site under New Jersey control. New Jersey filed a claim to settle the dispute and the case went directly to the Court under its original jurisdiction to hear disputes between two States.

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The Court held 6-2 that the 1905 compact between the States did not give New Jersey exclusive control over the construction project. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the Court, stated that Delaware acted within its authority in denying unreasonable uses of the river and soil within the lands it controls under the compact. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in, and Justice Antonin Scalia dissented from, the majority's opinion.Justice Stephen G. Breyer recused himself.


Virginia police stopped David Lee Moore after receiving a radio call alerting them that he was driving on a suspended license. State law specified the procedure for punishing that infraction: issuance of a citation and summons to appear in court. The officers instead decided to arrest Moore. After reading Moore his Miranda rights, they asked for and received consent to search his hotel room. Once they arrived at the room, they decided to search his person and discovered sixteen grams of crack cocaine. Moore was then charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
At trial court, Moore's attorney sought to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court allowed the evidence to be presented and Moore was convicted. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the introduction of the cocaine evidence at trial was unconstitutional.

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The Court held unanimously that the search did not violate Moore's constitutional rights. Writing for an eight justice majority (with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurring), Justice Antonin Scalia stated that the existence of probable cause gives an arresting officer the right to perform a reasonable search of the accused to ensure the officer's safety and to safeguard evidence. States may impose stricter search and seizure requirements, Scalia wrote, but "when states go above the Fourth Amendment minimum, the Constitution's protections concerning search and seizure remain the same."


Hendrick Humphries, an African-American, was an associate manager at a Cracker Barrel restaurant owned by CBOCS. After he was fired, Humphries filed a lawsuit claiming discrimination and retaliation under 42 USC Section 1981. Humphries alleged that retaliation took many forms of abuse by his superiors. Section 1981, which derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, states in part that "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."
Humphries lost his case in federal district court but on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Section 1981 protects against retaliation.

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Yes, Section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. The 7-2 decision, written by Justice Stephen Breyer, relied heavily on the concept of stare decisis, or adherence to prior Court decisions, in reaching its conclusion. Justice Breyer maintained that the historical interpretation of Section 1981 by the Court, as well as the legislative history leading up to the enactment of the law, placed a heavy burden on anyone arguing against including retaliation claims within the scope of Section 1981, and the burden was not met in this case. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Antonin Scalia joined.


In 1987, the United States Attorney General precleared a local Alabama law providing for a special election to fill vacancies on the Mobile County Commission, an exception to the usual procedure of gubernatorial appointment. The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the election violated the Alabama Constitution, so in response the Alabama Legislature passed an act explicitly allowing local laws to establish such an election. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the new state law failed to revive the local law. The plaintiffs, a group of Alabama residents, brought this suit in federal court alleging that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required the State of Alabama to preclear the two decisions of the Supreme Court in an action against the Governor of Alabama.
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama found for the plaintiffs, stating that because the local law was the most recent precleared practice put into effect with the 1987 special election, it was the baseline from which to determine if there was a change. Because the Alabama Supreme Court had rendered the local law invalid and the state law unenforceable, the two decisions represented changes that should have been precleared before being implemented.

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No. The Court characterized the Alabama law permitting the local elections as a "temporary misapplication of state law" and held that such a law was not in "force or effect" even if actually implemented by state election officials. Because the law never gained force or effect, it did not represent a change from the baseline and therefore Alabama's reinstatement of its prior practice did not require preclearance. The 7-2 opinion was written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg with a dissent by Justice John Paul Stevens in which Justice David Souter joined.


Greg Herrick, the owner of one of two F-45s, a rare 1930s vintage airplane, in existence filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking the plans and specifications for the craft from the Federal Aviation Administration. After the FAA refused to turn over the plans as "protected trade secrets," Herrick filed suit against the FAA to recover the plans. The district court found for the FAA, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Subsequently, roughly a month later, Brent Taylor, represented by Herrick's attorney, filed another FOIA request seeking the plans. When the request was again denied, Taylor also filed suit in federal court in the District of Columbia.
The district court determined that Taylor had been "virtually represented" by Herrick in the first suit and therefore could not pursue the second suit in federal court. This judgment was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In seeking Supreme Court review, Taylor argued the D.C. Circuit's finding that Taylor and Herrick enjoyed a close enough relationship for virtual representation to apply conflicted with several other circuits requiring a much closer nexus to block the second claim. Opposing certiorari, Fairchild Corp. (the airplane manufacturer) arguing on behalf of the FAA, claimed that Taylor had overstated the circuit splits. It also pointed out that, because Taylor and Herrick were collaborating on the plane restoration and were represented by the same attorney, the logical conclusion was that they were attempting to relitigate the same issue.

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No. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that such "nonparty preclusion" runs up against the "deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court." Virtual representation should only be applied rarely and under certain exceptions to the general rule, none of which the Court found applicable in this case. The D.C. Circuit's decision was vacated and the case sent back to the district court for a new trial.


Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.

Stoneridge Investment Partners alleged that the cable company Charter Communications had fraudulently inflated the price of its stock. The alleged scheme involved a "sham transaction" in which Charter gave its equipment vendor, Scientific-Atlanta, above-normal payments for T.V. set-top boxes and the vendor then gave back the extra payments as advertising fees. Charter then fraudulently accounted the returned payments as revenue. Stoneridge sued both Charter and Scientific-Atlanta under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but the district court threw out the claim against Scientific- Atlanta. The court ruled that Stoneridge's claim against the vendor was only a claim for aiding and abetting fraud.
The Supreme Court had ruled in Central Bank of Denver v. First International Bank of Denver that Section 10(b) punishes only deceptive conduct itself, not aiding and abetting such conduct. However, the Court that secondary actors such as banks, lawyers, and accountants can be considered violators of Section 10(b) if they engage in deceptive conduct along with the primary actor. On appeal, Stoneridge argued that Scientific-Atlanta qualified as a primary violator of Section 10(b). Scientific-Atlanta countered that it had not participated in Charter's fraudulent accounting practices, and, in contrast to Charter, it had made no false public statements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled for Scientific Atlanta. The Circuit Court held that the vendor could at most be accused of aiding and abetting Charter's deception, and such claims are not allowed under Section 10(b) according to the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank.

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The Court held that, under Central Bank and Section 10(b), securities fraud plaintiffs cannot sue "aiders and abettors" like Scientific-Atlanta. The Court noted Congress' subsequent failure to create a right of private action against aiders and abettors in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act for support of its position that no such right should be allowed in the present case. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, reading Central Bank as allowing the claim against Scientific-Atlanta because, in this case, it had actually undertaken plainly deceptive acts.


In 2004, Richard Irizarry pleaded guilty to threatening his ex-wife. The district court sentenced Irizarry to five years, the maximum sentence allowed by law. The court imposed this sentence, which is six months longer than the sentence prescribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, because it felt Irizarry was likely to continue to threaten his ex-wife.
Irizarry appealed, arguing that the district court violated Rule 32(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by not giving advance notice that it was considering a ground for departure not identified in the presentence report or a prehearing government submission. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected this claim, stating that the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in U.S. v. Booker had made the guidelines advisory as opposed to mandatory. In imposing a harsher sentence than that suggested by the federal guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, the district judge had merely varied the federal rules, not departed from them.

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No. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the five-justice majority, held that advance warning of a sentence departing from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is unnecessary after Booker, which made the guidelines advisory. If the guidelines were still mandatory, Stevens argued, advance warning might be required. Justice Stephen J. Breyer, joined by three other Justices, dissented.


Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.

Toy manufacturer Mattel was sued by its landlord Hall Street Associates in a dispute over a property lease. After the litigation went to federal court both parties agreed to resolve the case by arbitration according to the procedures outlined in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Atypically, the parties' arbitration agreement stipulated that the District Court could override the arbitrator's decision if "the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous." This provision of the agreement granted the federal courts a much broader role in supervising the arbitration than is specifically granted in the FAA. The Act explicitly mentions only a narrow set of circumstances under which courts can override an arbitration award, such as corruption, partiality, or misbehavior on the part of the arbitrator.
The arbitrator heard the parties' arguments and handed down a decision in favor of Mattel. Hall sought review from the District Court, and that court found that the arbitrator's decision contained legally erroneous conclusions. Accordingly, the arbitrator ruled for Hall Street, and the District Court affirmed.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the original arbitration award favoring Mattel must stand. Even if the arbitrator did make legal errors, it was not the place of the courts to review the soundness of the arbitrator's decision. The Ninth Circuit viewed the FAA's list of circumstances meriting judicial review as an exclusive list. As far as the original arbitration agreement expanded the scope of judicial review of the arbitration, the agreement could not be enforced.

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In a 6-3 opinion, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit ruling and held that the provisions of the FAA are exclusive and cannot be expanded through contractual agreement. Writing for the majority, Justice David Souter pointed to words such as "must" and "unless" in the FAA as evidence that its provisions were intended to be mandatory and incapable of modification by the parties. Therefore, the Court upheld the arbitrator's award in favor of Mattel.
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the FAA's central purpose-ensuring the enforcement of arbitration agreements-made judicial review necessary in this case. Justice Stephen Breyer also filed a separate dissent.


For his role in running an illegal lottery or "bolita," Efrain Santos was convicted on charges of illegal gambling and money laundering. Santos had used income from the lottery to pay both the winners and the couriers and collectors who worked for the gambling operation. The money laundering charges were based on 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1), which criminalizes the use of the "proceeds" of an illegal activity to promote or conceal that activity. However, federal courts disagreed on the meaning of "proceeds." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had ruled that the proceeds used in money laundering can be any of the gross income obtained from the illegal activity, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which had jurisdiction over Santos's case, had recently ruled that only net income (gross revenues minus expenses) used to promote or conceal illegal activities can be the basis of a money laundering conviction. Because Santos had only used gross revenues to promote his lottery, the District Court reversed the convictions.
The government argued on appeal that the Seventh Circuit's interpretation would put too great a burden on prosecutions, because the bookkeeping of criminal operations is often purposefully incomplete or misleading in order to obscure the distinction between gross and net income. The narrow interpretation would also restrict money laundering prosecutions to criminal enterprises that are actually profitable. Santos countered that the government's broad interpretation would result in overlapping convictions for a wide variety of offenders charged with both money laundering and the underlying crime. He argued that the government's interpretation strayed too far from the traditional understanding of money laundering, which focuses on the subsequent disguising of profits obtained from a criminal venture. The Seventh Circuit ruled for Santos and affirmed its original ruling.

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Splitting 5 to 4, the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, answering that "proceeds" refers to "net income" or profits and not to "gross income." Because the statute nowhere defines the term "proceeds", the plurality applied the so-called rule of lenity which requires such ambiguous statutes to be interpreted in favor of defendants. Justice Antonin Scalia announced the judgment and wrote a plurality opinion for himself and three other justices. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justices Anthony Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer.


Michael Watson was arrested for trading illegal drugs for an unloaded semi-automatic pistol. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 262 months in prison. Since Watson's crime involved a gun, his sentence included an additional 60 months. The extra jail time was imposed under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which punishes any drug trafficker who "uses or carries" a firearm during a drug deal. In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court had ruled that a defendant who trades a gun for drugs "uses" it for purposes of the statute. However, the Court clarified in Bailey v. United States that "use" means "active employment" of a firearm; mere possession of the firearm does not necessarily constitute use.
On appeal, Watson argued that the firearm was not used in his case. He stressed that the gun was never loaded and was in his possession for only moments before he was arrested. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Watson's arguments and affirmed the lower court. Following Circuit precedents, it ruled that Watson had used the gun under the statute's meaning of "use."

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Property owners in Cook County, Illinois neglected to pay their tax bills and the county acquired liens on their real estate. John Bridge and Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. mailed competing bids for the real estate liens when they were auctioned off by the county. Property liens are distributed proportionally to the parties seeking the lowest penalty from the original owner. After Bridge and Phoenix tied for the best bid, they were required to mail affidavits to the county stating that they were bidding in their own names and were not related to any other bidders. Subsequently, Phoenix filed suit against Bridge claiming the affidavits he sent were false and hid the fact that he was actually in collusion with other bidders, thereby obtaining more than his fair share of the liens. The district court held Phoenix lacked standing because Bridge had made the false statements to the county, not Phoenix.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that Phoenix had suffered injury in fact proximately caused by Bridge. In seeking certiorari, Bridge noted splits between the circuits on the issue of whether a plaintiff must plead and prove reliance on a false statement in a RICO claim. Although Phoenix suggested that proximate cause, not reliance or standing, was the ultimate issue in this case, the Court has decided to frame its review around the reliance issue.

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Yes, they may. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held in favor of Phoenix, stating that a plaintiff bringing a RICO claim based on mail fraud does not need to show that it actually relied on the defendant's misrepresentations. Plaintiffs do not lack standing merely because the false statements were made to a third party.


Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y. v. Tom F.

The Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) guarantees students with disabilities a "free appropriate public education." Tom Freston enrolled his son Gilbert in a private school for students with special needs, because the New York City school district was unable to establish an adequate "individualized education program." The school district reimbursed Freston for the private school tuition. After two years the school district offered to place Gilbert in another public school, but Freston chose to keep his son in private school and again sought tuition reimbursement from the district.
A U.S. district court ruled that the school district was not required by the IDEA to reimburse Freston, because Gilbert had never been enrolled in public school. The relevant section of the IDEA authorizes tuition reimbursement to the parents of a disabled child "who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency," but it does not explicitly state that parents of children who have never received public education are not entitled to reimbursement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court. By comparing the disputed section of the IDEA with other sections of the statute, the Second Circuit reasoned that the IDEA was not meant to deny reimbursement to students who have never been enrolled in public school. To rule otherwise, the Circuit Court held, would be to require parents like Freston to enroll children in inadequate public schools in order to be eligible for tuition reimbursement.

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The Court's role in the case proved to be anticlimactic. Justice Anthony Kennedy took no part in consideration of the case, leaving the eight remaining Justices to split evenly 4-4, affirming the judgment of the Second Circuit. This result leaves open the issue of reimbursements for private school placements under the IDEA when parents reject a public school placement and the child has not received special education services in the public school.


In 2005, the former manager for Alex Ferrer, television's Judge Alex, sued him to recover alleged unpaid commissions. The management contract at issue specifically called for all such disputes to be arbitrated out of court. Judge Alex responded by filing a complaint with California's labor commissioner charging that the management contract was illegal because the manager had actually been serving as an unlicensed talent agent in violation of California law. The commissioner, who has exclusive jurisdiction over talent agency disputes, said that he lacked authority to stop the arbitration. When Judge Alex filed suit in state court, the court stopped the arbitration.

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The Court disagreed with the California Labor Commissioner's assessment and allowed the arbitration to continue. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for an 8-1 majority, stated that the California law granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Labor Commission was superseded by the Federal Arbitration Act because the parties to this case had agreed to arbitrate any contractual disputes. Therefore, it was the function of an arbitrator, not the Labor Commission, to determine the legality of the management contract. Justice Clarence Thomas issued the sole dissent.


Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc.

In 1996, the Federal Communications Commission moved to require long-distance carriers to compensate pay-phone companies for so-called coinless phone calls. Last year, the Supreme Court ruled in Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., that pay-phone operators could sue for greater compensation. This case arose when APCC Services brought such a suit against Sprint seeking compensation for coinless long-distance calls. Sprint argued that APCC had no stake in the outcome of the case because, under the terms of the assignment, any compensation from a favorable judgment or settlement would go directly to the pay-phone companies, not "intermediary" companies such as APCC.
The district court initially dismissed APCC's suit, but the court eventually reversed itself, concluding that it was sufficient that the assignment transferred legal title to the claim rather than merely transferring power of attorney. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed, concluding that, as a matter of law, the assignment of a legal right to bring a claim gives the assignee a personal stake in the litigation sufficient to confer standing.

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Yes. In a close 5-4 ruling, the Court held that third-party companies like APCC have standing to pursue legal claims that have been assigned to them, even when they must then pass along any proceeds from the litigation to the pay-phone operators who hired them. The Court based its ruling on the "history and precedent" of assignees brining legal claims on behalf of others, and found that Sprint had not made any convincing arguments for departing from that history in this case. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, filed a dissenting opinion. Roberts referred to the historical precedent relied on by the majority as "at best, equivocal." Because APCC was required to pass the proceeds from the lawsuit onto the pay-phone operators, it had "nothing to gain" from the suit. Roberts therefore argued that the case should be dismissed.


Ahmad Edwards was arrested in Indiana after stealing a pair of shoes and shooting an FBI agent, a store security guard, and a bystander. Edwards was initially found mentally incompetent but, after five years of psychiatric evaluation, was put on trial for attempted murder. After his first trial resulted in a hung jury, Edwards asked to represent himself at his retrial. This request was initially granted by the trial court but was overturned when the court found that, although Edwards was competent to stand trial, he was unable to conduct a coherent defense. This ruling was supported by Edwards' filing of rambling and irrelevant documents during the proceedings.
After his conviction on all counts, Edwards appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation had been abrogated by the trial court. The Indiana high court noted that two Supreme Court decisions, Godinez v. Moran 509 U.S. 389 (1993), which held that a defendant is competent to defend himself if he is competent to stand trial, and Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which held that a defendant need only be "literate, competent, and understanding" to represent himself, argued in favor of Edwards' right to self-representation while another, Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California 528 U.S. 152 (2000), holding that the modern availability of lawyers undercuts the need for self-representation, argued against it. The Indiana Supreme Court eventually held that Godinez and Faretta required it to overturn the trial court's decision.

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No. In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not forbid states from insisting upon representation for those competent to stand trial but who suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. The Court noted that Faretta only affirmed the right to self representation when the individual "voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so," and therefore does not apply when that individual's mental competency is called into question. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented, stating that in his view the Constitution does not permit a state to substitute its own perception of fairness for the defendant's right to make his own case before the jury, even if the defendant does have questionable mental competence.


Michael Williams was convicted in federal district court of "pandering" (promoting) child pornography. The PROTECT Act proscribes the pandering of "any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe" that the material is illegal child pornography. The Act represents Congress's attempt to outlaw sexually explicit images of children - including both images of real children and computer-generated images of realistic virtual children. The Supreme Court struck down Congress's previous effort as overbroad in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Council, because the law as written could have outlawed artwork that was neither obscene nor child pornography. Williams argued that the PROTECT Act was similarly overbroad, but the district court held that the government can legitimately outlaw the pandering of material as child pornography, even if the material is not in fact child pornography.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court and struck down the PROTECT Act as unconstitutionally overbroad. The Eleventh Circuit was unmoved by the government's argument that prosecuting the promotion of virtual child pornography as real is necessary to combat the child porn market. The Circuit Court held that the Act's prohibition was broad enough to include any "braggart, exaggerator, or outright liar" who claims in a non-commercial context to have child pornography but actually does not. Thus, the Act's pandering provision prohibited protected speech as well as actual child pornography.

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No. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a seven-Justice majority, held that the statute was not overly broad as written. Justice Scalia noted specifically that offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection, and he characterized the speech of an individual claiming to be in possession of child pornography in this category of unprotected speech. He also stated that the law did not violate Due Process because its requirements were clear and could be understood by courts, juries and potential violators. Justice David Souter filed the only dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined.


John R. Sand & Gravel Company v. United States

John R. Sand & Gravel Company had leased the rights to mine sand and gravel on a piece of Michigan property that also contained an old landfill. After thousands of drums of illegally-buried industrial waste were discovered in the landfill, the EPA started a clean-up operation. In 1994 the EPA erected a security fence around its operations. Although John R. Sand kept mining other parts of the property, the fence blocked certain mining sites. John R. Sand's ability to mine the area was still impeded after the EPA moved the fence in 1998. In 2002 John R. Sand brought suit against the government, arguing that the restrictions on its operations amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking of property. The Tucker Act waives the government's sovereign immunity for such suits, but the Act has a six-year statute of limitations. John R. Sand argued that the issue in its claim originated in 1998 when the EPA moved its fence and for the first time obtained an order granting it unrestrained access to the property. The government countered that the claim actually accrued back in 1994 when the fence first went up, which would make the suit untimely. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that the suit was timely, but it also ruled that the government was not liable for a Fifth Amendment taking.
In John R. Sand's appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the issue of the statute of limitations was raised again - not by either of the parties, but by a group of corporations who were not parties to the case. Citing its own precedents, the Federal Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations was jurisdictional. Jurisdictional requirements determine whether courts can hear a case. They cannot be waived by the parties to the case, and courts can consider jurisdictional issues on the courts' own initiative. The Federal Circuit ruled that John R. Sand's claim accrued no later than 1994. Since the suit fell outside the time limit, the Federal Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction and it dismissed the case without considering the merits of the Fifth Amendment claim.

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In a seven-member majority opinion written by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court upheld the Federal Circuit ruling that the statute of limitations was "jurisdictional," or a predicate for court authority. Breyer referred to roughly five decades of the Court's case law to determine that the doctrine of stare decisis required it to follow the time limit and dismiss John R. Sand's claim. Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed separate dissenting opinions, each essentially reading the case law in a different light and determining that it had established a more flexible standard for applying statutes of limitation to suits against the government.


Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County

The California Legislature deregulated the power industry in 1996, establishing a so-called "spot market" in which utilities purchased electricity on the day it was needed. Four years later, during an exceptionally hot summer, wholesale electricity prices skyrocketed. In response, several utilities on the Western power grid determined that they could no longer afford the spot market, and instead negotiated less expensive but still inflated long-term contracts with power suppliers. Once the crisis passed, the utilities asked the government to let them change the contracts to reflect newly lowered electricity prices. The government refused, citing a longstanding Supreme Court doctrine presuming that utilities' contracts are reasonable. The Ninth Circuit ultimately ordered the government to permit the changes.

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Renegotiation is allowed only if the contract poses "serious harm to the public interest." In this case, the Court decided 5-2 (Justices John G. Roberts and Stephen Breyer took no part in the decision) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had failed to make sufficient factual findings in order to determine whether such serious harm could in fact occur. Therefore, the Court sent the case back down to the Ninth Circuit in order to provide an opportunity to revisit these factual findings. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion stating that she believed the Court should have waited to hear the case until all the facts had been uncovered. However, because the case was heard when it was, she felt obliged to agree with the majority's reasoning. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice David Souter, dissented, arguing that Congress, not the courts, should set the standards regarding the reasonableness of public contracts.


The case arises from competing claims to more than $30 million, the rewards of an investment former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos made with Merrill Lynch and subsequently misappropriated. A Philippine agency charged with recovering the funds, several Marcos family creditors, and human rights victims who had already secured a judgment against Marcos' estate each laid claim to the money, prompting Merrill Lynch to file an interpleader action to settle all of the claims in one case. The Philippine government, acting in concert with the recovery agency, claimed that it had sovereign immunity from suit and, because it was an indispensable party to the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), justice required that the case be stayed and brought before a special Philippine court established to return such misappropriated funds to the public treasury. However, the district court continued to adjudicate the case, eventually awarding the assets to the creditors.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the award, noting that the government's claim was barred by the applicable Philippine statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit further held that the "equity and good conscience" requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) did not require the Philippine government's participation in the case. In its petition for certiorari, the Philippine government argued that the award of assets undermined the comity principles of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) by not including the government as an indispensable party.

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Yes it did. The Court's opinion was unanimous in finding that the Philippine government was a required party to the case under Rule 19(b). Such a required party must be joined to the suit if it is "feasible," and the Court ruled that the government's inclusion was feasible in this case. The Court sent the case back to the district court with instructions to dismiss the interpleader action. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter concurred in part and dissented in part.


Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff

Richlin Security Service contracted with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide guards at Los Angeles International Airport. After discovering that the guards had been misclassified by the federal government and subsequently underpaid for a period of years, Richlin brought a successful suit to recover the lost wages. In seeking reimbursement for fees associated with the proceedings, Richlin sought to recover fees for paralegal services at market rates. Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 504, Richlin was entitled to "fees and other expenses incurred in the proceedings." Based on this language, the Board of Review determined that paralegal fees should be billed as a calculable cost to the firm and, therefore, should not be recoverable at market rates.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this decision, noting that the lack of a cap for paralegal fees could entice legal professionals to shift much of the work to them in order to maximize profits. Petitioners note, in urging the Court to grant certiorari, that a previous Court decision, Missouri v. Jenkins 491 U.S. 274 (1989), as well as several Eleventh Circuit decisions have reached the opposite result and have awarded paralegal fees at market rates.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court held that such paralegal fees are recoverable at market rates. Justice Samuel A. Alito stated that because Richlin incurred fees for paralegal services in connection with its case, a straightforward reading of the statute demonstrates that Richlin was entitled to recover fees for the paralegal services it purchased at the market rate. The Court found the government's argument that only "reasonable costs" should be recovered unpersuasive.


A group of employees brought this action following a job transfer they believed to be based on age discrimination. The employees filed a grievance with their union, including the age discrimination issues but also asserting that the transfer violated their collective bargaining agreement. The union pursued the employees' collective bargaining claim through Penn Plaza's arbitration system; however, the employees themselves pursued their age discrimination claim in federal court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Penn Plaza argued that the arbitration clause included in the employment contract, stating that all age discrimination claims must be pursued through arbitration, prevented the employees from bringing the claim in federal court. The district court ruled in favor of the employees, holding the arbitration clause unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, relying on its previous decisions holding that arbitration clauses with respect to statutory claims, such as the ADEA, are unenforceable.

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Yes. The Supreme Court held that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that ,here, the arbitration provision was a "bargained-for exchange" in the collective bargaining agreement and thus should not be interfered with by the courts. The Court went on to state that because the ADEA itself did not mandate such interference, the arbitration provision should be enforced.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He noted that the majority opinion was a departure from Supreme Court precedent with respect to arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements. He went on to state that it was it was Congress' responsibility to reassess the policy arguments favoring arbitration rather than for the Supreme Court to decide. Justice David H. Souter also wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer. He reemphasized that Supreme Court precedent did not preclude the pursuit of an ADEA claim because of an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement, as in this case.