A defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent can be barred under the doctrine of assignor estoppel from asserting a defense of invalidity if, and only if, the assignor’s claim of invalidity contradicts explicit or implicit representations the assignor made in assigning the patent. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.
The doctrine of assignor estoppel dates back to late 18th-century England, and the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized and approved it in American jurisprudence in Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924). The doctrine is grounded in a principle of fairness, that an inventor should not be able to assert invalidity of a patent he assigned but can merely argue about how to construe the patent’s claims.
The Court refused to abandon the doctrine of assignor estoppel entirely, finding that doing so would have broad effects that contradict many of the Court’s precedents. Moreover, the principle of fairness that originally grounded the doctrine applies equally still. Specifically, when an inventor warrants that a patent claim is valid and then assigns it to another, his denial of the validity violates norms of equitable dealing. However, to fully serve that purpose of fairness, the doctrine has its limits. If the assignor did not make explicit or implicit representations that conflict with the invalidity defense, there is no ground for applying assignor estoppel. In this case, the Federal Circuit erred by not considering whether Hologic’s new claim was materially broader than the ones Truckai had assigned, which would mean that Truckai could not have warranted its validity when making the assignment.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority avoids answering the essential threshold question whether Westinghouse should be overruled and thus cannot answer the question presented in the petition in this case. Justice Alito would therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the majority recrafted a rule of assignor estoppel entirely different from that in Westinghouse. Because the Patent Act of 1952 does not incorporate the doctrine of assignor estoppel, Justice Barrett would hold the doctrine no longer applies.


HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining LLC v. Renewable Fuels Association

Congress amended the Clean Air Act through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in an effort to reduce the nation’s dependence on fossil fuels. The legislation set certain targets for replacing fossil fuels with renewable fuels but created several exemptions, including one for small refineries if compliance in a given year would impose disproportionate economic hardship.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated three different orders granting extensions of the small refinery exemption, but these orders were not made publicly available. A group of renewable fuels producers challenged the orders, alleging that the orders exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority. The Tenth Circuit agreed, finding that a small refinery may obtain an exemption only when it had received uninterrupted, continuous extensions of the exemption for every year since 2011.

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A small refinery that previously received a hardship exemption may obtain an “extension” under §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) even if it saw a lapse in exemption coverage in a previous year. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion.
Although the key term “extension” is not defined in the statute, three textual clues indicate that it means an extension in time. The plain meaning of the word “extension” in a temporal sense does not require unbroken continuity. Without modifiers like “successive” or “consecutive,” nothing in the statute suggests that a lapse in coverage precludes the extension.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Barrett argued that the question before the Court is simply whether the provision limits the EPA to prolonging exemptions currently in place, or instead allows the EPA to provide exemptions to refineries that lack them. Justice Barrett concluded that the text and structure of the statute make clear that the EPA cannot “extend” an exemption that a refinery no longer has.


Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation

For over a century after the Alaska Purchase in 1867, the federal government had no settled policy on recognition of Alaska Native groups as Indian tribes. In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which authorized the creation of two types of corporations to receive money and land: Alaska Native Regional Corporations and Alaska Native Village Corporations (collectively ANCs).
In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) to “help Indian tribes assume responsibility for aid programs that benefit their members.” ISDA defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.”
In 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Title V of which makes certain funds available to the recognized governing bodies of any "Indian Tribe" as that term is defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA). The Department of the Treasury concluded that ANCs were eligible to receive Title V funds.
Six federally recognized tribes in Alaska and twelve federally recognized tribes in the lower 48 states challenged that determination, arguing that ANCs are not “Indian Tribes” within the meaning of the CARES Act or ISDA. Although the government conceded that ANCs have not been historically recognized as eligible for special programs and services because of their status as Indians, it nevertheless argued that Congress expressly included ANCs within the ISDA definition.
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that ANCs must qualify as Indian tribes to give effect to their express inclusion in the ISDA definition, even though no ANC has been recognized as an Indian tribe. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that ANCs are not eligible for funding under Title V of the CARES Act because they are not “recognized” as Indian tribes.

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Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) are “Indian tribe[s]” under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) and thus eligible for funding available to “Tribal governments” under Title V of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.
The majority determined that under the plain meaning of the ISDA, ANCs are Indian tribes. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) is the only statute the ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition mentions by name, so eligibility for ANCSA’s benefits satisfies the definition’s final “recognized-as-eligible” clause. The respondents failed to demonstrate that the phrase “Indian tribe” is a term of art that should exclude ANCs, and none of their other arguments for reading “Indian tribes” as exclusive of ANCs were persuasive.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Elena Kagan. Justice Gorsuch argued that the plain language and construction of the ISDA suggest that ANCs are not “Indian tribes,” supported by analogy to another statute with “nearly identical language in remarkably similar contexts,” and that the majority overlooked the critical statutory word “recognized.”


Tarahrick Terry pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a “detectable” amount of cocaine base (3.9 grams), thus triggering the penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Based on his prior convictions, the statutory term of imprisonment was 0 to 30 years, and the district court sentenced him to 188 months’ imprisonment with 6 years’ supervised release.
Terry moved for a sentence reduction on the basis that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the weight ceiling of § 841(b) from 5 grams of cocaine base to 28 grams. The district court denied his motion, concluding that Terry did not commit a “covered offense” and thus was not eligible for relief under the First Step Act, which made retroactive the statutory penalties for certain offenses committed before August 3, 2010. Because the Fair Sentencing Act did not expressly amend § 841(b)(1)(C), Terry’s offense was not a “covered offense.”
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

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Crack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) do not have a “covered offense” under Section 404 of the First Step Act because a sentence reduction under the Act is available only if an offender’s prior conviction of a crack cocaine offense triggered a mandatory minimum sentence. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court.
An offender is eligible for a sentence reduction only if he previously received “a sentence for a covered offense,” which the Act defines as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by” certain provisions in the Fair Sentencing Act. The Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties only for offenses that triggered mandatory-minimum penalties. Because Terry was convicted for an offense that does not have a mandatory minimum, his offense was not a “covered offense” and thus was not eligible for a sentence reduction under the Act.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. She expressly declined to join the majority’s “sanitized” description of the history of penalties for crack offenses and pointed out that because Terry was both convicted under subparagraph (C) and sentenced as a career offender, he never had a chance to ask for a sentence that reflects today’s understanding of the lesser severity of his crime, and he never will get that chance without action by the political branches.


Refugio Palomar-Santiago, a Mexican national, was granted permanent resident status in the United States in 1990. In 1991, he was convicted of a felony DUI in California, and he was subsequently deported because a DUI is a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and felony DUI is an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided in United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001), that a DUI is not a crime of violence and later held that classification to apply retroactively. United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2013).
Palomar-Santiago returned to live in the United States, this time without authorization. He was indicted for illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He moved to dismiss the indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), which requires a district court to dismiss a § 1326 indictment if the defendant proves (1) he exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) he was deprived of the opportunity for judicial review at the deportation hearing; and (3) that the deportation order was fundamentally unfair. However, under Ninth Circuit precedent, a defendant does not need to prove the first two elements if he can show the crime underlying the original removal was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and does not need to show the third element if he can show the removal should not have occurred at all.
The district court held that Palomar-Santiago met his burden in showing his crime was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and that he was wrongfully removed from the United States. On appeal, the federal government disputed that circuit precedent required the result the district court reached but argued that the precedent is wrong. Lacking authority to overturn circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed without addressing the merits of the government’s claims.

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A defendant seeking dismissal of a prior deportation order must prove each statutory requirement for bringing such a collateral attack. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Section 1326(d) requires that defendants charged with unlawful reentry “may not” challenge their underlying removal orders “unless” they “demonstrat[e]” each of three conditions. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation to the contrary—that the first two elements are not required if the noncitizen was removed for an offense that should not have rendered him removable—is incompatible with the text of that provision. The first element, exhaustion of administrative remedies, exists “precisely so noncitizens can challenge the substance of immigration judges’ decisions.” Additionally, all of the requirements apply regardless of whether the defendant alleges the removal order was procedurally flawed or substantively invalid.


Joshua James Cooley was parked in his pickup truck on the side of a road within the Crow Reservation in Montana when Officer James Saylor of the Crow Tribe approached his truck in the early hours of the morning. During their exchange, the officer assumed, based on Cooley’s appearance, that Cooley did not belong to a Native American tribe, but he did not ask Cooley or otherwise verify this conclusion. During their conversation, the officer grew suspicious that Cooley was engaged in unlawful activity and detained him to conduct a search of his truck, where he found evidence of methamphetamine. Meanwhile, the officer called for assistance from county officers because Cooley “seemed to be non-Native.”
Cooley was charged with weapons and drug offenses in violation of federal law. He moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that Saylor was acting outside the scope of his jurisdiction as a Crow Tribe law enforcement officer when he seized Cooley, in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”). The district court granted Cooley’s motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Saylor, a tribal officer, lacked jurisdiction to detain Cooley, a non-Native person, without first making any attempt to determine whether he was Native.

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A tribal police officer has the authority to detain temporarily and to search a non-tribe member traveling on a public right-of-way running through a reservation for potential violations of state or federal law. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Native American tribes are “distinct, independent political communities” exercising a “unique and limited” sovereign authority within the United States. Among the limitations is the general lack of inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal members. However, the Court recognized two exceptions to this rule in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). First, a tribe may regulate the activities of non-tribal members “who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” Second, a tribe may “exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” The authority at issue in this case aligns with the second exception “almost like a glove.” None of the policing provisions Congress has enacted fit the circumstances of this case as well as the Court’s understanding in Montana, and particularly the second exception. Rather, legislation and executive action appear to assume that tribes retain the detention authority presented in this case.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion noting that his agreement is limited to a narrow reading of the Court’s holding.


This is an ongoing case of original jurisdiction, the facts of which are explained here. In sum, the case involves a water-rights dispute between Georgia and Florida over the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin.

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Florida failed to establish that Georgia’s overconsumption of interstate waters was either a substantial factor contributing to, or the sole cause of, Florida’s injuries. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion on behalf of the unanimous Court.
To succeed on its claim, Florida must show by the heightened “clear and convincing evidence” that the harm it suffered—collapse of its oyster fisheries—was caused by Georgia’s overconsumption. The record evidence establishes at most that increased salinity and predation contributed to the collapse of Florida’s fisheries, not that Georgia’s overconsumption caused the increased salinity and predation. Thus, Florida failed to meet its burden of persuasion, so its exceptions to the findings of the Special Master’s report are overruled, and the case is dismissed.


The Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717Z, permits private companies to exercise the federal government’s power to take property by eminent domain, subject to certain jurisdictional requirements. PennEast Pipeline Co. obtained federal approval to build a pipeline through Pennsylvania and New Jersey and sued under the NGA to gain access to the properties along the pipeline route, of which the State of New Jersey owns 42. New Jersey sought dismissal of PennEast’s lawsuits for lack of jurisdiction based on the state’s sovereign immunity and, separately, because PennEast failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the NGA.
The district court ruled in favor of PennEast and granted a preliminary injunctive relief for immediate access to the properties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated, finding that while the NGA delegates the federal government’s eminent-domain power, it does not abrogate state sovereign immunity. PennEast’s lawsuits are thus barred by Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

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Section 717(h) of the Natural Gas Act authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to delegate to a private company the power to condemn all necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or states. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.
States are generally immune from lawsuits unless they have consented or Congress has abrogated their immunity. With respect to the federal eminent domain power, the states waived their sovereign immunity when they ratified the Constitution. That power carries with it the ability to condemn property in court. Because the Natural Gas Act delegates the federal eminent domain power to private parties, those parties can initiate condemnation proceedings, including against state-owned property. This understanding is consistent with the nation’s history and the Court’s precedents. Thus, PennEast’s condemnation of New Jersey land to build the pipeline does not offend state sovereignty.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Joining Justice Barrett’s dissenting opinion in full, Justice Gorsuch added only a clarification that states have two federal-law immunities from suit: structural immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The lower court should consider whether either type of immunity bars the suit.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined. Justice Barrett argued that Congress’s power to strip states of their sovereign immunity is extremely limited, and there is no reason to treat private condemnation actions as within one of those limited exceptions.