Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Company

The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company operated in the “Official territory,” along with several other railroad companies (Northern lines). Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Company and several other railroad companies (Southern lines) operated within the “Southern territory." Beginning on July 17, 1947, the Northern lines tried to obtain new divisions of the freight rates that applied between the Official territory and Southern territory from the Interstate Commerce Commission. These proposed divisions would be based on actual, relative costs of service.
The Commission determined that the existing divisions violated the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), which directed the Commission to set aside inequitable divisions of joint rates and to prescribe equitable divisions. In determining the relative costs that controlled the divisional formula, the Commission frequently relied on unadjusted average costs incurred by the railroads on the average of all traffic in their territories, and not on actual costs incurred by the Northern and Southern lines. The Commission found that the existing divisions violated the ICA because they allocated a lesser share of revenues to the Northern lines based on relative costs.
The Administrative Procedure Act required that courts set aside agency findings that are unsupported by substantial evidence. On appeal from the Commission’s decision, the district court set aside the Commission’s decision. It held that the Northern lines failed to prove that the Commission relied on substantial evidence about the relative costs of handling north-south freight traffic, noting that the burden of proof lay with the Northern lines. It also rejected the Commission’s finding that the divisions required adjustment due to the greater revenue needs of the Northern lines.

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Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court held that the district court properly set aside the Commission’s ruling due to a lack of substantial evidence. Justice Douglas argued that deferring to the Commission’s decision -- despite the lack of solid evidence on record regarding North-South traffic -- would in effect give final deference to the Commission’s expertise and allow no room for review. He explored the Commission’s findings of fact, questioning the Commission’s seemingly contradictory conclusions about the effect of suburban passenger operations on freight service costs. Justice Douglas rejected the petitioners’ argument that these costs must be considered to keep railroads solvent because the present question was about costs, not revenue.
Justice Douglas acknowledged that the Northern lines generally return more empty shuttle boxcars per year than the Southern lines, and that Detroit requires shipments of 800,000 carloads of automobile parts each year. He pointed, however, to the Commission’s failure to clearly connect the costs associated with returning empty cars with this higher volume of traffic.


Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corporation v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission

The Secretary of the Interior is responsible for the maintenance of national parks and for providing the facilities necessary to allow the public to enjoy them. In the performance of this duty, the Office of the Secretary of the Interior contracted Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp (UISC) to provide guided tours of the National Mall on minibuses that visitors may board and disembark at various sites. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (WMATC) sued to enjoin UISC from conducting tours without obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity from the WMATC. The district court dismissed the suit, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed without opinion.

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Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that Congress granted sole authority over contracts for services at national parks to the Secretary of the Interior. Any alternative interpretation of the statute would require a dual authority scheme that has no evidence of congressional intent.
In his dissent, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the Supreme Court should not interfere in matters of local law in the District of Columbia. He argued that this case did not present a constitutional issue but rather an issue of local law that should not have been reviewed by the Supreme Court. Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.
Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


California's Criminal Syndicalism Act prohibited advocating, teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime or unlawful acts of violence or terrorism. John Harris, a socialist, was indicted under the statute. Harris claimed the law had a "chilling effect" on his freedom of speech. After a California state court upheld Harris' conviction, a federal district court struck down the Act because of vagueness and overbreadth.

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In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that "settled doctrines" of federalism narrowly confined the availability of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions. Specifically, the Court found that a federal court could not properly enjoin enforcement of a statute "solely on the basis of showing that the statute 'on its face' abridges First Amendment rights." The Court referred to "the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence," under which federal courts were required to show proper respect for state functions and notions of comity.


Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham

Joyce Thorpe, a tenant at the federally subsidized McDougald Terrace, was evicted after being elected president of the building’s Parents Club. The Housing Authority gave no reason for the eviction. When Thorpe attempted to learn the reason, her requests went unanswered. The Housing Authority of the City of Durham obtained a court order to force Thorpe’s eviction. Thorpe argued that she was evicted because of her activity with the Parents Club, in violation of her First Amendment rights, but the state appeals court and the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the eviction.
While the case was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a circular which stated that all evicted tenants should be informed of the reason for their eviction. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for a ruling in accordance with the circular. The North Carolina court refused to apply the circular on the ground that it was to be applied prospectively. Throughout these proceedings, Thorpe remained in her apartment.

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No. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the unanimous majority, holding that the Housing Authority must follow the HUD circular procedure in Thorpe’s eviction. Since Thorpe had not physically been evicted from her apartment, the court saw no distinction between eviction proceedings that began after the circular was issued and Thorpe’s case. The Court also decided that the circular was mandatory, not advisory, and it was not an unconstitutional impairment of the Housing Authorities lease agreement. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a special concurrence stating that because the Housing Authority admitted to following the circular nothing needed to be decided other than that the circular applied in this case.


Benton was charged with burglary and larceny in a Maryland court. A jury found him not guilty of larceny but guilty of burglary. He was sentenced to ten years in prison. He won his appeal on the grounds that the grand jury that indicted him and the petit jury that convicted him were selected unconstitutionally. The case was remanded and Benton chose to confront a new grand jury. It indicted him for larceny and burglary; the petit jury found him guilty of both charges. Benton then appealed arguing that that re-indicting him on the larceny charge after he had been acquitted amounted to double jeopardy. The Maryland Supreme Court affirmed, following the U.S. Supreme Court's Palko decision, which held that the double-jeopardy clause did not apply to state court criminal proceedings.

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Yes. The Court -- in a 7-2 decision -- overruled Palko, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied to the states is an element of liberty protected by Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, Benton's larceny conviction was overturned. Justice Thurgood Marshall authored the majority opinion.


Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District

In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day, the planned end of the protest.
Through their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students' right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district's actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion.

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Yes. Justice Abe Fortas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the armbands represented pure speech that is entirely separate from the actions or conduct of those participating in it. The Court also held that the students did not lose their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech when they stepped onto school property. In order to justify the suppression of speech, the school officials must be able to prove that the conduct in question would "materially and substantially interfere" with the operation of the school. In this case, the school district's actions evidently stemmed from a fear of possible disruption rather than any actual interference.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that children are not necessarily guaranteed the full extent of First Amendment rights. Justice Byron R. White wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that the majority's opinion relies on a distinction between communication through words and communication through action.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the First Amendment does not provide the right to express any opinion at any time. Because the appearance of the armbands distracted students from their work, they detracted from the ability of the school officials to perform their duties, so the school district was well within its rights to discipline the students. In his separate dissent, Justice John M. Harlan argued that school officials should be afforded wide authority to maintain order unless their actions can be proven to stem from a motivation other than a legitimate school interest.


Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15

Section 2012 of the New York Education Law permitted school districts to limit eligible voters in school district elections to citizens owning or leasing taxable real property and parents of children enrolled in public schools. Union School District No. 15 applied these restrictions. On April 25, 1965, Morris H. Kramer, a resident of district 15 who resided with his parents and had no children, attempted to register for the local school district elections. His application was rejected for failure to comply with the restrictions. Kramer filed a class-action suit against the school board in federal court, claiming his constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated. The district court initially declined to hear his constitutional claims, but, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directed the district court to hear Kramer's claim. On hearing the complaint, the court found no constitutional violation and denied Kramer's claim.

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Yes. In a 5-3 decision authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court accepted Kramer's argument that all district residents share substantial interest in school meeting decisions. While the statute purported to limit voting rights to those who were "primarily interested" in the election's outcome, the Court found the structure of the law too broad to achieve this goal. The Court concluded that such restrictions must be tailored to achieve the stated goal, and the current classifications "permit inclusion of many persons who have, at best, a remote and indirect interest in school affairs and, on the other hand, exclude others who have a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting decisions."


United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc.

After World War II, the United States made funds available through the ‘Marshall Plan’ to many countries to pay for commodities sold by American companies and shipped from the United States and other free-world sources. Congress made foreign aid funds available to bring commodities to the Republic of Korea, beginning with the Mutual Security Act of 1954.
In 1961, the Concentrated Phosphate Export Association (CPEA) organized to act as an export-selling agency for the concentrated phosphate products of its member corporations. CPEA organized under the Webb-Pomerene Act, which Congress passed to help American firms compete with foreign cartels. The process began when Congress allocated funds to various Agency for International Development (AID) programs. The United States thus directly financed the purchase of commodities allocated to Korea, approved via a complicated, tightly regulated application procedure. The United States assigned two of the CPEA contracts, and the Republic of Korea assigned the other nine, subject to detailed regulation by AID. The contracts only circulated in the United States.
The United States filed an action to enjoin price fixing and business allocation activities among the CPEA’s five major member corporations. The district court held that CPEA’s sales were ‘export trade’ for the purposes of the Sherman Act; hence, although CPEA conceded that its members were coordinating their sales actions, CPEA did not violate the Sherman Act. On January 1, 1967, the State Department amended its regulations to preclude Webb-Pomerene associations from bidding on contracts where the procurement was limited to United States suppliers; in response, the CPEA dissolved on December 28, 1967, despite the district court’s favorable ruling.

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No and no. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a 7-2 majority, held that the case was not moot. Although CPEA itself was no longer in operation in that form, the government sought injunctive relief against each of its individual members as well. Justice Marshall also noted that the new AID regulations did not apply to all contracts that the former members of CPEA might bid on. Moreover, the Court could not simply rely on the appellees’ statement that joint operations would no longer be economically advantageous.
Justice Marshall also held that the CPEA did not fall within the Webb-Pomerene Act’s ‘export trade’ exemption. He looked to the legislative history of the Act, noting that the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and the Act’s two main sponsors specified that the Webb-Pomerene Act was not intended to injure American consumers. Hence, Congress did not mean its exemption to insulate transactions initiated, controlled, and financed by the American government. Justice Marshall rejected the CPEA’s argument that they competed for contracts with foreign suppliers, noting that the governing statute required a preference for American procurement and that none of the major trading nations were allowed to compete for contracts.
Justice Byron White dissented, joined by Justice Potter Stewart. He argued that the goods sold by the CPEA were exported from the United States in any ordinary sense of the word ‘export’. He noted that AID regulations referred to receiving countries as ‘importers’ and to the transactions as ‘exports’.
Justice John Harlan took no part in the decision of the case.


Law enforcement officers, under the authority of a warrant, searched Stanley's home pursuant to an investigation of his alleged bookmaking activities. During the search, the officers found three reels of eight-millimeter film. The officers viewed the films, concluded they were obscene, and seized them. Stanley was then tried and convicted under a Georgia law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials.

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The Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited making private possession of obscene materials a crime. In his majority opinion, Justice Marshall noted that the rights to receive information and to personal privacy were fundamental to a free society. Marshall then found that "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." The Court distinguished between the mere private possession of obscene materials and the production and distribution of such materials. The latter, the Court held, could be regulated by the states.


Voters and candidates in Mississippi and Virginia filed four separate cases seeking judgments that certain amendments to their states' election laws and procedures were subject to the pre-approval requirements of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and hence were not enforceable until the state complied with the requirements. The district courts found that the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the voting changes in the four cases and dismissed the complaints. The voters and candidates filed direct appeals, and the cases were consolidated.

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Yes, Yes, Yes. And Yes. The Supreme Court held that § 5 authorized a private right of action based on the remedial aims of the Voting Rights Act. The Court also interpreted the Act to provide that litigants bring these suits in their local district courts, and that three-judge district courts be convened (as was true at that time in constitutional challenges).
As to the substantive issue in the case, Chief Justice Earl Warren explained that the Voting Rights Act was "aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race." Therefore, the Court concluded that Congress intended that "all changes, no matter how small, be subjected to §5 scrutiny." The judgments were reversed, and all four cases were remanded to the district courts with instructions to issue injunctions restraining further enforcement of the enactments until such time as the states adequately demonstrated compliance with the approval requirements of the Act.
Justice John Marshall Harlan II, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that the language of § 5 referred only to laws by which voters registered to vote and had their ballots counted, and he therefore agreed that several of the disputed voting changes at issue were covered by the Act but disagreed as to several others. Justice Hugo Black dissented on the ground that § 5, in his view, is unconstitutional.


Plaintiffs, several African American residents of Chicago, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a number of Officials of Cook County and Chicago for the enforcement of a number of Illinois Statutes and Chicago ordinances prohibiting mob action, resisting arrest, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and intimidation. Plaintiffs contended that the officials violated Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to free speech by threatening enforcement of the statutes for the sole purpose of harassing and intimidating Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed the case in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. A three-judge court upheld all of the statutes except for one subsection that prohibited "the assembly of 2 or more persons to do an unlawful act" and one subsection a statute that prohibited intimidating a person by threats to commit any criminal offense. The court enjoined the officials from enforcing these two subsections. Defendants appealed the decision as to the intimidation statute.

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No. In an 8-1 decision, Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court held that Plaintiffs were not in danger of any irreparable injury from threatened use of the statute in question. The plaintiffs had never been arrested, prosecuted, or charged under the statute in question. Furthermore, the complaint did not mention any specific threats made by Defendant. It looked as though Plaintiffs had searched state statutes and city ordinances in order to pick out the ones that police could potentially use in bad-faith prosecutions. Justice Black held that it is not proper to block state criminal prosecutions based on speculation about the future. Justice Byron White and Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the result. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, saying that although the plaintiffs had not been prosecuted under the statute, officials were using it to harass the plaintiffs, causing irreparable injury.


Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism."

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The Court's Per Curiam opinion held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's right to free speech. The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action." The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.


Sidney Street was a black veteran of World War II and a recipient of the Bronze Star. He held a position with the New York City Transit Authority and had no prior criminal record. On June 6, 1966, Street was in his Brooklyn apartment listening to the radio when he heard a news announcement that civil rights activist James Meredith had been shot by a sniper during his march through Mississippi.
Street went to a bureau drawer and removed an old 48-star American flag. He carried the flag to the intersection of Lafayette Avenue and St. James Place, one block from his residence. He laid a piece of paper on the sidewalk. Then, keeping the flag properly folded, he set it on fire with a match. He held the burning flag in hand as long as he could, then laid it on the paper so that it would not touch the sidewalk. When a police officer arrived, he found Street standing over the burning flag and talking to a small group of people. Street admitted that he burned the flag. The officer later testified that he heard Street shout, "If they did that to Meredith, we don't need an American flag."
The New York City Criminal Court charged Street with malicious mischief for willfully and unlawfully defiling, casting contempt upon, and burning an American flag. The allegation included Street's words at the scene of the flag burning. At trial, Street moved to dismiss the information on the grounds that Street engaged in a constitutionally protected act because the flag burning was a form of protest protected by the First Amendment. The court dismissed this motion; Street was convicted and given a suspended sentence. On appeal, the court affirmed Street's conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, holding that the flag burning was an act of incitement fraught with danger to the public peace.

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No. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice John Harlan, the Court held that the record lacked sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the trial court constitutionally convicted Street of flag burning. Justice Harlan first held that Street properly raised the issue of the constitutionality of the allegation's reference to Street's words. He applied the rule in Stromberg v. California, where the Court held that a conviction must be set aside if it could have been based on constitutionally protected speech; here, Justice Harlan could not determine from the record that Street's words were not an independent cause of his conviction.
Justice Harlan rejected the Court of Appeals' characterization of the flag burning as an act of incitement, holding instead that Street's conviction furthered no government interest. He declined to rule on the broader issue of the constitutionality of New York's flag burning statute. The Court reversed and remanded Street's case.
Chief Justice Earl Warren dissented. He rejected the majority's characterization of the allegation against Street, noting that New York made no attempt to prove that the crowd heard Street's words. He argued that Street was convicted for his act, not his words, and that the state only introduced evidence of his words to show his intent.
Justice Hugo Black dissented. He agreed with the Court of Appeals that Street's conviction rested entirely on the act of burning an American flag, and that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not bar the states from prohibiting this act.
Justice Byron White dissented. He rejected both the majority's assumption that Street could have been convicted for speech alone and its proposition that the entire conviction must be reversed if the speech conviction was unconstitutional. He regarded the allegation as one that provided several means for conviction, and reasoned that there was sufficient evidence of Street's unlawful act on record.
Justice Abraham Fortas dissented. He focused on the unique legal history of the American flag, noting the peculiar obligations and restrictions wrapped up with ownership of an American flag.


During his trial for armed robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association, Harold Kaufman admitted to the crime but unsuccessfully claimed insanity. He was convicted and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Kaufman then filed a post-conviction motion in district court challenging the evidence that proved his sanity. He alleged that the evidence was unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied relief, holding that unlawful search and seizure was not an available attack in post-conviction proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.

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Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, writing for a 5-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that Kaufman could challenge unlawfully seized evidence in a post-conviction proceeding. There was no need to show special circumstances. The fact that Kaufman admitted to the crime was irrelevant because he claimed an affirmative defense.
Justice Hugo L. Black dissented, arguing that prisoners can only challenge evidence post-conviction in special circumstances. The prisoner should have to cast some shadow of doubt on his guilt. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a separate dissent, writing that Kaufman did not show special circumstances, so should not be allowed to challenge the evidence post conviction. Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.


To be placed on the ballot in a presidential election, Ohio law required a new political party obtain voter signatures totaling 15% of the number of ballots cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. Both the American Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party sought ballot access in Ohio for the 1968 presidential election. The American Independent Party, formed by supporters of George C. Wallace, obtained the requisite number of signatures but failed to file its petition for ballot access prior to the February 7, 1968 deadline. The Socialist Labor Party, which until 1948 had been on the ballot, failed to collect enough signatures and was also kept off the ballot. The parties filed separate suits in U.S. District Court against several state officials, including Governor James A. Rhodes, contending that being kept off the ballot violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cases were consolidated, and the court ruled that each party must be given write-in access but did not require the state to print the parties' candidates' names on the ballot. The American Independent Party requested and was granted an injunction forcing the state to add the party's candidates to the ballot while the case was on appeal. The Socialist Labor Party filed a similar request, but did so much later, and was denied primarily to avoid confusion in requiring the reprinting of another set of ballots.

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Yes. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court found that Ohio failed to show a compelling interest in limiting the parties' ballot access. The Court concluded that Ohio's restrictions gave the two major parties a "total monopoly" and imposed a significant, unequal burden on minority groups. Given this fact, and the particular importance of the right to vote, Ohio's arguments that its restrictive policies maintained an orderly process and ensured an electoral victor would have at least 50% of the vote failed to meet the necessary standard of a compelling state interest. The Court struck down the Ohio restrictions and granted the American Independent Party full ballot access. To avoid confusion and a last-minute reorganization of the ballot, however, it denied the Socialist Labor Party such access for the 1968 election, in accordance with the injunctive order.


Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne

A white supremacist organization held a public rally near a courthouse in Princess Anne, Maryland. During the rally, members of the organization made racist and derogatory speeches amplified over a public address system. Officials of Princess Anne and Somerset County obtained a restraining order to prevent the organization from reconvening the next day. The order was ex parte, so no notice was given to the organization. The order restrained the organization from holding rallies in the county for 10 days. At trial, the Circuit Court issued an injunction for another 10 months. On appeal the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the 10 day order, but reversed the 10 month injunction because the period of time was unreasonable and arbitrary.

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No, Yes. In a unanimous decision, Justice Abe Fortas wrote the majority opinion. The Supreme Court held that the case was not moot because the 10-day order still plays a role in the white supremacist organization's continued efforts in the county. The order was set aside because there was no notice given to the organization and they were not given the opportunity to participate in the adversary proceeding. The Court did note that there may be a case where ex parte orders are allowed when one party can show that the other is unavailable or impossible to serve. The Court did not address the 10 month injunction because it had been reversed by the appeals court.


In the spring of 1966, a series of armed robberies were committed in Mobile, Alabama. In two instances a gun was fired, and one person was injured when the bullet ricocheted off the floor. The petitioner, 27-year-old Edward Boykin, Jr., was arrested on five counts of robbery. He was provided with court-appointed counsel and pled guilty on all five counts. The judge did not ask Boykin whether he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, nor does the record show that Boykin was aware of his rights to trial by jury and to confront his accusers.
Pursuant to Alabama law, a jury trial determined Boykin’s punishment. Boykin did not testify and offered no evidence regarding his character. There was no evidence of a prior criminal record. The jury sentenced the petitioner to death on all five counts. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the death sentence, but three justices dissented on the grounds that the record did not show the petitioner entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.

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Yes. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that a guilty plea is a confession, and the admissibility of a confession is contingent on the confirmation that it was made voluntarily. The waiver of several constitutional rights is involved in a guilty plea. A defendant’s silence is insufficient to show that he understood these rights and chose to waive them.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the Court wrongly and inconsistently followed a precedent that subjects state courts to a federal rule of evidence concerning guilty pleas; and that this rule has no basis in the Constitution. He also argued that the question was irrelevant, because the petitioner never claimed that his plea was made unknowingly or involuntarily. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent.


The National Democratic Party of Alabama (NDPA) sought to place the names of minority candidates on the ballot for local and state-wide offices. Alabama election officials denied the NDPA request under the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act. The NDPA then brought suit in a special three-judge U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama claiming constitutional violations. NDPA lost and appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Initially, the Court heard arguments on October 18 in support of a temporary restraining order which it had granted on October 14. The day after oral argument, the Court granted the order and subsequently addressed the merits of the controversy on March 25.

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Yes and yes. In an opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court acknowledged that "the regulation of corrupt practices in state and federal elections is an important governmental function, [but] we refuse to accept a reading of an Act which gives such a loose meaning to words and such discretionary authority to election officials as to cause Fifteenth and First Amendment rights to be subject to disparate treatment."
Justice Byron R. White, joined by Justice Potter Stewart, dissented in part, arguing that the district court should have had the opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of the Corrupt Practices Act.
Justice Hugo L. Black took no part in the consideration or decision in this case.


George Samuels and several other defendants were indicted in state court on criminal anarchy charges, in violation of New York state law. The defendants filed for an injunction in federal court to prevent continuation of their case. They argued that the New York laws violated due process, First Amendment freedoms, and equal protection. The district court found the laws constitutional and refused to grant the injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal

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No decision. Justice Hugo L. Black, writing for the unanimous Court, affirmed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the defendants would not suffer irreparable damages if the state trial continued. The Court also held that the district court should not have evaluated the case on the merits because of the pending statute court proceedings. Justice William O. Douglas concurred, writing that the New York laws were not obviously unconstitutional, so it was up to the state court to evaluate the matter. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a separate concurrence, emphasizing that the majority decision dealt only with the proper procedure for a federal court to follow when a criminal prosecution is pending in state court. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the concurrence. Justice William J. Brennan concurred in the result, stating that the defendants did not allege bad-faith harassment by the prosecution, so an injunction would be improper.


Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church

The general Presbyterian Church (general church), and two local churches, Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church (Hull Church) and Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, were in dispute over the control of properties used by the local churches in Savannah, Georgia. The local churches withdrew from the general church due to these conflicting views. In response, the general church took over the local churches’ property. Each of the local churches sued the general church for trespass on the disputed property. The general church argued that the civil courts don't have the power to determine whether the general church had departed from its faith and practice. The district court disagreed and concluded that, under Georgia law, the implied trust of local church property for the benefit of the general church was terminated because of the general church’s substantial departure from its doctrines. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the judgment, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision by agreeing with the general church that the First Amendment prevents civil courts from ruling on church doctrine issues.

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No. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The court held that civil courts do not have the authority to award property on the basis of the interpretation and significance that the civil courts have assigned to aspects of the church doctrine. Therefore, the Court held that the Georgia courts have violated the First Amendment.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented civil courts from enforcing agreements that limit any religious organization’s use of property granted.


Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary. Upon serving him with the arrest warrant, the officers conducted a comprehensive search of Chimel's residence. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict Chimel. State courts upheld the conviction.

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In a 6-2 decision, the Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. While police could reasonably search and seize evidence on or around the arrestee's person, they were prohibited from rummaging through the entire house without a search warrant. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause as necessary bulwarks against government abuse.
Justice Abe Fortas participated in oral argument but retired before the Court rendered its decision.


Gunn v. University Comm. to End War in Viet Nam

Members of the University Committee to End the War in Viet Nam (Protestors) were protesting at a speech by President Lyndon B. Johnson at Central Texas College in Killeen, Texas. After being attacked by the gathered crowd, the Protestors were arrested and charged with disturbing the peace. The Protestors sued and asked that a three-judge panel be convened in the district court to overrule the disturbing-the-peace statute since it violated their First Amendment rights. That court found the statute unconstitutional but stayed the injunction that would prevent enforcement of the statute until the next session of the Texas legislature, so that the legislature might enact a constitutionally permissible statute. However, the Texas legislature did not enact a new statute at its next session, and the court took no further action. Lester Gunn, the local sheriff, appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. Gunn based his appeal on the Three-Judge Court Act, which allows direct appeals to the Supreme Court from orders granting or denying an injunction by a federal court of three judges.

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No. Justice Potter Stewart wrote the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that, since a clear and specific injunction is vital when a federal court is asked to nullify a law enacted by a state, it is also vital for direct Supreme Court jurisdiction under the Three-Judge Court Act. Without a specific order granting or denying an injunction, it is impossible to know with certainty what a district had decided, and thus the Court’s jurisdiction must be narrowly construed.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the opinion of the district court should be considered a declaratory judgment invalidating the Texas statute. While he agreed that the Three-Judge Court Act did not provide jurisdiction, Justice White noted that Gunn was still entitled to have the opinion reviewed by an appellate court. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined the concurrence.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun took no part in the decision.


The Arkansas legislature passed a law prohibiting teachers in public or state-supported schools from teaching, or using textbooks that teach, human evolution. Epperson, a public school teacher, sued, claiming the law violated her First Amendment right to free speech as well as the Establishment Clause. The State Chancery Court ruled that it violated her free speech rights; the State Supreme Court reversed.

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Yes. Seven members of the Court held that the statute violated the Establishment clause. Writing for the Court, Justice Abe Fortas stated that the law had been based solely on the beliefs of fundamentalist Christians, who felt that evolutionary theories directly contradicted the biblical account of Creation. This use of state power to prohibit the teaching of material objectionable to a particular sect ammounted to an unconstitutional Establishment of religion. Justice Fortas wrote, "The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment." The two other members of the Court concurred in the result, writing that it violated either the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment (because it was unconstitutionally vague) or the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment.


Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) applied for, and were issued, a search warrant to assist in uncovering evidence of defendant William Spinelli conducting illegal gambling activities. In the affidavit required for the warrant application, the FBI agents stated the defendant was known to "local law enforcement officials as a bookmaker." The FBI related in the affidavit that agents had tracked defendant Spinelli for five days, and that on four of the days, Spinelli was seen crossing into St. Louis, MO, entering an apartment at 1108 Indian Circle Drive. Finally, the agents offered that they "had been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136."

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No. The informant's tip, even when corroborated with the FBI's observations from their surveillance, was not sufficient to provide a basis for a finding probable cause when using the two-pronged test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). (Abstract prepared by Blaine Schmidt.)


Nacirema Operating Company, Inc. v. Johnson

These are two consolidated cases involving the same Respondents. William Johnson and Jonathan Klosek (husband of Julia Klosek) were employed by Nacirema Operating Company as longshoremen and Albert Avery was employed by Old Dominion Stevedoring Company. Johnson and Avery were injured and Klosek was killed during separate accidents that occurred while on the dock unloading a ship. The Deputy Commissioners of the United States Department of Labor denied claims by the men and their families under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (the Act) because the injuries did not occur “upon the navigable waters of the United States” as required under the Act. The district court upheld those decisions and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.

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No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 5-3 majority, reversed the Fourth Circuit. The Act’s language determines coverage by the location of the injury, navigable waters, rather than rather than an individual’s status as a longshoreman performing maritime contracts. While the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act extends admiralty tort jurisdiction to ship related injuries on a pier, it does not extend the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.
Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the Act was status oriented and covered all injuries sustained by longshoremen in the course of their employment. Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


A jury convicted Alex Evans of murder. The prosecution presented 20 witnesses who described Evans’ participation in the murder. A prison inmate testified that one of Evans’ conspirators in the murder said “we wouldn’t be in this now” if it weren’t for Evans. Evans’ counsel questioned the inmate, but still argued that Evans’ right to confrontation was violated because they could not confront the conspirator. The judge overruled Evans’ objection citing a Georgia statute that allows admission of conspirator’s statements against co-conspirators. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction.
Evans filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the writ, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Georgia statute violates Evans right to confrontation because it is broader than the rule used in federal conspiracy trials. The court found no “cogent reasons” for the Georgia hearsay exception.

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No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a four justice plurality, delivered the judgment of the court. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia hearsay exception did not violate the confrontation clause merely because it was slightly different from the federal rule. The accomplice’s statement was not crucial in light of the other evidence, and Evans’ counsel had full opportunity to cross-examine all of the prosecution’s witnesses. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, adding that admission of the accomplice’s statement was a harmless error if it was an error at all. Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result, writing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper standard for reviewing rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, arguing that admitting the accomplice’s statement denied Evans his right to cross-examine all witnesses against him. Even if the statement fell within a genuine hearsay exception, it should not be introduced unless the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Justices Hugo L. Black, William O. Douglas, and William J. Brennan joined in the dissent.


Colonnade Catering Corporation v. United States

A group of federal agents entered Colonnade Catering’s (Colonnade) New York premises to search for resealed liquor bottles, possession of which is a violation of federal tax law. After searching for some time, the agents asked Colonnade’s president, Salvatore E. Rozzo, to unlock a locked liquor storeroom. Rozzo refused and asked the agents if they had a search warrant. The agents responded that they did not need one. When Rozzo continued to refuse to unlock the storeroom, the agents broke the lock, entered the storeroom, and seized 53 bottles of liquor and two funnels.
At trial, Colonnade moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search and argued that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision and held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid warrantless administrative inspections. Therefore, the statutes, which authorize federal agents to enter any building or place where objects subject to a liquor tax are kept “so far as it may be necessary” in order to examine them during the day or business hours, do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court also found that the statutory provisions were equivalent to a warrant given their clarity and narrow scope.

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No. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court argued that business owners have a constitutional right to go about their business without unreasonable official entries onto their property. However, emphasizing a long history of liquor industry regulation, the Court stated that Congress has broad powers to fashion standards for reasonable searches of licensee’s businesses. The Court did not find the statute unconstitutional, but interpreted the statute’s imposition of a $500 fine on licensed liquor dealers who refuse to permit federal agents to inspect their liquor to mean that the fine was the only remedy available to the government upon a licensee’s refusal to grant entry.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the term “so far as it may be necessary” authorized the search and that the statutory penalty was enacted merely to encourage compliance by licensed liquor dealers. Because Congress could not have intended to allow licensed liquor to avoid confiscation of their liquor for a relatively small $500 fine, the fine does not mean that liquor dealers can opt out of the statutory inspection. Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Hugo L. Black wrote that the statutes do not expressly declare forcible search and seizure illegal and thus implicitly authorized the seizure in this case. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the separate dissent.


Willie E. Williams was convicted for theft of credit cards, checks, and papers worth less than $150. He received the maximum sentence for petty theft in Illinois: one year of imprisonment and a $500 fine. If Williams was unable to pay the fine (and an additional $5 in court costs) at the end of his sentence, he would remain in jail to “work off” the fine at a rate of $5 per day.
While in jail, Williams petitioned the trial court to vacate the “work off” provision of his sentence. Williams argued that he did not have any money or property with which to pay the money portion of his sentence, but he would pay if released after one year and allowed to get a job. The trial court held that Williams’ ability to pay might change by the end of his sentence and dismissed his petition. Williams appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois and argued that the denial of his petition violated his right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that there was no Fourteenth Amendment violation.

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Justice John M. Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Illinois law was impermissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause because the latter ruling would place a substantial burden on states to create a system of individualized fines. Additionally, the Equal Protection clause allowed judges to substitute their opinions for those of the legislature, while the Due Process Clause placed legislation that deprives an individual of his right to remain free under higher judicial scrutiny. Justice Harlan determined that the state interests in forcing someone without assets to “work off” their fines as opposed to using a payment plan or other alternative are administrative convenience and better crime deterrence, but that these interests cannot justify depriving poor individuals of their liberty.


A government informant, Harvey Jackson, wore a concealed radio transmitter and engaged in four conversations with defendant White at three different locations: Jackson's house, a restaurant, and Jackson's automobile. Government agents listened to each of the radio transmissions, thereby overhearing defendant White make self-incriminating remarks regarding his involvement in multiple narcotics transactions. Jackson was unavailable during the trial, so the prosecution offered the testimony of the agents who had conducted the electronic surveillance as evidence.

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No. The testimony of government agents, relating conversations between a defendant and an undercover informant, overheard via electronic surveillance, is admissible, despite the informant's unavailability at trial. This case expanded the principle announced in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). (Abstract prepared by Blaine Schmidt.)


The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, established by the Social Security Act of 1935 and jointly funded by the state and federal governments, provides financial assistance to children of families with little or no income. Under the program, each state computes a "standard of need" for each family. In Maryland, the standard of need increased with each additional member of the family, but became incrementally smaller, with an upper limit of $250 per month. Linda Williams, a single mother, and Junius and Jeanette Gary, husband and wife, were Baltimore residents and parents of eight children each. They objected to Maryland's means of calculating standard of need on the ground that it discriminated against larger families, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. They also argued that the calculation conflicted with the stated purpose of the program as laid out by the Social Security Act. They filed suit against Edmund P. Dandridge, Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare, and several other state officials. A U.S. District Court originally ruled the Maryland regulation violated both the Social Security Act and the Equal Protection Clause. On reconsideration, the court altered its ruling and based its judgment entirely on constitutional grounds but nonetheless struck down the provision.

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No. In a 5-3 opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court concluded that the Maryland provision violated neither the Social Security Act nor the Equal Protection Clause. Relying on the precedent set in King v. Smith (1968), which described the program as "a scheme of cooperative federalism" and gave the state "undisputed power" to calculate standard of need, the Court concluded that "nothing in the federal statute...forbids a State to balance the stresses that uniform insufficiency of payments would impose on all families against the greater ability of large families...to accommodate their needs to diminished per capita payments." Similarly, the Court rejected the families' equal protection claim, noting, "[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." Thus, because Maryland's provision was "rationally based and free from invidious discrimination," it was constitutionally valid. Justice Stewart took care to note that while "claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every measure," the Court could rule a provision invalid based only on its constitutionality, not on its wisdom.


Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York

Frederick Walz, the owner of real estate in Richmond County, New York, brought suit against the New York City Tax Commission, challenging property tax exemptions for churches. Walz alleged that the exemptions forced him, as a taxpayer, to indirectly contribute to those churches.

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In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the exemptions did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court held that the purpose of the exemptions was to neither advance nor inhibit religion; no one particular church or religious group had been singled out to receive tax exempt status. Unlike direct subsidies, which would have unduly entangled the state with religion, tax exemptions created only "minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches." The Court noted that "benevolent neutrality" toward churches and religions was "deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life."


Mae Wheeler was a 75-year-old widow who lived solely on her welfare check and monthly Social Security payment. On August 30, 1967, the San Francisco Department of Social Services learned that Wheeler had received the proceeds from her late son's veteran insurance policy. After a county welfare supervisor called Wheeler, the Welfare Department began withholding Wheeler's welfare check pending an investigation. Wheeler requested a hearing and for the restoration of her payments until her cause could be heard. Wheeler did not get the restoration of her payments, but she ultimately prevailed in her claim and had benefits restored several months later.
Wheeler along with other similarly-situated people were granted class action status, and the class claimed that California welfare termination provisions deprived the class members of their constitutional due process rights by terminating welfare benefits before having a full and adequate hearing. A three-judge District Court for the Northern District of California held that the California procedure for pre-termination review satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court reviewed the California court's opinion

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Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court held that the California welfare termination regulations did not satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause because they did not afford recipients an evidentiary hearing or allow the recipients to offer evidence or confront opposing witnesses. The Court reversed the lower court's opinion.
Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice Black. In his opinion, the justice stated that the administrative regulations regarding welfare was in an early stage of development and that the Court should allow the administrative processes to develop before burdening them with a heavy-handed constitutional ruling.
Justice Stewart also filed a dissenting opinion, where he stated that the procedures the state followed for terminating welfare payments did not violate the Constitution.


North Carolina charged Henry Alford with first-degree murder. That charge carried a possible sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty. Alford agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a second-degree murder conviction. When Alford took the stand, he testified that he was innocent and pled guilty to avoid the death penalty. The judge ensured that Alford made his decision freely after consulting counsel. Alford maintained his guilty plea, and after receiving evidence of Alford’s extensive criminal history, the judge sentenced Alford to the maximum 30-year sentence.
After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain post-conviction relief, Alford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied relief on the grounds that Alford’s guilty plea was entirely voluntary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the plea was involuntary because its primary motivation was the fear of death.

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No. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional violation where the defendant concluded based on competent counsel that it was in his best interest to plead guilty. The court saw no difference between a defendant who maintains his innocence with a plea bargain and one who admits to the crime.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a concurrence, agreeing with the majority, but expressing a belief that United States v Jackson was wrongly decided. Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, stating that the threat of the death penalty should be a factor considered when determining whether a plea was voluntary. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


Sara Baird graduated from law school at Stanford University in 1967 and passed the bar examination in Arizona. Among the questions asked by the Arizona Bar Committee, she answered Question 25, which requested that she list all of the organizations to which she has belonged since the age of 16. She declined to answer Question 27, which asked whether she “had ever been a member of the Communist party or any organization ‘that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence.’” Because she did not answer that question, the Committee did not process her application any further. The Arizona Supreme Court denied Baird’s petition for the Bar Committee to show cause why she should be denied admittance to the State Bar of Arizona.

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Yes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the First Amendment protection of freedom of association prevents a state from denying a person access to a profession based on the exercise of that right. In order for a state to investigate a person’s beliefs for the sake of employment, the state must show the inquiry is necessary “to protect a legitimate state interest.” The Court held that the petitioner had already provided the Bar Committee with enough relevant information about her membership in associations.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that such a state inquiry must distinguish between being a member of an organization and actively supporting the actions of an anti-governmental group. He also held that the question on the State Bar Application was unconstitutional because it was clearly used to deny admission to the Bar based on objectionable beliefs.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion. He argued that the First Amendment allows a state to make inquiries into the beliefs that will directly impact a professional’s ability to perform the duties of the job. Because a lawyer is an officer of the court, beliefs regarding the government are relevant to the Bar Committee’s inquiry. He wrote that, although being a lawyer is a privilege and not a right, nothing indicated that the Bar Committee would have refused Baird admission to the Bar had she answered the question in the affirmative. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice John M. Harlan, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that state Bars had a legitimate interest in preventing applicants who wish to overthrow the United States government from practicing law. He argued that there was no constitutional basis to prevent a state from making relevant inquiries into beliefs that could influence an applicant’s performance of his/her duties.


A juvenile court judge declared 17-year-old Clarence DeBacker a “delinquent child” and ordered him committed to the Boys’ Training School for forging his father’s signature on a check and attempting to pass it off as legitimate. Before the hearing, DeBacker had requested a jury trial, but the judge denied the request. The Nebraska Juvenile Court Act denies juveniles a trial by jury. Instead of seeking review of his sentence, DeBacker flied for state habeas corpus, arguing that the juvenile court violated the Sixth Amendment when it denied him a jury trial. The Nebraska District Court dismissed the petition and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. On appeal, DeBacker argued that recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Duncan v Louisiana and Bloom v Illinois entitle him to a jury trial.

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No answer. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted. DeBacker’s hearing took place before the Court decided Duncan and Bloom. Those cases only applied prospectively, so they did not apply to DeBacker. The Court could not answer DeBacker’s second question because he had not objected to the standard during the criminal hearing. DeBacker also failed to show that the judge would have ruled differently under a different standard
Justice William O. Douglas dissented, expressing that the Duncan and Bloom decisions should apply retroactively. Justice Hugo L. Black also dissented, writing that the “prospective only application” of constitutional decisions amounted to a judicial amendment to the Constitution.


Martin Robert Stolar was admitted to the New York Bar in 1968. In his application, he answered several questions about his social, religious and political affiliations. When Stolar applied to the Ohio Bar in 1969 he supplied the Ohio Bar Association with all of the information from his New York Bar application. The Ohio Bar also subjected Stolar to an oral interrogation where they asked questions relating to whether he was associated with any organization that advocated the violent overthrow of the government. Stolar refused to answer those questions and the interrogation committee recommended that he be denied admission to the Bar. Stolar had nothing in his record, other than refusal to answer the questions, that showed that he did not have the necessary good character for admission to the Ohio Bar. The Ohio Supreme Court approved the committee’s recommendation without opinion.

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Yes. Though they could not agree on an opinion, five members of the court agreed that the Ohio Bar’s questions violated the First Amendment. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the judgment of the court, holding that the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of association and prohibition against a state penalizing a person for their membership in a particular organization made the Ohio Bar questions improper. Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment, writing that the questions were improper under prior Supreme Court precedent.
Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that the Constitution did not require a state to admit someone to practice law who believed in violence. The Ohio Bar questions were properly designed to discover whether an applicant expected to actively support illegal violence. Justice Harry A. Blackmun also dissented, stating that the judgment should be affirmed based on Stolar’s refusal to answer the questions. Chief Justice Warren Burger, Justice John M. Harlan, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent. Justice John M. Harlan separately dissented, arguing that the Constitution does prevent a state bar association from denying admission based on theoretical beliefs in a right of revolution, but it does not require admission of someone who seeks entry for the purpose of doing away with the orderly process of law.


Joseph Waller stole a mural from the St. Petersburg City Hall. The city charged and convicted him in municipal court with two ordinance violations. Based on the same acts, Waller was prosecuted and convicted in the Circuit Court of Florida for grand larceny. On appeal, Waller argued that the municipal court and subsequent circuit court prosecutions put him in double jeopardy. The District Court of Appeal of Florida rejected this argument and upheld the conviction.

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Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a unanimous court, vacated the circuit court conviction. The Supreme Court held that Waller was put twice in jeopardy because the circuit court charges were based on the same acts as the municipal court charges. State and municipal courts are part of one sovereign judicial system. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred, but noted that state and federal governments should not be considered separate sovereignties for double jeopardy purposes. Justice William J. Brennan also concurred, writing that double jeopardy bars a second trial for charges arising out of the same acts unless the case falls within an exception to the “same transaction” rule.


Gladys Boddie was a married resident of Connecticut receiving welfare benefits. She filed for a divorce in New Haven County Superior Court. However, Boddie was not given a hearing because she had not paid the filing fee under Section 52-259 of the Connecticut General Statutes. Given her welfare status, she was unable to pay the fee. Her requests for fee waivers were also denied. Boddie and others who were denied divorces under Section 52-259 challenged the fee requirement in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. They alleged that the fee requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court upheld the requirement. Boddie appealed to the Supreme Court.

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Yes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed the District Court and held the fee requirement unconstitutional. In a majority opinion authored by Justice John M. Harlan, the Court recognized the importance of "access to the courts" for Boddie, as state court was the only method of obtaining a divorce in Connecticut. While the Court acknowledged Connecticut's interest in conserving limited resources and preventing "frivolous litigation," this interest was not a "sufficient countervailing justification." Therefore, Connecticut's refusal to allow Boddie to proceed with her divorce was "a denial of due process" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice William O. Douglas concurred in the result. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in part.


Robert M. Brady pleaded not guilty to kidnapping. After learning that his codefendant confessed and would be available to testify against him, Brady changed his plea to guilty. The crime had a maximum penalty of death, but a U.S. statute allowed the death penalty only if the verdict of a jury recommends. The judge sentenced him to 50 years in prison. The sentence was later reduced to 30 years. 8 years later, Brady sought relief in U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, claiming his guilty plea was not voluntarily given because the possibility of the death penalty coerced his plea. The district court denied relief and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, finding that Brady changed his plea because of the codefendants actions. The court held that an intervening decision United States v. Jackson, which held the death penalty unconstitutional because it imposes an impermissible burden on an accused’s Fifth Amendment right to not plead guilty and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, did not apply.

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No, No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for five members of the court, affirmed. The Supreme Court held that United States v. Jackson does not require every guilty plea to be overturned when fear of death was a factor in the plea. The voluntariness of the plea is determined by considering all of the relevant circumstances. While Brady may have been partially motivated by a desire to avoid the death penalty, the guilty plea was voluntarily made with the advice of competent counsel. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the judgment and substantially all of the opinion, but expressed his belief that United States v. Jackson was wrongly decided. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the result, because there was no evidence that fear of the death penalty played a substantial role in Brady’s decision. Justice Brennan also expressed that the court’s method of analysis was unclear. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence.


United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission

The Great Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company filed applications with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for a proposed merger of themselves and three subsidiaries. The ICC decided that the merger would result in savings, improved service, and more efficient use of the railroad’s facilities. These benefits were outweighed, however, by the potential loss of jobs and lessening of competition. The ICC later reopened its investigation, focusing on the amount of savings the merger would produce. This time, the ICC approved the merger, concluding that the proposed savings were more important. Several railroads filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the ICC failed to give proper weight to the decrease in competition the merger would produce. The district court affirmed the ICC decision. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

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No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed. The Supreme Court held that substantial evidence supported the ICC’s decision. The savings, service improvements, and conditions agreed to by the merging railroads far outweighed the loss of competition. The court also upheld the ICC’s decision on the ratio for the exchange of stock that would take place during the merger. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.


Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County

African-American citizens of Greene County Alabama filed a class action against the Greene County, Alabama Jury Commission, alleging racial discrimination in the selection of potential jurors, and the Governor of Alabama, for appointing an all-white jury commission in a predominantly African-American county. The class members alleged that they were qualified for jury service but never summoned. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief declaring that the Alabama statute governing jury selection was unconstitutional and enjoining future enforcement of the statute. The Alabama statute provided that potential jurors should be “generally reputed to be honest and intelligent” and “esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and sound judgment.” The district court held that the Jury Commission did not follow the Alabama statute and systematically discriminated in preparing jury lists. The court ordered a new list created in compliance with the Alabama statute and constitutional principles. The court declined to invalidate the statue or compel the Governor to appoint African-Americans to the jury commission. This case was heard on direct appeal.

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No, No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court held that, while the jury commission itself discriminated against African-Americans, the Alabama statute did not. The statute made no mention of race and was capable of being applied in a non-discriminatory way. Seven justices agreed that the Governor did not need to appoint African-American jury commissioners because the class failed to prove discrimination in the selection of the existing commissioners. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the judgment and the opinion, but noted that the majority opinion does not imply that the U.S. Supreme Court had the power to vacate the Governor’s jury commission appointments or order him to appoint African-American commissioners.
Justice William O. Douglas dissented in part, arguing that, while he would not order the Governor to appoint African-American jury commissioners, the jury commission system should be struck down because it did not provide for proportional representation of the races.


Through several treaties, the United States granted the Choctaw and Cherokee Nations several million acres of land in what is now Oklahoma. The Cherokee Nation sued the State of Oklahoma and several corporations for leasing gas, oil, and mineral rights to the river beds of the Arkansas River within that land. The Choctaw Nation was allowed to intervene to claim that the riverbeds of Arkansas River within their land grant belonged to them. The district court ruled against the Indian Nations, holding that the land grant did not convey rights to the river beds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

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Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a 4-3 majority, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the United States granted the Indian Nations rights to the riverbed of the Arkansas River where it was completely within the boundaries of the granted land and where it formed the border. Justice William O. Douglas concurred, writing that only the continuation of discrimination would justify denying the Indian Nations their claim.
Justice Byron R. White dissented, stating that the United States had a policy against conveying rights to the beds of rivers, and had expressed no intention to go against that policy. Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent. Justice John M. Harlan did not participate.


In 1911, U.S. Senator A. O. Bacon conveyed land to the city of Macon, Georgia through a testamentary trust for the purpose of providing a park for white persons only. The city operated the park in that manner, but after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, people of all races were permitted to use the park. The managers of the park attempted to have the city removed as the trustee because it could no longer legally enforce racial segregation. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of African American citizens who intervened, holding that the public nature of the park required that it be treated as a public institution subject to the Fourteenth Amendment regardless of who owned the park. The trustees of Bacon’s estate then moved for a ruling that the trust was unenforceable, because racial segregation was no longer permitted, so the property should revert to Bacon’s heirs. The trial court granted the motion, holding that racial segregation was an integral part of the trust, so the court could not simply amend the trust. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.

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No. Justice Lewis F. Black, writing for a 5-2 majority, affirmed the Georgia court. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia court did no more than apply well-settled principles of Georgia law. The court had no alternative but to end the trust under Georgia’s racially neutral trust laws. There was no indication that the Georgia judges had any discriminatory intent. The fact that the park managers and heirs may have had a discriminatory motivation in pursuing the dissolution of the trust did not create an Equal Protection Clause violation.
Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that Bacon’s will left all remainders and reversions to the city, not his heirs and the purpose of the will was to dedicate the land for municipal use. Amending the trust to allow the park to be used by everyone would carry out that purpose better than allowing the land to revert to Bacon’s heirs who would close the park. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. also dissented, arguing that closing a public facility because the public authority that owned it could not keep it segregated violated the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.


John Kelly, acting on behalf of New York residents receiving financial assistance either under the federally-assisted program for Families with Dependent Children or under New York State's home relief program, challenged the constitutionality of procedures for notice and termination of such aid. Although originally offering no official notice or opportunity for hearings to those whose aid was scheduled for termination, the State of New York implemented a hearing procedure after commencement of Kelly's litigation.

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Yes. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that states must afford public aid recipients a pre-termination evidentiary hearing before discontinuing their aid. Noting that welfare benefits are statutory entitlements, rather than "privileges," the Court weighed welfare recipients' need for procedural due process against the competing considerations of the possible harm they might suffer from discontinuation and the government's interest in summary adjudication. The Court concluded that state interests in conserving administrative costs are not sufficient to override public aid recipients' interest in procedural due process. With respect to New York's newly implemented hearings, the Court found them deficient insofar as they did not permit recipients to present evidence, be heard orally in person or through counsel, or cross-examine adverse witnesses.


W.M. Webb and other commercial fishing companies owned fishing boats that, according to established custom, were manned by independently contracted captains and crew. The company that owned each vessel was responsible for equipping it and hiring a captain, who then hired a crew. At the completion of each shipping expedition, the boat docked at a fish-processing plant, where the captain and crew were paid based on the volume of their catch. There was no guarantee that they would be paid if they did not catch fish. The commercial fishing companies determined at which plants the boats would dock and generally in what areas they would fish. The captain and the crew were responsible for the day-to-day running of the boats and expeditions.
The commercial fishing companies paid employers’ taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and claimed refunds for the taxes due on the earnings of the captains and crews. They then sued for the refunds in district court, which held that the companies were entitled to the refunds. The district court held that the captains and crews were not “employees” for the purposes of the statutes because the amount of control the companies exercised over the boats was not enough to create an employer-employee relationship. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

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Yes. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that there was no indication in the language of the statutes that Congress intended to hold maritime activities to a land-based common law standard. Rather, resorting to the common understanding of maritime jurisprudence minimizes the uncertainly in trying to apply common law to maritime practices. Under maritime standards, employees typically have much broader discretion than land-based employees, so the type of control the commercial fishing companies exercised over their boats can still constitute the type of legal relationship the statutes require.


Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education

The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, ordered school districts across the country to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.” However, nearly fifteen years after this order, many school districts, including schools in Holmes County, Mississippi, were either still segregated or saddled with laws making it very difficult for full integration to take place. In the summer of 1969, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi entered an order allowing the schools in Mississippi to continue using “freedom of choice” laws, which allowed parents to choose which school their children attended. The petitioners appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on July 23, 1969. That court, in a per curiam decision, reversed the lower court, but required the school districts to create and submit alternate plans by August 27, 1969. The petitioners then appealed.

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No. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court held that it was the obligation of every school district to immediately terminate any and all segregated school systems and to only operate integrated schools. Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeals should not have allowed any more motions for additional time to desegregate because, in the Court’s opinion, the standard of allowing “all deliberate speed” for desegregation was no longer constitutionally permissible.


John Henry Coleman and Otis Stephens were convicted of assault with intent to murder. The primary evidence against them was the identification by the victim, Casey Reynolds. He identified the pair in a police lineup at the Birmingham City Jail. During this lineup, the police had Coleman and Stephens say certain phrases that Reynolds remembered his attackers saying. Coleman and Stephens also did not have counsel at their preliminary hearing. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, rejecting augments that the lineup was so suggestive that it likely caused a misidentification, and that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage of prosecution where the defendants were entitled to the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied review.

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Yes, No. In a 5-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion vacating the convictions. The Supreme Court held that Reynolds' identification of Coleman and Stephens did not stem from a prejudicial police lineup. The Court also held that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage, so the defendants were constitutionally entitled to counsel. The Court remanded the case to determine whether denying counsel created an unfair prejudice against the defendants.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a concurrence, expressing that the right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than on the basis of holding a fair trial. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurrence, also expressing that the right to counsel is guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurrence, stating that requiring counsel for preliminary hearings might induce courts to eliminate preliminary hearings all together.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a partial dissent, stating that the convictions should not be overturned unless Coleman and Stephens can show that they lost favorable testimony during the preliminary hearing that otherwise would be preserved. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissent, expressing that the Constitution does not guarantee assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a separate dissent, also stating that defendants are not entitled to counsel at a preliminary hearing. Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate.


New Orleans police officers had a warrant to arrest Donald J. Vale on narcotics charges. While staking out Vale’s home, the officers saw Vale come out of the house and do what they thought was a drug deal. The officers arrested Vale outside his home and told him they were going to search the house. The officers did not have a search warrant. During the search, the officers found narcotics in a back bedroom. This evidence was admitted at Vale’s trial where he was convicted. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The court rejected Vale’s argument that the narcotics evidence was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure.

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Yes. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-2 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the house was not “incident to the arrest” because the arrest took place outside. The State also failed to show evidence of an exceptional situation where a warrantless search would be acceptable. Admitting the narcotics evidence was in error because they were the fruits of an illegal search.
Justice Hugo L. Black dissented, arguing that a search is proper when officers reasonably believe that someone might destroy the narcotics evidence if the search were postponed to obtain a warrant. Chief Justice Warren Burger joined in the dissent. Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate.


On March 27, 1964, Elliot Ashton Welsh II was ordered by the Selective Service to report for physical examination after having been classified I-A and available for military service. Walsh requested and filed application for conscientious objector status. On his form, Welsh specifically indicated that his objection was not rooted in religious belief; he responded "No" where the questionnaire asked if he believed in a supreme being. An appeal board rejected his application. Welsh refused to appear for induction and, on June 1, 1966, was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Court ruled in United States v. Seeger (1965) that conscientious objector status was not reserved to individuals of a traditional religious background. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that because Welsh denied any religious foundation for his beliefs, whereas Seeger had characterized his pacifist beliefs as "religious," Welsh's conviction was valid.

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Yes. In a 5-3 plurality opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court declared a registrant's characterization of his beliefs as nonreligious to be "a highly unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption." According to Justice Black, the term "religious" is broadly scoped, and denying conscientious objector status because of a refusal to use the term "places undue emphasis on the registrant's interpretation of his own beliefs." The Court therefore reasoned that conscientious objector status applies to "all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war."


At age twelve, Samuel Winship was arrested and charged as a juvenile delinquent for breaking into a woman's locker and stealing $112 from her pocketbook. The charge also alleged that had Winship's act been done by an adult, it would constitute larceny. Relying on Section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which provided that determinations of juvenile's guilt be based on a preponderance of the evidence, a Family Court found Winship guilty, despite acknowledging that the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship's appeal of the court's use of the lower "preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof, was rejected in both the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and in the New York Court of Appeals before the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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Yes. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court found that when establishing guilt of criminal charges the strict "reasonable-doubt" standard must be applied to both adults and juveniles alike. The Court noted that by establishing guilt based only on a "preponderance of the evidence," as is customary in civil cases, courts were denying criminal defendants a fundamental constitutional safeguard against the possibility that their fate be incorrectly decided due to fact-finding errors. The Court concluded that mere variations in age among criminal defendants will not suffice to warrant the use of different burdens of proof so long as they all face loss of liberty as a possible sentence.


Serafim Karalexis owned and operated a movie theater in Boston that was showing a movie entitled “I am Curious (Yellow).” The film was produced in Sweden and is about a girl’s search for identity and her relationship to the contemporary social and political problems of the time. During the course of the film, she takes a lover, and the film shows their explicit sex scenes, including scenes of oral sex. Suffolk County District Attorney Garrett H. Byrne determined that the film was obscene because it appealed to a “prurient interest in sex,” was offensive to community moral standards, and had no redeeming social value. He charged Karalexis with violating a state statute that prohibits the exhibition of obscene films.
Karalexis sought an injunction in district court in order to prevent this prosecution and future ones under a law that he argued violated the First Amendment protection afforded to such films..The district court held that the law was likely unconstitutional and granted the injunction.

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No. In a per curiam opinion that represented a 5-justice majority, the Court held that the law did not represent a threat to any constitutional rights that could not be defended in an individual court case.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented. He argued that it was appropriate for Karalexis to seek federal relief from the law after he was already convicted on the obscenity charges, because clearly the trial did not defend his constitutional rights. He also argued that the district court erred by granting an injunction before the film was determined to be obscene. Justice Byron R. White and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.
Justice William O. Douglas did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


The United States sued to condemn over 250 acres of W.G. and Mary Reynolds land for use in the Nolin Reservoir Project. The Fifth Amendment authorized this type of taking as long as the government provided “just compensation”. The Reynolds’ claimed that the original project did not contain 78 of the acres the United States tried to claim. A jury awarded the Reynolds’ $20,000 as compensation for all the land taken. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury instructions referred to matters disclosed outside the jury’s presence. Both the trial court and the court of appeals rejected the United States’ argument that the “scope of the project” issue was a question for the judge to decide, not the jury.

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The judge should decide; general area. In a 6-2 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion vacating the lower judgment and remanding to the district court. The Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71A(h) provides that the jury is limited to deciding amount of just compensation. The trial judge should decide all other issues. The Court also briefly confirmed that the scope of the project includes any land that will likely be used according to early plans. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent, stating that there is no reason to prevent the jury from deciding issues of fact, such as the scope of the project, on which its verdict will rely. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent.


In 1967, the state of Florida passed legislation to allow six-member juries in criminal cases. Johnny Williams was tried and convicted for robbery by such a jury. Williams, lost in a Florida appellate court; he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

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