No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the potential risk to police officers of another person on the arrest site must be weighed against the invasion of privacy. Because the arrest in this case happened in the suspect’s home, the officer was put at even greater risk because of the possibility of an ambush. This risk justified the protective sweep. The Court also held that a protective sweep was meant to be a cursory one, and not an in-depth search of the premises that would require a specific warrant.
In his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the state has the burden to prove that the search was protective in nature. He argued that the state must show that the officers had a “reasonable basis” for believing that there was a risk to themselves.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that he disagreed with Justice John Paul Stevens. He argued that the protective sweep was an element of police safety procedure, so the state did not have as high of a burden as Justice Stevens’ concurrence implied.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that the protective sweep represented the type of intrusive unwarranted search that the Fourth Amendment was created to prevent. He also argued that the majority opinion’s limits as to the scope and timeliness of the protective search are not enough to prevent the police from abusing such an unwarranted search. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent.


Marsha Kokinda and Kevin Pearl were volunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee. They set up a table on a sidewalk near a post office to solicit contributions and sell political literature. After post office employees received a large number of complaints, Kokinda and Pearl were asked to leave. They refused, at which point postal inspectors arrested them. They were charged and convicted of violating 39 CFR 232.1(h)(1)(1989), which prohibits "soliciting alms and contributions ... on postal premises." They appealed the convictions, arguing that they violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court, ruling that the sidewalk in question (which was entirely on Postal Service property and was intended only for traffic to and from the Post Office) was not a public forum, found that the restrictions were reasonable and therefore did not violate the First Amendment. On appeal, however, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the sidewalk was a traditional public forum and that the government's regulations were therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Because the government had no significant interest in banning solicitation, the convictions were unconstitutional.

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In a divided opinion, the Court ruled that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for a four-member plurality, wrote that the sidewalk was not a public forum. "Regulation of speech activity on governmental property that has been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity, such as public streets and parks, is examined under strict scrutiny. ... But regulation of speech activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First Amendment activity is examined only for reasonableness." The need to prevent solicitors from interrupting postal business satisfied this "reasonableness" test, so the convictions were constitutional. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing separately, held that it was unnecessary to determine whether the sidewalk was a public forum because the regulation met the traditional standard applied to time, place, and manner restrictions of protected expression.


Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz

In 1986, the Michigan State Police Department created a sobriety checkpoint program aimed at reducing drunk driving within the state. The program included guidelines governing the location of roadblocks and the amount of publicity to be given to the operation. Before the first roadblock went into effect, Rick Sitz, a licensed Michigan driver, challenged the checkpoints and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Sitz was victorious in the Michigan lower courts.

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In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the roadblocks did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that "no one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it." The Court then found that "the weight bearing on the other scale--the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints--is slight." The Court also found that empirical evidence supported the effectiveness of the program.


Michael Milkovich, Maple Heights High School’s wrestling coach, testified at a hearing concerning a physical altercation at a recent wrestling meet. After the hearing, Theodore Diadiun published an article in the local newspaper saying that anyone at the wrestling meet “knows in their heart” that Milkovich lied at the hearing. Milkovich sued Diadiun and the paper for defamation, alleging that the article accused him of perjury, damaged his occupation, and constituted libel. The court ruled in favor of the paper, holding that Milkovich failed to show the article was published with actual malice. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.
On remand, the trial court ruled in favor of the paper, holding that the article was a constitutionally-protected opinion. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded, holding that Milkovich was not a public figure and the defamatory statements were factual assertions, not constitutionally-protected opinions.

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No. In a 7-2 decision, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that there is no special constitutional privilege for opinions. The statements in the newspaper were sufficiently factual to be proved true or false. Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, expressing that the statements could not reasonably be interpreted as defamatory. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Rosalie Tung was an Asian-American professor who believed that she was denied tenure because of her sex and her race. To investigate her claim, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission asked the University for access to Tung's confidential peer review file. Citing the protection of academic freedom, the University refused to cooperate so as to avoid breaching the confidentiality promised to reviewers.

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A unanimous Court held that the need to ferret out invidious discrimination served a compelling government interest which justified inspection of confidential files. Since the EEOC was not interested in forcing the University to accept specific standards for promotion and it did not attempt to control the content of speech on campus, Justice Blackmun dismissed Pennsylvania's argument that the EEOC's actions violated academic freedom.


On January 1, 1984, officers of the New York City Police Department found Thelma Staton murdered in her apartment. Various facts of the case linked Bernard Harris to the crime. On January 16, police officers responded to Harris’ house to take him into custody. Although the police had not obtained an arrest warrant, when they knocked on his door, Harris let them enter. The police officers read Harris his Miranda rights, and Harris admitted to committing the murder. The police officers arrested Harris and took him to the police station, where he was read his Miranda rights again and signed an inculpatory statement. The police then videotaped an incriminating interview between Harris and the district attorney, despite Harris' requests to cease the interrogation.
The trial court suppressed Harris’ initial confession and video interview but allowed the signed statement into evidence. After a bench trial, Harris was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed and found the signed statement inadmissible because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest.

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No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule was designed to protect the physical sanctity of the home, not to grant criminal suspects protection from statements made outside the premises when the police have probable cause for arrest. Since the police had probable cause for an arrest, Harris was not unlawfully in custody when he was read his Miranda rights at the station and made the statement in question.
In his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that Harris’ arrest without a warrant and without exigent circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment, and the signed statement was therefore inadmissible because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest. He argued that the exclusionary rule was meant to prevent police officers from violating the Fourth Amendment in general, and it did not specifically apply to the home. He also argued that there is no evidence that a statement made at the police station is removed from the taint of an illegal arrest. Whether or not Harris was unlawfully in custody at the time his statement was made, he was in custody as a result of an illegal arrest, so the statement was still affected. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health

In 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in an automobile accident which left her in a "persistent vegetative state." She was sustained for several weeks by artificial feedings through an implanted gastronomy tube. When Cruzan's parents attempted to terminate the life-support system, state hospital officials refused to do so without court approval. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state's policy over Cruzan's right to refuse treatment.

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In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that while individuals enjoyed the right to refuse medical treatment under the Due Process Clause, incompetent persons were not able to exercise such rights. Absent "clear and convincing" evidence that Cruzan desired treatment to be withdrawn, the Court found the State of Missouri's actions designed to preserve human life to be constitutional. Because there was no guarantee family members would always act in the best interests of incompetent patients, and because erroneous decisions to withdraw treatment were irreversible, the Court upheld the state's heightened evidentiary requirements.


Under Section 2 of a Minnesota statute regulating a minor's access to abortion, women under 18 were denied access to the procedure until 48 hours after both their parents had been notified. Exceptions were made in the cases of medical emergencies and women who were victims of parental abuse. Section 6 of the law allowed the courts to judicially bypass Section 2 if the young woman could maturely demonstrate that notification would be unwise.

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The Court found Section 2 of the statute unconstitutional because requiring notification of both parents, whether or not both wanted to know or had taken responsibility for raising the child, did not serve a legitimate state interest. The Court favored notification of only one parent and a 48 hour waiting period. The Court upheld Section 6 of the law.


James was a youth arrested for the murder of another adolescent. During his trial a witness testifying on his behalf described James's appearance on the night of the supposed crime. This description contradicted statements which James had made to police officers the day after the crime. To expose this perjured testimony, prosecutors moved to introduce James's statements into the trial even though they were obtained illegally.

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The Court held that the statements could not be used. Justice Brennan argued that prosecutors are allowed to introduce illegally obtained evidence when using it to impeach a defendant's own testimony. However, in this case, the Illinois Supreme Court wrongly expanded that practice making it applicable to all defense witnesses. Brennan concluded that this expansion "would frustrate rather than further the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule."


FMC Corporation (FMC) provided its employees with a self-funded health benefit plan (Plan). The daughter of an FMC employee, Gerald Holliday (Holliday), was seriously injured in a car accident and the Plan paid for a portion of her medical expenses. Holliday also received, in settlement of a negligence action he brought on behalf of his daughter, payment from the driver of the automobile in which his daughter was injured. FMC sought reimbursement under the terms of the Plan. Holliday obtained a declaratory judgment that Section 1720 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law - which precludes reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery for benefit payments by a program, group contract, or other arrangement - prohibited FMC's exercise of subrogation rights. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which applies to employee welfare benefit plans such as FMC's Plan, did not preempt Section 1720.

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Yes. Three provisions of ERISA speak to the question of preemption: the preemption clause, the saving clause, and the deemer clause. The preemption clause establishes as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of every state law that "relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. The saving clause returns to the states the power to enforce those state laws that "regulat[e] insurance." The deemer clause dictates that an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be deemed an insurance matter. The Pennsylvania law is covered by the preemption clause since it relates to an employee benefit plan. It also falls within the saving clause because it invalidates certain insurance subrogation provisions. The deemer clause, however, exempts self-funded ERISA plans from being governed by state laws regulating insurance within the meaning of the saving clause. As a result, Section 1720 is preempted insofar as it prohibits FMC's self funded Plan from exercising its subrogation rights.


On May 5, 1983, an Eastern Airlines flight departed from Miami, bound for the Bahamas. After takeoff, one of the plane’s jet engines lost pressure. The flight crew shut down the failing engine and turned the plan around to return to Miami. The flight crew informed the passengers that the plane would be ditched in the Atlantic Ocean, but the crew managed to restart the engine and land the plane safely at Miami International Airport. A group of passengers, including Rose Marie Floyd, sued Eastern Airlines for mental distress caused by the incident. Eastern Airlines argued the engine failure and preparations for ditching the plane amounted to an accident under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and also that Article 17 requires physical injury a condition of liability. The district court concluded than mental distress alone is not enough to receive compensation under Article 17. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held the language in Article 17 encompasses purely emotional distress.

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No. Justice Thurgood Marshall deliver the unanimous opinion of the Court, which held that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention does not allow recovery for purely mental injuries. The translation of the direct language of the Convention can only be interpreted as “bodily injury,” which is consistent with the negotiating history of the Convention.


Shirley Irwin filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that he had been unlawfully fired by the federal Veterans Administration on the basis of his race and disability. In order to sue the federal government for unlawful discrimination, one must obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC (which is a waiver of the government's sovereign immunity from private suits). The EEOC mailed right-to-sue letters to both Irwin and his attorney. His attorney was out of the country, however, so while the letter arrived at his office on March 23, the attorney did not receive it until April 10. Irwin receive his copy of the letter on April 7. Less than a month from when Irwin received the letter, but more than a month from when the letter arrived at his attorney's office, Irwin filed suit in federal District Court. The court dismissed the suit, however, because it was filed more than a month after the attorney's office received the letter. Under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c), suits against the government must be filed within 30 days "of receipt of notice of final action taken" by the EEOC. The court ruled that the 30-day window began when the attorney's office received the letter. On appeal, Irwin argued that the window should have started when he or his attorney - not just the attorney's office - actually received the letter. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, however, upholding the District Court's decision.

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The 30-day window begins as soon as either the attorney's office, the attorney, or the client receives notification - whichever comes first. In an opinion written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that lower courts have consistently held that notice to an attorney's office qualifies as notice to the client. "The practical effect of a contrary rule would be to encourage factual disputes about when actual notice was received, and thereby create uncertainty in an area of the law where certainty is much to be desired," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.


Two police officers dressed in street clothes and wearing jackets with the word “Police” on the front and back were on patrol in Oakland, California in an unmarked car. As they approached a group of youths near Foothill Blvd. and 63rd Ave., the youths panicked and ran. One of the officers left the car and ran after Hodari D. Hodari tossed away something that looked like a small rock just before the officer tackled him and handcuffed him. The officer retrieved the rock, which turned out to be crack cocaine.
At trial, Hodari moved to suppress evidence relating to the cocaine, arguing that the officer obtained it during an unlawful search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Hodari was “seized” when he saw the officer running towards him and that seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The California Supreme Court denied the state’s application for review.

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No. No. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that a Fourth Amendment seizure requires some sort of physical force with lawful authority, or submission to an assertion of authority. Hodari had not been touched when he discarded the cocaine, and had not submitted to authority because he was still attempting to escape.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, writing that a seizure takes place when a police officer conveys the message that a citizen is not free to leave. In this situation, when the officer started chasing Hodari, he made it clear that Hodari was not free to leave. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


Following his conviction under Michigan law for possession of over 650 grams of cocaine, Ronald Harmelin was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Harmelin challenged his sentence as cruel and unusual, claiming it was disproportionate to the crime he committed and was statutorily mandated without consideration for the fact that he had no prior felony convictions. On appeal from an affirmance by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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No. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that since the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality guarantee, the determination of whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual" is not made with reference to the particular offense. Moreover, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause protects against unusual methods of punishment, not necessarily cruel ones. As such, while Harmelin's life sentence may have been cruel, it was not constitutionally unusual or unprecedented.


While detained at the Hocking Correctional Facility in Nelsonville, Ohio, Pearly Wilson claimed he experienced cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Wilson sought financial awards and an injunction against the prison under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He filed suit in a federal district court against two state prison officials, Richard P. Seiter and Carl Humphreys. The District Court ruled against Wilson, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that Wilson had to show that the prison officials had a "culpable state of mind" when inflicting harm upon him.

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No and Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court referred to its earlier decisions in Francis v. Resweber and Estelle v. Gamble to establish that cruel and unusual punishment required the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." For this to occur, the prison officials had to exhibit intentional cruelty, which would result in a "culpable state of mind." However, "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's conditions also constituted abusive treatment according to this standard. Therefore the Court of Appeals should have considered this aspect of Wilson's grievances.


The Louisiana Supreme Court had 7 judges. The First Supreme Court District elected 2 judges, and the 5 other districts elected 1 judge each. The Orleans Parish was 1 of 4 parishes in the First Supreme Court District and the majority of its registered voters were black. However, more than 75% of the other 3 parishes' registered voters were white. Ronald Chisom and the other petitioners in this case, representing New Orleans's black majority, filed an action in the District Court against Louisiana's governor, Charles E. Roemer, and state officials, arguing that the state's justice election procedure weakened the minority's voting power, allegedly violating section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The 1982 amendment to this act prohibited any voting procedure which caused minority voters to "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." The District Court ruled against the petitioners. When the Court of Appeals evaluated the case, it sent the case back to the District Court with instructions to maintain the original ruling based partly on its claim that the 1982 amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the election of judges. The District Court maintained their original opinion, but the petitioners and the United States appealed.

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Yes. In a majority decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court rejected the possibility that Congress had intended for the 1982 amendment to exclude judicial elections. The Court determined that if Congress had that aim, it would have indicated this exclusion explicitly. Consequently, the Court favored a broad interpretation of the word "representative" in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, considering it to encompass all winners of popular elections. Thus, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, sending the original case back to be reevaluated in light of the reversal.


When arrested for armed robbery, Paul McNeil did not initially invoke his Miranda right to counsel provided by the Fifth Amendment. However, he had a public defender represent him at a pretrial hearing at a county court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. After the hearing, sheriffs asked him about his involvement in a unrelated set of crimes, including murder. The sheriffs informed McNeil of his Miranda rights again, but he signed a waiver authorizing his testimony. His answers incriminated him for the crimes and he was charged in a state trial court. He unsuccessfully petitioned the court to invalidate his testimony as evidence. A jury convicted him and sentenced him to 60 years in prison. He contended that having the public defender represent him invoked his Miranda rights, which were later violated. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled against him.

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No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Sixth Amendment ensures competent legal representation in courts of law, whereas the Fifth Amendment ensures adequate counsel when confronting police. Because the Amendments have different purposes, invoking the Sixth Amendment by retaining a public defender does not invoke the Fifth Amendment when speaking with the police about an unrelated criminal charge. The Court reasoned that "[o]ne might be quite willing to speak to the police without counsel present concerning many matters, but not the matter under prosecution." McNeil's decision to have a public defender represent him at a pretrial hearing for armed robbery could not possibly indicate the choices he wished to make in the future regarding other confrontations with police.


Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell

In 1972, a federal district court issued an injunction ordering the Board of Education of Oklahoma City to implement the "Finger Plan," which bused black students to white schools. In 1977, the district court withdrew its enforcement of the plan, declaring that the Board had complied with the plan and reached "unitary" racial composition. In 1984, the Board passed the Student Reassignment Plan (SRP), which lessened busing in an effort to reduce travel time for black students. The group that originally protested segregation sought to restore the court-ordered desegregation, claiming that the school system again became segregated. The district court declined, but on appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the injunction was never formally removed. On reconsideration, the district court again declined to restore the injunction because it found the original "Finger Plan" unworkable. The Court of Appeals reversed.

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Yes. Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 5-3 court. The Court held that the "federal supervision of local school systems [has always] been intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination." Once a school system demonstrates earnest compliance with an injunction, the federal court can consider removing it. The district court's finding in 1977 that the plan had achieved its goal of racially "unitary" schools was not sufficiently clear to dissolve the 1972 injunction. Instead, the district court could remove the injunction upon finding that "that the school system was being operated in compliance with the Equal Protection Clause, and that it was unlikely that the Board would return to its former ways." If the Board satisfied these goals, the district court could remove the injunction and consider the SRP separately and on its own merits.


In 1987, Arkansas amended its Gross Receipts Act (GRA), imposing a tax on cable television but not on print media. Cable companies and others filed suit in the State Chancery Court, alleging that taxing cable services, but not print and satellite broadcast services, violated their First Amendment expressive rights and 14th Amendment equal protection rights. In 1989, after the Chancery Court upheld the amendment, Arkansas again amended the GRA, extending the tax to satellite broadcast services. On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the GRA. However, the court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits differential taxation among members of the same medium. Therefore, because cable and scrambled satellite television services are essentially the same, the tax was unconstitutional when it applied only to cable services.

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No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held 7-2 that without the intent or effect of suppressing expression, the First Amendment allows differential taxation of different media and differential taxation of some members of the same medium. Specifically, the Court held that the GRA was a generally applicable sales tax, and that its burden on cable television, while exempting the print media, was content-neutral, not directed at a select few, and not intended to interfere with expression. The Court went on to rule that the First Amendment allows a differential tax burden on some members of pay television services (that is, a tax on cable but not satellite services), if the tax is not intended to suppress expression. The Court ordered the State Supreme Court to address the 14th Amendment claim on remand. Dissenting, Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, argued that the First Amendment non-discrimination principle prohibits a heavier tax burden on one medium and not other media.


United States v. Centennial Savings Bank FSB

Centennial Savings Bank exchanged interests in one set of mortgage loans for another set of mortgage loans of the same market value. The mortgages were worth substantially less at the time they were exchanged than they had been at the time they were acquired, however, and Centennial reported the difference as lost income on its income tax return. In a separate set of transactions, Centennial collected early withdrawal penalties from customers who withdrew their certificates of deposit before they were scheduled. Centennial reported the early withdrawal penalties as "income from the discharge ... of indebtedness," meaning that it did not need to be reported as income under 26 U.S.C. 108(a)(1)(C).
With regard to the exchanged mortgages, the IRS did not allow the deduction, ruling that the properties exchanged had not been "materially different" and that the exchange therefore did not actually produce a reportable loss. With regard to the withdrawal penalties, the IRS ruled that they had to be reported as income. Centennial took the issue to federal District Court, where a judge ruled for the IRS on the mortgage exchange issue but for Centennial on the withdrawal penalty one. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the mortgage exchange holding and upheld the withdrawal penalty holding, siding with Centennial on both issues.

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Yes and no. On the exchanged mortgage question, the Supreme Court referred to a companion case, Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 499 U.S. 554, decided at the same time, in holding that the mortgages exchanged were "materially different" and could therefore be deducted as losses.
On the question of early withdrawal penalties, however, the Court sided with the IRS. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the majority, stated that income comes from the "discharge ... of indebtedness" only when it is the result of the forgiveness of an obligation to repay assumed by the debtor (in this case the bank) at the outset of the debtor-creditor relationship. Because the early withdrawal fee was stipulated in the contract agreed upon at the outset of the certificate of deposit agreements, its payment was not the forgiveness of any obligation on behalf of the bank but rather the fulfillment of an obligation on behalf of the creditor. The bank was therefore required to list the penalties as income.


Exxon Corporation v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc.

For certain contract disputes within admiralty jurisdiction, an action in rem is authorized against the vessel herself, even when jurisdiction cannot be asserted over her owner or operator. To satisfy a judgment for the plaintiff, the court may order the vessel sold at public auction. Such an action is permitted those who go unpaid after furnishing a vessel with supplies essential for her continued voyaging. But maritime law long distinguished the contracts of middlemen, that is, agents or brokers procuring supplies for a vessel from other sources. Such intermediary contracts were considered ordinary agency agreements, and therefore outside admiralty jurisdiction. The Supreme Court embraced this distinction in Minturn v. Minyard, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 477 (1854).
In this case, EXXON sued a cargo ship, the William Hopper, in rem and her owner, Central Gulf Lines, in personam for the price of fuel delivered to the ship in the ports of New York and Jeddah. Exxon had a contract with Waterman Steamship Company to supply fuel for its fleet anywhere in the world. Sometimes EXXON furnished its own fuels; otherwise, EXXON procured fuels from other sellers. Among the vessels operated by Waterman was the William Hopper, leased from Central Gulf Lines. When she visited New York, Exxon supplied her with its own fuel. When she visited Jeddah, EXXON got her fuel from Arabian Marine Operating Company. EXXON paid Arabian Marine, but Waterman went bankrupt before paying EXXON. In the bankruptcy proceedings, Central Gulf agreed to pay EXXON if a court found the William Hooper liable in rem. Invoking Minturn and its progeny, the Southern District of New York agreed with Central Gulf Lines that Exxon's claim for the fuel procured in Jeddah was one of agency, and therefore outside admiralty jurisdiction. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed without opinion.

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No. A unanimous Court reversed and remanded, finding Minturn v. Maynard obsolete in light of subsequent developments in maritime law. Because the modern test for admiralty jurisdiction in contract cases turns not on the contract's type but on its purpose, a contract like this one between EXXON and Waterman, i.e., an agency contract for services maritime in nature, ought to qualify.
Abstract prepared by Professor John Paul Jones, University of Richmond School of Law


California police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Acevedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle ( U.S. v. Ross ), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container ( U.S. v. Chadwick ). The California Court of Appeal decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence - not the car generally - they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California Supreme Court denied review, but the Supreme Court granted the State's petition.

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Yes. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled that the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's general search-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation where the police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a specific movable container within the car. The Court noted that the warrant requirement previously had depended on a "curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." In place of that uncertain distinction, the Court adopted a single rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall dissented.


Frank Garner was convicted of defrauding Coy Grogan and ordered to repay him. Garner then filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, asking the Bankruptcy Court to discharge (that is, nullify) his court-ordered repayment to Grogan. Grogan argued that the debt should not be discharged because section 523(a) of the bankruptcy code exempts obligations for money obtained by "actual fraud." The Bankruptcy Court, based on portions of the fraud case, agreed and did not allow Garner to discharge the debt. The District Court affirmed, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the standard of proof used in the original fraud case - the "preponderance of the evidence" standard - was lower than the standard of proof demanded under section 523(a) - a "clear and convincing evidence" standard. The Court found that most states used the "clear and convincing" standard in fraud cases and that Congress would have explicitly stated it if they used a different standard. Moreover, it argued that the intention of the bankruptcy code to provide a "fresh start" suggested that the standard most favorable to bankruptcy filers should be used (that is, the more demanding "clear and convincing" standard).

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Courts should apply the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Justice John Paul Stevens, for a unanimous Supreme Court, wrote that the lack of a specified standard of evidence in section 523(a) implied that Congress had intended the preponderance of the evidence standard to be used. That lower standard was generally used in civil actions between private parties (including bankruptcy filings) unless particularly important interests were at stake. Protecting a bankruptcy filer who had previously been convicted of fraud was not sufficiently important to demand a higher level of evidence.
Stevens also wrote that the "fresh start" intention of the bankruptcy laws did not suggest a higher standard of evidence. "In the same breath that we have invoked this 'fresh start policy," he wrote, "we have been careful to explain that the Act limits the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor.'" A debtor previously convicted of fraud did not fit this description.


In Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Department officers regularly boarded buses during stops to ask passenger for permission to search their luggage. Terrance Bostick, a passenger, was questioned by two officers who sought permission to search his belongings and advised him of his right to refuse. After obtaining Bostick's permission, the officers searched his bags, found cocaine, and arrested him on drug trafficking charges. Bostick filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained, but the trial court denied the motion. Following an affirmance and certification from the Florida Court of Appeals, the State Supreme Court held that the bus searches were per se unconstitutional because police did not afford passengers the opportunity to "leave the bus" in order to avoid questioning. Florida appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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No. The Court, in a 6-to-3 decision, noted that when deciding if a search request is overly coercive, within a confined space such as a bus, one must not look at whether a party felt "free to leave," but whether a party felt free to decline or terminate the search encounter. The Court held that in the absence of intimidation or harassment, Bostick could have refused the search request. Moreover, the fact that he knew the search would produce contraband had no bearing on whether his consent was voluntarily obtained. The test of whether a "reasonable person" felt free to decline or terminate a search presupposes his or her innocence.


In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act, which established five categories, or “schedules,” of substances for the purposes of regulation and prosecution. The Act grants the Attorney General the authority to add or remove substances and to move substances among the schedules. The Act also lays out specific procedures in order for the Attorney General to exercise this authority. Because the procedures lengthened the process of making any changes to the enforcement of the Act, drug manufacturers were able to develop products that took advantage of unforeseen loopholes in the Act. In 1984, Congress amended the Act to allow the Attorney General to temporarily schedule drugs, which expedited the enforcement process. The Attorney General then delegated these temporary scheduling powers to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which temporarily scheduled the designer drug “Euphoria” as a Schedule I substance.
During this time, the DEA executed a valid search warrant on the home of Daniel and Lyrissa Touby, where they found a fully operational Euphoria laboratory. The Toubys were indicted for manufacturing and conspiring to manufacture Euphoria. They moved for dismissal by arguing that the Controlled Substances Act unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Attorney General and the Attorney General improperly delegated authority to the DEA. The district court denied the motion, and the Toubys were convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions.

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No, yes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the nondelegation doctrine allows Congress to seek the assistance of other branches of government by leaving a certain degree of discretion up to other actors. By providing sufficient guidance to, and placing specific restrictions on, the Attorney General in the Controlled Substances Act, Congress did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power. The Court also held that the Act permits the Attorney General to delegate authority to other officers and employees of the Department of Justice, so the delegation to the Drug Enforcement Agency was appropriate.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that the Controlled Substances Act allows judicial review as a method of ensuring the constitutionality of the temporary scheduling and delegation. He also argued that the issue of delegation of powers within a branch of government is addressed by the Due Process Clause, and the majority’s decision does not examine the case within that framework.


International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW

Johnson Controls, Inc. ("Johnson") manufactures batteries whose assembly process entails exposure to high levels of lead. After discovering that eight of its female employees became pregnant while maintaining blood lead levels in excess of those thought safe by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Johnson barred all its female employees - except those with medically documented infertility - from engaging in tasks that require exposure to lead in access of recommended OSHA levels. Following its passage, the United Automobile Workers (UAW) challenged Johnson's fetal-protection policy as sexually discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Act). When the Appellate Court affirmed a district court decision in favor of Johnson, the UAW appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court noted that even well intentioned proposals are forbidden if they result in discrimination. Johnson's fetal-protection plan discriminated against women by not requiring their male counterparts to demonstrate proof of medical sterility, despite the fact that lead exposure has also proved hazardous to male reproductive systems. The Court added that Johnson's fetal-protection plan fell outside the bona fide occupational qualification exception of Title VII, since the exception only permits employers to discriminate based on qualities that detrimentally impact on an employee's job performance. In the present case, although lead exposure may be harmful to the unborn, Johnson furnished no proof that it detracted from its female employees' abilities to perform any of their essential tasks.


Under Article V, Section 26, of Missouri's Constitution, state court judges must retire at the age of seventy. The two petitioners in this case, both of whom were Missouri state judges, challenged the state constitution's retirement requirement on legislative and constitutional grounds.

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No and no. Missouri's mandatory retirement requirement for its state court judges did not violate either the ADEA or the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In addition to emphasizing Missouri's, or any other state's, Tenth Amendment right to define the qualifications of its highest state officials, the Court held that the regulations of the ADEA did not apply to "policy-making" appointees such as state court judges. With respect to the petitioners' Equal Protection challenge, the Court employed a rational basis test to examine whether a rational relationship existed between Missouri's goal of promoting competent state court judges and its retirement requirement. Noting the connection between increasing age and declining mental and physical capacities, the Court held that Missouri's retirement requirement for judges who reach the age of seventy was not unreasonable.


A Dade County police officer overheard Enio Jimeno arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone. He followed in his car, and eventually pulled Jimeno over for a traffic violation. He told him he had reason to believe Jimeno had drugs in the car, and asked for permission to search it. Jimeno consented, and a search revealed a brown paper bag with cocaine inside it. At trial, Jimeno argued that his consent to the search of the car did not extend to the closed paper bag within the car. The trial court agreed, excluded the drugs found inside the bag as the product of an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court both affirmed.

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Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," wrote Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in the majority opinion. "We think it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container."


The national government provides funds for family planning services (Title X). The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations limiting the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities. Title X funds were to be used only to support preventive family planning services.

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No. The intent of Congress in the enactment of Title X is ambiguous with regard to abortion counseling. Consequently, the Court will defer to the expertise of the administrative agency. The Court held that the "regulations promulgated by the Secretary [of HHS] do not raise the sort of 'grave and doubtful constitutional questions' that would lead us to assume Congress did not intend to authorize their issuance." Should government subsidize one protected right (family planning), as it does in this case, it does not follow that government must subsidize analogous counterpart rights (abortion services).


A Tennessee court tried Pervis Payne for murdering Charisse Christopher and her daughter Lacie. In hopes of avoiding the death penalty, Payne provided four witnesses testifying to his good character. The prosecution had Charisse's mother share how Charisse's death had impacted her surviving son Nicholas. In closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced Nicholas' loss of his mother when calling for the death penalty. The jury convicted him and sentenced him to death. Payne argued that the prosecution could not use testimony of how the victim's death impacted family members when contending for the death penalty. The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled against him.

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No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Court overruled Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers which prohibited the submission of evidence relating to the harms caused by the victim's death. The Court reasoned that since "[v]irtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances," the prosecution must be allowed to submit similar counter evidence. Evidence regarding the "assessment of the harm caused by the defendant has long been an important factor in determining the appropriate punishment, and victim impact evidence is simply another method of informing the sentencing authority about such harm."


Robert S. Minnick and James Dyess escaped from the Clark County Jail. The next day, they broke into a mobile home to search for weapons. While in the home, the owner returned with a friend and the friend’s infant son. Minnick and Dyess shot and killed the two adults and tied up two young women who arrived later. Minnick and Dyess fled to Mexico, but after a falling out, Minnick went to California alone where police arrested him on a warrant for the Mississippi murders.
After the arrest, two FBI officers came to interview Minnick at the San Diego Jail. Minnick refused, asking the officers to “Come back Monday when I have a lawyer.” Minnick did meet with an appointed lawyer on two or three occasions. The next Monday, the deputy sheriff of Clark County came to question Minnick. Prison officials told Minnick he “could not refuse” to speak to the sheriff. The deputy sheriff advised Minnick of his rights and Minnick refused to sign a waiver form. Minnick then confessed to one of the murders, saying that Dyess forced him to shoot. At trial, Minnick moved to suppress those statements, but the court denied the motion, reasoning that Edwards v Arizona only required counsel to be made available to an accused. Minnick argued that he was entitled to have counsel present at all questioning. The jury found Minnick guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed, holding that Minnick’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel was satisfied because he had met with counsel.

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Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-2 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that once counsel is requested, no interrogation can take place without counsel unless the accused waives that right. The right to counsel is not satisfied by merely meeting with counsel outside the interrogation room. The Edwards protection did end as soon as an accused meets with counsel.
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, writing that there was no justification for creating a rebuttable presumption that an accused has not waived his right to counsel after invoking that right. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


Cohen was a campaign associate in the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race. He gave court records concerning another party's candidate for lieutenant governor to the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. Though he had received a promise of confidentiality from the reporters, the papers identified Cohen in their stories. He was fired as a result. Cohen sued the papers in state court, alleging a breach of contract. At trial, Cohen won compensatory damages and the state appellate court upheld the award. But the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Cohen's claim relied on state "promissory estoppel" law, a law that essentially prevented a promisor from breaking a promise. The court ruled that the First Amendment's free press guarantee prevented promissory estoppel from applying to the newspapers.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Byron White, the Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel suit against the press. The Court first affirmed that such a cause of action, though private, triggered the First Amendment's protection. But the Court went on to rule that the state's promissory estoppel law was generally applicable and did not target the press. The law's enforcement against the press thus did not require stricter scrutiny than would its enforcement against other individuals or institutions.


Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc.

Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. is a public utility that provides telephone service to several communities in northwest Kansas. Rural also publishes a telephone directory that consists of white and yellow pages. Feist Publications, Inc. is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone directories that cover a much larger geographic range than Rural's directories. When Rural refused to license its white pages listings to Feist, Feist extracted the listings it needed from Rural's directory without consent. Although Feist altered many of Rural's listings, several were identical to listings in Rural's white pages. The District Court granted summary judgment to Rural in its copyright infringement suit, holding that telephone directories are copyrightable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not original to Rural and therefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural's combined white and yellow pages directory. The Court reasoned that Rural's white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection because the information they contained lacked the requisite originality, as Rural had not selected, coordinated, or arranged the uncopyrightable facts in any original way. "Because Rural's white pages lack the requisite originality, Feist's use of the listings cannot constitute infringement," wrote Justice O'Connor.


First American Bankshares, Inc. (FABI) began a "freeze-out" merger in which the First American Bank of Virginia (Bank) merged into Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (VBI), a wholly owned subsidiary of FABI. VBI already owned 85% of the Bank's shares, and would acquire the remaining 15% from the Bank's minority shareholders. The Bank's executive committee and full board approved the merger at $42 a share. The directors then solicited proxies for voting on the proposed merger at the next annual meeting. In their solicitation, the directors stated that they approved the plan because the price allowed the minority shareholders to achieve a "high" value for their stock. Sandberg did not give her approval of the merger and brought suit, the federal ground for which was soliciting proxies in violation of SEC Rule 14a-9, which prohibits the solicitation of proxies by means of materially false or misleading statements. The trial court instructed the jury that it could find for Sandberg as long as the proxy solicitation involved material misstatements, and the proxy solicitation was an "essential link" in the merger process. The jury found for Sandberg, awarding her $18 a share, finding that she would have received that much more if the stock had been valued adequately.

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Yes and no, respectively. Terms like "high value," in a commercial context, are reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis, and so could be shown to be misleading by garden-variety evidence. Furthermore, they can be materially misleading even if other information is available in the statement upon which an expert could deduce that they are false. A proxy statement should inform, not challenge the reader's critical wits. However, the link between the statement and the merger process is too speculative and too procedurally intractable to find an implied private right of action in cases in which the minority shareholders' votes are not required by law or corporate bylaw, and where the plaintiff's theory is that the vote was cosmetic.


Under 26 U.S.C. 7443A(b), the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court (an Article I Court established by Congress) may appoint special trial judges to certain specified proceedings explicitly laid out in the statute, in which the special trial judges may issue decisions. He may also appoint them to "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate," but in those unspecified cases the special trial judge may not issue a final decision, only draft an opinion which must be reviewed by a regular judge of the Tax Court.
Freytag and several other defendants were charged with using a tax shelter to avoid paying roughly $1.5 billion in taxes. They consented to have their case heard by a special trial judge. The trial judge eventually drafted an opinion unfavorable to their position, which was reviewed and adopted by the Chief Judge. They then appealed the case, arguing that their case was too complex to assign to a special trial judge under section 7443A. Congress's decision to allow the Chief Judge to make such an assignment, they argued, violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution (Article II Section 2), which provides that Congress may "vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Freytag asserted that the "Courts of Law" referred to there were only Article III courts (Federal District Courts, Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, all of which have judges with lifetime tenure), and that the Chief Judge was part of an Article I court, meaning that Congress could not assign him the power of appointment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, affirming the Tax Court's decisions.

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Yes and yes. On the question of whether 7443A permitted the assignment of complex cases to special trial judges, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the statute unambiguously did allow such appointments. Justice Harry Blackmun, in the majority opinion, wrote, "The plain language of 7443A(b)(4) surely authorizes the Chief Judge's assignment of petitioners' cases to a special trial judge. When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry should be complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances."
On the Appointments Clause question, however, the Court was divided 5-to-4. Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority that Article I Courts, like Article III Courts, exercised the judicial power of the United States and were therefore "Courts of Law" for purposes of Article II Section 2. While they may have been more dependent on Congress than the other branches, they were nevertheless independent, and it therefore did not violate the separation of powers to allow them to make appointments.


An Arizona prosecutor brought a charge of first-degree murder against Schad after he was found with a murder victim's vehicle and other belongings. In Arizona, first-degree murder is murder committed with premeditation or murder committed in an attempt to rob. Schad maintained that circumstantial evidence established at most that he was a thief. The jury's instructions addressed first-and second-degree murder, not theft. The jury convicted Schad of first-degree murder. The judge sentenced Schad to death.

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No. In a complex decision, Souter's plurality opinion acknowledged that jury instructions offering all-or-nothing alternatives in capital cases may overstep the Due Process Clause. But Schad's jury was not faced with such a choice. His jury had been instructed on the non-capital offense of second-degree murder.


Glen Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend, Indiana, operated entertainment establishments with totally nude dancers. An Indiana law regulating public nudity required dancers to wear "pasties" and a "G-string" when they perform. The Theatre and Lounge sued to stop enforcement of the statute.

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No. The Court was fractured and there was no majority opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a plurality opinion, conceded that nude dancing was a form of expressive activity. But he maintained that the public indecency statute is justified despite the incidental limitations on such expressive activity. The statute "furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality." The proscription on public nudity is unrelated to the erotic message the dancers seek to convey.


Arizona law officials suspected that Oreste Fulminante murdered his stepdaughter. He was later arrested in New York for an unrelated crime after the murder and incarcerated. While in prison he became friends with Anthony Sarivola, an inmate paid by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to collect information on other inmates while he served his term. Fulminante initially denied killing his stepdaughter to Sarivola, but admitted it when Sarivola offered him protection from other inmates in exchange for the truth. After his release, Fulminante also confessed to Donna Sarivola, Anthony's wife. Fulminante was indicted for murder in Arizona. Fulminante argued in trial court that his two confessions to the Sarivolas could not be used as evidence since the first was coerced and the second based on the first. The court admitted his confessions as evidence, convicted him, and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court ordered Fulminante to be retried without the use of the confessions.

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Yes and yes. Justice Byron R. White and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered parts of the opinion, both majorities by a 5-4 vote. The Court held that Fulminante was coerced to confess in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court found that "it was fear of physical violence, absent protection from his friend Sarivola, which motivated Fulminante to confess." This motivation invalidated his confession. Since Fulminante's confession to Donna Sarivola was closely tied to his first coerced confession, the Court dismissed both. The Court also found that the confessions played a determinative role in the trial. It maintained that a "successful prosecution depended on the jury's believing the two confessions." Because the confessions were critical to the outcome of the trial, the fact that they were obtained coercively could not be dismissed as a harmless error. Four justices dissented to using harmless error analysis for coerced confessions on the ground that confessions always significantly affect a trial's outcome.


Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

For tax purposes, Cottage Savings Association exchanged its interests in the mortgages of 252 single family homes with several other savings and loan associations, receiving in return 305 mortgages that, taken together, had the same market value. The fair market value of the mortgages it gave away, however, were worth $2.5 million less than their original value. In accordance with the accounting procedures of the federal regulatory body of savings and loan corporations, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), Cottage Savings recorded the exchanged properties as "substantially identical" (because they had the same fair market value).
When Cottage Savings filed its federal income tax return, however, it claimed a $2.5 million loss - the difference between the original value of the mortgages it gave away and the current value of the mortgages it received in return. The IRS refused to recognize the difference as a deductible loss, however, because under section 1001(a) of Title 26 of the tax code, the change in a property's value is only taken into consideration when it is realized through the "sale or disposition of [the] property." An exchange of property only constitutes a "disposition" if there is a "material difference" between the properties exchanged. Because Cottage Savings had reported the properties exchanged as "substantially identical," the IRS ruled, a "disposition" could not have taken place and the loss in value could not be deducted. Cottage savings took the issue to a federal Tax Court, which disagreed with the IRS and ruled the deduction permissible. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, siding with the IRS.

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Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the definition of "substantially identical" under the FHLBB regulations was intentionally flexible and broad enough to include even properties that were "materially different" for IRS purposes. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in the majority opinion, wrote that exchanged properties are "materially different" if they "embody legally distinct entitlements." The properties involved in this exchange clearly satisfied that test. "Because the participation interests exchanged by Cottage Savings and the other S & L's derived from loans that were made to different obligors and secured by different homes, the exchanged interests did embody legally distinct entitlements. Consequently, we conclude that Cottage Savings realized its losses at the point of exchange."


McLaughlin was arrested without a warrant and argued that Riverside did not act promptly (within 48 hours) on judicial probable cause determinations and arraignment procedures in his case and others.

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The Court held that Riverside's actions did not comply with the Gerstein precedent. Justice O'Connor argued that it was the state's burden to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances when delaying probable cause determinations beyond 48 hours. The lower court in this case had placed that responsibility on the accused. Intervening weekends or complicated pretrial proceedings were not legitimate reasons for delay.


After Jeffrey Masson was fired from his position at the Sigmund Freud Archives, Janet Malcolm interviewed him for an article in the New Yorker magazine. Malcolm_s article included many long direct quotations from Masson. The article presented Masson as extremely arrogant and condescending; at one point, he was quoted as calling himself "the greatest analyst who ever lived." However, Malcolm fabricated many of the more distasteful quotations. Masson sued for libel. The District Court dismissed the case on First Amendment free speech grounds because Masson was a public figure.

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No. In a 9-0 vote, the Court ruled that the First Amendment s free expression clause could not protect the distortions in Malcolm s article. Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion also explained when a direct quotation can be considered false, and therefore potentially libelous. The First Amendment limits libel suits by public figures. A report about a public figure cannot be considered "false" unless it is a gross distortion of the truth. Justice Kennedy's opinion explained that a direct quotation will qualify as such a distortion if the quoted words differ in their factual meaning from anything the public figure really said. Malcolm_s fabrication qualified as a "gross distortion," and the Court granted Masson standing to sue.


Larry Joe Powers, a white male, was indicted on the charges of two counts of aggravated murder and one count of attempted aggravated murder. He pleaded not guilty, and invoked his right to a jury trial. During the jury selection process, Powers objected when the prosecution excluded a black individual from the jury without explanation. The court denied the request for explanation. The prosecution struck nine more possible jurors, of which six were black. Powers objected each time, but the court overruled his objection. The jury convicted Powers on all charges. Powers appealed his conviction and argued that the prosecution’s discriminatory selection of jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution, and that his own race was irrelevant to the right to object. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal. The petitioner sought review before the Supreme Court.

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Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the prosecution is prohibited from excluding an unbiased and qualified juror based on the person’s race regardless of the race of the defendant. Although an individual does not have the right to sit on a jury, every citizen has the right not to be deprived of the opportunity to participate in this aspect of civil life. The Court also held that a criminal defendant has the right to raise objections on racial discrimination when excluding certain potential jurors because it could cause potential injury to the defendant. The defendant must feel that he is receiving a fair trial and that the integrity of the judicial system is upheld. Therefore the defendant, as well as the juror, has the right to eliminate racial discrimination in the courtroom and the color of his skin is irrelevant to these objections of racial discrimination.


In keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.

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Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government involvement in this case creates "a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school." Such conduct conflicts with settled rules proscribing prayer for students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently), forcing students to act in ways which establish a state religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.


Under Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution, a census must be conducted every ten years and the distribution of Representatives in Congress adjusted to provide proportional representation. The census is designed and carried out by the Secretary of Commerce before the results are forwarded to the President, who determines the number of Representatives each state will receive. In 1990, for only the second time since 1900, the census allocated employees of the Department of Defense who were stationed overseas to the states designated their "homes of record." Massachusetts claimed that this adjustment of the census shifted one Representative from Massachusetts to Washington state. They brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Constitution, arguing that the allocation of overseas personnel to their "homes of record" was arbitrary and capricious under the APA standards and did not meet the constitutional requirement of counting the number of people "in each State."

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The Secretary's decision was not reviewable under the APA because it was not a "final agency action." Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in the majority opinion, wrote that only agency decisions that complete the decision-making process and directly affect the party bring suit may be challenged under the APA. In this case the Secretary's decision resulted merely in a set of findings reported to the President that he could ask to have revised using a different formula. Also, the recommendation (and therefore the procedure used to arrive at it) did not directly affect Massachusetts; the President had to take action before the findings would affect the number of Representatives apportioned to the State. The procedure and the findings that resulted from it, therefore, was not a "final agency action" challengeable under the APA, and the actions of the President are also not challengeable under the APA.
Evaluating the Secretary's chosen procedure under Article I Section 2 of the Constitution, however, Justice O'Connor ruled that the decision to include overseas personnel of the Department of Defense was a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution's intent. "The Secretary's judgment does not hamper the underlying constitutional goal of equal representation, but, assuming that employees temporarily stationed abroad have indeed retained their ties to their home states, actually promotes equality," wrote Justice O'Connor.


In a statewide ballot, California residents approved the addition of Article XIIIA to their State Constitution. Article XIIIA's "acquisition value" provision limited property assessment value increases to two percent, if caused by changes in ownership or new construction improvements. Article XIIIA exempted two types of transfers from this reassessment limit: first, if the principal seller is 55 or older and moved to a home of equal or lower value, and second, when a transfer occurred between parents and children. One of Article XIIIA's effects is that over time the taxes of new property owners, adjusted to reflect recent values, would be substantially higher than long-term property owner's taxes. A new property owner filed suit to challenge the state constitutional amendment.

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The Court, through Justice Blackmun, held that California's new property tax system rationally and plausibly furthered legitimate state interests in restraining increasing property taxes and preserving local neighborhood stability. The discrepancy which Article XIIIA created between new and long time property owners is warranted, because the latter had a far greater reliance interest in their property than the former. Thus, long-time property owners deserved more protection from higher property taxes than new property owners. This demonstrated a significant difference between the two property owner types. In addition, both of Article XIIIA's exemptions rationally promoted a legitimate state interest. The first exemption did not discourage older people from moving to a smaller home that is likely to better suit their smaller family and income. The second exemption aimed at preserving family unity and neighborhood stability. Accordingly, the Court held that Article XIIIA did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.


After the district court held that the conditions at the Suffolk County Jail were constitutionally deficient, the Suffolk County officials and the inmates of Suffolk County Jail entered into a consent decree for construction of a new jail. In the decree, the parties agreed single-occupancy cells would be provided for pretrial inmates. During the delay of the construction, the sheriff of Suffolk County moved to modify the decree to allow double bunking in certain cells to raise the jail’s occupancy. The sheriff argued that with the increasing number of pretrial detainees and a recent court decision, there was a change in fact and in law that was required to modify the decree. The district court refused the modification because the sheriff is required to show a grievous wrong by new and unforeseen circumstances to modify the decree and that the increase of pretrial detainees was neither new nor unforeseen. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

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No, Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the grievous wrong standard does not apply to requests to modify consent decrees and that changes of conduct or conditions may be revised if necessary for future events based on a flexible standard. Under a flexible standard, the party seeking modification of an institutional reform consent decree must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants a revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is tailored to that change of circumstances. This requirement will be satisfied if the change was unforeseen or would be detrimental to public interests without the modification.
Justice John Paul Stevens, with whom Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined, wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that after the institution was found by the district court to be deficient, it is the district court’s duty to command an effective remedy. In this case, the remedy was to have single-occupancy cells for pretrial detainees and it is important that the court apply a strict standard when considering modification request that undermines the central purpose of a consent decree. The modification of the consent decree should be denied.
Justice Clarence Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision.


The pre-emption provision of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) prohibits states from enforcing any law relating to airline rates, route, or service. The ADA was enacted to ensure that states would not undo the anticipated benefits of federal deregulation of the airline industry. In 1987, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) adopted Air Travel Industry Enforcement Guidelines, which govern the content and format of airline advertising and award frequent flyers and payment to passengers who voluntarily gave up their seats on overbooked flights. The Attorney General of Texas sent letters to airlines, including Trans World Airlines, notifying them of the intent to sue if they did not follow the guidelines. Trans World Airlines sued and claimed that state regulation of fare advertisements is prohibited by the ADA. The district court found in favor of Trans World Airlines and held that states cannot take any enforcement action, which would restrict any aspect of the fare advertising or operations relating to rate, routes, or services. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

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Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the ADA prevents the enforcement of the NAAG fare-advertising guidelines through a state’s general consumer protection. When the ADA was enacted, Congress intended to prevent the state enforcement action if it has a connection with, or references airline rates, routes, or services, including advertisements. The NAAG guidelines explicitly refer to the rates within the meaning of the ADA and would have a significant impact on the airline’s ability to market their product and upon the fares they charge.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued the words “relate to” in the ADA should not be given a broad meaning because it gives the ADA pre-emption provision a meaning beyond the words and the legislative history behind the enactment. Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined the dissent
Justice David H. Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey

The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.

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In a bitter 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. In a rare step, the opinion for the Court was crafted and authored by three justices: O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
Learn more about the Supreme Court and abortion law in Body Politic, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


After 17 years of litigation, Mississippi's public university system remained racially divided. The state had operated legally segregated universities, but had since adopted race-neutral policies to dismantle its de jure segregated system. All students could choose which school to attend, though the choices produced nearly all white and all black institutions of higher learning. This case was decided together with that of Ayers v. Fordice.

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No. A state's duty is not discharged "until it eradicates policies and practices traceable to its prior de jure dual system that continues to foster segregation." Race-neutral admissions are not a sufficient corrective to constitutional violations of a dual system. Different admissions criteria, and different missions for university system components, may have racially discriminatory effects perpetuating the old system. The Court did not declare the present system unconstitutional, only that Mississippi had not done enough to eliminate segregation. The Justices turned the matter back to state officials -- and to the courts -- to determine what must be done to fulfill its duty under the Constitution.


Lechmere, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

Lechmere owned and operated a large retail store in a shopping plaza. Nonemployee union organizers campaigned to organize the store employees by entering the company's parking lot and placing handbills on car windshields. Lechmere prohibited solicitation and literature distribution on its property. The union organizers persisted in their leafleting campaign despite continued objections from Lechmere. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against Lechmere. An NLRB judge ruled in the union's favor.

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No, reasoned Justice Clarence Thomas, except in situations where inaccessibility makes communication through normal channels ineffective. There were alternatives short of trespass, such as signs, mailings, and newspaper ads. (Thomas's defense of private property rights may offer a clue to his budding jurisprudence.)


Rose Cipollone died at 58 from lung cancer. She smoked for 42 years. Before her death, she and her husband sued several cigarette manufacturers in federal court for damages resulting from Mrs. Cipollone lung cancer. A trial court judgment of $400,000 was reserved in the U.S. Court of Appeals. The Cipollone family appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

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In a complicated 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that federally mandated warnings do not bar smokers from suing manufacturers under state personal-injury laws. The justices ruled that such suits cannot be based on claims that cigarette advertising failed to warn smokers of smoking dangers. But the justices also ruled that individuals may press claims alleging that the tobacco companies made fraudulent or inaccurate statements in their advertising or that the companies conspired to mislead people about the health hazards of smoking.


The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (S7(a)(2)) required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that any authorized actions did not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or critically destroy natural habitats. A 1986 amendment to the act limited it scope to actions in the United States or on the high seas. Defenders of Wildlife and other organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the new amendment erred by providing for a geographic limit on the original law.

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No. Even if the Court were to assume that the agency-funded projects at issue threatened listed species, there was no proof that these actions would produce "actual or imminent" injuries to particular respondents who might some day wish to visit the foreign countries in question. The Court disregarded the proposed theory of "ecosystem nexus" which claimed that any person who used any part of of a "contiguous ecosystem" adversed affected by a funded activity had standing to sue.


Respondents -- the Seattle Audubon Society, the Portland Audubon Society, and several other environmental groups -- filed two separate suits in federal district court seeking to enjoin harvesting timber in forests managed by the United States Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. The suits challenged five federal statutes. In response, Congress enacted §318 of the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, which required harvesting in certain areas, while prohibiting it in others. §318 included the names of the lawsuits and specifically stated that it was enacted to address the challenges from the lawsuits. Respondents argued that §318 violated Article III of the Constitution because it directed the results of the two pending cases, a job for the judiciary, not the legislature. The district courts rejected that claim, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, holding that Congress was directing the result in pending cases without repealing or amending the underlying litigation.

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No. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that §318 did not violate Article III because it made changes to the law by replacing the legal standards of the five challenged statutes. It did not make any findings of law or fact, or compel any results in the pending cases. The explicit reference to the cases only served to identify the statutes underlying those cases.


On November 20, 1987, Paul Wade was found dead in his apartment with multiple stab wounds to his chest, head, and back. Forty-five hours later, David Riggins was arrested and charged with the murder. A few days after being taken into custody, Riggins complained to Dr. R. Edward Quass, the psychiatrist who treated patients in jail, that he was hearing voices. Dr. Quass prescribed the antipsychotic drug Mellaril and, when the voices did not stop, gradually increased the dosage. In January of 1988, Riggins successfully moved for determination of his competence to stand trial, and he was found to be competent. As the trial moved forward, Riggins moved to suspend his treatment with Mellaril because he planned to offer an insanity defense at trial and asserted that he had the right to show the jury his true mental state. The district court denied Riggins motion. Riggins was found guilty and sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.

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Yes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that an individual has the right to freedom from an unwanted antipsychotic drug. In order for the state to administer an antipsychotic drug against the patient’s wishes, the state must establish the pressing need for the administration of the drug. Because the district court did not reach a finding on the necessity of the Mellaril, the Court held that its administration was an error that infringed on Riggins’ constitutional rights.
In Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s concurring opinion, he wrote that the Due Process Clause prohibits the state from administering unwanted psychotic drugs to a defendant in order to make the defendant competent to stand trial. He argued that, since the administration of the antipsychotic drug can significantly alter the demeanor of the defendant during the trial and on the stand, it can amount to a manipulation of evidence by the state.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent where he argued that the issue of whether or not the state should have issued the antipsychotic medication without Riggins’ consent is a separate legal issue from his trial. He argued that there was no evidence that the Mellaril rendered Riggins’ trial anything less than “full and fair,” and therefore Riggins was not entitled to have his conviction reversed. Because he was found to be competent to stand trial under the influence of Mellaril, the Mellaril could not have significantly interfered with his ability to take part in his own defense. Justice Thomas also argued that, since Riggins approached the jail psychiatrist for medication because he was hearing voices, the district court did not order Riggins to take the Mellaril. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent.


Taco Cabana, a fast food Mexican restaurant chain in San Antonio, Texas, had a specifically-designed look or “trade dress”. Two Pesos, another similar restaurant chain based in Houston, Texas, opened a few years later with a remarkably similar look. Taco Cabana sued Two Pesos for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. Two Pesos allegedly copied Taco Cabana’s distinctive trade dress. The judge instructed the jury that trade dress must be inherently distinctive of have acquired a secondary meaning. The jury found that Taco Cabana’s trade dress was inherently distinctive, but had not acquired a secondary meaning. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Two Pesos argument that a finding of no secondary meaning necessarily means the trade dress is not inherently distinctive and is not protected under the Lanham Act.

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No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that trade dress can be protected under the Lanham Act based on inherent distinctiveness even if there is no proof of a secondary meaning. Recovery is usually available for trademark infringement without a secondary meaning, and there is no persuasive reason for treating trade dress differently from other types of trademark. Requiring a secondary meaning would go against the purposes of the Lanham Act.
Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, stating that the Lanham Act and its common law counterpart were broad enough to cover trade dress. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment, expressing that the majority’s decision was supported by stare decisis. Justice Clarence Thomas also concurred in the judgment, arguing that the common law roots of the Lanham Act justify this decision better than the majority’s reasoning.


Through its Tax Commissioner, the state of North Dakota filed an action in state court to force the Quill Corporation, an out-of-state mail-order office equipment retailer, to charge a North Dakota use tax on Quill merchandise to be used within the state. The state court ruled in favor of Quill, grounding its decision on Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753. In this 1967 case, the United States Supreme Court found a similar Illinois statute to be in violation of both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on a rejection of Bellas Hess in light of the "tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations" since it had been decided.

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No and No. In a majority opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court admitted that, over time, subsequent cases have allowed for more flexibility than Bellas Hess. Nevertheless, the Court maintained that this evolution does not suggest a rejection of Bellas Hess. The Court also determined that North Dakota's imposition of the use tax did not constitute a breach of the Due Process Clause because the Quill Corporation had sufficient contact with the state's residents and benefited from the state's tax revenue. However, it found the use tax to be unconstitutional because it interfered with interstate commerce, rendering it a violation of the Commerce Clause. Consequently, the Court reversed the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision by ruling in favor of the Quill Corporation.


The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Cortland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management.

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In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld two of the three provisions of the Act under review, reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to use financial rewards and access to disposal sites as incentives for state waste management. The third provision, the "take-title" qualification, stipulated that states must take legal ownership and liability for low-level waste or by the regulatory act. "Either type of federal action," wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments." This last provision violated the Tenth Amendment.


International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee

New York City's airport authority banned repetitive solicitation of money within airline terminals. Solicitation was permitted outside the terminals. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness solicits funds in public places. It challenged the regulation. A federal district court granted an injunction against the airport authority. The authority appealed.

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No. An airport terminal is not a public forum. The regulation banning such activity need only satisfy a reasonableness standard. The regulation is reasonable. Solicitators may slow the path of possible contributors, cause duress or commit fraud. Therefore, the regulation is permissible. In a related case, the Court held invalid the airport authority's ban on literature distribution in airport terminals.