Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that, when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense will be at issue during the trial, the Constitution requires the government to provide psychiatric assistance if the defendant cannot afford it. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires state-provided assistance in cases where there is a private interest that will be affected by the state’s actions, value that will be derived from the additional safeguards, and when providing the assistance will only be a minimal burden to the state. All three of these factors were present in this case. Furthermore, both justice and the Fourteenth Amendment require a defendant to be able to participate meaningfully in the judicial proceedings, which is impossible if the government were to deny this type of assistance to Ake and similar defendants.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a concurring opinion in which he noted that the Court’s decision applies only to capital cases.
Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which he, like Justice Burger, argued that this decision should apply only to capital cases. Furthermore, he argued that this rule should provide for an independent psychiatric evaluation, not a comprehensive defense consultant.


On October 10, 1980, an Oklahoma City police officer shot and killed Albert Tuttle outside a bar. Rose Marie Tuttle, Albert’s widow, sued the police officer and the city in district court under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which allows an individual to recover damages against a party who “acting under color of state law” deprives another of his constitutional rights. The district court instructed the jury that the city could be held liable only if the incident had been caused by a municipal “policy,” but a single, unusually excessive use of force could support a finding that the city was grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent in the training or supervision of its police force and was therefore liable under Section 1983. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the police officer but against the city and awarded Tuttle’s estate $1.5 million in damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

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No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the four-justice plurality. The plurality held that the district court’s instructions to the jury improperly allowed a plaintiff to impose liability on the city without proof of a single action taken by a municipal policy maker. The plurality further concluded that proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability on a city for a policy that is not in and of itself unconstitutional.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that Section 1983 does not permit a city to be held liable on a theory of strict responsibility for its non-policy-making employees. Instead, municipalities are liable for constitutional deprivations caused by an official policy or custom. Because the jury could have found the city liable solely because the police officer’s actions were so excessive and out of the ordinary, Justice Brennan concurred with the judgment reached by the Court. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent in which he argued that cities should be held liable under Section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their agents that are performed in the court of their official duties.


In 1981, John Abel was indicted for robbing a bank in California. During Abel’s trial, the prosecution called one of his accomplices, Kurt Ehle, to testify that Abel had participated in the robbery. To counter Ehle’s testimony, Abel called a mutual friend, Robert Mills, to the stand. Mills, Abel, and Ehle knew each other from the time they spent in prison together and their involvement in a prison gang, the Aryan Brotherhood. Mills testified that, in prison, Ehle had talked about his plans to rob the bank and blame it on Abel. To discredit Mills, the prosecution re-called Ehle to the stand to expose the three men’s involvement in the Brotherhood and the gang’s strict code of protection, which required members to lie, cheat, steal, and kill to protect a fellow member. Ehle testified that this code of conduct explained why Mills testified in defense of Abel. Abel’s counsel argued that this testimony was irrelevant, but the district court allowed it into evidence because the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect it may have on Abel. Abel lost and appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed because admitting evidence that Mills belonged to a perjurious organization, to suggest he was committing perjury this time, unfairly prejudiced him by association absent any evidence of his individual willingness to lie.

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No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion, in which the Court held that the evidence of bias introduced for purposes of impeachment is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Relevant evidence is that which has the tendency to make the existence of any fact more or less probable. The Court determined that a showing of bias on the part of a witness would have a tendency to make the facts to which they testify less probable and is therefore relevant. Furthermore, the district court ensured the admission of only the highly probative evidence about the men’s involvement in the Brotherhood and sustained objections relating to the punishment of unfaithful members and other topics that might have been prejudicial.


Michael James Elstad was suspected of committing a burglary and was picked up by police officers in his home. Before officers had given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, Elstad made an incriminating statement. Once at the Sheriff's headquarters, Elstad was advised of his rights. Elstad then voluntarily executed a written confession.

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In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that while Miranda required that unwarned admissions must be suppressed, subsequent statements, if made knowingly and voluntarily, need not be. The Court held that ". . .the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion." The Court also noted that police officers were ill-equipped to determine when "custody" legally begins. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, argued that the holding "in no way retreat[ed] from the bright-line rule of Miranda."


Kathryn Piper was a resident of Lower Waterford, Vermont, which is about 400 yards away from the New Hampshire border. In 1979, she applied to take the 1980 New Hampshire Bar Examination and submitted her statement of intent to become a New Hampshire resident. Piper passed the New Hampshire Bar and was informed she would have to establish a home address in New Hampshire before being sworn in. In May 1980, Piper requested a dispensation from the residency requirement due to special circumstances and the fact that she met all of the other requirements. When her request was denied, she formally petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court to become a member of the bar. The New Hampshire Supreme Court denied her petition on December 31, 1980.
On March 22, 1982, Piper sued the New Hampshire Supreme Court in district court and argued that the residency requirement violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court granted Piper’s motion for summary judgment and found that the requirement violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was intended to create one economic union out of a collection of states, and so it was relevant to employment and business regulations. Specifically the legal profession plays a crucial rule in the national economy, and therefore the ability to practice should be considered a “fundamental right” that is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Court also held that, because a lawyer is not an officer of the State, there is no substantial reason for New Hampshire to exclude non-residents from the bar.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion and argued that, other than the location of Piper’s home, there was nothing to distinguish her from any other New Hampshire lawyer. He found that the residency requirement should not apply in her case, but he did not think the majority’s opinion needed to reach any finding regarding the Constitutional validity of the residency requirement in general.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the practice of law differed from other professions in that it does not always readily translate across state lines, as laws and their enforcement often differ in different localities. He also argued that the state had substantial reasons to exclude out-of-state lawyers from the bar.


School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball

In the 1976-1977 school year, the school district of Grand Rapids, Michigan, adopted two programs, Shared Time and Community Education, that provided secular classes to private school students at public expense. The Shared Time program offered classes during the school day that were intended to “supplement the core curriculum” of the private schools. The Shared Time teachers were full-time public school teachers, and many had previously worked in private schools. The Community Education program was offered for children and adults at many different sites, but the classes at issue took place after the school day in private elementary schools. The Community Education teachers were part-time public school employees, and many also held jobs at private schools. The classrooms for both programs were leased from the private schools. The vast majority of the participating private schools were religious, and there was no evidence that a public school student ever attended a Shared Time or Community Education class held in a private school.
 Six taxpayers filed suit against the school district and state officials and alleged that they violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by using public funds to pay for private (and religious) education. The district court applied the Lemon test and determined that, although the aim was secular, the effect of the programs conferred benefits to religious institutions and entangled the affairs of church and state. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

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Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the statute failed the Lemon test because it had the effect of advancing religious agendas and it unnecessarily entangled the government and religion. The statute advanced religion in three ways: the teachers may inadvertently or intentionally instruct from a religious perspective; the programs themselves may serve as a symbolic link between the government and religion in the eyes of impressionable children; and the programs essentially serve as a government subsidy for religious instruction. The Court recognized that the intent of the programs was to provide secular education, but there was too great a risk of the religious environment influencing the children’s instruction.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the Court’s decision on the Community Education program, but dissented regarding the Shared Time program. He argued that there was no way to completely eliminate contact between the government and religion, and to attempt to do so in this case would come at the cost of children’s education.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in part and dissented in part. She argued that there was no evidence to indicate a link between the Shared Time program and religion other than the fact that the classes were taught in private schools. In the case of the Community Education program, she agreed with the majority.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent where he argued that the Court has long engaged in an unnecessarily narrow reading of the Establishment Clause. He held that this decision and others like it were “contrary to the long-range interests of the country.”
 Justice William H. Rehnquist also dissented and argued that the Establishment Clause was never meant to establish a “wall” between the government and religion but merely to prevent the establishment of a national religion, which these programs do not come close to doing. He also argued that there was no basis for the assumption that teaching secular topics in a religious school would effectively link the government and religion in the minds of schoolchildren.


Around 1 a.m. on July 18, 1982, Ralph Watkinson was locking up his shop when he saw a figure with a gun approaching him. Watkinson drew his own weapon, and the two fired at each other. Watkinson was hit in the legs, and the other shooter was wounded on his left side and managed to run away. About 20 minutes later, the police found Rudolph Lee, Jr., bleeding from his left side, eight blocks away from Watkinson’s shop. The police took Lee to the same hospital Watkinson was in, and Watkinson identified Lee as his shooter. Lee was charged with attempted robbery, malicious wounding, and two counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony.
The Commonwealth of Virginia filed a motion in state court to compel Lee to submit to surgery to recover the bullet still lodged in his side. The court granted the motion based on testimony that the surgery would be relatively noninvasive and accomplished without use of general anesthetic. The Virginia Supreme Court denied the appeal. Lee sued in district court on the ground that the surgery constituted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. The court issued a preliminary injunction. After presenting evidence that the surgery would be much more serious than the court originally thought, Lee asked for a rehearing in the state court, which was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Lee brought the case back to the district court, which ruled against the surgery. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

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Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that below-the-skin surgery represented such an infringement on the expectation of privacy that it must be justified by a compelling need for the evidence that might be produced. Since the state could not demonstrate a compelling need for the bullet in order to make the case against Lee, the Court held that the intrusion on Lee’s privacy vastly outweighed any state interest. Therefore, the surgery would be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun and Justice William H. Rehnquist concurred in the judgment.
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that he did not read this decision as preventing the police from detaining a suspect whose body they believed to contain evidence that would be naturally revealed.


City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.

The city of Renton, Washington, enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating with in 1,000 feet of "any residential zone, single-or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school." Playtime Theatres, Inc., challenged the ordinance and sought a permanent injunction against its enforcement.

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In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the zoning ordinance did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that the ordinance was a form of time, place, and manner regulation, not a ban on adult theaters altogether. The Court reasoned that the law was not aimed at the content of the films shown at adult motion picture theaters, "but rather the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community." The Court found that the ordinance was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest in preserving the quality of life and allowed for "reasonable alternative avenues of communication."


Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser

At a school assembly of approximately 600 high school students, Matthew Fraser made a speech nominating a fellow student for elective office. In his speech, Fraser used what some observers believed was a graphic sexual metaphor to promote the candidacy of his friend. As part of its disciplinary code, Bethel High School enforced a rule prohibiting conduct which "substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Fraser was suspended from school for two days.

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No. The Court found that it was appropriate for the school to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language. Chief Justice Burger distinguished between political speech which the Court previously had protected in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) and the supposed sexual content of Fraser's message at the assembly. Burger concluded that the First Amendment did not prohibit schools from prohibiting vulgar and lewd speech since such discourse was inconsistent with the "fundamental values of public school education."


Dow Chemical Company denied the Environmental Protection Agency a follow-up on-site inspection of its facilities in Midland, Michigan. In response, EPA conducted an unannounced aerial inspection. When Dow became aware EPA had taken aerial photographs of its facilities, it filed suit in District Court alleging that EPA conducted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court ruled that the aerial inspection violated Dow's "expectation of privacy" from searches. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling on the ground that Dow only expected pivacy with respect to its indoor property.

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No. Justice Warren Burger delivered the opinion for a 5-4 court. The Court maintained that the EPA's statutory jurisdiction "carries with it all the modes of inquiry and investigation traditionally employed or useful to execute the authority granted." Fourth Amendment protection involves the invasion of areas where intimate activities occur, whereas "the open areas of an industrial complex are more comparable to an 'open field' in which an individual may not legitimately demand privacy." The fact that EPA could take aerial photographs of the facilities from public airspace with the standard photographic equipment employed by mapmakers confirmed that the area was not subject to strict protection from observation.


Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing

Scott Ewing was enrolled in a medical program, and in the spring of 1981, he took and failed the NBME Part 1 (Exam), which is an exam his program required. After reviewing the status of several students in the program, the Promotion and Review Board (Board) voted unanimously to drop Ewing from the program. The Board took into account his recent failure as well as the totality of his academic record when making their decision. Ewing appealed the Board’s decision four times and argued that, because every student before him who had failed the Exam had been allowed to retake it, he should be afforded the same opportunity. All of his appeals were unsuccessful.
In August of the following year, Ewing sued in federal district court and alleged a breach of contract as well as a violation of his right to due process. The district court sided with the University and Ewing appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Ewing’s right to enrollment qualified as a property right that deserved protection from arbitrary state interference under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment grants citizens a substantive right to own property free from arbitrary state interference. The Court held that, even if Ewing had a property interest in his admission, the careful consideration that went into his dismissal made this interference with his property anything but arbitrary. The Court determined that Ewing’s dismissal was reasonable based on all the available evidence.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. filed a concurring opinion in which he argued that the classification of Ewing’s continued admission was not a constitutional property right deserving the protection of substantive due process, but rather a state issue requiring, at most, procedural due process protection.


After being dismissed from her job at a Meritor Savings Bank, Mechelle Vinson sued Sidney Taylor, the Vice President of the bank. Vinson charged that she had constantly been subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor over her four years at the bank. She argued such harassment created a "hostile working environment" and was covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Vinson sought injunctive relief along with compensatory and punitive damages against Taylor and the bank.

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The Court held that the language of Title VII was "not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination," finding that Congress intended "'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment. . ." The Court noted that guidelines issued by the EEOC specified that sexual harassment leading to noneconomic injury was a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. The Court recognized that plaintiffs could establish violations of the Act "by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." The Court declined to rule on the degree to which businesses could be liable for the conduct of specific employees.


Batson, a black man, was on trial charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During the jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike the four black persons on the venire, resulting in a jury composed of all whites. Batson was convicted on both of the charges against him.

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The Court found that the prosecutor's actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Relying heavily on precedents set in Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) and Swain v. Alabama (1965), Justice Powell held that racial discrimination in the selection of jurors not only deprives the accused of important rights during a trial, but also is devastating to the community at large because it "undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Without identifying a "neutral" reason why the four blacks should have been excluded from the jury, the prosecutor's actions were in violation of the Constitution.


Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists

In 1982, the state of Pennsylvania enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortion. The law required the following: "informed consent" of the woman, the dissemination of information concerning the risks of abortion, reporting procedures, the use of certain medical techniques after viability, and the presence of a second physician for post-viability abortions. The initial suit was brought against Richard Thornburgh, the Governor of Pennsylvania.

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In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Pennsylvania requirements "wholly subordinate[d] constitutional privacy interests and concerns with maternal health" and were attempts to deter women from making their own choices concerning abortion. The Court held that 1) the "informed consent" and printed materials provisions unduly intruded upon the privacy of patients and physicians; 2) the reporting and viability determination provisions were designed to identify and deter women from having abortions through the threat of harassment; and 3) the post-viability care and second physician provisions unconstitutionally interfered with the health of the mother by increasing delays and medical risks.


The Santa Clara Police received an anonymous tip that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his back yard. Unable to observe the yard from the ground due to a high fence which encircled it, the police secured a private plane and flew over Ciraolo's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The fly-over confirmed the presence of marijuana. The police then obtained a search warrant, seized 73 plants on the next day, and arrested Ciraolo who then pleaded guilty to the cultivation of marijuana. The California Court of Appeals, however, found that the aerial observation was illegal and reversed Ciraolo's conviction.

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The divided Court found that the observation did not violate the Constitution. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protections regarding the home had never been absolute: for example, police officers are not obligated to shield their eyes when passing homes on public streets or sidewalks. Since the observations of the Santa Clara officers was "nonintrusive" and "took place within public navigable airspace," their actions were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. "Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed," concluded Burger. The dissenters, led by Justice Powell, argued that this decision was a significant departure from the Court's holding in Katz v. United States (1967) which established a two-part test to evaluate privacy claims.


During the capital trial of Ardia McCree, a judge removed prospective jurors who stated that under no circumstances would they be able to impose the death penalty. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the judge's actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. A.L. Lockhart, the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction, appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

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The Court found that excluding people who are unwilling under any circumstances to impose the death penalty during sentencing did not violate a defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Justice Rehnquist argued that the state has a legitimate interest to impanel jurors who "can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial." As long as a jury is selected from a fair cross-section of the community, is impartial, and can properly apply the law to a case's circumstances, then a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is protected.


Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

In 1975, a federal district court found the Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Union guilty of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court established a 29 percent minority membership goal and ordered the union to implement procedures to meet the goal. In 1982 and 1983, the union was found guilty of civil contempt for disobeying the court orders. The court then established a 29.23 percent nonwhite membership goal to be met by August 1987.

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The Court held that Title VII did not prohibit courts from ordering, in appropriate circumstances, affirmative race-conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination. Specifically, the Court held that such relief was appropriate where employers or labor unions had engaged in "persistent or egregious discrimination, or where necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." The Court noted that injunctions simply reiterating Title VII's prohibition against discrimination were useless in cases of chronically discriminatory employers or unions.


Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air

In April of 1973, pursuant to the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (Penn DER) submitted a plan for meeting federal air quality standards. This plan included a provision requiring the implementation of a program for the inspection and maintenance of automobile emissions systems (I/M program) by May 1, 1975. By mid-1976, Pennsylvania had not implemented any I/M program.
In response, the Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (DVCCCA) brought suit against Pennsylvania and the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA filed a separate action against Pennsylvania and DVCCCA dropped its charges against the EPA. On August 29, 1978, Pennsylvania, Penn DER and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (Penn DOT) agreed to a final consent decree, terminating the DVCCCA and EPA actions.
On January 2, 1982 and after more than five years of intermittent litigation -- during which Pennsylvania consistently resisted or ignored the consent decree -- the district court declared Pennsylvania, the Secretaries of the Penn DOT and Penn DER to be in civil contempt. On May 3, 1983, the Pennsylvania legislature authorized the Secretary of Penn DOT to implement an I/M program following several years of consistently denying Pennsylvania the requisite funding.
The CAA provided that in issuing a final order in any action brought under the CAA, the court may award the costs of litigation to any party whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate. The DVCCCA and the EPA consequently sought attorneys’ fees and costs for all activity performed after the court issued the consent decree on August 29, 1978. The district court awarded attorneys’ fees that included time spent by plaintiffs’ attorneys monitoring Pennsylvania’s performance under the consent decree, an award for “superior quality” while opposing the state’s motion to stay the consent decree, and work performed for hearings held before the EPA. It also awarded a multiplier for the arguably small likelihood of plaintiffs’ success in three phases of the litigation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the attorneys’ fees awarded by the district court.

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Yes and no. In a decision written by Justice Byron White, the Court held that the district court appropriately awarded the DVCCCA and the EPA attorneys’ fees and costs for non-litigation work. Justice White noted the unusual nature of the plaintiffs’ dispute with Pennsylvania, given that the DVCCCA and the EPA were essentially tasked with protecting the full scope of the consent decree both in and out of court. He looked to the legislative history of the CAA, wherein Congress used the phrases “action” and “proceeding” interchangeably; this suggested to Justice White that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase “action” to litigation.
Justice White agreed, however, with Pennsylvania’s contention that the Third Circuit erred in awarding plaintiffs attorneys’ fees for “superior work”. He outlined the history of the Court’s “lodestar” approach to attorneys’ fees, reasoning that any reasonable “lodestar” approach would already account for attorneys’ superior work. Justice White cautioned that the district court’s award risked double counting attorneys’ work. He declined to consider whether the district court erred in multiplying attorneys’ to compensate for plaintiffs’ low chance of success.
Justice Harry Blackmun concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall. Justice Blackmun agreed that the district court appropriately awarded the DVCCCA and EPA attorneys’ fees for work performed out of court to protect the consent decree. He took issue with the majority’s decision to defer ruling on the district court’s multipliers for plaintiffs’ low chance of success. Justice Blackmun also rejected the Court’s limited interpretation of the “lodestar” approach to attorneys’ fees, arguing that the district court reasonably adjusted fees based on the quality of work performed. Justice William Brennan joined Blackmun’s dissent on this point alone.


Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riverside

A nurse in California was charged with killing 12 patients by administering massive doses of heart medication. During a preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of California, Riverside County, the nurse moved to exclude the public. California law requires preliminary hearings to be open to the public unless a closed hearing is necessary to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial. The judge granted the motion because of the the national publicity surrounding the case. After the hearing, Press-Enterprise Co. requested a transcript of the proceedings. The court denied the request because the transcript might prejudice the nurse’s right to a fair and impartial trial. Press-Enterprise filed a preemptory writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, but the court denied the writ. The California Supreme Court also denied the writ, holding that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right of access to preliminary hearings. The court also held that once the accused establishes a “reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice”, the burden shifts to Press-Enterprise to show there is no reasonable probability of prejudice.

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Yes, Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the California court. The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment right of public access applies to preliminary hearings. Closed preliminary hearings are only permissible when specific findings on the record show that closure is essential. The California court should have asked whether there was a substantial probability that the accused’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced, and whether any reasonable alternatives to closure could protect that right.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that the right to fair trial in this case was more significant than Press-Enterprise’s interest in getting the transcript. The framers did not intend for preliminary hearings to remain open. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


Clifford Carrier was arrested on charges of rape and abduction in 1977. Before his trial, Carrier's attorney filed a motion asking the court to give him access to the victim's statements about her assailants, their vehicle, and the location of the rape. The court rejected the motion. Carrier was subsequently convicted, and his attorney filed an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. The appeal did not mention the trial judge's decision about the victim's statements. That appeal was rejected.
A year later, Carrier filed a new appeal in state court claiming that he had been denied his 14th Amendment right to Due Process by the trial judge's refusal to grant him access to the victim's statements. The court dismissed his case, however, citing Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:21, which states that claims left out of an initial appeal cannot be raised in later appeals. Because Carrier's attorney had not mentioned the victim's statements in the first appeal, Carrier could not raise them in the second.
Carrier then filed a similar appeal in federal district court, again citing the 14th Amendment Due Process claims. The state argued that the appeal was procedural barred because it dealt with issues not raised during the initial appeal. Carrier countered that the omission of the claim had been his attorney's mistake (rather than a tactical decision), and that it should therefore not be held against him. The federal district court rejected the argument, dismissing the case. A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision, finding that the omission had been the attorney's mistake and therefore represented a failure of the attorney to provide effective counsel in that particular part of the case (though the representation as a whole was not unconstitutionally poor). The panel stated that because the omission resulted from ineffective counsel, it should not be held against Carrier.

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No. In a decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Supreme Court ruled that merely proving that an omission resulted from an attorney's mistake rather than from a tactical decision does not exempt a defendant from state court procedural rules. Justice O'Connor wrote, "We see little reason why counsel's failure to detect a colorable constitutional claim should be treated differently from a deliberate but equally prejudicial failure by counsel to raise such a claim. The fact that the latter error can be characterized as a misjudgment, while the former is more easily described as an oversight, is much too tenuous a distinction to justify a regime of evidentiary hearings into counsel's state of mind in failing to raise a claim on appeal."


Robert Bernard Jackson was charged with second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. During his arraignment, Jackson requested that the court appoint him counsel. The next day, Jackson was interrogated again before he was able to communicate with his attorney. Jackson confessed during that interrogation.
In December 1978, Rudy Bladel killed three railroad employees in Michigan. Bladel was arrested shortly thereafter, the police questioned him twice but released him. Two months later, he was arrested again and agreed to talk to the police without an attorney present. During his arraignment the following day, Bladel requested counsel, and the court assigned a firm to his case. The next day, the police questioned Bladel again before the firm was able to contact him and before he was aware he had been assigned counsel. During this questioning, Bladel confessed.
In both cases, the trial courts held that the confessions, which were obtained after arraignment and before the defendants were able to meet with counsel, were properly received into evidence. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Jackson’s conviction, and he appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court consolidated Jackson and Bladel’s cases and ruled that both confessions should not have been admitted into evidence.

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No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of representation prevent the police from initiating an interrogation after a defendant has requested counsel. Therefore, unless the accused initiates the conversation, police are not allowed to ignore a request for counsel and begin an interrogation. The Court also held that the arraignment marks the beginning of the judicial process and the moment when the accused has a Sixth Amendment right to rely on counsel to act as “a ‘medium’ between him and the State.” From this point on, the suspect becomes the accused, and the assistance of counsel becomes essential. The Court rejected the state’s argument that the defendant’s request for counsel only applied to formal legal proceedings and noted that such a request is a “significant event” requiring additional attention and safeguards. If a defendant asks for counsel at an arraignment, any waiver of that right to counsel during police-initiated interrogations that may follow would be invalidated.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger authored a concurring opinion that warned of the dangers of using “hard cases” with difficult fact scenarios, such as these, to set “bright-line rules” for all cases.
Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented and argued that the bright-line rule the majority opinion established should only apply to Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and not Sixth Amendment rights. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


Goldman was a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, an Orthodox Jew, and an ordained rabbi. He was not allowed to wear his yarmulke while on duty and in Air Force uniform. An Air Force regulation mandated that indoors, headgear could not be worn "except by armed security police in the performance of their duties."

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The Court held that the Air Force regulation did not violate the Constitution. Justice Rehnquist argued that, generally, First Amendment challenges to military regulations are examined with less scrutiny than similar challenges from civilian society, given the need for the military to "foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps." Since allowing overt religious apparel "would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations," the Air Force regulation was necessary and legitimate. In 1987, Congress passed legislation which reversed this decision and allowed members of the armed forces to wear religious apparel in a "neat and conservative" manner.


United States v. American College of Physicians

The American College of Physicians, a non-profit, tax-exempt organization, published a monthly medical journal. Within the journal were paid advertisements for products useful in the field of medicine specifically covered by the journal. Section 511(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on "unrelated business taxable income" of tax-exempt organizations. The IRS asserted that the advertising income from the medical journal fell under this category. The American College of Physicians countered that the advertisements were "substantially related" to its tax-exempt purpose of maintaining high standards in medicine, and that they were therefore tax-exempt. When the IRS refused to give the organization a tax refund, it filed suit in United States Claims Court.
The Claims Court held that the advertisements were not substantially related to the organization's tax-exempt purpose and that the income was therefore taxable. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that the advertisements helped to educate the journal's readers and was therefore substantially related.

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No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Supreme Court held that the advertisements in this particular case were not "substantially related" to the medical journal's educational purposes. The Court found that the conduct of the journal, rather than the content of the advertisements, was the relevant factor. Quoting the Claims Court, Justice Marshall wrote, "The evidence is clear that plaintiff did not use the advertising to provide its readers a comprehensive or systematic presentation of any aspect of the goods or services publicized. Those companies willing to pay for advertising space got it; others did not." The Court rejected both the government's contention that all advertising revenue should be taxed and the journal's contention that any informative advertising revenue should be exempt, relying instead on a case-by-case examination.


In 1979, the Southwestern Power Administration, a federal regulatory body acting on behalf of the Secretary of Energy, increased the cost of electricity generated by federally owned dams under its control. The price hike was initially implemented on an interim basis, and three years later, after furher review, the new rates were made permanent. A group of cities that purchased power from the dams filed suit to recover the extra fees it had paid before the interim rates were made final, claiming that Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 prohibited the imposition of interim fees. The Act stated that new rates would "become effective upon confirmation and approval by the Secretary (of Energy)." The cities asserted that the rates, while in their interim phase, had not yet received "confirmation and approval" from the Secretary and could therefore not be legally implemented.
The Court of Claims sided with the cities, holding that the new rates could only be charged once they received final approval from the Secretary. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.

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Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Secretary of Energy could impose rate hikes on an interim basis without violating the Act. The Court found that the language of the Act and its legislative history did not conclusively show whether Congress intended the Secretary to impose rate hikes on an interim basis. The Secretary's decision, therefore, only needed to be a reasonable attempt to balance the competing interests in the act: preventing unnecessarily high charges to customers while still allowing the dams to be self-sufficient (and therefore not a burden on government resources). Justice Marshall wrote "Interim ratesetting appears well suited to accommodating that dual goal... [and therefore] the procedures established by the Secretary to exercise his powers under the Flood Control Act both are within his delegated authority and constitute a reasonable accommodation of the policies underlying that Act." The Court further found that the rate increases were consistent with the cities' electricity contracts, which were based largely on the language of the Act.


In 1962, an all-white grand jury indicted Booker T. Hillery—a black man—for the murder of a 15-year-old girl. After Hillery was tried and convicted, he appealed his conviction and claimed that black potential jurors were systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him, which violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hillery pursued remedy in state courts until the California Supreme Court finally denied him relief in 1978. Shortly after, Hillery filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court requested and received statistical evidence regarding the probability of having an all-white grand jury in Kings County, California, where Hillery was indicted and subsequently ruled in favor of Hillery. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

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Yes, and no. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that Hillery was allowed to pursue his claim in federal court because the district court was within its power to request additional evidence that did not fundamentally alter the legal claim that the state courts already considered. The Court also held that Hillery's eventual conviction in a fair trial did not render any discrimination at the indictment phase "harmless error." The Court referenced the extensive precedent that rejected similar arguments and noted that discrimination in the indictment process can have an array of negative effects such as a false finding of probable cause, charging a greater or capital offense, or charging numerous counts.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which she argued that petitioners who have claimed discrimination during the indictment process and have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that claim in state court should not be able to file federal habeas corpus as an alternate avenue. However, in this case, Justice O'Connor agreed that Hillery was denied a fair state court review.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the injustice in this case was slight because a grand jury that accurately reflected the population of Kings County when Hillery was indicted would have had only one black member. Additionally, Justice Powell argued that relief in the form of an automatic reversal of Hillery's conviction, which required the state to hold a new trial 23 years after the crime had been committed, imposed too great of a burden on the state to justify setting Hillery free. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


In August of 1981, Larry Gene Heath hired two men to kidnap and murder his pregnant wife. Heath met the men in Georgia, just across the state line from the Heath residence in Alabama, led them back to the house, and left. Rebecca Heath’s body was later found on the side of a road in Georgia. Both Georgia and Alabama authorities pursued investigations in which there was a degree of cooperation.
On September 4, 1981, Georgia authorities arrested Heath, and he waived his Miranda rights and confessed. He was indicted by a grand jury in Troop County, Georgia, and pled guilty in February 10, 1982. On May 5, 1982, Heath was indicted by a grand jury in Russell County, Alabama. Prior to the trial, Heath argued that his conviction and sentencing in Georgia barred any prosecution in Alabama and that Alabama lacked jurisdiction. The trial court rejected both claims, and Heath was convicted. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the Alabama Supreme Court.

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No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of dual sovereignty grants each state the right to try a criminal under the laws of that state, regardless of whether he had already been tried under the laws of another state. The states can each be considered a separate sovereign because they do not derive their powers from the same source, namely the federal government. The Court also held that it would be an unconstitutional deprivation of a state’s powers to prevent that state from enforcing its laws because another state had proceeded to trial earlier.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that different interests or purposes in prosecution do not justify an exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. In Justice Marshall’s separate dissent, he argued that the dual sovereignty doctrine was meant to permit federal and state prosecutions for the same offense due to the overlapping spheres of governmental power, not to permit prosecution from multiple states. He also wrote that the Court should have heard arguments about other aspects of the case that violated the petitioner’s rights rather than limiting the issues at hand to the one of dual sovereignty.


Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in the act of consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim, the court dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Georgia's Attorney General, Michael J. Bowers, appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.

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No. The divided Court found that there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy, and that states could outlaw those practices. Justice Byron White argued that the Court has acted to protect rights not easily identifiable in the Constitution only when those rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (Palko v. Connecticut, 1937) or when they are "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition" (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). The Court held that the right to commit sodomy did not meet either of these standards. White feared that guaranteeing a right to sodomy would be the product of "judge-made constitutional law" and send the Court down the road of illegitimacy.
The Court subsequently overruled this decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).


In the morning of July 26, 1984, Lamont McLaughlin and a companion, both wearing stocking masks, entered a bank in Baltimore. McLaughlin displayed a handgun and ordered everyone in the bank to put his hands up and not to move. While McLaughlin remained in the lobby area holding the gun, his companion placed about $3,400 in a brown paper bag. A police officer apprehended the two as they left the bank. The police then found that McLaughlin's gun was not loaded. Ultimately, McLaughlin pleaded guilty to charges of bank robbery and bank larceny and was found guilty of assault during a bank robbery "by the use of a dangerous weapon." The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that an unloaded handgun is a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of the federal bank robbery statute, 18 USC section 2113(d). The Court articulated three reasons supporting the conclusion that such a gun is a dangerous weapon: First, a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically dangerous. Second, the display of a gun instills fear in the average citizen. Finally, a gun can cause harm when used as a bludgeon.


United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc.

Hughes Properties owned a casino called Harold’s Club in Reno, Nevada. This casino operated slot machines that featured “progressive” jackpots. This jackpot increased as gamblers played and only paid out when the machine hit a certain combination. State gaming regulations prohibited lowering the jackpot until someone won. At the end of each fiscal year, Hughes took the year’s total progressive jackpots and subtracted the amount of last year’s jackpots to claim that amount as a business expense deduction. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction, reasoning that until a patron won the jackpot, the liability was contingent.
The IRS determined a tax deficiency amount, which Hughes paid before suing for a refund. The United States Claims Court granted summary judgment to Hughes on the ground that the jackpot amount was contingent until someone won it. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the casino’s liability was not contingent because state regulations barred a decrease in the amount.

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Yes. In a 7-2 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the jackpot amount was fixed by the state regulation, so it could be deducted as a normal business expense. The Court felt that not knowing identity of the winner or the time it would be paid was irrelevant. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent, stating that the jackpot amount was contingent, because the casino could avoid paying out altogether by declaring bankruptcy or forfeiting its gaming license. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined the dissent.


In July 1978, Willie Lloyd Turner entered a jewelry store and killed the proprietor. Turner was disarmed, arrested, and charged with capital murder. During the jury selection process, Turner's counsel requested that the trial judge ask potential jurors if they would be biased by the fact that Turner was black while the victim was white. The judge declined to ask the question regarding racial prejudice and instead asked the prospective jurors if they thought that they would be able to be impartial and fair. Turner was convicted and sentenced to death.
After exhausting his appellate options at the state level, Turner filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. Because the facts of the case "did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might [have] infect[ed the defendant's] trial," the district court held that the trial judge's refusal to question potential jurors about racial prejudice was not unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

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Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that "special circumstance[s]" could create a significant likelihood that a trial judge's failure to question potential jurors about racial prejudice leads to a biased jury. In this case, where an interracial murder was charged as a capital offense, the Court held that the facts amounted to one of those special circumstances. The Court reasoned that jurors in capital cases have broader discretion that makes it easier to act, even if subtly, with racial prejudice. This discretion, coupled with the finality of a death sentence, entitles defendants in interracial capital cases to inform prospective jurors of the victim's race and question them about any potential racial bias.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the majority should have overturned Turner's death sentence rather than vacating it. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the defendant should retain the right to inform prospective jurors of the race of the victim and inquire about potential racial biases in any case that involved a violent interracial crime. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the opinion.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he warned that the majority's new rule would drastically increase the number of death row prisoners filing habeas petitions without providing them any new protections. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the opinion.


In 1975, eight Chicano individuals were attending a party that was broken up by the Riverside police using tear gas and physical force without a warrant. Subsequently, the eight individuals filed suit in Federal District Court against the city and various police officers under several federal Civil Rights Acts, alleging violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The jury found in the individuals' favor and awarded $33,350 in compensatory and punitive damages. The individuals also sought attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 in the amount of $245,456.25, based on 1,946.75 hours expended by their two attorneys at $125 per hour and 84.5 hours expended by law clerks at $25 per hour. Finding both the hours and rates reasonable, the District Court awarded the requested amount, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court found that the fee award was not excessive merely because it exceeded the amount of damages awarded by the jury.

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No. In an opinion delivered by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held, 5-4, that there was no requirement under Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 that attorneys' fees be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff might recover. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens, reasoned that such plaintiffs seek to vindicate important constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms, and a proportionality requirement would seriously undermine Congress's purpose under the Act to insure the availability of counsel in civil rights cases. Concurring, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., reasoned that neither the prior decisions of the Supreme Court nor the legislative history of the Act supported such a requirement.


East River Steamship Corporation v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.

Transamerica Delaval Inc. designed and manufactured propulsion systems for four supertankers. The propulsion systems eventually failed due to design and manufacturing flaws. Only the propulsion systems themselves were damaged - no other part of the ship was damaged, and no one was injured.
East River Steamship and the other companies that had purchased the supertankers sued Transamerica under the negligence and products-liability doctrines of tort law, a branch of law that deals with injuries not covered by contractual agreements. They sought compensation for the cost of repairing the ships as well as for the income they lost while the ships were out of service. The district court, however, granted summary judgment to Transamerica. It held that the injuries were not covered by tort law because only the propulsion systems themselves had been injured, and that the case therefore dealt with the product's warranty rather than tort law. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case en banc and affirmed the district court's decision.

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No. A unanimous Supreme Court ruled that when a defective product injures only itself and causes only economic harm, tort law claims do not apply. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the Court, stated "a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself." The suit, therefore, could only be brought under warranty claims, which could no longer be filed because of a time limit in the contract.


Liberty Lobby, Inc. (Liberty), a nonprofit "citizen's lobby" corporation, filed a libel action against a magazine published by Jack Anderson et al. Liberty claimed that one of Anderson's articles contained false and derogatory statements about its operations. In its defense, Anderson claimed that as a public entity Liberty must show with "convincing clarity" that Anderson acted with actual malice - something they could not do since the article's author stated in an affidavit that he thoroughly researched and cross-checked all his information. Liberty claimed that Anderson did act with actual malice since its author depended on patently unreliable sources. Following a district court's summary judgment ruling favoring Anderson, an appellate court reversed as it held that the lower court erroneously applied actual malice standards of proof at the summary judgement phase. Anderson appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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No. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court held that the purpose of summary judgments is to determine if the evidence is so one-sided that a party should prevail as a matter of law. Summary judgments will not lie if there is a sufficient likelihood that a reasonable jury would return a verdict favorable to the nonmoving party. In libel cases involving public entities, trial courts faced with summary judgment motions must decide whether a reasonable jury could conclude with convincing clarity that actual malice existed. The mere assertion by a plaintiff that a defendant's summary judgment motion is deficient because a reasonable jury might disbelieve the defendant's denial of actual malice is insufficient to warrant a grant of summary judgment without any offer of evidentiary proof to that effect. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded for reconsideration of its summary judgment ruling.


Under the collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson Board of Education (Board) and a teachers' union, teachers with the most seniority would not be laid off. It was also agreed not to lay off a percentage of minority personnel that exceeded the percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of a layoff. When the schools laid off some nonminority teachers, while retaining other minority teachers with less seniority, Wendy Wygant, a displaced nonminority teacher, challenged the layoff in district court. Holding that the Board could grant racial preferences without grounding them on prior discrimination findings and that the preferences did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, since they remedied discrimination by providing "role models" for minority students, the District Court upheld the layoff provision's constitutionality. When the appeals court affirmed, the Supreme Court granted Wygant certiorari.

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Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court argued that Wygant's layoff stemmed from race and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court noted that the government, when embarking on affirmative action, had two duties: first, to justify racial classification with a compelling state interest and second, to demonstrate that its chosen means were narrowly tailored to its purpose. Regarding the first, the Court rejected the lower court's argument that racial preferences were justified because the percentage of minority students exceeded the percentage of minority teachers. At best, this argument implied a separate but equal system, which the Court rejected in Brown v. Board of Education. Instead, racial preferences had to be based on prior discrimination. Second, the Court rejected the school's discrimination remedy: layoff preferences incorrectly addressed injurious prior discriminatory hiring practices since "denial of a future employment opportunity [was] not as intrusive as loss of an existing job."


In order to protect its fisheries from parasites and non-native species, the state of Maine prohibited the importation of live baitfish. Robert J. Taylor, the owner of a bait business, violated the law and was prosecuted by Maine authorities.

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No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the limitation imposed by the Commerce Clause on state regulatory power was not absolute and that the States "retain[ed] authority under their general police powers to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern.'" The Court found that Maine's ban on the importation oflive baitfish served a legitimate local purpose that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives. The Court argued that the ban was not a simple case of "arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce."


Square D Company v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc.

The petitioners represented a group of corporations that used a group of motor carriers regulated by the Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc. (NFTB), an organization that engaged in collective ratemaking activities for shipping goods over the border between the United States and Canada. The petitioners sued the carriers and alleged that, between 1966 and 1981, the group had engaged in price fixing that violated the terms of the NFTB agreement and could not be approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The petitioners argued that during those years they paid higher rates than they would have in a freely competitive market and sought treble damages on that difference, along with declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the case based on precedent set by a previous Supreme Court decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the treble damages and remanded for further hearings to determine whether the petitioners were entitled to injunctive relief.

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No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that the precedent established by the previous decision is relevant to this case because in both cases the rates were approved by the ICC, which meant that the rates were lawful under the Interstate Commerce Act, and the carriers were protected from suits for damages. The Court also held that the recently enacted Reed-Bullwinkle Act did not alter any anti-trust laws applicable to carriers. The legislative history surrounding the Act makes it clear that Congress did not intend to drastically alter existing anti-trust legislation and its judicial interpretation.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court of Appeals opinion provided sufficient analysis as to why the previous precedent should be overruled and that he was persuaded by the analysis.


Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Philadelphia Gear Corporation

Orion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion) was a customer of Philadelphia Gear Corporation (PG). To provide a guarantee of payment to PG, Orion obtained a letter of credit for the benefit of PG from Penn Square Bank, N.A. (Bank). If Orion failed to pay an invoice to PG for at least 15 days, PG could draw upon that line of credit, up to $145,200. This type of credit line, meant to guarantee payment to a seller, is referred to as a standby letter of credit. To back up that line of credit, Orion executed an unsecured promissory note in favor of the Bank. This note is referred to as a backup letter of credit. Nothing was due on the backup letter of credit unless PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit. Thus the backup letter was a contingent promissory note. The Bank did not credit any account of Orion's in exchange for the note, and did not treat its own assets as increased by its acceptance of the note. In 1982, the Bank was declared insolvent and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed its receiver. PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit for goods delivered before the Bank's insolvency, but the FDIC returned them unpaid. PG sued the FDIC, claiming that the standby letter of credit was an insured deposit under the definition of "deposit" set forth at 12 U.S.C. Section 1813(l)(1), and that PG was therefore entitled to $100,000 in deposit insurance.

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No. In light of the longstanding interpretation of the FDIC, such a letter does not create a deposit. This interpretation is consistent with Congress' intent in creating the FDIC, namely ensuring that a deposit of "hard earnings" entrusted to a bank would not lead to a tangible loss in the event of a bank failure. In this case, the standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note did not entrust any noncontingent assets to the Bank. Therefore, such a letter of credit does not give rise to an insured deposit.


Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind

Larry Witters attended the Inland Empire School of the Bible, seeking to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Inland Empire was a non-denominational Christian school supported by donations and tuition payments. Witters suffered from a progressive eye condition, which rendered him legally blind under Washington law.
Witters applied to Washington’s Commission for the Blind to participate in its vocational rehabilitation program, funded by approximately eighty percent federal funds and twenty percent state funds. The commission, however, had previously adopted a policy statement forbidding the use of public funds to assist an individual in pursuing a career or degree in theology or related areas, based on Washington’s constitution. The commission denied Witters’ application because his vocational objective was to become a pastor, viewing this as falling within the areas related to theology. A state hearings examiner upheld the commission’s ruling, also citing Washington’s constitution. A Washington district court upheld the decision for the reasons given by the hearings examiner.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the decision, but declined to base its ruling on the Washington Constitution. Instead, it reserved judgment on the state constitutional issue and determined that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause required the commission to deny Witters’ application. Using the three-part test established by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, it held that approving his application would have the primary effect of advancing religion.

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No. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that extending aid to Witters through Washington’s vocational rehabilitation program would be consistent with the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Justice Marshall also looked to the Lemon test, agreeing with the Supreme Court of Washington that the statute had a facially secular purpose, to promote the well-being of the visually handicapped.
Justice Marshall held, however, that extending aid to Witters would not have the primary effect of advancing religion. He noted that the program did not provide greater or broader benefits for recipients who apply their aid to religious education, and that nothing in the record indicated that a significant portion of aid extended through the program would flow to religious education. He also argued that although the aid would ultimately flow to Inland Empire, this was not because of the state's actions but rather Witters’.
Justice Louis Powell, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William Rehnquist, concurred. He argued that the statute could not have the primary effect of advancing religion because the funds were available to applicants regardless of whether their school was secular or religious; hence, any aid to religion would result from the private choices of individual beneficiaries.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor also concurred. She emphasized that any potential aid to religion would be the result of Witters’ choice, and that no reasonable observer would likely draw an inference that Washington was endorsing a religious belief or practice.


Brian Burbine was arrested for burglary in Cranston, Rhode Island. Police then received information connecting Burbine to a murder that happened in town a few months earlier. Burbine was read his Miranda rights and held for questioning. At first, Burbine refused to waive his rights, but later he signed three forms acknowledging that he understood his right to an attorney and waived that right. After questioning, he also signed three written statements admitting to the murder. That same night Burbine’s sister called the local Public Defender’s Office to get a lawyer for her brother. The sister did not know about the potential murder charge. When the Public Defender called the Cranston Police Station, police told her that Burbine was unavailable and would not be questioned until the next day. Police never told Burbine that an attorney attempted to contact him.
At trial, the judged denied a motion to suppress the statements made at the police station, holding that Burbine knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island denied Burbine’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that the police officer’s deliberate or reckless failure to inform Burbine that his counsel attempted to contact him invalidated his waiver of rights.

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No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that failure to inform Burbine about the attorney’s phone call did not affect the validity of his waiver of rights. The waiver was not coerced, and Burbine was aware of his rights at all times. The right to counsel does not attach until an accused is formally charged, so that right was not violated in this case. Also, the misleading conduct by the police was not so offensive that it deprived Burbine of his due process rights.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that Burbine’s waiver of rights was invalidated by the police’s deceptive acts. Those acts also constituted an interference with the administration of justice that the due process clause was meant to prohibit. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller, along with their daughter Little Bird of Snow, were residents of Pennsylvania receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps programs. Roy and Miller refused to comply with the federal requirement that participants in these programs provide the social security numbers of all family members receiving benefits. They argued that obtaining a social security number for Little Bird would violate their Native American religious beliefs. The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare terminated AFDC benefits paid for Little Bird and the parents sued, arguing that the free association clause of the First Amendment provided an exemption to the social security number requirement. At trial, Roy disclosed the Little Bird already had a social security number, and the court suggested the case was moot. Roy then argued that widespread use of the social security number would “rob the spirit” of Little Bird, violating their religious beliefs. The court restrained the government from denying benefits for Little Bird until she was 16 years old, but denied Roy’s request for damages.

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No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for seven members of the court, vacated the lower judgment and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the social security requirement did not violate the First Amendment and the injunction against the government was vacated. The requirement was entirely neutral in religious terms, and was a reasonable means of preventing welfare fraud. The First Amendment does not require the government to aid individuals in carrying out their religious beliefs. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in part, expressing that the entire lower judgment should be vacated because the record was unclear as to whether a justiciable controversy remained. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and concurred in the result, expressing that the Roy’s claim for benefits was either moot or not ripe for decision.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the government failed to show that allowing an exception to the social security requirement for those with legitimate religious objections would harm the state’s interest in preventing welfare fraud. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in Justice O’Connor’s opinion. Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that prior precedent clearly showed that requiring a social security number to receive benefits in spite of legitimate religious objections clearly violated the First Amendment.


Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, dba Condado Holiday Inn v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico

A Puerto Rican law restricted advertising by the island's casino gambling establishments. Even though gambling was a legal activity in Puerto Rico, the law only allowed advertising that was targeted at tourists.

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No. The Court held that the Act passed the constitutional test for restrictions on commercial speech. Justice Rehnquist argued that Puerto Rico's desire to protect the "health, safety, and welfare of its citizens" by attempting to isolate them from casino advertising served a "substantial government interest." The law was clearly drawn and directly related to the government's goal of minimizing the ill effects, such as prostitution and crime, that gambling cultivates in local communities.


In 1974, a Florida court sentenced Alvin Bernard Ford to death for first-degree murder. At the time of the murder, trial, and sentencing phase, there was no indication that Ford was suffering from any mental deficiencies. While awaiting execution, Ford's mental condition worsened. His competency was assessed in accordance with Florida procedures. Following this assessment, Florida's Governor signed Ford's death warrant. A state court declined to hear arguments raised about Ford's competency. Without the benefit of a hearing, Ford's habeas corpus petition was then denied by the a federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

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Yes and yes. In a 7-2 decision reversing and remanding the lower court's judgment, Justice Thurgood Marshall writing for the five-justice majority noted that English common law found executing the insane "savage and inhumane." In addition, no State permitted such executions. Opponents of such executions maintained that it "offends humanity" and that such executions had neither a deterrent nor a retributive effect. On the second question, Marshall observed that no state court had heard arguments that Ford was insane. In addition, Florida's competency procedures were inadequate.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, in a separate concurring opinion, agreed that executing an insane inmate violated the Eighth Amendment. For Powell, "the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it." Powell argued that Florida's procedure for determining the competency of the inmate violated due process.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined by Justice Byron R. White, dissented in part. They agreed that Florida's procedures did not protect Ford's due process rights but that "the Eighth Amendment does not create a substantive right not to be executed while insane." Justice William H. Rehnquist further, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, also maintained that no substantive right was created. In addition, Rehnquist argued that the State's procedures drew sustenance from the common law and were not out of step with contemporary practice.
This abstract was prepared by Adam J. Ruggles, Gloria R. Thornburg, and Peter Watkins.


In December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police force was conducting an authorized wiretap on the telephone of Paul Driscoll. On December 20, the police intercepted two phone calls from an unknown source that made reference to marijuana use that had occurred at a party the previous night at the Briggs’ residence. Edward Malley was the police officer in charge of the Driscoll investigation, and on the basis of these two calls, he drew up felony charges for the Briggs. The charges were presented to a state district court judge in February 1981, and the judge signed warrants for the Briggs’ arrest. The Briggs were arrested in their home on March 19, 1981, and taken to a police station where they were booked and held for several hours before being released. When presented to a grand jury, the charges were dropped.
The Briggs sued Malley in district court and alleged that his application for the warrants for their arrest violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the evidence was presented to the jury, Malley moved for a direct verdict, which the district court granted. The district court held that it was judge’s signing of the arrest warrants that was improper and that an officer who believes that he is acting on correct information is entitled to immunity from prosecution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that an officer is not entitled to immunity unless the officer had an “objectively reasonable” basis to believe that the alleged facts are sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest warrant.

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No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that immunity can be judged on a standard of objective reasonableness. If a reasonable officer could not believe that a warrant has sufficient probable cause, the officer cannot be immune from prosecution. The Supreme Court also held that the officer applying for the warrant bears the burden of liability rather than the magistrate who signs it because, under the constraints of a docket, the magistrate may tend to defer to the officer’s judgment.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote that, based on the record for this case, a reasonable officer could have assumed that there was probable cause for an arrest warrant. He argued that the majority’s opinion did not grant enough weight to the fact that a judge signed off on the arrest warrant. Because a judge also agreed that there was enough evidence for an arrest, there is substantial evidence that the police officer acted reasonably and should have been granted immunity from damages. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.


A group of Democrats challenged Indiana's 1981 state apportionment scheme on the ground of political gerrymandering. The Democrats argued that the apportionment unconstitutionally diluted their votes in important districts, violating their rights. A three-judge District Court sustained the Democrats' challenge.

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No. The Court held that while the apportionment law may have had a discriminatory effect on the Democrats, that effect was not "sufficiently adverse" to violate the Equal Protection Clause. The mere lack of proportional representation did not unconstitutionally diminish the Democrats' electoral power. The Court also ruled that political gerrymandering claims were properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, noting that judicially manageable standards could be discerned and applied in such cases.


The North Carolina General Assembly passed a redistricting plan for the state's Senate and House of Representatives. Black citizens of North Carolina alleged that the plan created seven new districts where blacks would not be able to elect representatives of their choosing. They filed suit in a District Court claiming that this violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Before the District Court could hear the case, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in order to clarify that voting violations needed only to have a "discriminatory effect" and required no "discriminatory purpose." Considering the "totality of circumstances" of the redistricting plan, the District Court ruled that six of the new districts violated the newly amended Voting Rights Act by diluting the power of the black vote. The North Carolina Attorney General appealed the decision directly to the Supreme Court.

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No. The Court found that five of the six contested districts discriminated against blacks by diluting the power of their collective vote. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The District Court properly performed its function "to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a politically cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." The District Court correctly analyzed data from three election cycles in North Carolina to determine that the black voters strongly supported black candidates, whereas whites usually voted against black candidates. The redistricting plan apportioned "politically cohesive groups of black voters" into districts where blocs of white voters would consistently defeat the black candidates. In violation of the Voting Rights Act, this damaged the ability of black citizens "to participate equally in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice."


Investigator David Groblewski from the Erie County District Attorney's Office viewed videos rented from P.J. Video and determined their content violated New York obscenity statutes. He drafted an affidavit describing the content on the videos and filed a warrant authorizing their seizure. A village justice in Depew NY issued the warrant and the police seized ten movies suspected to contain obscene content. A local court determined five of the movies violated obscenity standards. P.J. Video argued that the justice issued the warrant without probable cause since he did not personally view the movies. The court agreed and suppressed the videos as evidence. The County Court of Erie County affirmed the decision, and the New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. It asserted that warrants authorizing the seizure of items that were both non-dangerous and mediums of speech needed to satisfy a higher level of proof of "probable-cause" than other types of warrants because of First Amendment concerns.

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No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Court determined that the police department did not discriminate based on content. It seized the videos in order to preserve evidence rather than to suppress speech. In nondiscriminatory cases, the Court held that the same test for preventing Fourth Amendment wrongful search violations also secured against First Amendment free speech violations. Particularly, "the First Amendment should be evaluated under the same probable-cause standard used to review warrant applications." The officers met this standard by describing content in the videos that clearly violated the obscenity statutes.


In a series of articles, the Philadelphia Inquirer accused Hepps of links to organized crime and of capitalizing on that connection to influence the state legislature. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court favored Hepps and held that the newspaper was obligated to prove its accusations true.

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Yes. Relying on its reasoning in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. (1974), the Court reversed the state court's decision. The Gertz standard for evaluating potentially libelous speech required that "the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages."


Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Public Schools, Inc.

Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. (Dayton) is a private, non-profit corporation formed by two churches for the purposes of providing private education at the primary and secondary levels. The corporate charter includes a section that requires employees to subscribe to a particular set of religious beliefs, including a resolution of disputes through the “Biblical chain of command,” which means that all disputes must be handled internally, without redress in civil court. p>
Linda Hoskinson was a teacher at Dayton during the 1978-1979 school year. She agreed to the requirement of the corporate charter, including the Biblical chain of command. In January 1979, Hoskinson informed her principal that she was pregnant and was told that her employment contract would not be renewed because of the organization’s belief that mothers should stay home with their young children. Rather than appealing the decision internally, Hoskinson contacted a lawyer and threatened to sue based on state and federal sex discrimination laws if her employment contract was not renewed. Hoskinson was suspended and then fired for going outside of the internal dispute resolution system.
Hoskinson filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, which filed an order that required Dayton to reinstate Hoskinson with backpay. When Dayton did not respond, the Commission filed suit. Dayton responded by arguing that that the First Amendment prevented the Commission from having jurisdiction over the exercise of religious beliefs. While the administrative proceedings were pending, Dayton sued the commission in district court and sought an injunction against the state proceedings because they violated the First Amendment. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss and argued that federal abstention doctrines meant that the district court should let the administrative proceedings run their course. The district court refused the issue the injunction without addressing the abstention argument. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that allowing the Commission jurisdiction over Dayton would violate the First Amendment.

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Yes. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal courts should abstain from adjudicating civil state proceedings in which important state interests are involved. As long as the plaintiff has a full and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional claim, there is no reason for the district court to become involved. Because the Ohio court has the authority to consider whether the Commission’s actions violated the First Amendment, the issue can be fully addressed in state court.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the district court’s decision on the merits of the case was correct. The Commission merely investigated a complaint based on Dayton’s conduct and filed suit; there was no evidence that the Commission intended to impose a sanction. Without the threat of a sanction, there is no potential constitutional violation. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.


Section 706(g)of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits a court from ordering the promotion of an individual who was denied advancement for any reason other than racial discrimination. In 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland, an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters employed by the City of Cleveland, filed a lawsuit alleging that the City’s system for hiring and promoting firefighters discriminated against racial minorities, which violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Shortly after the City entered into settlement negotiations with the Vanguards, Local Number 93 of the International Association of Firefighters (a union representing a majority of Cleveland firefighters) moved to intervene as a party-plaintiff according to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that allows a nonparty to join an ongoing lawsuit in order to protect its rights from being affected by the litigation. The union argued that it had an interest in the suit because of its concern that promotions based upon a “racial quota system” (rather than competence exams or seniority rights) would detract from the quality of the Cleveland firefighting force. The Court approved the motion and ordered the Vanguards and the City to engage the union in settlement negotiations.
During the negotiations, the union membership overwhelmingly rejected a consent decree between the parties that increased the total number of supervisory positions within the Fire Department without specifying to whom those positions would be given. The Vanguards and the City moved for the approval of an amended consent decree that adopted the agreed-upon promotional system but was not subject to the union members’ approval. The district court approved the consent decree over the union’s objections. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Local Number 93 petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari based on its argument that the consent decree was an impermissible remedy under Section 706(g) of Title VII. According to the union, the court was precluded from approving the new promotional system because it may benefit individuals who were not actual victims of racial discrimination.

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No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that Section 706(g) does not apply to relief awarded in a consent decree. Although a consent decree has several characteristics of a judicial order, the Court found that it was not an “order” for purposes of Section 706(g) because of its voluntary, contractual nature. Additionally, the legislative history surrounding the enactment of Title VII suggests that Congress intended to encourage private, voluntary remedies for past discrimination. Because the consent decree did not “bind Local 93 to do or not to do anything,” it did not preclude the union from raising claims it may have under other laws, such as the unlawful employment provisions of Title VII.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor emphasized the narrow nature of the majority’s opinion. Even though the union had not raised the claims before the Court in its petition for certiorari, the non-minority employees retained the ability to challenge the consent decree under Section 703 of Title VII or the 14th Amendment.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent in which he argued that the consent decree fell under the purview of Section 706(g) and therefore was not a permissible remedy for past discrimination because it benefited minorities who may not have been the actual victims of the City’s racially discriminatory promotional system for firefighters. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that a consent decree is a judicial order and subject to the limitations of Section 706(g). He wrote that the district court’s failure to make a finding about past discrimination toward each minority firefighter who would receive preferential treatment under the new promotional system rendered the consent decree an impermissible judicial order. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined the dissent.