Utah Detective Douglas Fackrell received an anonymous tip about drug sales in a South Salt Lake residence, so he surveyed the area over a short period of time and speculated there was drug activity taking place. Fackrell saw Edward Joseph Strieff, Jr. leaving the residence and stopped him for questioning. During the stop, Fackrell discovered Strieff had an outstanding warrant and arrested him. During the lawful search after his arrest, Fackrell found methamphetamine and a drug pipe on Strieff’s person. The district court ruled that, although Fackrell did not have enough evidence to conduct an investigatory stop, the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia obtained during the lawful search incident to arrest justified the admission of that evidence for trial. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that the evidence should have been suppressed because the warrant that was the basis for the arrest was discovered during an unlawful investigatory stop.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62585.xml


In the absence of flagrant police misconduct, the discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant attenuated (weakened) the connection between the unconstitutional investigatory stop and the evidence seized incident to the lawful arrest, which allowed the evidence to be used against the defendant. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protections should not be excluded from evidence when the costs of its exclusion outweighs its benefits. Exclusion is not justified when the link between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovered evidence is too attenuated. To determine whether the connection is attenuated, courts must examine the temporal proximity of the discovery of the evidence to the unconstitutional conduct, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of the police misconduct. Based on the analysis of those factors, when a valid warrant is discovered after an unconstitutional investigatory stop, the connection between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence incident to a lawful arrest based on the warrant is sufficiently attenuated.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule was intended to prevent police officers from taking advantage of their own unconstitutional conduct, which was the case here. Because the initial unconstitutional stop was clearly calculated to procure further evidence, it was not an intervening circumstance that attenuated the connection between the misconduct and the discovery of evidence. Justice Sotomayor also argued that allowing the police such free rein essentially created a group of second-class citizens that could be subjected to police invasion of constitutional rights at a whim. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in all but the last portion of the dissent. In her separate dissent, Justice Elena Kagan wrote that the discovery of the evidence was too closely connected to the unconstitutional investigatory stop for the valid warrant to attenuate the connection. Because the two events were closely connected in time, the warrant itself was not an intervening circumstance, and the police conduct was purposeful and flagrant, the exclusionary rule should apply in cases like this one. Justice Ginsburg joined in the dissent.


Americold Realty Trust v. Conagra Foods, Inc., et al.

The plaintiffs, food distributors including Conagra Foods Inc. and Kraft Foodservice, sued Americold Logistics LLC and Americold Realty Trust (Americold) in state court for a breach of contract stemming from a dispute regarding liability for a warehouse fire. Americold sought to remove the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction because of the diversity of the trust’s board. No party challenged the propriety of the removal, and the district court addressed the case solely on its merits. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court found in favor of the defendant.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit raised the issue of potentially improper removal and asked the parties to submit briefs addressing the issue. The appellate court held that Americold did not meet its burden to demonstrate that diversity jurisdiction was appropriate because the inquiry must extend to the trust’s beneficiaries (who are its shareholders), not just the trustees.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62586.xml


For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of a trust is based on the citizenship of its members, which includes the shareholder-beneficiaries as well as the trustees. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that, although precedent and statute allow corporations to be considered a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated for the purposes of jurisdiction, the same exception does not exist for other artificial legal entities. For those entities, the general rule has been that their citizenship is defined by that of their members. In a trust, the term “members” includes the beneficiaries of that trust as well as the trustees, and in Maryland, a real estate investment trust is an “unincorporated business trust or association” in which property is held and managed “for the benefit and profit of any person who may become a shareholder.”


Omaha Tribal members attempted to enforce liquor licenses and taxes on local venders and clubs selling alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the owners of clubs and venues that sold alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska, joined by the state of Nebraska, sued for injunctive relief and argued that they are not located on federally-recognized Indian reservation land and therefore were not under the jurisdiction of the Omaha Tribe. The plaintiffs and defendants cross-filed for summary judgment, and the trial court found in favor of the defendants. The trial court held that Pender, Nebraska, was under the jurisdiction of tribal law because the U.S. Senate’s passage of an 1882 Act that allowed the Omaha tribe to sell allotments of its tribal land did not diminish the tribal boundaries of jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62587.xml


The passage of the 1882 Act did not diminish the Omaha Indian Reservation boundaries. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that only the clear intent of Congress can determine when tribal land is diminished. Because the 1882 Act only allowed for the tribe to sell plots of tribal lands to non-tribal members and there was no clear indication that Congress intended to diminish the reservation, the Omaha Tribe’s boundaries had not been diminished.


Deborah Peterson and a group of other plaintiffs were seeking to obtain judgments for injury or wrongful death during acts of terrorism by Iran. The Iran Central Bank (Bank Markazi) owned nearly $2 billion worth of bonds that were held in an account in New York City. Based on the Uniform Commercial Code, these assets were not considered assets of Bank Markazi, and therefore could not be attached by the plaintiffs and were immune from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
While this case was pending, Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Section 8772 of which stated, “[T]he financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., shall be subject to execution...in order to satisfy any judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for personal injury or death caused by an act of [terrorism].” The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based on Section 8772. Bank Markazi argued that Section 8772 violated the United States’ separation of powers because the law was solely directed at this specific case. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and ordered the turnover of the assets. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62588.xml


A statute that effectively directs a particular result in a single pending case does not violate the separation of powers. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that Section 8772 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 did not violate the separation of powers by directing the distribution of funds to terrorist victims. The fact that Congress passed the act during litigation did not tread onto judiciary “turf”; instead, it only supplied a new law to be applied to undisputed facts. Rather than telling the judiciary branch what to do, Congress passed a law for the judiciary to interpret during the case itself, and therefore did not intrude on the judicial powers of Article III.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that Congress violated Article III by passing the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Section 8772 because Congress is not allowed to “pick” the winners of court cases by applying statutes directed at those court cases during litigation. It is a violation of Article III for legislators to determine the outcome of judicial decisions. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined the dissent.


John Sturgeon regularly hunted on the Yukon-Charley River National Preserve (Yukon-Charley), which is part of the National Park Service (NPS), in Alaska. Sturgeon used a hovercraft to hunt. During one of his hunting trips, he was approached by three NPS enforcement employees and told that NPS regulations prohibited the operation of hovercrafts within all national parks, and therefore he was prohibited from using his hovercraft within the Yukon-Charley boundaries. Sturgeon insisted that the NPS did not have jurisdiction in the area because it was a state-owned river and subsequently sued Bert Frost, the director of the NPS for Alaska. Sturgeon claimed the NPS violated Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA) as applied to his use of hovercrafts on state-owned lands and waters because ANILCA limited the applicability of NPS regulations on land that is not federally owned.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62589.xml


The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 does not allow the National Park Service to regulate all land physically within the boundaries of the National Park System in Alaska. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of ANILCA would lead to inconsistent Park practices. The result of this interpretation would be that the Park Service may regulate “non-public” lands with national regulations, but it may not regulate Alaska-specific regulations to those lands.


Jeffrey Heffernan was a police officer for the City of Paterson, New Jersey. A fellow police officer observed Heffernan picking up a campaign sign for the mayoral candidate running against the incumbent. When a supervisor confronted him, Heffernan claimed that he was not politically involved, could not vote in the city of Paterson, and was picking up the sign on behalf of his mother. Heffernan was demoted to a walking post because his actions were considered to be “overt involvement in political activities.” Heffernan sued the city of Paterson and claimed that the city had violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The city filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that, since Heffernan had not actually engaged in constitutionally protected speech, the City’s actions had not violated his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment because there was no evidence Heffernan associated himself with the political candidate at issue. Heffernan admitted himself that he was not associated with the candidate, and therefore there is no evidence of a violation of his right to freedom of association. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62595.xml


A government employee who is demoted because of perceived involvement in protected political activity is entitled to challenge his demotion under the First Amendment even if the demotion was based on a factual mistake. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, although there was no First Amendment case that specifically addressed this issue, there was at least one precedential case in which the employer’s motive was what determined whether the action violated the employee’s First Amendment rights. Therefore, when an employer demotes an employee out of a desire the prevent or punish the employee for engaging in protected speech, that action violates the First Amendment, even if the employer made a factual mistake and no protected speech occurred. The Court also held that this rule tracks the language of the First Amendment because it focuses on the harm the government actor committed, which is the same whether or not the employer made a factual mistake, and does not alter the burden that an employee claiming a First Amendment violation must meet, which is to prove that the defendant had an improper motive.
In his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the Constitution does not provide a cause of action when a plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not violated. The question of whether or not the employee engaged in constitutionally protected speech is the threshold question to determining whether the employer violated the employee’s constitutional rights by demoting the employee based on that speech. If the employee did not exercise his First Amendment rights, he has no claim based on the employer’s reaction to that speech. Even if the plaintiff is able to establish that the employer attempted to interfere with his constitutional right to speech, a factually impossible attempt does not establish liability. The plaintiff still has to prove that his First Amendment rights were actually violated, which the plaintiff in this case cannot do because everyone agreed that he never exercised his First Amendment rights in this case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


Terrance Williams was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. The Supreme Court affirmed Williams’ conviction and sentence, and he filed three petitions under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, all of which were denied and the denials affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Williams also petitioned for federal habeas relief, which was denied. On his fourth petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, the state court determined that Williams had sufficiently demonstrated that there was governmental interference in his trial and granted the relief. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and lifted the stay of execution.
The Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at that point was Ronald Castille, who had been the District Attorney for Philadelphia throughout Williams’ trial, sentencing, and appeal, and who had personally authorized his office to seek the death penalty in this case. Prior to having his case heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Williams moved to have Chief Justice Castille recuse himself from this case. Chief Justice Castille refused to do so and ultimately joined the opinion that reversed the lower court’s grant of habeas relief and lifted the stay of execution.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62596.xml


The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when a judge who was previously involved in the case as a prosecutor declined to recuse himself, regardless of whether that judge’s decision as part of a multi-member tribunal was dispositive. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that there was an impermissible of risk of bias that violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when a judge was previously involved in the case as a prosecutor who participated in crucial decisions about the case. Especially in the case of a former prosecutor, who likely made critical strategy decisions, the risk of improper, even if inadvertent, bias toward the position the prosecutor advocated for as a member of the adversarial process is so serious as to be unconstitutional. In this case, there is no doubt that the judge was involved in a critical decision as a prosecutor because he played a vital role in deciding to seek the death penalty, which is one of the most significant decisions a prosecutor can make. Additionally, because the deliberations of an appellate panel are confidential, it does not matter whether the potentially biased judge’s decision was dispositive, because it can be assumed that it at the very least influenced the outcome. Even the appearance of such influence undermines the crucial neutrality of the tribunal.
In his dissent, Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote that the Due Process Clause is only violated when the judge is actually biased by his previous involvement in the case. In this case, there was no evidence that the judge in question had actually been involved in, or formed a decision on, the decision about whether the seek the death penalty, and therefore there was no “objective risk of actual bias” such that it was fundamentally unfair for him to hear the case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the rule in question should be less strict when the matter before the judge was different from what the judge worked on when he was involved in the case. In this case, the criminal conviction was not at issue; instead, the matter is a question of post-conviction relief, which is wholly different from what the judge was involved with as a prosecutor on the case. Justice Thomas argued that historical practice and precedent construe judicial disqualification narrowly and therefore did not require a judge who was involved in a criminal case to recuse himself from the post-conviction proceedings, which are a separate civil matter. Justice Thomas also noted that any concerns about potential bias should be addressed by state legislatures, not the Court.


In 2008, Luis M. Sanchez Valle was charged in federal for illegally trafficking in weapons and ammunition in interstate commerce and, on substantially the same facts, was charged with several violations of the Puerto Rico Weapons Act. After Sanchez Valle was convicted in federal court, he filed a motion to dismiss the claims under Puerto Rican law and argued that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy meant that he could not be prosecuted in Puerto Rico for the same offenses for which the federal court had already convicted him. The prosecution argued that, pursuant to the precedent the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico established in Puerto Rico v. Castro García, the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico derive their authority from different sources and therefore can punish substantially the same offenses without implicating the constitutional protections against double jeopardy.
The trial court dismissed the charges against Sanchez Valle and held that he could not be indicted twice for the same offenses by the same sovereign entity, and because Puerto Rico and the United States both derive their authority from the United States Constitution, they are the same sovereign entity. The Court of Appeals consolidated this case with several others presenting the same question and held that, under current law, a person could punished for the same offenses in both federal and Puerto Rican court without implicating the protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed and held that the U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding double jeopardy was binding on the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and therefore the Puerto Rico v. Castro García precedent was incorrect and the Puerto Rican charges against Sanchez Valle should be dismissed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62598.xml


The U.S. federal government and the Puerto Rican government are the “same sovereign” for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the concept of “sovereignty” as used in the Double Jeopardy Clause did not have its ordinary meaning, but rather deals with the question of whether the entities in question derive their authority from different sources. Based on this historical analysis, the Court determined that, while the states derived their sovereign power from a separate source than the federal government, territories do not. Although in many ways Puerto Rico functioned as a separate sovereign because the federal government had delegated much of its power to the people of Puerto Rico, the delegation further emphasizes the fact that historically the authority to govern Puerto Rico derived from the U.S. Constitution.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the double jeopardy protection should perhaps not be limited to prosecutions by the same sovereign and argued that the question of the extent of double jeopardy protections warranted further examination. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he disagreed with the Court’s approach to the sovereignty of Indian tribes.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority’s view of the U.S. Constitution as the source of Puerto Rico’s power to self-govern was an overly simplistic view of the role the Constitution played in creating the sovereignty of other entities, such as the states that were originally territories. Based on a more complex framework that takes into account customs, actions, and attitudes of different governmental entities, Puerto Rico was a separate sovereign entity for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.


The Federal Power Act (FPA) was passed in 1935 to regulate interstate electricity sales. The FPA vested the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with authority over the transmission of electrical energy in interstate commerce and the wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce. To this end, FERC has created regional transmission organizations, such as PJM Interconnection, LLC, (PJM) which regulates a large regional market that includes Maryland and the District of Columbia. Maryland became concerned that FERC actions were failing to adequately incentivize the construction of new plants, so the Maryland Public Service Commission began soliciting proposals for the construction of a new plant and instituted a Generation Order to regulate how the company that won the bid would interact with the rest of the energy market. Commercial Power Ventures Maryland, LLC, (CPV) won the bid. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, (PPL) and other existing power plants sued and argued that the Generation Order unconstitutionally interfered with the PJM-regulated market. The district court held that the Generation Order was preempted by the federal regulation of the energy markets pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. This case was consolidated with CPV’s suit against PPL and the other existing power plants.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62599.xml


The Federal Power Act preempts state regulation that interferes with the national energy market, as the Generation Order does. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that federal law preempts state law when the state law is in an area that Congress has already extensively legislated or when the state law is an obstacle to the objectives of the federal law. In this case, the program at issue invades the regulatory space that Congress has granted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Although states may regulate in areas incident to FERC’s domain, states may not do so when their regulations intrude on FERC’s ability to regulate interstate wholesale rates. Because the program at issue in this case does so, federal law preempts it.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that preemption analysis in areas in which both the federal government and states collaboratively regulate must examine the purpose of the regulations at issue rather than “talismanic vocabulary.” Because the majority opinion properly looked to the purpose of the Federal Power Act and how the Maryland program interfered with it, Justice Sotomayor joined the majority’s opinion in full. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the issue of preemption in this case should be decided solely by examining the relevant text of the statutes in question rather than by looking at the broader doctrine of implied preemption, as the majority opinion did.


A jury found Fowler guilty of murder in the first degree. The trial judge imposed the mandatory sentence of death in the state's gas chamber. Fowler appealed his conviction and sentence. Both were affirmed. Fowler then attacked the mandatory imposition of his sentence. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certioriari.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62601.xml


The Court deferred action in Fowler's case until it resolved the question of mandatory death sentences in five cases heard and decided in the 1975 Term. One of these cases was Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), which held that the mandatory imposition of the death sentence violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment prohibition of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following Woodson, the Court by memorandum vacated Fowler's mandatory death sentence and returned the case to the North Carolina for further proceedings. Fowler was resentenced to life in prison.


Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics Inc.

Halo Electronics, Inc. (Halo) and Pulse Electronics, Inc. (Pulse) are both suppliers of electronic components. Halo owns three patents regarding surface mount electronic packages; Pulse designs and sells surface mount electronic packages and does its manufacturing in Asia. In 2002, Halo unsuccessfully attempted to license their patents to Pulse. In 2007, Halo sued Pulse for patent infringement. The district court held that Pulse infringed on Halo’s patents with products shipped into the United States, had induced others to infringe on products delivered outside of the U.S. but ultimately imported into the U.S. as finished products, and found that it was highly probable that Pulse’s infringement was willful. The court later found that Pulse’s infringement was not willful. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed and held that there was no “willful infringement.” In determining that there was no willful infringement, the appellate court applied a rigid two-part test established in In re Seagate that required that willfulness be proven on both an objective and subjective basis. In this case, the appellate court held that the objective prong was not met. This two-part test is similar to one the Supreme Court struck down last term in Octane Fitness, LLc v. ICON Health & Fitness, which dealt with a test for awarding attorneys fees.
In the consolidated case, Stryker Corporation (Stryker) sued Zimmer, Inc. (Zimmer) over patent infringement of medical equipment. Stryker and Zimmer are both competitors in the market for pulsed lavage devices, which deliver pressurized irrigation for certain medical procedures in orthopedic medicine. Stryker holds three patents for pulsed lavage devices that it claimed Zimmer had infringed. The district court found Zimmer liable for patent infringement. The jury awarded Stryker treble damages as allowed under 35 U.S.C. § 284 on the grounds that Zimmer intentionally violated Stryker’s patents. Zimmer appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which requires that the patent-holder prove the infringement was willful to be eligible for treble damages. Therefore, the appellate court overturned the award for treble damages on the grounds that Zimmer did not intentionally violate Stryker’s patents.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62603.xml


The rigid two-part test is not necessary for determining whether a patentee is eligible for enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C §284. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The plain language of Section 284 simply stated that courts “may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.” There is no language that creates the kind of test that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit applied, and precedent had established that the word “may” connotes judicial discretion. While it’s true that the award is typically only granted in extreme cases, the two-part test was overly rigid and could insulate some of worst patent infringers from liability for enhanced damages. Because the language of the section is discretionary, courts should take into account a variety of factors and should not be limited by a rigid test.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the language of Section 284 encompasses limitations on the use of a court’s discretion to award enhanced damages. Generally, enhanced damages are reserved for particularly egregious cases. Additionally, whether or not the infringer consults counsel should not be relevant to the award decision, nor should the award be used to compensate for the costs of the litigation. Justice Breyer argued that, while enhanced damages served an important purpose, its use must be limited. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence.


Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt

Throughout the 1990s, inventor Gilbert P. Hyatt was involved in litigation with the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) based on the FTB’s audits of his 1991 and 1992 tax returns. The FTB claimed that Hyatt had falsified his tax forms by manufacturing a move to Nevada that did not occur until later and therefore failing to file state taxes for time that he was actually living in California. Hyatt protested that the FTB acted in bad faith and eventually sued the FTB in Nevada alleging negligence along with several intentional torts and seeking damages. Before the case went to trial, the FTB argued that it should be immune from the lawsuit based on California law that granted it sovereign immunity. The case eventually went before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that Nevada courts were not bound to grant the FTB full immunity.
At trial, the jury found in favor of Hyatt and awarded him over $300 million in damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, which held that the FTB is not immune from the suit because in Nevada governmental entities are not immune from claims for intentional torts. However, because Nevada law does not allow punitive damages against governmental entities, the punitive damage award in this case should be reversed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62604.xml


The Constitution does not allow Nevada to refuse to extend to other states haled into Nevada courts the same immunities Nevada would receive in those courts. The Court was equally divided on the question of whether Nevada v. Hall should be overruled and therefore affirmed the lower court’s exercise of jurisdiction over California. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution prohibits a state from adopting a “policy of hostility” towards another state. Because the Nevada rule that does not extend Nevada’s governmental immunity to governmental entities from other states is essentially a “policy of hostility” towards other states, it violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. concurred in the judgment without writing a separate opinion.
In his dissent, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote that a “policy of hostility” under the Full Faith and Credit Clause is one that has “no sufficient policy considerations” to support it. In this case, Nevada’s application of its own immunity law, which does not protect other states’ governmental entities, is supported by the policy interest in ensuring appropriate redress for its citizens. Nevada is not required to presume that other states are equally committed to the protection of Nevada citizens. Therefore, Nevada’s rule is not an unconstitutional “policy of hostility” towards other states. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


In 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman (with whom he was in a domestic relationship) under a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a family or household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
William Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend’s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
Voisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes do not constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because “recklessness” is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the “physical force” requirement of the federal statute. On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine’s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62611.xml


A reckless domestic violence assault qualifies as misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9). Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the relevant statutory text -- “us[ing] force” -- does not rule out an interpretation that encompasses an act of force carried out recklessly, or with a conscious disregard of the substantial risk of causing harm. Although the statutory language does not apply to true accidents, it certainly does to reckless conduct. The legislative history of the statute also supports this reading, because Congress expressly intended for the statute to prevent those convicted of misdemeanors of domestic assault from being able to purchase firearms. In many states, such misdemeanor offenses are defined as only requiring reckless intent; if these were not included in the statutory prohibition, the statute would not be effective in a majority of jurisdictions.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that term “use of force” required intentional conduct to trigger the statutory firearm prohibition. The Court has traditionally interpreted “use” in ways that make it clear that the conduct must be intentional, which is consistent with its use elsewhere in the statute. In holding otherwise, Justice Thomas argued that the majority opinion conflated recklessly causing force with recklessly causing harm through the intentional use of force. Because the Maine domestic violence statute emcompasses reckless conduct while the federal statute does not, a conviction under the Maine statute should not trigger the firearm prohibition. The majority opinion also extended the sweep of the statute into unconstitutional territory by denying those convicted of a reckless misdemeanor of domestic violence their Second Amendment rights. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent, though not in the part that addressed the Second Amendment.


In 2003, Lester Nichols was charged with intent to engage in sex with a minor. In 2006, the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) was passed, and the Attorney General issued a rule in 2007 that SORNA applied retroactively to convicted sex offenders. Under this rule, Nichols was required to register with SORNA and update his residency. In 2012, Nichols flew from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his location pursuant to SORNA. Authorities in the Philippines took Nichols into custody and returned him to the United States where he was charged with noncompliance with SORNA regulations regarding updating his residency. Nichols filed a motion to dismiss and argued that the Philippines are outside U.S. jurisdiction, so he was not required to update his location. The trial court dismissed his motion, and Nichols plead guilty. He then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed his conviction.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62616.xml


A convicted sexual offender is not required to notify the state under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) when he moves outside of U.S. jurisdiction. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that SORNA requires that sexual offenders notify states to which they move or reside. The Court interpreted the present tense of “reside” in the statute to mean that an offender must currently be living in a U.S. jurisdiction for the requirement to take effect. Therefore, a registered sex offender does not violate SORNA by failing to update his registration when he moves from a U.S. jurisdiction to a non-U.S. jurisdiction.


Husky International Electronics, Inc. (Husky) sold and delivered electronic equipment to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp. (Chrysalis), headed by Daniel Ritz. Chrysalis owed Husky $163,999.38 in purchases between 2003 and 2007. In 2007, Ritz started transferring funds from Chrysalis to various other ventures in which he owned stock. In 2009 Husky sued Ritz for payment of his outstanding debt, and Ritz then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In 2011, Husky filed a complaint against the discharge of Ritz’s debt and argued that Ritz had fraudulently moved funds from Chrysalis to other accounts in order to file for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court found that Ritz had not fraudulently filed for bankruptcy and that it could not “pierce the veil” to go after Ritz’s personal finances for the debt Chrysalis owed.
Husky appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination and found that Ritz had not committed “actual fraud” by false representation and that Husky had not proven that Ritz acted “maliciously and willfully.” The United States Appeals Court for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to discharge Ritz’s debt.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62619.xml


The “actual fraud” language of the bankruptcy statute encompasses traditional forms of fraud and is not limited to fraudulent representation. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that “actual fraud” is fraud that is committed with wrongful intent, and that “fraud” has traditionally been defined as any transfer of assets that impairs a creditor’s ability to collect on the debt. In the common law, such fraudulent conveyances did not require that the debtor make a false representation to the creditor. Therefore, historically, false representation has never been a requirement of “actual fraud” and should not be treated as one in the wording of the relevant section of the Bankruptcy Code. This reading maintains meaningful distinctions throughout the code and does not make the language redundant.
In his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that “actual fraud” as used in the relevant section of the bankruptcy statute does not encompass fraudulent transfer schemes. Despite the fact that the common law meaning of actual fraud is expansive, this case is one of statutory interpretation, not common law, and therefore the common law definition cannot be dispositive when it does not fit with the relevant language of the statute. The relevant language in this case limits “actual fraud” to situations in which fraud induced the creditor to enter into a transaction with the debtor. Justice Thomas argued that the majority opinion’s reading of the phrase is overbroad and second-guesses Congress’ intent.


In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which requires group health plans and health insurance issuers offering health plans to provide preventative care and screenings for women pursuant to the guidelines established by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These guidelines include “approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.” The regulations include an exemption from contraceptive coverage for the group health plan of a religious employer. The exemption does not mean that such services are not covered, but that they are not covered through a cost-sharing mechanism.
The petitioners are religious organizations that argue that the contraceptive coverage mandate of the ACA violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which Congress enacted in 1993, because the mandate requires these organizations to “facilitate” the provision of insurance coverage for contraceptive services that they oppose on religious grounds. In several separate cases, the relevant district courts issued injunctions against the government, and the relevant Courts of Appeals reversed. The appellate courts held that the religious organizations were unable to show that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the exercise of their religious freedom.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62620.xml


After determining through supplemental briefing that insurance companies could provide contraceptive coverage to employees of organizations that object to such coverage on religious grounds without the organizations needing to provide notification, the Court vacated the case for further consideration by the lower courts in light of this agreement from the parties. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that it reached no decision on the merits of the case, and nothing in the opinion should be construed as affecting the ability of the government to ensure that employees covered by the insurance plans at issue receive full contraceptive coverage. Given the importance of the issues involved in this case, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts to afford the parties the opportunity to determine how to proceed in a manner that grants employees full contraceptive coverage while also respecting the organizations’ religious exercise.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that nothing in the majority opinion should be construed as signaling to lower courts where the Supreme Court stands on the merits of the case. Remanding the case allows the lower courts to consider whether the existing or modified regulations may properly balance the interests at issue.


In 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2 (H.B. 2), which contained several provisions related to abortions. One such provision required that any physician performing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of where the abortion was performed, and another provision required that all abortion clinics comply with standards for ambulatory surgical centers. The petitioners are a group of abortion providers who sued the State of Texas seeking to invalidate those provisions in H.B. 2 as they relate to facilities in McAllen and El Paso. The petitioners argued that H.B. 2 denied equal protection, unlawfully delegated lawmaking authority, and constituted arbitrary and unreasonable state action. The district court dismissed the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the two contested provisions of H.B. 2. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and partially reversed the injunctions because the plaintiffs failed to show that they placed a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62621.xml


In applying the substantial burden test, courts must weigh the extent to which the laws in question actually serve the stated government interest against the burden they impose. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority, which held that the provisions of H.B. 2 at issue do not confer medical benefits that are sufficient to justify the burdens they impose on women seeking to exercise their constitutional right to an abortion. Therefore, the provisions unconstitutionally impose an undue burden. The Court held that the judicial review of such statutes need not be wholly deferential to the legislative fact-finding, especially when the factual record before the district court contradicted it. In this case, the evidence presented before the district court showed that the admitting privileges requirement of H.B. 2 did not advance the state’s interest in protecting women’s health but did place a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion by forcing about half of the state’s abortion clinics to close. This additional layer of regulation provided no further protections than those already in place. Similarly, the requirement that abortion clinics meet the standards for ambulatory surgical centers did not appreciably lower the risks of abortions compared to those performed in non-surgical centers. These requirements were so tangentially related to the actual procedures involved in an abortion that they were essentially arbitrary. If these requirements took effect, only seven or eight facilities in the entire state would be able to function, which is in and of itself a substantial burden on women seeking abortions because those remaining facilities would not be able to meet the demand. The Court also held that the petitioners were not precluded from challenging the provisions as they were applied despite previous litigation on whether the provisions were unconstitutional on their face, especially given the evidence about how their enforcement had actually affected abortion access across the state.
In her concurrence, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that modern abortions are so safe relative to other medical procedures, including childbirth itself, that any law that made accessing abortions more difficult in the name of safety could not pass judicial review.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion bent the rules of judicial scrutiny and misinterpreted precedent to reach its conclusion. He argued that this case should never have made it to the Supreme Court because the Court normally did not allow suits by third parties to vindicate the rights of others. Additionally, the majority opinion misconstrued the undue burden test as requiring courts to apply a standard of review similar to strict scrutiny in assessing laws that regulate abortions, despite the fact that there was no precedential support for that level of scrutiny in these cases. By adding further tiers to the levels of judicial scrutiny, the majority created a test that was a “meaningless formalism” and that provided little guidance to lower courts because the result is based on whether a right is favored instead of being actually enumerated in the Constitution. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Court should not have reached the substantive issues of this case because the claims should have been barred as already litigated based on the outcome of the facial challenges to the provisions, which arose from the same set of operative facts. If the lower court’s decision was wrong as a matter of law, the petitioners could have appealed on that basis, but the strategic decision not to do so had consequences, and the majority opinion should have properly applied the well-established doctrine of claim preclusion. Even if the claims were not precluded, the petitioners did not meet their burden to show that the provisions in question affect a large fraction of Texan women. The fact that some clinics closed is evidence of a correlation with the provisions, not causation. Additionally, the petitioners did not prove that the closure of some clinics would actually affect the number of women able to access abortions, especially since many abortion clinics operated below capacity. Even if those provisions were problematic, the majority erred in declaring them completely unconstitutional when they could and should be upheld in any area in which they did not impose an undue burden. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.
Learn more about the Supreme Court and abortion law in Body Politic, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


Walter Himmelreich is a federal prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut. In 2008, he was attacked by another prisoner. Himmelreich filed a complaint against multiple defendants alleging many causes of action, including a claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was placed in administrative detention after filing a claim under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) and a claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the prison officials failed to protect him from being assaulted by another inmate. The district court dismissed his case for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of the First and Eighth Amendment claims.
On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants by holding that Himmelreich had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on the claims and that the prison officials were subject to the discretionary exception to the FTCA, which triggered the judgment bar of the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §2676, that prohibits “any action by the same claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act of omission gave rise to the claim.” The appellate court again vacated and remanded the lower court’s judgment. It held that Himmelreich’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies should be excused because he had been intimidated and threatened by prison officials to not pursue a grievance process against them. The appellate court also found that the dismissal of Himmelreich’s claim based on discretionary exception to the FTCA as applied by the district court does not necessarily trigger a judgment bar of 28 U.S.C §2676.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62622.xml


The judgment bar of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not apply to claims dismissed for falling under the exceptions to the FTCA. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the FTCA explicitly exempts coverage from certain categories of claims. Because the judgment bar is part of the FTCA, if the FTCA does not apply to a claim, then the judgment bar does not either. In the absence of Congressional intent to the contrary, the plain reading of the language of the statute -- that the FTCA, including the judgment bar, does not cover cases that are exempt -- should control the analysis. In this case, because Himmelreich’s first claim fell under the discretionary action exception to the FTCA, the judgment bar did not apply to his second claim.


Brandon Thomas Betterman failed to appear in court on December 8, 2011, on charges of partner or family member assault, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On February 9, 2012, Betterman turned himself in and stated that he knew he was supposed to appear in court but claimed he had neither money nor transportation to get to the courthouse that day. He was convicted on March 15, 2012, and sentenced to five years. On April 19, 2012, he pled guilty to the charges of jumping bail. His sentence hearing did not occur until January 17, 2013, when he filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that he was denied a speedy and fair trial due to the amount of time that had lapsed between his guilty plea and sentencing hearing. On April 29, 2013, his motion was denied, and on June 27, 2013, Betterman was sentenced to seven years for his bail-jumping charge. The Supreme Court of Montana held that the delay between Betterman’s plea and sentencing was unacceptably long but had not violated his rights to fair and speedy trial.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62631.xml


The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial does not extend past a guilty verdict or guilty plea. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that, although a defendant may have other recourse for an inordinate delay in sentencing, the Sixth Amendment does not apply to post-conviction, pre-sentencing delays. This reading of the Sixth Amendment is in line with the historical understanding of what the right protects: The right of the accused to have a speedy trial. Because “the accused” is different from “the convicted,” extending the Sixth Amendment right to post-conviction procedures would change the nature of the right. The manner in which legislatures and courts have interpreted the right, as well as the remedies available for a violation of the right, are also in line with the time-limited reading. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as many states’ rules of criminal procedure, provide some protections against undue delays in sentencing, but the Sixth Amendment does not.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Court’s opinion leaves open the question of whether an undue sentencing delay would violate a defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that it’s not clear what test the Court would use in adjudicating such a case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a separate concurring opinion in which she emphasized that the question of when an undue delay in sentencing violated the Due Process Clause was an open one. Justice Sotomayor argued that a possible test would be based on an analysis of four factors: The length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.


Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust

Unlike states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may not authorize its municipalities, including utilities, to declare bankruptcy and seek relief under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In June 2014, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (Recovery Act), which expressly provided different protections for creditors than Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
The plaintiffs in this case are a group of investors who collectively hold nearly two billion dollars in bonds issued by one of Puerto Rico’s public utilities, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), which could potentially file for bankruptcy under the Recovery Act. The plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico in district court and argued that Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits state municipal debt restructuring laws from binding creditors without their consent, preempts the Recovery Act. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined the enforcement of the Recovery Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62632.xml


Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code preempted the Puerto Rico statute that allowed public utilities to restructure their debt. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 5-2 majority. The Court held that Puerto Rico is a “state” within the meaning of the preemption provision of Chapter 9. When the Bankruptcy Code was originally enacted, it included territories, such as Puerto Rico, in the definition of “states” to which the Code applied. Since then, Congress had amended the definition of “state” to exclude Puerto Rico for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under a specific provision of Chapter 9, but that narrowing of the definition did not apply to the preemption provision. The plain language of the preemption clause did not contain any language that excluded Puerto Rico; in contrast, the amended definition of state specifically excluded Puerto Rico for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor and went no further. Without further language from Congress, the text should not be interpreted to reflect a Congressional intent for which there is no textual evidence.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that each of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code must be read within the context of the whole Code. Because the language of the preemption provision presupposed that it applied to states who could be considered debtors, that provision did not apply to Puerto Rico. Crucially, the language of the Code also meant that the only ways to solve Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis were for Puerto Rico to pass the kind of statute that it did or wait for direct Congressional action. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


Universal Health Services, Inc. v. Escobar

Universal Health Services, Inc. (UHS) owns and operates Arbour Counseling Services (Arbour), a mental health services provider in Lawrence, Massachusetts. Arbour participates in the state Medicaid program, MassHealth, and the state has promulgated regulations for such “satellite” facilities.
Julio Escobar and Carmen Correa are the parents of Yarushka Rivera, a teenager with behavioral issues who began seeing a counselor at Arbour. These counselors were not licensed, and Escobar and Correa became concerned that they were not being properly supervised as the regulations of satellite facilities required. Rivera was eventually diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed a medicine by a “doctor” who was later discovered to be a nurse under the supervision of a non-board-certified psychiatrist. Rivera soon had an adverse reaction to the medicine and called Arbour for guidance but was unable to speak with anyone. A few days later, she had a seizure and was hospitalized. A few months later, she suffered a fatal seizure.
Escobar and Correa filed complaints with several state agencies and eventually sued UHS under both the federal and state False Claims Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint and held that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead the elements of falsity that claims under the False Claims Act require. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed and held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pled the elements of falsity by applying an “implied certification” test, which states that falsity has been sufficiently pled when there is evidence that the defendant did not comply with a condition of payment.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62633.xml


The implied certification test could be a valid basis for False Claims Act liability, and the conditions of payment with which the defendant allegedly failed to comply did not need to be explicitly stated. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that the implied certification theory could be a basis for liability under certain circumstances. When the defendant submitted a claim for payment that made specific representations about goods or services provided but knowingly did not disclose noncompliance with statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements, liability could attach if the omission made those representations misleading. However, liability did not depend on whether the requirements were expressly designated as conditions of payment; instead the determining factor was whether the misrepresentation about compliance was material under the traditional common law meaning of the term. Because the materiality standard and the “knowingly” part of the liability test are strict, the requirements of payment need not be expressly stated.


The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a sexual harassment suit on behalf of approximately 270 female employees against CRST Van Expedited (CRST). Two years after filing the suit, the EEOC failed to identify the 270 women, and the district court ordered the EEOC to amend its list of 270 women to include only the women who wished to continue with the suit and to ensure that those women be available for deposition. The EEOC complied with the first court order and failed to fulfill the second before the deadline. CRST had filed seven motions to dismiss, and the district granted (or granted in part) six of the motions. CRST subsequently filed a bill of costs against the EEOC for $4,560,285.11, and the district court granted the fee award. The EEOC appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the fee award. The appellate court held that the EEOC’s pre-suit obligations were not elements of the claim and did not constitute a ruling on the merits that was eligible for fees.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62634.xml


The defendant may be a “prevailing party” for the purpose of the award of fees even without a ruling on the merits. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the determination of whether a particular party has “prevailed” for the purpose of fee-shifting statutes is whether there has been a material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties. Because the defendant can obtain its objective by preventing the plaintiff from altering the legal relationship in its favor, the defendant can prevail without judgment on the merits of the case. In this case, the defendant prevailed because the plaintiffs did not satisfy their pre-suit obligations and therefore were unable to alter the legal relationship between the parties. There is no indication that Congress, in drafting the statutory language, intended to limit the opportunity to collect fees to parties that prevailed on the merits, especially as doing so would prevent parties from obtaining fees on claims that were dismissed as frivolous.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the Court’s opinion and argued that previous precedent suggesting that a district court must make a separate finding before determining that a defendant is eligible for a fee award should not be extended further.


In 1977, Congress enacted the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in an effort to combat abusive debt collection practices, which were particularly problematic with third party or independent debt collectors, who are unlikely to have contact with the consumer and therefore have little incentive to act fairly. One of the issues that the FDCPA addressed was independent debt collectors representing themselves as government officials. Therefore, the FDCPA targeted these “debt collectors” while exempting government officials from that definition. The statutory language of the exemption was specific to “any officer or employee of ... any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.”
The Ohio Revised Code contains a provision that unpaid debts owed to a state entity get “certified” to the Ohio Attorney General, who is then responsible for collecting the debt or disposing of it by other means. The Attorney General may enlist “special counsel” to collect debts on the Attorney General’s behalf. To do so, the special counsel and the Attorney General enter into a retention agreement that, among other terms, allows the special counsel to use the Attorney General’s letterhead in connection with claims arising out of the tax debts the special counsel is authorized to collect.
The plaintiffs in this case are individuals who received debt collection letters that used the seal of the Ohio Attorney General from the defendants, who became special counsel to the Attorney General in 2013. The plaintiffs sued and argued that the defendants violated the FDCPA by using the Ohio Attorney General letterhead. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and held that special counsel are not “debt collectors” under the meaning of the FDCPA because they are officers of the state for the purposes of debt collection, and therefore the use of the Ohio Attorney General letterhead was not false or misleading. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision and held that special counsel are “debt collectors” under the meaning of the FDCPA and do not fall under the exemption, and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the use of Ohio Attorney General’s seal on debt collection letters was misleading.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62635.xml


Even if special counsel appointed by the state Attorney General to collect debts are not “state officers” under the meaning of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), use of the Attorney General Letterhead is not materially misleading. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that, regardless of whether the special counsel are “state officers” under the FDCPA, their use of the Attorney General’s letterhead was not materially misleading because it accurately conveyed that the special counsel was tasked with collecting debts on the Attorney General’s behalf. The use of the Attorney General’s letterhead was in fact required when the special was sending debt collection communications, because that explained on whose authority the special counsel was writing to the debtor. The Court also noted that to interpret these actions as violating the FDCPA would raise a federalism concern, because the manner in which states collect debts is a matter of state government in which the federal government should not interfere.


On June 21, 2007, Lieutenants Michael Ross and James Madigan were escorting Shaidon Blake from his cell when Madigan shoved Blake several times. The incident escalated to Madigan punching Blake in the face several times with a key ring wrapped around his fingers while Ross held him. Blake was then taken to the medical unit and later diagnosed with nerve damage. Blake reported the incident to senior corrections officers, and the Internal Investigative Unit of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services conducted an investigation and issued a formal report. The formal report determined that Madigan had used excessive force against Blake and that Blake was not at fault in any way. Blake subsequently sued Ross and Madigan in addition to two supervisors and three government entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and argued that they violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force.
Nearly two years after Blake initially filed the suit, Ross filed an amended answer to the complaint that alleged that Blake had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required. Ross also moved for summary judgment based on the same argument, and the district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the “special circumstances” exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement was met in this case. Because the internal investigation provided the correction officials time and opportunity to address the complaints internally and Blake reasonably believed that he had exhausted his administrative remedies by participating in an internal investigation, the requirements for the “special circumstances” exception to the PLRA were met.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62636.xml


The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s requirement to exhaust administrative remedies does not have a “special circumstances” exception. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the plain text of the statute clearly does not include any sort of special circumstances exception. Because no such exception exists, courts may not excuse a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, regardless of what “special circumstances” might exist. Judicial precedent interpreting the PLRA’s exhaustion provision has continually taken this strict approach to construing the provision. Additionally, the precursor to the PLRA had a relatively weak exhaustion provision, so the PLRA is best interpreted as a stronger response to what came before it. However, the Court also noted that the PLRA’s exhaustion scheme hinges on the “availability” of remedies, and that there might be cases in which administrative remedies were not available. Because this case might be one in which remedies were not “available” within the meaning of the PLRA, the Court remanded the case.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the majority opinion impermissibly considered the existence of documents that were not properly before the Court because they were not part of the appellate record. In his separate opinion concurring in part, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the term “exhaustion” should be given the meaning it traditionally has in administrative law. Therefore, the term should include “well-established” exceptions to exhaustion, though none were relevant to the disposition of this case.


Danny Birchfield drove into a ditch in Morton County, North Dakota. When police arrived on the scene, they believed Birchfield was intoxicated. Birchfield failed both the field sobriety tests and the breath test. He was arrested, but he refused to consent to a chemical test. Birchfield was charged with a misdemeanor for refusing to consent to a chemical test in violation of state law. He moved to dismiss the charge and claimed that the state law violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In a similar case, police were called to the South St. Paul boat launch where three men were attempting to pull their boat out of the water and onto their truck. William Robert Bernard, Jr., admitted he had been drinking and had the truck keys in his hands, but he denied driving the truck and refused to perform a field sobriety test. He was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI) and taken to the police station, where he refused to consent to a chemical test in violation of Minnesota state law. Bernard was charged with two counts of first-degree test refusal pursuant to state law. In a separate incident, Steve Beylund consented to a blood alcohol to test to confirm he was driving under the influence after being informed it was a criminal offense in North Dakota to refuse a blood alcohol test. The test confirmed he was over the legal limit, and Beylund was charged with driving under the influence.
All three men challenged the state statutes criminalizing refusal to submit to a chemical test and argued that the statutes violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when there was no probable cause that would support a warrant for the test. Both the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that criminalizing the refusal to submit to a chemical test was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62638.xml


A state statute may not criminalize the refusal to submit to a blood test in the absence of a warrant because, while the Fourth Amendment allows for warrantless breath tests incident to an arrest for drunk driving, warrantless blood tests incident to an arrest violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that warrantless breath tests are permissible under the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because they do not implicate significant privacy concerns. They involve minimal physical intrusion to capture something that is routinely exposed to the public, reveal a limited amount of information, and do not enhance any embarrassment beyond what the arrest itself causes. Blood tests, however, implicate privacy interests because they are much more physically invasive -- they require the piercing of the skin -- and they produce a sample that can be preserved and used to obtain further information beyond the subject’s blood alcohol level at the time of the test. The Court also determined that criminalizing refusal to submit to a breath test is designed to serve the government’s interest in preventing drunk driving, which is greater than merely keeping currently drunk drivers off the roads, and does so better than other alternatives. However, the same rationale did not apply to criminalizing refusal to submit to a blood test because of the greater degree of intrusion and the available alternative of the breath test.
In her partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless searches should apply to breath tests unless exigent circumstances justify one in a particular case. In establishing exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Court has routinely examined whether a legitimate government interest justified the search in light of the individual’s privacy interest and whether that determination should be made based on a case-by-case analysis or a categorical rule. Based on this analysis, Justice Sotomayor argued that a categorical rule allowing warrantless breath tests incident to arrest was unnecessary to protect the government interest of preventing drunk driving because at that point the driver is off the road and a warrant could be obtained if necessary. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement should apply categorically to all blood alcohol tests, including blood tests. By drawing an arbitrary line between blood tests and breath tests, the majority destabilized the law of exceptions to the warrant requirement and made the jobs of both police officers and lower courts more difficult.


United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc.

Hawkes Co., Inc. (Hawkes) was interested in purchasing a piece of land in northern Minnesota to mine high-quality peat. Hawkes applied to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources for a permit to begin extracting peat from the land once they purchased the property in October 2010. The Corps informed Hawkes that the permit process would be very costly and would take a long time and so urged Hawkes not to purchase the property. The Corps then submitted an Approved Jurisdictional Determination to derail Hawkes’ plan to purchase and mine the property by arguing that the land was a wetland connecting to “waters of the United States,” which are protected under the Clean Water Act. Hawkes challenged the jurisdictional determination and filed an action for immediate judicial review. The trial court dismissed the action and held that the jurisdictional determination was not a “final agency action” under the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore it was not subject to judicial review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the jurisdictional determination was a final agency action and remanded the action for judicial review.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62639.xml


The Army Corps of Engineers’ jurisdictional determination that the property in question constituted “water of the United States” was a final agency action subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that two conditions must be satisfied for an agency action to be considered “final” under the APA: The action must be the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process and it must determine rights or obligations that create legal consequences. Because a jurisdictional determination is typically not revisited and marks the end of an extensive fact-finding process, it is the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process and satisfies the first condition. Similarly, the jurisdictional determination binds the two governmental agencies authorized to sue to enforce the Clean Water Act and therefore creates legal consequences, which satisfies the second condition.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the reach of the Clean Water Act remains unclear, and that the majority opinion is important to place a limit on some of the government’s power through the Act. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence. Justice Elena Kagan wrote a separate concurring opinion in which she argued that the fact that jurisdictional determinations are binding on both the Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency is essential to the disposition of the case. Because the jurisdictional determination binds those agencies in subsequent litigation, it creates a legal consequence.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which she argued that the fact that the jurisdictional determination is binding on the Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency is not essential to the disposition of the case. Because the jurisdictional determination is definitive and creates an immediate and practical impact, that alone satisfies both of the conditions necessary for an agency action to be considered final for the purpose of APA review.


In June 2011, Michael Bryant, Jr. was convicted of two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 117(a), a federal law that criminalizes domestic assault by any person who has been convicted of at least two domestic violence offenses in federal, state, or Indian tribal court. For the predicate offenses, the prosecution relied on Bryant’s previous domestic abuse convictions in Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court. Bryant moved to dismiss the indictment and argued that the use of the tribal court convictions as predicate convictions for the charge violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because he was not afforded counsel in the tribal court proceedings, so his convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment if they had occurred in state or federal court. The district court denied the motion, and Bryant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that an uncounseled conviction that violated the Sixth Amendment could not be used as a predicate offense for the purpose of a charge under Section 117(a).

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62640.xml


The use of an uncounseled conviction in tribal court proceedings that complied with the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. 117(a) did not violate the Sixth Amendment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that, although the Sixth Amendment does not apply in tribal court proceedings, ICRA contains procedural safeguards that are similar to those in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. As long as prior convictions were valid under ICRA when they were entered, they can be used as predicate offenses to enhance a sentence under 18 U.S.C. 117(a), even if they would not have been valid in state or federal court. The Court determined that this decision was consistent with precedent and avoided the creation of a hybrid tribal court conviction that was valid on its own but not for enhanced sentencing purposes. Additionally, ICRA allows for federal habeas review in cases that do raise constitutional violation concerns.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the fact that this case was before the Court illustrated that the Court has used two conflicting views of Indian tribal sovereignty. On the one hand, the Court has established that the Sixth Amendment did not apply because the tribes are sovereign; however, the federal government has the power to subject members of the tribes to federal criminal prosecution because Congress has power over tribal sovereignty. Justice Thomas argued that the Court should reconsider its precedents that relate to Indian tribal sovereignty and create a more cohesive, coherent, theory.


Elijah Manuel was a passenger in a car that was pulled over for failing to signal on March 18, 2011. When the police officer detected an odor of marijuana in the car, he dragged Manuel out of the car, pushed and kicked him, and handcuffed him. The officer found a bottle of pills in Manuel’s pocket during his pat-down. The pills were tested and the officers falsified the results to show the pills were ecstasy. The initial positive pill results were later tested at the scene of the arrest. More detailed negative lab results were presented by Manuel later. Manuel was arrested based on these initial results. The officers continued to rely on the false positive initial test throughout the grand jury proceedings, and he was held until May 4, when the Assistant State’s Attorney sought dismissal of the charges.
Manuel sued the City of Joliet and various city officials and alleged malicious prosecution as well as other civil rights claims. The district court dismissed most of Manuel’s claims as falling outside of the statute of limitations. His malicious prosecution claim was not time-barred, however, but was dismissed under Newsome v. McCabe, which held that federal claims of malicious prosecution stem from the right to due process and are not a Fourth Amendment issue. Therefore, there was no malicious prosecution claim under federal law if the state provided a similar cause of action, as Illinois did. On appeal, Manuel argued that Newsome did not foreclose a malicious prosecution claim on Fourth Amendment grounds when officers misrepresented evidence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling against Manuel as consistent with the Newsome precedent.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62650.xml


An individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure continues throughout the legal process of a criminal case. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that an individual’s claim that challenges pretrial detention falls within the scope of the Fourth Amendment regardless of whether legal process has begun. Even where legal process has begun, the prosecution itself may be unsupported by probable cause, which gives rise to a Fourth Amendment claim. In such cases, a detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim does not become a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim because the requirements of the Fourth Amendment have not been satisfied. The Court thus held that Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim was proper because his arrest was made without probable cause. The Court then declined to decide whether Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim arose when his criminal charges were dismissed or when legal process began and instead remanded the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for further consideration.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the point at which Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim arose was irrelevant because Manuel filed his claim after the statute of limitations had run for either possible date. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority had ignored the question of whether a malicious prosecution claim may be brought under the Fourth Amendment. At the point that Manuel brought his claim, the only timely claim he could have made was one for malicious prosecution. However, while a claim under the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure is typically brought against law enforcement officers, officers do not initiate or dismiss prosecution, which is required for a claim of malicious prosecution. Malicious prosecution claims also require subjective bad faith, whereas Fourth Amendment claims use an objective standard. Lastly, malicious prosecution requires a termination of charges, while a Fourth Amendment violation occurs regardless of whether charges are eventually dismissed or not. Therefore, Justice Alito argued that a malicious prosecution claim cannot be based on the Fourth Amendment.


The parents of Joseph P. Murr and his siblings (the Murrs) purchased two adjacent lots (Lots E and F) in St. Croix County in 1960. The two lots together made up approximately .98 acres. In 1994 and 1995 respectively, the Murrs’ parents transferred Lot F and Lot E to their children. In 1995, the two lots were merged pursuant to St. Croix County’s code of ordinances. The relevant ordinance prohibits the individual development or sale of adjacent lots under common ownership, unless an individual lot was at least one acre. The ordinance further specified that if each lot is not at least one acre, the lots may be measured together to equal one acre. Seven years later, the Murrs wanted to sell Lot E and not Lot F. The St. Croix County Board of Adjustment denied the Murrs’ application to sell the lots separately.
The Murrs sued the state and county and claimed the ordinance in question resulted in an uncompensated taking of their property and deprived them of “all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot.” The circuit court granted summary judgement to the state and county. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed and held that the Murrs were not deprived of their practical use of the property.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62651.xml


In a regulatory takings case, two legally distinct but commonly owned contiguous parcels should be combined for takings analysis purposes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that, while generally governmental regulation of property was not a taking, regulation could be so burdensome that it became a taking. The analysis essentially required courts to balance the rights of property ownership against the government’s power to adjust rights for the good of the public, which is a fact-intensive inquiry. In order to properly conduct this inquiry, it was necessary to define the scope of the relevant property. The Court had determined that two approaches did not adequately protect the property rights at stake: defining the property as only the portion targeted by the challenged regulation and allowing state law to define the property. Instead, courts should consider factors such as the treatment of land under state and local law, the physical characteristics of the land, and the prospective value of the regulated land. This inquiry was objective and examined the landowner’s reasonable expectation about whether the property at issue would be treated as a single parcel or separate ones. In this case, the proper application of these factors meant that the parcels in question should be evaluated as a single unit for takings analysis purposes.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to established private property rights, which had historically been defined by state law. Because the analysis of whether a regulation constituted a taking required the examination of the impact of the regulation on a property right, there was an incentive for property owners to define the relevant property rights narrowly to maximize the impact of the regulation. State laws, however, provided definite, easily ascertainable boundaries to units of land and therefore clearly defined the affected property. Using state law to define the relevant property for takings analysis purposes simplified the analysis and avoided creating a “litigation-specific” definition of property. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas wrote that the Court should reexamine its decisions on regulatory takings to determine whether such a concept was actually grounded in the original meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Justice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


Academic textbook publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Wiley) owns the American copyright for textbooks and often assigns its rights to its foreign subsidiaries to publish, print, and sell its textbooks abroad. Supap Kirtsaeng is a Thai citizen who came to the United States in 1997 to study mathematics. While he was in the United States, Kirtsaeng asked friends and family in Thailand to buy the English-language versions of his textbooks there, where they were cheaper, and mail them to him. Kirtsaeng would then sell the textbooks in America, where they were worth more, reimburse his friends and family, and make a profit.
In 2008, Wiley sued Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement. The case went to the U.S. Supreme Court on the question of whether Kirtsaeng was barred from asserting an affirmative defense because the copyrighted works in question were manufactured abroad. The Court held that the affirmative defense was available to Kirtsaeng and remanded the case. Kirtsaeng won the case on remand and sought an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses pursuant to Section 505 of the Copyright Act. The district court held that Section 505 provides that the court may “in its discretion” award attorney’s fees but is not bound to do so. Because Wiley’s suit was not “frivolous” or “objectively unreasonable,” the district court held that awarding Kirtsaeng attorney’s fees would “not promote the purposes of the Copyright Act.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62652.xml


When deciding whether to grant attorney’s fees under Section 505 of the Copyright Act, courts should give substantial weight to the objective reasonableness of the losing party’s position, but that determination should not be the controlling factor. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that, while the objective reasonableness of the losing party’s position should be given substantial weight, the court retained discretion to consider that factor in light of other relevant considerations. While the language of Section 505 clearly granted a court discretion in awarding attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court had created some restrictions that advanced the overall goals of the Copyright Act -- to encourage creation while allowing others to build on previous work. The objective reasonableness factor for determining fee awards furthered useful copyright litigation because it encouraged both parties to advance strong legal positions and deterred frivolous suits based on weak claims. However, any fee award analysis must take into account more than only this factor, as others were relevant to the court’s determination.


Hillary Bouldin’s vehicle collided with Rocky Dietz’s in Montana in 2009. Dietz filed a negligence claim for injuries sustained from the accident. The action was removed to federal court. The parties made stipulations as to past damages, and the jury ruled in Dietz’s favor but awarded $0 in damages. The district court judge dismissed the jury but then reconsidered and re-empaneled the jury. He asked them to re-determine the damages in a manner consistent with the parties’ stipulation. The jury returned the same verdict and awarded $15,000 in damages. On appeal, Dietz claimed that the district court erred by recalling the jury after it had been dismissed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that dismissing the jury, then recalling the jurors, was not an abuse of discretion because the jurors were not exposed to prejudicial influence during the brief duration of their dismissal.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62653.xml


A federal district court judge has a limited ability to recall jurors in a civil case after identifying an error in their verdict, and that power was not abused in this case. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set out many of the powers of a district court judge, they do not establish an exhaustive list. District court judges have some powers that are not enumerated in the Federal Rules, but those powers are limited in that they must be a “reasonable response” to whatever problems are confronting the court and they cannot contradict any other express rule or statute. Based on this analysis, district court judges may recall jurors when they identify an error in the jury’s verdict because this is a more expedient way to resolve the problem than empaneling a whole new jury and re-trying the case, and there is no rule or statute prohibiting such an action. However, a district court judge may only do so when there is no suggestion that the jurors have been prejudiced by their time outside of the jury room. Additionally, this power only exists in civil trials. In this case, the district judge did not abuse its discretion by exercising the limited power to recall the jurors after discovering that their verdict was a legal error.
In his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the common law rule preventing a judge from recalling a jury once the jury has had the opportunity to interact with the public after the conclusion of the case should control in this case. Although jurors are no longer as strictly sequestered as they once were, the prophylactic nature of drawing the rule at the opportunity for prejudice to occur is the most administrable rule that promotes confidence in the justice system. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority’s multi-factor test would create more confusion and therefore more litigation. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.


In June 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, along with criteria for determining when prosecutors can choose not to enforce immigration laws under DACA. People who qualify for DACA may apply for work authorization. In 2014, DHS established a similar process for parents of citizens and lawful permanent residents as well as expanding DACA by making more people eligible. The new program was known as the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program.
Texas and other states sued to prevent the implementation of DAPA and argued that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it had not gone through the notice-and-comment process, and because it was arbitrary and capricious. The states also argued that DAPA violated the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which clarifies the President's power. The district court held that the states had standing to file the suit and temporarily enjoined the implementation of DAPA because the states had established a substantial likelihood of success on the notice-and-comment claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the states had standing as well as a substantial likelihood of success on their substantive and procedural claims.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\62654.xml


In an unsigned per curiam opinion, the equally divided Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.