Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that a tort claim for personal injuries suffered in connection with travel outside of the United States was not “based upon” the sale of the ticket in the United States. Therefore, the lawsuit fell outside of the commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and sovereign immunity barred the suit. According to the Court’s decision in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, the fact that the relevant commercial activity would establish a single element of the claim in question was not sufficient to prove that the claim was “based upon” the commercial activity. In this case, the conduct that gave rise to the lawsuit occurred entirely abroad and therefore was not “based upon” commercial activity in the United States sufficient to satisfy the commercial activity exception.


Valerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson’s husbands are the two members of PHC Development, LLC (PHC). Between 2005 and 2008, Community Bank of Raymore (Community) made four loans totaling more than $2,000,000 to PHC for the development of a residential subdivision. The Hawkins and Pattersons each executed personal guaranties to secure the loans. In April 2012, PHC failed to make the payments due under the loan agreements, and Community declared the loans to be in default, accelerated the loans, and demanded payment.
Hawkins and Patterson sued Community seeking damages and an order declaring their guaranties void and unenforceable. They argued that they had only been required to execute their guaranties because they were married to their respective husbands, which constituted discrimination based on their marital status in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). Community moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion by holding that the wives, in joining their husbands’ loans, did not apply to a lender and therefore did not qualify as applicants that gain the protections of the ECOA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

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In an unsigned per curiam opinion, the equally divided Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.


Samuel Ocasio was a police officer of the Baltimore Police Department who was indicted in connection with a kickback scheme involving payments to police officers in exchange for referrals to Majestic Auto Repair Shop (Majestic). The indictment charged Ocasio with conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act by agreeing to unlawfully obtain money or property under color of right from Majestic. The jury convicted Ocasio, and he appealed by arguing that he cannot be guilty of conspiring to commit extortion with the owners of Majestic because they were also the victims of the conspiracy, and the victim of a Hobbes Act conspiracy must be a person outside of the alleged conspiracy. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Ocasio’s conviction.

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A conspiracy to commit extortion can involve the purported victims of the extortion as members of the conspiracy. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that, under longstanding principles of conspiracy law, a defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act based on proof that he was conspiring to obtain property from another conspirator under color of law. Although conspirators have to be pursuing the same criminal objective, an individual conspirator need not agree to facilitate every element of the crime; the intent to agree that the substantive offense be committed is all that is necessary. The Court also held that this reading of the Hobbs Act is not overly broad because it still focused on the intent to commit the conspiracy.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the Supreme Court’s decision in Evans v. United States makes it difficult to draw a distinction between the involuntary action of paying a bribe and the voluntary behavior of joining a conspiracy.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court’s decision in Evans v. United States wrongly conflated bribery with extortion and that the majority’s opinion in this case continued that error. Under the Hobbs Act definition of extortion, people cannot conspire to extort one of their own because all those involved would know that the person accepting the money is not entitled to it. In her separate dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the majority opinion endorses an unnatural reading of the Hobbs Act, which clearly criminalizes extortion “from another.” Therefore, a conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act must still focus on a victim that is “other” than the conspiratorial group. This reading is also consistent with the Court’s conspiracy precedent, which focuses on the criminal behavior of the conspiratorial group as a whole. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. joined in the dissent.


Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in the 1800 presidential election. Before Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801, Adams and Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, which created new courts, added judges, and gave the president more control over appointment of judges. The Act was essentially an attempt by Adams and his party to frustrate his successor, as he used the act to appoint 16 new circuit judges and 42 new justices of the peace. The appointees were approved by the Senate, but they would not be valid until their commissions were delivered by the Secretary of State.
William Marbury had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, but his commission was not delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to compel the new Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the documents. Marbury, joined by three other similarly situated appointees, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the delivery of the commissions.

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The Court found that Madison’s refusal to deliver the commission was illegal, but did not order Madison to hand over Marbury’s commission via writ of mandamus. Instead, the Court held that the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 enabling Marbury to bring his claim to the Supreme Court was itself unconstitutional, since it purported to extend the Court’s original jurisdiction beyond that which Article III, Section 2, established.
Marshall expanded that a writ of mandamus was the proper way to seek a remedy, but concluded the Court could not issue it. Marshall reasoned that the Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicted with the Constitution. Congress did not have power to modify the Constitution through regular legislation because Supremacy Clause places the Constitution before the laws.
In so holding, Marshall established the principle of judicial review, i.e., the power to declare a law unconstitutional.


In 1795, the Georgia legislature passed an act granting approximately 35 million acres of land in present-day Alabama and Mississippi to four companies, including the Georgia Company, for $500,000. The grant was procured through widespread bribery of legislators, with company representatives promising legislators shares in the land if they voted for the bill. In 1796, a newly elected Georgia legislature, responding to public outrage over the corruption, passed an act rescinding the 1795 grant, declaring it null and void, and directing that all records of the original act be expunged. However, before the rescinding act, innocent third parties had already purchased portions of the land. Robert Fletcher purchased 15,000 acres from John Peck in 1803, with Peck's deed containing covenants that Georgia had authority to sell the land and that the title had not been constitutionally impaired by any subsequent act of the legislature.
Fletcher subsequently sued Peck in the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging breach of these covenants based on the corruption in the original grant and Georgia's 1796 rescinding act. The circuit court ruled in favor of Peck on all counts, finding that the pleas were sufficient and that Georgia was seised in fee simple of the lands at the time of the original grant. Fletcher brought a writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court.

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A state legislature cannot rescind a land grant made by a previous legislature, even if the original grant was obtained through corruption, because such a rescission would violate the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Chief Justice John Marshall authored the unanimous 4-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The Contract Clause prohibits states from passing any law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts," and a land grant from a state to private purchasers constitutes a binding contract that vests absolute property rights in the grantees. Once Georgia conveyed the land through the 1795 act, it created a contract that transferred complete ownership to the purchasers, and the state's rights to the property were entirely extinguished. The fact that the original grant may have been procured through bribery or corruption does not change this constitutional protection, as innocent third-party purchasers who bought the land without knowledge of the corruption have legitimate vested rights that cannot be destroyed by subsequent legislative action.
Furthermore, the Constitution's Contract Clause applies to contracts made by states themselves, not just private contracts, and states cannot exempt themselves from this constitutional limitation by claiming sovereign authority. While legislatures generally have broad powers to repeal their own acts, they cannot undo a completed contract that has already conveyed property rights, as this would retroactively destroy vested interests in violation of fundamental principles of law and the constitutional protection of contracts. The 1796 rescinding act was therefore void as an unconstitutional impairment of contract obligations.
Justice William Johnson authored a concurring opinion, agreeing with the result but basing his reasoning on general principles of law rather than specifically on the Contract Clause.


During the American Revolution, Virginia created laws allowing the state to seize property of Loyalists. In 1781, Denny Martin, a British subject, inherited land from his uncle, a Loyalist. The following year, the Virginia legislature voided the land grant and transferred the land back to Virginia. Virginia granted a portion of this land to David Hunter. A federal treaty dictated that Lord Fairfax was entitled to the property.
The Virginia Supreme Court upheld Virginia's law permitting the confiscation of property, even though it conflicted with the federal treaty. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the treaty superseded state law under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. On remand, the Virginia Court of Appeals declined to follow the ruling and argued that the law granting the Supreme Court appellate review over state court decisions, section 25 of the Judiciary Act (the Act), was unconstitutional.

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No. Article VI of the US Constitution (the Supremacy Clause), combined with the grant of appellate jurisdiction in Article III, gives federal courts the power to review state court decisions that interpret federal law or the Constitution.
The Court rejected the claim that Virginia and the national government were equal sovereigns. Relying on the Supremacy Clause, Justice Story held that federal interpretations of federal law should supersede state interpretations. He reasoned that there should be uniform and predictable outcomes across all states.


In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In 1818, the state of Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank. James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to pay the tax. The state appeals court held that the Second Bank was unconstitutional because the Constitution did not provide a textual commitment for the federal government to charter a bank.

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In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress had the power to incorporate the bank and that Maryland could not tax instruments of the national government employed in the execution of constitutional powers.
Pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause (Art. I, Section 8), Chief Justice Marshall noted that Congress possessed powers not explicitly outlined in the U.S. Constitution. Marshall redefined “necessary” to mean “appropriate and legitimate,” covering all methods for furthering objectives covered by the enumerated powers. Marshall also held that while the states retained the power of taxation, the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme and cannot be controlled by the states.


Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward

In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to change Dartmouth College-- a privately funded institution--into a state university. The legislature changed the school's corporate charter by transferring the control of trustee appointments to the governor. In an attempt to regain authority over the resources of Dartmouth College, the old trustees filed suit against William H. Woodward, who sided with the new appointees.

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The Contract Clause (Art 1, Section 10, Clause 1) prohibits states from violating contracts with private or public corporations. In a 5-to-1 decision, the Court concluded that the Contract Clause applies to private as well as public corporations. The Court held that the College's corporate charter qualified as a contract between private parties, with which the legislature could not interfere. The fact that the government had commissioned the charter did not transform the school into a civil institution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that the term "contract" referred to transactions involving individual property rights, not to "the political relations between the government and its citizens."


An act of Congress authorized the operation of a lottery in the District of Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D.C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia, violating state law. State authorities tried and convicted the Cohens, and then declared themselves to be the final arbiters of disputes between the states and the national government.

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In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review state criminal proceedings. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the Court was bound to hear all cases that involved constitutional questions, and that this jurisdiction was not dependent on the identity of the parties in the cases. Marshall argued that state laws and constitutions, when repugnant to the Constitution and federal laws, were "absolutely void." After establishing the Court's jurisdiction, Marshall declared the lottery ordinance a local matter and concluded that the Virginia court was correct to fine the Cohens brothers for violating Virginia law.


In September 1831, Samuel A. Worcester and others, all non-Native Americans, were indicted in the supreme court for the county of Gwinnett in the state of Georgia for "residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation without a license" and "without having taken the oath to support and defend the constitution and laws of the state of Georgia." They were indicted under an 1830 act of the Georgia legislature entitled "an act to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power by all persons, under pretext of authority from the Cherokee Indians." Among other things, Worcester argued that the state could not maintain the prosecution because the statute violated the Constitution, treaties between the United States and the Cherokee nation, and an act of Congress entitled "an act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes." Worcester was convicted and sentenced to "hard labour in the penitentiary for four years." The U.S. Supreme Court received the case on a writ of error.

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No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court held that the Georgia act, under which Worcester was prosecuted, violated the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States. Noting that the "treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union," Chief Justice Marshall argued, "The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory in which the laws of Georgia can have no force. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States." The Georgia act thus interfered with the federal government's authority and was unconstitutional. Justice Henry Baldwin dissented for procedural reasons and on the merits.


Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore

Baltimore wharf owner John Barron alleged that construction by the city had diverted water flow in the harbor area. He argued that sand accumulations in the harbor deprived Barron of deep waters, which reduced his profits. He sued the city to recover a portion of his financial losses. The trial court awarded him $4,500 in damages, which the state appellate court struck down.

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Writing for the unanimous Court, Chief Justice Marshall found that the limitations on government articulated in the Fifth Amendment were specifically intended to limit the powers of the national government. Citing the intent of the framers and the development of the Bill of Rights (the first 10 amendments) as an exclusive check on the federal government, Marshall reasoned that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction in this case since the Fifth Amendment was not applicable to the states. This meant that Barron was not entitled to damages for his property loss from the city under the Fifth Amendment provision on just compensation for a government taking.


Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge

In 1785, the Massachusetts legislature incorporated the Charles River Bridge Company to construct a bridge and collect tolls. In 1828, the legislature established the Warren Bridge Company to build a free bridge nearby. Unsurprisingly, the new bridge deprived the old one of traffic and tolls. The Charles River Bridge Company filed suit, claiming the legislature had defaulted on its initial contract.

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In a 5-to-2 decision, the Court held that the state had not entered a contract that prohibited the construction of another bridge on the river at a later date. The Court held that the legislature neither gave exclusive control over the waters of the river nor invaded corporate privilege by interfering with the company's profit-making ability. In balancing the rights of private property against the need for economic development, the Court found that the community interest in creating new channels of travel and trade had priority.


Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott filed suit in Missouri court for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man. After losing, Scott brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no “negro” or descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution.

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The majority held that “a negro, whose ancestors were imported into [the U.S.], and sold as slaves,” whether enslaved or free, could not be an American citizen and therefore did not have standing to sue in federal court. Because the Court lacked jurisdiction, Taney dismissed the case on procedural grounds.
Taney further held that the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was unconstitutional and foreclose Congress from freeing slaves within Federal territories. The opinion showed deference to the Missouri courts, which held that moving to a free state did not render Scott emancipated. Finally, Taney ruled that slaves were property under the Fifth Amendment, and that any law that would deprive a slave owner of that property was unconstitutional.
In dissent, Benjamin Robbins Curtis criticized Taney for addressing the claim’s substance after finding the Court lacked jurisdiction. He pointed out that invalidating the Missouri Compromise was not necessary to resolve the case, and cast doubt on Taney’s position that the Founders categorically opposed anti-slavery laws.
John McLean echoed Curtis, finding the majority improperly reviewed the claim’s substance when its holding should have been limited to procedure. He also argued that men of African descent could be citizens because they already had the right to vote in five states.


Lambden P. Milligan was sentenced to death by a military commission in Indiana during the Civil War for engaging in acts of disloyalty. Milligan sought release through habeas corpus from a federal court.

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Writing for the Court, Justice David Davis held that trials of civilians by presidentially created military commissions are unconstitutional. Specifically, it is unconstitutional to try civilians by military tribunals unless there is no civilian court available. The military commission therefore did not have jurisdiction to try and sentence Milligan, and he was entitled to discharge.


Louisiana passed a law that restricted slaughterhouse operations in New Orleans to a single corporation. Pursuant to the law, the Crescent City Live-stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company received a charter to run a slaughterhouse downstream from the city. No other areas around the city were permitted for slaughtering animals over the next 25 years, and existing slaughterhouses would be closed. A group of butchers argued that they would lose their right to practice their trade and earn a livelihood under the monopoly. Specifically, they argued the monopoly created involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and abridged privileges or immunities, denied equal protection of the laws, and deprived them of liberty and property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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The Court held that the monopoly violated neither the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments, reasoning that these amendments were passed with the narrow intent to grant full equality to former slaves. Thus, to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment only banned the states from depriving blacks of equal rights; it did not guarantee that all citizens, regardless of race, should receive equal economic privileges by the state. Any rights guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause were limited to areas controlled by the federal government, such as access to ports and waterways, the right to run for federal office, and certain rights affecting safety on the seas. Moreover, the Court held that the butchers bringing suit were not deprived of their property without due process of law because they could still earn a legal living in the area by slaughtering on the Crescent City Company grounds. Thus, the Court concluded that the Louisiana law was constitutional.
Justice Stephen Johnson Field’s dissent argued that the Fourteenth Amendment could not be construed as only protecting former slaves. Rather, he believed that it incorporated strands of common-law doctrine and needed to be interpreted outside the Civil War context. This position would later become widely accepted.


Illinois regulated grain warehouse and elevator rates by establishing maximum rates for their use.

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No on both counts. Waite, for the Court, took a broad view of the state's police power. He argued that the states may regulate the use of private property "when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good." Waite resurrected an ancient legal doctrine to support his view: "When property is affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only."


George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, was charged with bigamy under the federal Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act after marrying a woman while still married to his previous wife. Reynolds argued that the law was unconstitutional. He reasoned that his religion required him to marry multiple women and the law therefore violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.

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The Court upheld Reynolds's conviction and Congress’s power to prohibit polygamy. The Court held that while Congress could not outlaw a belief in the correctness of polygamy, it could outlaw the practice thereof. The majority reasoned that while marriage is a “sacred obligation,” it is nevertheless “usually regulated by law” in “most civilized nations.” Finally, the Court held that people cannot avoid a law due to their religion.


The Civil Rights Act of 1875 affirmed the equality of all persons in the enjoyment of transportation facilities, in hotels and inns, and in theaters and places of public amusement. Though privately owned, these businesses were like public utilities, exercising public functions for the benefit of the public and, thus, subject to public regulation. In five separate cases, a black person was denied the same accommodations as a white person in violation of the 1875 Act.

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Differentiating between state and private action, the majority ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not permit the federal government to prohibit discriminatory behavior by private parties. Thus, Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were unconstitutional because they exceeded Congress's authority under the Fourteenth Amendment by purporting to regulate the conduct of private individuals. The Court held the Act likewise exceeded Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment, which bars involuntary servitude and is restricted to prohibiting ownership of slaves, not other forms of discriminatory conduct.
Justice Harlan advocated for a broader interpretation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. He pointed to the public function that these private places of accommodation serve. Harlan argued the line between state and private action is often blurred, such as how private railroads provide the government function of facilitating travel. He suggested that restrictions on the right to travel might violate the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude, and argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may also be implicated.


The Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the public concern in the growth of giant corporations controlling transportation, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the few. It outlawed "every contract, combination...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E.C. Knight Company was such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar-refining business in the United States.

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The Act was constitutional but it did not apply to manufacturing. Manufacturing was not commerce, declared Fuller for the majority; the law did not reach the admitted monopolization of manufacturing (in this case, refining sugar). Although American Sugar had monopolized manufacturing, the Court found no violation of the Sherman Act because the acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries involved intrastate commerce. The trust did not lead to control of interstate commerce and so "affects it only incidentally and indirectly."


Louisiana enacted the Separate Car Act, which required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Plessy – who was seven-eighths Caucasian – agreed to participate in a test to challenge the Act. He was solicited by the Comite des Citoyens (Committee of Citizens), a group of New Orleans residents who sought to repeal the Act. They asked Plessy, who was technically black under Louisiana law, to sit in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train.
The railroad cooperated because it thought the Act imposed unnecessary costs via the purchase of additional railroad cars. When Plessy was told to vacate the whites-only car, he refused and was arrested.
At trial, Plessy’s lawyers argued that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge found that Louisiana could enforce this law insofar as it affected railroads within its boundaries. Plessy was convicted.

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The Court held that the state law was constitutional. In an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown, the majority upheld state-imposed racial segregation. Justice Brown conceded that the 14th Amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law, but held that separate treatment did not imply the inferiority of African Americans.
In short, segregation did not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination.
In dissent, John Marshall Harlan argued that the Constitution was color-blind and that the United States had no class system. Accordingly, all citizens should have equal access to civil rights.


The state of New York enacted a statute known as the Bakeshop Act, which forbid bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day. Lochner was accused of permitting an employee to work more than 60 hours in one week. The first charge resulted in a fine of $25, and a second charge a few years later resulted in a fine of $50. While Lochner did not challenge his first conviction, he appealed the second, but was denied in state court. Before the Supreme Court, he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment should have been interpreted to contain the freedom to contract among the rights encompassed by substantive due process.

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The Court invalidated the New York law. The majority maintained that the statute interfered with the freedom of contract, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment's right to liberty afforded to employer and employee. The Court further held that the New York law failed the rational basis test for determining whether government action is constitutional. The majority reasoned that the Bakeshop Act had no rational basis because long working hours did not dramatically undermine the health of employees, and baking is not particularly dangerous.
Broadly interpreting state authority to regulate under its police powers, Justice Harlan in his dissent articulated reasoning that would inform later decisions in the post-Lochner era. Rather than requiring the government to prove that a law had a rational basis, he would require the party challenging the law to prove that the test was not met. (This is the current rule.)


Oregon enacted a law that limited women to ten hours of work in factories and laundries. The owner of a laundry business, Curt Muller, was fined $10 when he violated the law. Muller appealed the conviction. The state supreme court upheld the law’s constitutionality.

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The Court unanimously upheld the Oregon regulation. The Court distinguished Lochner v. New York, which invalidated a similar law restricting the hours of bakers, on the basis of the “difference between the sexes.” The Court reasoned that the child-bearing nature and social role of women provided a strong state interest in reducing their working hours.


Police entered the home of Fremont Weeks and seized papers which were used to convict him of transporting lottery tickets through the mail. This was done without a search warrant. Weeks took action against the police and petitioned for the return of his private possessions.

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In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the seizure of items from Weeks' residence directly violated his constitutional rights. The Court also held that the government's refusal to return Weeks' possessions violated the Fourth Amendment. To allow private documents to be seized and then held as evidence against citizens would have meant that the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring the right to be secure against such searches and seizures would be of no value whatsoever. This was the first application of what eventually became known as the "exclusionary rule."


The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's father -- Roland -- had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill.

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Day spoke for the Court majority and found two grounds to invalidate the law. Production was not commerce, and thus outside the power of Congress to regulate. And the regulation of production was reserved by the Tenth Amendment to the states. Day wrote that "the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are reserved" to the states and to the people. In his wording, Day revised the Constitution slightly and changed the intent of the framers: The Tenth Amendment does not say "expressly." The framers purposely left the word expressly out of the amendment because they believed they could not possibly specify every power that might be needed in the future to run the government.


During World War I, socialists Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. The leaflets urged the public to disobey the draft, but advised only peaceful action. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Schenck and Baer were convicted of violating this law and appealed on the grounds that the statute violated the First Amendment.

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The Court held that the Espionage Act did not violate the First Amendment and was an appropriate exercise of Congress’ wartime authority. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes concluded that courts owed greater deference to the government during wartime, even when constitutional rights were at stake. Articulating for the first time the “clear and present danger test,” Holmes concluded that the First Amendment does not protect speech that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil that Congress has power to prevent. Holmes reasoned that the widespread dissemination of the leaflets was sufficiently likely to disrupt the conscription process. Famously, he compared the leaflets to falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theatre, which is not permitted under the First Amendment.


In 1918, the United States participated in a military operation on Russian soil against Germany after the Russian Revolution overthrew the tsarist regime. Russian immigrants in the US circulated literature calling for a general strike in ammunition plants to undermine the US war effort. The defendants were convicted for two leaflets thrown from a New York City window. One denounced the sending of American troops to Russia, and the second denounced the war and advocated for the cessation of the production of weapons to be used against "Workers Soviets of Russia". They were sentenced to 20 years in prison.

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The Court held that in calling for a general strike and the curtailment of munitions production, the leaflets violated the Espionage Act. Congress’ determination that all such propaganda posed a danger to the war effort was sufficient to meet the standard set in Schenck v. United States for prosecuting attempted crimes. As in Schenck, the Court emphasized that protections on speech are lower during wartime.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that the First Amendment protects the right to dissent from the government’s viewpoints and objectives. Protections on speech, he continued, should not be curtailed unless there is a present danger of immediate evil, or the defendant intends to create such a danger. The evidence in this case consisted of two leaflets, which he concluded did not meet the “clear and present danger” test.


The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians to send children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school in the district where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation which facilitated care for orphans, educated youths, and established and maintained academies or schools. This case was decided together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy.

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Yes. The unanimous Court held that "the fundamental liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."


Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested in 1919 for distributing a “Left Wing Manifesto" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under New York’s Criminal Anarchy Law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterances without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The appellate division affirmed his conviction, as did the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court in that state.

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In an opinion authored by Justice Edward Sanford, the Court concluded that New York could prohibit advocating violent efforts to overthrow the government under the Criminal Anarchy Law. Citing Schenck and Abrams, the Court reasoned the government could punish speech that threatens its basic existence because of the national security implications. Despite the small scale of Gitlow’s actions, the majority was not persuaded that they were too insignificant to have an impact.
The Supreme Court previously held, in Barron v. Baltimore (1833), that the Constitution's Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government. Gitlow partly reversed that precedent and established that while the Bill of Rights was designed to limit the power of the federal government, the incorporation principle allows it to be applied to states.
In dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes held that Gitlow had not violated the clear and present danger test used in Schenck. Since Gitlow’s call to action was abstract and would not resonate with a large number of people, Holmes concluded that there was not sufficient imminence to warrant punishing the speech.


Roy Olmstead was a suspected bootlegger. Without judicial approval, federal agents installed wiretaps in the basement of Olmstead's building (where he maintained an office) and in the streets near his home. Olmstead was convicted with evidence obtained from the wiretaps. This case was decided along with Green v. United States, in which Green and several other defendants were similarly convicted, based on illegally obtained wire-tapped conversations, for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by importing, possessing, and selling illegal liquors. This case was also decided with McInnis v. United States.

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No. The Court held that neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendment rights of the recorded parties were violated. The use of wiretapped conversations as incriminating evidence did not violate their Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination because they were not forcibly or illegally made to conduct those conversations. Instead, the conversations were voluntarily made between the parties and their associates. Moreover, the parties' Fourth Amendment rights were not infringed because mere wiretapping does not constitute a search and seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. These terms refer to an actual physical examination of one's person, papers, tangible material effects, or home - not their conversations. Finally, the Court added that while wiretapping may be unethical no court may exclude evidence solely for moral reasons. When criticized for his opinion, Justice Taft mocked his foes as he wrote to a friend: "If they think we are going to be frightened in our effort to stand by the law and give the public a chance to punish criminals, they are mistaken, even though we are condemned for lack of high ideals." This case was reversed by Katz v. U.S. (1967).


In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford accused local officials of being implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. The state supreme court upheld both the temporary injunction and the permanent injunction that eventually issued from the trial court.

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In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Charles Hughes, the Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was facially unconstitutional, meaning the decision was based on an analysis of the law's general applications, not the specific context of this case. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. (The majority used the incorporation doctrine to apply the rights granted under the Bill of Rights to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.) The Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding. In some situations, such as when speech is obscene, incites violence, or reveals military secrets, the government might be able to justify a prior restraint.
Justices Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland dissented in an opinion written by Justice Butler.


Nine black youths -- described as, "young, ignorant, and illiterate" -- were accused of raping two white women. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to represent them at the trial. This case was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama and Weems v. Alabama.

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Yes. The Court held that the trials denied due process because the defendants were not given reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel in their defense. Though Justice George Sutherland did not rest the Court holding on the right-to-counsel guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, he repeatedly implicated that guarantee. This case was an early example of national constitutional protection in the field of criminal justice.


A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States

Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, Congress allowed the President to regulate certain industries by distributing authority to develop codes of conduct among business groups and boards in those industries. The Act did not provide standards for the President or the business groups in implementing its objectives. When Schechter Poultry Corp. was indicted for violating a business code governing the poultry industry in New York City, it argued that the law was an unconstitutional violation of the non-delegation doctrine.

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In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Hughes, the unanimous Court held that the Act was "without precedent" and was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The President cannot be allowed to have unbridled control to make whatever laws he believes to be necessary to achieve a certain goal. The law did not establish rules or standards to evaluate industrial activity, meaning Congress failed to provide the necessary guidelines for the implementation of this functionally legislative process.
Justice Cardozo wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Stone.


In the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go under. Authority to determine which crops would be affected was granted to the Secretary of Agriculture. He decided that one of the crops should be cotton, and Butler received a tax claim as a receivers of the Hoosal Mills Corp., a cotton processor.

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In an opinion written by Justice Roberts, the majority declared the Act unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate and control agricultural production, an arena reserved to the states. Congress’ Spending Power (Article I, Section 8) is restricted to situations in which it is being used for the general welfare of the people. Agricultural production historically lies beyond the authority of the federal government to regulate. Although Congress does have the power to tax and appropriate funds, in this case those activities were "but means to an unconstitutional end.” That is, Congress was using the spending power as an enforcement mechanism to control activity that was completely within the authority of the states. Thus, the Act violated the Constitution.
Justice Stone wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo.


United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation

The Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, a weapons manufacturer, sold fighter planes and bombers to Bolivia during the Chaco War, during which Paraguay and Bolivia contested control of a semi-arid region. This violated a Joint Resolution of Congress and a proclamation issued by President Roosevelt, which banned U.S. weapons manufacturers from aiding either side of the war. Challenging its indictment, Curtiss-Wright argued that Congress had violated the non-delegation doctrine in allowing the executive branch to make decisions that were properly left to the legislature.

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In an opinion written by Justice Sutherland, the majority upheld the Joint Resolution. The Court reasoned that the federal government could not exceed its enumerated powers regarding internal issues but had a much broader scope of discretion in foreign affairs. Because "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation," Congress may provide the President with a special degree of discretion in external matters which would not be afforded domestically. Roosevelt thus had the discretion to determine what impact a certain policy might have on foreign affairs and make decisions accordingly, even had Congress not authorized him.
Justice McReynolds authored a dissenting opinion.


Under Washington state law, the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry set a minimum wage of $14.50 for each work week of 48 hours. Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, received an amount less than this wage. Parrish brought a suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state law. In ruling for the hotel, the lower court relied on Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923), in which the Court struck down a minimum wage law for working women.

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In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the Court held that the establishment of minimum wages for women was constitutional. Echoing Muller v. Oregon (1908), the majority ruled that the state may use its police power to restrict the individual freedom to contract. The decision overruled Adkins and marked the Court's departure from the expansive view of the freedom to contract. The decision is generally regarded as having ended the Lochner era, a period in American legal history in which the Supreme Court tended to invalidate legislation aimed at regulating business.
While Justice Hughes wrote the opinion, the stark doctrinal shift resulted from Justice Owen Josephus Roberts changing his perspective on this issue. According to Hughes, President Franklin Roosevelt's reelection in 1936 and the impressive achievements of the New Deal caused Roberts to abandon his affiliation with the Court's conservative justices.
In dissent, Justice George Sutherland implicitly criticized Roberts for changing sides and argued that politics and public opinion should not impact the Court’s understanding of the Constitution.


National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation

With the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, Congress determined that labor-management disputes were directly related to the flow of interstate commerce and, thus, could be regulated by the national government. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charged Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. the country’s fourth largest steel producer, with discriminating against employees who were union members.

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In an opinion written by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the majority found that companies cannot discriminate against employees for exercising their fundamental right to unionize. The Court upheld the Act, reasoning that it was narrowly constructed so as to regulate industrial activities which had the potential to restrict interstate commerce. The majority stated that any significant effect (direct or indirect) on interstate commerce allows Congress to regulate an activity under the Commerce Clause. While the manufacturing process or relationships between labor and management may not have a direct impact on the flow of goods, they have an aggregate impact on commerce. In this case, the potential secession of manufacturing activity due to conflicts between management and labor could potentially impede interstate commerce. However, Hughes carefully limited the opinion to exclude situations in which an activity had such an inconsequential or remote impact on interstate commerce that it exclusively impacted local matters.
In dissent, Justice McReynolds questioned Congress's enhanced power under the Commerce Clause.


Frank Palko had been charged with first-degree murder. He was convicted instead of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut appealed and won a new trial; this time the court found Palko guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.

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The Supreme Court upheld Palko's second conviction. In his majority opinion, Cardozo formulated principles that were to direct the Court's actions for the next three decades. He noted that some Bill of Rights guarantees--such as freedom of thought and speech--are fundamental, and that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause absorbed these fundamental rights and applied them to the states. Protection against double jeopardy was not a fundamental right. Palko died in Connecticut's electric chair on April 12, 1938.
In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Court expressly overruled its decision in Palko.


An Arkansas federal district court charged Jack Miller and Frank Layton with violating the National Firearms Act of 1934 ("NFA") when they transported a sawed-off double-barrel 12-gauge shotgun in interstate commerce. Miller and Layton argued that the NFA violated their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.

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The Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual the right to keep and bear a sawed-off double-barrel shotgun. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice James Clark McReynolds reasoned that because possessing a sawed-off double barrel shotgun does not have a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of such an instrument.


Newton Cantwell and his sons, Jehovah's Witnesses, were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were travelling door-to-door and approaching people on the street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an anti-Catholic message. Cantwell and his sons were arrested and charged with: (1) violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate before soliciting funds from the public, and (2) inciting a common-law breach of the peace.

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In a unanimous decision, the Court held the Cantwells’ actions were protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for the Court, Justice Owen Roberts reasoned that while general regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were not. Because the statute allowed local officials to determine which causes were religious and which ones were not, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the suppression of "free communication of views." The Cantwells' message, while offensive to many, did not threaten "bodily harm" and was protected religious speech.


In 1935, Lillian and William Gobitis were expelled from Pennsylvania public schools for refusing to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise. The Gobitis children were Jehovah's Witnesses and believed that saluting the flag was forbidden by the Bible. They argued the expulsions violated their First Amendment rights.

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In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court upheld the mandatory flag salute. Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter he relied primarily on the "secular regulation" rule, which weighs the secular purpose of a nonreligious government regulation against the religious practice it makes illegal or otherwise burdens the exercise of religion. The Court held that the state's interest in "national cohesion" was "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values," and that national unity was "the basis of national security." Frankfurter wrote that the school district's interest in creating national unity was enough to allow them to require students to salute the flag.
The Court declined to make itself “the school board for the country.”
Justice Harlan Stone dissented, writing that the “very essence of the liberty” guaranteed by the Constitution “is the freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall say.” Stone’s position soon became the majority; the decision was reversed in 1943 in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette


In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to regulate many aspects of employment, including minimum wages, maximum weekly hours, and child labor. When a lumber manufacturer, Darby, shipped lumber out of state, he was arrested for violating the FLSA. His charges were dismissed because the federal district court found that FLSA was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the FLSA’s potential effects on intrastate activities violated the Commerce Clause.

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The unanimous Court upheld the FLSA. Relying heavily on the Court's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), Justice Stone affirmed the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, which "can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power." The Court held that the purpose of the FLSA was to prevent states from using substandard labor practices to their own economic advantage by interstate commerce. Congress acted with proper authority in outlawing substandard labor conditions since they have a significant impact on interstate commerce.


On a public sidewalk in downtown Rochester, Walter Chaplinsky was distributing literature that supported his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness and attacked more conventional forms of religion. Chaplinsky called the town marshal "a God-damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist." He was arrested and convicted under a state law that prohibited intentionally offensive, derisive, or annoying speech to any person who is lawfully in a street or public area. On appeal, Chaplinsky argued that the law violated the First Amendment on the grounds that it was overly vague.

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Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Frank Murphy upheld Chaplinsky’s conviction. The Court identified certain categorical exceptions to First Amendment protections, including obscenities, certain profane and slanderous speech, and "fighting words." He found that Chaplinsky's insults were “fighting words” since they caused a direct harm to their target and could be construed to advocate an immediate breach of the peace. Thus, they lacked the social value of disseminating ideas to the public that lay behind the rights granted by the First Amendment. A state can use its police power, the Court reasoned, to curb their expression in the interests of maintaining order and morality.


Betts was indicted for robbery in Maryland. He was unable to afford counsel and requested one be appointed for him. The judge in the case denied the request, and Betts subsequently pled not guilty. He was convicted of robbery, which he eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. He argued he was wrongfully denied his right to counsel.

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In an opinion authored by Justice Owen Roberts, the majority ruled Betts did not have a constitutional right to counsel. The Court reasoned that while the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits an unfair trial, the amendment does not embody “an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.” The majority opinion concluded that indigent defendants need only be provided with a lawyer under special circumstances.
Justice Black dissented, arguing that denial of counsel based on financial stability makes it so that those in poverty have an increased chance of conviction, which violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
This decision was overruled in 1963 in Gideon v. Wainwright.


Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio who harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Filburn was penalized under the Act. He argued that the extra wheat that he had produced in violation of the law had been used for his own use and thus had no effect on interstate commerce, since it never had been on the market. In his view, this meant that he had not violated the law because the additional wheat was not subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.

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A unanimous Court upheld the law. In an opinion authored by Justice Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate prices in the industry, and this law was rationally related to that legitimate goal. The Court reasoned that Congress could regulate activity within a single state under the Commerce Clause, even if each individual activity had a trivial effect on interstate commerce, as long as the intrastate activity viewed in the aggregate would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. To this extent, the opinion went against prior decisions that had analyzed whether an activity was local, or whether its effects were direct or indirect.


West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette

In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to include salutes to the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory part of school activities. The children in a family of Jehovah's Witnesses refused to perform the salute and were sent home from school for non-compliance. They were also threatened with reform schools used for criminally active children, and their parents faced prosecutions for causing juvenile delinquency.

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In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. In an opinion written by Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the First Amendment cannot enforce a unanimity of opinion on any topic, and national symbols like the flag should not receive a level of deference that trumps constitutional protections. He argued that curtailing or eliminating dissent was an improper and ineffective way of generating unity.
Justices Black and Douglas concurred to repudiate their earlier opinions in First Amendment decisions.
Justice Frankfurter dissented. He believed the Court was exceeding the scope of the judicial role and was taking on a legislative function in striking down the law.


In 1942, Congress enacted the Emergency Price Control Act to control commodity prices and prevent inflation during wartime. This case is the consolidation of two cases in which the defendants were tried and convicted in district court on several counts of selling wholesale cuts of beef at prices above the maximum prices set by the Revised Maximum Price Regulation under the Act. During the trial, the district court overruled all motions regarding the validity of the Regulation and the Act, including questions of whether the Act deprived the defendants of their Fifth Amendment rights to due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions.

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No, yes. Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that Congress sufficiently regulated the powers of the Administrator of the Act in such a way as to be a constitutional delegation of legislative power to obtain a particular objective. The Constitution grants Congress the necessary flexibility to perform its legislative function in a variety of ways. Because the regulations and standards are specific enough to ensure that the enforcement of the Act is conforming to the congressional intent behind it, it is constitutional. The Court also held that, because the Act establishes a procedure for redress for those who feel they have been wronged by the Act, it does not violate due process.
Justice Owen J. Roberts wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Act unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Administrator of the Act. Because the standards set by the Act leave many decisions up to the judgment of the Administrator, they cannot be sufficiently overseen by Congress. He also argued that the standard for review of the regulations relies too heavily on the Administrator to be impartial, as it is the Administrator who sets the regulations in the first place. In his dissent, Justice Wiley B. Rutledge argued that the way in which Congress conferred jurisdiction over the Act onto state and federal courts while creating a separate system for the redress of wrongs was unconstitutional. He wrote that Congress cannot require a court to enforce regulations without allowing the court to consider their constitutional validity. Such a piecemeal approach to due process denies the defendants their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Justice Frank Murphy joined in the dissenting opinion.


In response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, the U.S. government decided to require Japanese-Americans to move into relocation camps as a matter of national security. President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 in February 1942, two months after Pearl Harbor. A Japanese-American man living in San Leandro, Fred Korematsu, chose to stay at his residence rather than obey the order to relocate. Korematsu was arrested and convicted of violating the order. He responded by arguing that Executive Order 9066 violated the Fifth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Korematsu's conviction.

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In an opinion written by Justice Black, the Court ruled that the evacuation order violated by Korematsu was valid. The majority found that the Executive Order did not show racial prejudice but rather responded to the strategic imperative of keeping the U.S. and particularly the West Coast (the region nearest Japan) secure from invasion. The Court relied heavily on a 1943 decision, Hirabayashi v. U.S., which addressed similar issues. Black argued that the validation of the military's decision by Congress merited even more deference.
Justice Frankfurter concurred, writing that the “martial necessity arising from the danger of espionage and sabotage” warranted the military’s evacuation order.
Justice Jackson dissented, arguing that the exclusion order legitimized racism that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing

A New Jersey law authorized reimbursement by local school boards of the costs of transportation to and from schools, including private schools. 96% of the private schools who benefitted from this law were parochial Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that this indirect aid to religion violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After losing in state courts, Everson appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds.

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A divided Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. Justice Black reasoned that the law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in anyway. It was rather enacted to assist parents of all religions with getting their children to school.
Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, Rutledge, and Burton dissented.


Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County

The case tested the principle of "released time", where public schools set aside class time for religious instruction. The Champaign County Board of Education authorized a program in which outside religious teachers hired by private third parties provided weekly religious instruction in public schools. The classes were not mandatory. McCollum, an atheist, complained that her son was ostracized for not attending the classes. McCollum eventually sued the school board in 1945, arguing that the religious instruction in the public schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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In an opinion written by Justice Black, the majority held that program violated the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close cooperation between the school authorities and the religious council violated the constitutionally-required separation of church and state. Because pupils were required to attend school and were released in part from this legal duty if they attended the religious classes, the Court found that the Champaign system was "beyond question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups and to spread the faith."
In his lone dissent, Justice Stanley Forman Reed objected to the majority’s broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause.


In 1911, a St. Louis, Missouri neighborhood enacted a racially restrictive covenant designed to prevent African-Americans and Asian-Americans from living in the area. In 1945, an African-American family (the Shelleys) moved into the neighborhood. Louis Kraemer brought suit to enforce the covenant and prevent the Shelleys from moving into their house. A similar lawsuit arose in Detroit, Michigan. Both state supreme courts enforced the covenants because they were private rather than state action. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases on appeal.

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In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Fred Vinson, the Court held that standing alone, racially restrictive covenants do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Private parties may abide by the terms of such a covenant, but they may not seek judicial enforcement of such a covenant, as that would be a state action. Thus, the enforcements of the racially restrictive covenants in state court violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


Julius A. Wolf, Charles H. Fulton, and Betty Fulton were charged with conspiracy to perform an abortion. At trial, Wolf objected to evidence material and admissible as to his co-defendants would be inadmissible if he were tried separately. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld all three convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a federal court.

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In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject criminal justice in the states to specific limitations and that illegally obtained evidence did not have to be excluded from trials in all cases. The Court reasoned that while the exclusion of evidence may have been an effective way to deter unreasonable searches, other methods could be equally effective and would not fall below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause. Civil remedies, such as "the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion," were sufficient.


In 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt, a black man, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. State law restricted access to the university to blacks, and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission, the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students.

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In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. The Court found that the "law school for Negroes," which was to have opened in 1947, would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. The Court argued that the separate school would be inferior in a number of areas, including faculty, course variety, library facilities, legal writing opportunities, and overall prestige. The Court also found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students' abilities to compete in the legal arena.


In 1948, eleven Communist Party leaders were convicted of advocating the violent overthrow of the US government and for the violation of several points of the Smith Act. The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United States government. The party members who had been petitioning for socialist reforms claimed that the Act violated their First Amendment rights. Party leaders were found guilty and lower courts upheld the conviction.

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In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court upheld the convictions of the Communist Party leaders and found that the Smith Act did not "inherently" violate the First Amendment. In the plurality opinion, the Court held that there was a distinction between the mere teaching of communist philosophies and active advocacy of those ideas. Such advocacy created a "clear and present danger" that threatened the government. Given the gravity of the consequences, the Court held that success or probability of success was not necessary to justify restrictions on the freedom of speech.
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred in separate opinions.
Justices Black and Douglas dissented in separate opinions. Justice Black stressed that the petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow the Government or any overt acts designed to overthrow the Government. They were not even charged with saying anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the Government. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date. “No matter how it is worded, this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I believe the First Amendment forbids.”


Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer

In April of 1952, during the Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order directing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate most of the nation's steel mills. This was done in order to avert the expected effects of a strike by the United Steelworkers of America.

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In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order. The Court found that there was no congressional statute that authorized the President to take possession of private property. The Court also held that the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The Court argued that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."


Pete Hernandez, an agricultural worker, was indicted for the murder of Joe Espinoza by an all-Anglo (white) grand jury in Jackson County, Texas. Claiming that Mexican-Americans were barred from the jury commission that selected juries, and from petit juries, Hernandez' attorneys tried to quash the indictment. Moreover, Hernandez tried to quash the petit jury panel called for service, because persons of Mexican descent were excluded from jury service in this case. A Mexican-American had not served on a jury in Jackson County in over 25 years and thus, Hernandez claimed that Mexican ancestry citizens were discriminated against as a special class in Jackson County. The trial court denied the motions. Hernandez was found guilty of murder and sentenced by the all-Anglo jury to life in prison. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that "Mexicans are...members of and within the classification of the white race as distinguished from members of the Negro Race" and rejected the petitioners' argument that they were a "special class" under the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the court pointed out that "so far as we are advised, no member of the Mexican nationality" challenged this classification as white or Caucasian.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects those beyond the two classes of white or Negro, and extends to other racial groups in communities depending upon whether it can be factually established that such a group exists within a community. In reversing, the Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment "is not directed solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class theory'" but in this case covers those of Mexican ancestry. This was established by the fact that the distinction between whites and Mexican ancestry individuals was made clear at the Jackson County Courthouse itself where "there were two men's toilets, one unmarked, and the other marked 'Colored Men and 'Hombres Aqui' ('Men Here')," and by the fact that no Mexican ancestry person had served on a jury in 25 years. Mexican Americans were a "special class" entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Abstract submitted by Professor Marc S. Rodriguez


Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1)

This case was the consolidation of cases arising in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Washington D.C. relating to the segregation of public schools on the basis of race. In each of the cases, African American students had been denied admittance to certain public schools based on laws allowing public education to be segregated by race. They argued that such segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were denied relief in the lower courts based on Plessy v. Ferguson, which held that racially segregated public facilities were legal so long as the facilities for blacks and whites were equal. (This was known as the “separate but equal” doctrine.)

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Separate but equal educational facilities for racial minorities is inherently unequal, violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that “separate but equal” facilities are inherently unequal and violate the protections of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the segregation of public education based on race instilled a sense of inferiority that had a hugely detrimental effect on the education and personal growth of African American children. Warren based much of his opinion on information from social science studies rather than court precedent. The decision also used language that was relatively accessible to non-lawyers because Warren felt it was necessary for all Americans to understand its logic.


The D.C. Board of Education denied a petition by a group of parents in Anacostia to racially integrate John Phillip Sousa Junior High School. The following year, in 1950, the parents sought admission to the all-white school for 11 African-American children. When the request was again denied by the Board, a Howard University law professor brought a lawsuit. The claim was dismissed by the trial court.

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The Fifth Amendment's guarantee of "liberty" protected by due process also guaranteed racial equality in public education in the District of Columbia.
In a unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court found that racial discrimination in the public schools of Washington, DC, denied blacks due process of law as protected by the Fifth Amendment. Noting the legal peculiarities of DC, Justice Warren recognized that the Fifth Amendment (which applied to the District) did not contain an Equal Protection Clause, while the Fourteenth Amendment. Lacking an equal protection standard to invalidate the District's segregation, Warren creatively relied on the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of "liberty" to find the segregation of the Washington, DC, schools unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court decided this case on the same day as Brown v. Board of Education, which overshadowed it. Its most important legacy is the concept of reverse incorporation and the application of the same anti-discrimination principles to state and federal governments.


Jack Abbott and other prisoners were denied access to publications that Richard Thornburgh, the U.S. Attorney General at the time, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP) deemed to be detrimental to penological interests. FBP regulations allow publications that may pose a threat to the security and discipline of prisons or that promote criminal activity to be rejected. Material cannot be rejected based on its political, philosophical, or distasteful nature, and prison officials have the burden of showing why the restriction was necessary and how the denied material was detrimental to penological interests. Abbott and others sued and argued that the restriction on certain publications violated their First Amendment rights. The district court held that prisons had a right to deny access to certain publications and that prison wardens must be given broad discretion in their duties to maintain the security of the prison, but their discretion must not limit the prisoners’ First Amendment right more than what is necessary to protect the government’s penological interests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the prison officials had the burden of showing how the denied material is detrimental to penological interests.

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No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that there is a substantial penological interest in denying access to certain publications because it is necessary to maintain the security and order of the prison. However, the limitation on the prisoners’ First Amendment rights must be no greater than what is necessary to the preserve the penological interest. Therefore, the Federal Bureau of Prisons may deny access to publications that include threats to security of the prison or may incite violence among prisoners.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that, while “penological interests” may be highly ambiguous, prison officials often require broad discretion to “prevent internal disorder.” Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District, which was already majority African-American, and increased the percentage of African-American voters in the district. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the plan was submitted to the Department of Justice for preclearance, which was granted. On October 2, 2013, plaintiffs sued the defendants in their official capacities and argued that Virginia’s Third Congressional District was racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court ruled that the districting plan was unconstitutional because its use of race as a factor was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.
The defendant Commonwealth of Virginia did not appeal; instead, ten members of Congress, who had intervened in the case at the trial level, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. In that case, the Court held that the Voting Rights Act does not require a legislature to maintain a particular minority number percentage in creating a districting plan, but rather it requires that the legislature maintain a minority’s ability to elect a candidate of choice. In considering whether a districting plan is unconstitutional, courts must examine whether racial considerations predominated over nonracial ones in determining which voters to place in which district. On remand, the district court again determined that the Third Congressional District was unconstitutional because racial considerations predominated in creating the plan.

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The appellants did not have standing to appeal this case to the Supreme Court under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the appellants in this case, ten members of Congress who had intervened in the case at the trial level, did not have standing to appeal because they do not meet the requirements for standing under Article III -- an injury in fact that is directly traceable to the conduct at issue and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Although ten members of Congress initially intervened, by the time the case reached oral argument at the Supreme Court, only three claimed to have standing. Of those, one determined that he would run for office regardless of the new plan, and therefore did not suffer an injury in fact. The other two appellants were unable to produce evidence that their chances of reelection would be significantly impaired by the new districting plan and therefore did not meet their burden to establish that they suffered an injury sufficient to have standing under Article III.


David Anthony Taylor was a member of the “Southwest Goonz,” a group of robbers based in Roanoke, Virginia, that focused on robbing drug dealers, who typically have drug proceeds in their home and are reluctant to report crime. Taylor was indicted on two counts of robbery under the Hobbs Act, which prohibits actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign commerce. At Taylor’s second trial, after his first resulted in a hung jury, the government moved to prevent Taylor from offering evidence that robbing a drug dealer who grows marijuana outside of state lines does not affect interstate commerce and therefore cannot violate the Hobbs Act. The district court granted the government’s motion, and Taylor was subsequently convicted of both counts under the Hobbs Act. Taylor moved to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the government did not present sufficient evidence that his actions affected interstate commerce. The district court denied Taylor’s motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction.

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In a prosecution for robbery under the Hobbs Act, the commerce element is satisfied when the government shows that the defendant robbed a drug dealer of drugs or drug proceeds. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that “commerce” under the Hobbs Act is defined broadly as all interstate commerce over which the federal government has jurisdiction. Precedent has established that the federal government can regulate intrastate economic activity that has substantial effects on interstate commerce, and although the sale of drugs is illegal under federal law, it is still an economic activity; therefore Congress can regulate purely intrastate drug theft. The government does not need to prove that the defendant’s specific action affected interstate commerce as long as the affected activity does so in the aggregate.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority’s opinion went too far in expanding Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Because Congress does not have the power to regulate robbery by itself, it can only do so when such regulation is “necessary and proper” to carrying out one of Congress’ enumerated powers, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce. Commerce Clause jurisprudence has established that Congress may also regulate activities that bear an “obvious, simple, and direct” relationship to regulating interstate commerce. While a robbery might fit this criteria, not every robbery would. Therefore, in order to regulate robbery under the Hobbs Act, the government must prove that the robbery in question affected interstate commerce. To hold otherwise would rid the government of its burden in a criminal case to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.


Saul Molina-Martinez pleaded guilty to being in the United States illegally following deportation proceedings that stemmed from his felony convictions. The district court accordingly sentenced Molina-Martinez to 77 months in prison, pursuant to the sentencing range established in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for his criminal history category. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, prior sentences are counted as a single sentence if they were imposed on the same day unless the offenses in question were separated by an intervening arrest. Molina-Martinez’s prior offenses were not separated by an intervening arrest, so when his probation officer calculated his criminal history points and concluded that they placed him in category VI, he erred; Molina-Martinez should properly have been placed in category V, which carries a lower sentencing range of 70-87 months. Molina-Martinez appealed his sentence on the grounds that the district court erred in sentencing him based on the incorrect criminal history category. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, despite the error in calculation, Molina-Martinez failed to show that the error affected his substantial rights and therefore affirmed his conviction and sentence.

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If a defendant shows that the court mistakenly applied a higher sentencing range to his sentence, his substantial rights are affected. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the unanimous court. The Court held that, when appellate courts review errors in the application of the Sentencing Guidelines, the defendant is not required to identify “additional evidence” to show that he received an incorrect sentence. Nothing in the Guidelines themselves, the relevant precedent, or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governing appellate review of such an error requires that a defendant make a showing of prejudice beyond showing that the error occurred. By requiring more from the defendant, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit failed to properly account for the crucial rule the Guidelines play in the sentencing process and the dynamics of sentencing, which often leaves the defendant without any of the evidence the Fifth Circuit would require.
In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that, while a court’s use of an incorrect Sentencing Guideline range is sufficient evidence that the defendant’s substantial rights were affected, Guideline error issues should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Justice Alito argued that the majority opinion should not have speculated about the future effects of Guideline errors. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.


The European Community and 26 of its member states sued RJR Nabisco (RJR) and alleged that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering enterprise in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. The European Community claimed that Colombian and Russian criminal organizations imported illegal drugs into European countries, where they produced revenue in euros that was then laundered back into the currency of the criminal organizations’ home countries while the euros were sold to cigarette importers at a discounted rate to purchase RJR’s cigarettes. The lawsuit alleged that RJR controlled this operation and in the course of executing it committed various violations of the RICO statute as well as violations of New York state law. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion based on the presumption the U.S. statutes did not apply extraterritorially absent express Congressional intent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that claims under the RICO statute can apply extraterritorially when the RICO claim is a violation of a predicate statute that Congress clearly intended to apply extraterritorially.

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Sections of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute can apply extraterritorially because they rebutted the presumption against extraterritoriality and expressed a clear indication that Congress intended them to apply extraterritorially. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-0 majority. The Court held that some of the relevant substantive provisions of RICO applied extraterritorially because the text clearly defined certain racketeering offenses as ones that can occur outside of the United States. Therefore, the presumption against extraterritoriality was rebutted for the RICO provisions that are based on predicate offenses that are explicitly extraterritorial. However, not every foreign enterprise would qualify; the foreign enterprise must affect or directly affect commerce involving the United States for RICO to apply. The four-justice majority also held that RICO’s private right of action did not rebut the presumption of extraterritorially, and therefore a plaintiff must allege that there was a domestic injury in order for the lawsuit to proceed. In this case, because the plaintiffs waived their damages claims for domestic injuries, their remaining claims were based on injuries suffered abroad and should be dismissed.
In her opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting in the judgment, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that Congress’ intent for RICO to apply extraterritorially was clear because the text of the statute explicitly included offenses that encompass activities that could occur abroad. However, Justice Ginsburg also argued the private right of action was not limited to domestic injuries. RICO clearly allowed the government to sue based on injuries that occurred abroad, and there was no reason to read the private right of action differently. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting in the judgment. Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting in the judgment in which he argued that the U.S. government’s stance that allowing for recovery in U.S. courts for injuries that occurred abroad would create international friction did not hold up against the opposite argument from the European Community and its 26 member states.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


Ramon Nelson was riding his bike when he suffered a lethal blow to the back of his head with a baseball bat. After two eyewitnesses identified Lawrence Owens from an array of photos and then a lineup, he was tried and convicted for Nelson’s death. Because Nelson was carrying cocaine and crack cocaine potentially for distribution, the judge at Owens’ bench trial ruled that Owens was probably also a drug dealer and was trying to “knock [Nelson] off.” Owens was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years in prison.
Owens filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that his constitutional right to due process was violated during the trial. He argued that the eyewitness identification should have been inadmissible based on unreliability and that the judge impermissibly inferred a motive when a motive was not an element of the offense. The district court denied the writ of habeas corpus, and Owens appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the denial and held that the trial judge’s inference about Owens’s motive violated his right to have his guilt adjudicated solely based on the evidence presented at trial.

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After arguments, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted.