No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the FMCA clearly provided Brown with immunity from prosecution based on his testimony. Because he could not possibly incriminate himself, he could not invoke the Fifth Amendment. There was no statutory cap on sentencing, so 15 months was not an abuse of discretion.
Chief Justice Earl Warren dissented, arguing that the district judge denied Brown due process by following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a) instead of 49(b). Under 49(b) Brown would be sentenced to prison until he agreed to answer the questions instead of a fixed 15 month sentence. Justice Hugo L. Black, Justice William O. Douglas, and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined the dissent.


Fox West Coast Theatres held various contracts for "first-run" rights of movies in San Bernardino, CA. Beacon Theatre opened a drive-in theater in the area and threatened to sue Fox West Coast over their "first-run" contracts claiming they violated antitrust laws, in particular the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act. Fox West Coast filed an injunction against Beacon taking legal action, and Beacon counterclaimed.
The lower court denied Beacon a trial by jury because the suit involved both matters of law and equitable damages. Beacon appealed this decision on the grounds that the alleged competition between Beacon and Fox West Coast was a matter of fact to be decided by a jury pursuant to the Seventh Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. Beacon responded by seeking a writ of mandamus.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59795.xml


Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that a case involving both equitable and legal claims must be tried by jury before the equitable damages can be accessed. Therefore, Beacon Theatre had a Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. Fox West Coast’s injunction for permanent relief from Beacon could be assessed after the jury verdict.
Justice Potter Stewart (joined by Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Charles E. Whittaker) wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court should have denied the writ of mandamus because the issues of this case were questions of law rather than fact, and that the trial judge should be granted deference.


Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 v. Sax Enterprises, Inc.

In February of 1955, Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 began an effort to organize employees at resort hotels in Miami and Miami Beach, Florida; these hotels wholly occupied a stretch of land from Collins Avenue to the Atlantic Ocean. The National Labor Relations Board, however, had a stated policy of refusing jurisdiction over hotel employees. Hence, the union did not petition the board for an election or certification.
In March, the union tried to establish a procedure to collectively bargain for the employees of the various hotels. It could not reach an agreement between the employee representatives from each hotel, so it addressed a letter to the Miami Beach Hotel Association requesting a conference. It also sent copies to each hotel and published copies in local newspapers. The Association -- which was not specifically authorized to bargain for its members -- did not answer the union’s request. In response, on April 13, 1955, the union began a strike at nine hotels, including the Sherry Frontenac.
The hotels filed for an injunction against the picketers. Of the nine cases, the district court tried seven separately, with each judge retaining jurisdiction over his particular case. In each of the seven cases, the trial judge held that there was not enough evidence of violence to justify enjoining the picketing on that basis. Before each court could address whether the unions were coercing hotel employees to unionize, however, the Florida Supreme Court intervened. On the basis of the hotels’ complaint, it held that the real purpose of the strike was indeed to coerce hotel employees to join the union, in violation of Florida law.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59808.xml


No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Florida Supreme Court did not properly enjoin the union employees from picketing the resort hotels. The Court held that the strike's status under the National Labor Relations Act did not control the case. Instead, the Court looked to whether or not any violence resulted from the picketers’ activities. It held that none of the district courts made any finding of violence sufficient to merit an injunction from the Florida Supreme Court. The Court determined that it was not necessary to consider whether interstate commerce was involved in the Florida resort hotel industry.


William Dick was a 47-year-old farmer and experienced hunter who lived with his wife Blanche on a farm near Englevale, North Dakota. William had two life insurance policies issued by the New York Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, payable to his wife. Each contained a double indemnity clause preventing payment if William's death resulted from “self-destruction, whether sane or insane.” On January 20, 1955, between 10:30 and 11:00 am, Blanche entered the farm’s silage shed and found her husband lying on his back. She saw a wound on his head and knew he was dead; William's double-barreled shotgun was lying near his body.
The county sheriff later determined that the shotgun was held about eighteen inches from William's body with the stock toward the feet and the barrel along the body when it was fired. He also determined that the gun likely did not fire from a person jarring, pounding, or dropping it, although there was also evidence that the gun had occasionally discharged accidentally in the past. Dr. Veitch, the county coroner, found another wound in William's chest, but determined that it was the wound to William's head that caused his immediate death; the chest wound likely only resulted in a great deal of pain. Dr. Veitch, who was also William's personal physician, testified that William had mild to moderate non-specific prostatitis, which left him tired but did not prevent him from doing farm work. William did not apparently leave a suicide note or mention suicide to his relatives or friends. In connection with Blanche's later claim for benefits, however, Dr. Veitch listed the cause of death as “suicide.”
New York Life Insurance filed an action in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, claiming that William committed suicide. Under North Dakota law, proof of insurance coverage and death by gunshot wound shifted the burden to the insurer to prove that the death was not accidental. The jury found for Blanche Dick and awarded $7,500 in damages. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, reviewed the evidence and determined that the shotgun could not have fired unless someone or something pushed or pulled one of the triggers. It further concluded that the evidence could not be reconciled with any reasonable theory that the shooting was accidental, given William's experience as a hunter and the multiple gunshot wounds on his body.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59823.xml


No. In a 6-2 decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the Fourth Circuit erred in reversing the judgment of the district court. Chief Justice Warren argued that the jury could have determined that William Dick's death was accidental from the evidence Blanche Dick presented at trial, emphasizing that the evidence apparently did not suggest that William had either the motive or intention to commit suicide. He also noted that William was in the middle of his chores when he died, which the jury could have reasonably concluded to be improbable timing for a suicide attempt.
Chief Justice Warren declined to answer whether a state or federal evidentiary standard is proper when jurisdiction is based on the diversity of the parties because both parties assumed the North Dakota standard was proper in their briefs and arguments.
Justice Potter Stewart concurred, agreeing that the district court properly applied North Dakota’s evidentiary standard. Justice Stewart noted that he was not a member of the court when the case was granted a writ of certiorari, and thus refrained from expressing an opinion on whether the Court granted the writ appropriately.
Justice Felix Frankfurter, joined by Justice Charles Whittaker, dissented. He argued that the Court improperly granted a writ of certiorari to Blanche Dick’s case. Justice Frankfurter outlined the history of diversity jurisdiction cases in the circuit courts, emphasizing that congress intended the Court to use its certiorari power sparingly in such cases. He argued that the Eighth Circuit properly applied North Dakota’s evidentiary standard and concluded that Blanche's claim fell short of the North Dakota requirements for submission to a jury.
Justice John Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


On January 27, 1957, Vincent Joseph Spano was involved in a bar fight with Frank Palermo, Jr. Palermo knocked Spano to the ground and kicked him in the head multiple times. Later that night, Spano acquired a gun, found Palermo, and killed him. On February 1, 1957, a grand jury indicted Spano for first-degree murder and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Two days later, Spano called Gaspar Bruno, a longtime friend of his who was enrolled in the police academy. During that conversation, Spano told Bruno that Palermo had been beaten up in a fight, he was dazed, and he shot at Palermo. The next day, Spano turned himself in but refused to answer officers’ questions. The police questioned him for several hours before they brought in Spano’s friend Bruno to play on their friendship in order to convince Spano to confess, which he eventually did.
The confession was admitted into evidence at trial, and the jury was instructed to consider it only if it was found to be voluntary. The jury found Spano guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59825.xml


Yes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the interrogation tactics the police used -- such as questioning Spano for hours without a break and using a childhood friend to manipulate him -- were coercive and violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the confession was involuntary, it should not have been admitted into evidence in trial.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the interrogation was also unconstitutional because the police denied Spano access to his lawyer. He wrote that a defendant who has been charged with a crime is entitled to representation by counsel, and that right extends beyond the trial. Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurrence in which he argued that the judgment should be reversed solely due to the fact that the defendant was denied access to counsel during his interrogation. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.


In the midst of a labor strike against Southern Bell Telephone Company, Louis Joseph Abbate, Michael Louis Falcone, and Norman McLeod met with James Shelby, a union official, in a Chicago tavern. Shelby requested the others’ assistance in carrying out plans to bomb certain Southern Bell facilities in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee. Abbate and Falcone did not go through with the plan and instead informed Chicago police when McLeod obtained dynamite and traveled to Mississippi. The State of Illinois subsequently charged all four with the crime of conspiring to destroy the property of another. Abbate and Falcone pled guilty and were sentenced to three months in prison each. Because several of the targeted facilities were used exclusively by the military and federal agencies, federal prosecutors subsequently charged Abbate, Falcone, and Shelby with conspiring to destroy property essential to the U.S. communications systems. At trial in federal district court, McLeod testified against his former co-conspirators, and the jury found them guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgments against Abbate and Falcone on appeal. In their petition to the Supreme Court, Abbate and Falcone argued that the federal prosecution subsequent to their convictions under Illinois law violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prevents someone from being tried more than once for the same crime.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59838.xml


No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to a federal prosecution that follows a state prosecution of the same person for the same actions. Rather, the separate prosecutions reflect the concurrent power of the state and federal governments to enforce their separate statutes. Moreover, the Court held that allowing the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar subsequent prosecutions by the other level of government would hinder the law enforcement capability of that entity.
In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan commented on the federal government’s argument in favor of affirming the convictions. He found the implications disturbing as the argument potentially allowed successive prosecutions of the same person by the same level of government. Justice Brennan reiterated that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects the notion that individuals should only have to spend money and time defending themselves once for a single crime.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent in which he argued that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, Abbate and Falcone’s subsequent federal prosecution was just as troubling as Illinois imprisoning them twice for their role in the conspiracy. Expressing skepticism towards the concurrent powers theory relied on by the Court, Justice Black noted that foreign nations, unlike state and federal governments, are completely distinct sovereigns, yet many nations refuse to prosecute an individual following a prosecution in another country for the same acts. Additionally, the legislative history of the Double Jeopardy clause showed that language that would have restricted the clause to prohibit only successive prosecutions by the same government had been rejected. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas concurred in the dissent.


Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Bowers

These are two consolidated cases concerning the tax consequences of importing goods from foreign countries that are then used for manufacturing in the United States.
In 9, Youngstown Steel and Tube Co. imported ores for manufacturing, which were stored at its plant in Ohio. Under the U.S. Constitution, imports are not taxed. Youngstown took the ore needed for each day of manufacturing from the storage piles to stock bins. The state of Ohio assessed property tax on the ore because Youngstown had changed the ore from an import to a manufacturing supply. Youngstown argued that the ore kept in storage bins was not taxable because it was held for storage only. Youngstown also argued that the tax violated equal protection because it applied to residents of Ohio, but not to non-residents who had property in the state. After exhausting administrative proceedings, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the tax.
In 44, Plywood Corp. imported lumber and veneers for manufacturing. Plywood piled the lumber in a yard in Algoma, Wisconsin for storage and drying. The City of Algoma taxed half of the stored supplies on the theory that at least that amount was destined for manufacturing. Plywood paid the tax and sued for a refund. The trial court and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the tax.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59854.xml


Yes. In a 6-2 decision, Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that because the imported goods became supplies needed for manufacturing, the goods changed their status as imports. It did not matter that the goods were stored away from other taxable property before us. The court also deferred to the Supreme Court of Ohio and rejected Youngstown’s claim that the Ohio tax violated equal protection.
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a partial dissent, agreeing with the majority about Youngstown, but disagreeing about Plywood. He found that Plywood’s main purpose for storing the lumber was drying, so it remained an import. Justice Potter Stewart did not participate.


An Illinois law required that trucks and trailers on its highways use a contoured mudguard, while Arkansas required them to have a straight mudguard. All of the other states required one type or the other. Arguing that the Illinois law unduly burdened interstate commerce, Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. prevailed in the lower court, which issued an injunction preventing Bibb from enforcing the law.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59858.xml


In a unanimous opinion authored by William O. Douglas, the Court held that the Illinois requirement placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. While writing that safety measures "carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged," Justice Douglas nevertheless affirmed that if the effect of such measures are "slight or problematical," then the interests of commerce should prevail. No clear benefits of using contoured mudguards could be identified, and they might even lead to additional hazards. Thus, the presumption of validity could be overcome.
Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred.


A general contractor defaulted on federal tax payments and payments to subcontractors. Under the Internal Revenue Code, the U.S. government claimed priority over the lien on the “property rights to the property” of the general contractor. The subcontractors also claimed priority, because the amounts owed to them were large enough that they constituted “trust funds” under a New York tax law. The subcontractors were the beneficiaries of these “trust funds” so the general contractor had no property rights. The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, granted the subcontractor’s motion to for summary judgment and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals of New York ruled in favor of the United States

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59863.xml


In a 7-2 decision Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority opinion vacating the judgment below. The Supreme Court held that state law controlled the answer to the question presented, while federal law controlled the priority of the competing liens. The Court remanded the case to the New York Court of Appeals to determine the nature of the property rights under state law.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, stating that the majority’s decision was inconsistent with prior case law. Justice Hugo L Black joined in the dissent.


Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton

Specialist Second Class James W. Dial of the United States Army and his wife, Joanna Dial, were charged with involuntary manslaughter for the death of their one-year-old child while stationed in Germany. James Dial was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, sentenced to three years in prison, and dishonorably discharged. His wife was not an active member of the military, but because she was a dependent of an active military member, she was tried in military court in Germany. She moved to challenge the jurisdiction of the military court over her case, but the motion was denied. She pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.
Mrs. Dial's mother, Alberta Singleton, filed a writ of habeas corpus on her daughter's behalf and argued that civilian dependents of military personnel cannot be tried in a military court. The circuit court judge stated he did not want to grant the writ of habeas corpus but was bound by the Supreme Court case Reid v. Covert, in which the Court held that non-military personnel cannot be court martialed for capital offenses. Nina Kinsella, the warden where Mrs. Dial was serving her time, appealed the writ and argued that the defendant in Reid v. Covert was on trial for a capital offense, whereas Mrs. Dial was on a trial for a non-capital offense. Therefore, the court was not bound by that case.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59900.xml


No. Justice Tom C. Clark delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that civilian dependents of active service members can only be court martialed for capital offenses. The Constitution does not allow for the extension of military power to have jurisdiction over civilians. Therefore, James Dial’s wife had a right to trial in a court protecting her rights as outlined under Article III of the Constitution and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that non-military personnel employed by the military overseas may be under military jurisdiction during peace times. However, Joanna Dial was a dependent of an active military member, and she was not employed by the military, so she should not have been court martialed. Justice Potter Stewart joined the opinion.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the interpretation of military “status” should not automatically exclude non-military personnel. One’s status as non-military personnel should only be a factor while determining jurisdiction, and the relationship of non-military personnel with the military establishment should also be examined. The Constitution allows the Court to consider these factors in determining appropriate jurisdiction. Justice Felix Frankfurter joined the dissent.


Ellen Goett sought recovery for her husband’s death under the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act. Her husband, Marvin Paul Goett, drowned while repairing a barge owned by Union Carbide Corp. Marvin worked for Amherst Barge Corp. as a sand blaster. Ellen argued that Union Carbide was negligent when it delivered the barge to Amherst for repairs without any rescue equipment. The district court ruled in favor of the Goetts, finding that the barge was unseaworthy and Union Carbide was negligent. The court awarded the maximum amount of damages based on negligence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Union Carbide did not owe a duty of seaworthiness to Amherst employees. The court also held that the barge was not unseaworthy but did not indicate whether the Goetts could recover damages if it were.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59916.xml


No answer. In a per curiam opinion, the court vacated the lower judgment and remanded to determine whether the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act uses the state law or maritime law concept of negligence. On remand, the court of appeals should also consider whether the Act incorporates the doctrine of unseaworthiness. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo L. Black, Justice William O. Douglas, and Justice William J. Brennan wrote in a footnote that they voted with the majority only because of the Court’s recent ruling on this issue in The Tungus v Skovgaard, although he disagreed with that ruling.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, stating that there was no reason to remand the case. Justice Felix Frankfurter joined in the dissent. Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote a dissent, stating that he would affirm the lower court. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent also agreeing with the lower court decision.


International Association of Machinists v. Street

Several labor unions entered into a union shop agreement that authorized spending union funds to support political causes. Many union employees opposed those causes and sued to enjoin enforcement of the union shop agreement. The employees argued that forcing union members to fund political activities they disagree with unconstitutionally restrained free speech. The Superior Court of Bibb County granted the injunction and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59945.xml


No. In a 7-2 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote for a four-judge plurality reversing the lower judgment. The Supreme Court held that the lower court did not need to decide the constitutionality of the union shop agreement. The Court remanded the case with suggestions for possible remedies. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurrence noting reservations about the suggested remedies. Justice Charles E. Whitaker concurred in part, but dissented to the suggestion of remedies.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent, stating that the statute authorizing union expenditures over the objection of its members violated the First Amendment. Justice Felix Frankfurter also wrote a dissent, expressing that the union members were still free to exercise their First Amendment rights.


Located on the Columbia River between the states of Oregon and Washington, the Bonneville Dam consisted of several facilities including a spillway dam with eighteen numbered bays separated by fifty-foot gates. On the bed of the river was a concrete structure called a baffle deck, which extended the width of the dam. This deck was lined with concrete blocks called ‘baffles’, designed to reduce the downstream velocity of the river. Over the years, the flow of water eroded the baffles. To restore them to their original condition, the United States contracted with Larson Construction Company, an independent contractor. The United States retained the right to inspect Larson’s work, but did not have direct control over it.
On August 20, 1954, Larson’s tug ‘Muleduzer’ set out from Bradford Island pushing Larson’s barge. As the tug and barge approached bay nine, the Columbia River’s flow was clearly turbulent; despite this, Larson proceeded with its work. The barge veered north when it reached bay nine and the port bow struck a pier. Water flooded a hole in the bow, and the barge and tug were swamped and sunk. Most of the crew drowned, including George William Graham; Graham was a member of the sounding party aboard the tug. The crew died in navigable Oregon waters.
Under Oregon’s Employers’ Liability Law (ELL), employers were liable for failure to use every device, care and precaution practicable for the protection and safety of life and limb. Oregon’s Wrongful Death Act (WDA), however, only permitted recovery for deaths caused by a wrongful act or omission, and set contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery. Henry Hess, the administrator of Graham’s estate, filed an action against the United States under both the ELL and the WDA. The district court entered judgment for the United States, holding that the United States was not liable under either statute. It ruled that the ELL did not apply to Hess’ case in part because the ELL imposed a higher standard of duty than federal maritime law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that only the WDA applied to Hess’ claim.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59974.xml


Yes. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that there was no constitutional impediment to applying Oregon’s Employers’ Liability Law to Hess’ claim through maritime law. Justice Stewart cited precedent that wrongful deaths in state territorial waters were not judged under maritime law’s standards of duty, but rather under the substantive standards of state law. He argued that it would be an anomaly to allow states to create a right of action for death, but not to allow them to determine the circumstances under which that right exists. Justice Stewart refused to answer whether a state wrongful death act might offend traditional principles of maritime law, noting that the ELL was in some ways more in consonance with general maritime law principles than the WDA.
Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo Black, Justice William Douglas and Justice William Brennan concurred. They argued for the evenhanded application of the Court’s recent ruling in Tungus v. Skovgaard, but took issue with that case’s holding that the federal maritime wrongful death duty depended on the substantive law of a given state.
Justice John Harlan dissented, joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter. Justice Harlan noted that Oregon imposed a higher standard of duty for wrongful deaths on its navigable waters, but that the normal lesser maritime duty applied to injuries short of death. He argued that the Court should not impose a state standard of duty higher than the general maritime duty unless that state explicitly required it.
Justice Charles Whittaker also dissented, joining Justice Harlan’s dissent except for its implication that wrongful deaths on the navigable waters of a state are ever governed by the general substantive tort laws of that state.


Ephram Nestor immigrated to the United States from Bulgaria in 1913 and became eligible for old-age benefits in 1955. In 1956, he was deported for having been a member of the Communist Party in the 1930s. When he was deported, his old-age benefits were terminated and notice was given to his wife, who remained in the country and was eligible to receive his benefits. Nestor sued in district court and argued that the termination of his benefits violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in that it deprived him of an accrued property right. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Nestor, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare directly appealed to the Supreme Court.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59985.xml


No. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Social Security system was meant to be a form of long-term social insurance that has to constantly adapt to the demands of a changing workforce, which prevents it from fitting within the framework of the right to accrued property. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only bars government action that is arbitrary or lacking in rational justification, neither of which is true in this case. The Court also held that the termination of benefits was not punitive but rather the “denial of a non-contractual government benefit.”
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that, because Nestor had been paying into the Social Security fund before he began receiving benefits, the government’s termination of his benefits was effectively depriving him of his property without just compensation. He also argued that both the deportation and termination of Nestor’s benefits, based solely on the fact that he was a member of the Communist Party 20 years previously when it was not illegal to do so, imposes an ex post facto law on him. In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice William O. Douglas argued that receiving Social Security benefits is a right earned by years of working and paying into the system, which Nestor did. The deprivation of those rights is a punishment that should only be reserved for those convicted of a crime. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., also wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the deprivation of Social Security benefits for certain offenses constituted a punishment without judicial trial in violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.


United States v. Republic Steel Corporation

Republic Steel Corporation, International Harvester Company, and Interlake Iron Corporation operated steel mills on the banks on the Calumet River. Their manufacturing processes produced industrial waste. Water containing waste was recycled back into the river. Most of the solid waste was separated and disposed of, but liquid and small particles were dumped into the river. Over time, these small particles reduced the river depth from 21 feet to less than 9 feet in some places. The Rivers and Waters Act prohibits the “creation of any obstruction....to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States.” The statue does allow for certain exceptions authorized by the Secretary of the Army. The United States sued the steel companies for creating an obstruction by dumping their industrial waste. The district court granted an injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the waste deposits did not constitute an “obstruction” under the Act and even if it did, an injunction was not permitted.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59989.xml


Yes, yes. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the deposits were an obstruction within the meaning of the act and were not exempt. The Court also held that the district court was authorized to issue an injunction against the steel companies.
Justice John M. Harlan dissented, arguing that the majority incorrectly interpreted the Rivers and Waters Act. He argued that “obstruction” only referred to certain kinds of obstruction, not including industrial waste. Justice Felix Frankfurter, Justice Charles E. Whittaker, and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corporation

In April of 1953, Daniel J. Sentilles, an engineer specializing in marine refrigeration, left the port of Santa Mara, Colombia, aboard the S.S. Montego to assist the ship in transporting bananas to Miami, Florida. The ship experienced rough waters during the journey, and on one occasion, Sentilles was knocked off his feet and washed across the deck by a large wave. The next day he developed a cough and other flu-like symptoms that persisted for several days. From Miami, he traveled to New Orleans, where he was treated for an acute case of pulmonary tuberculosis. Sentilles sued the owner of the S.S. Montego, the Inter-Shipping Corporation (“Shipping”), in federal district court under the Jones Act, which regulates U.S. shipowners. Sentilles argued that the accident aboard the S.S. Montego activated or aggravated a dormant tuberculosis infection. At trial, three medical specialists suggested that the accident could have caused the tuberculosis flare-up. A jury found in favor of Sentilles and awarded him $20,000 in damages. On appeal, Shipping argued that the evidence did not justify the jury’s conclusion. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted Shipping’s argument and reversed the judgment. Sentilles argued that the appellate court applied an improper standard of review by failing to consider the reasonableness of the judgment reached by the jury.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\59992.xml


Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the testimony of the medical specialists supported the reasonableness of the judgment in favor of Sentilles. The Court noted that the role of the appellate court is not to independently review the evidence, but rather is limited to considering the reasonableness of decisions reached in the lower tribunal.
Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the Court’s opinion. Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote a concurring opinion in which he noted that the record contained evidence that the accident actually caused the tuberculosis. In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Potter Stewart disagreed with the Court’s standard of review and instead reversed the appellate court upon an independent examination of the record. He also argued that the Court should not grant certiorari to cases in which the sufficiency of the evidence is the sole question before the Court.
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a dissent in which he agreed with Justice Stewart’s conclusion that the Court should not hear these types of cases. Rather than deciding the case, Justice Frankfurter argued that the Court should have dismissed its writ of certiorari after the parties’ oral arguments.


Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc.

The owners and a majority of the patrons of Crown Kosher Super Market are members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which forbids shopping on the Sabbath, from sundown Friday until sundown on Saturday. Crown Kosher Super Market had previously been open for business on Sundays, on which it conducted about one- third of its weekly business. In 1962, the Massachusetts’ Legislature enacted a statute forbidding shops to be open and doing any labor, business, or work on Sunday. The Crown Kosher Super Market argued this provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it does not respect their religious practices. The federal district court held that this provision is unconstitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the provision does not prohibit the free exercise of religion.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60043.xml


No. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The court held that statutes requiring stores to stay closed on Sundays do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the statute in question does not prohibit the free exercise of religion. A statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause simply because in practice it results in some inequality. The Court also concluded the statute was not for religious purposes, as the defendants contested.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered a dissenting opinion arguing the Sunday closing statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because one religion is economically disadvantaged by it. In his separate dissent, Justice Potter Stewart agreed with Justice Brennan’s dissent and added that making a citizen chose between his faith and economic survival is a cruel choice as well as unconstitutional.


In 1943, Peter Meyer took out life insurance policies in his own name worth $50,000. He pledged his insurance policies to Huntington National Bank of Columbus, Ohio as collateral security for a loan. This gave the bank the right to satisfy its claim out of the 'net proceeds of the policy when it becomes a claim by death.' After Peter Meyer pledged the policies to the bank, the United States determined that he owed $6,159.09 plus interest in unpaid taxes. The United States filed notice of tax lien on July 11, 1955.
Peter Meyer died on December 28, 1955, owing $26,844.66 to Huntington National Bank. Ethel Meyer, the petitioner and Peter Meyer's widow, was named executrix of his estate and received $441.21, representing the remainder of the full cash surrender from Peter Meyer's insurance policies after payment to the bank.
The United States brought suit against Ethel Meyer under 26 U.S.C.A. 6321 and 6322, arguing that it should be compensated for the full tax lien by marshalling the funds already paid to Huntington National Bank. At trial, Ethel Meyer argued that she owed nothing to the government because she was not personally liable for Peter Meyer's tax lien. She also argued that the tax lien did not and could not attach to the net proceeds of the cash surrender because those proceeds would be exempt under New York Insurance Law.
District court Judge Edmund Palmieri held that the government was entitled to recover the full tax lien through the insurance policy's full cash surrender. The court relied on United States v. Behrens, where the court ordered a defendant to pay both a bank lien and tax lien from the same cash surrender. Although most of Peter Meyer's cash surrender was pledged to the bank for the payment of loans, this did not preclude the government from collecting on its full tax lien first. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed in a per curiam ruling. The court agreed that Behrens controlled the case.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60053.xml


No. Justice Thomas Whittaker, writing for the majority in a 6-3 decision, held that New York state law controlled the case; New York exempted the net proceeds of insurance policy cash surrenders from attaching to tax liens. There was not clear guidance in federal law on this matter, whereas New York law protected the cash surrender in question. As the priority of liens is then determined by "first in time first in right," the United States did not have a right to marshal the cash surrender to recover its tax lien because the bank's debt had priority.
Justice Byron White, joined by Justices John Harlan and Potter Stewart, dissented. He argued that federal law should control the case to avoid inconsistent results in different states; once a tax lien has attached to a taxpayer's interests, federal law then determines the priority of liens. He also disputed the majority's interpretation of New York law, and did not find a clear, consistent policy of protecting the net proceeds of insurance policies' cash surrenders from creditors.


In August 1958 William H. Burton, an African American, entered the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, a restaurant leasing space within a parking garage operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority, and was denied service solely because of his race. The Parking Authority is a tax-exempt, private corporation created by legislative action of the City of Wilmington for the purpose of operating the city's parking facilities, and its construction projects are partially funded by contributions from the city. The Parking Authority provided the restaurant heating and gas services and maintained the premises at its own expense. Burton filed suit seeking an injunction preventing the restaurant from operating in a racially discriminatory manner on the ground that doing so violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state court granted the injunction but was reversed on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60060.xml


In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the Court concluded that the restaurant, as a recipient of assistance by the parking authority, benefited from the city's aid and constituted an financially integral and indispensable part of the state. As such, the Court found that the restaurant and the parking authority were so physically and financially intertwined that the private entity's conduct could be imputed to the government. Thus, it’s discrimination could be considered state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Whittaker, dissented. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate dissenting opinion.


Aro Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Company, Inc.

Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc. obtained a patent for a “convertible folding top with automatic seal at rear quarter.” The folding top included a flexible top fabric, supporting structure, and a sealing mechanism. None of those parts were individually patented. Convertible Top sued Aro Manufacturing Co., Inc. for direct and contributory patent infringement for manufacturing and selling replacement fabric designed to fit the patented device. After trial, the district court ruled in favor of Convertible Top and enjoined Aro from further manufacture or distribution of the fabric replacements. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60076.xml


No. Justice Charles E. Whittaker, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that because Convertible Top did not patent the fabric top individually, there was no direct patent infringement. With no direct infringement, there could be no contributory infringement. The patent only covered the combination of parts that made up the folding top, not each individual part that made up that top. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred, writing that the other concurring opinion and the dissenting opinion were unnecessarily confusing.
Justice William J. Brennan concurred in the result, arguing that there was no infringement because the cost of the replacement top in comparison with the device as a whole was so small made replacing the top a permissible repair instead of a reconstruction. Justice John M. Harlan dissented, arguing that the replacement of an unpatented part in a patented device is a forbidden reconstruction of the device. This constitutes direct patent infringement. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


Peter Chaunt, a Hungarian native, came to the United States in 1921 at the age of 22. He became a U.S. citizen in 1940, one year after filing a petition for naturalization with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). In 1953, the Government filed a complaint, which alleged that Chaunt had concealed and misrepresented his arrest record in his application for citizenship, and sought to revoke his naturalization. The district court held that Chaunt had concealed his membership in the Communist Party and three arrests in Connecticut for distributing handbills, violating park regulations, and committing a breach of the peace. All of the arrests occurred more than ten years prior to Chaunt’s naturalization. The district court cancelled the order granting citizenship to Chaunt, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60079.xml


No. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Government failed to show by “clear, unequivocal and convincing” evidence that Chaunt either concealed facts warranting a denial of citizenship or that their disclosure would have led to the discovery of other facts warranting a denial of citizenship. The arrests did not justify revocation of Chaunt’s citizenship because each arrest occurred outside the statutory requirement of demonstrated good moral character for five years prior to a petition for naturalization, and the charges did not involve moral turpitude. Noting Chaunt’s disclosure of his employment with the International Workers’ Order, an organization purportedly controlled by Communists, the Court declined to find that disclosure of the arrests might have led the INS to discover that Chaunt once served as a district organizer of the Communist Party in Connecticut.
Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act only requires that the Government prove that Chaunt’s conduct blocked an investigation that might have resulted in the rejection of his application. He argued that the Government satisfied this test by showing that Chaunt intentionally concealed his arrest record because the INS could have rejected his application if it had discovered this misconduct prior to the court’s naturalization order. Justice Charles E. Whittaker and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


Knetsch purchased annuity savings bonds from Sam Houston Life Insurance Company. In return, the company gave Knetsch loans and an annuity contract that would produce monthly annuity payments upon maturity. However, Knetsch kept borrowing from the insurance company in amounts that kept the net cash value of the annuity so low that it could produce no financial benefit other than tax deductions. Knetsch claimed payments to the insurance company as interest paid on indebtedness. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions and determined a deficiency amount for each of the two years in question. After paying the deficiency, Knetsch brought suit to obtain a refund in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The court ruled in favor of United States, holding that the transaction was a sham because it did not create "indebtedness" and, therefore, there was "no commercial economic substance" beyond the tax deductions. The U.S. Appeals Court for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60081.xml


No. In a 6-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote for the majority affirming the lower court's decision that the transaction was a sham. The loans the insurance company gave Knetsch were essentially rebates for a substantial portion of the interest payments and the small amount kept by the company was its fee for providing a "façade of loans" to be used to provide tax deductions. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, saying that as long as a transaction is allowed within the limits of insurance policies it should be recognized by the Internal Revenue Service, and any remedy should be left to the legislature.


Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60083.xml


In an opinion authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the majority brushed aside First Amendment issues and declared that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a state court. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.
Justices Black and Douglas concurred.
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment but agreed fully with Part I of Justice Harlan's dissent and expressed no view as to the merits of the constitutional issue.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, wrote a dissenting opinion.


An act of the Alabama legislature re-drew the electoral district boundaries of Tuskegee, replacing what had been a region with a square shape with a twenty-eight sided figure. The effect of the new district was to exclude essentially all blacks from the city limits of Tuskegee and place them in a district where no whites lived.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60103.xml


A state violates the Fifteenth Amendment when it constructs boundary lines between electoral districts for the purpose of denying equal representation to African Americans.
The unanimous Court held that the Alabama legislature violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter admitted that states are insulated from judicial review when they exercise power "wholly within the domain of state interest." However, in this case, Alabama's representatives were unable to identify "any countervailing municipal function" the act was designed to serve. The Court believed that the irregularly shaped district was drawn with only one purpose in mind: to deprive blacks of political power.


Frank Wilkinson was summoned to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for questioning before a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. The subcommittee was investigating Communist propaganda in the southern United States. Wilkinson refused to answer any questions, including whether he was a member of the Communist Party. He did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and argued instead that the subcommittee had no authority to interrogate him. Wilkinson also argued that he was only called before the subcommittee because of his public opposition to the Un-American Activities Committee. Wilkinson was incited and convicted for contempt of Congress. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60118.xml


Yes, Yes. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 5-4 majority affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the subcommittee’s investigation was clearly authorized by Congress. The question of whether Wilkin was a member of the Communist Party was relevant to the inquiry so Wilkinson was obligated to answer. The reasons why Wilkinson was called before the committee were irrelevant to the decision.
Justice Hugo L. Black dissented, arguing that an investigation of those who criticize the Un-American Activities Committee is unconstitutional. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent. Justice Douglas dissented separately, arguing that Congress did not authorize the type of investigation that took place. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black joined in the dissent. Justice William J. Brennan dissented, arguing that the primary purpose of questioning Wilkinson was to expose him for the sake of exposure, rather than to aid lawmaking. Justice Douglas joined in the dissent.


Roy R. Torcaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public by the Governor of Maryland, but he could not receive his commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God as the Maryland Constitution required. He sued for his commission in the Maryland Circuit Court on the grounds that the requirement violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The circuit court rejected his claims and the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60119.xml


Yes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that such a requirement places the state of Maryland firmly on the side of those people who believe in God and are willing to state their belief. With this requirement, Maryland effectively aids religions that profess a belief in God at the expense of any other form of belief or disbelief. The First Amendment expressly prohibits a state from taking this position. Although the candidate has the option of not pursuing public office rather than declaring a belief in God, the test is an unconstitutional encroachment on the freedom of religion. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result.


On October 29, 1958, thirteen police officers, including Frank Pape, arrived at James Monroe's Chicago apartment at 5:45 A.M. The officers broke down the door, forced Monroe and his wife to stand naked in their living room, and ransacked the apartment. Afterwards, James Monroe was escorted to police quarters and held for ten hours on "open" charges while he was interrogated about a murder. The police did not have a warrant for the search or the arrest, and refused Monroe permission to call his attorney.
Monroe brought a complaint against each of the Chicago police officers individually and against the City of Chicago. The City of Chicago moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not liable under the Civil Rights Act nor for acts committed in performance of governmental functions. All defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that there was no cause of action under the Civil Rights Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60123.xml


Yes and No. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that the city police officers, in conducting an unreasonable search and seizure, had committed an action which was under the color of law, and that the police could be held liable individually under the Civil Rights Act. However, the majority further held that a municipality could not be liable under the Civil Rights Act. So, the court reversed the lower court's opinion insofar as it dismissed the Civil Rights Act claim against the police officers.
Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote a concurring opinion which Justice Potter Stewart joined. In his opinion, Justice Harlan discussed the difficulties in explaining the distinction between authorized or unauthorized deprivations of constitutional rights.
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a dissent arguing that a police officer who acts outside the law loses his authority under the law, making a state tort claim against individual officers more appropriate than a claim under the Civil Rights Act.


United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Company

In 1944, Congress authorized the construction of a dam on the Roanoke River and for that purpose sought to acquire a 1,840-acre easement from the 7,400-acre estate surrounding the Dan River, a tributary of the Roanoke River. The Virginia Electric Company owned 1,540 acres of the property in question that had been purchased from the estate owner in 1907 and would be part of the government’s easement. In 1951, the government reached an agreement with the estate owner to purchase the easement for one dollar and to officially acquire the land through a condemnation proceeding. The Virginia Electric Company, whose land was about to be taken in the easement, intervened to contest the issue of just compensation.
The district court awarded a substantial compensation to the Virginia Electric Company, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the decision in United States v. Twin City Power Company that held that the amount of compensation should not take into account the value of the land for water power purposes. On remand, the district court appointed commissioners to evaluate the value of the land and awarded $65,520 in compensation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60141.xml


Yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the land the government was taking for easement had market value, and the Fifth Amendment prevents the government from taking private property without compensation. The Court also held that the district court’s method of determining the value of the land was correct, but the determination of how much of that compensation is due to the Virginia Electric Company was not correct. The district court granted compensation based on the maximum possible value rather than the actual value based on land use.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the owner of the easement did not have rights to anything that gained value from the flow of the stream. However, the owner did have the rights to anything that was considered “property” under the Fifth Amendment and deserved to be justly compensated when the government takes that.
Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that compensation should be based on the value the land the owner had at the time the government took it. Because the Virginia Electric Company only owned that land in the hope that it would gain permission from the government to build a dam, the land had no value to the company when it was taken. He argued that the Fifth Amendment required compensation only based on what value the owner had lost rather than what the government has gained. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent.


Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts within the state.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60162.xml


In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan provided past examples in which the Court had intervened to correct constitutional violations in matters pertaining to state administration and the officers through whom state affairs are conducted. Brennan concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues which Baker and others raised in this case merited judicial evaluation.
Justices Douglas, Clark, and Stewart filed separate concurring opinions.
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented.


Paul and Pauline Poe, a married couple, decided to use contraceptives to prevent a fourth pregnancy after their first three children had died in infancy. Another woman, Jane Doe, sought to obtain access to contraceptives in order to forestall a second pregnancy that could be life-threatening. Since the late 1800s, Connecticut had prohibited the distribution and use of medical advice on contraceptives, although these laws were not regularly forced.. The Poes and Doe argued that the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60163.xml


The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Frankfurter, chose to dismiss the case because it involved the threatened and not actual application of the Connecticut law. Since there was no immediate injury, there was no standing to confer jurisdiction.
In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the plaintiffs should not be forced to break the law to get this vital information, even though the statutes are not regularly enforced. Courts should not require an actual arrest or prosecution before they review the constitutional rights at issue.
Justices Harlan II, Stewart, and Black all dissented in separate opinions.
Justice Brennan concurred.


Abraham Braunfeld owned a retail clothing and home furnishing store in Philadelphia. As an Orthodox Jew, he was prohibited by his faith from working on Saturday, the Sabbath. The Pennsylvania blue law only allowed certain stores to remain open for business on Sundays. Braunfeld's store was not one of those types allowed to be open. He challenged the law as a violation of the religious liberty clauses because he needed to be open six days a week for economic reasons and was prohibited from doing so by a tenet of his faith and the blue law.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60168.xml


In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Pennsylvania blue law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute; however, the freedom to act (even in accordance with religious convictions) is not totally free from government restrictions. The Court found that the Sunday Closing Law had a secular basis and did not make any religious practices unlawful. The blue law is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the state can accomplish its secular goal of providing a uniform day of rest for all through other means. That an indirect burden, such as economic sacrifice, may be a result of the statute, does not make the blue law unconstitutional.


Bruce Boynton, an African American law student, bought a Trailways bus ticket from Washington, D.C. to Montgomery, Alabama. The bus route went through Richmond, Virginia, where there was a 40-minute stop scheduled. Boynton entered the segregated restaurant in the bus station and sat on the side reserved for white customers. Both a waitress and a manager requested that Boynton move to the other side of the restaurant, and he explained that he was an interstate bus passenger and refused. A police officer arrived and arrested Boynton. He was tried, convicted, and fined for unlawfully remaining on the premises after being forbidden to do so.
Boynton appealed his conviction to the Hustings Court in Richmond where he filed a motion to dismiss and argued that his constitutional rights were violated. The Hustings Court denied the motion. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60178.xml


The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 should be interpreted to ban all forms of segregation by race in any type of public transportation.
Writing for the 7-2 majority, Justice Hugo L. Black concluded that, because the bus carrier provides the services of the terminal and its restaurant to the interstate passengers, these services must be subject to the same discrimination prohibitions as the transportation itself. Since the Interstate Commerce Act prohibits racial discrimination during travel, the same restrictions apply in the stations during stops.
Justice Charles E. Whittaker, joined by Justice Tom C. Clark, wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the restaurant was owned and operated by a private owner unaffiliated with the bus company. Without evidence that the bus company had control over the operation of the restaurant, there was no reason to hold the restaurant to the discrimination prohibitions laid out by the Interstate Commerce Act.


Several employes of a discount department store sold a few items, such as floor wax and loose-leaf notebooks, to customers on a Sunday. By doing so, they violated Maryland's blue laws which only allow certain items, such as drugs, tobacco, newspapers and some foodstuffs, to be sold on Sundays.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60188.xml


No. The Court found that the blue laws did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the employees allege only economic injury and not infringement on their own religious practices. The Court also found that the blue laws did not violate the division between church and state. Sunday closing laws started out to facilitate church attendance in colonial America; however, the present Maryland laws are based on secular rather than religious state interests. The laws are to improve the "health, safety, recreation, and general well-being" of citizens. The present purpose of the laws is to provide a uniform day of rest for all. The fact that this day is of particular significance for various Christian sects does not bar the State from achieving its secular goals.


In June, 1957, a Utah court entered a judgment against Harold Kesler for negligently operating a motor vehicle. When Kesler failed to pay the judgment for over sixty days, the judgment’s creditors, following Utah’s Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (UMVSRA), filed the unpaid judgments with Utah’s Department of Public Safety. As a result, the Department suspended Kesler’s driver’s license and vehicle registration until he paid his judgment.
In December, 1959 Kesler, who had still failed to pay the judgment, filed for bankruptcy in federal bankruptcy court. Although this released him from his judgment debts, the Department refused to restore his driver’s license and vehicle registration. The Department claimed that, under the UMVSRA, a bankruptcy proceeding will not release debts for negligently operating a motor vehicle.
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, affirmed the law and refused to both restore his license and to invalidate Utah’s law. A direct appeal to the United States’ Supreme Court followed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60218.xml


No. Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for the Court held that Utah’s law did not violate the Supremacy Clause. First, Justice Frankfurter noted that the states had compelling interests in promoting highway safety within their jurisdictions, citing to various measures taken to encourage safe driving throughout the United States. He also noted that most of these statutes did not allow drivers to discharge judgments against them for driving violations in bankruptcy. Justice Frankfurter held that, although the Bankruptcy Act relieved an individual’s obligations to pay certain debts, it did not remove the negative consequences that a state may place on those debts. To that end, a state may decide that, in order to promote safe driving, a judgment must be paid before an individual may regain driving privileges. Justice Potter Stewart concurred in part, but felt that the appeal was not properly before the Court. Chief Justice Earl Warren, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the initial three-judge panel at the District Court was improper and that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Finally, Justice Hugo L. Black, in his dissenting opinion argued that Utah’s statute took away rights conferred to all United State’s citizens under the Bankruptcy Act and, therefore, violated the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution.


Western Union Telegraph Company v. Pennsylvania

Western Union Telegraph Company, headquartered and incorporated in New York, processed money orders between people living in different states. This case concerns money orders between payors in Pennsylvania and payees in other states. Over the years, Western Union accumulated a large sum of money from payees who never claimed the money sent to them. Pennsylvania law states that when property goes unclaimed for seven years and the whereabouts of the owner are unknown, that property escheats to the state. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania started proceedings to escheat the unclaimed money. Western Union argued that Pennsylvania provided insufficient service of process, and had no power to protect Western Union from other states who might attempt to escheat the same money. The Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of Pennsylvania and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60222.xml


Yes, No answer. In a unanimous decision, Justice Hugo L. Black wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the lower judgment violated due process because Pennsylvania had no power to protect Western Union from other states making similar claims over the same money. In fact, the state of New York had already done just that. The Court also held that the U.S. Supreme Court is authorized by Article 3, §2 of the Constitution to resolve dispute between states. The Court stated that the service question was irrelevant because Pennsylvania didn’t have the power to enforce the judgment anyway.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurrence, disagreeing with the Court’s reasoning, and stating the New York was clearly entitled to the property involved.


In early December of 1957, Mark Coppedge broke into a pharmacy and stole property, including a check writer and a batch of blank money orders that he filled in, forged, and cashed. He was tried and convicted in district court a year later, but he appealed his conviction based on information that corrupted the jury. A newspaper published an article regarding a witness who was too afraid of Coppedge to testify, which was information relayed to the judge while the jury was out of the room, and the jury should not have known. Coppedge petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for permission to appeal in forma pauperis, which would free him from the obligation to pay court costs. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60223.xml


No. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-2 majority. The Court held that, since the Constitution guarantees the right to an appeal, the indigent petitioner must be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis if there is evidence of a legitimate issue to be considered on appeal. Additionally, the Court held that it is the responsibility of the legal system to ensure fair and speedy justice, which can often be difficult for poor defendants to access. Granting the in forma pauperis petition eliminates some of the hearings necessary for the case of a poor defendant to make it through the system and allows for increased efficiency.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the American justice system considers criminal appeals to be a right, and therefore the in forma pauperis provisions are not meant to be an extra obstacle to the appeals process. He also argued that, at times, the arguments to determine whether an appeal is frivolous could lead courts to make a determination on the merits before the appropriate time, which truncated the appeals process. He suggested that petitions for in forma pauperis appeals be accepted “as a matter of course” to remove such confusion. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.
Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent where he argued that the majority’s decision essentially overturned previous rulings by placing the burden on the government to prove the frivolity of the defendant’s appeal. He argued that the majority’s decision overstepped its bounds by remanding the case to the lower court, because the lower court had already found the case to be frivolous and dismissed the appeal. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent.
Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Byron R. White did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


Don Gilmore was the primary owner and managing officer of three different franchises of General Motors in California. In 1955, Don Gilmore and his wife, Dixie Gilmore, divorced. The trial court determined that the divorce was absolute without alimony for Dixie, which meant that Don successfully protected his assets from Dixie's claims that his assets were community property. Don's legal expenses totaled about $40,000 for the taxable years of 1953 and 1954. The Internal Revenue Code allows deductions from gross income for "ordinary and necessary expenses incurred during the taxable year for the conservation of property held for the production of income."
Gilmore sued in the Court of Claims to recover alleged overpayment of income taxes related to the legal expenses incurred during the divorce. The Court of Claims held that the legal expenses were attributable to Gilmore's successful resistance of his wife's claims to certain assets and were therefore deductible for federal income tax purposes. However, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue found that these expenditures were personal or family expenses and therefore not deductible. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question in the administration of the tax laws.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60237.xml


Yes. Justice John Marshall Harlan delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the origin and character of a claim with respect to expense incurred, rather than its potential consequences for the taxpayer, controls the basic test of whether an expense is classified as business or personal; therefore legal expenses are deductible as expenses incurred for conservation of property held for production of income. Dixie Gilmore's claims stemmed from the marital relationship and not from income-producing activity; therefore the claims in this case were personal, rather than business, expenses.
In their dissenting opinion, Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the majority opinion based its analysis on an unjustly narrow interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code. They argued that the legal expenses in this specific case should be considered business expenses.


Olga Zdanok and other individual employees of Glidden Company(Glidden) sought to recover damages for breach of collective bargaining agreement in New York state court, and then Glidden removed the case to federal district court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. Judge J. Warren Madden, an active judge on the Court of Claims at the time, granted the employees damages. Glidden argued that the guarantee in Article III of the Constitution that judges should hold their offices during good behavior meant that Judge Madden displayed a lack of appropriate judicial independence.
Previous judicial precedent had established that the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the United States Court of Claims were neither confined in jurisdiction nor protected in independence by Article III of the Constitution, but that there were created by other powers Congress possessed under Article I. Congress had since enacted statutes explicitly including the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Article III of the Constitution.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60247.xml


Yes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-2 majority. The Court held that the judges, including retired judges, of the United States Court of Claims and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are constitutionally protected in tenure and compensation under Article III of the Constitution. Congressional declarations made it clear that those judges are protected under Article III, although such clarification was relatively recent. The Court held that it was not strictly bound to follow past precedent but was able to reconsider cases in which Congressional declarations have negated the previous holdings.
Justice Byron R. White and Justice Felix Frankfurter did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.


In a number of consolidated cases from Louisiana, several defendants were convicted of disturbing the peace by sitting at lunch counters that were reserved for patrons of a different race and refusing to leave. Defendants alleged that their convictions were based upon no evidence of guilt and, therefore, denied them of due process of the law. Defendants were denied post-conviction relief in the state courts, and the Court granted certiorari.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60250.xml


Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, a state cannot apply its criminal statutes on disturbing the peace to non-violent protestors staging a sit-in to express opposition to segregation by race.
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the convictions violated defendants' rights to due process of law guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court found no evidence that defendants' quiet, peaceable sitting at the counter that would have supported a finding that their conduct would have foreseeably disturbed the public. The Court acknowledged that the state courts might have construed the statute more broadly to permit a finding of imminent public commotion caused by peaceful and orderly conduct. Nonetheless, the Court found no evidence to support a finding of disturbing the peace.
Justice William O. Douglas concurred on the ground that restaurants operating under a public license, though private enterprises, were public facilities in which a state may not constitutionally enforce a policy of racial segregation.
Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred in the judgment on the ground that the records in the present cases contained no evidence of disturbance or alarm in the behavior of the public.
Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the judgment on the grounds that the defendants' conduct, insofar as it occurred with the implied consent of the management, was a form of expression within the range of protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment which could in no event be punished by the state under a general breach of the peace statute; and that, in any event, the Louisiana statute, as applied, was unconstitutionally vague and uncertain.


Francisco Mendoza-Martinez (Martinez) was an American by birth with dual Mexican citizenship. Martinez admitted that to avoid the draft, in 1942, he left the United States for Mexico and did not return until November, 1946. As a result of his deliberate absence, Martinez entered a guilty plea in 1947 to violating Section 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (the "Act") and served 366 days in prison. Five years after his release, Martinez was issued an arrest and deportation warrant premised on a violation of Section 401(j) of the Act which divested draft dodgers of their U.S. citizenship. Following a dismissal of his appeal from the Attorney General's special inquiry decision stripping him of his U.S. citizenship, Martinez challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(j) in District Court but was defeated. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's opinion upholding the district court decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. This case was decided together with Rusk v. Cort.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60260.xml


Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court began by sustaining the validity of the Government's second action against Martinez since it addressed his lost of citizenship rather than revisiting his self-confessed draft evasion. The Court added, however, that although citizenship duties entail military service, the Government cannot divest citizens of their citizenship as a result of draft evasion alone. The imposition of such a drastic penalty, in the context of a reflexive statutory scheme, violates constitutional due process by denying subjects procedural safeguards such as the opportunity to experience a more incremental penal structure.


The State of Alaska threatened to enforce its anti-fish trapping law against two local Native American tribes. The federal government had not designated a reservation for the tribes. The tribes depended on the salmon they trapped for survival and received permits to use the traps from the Army Corps of Engineers and the United States Forest Service, as well as favorable regulations from the Secretary of the Interior. The president of the Kake Village Council was arrested while trying to moor a trap. The tribes sued to enjoin Alaska from enforcing the anti-trapping law. The district court dismissed the suit and the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60261.xml


No. In a 8-1 decision Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote for the majority affirming the Alaska court. The Supreme Court held that there was no statutory authority granting the Secretary of the Interior the power to regulate contrary to state law. In addition, the permits did not trump state law. In order to prevent undue hardship, the Court ordered that the Native American tribes be allowed to continue using the traps through the end of the 1962 fishing season. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a partial dissent, agreeing that the Alaska law should prevail, but disagreeing with allowing the tribes to continue to use traps through the end of the 1962 season.


A Florida statute automatically exempted women from jury duty and did not place women on jury lists. Women could, however, volunteer and register for jury duty. After an all-male jury convicted Mrs. Hoyt for murdering her husband, she appealed the decision to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Court upheld the conviction.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60266.xml


In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the statute was based on a reasonable classification and was therefore constitutional. Noting that women were "still regarded as the center of home and family life," the Court found that the states could relieve them from the civic responsibility of jury duty unless they themselves determined that such service was consistent with their own "special responsibilities." The Court held that the case was distinct from other cases involving racial discrimination in jury selection, and that male-female disproportions on jury lists carried no constitutional significance.


The general maritime law of the United States has long obliged ship owners to indemnify seamen against expenses of injury or illness suffered while on the job aboard ship. An ill or injured seaman is entitled to "maintenance and cure," that is, to compensation by his employer for the expenses of his medical treatment and subsistence (i.e., room and board) while convalescing ashore. (Until 1982, a seaman could obtain free medical attention from the US Public Health Service. In such a case, the USPHS effectively relieved the seaman's employer of the duty of cure.)
At discharge, after two voyages on S.S. National Liberty, seaman Clifford Vaughan got a hospitalization certificate from the master, N.J. Atkinson. Vaughan then spent three months in a USPHS hospital and two years as an outpatient undergoing treatment for tuberculosis. The ship owner ignored Vaughan's request for maintenance as an outpatient. For a while before obtaining clearance to return to duty, Vaughan worked ashore as a cab driver. Later, he sued unsuccessfully in federal district court for maintenance and for damages from the ship owner's failure to promptly pay, including his attorney's fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60271.xml


Yes and yes. In a 5-2 opinion for the Court, Justice William O. Douglas held that allowing offset would encourage callous ship owners to refuse maintenance and cure. Moreover, courts in admiralty have adequate equity power to treat attorney's fees as damages from failure to pay maintenance (and cure) when it was a willful breach of duty.
Justice Potter Stewart, joined by Justice John Marshall Harlan II, dissented. While there should be no duty to mitigate, wages should be offset when actually earned. The duty to pay maintenance and cure was created to make the seaman whole, not afford him a windfall.


William Douglas and Bennie Will Meyes, two indigent men, were arrested and charged with thirteen felonies, including armed robbery and assault with intent to commit murder. A single public defender represented both defendants. The public defender asked the trial court for a continuance because he was unprepared, there was a conflict of interest between the two defendants, and Douglas requested a new attorney. The judge denied the request for a continuance. The defendants then requested that the public defender be removed from the case. The judge granted that request but denied their request to appoint a new attorney. The defendants completed the trial without any representation. A jury found the defendants guilty of all thirteen felonies.
The defendants appealed. The Second District Court of Appeals for California’s Third District did not appoint counsel to represent the defendants, because, based on their review of the record, appointing counsel would add no benefit to the defendants’ case. Following this decision, that court affirmed the trial court’s decision.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60274.xml


Yes, the trial court’s refusal violated the defendants’ equal protection rights. Justice William Douglas delivered the opinion of a 6-3 majority. The Court held that California’s treatment of defendants changed depending on whether the defendant could afford counsel. Indigent defendants, potentially with “hidden merit” in their appeals, could not meaningfully appeal convictions when courts conducted reviews without input from the defendant’s attorney. When indigent defendants, unable to afford attorneys, were forced to show preliminarily merit for their appeal before a court appoints counsel, they were denied due process. Instead, California’s practice amounted to rich v. poor discrimination.
Justice Tom C. Clark dissented and argued that, because over 96% of prison appeals frivolously clog the court systems, California’s procedure balances defendants’ rights with state needs. Justice John M. Harlan, joined by Justice Potter Stewart, wrote a separate dissent. They argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Equal Protection Clause, should have governed this issue. Because California adequately balanced state and defendant rights, the state did not violate the Due Process Clause.


Police arrested Hom Way for possession of heroin. While under arrest, Way told police that a man named “Blackie Toy” once sold him an ounce of heroin at his laundry on Leavenworth St. Later that day, police found a laundry run by James Wah Toy. Nothing on the record identified Toy as “Blackie Toy”, but police arrested him anyway. Police then went to Toy’s house where they arrested Johnny Yee and found several tubes containing less than one ounce of heroin. Police also arrested Wong Sun. Police interrogated the men and wrote statements in English for them to sign. Both men refused, citing errors in the statements. At trial in U.S. District Court, Toy and Sun were convicted on federal narcotics charges. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60280.xml


No, No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court and remanding for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the police did not have probable cause to justify the arrests. With regard to Toy, the court should exclude all evidence found during the search because they are the “fruits” of an unlawful search. The unsigned statement was not corroborated, so it gave no basis for conviction. Sun’s unsigned confession and evidence against him were admissible.
Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent, stating that the arrests were lawful and there was no reason to grant Sun a new trial. Justices James M. Harlan, Potter Stewart, and Byron R. White joined in the dissent.


Brown Shoe Company, Inc. v. United States

When Brown Shoe Company bought Kinney Company Inc., the United States sued Brown for antitrust violations of the Clayton Act. The United States argued that the merger would substantially lessen competition in the shoe manufacturing and sales industries. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri ruled in favor of the United States. The court ordered Brown to divest itself of all Kinney stock and assets and to operate Kinney as separately as possible pending complete divestiture. The court gave Brown 90 days to come up with a plan for complete divestiture. The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal under the Expediting Act, which allows direct appeal of final district court judgments.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60287.xml


Yes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the unanimous opinion of the court affirming the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s judgment was final, despite the pending plan for divestiture. The Court also held that the district court's findings on the effect of the merger on competition were correct. Justice Tom C. Harlan wrote a concurrence, stating that the effect of the merger was much broader than the district court found. Justice John M. Harlan dissented in part, concurring in the judgment, but finding that the district court’s judgment was not final, so direct appeal was not proper. Justices Byron R. White and Felix Frankfurter did not participate.


The Federal Tobacco Inspection Act provides uniform standards for classification and inspection of tobacco. The regulations under the Act require sellers to identify type 14 tobacco with a blue tag. The Georgia Tobacco Identification Act requires sellers to mark the same type of tobacco with a white tag. Several owners and operators of tobacco warehouses in Georgia sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia to enjoin enforcement of the Georgia law. The three judge court granted the injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60291.xml


Yes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Court held that Congress had the power to regulate tobacco sales through the Commerce Clause. By enacting the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act, Congress preempted the states from regulating in that area of commerce, so the identification provision of the Georgia Tobacco Identification Act is invalid. Justice Hugo L. Black dissented, writing that Congress did not intend to preclude this area of regulation with the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act. The Georgia statute was valid because it did not conflict with the federal act. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent.


On August 24, 1954, William Link sued Wabash Railroad company over injuries he received when his car ran into a Wabash Railroad train at a crossing. After six years of motions, a pretrial hearing was set for October 12, 1960. On October 11, 1960, Link’s attorney contacted the Wabash Railroad attorney to inform him that he was doing work in Indianapolis and would miss a deposition that was set to happen before the hearing. The next morning, Link’s lawyer called the courthouse to notify the judge that he was detained in Indianapolis filing papers for a case before the Iowa Supreme Court. He said he could not make it to court that day but was available both of the next two days. Two hours after the pretrial was supposed to start, the court found that Link’s lawyer had not provided a sufficient reason for missing the hearing and dismissed the case “for failure to prosecute the action.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60292.xml


Yes. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the decision of the 4-3 majority. The Court held that a court has the right to clear its calendar of cases that have been dormant because of inaction on the part of the plaintiff without any motion from the defense. This right has long been understood as one of the inherent powers of the court and no law explicitly restricts it. The Court also held that there are circumstances where a lack of a chance for argument does not violate the right to due process. In this case, the plaintiff voluntarily chose a lawyer with potential time conflicts, and both sides had plenty of notice about the hearing.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent where he argued that the majority’s decision essentially punished the plaintiff by forcing him to accept the loss of his property without due process. He found that the court’s decision relied solely on the lawyer’s failure to appear, rather than any other want of prosecution in the history of the case. Instead, the lawyer’s attempts to contact the court and reschedule the hearing clearly indicated a desire to continue the prosecution of the case. He also argued that to punish the client for the sins of the lawyer placed an enormous and unfair burden on the client to oversee the work of his attorney. Chief Justice Earl Warren joined in the dissent.
Justice William O. Douglas also dissented.
Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Byron R. White did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


The Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company were both large distributors of milk products based in Chicago, Illinois. Each company sold dairy products to retail stores under a plan that gave independent stores discounts on the list prices based on the volume of the independent stores' purchases, up to a specified maximum discount. The dairies granted grocery chain stores a flat discount, without reference to the volume of their purchases, at a rate substantially higher than the maximum discount available to independent grocery stores.
The government brought a Section 2(a) Clayton Act suit against The Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company, seeking an injunction against selling milk products at prices which discriminated between the independent groceries and the chain groceries. Each company conducted its own cost study in an attempt to demonstrate that the differences in pricing between independent groceries and chain groceries were due to actual cost differences. The cost studies demonstrated that it was less costly on average to sell to chain stores. So, the dairy companies argued that the price discrimination was justified by the cost justification proviso of the Clayton Act.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the Government's suit, concluding that the cost differences demonstrated by the two companies' cost studies were sufficient to justify the price discrimination. The United States appealed the District Court's decision.

D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\xml_data\60296.xml


No, Justice Tom C. Clark, wrote the opinion of the Court reversing and remanding the lower court's decision. Writing for himself and five other justices, Clark maintained that the cost studies submitted by the two dairy companies did not satisfy their burden of showing that their respective discriminatory pricing plans reflected only a due allowance for cost differences. Clark recognized that eliminating class pricing would be impractical, but emphasized that customer classifications could not be arbitrary and that members of a class must have such similarity as to make the averaging of the cost of dealing with the class a valid and reasonable indication of the cost of dealing with any specific member of the class. Since Borden and Bowman did not show sufficient homogeneity within the class of chain groceries or within the class of independent groceries, the price discrimination between the two classes was illegal under the Clayton Act.
Justice William O. Douglas voted with the majority and wrote a concurring opinion, which emphasized the purpose of the anti-trust acts. Douglas stated that the Clayton Act should be read in a way that preserves as much of traditional free enterprise as possible, by controlling practices such as unfair discounting, which could lead to unfair competitive advantage and monopoly.
Justice Marshall Harlan dissented. Harlan stated that the cost studies submitted to the district court were adequate under the accepted principles of the law in this field. He agreed with the District Court's conclusion that the studies were conscientiously prepared and appeared to justify the price discrimination arising from the discount practices. As such, Harlan would have affirmed the lower court's opinion.
Justice Felix Frankfurter took no part in this decision.