No. The Court ruled that Section 1983 relief for prosecution without probable cause is only valid if the prosecuted party claims Fourth Amendment (pretrial rights) violations. In a 7-2 decision authored by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Courtt reaffirmed its commitment not to extend substantive due process indefinitely and held that substantive due process does not guarantee non-interference by criminal investigations.


Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

In 1989, Oregon Legislature imposed a surcharge on solid waste generated out-of-state and disposed of within the state. The Department of Environmental Quality, determined the amount of the surcharge to be $2.25 per ton, significantly higher than the $0.85 per ton fee charged for in-state waste. Two waste disposal companies —Waste Systems Inc. and Columbia Resource Company (CRC) — disposed of waste generated out-of-state in Oregon. Waste Systems Inc. managed and owned a landfill in Oregon, and CRC transported waste from Washington State to Oregon. The companies challenged the surcharge in the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing that it breached the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. However, the appellate court upheld the surcharge, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.

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Yes. In a majority decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court noted that the Commerce Clause prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, and a regulation is discriminatory if it "taxes a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines." The majority determined that the surcharge was clearly discriminatory because waste disposal companies were required to pay three times more to dispose of waste produced out-of-state. Thus, for the surcharge to comply with the Commerce Clause, the Department of Environmental Quality needed to demonstrate that it had no choice but to use discriminatory means to serve some local purpose, but it failed to do so. Consequently, the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court was reversed.


Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall

Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) employee James Gottshall observed a fellow worker, Richard Johns, die of a heart attack while on duty. Gottshall's boss postponed seeking medical assistance during Johns' heart attack, insisted that the crew keep working, and left the body at the work site for the remainder of the work day. Shortly after Johns's death, Gottshall was admitted to a psychiatric institution. Gottshall sued Conrail under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for exposing him to distressing circumstances which he claimed caused his illness. A District Court rejected the suit.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and found that Gottshall's injuries were "genuine and severe." The Third Circuit contrasted the liberal injury recovery policy embodied in FELA over the more limited injury relief recovery policy embodied in common law standards, which often applied harsh tests to prove employee injury.
Conrail employee Alan Carlisle also filed a FELA action against Conrail. He claimed that Conrail subjected him to unsafe working conditions, which caused him stress and lead to health problems. Because the stress related health problems were foreseeable to Conrail, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment for Carlisle.

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No. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a 7-2 Court. The Court categorized FELA emotional stress claims closely with common law treatments of emotional stress claims. The Court rejected the Third Circuit's assertion that common law tests were arbitrary and could be disregarded. Instead, common law standards should be used to verify claims filed under FELA. The Court adopted the "zone of danger test" from common law, which limits relief to those employees who sustain physical injury resulting from emotional stress caused by employer negligence. The Court held that this test would best distinguish between genuine and fraudulent claims, and provide relief in the case of injury. The Court rejected the Third Circuit's holding that employers were liable for causing foreseeably stressful conditions, reasoning that this would extend to many types of everyday employment.


C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown

A New York town, Clarkstown, allowed a contractor to construct and operate a waste processing plant within town limits. The revenue from the plant would help compensate the contractor. Clarkstown promised that the plant would receive 120,000 tons of solid waste each year, and permitted the contractor to charge an $81 "tipping fee" for each ton received. To meet the 120,000 ton quota, Clarkstown adopted a "flow control ordinance." The ordinance required that all solid waste flowing into and out of the town pass through the new plant. C & A Carbone, Inc. operated a similar plant within the town. To avoid paying the $81 fee, Carbone trucked processed waste directly to an Indiana landfill. In 1991, a Carbone truck carrying illegal waste crashed and police discovered that Carbone was violating the ordinance. Clarkstown sued Carbone in a New York Supreme Court. Carbone responded by suing Clarkstown in a federal District Court, claiming that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause by disrupting interstate commerce. The District Court agreed but dissolved its injunction against Clarkstown when the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of Clarkstown.

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Yes. Tthe Court held 6-3 that the Commerce Clause invalidates local laws that discriminate against interstate commerce, disrupt the flow of articles of commerce, and grant municipalities disproportionate market gains. In an opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court found that "the article of commerce...is the service of processing and disposing of [waste]." The Court held that the flow ordinance was discriminatory because "[i]t hoards solid waste...for the benefit of the preferred processing facility." For the ordinance to be constitutional, the municipality would have had to prove that its effects on commerce are nondiscriminatory and justified by a "legitimate local interest."


BFP, a partnership formed by two private investors, bought a home in Newport Beach, CA in 1987. BFP secured the property by obtaining a deed of trust from Imperial Savings Association (Imperial). Imperial owned the property until BFP could pay off the amount borrowed. BFP defaulted on loan repayment and Imperial proceeded to sell the property for $433,000 to settle the loan (foreclosure). Before the title of ownership transferred to the buyer, BFP filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. BFP asked bankruptcy court to nullify the original foreclosure sale because the home was valued at over $725,000. BFP argued that the low sales price constituted a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. Section 548(a)(2)(A), which guarantees that debtors receive "reasonably equivalent value" for property foreclosed. BFP claimed "reasonably equivalent value" was equal to the market value of the property in question. The bankruptcy court denied BFP's claim, and a District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

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No. In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, The Court ruled 5-4 that the value received for a property at a foreclosure sale can be reasonable even if it is different from the "fair market value." A foreclosure sale alters market conditions and can lower a property's selling price. If a foreclosure sale is necessary to settle a debt, the price at which the property is sold is reasonable so long as "all the requirements of the State's foreclosure law have been complied with."


Teresa Harris was sexually harassed by her employer. She filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the harassment created an "abusive work environment" in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employer countered that the harassment had not been severe enough to seriously affect her psychologically or impair her ability to work, and that it therefore did not create an abusive work environment under the meaning of Title VII. The district court agreed, stating that the decision was a "close case" but that the harassment had not been severe enough to create an abusive work environment in violation of the Act. A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's decision.

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No. In an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court found that the district court had been wrong to focus on whether or not the harassment had caused "concrete psychological harm." Instead, Justice O'Connor wrote that the court should have focused on whether the conduct was hostile or abusive. "Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well being, but the statute is not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive... there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious (in order to find that it violates Title VII)."


Three days after his arrest by local police on state narcotics charges, Pedro Alvarez-Sanchez confessed to the Secret Service that federal reserve notes found in his home were counterfeit. When he was subsequently charged with the federal offense of possession of counterfeit currency, Alvarez defended himself by claiming that the delay between his arrest on state charges and his presentment on the federal charge rendered his confession inadmissible. Alvarez cited 18 U.S.C. Section 3501(c), which pronounced separate charge-based confessions inadmissible if obtained after the first six hours of detention. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's decision to uphold the confession, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.

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No. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the provisions of the federal statute in question do not apply to suspects being held solely on state charges. The Court explained that no delay is said to occur until the suspect is arrested and detained for a federal crime. The six-hour period only begins to expire from the point of a suspect's federal arrest and charging. In this case, Alvarez-Sanchez was presented before a federal judge within six hours of his arrest on a federal counterfeit charge. The fact that he was held for some two and a half days prior has no bearing on his federal status under the statute since he was detained on state and local charges only during this time.


Central Bank of Denver , N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver , N. A.

In 1986 and 1988, the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority issued $26 million worth of bonds to fund public improvements and residential and commercial developments. The Central Bank of Denver served as a trustee on the bonds. In 1988, there was concern that the land was no longer worth 160% of the value of the bonds’ outstanding principals and interests as required by the bond covenant. Before a review was completed, the Public Building Authority defaulted on the bonds.
First Interstate Bank of Denver and the other respondents had purchased $2.1 million of the bonds, and after the default, sued for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The respondents argued that Central Bank was also liable for aiding and abetting the violations. Central Bank petitioned the district court for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.

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No. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Securities Exchange Act only prohibits manipulative or deceitful actions, and it can only be used to prosecute such actions. Since the charge of aiding and abetting is not directly covered in the statute, companies cannot be liable for such actions. The Court also held that if Congress intended the statute to be used in such a way, it would have added a section that specifically addressed the issue.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the judicial history of similar cases showed that those who aid and abet in violations of the Securities Exchange Act are considered liable. He also argued that, given the liberal background to the construction of the Act, it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended it to have a broad applicability. Justices Harry A. Blackmun, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.


Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman

Following Missouri's imposition of a 1.5% statewide "use tax," the Associated Industries of Missouri - representing Missouri businesses that had to collect the tax and a manufacturing firm that had to pay it - filed suit alleging that the tax violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. Such discrimination was said to result from the fact that the use tax exceeded many in-state localities' sales tax rate.

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Yes. The Court held that the use tax was discriminatory in those localities where it exceeded the local sales tax. Such discrepancies, between certain localities' sales taxes and the state use tax, prevented the latter tax from being a valid "compensatory" tax, since it obviously did not impose a "substantially similar" burden on the interstate and intrastate commerce of such localities. The Court added that in those localities where the use tax did not exceed the local sales tax, no discriminatory treatment resulted and so the use tax's application would not be struck down in its entirety. Instead, the Court remanded the case back to Missouri for a decision on how to best correct certain of its localities' existing tax discrepancies.


Lenard Ray Beecham was convicted in Federal District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which makes it illegal for a convicted felon to possess a firearm. Beecham argued that according to the statute's exemption clause ("Any conviction...for which a person...has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction...") he was no longer a convicted felon because Tennessee had restored his civil rights. Prosecutors pointed to the statute's "choice of law clause," which states that "What constitutes a conviction...shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held." They argued that because Beecham's prior conviction was under federal law, no state could restore his right to possess a firearm.
The District Court ruled that a state could restore civil rights barred by a federal conviction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision. The Fourth Circuit's rule conflicted with those of the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which held that the since the exemption clause applied to "any conviction," it also permitted states to undo restrictions caused by federal convictions.

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No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court applied the choice of law clause to the exemption clause and reasoned that no rights could be restored unless by the jurisdiction that first barred the rights. The Court ruled that though the federal government did not currently have any procedures in place to restore the civil rights of felons, only the federal government had jurisdiction over federal convictions. Therefore, Beecham's state-law restoration of civil rights was insufficient to restore his right to possess a firearm in light of 18 U.S.C. 922(g).


Dee Farmer, a biological male, underwent estrogen therapy, received silicone breast implants and underwent unsuccessful sex reassignment surgery. Farmer was convicted and sentenced to prison on federal criminal charges. Prison medical personnel diagnosed Farmer as a transsexual. Farmer was generally kept separate from the general male population, in part because of Farmer’s misconduct, but also because of safety concerns.
Farmer was transferred to the U.S. Penitentiary Terre Haute and placed in the general male population in accordance with prison policy. Within two weeks, a cellmate allegedly beat and raped Farmer. Farmer sued in federal district court, alleging that prison officials deliberately and indifferently failed to protect a prisoner. This violated Farmer’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer sought damages and an injunction against future incarceration in any prison. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials, noting that Farmer never complained or expressed any safety concerns prior to the incident. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

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Maybe. Justice David H. Souter, writing for seven members of the court, vacated the lower court judgment and remanded. The Supreme Court held that prison officials may be liable if they showed “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm when the official was subjectively aware of the risk and disregarded it. The Court remanded the case for further consideration of whether prison officials were aware of the risk to Farmer. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, writing that inhumane prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment regardless of a prison official’s state of mind. Justice John Paul Stevens also concurred writing that he agreed with Justice Blackmun, but joined in the majority because it followed prior precedent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment arguing that conditions of confinement do not violate the Eighth Amendment unless they are imposed as part of a sentence.


After successfully defending against a copyright infringement suit filed against him by Fantasy Inc. (Fantasy), John Fogerty sought to recover the cost of his attorney's fees from Fantasy. Fogerty based his claim on 17 U.S.C. section 505 which states in part that: "the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs." On appeal from an unfavorable district court ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed as it found that Fogerty did not demonstrate that Fantasy's original suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith. Fogerty appealed again, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that while attorney's fees are awarded from time to time to prevailing defendants or plaintiffs, this practice is entirely subject to the deciding court's discretion. Indeed, the Court observed, that the statute in question emphasizes such discretion by stating in relevant part that a court "may" award attorney's fees. The Court concluded that such discretion is to be applied evenhandedly between victorious defendants and plaintiffs.


Digital Equipment Corporation v. Desktop Direct, Inc.

After Digital Equipment Corporation and Desktop Direct, Inc. arrived at a settlement agreement in a trademark infringement suit, the federal District Court dismissed the case. Several months later, after Desktop claimed that Digital had misrepresented important facts during the settlement negotiations, the Court reopened the case and cancelled the agreement. Digital appealed, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hear the case, holding that it was not immediately appealable under the guidelines laid out by the Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463. The court held that the "right not to go to trial" claimed by Digital under the settlement was not sufficiently important to merit an immediate appeal and was different from immunity rooted in an explicit statutory or constitutional provision or compelling public policy rationale, the denial of which had been held immediately appealable.

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No. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the denial of immunity - while cause for concern - does not automatically create a right to immediate appeal. It is important to have final judgments before appeals are made, Justice David H. Souter wrote for the Court, and exceptions should only be made in particularly important cases. A "right not to go to trial," while significant, is rarely the key factor in a settlement agreement, and cannot compare in importance to the right to be free from "double jeopardy" in criminal court or the encroachment on public duties caused by a denial of immunity to public officials.


Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy

Silvia Safille Ibanez practiced law in White Haven, Florida, and had been a member of the Florida Bar since 1983. She was also a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) licensed by the Florida Board of Accountancy (Board) and was authorized by the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards—a private organization—to use the designation Certified Financial Planner (CFP). Ibanez used both of these titles in her advertising and on her law office's stationery. When the Board learned that Ibanez advertised these designations, she was charged with practicing public accounting at an unlicensed firm, which violated the Public Accountancy Act. The officer who heard the case recommended that the Board dismiss the charges due to a lack of proof. The Board refused and declared Ibanez guilty of "false, deceptive, and misleading" advertising. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First Circuit, affirmed.

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Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that Ibanez's use of her CPA and CFP designations constituted commercial speech, which can only be restricted if it can be proven to be false or misleading and the state has a substantial interest in restricting it. Because Ibanez is fully licensed, her use of the designations was neither false nor misleading. Without evidence that the commercial speech caused "real harms" and that limiting it would restrict those harms, the Board did not meet its burden to show a substantial state interest.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which she argued that Ibanez's use of the CFP designation was misleading. Because it appears in conjunction with the CPA designation, Justice O'Connor argued that the average consumer would be led to believe that a state licensing board controlled the use of both titles, which is not the case. Without listing the agency that regulates the use of the CFP title, the average consumer would be unable to verify this information. Because this designation is potentially misleading, the Board properly disciplined Ibanez with regard to the CFP designation. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.


Robert Edward Stansbury, an ice cream truck driver, was taken to the Pomona Police Department for questioning as a potential witness in the investigation of the death of a 10-year-old girl. Stansbury was not a suspect in the death, and did not receive Miranda warnings, but during questioning, made a statement that put him under suspicion. After further questioning, Stansbury admitted to prior convictions for rape, kidnapping and child molestation. At this point the interrogating officer advised Stansbury of his Miranda rights and Stansbury refused to make any further statements. Stansbury requested an attorney and was arrested and charged with first-degree murder. The trial court held that Stansbury was not truly in custody and therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings until suspicion focused on him. The court refused to suppress Stansbury’s statements made prior to the warning. Stansbury was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California affirmed.

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No. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court and remanded. The Court held that an officer’s subjective view is irrelevant to the determination of whether a person being interrogated is “in custody.” On remand, the Supreme Court of California should consider whether the objective circumstances showed that Stansbury was in custody during his entire interrogation. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, writing that the death penalty cannot be imposed fairly within the constraints of the Constitution.


Karl Oberg was driving an all-terrain vehicle when it overturned, causing him severe, permanent injuries. The jury in his trial assessed almost $1 million in compensatory damages, and an additional $5 million in punitive damages. A 1910 amendment to the Oregon state constitution prohibited judicial review of jury awards.

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Yes. The denial of judicial review creates the possibility that juries might make arbitrary and excessive awards without offering a way to adjust them. The common-law practice of allowing judicial review for jury awards is important in ensuring that juries do not ignore guidelines.


ABF Freight Systems, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

After employee Michael Manson gave a false excuse for being late to work, ABF Freight System, Inc. (ABF) fired him for tardiness. Manson repeated his false excuse while under oath at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, during which he argued that ABF had fired him in retaliation for his previous union activities. The National Labor Relations Board reversed the judge, ruling that ABF had used Manson's tardiness as a pretext to fire him. The Board reinstated him with backpay.
ABF appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, claiming that the Board could not reinstate an employee who lied under oath. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the Board could determine whether or not to pardon Manson for giving a false excuse.

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Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that the National Labor Relations Act gave the Board broad authority to adopt laws regarding the reinstatement of employees. The Court called perjury "intolerable in a formal proceeding," but ruled that the National Labor Relations Board was under no obligation to adopt a blanket rule against reinstating employees who have perjured themselves. Reducing the Board's discretion in making rules for employee reinstatement "might force the Board to divert its attention from its primary mission and devote unnecessary time and energy to resolving collateral disputes about credibility."


Granderson, convicted for mail destruction, faced potential imprisonment of 0-6 months under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced him to five years of probation. When Granderson tested positive for cocaine, the court resentenced him under section 3565 of the U.S. Code. The section says that if a person serving a sentence of probation possesses illegal drugs, "the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one third of the original sentence." The district court interpreted the phrase "original sentence" to refer to the term of probation imposed (60 months), rather than the 0-6 month imprisonment range set by the Guidelines. The court resentenced Granderson to 20 months' imprisonment.
The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Granderson's new sentence. Citing "lenity," the court agreed with Granderson that "original sentence" referred to the potential imprisonment range under the Guidelines, not to the actual probation sentence.

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In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held 7-2 that the U.S. Code's section 3565 refers to the original sentence range set by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, the minimum revocation sentence for drug possession while on probation is one third the maximum of the Guidelines range of imprisonment; the maximum revocation sentence is the Guidelines maximum. The Court pointed out that the statute differentiates between "sentence of probation" and "original sentence." Moreover, the history of the language shows that Congress may not have given it careful attention and that it "may have been composed with an obsolete federal sentencing regime in the drafter's mind." In "circumstances, where the text, structure, and statutory history fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct, the rule of lenity... resolve[s] the statutory ambiguity in Granderson's favor."
Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy concurred separately. Dissenting, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, with whom Justice Clarence Thomas concurred, argued that "original sentence" should be interpreted as the term of probation.


On January 28, 1992, in response to the serious financial hardships of Massachusetts dairy farmers, the Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture issued a pricing order. The order required all dealers who sold milk to Massachusetts retailers to make a monthly premium payment to be distributed among in-state dairy farmers. Two Massachusetts milk dealers --West Lynn Creamery and LeComte's Dairy -- sell dairy products in Massachusetts. West Lynn Creamery relies on out-of-state producers; LeComte purchases all of its milk from West Lynn. The dealers filed an action in state court claiming that the order violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The state court rejected their claims; the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed.

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Yes. In a majority decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court determined that the pricing order violated the Commerce Clause because it discriminated against interstate commerce. The majority found that while the pricing order taxed all dealers, the benefit of the tax was reserved exclusively for in-state dairy farmers and outweighed the tax they were required to pay. Thus, the Court concluded that, in effect, the pricing order functioned like a tariff, and was clearly unconstitutional. The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was reversed.


In July 1990, Jonathan Dale Simmons beat an elderly woman to death in her home. The week before his trial for capital murder was scheduled to begin, Simmons pled guilty to first-degree robbery and two counts of criminal sexual conduct in connection with two previous assaults. These guilty pleas rendered him ineligible for parole if convicted of any other violent-crime offense. Prior to jury selection, the trial court judge granted the prosecution’s motion to bar any questions pertaining to parole during the jury selection process. Simmons was convicted of murder and brought forth mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial. In closing arguments, the prosecution focused on the issue of the future danger the defendant presented to society as a reason to sentence him to death. The defense requested that the trial judge give a specific jury instruction clarifying the meaning of “life imprisonment” in this case, and the trial judge refused to do so. The jury sentenced Simmons to death. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court declined to reach a decision on the merits and instead held that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury satisfied the substance of Simmons’ request.

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Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 7-2 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the lack of a specific instruction regarding the actual consequences of the jury’s decision led to Simmons being sentenced on the basis of essentially false information. The Due Process Clause grants defendants the right to “deny or explain” the evidence against them, and Simmons was not given the opportunity to do so regarding his potential future danger to society. Because evidence of future dangerousness often plays an important role in sentencing, preventing the jury from having access to the relevant information does not conform to the precedents established in Due Process jurisprudence. The Supreme Court also held that the South Carolina Supreme Court erred in holding that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury were sufficient. The instructions the trial judge gave did nothing to dispel any misunderstanding the jury members might have had regarding the meaning of the possible sentences.
Justice David H. Souter wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the trial judge has a responsibility to dispel jury misunderstandings of sentencing terms, particularly when the jury explicitly requests such guidance. Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the concurrence. In her separate concurrence, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the most basic right the Due Process Clause protects is the right to be heard, which was denied to Simmons when he was prevented from clarifying his parole situation. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote an opinion concurring in judgment in which she argued that the Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant’s right to rebut the prosecution’s evidence against him. In a sentencing trial in which the prosecution bases its argument on the defendant’s future dangerousness, the Constitution requires that the defendant have the opportunity to provide evidence to the contrary. Proof that the defendant will not be released is sometimes the only way to rebut the prosecution’s evidence. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony Kennedy joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s opinion creates an overbroad reading of the Due Process Clause’s power to override state law regarding the admissibility of parole information. Such an issue should be left to the states to decide individually, as there is no indication in the Constitution that the Due Process Clause requires such a strict national standard. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


On the Charleston Naval Base, Keith Shackleton lost a game of pool and a $30 wager to Robert L. Davis. Shackelton refused to pay, and was later found behind the pool club beaten to death with a pool cue. The Naval Investigative Service (NIS) questioned Davis after finding a bloodstain of one of the pool cues Davis owned. Before questioning, Davis waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel both orally and in writing. About an hour and a half into questioning, Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” The interviewing agents attempted to clarify the statement and reminded Davis he could remain silent and/or speak to counsel, but Davis said, “No, I don’t want a lawyer.” Questioning continued for another hour before Davis said, “I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else.” At this point questioning ceased.
At trial, Davis was convicted on one count of unpremeditated murder and sentenced to confinement for life and dishonorable discharge. Davis appealed, arguing that the NIS investigators violated his right to counsel, as laid out in Edwards v. Arizona, when they continued questioning after Davis indicated he “maybe” should talk to a lawyer. The U.S. Court of Military Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that Davis’ statements were ambiguous and the NIS appropriately clarified Davis’ wishes before continuing questioning.

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No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for five members of the court, affirmed. The Supreme Court held that, assuming Edwards applies in military proceedings, investigators do not need to cease questioning when an accused makes an ambiguous statement like “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” The Court noted that, while it was proper for the investigators to clarify Davis’ intentions, the Court does not require investigators to adopt that practice in future interrogations. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, writing that the Court should consider the federal statute governing the admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions the next time a similar case comes before the court.
Justice David H. Souter concurred in the judgment, but expressed that investigators have a legal obligation to clarify ambiguous statements that could reasonably be understood as a request to consult with a lawyer. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Justice John Paul Stevens, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the concurrence in the judgment.


Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Sections 4 and 5 of this Act required cable systems to allocate a percentage of their channels to local public broadcast stations, the must-carry rules. The rules limit the cannels available for exclusive control by cable programmers and increase competition for the remaining channels.

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No. The Court held that the must-carry provisions were content neutral, thus not a violation of the First Amendment. The rules were not determined by the programming content, but by broadcast method. The rules promote fair competition in television programming. Congress recognized that the public television stations had an intrinsic value to the American public and were in economic peril of disappearing due to the cable television industry's monopoly. The rules do not force the cable companies to alter their message.


Roy Heck was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the death of his wife in Indiana state court and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He filed an action in federal district court claiming that the prosecution engaged in an “unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation” before his arrest and knowingly destroyed favorable evidence. Heck sought compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983, but did not seek a release from custody. The district court dismissed the action. While his appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was pending, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Heck’s petition for habeas corpus was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Heck’s damages action, stating that the action challenged the legality of the conviction, so Heck must exhaust all state remedies before seeking §1983 relief like he would under the habeas corpus statute.

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No, Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for five members of the court, affirmed. The Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot claim damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment without showing that the conviction or sentence has been overturned in some way. The defendant must also exhaust state court remedies before bringing a §1983 action. The Court derived its analysis from the common law tort of malicious prosecution which requires termination of the criminal proceeding before it can begin. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred, writing that the majority’s opinion limited the scope of §1983. Justice David H. Souter concurred in the judgment, arguing that the proper way to resolve the case would be to interpret § 1983 in light of the habeas corpus statute instead of common law torts. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Justice John Paul Stevens, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the concurrence in the judgment.


Women's Health Center Inc. operated several abortion clinics throughout central Florida, including the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida. In 1992, in response to anti-abortion protesters, a state court prohibited the protesters from physically abusing those entering or exiting the clinic, or otherwise interfering with access to the clinic. About 6 months later, Women's Health Center Inc. expressed a need to broaden the court order. The state court agreed, banning demonstrators from entering a 36-foot buffer-zone around the clinic, making excessive noise, using images visible to patients, approaching patients within a 300-foot radius of the clinic, and protesting within a 300-foot radius of staff residences. Petitioner Judy Madsen and her fellow protesters claimed that these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to free speech, but the Florida Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the court order.

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No, Yes, No, Yes, Yes, and Yes. In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the state of Florida could only restrict protesters to the extent necessary to allow the clinic to run and the staff to live in their homes without interference. Thus, the majority approved of the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic because it was essential to allow patients and staff to enter and leave the building freely, but disapproved of the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the building because it found no indication that protesting in these areas interfered with the function of the clinic. The Court also determined that the limitations placed on noise-making were necessary to insure the well-being of the patients, whereas those placed on images were not because they were easier to ignore. Finally, the Court concluded that both 300-foot radius rules were too broad, thus restricting the protestors more than was necessary. Therefore, the decision of the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.


Barclay's Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California

California used a "worldwide combined reporting" method to determine tax liability for multinational corporations operating inside the state. Under this method, the multinational's income was taxed in proportion to the average percentage of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located inside the state. Barclays Bank of California (Barcal) was wholly owned by a multinational corporation, Barclays Bank International Limited (BBI). Barcal did not include financial data for BBI in its 1977 tax filings. The California Franchise Tax Board (Tax Board) determined that Barcal misrepresented the proportion of income subject to taxation, causing a tax deficiency of over one hundred thousand dollars. Barcal and BBI paid, but then sued for the amount paid, complaining that the cost to provide BBI's worldwide financial data was disproportionately large considering that Barcal operated largely independently of BBI and BBI operated largely outside of California. Barcal and BBI contended that this violated the Commerce Clause-derived anti-discrimination requirement, which prevents States from imposing disproportionately large tax compliance burdens upon corporations. The Tax Board allowed BBI to make a "reasonable approximation" of financial data to minimize costs, but BBI claimed that this action violated Due Process by admitting financial data that was possibly inaccurate.
The California Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and remanded the case to a California Court of Appeals, which also did not find the burden disproportionate. Barcal and BBI also contended that the "worldwide combined reporting" method risked double taxation by the state and the federal government. Additionally, The "worldwide combined reporting" method deviated from taxing methods employed by other states, thus transgressing the federal government's interest in providing uniform standards for taxing foreign commerce. (The case was consolidated with Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Board Of California.)

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Justice Ruth Ginsburg wrote the opinion for a 7-2 Court. (1) The Court dismissed the alleged Due Process violation because a corporation could take action against the Tax Board if it felt the approximated amount was inaccurate. (2) Reasoning that the use of "reasonable approximations" minimized a multinational's compliance burden, the Court also dismissed the alleged Commerce Clause violation. The Court recognized that the "worldwide combined reporting" method carried a risk of double taxation by both the state and the federal government, but reasoned that this did not violate the Commerce Clause because every other method employed by the state to tax foreign commerce carried the same risk. Also, the Court found no "specific indications of congressional intent" to enforce uniformity in taxation of foreign commerce by preempting the California tax laws.


Margaret Gilleo placed a 24-by-36-inch sign calling for peace in the Persian Gulf on her front lawn. The original sign disappeared and a subsequent sign was knocked down. She reported these incidents to the police who advised her that such signs were prohibited in Ladue. She sued the city and the District Court ordered a preliminary injunction. Ladue repealed the law and replaced it with a new one which also banned window signs. Gilleo then placed another anti-war sign in her second-story window and amended her complaint to challenge the new ordinance.

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Yes. Although acknowledging Ladue's police power to minimize visual clutter associated with signs, the Court ruled that the law "almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important." The Court held a "special respect" for an individual's right to convey messages from her home.


Robert Miller, a Mississippi resident who had moved north to find work, was injured while working as a seaman for American Dredging Company, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Miller returned home to Mississippi, and filed a suit against the company in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. The suit was filed under the Jones Act, a federal law that allows a seaman to sue his employer in either federal or state court when he suffers personal injury.
American Dredging moved to dismiss the case under the doctrine of "forum non conveniens," which allows a court to dismiss a case if it is filed in a place that is unnecessarily and significantly inconvenient to the defendant. The trial court agreed, holding that a Louisiana law making the doctrine of "forum non conveniens" inapplicable in Jones Act cases was superseded by federal maritime law (law that deals with oceanic commerce). An appeals court affirmed the decision, but the Louisiana Supreme Court overturned it, holding that the Louisiana law was not superseded by federal maritime law.

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No. The Court decided that "forum non conveniens" claims were only procedural, not substantive, and that national uniformity was therefore not required by the Constitution. Writing for the seven-member majority, Justice Antonin Scalia stated "venue is a matter that goes to process rather than substantive rights -- determining which among various competent courts will decide the case. Uniformity of process (beyond the rudimentary elements of procedural fairness) is assuredly not what the law of admiralty seeks to achieve, since it is supposed to apply in all the courts of the world." Further, Scalia wrote that the amount of discretion left to the trial court by the forum non conveniens doctrine necessarily meant that, even if it was embraced by every state, it would still not result in uniformity.


Alabama, acting on behalf of T.B. (the mother), sought paternity and child support from J.E.B.(the putative father). A jury found for T.B. In forming the jury, Alabama used its peremptory strikes to eliminate nine of the ten men who were in the jury pool; J.E.B. use a peremptory challenge to strike a tenth man in the pool.

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Yes. The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection bars the exclusion of potential jurors on the basis of their sex, just as it bars exclusion on the basis of race. "[G]ender-based classifications," wrote Justice Harry Blackmun for the majority, "require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny." As a consequence, "[P]arties still may remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias."


Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for a Great Oregon

The Endangered Species Act requires that no person "take" an endangered or threatened species. The Act defines take as "harass, harm, pursue," "wound," or "kill." The Secretary of the Interior further characterizes "harm" as including "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife." Several persons within forestry industries sued the Secretary, asserting that Congress did not intend for the regulation to include changes in habitat. The District Court found for the Secretary of the Interior.
The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of noscitur a sociis, which means that the meaning of words is determined by the words around it. Thus, "harm" could only include actions applying direct force to the animal.

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Yes. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court held that habitat modification is a legitimate application of the word "harm." First, the Court found that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in assuming that the words in the definition of "take" only apply to actions involving direct contact with endangered animals. Then, based on the Act itself, the Court determined that the ordinary meaning of harm would in fact include changes in habitat that hurt the endangered animals. Also, the Court held that the intent of the Act to give broad protection to endangered species must include even actions that may have minimal or unforeseeable effects.


Coors Brewing Co. (Coors) applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for an approval of proposed labels. The approval was rejected because it violated the Federal Alcohol Administration Act’s (FAAA) prohibition of disclosing the alcohol content on beer labels or advertisements. Coors filed a claim arguing the regulation violated the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. The government argued the regulation was necessary to prevent “strength wars” among brewers, which in this case, refers to breweries competing on the basis of the potency of their alcohol.
The district court found in favor of Coors, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court subsequently upheld the ban of alcohol content in advertising, but not on labels. The government appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court by concluding that the label ban did not prevent strength wars.

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Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that for the government to regulate commercial speech, the government must have a substantial interest that the regulation directly affects. In this case, the interest the government intended to protect by banning the display of alcohol content on beer labels was to limit the “strength wars” of competing beer companies, which could lead to greater alcoholism. However, the Court concluded that this interest was not substantial enough, since there was no reason to believe that banning the alcoholic content on beer labels would prevent such social harms. The regulation also does not directly advance the suppression of strength wars, especially since other provisions of the FAAA directly counteract its effects. Finally, the Court held the regulation was more extensive than necessary, since there were available and effective alternatives that would not violate the First Amendment.
Justice John Paul Stevens delivered a concurring opinion emphasizing the regulation is unconstitutionality of the regulation because it did not increase consumer awareness, but instead blinded the public to the truth of the alcohol content.


James Ryder, an enlisted member of the Coast Guard, was convicted of drug offenses by a court-martial. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review affirmed. On rehearing, the court rejected Ryder's claim that its composition violated the Appointments Clause because two of the judges on the three-judge panel were civilians appointed by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. The Court of Military Appeals agreed with Ryder that the appointments violated the Clause under its previous decision in United States v. Carpenter that appellate military judges are inferior officers who must be appointed by a President, a court of law, or a head of a department. The court nonetheless affirmed Ryder's conviction on the ground that the actions of the two civilian judges were valid de facto.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the judges' actions were not valid de facto. The Court reasoned that a defendant who made a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case was entitled to a decision on the merits of the question and whatever relief may be appropriate if a violation had occurred. The Court also noted that review by the properly constituted Court of Military Appeals did not necessarily give Ryder all the possibility for relief that review by a properly constituted Coast Guard Court of Military Review would have given him.


In 1987, several Spendthrift Farm shareholders, including Ed Plaut, brought suit against the corporation claiming stock sales in 1983 and 1984 had violated the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court's ruling in Lampf v Gilbertson (1991) set a universal time limit of three years after an alleged violation for suits stemming from the relevant portion the Securities and Exchange Act. Based on this ruling, a district court judge dismissed the shareholders' case on August 13, 1991. On December 19, 1991, Congress enacted the FDIC Improvement Act, which required courts to reinstate cases dismissed under the Supreme Court's limitation in Lampf. The shareholders filed a motion to reinstate. A district court judge agreed the act required the case be reinstated, but denied the request on the ground that Congress had violated separation of powers in requiring the courts to reopen settled matters. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's conclusion on the same ground.

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Yes. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court concluded that Congress had usurped power assigned to the judiciary by Article III and thus had violated the separation of powers principle. Justice Scalia notes that Article III assigns to the courts the "judicial power of the United States" and the power to "say what the law is." According to the Court, this clearly includes "the power to render final judgments," and by enacting what Justice Scalia describes as "retroactive legislation, that is, legislation that prescribes what the law was at an earlier time," Congress intruded upon the power of the courts to issue "the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy." Thus, Congress had violated separation of powers.


John Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA on the ground that there had been a change in conditions such that Rambo was no longer disabled. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA authorizes modification only where there has been a change in an employee's physical condition.

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Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that a disability award may be modified under the LHWCA where there is a change in the employee's wage-earning capacity, even without any change in the employee's physical condition. The Court reasoned that, because an interpretation of the term "change in conditions" to include not only changes in physical condition but also changes in other conditions relevant to the initial entitlement to benefits, such as a change in wage-earning capacity is consistent with the purpose of the LHWCA. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that the term refers to the physical condition of the person receiving compensation and should not be departed from absent any indication from Congress.


Asgrow Seed Company (Asgrow) held two Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) certificates protecting different varieties of soybean seed. These PVPA certificates act like patents in order to promote research on new varieties of plants and to protect the owners of seed varieties from unauthorized sales. However, there is an exemption for farmers who sell seed to other farmers whose primary occupation is growing crops for sale. In 1990, Winterboer planted and harvested 265 acres of land with two Asgrow soybean varieties. He then sold enough to plant 10,000 acres to other farmers for use as seed. Asgrow claimed that the PVPA prohibits anyone from selling for seed more than would be needed to replant his own fields - an amount greatly exceeded by Winterboer's sales. Winterboer argued that the exemptions in the statute protect sales of unlimited amounts of seed as long as both seller and buyer grow crops primarily for "other than reproductive purposes." The District Court ruled in favor of Asgrow, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and denied Asgrow's petition for rehearing.

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Yes. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a farmer may sell for reproductive purposes only such seed as he has saved for the purpose of replanting his own fields. While the statute allows farmers to save seed to replant and then sell that saved seed to other farmers for planting, the statute prohibits growing protected seed as a "step in marketing" it as seed for planting. The Court held that because Winterboer's planting and harvesting were conducted solely to market (that is, to sell) Asgrow's protected seed varieties, he forfeited eligibility for the PVPA exemption and infringed on Asgrow's protective certificates.


First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan

After the October 1987 stock market crash, First Options of Chicago, Inc., a firm that clears stock trades on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, demanded that Manuel Kaplan, his wife, and his wholly owned investment company, MK Investments, Inc. (MKI) immediately pay the entire MKI debt. When First Options' demands for payment went unsatisfied, it sought arbitration by a panel of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange based on workout agreements, which governed the working out of debts owned by Kaplan, his wife, and MKI. MKI, which had signed the only workout document containing an arbitration agreement, submitted to arbitration, but the Kaplans, who had not signed that document, filed objections with the panel. The Kaplans argued that their disagreement with First Options not was arbitrable. After deciding that they had the power to rule on the dispute's merits, the arbitrators ruled in First Options' favor. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the award, finding that the dispute was not arbitrable. The appellate court concluded that courts should independently decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over a dispute, and that it would apply ordinary standards of review when considering the District Court's denial of a motion to vacate the arbitration award.

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Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts and that, rather than a special abuse of discretion standard, courts of appeals should apply ordinary standards when reviewing district court decisions upholding arbitration awards. "We conclude that, because the Kaplans did not clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court.


Between 1980 and 1990, only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black. According to the 1990 decennial census, Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an additional eleventh congressional seat, prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the state's congressional districts. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the Assembly's proposed new districts, the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. This district, however, was called a "geographic monstrosity" because it extended 6,784.2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. In short, "the social, political, and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community."

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Yes. In some instances, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular and bizarre in shape that it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters based on race. Applying the rule laid down in Shaw v. Reno requires strict scrutiny whenever race is the "overriding, predominant force" in the redistricting process.


The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 prohibited the interstate transportation, shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual materials containing children engaged in sexually explicit acts. Richard Gottesman, owner and manager of X-Citement Video, sold forty-nine tapes to undercover officers. Gottesman shipped the videos, containing pornographic acts by industry legend Traci Lords before she turned eighteen, to Hawaii. Although he claimed he did not know the tapes contained underage pornographic acts, Gottesman was arrested for violating the sexual exploitation act.

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No. The Court relied on an awkward grammatical construction as it held that the term "knowingly" applied to the entire passage of the law. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated that other interpretations failed to make sense since Congress obviously did not envision people accidentally mailing underage pornographic materials. All the law required was a showing that alleged violators intentionally distributed illegal pornography, regardless of whether they knew it depicted underage performances.


In consolidated state-court class actions brought in Illinois, participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer program, AAdvantage, challenged American's retroactive changes in program terms and conditions. Specially, the participants alleged that American's imposition of capacity controls and blackout dates to mileage credits they had previously accumulated violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted a breach of contract. American responded that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) preempted the claim. The ADA prohibits States from "enacting or enforcing any law...relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services." The Illinois Supreme Court ruled to allow the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act monetary relief claims to survive. After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, American petitioned for certiorari.

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Yes. In a 6-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the ADA bars state-imposed regulation of air carriers, thus claims brought under a state's consumer fraud act are preempted; but that the ADA allows room for court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves, which permits breach of contract claims to proceed. "A remedy confined to a contract's terms simply holds parties to their agreements -- in this instance, to business judgments an airline made public about its rates and services," wrote Justice Ginsburg. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by Justice Thomas Clarence. Justice Antonin Scalia took no part in the decision of the case.


Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales.

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Yes. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547), the Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. In other words, they "must serve a compelling government interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." The Court added that compensation programs which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards. However, since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, even proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny.


United States v. National Treasury Employees Union

The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, prohibits members of Congress, federal officers, and other government employees from accepting an honorarium for making an appearance, speech, or writing an article. The prohibition applies even when neither the subject of the speech or article nor the person or group paying for it has any connection with the employee's official duties. The National Treasury Employees Union filed suit challenging the honorarium ban as an unconstitutional abridgement of its freedom of speech. A District Court held the ban unconstitutional and enjoined the government from enforcing it against Executive Branch employees. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Yes. In a 6 to 3 decision delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court declared that a flat ban violated free-speech rights. Concerns about impropriety do not apply if there is no link between a government employee's job and "the subject matter of the expression or the character of the payor."


In 1986 and 1987, the FBI investigated Michael Rudy Tham and Abe Chapman as part of a nationwide investigation into healthcare provider fraud. The judge on the case authorized a wiretap of Tham and Chapman’s phones. He kept these wiretaps secret. Chapman was distantly related to U.S. District Court Judge Robert P. Aguilar. When Chapman asked Aguilar for help in the case, Aguilar talked to the judge on the case and learned about the wiretap. Though the wiretap order had expired, Aguilar told Chapman about it. When FBI agents questioned Aguilar on the matter, he lied about his knowledge and participation in the case. Aguilar was tried and convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for disclosing a wiretap and endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions, holding that disclosing an expired wiretap does not violate the law, and Aguilar did not obstruct justice because the grand jury investigating the case did not order the FBI investigation.

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No, Yes. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court, affirming in part and reversing in part. The Supreme Court held that making false statements to an FBI agent who may or may not testify at trial is not sufficient to support a conviction for obstruction of justice. Aguilar’s conviction for disclosing a wiretap was proper, however, because the statute does not require that the wiretap is currently in force. The First Amendment did not require excluding expired wiretaps from the statute either.
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that Aguilar’s conviction for obstructing justice should be overturned, but arguing that the wiretapping conviction should be overturned as well. There was no way Aguilar could interfere with a wiretap that no longer existed.
Justice Antonin Scalia also concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing to affirm the disclosure of wiretapping conviction, but arguing that the obstruction of justice should be affirmed as well.


Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia

Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality," as prohibited by University guidelines.

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Yes. The Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion, held that the University's denial of funding to Rosenberger, due to the content of his message, imposed a financial burden on his speech and amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted that no matter how scarce University publication funding may be, if it chooses to promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of it equally. Furthermore, because it promoted past publications regardless of their religious content, the Court found the University's publication policy to be neutral toward religion and, therefore, not in violation of the establishment clause. The Court concluded by stating that the University could not stop all funding of religious speech while continuing to fund an atheistic perspective. The exclusion of several views is as offensive to free speech as the exclusion of only one. The University must provide a financial subsidy to a student religious publication on the same basis as other student publications.


Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.

In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech.

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Yes. A unanimous court held that the State Court's ruling to require private citizens who organize a parade to include a group expressing a message that the organizers do not wish to convey violates the First Amendment by making private speech subordinate to the public accommodation requirement. Such an action "violate[s] the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say."


In 1992, Sharlene Wilson sold illicit narcotics to undercover agents of the Arkansas state police. Police officers then applied for and obtained warrants to search Ms. Wilson's home and to arrest her. When the police arrived, they found the main door to Ms. Wilson's house open. The officers opened the unlocked screen door and walked in, identified themselves as police officers, and said that they had a warrant. Ms. Wilson's attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search, claiming it was invalid on the grounds that the officers had failed to "knock and announce" before entering.

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Yes. A unanimous Court held that the common-law "knock-and announce" principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. "Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice of announcement, and the wealth of founding-era commentaries, constitutional provisions, statutes, and cases espousing or supporting the knock-and-announce principle,...the Amendment's Framers thought that whether officers announced their presence and authority before entering a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing a search's reasonableness." Countervailing law enforcement interests, such as officer safety, may, however, establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.


Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company

The city of Chicago hired the Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company (Great Lakes) to perform work that would prevent ships from bumping into piers. To that end, Great Lakes used a crane to drive piles into the riverbed, which potentially weakened the structure of the freight tunnel that ran below the river. On April 13, 1992, water from the Chicago River poured into a freight tunnel, which subsequently flooded into the basements of several buildings. After the flood, many victims sued Great Lakes in state court and argued that the flood was the result of the weakening of the tunnel. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock removed the case to federal district court and argued federal admiralty court had jurisdiction of marine cases. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of admiralty jurisdiction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.

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Yes. Justice David Souter delivered the opinion of the 7-0 majority. The Court held the federal district court has admiralty jurisdiction to determine and limit the extent of the Great Lakes’ tort of liability. Admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate when a party can prove either that the tort occurred on navigable water or that the injury on land was caused by actions on navigable water. In this case, this condition is satisfied since the alleged tort was committed on navigable water, and it is not necessary to prove that the subsequent damage was close in time and space. Great Lakes proved the connection with maritime activity by showing how the damage caused by a vessel on navigable water to an underwater structure is potentially disruptive to maritime commerce.


In 1987, Steven Gwin, a homeowner in Birmingham, Alabama, bought a lifetime "Termite Protection Plan" from a local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Company. The termite prevention contract specified that any controversy would be settled exclusively by arbitration. After the Gwins sold their house and transferred their plan to the Dobsons, the Dobsons initiated suit against the Gwins, Allied-Bruce, and Terminix following a termite infestation. Allied- Bruce and Terminix asked for, but were denied, a stay to allow for arbitration under the contract and the Federal Arbitration Act. In affirming, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the denial of the stay on the basis of a state statute making written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable. The court also found that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply because the parties entering the contract contemplated transactions that were primarily local and not substantially interstate.

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Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act applied to all disputes involving commerce, and thus the arbitration clause was valid and enforceable. The Court reasoned that the word "involving" in section 2 of the Act signaled an intent to exercise Congress' commerce clause power to the full and that section 2 is to be read requiring only that the "transaction" in fact "involve" interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas filed dissenting opinions.


Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.

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Yes. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic activity.


In January 1991, Phoenix police officer Bryan Sargent observed Isaac Evans driving the wrong way on a one-way street. Sargent directed Evans to pull over and asked to see his license. Evans informed Sargent that his license was suspended, and upon running the license, Sargent found that there was also an outstanding warrant for Evans’ arrest. During the arrest, Evans dropped a hand-rolled cigarette that smelled of marijuana, so officers searched his car and discovered a bag of marijuana. When Evans was charged with possession of marijuana, the police were informed that his arrest warrant had been quashed and only remained on the record due to a clerical error. Evans moved to exclude the marijuana evidence because it was discovered during the course of an illegal arrest. The trial court granted the motion.
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that the exclusionary rule was not intended to deter government employees who were not directly associated with the arrest. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and held there was no meaningful distinction between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel and those committed by court employees.

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No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review cases from state courts that deal primarily with federal law. The Court also held that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect against intrusions into a home or onto private property, or the conduct of police officers. The exclusionary rule therefore does not apply to the conduct of judicial officers.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion where she argued that the majority’s decision does not allow any evidence that is the result of a clerical error. Rather, the police must rely on accurate record-keeping systems in order to admit evidence found based on the information in those records. Justice David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer joined in the concurrence. In his concurrence, Justice Souter wrote that the majority’s opinion should be read as dealing solely with the issue of this type of clerical error, and not as dealing with the concept of how deterrence by exclusion extends to the government as a whole. Justice Breyer joined in the concurrence.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent and argued that the Fourth Amendment was meant as a constraint on governmental power as a whole, and not merely on its agents, namely the police. He also argued that the exclusionary rule does not place the government at a disadvantage in trial; the government is merely in the position it would be if it had not conducted the illegal search at all. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed because the Arizona Supreme Court ruled on the issue based on its constitutional analysis, rather than federal law, so the U.S. Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction. She also argued that the exclusionary rule should apply to judicial clerical errors because such errors become magnified and can hugely impact an innocent citizens life. Justice Stevens joined in the dissent.


In Washington State, the City of Edmonds' zoning code provides that the occupants of single-family dwelling units must compose a family, defined as "persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer [unrelated] persons." Under the code, Oxford House, which operates a group home for 10-12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences, was issued a citation. Oxford House asserted that under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prohibits discrimination in housing against persons with handicaps, the city had failed to make reasonable accommodations permitting the maintenance of the group home in a single-family zone. Edmonds sought a declaration that the FHA did not apply to the city's zoning code. The District Court held that the city's zoning code rule defining family was exempt from the FHA under as a reasonable restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling. The Court of Appeals reversed.

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No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Edmonds' zoning code definition of the term "family" is not a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from the FHA. Noting that it was designed to foster the family character of a neighborhood, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the provision was a family composition rule and was not a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from FHA scrutiny because, while it capped the number of unrelated persons allowed to occupy a single-family dwelling at five, it did not cap the total number of people permitted to live in such a dwelling. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.


On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.

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Yes. The freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the First Amendment and "extends beyond the literary realm to the advocacy of political causes." When a law burdens such anonymous speech, the Court applies "exacting scrutiny," upholding the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.


Matthew Wayne Tome was charged with sexually abusing his daughter, who was four years old at the time of the alleged crime. Tome and the child’s mother were divorced and Tome had primary physical custody of the child, but the mother was awarded custody in 1990. The prosecution argued that the sexual abuse occurred while the child was with Tome, but was not discovered until the child spent vacation time with her mother. Tome argued that the allegations were fabricated to keep the child from being returned to him. The prosecution produced six witnesses who testified to verify the out of court statements made by the child. The out of court statements were all made after the motive to fabricate would have arisen. The district court admitted the statements into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which state that prior statements of a witness are not hearsay is they are consistent with the witness’ testimony and are offered to rebut a charge of “recent fabrication or improper influence of motive.” Tome was convicted. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, holding that the proper test was to weigh the probative value against their prejudicial effect, not whether statements were made before or after the motive to fabricate arose.

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No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that, consistent with common law, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) requires that prior consistent statements be made before the motive to fabricate arose in order to be admissible. While hearsay evidence is often relevant, relevance is not the only criterion for determining admissibility. The Court held that the 10th Circuit’s balancing approach involved too much judicial discretion, reduced predictability, and enhanced difficulties of trial preparation. The Court also noted that the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure confirm their analysis. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing that the Advisory Committee Notes should have no authoritative effect and the case could be resolved without resorting to the Notes.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the basic issue in the case was relevance, not hearsay. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not codify the common law, and it permits the district court to allow prior consistent statements made at any time when they are probative. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.

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No. The reasonableness of a search is judged by "balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." In the case of high school athletes who are under State supervision during school hours, they are subject to greater control than over free adults. The privacy interests compromised by urine samples are negligible since the conditions of collection are similar to public restrooms, and the results are viewed only by limited authorities. Furthermore, the governmental concern over the safety of minors under their supervision overrides the minimal, if any, intrusion in student-athletes' privacy.


On August 18, 1975, Margaret Whitecotton received her vaccine against diptheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT vaccination) as a four-year old. That evening and the following morning, Margaret suffered seizures that were a symptom of encephalopathy. Her parents filed a claim on her behalf and alleged that the vaccine caused her encephalopathy, a condition that impairs brain function.
In order to prove their claim under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, claimants must meet the requirements of the Vaccine Injury Table, which lists the conditions associated with each vaccine and the timeframe of their expected occurrence. The Special Master, empowered to hear such claims, determined that Margaret’s symptoms indicated encephalopathy, but that she exhibited symptoms of the condition prior to the vaccination, and therefore her symptoms did not fit within the timetable. The Master denied compensation and the Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision.

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Yes. Justice David H. Souter delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that a claimant must show that the symptoms did not exist prior to the administration of the vaccine. The Act specifically states that the first symptom must occur within the timeframe set by the table in order for the claim to be valid. If the first symptom occurs before the vaccination, any further symptoms do not fulfill the requirement.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote that the Court’s ruling properly held the claims allowed by the Act to a high standard of proof, which adhered to the purpose of the Act. She also emphasized that the decision of the Court solely dealt with defining the burden of the claimant, and did not address any subsequent factual challenges on the part of the Whitecottons against the decision of the Special Master. Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined in the concurrence.


Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette

In 1993, the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an unattended cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in Columbus, Ohio, during the 1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gives the Advisory Board responsibility for regulating access to the square. The Board denied the application of the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on Establishment Clause grounds.

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Yes. The display was private religious speech that "is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression." Because Capitol Square is designated as a traditional public forum, any group may express their views there, and the Board may regulate the content of the Klan's expression on the plaza only if a restriction is necessary and narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.


Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co.

After a ship owned by the Cement Division of National Gypsum Co. sank in a winter storm while berthed in a slip owned by Milwaukee, National Gypsum brought an admiralty suit for damages, alleging that the city had negligently breached its duty as a wharfinger. The city denied fault and filed a counterclaim for damage to its dock, alleging that National Gypsum was negligent in leaving the ship virtually unmanned. The District Court found that both parties were negligent, apportioned liability primarily to National Gypsum, and entered a partial judgment for the stipulated amount of National Gypsum's damages, excluding prejudgment interest. The court held that the fact that National Gypsum's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence and the existence of a genuine dispute over the City's liability were special circumstances justifying a departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that mutual fault cannot provide a basis for denying prejudgment interest.

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No. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that neither a good-faith dispute over liability nor the existence of mutual fault justifies the denial of prejudgment interest in an admiralty collision case. In calculating the amount of the loss for which the relatively innocent party is responsible, the Court found that a denial of prejudgment interest on the basis of mutual fault would unfairly penalize a party twice for the same mistake. "The existence of a legitimate difference of opinion on the issue of liability is merely a characteristic of most ordinary lawsuits. It is not an extraordinary circumstance that can justify denying prejudgment interest," wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision.


A collision between a car and a truck occurred in Ohio. More than three years later, Carol Hyde, a passenger in the car, sued the truck driver and his employer for negligence in the Court of Common Pleas. Ohio had a two-year statute of limitations for such actions, but because the truck driver and his employer were from out of state, a special provision tolled the running of the statute of limitations. 10 months after this suit began, the Supreme Court decided in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) that the tolling provision placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Court of Common Pleas applied Bendix and dismissed Hyde's suit as untimely. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed on the ground that Bendix could not be retroactively applied to claims that commenced prior to that decision.

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No. In a unanimous decision, Justice Stephan G. Breyer wrote for the majority, holding that the Bendix rule must be retroactively applied. Hyde conceded that the Supreme Court had already decided in Harper v Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993) that when the court applies a new legal rule courts must treat the new rule as retroactive. The Court rejected Hyde's claim that applying the rule would unfairly deny her a remedy. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a special concurrence stating that Bendix did not announce a new rule and merely applied existing precedent. Following this reasoning, the discussion of retroactivity was unnecessary.


Police officers found Houston Jones, a diabetic, on the street while he was having an insulin seizure. The officers arrested Jones because he appeared drunk. Later, Jones found himself with several broken ribs. Jones brought a constitutional tort action against the officers, claiming that they used excessive force when they arrested him and that they beat him at the police station. As government officials, the officers were entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense. Three of the officers moved for summary judgment arguing that he could point to no evidence that these three had beaten him or had been present during beatings. Holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting Jones's theory of the case, the District Court denied the motion. The officers sought an immediate appeal, arguing that the denial was wrong because the evidence in the pretrial record was not sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial. The Court of Appeals held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

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