Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that remittances of withholding tax and estimated income tax are paid on the due date of a calendar year taxpayer's income tax return. The Court concluded that the ceiling on Baral's requested credit was zero, because, rather than being paid within the look-back period, between February 1, 1990 and June 1, 1993, both the withholding and the estimated taxes had been paid on April 15, 1989. The decision means that the three-year time limit for seeking a refund begins running when someone's withholding and estimated tax payments are made to the government. The deadline does not depend on when the person's income tax return is filed, the court said.


In 1991, Cynthia Herdrich, after feeling an unusual pain in her stomach, was examined by Lori Pegram, a physician affiliated with Carle Clinic Association, P. C., Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. (hereafter Carle). Carle functions as a health maintenance organization (HMO) organized for profit. Pegram then required Herdrich to wait eight days for an ultrasound of her inflamed abdomen, which was to be performed at a facility staffed by Carle more than 50 miles away from Herdrich. During that period, Herdrich's appendix ruptured. Herdrich sued Carle, including Pegram, in State court for medical malpractice and two counts of fraud. Carle and Pegram, under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), removed the case to federal court. Ultimately, Herdrich was only able to pursue one fraud count, which was amended to allege that Carle's HMO organization provisions rewarding its physician owners for limiting medical care, entailed an inherent or anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, because the terms create an incentive to make decisions in the physicians' self-interest, rather than the plan participants' exclusive interests. The District Court granted Carle's motion to dismiss on the ground that Carle was not acting as an ERISA fiduciary. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that mixed treatment and eligibility decisions to delay medical treatment by sending a patient to a HMO owned facility, with adverse consequences, made by a health maintenance organization through its physician, are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA. Thus, Herdrich did not state an ERISA claim. "Herdrich's remedy -- return of profit to the plan for the participants' benefit -- would be nothing less than elimination of the for-profit HMO," wrote Justice Souter for the Court, "no HMO organization could survive without some incentive connecting physician reward with treatment rationing." Justice Souter noted that "the Federal Judiciary would be acting contrary to the congressional policy of allowing HMO organizations if it were to entertain an ERISA fiduciary claim portending wholesale attacks on existing HMOs solely because of their structure."


In 1998, William Stoecker formed Chandler Enterprises, Inc., which purchased a plane out of state and moved it to Illinois. By the time the Illinois Department of Revenue, having discovered that the corporation had failed to file a use tax return or pay the tax on the plane, issued a notice of tax liability against the corporation and a notice of penalty liability against the debtor in the District Court, the corporation was defunct and Stoecker was in bankruptcy. Under Illinois law, any corporate officer who is responsible for filing tax returns and making payments, and who "willfully" fails to do so, is personally liable for a penalty "equal to the total amount of tax unpaid by the corporation." There was no proof that Stoecker was responsible for payment of the tax and the court ruled that while Chandler owed taxes on the plane, Stoecker should not be penalized. However, Illinois law shifted the burden of proof, both on production and persuasion, to the purportedly responsible officer, the trustee in bankruptcy, Thomas Raleigh, once a notice of penalty liability was issued. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Department, holding that the burden of proof remained with Raleigh, just as it would have been on Stoecker had the proceedings taken place outside of bankruptcy, and finding that Raleigh had not satisfied the burden of persuasion.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "[w]hen the substantive law creating a tax obligation puts the burden of proof on a taxpayer, the burden of proof on the tax claim in bankruptcy court remains where the substantive law put it (in this case, on the trustee in bankruptcy)." The Court concluded that the bankruptcy estate's obligation to the Department was established by the state's tax code and that the Bankruptcy Code made no provision for altering the burden on a tax claim, and its silence said that no change was intended.


The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In 1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young people. The New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad-based membership solicitation and its connections with various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's membership based on his homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal constitutional claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that application of New Jersey's public accommodations law did not violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's inclusion would not significantly affect members' abilities to carry out their purpose. Furthermore, the court concluded that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message.

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Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association." In effect, the ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill," and that a gay troop leader's presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the young members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."


Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United States

In 1981, Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. and Marathon Oil Co. both paid the Federal Government over $150 million in return for the rights to explore for and develop oil off the coast of North Carolina, provided that the companies received exploration and development permissions in accordance with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), and the regulations promulgated pursuant to OCSLA and CZMA. In 1990, the companies submitted an exploration plan, as required by OCSLA and CZMA, to the Department of the Interior for approval. Thereafter, the Outer Banks Protection Act (OBPA) became effective. The OBPA prevented the Secretary of the Interior from approving the exploration plan for at least 13 months. The state of North Carolina then objected to certification of the companies' plans under the CZMA. Before the Secretary of Commerce rejected Mobil's request to override North Carolina's objection, the companies filed a breach-of-contract lawsuit. In granting summary judgement for the companies, the Court of Federal Claims found that the Federal Government had broken its contractual promise to follow OCSLA's requirement to approve an exploration plan that satisfied OCSLA's requirements within 30 days of the plan's submission, which constituted the repudiation of the contract and entitled the companies to restitution of the payments. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Federal Government's refusal to consider the companies' final exploration plan was not the operative cause of any failure to carry out the contracts' terms, because North Carolina's objection would have prevented the companies from exploring.

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Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Federal Government broke its promise, repudiated the contracts, and must give the companies their money back. "We find that the oil companies gave the United States $158 million in return for a contractual promise to follow the terms of pre-existing statutes and regulations. The new statute prevented the Government from keeping that promise," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court, "therefore the Government must give the companies their money back."


A California state-court jury convicted Lee Robbins of second degree murder and grand theft auto. After the trial, in which Robbins defended himself, his appointed counsel on appeal concluded that an appeal would be frivolous. Under a new California procedure, established in People v. Wende, Robbins' counsel then filed with the California Court of Appeal to allow him to withdraw or to let the court dispose of the case by filing a brief that was silent on the merits of the case and offered to brief issues at the court's direction. The court affirmed and, after Robbins appealed his own case, the California Supreme Court denied review. After exhausting his state post-conviction remedies, Robbins sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that he had been denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. The Federal District Court granted Robbins' petition and concluded that his counsel failed to meet even the minimum duty to further a client's case after determining that his appeal was without merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded the case for the District Court to consider other trial errors raised by Robbins.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "States are free to adopt different procedures, so long as those procedures adequately safeguard a defendant's right to appellate counsel," as does California's procedure. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that California's procedure "reasonably ensures that an indigent's appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal. Whatever its strengths or weaknesses as a matter of policy, we cannot say that it fails to afford indigents the adequate and effective appellate review that the Fourteenth Amendment requires." The dissenting minority collectively noted that California's procedures allowed attorneys to remain too passive.


In California, candidates for public office can gain access to the general ballot by winning a qualified political party's primary. In 1996, voter approved Proposition 198 changed California's partisan primary from a closed primary, in which only a political party's members can vote on its nominees, to a blanket primary, in which each voter's ballot lists every candidate regardless of party affiliation and allows the voter to choose freely among them. The candidate of each party who wins the most votes is that party's nominee for the general election. The California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party have historically prohibited nonmembers from voting in their party's primary. Each political party filed suit against Bill Jones, the California Secretary of State, alleging that the blanket primary violated their First Amendment right of association. Jones countered that a blanket primary will intensify the election and allow for better representation in elected office. Siding with Jones, the District Court held that the primary's burden on the parties' associational rights was not severe and was justified by substantial state interests. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that California's blanket primary violates a political party's First Amendment right of association. "Proposition 198 forces political parties to associate with -- to have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by -- those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival," wrote Justice Antonin Scalia for the majority. "A single election in which the party nominee is selected by nonparty members could be enough to destroy the party." Justice Scalia went on to state for the Court that Proposition 198 takes away a party's "basic function" to choose its own leaders and is functionally "both severe and unnecessary." Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. "This Court's willingness to invalidate the primary schemes of 3 States and cast serious constitutional doubt on the schemes of 29 others at the parties' behest is," Justice Stevens wrote, "an extraordinary intrusion into the complex and changing election laws of the States."


A Colorado statute makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to "knowingly approach" within 8 feet of another person, without that person's consent, in order to pass "a leaflet or handbill to, display a sign to, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person...." Leila Hill and others, sidewalk counselors who offer abortion alternatives to women entering abortion clinics, sought to enjoin the statute's enforcement in state court, claiming violations of their First Amendment free speech rights and right to a free press. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the statute imposed content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of communication. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment after holding that a provision creating a speech-free floating buffer zone with a 15-foot radius violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment. In affirming, the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated the lower court's conclusions. The court concluded that the statute struck a proper balance between a person's right to protest and a person's right to medical treatment.

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No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Colorado statute's restrictions on speech-related conduct are constitutional. The Court concluded that the statute "is not a regulation of speech. Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur." "Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however, make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities," Justice Stevens wrote for the Court. "The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases." Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony M. Kennedy dissented.


Robin Free and Renee Free, consumers of infant formula, sued Abbott Laboratories, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, and Mead Johnson & Company (collectively Abbott), under Louisiana's antitrust laws alleging a price-fixing conspiracy. After Abbott successfully removed the case to federal court, the District Court granted the Frees' motion to remand, holding that it lacked federal question jurisdiction and that it had diversity jurisdiction only over the named plaintiffs' claims, not over the other class members. Ultimately concluding that federal jurisdiction extended to the case, the Court of Appeals held that the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the unnamed plaintiffs because it had diversity jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs' claims.

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In a per curiam opinion announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals by an equally divided 4-4 ruling. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


The Hawaiian Constitution limits the right to vote for the nine trustees of the state agency known as the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). The agency administers programs designed for the benefit of two subclasses of Hawaiian citizenry, "native Hawaiians," defined as descendants of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Islands before 1778, and "Hawaiians," defined as descendants of the peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778. Only "Hawaiians" may vote in the statewide election for the trustees. Harold Rice, born in Hawaii and a Hawaiian citizen, does not have the requisite ancestry to be a "Hawaiian" under state law. However, Rice applied to vote in OHA trustee elections. After Rice's application was denied, he sued Hawaiian Governor Benjamin J. Cayetano, claiming that the voting exclusion was invalid under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Federal District Court granted the state summary judgment. The court examined the voting qualifications with the latitude applied to legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power over Indian affairs, and found that the electoral scheme was rationally related to the state's responsibility to utilize a part of the proceeds from certain public lands for the native Hawaiians' benefit. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Hawaii "may rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being the group to whom trust obligations run and to whom OHA trustees owe a duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide who the trustees ought to be."

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Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Hawaii's denial of Rice's right to vote in OHA trustee elections violates the Fifteenth Amendment," in creating a race-based voting qualification. "A state may not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, and this law does so," Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court. The court rejected the state's argument that the voting limitation was one based on ancestry, not race. In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for himself and Ruth Bader Ginsburg that the majority's decision "rests largely on the repetition of glittering generalities that have little, if any, application to the compelling history of the state of Hawaii."


Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens

Jonathan Stevens, a former attorney for the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, filed suit against his former employer, the agency, alleging that it had submitted false claims to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in order to induce the EPA to disburse more grant money than it was entitled to receive. Stevens filed suit under the False Calms Act (FCA), which provides for a private person to bring a qui tam civil action "in the name of the [Federal] Government," against "any person" who "knowingly presents...to...the...Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment." The State of Vermont moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that a State or state agency is not a "person" subject to liability under the FCA and that a qui tam action in federal court against a State is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied the motion. Vermont then filed an interlocutory appeal. Thereupon, the court stayed its proceedings and the United States intervened in the appeal in support of Stevens. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a private individual has standing to bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act, but that the False Claims Act does not subject a state or state agency to liability in such actions. The Court concluded that the False Claims Act does not include states as "persons" who can be sued under the law. Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter dissented.


While serving a life sentence for murder in Georgia, Robert Jones escaped and committed a second murder in 1982. Jones was sentenced to a second life term. At the time of Jones' second offense, Georgia law required the State's Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) to consider inmates serving life sentences for parole after seven years and if it was not granted at that time, that it be reconsidered every three years thereafter. Jones was initially considered for parole in 1989, seven years after his 1982 conviction, and parole was denied. After Jones was incarcerated but before his first parole hearing, the Board amended its rule to require that parole reconsideration take place only once every eight years. Subsequently, the Board scheduled Jones for reconsideration eight years later, in 1997. However, a Federal Court of Appeals ruling, that such board actions could not be applied retroactively, allowed Jones to be reconsidered for parole in 1992 and again in 1995. Then a U.S. Supreme Court decision was read to allow for retroactive adjustments in parole and Jones was scheduled for reconsideration in 2003 (eight years later), rather then in 1998. Jones sued the Board members, claiming that retroactive application of the amended rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The District Court ruled in favor of the Board. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the amended Rule's retroactive application was necessarily an ex post facto violation.

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No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the retroactive application of the Georgia provision permitting extension of intervals between parole considerations does not to necessarily violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court concluded that the key element in deciding whether an increase in the interval between a state's parole hearings for prison inmates violates the Ex Post Facto Clause is whether the change creates a sufficient risk of increasing the punishment attached to the covered crimes. "States must have due flexibility in formulating parole procedure and addressing problems associated with confinement and release," wrote Justice Kennedy.


Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist.

Salvador Martinez, a self-described self-taught paralegal with 25 years of experience at 12 different law firms, was working for a Santa Ana, California law firm when a client gave him $6,000.00 to bail her boyfriend out of jail. The bail was never posted and Martinez was subsequently charged with grand theft and the fraudulent appropriation of the property of another. Martinez chose to represent himself at trial before a jury, which acquitted him of theft, but convicted him of embezzlement. Martinez then filed a timely notice of appeal, a motion to represent himself, and a waiver of counsel. The motion to represent himself was denied by the California Court of Appeal. The court explained: "There is no constitutional right to self-representation on the initial appeal as of right. The right to counsel on appeal stems from the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth Amendment....The denial of self-representation at this level does not violate due process or equal protection guarantees."

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that here is no constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction. "We are not aware of any historical consensus establishing a right of self-representation on appeal," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Noting that the rights established by the Sixth Amendment "are presented strictly as rights that are available in preparation for trial and at the trial itself" and that the Amendment "does not include any right to appeal," Justice Stevens concluded, "[i]t necessarily follows that the Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal." Justice Stevens added "[o]ur experience has taught us that "a pro se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney." Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Antonin Scalia wrote concurring opinions.


In 1998, Dewey Jones, of Detroit, tossed a Molotov cocktail into the home of his cousin, James Walker, Jr., in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Walker's home was severely damaged. Subsequently, Jones was convicted in U.S. District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. section 844(i), which makes it a federal crime to "maliciously damage or destroy, ...by means of fire or an explosive, any building... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." The Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction. Before both courts, Jones unsuccessfully argued that section 844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.

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No. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity, such that arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under section 844(i). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[w]ere we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of section 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain."


Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.

The Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Council), an association of nursing homes participating in Medicare, sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, challenging the validity of various Medicare regulations establishing sanctions and remedies for nursing homes found guilty of violating minimum health and safety standards. The Council alleged that certain terms in the new regulations were unconstitutionally vague, that the regulations created administrative procedures inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause, and that the regulations' legislative rules that were not promulgated consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act. The Council invoked the Federal District Court's federal-question jurisdiction, which states that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," to rule on its claims. The District Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. The court concluded that set of special statutory provisions under the Medicare Act create a separate, virtually exclusive, system of administrative and judicial review for such claims. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

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Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Medicare Act barred federal-question jurisdiction of the Council's challenges to the validity of various Medicare regulations. The Court concluded that the Council must proceed instead through the special review channel that the Medicare statutes create. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in his dissent that, "[d]elayed review...may mean no review at all. For when the costs of presenting a claim via the delayed review route exceed the costs of simply complying with the regulation, the regulated entity will buckle under and comply, even when the regulation is plainly invalid."


The Taylor Grazing Act grants the Secretary of the Interior authority to divide the public rangelands into grazing districts, to specify the amount of grazing permitted in each district, and to issue grazing leases or permits to "settlers, residents, and other stock owners." When Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt announced new regulations governing the administration of livestock on 170 million acres of public range, the Public Lands Council (Council), a group of nonprofit ranching-related organizations, objected. The Council's members who held grazing permits brought an action against Secretary Babbitt challenging 10 of the new federal grazing regulations issued by the Secretary in 1995. The Council claimed that the Secretary acted beyond his power in regulating the grazing patterns. The District Court found 4 of the 10 regulations unlawful. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals upheld three previously overturned regulations, which changed the definition of "grazing preference," permitted those who were not "engaged in the livestock business" to qualify for grazing permits; and granted the United States title to all future range improvements.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "[t]he regulatory changes do not exceed the Secretary's Taylor Grazing Act authority." "Congress itself has directed development of land-use plans, and their use in the allocation process in order to preserve, improve and develop the public rangelands," wrote Justice Stephen G. Breyer. "And the secretary [of the Interior] has always had the statutory authority...to reclassify and withdraw range land from grazing use."


Charles C. Apprendi, Jr. fired several shots into the home of an African- American family. While in custody, Apprendi made a statement, which he later retracted, that he did not want the family in his neighborhood because of their race. Apprendi was charged under New Jersey law with second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which carries a prison term of 5 to 10 years. The count did not refer to the state's hate crime statute, which provides for an enhanced sentence if a trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the crime with a purpose to intimidate a person or group because of race. After Apprendi pleaded guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance the sentence. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the shooting was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to a 12-year term on the firearms count. In upholding the sentence, the appeals court rejected Apprendi's claim that the Due Process Clause requires that a bias finding be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The State Supreme Court affirmed.

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Yes. In an 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Due Process Clause requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that "the New Jersey procedure challenged in this case is an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system." Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Stephen G. Breyer wrote dissenting opinions that were joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.


A Nebraska law prohibited any "partial birth abortion" unless that procedure was necessary to save the mother's life. It defined "partial birth abortion" as a procedure in which the doctor "partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the... child," and defined the latter phrase to mean "intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the [abortionist] knows will kill the... child and does kill the... child." Violation of the law is a felony, and it provides for the automatic revocation of a convicted doctor's state license to practice medicine. Leroy Carhart, a Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical setting, brought suit seeking a declaration that the statute violates the U.S. Constitution, claiming the law was unconstitutionally vague and placed an undue burden on himself and female patients seeking abortions. The District Court held the statute unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Yes. In a complicated 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "Nebraska's statute criminalizing the performance of "partial birth abortion[s]" violates the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted in Casey and Roe." The sharply divided Court struck down the statute because it placed an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion and did not allow for exception in cases of threatened health. "All those who perform abortion procedures using that method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment," that results in "an undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion decision," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent concluded that "[t]he notion that the Constitution of the United States... prohibits the States from simply banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our half-born posterity is quite simply absurd."
Learn more about the Supreme Court and abortion law in Body Politic, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc.

Samara Brothers, Inc. designs and manufactures a line of children's clothing. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., contracted with a supplier, Judy-Philippine, Inc. (JPI), to manufacture outfits based on photographs of Samara garments and to be offered under Wal-Mart's house label, "Small Steps." When JPI manufactured the clothes, it copied sixteen of Samara's garments with some small modifications to produce the line of clothes required under its contract with Wal-Mart. After discovering that Wal-Mart and other retailers were selling the so-called knockoffs, Samara brought an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under section 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946. The jury found for Samara and awarded the company more than $1 million in damages. Wal-Mart then renewed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Samara's clothing designs could be legally protected as distinctive trade dress for purposes of section 43(a). The District Court denied the motion and awarded Samara relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion and concluded that "copyrights depicting familiar objects, such as the hearts, daisies, and strawberries in Samara's copyrights are entitled to very narrow protection. It is only the virtually identical copying...which will result in a successful claim of infringement of familiar objects."

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "[i]n a section 43(a) action for infringement of unregistered trade dress, a product's design is distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning. The fact that product design almost invariably serves purposes other than source identification not only renders inherent distinctiveness problematic; it also renders application of an inherent-distinctiveness principle more harmful to other consumer interests," Justice Scalia wrote for the Court. "Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness," Justice Scalia concluded.


Mark Rotella was admitted to a Brookhaven Psychiatric Pavilion in 1985 and discharged in 1986 after Brookhaven allegedly coerced him to stay longer than he intended. In 1994, the facility's parent company pleaded guilty to charges of fraud, conspiracy and violations of RICO, for giving physicians monetary incentives to needlessly admit, treat and retain patients at their hospitals. Rotella learned of the plea that same year, and in 1997 he filed a civil damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), claiming that the Brookhaven doctors and related business entities, had conspired to keep him hospitalized to maximize their profits. RICO makes it criminal "to conduct" an "enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." A "pattern" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, the last of which occurred within 10 years after the commission of a prior act. Brookhaven countered that the statute of limitations under RICO had run on the charge. The District Court granted Brookhaven summary judgment on the ground that the 4-year limitation period for civil RICO claims had expired in 1990, four years after Rotella admitted discovering his injury. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Rotella's argument that the limitations period does not begin to run until a plaintiff discovers (or should have discovered) both the injury and the pattern of racketeering activity.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Rotella's action was not timely, because the start of the 4-year limitations period applicable to a civil RICO action was not governed by an "injury and pattern discovery" accrual rule under which such a civil claim would accrue only when the claimant discovered, or should have discovered, both an injury and a pattern of racketeering activity. In a footnote, Justice Souter noted that "[w]e do not...settle upon a final rule."


Robert A. Beck, II, of Southeastern Insurance Group (SIG), alleged that after he discovered former senior officer and director Ronald M. Prupis' unlawful conduct and contacted regulators, Prupis enacted a scheme to remove him from SIG. Beck sued Prupis under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Beck alleged that his injury, the loss of his employment, served to further Prupis' conspiracy and therefore provided a cause of action under RICO. The District Court dismissed Beck's RICO conspiracy claim. The court agreed with Prupis that employees who are terminated for refusing to participate in RICO activities, or who threaten to report RICO activities, do not have standing to sue under RICO for damages from their loss of employment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the act causing Beck's injury was not an act of racketeering, it could not support a RICO cause of action.

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No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or otherwise wrongful under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not give rise to a cause of action under RICO. Thus, because Prupis' scheme to remove Beck from SIG was not an act of racketeering itself, Beck had no ground to sue him under RICO. Although Prupis did engage in acts of racketeering, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "the alleged overt act (terminating) in the present case was not independently wrongful under any substantive provision of RICO."


On October 13, 1995 Miami-Dade police received an anonymous tip that a black male wearing a plaid shirt was standing near a bus stop carrying a gun. The two officers who responded found three black males, one of which, J.L., a 15 -year-old, was wearing a plaid shirt. After frisking him, the officers did find a firearm. J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed weapon without a license. At trial, he moved to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing that the frisking performed by the officers was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court granted the motion, but was reversed by the immediate appellate court. The Florida Supreme Court overruled the appellate court and suppressed the evidence.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court concluded that J.L. the anonymous tip did not meet the minimum requirements to perform a warrantless search. Justice Ginsburg, drawing from the Court's logic in Terry v. Ohio and Adams v. Williams, indicated that an anonymous tip must posses a moderate level of reliability, including "predictive information" that offers police a "means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility." An accurate description of a person without a reliable assertion of illegality or description of the crime in question, as was the anonymous tip in this case, does not meet this standard. "All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believe he had inside information."


State departments of motor vehicles (DMVs) require drivers and automobile owners to provide personal information, which may include a person's name, address, telephone number, Social Security number, and photograph, as a condition of obtaining a driver's license or registering an automobile. Congress enacted the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA),which establishes a regulatory scheme that restricts the States' ability to disclose a driver's personal information without the driver's consent, after finding that many States sell such information. The DPPA conflicts with South Carolina law, under which information contained in the State's DMV records is available to any person or entity that fills out a form listing the requester's name and address and stating that the information will not be used for telephone solicitation. The Attorney General of South Carolina filed suit, alleging the DPPA violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. The District Court concluded that the DPPA was incompatible with the principles of federalism, granted summary judgement for the State, and permanently enjoined the DPPA's enforcement against the State. In affirming, the Court of Appeals also concluded that the DPPA violated the constitutional principles of federalism.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause and doesn't run afoul of federalism principles. The law "does not require the states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. "It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals," the Chief Justice added.


Bonnie Weisgram died of carbon monoxide poisoning during a fire in her home. Chad Weisgram, her son, brought a diversity suit in federal District Court, seeking wrongful death damages, alleging that a defective heater, manufactured by Marley Company and used by Bonnie Weisgram, cause both the fire and her death. At trial, Weisgram introduced the testimony of three supposed experts to prove the alleged heater defect and its causal connection to the fire. Marley's objection that the testimony was unreliable, and therefore inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, was overruled by the District Court. After Weisgram's evidence was introduced, Marley again unsuccessfully moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Weisgram had failed to meet his burden of proof on the issues of defect and causation. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for Weisgram. Afterwards, Marley, once again, requested judgment as a matter of law. Additionally, Marley requested a new trial. The court denied the motions and entered judgment for Weisgram. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Marley's motion for judgment as a matter of law should have been granted because the testimony of Weisgram's expert witnesses, the sole evidence supporting the product defect charge, was speculative and not shown to be scientifically sound. The appeals court did not order a new trial.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 permits an appellate court to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law when it determines that evidence was erroneously admitted at trial and that the remaining, properly admitted, evidence is insufficient to constitute a submissible case. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "if...the court of appeals concludes that further proceedings are unwarranted because the loser on appeal has had a full and fair opportunity to present the case, including arguments for a new trial, the appellate court may appropriately instruct the district court to enter judgment against the jury-verdict winner. "


In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo established a $1,000 cap on individuals' contributions to candidates for federal office. Missouri law imposes campaign contribution limits, ranging from $250 to $1,000, to candidates for state office. The statute allows for periodic adjustments, which increased the 1998 contribution limit to $1,075 for candidates for statewide office, including state auditor. In 1998, Zev David Fredman, a candidate for the Republican nomination for Missouri state auditor, and the Shrink Missouri Government PAC, a political action committee, filed suit, alleging that the Missouri statute imposing limits on contributions to candidates for state office violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The PAC had contributed $1,075 to Fredman and argued, without the limitation, it would contribute more to Fredman's campaign. Additionally, Fredman alleged he could campaign effectively only with more generous contributions. The Federal District Court, applying Buckley v. Valeo, upheld the statute. The court rejected Fredman's and the PAC's contention that inflation since Buckley's approval of a federal $1,000 restriction meant that the state limit of $1,075 for a statewide office could not be constitutional today. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, found that Missouri's interest in avoiding the corruption or the perception of corruption caused by candidates' acceptance of large campaign contributions was insufficient to satisfy Buckley's strict scrutiny standard of review.

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Yes, no, and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Buckley is the authority for comparable state regulation and, but that the federal limits approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, do not define the scope of permissible state limitations. The Court held the Missouri statute not to violate the First Amendment. "Even without the authority of Buckley, there would be no serious question about the legitimacy of the interests claimed, wrote Justice Souter for the Court, "the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance." Justices Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented, voting to overturn Buckley as a violation of First Amendment speech rights.


Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 provides for the allocation of funds for educational materials and equipment, including library materials and computer software and hardware, to public and private elementary and secondary schools to implement "secular, neutral, and nonideological" programs. In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, about 30% of Chapter 2 funds are allocated for private schools, most of which are Catholic or otherwise religiously affiliated. Mary Helms and other public school parents file suit alleging that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The District Court initially agreed, finding that Chapter 2 had the primary effect of advancing religion because the materials and equipment loaned to the Catholic schools were direct aid and that the schools were pervasively sectarian. However, after the presiding judge who made the initial ruling retired, the case was reviewed by a new judge, who reversed that decision. Thereafter, based on different precedent, the court upheld Chapter 2. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Chapter 2 unconstitutional.

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No. In a 6-3 plurality decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, is not a law respecting an establishment of religion simply because many of the private schools receiving Chapter 2 aid in the parish are religiously affiliated. Turning to neutrality to distinguish between indoctrination attributable to the State and that which is not, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court, "[i]f the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government."


The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) makes it unlawful for a private employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual...because of such individual's age." In 1974, Congress extended the ADEA's substantive requirements to the states. First, in 1994, employees of the University of Montevallo filed suit against the university, a branch of the State of Alabama, alleging that the university had discriminated against them on the basis of their age. The federal District Court dismissed the case based on the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court determined that, although the ADEA shows Congress' intent to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress did not enact or extend the ADEA under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. The court, therefore, held that the ADEA did not abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Second, in 1995, a group of faculty and librarians of Florida State University filed suit against the Board of Regents, alleging that the university's fiscal actions had violated the ADEA because the actions had a disparate impact on the pay of older employees. When the Florida Board of Regents moved to dismiss the suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the District Court denied the motion, holding that Congress expressed its intent to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity in the ADEA, and that the ADEA is a proper exercise of congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Likewise, in 1996, a third case, involving an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections, was similarly decided. The Court of Appeals, in deciding all three cases, held that the ADEA does not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the ADEA contains a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the states' immunity, but that the abrogation exceeds Congress' authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. "States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest," wrote Justice O'Connor for the Court. Justice O'Connor noted that, "[o]ld age also does not define a discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will experience it." Justice O'Connor concluded that "[i]n contrast, when a State discriminates on the basis of race or gender, we require a tighter fit between the discriminatory means and the legitimate ends they serve." Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer dissented.


In 1975, inmates at the Pendleton Correctional Facility filed a class action lawsuit, which ultimately led the District Court to issue an injunction to remedy Eighth Amendment violations regarding conditions of confinement. In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), which sets a standard for the entry and termination of prospective relief in civil actions challenging prison conditions. The PLRA provides that a motion to terminate such relief "shall operate as a stay" of that relief beginning 30 days after the motion is filed and ending when the court rules on the motion. In 1997, the State of Indiana filed a motion to terminate the remedial order against the correctional facility. Under the PLRA, the motion stayed the court's original remedial order. The prisoners of Pendleton moved to enjoin the operation of the automatic stay, arguing that the automatic stay provision of the PLRA violated due process and the separation of powers doctrine. The District Court enjoined the stay. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that the provision precluded courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin the stay, but concluded that the statute was unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds.

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Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Congress clearly intended to make operation of the PLRA's automatic stay provision mandatory, precluding courts from exercising their equitable power to enjoin the stay and that the PLRA does not violate separation of powers principles. Thus, Congress lawfully imposed deadlines for federal judges to review states officials' motions to discontinue court monitoring and supervision of state prison conditions. Justice O'Connor, in addressing whether the PLRA violated the separation of powers, remarked in a footnote that, "[t]he PLRA does not deprive courts of their adjudicatory role, but merely provides a new legal standard for relief and encourages courts to apply that standard promptly." Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer and John Paul Stevens dissented.


In 1994, Webster Hubbell, in a plea agreement, promised to provide the Independent Counsel with information about matters relating to the Whitewater investigation. Subsequently, the Independent Counsel served Hubbell with a subpoena calling for such information, and Hubbell invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to state whether he had the documents the Independent Counsel demanded. After being granted immunity, pursuant to 18 USC section 6003 (a), Hubbell produced the desired documents. The Independent Counsel then used those documents to indict Hubbell on tax and fraud charges. The District Court dismissed the indictment because the evidence that would be used against Hubbell was derived either directly or indirectly from his immunized act of producing those documents. Vacating that decision, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to determine the scope of the Government's knowledge of Hubbell's financial affairs on the day the subpoena was issued. The court determined that if the Government could not demonstrate with reasonable particularity that there existed a prior awareness of the contents of the documents and that those documents were in Hubbell's possession, then the indictment was tainted. After acknowledging he could not meet this standard, the Independent Counsel entered into a conditional plea agreement providing for the dismissal of the indictment, unless the Supreme Court's disposition of the case made it reasonably likely that Hubbell's immunity would not pose a significant bar to his prosecution.

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Yes and no. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court, in order to determine the precise scope of a grant of immunity with respect to the production of documents in response to a subpoena, held that a person responding to subpoena, pursuant to a court order granting immunity, could not be prosecuted on the basis of information in the documents produced if the government did not have any prior, independent knowledge of the documents. Thus, the indictment against Hubbell was dismissed because it was not derived from sources independent of documents produced under his grant of immunity. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, "we have no doubt that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects the target of a grand jury investigation from being compelled to answer questions designed to elicit information about the existence of sources of potentially incriminating evidence." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist was the lone dissenter.


The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact to establish procedures for resolution of one state's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another state. Under the Compact Clause, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. In order to resolve outstanding murder and robbery charges against Michael Hill, an Ohio prisoner, the State of New York lodged a detainer against him under the IAD. Hill filed a request for disposition of the detainer, pursuant to IAD Article III, and was returned to New York. Article III provides that, upon such a request, that the prisoner be brought to trial within 180 days. Thereafter, Hill's counsel agreed to a trial date outside the 180-day period. Subsequently, Hill moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that the IAD's time limit had expired. The trial court denied Hill's motion, concluding that his defense counsel's explicit agreement to the trial date constituted a waiver or abandonment of Hill's IAD rights. After his conviction and subsequent appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to dismiss. In reversing, the state Court of Appeals ordered that Hill's indictment be dismissed because his counsel's agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive his IAD speedy trial rights.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a defense counsel's agreement to a trial date outside the period provided for by the IAD bars the defendant from seeking dismissal on the ground that trial did not occur within that period. Noting scheduling matters are generally controlled by counsel without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, Justice Scalia wrote, "[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue." In such cases, "[a]bsent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsel's word on such matters is the last." Thus, defense counsel's agreement to a later trial date waived Hill's speedy trial rights under the IAD.


During Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel's relationship, which ended in 1991, they had two daughters. Until Brad's suicide in 1993, Brad's parents Jenifer and Gary Troxel, the paternal grandparents, had regularly seen their granddaughters on weekends. However, after Brad's suicide, Granville informed the Troxels that she wished to reduced their visitation time to one short visit per month. The Troxels filed suit for the right to visit their grandchildren, under section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington, which permits "any person" to petition for visitation rights "at any time" and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child's best interest. Granville did not oppose the petition outright but did oppose the amount of visitation time sought by the Troxels. Subsequently, a Washington Superior Court ordered more visitation than Granville desired. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that non-parents lacked standing to sue under the statute. In affirming, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the statute unconstitutionally interfered with parents' right to rear their children.

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Yes. In a 6-3 decision delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Washington Statute violated the right of parents, under the due process clause of the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that "[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy dissented.


While checking the immigration status of passengers on a bus in Texas, Border Patrol Agent Cesar Cantu squeezed the soft luggage which passengers had placed in the overhead storage space. When Agent Cantu squeezed a canvas bag above Steven Dewayne Bond, Agent Cantu noticed that it contained a "brick-like" object. After Bond admitted owning the bag and consented to its search, Agent Cantu discovered a "brick" of methamphetamine. Bond was indicted on federal drug charges. Bond moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the agent conducted an illegal search of his bag, when squeezing it, in alleged violation of the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The District Court denied the motion and subsequently found Bond guilty. On appeal, Bond conceded that other passengers had access to his bag, but contended that Agent Cantu manipulated the bag (by squeezing)in a way that other passengers would not, thus constituting an unreasonable search. In affirming the denial of the motion, the Court of Appeals held that Agent Cantu's manipulation of the bag was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.

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Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "Agent Cantu's physical manipulation of petitioner's carry-on bag violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches." The Court concluded that Bond "possessed a privacy interest in his bag," and that such an expectation of privacy is reasonable. "Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, a bus passenger "does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner." Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissented, seeing no "reasonable expectation" that strangers would not manipulate luggage in a bus.


Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc.

The Department of Transportation, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act), promulgated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208, which required auto manufacturers to equip some of their 1987 vehicles with passive restraints. To comply with FMVSS 208, Honda installed manual seat belts and a warning light, instead of a driver-side airbag, for the 1987 Honda Accord. Alexis Geier suffered severe head and facial injuries in an accident while driving a 1987 Honda Accord that did not have a driver-side airbag. Geier and her parents sought damages under District of Columbia tort law, claiming that American Honda Motor Company was negligent in not equiping the Accord with a driver's side airbag. The District Court ruled in favor of Honda, finding that Geier's claims were expressly pre-empted by the Act because a jury verdict in Geier's favor "might establish a safety standard that was not identical to Standard 208." In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that, because Geier's state tort claims posed an obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives of FMVSS 208, those claims conflicted with that standard and that the Act consequently pre-empted the lawsuit.

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Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "[Geier's] 'no airbag' lawsuit conflicts with the objectives of FMVSS 208 and is therefore pre-empted by the Act." Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that a rule of state tort law imposing a duty to install airbags in cars such as Honda's would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation sought and to the phase-in that the federal regulation deliberately imposed. It would also have made adoption of state mandatory seatbelt laws less likely." The dissent found fault in the majority's "unprecedented use of inferences from regulatory history and commentary as a basis for implied pre-emption."


In 1994, while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both students and varsity football players at Virginia Tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two semesters. Crawford was not punished. A second hearing again found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the university's administrative system, Morrison's punishment was set aside, as it was found to be "excessive." Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce nor did it redress harm caused by the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that [i]f the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of...Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States." Dissenting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer argued that the majority opinion "illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone." Additionally, Justice David H. Souter, dissenting, noted that VAWA contained a "mountain of data assembled by Congress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce."


Ray Agard was tried in New York on sodomy, assault, and weapons counts. Ultimately, Agard's trial turned on whether the jury believed the testimony of the victim and her friend or the conflicting testimony of Agard. The prosecutor challenged Agard's credibility. During summation, the prosecutor remarked, "[h]e gets to sit here and listen to the testimony of all the other witnesses before he testifies," and "[t]hat gives [him] a big advantage, doesn't it?" The prosecutor alleged that Agard had tailored his testimony to fit evidence that he heard from witnesses through the course of the trial. The trial court rejected Agard's objection that these comments violated his right to be present at trial. After exhausting his state appeals, Agard petitioned for federal habeas corpus, claiming that the prosecutor's comments violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to be present at trial and confront his accusers, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court denied his petition. The Court of Appeals reversed.

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No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the prosecutor's comments did not violate Agard's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and that the prosecutor's comments also did not violate Agard's right to due process. "Allowing comment upon the fact that a defendant's presence in the courtroom provides him a unique opportunity to tailor his testimony is appropriate and...sometimes essential to the central function of the trial, which is to discover the truth," Justice Scalia wrote for the Court. Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice David H. Souter, observed that the majority's holding "transforms a defendant's presence at trial from a Sixth Amendment right into an automatic burden on his credibility."


The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 replaced most forms of parole with supervised release. If release conditions are violated, the sentencing court may revoke the release and order the violator to serve part or all of the release term in prison without credit for time previously served on release. In 1994, Cornell Johnson was convicted of conspiring to produce and use counterfeit credit cards. Johnson was sentenced to imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release. While on supervised release, Johnson violated its terms. Subsequently, the District Court revoked Johnson's release and ordered him to serve an 18-month prison term to be followed by an additional 12 months of supervised release. The court cited no authority for ordering the new supervised release. The court could have cited a subsection added to the Act in 1994, 18 USC section 3583(h), which explicitly gave it the authority to add the new term; however, Congress made the amendment after Johnson's conviction. On appeal, Johnson argued that the application of the federal law established after his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision.

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Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that 18 USC section 3583(h) is not retroactively applicable; however, its prior version, 18 USC section 3583(e)(3), authorizes a Federal District Court to impose additional term of supervised release after revocation of initial term and reimprisonment. Thus, Johnson's judgment was affirmed because the federal sentencing statute, which was in effect at the time of his original offense, permitted the imposition of supervised release following recommitment. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that "[p]re-Guidelines practice, linguistic continuity from the old scheme to the current one, and the obvious thrust of congressional sentencing policy confirm that, in applying the law as before the enactment of subsection (h), district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release following reimprisonment." Justice Antonin Scalia dissented.


Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.

Section 406(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) bars a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan from causing the plan to engage in certain prohibited transactions with a "party in interest." Such a party encompasses entities that a fiduciary might be inclined to favor at the expense of the plan's beneficiaries. After the Ameritech Pension Trust (APT), an ERISA pension plan, allegedly entered into a transaction prohibited by ERISA with Salomon Smith Barney Inc., APT's fiduciaries sued Salomon under section 502(a)(3), which authorizes a fiduciary to bring a civil action to obtain appropriate equitable relief." Salomon arguing that section 502(a)(3) only authorizes a suit against the fiduciary who caused the plan to enter the prohibited transaction. Ultimately, the District Court held that ERISA provides a private cause of action against nonfiduciaries who participate in a prohibited transaction. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the authority to sue under section 502(a)(3) does not extend to a suit against a nonfiduciary "party in interest" to a transaction barred by section 406(a).

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Section 502(a)(3)'s authorization to a plan "participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary" to bring a civil action for "appropriate equitable relief" extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary "party in interest" to a prohibited transaction barred by section 406(a). "We reject," wrote Justice Thomas that, "absent a substantive provision of ERISA expressly imposing a duty upon a nonfiduciary party in interest, the nonfiduciary party may not be held liable under [section 502(a)(3)]." Justice Thomas concluded that "[section 502(a)(3)] itself imposes certain duties, and therefore that liability under that provision does not depend on whether ERISA's substantive provisions impose a specific duty on the party being sued."


Hartford Underwriters Ins. Company v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.

Hen House Interstate, Inc. filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. During the reorganization attempt, Hen House obtained workers' compensation insurance from Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company. Hen House repeatedly failed to make the monthly premium payments required by the policy. Ultimately, Hen House's reorganization failed and the court converted the case to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding and appointed a trustee. Hartford, learning of the bankruptcy proceedings, sought to recover its premiums as an administrative expense. Recognizing that the estate lacked unencumbered funds to pay the premiums, Hartford attempted to charge the premiums to Union Planters Bank, the secured creditor for all of the property of Hen House, by filing a claim with the Bankruptcy Court under 11 USC Section 506(c). The Bankruptcy Court ruled in favor of Hartford and the ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en banc and reversed, on the ground that an administrative claimant could not invoke section 506(c).

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "Section 506(c) does not provide an administrative claimant of a bankruptcy estate an independent right to seek payment of its claim from property encumbered by a secured creditor's lien, or subject to secured claims. Justice Scalia noted that plain meaning of the language in Section 506(c) and the "most natural reading" of the section persuaded the court that no one other than the trustee has an independent right to seek payment of administrative claim, like premiums from property secured by a creditor's lien, under the section.


The Organic Act of Guam provides that that "if no [slate of] candidates [for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Guam] receives a majority of the votes cast in any election...a runoff election shall be held." The Election Commission certified that the Democratic slate of Carl T.C. Gutierrez for governor and Madeleine Z. Bordallo for lieutenant governor had defeated the Republican slate, Joseph F. Ada and Felix P. Camacho. Gutierrez and Bordallo had received a majority of the votes cast for gubernatorial slates in the 1998 Guam general election, but did not receive a majority of the total number of ballots that voters cast due to voters selecting write-in candidates, people voting for both slates, and blank ballots. The opposing Republican slate sought a writ of mandamus ordering a runoff election. According to Ada and Camacho, the phrase "in any election" means the majority as measured by the votes cast in the entire election, not simply in the race for governor. Gutierrez responded that "votes cast" meant actual votes cast for governor and lieutenant governor, rather than ballots in which the governor's contest is left blank. The District Court issued the writ and the Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, interpreting the statutory phrase "majority of the votes cast in any election" to require that a slate receive a majority of the total number of ballots cast in the general election.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "[t]he Guam Organic Act does not require a runoff election when a candidate slate has received a majority of the votes cast for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the Territory, but not a majority of the number of ballots cast in the simultaneous general election." Justice Souter wrote for the Court that an "obvious reading" of the law requires only a majority of votes cast in that one specific race, "Congress did not shift its attention when it used 'any election' unadorned by a gubernatorial reference or other definite modifier."


Lonnie Weeks, Jr., was found guilty of capital murder in the death of Virginia State Trooper Jose Cavazos. During the penalty phase of his trial, the prosecution sought to prove two aggravating circumstances. Weeks' defense presented 10 witnesses in mitigation. During deliberations, the jurors sent the trial judge a note asking whether, if they believed Weeks guilty of at least one of the aggravating circumstances, it was their duty to issue the death penalty, or whether they must decide whether to issue the death penalty or a life sentence. In responding, the trial judge only referred the jury to their instructions, which stated: "If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either of the two [aggravating circumstances], and as to that alternative, you are unanimous, then you may fix the punishment...at death, or if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment...at life imprisonment." The defense counsel objected, arguing for the judge to instruct the jury it could find one or both of the aggravating circumstances and still impose a life sentence. In finding one of the aggravating circumstances and after considering the evidence in mitigation, the jury returned a unanimous verdict fixing Weeks' punishment at death. On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Weeks' presented 47 assignments of error, of which his assignment of error respecting the judge's answering the jury's question about mitigating circumstances was number 44. The court affirmed Weeks' conviction and sentence. Weeks' petition for federal habeas relief was ultimately denied.

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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Constitution was not violated by the Virginia trial judge who, during a capital trial's penalty phase, directed the jury's attention to the allegedly ambiguous paragraph of the jury's instruction in response to the jury's question as to mitigating evidence. "Given that petitioner's jury was adequately instructed, and given that the trial judge responded to the jury's question by directing its attention to the precise paragraph of the constitutionally adequate instruction that answers its inquiry, the question becomes whether the Constitution requires anything more," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "[w]e hold that it does not." Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that "[t]he record in this case establishes, not just a 'reasonable likelihood' of jury confusion, but a virtual certainty that the jury did not realize that there were two distinct legal bases for concluding that a death sentence was not 'justified.'"


Robert Carpenter was indicted on charges of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, pleaded guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment, with parole possible after 30 years. On direct appeal, Carpenter unsuccessfully challenged only the length of the minimum sentence. After unsuccessfully pursuing state post-conviction relief and represented by new counsel, Carpenter petitioned the Ohio Court of Appeals to reopen his direct appeal on the ground that his original appellate counsel had been constitutionally ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and sentence. The court dismissed the application as untimely, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Carpenter then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, raising the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, and alleging that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not raising that claim on direct appeal. The District Court determined that, while the sufficiency claim had been procedurally defaulted, the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could excuse that default; concluded that Carpenter's appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective; and granted the writ. The Court of Appeals concluded that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of the sufficiency claim, regardless of whether the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim had been procedurally defaulted; and found prejudice from counsel's failure to raise the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim on direct appeal.

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No. In a opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a state prisoner's procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can excuse the procedural default of another habeas claim only if the inmate can demonstrate that the poor lawyering rises to a constitutional level, not only that it prejudiced them at trial. The 7-2 decision means that ineffective-assistance claims filed too late in a state appellate court generally cannot be used in federal court to excuse an inmate's default on other claims. Justice Scalia wrote for the court that it is not enough to say such a claim "was presented to the state courts even though it was not presented in the manner that state law requires."


Roy Lee Johnson had been serving time in federal prison for multiple drug and firearms felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid. The District Court ordered his immediate release. Johnson's 3-year term of supervised release that was yet to be served on the remaining convictions then went into effect. As a result of serving time for the two invalid convictions, Johnson had served 2.5 years' too much prison time. After his release, Johnson filed a motion to credit the excess two and one-half years he was erroneously incarcerated toward his three-year supervised release sentence. The District Court denied relief, explaining that the supervised release commenced upon Johnson's actual release from incarceration, not before. In reversing, the Court of Appeals accepted Johnson's argument that his supervised release term commenced not on the day he left prison, but when his lawful term of imprisonment expired.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the length of a supervised release term cannot be reduced by reason of excess time served in prison. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[t]he objectives of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release." The Court found that Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community life and that supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.


After a state agency denied Juatassa Sims' application for Social Security disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits, she obtained a hearing before a Social Security Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ also denied Sims' claims, concluding that, although she did have some medical impairments, she had not been and was not under a "disability." Sims then sought review by the Social Security Appeals Council, which denied review. She next filed suit in the Federal District Court, contending that the ALJ erred in three ways by making selective use of the record, by posing defective questions to a vocational expert, and by failing to order a consultative examination. The District Court rejected her contentions. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the contentions because they were not included in Sims' request for review by the Appeals Council.

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No. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held, 5 to 4, that Social Security claimants who exhaust administrative remedies need not also exhaust issues administratively in order to preserve judicial review of those issues. Justice Thomas wrote that the issue-exhaustion requirement, usually required even in the absence of a statute or regulation, does not apply in a non-adversarial proceeding, as in Social Security cases. Justice O'Connor filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.


In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the State of Washington created the Office of Marine Safety, which was directed to establish standards to provide the "best achievable protection" (BAP) from oil spill damage. The agency promulgated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), a trade association of tanker operators, filed suit against the state and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations. Intertanko argued that Washington's BAP standards had entered an area occupied by the federal government and imposed unique requirements in an area where national uniformity was mandated. Further, Intertanko argued that if every political subdivision were to promulgate such maritime regulations, the goal of national governments to develop effective international environmental and safety would be undermined. The District Court upheld Washington's regulations. Thereafter, the Federal Government intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending that the District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Washington's regulations regarding general navigation watch procedures, crew English-language skills and training, and maritime casualty reporting are pre-empted by the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers. "The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area where the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and is now well established," wrote Justice Kennedy for the Court. Justice Kennedy also noted that States may regulate their own ports and waterways so long as the rules are based on "the peculiarities of local waters" and do not conflict with federal regulation.


The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) permits governmental entities to compensate their employees for overtime work by granting them compensatory time in lieu of cash payment. If the employees do not use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer must pay cash compensation under certain circumstances. Harris County, Texas, found that too many of its deputy sheriffs had too many hours of accrued compensatory time. Fearing a budget crisis, the county adopted a policy under which its employees could be ordered to schedule compensatory time at specified times in order to reduce the amount of accrued time that would otherwise require cash payment. Edward Christensen and 128 other deputy sheriffs in Harris County believed they had the right to use their compensatory time when they saw fit. The sheriffs sued, claiming that the FLSA does not permit an employer to compel an employee to use compensatory time in the absence of an agreement permitting the employer to do so. The District Court ruled in favor of the sheriffs, concluding that the policy violated the FLSA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the FLSA did not address the issue in question and thus did not prohibit the county from implementing a compensatory time policy.

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No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held 6-3 that "[n]othing in the FLSA or its implementing regulations prohibits a public employer from compelling the use of compensatory time." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "under the FLSA, an employer is free to require an employee to take time off work, and an employer is also free to use the money it would have paid in wages to cash out accrued compensatory time. The compelled use of compensatory time challenged in this case merely involves doing both of these steps at once."


Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council

In 1996, the Massachusetts Burma Law, which restricted state entities from buying goods or services from companies doing business with Burma, was passed. Afterwards, Congress also imposed mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma. Businesses with ties to Burma landed on Massachusetts' "restricted trade" list. The list came to include 34 members of the National Foreign Trade Council (Council), a non-profit advocate for American companies that do business abroad. The Council filed suit against Stephen Crosby, the Massachusetts Secretary of Administration and Finance, and other state officials in federal court, claiming that the state act unconstitutionally infringes on the federal foreign affairs power, violates the Foreign Commerce Clause, and is preempted by the Federal Burma Law. The District Court permanently enjoined the state act's enforcement, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court also found that the Massachusetts Burma Law violated the Supremacy Clause because the state was acting in an area of unique federal concern, foreign policy, through a balanced, tailored approach.

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Yes. In a opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "the state Act is preempted, and its application unconstitutional, under the Supremacy Clause." Justice Souter wrote for the Court that Massachusetts' law created an obstacle to the President's discretion to control economic sanctions against Burma, interfered with Congress's intention to limit economic pressure against the Burmese Government, and was at odds with the President's authority to speak for the United States among the world's nations to develop a comprehensive, multilateral Burma strategy. Therefore, the Massachusetts Burma Law "is invalid under the Supremacy Clause...owing to its threat of frustrating federal statutory objectives."


Abel Martinez-Salazar was charged with a variety of federal narcotics and weapons offenses. The District Court allotted him 10 peremptory challenges exercisable in the selection of 12 jurors. After prospective juror Don Gilbert indicated several times that he would favor the prosecution, Martinez- Salazar's counsel challenged him for cause. The court declined to excuse Gilbert. After twice objecting, unsuccessfully, to the for-cause ruling, Martinez-Salazar used a peremptory challenge to remove him. Subsequently, Martinez-Salazar exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Thereafter, Martinez-Salazar's counsel did not object to the final seating of the jurors. Martinez-Salazar was then convicted on all counts. On appeal, Martinez-Salazar argued that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Gilbert for cause and that this error used one of his peremptory challenges wrongly. The Court of Appeals agreed that the District Court's refusal to strike Gilbert for cause was an abuse of discretion. Ultimately, the court found that the District Court's error resulted in a violation of Martinez- Salazar's Fifth Amendment due process rights because it forced him to use a peremptory challenge curatively, which impaired his right to a full complement of peremptory challenges. The Court of Appeals held that the error required an automatic reversal.

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No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use such a challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "if the defendant elects to cure such an error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right." The Court also concluded that the loss of a peremptory challenge did not constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.


Michael Wayne Williams was sentenced to death after he was convicted of two capital murders. Ultimately, Williams sought federal habeas relief, in which he requested an evidentiary hearing on three constitutional claims, regarding the fairness of his trial, which he had tried unsuccessfully to develop in the state-court proceedings. The District Court granted Williams' evidentiary hearing. However, before any hearing could be held, the Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth's requests for an emergency stay and for a writ of mandamus and prohibition. The Commonwealth argued that Williams' evidentiary hearing was prohibited by federal law as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). On remand, the District Court dismissed Williams' petition citing the AEDPA statute and finding that Williams failed to show "actual innocence." In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Williams could not satisfy the statute's conditions for excusing his failure to develop the facts of his claims and barred him from receiving an evidentiary hearing.

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No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that under federal law, as amended by the AEDPA, "a 'failure to develop' a claim's factual basis in state court proceedings is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or his counsel." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "comity is not served by saying a prisoner 'has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim' where he was unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort. In that circumstance, an evidentiary hearing is not barred."