The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) does not strip state courts of jurisdiction to hear claims under the Securities Act of 1933, nor does it permit defendants to remove class actions alleging only 1933 Act claims from state to federal court. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court found that the language of SLUSA, which modifies the Securities Act of 1933, leaves the state courts' jurisdiction intact. The background rule of § 77v(a) gives state courts concurrent jurisdiction over all suits “brought to enforce any liability or duty created by” that statute. Section 77p, which bars certain securities class actions based on state law, controls if there is a conflict between § 77v(a) and § 77p, but §77p does nothing to limit state-court jurisdiction over class actions brought under the 1933 Act. The Court also found that the structure and context also support its reading of the provision.
The 1933 Act barred the removal of certain claims from state to federal court. Section 77p(c) of SLUSA modifies the removal ban, permitting the removal of certain class actions to federal court, where they are subject to dismissal. The Court found that the most natural reading of that provision does not alter the ban on removal of class actions alleging only 1933 Act claims.


Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission

In July 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins went to Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, CO, and requested that its owner, Jack C. Phillips, design and create a cake for their wedding. Phillips declined to do so on the grounds that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs. Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art through which he can honor God and that it would displease God to create cakes for same-sex marriages.
Craig and Mullins filed charges of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), §§ 24-34-301 to -804, C.R.S. 2014. After the Division issued a notice of determination finding probable cause, Craig and Mullins filed a formal complaint with the Office of Administrative Courts alleging that Masterpiece discriminated against them in a place of public accommodation in violation of CADA.
The Administrative Law Judge issued a written order finding in favor of Craig and Mullins, which was affirmed by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the Commission's ruling.

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The Court reversed in a 7-2 decision, holding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission's conduct in evaluating a cake shop owner's reasons for declining to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated the Free Exercise Clause.
The Court explained that while gay persons and same-sex couples are afforded civil rights protections under the laws and the Constitution, religious and philosophical objections to same-sex marriage are protected views and can also be protected forms of expression. The Colorado law at issue in this case, which prohibited discrimination against gay people in purchasing products and services, had to be applied in a neutral manner with regard to religion. The majority acknowledged that from Phillips' perspective, creating cakes was a form of artistic expression and a component of his sincere religious beliefs.
The Court also explained that in 2012, the year that Phillips refused his services to Craig and Mullins, the law in Colorado and across the country with regard to same sex marriage was much more unsettled than it became after United States v. Windsor, 570 US 744 (2013) and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US ___ (2015). At the time, the State Civil Rights Division had also concluded in at least three other cases that bakers had acted lawfully in declining to make cakes that included messages they disagreed with, specifically messages demeaning gay persons. Thus it was not unreasonable for Phillips to believe that he was acting lawfully at the time, and his claims before the Commission were entitled to neutral treatment.
However, the Court stated that Phillips did not receive this neutral treatment, with members of the Commission showing clear and impermissible hostility toward his religious beliefs. The Court explained that commissioners' comments disparaging Phillips' beliefs and characterizing them as rhetorical were inappropriate, though these comments were not mentioned or disavowed in subsequent legal proceedings. The Court concluded that these comments cast doubt on the fairness of the Commission's consideration of Phillips' claims. The Court also pointed out that disparities between Phillips' case and those of other bakers with objections to making cakes with anti-gay messages, and who were victorious before the Commission, further reflected hostility toward the religious basis for Phillips' position.
The Court concluded that the Commission's actions violated the State's duty under the First Amendment not to use hostility toward religion or a religious viewpoint as a basis for laws or regulations. Under the facts of this case, the Court determined that Phillips' religious justification for his refusal to serve Craig and Mullins was not afforded the neutral treatment mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.
Justice Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, in which she was joined by Justice Sotomayor, stating that neither the Commission's comments regarding Phillips' religious views nor its alleged disparate treatment of bakers objecting to making cakes with anti-gay messages justified ruling in favor of Phillips.
Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Breyer, in which she agreed with the majority that the Commission had not given neutral treatment to Phillips' religious views, but declined to assign any significance to the Commission's treatment of bakers who refused to create cakes with anti-gay messages because she believed that this did not violate the Colorado law at issue in Phillips' case.
Justice Gorsuch also filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alito, in which he argued that the cases of Phillips and the bakers who objected to using anti-gay messages in their baking were quite similar, and the Commission acted inappropriately in treating them differently.
Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, and was joined by Justice Gorsuch. Thomas argued that an order requiring Phillips to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple would violate his First Amendment rights.


Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association

In 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704, to prohibit state-sanctioned sports gambling. Included in PASPA are exceptions for state-sponsored sports wagering in Nevada and sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware, as well as for New Jersey, provided that New Jersey also enact a sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA's enactment, which it did not do. PASPA also permits any sports league whose games are or will be the subject of sports gambling to bring an action to enjoin the gambling.
In 2011, the New Jersey Legislature held a referendum asking voters whether sports gambling should be permitted, and 64 percent voted in favor of a state constitutional amendment that would permit sports gambling. The legislature then drafted and received voter approval of a sports-wagering constitutional amendment, after which time, in 2012, it enacted the Sports Wagering Act ("2012 Act"), which authorized certain regulated sports wagering at New Jersey casinos and racetracks and implemented a comprehensive regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events.
Five sports leagues sued under PASPA to enjoin the New Jersey law, which the state defended by arguing that PASPA was unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine. The district court held that PASPA was constitutional and enjoined the 2012 Act. The legislature passed a second law ("2014 Law") that purported to repeal the regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events, effectively providing tacit authorization of them. The leagues again sued to enjoin the 2014 Law, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the leagues and issued a permanent injunction against the governor and other state agencies. A divided panel of the Third Circuit affirmed, and upon rehearing, the Third Circuit en banc affirmed the majority opinion of the panel.

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In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Alito, the court reversed in favor of the State of New Jersey, finding that PASPA's provision prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling schemes violates the anticommandeering doctrine under the 10th Amendment to the Constitution as interpreted under New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Pursuant to this authority, “Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the legislative process of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’"
In so holding, the Court explained that when a state fully or partially repeals old laws prohibiting sports gambling schemes, as New Jersey did in enacting the 2014 Law, it "authorizes" those schemes under PASPA. The Court also explained that there was no meaningful difference between directing a state legislature to enact a new law or prohibiting a state legislature from doing so, and PASPA's anti-authorization provision violated the anticommandeering principle because it specifically mandated what a state could and could not do. The Court stated that complying with the anticommandeering rule is important because it serves as one of the Constitution's structural safeguards of liberty, advances political accountability, and prevents Congress from shifting regulatory costs to the states.
The Court further held that no provision of PASPA is directly severable from those at issue in this case.
Justice Breyer joined the majority opinion as to all except Part VI-B, and filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and Justice Breyer joined in part.


In September 1997, three Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up in an a crowded area in Jerusalem. Among the injured were eight U.S. citizens, who consequently filed a lawsuit against the Islamic Republic of Iran for its role in providing material support to the attackers. In general, sovereign governments are immune from lawsuit, but the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") provides an exception to that immunity in cases of state-sponsored of terrorism. A district judge in D.C. entered a $71.5 million default judgment against Iran, which Iran did not pay. The plaintiffs then litigated numerous cases across the country in an attempt to attach and execute on Iranian assets to satisfy the judgment.
The case at hand involves four collections of ancient Persian artifacts within the possession of the University of Chicago and Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History. With few exceptions, a foreign state's property in the United States is immune from attachment and execution. The plaintiffs argued before the district court that they should be able to attach and execute Iran's property under subsections (a) and (g) of 28 U.S.C. § 1610, as well as section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ("TRIA"). The district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that while § 1610(a) permits execution on a foreign state's property "used for a commercial activity in the United States," that provision requires use by the foreign state itself, not a third party (such as a museum). The district court also held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 1610(g) permits attachment to property of a foreign state in aid of execution only in cases described elsewhere in § 1610, rendering that provision unavailable to the plaintiffs in this case. Finally, the district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 201 of TRIA applies only to assets blocked by executive order, and in the absence of an executive order blocking the particular assets sought, plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of that provision either.
The Seventh Circuit's holding thus conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's prior holding that § 1610(g) provides a freestanding attachment immunity exception that allows terrorism victims to attach and execute upon any assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism, regardless of whether the assets are otherwise subject to execution under section 1610.

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No, Section 1610(g) does not provide a freestanding basis for parties to attach and execute against the property of a foreign state. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 8-0 unanimous Court. Looking first at the statutory text, the Court found that the most natural reading of Section 1610(g)(1)—that certain property will be "subject to attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon [a §1605A] judgment as provided in this section"—is that there must be an indepedent basis for the withdrawal of property immunity. To conclude otherwise would have rendered the other provisions of §1610(g) superfluous because any plaintiff with a §1605A judgment could seek property attachment under §1610(g) regardless of whether the conditions of any those provisions were met. The Court's interpretation is also consistent with the historical practice of rescinding attachment and execution immunity primarily in the context of a foreign state's commercial acts. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


Carlo J. Marinello II owned and operated a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada. Between 1992 and 2010, Marinello did not keep an accounting of his business, nor did he file personal or corporate income tax returns. Indeed, he shredded bank statements and business records. After an investigation by the IRS, Marinello was indicted by a grand jury on nine counts of tax-related offenses, and a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison, one year of parole, and was ordered to pay over $350,000 to the IRS in restitution.
One of the counts of which Marinello was charged and convicted was violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who "in any . . . way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title." Marinello appealed his conviction on the grounds that the phrase "the due administration of this title" requires the defendant be aware of IRS action, and the government provided no evidence at trial that Marinello knew of a pending IRS investigation against him. Finding that knowledge of a pending investigation is not an element of the offense of which Marinello was convicted, the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence.

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The federal crime of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct or impede the due administration of the tax laws, 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), requires proof that the defendant acted with knowledge of a pending Internal Revenue Service action. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. Justice Breyer found that in the past, the Court had interpreted similar criminal statutes to require a "nexus" between the defendant's obstructive conduct and a particular judicial proceeding. Given that the key words in the statute "obstruct" and "impede" require an object the taxpayer must act with respect to a particular person or thing of which he is aware. Moreover, just because a taxpayer knows that the IRS will review his tax return does not mean that every Tax Code violation constitutes obstruction. Rather, in addition to satisfying the nexus requirement, the government must also demonstrate that the proceeding was pending at the time the defendant engaged in the obstructive conduct or at least was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a separate dissent in which Justice Samuel Alito joined. Justice Thomas found that the plain language of the statute forbids "corrupt efforts to impede the IRS from performing any of these activities" and does not require that the defendant acted with knowledge of a pending IRS action.


Paul Somers worked as Vice President of Digital Realty Trust from 2010 to 2014. According to his complaint, Somers filed several reports to senior management regarding possible securities law violations by the company, after which reports the company fired him. He did not report his concerns to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) before he was terminated. Somers then sued Digital Realty, alleging violations of state and federal laws, including Section 21F of the Exchange Act, which includes the anti-retaliation protections created by the Dodd-Frank Act. Digital Realty sought to dismiss the Section 21F claim on the ground that, because Somers did not actually report the possible violations to the SEC, he was not a "whistleblower" as defined in the Act and thus not entitled to protection under its provisions.
The Fifth Circuit in 2013 had strictly applied the Act's definition of "whistleblower" to the anti-retaliation provision, while the Second Circuit, finding the statute itself ambiguous and applying Chevron deference to the SEC's reasonable interpretation of it, had held in 2015 that the provision extends to all those who make disclosures of suspected violations, regardless of whether the disclosures are made internally or to the SEC. The district court in this case followed the Second Circuit's approach and denied Digital Realty's motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.

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No, the anti-retaliation provision for "whistleblowers" in the Dodd-Frank Act protects only individuals who report alleged misconduct to the SEC. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Act explicitly defines whistleblowers as any individual who provides pertinent information "to the Commission," and this definition is corroborated by Dodd-Frank's purpose to aid the SEC's enforcement efforts by incentivizing people to tell the SEC about violations. Individuals who report violations to any other federal agency, Congress, or an internal supervisor, are not within the scope of this express definition of whistleblower in the Dodd-Frank Act. Because the language of the statute is not ambiguous, the SEC's contrary view is not entitled to Chevron deference.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch joined, in which he joined the majority in its reading of the statutory text of the Dodd-Frank Act, but not as to the majority's use of a Senate Report to determine the purpose of the statute.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor joined the Court's opinion in full but noted her disagreement with Justice Thomas's suggestion in his concurrence that a Senate Report is not an appropriate source for the Court to consider when interpreting a statute.


Charles Murphy was an inmate in the Vandalia Correctional Center in Illinois. In July 2011, correctional officers hit Murphy, fracturing his eye socket, and did not provide him proper medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law theories. A jury returned a verdict in his favor and awarded him damages for some of his claims under state law, and the district court awarded him attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Two of the defendants appealed the judgment, arguing that the Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the state-law claims and that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that 25 percent of the damages awarded be used to pay the attorney fee award.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the state officials or employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity against state-law claims where the officials or employees violated statutory or constitutional law, which violations Murphy alleged and proved. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the attorney fee award, however, finding that the 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) requires that the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from up to 25 percent of the damage award and that the district court does not have discretion to reduce that maximum percentage.

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The phrase "not to exceed 25 percent" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) with respect to the award of attorneys fees in a civil rights suit means that the district court must use as much of the judgment as necessary to satisfy the fee award without exceeding the 25% limit, as the Seventh Circuit held. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The language of the provision, including the words "shall" and use of the infinitive phrase "to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded" indicated the mandatory, rather than discretionary, nature of the provision's command to the district court. The majority also found that the statutory scheme, including Congress's intent in enacting a new and different law for prisoner rights suits, as well as the surrounding provisions, supported this reading of the statute.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan joined. In the dissent's view, the plain language of the provision at issue should give district courts the discretion to allocate a portion of a prisoner-plaintiff’s monetary judgment to an attorney’s fee award, provided that the portion is not greater than 25 percent. In support of its position, the dissent points to language considered but not accepted by Congress that more clearly supports the respondent-prisoners' interpretation.


Terrence Byrd was driving on a divided four-lane highway near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, when he was pulled over allegedly for violating a state law requiring drivers to use the left lane for passing only. Recognizing the car as a rental car, the officers asked Byrd for his license and rental agreement, which he had difficulty locating. Once he did locate them, the officers noted that the rental agreement did not list Byrd as an authorized driver, and when they ran his identification, they noted that he was using an alias and had an outstanding warrant in New Jersey. Despite the warrant’s indication that it did not request extradition from other jurisdictions, the officers attempted to contact authorities in New Jersey to confirm they did not seek Byrd’s arrest and extradition, allegedly following protocol for such situations. The officers experienced difficulty with their communications, however, and returned to Byrd’s car, where they asked him to exit the vehicle and about his warrant and alias.
The officers asked whether Byrd had anything illegal in the car and then requested Byrd’s consent to search the car, noting that they did not actually need his consent because he was not listed on the rental agreement. The officers allege that Byrd gave his consent, but Byrd disputes this contention. The subsequent search turned up heroin and body armor in the trunk of the car.
At trial, Byrd moved to suppress the evidence, challenging the initial stop, the extension of the stop, and the search. The district court determined that the violation of the traffic law justified the initial stop and that the extension of the stop was justified by the officers’ developing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Byrd maintains that he did not consent to the search, so the issue remains whether he needed to consent at all—that is, whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle, despite not being listed on the rental agreement. If he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, then the officers’ search of the vehicle did not require his consent.
There is a circuit split as to whether an unlisted driver of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle, and the Third Circuit (where the district court in this case sits) has held that such a driver does not. Thus, the district court denied Byrd’s motion to suppress, and the Third Circuit, reviewing the factual questions for clear error and the legal question de novo, affirmed the judgment of the district court.

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In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that a driver of a rental car who has the renter's permission to drive it but is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement does have a reasonable expectation of privacy against government searches of the vehicle. Although such a driver does not have a property interest in the car, property principles inform the reasoning behind this conclusion. A driver who has the permission of the lawful possessor or owner of the car has complete "dominion and control" over the property and can rightfully exclude others from it. The Court analogized to the situation in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), where the Court found that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment in which he was staying temporarily with the owner's permission, not withstanding the fact that the apartment was not lawfully his. Essential to the Court's holding was the finding that the driver in this case was in lawful possession; indeed, the driver of a stolen vehicle lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in a car he may be driving.
Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which Neil Gorsuch joined, questioning the validity of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. Justice Samuel Alito filed a separate concurring opinion encouraging the Court of Appeals to consider the question whether Byrd may assert a Fourth Amendment claim or to decide the appeal on another appropriate ground.


Matthew Vogt was employed as a police officer with the City of Hays, Kansas, when he applied for a position with the City of Haysville police department. During Vogt’s interview process with the City of Haysville, he disclosed that he had kept a knife obtained while working for the City of Hays.
The City of Haysville made Vogt an offer of employment contingent on his reporting his acquisition of the knife to the City of Hays and returning it, which Vogt did. Upon this report, the City of Hays chief of police ordered Vogt to issue a statement regarding the knife, which Vogt submitted nominally, in addition to a letter of resignation due to his intent to accept the position with the Haysville Police Department.
The Hays police chief began an internal investigation into Vogt and required him to issue a more detailed statement regarding the knife. This subsequent statement led to additional evidence, and Hays Police Department submitted both to the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, asking the Bureau to initiate a criminal investigation. As a result of the criminal investigation, the Haysville Police Department withdraw its offer of employment to Vogt.
Vogt was charged in state court with two felony counts related to his possession of the knife. Following a probable cause hearing, the state district court determined that probable cause was lacking and dismissed the charges. Vogt brought a federal lawsuit alleging that the use of his compelled statements (1) to start an investigation leading to the discovery of additional evidence concerning the knife, (2) to initiate a criminal investigation, (3) to bring criminal charges, and (4) to support the prosecution during the probable cause hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
The district court dismissed his case for failure to state a claim, and, reviewing the claims de novo, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding as to the first three claims but reversed as to the fourth one, finding that the Fifth Amendment is violated when criminal defendants are compelled to incriminate themselves and the incriminating statement is used in a probable cause hearing.

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In a per curiam opinion, the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted. Justice Neil Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


On two occasions, a particular unique-looking motorcycle evaded Albemarle police officers after they observed the rider violating traffic laws. After some investigation, one of the officers located the house where the suspected driver of the motorcycle lived and observed what appeared to be the same motorcycle covered by a tarp in the driveway. The officer lifted the tarp and confirmed that it was the motorcycle (which was also stolen) that had eluded detainment on multiple occasions. The officer waited for the suspect to return home, at which point he went to the front door to inquire about the motorcycle. Initially the suspect denied knowing anything about it but eventually confessed that he had bought the motorcycle knowing that it had been stolen. The officer arrested the suspect for receipt of stolen property.
At trial, the defendant sought to suppress the motorcycle as evidence on the grounds that the police officer conducted an illegal warrantless search (by lifting the tarp covering the motorcycle parked in the driveway) that led to its discovery. The trial court held that the search was based on probable cause and justified under the exigent circumstances automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and convicted the defendant. The appeals court affirmed on the grounds of exigent circumstances, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed as well, but under the automobile exception only. The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that the automobile exception applies even when the vehicle is not “immediately mobile” and applies to vehicles parked on private property.

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The Fourth Amendment's automobile exception does not permit a police officer without a warrant to enter private property to search a vehicle parked a few feet from the house. In an 8–1 opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court held that its own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the home and the "curtilage" of one's home (the area immediately surrounding it) clearly prevents officers from entering and searching without a warrant, even if the object searched is an automobile. The Court found that the area searched (the back of the driveway) was indeed the curtilage of the defendant's home, and thus the Fourth Amendment's highest degree of protection applies there. Although warrantless searches of automobiles are permissible in limited circumstances, the warrantless search of an automobile parked within the curtilage of one's home is not permissible.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion to express doubt about the Court's authority to impose the exclusionary rule on the states.
Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissenting opinion in which he opined that the automobile exception should apply in this case and that the search was in no way "unreasonable."


Since shortly after the Civil War, federal law has required express authorization from Congress before active-duty military officers may hold a "civil office,” including positions that require "an appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 10 U.S.C. § 973(b)(2)(A)(ii). After President Obama nominated and the Senate confirmed Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I US Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on the US Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA). A judge convicted Nicole Dalmazzi of wrongfully using ecstasy, a Schedule I controlled substance and sentenced her to dismissal and confinement for one month. The AFCCA affirmed the findings and sentence. Dalmazzi moved the CCA to vacate its judgment because of the participation of Judge Mitchell on the panel. Before the CCA ruled on her motion, Dalmazzi filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), so the CCA dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The CAAF rejected as moot Dalmazzi’s challenge to Judge Mitchell's continued service on the AFCCA, because his CMCR commission had not been signed until after the AFCCA decided her case on the merits. Both of the other consolidated cases involve similar facts, where Judge Mitchell was on the CCA panel that affirmed the convictions of the petitioners.

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In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted in this case and in the consolidated case Cox v. United States (16-1017). The Court reached the merits and issued a decision in the third consolidated case only, Ortiz v. United States (16-1423).


Encino Motorcars, LLC, which sells and services Mercedes-Benz cars, employed Hector Navarro and others as “service advisors.” Their role was to greet car owners upon arrival in the service area of the dealership, listen to customers’ concerns about their cars, evaluate the repair and maintenance needs of the cars, suggest services, write up estimates, and follow up with the customer while repair work was being done.
Navarro and the other plaintiffs alleged in federal district court that Encino Motorcars violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay them overtime wages. The district court dismissed the claim, finding that the FLSA exempts service advisors from its overtime compensation provisions. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, using the principle of Chevron deference to rely on a regulation promulgated by the Department of Labor in 2011 interpreting the statutory exemption as not encompassing service providers. The US Supreme Court vacated the panel’s decision, holding that the regulation lacked sufficient explanation and thus was not entitled to deference. On remand, the Ninth Circuit formulated its own interpretation of the applicable FLSA provision and concluded that the exemption does not encompass service advisors.

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In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit, holding that because service advisors at car dealerships are “salesm[e]n . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles,” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A), they are exempt from the FLSA's overtime-pay requirements.
Construing the relevant portions of the statute, the Court explained that a service advisor is clearly a “salesman” who sells services to customers for their vehicles. The Court also concluded that service advisors are “primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles” since they are integral in the process of providing maintenance and repair services to customers, even if they do not spend most of their time physically repairing vehicles. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s use of the distributive canon, as well as its conclusion that FLSA exemptions should be construed narrowly in holding that service advisors were not exempt. It also rejected the appellate court’s reliance on a 1966-67 DOL Occupational Outlook Handbook and the FLSA legislative history, both of which the Court found unpersuasive.
Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.


Ethlyn Hall, an elderly landowner in the Virgin Islands, filed suit against her son when she grew dissatisfied with his actions as her attorney. After Ethlyn passed away, one of her daughters, Elsa Hall, served as personal representative of the estate (the “Estate”) and continued to press Ethlyn’s claims against Samuel. Samuel brought claims of his own against Elsa in a separate proceeding. He argued that Elsa had poisoned his relationship with his mother, which caused him serious emotional distress. The Estate’s claims and Samuel’s claims were consolidated and tried together. A jury rejected the Estate’s claims and rendered a two million dollar verdict in Samuel’s favor. The District Court entered separate judgments on both aspects of the jury’s decision.
The Estate appealed the judgment with respect to its claims, but did not appeal the judgment in favor of Samuel because the district court vacated the jury verdict and his claims were still awaiting retrial. Samuel argue that the appellate court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal while his claims were still pending in the district court, and the Third Circuit agreed.
The Third Circuit relied on its binding precedent in Bergman v. City of Atlantic City, which held that when two cases have been consolidated for all purposes, a final decision on one set of claims is generally not appealable while the second set remains pending. The Estate argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp. affirming the appealability of final judgment in a case that was part of a multi-district litigation should dictate the outcome of the case and permit the exercise of jurisdiction over the claims that have a final judgment.

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In an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court unanimously held that when one of multiple cases consolidated under FRCP 42(a) is finally decided, that ruling confers upon the losing party the right to immediate appeal regardless of whether any of the other consolidated cases are still pending.
Because the meaning of the term “consolidate” as used in Rule 42(a) was ambiguous, the Court examined its legal lineage and concluded that it extended back at least to the first federal consolidation statute, enacted in 1813. Pursuant to that history, the Court found it to be clear that an individual case consolidated under the Rule maintains its independent character, at least to the extent that it is appealable when it is finally resolved, whether or not proceedings are ongoing in the other consolidated cases.
The Court also explained that under the consolidation statute that was in place for 125 years before Rule 42(a) was enacted, consolidation was a case management tool rather than a means of completely merging the consolidated cases into one, meaning that prior to Rule 42(a), a final judgment in a single case was immediately appealable. Because Rule 42(a) was explicitly modeled on the consolidation statute, and the term “consolidate” used therein is ambiguous, the term presumably carries forward the same meaning it had under the old statute.
The Court rejected the argument that the term “consolidate” took on a new meaning under Rule 42(a), namely that it permitted consolidation for either limited or all purposes. It also explained that the Federal Rules Advisory Committee would not have silently changed the meaning of a term that had been in use pursuant to a long-term, settled understanding.
Finally, the Court stated that it was not creating a rule that a district court could not consolidate a group of cases for all purposes, but it reiterated that in this context, cases retain their individual identities to the extent that final judgments in any specific case are immediately appealable.


Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31

In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, upheld against a First Amendment challenge a Michigan law that allowed a public employer whose employees were represented by a union to require those of its employees who did not join the union nevertheless to pay fees to it because they benefited from the union’s collective bargaining agreement with the employer.
Illinois has a law similar to that upheld in Michigan. The governor of Illinois brought a lawsuit challenging the law on the ground that the statute violates the First Amendment by compelling employees who disapprove of the union to contribute money to it. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the governor lacked standing to sue because he did not stand to suffer injury from the law, but two public employees intervened in the action to seek that Abood be overturned. Given that Abood is binding on lower courts, the district court dismissed the claim, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for the same reason.

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In a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the State of Illinois’ extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violated the First Amendment, meaning that Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, which held otherwise, was overruled.
In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court began by stating that the district court had jurisdiction over Janus’ suit, as he was undisputedly injured in fact by the state’s agency fee system, and the harm he suffered could be redressed if he prevailed in court.
Moving on to the merits, the Court concluded that the state’s collection of agency fees from nonconsenting public employees was a violation of the First Amendment, and that Abood was incorrect in deciding otherwise. The Court stated that requiring individuals to endorse ideas they disagreed with runs counter to First Amendment principles, and that even under a more permissive standard than the “exacting” strict scrutiny that the Court had applied in evaluating the constitutionality of agency fees in the past, the Illinois scheme could not pass muster.
The Court explained that neither of Abood’s two justifications for agency fees, which were maintaining “labor peace” and eliminating the risk of “free riders,” could survive under this standard, finding that both problems could be mitigated through less restrictive means than agency fees. The Court also rejected newer state interests that had been asserted, which were to support bargaining with a sufficiently funded agent and increasing workforce efficiency, stating that unions could be effective without agency fees.
The Court further reasoned that stare decisis principles did not require deference to Abood, finding that Abood was poorly reasoned, lacked workability, and that over time it had become an “outlier” in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. It also stated that Abood’s uncertain status, along with the short-term nature of collective bargaining agreements and unions’ ability to protect themselves when agency-fee provisions were critical to their bargains all militated against giving Abood decisive weight.
In light of these reasons, the Court concluded that the practice of states and public-sector unions collecting agency fees from nonconsenting employees was a violation of the First Amendment, and that no further agency fees or other forms of payment to a public-sector union could be collected, nor could attempts be made to collect such payments from employees without their consent.
Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissent faulted the Majority for upsetting the balance that Abood brought to public-sector labor relations, and for disregarding stare decisis principles for no special reason. It also criticized the Majority for issuing its decision without considering the consequences it could have in light of the fact that over 20 states had elaborate statutory schemes built on the Abood decision, thousands of contracts involving millions of employees relied upon those laws, and the government services that these public-sector employees performed impacted the lives of tens of millions of Americans.
Justice Sotomayor filed an additional dissenting opinion.


Robert McCoy was arrested on May 9, 2008, for the first-degree murders of the son, mother, and step-father of his estranged wife in a May 5, 2008, shooting. On May 15, 2008, McCoy was found to be indigent and appointed a public defender. Throughout his representation by the public defender and his subsequent representation by retained counsel McCoy maintained his innocence and repeatedly stated his desire to plead not guilty. In December 2009, McCoy moved for his public defender to be removed due to his belief that the public defenders were doing nothing to assist him in proving his innocence. The court granted McCoy’s motion to represent himself until he could find substitute counsel. McCoy subsequently found new counsel to represent him, and his counsel advised him to take a plea. When McCoy refused to take a plea, his counsel notified him that he intended to concede guilt, after which time McCoy moved to discharge him. The court denied McCoy’s motion to discharge his attorney as untimely. His counsel proceeded to concede McCoy’s guilt and argued for verdicts of second-degree murder on a theory of diminished capacity. The jury returned a verdict of first-degree murder on all three counts and recommended the death penalty.
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the convictions and the sentence, reasoning that defense counsel’s failure to follow McCoy’s direction not to concede guilt did not deny Mr. McCoy the assistance of counsel or create a conflict of interest because it did not completely abdicate the defense. Rather, the decision to concede guilt was a strategic choice by counsel.

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Inherent in the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel is the autonomy right of a criminal defendant to choose the objective of his defense and insist that counsel not admit guilt, even if the counsel's experience-based view is that admitting guilt offers the best chance of avoiding the death penalty. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court distinguished decisions that may be made by counsel and those reserved to the client. Counsel may make decisions described as "trial management" such as whether to call a particular witness or raise certain objections to evidence. Reserved exclusively to the client are decisions including whether to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify in one's own behalf, and forgo an appeal. Whether to assert innocence as a defense is also within those decisions reserved to the client. Because the issue presented in this case involves client autonomy, not effectiveness of counsel, the error is considered "structural error" and is not subject to harmless-error review.
 Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. In the dissent's view, the Court's holding arbitrarily distinguishes between counsel's conspicuously omitting discussion of one element of a crime and expressly conceding that element. The dissent further criticizes the majority for reaching an overly broad holding despite the unusual circumstances of the particular case before it.


Florencio Rosales-Mireles pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). His total criminal-history score was calculated according to the US Sentencing Guidelines Manual, but when calculating the criminal-history score, the probation officer erroneously counted a 2009 Texas conviction of misdemeanor assault twice. His total criminal-history score, combined with other factors, led a sentence of 78 months of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. Rosales-Mireles did not object to the sentence after it was imposed.
The Fifth Circuit found that Rosales-Mireles met the three prongs necessary to meet the plain error standard. However, if all three prongs are met, the court has the discretion to remedy the plain error if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The court declined to exercise its discretion in this case and therefore affirmed the judgment of sentence.

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The Court reversed and remanded, holding that a miscalculation of a Federal Guidelines sentencing range that has been determined to be plain and to affect a defendant’s substantial rights calls for a court of appeals to exercise its discretion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) to vacate the defendant’s sentence in the ordinary case.
In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Court explained that the Fifth Circuit’s narrow shock-the conscience standard was too restrictive in defining the extent of the appellate court’s jurisdiction in this context. The risk of unnecessary deprivation of liberty that can result from this narrow approach undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings where a Guidelines error is plain, because it is ultimately the district court that is responsible for ensuring that it applies the correct Guidelines range. In addition, the Court stated that remands for resentencing are inexpensive compared to remands for retrial, and ensuring that Guidelines determinations are accurate furthers the Sentencing Commission’s goals of uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.
Justice Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Alito.


Since 1997, Microsoft has operated a web-based email service available for public use without charge (most recently called Outlook.com). Much of the data associated with this service is saved on datacenters operated by Microsoft and its subsidiaries, which are located throughout the world.
In 2013, Microsoft was served with a search and seizure warrant for the data pertaining to a particular user. That user's data was stored solely in Microsoft's datacenter in Dublin, Ireland. Microsoft disclosed all other responsive information requested in the warrant but moved the magistrate judge to quash the warrant with respect to the user data stored in Dublin. The magistrate judge denied Microsoft's motion to quash, finding that the Stored Communications Act (SCA) authorized the district court to issue a warrant for "information that is stored on servers abroad." The magistrate judge held that the place where the government would review the content (the United States), not the place where the content was stored (Ireland) was the relevant place of seizure.
Microsoft appealed the magistrate judge's decision, and the district court affirmed after reviewing de novo. The district court also held Microsoft in civil contempt for refusing to comply fully with the warrant. The Second Circuit held that the SCA does not authorize courts to issue and enforce against US-based service providers warrants for the seizure of customer email content that is stored exclusively on foreign servers and thus reversed the district court's denial of the motion to quash, vacated the finding of contempt, and remanded the case to the district court.

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While this case was pending, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act, which amended the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq., to require email providers to disclose emails in its "possession, custody, or control," even if the emails are stored outside the United States. The government then procured and served Microsoft with a new warrant pursuant to the amended law, and the parties agreed that the new warrant had replaced the original warrant at issue in this case. The Court explained that because there was no longer any live dispute between the parties, the case had become moot. The Court vacated the ruling on review and remanded the case to the Second Circuit with instructions to vacate the district court's contempt finding and its denial of Microsoft's motion to quash, and to direct the district court to dismiss the case as moot.


Los and Roosevelt Dahda – twin brothers – were indicted on charges that they had conspired to acquire and distribute marijuana. Much of the evidence against the Dahdas was obtained through wiretaps of cell phones used by the co-conspirators, including the Dahdas. The wiretaps arose out of nine orders issued by a federal district court in Kansas. Prior to trial, the Dahdas brothers moved to suppress the information obtained from the wiretaps on the grounds that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction. The trial court rejected that argument, and both were found guilty and sentenced.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the decision allowing evidence from the cellphones to be used against the brothers. Although the court of appeals agreed that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction, it held that such defect did not "directly and substantially affect a congressional intention to limit wiretapping. The court identified two “core concerns” of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968—privacy and uniformity—that were not implicated by the Dahdas’ argument that the order exceeded the Kansas district court’s jurisdiction.

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A unanimous Court, with the exception of Justice Gorsuch who took no part in the opinion, affirmed the 10th Circuit’s ruling, but with different reasoning than the appellate court had used. In an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court explained that the 10th Circuit had incorrectly applied United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505, 527 (1974) in deciding the case. Giordano and its “core concerns” test only applied to the first subsection of the statutory provision at issue, which dealt with “unlawfully intercepted” communications, where in this case, the second subsection, regarding facially insufficient wiretap orders, was the portion in dispute.
The Court went on to hold that the wiretap orders authorized by the Kansas district court judge were not facially insufficient because they were not lacking any information that the wiretap statute required them to include, noting that “not every defect results in an insufficiency.” The Court also explained that the challenged language authorizing interception outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction was surplus, and thus did not render the orders facially insufficient.


In the credit-card industry, there is what is called a “two-sided market.” Cardholders benefit from holding a card only if that card is accepted by a wide range of merchants, and merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number of cardholders use it. Thus, the cardholder and the merchant both depend on widespread acceptance of a card.
In the United States, credit-card transaction volume is comprised primarily of four networks: Visa (45%), American Express (26.4%), MasterCard (23.3%), and Discover (5.3%). Because of the way Visa and MasterCard transactions are handled, they do not directly set certain fees, but merely influence these prices. In contrast, American Express is directly involved in the vast majority of transactions involving its cards. Thus, it maintains direct relationships with both its cardholders and merchants and directly sets the relevant fees.
In the 1980s, Visa and MasterCard adopted exclusionary rules preventing member institutions from issuing card products on the Amex or Discover networks, and ran ad campaigns highlighting Amex’s smaller network and higher merchant fees. In response, Amex strengthened contractual restraints designed to control how merchants treat Amex cardholders at the point of sale, known as non-discriminatory provisions (NDPs).
In 2010, the federal government and 17 states sued Amex, Visa, and MasterCard for unreasonably restraining trade in violation of the Sherman Act. They alleged that the credit card companies used anti-steering provisions to suppress competition and block competition from rival networks. In 2011, Visa and MasterCard entered into consent judgments and voluntarily rescinded their anti-steering provisions. Amex proceeded to trial, and the district court ruled that Amex’s NDPs violated US antitrust laws. Reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the lower court should have weighed the NDPs’ net effect on both merchants and cardholders under the generally accepted “rule of reason.”

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Amex's anti-steering provisions do not violate federal antitrust law. In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court first looked to the definition of the market in this context, finding that it consists of both cardholders and merchants. The "rule of reason" establishes a burden-shifting process for showing antitrust violations, the first burden being on the plaintiffs to show anticompetitive effects. Defining the market as it did, the Court found that the government needed to prove not only that the anti-steering provisions had an anticompetitive effect on the merchants (which it did show), but also that they had an anticompetitive effect on the cardholders (which it did not). Having found that the government failed to meet its burden in the first step of the "rule of reason" test, the Court affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit.
Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. In dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the majority for coming up with a market definition that has no basis in precedent and instead actually contradicts its holding in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). Justice Breyer points to the finding by the district court of direct evidence of significant anticompetitive effects of the anti-steering provisions and would find that this evidence is sufficient to meet its burden under the "rule of reason" burden-shifting framework.


Michael N. Currier was indicted by a single grand jury and charged with burglary, grand larceny, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Before trial, the defense and prosecution agreed to sever the firearm charge from the grand larceny and burglary charges. The case proceeded to trial on the burglary and grand larceny charges, and a jury acquitted Currier of both charges.
When the Commonwealth of Virginia sought to try Currier on the remaining charge of felon in possession of a firearm, he objected that collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) protections embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded his retrial. Notwithstanding his objections, Currier was tried, convicted, and sentenced. Currier filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict, and the trial court denied his motion. The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s conviction, as did the Supreme Court of Virginia.

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The Court affirmed the Virginia Supreme Court’s ruling in a 5-4 vote, holding that because Currier consented to a severance of the multiple charges against him, his second trial and resulting conviction, following an acquittal at his first trial, did not violate the double jeopardy clause.
Justice Gorsuch delivered the Court’s opinion with respect to Parts I and II, explaining that the double jeopardy clause bars a person from being tried more than once “for the same offence.” Currier argued that the Court’s precedent in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) required a ruling in his favor. However, the Court stated that for a second trial to be precluded under Ashe, the Court must have been able to conclude that “it would have been irrational for the jury” in the initial trial to acquit without finding for the defendant on a fact essential to a conviction in the second trial. The Court then distinguished Ashe from the instant case by pointing out that even if Currier’s second trial could be classified as a retrial of the same offense under Ashe, he consented to it.
The Court went on to explain that the relevant precedent was Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977), in which the issue was a trial on a greater offense after an acquittal of a lesser-included offense. In Jeffers the Court held that if a single trial on multiple charges would be sufficient to avoid a double jeopardy violation, there could not be a violation where the defendant seeks two separate trials and persuades the trial court to grant the request. The Court stated that if consent could nullify a double jeopardy complaint in a situation involving a second trial for a greater offense, it could certainly overcome a double jeopardy complaint under Ashe. To hold otherwise would have been inconsistent with Jeffers and other Supreme Court precedent.
In Part III, Justice Gorsuch was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito in concluding that civil issue preclusion principles could not be applied to criminal law through the double jeopardy clause to stop parties from retrying any issue or bringing in evidence regarding a previously tried issue.
Justice Kennedy filed a separate opinion concurring in part, finding that because Parts I and II resolved the case fully and properly, the scope of double jeopardy protections defined in Ashe did not need to be part of the Court’s analysis here.
Justice Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.


The Chattahoochee River starts in north Georgia, flows southwest past Atlanta, and then flows south along Georgia's border, first with Alabama, then with Florida. In the southwest corner of Georgia, the Chattahoochee joins the Flint River, to form the Apalachicola River, which flows south through northwest Florida and into the Apalachicola Bay in the Gulf of Mexico. At issue is the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (ACF Basin), which the US Army Corps of Engineers reports drains a total of 19,800 square miles in Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, which is distributed roughly into 74%, 15%, and 11%, respectively.
Pursuant to congressional authorizations, the Corps operates a system of dams in the ACF Basin based on a Master Manual governing all the dams and a reservoir regulation manual for each individual dam. The Master Manual was completed in 1958 and has not been comprehensively revised since then. There have been several lawsuits among the states seeking update and clarify the apportionment of the waters of the ACF Basin. The present action was filed by Florida, which alleges that the ecosystem and economy of the Apalachicola region "are suffering serious harm" because of Georgia's consumption and storage of water from the Basin. Florida invokes the US Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to ask that the Court equitably apportion the waters of the ACF Basin. For equitable relief to be granted, Florida must first show standing—that is, that it has suffered a wrong through the action of another state that can be corrected by the courts. Second, the state must show by clear and convincing evidence a "threatened invasion of rights . . . of serious magnitude." Third, the state must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of apportionment substantially outweigh the harm that could result. If a state meets this burden, the Court must craft an equitable-apportionment decree. After lengthy evidentiary hearings, the Special Master filed a report recommending that the Court deny Florida's request for relief on the ground that "Florida has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that its injury can be redressed by an order equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin."

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Florida made a legally sufficient showing as to the possibility of fashioning an effective remedial decree equitably apportioning the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (ACF Basin). In a 5–4 opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the Special Master applied too strict a standard ("clear and convincing evidence") when he determined that the Court could not fashion a appropriate relief. A complaining state should not have to prove with specificity the details of a workable decree; rather, it need only to show that it is possible to fashion such a decree, applying principles of "flexibility" and "approximation." The Court reserved judgment as to the ultimate disposition of the case, finding only that Florida had made a legally sufficient showing of redressability. Further findings are needed to resolve many of the other evidentiary issues.
Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Elena Kagan, and Neil Gorsuch joined. The dissent points out that the issue raised in this case is entirely about the balance-of-harms analysis and criticizes the majority for "mush[ing] the requirements from our precedents together." In the dissent's view, the precedents are abundantly clear, and after a full trial, Florida failed to meet its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that "the benefits of apportionment substantially outweigh the harm that could result."


The Rio Grande originates in Colorado, flows south into New Mexico, and flows into Texas near El Paso. The Rio Grande Compact apportions the water of the Rio Grande Basin among the states of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. Among other things, the Compact provides that Colorado must deliver a specific quantity of water to the New Mexico state line, and that New Mexico must then deliver a specific quantity of water to Elephant Butte Reservoir, a federal Bureau of Reclamation project that distributes water to New Mexico and Texas.
Texas alleges that New Mexico has depleted Texas's equitable apportionment of water under the Compact by allowing diversion of surface water and pumping of groundwater that is hydrologically connected to the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte. New Mexico contends that the Compact does not require it to deliver any specific amount of water to the Texas state line and thus that its actions do not violate the Compact.

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In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court held that the United States is permitted to intervene in this particular dispute over a compact between states to defend "distinctively federal interests" that a normal litigant might not be permitted to pursue in traditional litigation. To reach this conclusion, the Court assessed four considerations. First, the compact at issue in this case is inextricably intertwined with certain other contracts that implicate federal interests (the Rio Grande Project and the Downstream Contracts). Second, the United States has a critical role in the operation of the compact at issue. Third, a breach of the compact could jeopardize the federal government’s ability to satisfy its treaty obligations to Mexico. Finally, the United States has asserted its compact claims in an existing action brought by Texas, seeking substantially the same relief and without that State’s objection. The Court specifically limited its holding so as not to answer the question whether the United States may initiate litigation to force a State to perform its obligations under the compact or expand the scope of an existing controversy between states.


National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra

The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates and two other religiously-affiliated pro-life entities engaged in providing pregnancy-related services in the state of California (collectively “NIFLA”) sought to enjoin the enforcement of the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the “Act”). The law’s stated purpose is to ensure access to reproductive health services for all California women, regardless of income. NIFLA argued that the Act’s requirements that (1) licensed clinics provide information to patients about free and low-cost publicly funded family planning services, including contraception and abortion, and that (2) unlicensed clinics inform patients of their unlicensed status violated their free speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied NIFLA’s motion for preliminary injunction, concluding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, as required under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), as to either their free speech or free exercise claims.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court had not abused its discretion by denying the injunction. The Court rejected NIFLA’s argument that strict scrutiny should apply to the Act, because while the law compelled content-based speech by requiring NIFLA to disseminate information about low-cost family planning services, it did not discriminate based on viewpoint. Relying on its own precedent in the face of a circuit split regarding the level of scrutiny to apply in the abortion-related disclosure context, the Court reasoned that the type of speech at issue in this case was professional speech. It was therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny, which the family planning information disclosure requirement survived.
The Court also affirmed that the requirement that unlicensed facilities disclose their unlicensed status survived any level of scrutiny.
Finally, the Court agreed with the decision below that NIFLA was not entitled to a preliminary injunction on free exercise grounds, finding that the Act to be a facially neutral law of general applicability that survived rational basis review. The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari did not include this issue.

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In a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the pro-life pregnancy center petitioners were likely to succeed on their claim that the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the “FACT Act” or the “Act”) violated the First Amendment.
In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court began its discussion by explaining that the licensed notice was a content-based regulation that likely violated the First Amendment. The court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of the licensed notice as regulating professional speech, stating that the Court had never recognized “professional speech” as a separate category of speech that was subject to different free speech rules. The Court explained that it had only granted lesser protection to professional speech in two situations--where professionals were required to disclose “factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech,’’’ and where states regulated professional conduct that incidentally implicated speech--and that neither of those lines of authority were applicable in the instant case. The Court further stated that it had a long history of protecting the First Amendment rights of professionals outside of those two contexts, emphasizing that imposing content-based regulations on professional speech created a risk of the government seeking to suppress unpopular ideas rather than advance legitimate regulatory objectives. The Court also concluded that the licensed notice did not survive even intermediate scrutiny, as it was “wildly underinclusive” in light of the Act’s stated purpose of providing low income women with information about the state-sponsored health services at issue.
The Court also held that the unlicensed notice unduly burdened protected speech. Assuming without deciding that rules requiring professionals to disclose “factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech’” applied here, the Court stated that California was required to show that such disclosures were only justified if they addressed a potentially real and not simply hypothetical harm, and that here, the state had only presented hypothetical risks. And even if the state had overcome this requirement, the Court ruled that the unlicensed notice was still unduly burdensome because it “impose[d] a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement that [wa]s wholly disconnected from the State’s informational interest,” possibly leaving unburdened speakers whose messages aligned with the state’s views.
Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined.
Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. The dissent argued that both notice requirements were likely to pass constitutional scrutiny. Regarding the licensed notice, Breyer highlighted the Court’s precedent permitting state notice requirements as to abortion alternatives, such as adoption, and asked why a state law couldn’t require healthcare provider to provide information about abortion and childbirth services in this case. Breyer also rejected the majority’s assertion that the unlicensed notice was supported by only a “hypothetical” interest, as well as the conclusion that this particular requirement should be deemed facially unconstitutional due to the fact that it could create an undue burden in some situations.


Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida

Fane Lozman was a resident of the City of Riviera Beach (the “City”), where he was a vocal critic of the City’s plan to utilize eminent domain to redevelop the Riviera Beach Marina. After the redevelopment plan was approved, Lozman filed suit against the City under the Florida Sunshine Law, seeking to invalidate the City’s approval of the plan due to insufficient public notice for the emergency meeting during which the plan had been approved. The city council met in a closed session to discuss the lawsuit, and the meeting transcript seemed to reflect councilmembers suggesting that the City should employ intimidation tactics in fighting Lozman’s claim.
On November 15, 2006, Lozman attended a regularly scheduled city council meeting and was granted permission to speak during the non-agenda public comment portion of the meeting. When it was his turn to speak, he attempted to begin discussing corruption in local government, and a councilmember instructed him to discontinue his comments on that topic. Lozman repeatedly ignored the councilmember’s instructions, and she ultimately instructed a City police officer to arrest Lozman.
Lozman was charged with, inter alia, disturbing a lawful assembly. The prosecuting attorney concluded that there was probable cause for the arrest, but dismissed the charges on the grounds that successful prosecution was unlikely.
In February 2008, Lozman filed suit against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that the City had arrested him at the city council meeting in retaliation for his opposition to the redevelopment plan. He alleged (1) retaliation by false arrest under the First Amendment, (2) unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and (3) common law false arrest. The case went to trial in November 2014 with Lozman appearing pro se. The jury found in favor of the City on all claims. Lozman filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied.
On appeal, Lozman argued that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the jury’s finding of probable cause on the charge of disturbing a lawful assembly was against the great weight of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this contention in light of the evidence presented at trial. It further explained that under its own precedent, a finding of probable cause bars a claim for false arrest under the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and state law.
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Lozman’s challenge to the district court’s instruction on retaliatory animus, stating that any error the instruction may have contained was harmless because the jury’s probable cause finding defeated Lozman’s retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. The appeals court also rejected Lozman’s challenge to the lower court’s jury instructions regarding the City’s authority to limit public comment during city council meetings. The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari did not include these two issues.

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Ruling 8-1, the Court vacated and remanded, holding that the existence of probable cause for Lozman’s arrest for disrupting a city council meeting did not bar his First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim under the circumstances of this case.
In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court explained that its holding in this case was narrow. Lozman had conceded that probable cause for his arrest existed, but claimed that his arrest was in retaliation for his earlier protected speech, which took the form of an open-meetings lawsuit and public criticisms of city officials. However, the parties disagreed as to what standard should govern the allegations of retaliatory arrest. Lozman argued that the applicable precedent was Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), a civil case in which a teacher alleged retaliatory employment action in violation of his First Amendment rights, and the Court held that the employer could not be liable unless the alleged constitutional violation was a but-for cause of the employment termination. The City argued that Mt. Healthy should not provide the sole standard in this case, and that instead Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), a criminal case which held that a plaintiff alleging retaliatory prosecution must show the absence of probable cause for the underlying criminal charge, should govern the case. But the Court responded that the question of what precedent applied to this issue need not be decided in a broad sense given that the facts of this case were so unusual in the retaliatory arrest context.
Indeed, Lozman did not sue the officer who made the arrest, and likely could not have succeeded on a retaliatory arrest claim against him as the officer seemed to have acted in good faith, and there was no indication that he had any knowledge of Lozman’s prior lawsuit or criticisms of the local government. Instead, Lozman alleged that city officials had implemented an official policy of intimidation against him due to his lawsuit and public statements criticizing them, and that their premeditated plan culminated in his arrest at the city council meeting. Further, in order for the city to be subject to liability under § 1983, Lozman would need to prove that he suffered harm as a result of an “official municipal policy,” distinguishing his claim from most cases alleging retaliatory arrest, which often involve on-the-spot judgements by individual police officers.
Given the uniqueness of this case in the retaliatory arrest context, along with the core First Amendment values at stake, the Court held that Lozman did not need to prove the absence of probable cause to maintain his retaliatory arrest claim. The Court also concluded that Mt. Healthy was the proper standard for assessing the retaliatory arrest claim on remand under these particular facts, but declined to address the requirements for proving such a claim in other contexts. The Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.


Minnesota Statute § 211B.II prohibits individuals from wearing political apparel at or around polling places on primary or election days. The text of the statute did not define “political”, so Minnesota election officials distributed policy materials to help identify which items fell within the scope of the law. Election officials received instructions to request that anyone wearing apparel which violated the guidelines laid out in the policy materials remove or cover it up. While officials were instructed to allow the person to vote regardless of their compliance, misdemeanor prosecution was a possible outcome, should an individual refuse the removal or cover-up request.
This case arose when Andrew Cilek, executive director for Minnesota Voters Alliance, was temporarily prevented from voting at his local polling place in November 2010 because he was wearing a t-shirt with a Tea Party logo and a button that advocated for the requirement of a photo ID to vote.
Minnesota Majority, Minnesota Voters Alliance, and Minnesota Northstar Tea Party Patriots, along with their association Election Integrity Watch (EIW), filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Secretary of State and various county election officials to enjoin enforcement of the statute as unconstitutional. The parties claimed that the statute violated the First Amendment, facially and as-applied, and was selectively enforced, which also violated their Equal Protection rights.
Initially, the district court dismissed all claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed as to the claims regarding Equal Protection and facial First Amendment violations. It reversed and remanded the as-applied First Amendment claim. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment against EIW, et al., on the as-applied First Amendment claim. Reviewing de novo the grant of summary judgment against EIW, the Eighth Circuit considered EIW's claim that the Minnesota statute was not reasonable, as applied to Tea Party apparel, because the Tea Party is not a political party in Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit was unpersuaded and held that the district court was correct in its ruling, since EIW had failed to present specific facts that showed banning Tea Party apparel was not reasonable, given the Minnesota statute's purpose. The Eighth Circuit held that EIW's argument that voters in Tea Party apparel were affected by selective enforcement had also failed, as it offered nothing more than speculation that voters wearing other forms of political apparel avoided enforcement of the statute. EIW, et al., then petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the lower courts’ ruling was correct.
EIW indicates in their petition for a writ of certiorari that there is a circuit split on the issues presented, where the Eighth Circuit’s ruling aligns with the D.C. and Fifth Circuit, which both have held that the government has authority to ban forms of political speech near polling places. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held, by contrast, that a complete ban on all political speech, absent any limiting principle, is unconstitutional, regardless of the location in which such speech has been banned.

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The Minnesota statute prohibiting individuals from wearing political apparel at a polling place violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court reasoned that a polling place is a nonpublic forum under its precedents, which means that the state may place reasonable limits on speech therein. Content-based restrictions on speech must be "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression" based on the speaker's viewpoint. The text of the Minnesota statute made no distinction based on the speaker's political persuasion, so it would be permissible so long as it is "reasonable." One component of reasonableness is the presence of "objective, workable standards" guiding enforcement of the law. Because the statute in question does not define the term "political" nor any other key terms describing the types of apparel subject to the prohibition, the law affords too much discretion in enforcing the ban and is thus unreasonable.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. The dissent would not have reversed and remanded the court of appeals below, as the Court did, but instead would have certified the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court to give the state courts "a reasonable opportunity to pass upon and construe the statute."


Mark A. Sveen and Kaye L. Melin were married in 1997. Sveen purchased a life insurance policy that year, and the following year he named Melin the primary beneficiary, and his children the contingent beneficiaries. Sveen and Melin divorced in 2007, and Sveen died in 2011.
Minnesota had changed its probate code in 2002 to apply a revocation-upon-divorce statute to life insurance beneficiary designations. Sveen had never changed the designation on his life insurance policy, and Melin was therefore still listed as the primary beneficiary at the time of his death.
The insurance company filed an interpleader to establish whether the revocation-upon-divorce statute nullified this designation. Sveen’s children and Melin cross-claimed for the proceeds, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the children, rejecting Melin’s contention that retroactively applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution.
The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that under its own precedent, the dispositive issue in this context was the right of the policyholder to have his wishes carried out in accordance with his intentions at the time he signed the contract. Applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute retroactively would deprive him of that right in violation of the Contract Clause.

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In an 8-1 opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the retroactive application of Minnesota’s revocation-upon-divorce statute, which automatically nullifies an ex-spouse’s beneficiary designation on a life insurance policy or other will substitute, does not violate the contracts clause of the Constitution.
The Court explained that not all laws affecting pre-existing contracts violate the contracts clause. There is a two-step inquiry to determine whether such a law is in fact unconstitutional in this context. The first question is whether the state law “operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.” This inquiry involves three sub-issues, which are the extent to which the law 1) undermines the contractual bargain, 2) interferes with a party’s reasonable expectations, and 3) prevents the party from safeguarding or reinstating his rights. If those factors reflect a substantial impairment, the Court must then ask whether the law has been crafted in an “appropriate” and “reasonable” way to advance “a significant and legitimate public purpose.”
In this case the Court stopped its inquiry after considering only the first factor, finding that the Minnesota statute did not substantially impair pre-existing contractual arrangements. It found that first, the law in this case was intended to reflect the policyholder’s intent that he or she likely would not want their life insurance proceeds to pass to a former spouse, thus supporting rather than undermining the contractual scheme. Second, the law was not likely to thwart the policyholder’s expectations, as the policyholder could not reasonably expect a beneficiary designation to stay in place after a divorce. Third, the law in this case served as a mere default rule, which the policyholder could undo at any time by sending in a new beneficiary designation form. The Court stated that such a minimal paperwork burden does not violate the contracts clause under its well-established precedent.
Justice Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion.


Erik Hughes pleaded guilty to drug and firearm offenses and entered into a plea agreement with the government under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court accepted the agreement and sentenced Hughes accordingly. Hughes then sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which permits defendants who have been “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court relied on Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) in determining that Hughes was ineligible for a sentence reduction because he was not sentenced “based on a sentencing range,” but on a plea agreement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.

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In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that a sentence imposed pursuant to a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) (“Type C”) plea bargain is “based on” the defendant’s Federal Sentencing Guidelines range as long as that range was a component of the framework the court used in imposing the sentence or accepting the plea bargain, meaning that in this case, Erik Hughes could seek a sentencing reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
The Court explained that a central purpose of the Guidelines is uniformity in sentencing. However, in the wake of the Court’s 4-1-4 decision in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011), which considered the question of a defendant’s eligibility for a reduced sentence under § 3582(c)(2) after entering into a Type C agreement, some circuits followed the plurality opinion while others followed Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, depending on how they applied Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
In seeking to resolve this split in authority, the Court stated that a district court imposes a sentence that is “based on” the Guidelines range if the range was part of the basis the court used in exercising its discretion to impose a sentence. District courts are required to use the Guidelines range as a starting point for calculating sentences in every case, including cases involving Type C agreements. As such, in most cases, sentences imposed pursuant to Type C agreements are “based on” the defendant’s guidelines range. Therefore, when the Sentencing Commission lowers the range for a particular offense, unless there is a clear showing that the court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the Guidelines range, a defendant who has entered into a Type C agreement related to that offense will generally be eligible for a reduction in sentence under § 3582(c)(2). The Court stated that this interpretation, as a systemic, structural matter, best supported the sentencing system Congress put into place.
Pursuant to this reasoning and in light of the fact that the Guidelines range was a basis for Hughes’ sentence, the Court held that he was eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2) given that the range had been lowered
The Court declined to decide the question of how Marks should properly apply.
Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion in which she explained that she was joining the majority in full in the instant case in order to help resolve the confusion that had arisen in the aftermath of Freeman, but stated that she still believed that her concurrence in Freeman set forth the most convincing application of § 3582(c)(2)’s text.
Justice Roberts authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito and Thomas joined.


Rene Sanchez-Gomez and defendants in three other criminal cases (collectively “Defendants”) objected to a policy (the “Policy”) of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California (the “District”) which required them to appear for pretrial non-jury proceedings in full physical restraints. The Policy, which applied to most in-custody defendants appearing in such proceedings, was proposed by the U.S. Marshals Service and accepted by the District’s judges.
The magistrate judges in all four cases overruled the Defendants’ objections to the Policy. The Defendants appealed these denials to the district court, and also filed emergency motions challenging the Policy’s constitutionality. The district court denied all relief, and the four cases were consolidated before the 9th Circuit.
The 9th Circuit, sitting en banc, construed the Defendants’ appeals as petitions for writs of mandamus under its supervisory authority, and found that it had jurisdiction to review the Policy’s constitutionality. It explained that while the individual Defendants’ claims may be moot by the time of review due to their criminal cases ending and the Policy having been changed, under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Gerstein v. Pugh, the Defendants represented a broader group of similarly situated people who could be injured should the Policy be reinstated. Thus, applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review mootness exception, the supervisory mandamus case was not moot. However, because the Policy was no longer in effect, the court withheld a formal writ of mandamus.

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A unanimous Court held that the case is moot. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court found that the appellate court's reliance on Gerstein was misplaced, as that case does not support a freestanding exception to mootness outside the class action context. Further, the mere presence of allegations that might, if resolved in respondents' favor, benefit other similarly situated individuals does not save their case from mootness. Additionally, the Court found unpersuasive the respondents' arguments that their claims fall within the exception to mootness by virtue of being "capable of repetition yet evading review" because the possibility that a person will be criminally prosecuted is insufficient to establish judicial standing.


Sharline and Ray Lundgren and the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (the “Tribe”) own adjacent pieces of property in Skagit County, Washington. The space between a fence running across the width of the Tribe’s property and its southern border became a subject of dispute between the parties after the Tribe attempted to assert ownership of it in 2013.
The Lundgrens’ property had been in their extended family since approximately 1947, during which time they had always treated the fence as the property line. In 2013 the Tribe purchased land to the north of the Lundgrens’ property, and were apparently not aware of the fence at that time. When they discovered it, they informed the Lundgrens of their intention to assert ownership rights over the disputed portion of land.
In 2015, the Lundgrens filed suit to quiet title to the property, seeking summary judgment on the basis that they had acquired the disputed property by adverse possession or mutual acquiescence and recognition long before the Tribe bought its parcel. The Tribe moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, and because the Lundgrens could not join them as a necessary and indispensable party. The trial court denied the Tribe’s motion, and the Tribe sought direct discretionary review. In the resulting ruling, the court granted the Lundgrens’ motion for summary judgment, finding that they had established legal ownership of the disputed property through adverse possession and mutual recognition and acquiescence.
The Washington Supreme Court accepted the Tribe’s amended motion for discretionary review of both prior orders, and affirmed. The court rejected the argument that the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, which neither the Tribe nor Congress had waived with regard to quiet title actions. The court found that because it had in rem jurisdiction, the Tribe’s sovereign immunity did not create a barrier to jurisdiction.

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In a 7-2 opinion by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the Washington Supreme Court to address the common-law question of sovereign immunity. The majority clarified that its decision in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation addressed only a question of statutory interpretation, not the question presented here of whether Indian tribes have sovereign immunity in in rem lawsuits. The respondents ask the Court to affirm on an alternative, common-law ground—that the tribe cannot assert sovereign immunity because the suit relates to immovable property located in Washington state and purchased by the tribe.
Chief Justice John Roberts filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Anthony Kennedy joined. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Samuel Alito joined.