No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not allow a defendant to use ill-gotten gains to pay an attorney. The Court also held that, since the government had the power to restrain persons given probable cause that they committed a crime, it follows that the government can constitutionally restrain property as well. Similarly, because the criminal justice system entrusts to the grand jury the determination of whether there is probable cause to restrain a defendant prior to trial, there is not reason to use another method to determine whether there is probable cause to restrain a defendant's property. The Court also held that the alternative ruling, which would allow a judge to overrule a grand jury's finding of probable cause, could have destructive impacts on the criminal justice system as a whole. Previous precedent has maintained that there is no need for an adversarial hearing to determine probable cause because it is such a relatively low standard of proof, and the Court found no reason to depart from that precedent in this case.
In his dissent, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote that, while the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not equate to an absolute right to choice of counsel, the right cannot be denied based on the discretion of the prosecutor. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the issue of the forfeiture of assets is entirely separate from the issue of indictment for a crime and requires different evidence. Therefore, a hearing to determine whether the Kaleys' assets were forfeitable would not be relitigating a decided issue but rather allowing a judge to determine whether the government met its burden. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion essentially allows the government to deprive defendants of the counsel of their choice, which is fundamentally at odds with the ideals of the criminal justice system. While the government does have a legitimate interest in ensuring that ill-gotten assets are available to be returned if the defendant is convicted, there are other ways to protect the assets that do not require the defendant to forfeit his right to the counsel of his choice. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.


The town of Greece, New York, is governed by a five-member town board that conducts official business at monthly public meetings. Starting in 1999, the town meetings began with a prayer given by an invited member of the local clergy. The town did not adopt any policy regarding who may lead the prayer or its content, but in practice, Christian clergy members delivered the vast majority of the prayers at the town's invitation. In 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens complained about the town's prayer practices, after which there was some increase in the denominations represented.
In February 2008, Galloway and Stephens sued the town and John Auberger, in his official capacity as Town Supervisor, and argued that the town's practices violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by preferring Christianity over other faiths. The district court found in favor of the town and held that the plaintiffs failed to present credible evidence that there was intentional seclusion of non-Christian faiths. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the practices violated the Establishment Clause by showing a clear preference for Christian prayers.

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No. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the context and jurisprudence surrounding the First Amendment suggested that the Establishment Clause was never meant to prohibit legislative prayer, which created the proper deliberative mood and acknowledged religion's role in society. The content of this prayer does not need to be non-sectarian, because such a requirement would place the courts in the role of arbiters of religious speech, which would involve the government in religion to an extent that is impermissible under the Establishment Clause. The Court thus held that the prayers in question do not violate this tradition and are therefore acceptable under the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy further argued that legislative prayer is primarily for the members of the legislative body, and therefore such prayers do not coerce the public into religious observance. Though the respondents testified that they felt offended by these prayers, Justice Kennedy distinguished between offense and coercion and noted that the former does not violate the Establishment Clause. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas did not join in this portion of the opinion.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that there is a long tradition of constitutionally permissible legislative prayer and that such prayer need not be non-sectarian, especially when such a requirement would place the government in the position of policing prayer. Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the Establishment Clause should be read as a federalist provision that protected states' rights rather than individual rights.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that, as the Court of Appeals held, the Town of Greece must do more to make its legislative prayer inclusive of other faiths. Despite the fact that the town is not exclusively Christian, the town made no significant effort to inform non-Christian clergy about the possibility of delivering an invocation, and in doing so, marginalized religious minority populations. Justice Elena Kagan wrote in a separate dissent that the town's failure to represent a variety of religions in its meetings amounted to the unconstitutional preference of one religion over others. To do so in a public forum where people come to participate in the political process forces individuals who do not agree with the beliefs represented in the prayer to either acquiesce or visibly make their dissent known. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Breyer joined in the dissent.
"


McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission

In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which established two sets of limits to campaign contributions. The base limit placed restrictions on how much money a contributor—defined broadly as individuals, partnerships, and other organizations—may give to specified categories of recipients. The aggregate limit restricted how much money an individual may donate in a two-year election cycle. The limits were periodically recalibrated to factor in inflation.
Shaun McCutcheon is an Alabama resident who is eligible to vote. In the 2011-2012 election cycle, he donated to the Republican National Committee, other Republican committees, as well as individual candidates. He wished to donate more in amounts that would be permissible under the base limit but would violate the aggregate limit. McCutcheon and the other plaintiffs sued the Federal Election Commission, arguing that the aggregate limit violated the First Amendment by failing to serve a "cognizable government interest" and being prohibitively low. The district court held that the aggregate limit served government interests by preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption and was set at a reasonable limit.

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No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the four-justice plurality. The plurality held that the aggregate limit did little to address the concerns that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was meant to address and at the same time limited participation in the democratic process. Because the aggregate limit fails to meet the stated objective of preventing corruption, it does not survive the "rigorous" standard of review laid out by previous precedent dealing with campaign contributions from a First Amendment perspective and is therefore unconstitutional. The aggregate limit also prevents a donor from contributing beyond a specific amount to more than a certain number of candidates, which may force him to choose which interests he can seek to advance in a given election. The plurality held that the collective interest in combating corruption can only be pursued as long as it does not unnecessarily curtail an individual's freedom of speech, and in this case the aggregate limit is not sufficiently closely tailored to accomplish this goal. The plurality also noted that there are many other means by which the government may fight election corruption without setting an aggregate limit on campaign contributions.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, a previous case dealing with limits on campaign contributions, should be overruled because it denigrates the core values of the First Amendment. Because the reasoning in Buckley v. Valeo could not sufficiently justify using a standard lower than strict scrutiny to examine limits on campaign contributions, Justice Thomas wrote that Buckley should be overruled and the BCRA should be subject to strict scrutiny.
In his dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the plurality's opinion misconstrues the nature of competing constitutional issues and destroys campaign finance laws, which causes great harm to the democratic process. Justice Breyer argued that the plurality's opinion was based on a definition of corruption that is too narrow to be effective. He went on to state the reasoning that the aggregate limit is faulty is because there is no substantial mismatch between Congress' goal of combating corruption and the means established to achieve it. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


The Patent Act allows a court to award reasonable attorneys fees in exceptional cases in which the lawsuit is objectively baseless and brought in bad faith. Allcare Management Systems, Inc. (Allcare) owns a patent that covers a computer-based method of generating treatment options based on symptom data entered by a physician. This process can help an insurance company determine whether to approve a particular treatment for a patient. In 2003, Highmark, Inc. (Highmark), a health insurance company, sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement of Allcare's patent. Allcare filed a counterclaim and alleged that Highmark infringed on two sections of its patent. The federal district court awarded summary judgment in favor of Highmark. The court also found that Allcare had willfully pursued frivolous infringement claims and ordered it to pay Highmark's attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit independently reviewed the district court's determination that Allcare's claims were objectively baseless. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding with respect to one of Allcare's claims and reversed the court regarding Allcare's second claim.

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Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that a district court is in the best position to determine whether a lawsuit is objectively baseless and, as such, is entitled to deference upon appeal. The Federal Circuit applied too strict of a standard in its independent review of the case, which should be reserved for questions of law. The Court remanded the proceedings and instructed the Federal Circuit to examine the district court’s findings for abuse of discretion.


In 2001, James Alvin Castleman was charged and pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor domestic assault under the relevant Tennessee statute, which dealt with knowingly or intentionally causing bodily harm to the mother of the defendant's child. Seven years later, federal agents discovered that Castleman and his wife were buying firearms from dealers and selling them on the black market. Because Castleman's domestic assault conviction prohibited him from purchasing firearms, Castleman's wife bought the weapons in her own name. Castleman was indicted in federal district court and charged with two counts of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The district court dismissed the charges and held that Castleman's misdemeanor domestic assault conviction under Tennessee law did not constitute the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as required by the federal statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

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Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that, because the statute in question—that prevents people convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing firearms—incorporates an element regarding the use of physical force, it includes those convicted of domestic assault under state law. This reading of the statute is consistent with the common-law meaning of violence, and to read it otherwise would have meant that the statute was ineffective in many states at the time of its enactment. Because the Tennessee statute under which Castleman was convicted necessarily involved the use of physical force, it should be considered a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction for the purpose of the federal statute.
In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the majority opinion could have settled the case on much narrower grounds than it did. Because the meaning of the Tennessee statute in question categorically includes the meaning of "physical force," a conviction under that statute qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the reasoning in the majority opinion purports to rely on the reasoning in Johnson v. United States, but because the majority opinion in this case holds that force does not need to be violent, it is an improper application of the precedent. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.


In 1908, the United States granted land, known as a right-of-way (ROW) to the Hahn's Peak and Pacific Railway Company to build a 66-mile railway from Laramie, Wyoming to Colorado. In 1976, the United States granted Fox Park, Wyoming⎯land that surrounds the ROW⎯to Melvin and Lula Brandt. In 1986, a new company, the Wyoming and Colorado Railway Company, acquired the ROW. The company operated the ROW until it officially abandoned the land in 2003. Following the abandonment, the United States sued the Brandt Revocable Trust and other potential property owners under 42 USC 912, a statute governing the disposition of abandoned or forfeited railroad grants. The government argued that this statute reverts abandoned ROWs back to the federal government's exclusive possession. The United States sought a judicial order of abandonment and exclusive possession of the ROW. The Brandt Revocable Trust and property owners filed a countersuit seeking full possession of the ROW, insofar as it cut through their land. They argued that the statute only granted an easement to the United States, not full possession. The district court granted the interest in the ROW to the United States and the US. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

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No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the language, legislative history, and subsequent administrative interpretation of the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 (1875 Act) clearly grants an easement for the railroad's land and not a more enduring property interest. When the United States granted Fox Park to Melvin and Lula Brandt, it did not reserve for itself any additional interest in the railroad property. Therefore, pursuant to the 1875 Act, when the railroad company abandoned the land, it should have been settled as an easement. When an easement is abandoned, the easement disappears and the land reverts to its previous owner, so in this case, the land would revert to the Brandt Revocable Trust and property owners.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that there is judicial precedent to support the view that, in granting land to railroad companies, Congress did not intend to allow those land grants to be disposed at the will of the private companies. Justice Sotomayor also argued that the majority opinion failed to take into account the fact that railroad rights have historically not been treated as property rights that can be decided simply on the basis of common law principles. Therefore, even if the 1875 Act only granted an easement, it should not be treated as an ordinary easement. Instead, such an easement should be settled according to the presumption in favor of the sovereign grantor, the United States, as has typically governed railroad ROW property.


In August 2007, Justus Rosemond and Ronald Joseph met Ricardo Gonzalez in a Tooele, Utah, park to sell him a pound of marijuana. When Gonzalez attempted to take the marijuana without paying, he was fired upon while fleeing. The government charged Justus Rosemond with several drug-and firearm-related offenses. At trial, the government alleged that Rosemond was either the shooter or that he aided and abetted the shooter. The jury convicted Rosemond on all charges.On appeal, Rosemond argued that the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding the aiding and abetting theory were insufficient and that the jury must find that Rosemond "intentionally took some action to facilitate or encourage the use of a firearm" to convict. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Rosemond's conviction.

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Yes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the government must prove that the defendant actively participated in a drug or violent crime intending to see it succeed and knew in advance that one of his coconspirators had a gun during the crime. Whether the defendant approved or disapproved of having or using the gun is irrelevant, as long as he participated in the underlying drug or violent crime with knowledge of a gun. Proof that the defendant knew that a gun was used sometime in the commission of the crime is insufficient; if, as in this case, a defendant learns of a gun upon seeing or hearing an accomplice fire shots after the criminal scheme has begun, he cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting under this statute. The State must prove as part of the knowledge element that the accomplice had the opportunity to walk away after learning of the gun but chose to proceed thereby incurring the liability of this statute.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreeing only with the majority's new rule that the State prove that the aider and abetter had an opportunity to refrain from the criminal conduct after learning of a gun. His dissent rests on the position that this requirement deviates from the traditional aiding and abetting doctrine, and it opens up the affirmative defense of necessity or duress for the accomplice that does not object to having a gun for fear violence might be directed at him. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.


Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund

A collective bargaining agreement directed Ray Holuch Gravel, a landscape supply company, to remit contributions to several benefit funds affiliated with the Central Pension Fund, a labor union which represents landscape supply company employees. After conducting an audit of the company's books in 2009, the union sued for additional remittances of past unreported work. They also sued for attorney's fees. The district court ruled in favor of the labor union on both issues with respect to one employee, but ruled against them with respect to employees who could not be identified because the landscape supply company failed to keep the required records. The two decisions were announced separately and one week apart. The labor union appealed both rulings within thirty days of the second ruling, but more than thirty days after the first ruling. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the appeal was timely because the attorney's fees are a merits issue, so the first decision was not final until the lower court had decided both cases.

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Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that the decision on the merits, even if the issue of attorney's fees remains unresolved, is the final decision for the purpose of appeal. Because attorney's fees do not remedy the injury giving rise to the action and are often available to the defendant(s) as well as the plaintiff(s), the issue is generally not considered part of a merits decision. Although this distinction could lead to piecemeal litigation, the Court held that the concern was counterbalanced by the clarity that such a uniform rule provided to the appeals process.


Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.

Former shareholders of Halliburton Company (Halliburton) filed a class action lawsuit against the company and argued that Halliburton falsified its financial statements and misrepresented projected earnings between 1999 and 2001. In their petition for class certification, the shareholders invoked the "fraud on the market" presumption to demonstrate their class-wide reliance on Halliburton's statements. The "fraud on the market" theory assumes that, in an efficient market, the price of a security reflects any material, public representation affecting that security. Therefore, under this theory, the law presumes that investors have relied on a material misstatement when they purchase a security at an artificially high or low price. The federal district court certified the shareholders as a class and prevented Halliburton from introducing evidence that the statements did not impact its stock prices at all. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that Halliburton could not rebut the presumption that the plaintiffs relied on the statements until a trial on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims.

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Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that there was no reason to prevent defendants in a securities fraud case from presenting evidence regarding the impact of alleged misinformation on stock prices during the class certification stage. The Court also held that Halliburton was unable to provide adequate justification to overrule the established precedent that plaintiffs in securities fraud cases only need to prove a presumption of reliance on fraudulent information. The presumption standard is based on the generally agreed-upon principle that public information affects stock prices. Without any evidence that this principle was misunderstood or no longer reflects current economic realities, the presumption standard should remain. Additionally, because Congress had the opportunity to pass a law that created a new standard and chose not to do so, Congress clearly intended the presumption to stand.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that, while allowing the defendants to present price-impact evidence at the class certification stage may broaden the scope of those proceedings, it should not present an undue burden to plaintiffs with legitimate claims. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the presumption of reliance standard should not be used because it is based on a flawed understanding of economics and effectively lowers the burden of proof for the plaintiffs. For these reasons, Justice Thomas argued that the decision in Basic v. Levinson—the decision that established the “fraud on the market” presumption standard—should be overruled. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence.


The plaintiffs, Jackie Lawson and Jonathan Zang, brought a lawsuit against their former employer, FMR LLC, a subcontractor of Fidelity Investments (Fidelity), alleging that the company unlawfully fired them in retaliation for filing complaints. Both Lawson and Zang told the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) that they believed that Fidelity had violated certain rules and regulations set forth by both the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and federal laws relating to fraud against shareholders. Sometime after filing these complaints, Zang was terminated for unsatisfactory performance. Lawson filed several retaliation claims against her employer with OSHA, and resigned in 2007, claiming that she had been constructively discharged.
Zang and Lawson each filed separate actions against their former employers in district court. They alleged that the defendants violated "whistleblower" protection sections of the Sarbanes-Oakley Act by taking retaliatory actions against them. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the whistleblower provisions extended to employees of private agents, contractors, and subcontractors to public companies and that the plaintiffs had engaged in protected activity under the statute. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which reversed the decision. Looking at both Congressional intent and the plain meaning of the statute, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not protected employees under the act.

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Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that whistleblower-protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act protects employees of private contractors and subcontractors just as it does employees of the public company served by the private contractors and subcontractors. Because there was no language in the Act that specifically limited the covered employees to those working for the public company, the Court held that Congress must not have intended the Act to have such a limited scope. The legislative record supports the view that Congress was aware of the role that outside contractors can play in recognizing and reporting fraud, and that fear of retaliation can prevent them from fulfilling that role.
In his opinion concurring in principal part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that, while he agreed with the judgment of the majority opinion, the majority opinion's reliance on legislative history is an ineffective measure of proof because it cannot accurately reflect Congressional intent. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence in principal part and in the judgment.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority opinion was an over-broad interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. There are several key indicators that support a narrower reading of that Act, not the least of which is the fact that the relevant section is entitled "Protection for Employees of Publically Traded Companies Who Provide Evidence of Fraud." Beyond the evidence of the Act's context that support a narrow reading, Justice Sotomayor also argued that the majority opinion's interpretation would result in opportunities for litigation any time any employee claims to be harassed for providing information regarding any offense; it is not plausible that Congress would have intended to place such burdens on the courts. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation

The Clean Air Act creates a federal-state partnership that aims to control air pollution in the United States. The Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to both establish air quality standards and gives the states significant freedom to implement plans in order to meet those standards. Among the problems the Act sought to prevent was the possible spread of air pollution from "upwind" states to "downwind" states.
In 2011, the EPA created the Transport Rule, a rule which sets emission reduction standards for 28 "upwind" states based on the air quality standards in "downwind" states. Various states, local governments, industry groups, and labor organizations brought suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and argued that the Transport Rule created federal standards with no deference to the states, which violated federal law. The court held that the Transport Rule violated federal law because the Clean Air Act allows states to implement their own plans to curb air pollution.

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Yes, no, no. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the Clean Air Act supports the EPA's contention that if a state implementation plan (SIP) is determined to be insufficient, then the EPA has an absolute mandate to create and enforce a federal implementation plan (FIP) at any point within the next two years unless the state revises the SIP in question. Nothing in the Act required the EPA to provide states with specific metrics regarding upwind states' contributions to the pollution of downwind states, especially since this schedule could prolong the process by instituting a delay that Congress did not order in the Act. The Court held that the Transport Rule was necessary for the EPA to fulfill its statutory requirement to balance the possibility of under-and over-control of emissions standards. The Court also held that there was no jurisdictional bar to the Court of Appeals and then the Supreme Court hearing the case.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Clarence Thomas arguing that the majority opinion failed to rely on a textual justification for its holdings. Instead, the majority opinion reached the logically inconsistent conclusion that the EPA did not have to provide states with information regarding emission standards before states were required to implement plans that conformed to those standards.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.
[In the initially published opinion, Justice Scalia's dissent cited a Supreme Court case dealing with the EPA, Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., as an example of a case that had denied the EPA the ability to expand its mandate. However, the case actually had to do with the EPA defending its more limited mandate, and the majority sided with the EPA. Additionally, Justice Scalia was the author of the opinion he mischaracterized. The Supreme Court then issued a corrected version of Justice Scalia's dissent that removed the incorrect reference.]


Diana Alvarez and Manuel Lozano, two native Columbians, met while living in London and had a daughter together. At trial Alvarez testified that, from 2005 until 2008, Lozano was abusing and threatening to rape her. Lozano denied these allegations and claimed that, although they had normal couple problems, they were generally "very happy together." In November 2008, Alvarez took the child and, after a stay at a women's shelter, moved to her sister's home in New York. A psychiatrist diagnosed the child with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by her experience living in the United Kingdom, moving to America, staying at a women's shelter, and knowing that her mother had been threatened. However, six months later, the child's condition drastically improved.
After Lozano exhausted all remedies within the UK to attempt to locate the child, on November 10, 2010, he filed a Petition for Return of Child under Article 2 of the Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act in U.S. district court. The district court held that the child was now settled in New York and that removing the child would cause undue harm. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

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Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that the policy of equitable tolling, which pauses the running of a statute of limitations when a litigant has diligently pursued his rights, does not apply to the Hague Convention's provision on international child abduction. Because equitable tolling extends an otherwise discrete time period, it must be proven to align with statutory intent. However, the Hague Convention is a treaty, not a statute, and a treaty by its nature must be interpreted based on principles shared by the nations involved. Equitable tolling is not an established part of the background law of all signatories of the Hague Convention and therefore has no role in the interpretation of the treaty. The Court also held that the one-year period is not actually a statute of limitations because its expiration opens the door for other considerations that could result in the return of the child to the home country.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Hague Convention allowed courts to consider all factors relevant to the child's wellbeing and order the child's return to the home country even after the one year has elapsed. Nothing in the Hague Convention specifies that the one-year period places limits on a court's discretionary power to order the child's return. The one-year period is the time when the court must order the return, but not the only time the court may do so. Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.


Doyle R. Paroline pled guilty to possession of 150-300 images of child pornography. Included among those files on his computer were two photographs of Amy Unknown, a victim of child pornography. He was sentenced to 24 months of incarceration followed by release under supervision. Under a federal statute that mandates full restitution to victims of child pornography by those convicted of creating, distributing or possessing such material, the Government and Amy sought restitution in the amount of nearly $3.4 million. The district court denied restitution and held that the statute required the Government to prove that Paroline's possession of the images was the proximate cause of the injuries for which restitution was sought. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that Paroline was responsible for restitution for all the victim's losses even if his criminal acts occurred after the victim's losses.

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Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the government or victim must prove that the costs for which the victim seeks restitution stem from the offense in question. However, this causal link must be not simply factual but rather proximate, which means that there must be a sufficient connection between the offense and the victim's costs. The proximate cause requirement prevents a defendant from being held liable in situations where the link between the offense and the alleged harm could best be described as coincidental. In this case, although Paroline's individual possession of the pornographic images may not have directly caused the extent of the victim's losses that stem from the continuing traffic of her images, the Court held that it would be appropriate for a court to order restitution in an amount that represents the defendant's relative role in the larger process that caused harm to the victim.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, because there is no way to prove exactly what amount of the victim's harms were caused by this specific defendant's possession of her images, the court would only be able to pick an arbitrary restitution amount, which undermines a criminal defendant's right to due process of law. Since the statute requires the government or the victim to demonstrate the amount of the victim's loss that was caused by the offense in question, the restitution system fails in cases like this one, where the injury is not divisible. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In her separate dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that the restitution statute in question requires the defendant to pay restitution for the victim's costs in full, though a periodic payment schedule may be implemented. If the defendant were to avoid paying restitution simply because he was one of many people who contributed to the victim's harms, such logic would excuse all similar offenders and the victim would be unable to obtain any restitution. Because individual possessors of child pornography act in concert as part of a larger network, they act with the knowledge of their roles and the larger harms their actions cause to the victim, which means that they must be held liable.


Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.

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Not decided, no. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the majority opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the law considers causation as a hybrid between two constituent parts: actual cause, or cause-in-fact, and legal cause, which is also known as proximate cause. Because the cause-in-fact requirement was not met in this case, the Court did not rule on whether the crime of distribution of drugs causing death required a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement. Instead, the Court focused on the specific text found in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), the federal law requiring heightened sentences for drug sales causing death or serious bodily injury. The language in that statute requires that the death "results from" the sale of illegal drugs. Because the deceased in this case was found with multiple drugs in his system, the heroin sold by the defendant could not be considered an independently sufficient cause of death.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which she objected to an analogy made in the majority opinion that compared the "results from" language in drug statutes to similar language found in Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. Instead she cited to her dissent in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar . There, Ginsburg also dissented, arguing that the Court's interpretation of similar language (in that case, "because of") lacked sensitivity to real-life concerns. Despite her reservations about the Court's statutory interpretation, she agreed with the ruling in this case. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined Ginsburg's special concurrence.


In 2006, Edward Lane accepted a probationary position as Director of the Community Intensive Training for Youth ("CITY") program at Central Alabama Community College ("CACC"). He subsequently terminated the employment of Suzanne Schmitz, a state representative who had not performed any work for the program despite being listed on CITY's payroll. Lane also testified against Schmitz in two federal criminal trials between 2008 and 2009. In January 2009, Steve Franks, the president of CACC, sent termination letters to 29 CITY employees, including Lane, but rescinded the terminations of 27 of those employees within a few days. Lane sued Franks in federal district court and alleged that his termination from the CITY program was in retaliation for his testimony against Schmitz and therefore violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded Franks from liability and granted summary judgment in his favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed but declined to reach a decision on the qualified immunity question. Instead, the appellate court held that the First Amendment did not protect Lane's testimony because it was made pursuant to his official duties as a public employee.

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Yes and no. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that Lane’s testimony clearly constituted citizen speech on a public matter and that the testimony was elicited during a trial for misuse of state funds and corruption. Therefore, Lane did not testify as part of his employment responsibilities. Though Lane learned some of the subject matter of his testimony through the course of his employment, that alone does not make the testimony a part of Lane’s employment responsibilities. However, even though the Court found that Lane’s speech was protected under the First Amendment, ultimately Lane’s claim must be dismissed because Franks had qualified immunity. Previous precedent, specifically Morris v. Crow, had held that public employee testimony was unprotected speech, and thus when Franks fired Lane, he was not violating a clearly established constitutional right.
In his concurring opinion Justice Clarence Thomas agreed that, because Lane did not testify as a part of his employment duties and responsibilities, his testimony constituted citizen speech on a public matter and was entitled to First Amendment protection. Justice Thomas further applauded the Court for not addressing whether the First Amendment protects the testimony of public employee when that testimony is part of the employee’s employment duties. Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Justice Antonin Scalia joined the concurrence.


Freddie Lee Hall was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1978 murder of Karol Hurst. Hall sought a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution in state court, which was denied. Hall then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Hall appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed in part and remanded the case for a hearing regarding the potential effect of his absence from the courtroom during the trial and ineffective counsel. On remand, the district court again denied habeas corpus and held that Hall's absences from the courtroom were harmless and that he deliberately bypassed ineffective counsel claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Hall petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for habeas corpus relief based on the Supreme Court decision in Hitchcock v. Dugger, which held that all mitigating factors should be considered rather than just the mitigating factors listed in the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition and held that no error occurred in sentencing. After the governor signed his second death warrant, Hall filed a motion to vacate the sentence, which the trial court denied by holding that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision barred further review of the case. The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed and held that the case involved additional non-record facts that had not been considered in the previous review. The case was vacated and remanded for new sentencing. At the new sentencing trial, the trial court held that Hall's mental retardation was a mitigating factor with "unquantifiable weight," and he was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.
In 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held that the execution of mentally retarded defendants constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hall filed a motion to declare certain sections of the Florida death penalty statute unconstitutional based on this decision and filed a claim to be exempt from the death penalty under that ruling. The trial court held a hearing to determine if Hall was eligible for such a claim and found that he was not because the first prong of the test—whether he had an IQ below 70—could not be met. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.

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Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that executing an intellectually disabled person violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. If a person is unable to make the calculated judgments that are the premise for the rationale that the death penalty functions as a deterrent and as retribution, then the death penalty serves no legitimate purpose. While the Florida statute in question may be constitutional on its face, the Florida courts have interpreted the statute too narrowly by relying only on an IQ test score—which itself is not infallible—instead of allowing for the consideration of other evidence regarding the defendant’s intellectual disability. In this manner, the mandatory cutoff at an IQ of 70 allows for intellectually disabled people to be sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion represented an unprecedented departure from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence because it relied on professional standards rather than the evolving standards of society at large. Because the standards of professional organizations frequently change, tying Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to them will likely result in legal instability and protracted litigation. In fact, Justice Alito argued that there was no evidence that the new method the majority opinion favored was any more accurate than the IQ test, and that Florida’s statutory scheme already took the risk of testing error into account by allowing for the introduction of multiple test scores into evidence. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


S. Binyomin Ginsberg became a member of the Northwest Airlines frequent flyer program in 1999 and obtained Premium Elite Status in 2005. In 2008, his membership was terminated, as per the terms of the program that allow Northwest Airlines discretion over the removal of participants. In January 2009, Ginsberg sued Northwest Airlines and argued that, by terminating his membership in the frequent flyer program, the company breached both the contractual agreement and the implied doctrine of good faith and fair dealing under Minnesota law.
At trial in district court, the defense argued that Ginsberg's claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), which prohibits states from enacting or enforcing regulation over the price, route, or service of an air carrier. The district court found in favor of Northwest Airlines. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the ADA did not preempt the claims because the claims were unrelated to the price, route, or services of the air carrier.

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Yes, the Airline Deregulation Act pre-empts state law claims when such claims seek to enlarge the contractual obligations that the parties voluntarily adopted. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that exempting such claims from pre-emption would negate the ADA's goal of allowing market forces to establish aspects of air transportation without the interference of state laws. Additionally, since Minnesota state law does not allow parties to contract out of the covenant into which they voluntarily entered, a claim of a breach of covenant is pre-empted unless otherwise specified.


Sandifer v. United States Steel Corporation

Workers at the United Steel Corporation brought a class action suit against the company arguing that the Fair Labor Standards Act required the company to compensate them for time spent changing into and out of work clothes and the transit time from the locker room to their work stations. The Act states that an employer does not need to compensate employees for time spent "changing clothes." United States Steel Corporation moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion as it relates to compensation for changing clothes but not in relation to compensation for transit time.
The company appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Act did not require the company to compensate the employees for either the time spent changing or the time spent in transit between the locker room and the work stations.

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Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that safety gear falls within the parameters of "clothes" for the purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act and therefore is subject to the separate collective bargaining agreement that does not provide compensation for changing into and out of safety gear. Because the statutory context makes it clear that the concept of "clothes" refers to items that are necessary for job performance, there is no need to construe the term more strictly. Additionally, since "changing" clothes does not require the substitution of one outfit for another, the act of donning or doffing safety can be considered "changing clothes" for the purposes of the Act.


Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co.

Julie Heimeshoff worked for Wal-Mart as Senior Public Relations Manager from April 1986 through June 2005. In January 2005, she began suffering from pain from fibromyalgia as well as Irritable Bowel Syndrome and lupus. By June, her condition was so severe that she had to leave work. In August 2005, Heimsehoff filed a claim with Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. (Hartford) for Long Term Disability benefits. Heimsehoff's doctor failed to provide an analysis of her condition to Harford, so Hartford denied her claim in December 2005. In May 2006, Heimsehoff obtained counsel to assist her in obtaining benefits. After several evaluations by other doctors, Hartford denied Heimsehoff's claim again in November 2006, finding that she could perform the duties of her former position. Heimsehoff appealed the decision, but Hartford denied her claim for a final time in November 2007.
Heimsehoff sued in district court, alleging that Hartford violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in denying her claim. The district court dismissed the suit as time barred because the plan unambiguously prohibited legal action more than three years after proof of loss is required. Heimsehoff argued that the three-year statute of limitations should instead run from the date when Hartford denied her claim for the final time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

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Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that, because ERISA does not mandate a statute of limitations, parties may agree to one that begins before a final denial of coverage that allows a party to state a claim in district court. Since Hartford's agreed-upon limitations period is neither too short nor is there a statute that prevents it from taking effect, the courts are bound to enforce the limitations period and its start date as written in the coverage plan. The Court also held that there is no evidence that the limitations period would prevent a party from fully pursuing internal review followed by judicial review, and if that were to happen, the courts could apply well-established doctrines to allow the suit to proceed.


The respondents are all immigrants to the United States and are considered lawful permanent residents. At various times each of the respondents applied for family-sponsored visas. However, because of the delays caused by visa quotas and serious backlogs in the U.S. immigration system meant that all of their children had turned twenty-one and, based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), had "aged out" of eligibility for any derivative child-visas. As a result, their visa applications converted from child-applications to adult-applications and were moved to the bottom of the adult-application list, which potentially added years to their wait to receive a visas.
In 2009, after the Board of Immigration Appeals converted several child visa petitions to adult petitions, the respondents filed two cases in federal district court in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California asking hat the court order the Board to retain use of their children's original visa filing dates. That court denied the request. The respondents then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. There, the petitioners argued that certain provisions in the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) should allow the use of the children's original application dates for certain visa applications. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the language of both CSPA and the INA allow the child-status petition to convert to an adult petition while still retaining the original date when the visa petition was filed.

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No, yes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the three-justice plurality. The plurality held that the relevant sections of the Child Status Protection Act are not ambiguous but rather allow children to retain their original application date only in certain situations and not in others. Therefore, the interpretation of the Board of Immigration Appeals is reasonable and should receive deference in this case. However, the plurality also noted that the CSPA does not require the Board's interpretation in this case; it is simply one possible reading based on the differences in the text of the statute.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in judgment in which he argued that Congress intended any ambiguity in the statute to be resolved by the Board. Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the plurality that the Board's interpretation of the statute was reasonable and should be allowed to stand. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.
In his dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the CSPA has an appropriate category into which to convert the petitions of children who have "aged out" of their previous category. Because such a conversion is possible without any action on the part of the INA, the respondents' petitions should have been immediately converted and their original petition dates should be retained. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a separate dissent in which she argued that, because all five categories of aged out children meet the requirement in the initial clause of the statute, they are entitled to relief in the form of retaining their original petition dates. By holding that the Board's interpretation was a reasonable one, the plurality's opinion ignores the principle of statutory interpretation that requires courts to assume that Congress constructed the statute as a coherent whole. Because the Board's construction of the statute neglected this principle and treated the statute as entirely disparate parts, Justice Sotomayor argued that the Board's interpretation was impermissible. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


Carol Anne Bond worked for the chemical manufacturer Rohm and Haas. When she learned that her friend Myrlinda Haynes was pregnant and that Bond's husband was the father, she used her connections with the chemical company to obtain the means for revenge. She stole and purchased highly toxic chemicals that she applied to Haynes' doorknobs, car door handles, and mailbox. Haynes suffered a minor burn, and after contacting a federal investigator, Bond was identified as the perpetrator. She was charged with several violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (Act).
In the district court, Bond moved to dismiss the case and argued that Congress did not have the authority to enforce the Act because it subverted states' rights in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Bond conditionally pled guilty with the understanding that she could continue to appeal the decision regarding the validity of the Act. She was sentenced to six years in prison. Bond renewed her challenge to the Act in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which held that Bond did not have standing to appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the case must be considered on its merits. The case was remanded back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3d Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the Act was within Congress' power to enact and enforce.

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No, yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that federal law typically does not intrude on the ability of states to regulate local matters, and the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act is not an exception to that general rule. While Congress has the authority to create legislation to enforce treaties, it must do so while respecting the traditional division of sovereign responsibility between the federal government and the states. The Court also held that it is incumbent upon the courts to be sure of Congress' intent before ruling based on such a rationale; in this case, because there is no evidence that Congress intended the statute to have expansive powers, it must be read more narrowly. In fact, the language of the statute suggests that the facts of this case do not match the types of situations the statute was enacted to govern.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that, in determining whether the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act covers Bond's actions, the majority opinion overstepped its bounds and performed Congress' duty. Justice Scalia also wrote that it was clear from the wording of the statute that Bond's actions were covered, and the majority opinion's interpretation of the statute made it so broad as to be unintelligible. However, the statute was unconstitutional because it infringed on the rights of the states. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas wrote that, while Congress has the power to create laws that enforce treaties, that power does not extend to the enforcement of laws that would infringe on states' rights. The historical context of this "Treaty Power" indicates that it was meant to be limited to international affairs and not interfere with the constitutional structure of federal and state power. Justice Scalia and Justice Alito joined in the concurrence in judgment. Justice Alito also wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the statute went beyond Congress' power to enforce treaties and is therefore unconstitutional.


Peggy Young was employed as a delivery driver for the United Parcel Service (UPS). In 2006, she requested a leave of absence in order to undergo in vitro fertilization. The procedure was successful and Young became pregnant. During her pregnancy, Young's medical practitioners advised her to not lift more than twenty pounds while working. UPS's employee policy requires their employees to be able to lift up to seventy pounds. Due to Young's inability to fulfill this work requirement, as well as the fact that she had used all her available family/medical leave, UPS forced Young to take an extended, unpaid leave of absence. During this time she eventually lost her medical coverage. Young gave birth in April 2007 and resumed working at UPS thereafter.
Young sued UPS and claimed she had been the victim of gender-and disability-based discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. UPS moved for summary judgment and argued that Young could not show that UPS's decision was based on her pregnancy or that she was treated differently than a similarly situated co-worker. Furthermore, UPS argued it had no obligation to offer Young accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act because Young's pregnancy did not constitute a disability. The district court dismissed Young's claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

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No, but courts must evaluate the extent to which an employer’s policy treats pregnant workers less favorably than non-pregnant workers with similar inabilities to work and determine whether there are any legitimate reasons for such differences. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that an interpretation of the Act that requires employers to offer the same accommodations to pregnant workers as all others with comparable physical limitations regardless of other factors would be too broad. There is no evidence that Congress intended the Act to grant pregnancy such an unconditional “most-favored-nation status.” However, Congress clearly intended the Act to do more than defining sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination. The Court held that a plaintiff may show that she faced disparate treatment from her employer according to the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which requires evidence that the employer’s actions were more likely than not based on discriminatory motivation, and that any reasons the employer offered were pretextual.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the language of the Act makes employers liable for discriminatory conduct regardless of intent. To determine whether the conduct was discriminatory, Justice Alito argued that the treatment of pregnant employees should be compared to the treatment of non-pregnant employees in similar jobs with similar abilities and inabilities to work.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Act only prohibited an employer from distinguishing between employees of similar abilities and inabilities because of pregnancy, while differing treatment for other reasons is permissible. To adopt a broader reading of the Act’s protections would entitle pregnant workers to every possible accommodation. Justice Scalia also argued that the Act’s main intent is to clarify that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Kennedy wrote that the majority opinion interpreted the Act in a manner that conflates evidence of disparate impact with that of disparate treatment, which creates unnecessary confusion in litigating pregnancy discrimination cases.


Kellogg Brown & Root v. U.S. ex rel. Carter

In early 2005, Benjamin Carter worked for Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), a U.S. Government contractor providing logistical services to the U.S. military in Iraq. In 2006, Carter filed a whistleblower suit against KBR for fraudulent billing practices under the False Claims Act (FCA). Carter alleged that KBR had a standing policy of filling out fraudulent time sheets and thus overbilling the U.S. Government for services rendered in Iraq.
In 2010, just before trial, the U.S. Government informed the parties of a complaint that was filed earlier and alleging similar claims. The district court ruled that the earlier suit was related to Carter’s claims and dismissed the suit under the FCA’s “first-to-file” requirement, which bars a suit if a related one is pending. In 2011, Carter refiled his complaint, and KBR moved to dismiss by arguing that the latest complaint was filed after the FCA’s six-year statute of limitations had expired, and Carter’s complaint did not satisfy the first-to-file rule because there was yet another related matter pending. The district court dismissed Carter’s complaint, but the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA), which suspends the applicable six-year statute of limitations, only applies to criminal charges and, because the remaining related cases had since been dismissed, there was no pending related matter to prevent Carter’s claim from proceeding.

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No and yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court looked to the WSLA’s text, structure, and history to show that it applies only to criminal offenses, and not to civil claims like the ones in this case. However, the Court also held that the False Claims Act’s first-to-file bar keeps new claims out of court only while related claims are still alive, not in perpetuity. The Court deemed KBR’s interpretation of the word “pending” to be “peculiar” and turned to the dictionary definition of “pending,” which means “remaining undecided; awaiting decision.”


Retirees from the Point Pleasant Plant in Apple Grove, West Virginia⎯owned by M&G since 2000⎯sued after M&G announced that the retirees would be required to contribute to the cost of their medical benefits. The retirees, who had been employees of Apple Grove before the plant was bought by M&G, entered into a series of collective bargaining negotiations through their unions regarding healthcare benefits. Just as earlier versions had included, the 2005-2008 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) included a provision that "capped", or limited, the company's annual contribution towards employee healthcare benefits. In 2006, M&G announced it was requiring employees to cover their individual costs once that cap was exceeded in response to the shifting healthcare landscape. The retirees claimed that language in the effective CBA promised full coverage of healthcare benefits for life without any contribution requirement and sued the company because that "capping" provision was not included in the pension and insurance booklet or adopted by the union on behalf of employees in the latest agreement. The retirees sued under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
The district court dismissed the retirees' claim, and they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court found in favor of the retirees but ordered that their healthcare benefits be reinstated to the post-2007 version that included employee contributions. Both parties appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgement.

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Courts should apply ordinary principles of contract law. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that collective bargaining agreements, including those established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) plans, should always be interpreted according to ordinary principles of contract law. In this case, the appellate court's holding relied on an understanding of contract law that leaned too heavily in favor of vested retiree benefits in all collective bargaining agreements and therefore distorted the efforts to ascertain the intentions of the parties, a principle on which ordinary contract law is based. Additionally, the Court held that the appellate court relied on inferences that did not have sufficient support in the factual record of this case and therefore failed to properly apply principles of contract law, such as not construing ambiguous writings to create lifetime promises.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that courts must apply ordinary principles of contract law, which require courts to consider whether the agreement as a whole adequately expresses the parties' intents. If not, then courts may turn to extrinsic evidence. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the concurrence.


Mach Mining, LLC v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received a complaint from a woman who claimed Mach Mining, LLC (Mach Mining) denied her a job because of her gender. The EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to believe Mach Mining had discriminated against female applicants and began conciliation, but the parties ultimately could not agree and the EEOC sued on the female applicants' behalf. Mach Mining argued that the EEOC did not conciliate in good faith, and the EEOC moved for summary judgment on whether failure to conciliate in good faith is a viable defense to its suit for unlawful discrimination. The district court denied the motion and held that courts may review the EEOC's informal settlement efforts to determine whether the EEOC made a sincere and reasonable effort to negotiate.
Nonetheless, the court certified the question to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that, so long as the EEOC has pleaded that it complied with Title VII and the relevant documents are facially sufficient, judicial review is satisfied. The appellate court noted that Title VII gives the EEOC complete discretion to accept or reject settlement offers during informal conciliation and provides no standard to evaluate the failure-to-conciliate affirmative defense. Therefore, the appellate court determined that allowing an employer to use failure-to-conciliate as an affirmative defense would protract and complicate employment discrimination cases.

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Yes, but the scope of the review is narrow. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that, while judicial review to ensure that the EEOC fulfilled its statutory obligation to attempt conciliation before suing was appropriate, the scope of such review must be narrow in recognition of the EEOC’s extensive discretion. Because there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review, the Court will only hold that judicial review is inappropriate when Congress has expressly stated in statute that an agency is permitted to police itself. Despite the fact that Congress granted the EEOC broad leeway on when to begin and end conciliation, there is no indication that Congress intended to make the EEOC immune to judicial review. The scope of such review must be limited to what Title VII requires of the EEOC: that the EEOC provide the employer with notice of the specific allegation and allow the employer the opportunity to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice.


Colorado imposes a 2.9% tax on the sale of tangible goods in the state, which retailers with a physical presence in the state are required to collect from purchasers and remit to the state. If a Colorado purchaser has not paid the sales tax on tangible goods, as occurs in some online and mail-order transactions in which the businesses have no physical presence in Colorado, the purchaser must pay a 2.9% use tax and is responsible for reporting and paying the tax to the state. To increase the rate of collection of the use tax, in 2010, Colorado implemented regulations for non-collecting retailers whose gross sales in Colorado exceed $100,000. These retailers must provide transactional notices to Colorado purchasers, send annual purchase summaries to Colorado customers, and annually report Colorado purchaser information to the Colorado Department of Revenue. Retailers that do not comply with these regulations are subject to penalties.
In June 2010, Direct Marketing Association (DMA)—a group of businesses and organizations that market products via catalogs, advertisements, broadcast media, and the Internet—sued the Colorado Department of Revenue's executive director and argued that the regulations violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The district court granted DMA's request for an injunction and later granted summary judgment in favor of DMA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did not reach a decision on the merits of the appeal and instead held that the Tax Injunction Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin Colorado's tax collection effort.

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No. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that the requested relief would not "enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax," and therefore the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) did not prevent a federal district court from exercising jurisdiction to hear the case. Because the requested relief was an injunction, which would constitute the type of action the TIA bars, the question was whether the notice and reporting requirements constitute the assessment, levying, or collection of a tax. The Court held that the notice and reporting requirements are a preliminary part of the tax administration process that occur before assessment, levying, or collection, and therefore do not fit into any of those categories. Because the requested relief would not affect any of the categories the TIA protects, the federal district court could hear the case.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that outdated precedents preventing states from collecting use taxes from businesses that do not have a physical presence within the state should be reexamined in light of modern economic realities. However, Justice Kennedy also noted that this case did not present that question to the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion in which she noted that this case did not implicate Congress' intent in enacting the TIA, which was to prevent taxpayers from avoiding their liability by pursuing an alternate legal challenge route, and was consistent with previous jurisprudence on the TIA. Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined in the concurrence and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined the concurrence in part.


In 2010, Moones Mellouli, a citizen of Tunisia residing in the United States, was arrested for driving under the influence. While Mellouli was detained, police discovered four tablets of Adderall in his sock. Although initially charged with trafficking a controlled substance in a jail, Mellouli ultimately pled guilty to the lesser charge of possessing drug paraphernalia in violation of a Kansas statute. In 2012, the government attempted to deport Mellouli pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which states that aliens convicted under any law "relating to a controlled substance" as defined by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), are deportable.
In immigration court, Mellouli argued that, since his 2010 conviction did not specify a particular controlled substance and the Kansas statute includes some substances not included in the CSA, his conviction did not necessarily "relate to a controlled substance" for the purposes of the INA. The judge rejected the argument and held that Mellouli was deportable because the particular controlled substance involved in his conviction was irrelevant. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and held that possession of drug paraphernalia involves drug trade in general, which is "related to a controlled substance," and therefore Mellouli's conviction met the criteria required by the INA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit denied Mellouli's petition for review and his petition for rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the BIA's conclusion was reasonable in light of the INA's use of the general term "relating to" instead of a more specific term like "involving."

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Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that a drug conviction under state law triggers deportation only if the crime falls within a category of deportable offenses defined by federal law. It has long been established that, if a state criminalizes certain “narcotics” not listed as a “narcotic drug” under federal law, a state conviction cannot serve as the basis for deportation. Because the Board of Immigration Appeals’ approach in this case makes state paraphernalia convictions deportable because they generally “relate to” any and all controlled substances, whether or not federally listed, less grave paraphernalia possession misdemeanors can have harsher consequences than certain drug possession and distribution offenses. The text of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) limits the meaning of “controlled substance” for removal purposes to those listed under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Because the Kansas paraphernalia statute does not depend on whether the substance is listed under the CSA, nor did state prosecutors seek to prove that Mellouli possessed a substance listed under the CSA, Mellouli’s conviction does not warrant deportation.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the narcotics on Kansas’ controlled substances list are the same as those listed in the CSA, with nine additions. Therefore, the Kansas law under which Mellouli was convicted “relates to” a “controlled substance” as defined in the CSA, and Mellouli’s state paraphernalia conviction could trigger deportability under the INA. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., joined in the dissent.


The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay overtime wages to employees who work more than 40 hours per week. However, the FLSA also provides exemptions to this overtime rule for employees, including those "employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity...or in the capacity of outside salesman."
Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) is a national trade organization that represents real estate financial companies and their employees across the country. Among these employees are mortgage loan officers, who assist prospective buyers in finding and applying for mortgage offers. In 2006, the Department of Labor issued an opinion letter that stated that mortgage loan officers' duties fell within the definition of "administrative" and that they qualify for the exception to the overtime rule in the FLSA. In 2010, however, the Deputy Administrator issued a second pronouncement that declared that a mortgage loan officer did not qualify for the administrative employee exception. MBA sued the Department of Labor in district court and argued that the agency could not change its interpretation without first going through a notice-and-comment period required by the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied MBA's motion for summary judgment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the Department of Labor's 2010 interpretation.

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No. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the appellate court improperly relied on the rule established in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P., which required an agency to use notice-and-comment procedures when making significant changes to a previously interpreted legislative rule. The Court held that this rule was invalid because it was contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) clear provision that agencies need only use notice-and-comment procedures when enacting a legislative rule that has the "force of law." Because notice-and-comment procedures are not required when agencies enact interpretive rules, they should not be required to make subsequent interpretations, as occurred in this case. The Court rejected Mortgage Banker Association's policy argument and noted that the APA contains other safeguards to prevent agencies from creating substantive changes to legislative rules under the guise of "interpretation."
In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the majority opinion correctly overruled the Paralyzed Veterans rule as incompatible with the APA. Justice Alito also noted his agreement with Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Antonin M. Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the majority opinion continued the dangerous trend of judicial deference to agencies' interpretation of their own rules. The APA allows reviewing courts to interpret disputed terms in agencies' legislative rules, but traditionally courts have deferred to the definitions that agencies have enacted through their interpretive rules. Justice Scalia pointed out the majority opinion failed to curb growing agency power and would continue to allow the use of interpretive rules to bind the public without notice-and-comment oversight. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas echoed Justice Scalia's concerns and took issue with judicial deference making way for agencies to enact "interpreting rules" that, in reality, have substantive outcomes.


Kwai Fun Wong, a citizen of Hong Kong and leader of the Wu Wei Tien Tao religious organization, was arrested and deported by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for unlawful entry into the U.S. Prior to her deportation, Wong was briefly detained by the INS, during which she claimed to have been treated negligently by the INS. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), no civil suit may be filed against the United States unless the claimant has first filed a claim with the relevant federal agency and that claim has been denied.
Following denial, a claimant has six months to file suit or the suit is permanently barred. Wong filed a claim with the INS and, following the denial of that claim, sought leave from the district court to add a civil claim against the U.S. to her already outstanding suit against a number of federal officials. For unexplained reasons, the district court did not allow Wong to amend her complaint until seven months later, after the six-month deadline had passed. The district court then dismissed Wong’s federal civil complaint and held that the six-month deadline was “jurisdictional” and thus not subject to equitable tolling, or delaying the time at which a statute of limitations begins to run. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and found that equitable tolling could be applied to the six-month deadline.
This case was consolidated with United States v. June, a case in which the conservator (financial manager) of an estate argued that the two-year statute of limitations for filing suit under the FTCA should not have begun to run until she had access to the depositions of federal employees without which she could not have been aware of her claim against the federal government. As in Wong, the federal government claimed that this statute of limitations was “jurisdictional,” and thus not subject to equitable tolling. The district court agreed with the federal government and dismissed the suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that equitable tolling was appropriate based on its earlier opinion inWong v. Beebe.

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Yes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, as in suits between private parties, there is presumption that equitable tolling is available for suits against the federal government. That presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional, as the government attempted to show in these cases. Because such a determination would completely deprive a court of the authority to hear a case, the Court will only find that the time limitation is jurisdictional if Congress has clearly intended that result. The Court held that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not provide any such clear statement that Congress intended the statute of limitations provisions to be jurisdictional.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the history of the FTCA and its statutory language indicate that the statute of limitation provisions are not subject to equitable tolling. Because the FTCA waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity, Congress placed strict limits on situations in which the federal government might be subject to liability. The statute of limitations provisions at issue in these cases are examples of such protections against extensive governmental liability and have been interpreted as such. Even if the statute of limitations provisions are not jurisdictional, Justice Alito argued that they should still be interpreted as inflexible based on the statutory language and therefore not subject to equitable tolling. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


U.S. Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads

In 1970, Congress created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) through the Rail Passenger Service Act and gave them the priority to use track systems owned by freight railroads for passenger travel. In 2008, Congress gave Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) joint authority to issue metrics and standards addressing scheduling, including on-time performance and train delays. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) sued the Department of Transportation, the FRA, and two officials alleging that the metrics and standards are unconstitutional. The AAR alleged that allowing a private entity, like Amtrak, to exercise joint authority in their issuance violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by vesting the coercive power of government in an interested private party, and also violated the constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers by placing legislative authority in a private entity.
The district court rejected the AAR’s argument, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed holding that Amtrak is a private corporation and Congress violated the constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers.

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No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the majority. The Court held that, for purposes of determining the validity of the metrics and standards, Amtrak is a governmental entity. The members of Amtrak’s Board of Directors are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and Amtrak is required by statute to pursue broad public objectives. Because of Amtrak’s significant ties to the government, Amtrak is not a private enterprise, and therefore, treating Amtrak as a governmental entity is consistent with the constitutional separation of powers.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he addressed the issues of accountability and the constitutional questions that arise out of the recognition that Amtrak is functionally a governmental entity. First, unlike other governmental officers, Amtrak’s board members are not required to take an oath to uphold the Constitution. Next, the arbitration clause of the PRIIA is potentially unconstitutional if it is interpreted to allow for a private arbitrator because private parties are not vested with legislative powers. Finally, although all of the other board members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, Amtrak’s president is not but is rather selected by the other board members.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that Amtrak is a private entity and therefore should be subject to generally applicable rules of private conduct created through the proper exercise of legislative power. Because Congress has permitted Amtrak, a private corporation, to make legally binding rules, there are serious constitutional questions that the majority opinion failed to address.


The London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) is a daily interest rate benchmark that is used to help set the interest rate of financial transactions across the globe. Between August 2007 and May 2010, it has been alleged that the LIBOR rate was artificially manipulated downward by a number of colluding financial institutions. Ellen Gelboim was one of many parties to file individual suits against these financial institutions. Given the large number of cases, Gelboim's case was consolidated with a number of other similar cases for pre-trial purposes. During this pre-trial phase, the district court dismissed a number of the cases, including Gelboim's, for failure to state a claim. Gelboim sought to appeal the dismissal, however the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed Gelboim's appeal and held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the district court had not entered a final order concerning all the claims in the consolidated action.

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Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that, because cases that are consolidated for pretrial proceedings retain their separate identities, the question is not whether all claims within the consolidated cases have been subject to a final order, but whether the specific case which is being appealed has been subject to a final order. Because Gelboim's case had been dismissed without leave to amend, the dismissal acted as a final order and thus Gelboim could appeal the district court's dismissal of her case.


Naranjibhai and Ramilaben Patel are owners and operators of motels in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) requires motel operators to keep records with specified information about their guests. The LAMC also authorizes police officers to inspect hotel records at any time without a search warrant. The Patels filed suit and argued that the provision violated their Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches. The city of Los Angeles argued that motels are "closely regulated" businesses and are therefore subject to warrantless inspections.
The district court determined that motels were not subjected to the same kind of pervasive and regular regulations as other recognized "closely regulated" businesses. Nonetheless, the court held that motels do not have an ownership interest that gives rise to a privacy right in their records because the records were created to comply with the ordinance. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, but later reversed in rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the hotel records were private "papers" protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the LAMC's warrantless search provision was unreasonable because it does not provide for pre-compliance judicial review of an officer's demand to inspect a motel's records.

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Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that an individual may challenge a statute for violating the Constitution on its face without needing to allege unconstitutional enforcement, and that the municipal ordinance in question is unconstitutional on its face because it does not allow for hotel operators to engage in pre-compliance review by questioning the reasonableness of the subpoena in district court. The type of search the municipal ordinance authorizes is an administrative one, which means that its purpose is to ensure that the hotel operators are complying with the record requirement, and judicial precedent has held that there must be an opportunity for the subpoenaed party to contest the subpoena for an administrative search before penalties are imposed. Such pre-compliance review is necessary to ensure that the search is not a pretext to harass the business owner. The Court also held that hotels are not a “closely regulated” business and therefore do not fall under that exception to the warrant requirement.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the municipal ordinance in question is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment in most, if not all, of its applications because warrantless searches are not unreasonable under certain conditions. One of those conditions is when the premises to be searched is that of a closely regulated business, as long as the regulatory scheme of which the search is a part furthers a substantial government interest, the search is necessary to further the regulatory scheme, and the regulatory scheme provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. Because hotels have a long tradition of being closely regulated and the municipal ordinance in question satisfies the conditions of a regulatory scheme for closely regulated businesses, the unwarranted search of hotel records is not unreasonable. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that, in order to hold a statute unconstitutional on its face, the Court must find that the statute is unconstitutional in every application. Because there are many circumstances in which the municipal ordinance in question could be applied constitutionally, relief should only be granted in cases when applying the ordinance would conflict with the Constitution. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.


In the spring of 1994, Hana Bank, a Korean entity, began to extend its services to the United States under the name Hana Overseas Korean Club. In advertisements distributed during the summer of 1994, Hana Bank included the name "Hana Overseas Korean Club" in English as well as "Hana Bank" in Korean. The advertisements also included Hana Bank's logo, known as the "dancing man." A second, distinct entity, Hana Financial, Inc. (HFI) was founded in California in the fall of 1994. In 1996, HFI obtained a federal trademark for their logo, a pyramid, with the words "Hana Financial" for use in financial services. Hana Bank officials were aware of HFI's use of the name Hana Financial but did not see the need to take any action because the entities did not directly compete with each other.
In 2007, HFI filed a complaint against Hana Bank alleging trademark infringement. The district court jury found that Hana Bank had used the "Hana Bank" trademark in the United States continuously since before HFI began using the "Hana Financial" trademark in 1995 and that Hana Bank's trademark could be "tacked" to their 1994 advertisements, which included a similar, but distinct use of the phrase "Hana Bank." HFI appealed, claiming that the determination of whether a trademark may be "tacked" to a prior mark is a question of law that must be determined by the court, not a question of fact that may be decided by a jury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the affirmed the jury's decision.

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The issue of "tacking" is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined by the jury. Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court noted that the test for "tacking" is whether the two marks create the same, continuing commercial impression so that consumers consider both as the same mark. The Court held that juries are better equipped to make a determination under a test that relies on consumer impressions. Juries can also apply legal standards to facts when given adequate jury instruction. However, a judge may decide a "tacking" question on a motion for summary judgment, a motion for judgment as a matter of law, and during a bench trial. The Court concluded that allowing juries to resolve "tacking" questions would not create any more unpredictability in the law of trademarks than other jury determinations across all legal fields.


Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Until 2000, the Arizona State Constitution granted the State Legislature the ability to draw congressional districts, subject to the possibility of a gubernatorial veto. In 2000, the Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, which amended the state constitution to remove the congressional redistricting power from the legislature and vest it in the newly created Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC).
In 2012, after the IRC approved a new congressional district map, the legislature sued the IRC and argued that Proposition 106 violated the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution by removing redistricting authority from the legislature and therefore that the new district map was unconstitutional and void. The legislature also requested that the district court permanently enjoin the IRC from adopting, implementing, or enforcing the new congressional district map. The district court held that Proposition 106 did not violate the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution.

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