Sarno v. Illinois Crime Investigating Commission70-71971Burger Court (1972-1975)burger4https://api.oyez.org/courts/burger4SarnoIllinois Crime Investigating Commission1972-01-111972-05-224064821972https://api.oyez.org/case_citation/case_citation/14583https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/406/482/Writ of <i>certiorari</i><p>The Illinois Crime Investigating Commission was created to investigate organized crime in Illinois. Albert Sarno and Chris Cardi were police officers. The Commission wanted the officers to testify pursuant to an investigation of a "juice loan" or "loan shark" racket.</p> <p>On February 8, 1968, the presiding judge in the Circuit Court of Cook County entered an order requiring the petitioners to appear before the commission under a grant of immunity pursuant to an Illinois statute. On February 24, 1968, the officers appeared, but they refused to answer any questions pleading their right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.</p> <p>On March 21, 1968, the Commission filed a motion in the Circuit court, and moved the court to enter an order directing the petitioners to appear before the Commission and answer the questions. The officers filed a motion to dismiss or to strike the foregoing motion. The officers' motion was denied, and the court entered an order directing the petitioners to appear before the Commission and to answer the questions. The officers refused to obey this subsequent order, still pleading the Fifth Amendment. The officers were found in contempt of court and sentenced to serve a period of six months in the County Jail. The decision of the trial court was appealed and subsequently affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. The officers appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> The Illinois Crime Investigating Commission was created to investigate organized crime in Illinois. Albert Sarno and Chris Cardi were police officers. The Commission wanted the officers to testify pursuant to an investigation of a "juice loan" or "loan shark" racket. On February 8, 1968, the presiding judge in the Circuit Court of Cook County entered an order requiring the petitioners to appear before the commission under a grant of immunity pursuant to an Illinois statute. On February 24, 1968, the officers appeared, but they refused to answer any questions pleading their right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. On March 21, 1968, the Commission filed a motion in the Circuit court, and moved the court to enter an order directing the petitioners to appear before the Commission and answer the questions. The officers filed a motion to dismiss or to strike the foregoing motion. The officers' motion was denied, and the court entered an order directing the petitioners to appear before the Commission and to answer the questions. The officers refused to obey this subsequent order, still pleading the Fifth Amendment. The officers were found in contempt of court and sentenced to serve a period of six months in the County Jail. The decision of the trial court was appealed and subsequently affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. The officers appealed to the Supreme Court.<p>Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court cited its own decision in <em> Kastigar v. United States</em>, and held that testimony may be compelled from an unwilling witness over a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by the grant of immunity. The Court further determined that any questions regarding the scope of protection under the Illinois immunity statute was best left to the courts of Illinois, meaning that the writ of certiorari was improperly granted. The Supreme Court dismissed the Writ.</p> <p>Justice William O. Douglas dissented for the reasons state in his dissenting opinion in <em>Kastigar v. United States</em>. Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in <em>Kastigar v. United States</em>. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the consideration of this case.</p> Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court cited its own decision in Kastigar v. United States, and held that testimony may be compelled from an unwilling witness over a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by the grant of immunity. The Court further determined that any questions regarding the scope of protection under the Illinois immunity statute was best left to the courts of Illinois, meaning that the writ of certiorari was improperly granted. The Supreme Court dismissed the Writ. Justice William O. Douglas dissented for the reasons state in his dissenting opinion in Kastigar v. United States. Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Kastigar v. United States. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the consideration of this case.Frank G. Whalenhttps://api.oyez.org/people/frank_g_whalenJoel M. Flaumhttps://api.oyez.org/people/joel_m_flaumWilliam O. Douglashttps://api.oyez.org/people/william_o_douglasPotter Stewarthttps://api.oyez.org/people/potter_stewartThurgood Marshallhttps://api.oyez.org/people/thurgood_marshallWilliam J. Brennan, Jr.https://api.oyez.org/people/william_j_brennan_jrByron R. Whitehttps://api.oyez.org/people/byron_r_whiteWarren E. Burgerhttps://api.oyez.org/people/warren_e_burgerHarry A. Blackmunhttps://api.oyez.org/people/harry_a_blackmunLewis F. Powell, Jr.https://api.oyez.org/people/lewis_f_powell_jrWilliam H. Rehnquisthttps://api.oyez.org/people/william_h_rehnquisthttps://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-7D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\json_data\api.oyez.org_cases_1971_70-7.json