Sierra Club v. Morton70-341971Burger Court (1971-1972)burger3https://api.oyez.org/courts/burger3Sierra ClubRoger C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior of the United States1971-11-171972-04-191971-02-214057271972https://api.oyez.org/case_citation/case_citation/14711https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/405/727/Writ of certiorariThe Mineral King Valley was an undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest that was mostly used for mining until the 1920s. In the late 1940s, developers began to make bids on the land for recreational developments. Walt Disney Enterprises won a bid to start surveying the valley in the hopes of developing an 80-acre ski resort. The size of the proposed resort would require the construction of a new highway and massive high voltage power lines that would run through the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club kept track of this project for years and hoped to stop it to protect the undeveloped land. The Sierra Club filed preliminary and permanent injunctions against federal officials to prevent them from granting permits for the development of the Mineral King Valley. The district court granted these injunctions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the injunctions on the grounds that the Sierra Club did not show that it would be directly affected by the actions of the defendants and therefore did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, the appellate court also held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury or likelihood of their success on the merits of the case. The Mineral King Valley was an undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest that was mostly used for mining until the 1920s. In the late 1940s, developers began to make bids on the land for recreational developments. Walt Disney Enterprises won a bid to start surveying the valley in the hopes of developing an 80-acre ski resort. The size of the proposed resort would require the construction of a new highway and massive high voltage power lines that would run through the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club kept track of this project for years and hoped to stop it to protect the undeveloped land. The Sierra Club filed preliminary and permanent injunctions against federal officials to prevent them from granting permits for the development of the Mineral King Valley. The district court granted these injunctions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the injunctions on the grounds that the Sierra Club did not show that it would be directly affected by the actions of the defendants and therefore did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, the appellate court also held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury or likelihood of their success on the merits of the case.The Sierra Club did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it failed to show that any of its members had suffered or would suffer injury as a result of the defendants’ actions. Justice Potter Stewart wrote the opinion for the 4-3 majority, in which the Court held that, in order to have standing to sue under the APA, the plaintiffs must demonstrate they had directly suffered an injury as a result of the actions that led to the suit. Although building roads and high voltage power lines through the wilderness upsets the beauty of the area and the enjoyment of some, such “general interest” in a potential problem is not sufficient to establish that a plaintiff has been injured in the manner that standing doctrine requires. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the standing doctrine should allow environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club to sue on behalf of inanimate objects such as land. There is precedent for inanimate objects to have legal personality for the purpose of lawsuits, and “[t]hose who have that intimate relation with the inanimate object about to be injured, polluted, or otherwise despoiled are its legitimate spokesmen.” In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that, when faced with new issues of potentially enormous and permanent consequences, such as environmental issues, the Court should not be quite so rigid about its legal requirements. Justice Blackmun proposed two alternatives for how to proceed in this case: either the Sierra Club’s request for preliminary injunction should be granted while it is given time to amend its complaint to comport with the requirements of the standing doctrine, or the Court should expand the traditional standing doctrine to allow this type of litigation. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent in which he agreed with Justice Blackmun regarding the Sierra Club’s standing and argued that the Court should have considered the case on its merits. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The Sierra Club did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it failed to show that any of its members had suffered or would suffer injury as a result of the defendants’ actions. Justice Potter Stewart wrote the opinion for the 4-3 majority, in which the Court held that, in order to have standing to sue under the APA, the plaintiffs must demonstrate they had directly suffered an injury as a result of the actions that led to the suit. Although building roads and high voltage power lines through the wilderness upsets the beauty of the area and the enjoyment of some, such “general interest” in a potential problem is not sufficient to establish that a plaintiff has been injured in the manner that standing doctrine requires. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the standing doctrine should allow environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club to sue on behalf of inanimate objects such as land. There is precedent for inanimate objects to have legal personality for the purpose of lawsuits, and “[t]hose who have that intimate relation with the inanimate object about to be injured, polluted, or otherwise despoiled are its legitimate spokesmen.” In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that, when faced with new issues of potentially enormous and permanent consequences, such as environmental issues, the Court should not be quite so rigid about its legal requirements. Justice Blackmun proposed two alternatives for how to proceed in this case: either the Sierra Club’s request for preliminary injunction should be granted while it is given time to amend its complaint to comport with the requirements of the standing doctrine, or the Court should expand the traditional standing doctrine to allow this type of litigation. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent in which he agreed with Justice Blackmun regarding the Sierra Club’s standing and argued that the Court should have considered the case on its merits. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.Leland R. Selna, Jr.https://api.oyez.org/people/leland_r_selna_jrErwin N. Griswoldhttps://api.oyez.org/people/erwin_n_griswoldThe Sierra Club lacked standing to sue.William O. Douglashttps://api.oyez.org/people/william_o_douglasPotter Stewarthttps://api.oyez.org/people/potter_stewartThurgood Marshallhttps://api.oyez.org/people/thurgood_marshallWilliam J. Brennan, Jr.https://api.oyez.org/people/william_j_brennan_jrByron R. Whitehttps://api.oyez.org/people/byron_r_whiteWarren E. Burgerhttps://api.oyez.org/people/warren_e_burgerHarry A. Blackmunhttps://api.oyez.org/people/harry_a_blackmunLewis F. Powell, Jr.https://api.oyez.org/people/lewis_f_powell_jrWilliam H. Rehnquisthttps://api.oyez.org/people/william_h_rehnquisthttps://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-34D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\json_data\api.oyez.org_cases_1971_70-34.json