Schneckloth v. Bustamonte71-7321972Burger Court (1972-1975)burger4https://api.oyez.org/courts/burger4Merle R. SchnecklothRobert Clyde Bustamonte1972-10-101973-05-291972-02-284122181973https://api.oyez.org/case_citation/case_citation/14733https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/412/218/Writ of <i>certiorari</i><p>A police officer stopped a car that had a burned out license plate light and headlight. There were six men in the car, including Robert Clyde Bustamonte. Only one passenger had a drivers license, and he claimed that his brother owned the car. The officer asked this man if he could search the car. The man said, “Sure, go ahead.” Inside the car, the officer found stolen checks. Those checks were admitted into evidence at Bustamonte’s trial for possessing checks with the intent to defraud. A jury convicted Bustamonte, and the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed. The court reasoned that consent to search the car was given voluntarily, so evidence obtained during the search was admissible. The California Supreme Court denied review. Bustamonte filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that consent is not voluntary unless it is proven that the person who consented to the search knew he had the right to refuse consent.</p> A police officer stopped a car that had a burned out license plate light and headlight. There were six men in the car, including Robert Clyde Bustamonte. Only one passenger had a drivers license, and he claimed that his brother owned the car. The officer asked this man if he could search the car. The man said, “Sure, go ahead.” Inside the car, the officer found stolen checks. Those checks were admitted into evidence at Bustamonte’s trial for possessing checks with the intent to defraud. A jury convicted Bustamonte, and the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed. The court reasoned that consent to search the car was given voluntarily, so evidence obtained during the search was admissible. The California Supreme Court denied review. Bustamonte filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that consent is not voluntary unless it is proven that the person who consented to the search knew he had the right to refuse consent.<p>Yes, No answer. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that whether consent is voluntary can be determined from the totality of the circumstances. It is unnecessary to prove that the person who gave consent knew that he had the right to refuse. The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not require a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. Because the Fourth Amendment claims had no merit, the Court did not reach the second question.</p> <p>Justice Lewis F. Powell also concurred, stating that the main question should be whether Bustamonte had a fair opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment claims. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, agreeing with the majority and noting it was unnecessary to reach the issue discussed by Justice Powell.</p> <p>Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the Ninth Circuit made the correct decision. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate dissent, stating that a person cannot waive their Fourth Amendment rights when he is unaware that his rights would be constitutionally protected if he did not waive those rights. Justice Thurgood Marshall arguing that the prosecution cannot rely on consent to a search if the person who gave consent did not know he could refuse consent.</p> Yes, No answer. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that whether consent is voluntary can be determined from the totality of the circumstances. It is unnecessary to prove that the person who gave consent knew that he had the right to refuse. The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not require a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. Because the Fourth Amendment claims had no merit, the Court did not reach the second question. Justice Lewis F. Powell also concurred, stating that the main question should be whether Bustamonte had a fair opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment claims. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, agreeing with the majority and noting it was unnecessary to reach the issue discussed by Justice Powell. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the Ninth Circuit made the correct decision. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate dissent, stating that a person cannot waive their Fourth Amendment rights when he is unaware that his rights would be constitutionally protected if he did not waive those rights. Justice Thurgood Marshall arguing that the prosecution cannot rely on consent to a search if the person who gave consent did not know he could refuse consent.Robert R. Granuccihttps://api.oyez.org/people/robert_r_granucciStuart P. Tobismanhttps://api.oyez.org/people/stuart_p_tobismanWilliam O. Douglashttps://api.oyez.org/people/william_o_douglasPotter Stewarthttps://api.oyez.org/people/potter_stewartThurgood Marshallhttps://api.oyez.org/people/thurgood_marshallWilliam J. Brennan, Jr.https://api.oyez.org/people/william_j_brennan_jrByron R. Whitehttps://api.oyez.org/people/byron_r_whiteWarren E. Burgerhttps://api.oyez.org/people/warren_e_burgerHarry A. Blackmunhttps://api.oyez.org/people/harry_a_blackmunLewis F. Powell, Jr.https://api.oyez.org/people/lewis_f_powell_jrWilliam H. Rehnquisthttps://api.oyez.org/people/william_h_rehnquisthttps://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-732D:\PyCharm Community Edition 2024.3.1.1\PythonProject\IBM Z Datathon\json_data\api.oyez.org_cases_1972_71-732.json