Input:
Refugees’ impact on the economy manifests in a multi-layered fashion. An influx of refugees means first and foremost an increase in population. As such, they enter the economy boosting the labour market as new workers, increase demand as new consumers, and stimulate business by creating market niches catering to their needs and as potential new business owners. However, their characteristics differ from the local population (in terms of gender, age, education, skills etc.) meaning their impact as both workers as well as consumers would not be proportional to increases in population. Refugees also differ in their characteristics with other migrants. Although their economic impact in the literature is modelled similarly to the impact of other migrant groups, they also differ from them due to life circumstances.
While immigration systems generally rely on 30


Input:
On 27 June 2023, Chad’s National Transitional Council (CNT) officially adopted the proposed new
Constitution. This Constitution aims to restore constitutional order and conclude the transition initiated
after the passing of former President Idriss Déby on 19 April 2021. Drawing from the 1996 Constitution,
the document incorporates recommendations from the national dialogue. Notably, the reinstatement
of institutions such as the Senate, the High Court of Justice and the Supreme Court occurs, preserving
the decentralized unitary state. Half of the cross-cutting recommendations from the Sovereign National
Inclusive Dialogue (DNIS) concentrate on fostering social cohesion. The primary focus of the Post-DNIS
Transition Specifications’ initial strategic axis revolves around Defence, Security, Peace, Social Cohesion
and National Reconciliation. Consequently, the Ministry of National Reconciliation and Social Cohesion has
been established.

[As part of the RESILAC project funded by the European Union (EU) and the French Development Agency](https://www.urd.org/fr/publication/rapports-de-capitalisation-du-projet-resilac-2020-2022/)
[(AFD), the capitalization report on the implementation of social cohesion activities in the Lake Chad basin](https://www.urd.org/fr/publication/rapports-de-capitalisation-du-projet-resilac-2020-2022/)
[(2022)](https://www.urd.org/fr/publication/rapports-de-capitalisation-du-projet-resilac-2020-2022/) recommended strengthening social cohesion at various levels (community members, groups,
institutions) and adopting a cross-cutting approach coupled with economic recovery and institutional
support activities.


Input:
including physical and sexual abuse and neglect; children are kept from school due to difficulties
paying for incidental school expenses; refugees have limited opportunities to productively engage in
Indonesia by developing and utilizing skills and capacities in an employment setting, impacting both
the quality of their experience in the host country and opportunities to access a third country solution
through labor mobility; barriers to accessing the workplace limit opportunities to meaningfully
interact with Indonesians, impacting social cohesion between refugees and their hosts; refugees are
unable to make positive contributions to the Indonesian economy while residing in the country; etc.

### **Smuggling and Trafficking**


Input:
There
 are
 no
 mine
 maps
 currently
 available
 and
 the
 extent
 of
 the
 threat
 is
 impossible
 to
accurately
 assess.
 However,
 it
 is
 suspected
 that
 Myanmar
 is
 one
 of
 the
 most
 highly
landmine-‐contaminated
 countries
 in
 the
 world,
 with
 these
 devices
 continuing
 to
 claim
several
 hundred
 civilian
 victims
 each
 year.
 Myanmar
 has
 not
 acceded
 to
 the
 Mine
 Ban
Treaty
 but
 has
 recently
 set
 up
 a
 Myanmar
 Mine
 Action
 Centre,
 under
 the
 Myanmar
Peace
 Centre
 (MPC) [4] to
 co-‐ordinate
 and
 oversee
 the
 implementation
 of
 a
 national

3 _Changing
 Realities,
 Poverty
 and
 Displacement
 In
 South
 East
 Burma/Myanmar_,
 The
 Border
 Consortium,
 31
October
 2012, http://www.tbbc.org/resources).

---
[4] The
 Myanmar
 Peace
 Centre
 (MPC)
 was
 established
 in
 October
 2012
 by
 a
 Presidential
 Decree
 to
 serve
 as


Input:
**Unaccounted positive externalities**
All our theoretical economic modelling results are conservative lower bound estimates, as econometric studies from other countries have found immigration to have additionally a positive impact on labour productivity that cannot be accounted for using the available data.
According to these econometric studies, immigration can not only raise economic output (i.e., more workers equal more production), but more importantly labour productivity (i.e., more value added per worker). Such results are unfortunately too aggregated to disentangle the constituent effects (Chapter 4).


Input: immigration in a sample of 18 developed OECD countries during the 1980-2010 period. Authors find that increase of immigrant share in the adult population by 1 percentage point raises labour productivity and GDP per capita in the longterm by about 2%. They also examine impacts for the population in top 10% and bottom 90% of income distribution of tertiary and non-tertiary educated immigrants. Effects are similarly 2-3%, apart from the impact of tertiary educated immigrants on population in the top 10%, which are about 6%. These are not just correlations, but causal estimates, as authors carefully address potential problems of reverse causality (i.e., that immigrants may migrate to countries with better growth prospects, instead of improving them). They want to estimate the impact of immigrant shares on GDP per capita, but these could be correlated (biasing the result) as GDP per capita is a pull factor for immigrants. To resolve this, they first create an “instrument” for immigrant shares by estimating a model that predicts them based on country-of-origin push factors and bilateral migration costs determined by geography and culture. In effect they can now control for reverse causality.


Input:
Smooth inclusion of refugees on labour market thus far was enabled by proper policies. In response to the war escalation in Ukraine and the influx of refugees into the EU, prompt actions were taken both at EU and national level.

Refugees from Ukraine in the European Union are covered by the Temporary Protection Directive TPD, which was activated on 4th March 2022 (European Council, 2022). The regulation aims to support EU Member States’ asylum schemes and to ensure harmonised rights for the incoming Ukrainian refugees throughout the EU. It also includes citizens who fled Ukraine not long before 24th February and those who were outside the


Input:
Lower income households are, on the other hand, much more dependent on social protection benefits. These comprise almost half of all earnings.
Two thirds of the income provided by social protection is generated by the host country, with the remainder mostly coming from pensions paid by Ukraine (13% of all adults below the poverty line are of pension age as opposed to 5% above it).

**The overall employment rate of refugees from**

**Ukraine is almost in line with host country**

**nationals**
Across the region, employment stands out as the largest source of income for refugee households by far (64% of all earnings). In some countries – such as Hungary and Poland this share is even larger (at 74% and 68%, respectively). Moldova appears to be an outlier, with employment representing only 32% of respondent household income, but this figure may have been affected by sampling limitations.


Input:
- Refugees
 and
 IDPs
 are
 provided
 with
 accurate
 and
 up-‐to-‐date
 information
 that
 is
objectively
 presented
 and
 consistent
 with
 humanitarian
 protection
 and
 human
rights
 principles
 and
 a
 wide
 range
 of
 representatives
 are
 allowed
 to
 visit
 places
of
 origin
 or
 intended
 return.

- All
 stakeholders
 at
 all
 level
 have
 a
 clear
 understanding
 and
 commitment
 to
 the
principles
 and
 standards
 underpinning
 durable
 solutions.

- The
 Government
 includes
 local
 integration/reintegration
 needs
 of
 IDPs
 and
returning
 refugees
 in
 its
 long
 term
 development
 plans.

- Sufficient
 resources
 are
 available
 to
 increase
 UNHCR
 and
 partners’
 operational
capacity
 in
 the
 immediate
 to
 longer
 term.
 Investments
 are
 made
 by
 development
actors
 in
 long-‐term
 reconstruction
 and
 development
 projects.
 Many
 places
 of
origin
 of
 refugees
 are
 isolated
 and
 have
 received
 little
 investment
 in
infrastructures
 or
 in
 the
 creation
 of
 livelihood
 opportunities
 that
 can
 support
 the
sustainability
 of
 the
 return
 process.

11


Input:
**even greater disparity in financial wellbeing**

At the regional level, the weighted average share of the host population living in rented housing was calculated at 13% based on Eurostat data. This figure is dwarfed by 60% of refugee households fully paying rent for their accommodation and 21% partially paying, as per the SEIS survey. Likewise, accommodation expenses as a share of disposable income were estimated at 17% for hosts, including mortgages, compared to 32% for refugees. This essentially implies that refugees, on average, have a much smaller share of their disposable income remaining for other needs. To estimate the magnitude of this effect, poverty rates were recalculated after subtracting the portion of housing expenses that exceed the national average directly from disposable income. This calculation almost doubled the poverty rate, bringing it to 40%.

11. Defined as someone feeling so upset, anxious, worried, agitated, or depressed that it affects daily functioning

**5**

SEIS survey

Eurostat data


Input:
the general population. UNHCR (2025b), using a different method than the one in this report, estimated average instead of median net wages based on the SEIS data. The average net wage of a Ukrainian refugee they arrived at was PLN 4,214, only slightly higher than calculated above. This would yield 72% of the national average net wage. [15] Average is not used here, because median is more relevant for discussing economic impact, as it is not disrupted by bottom or top earnings. Furthermore, there are no outside estimates to compare it to. Second, as discussed previously, there are much fewer Ukrainian refugees with employment contracts than Poles, and this lowers their social contributions and thus gross earnings. Unfortunately, there is no such data available, as both SEIS and NBP (2024) measure only net earnings.

**Chart 13. Polish citizens and Ukrainian refugees’ employment rates by age group**

Male Female

**Chart 14. Ukrainian refugee median net wage estimates in Q2 2024**

Monthly net wage (PLN) Percengate of all workers total economy average 84% UNHCR NBP UNHCR NBP 15 May - 24 June 2024 6 May - 5 July 2024 15 May - 24 June 2024 6 May - 5 July 2024

SEIS data


Input:
[In addition to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of movement, Article 21 of the Asylum Law](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf) confirms
that refugees and asylum-seekers in possession of their identification documents enjoy the right to circulate
and to reside in Chad in the same conditions as nationals. Furthermore, Article 73 of the [2023 Decree](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)
outlines that the refugee identity card allows the free movement of refugees in the conditions specified
by the law. Additionally, Article 61 of the 2023 Decree specifically addressing local integration of refugees
recognizes, as part of the perquisite to achieve self-reliance, among others, the freedom of movement and
the right to settle in places favourable to their self-reliance.

However, regarding asylum-seekers, it is important to note that Article 20 of the 2020 Law, incorporating
the principle of non-penalization for illegal entry, specifies in its second paragraph that the movement of
asylum-seekers is restricted only if necessary and as long as their refugee status is not determined or until
they have been admitted to another host country.

Refugees and asylum seekers continue to have access to a free travel permit issued by CNARR (saufconduits). This document specifies the intended destination and the duration of absence from the camp.


Input:
requests.

### **Solutions - Resettlement**

UNHCR Indonesia continues to identify and submit refugees for resettlement consideration. In 2024,
950 resettlement spaces have been made available for refugees in Indonesia. UNHCR seeks to ensure
the most vulnerable refugees are prioritized for resettlement consideration, assessing heightened
specific needs and protection concerns, as well as length of stay in the country, when identifying cases
for submission.

### **Solutions - Complementary Pathways**


Input:
to the MSNA Poland 2023 survey, 20% of Ukrainian refugee households earn less than 3 000 PLN, 41% earn between 3 000 and 6 000 PLN, and 12% earn more than 6 000 PLN, while 27% of respondents preferred not to answer. That said, the standard of living of Ukrainian refugees may be significantly lower than that of native residents, even at similar incomes, due to their lack of housing, which in Poland is usually occupant-owned.

**Inflow of Ukrainian refugees into**

MSNA Poland 2023 survey


Input:
- Governments, development and humanitarian actors take into account poverty levels when designing their
support programs for Ukrainian refugees. The quality of day to day life, safety, and level of access to key services are directly tied to household income.

- Poverty measures account for differences in housing costs between refugees and host populations.

- A special focus is placed on supporting refugee employment at their skill level, including transition from
current low-level jobs. The difference between refugee and local population wages could be an important metric to monitor on an ongoing basis


Input:
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

## Executive summary

##### Progress in market integration

**Ukrainian refugees have been**

**increasingly successful in terms of**

**labour market integration.** The large
influx of refugees since February 2022, has further increased and changed the demographics of the already significant Ukrainian migrant population in Poland.
Refugees from Ukraine are primarily women and children, with over 67% of female-headed households. Poland was quick to open its labour market to refugees from Ukraine, who – despite difficulties

- surprisingly promptly began their
economic integration and soon supported themselves primarily from employment.
In the past year, refugees’ employment rate grew from 61% to 69%, with the median net wage rising from PLN 3,100 to PLN 4,000 and narrowing the gap to the median net wage in the entire economy.

**As Ukrainian refugees entered the**

**labour market, the economy adapted,**

**resulting in more specialization and**


Input:
HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

# **Summary of findings and** **recommendations**

The 2024 round of the SEIS survey indicates that while the financial vulnerability of refugees from Ukraine residing in neighboring countries - specifically those included in the [Regional Refugee Response Plan - has](https://www.unhcr.org/europe/publications/regional-refugee-response-plan-2025-2026) declined over the past year [1], one in five still live with an income below the poverty line [2] . When factoring in the disproportionately high accommodation costs refugees face, largely due to the region’s high homeownership rates among locals, the poverty rate [3] rises to 40%, more than three times that of host communities [4] .

the 2024 round of the SEIS survey


Input: Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland The above results do not distinguish between Ukrainian refugees improving the labour market outcomes in the poviats they arrived in and Ukrainian refugees disproportionately moving to the poviats with better performance, which continued to perform better in subsequent quarters. This distinction is mostly academic, as causality is always uncertain in social sciences, as effects can run both ways. However, instrumental variable regressions have been performed to ascertain causal effects. This approach is widely used in studies focused on the impact of migration on socio-economic outcomes. This econometric technique additionally uses variables that correlate well with Ukrainian refugees’ employment shares, but do not directly cause changes to the Polish citizens' employment rate or to the unemployment rate. Two variables have been used: the first was the share of Ukrainian children in Polish schools, and the second was the pre-war distribution of Ukrainian citizens based on notifications of entrusting work to a foreigner. Unfortunately, panel fixed effects regressions with quarterly dummies showed statistically insignificant results for either instruments or both. In addition, regressions using only the instrumental variable for the distribution of pre-war Ukrainian citizens reveal only a modest link to the employment share of Ukrainian refugees.