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	Background

		Family Separations at the Southwest Border

According to DHS and HHS officials, DHS has historically separated a  number of children from accompanying adults at the border and  transferred them to HHS custody, but these separations occurred only in  certain circumstances. For example, DHS might separate families if the  parental relationship could not be confirmed, if there was reason to  believe the adult was participating in human trafficking or otherwise a  threat to the safety of the child, or if the child crossed the border with  other family members such as grandparents without proof of legal  guardianship. HHS has traditionally treated these children as  unaccompanied alien children (UAC)—children who (1) have no lawful  immigration status in the United States, (2) have not attained 18 years of  age, and (3) have no parent or legal guardian in the United States or no  parent or legal guardian in the United States available to provide care and  physical custody.
The Attorney General’s April 2018 memorandum, also referred to as the  “zero tolerance” policy, directed Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors  to accept all referrals of all improper entry offenses from DHS for criminal  prosecution, to the extent practicable. According to DHS officials, in  implementing the April 2018 memo, DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) began referring a greater number of individuals  apprehended at the border to DOJ for criminal prosecution, including  parents who were apprehended with children. In these cases, referred  parents were placed into U.S. Marshals Service custody and separated  from their children because minors cannot remain with a parent who is  arrested on criminal charges and detained by U.S. Marshals Service. In  cases where parents were referred to DOJ for criminal proceedings and  separated from their children, DHS and HHS officials stated they treated  those children as UAC. In such cases, DHS transferred these children to  the custody of HHS’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) and ORR  placed them in one of their shelter facilities, as is the standard procedure  for UAC.
The President’s executive order issued on June 20, 2018, directed,  among other things, that the Secretary of Homeland Security maintain  custody of alien families during any criminal improper entry or immigration  proceedings involving their family members, to the extent possible. This  order stated that the policy of the administration is to maintain family  unity, including by detaining alien families together where appropriate. In  addition, on June 26, 2018, a federal judge ruled in the Ms. L. v. ICE case  that certain separated parents must be reunited with their minor children  (referred to in this testimony statement as the “June 2018 court order”).  In this case, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a federal lawsuit on  behalf of certain parents (referred to as class members) who had been  separated from their children. As of September, 10, 2018, the  government had identified 2,654 children of potential class members in  the Ms. L. v. ICE case, which we discuss in greater detail later in this  statement. As of January 31, 2019, this litigation was ongoing.

		Care and Custody of Unaccompanied Alien Children (UAC)

Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, responsibility for the  apprehension, temporary detention, transfer, and repatriation of UAC is  delegated to DHS, and responsibility for coordinating and implementing  the placement and care of UAC is delegated to HHS’s ORR. CBP’s U.S.  Border Patrol (Border Patrol) and Office of Field Operations (OFO), as  well as DHS’s ICE, apprehend, process, temporarily detain, and care for  UAC who enter the United States with no lawful immigration status.  ICE’s Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) is generally  responsible for transferring UAC, as appropriate, to ORR, or repatriating  them to their countries of nationality or last habitual residence. Under the  William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of  2008 (TVPRA), UAC in the custody of any federal department or agency,  including DHS, must be transferred to ORR within 72 hours after  determining that they are UAC, except in exceptional circumstances. In  addition, the 1997 Flores v. Reno Settlement Agreement (Flores  Agreement) sets standards of care for UAC while in DHS or ORR  custody, including, among other things, providing drinking water, food,  and proper physical care and shelter for children.
In 2015 and 2016, we reported on DHS’s and HHS’s care and custody of  UAC, including the standard procedures that DHS follows to transfer UAC  to ORR. ORR’s UAC policy guide states that the agency requests  certain information from DHS when DHS refers children to ORR,  including, for example, how DHS determined the child was  unaccompanied. Depending on which DHS component or office is  referring the child to ORR, DHS may provide information on the child in  an automated manner directly into ORR’s UAC Portal—the official system  of record for children in ORR’s care—or via email.
ORR has cooperative agreements with residential care providers to  house and care for UAC while they are in ORR custody. The aim is to  provide housing and care in the least restrictive environment  commensurate with the children’s safety and emotional and physical  needs. In addition, these care providers are responsible for identifying  and assessing the suitability of potential sponsors—generally a parent or  other relative in the country—who can care for the child after the child  leaves ORR custody. Release to a sponsor does not grant UAC legal  immigration status. Children are scheduled for removal proceedings in  immigration courts to determine whether they will be ordered removed  from the United States or granted immigration relief.
Once at the shelter, shelter staff typically conduct an intake assessment  of the child within 24 hours, and then are to provide services such as  health care and education. According to ORR’s UAC policy guide, shelter  staff are responsible for meeting with the child to begin identifying  potential sponsors, which can include parents. To assess the suitability of  potential sponsors, including parents, ORR care providers collect  information from potential sponsors to establish and identify their  relationship to the child. For example, the screening conducted of  potential sponsors includes various background checks and in June 2018,  ORR implemented increased background check requirements that were  outlined in an April 2018 memorandum of agreement with DHS. These  changes required ORR staff to collect fingerprints from all potential  sponsors, including parents, and all adults in the potential sponsor’s  household and transmit the fingerprints to ICE to perform criminal and  immigration status checks on ORR’s behalf. ICE was to submit the results  to ORR, and ORR used this information, along with information provided  by, and interviews with, the potential sponsors, to assess their  suitability. However, in December 2018, ORR revised its background  check policy to limit criminal and immigration status checks conducted by  ICE to the potential sponsor, unless concerns about other adult  household members are raised via a public records check, there is a  documented risk to the safety of the child, the child is particularly  vulnerable, or the case is referred for a home study.

	HHS and DHS Planning for Family Separations

According to HHS and DHS officials we interviewed, the departments did  not take specific steps in advance of the April 2018 memo to plan for  family separations or a potential increase in the number of children who  would be referred to ORR because they did not have advance notice of  the memo. Specifically, ORR, CBP, and ICE officials we interviewed  stated that they became aware of the April 2018 memo when it was  announced publicly.
Though they did not receive advance notice of the April 2018 memo,  ORR officials stated that they were aware that increased separations of  parents and children were occurring prior to the April memo. According to  ORR officials, the percentage of children referred to ORR who were  known to have been separated from their parents rose by more than  tenfold from November 2016 to August 2017 (0.3 to 3.6 percent). In  addition, the ORR shelter and field staff we interviewed at four ORR  facilities in Arizona and Texas told us they started noticing an increase in  the number of children separated from their parents in late 2017 and early  2018, prior to the April 2018 memo. The DHS officials we interviewed  stated that, in some locations across the southwest border, there was an  increase in the number of aliens CBP referred to DOJ for prosecution of  immigration-related offenses after an Attorney General memo issued in  April 2017. This memo prioritized enforcement of a number of criminal  immigration-related offenses, including misdemeanor improper entry. In  addition, CBP officials stated that there may have been an increase in  children separated from non-parent relatives or other adults fraudulently  posing as the child’s parents.
According to ORR officials, in November 2017, ORR officials asked DHS  officials to provide information about the increase in separated children. In  response, DHS officials stated that DHS did not have an official policy to  separate families, according to ORR officials. A few months prior to the  April 2018 memo, ORR officials said they saw a continued increase in  separated children in their care. ORR officials noted that they considered  planning for continued increases in separated children, but HHS  leadership advised ORR not to engage in such planning since DHS  officials told them that DHS did not have an official policy of separating  families.
From July to November 2017, the Border Patrol sector in El Paso, Texas  conducted an initiative to address an increase in apprehensions of  families that sector officials had noted in early fiscal year 2017.   Specifically, Border Patrol officials in the sector reached an agreement  with the District of New Mexico U.S. Attorney’s Office to refer more  individuals who had been apprehended, including parents who arrived  with minor children, for criminal prosecution. Prior to this initiative, the  U.S. Attorney’s Office in this district had placed limits on the number of  referrals it would accept from Border Patrol for prosecution of immigration  offenses. According to Border Patrol officials, under this initiative, the  U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed to accept all referrals from Border Patrol in  the El Paso sector for individuals with violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1325  (improper entry by alien) and § 1326 (reentry of removed aliens),  consistent with the Attorney General’s 2017 memo directing federal  prosecutors to prioritize such prosecutions. For those parents placed  into criminal custody, Border Patrol referred their children to ORR’s care  as UAC. According to a Border Patrol report on the initiative, the El Paso  sector processed approximately 1,800 individuals in families and 281  individuals in families were separated under this initiative. Border Patrol  headquarters directed the sector to end this initiative in November 2017,  and Border Patrol officials stated that there were no other similar local  initiatives that occurred prior to the Attorney General’s 2018 memo.

	DHS and HHS Systems for Indicating When Children Were Separated from Parents

When the April 2018 memo was released, there was no single database  with easily extractable, reliable information on family separations. DHS  and HHS subsequently updated their data systems in the spring and  summer of 2018, but it is too soon to know the extent to which these  changes, if fully implemented, will consistently indicate when children  have been separated from the parents or will help reunify families, if  appropriate. Specifically, prior to April 2018, CBP’s and ORR’s data  systems did not include a designated field to indicate that a child was  unaccompanied as a result of being separated from his or her parent, and  ORR officials stated that such information was not always provided when  children were transferred from DHS to HHS custody. According to agency  officials, between April and August 2018, the agencies made changes to  their data systems to help notate in their records when children are  separated from parents.
Regarding DHS, CBP’s Border Patrol and OFO made changes to their  data systems to allow them to better indicate cases in which children  were separated from their parents; however, ORR officials told us in  September 2018, that they had been unaware that DHS had made these  systems changes.
According to Border Patrol officials, Border Patrol modified its system  on April 19, 2018, to include yes/no check boxes to allow agents to  indicate that a child was separated from their parent(s). However,  Border Patrol officials told us that information on whether a child had  been separated is not automatically included in the referral form sent  to ORR. Rather, agents may indicate a separation in the referral notes  sent electronically to ORR, but they are not required to do so,  according to Border Patrol officials. While the changes to the system  may make it easier for Border Patrol to identify children separated  from their parents, ORR officials stated ORR may not receive  information through this mechanism to help it identify or track  separated children. Prior to this system modification, Border Patrol  agents typically categorized a separated child as an unaccompanied  child in its system and did not include information to indicate the child  had been separated from a parent.
CBP’s OFO, which encounters families presenting themselves at  ports of entry, also modified its data system and issued guidance to  its officers on June 29, 2018, to track children separated from their  parents. OFO officials have access to the UAC Portal but typically  email this information to ORR as part of the referral request.  According to OFO officials, prior to that time, OFO designated children  separated from their parents as unaccompanied.
ORR updated the UAC Portal to include a check box for indicating that a  child was separated from his or her parents. According to ORR officials,  ORR made these changes on July 6, 2018, after the June 20 executive  order and June 2018 court order to reunify families. According to ORR  officials, prior to July 6, 2018, the UAC Portal did not have a systematic  way to indicate whether a child was designated as unaccompanied as a  result of being separated from a parent at the border. The updates allow  those Border Patrol agents with direct access to the UAC Portal to check  this box, and Border Patrol issued guidance on July 5, 2018, directing its  agents to use the new indicator for separated children in the UAC Portal  and provide the parent’s alien number in the UAC Portal when making  referrals to ORR as of July 6, 2018. However, ORR officials also said  that DHS components with access to the UAC Portal are not yet utilizing  the new check box consistently.
Staff at three of the four shelters we visited in Arizona and Texas in July  and August of 2018 said that in most, but not all cases during the spring  of 2018, DHS indicated in the custody transfer information that a child had  been separated. Staff at one shelter estimated that for approximately 5  percent of the separated children in its care there was no information from  DHS indicating parental separation. In these cases, shelter staff said they  learned about the separation from the child during the shelter’s intake  assessment. Staff at the same shelter, which cares for children ages 0 to  4, noted that intake assessments for younger children are different from  intake for older children, as younger children are unable to provide  detailed information on such issues as parental separation.
While the updates that OFO and ORR have made to their data systems  are a positive step, they do not fully address the broader coordination  issues we identified in our previous work. Specifically, we identified  weaknesses in DHS and HHS’s process for the referral of UAC. In 2015,  we reported that the interagency process to refer and transfer UAC from  DHS to HHS was inefficient and vulnerable to errors because it relied on  emails and manual data entry, and documented standard procedures,  including defined roles and responsibilities, did not exist. To increase  the efficiency and improve the accuracy of the interagency UAC referral  and placement process, we recommended that the Secretaries of DHS  and HHS jointly develop and implement a documented interagency  process with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, as well as  procedures to disseminate placement decisions, for all agencies involved  in the referral and placement of UAC in HHS shelters. In response, DHS  officials told us DHS delivered a Joint Concept of Operations between  DHS and HHS to Congress on July 31, 2018, which provides field  guidance on interagency policies, procedures, and guidelines related to  the processing of UAC transferred from DHS to HHS. DHS submitted the  Joint Concept of Operations to us on September 26, 2018, in response to  our recommendation. We are reviewing the extent to which the Joint  Concept of Operations includes a documented interagency process with  clearly defined roles and responsibilities, as well as procedures to  disseminate placement decisions, for all agencies involved in the referral  and placement of unaccompanied children, including those separated  from parents at the border, in HHS shelters. Moreover, to fully address  our recommendation, DHS and HHS should implement such interagency  processes.

	DHS and HHS Actions to Reunify Families in Response to the June 2018 Court Order

DHS and HHS took various actions in response to the June 26, 2018,  court order to identify and reunify children separated from their parents.  The June 2018 court order required the government to reunite class  member parents with their children under 5 years of age within 14 days of  the order, and for children age 5 and over, within 30 days of the order.  HHS officials told us that there were no specific procedures to reunite  children with parents from whom they were separated at the border prior  to the June 2018 court order. Rather, the agency used its standard  procedures, developed to comply with the William Wilberforce Trafficking  Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA), to consider  potential sponsors for unaccompanied children in their custody; if a parent  was available to become a sponsor, reunification with that parent was a  possible outcome.
DHS and HHS Efforts to Identify Potential Class Members. To create  the list of potential class members (that is, those parents of a separated  child covered under the lawsuit) eligible for reunification per the June  2018 court order, DHS and HHS officials told us that they generated the  list based on children who were in DHS or HHS custody on that date. As  a result, DHS and HHS officials told us that a parent of a separated child  would only be a class member if his or her child was detained in DHS or  HHS custody on June 26, 2018. After developing the class list, DHS and  HHS officials told us that they next determined whether class members  were eligible for reunification, as a class member could be determined  ineligible for reunification if it was determined that the parent was unfit or  presented a danger to the child.
Parents of children who were separated at the border but whose children  were released by ORR to sponsors prior to the June 2018 court order  were not considered class members, and according to HHS officials, the  department was not obligated to reunite them with the parent or parents  from whom they were separated. Further, HHS officials told us that they  do not know how many such children separated from parents at the  border were released to sponsors prior to the order and that the court  order does not require the department to know this information.
Because there was no single database with information on family  separations, HHS officials reported using three methods to determine  which children in ORR’s custody as of June 26, 2018, had been  separated from parents at the border:  1.  Data Reviewed by an Interagency Data Team. An interagency team  of data scientists and analysts—led by HHS’s Office of the Assistant  Secretary for Preparedness and Response with participation from  CBP, ICE, and ORR—used data and information provided by DHS  and HHS to identify the locations of separated children and parents,  according to HHS officials.  2.  Case File Review. HHS reported that more than 100 HHS staff  reviewed about 12,000 electronic case files of all children in its care  as of June 26, 2018 for indications of separation in specific sections of  each child’s case file, such as the phrases “zero tolerance,”  “separated from ,” and “family  separation.”  3.  Review of Information Provided by Shelters. According to HHS  officials, shelter staff were asked to provide lists of children in their  care who were known to be separated from parents based on the  shelter’s records.
On the basis of its reviews, as of September 10, 2018, the government  had identified 2,654 children of potential class members in the Ms. L. v.  ICE case. Of the 2,654 children, 103 were age 0 to 4 and 2,551 were  age 5 to 17. As previously discussed, the number of children of potential  class members does not include those who were separated from parents  but released to sponsors prior to the June 2018 court order or the more than 500 children who were reunified with parents by CBP in late June  2018, because these children were never transferred to ORR custody.
As of September 10, 2018, 2,217 of the 2,654 identified children had  been released from ORR custody, according to a joint status report filed  in the Ms. L. v. ICE case. About 90 percent of the released children  were reunited with the parent from whom they were separated and the  remaining children were released under other circumstances. Children  released under other circumstances could include those released to  another sponsor such as a parent already in the United States, another  relative, or an unrelated adult, or children who turned 18. Staff at one  ORR facility we visited told us they planned to release some children  under these circumstances. As of December 11, 2018, the government  had identified additional possible separated children of potential class  members for a total of 2,816. It had released 2,657 and 159 remained in  ORR custody. However, the government has also reported that 79 of  the children it initially identified as separated had not been separated from  a parent. Excluding those 79 children from the 2,816 total would bring  the total number of children separated to 2,737.
Plan for Reunifying Children with Class Member Parents Within and  Outside ICE’s Custody. The process used to reunify separated children  with their class member parents in the Ms. L. v. ICE case evolved over  time based on multiple court hearings and orders, according to HHS  officials. After the June 2018 court order, HHS officials said the agency  planned to reunify children using a process similar to their standard  procedures for placing unaccompanied children with sponsors. However,  according to agency officials, the agency realized that it would be difficult  to meet the court’s reunification deadlines using its standard procedures  and began developing a process for court approval that would expedite  reunification for class members. As a result, from June 26, 2018 to July  10, 2018, the reunification process was refined and evolved iteratively  based on court status conferences, according to HHS officials. ORR field  and shelter staff we interviewed noted the impact of the continually  changing reunification process; for example, staff at one shelter told us  there were times when they would be following one process in the  morning but a different one in the afternoon.
On July 10, 2018, the court approved reunification procedures for the  class members covered by the June 2018 court order. In the July 10,  2018 order that outlined these procedures, the court noted that the  standard procedures developed by ORR pursuant to the TVPRA were  meant to address “a different situation, namely, what to do with alien  children who were apprehended without their parents at the border or  otherwise” and that the agency’s standard procedures were not meant to  apply to the situation presented in the Ms. L. v. ICE case, which involves  parents and children who were apprehended together and then separated  by government officials. The reunification procedures approved in the  Ms. L. v. ICE case apply only to reunification of class members with their  children and included determining (1) parentage and (2) whether the  parent is fit to take care of the child or presents any danger to the child.  Specifically:  1.  Determining Parentage. Before July 10, 2018, to determine  parentage for children ages 0 to 4, HHS officials said they initially  used DNA swab testing instead of requiring documentation, such as  birth certificates, stating that DNA swab testing was a prompt and  efficient method for determining biological parentage in a significant  number of cases. On July 10, 2018, the court approved the use of  DNA testing “only when necessary to verify a legitimate, good-faith  concern about parentage or to meet a reunification deadline.” HHS  officials told us that at that point, to determine parentage, ORR relied  on the determinations made by DHS when the family was separated  and information ORR shelter staff had already collected through  assessments of the children in their care. Unless there were specific  doubts about the relationship, ORR did not collect additional  information to confirm parentage, according to HHS officials.  2.  Determining Fitness and Danger. To reunify class members, HHS  also followed the procedures approved by the court on July 10, 2018  for determining whether a parent is fit and whether a parent presents  a danger to the child. HHS used the fingerprints and criminal  background check of the parent conducted by DHS when the  individual was first taken into DHS custody rather than requiring the  parent and other adults living in the household to submit fingerprints  to ORR, as potential sponsors were typically required to do for  unaccompanied children. According to HHS officials, ORR  personnel also reviewed each child’s case file for any indication of a  safety concern, such as allegations of abuse by the child. HHS did not  require fingerprints of other adults living in the household where the  parent and child will live. HHS also did not require parents to complete  an ORR family reunification application as potential sponsors are  typically required to do for unaccompanied children.
The specific procedures for physical reunification varied depending on  whether the parents were inside or outside of ICE custody. DHS and HHS  took steps to coordinate their efforts to reunify children with parents who  were in ICE custody, but experienced challenges. Generally, for parents  in ICE custody, DHS transported parents to a detention facility close to  their child and HHS transported the child to the same facility. At the  facility HHS transferred custody of the child to ICE for final reunification.  HHS officials said that in some instances children had to wait for parents  for unreasonably long amounts of time and parents were transported to  the wrong facilities. In one case, staff at one shelter told us that they had  to stay two nights in a hotel with the child before reunification could occur.
According to HHS officials, for families in which the parent was released  into the interior of the United States, the reunification process involves  ORR officials and shelter staff attempting to establish contact with the  parent and determining whether the parent has “red flags” for parentage  or child safety. These determinations are based on DHS-provided  criminal background check summary information and case review of the  child’s UAC Portal records. In cases where no red flags are found, HHS  transports the child to the parent or the parent picks the child up at the  ORR shelter. For more information on DHS and HHS reunification  procedures for class member parents inside and outside ICE custody,  see GAO-19-163.
Chair DeGette, Ranking Member Guthrie, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes our prepared remarks. We would be happy  to answer any questions that you may have.

	GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Kathryn  A. Larin at (202) 512-7215 or larink@gao.gov or Rebecca Gambler at  (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement.
Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony include Kathryn  Bernet (Assistant Director), Elizabeth Morrison (Assistant Director), David  Barish (Analyst-in-Charge), Andrea Dawson, Jason Palmer, and Leslie  Sarapu. In addition, key support was provided by Susan Aschoff, James  Bennett, Sarah Cornetto, Michael Kniss, Sheila R. McCoy, Jean  McSween, Jan Montgomery, Heidi Nielson, and Almeta Spencer.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.


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	Background

		Microelectronics Production at Sandia

The MESA Complex at Sandia comprises multiple production facilities  and buildings, which total approximately 400,000 square feet (see fig.  1). In particular, the SiFab Facility, completed in 1988, is the primary  production facility for microelectronics integrated into nuclear weapons.  The SiFab Facility produces application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)  that are custom-designed to control certain nuclear weapon arming,  fuzing, and firing functions. The MESA Complex also includes other  buildings, such as the Micro Fabrication Facility, which was completed in  2006 and produces strategic radiation-hardened devices for manipulating  electronic signals and electrical power. The physical layouts of these  two production facilities center around a series of clean rooms that are  designed to maintain an extremely low level of dust and other  particulates, which can harm microelectronic functionality. The two  facilities contain about 375 pieces of specialized production equipment,  some of which cost millions of dollars, and have acid exhaust and liquid  waste management systems for handling the byproducts of the  production processes.
The SiFab Facility produces all of the strategic radiation-hardened ASICs  currently used in nuclear weapons. ASICs are produced on wafers—a  thin slice of semiconductor material such as silicon—using what is  referred to as a complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS)  process technology. The production of ASICs requires hundreds of  processing steps, which are completed over multiple weeks. For example,  according to Sandia documentation, the production of a specific type of  ASIC requires over 600 processing steps over an approximately 26-week  period.
Microelectronics are produced with characteristic dimensions (or “feature  sizes”) measured in nanometers (nm), or one-billionth of one meter. The  process technology together with an associated feature size is known as  a technology “node.” In general, smaller nodes represent more advanced  technologies. The SiFab Facility produces microelectronics at the 350 nm  node, and NNSA and Sandia refer to the CMOS production process technology at the 350 nm node as “CMOS7.” Currently, state-of-the-art  microelectronics are produced at the 32 nm or below node. For example,  the Intel Corporation produces commercial microelectronics at the 14 nm  node for use in personal computers and servers. However, such smaller  nodes are more challenging to produce and have not been proven to  perform at the strategic radiation-hardened level, according to Sandia  contractor representatives. Figure 2 shows commercially produced  microelectronics on a wafer (left photo) and diced into individual  microelectronics parts next to a U.S. dime (right photo).

		Ongoing and Planned Weapon Modernization Programs and Other Modernization Plans Requiring Microelectronics

As shown in table 1, NNSA is undertaking multiple LEPs and weapon  modernization efforts, in which Sandia is participating. In addition, the  2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for NNSA to consider additional  weapon programs—specifically, a program to develop a modern nuclear- armed sea-launched cruise missile, and another to develop a new  submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead (now referred to as the  W93). To develop and produce microelectronics for these efforts, Sandia  must (1) conduct research and development activities, (2) finalize the  design of microelectronics to meet military requirements specific to the  weapon program into which the microelectronics will be integrated, and  (3) produce the microelectronics. Sandia must conduct all of these  activities years before NNSA delivers a weapon program’s first production  unit to DOD. According to Sandia documents and contractor representatives, microelectronics research and development efforts  generally begin 10 to 15 years before a weapon program’s first production  unit date, while microelectronics production generally begins 3 to 5 years  before a first production unit date.
DOD is also undertaking modernization efforts related to nuclear weapon  delivery platforms, and Sandia is producing microelectronics to support  those efforts. Specifically, DOD is responsible for designing and  producing the arming and fuzing components on delivery platforms for  certain types of nuclear weapons, and Sandia produces some of these  components for DOD at the MESA Complex. For example, according to  Air Force and Sandia documentation, the Air Force contracted with  Sandia to design and produce microelectronics for its Intercontinental  Ballistic Missile Fuze Modernization, which will provide a new fuze for use  on both the current Minuteman III missile and its replacement, the Ground  Based Strategic Deterrent missile.

		DOE and NNSA Management Approaches for Projects and Programs

DOE and NNSA distinguish between projects and programs, and the  agencies use different management approaches for each:
Projects. DOE’s project management order governs NNSA’s  management of capital asset acquisition projects with a total cost  greater than $50 million. The order states that capital assets  projects have a defined start and end point. Capital assets include  land, structures, equipment and intellectual property that are used by  the federal government and have an estimated useful life of 2 years or  more. The order’s goal includes delivering projects within their original  performance baselines (on time and within budget) and fully capable  of meeting mission performance and other requirements, such as  environmental, safety, and health standards.
Programs. As we reported in 2018, DOE has not established a  program management policy. However, NNSA issued its own  program management policy in February 2019. The policy applies to  all NNSA elements and requires them to establish additional program  management requirements for respective NNSA programs based on  needs, risk, complexity, and stakeholder involvement, among other  things. The NNSA policy defines a program in part as an organized  set of activities directed toward a common purpose or goal,  undertaken or proposed in support of an assigned mission area. In  addition, some NNSA offices have issued their own program  management directives that are more specific than the NNSA policy.  For example, NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs—which is  responsible for, among other things, weapon modernization programs,  including LEPs, and associated materials and components, such as  microelectronics—issued a program management directive in June  2019 that establishes requirements and processes for managing the  office’s programs. This directive establishes four program  management categories and execution requirements for these  categories. These management categories are risk-based and apply  different execution requirements commensurate with program risk.

		Fiscal Year 2020 Funding for Microelectronics Activities at Sandia

The MESA Complex’s estimated fiscal year 2020 budget is $283 million,  according to Sandia documentation. As shown in figure 3, this funding  comes from a variety of sources, because Sandia uses the MESA  Complex to meet both NNSA’s and DOD’s nuclear weapon production  missions as well as for research and development for those and other  federal entities through strategic partnership programs. Sandia  documentation states that a portion of the MESA Complex’s budget is  obtained from other, non-NNSA federal entities that pay Sandia directly to  produce microelectronics for, among other thing, research and  development purposes, and this amount of funding fluctuates annually.  According to Sandia contractor representatives, the laboratory presents  MESA’s budget as an estimate for this reason.
Specific funding sources are discussed in greater detail below:
NNSA provides about 60 percent (or $168 million) of the MESA  Complex’s total estimated budget for fiscal year 2020. Two NNSA  offices account for most of the agency’s funding:
The Office of Defense Programs accounts for 42 percent (or about  $71 million) and is responsible for ensuring the United States  maintains a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile through  the application of science, technology, engineering, and  manufacturing activities. This funding comes from multiple sub- offices. For example, the Office of Research, Development, Test,  and Evaluation provides funding for microelectronics research and  development; the Office of Production Modernization provides  funding for, among other things, refurbishing microelectronics  processing capabilities; and the Office of Stockpile Management  provides funding for microelectronics production, according to an  NNSA official and NNSA documentation.
The Office of Safety, Infrastructure and Operations accounts for  46 percent (or about $78 million), and this office is responsible for  ensuring existing facilities are safely operated, effectively  managed, and maintained to meet mission needs.
DOE’s Strategic Partnership Programs account for about 13 percent  (or $36 million) of the MESA Complex’s fiscal year 2020 budget.  These programs include research and development projects  sponsored by the Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research  Projects Agency.
DOE’s Laboratory Directed Research and Development work  accounts for about 10 percent (or $28 million) of the MESA Complex’s  fiscal year 2020 budget. Each of DOE’s 16 contractor-operated  laboratories—including Sandia—may direct a portion of the funding  they receive from DOE to scientists who conduct independent  research. The statutory limit on this laboratory-directed research and  development work is between five to seven percent of funds provided  by DOE to the laboratories for national security activities.
DOD provides about 6 percent (or $17 million) of the MESA  Complex’s fiscal year 2020 budget through Strategic Partnership  Programs. According to Sandia documentation, this funding comes  directly from the Air Force and Navy to support the production of  microelectronics that are integrated into nuclear weapon delivery  platforms.
Other sources account for about 12 percent (or $34 million) of the  MESA Complex’s fiscal year 2020 budget. Among other things, this  funding comes from indirect rates applied to all Sandia programs to  support the MESA Complex’s management and operations.

	NNSA Completed Actions over the Past Decade to Sustain Its Microelectronics Capability at Sandia and Identified but Did Not Pursue Alternatives for a New Future Capability

Over the past decade, NNSA completed several actions to sustain its  existing strategic radiation-hardened microelectronics facilities at Sandia  through 2025 while simultaneously identifying future alternatives for its  microelectronics capability beyond 2025. In particular, during fiscal years  2012 through 2019, NNSA engaged in a $150 million effort at Sandia to  sustain operations at the SiFab Facility through 2025. NNSA pursued  this effort in response to a 2010 study conducted by Sandia that identified  the need for millions of dollars in funding to sustain the SiFab Facility  through 2025. NNSA’s sustainment efforts focused on the following two  areas:  Infrastructure. NNSA spent about $27 million to complete  approximately 25 infrastructure projects that support microelectronics  production. For example, NNSA installed two new 20,000-gallon tanks  for water storage to improve the facility’s deionized water system,  which provides ultra-high purity water for use in certain processing  steps. NNSA also replaced a portion of the facility’s acid exhaust  system.
Equipment. NNSA spent about $123 million on production equipment  for two main purposes: (1) to replace aging equipment that Sandia  classified as being at high risk of failure; and (2) to refurbish existing  equipment and procure equipment that will be used to produce  microelectronics once Sandia completes its ongoing effort to convert  the production process from using 6-inch silicon wafers to 8-inch  wafers.
Prior to these equipment investments, the SiFab Facility relied on aging  equipment to perform certain processing steps using a manual process.  In fiscal year 2018, Sandia refurbished existing equipment and purchased  new equipment that is more automated and is intended to increase  process reliability. In addition, according to Sandia documentation,  Sandia needed to convert its production process to use 8-inch silicon  wafers because the commercial sector had increasingly limited  maintenance support and service for equipment that processed 6-inch  wafers.
While NNSA was working with Sandia to sustain the SiFab Facility  through 2025, the agency also began identifying and evaluating options  for producing microelectronics after 2025, such as constructing a new  multibillion-dollar production facility at Sandia. However, because of  changes to key assumptions, NNSA decided in November 2018 not to  pursue any of the identified alternatives and instead stated that the  agency was going to assess options to sustain its current capability at  Sandia beyond 2025. See figure 4 for a summary of NNSA’s actions to  sustain the SiFab facility and consider alternatives.
More specifically, NNSA took the following actions during the past decade  to identify alternatives for producing microelectronics beyond 2025:  In 2011, NNSA’s Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs  requested proposals from the agency’s three nuclear weapons  laboratories for flagship experimental science, technology, and  engineering facilities to help ensure that NNSA will have the  capabilities to address future national security needs. In response,  Sandia submitted a proposal to NNSA in 2012 to construct a new,  multibillion-dollar microelectronics production facility, called the Center  for Heterogeneous Integration, Packaging, and Processes (CHIP2).  The Sandia proposal estimated that CHIP2 would take 14 years to  design and build at an estimated cost of $2.5 billion. The proposal  indicated that the facility would increase microelectronics functionality  and trustworthiness by creating a trusted supply chain into the future  for design, fabrication, testing, and packaging activities. As a result of  the time needed to design and construct CHIP2, investment would still  be needed to sustain the MESA SiFab Facility through 2025.
NNSA commissioned two studies by The Aerospace Corporation, a  federally funded research and development center sponsored by the  Air Force, to help the agency evaluate Sandia’s CHIP2 proposal  against other potential alternatives, such as contracting with  commercial entities to produce microelectronics. These studies,  completed in August and September 2014, generally ranked the  CHIP2 proposal at or near the top of the alternatives but also stated  that CHIP2 did not stand out as a decidedly better option.  Nonetheless, in early 2015, NNSA’s Deputy Administrator for Defense  Programs issued a memorandum recommending that NNSA pursue  the CHIP2 proposal as a formal capital asset project, subject to DOE’s  project management order on acquisition of capital assets.
In 2016, in accordance with DOE’s project management order, NNSA  developed two key documents during the initiation phase of its capital  asset project supporting the CHIP2 proposal, which NNSA referred to  as the Trusted Microelectronics Capability (TMC) project.
NNSA first developed a mission need statement, which is a formal  document that identifies a credible performance gap between  current capabilities and those needed to achieve the goals stated  in the agency’s strategic plan. The mission need should be  stated in a way that is solution-neutral. The project’s mission need  statement stated that, among other things, after 2025 the SiFab  Facility faced a severe risk of equipment and facility failures that  could have detrimental impacts on future microelectronics  production schedules. The statement noted that continued  refurbishment of the SiFab Facility beyond 2025 could result in  significant downtime during critical weapon development and  production cycles, as the facility was constructed in the 1980s and  was not sized for modern microelectronics production equipment  and supporting infrastructure.
NNSA next developed a requirements document, which describes  the ultimate goals the project must satisfy while also identifying  key assumptions and constraints. The requirements document  identified several key requirements, including that the TMC project  must be able to provide NNSA with trusted access to produce  microelectronics in support of the agency’s nuclear weapons  mission.
Between 2016 and 2017, in accordance with DOE’s project  management order, NNSA conducted an analysis of alternatives for  the TMC project based on achieving NNSA’s mission need statement.  Such an analysis identifies, analyzes, and selects a preferred  alternative to best meet the mission need by comparing the  operational effectiveness, costs, and risks of potential alternatives,  according to DOE documentation. During this process, NNSA  considered 21 alternatives for meeting the mission need statement,  among them the CHIP2 proposal as well as several alternatives that  included partnerships with commercial industry and other government  production facilities. The final TMC analysis of alternatives report,  dated January 2018, did not identify the CHIP2 proposal as a  preferred alternative because of the proposal’s high life-cycle costs,  high total project cost, and long project schedule. Instead, the report  identified two preferred alternatives as best meeting NNSA’s needs:  (1) partnering with an existing, government-owned, contractor- operated production facility other than Sandia; and (2) entering into  an interagency agreement with DOD and at least one member of the  intelligence community, as well as a commercial entity, to design,  build, and operate a state-of-the-art production facility.
Ultimately, NNSA decided not to pursue either preferred alternative  because of changing assumptions. For example, one of NNSA’s key  assumptions for the TMC analysis of alternatives was that the SiFab  Facility could not remain operational beyond 2025. However, NNSA  tasked The Aerospace Corporation to validate this assumption, and in  January 2018, The Aerospace Corporation completed a study concluding  that the SiFab Facility could remain viable until 2040 with prioritized and  well-planned infrastructure repairs and equipment replacements.  Another example of changing assumptions concerned the preferred  alternative under which NNSA would enter into an interagency agreement  with DOD and at least one member of the intelligence community to  design, build, and operate a state-of-the-art production facility. This  preferred alternative assumed that DOD, the intelligence community, or  both, would pay to develop and build the production facility (estimated to  cost from $350 million up to $1.2 billion), while NNSA would pay to equip  its portion of the production process. The TMC analysis of alternatives  report stated that commitment from DOD and the intelligence community  would be vital, and that this alternative carried significant execution risks.  In January 2018, NNSA documentation stated that this interagency  alternative was no longer viable because other agencies stated they were  no longer interested in a potential partnership.
Partly as a result of these changes in key assumptions, in November  2018, NNSA wrote in a letter to Congress that it was no longer requesting  funding for the TMC and was assessing what investments were needed  to extend the operational life of the SiFab Facility to 2040.

	NNSA Has Decided to Upgrade and Sustain Its Microelectronics Capability at Sandia through 2040, but Its Management Approach Does Not Fully Incorporate Key Controls

As part of NNSA’s ongoing approach to managing its strategic radiation- hardened microelectronics activities, the agency plans to upgrade and  sustain its microelectronics capability at Sandia through 2040, which it  estimates will cost about $1 billion over the next 20 years. NNSA is also  in the preliminary stages of identifying and evaluating options for a  microelectronics capability beyond 2040. In addition, NNSA is starting to  implement a revised management approach, including appointing a  coordinator to guide certain aspects of its microelectronics activities.  However, NNSA’s approach does not fully incorporate key management  controls, such as developing an overarching management plan, which the  agency has applied to other important activities.

		NNSA Plans to Upgrade and Sustain Its Microelectronics Capability at Sandia through 2040 and Is Beginning to Identify Options for a Capability Beyond 2040

In 2019, NNSA made three key decisions related to upgrading and  sustaining its microelectronics capability at Sandia through 2040. First,  NNSA approved plans to further upgrade its process for producing  microelectronics. This upgraded process, called CMOS8, contains some  features of the currently employed CMOS7 process, but is a more  advanced technology node that also includes many new features,  according to Sandia documentation. Second, NNSA approved plans to  produce and integrate into future nuclear weapons a more advanced type  of microelectronics component called a field programmable gate array  (FPGA). According to Sandia documentation, strategic radiation- hardened FPGAs can be produced using the CMOS8 process but not the  CMOS7 process. Third, Sandia developed and NNSA approved a plan to  identify, prioritize, and provide budget estimates to sustain Sandia’s  microelectronics infrastructure and equipment at the MESA Complex over  the next 20 years. This plan incorporates NNSA’s decisions to develop  the CMOS8 process and produce FPGAs.
According to NNSA and Sandia documents, the rationale behind and  expected benefits of these three key decisions are as follows:
The CMOS8 process will allow Sandia to produce microelectronics at  a smaller, more advanced technology node (180nm) compared with  the current CMOS7 technology node (350nm). NNSA documentation  states that, among other things, the CMOS8 process is expected to  produce microelectronics that have twice the processing speed  compared with those produced using the CMOS7 process. Such  advances are needed to help ensure that future nuclear weapons  remain safe, secure, and reliable while operating in increasingly  hostile threat environments and that the weapons meet increased  performance requirements, according to Sandia documentation.  According to NNSA officials, the agency agreed with Sandia’s  assessment on implementing the CMOS8 production process based,  in part, on findings and recommendations contained in an  independent study commissioned by NNSA and completed by  multiple entities including The Aerospace Corporation.
According to Sandia documentation, while FPGAs have never been  used before in a nuclear weapon, they may significantly reduce the  cycle time for microelectronics research, development, and production  compared with cycle times for ASICs used in nuclear weapons. This  reduction may be possible because the ASICs currently used in  nuclear weapons are uniquely designed and produced to carry out  specific functions, whereas FPGAs can be produced using a common  design and then programmed after production (but before insertion  into a nuclear weapon) to carry out different functions, according to  NNSA officials. Reduced cycle time from FPGAs could alleviate  schedule pressure on future weapon modernization programs  because cycle times for designing and producing ASICs for LEPs  have historically been about 10 years before production of the first  weapon, according to Sandia documentation.
Sandia’s plan will provide NNSA with the basis for the investment  profile needed to sustain the MESA Complex’s infrastructure and  equipment through 2040. Because the sustainment effort will last at  least 20 years, NNSA officials said that having a long-term planning  document that provides a current baseline for the condition of  Sandia’s microelectronics infrastructure and equipment, identifies  challenges, and recommends specific sustainment activities will be a  useful management tool.
The plan for extending the life of the MESA Complex at Sandia provides  cost and schedule estimates related to sustainment of existing facilities  and equipment, as well as installation of new equipment for CMOS8 and  development and maturation of the FPGA technology. Overall, the plan  calls for spending about $1 billion over the next 20 years. Specifically, the  plan identifies spending for the following activities:
Sustainment of existing facilities and equipment. The plan  identifies about $900 million in spending from fiscal years 2020  through 2040—or about $45 million a year for the next 20 years—to  complete identified infrastructure and equipment projects. The plan  calls for spending roughly half of the $900 million on projects to  upgrade existing infrastructure within the MESA Complex. In  particular, Sandia plans to spend about $120 million from fiscal years  2020 through 2024 on projects to improve or upgrade infrastructure  within the SiFab Facility that is considered to be in “poor condition”  based on information contained in NNSA’s infrastructure condition  database. The SiFab Facility is to be the physical location for the  majority of production tools for CMOS8. Two of these projects would  replace electrical power and distribution equipment at an estimated  cost of about $50 million, while another project would replace the  facility’s chemical distribution system at an estimated cost of about $5  million. Sandia plans to spend the other half of the $900 million on  equipment-related projects. For example, Sandia plans to spend  about $85 million from fiscal years 2021 through 2026 on projects to  support existing, non-CMOS8 production processes—such as  producing transistors in the Micro Fabrication Facility—as well as  activities that support microelectronics production, such as laboratory  analysis, testing, and packaging. For example, Sandia plans to spend  $1.5 million on a computerized tomography machine to support  microelectronics testing.
Development of CMOS8 and production of FPGAs. The MESA  Complex extended life plan identifies about $170 million in spending  from fiscal years 2020 through 2027 related to developing, maturing,  installing, and implementing the CMOS8 process and the FPGA  technology. Sandia contractor representatives told us that the CMOS8  process relies on newer and more advanced equipment to complete  critical individual processing steps compared with the current CMOS7  process. As a result, the plan identifies about $70 million (out of the  $170 million total) to acquire approximately 30 pieces of equipment,  which Sandia will need to install and then qualify their performance. In  addition, the plan identifies almost $90 million (out of the $170 million  total) for developing and maturing the CMOS8 production process and  the FPGA technology. According to Sandia documentation, Sandia  plans to begin using the CMOS8 process to produce FPGAs for  integration into a future nuclear weapon program at the end of fiscal  year 2027.
In addition to upgrading and sustaining Sandia’s microelectronics  capabilities through 2040, NNSA is in the preliminary stages of identifying  and evaluating options to ensure a continued microelectronics capability  beyond 2040, according to NNSA officials and documentation. In  particular, NNSA has identified the following two key options:
NNSA is in the initial stages of identifying and evaluating options to  construct a new facility for producing microelectronics by 2040 and  beyond. In December 2019, NNSA officials provided us with  documentation stating that the agency plans to begin evaluating  options for a new microelectronics facility in 2021 with the goal of  completing construction in 2030, installing needed equipment in the  completed facility by 2033, and qualifying the production process and  begin producing microelectronics for integration into nuclear weapons  no later than 2035. In NNSA’s fiscal year 2021 budget request, which  was released in February 2020, the agency requested funds to begin  evaluation and early planning activities for this new microelectronics  facility.
NNSA is also evaluating whether the agency might be able to  leverage a recent investment by DOD in a U.S. commercial  microelectronics production facility to help meet NNSA’s  microelectronics production needs after 2040. Specifically, DOD  announced in October 2019 that it had awarded a contract to a U.S.- owned-and-operated microelectronics commercial production facility  to, among other things, enhance its radiation-hardened  microelectronics production process to meet DOD’s microelectronic  needs for systems (such as satellites) that operate in environments  with increased radiation levels. Over the next two years, the U.S.  commercial microelectronics production facility plans to adapt its  current production process and develop a new process that will  produce microelectronics at a smaller node, according to DOD  documentation. According to NNSA officials we interviewed in  February 2020, NNSA and DOD are in preliminary discussions to  determine if NNSA could make additional investments in this same  facility to potentially produce strategic radiation-hardened  microelectronics for integration into nuclear weapons. NNSA officials  said that there was no firm timeframe for making an investment  decision because such a decision would need to be made after the  microelectronics facility begins producing microelectronics at the  smaller node.

		NNSA Is Starting to Implementing a Revised Microelectronics Management Approach, but This Approach Does Not Fully Incorporate Key Management Controls

NNSA is starting to implement a revised approach to managing its  microelectronics activities. During our initial interviews with NNSA officials  in early 2019, they stated that NNSA had not established a formal  management structure to oversee the agency’s microelectronics  activities. Instead, they said that NNSA had delegated primary  responsible for overseeing such activities to two officials within NNSA’s  Office of Defense Programs, who both served in multiple positions and  had other duties within the office. According to these officials, once NNSA  formally canceled the TMC project in November 2018, management  efforts were focused on making initial determinations on the actions and  budget estimates needed to sustain NNSA’s existing microelectronics  capability at Sandia until 2040. These efforts included coordinating with  multiple NNSA offices—such as the Office of Safety, Infrastructure and  Operations—to understand their future microelectronics needs and  requirements and to review draft MESA Complex sustainment  documentation prepared by Sandia.
However, officials from NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs told us that  in late 2019 they determined that a more coordinated management  approach would better position NNSA to oversee microelectronics  activities and make informed budgetary and programmatic decisions.  Specifically, NNSA officials stated that in November 2019 the Office of  Defense Programs created and filled a new full-time microelectronics  coordinator position within a sub-office, the Office of Research,  Development, Test, and Evaluation. The microelectronics coordinator told  us that NNSA has not yet finalized an official position description for the coordinator role. However, the coordinator said that the position will  primarily be responsible for developing the CMOS8 process and the  FPGA technology and integrating the research and development activities  of the Office of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation with  another sub-office, the Office of Production Modernization.
In addition, officials from NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs and Office  of Safety, Infrastructure and Operations told us that they continue to use  other existing processes to manage microelectronics activities at Sandia.  For example, these officials said that they use the annual planning,  programming, budgeting, and evaluation process, along with the annual  work authorization process, to coordinate across NNSA offices on  budgetary matters and work activities associated with microelectronics  activities at Sandia. As part of these processes, agency officials told us  that they issue annual implementation plans to direct the work of Sandia  contractors related to microelectronics activities. NNSA officials then  monitor the contractors’ progress toward completing the identified scope  of work and work activities. For example, NNSA officials said that they  conduct monthly meetings with contractor representatives to review  status and financial reports. They also said that they hold mid-year and  end-of-year program reviews with contractor representatives.
To help management achieve desired results—such as ensuring a  continued microelectronics capability—federal agencies design,  implement, and operate internal controls, which comprise the plans,  methods, policies, and procedures used to fulfill an entity’s mission,  goals, and objectives. Federal standards for internal control state that  management should, among other things: design control activities, such as by developing policies, procedures,  techniques, and mechanisms that enforce management’s directives,  to achieve objectives and respond to risk; and establish an organizational structure, assign responsibility, and  delegate authority to achieve the entity’s objectives.
NNSA has implemented internal controls at the agency level, in part, by  developing and implementing directives that provide an organizational  structure for the agency to plan, execute, control, and assess its  programs and projects while also assigning responsibility and delegating  authority for key management roles. For example, one purpose of  NNSA’s 2019 program management directives is to increase  management efficiency and effectiveness by, among other things, clearly  defining management responsibilities and authorities. In addition, DOE’s  project management order for the acquisition of capital assets lists  principles for successful project execution such as disciplined, up-front  planning; line management accountability; and effective implementation  of all management systems (such as risk and performance management)  supporting the project.
In particular and as applicable to front-end planning, NNSA’s and DOE’s  directives related to program and project management both include the  following controls:
Appointment of a federal manager, who is vested with the authority to  carry out assigned responsibilities to meet program or project  milestones on schedule and on budget, who manages the  coordination of deliverables between the multiple entities (such as  different program offices) involved, and who is responsible and  accountable for planning, implementing, and executing a program or  project, which includes responsibility for developing an overarching  management plan;
An overarching management plan, which establishes the procedures  to define, execute, and monitor a program or project, as well as  establishing specific requirements in a variety of areas—such as cost  estimating, an integrated schedule, performance management, and  risk management—to use to develop a baseline and against which to  measure and monitor;
A mission need statement, which identifies a credible gap between  current capabilities and those needed to achieve the goals stated in  the strategic plan; and
A requirements document that describes the ultimate goals the  program or project must satisfy while also identifying key assumptions  and constraints.
However, while some in NNSA and at Sandia have recognized the need  to coordinate microelectronics activities to effectively carry them out and  meet specific goals by specific dates, as evidenced by the hiring of a  coordinator, Office of Defense Programs leadership have not fully  developed controls to better manage and coordinate its microelectronics  activities. Specifically, NNSA does not have or has not fully developed the  following:
Federal manager with coordination or oversight authority. NNSA  has not established a federal management position with the authority  and accountability to better coordinate or oversee NNSA’s  microelectronics activities. Instead, as described above, agency  officials told us that NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs established a  coordinator position—within a sub-office, the Office of Research,  Testing, Development and Evaluation—in November 2019 to help  guide the agency’s efforts to develop the CMOS8 process and the  FPGA technology, among other things. Moreover, in May 2020, NNSA  stated that senior leadership within the Office of Defense Programs  have not endorsed the formal role of a microelectronics coordinator  and that the coordinator’s role and responsibilities are currently under  review. NNSA also stated that the coordinator has not been given  authority to manage an annual budget for microelectronics activities  and that it was unlikely that such authority would be granted.  This  statement stands in contrast to earlier statements made to us that the  coordinator would have responsibility for an annual budget of about  $50 million, subject to future appropriations.
Management plan. NNSA has not developed an overarching  management plan to guide and coordinate the agency’s  microelectronics activities. Instead, NNSA officials from the Office of  Defense Programs and the Office of Safety, Infrastructure and  Operations told us that the agency is in the very early stages of  developing a NNSA plan that will incorporate key decisions and  approaches outlined in the Sandia’s 20-year MESA sustainment plan,  among other things. While NNSA officials are still evaluating the  specific contents of this plan, they said that the plan may outline  specific roles and responsibilities for each NNSA office involved in  microelectronics, describe how these offices will interact with the  microelectronics coordinator, and provide options for future  microelectronics technology development efforts. However, it is  unclear whether the document will define the planning approach,  procedures, and processes that NNSA will use to ensure coordinated  management in multiple areas and across multiple offices, such as  developing cost estimates, an integrated schedule, and performance  metrics. Agency officials said that this plan, when finalized, will  provide a useful tool for coordinating various aspects of NNSA’s  microelectronics activities, but they did not provide an estimated date  for when the plan will be completed.
Mission need statement and requirements document. NNSA has  not developed a current mission need statement or a current program  requirement document. In 2016, as required by DOE’s project  management order on the acquisition of capital assets, NNSA issued  a formal mission need statement and a requirements document to  guide its assessment of the cancelled TMC project (as described  earlier in this report). However, agency officials told us that these  2016 documents are no longer applicable to NNSA’s current approach  to sustaining its microelectronics capability and evaluating options to  ensure a continued capability after 2040. NNSA officials said that they  intend to establish an updated set of requirements to guide the  agency’s future microelectronics capability, and that they will consider  these requirements in establishing a future mission need statement.  However, NNSA officials did not provide a timeframe for finalizing  these documents.
NNSA officials acknowledged the importance of using management  controls and that the controls described above would be useful, but they  could not identify any specific DOE or NNSA directives, government-wide  guidance, or best practices that they follow to manage their  microelectronics activities. Instead, they offered three reasons why the  agency has not implemented a more coordinated and robust set of  management controls to oversee the agency’s microelectronics activities:
Microelectronics production has historically been managed as a  component production effort by an LEP, which is led by an NNSA  program manager within the Office of Defense Programs who  coordinates directly with other NNSA offices and Sandia contractors.
Because NNSA has not designed microelectronics as a formal  program, the requirements contained in the agency’s program  management directives are not binding on microelectronics activities.
NNSA officials said that the multiple projects (identified in the MESA  Complex extended life plan) to upgrade and sustain the  microelectronics capabilities at Sandia through 2040—at an estimated  cost of over $1 billion over 20 years—will not be subject to DOE’s  project management order, as these projects are for sustainment and  not for new facility construction. According to officials from NNSA’s  Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations, infrastructure  investments are being planned and managed as maintenance and  repair efforts.
NNSA officials told us that the agency’s current efforts provide the  necessary structure for NNSA to oversee and manage its  microelectronics capability. However, NNSA has recognized the  importance of implementing a more coordinated and robust set of  management controls for other important activities within its nuclear  security mission that similarly have not been treated in the past as  specific programs. For example, as we reported in June 2019, while  NNSA historically managed its high-explosive capability without a formal  mechanism to coordinate activities across multiple programs, it recently  implemented a more robust set of management controls to oversee its  high-explosive activities. Specifically, in 2018 NNSA appointed an  enterprise manager to help coordinate these activities. NNSA also  encouraged the enterprise manager to adopt, where appropriate, the  program management controls contained in an NNSA directive on  managing nuclear weapon life extension and strategic materials  programs. Subsequently, the enterprise manager issued a strategic plan  that provided an organizational structure for the agency’s high explosives  capability. By taking a similar approach to its management of  microelectronics activities and incorporating a more coordinated and  robust set of management controls, the agency would have increased  assurance that its planned microelectronics activities are clearly defined,  efficiently executed, and effectively monitored.

	Conclusions

NNSA’s ability to produce unique microelectronics for nuclear weapons is  essential to ensuring a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent. Producing such  microelectronics is a complex task, and NNSA is limited in its ability to  partner with the commercial sector for such production. Over the next two  decades, NNSA will undertake an expensive and ambitious approach to  upgrade and sustain its existing microelectronics production facilities and  capabilities. Specifically, NNSA plans to spend about $1 billion over the  next 20 years to, among other things, upgrade its process to produce a  new type of microelectronic component that has never been integrated  into a nuclear weapon. In addition, NNSA officials said that the agency  will need to identify and analyze options for a continued capability after  2040, and that effort could begin as early as 2021.
To increase its management and oversight of the agency’s  microelectronics activities, NNSA has taken some positive steps such as  appointing a microelectronics coordinator within the Office of Defense  Programs and approving certain long-term planning documents.  However, in contrast to other NNSA activities, including programs and  projects, NNSA has not fully developed a coordinated and robust set of  management controls to oversee its microelectronics activities. For  example, NNSA has not established an overarching management plan to  manage and coordinate the cost, schedule, and risks associated with its  microelectronics activities. By incorporating a more coordinated and  robust set of management controls, NNSA would have increased  assurance that its planned microelectronics activities are clearly defined,  efficiently executed, and effectively monitored.

	Recommendation for Executive Action

The NNSA Administrator should incorporate additional management  controls to better oversee and coordinate NNSA’s microelectronics  activities. Such management controls could include investing the  microelectronics coordinator with increased responsibility and authority,  developing an overarching management plan, and developing a mission  need statement and a microelectronics requirements document.  (Recommendation 1)

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DOD and NNSA for review and  comment. DOD did not provide any comments. In its written comments,  reproduced in appendix I, NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with our  recommendation but provided three main comments. First, NNSA stated  that by December 2020 the agency plans to complete a strategic  management plan that will more clearly articulate the integration of  management controls for the various components of its microelectronics  activities. NNSA stated that it believes this action is consistent with our  recommendation. We are encouraged by this planned action and will  evaluate the completed strategic management plan to determine if it  meets the intent of our recommendation.
Second, NNSA stated that our report did not clearly convey the  differences between the management of microelectronics and other  weapons or materials programs and did not include all aspects of its  microelectronics activities (such as the procurement of commercial off the  shelf components) in our audit’s scope. In response, we added  references to the various aspects of NNSA’s microelectronics activities  and clarified that our report focuses on NNSA’s strategic radiation- hardened microelectronics activities at Sandia’s MESA Complex. As  stated in the report, we focused on this specific aspect of NNSA’s  microelectronics mission because of the language in the Senate  committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which included a provision for us  to review NNSA’s efforts to recapitalize its strategic radiation-hardened  microelectronics design and production capacity. We also focused on this  specific aspect of NNSA’s mission because the fiscal year 2020 Stockpile  Stewardship and Management Plan lists the continued production of  strategic radiation-hardened microelectronics as one of four key  challenges to the agency’s nuclear stockpile mission.
Third, NNSA stated that our audit did not include an assessment of  management controls for the range of activities that work together to  ensure the effectiveness of microelectronics planning and execution.  However, our report identifies and describes these management controls,  and as part of our work we considered how these controls work together.  In addition and as stated above, NNSA intends to complete a strategic  management plan to more clearly articulate the integration of its various  microelectronics management controls, which is especially important as  the agency invests about $1 billion dollars over the next 20 years while  simultaneously needing to meet microelectronics production deliverables  for multiple nuclear weapon modernization programs.
NNSA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in our  report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, and other  interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or at bawdena@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix II.

Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact Staff Acknowledgments

Allison B. Bawden at (202) 512-3841 or bawdena@gao.gov  In addition to the contact named above, Jason Holliday (Assistant  Director), Patrick Bernard (Analyst in Charge), and Alisa Carrigan made  key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were  Jonathan Felbinger, Juan Garay, Lisa Gardner, Cindy Gilbert, Cynthia  Norris, and Dan C. Royer.