Input:
	Background

		Surface Ship Assignments to U.S. and Overseas Homeports

The Navy bases the majority of its surface ships at homeports in the  United States, and five regional maintenance centers manage their  maintenance. At the time of our review, the Navy had 38 surface ships  assigned to overseas homeports, as illustrated in figure 1.
A homeport is where a ship is based and primarily managed and  maintained. The Navy assigns all newly commissioned ships entering the  fleet to a U.S. homeport, and the Navy may change a ship’s homeport  throughout its service life. The Navy may move a ship to an overseas  homeport to respond to strategic needs or to relieve another ship  returning to a U.S. homeport. We found in May 2015 that basing ships at  overseas homeports provides considerable additional time in strategic  areas of operation and other benefits ranging from increased  opportunities for collaboration with partners and allies to faster response  time for emerging crises. However, we also found that the Navy’s high  pace of operations for its overseas-homeported ships affected the  material condition of these ships, and that they had experienced a  worsening trend in overall ship readiness when compared to U.S.- homeported ships over the preceding 5 years. We also reported that the  Navy generally intended ships to be homeported overseas for about 7 to  10 years, according to officials, but that some ships in Japan had been  based there for longer than 10 years. In 2018 Congress instituted a 10- year cap on the length of time certain U.S. Navy ships may be based at  overseas homeports.

		Maintenance Responsibilities for Surface Ships

A number of organizations and commands within the Navy share  responsibilities for setting maintenance policies and planning, scheduling,  and executing ship maintenance, from the offices of the Secretary of the  Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, to fleet commanders and ships’  crews. Key organizations include:  Type Commanders. The Navy’s type commanders for surface ships— Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Commander,  Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet—are responsible for maintaining,  training, and ensuring the readiness of the surface ships assigned to each  fleet.
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). NAVSEA, among other  things, maintains surface ships to meet fleet requirements within defined  cost and schedule parameters. These offices perform contract  administration, program management, and planning for future  maintenance periods informed by the historical maintenance needs of  Navy ships. For example, the following NAVSEA organizations have  certain responsibilities for overseas ship maintenance:
NAVSEA’s Deputy Commander for Ship Maintenance and  Modernization (NAVSEA 21). This office provides life-cycle  management for surface ships and manages critical modernization,  maintenance, training, and inactivation programs.
NAVSEA’s Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program  (SURFMEPP). SURFMEPP provides life-cycle management of  maintenance requirements for surface ships, including providing  centralized class maintenance and modernization planning and  management of maintenance strategies.
Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center (CNRMC). This  office oversees the regional maintenance centers in the United States,  as well as the Forward Deployed Regional Maintenance Center  (FDRMC) headquarters in Italy, and its detachments in Rota, Spain,  and Manama, Bahrain, that manage the maintenance for the U.S.  Navy ships homeported there.
NAVSEA’s Logistics, Maintenance, and Industrial Operations  (NAVSEA 04). This office manages and oversees the naval shipyards  and the Ship Repair Facility and Japan Regional Maintenance Center  (SRF-JRMC) in Yokosuka, Japan, and its detachment in Sasebo,  Japan.
Surface Team One. This body of stakeholders from across the Navy’s  surface ship maintenance, modernization, and sustainment organizations  collaborates for the purpose of setting and developing surface ship  maintenance and modernization priorities, conducting analyses, and  improving surface ship maintenance performance. A Senior Flag  Oversight Council comprised of Commander, Naval Surface Force  Pacific, and Commander, NAVSEA, provides strategic vision and directs  Surface Team One’s efforts, which may include knowledge-sharing  networks, working groups, or deep-dive studies and business case  analyses.

		Types of Ship Maintenance Periods

The level of complexity of ship repair, maintenance, and modernization  can affect the length of a maintenance period, which can range from a  few weeks to 6 months or longer. The types of maintenance periods  include the following:
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) maintenance. CNO maintenance  periods are scheduled to accomplish industrial, depot-level  maintenance and modernization—work that cannot be conducted by  ship’s crews or goes beyond fleet capabilities. These depot-level  maintenance periods can last 6 months or longer and the Navy  generally schedules them every 2 to 3 years throughout a ship’s  service life. This can include major repair, overhaul, or complete  rebuilding of systems needed for ships to reach their expected service  life, and involve complex structural, mechanical, and electrical repairs.  For example, in certain types of depot-level maintenance, ships are  taken out of the water and put into a dry dock to perform maintenance  on below-water parts of the ship (see fig. 2 for a photo of a dry dock at  SRF-JRMC in Yokosuka, Japan). To inform the planning of the work  package for this maintenance period, Navy officials or contractor  representatives typically perform one or more “ship checks” to assess  the material condition of the ship in advance of the maintenance  period.
Continuous maintenance. Continuous maintenance periods are to  conduct maintenance outside of the longer CNO maintenance periods  that can be done in short periods typically scheduled to be 2 to 6  weeks in duration. According to Navy officials, the schedules of these  periods can vary, and commanders can adjust, postpone, or cancel  them based on operational demands.
Voyage repair. Voyage repair maintenance periods are solely to  accomplish corrective maintenance of a mission- or safety-essential  nature necessary for a ship to deploy or continue its deployment. For  example, ships based in the United States that are deployed overseas  on a temporary basis schedule mid-deployment voyage repair to  ensure they can continue their deployment.

		Planning Process for Surface Ship Depot-level Maintenance Periods

The process for planning surface ship depot-level maintenance periods  (i.e., CNO maintenance periods), whether the ship is based overseas or  in the United States, is contained in the Navy’s Joint Fleet Maintenance  Manual. In general, the Navy begins planning for a ship’s depot-level  maintenance period 720 days—or roughly 2 years—before the planned  start of the maintenance period. During this time, a variety of  organizations within the Navy plan what will be repaired, how long it will take, where the work will be done, as well as select the contractors to  perform the work, among other things. This process also includes  activities to close out the maintenance period once it is complete, which  overlap with the start of the planning cycle for the next maintenance  period. For example, certain milestones serve both planning and closeout  purposes—such as the Life-cycle Planning Conference Meeting, which is  to both closeout a ship’s completed maintenance period and to begin  planning for the next one by reviewing the maintenance requirements,  deferred work, and planned schedules (see figure 3).
NAVSEA 21, including SURFMEPP, is generally responsible for the  advanced planning of maintenance periods, which includes setting the  baseline requirements and early estimates of how long maintenance  might take. In general, regional maintenance centers have overall  responsibilities for meeting milestones approximately a year prior to the  start of maintenance through execution and closeout, as illustrated in  figure 3 above. Overseas, the responsible regional maintenance centers  are the SRF-JRMC at the homeport in Yokosuka, Japan, and its  detachment at the homeport in Sasebo, Japan, and the FDRMC  detachments at the homeports in Rota, Spain, and Manama, Bahrain.  Naval Supply Systems Command’s Fleet Logistics Centers offices  overseas are responsible for soliciting and awarding maintenance  contracts, for ships based overseas, among other things.

	The Navy’s Ship Maintenance Capacity and Approach Varies by Overseas Location

The Navy has developed different maintenance capacity and approaches  to maintain the 38 surface ships based in Japan, Spain, and Bahrain. The  Navy maintains these ships through a mix of Navy, host government, and  contractor industrial base facilities and resources that are different at  each location. The Navy has tailored the maintenance approaches it uses  at each homeport considering the available Navy and contractor capacity,  as well as the number and type of ships, according to Navy documents  and officials. Table 1 provides an overview of the Navy and contractor  industrial base capacity for depot-level maintenance of surface ships  based at the four main overseas homeports.
U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility and Japan Regional Maintenance  Center (SRF-JRMC), Yokosuka, Japan. The Navy’s largest overseas  maintenance facility, SRF-JRMC is located in Yokosuka and is  responsible for the maintenance of 12 surface ships homeported there— including the most destroyers and the only cruisers based outside of the  United States. According to Navy officials, SRF-JRMC in Yokosuka  operates as a public shipyard would in the United States, with three on- base dry docks that fit all sizes of ships based there, as well as other  smaller dry docks. SRF-JRMC employs a Japanese workforce that  conducts the majority of the maintenance workload through a cost- sharing agreement between the United States and Japan. For example,  in fiscal year 2018, SRF-JRMC directly conducted about two-thirds of the  total ship maintenance workload, with about one-third conducted by local  contractors, according to SRF-JRMC workload reporting documentation.  For the contracted work, SRF-JRMC relies on one main contractor,  Sumitomo Heavy Industries, for ship maintenance in Yokosuka, though  additional smaller contractors are also used. Most contracted work also  takes place at Navy facilities on base, according to SRF-JRMC officials.
Ships in Yokosuka are able to receive deeper, more complex  maintenance than other ships based overseas because of the Navy  maintenance capacity at SRF-JRMC, according to NAVSEA officials.  SRF-JRMC in Yokosuka also conducts detailed planning for maintenance  periods that other regional maintenance centers do not, according to  NAVSEA officials. Specifically, it plans all the individual maintenance and  repair tasks to be conducted in each maintenance period, while other  U.S. and overseas maintenance centers can rely on the contractors to  plan the work they do. For additional information on SRF-JRMC in  Yokosuka, Japan, see appendix III.
SRF-JRMC Detachment, Sasebo, Japan. The Navy also operates its  own shipyard with a Japanese workforce at the SRF-JRMC detachment  in Sasebo, though it primarily relies on the local contractor base to  conduct maintenance work. In fiscal year 2018, the SRF-JRMC  detachment directly conducted about one-third of the total maintenance  workload, with nearly two-thirds performed by contractors according to  SRF-JRMC workload reporting documentation. For the contracted work,  the Navy relies on about 14 smaller contractors, and while the SRF- JRMC detachment coordinates the work of the multiple contractors that  may contribute to a single maintenance period, the contractors directly  plan and manage their portion of the work, according to Navy officials.
The SRF-JRMC detachment in Sasebo includes two Navy dry docks,  though only one is used for depot-level maintenance periods. As a result,  dry-dock maintenance and modernization can be conducted on ships  based in Sasebo, but it is generally limited to the four MCM and two LSD  ships. The other amphibious ships based in Sasebo receive depot-level  maintenance that has been planned from about 2 to as long as nearly 9  months, but this does not include dry-dock maintenance. A unique  maintenance consideration in Sasebo is the deployment schedule of the  amphibious ships based there. These ships typically deploy three at a  time with U.S. Marines based in Okinawa on board. As a result, there are  times when all ships are in port and require maintenance, so the  detachment tries to stagger the work with the MCMs and closely  coordinate with contractors there in an effort to manage workload,  according to SRF-JRMC officials. For additional information on the SRF- JRMC detachment in Sasebo, Japan, see appendix IV.
Forward Deployed Regional Maintenance Center (FDRMC)  Detachment, Rota, Spain. The FDRMC detachment and four destroyers  are based in Rota, Spain, where a single state-owned contractor,  Navantia, performs all depot-level maintenance on the ships. Beginning  in 2014, the Navy deployed four destroyers to Spain to support the U.S.  ballistic missile defense mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  The Navy designed the maintenance approach for these ships with the  understanding that they would not require access to Navy- or contractor- operated dry docks during the time they are based in Spain, according to  Navy officials. The Navy initially expected these destroyers to be in Spain  for about 6 years and to receive maintenance every 2 years. However, in  2015 the Navy updated its maintenance strategy for these ships to  provide shorter, but more frequent maintenance periods to support a  longer time basing them in Spain. Under the updated approach, the Navy  plans for each destroyer to receive six maintenance periods during a  roughly 8-year time period based in Spain. For additional information on  the FDRMC detachment in Rota, Spain, see appendix V.
FDRMC Detachment, Manama, Bahrain. The FDRMC detachment in  Bahrain is responsible for the depot-level maintenance of the 10 patrol  coastal and 4 mine countermeasures ships based there—the most ships  based at an overseas homeport. While the Navy does not operate any  dry docks or depot-level repair facilities in Bahrain, it relies on two main  contractors, Bahrain Ship Repairing and Engineering Company and Arab  Shipbuilding and Repair Yard, to conduct ship maintenance in Bahrain.
The ships in Bahrain receive depot-level maintenance at contractor  facilities there. Both contractors in Bahrain have dry docks or similar  capacity to fit the MCMs and PCs based there, as well as some larger  Navy ships. A unique capacity consideration for ships visiting Bahrain,  according to officials there, is that the Navy does not have dedicated pier  space for ships when they come into port. As a result, the Navy must rely  on contractor space for maintenance, and on other pier space when  visiting ships are at the homeport—which they share with others, such as  commercial cruise lines. For additional information on FDRMC  detachment in Manama, Bahrain, see appendix VI.
In addition to the depot-level maintenance periods for the surface ships  we reviewed, the Navy maintenance centers in Japan, Spain, and  Bahrain, also support additional maintenance functions, such as voyage  repairs or technical assistance for visiting U.S. ships; coordinating  intermediate-level maintenance that may be conducted there; and  providing additional maintenance support to overseas ships outside of  scheduled depot-level periods.

	The Navy Did Not Complete the Majority of Maintenance on Time during Fiscal Years 2014 through 2018 for Ships Based Overseas, and Its Analysis on the Causes of Delays Is Limited

The Navy did not complete the majority of the maintenance periods  performed on ships based overseas on time during fiscal years 2014  through 2018. Navy officials identified a variety of factors that contribute  to delays, such as the discovery of additional work requirements after  maintenance has begun or staff shortages affecting management and  oversight of maintenance. The Navy collects information on overseas  maintenance at individual homeports, but its analysis of factors  contributing to the delays is generally focused on the planning and  execution of individual maintenance periods.

		The Navy Underestimated Time Required to Complete the Majority of Maintenance Periods for Ships Based Overseas

The Navy underestimated the time needed to complete maintenance for  50 of the 71 maintenance periods—about 70 percent—started during  fiscal years 2014 through 2018. Specifically, 21 maintenance periods  ended early or on time and 50 maintenance periods ran beyond their  planned schedules, as illustrated in figure 4. More than half of the  maintenance periods that were completed late—29 of 50—went 31 or  more days beyond the Navy’s planned schedule. As a result, from 2014  through 2018 there were 29 times when ships based overseas were  unavailable for operational requirements, certain training, or other  purposes for 31 or more unplanned days. During this time period, the  Navy completed more maintenance periods a month or more later than  planned than it completed early or on time.
As a result of maintenance schedules not being completed on time, all  four overseas Navy homeports with surface ships we analyzed— Yokosuka, Japan; Sasebo, Japan; Rota, Spain; and Manama, Bahrain— experienced a total of 3,475 days ships were in maintenance beyond their  expected durations—referred to in this report as days of maintenance  delay. As illustrated in figure 5, Manama, Bahrain, experienced the most  days of maintenance delay during fiscal years 2014 through 2018, while  Rota, Spain, experienced the least.
We also analyzed delays at overseas homeports by calculating the days  of delay experienced as a percentage of its total workload in terms of total  days of maintenance conducted. Using this analysis, we found that ships  in Bahrain experienced the highest rate of delay at 34 percent while ships  based in Rota, Spain, experienced only a 2.2 percent rate of delay (as  illustrated in figure 6).
Taking workload into account illustrates some difference in the rate at  which each of these homeports experiences ship maintenance delays.  For example, ships in Sasebo and Yokosuka experienced a similar total  number of days ship maintenance was delayed—1,001 days and 994  days over the 5-year time period, respectively. However, when port  workload is taken into account, Sasebo’s rate of delay is higher.  Specifically, ships based in Sasebo experienced a maintenance delay  rate of 31.2 percent compared with 18.5 percent of the time for the  surface ships in Yokosuka.

		Various Factors Contribute to Maintenance Delays for Ships Based Overseas

According to Navy maintenance center officials and crewmembers from  the ships we visited, and our analysis of Navy information, a number of  interrelated factors and issues contribute to maintenance delays for the  surface ships based overseas including:  Discovery of additional, unplanned work after maintenance is  underway. According to maintenance officials in Bahrain and Japan, the  discovery of the need for additional maintenance and repair work after the  work planned for the maintenance period has been finalized is a key  driver of maintenance delays. This additional work can be in the form of  growth in the magnitude of planned work, or identification of the need for  new work that was not previously planned. For example, maintenance  officials in Japan attributed maintenance delays they experienced on  ships at both Yokosuka and Sasebo during fiscal years 2016 through  2018 to this growth in planned work or new work. Similarly, officials in  Bahrain said that growth and new work is one of many contributing  factors to maintenance delays for the aging MCMs and PCs based there.  For example, officials from Commander, Naval Surface Squadron Five  that track their ships’ depot maintenance identified that additional work to  stern tubes on the USS Squall, which is homeported in Bahrain, resulted  in the ship’s maintenance schedule being extended by 137 days. Navy  officials also stated that the reason growth and new work is such a key  driver of delays is that it can add further delays beyond that needed to  complete the repair, due to time required for additional contract actions  and ordering parts that are needed to conduct the added work. A  number of factors can cause or further exacerbate growth and new work,  according to Navy officials. For example, the Navy has made efforts to  catch up on backlogs of deferred maintenance and improve the health  and condition of the ship, so the Navy may decide to extend the  maintenance period to ensure all identified maintenance has been  completed rather than deferring it to a subsequent maintenance period.  Additionally, officials pointed to ships’ complex propulsion,  communication, and weapons systems that have complicated  maintenance and modernization requirements that cannot always be fully  anticipated.
Missing or late maintenance planning milestones. The Joint Fleet  Maintenance Manual emphasizes the importance of meeting planning  milestones to identify, estimate, and schedule the work to be done in the maintenance period. These milestones include steps to guide advanced  planning of initial maintenance requirements and schedules, and to  further refine and develop the work, cost, and schedule estimates for  each maintenance period. For example, these milestones include  assessments of the ship’s condition and other ship checks to identify and  validate planned work intended to minimize growth and new work; to  identify and mitigate risks to planned schedules; and to provide deadlines  for developing and awarding contracts to do the work. Adherence to these  planning milestones becomes more critical as the planned start of the  maintenance period approaches to ensure work can be contracted and  begun on time. The final contract is awarded about 2 months prior to work  beginning, and the Navy finalizes the planned duration and schedule of  the maintenance period about a month before maintenance is scheduled  to begin.
According to Navy officials, missing or late planning milestones can  contribute to maintenance delays. For example, NAVSEA and overseas  maintenance officials emphasized that getting on board a ship at various  points in the planning process to assess the ship’s condition and validate  planned work is critical to developing accurate work scope, cost  estimates, and schedules—otherwise, growth and new work or other  issues can emerge once maintenance is underway. According to the Joint  Fleet Maintenance Manual, ship checks are needed to inform specific  planning milestones, to validate planned work, and should be done as  early in the planning process as possible. The Navy requires this  validation to ensure needed maintenance work is sufficiently defined,  problems are accurately diagnosed, and feasible resolutions are  recommended. However, even though ship condition assessments are  important milestones to limit growth and new work, NAVSEA officials part  of Surface Team One said that these assessments and other checks are regularly postponed, which can prevent work from being identified with  sufficient time to plan for it. Similarly, maintenance officials in Japan said  that, due to the operational tempo in Yokosuka and Sasebo, ships are  often not available for required ship checks until the ship arrives in port at  the start of its maintenance period.
Though officials could not provide the frequency that such milestones are  missed, they said missing assessments and other milestones can  contribute to schedule delays and result in maintenance periods  exceeding planned resources. For example, the Naval Inspector General  found that the shortage of personnel at the FDRMC and Fleet Logistics  Center in Bahrain resulted in contracting milestones being routinely  missed for ships based there, and once these ships were in maintenance,  the growth in work to be completed grew by an average of $830,000 for  maintenance periods in fiscal years 2017 and 2018.
Shortages of experienced and skilled personnel for planning,  management, and oversight. According to NAVSEA and overseas  maintenance center officials, shortages of U.S. personnel that perform  maintenance planning, contracting, and oversight roles, particularly staff  with critical skills and experience, can affect ship maintenance and  contribute to delays. For example:
Personnel shortages hinder staffing of project teams. FDRMC Bahrain  officials said that due to personnel shortages, they are often unable to  assign staff to the project teams until the maintenance period starts.  According to the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual, a project team is  assigned to manage an individual maintenance period, and is  composed of personnel with specific skills and responsibilities.  Additionally, according to CNRMC Instruction 4790.4B, the project  team is responsible for key maintenance planning and execution  activities and related milestones from as early as a year before the  maintenance begins. CNRMC Instruction 4790.4B also states that  such maintenance planning milestones are to aid in developing  project plans, identifying and mitigating risks, and tracking progress of  planning. Project teams are also responsible for overseeing  contracted maintenance work and ensuring it meets quality standards.  For example, prior to the start of the maintenance period, project  teams are responsible for identifying and mitigating risks to  completing maintenance within the planned schedule and budget.  However, officials in Bahrain stated that as a result of persistent  staffing shortages, they have been unable to staff these project teams  until the maintenance period begins, and have also been unable to  provide sufficient oversight of the contractors’ performance during the  maintenance period, which has resulted in maintenance delays.
Shortages of personnel with relevant experience affect management  and oversight of maintenance. Officials in Japan and Bahrain stated  that insufficient numbers of personnel with ship maintenance  experience can negatively affect maintenance timeliness. For  example, the Fleet Logistics Center in Bahrain—which manages the  contracting process for ships based there—had only eight of 18  authorized U.S. civilian contracting-related positions filled, as of March  2019, according to officials. Additionally, of the filled positions, only  one contracting officer had prior experience with ship maintenance  contracting, according to Fleet Logistics Center officials. Officials in  Japan said that experience levels of U.S. civilians at SRF-JRMC have  decreased as a result of high turnover in recent years with the  average amount of work experience for U.S. civilians managing ship  maintenance in Sasebo declining from over 5 years in 2014 to 3 years  in 2017.
Staff shortages on ships affect crews’ ability to conduct maintenance.
Navy officials also emphasized the importance of ship crews in  identifying and providing needed maintenance work, but noted that  ship crew shortages negatively affect on-board ship maintenance.  This can increase the amount of work required during depot-level  maintenance periods. In May 2017, we reported that reduced crew  sizes contributed to maintenance being deferred and increased  maintenance costs, and Navy officials and ships’ crews we spoke to in  Japan and Bahrain stated that ships there continue to experience  manning shortages. For example, from September 2018 through  February 2019, nearly 30 personnel from Bahrain-based Navy  organizations were temporarily assigned to ships based in Bahrain to  fill manning shortages, according to Navy officials and information,  including for maintenance-specific positions.
According to maintenance officials overseas and in the United States,  other factors also can add to the complexity of maintenance planning and  contribute to delays including the length of time it takes to obtain spare  parts overseas, availability of obsolete parts, and other challenges  associated with maintaining aging ships, such as the MCMs and PCs,  which are at or beyond their original service lives.

		The Navy Collects Information on Overseas Maintenance at Individual Homeports, but Its Analysis of Factors Contributing to the Delays Is Limited

The Navy uses a number of mechanisms to monitor the planning and  execution of individual maintenance periods to track progress and  mitigate possible risks. According to Navy documentation and officials,  these mechanisms include:  Individual homeports identify technical reasons for delays on  individual maintenance periods. Maintenance centers overseas and  in the United States monitor the planning and progress of individual  maintenance periods. SRF-JRMC officials in Yokosuka, Japan,  monitor ongoing and recently completed maintenance periods and  may identify technical causes for ship delays. For example, new work  was identified on the main reduction gear of the USS Barry that was  not in the planned work package and led to delays, according to  officials. Additionally, Commander, Naval Surface Squadron Five in  Bahrain tracks instances of growth and new work during the depot- level maintenance periods for the PCs and MCMs based there,  including tracking the specific number of delayed days attributed to  certain issues.
NAVSEA conducts regular meetings to report status of  upcoming and ongoing maintenance. NAVSEA collects information  on and monitors the progress of individual maintenance periods,  including at overseas homeports, through a variety of regular  meetings and briefings. For example, NAVSEA 04 and CNRMC each  conduct biweekly meetings with their respective maintenance centers  to monitor advanced planning of upcoming maintenance periods and  the progress of ongoing maintenance periods for the ships under their  responsibilities, according to officials. Information shared during these  briefings can include tracking whether certain planning milestones are  met and identifying risks to the on-time completion of individual ships’  maintenance periods. This information is then compiled into monthly  briefings to the NAVSEA commander providing a snapshot of  upcoming and ongoing maintenance periods and seeking approval for  adjustments, according to officials.
Collecting and sharing lessons learned throughout the planning  process. According to the Navy’s maintenance manual and related  guidance, the collection and sharing of lessons learned from individual  maintenance periods is to be part of certain planning milestones,  including to inform the maintenance schedule and work estimates. For  example, CNRMC Instruction 4790.4B directs that maintenance  completion conferences with relevant stakeholders are to provide a  detailed review of the maintenance period, including lessons learned  that can be used to plan future maintenance periods, such as to  revise specific work items. According to CNRMC and NAVSEA 04  officials, lessons learned are collected at the end of each  maintenance period and can be shared with other project teams. The  Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual also states that while the lessons  learned process is owned by the type commanders—for surface  ships, these are Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet  for ships in Japan and the western United States, or Commander,  Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, for ships in Spain, Bahrain,  and the eastern United States—the lessons learned process is part of  the Surface Team One structure. However, Surface Team One  officials noted that each of the milestones that include them is led by  other Navy organizations, and its role in the lessons learned process  is managed by a part-time contracted position.
CNRMC tracks overall days of maintenance delay by fiscal year.
CNRMC tracks and monitors the overall number of days individual  ship maintenance periods are delayed and can perform analysis of  overall delays, such as the number of days experienced by ship class  and fiscal year. Additionally, CNRMC analysis has also identified  specific ships that experience the longest delays, though it did not  regularly include maintenance periods in Japan until 2018, according  to officials.
CNRMC tracks costs associated with growth and new work for  individual maintenance periods. CNRMC tracks the costs  associated with growth and new work discovered during maintenance  periods by the regional maintenance centers it manages, including at  overseas detachments in Bahrain and Spain. The costs that are  tracked do not include information on any related delays, however,  and do not include these costs for the ships in Japan.
Other recent Navy efforts have begun to examine issues related  to delays. According to Navy officials, several Navy entities are  beginning efforts to improve the execution of surface ship  maintenance. For example, in fiscal year 2019 the Navy began a  broad effort to improve Navy surface ship, submarine, and aviation  readiness, as well as public shipyards. This effort, called Performance  to Plan, designates Commander, Naval Surface Forces, and  Commander, NAVSEA, to improve performance of ship maintenance  in private and public shipyards. According to Navy officials, the effort  to improve surface ship maintenance consists of a pilot program  examining how to better execute maintenance periods for destroyers,  improve forecasts of maintenance period duration and assessments  of ship condition, planning for growth and new work, and adherence to  planning milestones. However, officials said this effort is still in the  early stage and does not specifically assess maintenance delays for  ships based overseas. NAVSEA’s SURFMEPP and Surface Team  One also have recently begun related efforts. For example,  SURFMEPP officials said they recently began an effort to examine  and correct causes of growth and new work by analyzing changes to  contracts or work items that result in more than $100,000 of additional  cost. However, while officials said in July 2019 that this effort has  been underway for about 9 months, they could not provide additional  information on how it relates to delays. According to NAVSEA officials  that co-chair Surface Team One, it has begun an effort to improve  how adherence to key planning milestones is tracked across surface  ship maintenance periods. To support this effort, in October 2018 the  Navy updated the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual to include  additional requirements for meeting maintenance milestones and to  document any changes, including reasons for those changes.  However, according to officials, these efforts are in their early stages,  and the Navy has not used the information to analyze maintenance  delays for overseas ships.
Although a number of different Navy entities conduct a variety of activities  through which information on maintenance delays is collected and  analyzed, these efforts are limited as the existing analysis is not  comprehensive and systematic in nature. Specifically, the Navy has not  positioned itself well to address the factors contributing to the  maintenance delays because it has not (1) designated an individual entity  responsible for conducting a single, comprehensive systematic analysis  of overseas surface ship maintenance delays; and (2) developed a plan  based on that analysis to address these delays.
First, this is in part because the responsibilities for managing surface ship  maintenance overseas is shared among NAVSEA 21, CNRMC, and  NAVSEA 04, which use somewhat different processes for their work,  according to officials. For example, NAVSEA 04 has responsibility for the  maintenance of aircraft carriers and submarines at naval shipyards, while  CNRMC focuses on surface ships. In addition, until SRF-JRMC was  brought under control of NAVSEA in October 2018, CNRMC was not  regularly including maintenance periods in Japan as part of its tracking  and monitoring of days of maintenance delay. According to officials, an  operating instruction to align roles, responsibilities, and processes for  surface ship maintenance in Japan between CNRMC and NAVSEA 04 is being developed, but as of September 2019, this instruction had not yet  been finalized. Further, CNRMC and NAVSEA 04 officials pointed to  NAVSEA 21 or Surface Team One as more appropriate entities to  conduct a comprehensive systematic analysis of ship maintenance delays  given their broad, enterprise-wide roles for managing and improving  surface ship maintenance.
Surface Team One officials said that it could be an appropriate entity to  conduct such analysis, and according to its charter, one of the entity’s  purposes is to measure performance of the planning and execution of  surface ship maintenance periods and to manage and improve schedule,  cost, and quality. However, officials said they have not conducted such a  systematic analysis of maintenance period performance or developed a  comprehensive plan to address them, in part due to inconsistent  organizational leadership and personnel turnover. According to officials,  since its founding in 2009, Surface Team One has been re-chartered  twice and is in the process of further reorganizing under a fourth version  of its charter. Part of the reason for this reorganization, according to  officials, is to resource and structure Surface Team One to conduct more  systematic, enterprise-wide analyses of issues affecting surface ship  maintenance, for which they hope to develop a plan by the end of 2019.  However, officials said these efforts did not specifically include analysis of  maintenance delays for ships based overseas. Additionally, while Navy  officials said that Performance to Plan efforts could help inform overseas  maintenance delays, this effort is in the early stages of a pilot effort  looking only at destroyer maintenance, and does not specifically analyze  maintenance delays for ships based overseas.
Second, as a result of there being no single, comprehensive analysis of  overseas surface ship maintenance delays, there is no plan for the Navy  to improve the timeliness of its maintenance in a holistic way. Instead,  individual organizations and maintenance centers have identified  improvements for individual ships’ maintenance or have undertaken  efforts to address certain contributing factors to delays. While these  efforts are important, given the interrelated challenges related to  maintenance across the Navy, and that the Navy is dependent upon  synchronized and timely maintenance to provide ships for operations to  meet national security needs, the Navy would benefit from a plan of  action that was comprehensive in nature.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that  management should assign responsibility to achieve objectives and  remediate deficiencies; compare actual performance against planned  performance; and evaluate deficiencies on both an individual basis and in  the aggregate. Further, OMB Circular No. A-123, Management’s  Responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control,  emphasizes that when developing corrective actions, agencies should  perform a root-cause analysis of the deficiency and ensure that  subsequent strategies and plans address the root of the problem and not  just the symptoms. Additionally, our past work on results-oriented  management cites a number of key practices that can strengthen the use  of performance information for process improvements. These practices  include aligning agency-wide goals and measures, and building analytic  capacity to use the information. Our past work has further shown this  information should then be incorporated into improvement plans that  include identifying analytically based goals; results-oriented metrics to  measure progress; required resources, risks, and stakeholders to achieve  those goals; and regularly reporting on progress.
While several different Navy entities have a variety of efforts underway  related to issues associated with ship maintenance delays, without  designating an entity to conduct a comprehensive, systematic analysis to  identify and understand the underlying causes maintenance periods grow  beyond planned schedules, the Navy risks continuing to underestimate  maintenance needs and the time and resources required to address  them. Further, without conducting such an analysis to understand the  underlying, interrelated causes of these delays, and incorporating this  analysis into a comprehensive results-oriented plan to address them, the  Navy cannot effectively target corrective actions to improve timely  completion of ship maintenance to ensure ships are available for the  critical training crews need and operations to support U.S. military and  national security goals.

	Navy Has Not Assessed and Mitigated Risks That Challenges Pose to Implementing Its New Maintenance Approach or Included Overseas Maintenance in Its Plans to Grow Fleet

The Navy is in the process of updating the maintenance approach for  cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships based in Japan, but it has not  assessed and mitigated risks that several challenges may pose to its  successful implementation. Additionally, the Navy has not included  assessments of overseas maintenance requirements in its long-range  plans to support fleet growth to 355 ships.

		The Navy Has Developed a New Maintenance Approach for Surface Ships in Japan Based on the Approach Used in Spain

The Navy has developed a new maintenance approach for the cruisers  and destroyers in Yokosuka and the amphibious ships in Sasebo based  on the approach developed for destroyers in Spain. Specifically, the Navy  developed a new maintenance approach for the four destroyers it began  to deploy to Rota, Spain, in 2014 and 2015 that includes generally  shorter, but more frequent, maintenance periods. According to  maintenance center and other Navy officials, the Navy developed this  approach to avoid conducting dry-dock maintenance overseas so that the  Navy could maximize the time the ships were available for operations.
According to officials, the Navy tailored this approach to the specific  ships, mission, and maintenance resources available in Rota. For  example, the four destroyers in Rota conduct patrols two ships at a time  with predictable patrol schedules. With such specific operational and  maintenance schedules officials said there is little margin for changes,  and adjustments or delays could affect the ships’ operational availability  to support their ballistic missile defense mission. Under this approach, the  Navy completed the majority of its maintenance on these four ships  during fiscal years 2014 through 2018 on time—with only 20 total days of  maintenance delay, equating to a relatively low overall delay rate of 2.2  percent.
Navy officials said that the new maintenance approach in Rota has been  successful because the Navy:  selected four ships with a high degree of commonality; for example,  the ships were of similar age, systems, and equipment configuration,  which helped facilitate planning for and conducting maintenance; ensured the ships received all needed maintenance and  modernization before being sent to Spain, and arrived from the United  States in good condition, which reduced the likelihood that they would  require unexpected maintenance while overseas; designed the maintenance center and its staffing around the  maintenance approach for the four destroyers; and  coordinated with the contractor in Spain to ensure it had sufficient  workforce and resources, including capacity to surge resources if  additional work is discovered so that it can be completed on time.
Based on the performance of the maintenance approach for destroyers in  Spain, officials stated that the Navy began to develop a similar approach  in 2016 for its ships in Japan. NAVSEA officials identified that shorter,  more frequent maintenance could help ensure that its ships based in  Japan received the maintenance they need, while also meeting their high  operational demands. The Navy finalized a new maintenance approach  for cruisers and destroyers in Yokosuka in December 2018, and was in  the process of finalizing the maintenance concept for the amphibious  ships in Sasebo, according to NAVSEA officials in June 2019. For  example, like in Spain, the Navy has adjusted the schedules for the  planned periods in Yokosuka to be shorter, but more frequent. Planning  documents show that under the new approach for the destroyers in  Yokosuka, the Navy plans to provide them with eight maintenance  periods over approximately 8 years overseas before rotating the ships  back to the United States. Previously, the Navy planned for destroyers in  Japan to receive eight maintenance periods over an estimated span of  over 16 years overseas under the prior approach. Under the new  approach, the surface ships in Japan are expected to receive all required  maintenance, including completing most or all backlogged maintenance  according to officials, in the United States before relocating the ships to  Japan. Additionally, while officials expect ships in Yokosuka to receive  some dry-dock maintenance during their rotation overseas, the  amphibious ships in Sasebo generally will not—similar to the  arrangement for destroyers in Spain. As a result, the new maintenance  approach expects that ships in Sasebo will accrue maintenance backlogs  that must be resolved upon return to the United States.

		Several Challenges Pose Risks to Successful Implementation of New Maintenance Approaches Overseas

The Navy has decided to apply its new maintenance approach for  cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships in Japan and in 2018 began  initial implementation on certain ships already based there, but a number  of challenges may pose risks to successful implementation of the  strategy. Based on information from planning documents and officials,  successful implementation relies on several planning assumptions that  may be optimistic when compared to actual experience maintaining  surface ships overseas and in the United States. Specifically, the new  approach in Japan assumes that:
Ships will receive robust, deep maintenance and modernization in the  U.S. and meet their life-cycle health requirements prior to overseas  assignment.
Ships will receive and complete planned maintenance on time while  overseas to maximize operational availability.
Ships will rotate back to receive full maintenance in the United States  after no longer than 9 years of overseas assignment.
However, Navy officials and our analysis identified several challenges: (1)  U.S. industrial base maintenance capacity limitations, (2) maintenance  delays in the United States and overseas, (3) the ability of the overseas  contractor industrial base to support future workload in Japan, and (4)  differences in the operating environments between Spain and Japan.  These challenges, which are discussed below in more detail, could pose  risks to the successful implementation of the new maintenance approach.
U.S. industrial base maintenance capacity limitations. Implementing  the new maintenance approach in Japan assumes that the ships  identified for deployment will receive all required maintenance and  modernization in the United States prior to being based overseas.  However, the Navy has been challenged to do this in the past due to  limited domestic maintenance capacity. For example, the Navy deferred  maintenance assessments of the condition of the USS Barry and USS  Milius that were to take place in the United States before moving the  ships to Japan. As a result, Navy officials said these assessments had to  be done in Japan. Additionally, upon arriving in Japan in November 2017,  the USS Barry had to begin immediate unscheduled maintenance to  correct various issues, and as of our visit in February 2019, was still  undergoing maintenance. According to U.S. Pacific Fleet and  maintenance center officials, in fiscal year 2014 the USS Curtis Wilbur  received modernization in Japan due to lack of capacity in the United  States.
Further, Navy planning documents identified U.S. commercial dry-dock  capacity shortfalls that may hinder the Navy’s ability to support the future  maintenance workload in the United States. For example, the Navy’s  Long-Range Plan for the Maintenance and Modernization of Naval  Vessels for Fiscal Year 2020 identified limited U.S. dry-dock capacity in  the United States as posing a significant challenge to maintenance of  U.S.-homeported ships and that this situation reduces the margin for  schedule changes. According to the Navy’s analysis, demand for surface  ship maintenance in the United States will exceed available maintenance  resources for fiscal years 2019 through 2026. During this time, the Navy  will be rotating ships based in the United States to exchange with those  currently based in Japan and Spain. Navy officials said the capacity  shortfall in the United States negatively affects ship condition and  maintenance of ships sent to Japan. However, the Navy’s analysis does  not account for the need to perform deep maintenance and modernization  on ships in the United States before and after sending them to overseas  homeports, as required by the new maintenance approach for ships  bound for Japan, as well as Spain.
Maintenance delays in the United States and overseas. Maintenance  delays at both U.S. and overseas homeports may also affect the Navy’s  implementation of its new maintenance approach. Successful  implementation of the new approach depends in part on ships receiving  all required maintenance on time prior to moving overseas, as well as  receiving timely maintenance during their time based abroad. Our  analysis of Navy surface ship maintenance periods that started in fiscal  years 2014 through 2018 found that about 60 percent of maintenance  periods in the United States ran 31 or more days beyond schedule.  Additionally, our analysis shows that ships homeported at both U.S. and  overseas locations experienced an average rate of delay of about 25  percent (see fig. 7). Additionally, rates of delay in Sasebo, where the  Navy plans to implement one of its new maintenance approaches, exceed  30 percent.
According to Navy officials, the new maintenance approach for ships in  Japan is intended to provide more frequent maintenance periods, in an  effort to improve ship maintenance and to maximize ships’ availability for  operations. However, the approach also relies on most of these  maintenance periods being shorter—and being completed on time. Given  the Navy’s history of persistent maintenance delays in Japan, this could  be a challenge. Further, Navy officials said that maintenance delays  experienced in the United States could also affect the maintenance that  ships bound for and returning from overseas homeports may receive, and  pose a risk that maintenance will be deferred to overseas homeports.
Challenges with overseas contractor industrial base meeting future  workload in Japan. Navy maintenance officials in Spain said that  successful implementation of the new maintenance approach there relied  on sufficient contractor capacity overseas, and that the Navy involved the  contractor in the development of the maintenance approach to ensure  they could implement it.
In contrast, Navy officials in Japan stated that current contractor capacity  may not meet expected future workload. For example, Navy  documentation shows that contractors performed almost two-thirds of  ship maintenance in Sasebo in fiscal year 2018. Additionally, the  documentation shows that maintenance planned for fiscal year 2020 is  expected to increase beyond existing Navy and contractor capacity.  Maintenance in Sasebo relies on a number of smaller contractors, and  these contractors have experienced challenges planning for the  unpredictable maintenance workload there, according to officials.  Specifically, the amphibious ships based in Sasebo typically deploy as a  group of three. As a result, Navy officials said the workload in Sasebo  can be uneven. When all three ships return to port, they require  maintenance at the same time. The Navy found that contractors have  difficulty planning for this uneven workload, among other issues, which  can deter contractors from bidding on work. For example, in fiscal year  2015, the Navy found that they were unable to award over 25 percent of  work planned for contractors in Sasebo because no contractor bid on the  work. The Navy plans to add a fifth amphibious ship in Sasebo in fiscal  year 2020, in part to provide a more stable workload there, according to  officials. The Navy expects the additional ship will also result in a  forecasted increase in overall maintenance workload there.
Navy officials also expressed concerns about the continuity of the existing  industrial base in Yokosuka to be able to support future Navy needs.  According to Navy documentation, in fiscal year 2018, about one-third of  ship maintenance in Yokosuka was conducted by contractors, and,  according to officials, the Navy relied on one main contractor to conduct  much of this work. However, Navy maintenance center officials in Japan  stated they have concerns about the continuity of the contractor to  support this workload. The Navy has begun efforts to consider conducting  maintenance at contractor facilities outside the ships’ homeports of  Yokosuka and Sasebo. Specifically, the Navy has begun to consider  using contractor facilities located outside the Yokosuka area, as far as 2  hours away from where the ships are currently based. For example, Navy  officials told us that they conducted market research and outreach to  potential contractors, and have awarded a small contract for a short  continuous maintenance period to a new contractor about 30 minutes  outside the Yokosuka area. However, maintenance and contracting  officials stated these efforts face their own challenges. For example,  conducting weeks or months of maintenance on a ship as far as 2 hours  outside a ship’s homeport—where crews and families live—could require  additional travel, housing, and other costs. Additionally, maintenance and  contracting officials in Yokosuka stated that the substantial regulatory,  legal, and Navy requirements that private companies must adopt to  contract with the U.S. government might serve as disincentives for  prospective Japanese contractors, and developing these contractors will  take time.
Differences in the operating environments in Japan and Spain.  According to NAVSEA officials, the decision to apply the approach in  Japan was based on its timely performance in Spain, but the ships,  missions, and operating environment in Yokosuka and Sasebo differ  substantially from the environment in Spain. For example:
Greater diversity and number of ships in Japan. Navy officials told us  that the four destroyers sent to Rota in 2014 and 2015 were  specifically chosen with similar age, configuration, and condition,  which made it easier to sustain the maintenance approach, since  issues and lessons from one ship could be easily applied to the next.  The ships in Japan in fiscal year 2019 consisted of a more diverse set  of ships—eight destroyers and three cruisers in Yokosuka, and  various classes of amphibious ships in Sasebo. According to officials,  these ships are of different configurations and capabilities.
Greater workload and staffing challenges in Japan. Navy officials  have attributed the persistent maintenance delays experienced in  Japan to insufficient U.S. maintenance prior to deployment,  insufficient estimation of the maintenance work package, missed  planning milestones, staffing challenges, and other causes, that are  not currently being experienced in Rota.
Less predictability in operational tempo in Japan. According to Navy  officials in Rota, the four ships based there have the same mission,  regular and predictable patrol schedules, and do not go above Navy  deployment limits. Additionally, officials said the patrol schedules  allow for some additional maintenance to be conducted when ships  are in port, if needed. As a result, Navy officials in Rota said that they  are able to meet key maintenance planning milestones such as  conducting ship checks and other assessments.
In Japan, however, Navy officials and operational commanders  described operational tempo as more unpredictable, and that ships  can be unavailable due to the operational demands of the varied  missions with different timeframes for ships in Seventh Fleet’s area of  responsibility. For example, according to Seventh Fleet officials, the  cruisers and destroyers in Yokosuka are expected to serve a number  of different missions, including conducting patrols around Japan or  Guam; providing ship presence in the East China Sea; or escorting  the carrier as part of the strike group. Additionally, according to Navy  officials, operational tempo in Japan continues to be high, and in 2015  we reported that to meet increasing demands overseas, the Navy has  extended deployments and increased operational tempo.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that it is a  key responsibility of management to analyze and respond to identified  changes and related risks, and to monitor program effectiveness. These  standards also note that changing conditions often result in new risks or  changes to existing risks that need to be assessed. Additionally, the  April 2011 DOD Product Support Business Case Analysis Guidebook  further states that each risk should be reviewed and assessed, and that  effective mitigation plans may involve making tradeoffs in capabilities,  schedule, and performance.
However, NAVSEA officials said the Navy has not assessed the risks  posed by these challenges to implementing its new maintenance  approach in Japan. Instead, officials based the decision to implement the  approach in Japan on the performance of the approach in Rota, Spain.  Without a full assessment of the risks these challenges may pose to  successful implementation of its new maintenance approach, and without  identifying ways to mitigate any risks posed by these challenges, the  Navy cannot ensure its overseas homeported ships complete all required  maintenance as planned in support of fleet readiness needs.

		The Navy Plans to Grow Its Fleet but Has Not Included Overseas Ship Maintenance Requirements in Its Plans

The Navy’s timeline for growing the fleet from 290 total ships (as of  September 2019) to 355 ships shows that the largest increase will be in  the number of surface ships. Specifically, the Navy plans to increase the  number of surface ships in the fleet by a total of 48 ships in the next 15  years, or by 2034. However, the Navy’s long-range plans to grow its fleet  do not consider the maintenance these ships will require while based or  traveling overseas. The Navy’s Report to Congress on the Annual Long- Range Plan for Maintenance and Modernization of Naval Vessels for  Fiscal Year 2020, which is intended to assess the maintenance and  modernization requirements for the fleet as it grows, only assesses  maintenance provided by private and public shipyards in the United  States, not overseas. It does not identify or assess the maintenance  requirements needed overseas—including those provided by Navy  facilities or the contractor industrial base. Moreover, it does not identify  overseas requirements, such as any expected changes in the number of  ships based there or growth in the number of ships visiting overseas  locations from the United States. For example:
As the number of ships in the overall fleet grows, NAVSEA officials  said they expect the number of ships based overseas to grow  proportionally, and the number of U.S.-based ships conducting  operations and exercises overseas to increase, thereby increasing  overseas maintenance requirements. However, the expected increase  in the fleet and associated maintenance requirements for ships based  and visiting overseas were not included in the recent long-range  plans. For example, according to officials, the Navy plans to base an  additional amphibious ship in Sasebo, Japan, by fiscal year 2020, and  the Navy is examining a possible increase to the number of  destroyers in Rota, Spain. According to maintenance center officials  in Rota, increasing the number of ships based in Rota would require  additional planning to meet the Navy’s needs, such as negotiating  with the Government of Spain to request additional capacity, such as  pier space, for such future requirements.
The Navy projects the number and type of ships based in Japan and  Bahrain to change in the next few years. Specifically, the Navy plans  to decommission the mine countermeasures (MCM) ships currently  homeported in Japan and Bahrain by 2023 and replace them with  littoral combat ships to perform the mine countermeasures missions.  However, maintenance center officials in Bahrain stated that as of  March 2019, plans for the overseas maintenance of littoral combat  ships remained uncertain, even though officials expect the initial  deployments of littoral combat ships to Bahrain to begin as early as  2020. Additionally, the Navy has not developed deployment timelines  and overseas maintenance requirements for littoral combat ships in  the Middle East and Western Pacific areas of operation, even though  the USS Montgomery arrived in Singapore to begin its overseas  rotational deployment in July 2019. According to Navy officials, the  Navy expects long-term deployments of littoral combat ships to both  areas of operation as the MCMs are decommissioned.
Ships based in the United States also rely on voyage repair at  overseas shipyards while conducting missions or patrols. For  example, according to the Navy’s annual report to Congress listing all  repairs and maintenance performed on Navy ships, in fiscal year  2018, the maintenance center in Bahrain conducted voyage repairs  for the USS Monterey and USS Arleigh Burke, both based in Norfolk,  Virginia, and the USS The Sullivans, based in Mayport, Florida.  Additionally, voyage repairs were conducted in Japan for visiting Navy  ships and submarines based in Washington and Hawaii.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that it is a  key responsibility of management to consider changes within the  environment and other factors, and analyze and respond to identified  changes and related risks through methods such as strategic planning  and other assessments. These standards also note that conditions  affecting the organization and its environment continually change, and  management can anticipate and plan for significant changes by using a  forward-looking process.
NAVSEA officials said that when planning for future growth, they have  focused on analyzing U.S. industrial base issues and potential mitigations  to increase capacity for U.S.-based ship maintenance as demand grows  beyond existing dry docks and pier space. Officials said the Navy did not  analyze overseas maintenance requirements or projected growth  overseas to include in the long-range plan. According to NAVSEA  officials, future iterations of long-term maintenance planning are to  include analysis of the Navy’s overseas maintenance capacity, which  Navy officials said could begin in March 2020. As the Navy continues its  long-term maintenance planning, it will be important for the Navy to  conduct and include analysis of anticipated overseas maintenance  requirements given that substantial growth of surface ships is expected  through 2034—including destroyers and amphibious ships, two types of  ships currently based overseas. Without analyzing maintenance needs  and requirements for ships based overseas, including any projected  growth or other force changes, in its long-range plans, the Navy cannot  ensure it is sufficiently planning for the total needs—and resulting  readiness and health—of the future fleet.

	Conclusions

The Navy bases and maintains 38 surface ships—such as destroyers,  cruisers, and amphibious ships, among others—at homeports outside of  the United States. The 2018 National Defense Strategy has prioritized  military readiness, which depends in part on ships completing  maintenance on time, to ensure that the United States is positioned to  respond to events quickly all over the world. Ship maintenance is a  complex process involving numerous Navy and private industry  stakeholders that devote substantial time and effort to ensure that ships  receive the maintenance they need. Yet we have previously reported on  the persistent delays and other challenges the Navy faces in completing  maintenance on time both for ships in the United States and overseas.  While a number of entities in the Navy have different efforts underway to  examine individual ship maintenance issues, a comprehensive,  systematic understanding of the underlying and interrelated causes for  these delays is essential to implementing corrective actions to ensure  these strategically based ships are able and ready for operations when  needed.
The Navy has also taken steps to adjust its maintenance strategies to  improve ship maintenance while balancing the high operational demands  for ships based in Japan. Additionally, the Navy has begun planning to  grow the fleet, but the expected increase in the fleet and associated  maintenance requirements for ships based and visiting overseas were not  included in the recent long-range plans. Also, the Navy’s plans to  implement updated maintenance strategies overseas, as well as to grow  the total fleet, were developed without accounting for risks that challenges  may pose to these strategies, as well as analysis of the necessary  overseas maintenance requirements to sustain the Navy’s strategically  important ships homeported or visiting overseas locations. Ensuring the  Navy’s maintenance plans and capacity for the total fleet align with its  plans for substantial future fleet growth will enhance the Navy’s ability to  conduct timely maintenance of its overseas surface fleet, which, in turn, is  essential to the Navy achieving its strategic goals.

	Recommendations

We are making a total of five recommendations to DOD.
The Secretary of the Navy should assign responsibility to an entity to  conduct a single, comprehensive systematic analysis of overseas surface  ship maintenance delays. (Recommendation 1)
The Secretary of the Navy should ensure the designated entity conducts  a comprehensive, systematic analysis to identify the underlying,  interrelated causes of overseas surface ship maintenance delays.  (Recommendation 2)
The Secretary of the Navy should use the results of the analysis to  develop a plan to address surface ship maintenance delays overseas.  Such a plan should incorporate results-oriented elements, including  analytically based goals, identification of risks to achieving those goals,  identification of required resources and stakeholders, metrics to measure  progress, and regular reporting on progress. (Recommendation 3)
The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that Naval Sea Systems  Command assesses and mitigates risks posed by any challenges, such  as persistent delays and capacity limitations, to successful  implementation of its new maintenance approach in Japan.  (Recommendation 4)
The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that Naval Sea Systems  Command conducts analysis to include overseas maintenance  requirements as part of its long-term maintenance plan to support the  planned growth and readiness of the fleet. (Recommendation 5)

	Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In  written comments provided by the Navy (reproduced in appendix VII),  DOD concurred with our recommendations. The Navy also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and  other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at  maurerd@gao.gov or (202) 512-9627. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix VIII.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report (1) describes existing maintenance capacity and approaches  the Navy uses for surface ships based overseas, (2) assesses the extent  to which the Navy completed maintenance periods as scheduled in fiscal  years 2014 through 2018 and analyzes factors contributing to any delays,  and (3) evaluates the extent to which the Navy has assessed any  challenges facing future overseas ship maintenance efforts.
The scope of this review includes the regularly scheduled depot-level  maintenance of surface ships based overseas, the maintenance of which  is generally the responsibility of Naval Sea Systems Command  (NAVSEA). These ships comprised 38 of the 40 ships based overseas  during the time period we analyzed, and consisted of the following ship  classes: guided-missile cruisers (CG 47 class), guided-missile destroyers  (DDG 51 class), mine countermeasures ships (MCM 1 class), patrol  coastal ships (PC 1 class), amphibious assault ships (LHD 1 class),  amphibious transport dock ships (LPD 17 class), dock landing ships (LSD  41 class), and an amphibious command ship (LCC 19 class). These  ships were based overseas at homeports located in Japan, Spain, and  Bahrain as of the end of fiscal year 2018.
For objective one, to describe existing capacity and maintenance  approaches the Navy uses for the regularly scheduled depot-level  maintenance periods for the 38 surface ships based overseas during the  time of our review, we reviewed Navy documents and information on the  Navy’s overseas maintenance centers’ physical capacity and authorized  workforce, local contractor industrial base and capacity, and other Navy  organizations and commands responsible for planning, managing, and  overseeing the maintenance of these ships. To examine physical  capacity, we analyzed Navy information on U.S. and contractor facilities  and equipment such as dry docks and information on future planning or  improvements. We reviewed NAVSEA information and data on ship  maintenance periods, as well as information and documentation on  historic and forecasted workloads at each homeport, including the  number and type of ships that have received maintenance at those  shipyards. We also reviewed Navy maintenance plans and guidance that  document Navy maintenance approaches and organizations at overseas  homeports. We conducted site visits to three overseas homeports— Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan, and Manama, Bahrain—where the Navy  bases a majority of the surface ships overseas. We observed the physical  capacity and operations of the maintenance centers and shipyards there,  as well as the Forward Deployed Regional Maintenance Center (FDRMC)  headquarters in Naples, Italy. We interviewed cognizant officials at Navy  commands, numbered fleets, and maintenance centers, including officials  at all the overseas maintenance centers responsible for ships based  overseas: the U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility and Japan Regional  Maintenance Center (SRF-JRMC) in Yokosuka, Japan, and its  detachment in Sasebo, and the FDRMC headquarters in Naples, Italy, as  well as its two detachments—in Rota, Spain, and Manama, Bahrain.
For objective two, to assess the extent to which maintenance schedules  are completed as planned, we analyzed Navy data on regularly  scheduled, depot-level maintenance periods for surface ships—including  those maintained at overseas homeports and in the United States.  NAVSEA collects and manages data on these maintenance periods— known as Chief of Naval Operations maintenance availabilities—for  surface ships, submarines, and aircraft carriers. We obtained the data on  surface ship depot-level maintenance periods used by NAVSEA’s Surface  Maintenance Engineering Planning Program and the Commander, Navy  Regional Maintenance Center (SURFMEPP). We used Navy data to  identify depot-level maintenance periods conducted at each homeport  starting in fiscal years 2014 through 2018 and to assess the extent to  which maintenance schedules for ships based overseas were executed as planned from fiscal year 2014 through 2018, and the delays  experienced.
To assess the reliability of this data, we interviewed cognizant NAVSEA  officials to understand system operating procedures, organizational roles  and responsibilities, and any data limitations. NAVSEA provided  information based on our questions regarding data reliability, including an  overview of the data, data-collection processes and procedures, data  quality controls, and overall perceptions of data quality. NAVSEA also  provided documentation of how the systems are structured and what  written procedures are in place to help ensure that the appropriate  information is collected and properly categorized. We interviewed officials  from SURFMEPP and CNRMC to obtain further clarification on data  reliability, discuss how the data were collected and reported, and explain  how we planned to use the data. Some of these data were used in prior  reports, and their reliability had previously been assessed. In addition, we  also assessed the reliability of the data by checking: (1) for missing data  entries, (2) for duplicate records, and (3) to ensure the data was  formatted consistently. We determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of summarizing surface ship maintenance  periods and related information at homeports both overseas and in the  United States, including reporting on the duration of maintenance periods  and the number of days of maintenance delays.
Because maintenance periods may cross over one or more fiscal years,  to be able to report on days ships spent in maintenance periods from  fiscal years 2014 through 2018, we analyzed data on maintenance  periods that began in fiscal years 2012 through 2018 for all surface ships  included in the data, including those based at overseas and U.S.  homeports. Specifically, we used the dates of the planned and actual  durations of the maintenance periods in our data set to determine the  total number of days ships spent in maintenance in fiscal years 2014  through 2018 and by how many days the maintenance periods were  extended beyond their planned number of days—which the Navy refers to  “days of maintenance delay.” To determine the total number of days  ships spent in maintenance in each fiscal year, we allocated the number  of days spent in maintenance periods according to the fiscal year in which  the maintenance days occurred. After we calculated the number of days  each maintenance period went beyond the planned duration, we allocated  these days of maintenance delay to the fiscal years in which they  occurred. To compare ship maintenance delays experienced at different  homeports while accounting for the varying workload at each, we  calculated days of maintenance delay as a percentage of the total  number of days ships spent in maintenance periods each location, which  resulted in a rate of delay that we could compare across homeports. In  addition, we analyzed the number of maintenance periods that were  completed on or ahead of time or were completed later than planned, and  we examined these maintenance durations by the fiscal year in which the  maintenance periods started.
We interviewed officials to understand the reasons they identified for  delays. We reviewed the actions the Navy has taken to identify, evaluate,  and resolve these delays, including information in Navy policies,  guidance, and documentation on the planning, management, and  oversight of overseas ship maintenance. This information included the  Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual and related Navy instructions,  documents establishing maintenance requirements. We also reviewed  Navy guidance and documentation on the planning and execution of  maintenance for ships based overseas and in the United States, including  documentation such as status briefings, planning documents, and lessons  learned information identifying certain reasons for maintenance delays of  individual maintenance periods. We interviewed cognizant Navy officials  responsible for planning, managing, and conducting oversight for surface  ship maintenance in the United States and overseas to understand how  they produce and use this information to improve maintenance planning  and execution. We compared this information to standards for planning,  scheduling, and monitoring events to correct deficiencies and identify  process improvements, including Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government, which includes principles pertaining to oversight  responsibility, evaluating issues, and remediating deficiencies; our  Schedule Assessment Guide; and OMB Circular No. A-123,  Management’s Responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management and  Internal Control, which includes guidance on conducting a root-cause  analysis when developing corrective actions. We also compared this  information with our past work identifying best practices for results- oriented performance management and planning.
For objective three, to assess the extent to which the Navy has assessed  and mitigated challenges that may affect overseas ship maintenance  efforts, including new maintenance approaches and future maintenance  requirements as the Navy seeks to grow the fleet, we analyzed Navy  documentation, NAVSEA data, and available information documenting  challenges that affect maintenance overseas, as well in the United States.  We also analyzed Navy efforts to address these challenges, as well as  Navy plans for future fleet growth and maintenance workload, including  the long-range plans for shipbuilding and maintenance as the Navy seeks  to grow its fleet, as well as other studies and analyses pertaining to these  plans. We interviewed cognizant Navy officials who plan, execute, and  oversee overseas shipyards and maintenance, as well as operational  commanders, to obtain their perspectives on issues and challenges  associated with execution of ship maintenance. We compared this  information to government standards for planning and monitoring events  to assess changes in risk, correct deficiencies, and identify process  improvements, including Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government and DOD Product Support Business Case Analysis  Guidebook.
Logistics, Maintenance, and Industrial Operations (NAVSEA 04)
Deputy Commander for Ship Maintenance and Modernization (NAVSEA 21)
Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center (CNRMC)
Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP)
U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility and Japan Regional Maintenance Center (Yokosuka, Japan, and detachment in Sasebo, Japan)
Forward Deployed Regional Maintenance Center in Naples, Italy, and its detachments in Rota, Spain, and Manama, Bahrain
Naval Supply Systems Command Fleet Logistics Centers in Yokosuka, Japan, and Manama, Bahrain
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa
Human Resources Office for Commander Navy Region Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia (CNREURAFSWA)
We conducted this performance audit from August 2018 to February 2020  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Organizations with Responsibility for Surface Ship Maintenance Overseas

History and Mission  The Ship Repair Facility and Japan  Regional Maintenance Center  (SRF-JRMC) was originally created  in 1947 as the Ship Repair  Department, and in 1951 became  the Ship Repair Facility. In 2004 it  became the combined SRF-JRMC.  Headquartered in Yokosuka, SRF- JRMC provides oversight and  support to its detachment in  Sasebo and is responsible for the  maintenance for ships based in  Yokosuka. SRF-JRMC also  provides technical assistance and  voyage repairs for Navy ships  visiting Japan.
U.S. Navy Surface Ship Maintenance Snapshot  Surface Ships Maintained in Yokosuka as of Fiscal Year 2018  8 Guided-missile destroyers (DDG)  3 Guided-missile cruisers (CG)  1 Amphibious command ship (LCC)
Fiscal Year 2018 Authorized SRF-JRMC Workforce   U.S. Civilians: 272   U.S. Navy: 108   Japanese nationals: 2,341 (paid for by the Government of Japan)
In 2018, the Navy finalized a new maintenance approach for cruisers and  destroyers based in Yokosuka. This approach relies on deep maintenance in the  United States prior to ships moving to Japan, and increases the frequency of  maintenance periods while ships are in Japan. The Navy has begun efforts to  identify additional private companies to conduct ship maintenance to meet future  planned workload, according to Navy officials.
History and Mission  The Ship Repair Facility and Japan  Regional Maintenance Center  (SRF-JRMC) detachment in  Sasebo was originally designated  as the Sasebo Office to the Ship  Repair Facility in Yokosuka in  1976, and made a detachment in  1984. The SRF-JRMC detachment  is responsible for supporting the  maintenance for the eight surface  ships based in Sasebo, and can  provide technical assistance and  other maintenance to ships in and  visiting Japan.
U.S. Navy Surface Ship Maintenance Snapshot  Surface Ships Maintained in Sasebo as of Fiscal Year 2018  1 Amphibious Assault Ship (LHD)  1 Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)  2 Dock Landing Ships (LSD)  4 Mine Countermeasures Ships (MCM)  Fiscal Year 2018 Authorized SRF-JRMC Workforce   U.S. Civilians: 65   U.S. Navy: 40   Japanese nationals: 450 (paid for by the Government of Japan)
U.S. Navy Surface Ship Maintenance Snapshot  Surface Ships Maintained in Rota as of Fiscal Year 2018  4 Guided-missile destroyers (DDG)
Fiscal Year 2018 Authorized FDRMC Workforce  U.S. Civilians: 73   U.S. Navy: 8   Future Considerations  The Navy plans to rotate the four current ships back to the United States  beginning in 2020 through 2022. FDRMC officials said the next set of ships  will not be as standardized as the first four. Additionally, the Senate Armed  Services Committee has directed the Navy to assess the feasibility of  increasing the number of guided-missile destroyers based in Rota from four  to six. FDRMC officials said increasing the number of ships would require  additional staff and physical infrastructure that would need to be negotiated  with the Spanish government.
History and Mission  The Forward Deployed Regional  Maintenance Center detachment in  Bahrain (FDRMC Detachment  Bahrain) was established in June  2014. FDRMC Detachment  Bahrain manages the maintenance  of ships based there, and can  provide fleet technical assistance  and coordinate voyage repairs for  other ships in the U.S. Fifth Fleet  area of operations including Military  Sealift Command ships and visiting  U.S. Navy ships. FDRMC  Detachment Bahrain manages the  maintenance for the most  homeported ships of all overseas  locations.
U.S. Navy Surface Ship Maintenance Snapshot  Surface Ships Maintained in Manama as of Fiscal Year 2018  10 Patrol Coastal Ships (PC)  4 Mine Countermeasures Ships (MCM)
Fiscal Year 2018 Authorized FDRMC Workforce  U.S. Civilians: 87   U.S. Navy: 29   Foreign nationals: 14  Future Considerations  Beginning in fiscal year 2020, the Navy will decommission U.S.-based MCMs  to provide spare parts to MCMs overseas. The Navy plans to decommission  the MCMs and PCs in Bahrain in fiscal years 2023 and 2026, respectively.  The Navy plans to replace the MCM mission with littoral combat ships but  has not finalized plans for their deployment or maintenance, according to  Navy officials.

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition the contact named above, the following staff members made  key contributions to this report: Suzanne Wren (Assistant Director), Sally  Williamson (Analyst in Charge), David Ballard, Martin De Alteriis,  Alexandra Gonzalez, Amie Lesser, Shahrzad Nikoo, Carol Petersen,  Clarice Ransom, Rachel Schultz, and Samuel Woo.

Related GAO Products

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Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Evaluate the Effectiveness of  Changes to Surface Warfare Officer Training. GAO-20-154. Washington,  D.C.: November 14, 2019.
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Military Readiness: Clear Policy and Reliable Data Would Help DOD  Better Manage Service Members’ Time Away from Home. GAO-18-253.  Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2018.
Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance,  Training, and Other Challenges Affecting the Fleet. GAO-17-809T.  Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2017.
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Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance,  Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet. GAO-17-798T.  Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2017.
Navy Shipbuilding: Policy Changes Needed to Improve the Post-Delivery  Process and Ship Quality. GAO-17-418. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2017.
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Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and  Composition of Ship Crews. GAO-17-413. Washington, D.C.: May 18,  2017.
Navy Ship Maintenance: Action Needed to Maximize New Contracting  Strategy’s Potential Benefits. GAO-17-54. Washington, D.C.: November  21, 2016.
Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s  Optimized Fleet Response Plan. GAO-16-466R. Washington, D.C.: May  2, 2016.
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