Input:
	Background

AFSOC is the Air Force component of U.S. Special Operations Command  and is responsible for providing Air Force capabilities and forces to  support special operations activities. Special operations are operations  requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment,  and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive  environments. Demand for AFSOC capabilities, including those provided  by the ARC, is identified as part of the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  Global Force Management process for assigning and allocating forces to  meet global requirements. This process allows the Secretary of Defense  to strategically manage forces—including the military services,  conventional forces, and special operations forces—to support strategic  guidance and meet combatant commander requirements. As part of this  process, the Joint Staff validates requirements for forces. U.S. Special  Operations Command, as the joint force provider, is responsible for  identifying and recommending forces to support special operations  requirements.
U.S. Special Operations Command coordinates with its service  component commands, including AFSOC, to determine which capabilities  and specific units are best suited to meet validated requirements for  special operations capabilities. After receiving these requirements,  AFSOC considers its available options to provide the capabilities needed.  This consideration includes reviewing active duty and reserve component  units that provide specific sets of capabilities, such as intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance; personnel recovery; and radio and  television broadcasting for psychological operations.
If AFSOC, in conjunction with Headquarters Air Force, determines that  the best solution to meet a requirement is to use capabilities from the  ARC, it can rely on either volunteerism or involuntary recall to active  duty—referred to as involuntary mobilization—to activate the needed  forces. These two types of activation are described below.
Volunteerism. The Secretary of the Air Force is authorized to activate  ARC personnel on active duty with the consent of those individuals;  however, the consent of the state governor is required for the  voluntary activation of ANG personnel. According to Joint Publication  4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning (Feb. 21, 2014), volunteerism is  important because it enables a service to fill required positions with  reserve component personnel without its counting against the  statutory limits related to involuntary mobilization. However, the  guidance also states that volunteerism should be used judiciously,  because excessive use of volunteers removes personnel from reserve  component units, which could result in a reduction of the unit’s  readiness in the event of unit mobilization. Another factor that  mobilization planners must take into account is dwell time policy in  relation to deployments. Furthermore, the Air Force has established  specific goals for managing the operational tempo of its forces, and  planners need to consider this factor as well.
Involuntary Mobilization. Any unit or individual of a reserve component  may be ordered to active duty under multiple mobilization statutory  authorities under Title 10 of the U.S. Code that vary regarding the  number of personnel who can be mobilized, the duration of the  mobilization, and the approval authority. For example, section 12304  of Title 10, U.S. Code, provides authority to the President to  involuntarily activate up to 200,000 members of the selected reserve  for up to 365 days to augment active forces for an operational mission  or in response to certain emergencies.

	AFSOC’s Mobilization Process Does Not Fully Support ARC Needs for Timely and Reliable Information

		Air Force Has Established Guidance and Processes for Mobilizing the ARC

AFSOC is required to follow Air Force guidance for accessing ARC units  and personnel. The Air Force guidance implements DOD Instruction  1235.12, Accessing the Reserve Components (RC), which establishes  the overarching policies and procedures for accessing the reserve  components for all military departments. When AFSOC officials  determine that ARC capabilities are the appropriate option for a given  special operation requirement, their access to the reserve component is  governed by Air Force Instruction 10-301, Managing Operational  Utilization Requirements of the Air Reserve Component Forces. This  instruction outlines roles and responsibilities for managing requirements  for reserve component capabilities accessed through both involuntary  mobilizations and volunteerism. Among other things, it establishes that  AFSOC use the reserve component in a cyclical or periodic manner that  provides predictability to ARC individuals, to the individual’s employer,  and to the combatant command receiving the capabilities.
The process for accessing the reserve component through involuntary  mobilization is further outlined in Air Force Instruction 10-402,  Mobilization Planning. This guidance implements and expands on the  specific timelines for particular milestones during the mobilization process  established in DOD Instruction 1235.12, such as the identification of the  types of capabilities required and of the unit responsible for providing  them. These timelines vary, depending on whether the requirement for  capabilities is known well ahead of mobilization—a rotational, or  preplanned, requirement—or, conversely, is emergent.
Rotational or preplanned requirements: AFSOC must provide the  reserve component with a request for particular capabilities at least  330 days prior to the mobilization, to allow ANG or AFR officials to  identify the specific individuals who are available to support the  request. Air Force guidance communicates the time frames in which  reserve component personnel are to receive their mobilization orders.  Specifically, AFSOC is required to submit requests to mobilize the  ARC to Air Force headquarters to provide the Secretary of the Air  Force enough time to approve the request; and then to communicate  with ANG and AFR in sufficient time to provide personnel with their  mobilization orders at least 180 days prior the start date of rotational  or preplanned requirements.
Emergent requirements: AFSOC is required to submit requests so  that personnel receive notification at least 120 days prior to the  mobilization date. In comparison, there are no specific time frames  in the guidance for accessing the reserve component through  volunteerism. The guidance generally discusses volunteerism as an  approach that allows for ARC personnel to quickly respond to  requests for forces.
AFSOC officials told us that they have observed an increase in requests  from ARC units to use involuntary mobilizations rather than rely on the  use of volunteerism, and that they anticipate this trend to continue, since  involuntary mobilizations afford more predictability than do voluntary  deployments. As such, involuntary mobilizations help personnel manage  the frequency of time spent away from home and maximize their access  to military medical and retirement benefits. Specifically:
Managing time away from home: Air Force guidance limits the  frequency of involuntary mobilizations for an individual to a standard  of five periods of time spent at home for every one period spent  involuntarily mobilized. For example, an individual involuntarily  mobilized for 90 days would not be available to AFSOC for involuntary  mobilization for another 450 days after the individual’s return. This  provides ARC personnel with some assurance that they will not  deploy again for a specific window of time, unless they volunteer to do  so. We have previously reported on challenges faced by DOD in  setting policies to establish thresholds and track the total time  individual servicemembers may be away from home, including for  exercises, training, and deployment. We found that, with the  exception of the Navy and U.S. Special Operations Command, the  services either were not enforcing or had not established specific and  measurable thresholds in their policies. Additionally, we found that  DOD lacked reliable data for tracking the total time individual  servicemembers spent away from home. We recommended that DOD  clarify its policy to include specific and measurable department-wide  thresholds and take steps to emphasize the collection of complete  and reliable data. DOD concurred with our recommendation.
Medical and retirement benefits: Involuntary mobilization can also  maximize the window during which personnel receive medical and  retirement benefits. All ARC personnel are eligible for benefits up to  180 days prior to their involuntary mobilization or voluntary  deployment. However, to receive these benefits the individual must  also have been issued mobilization orders identifying the mobilization  date or, for a volunteer, the deployment date. As previously  discussed, Air Force guidance identifies notification time frames  designed to provide ARC personnel involuntarily mobilized to support  rotational or preplanned requirements with their orders at least 180  days prior to the mobilization start date. This time frame allows  personnel to receive these benefits for the entire time they are  potentially eligible. By contrast, personnel who are involuntarily  mobilized for emergent requirements are supposed to receive their  orders with at least 120 days’ notice, and, according to AFSOC  officials, volunteers can receive as little as one week’s notice. As a  result, personnel may prefer involuntary mobilization, as it generally  results in their receiving military medical and retirement benefits for  more time than they would have received them if they had  volunteered to deploy.

		AFSOC Has Mobilization Processes but Faces Difficulties in Providing the ARC with Timely and Reliable Information about Requirements

AFSOC has mobilization processes that follow Air Force guidance, but it  faces difficulties in implementing these processes. Specifically, we found  AFSOC faces challenges in (1) consistently providing ARC units and  personnel with timely notifications regarding anticipated demand for their  capabilities; (2) coordinating with ANG and AFR commands on potential  requirements for ARC capabilities; and (3) sharing reliable information  about mission requirements and resources with ARC units and personnel.

			AFSOC Has Not Always Provided Timely Notification to ARC Units and Personnel

The notifications that AFSOC gives ARC units or personnel of anticipated  demand for their capabilities generally do not meet the notification time  frames associated with involuntary mobilizations for non-emergent  requirements, thereby impeding ARC units’ ability to prepare for  deployments. Officials at three of the four reserve component units we  spoke with told us that AFSOC routinely provides units with limited notice  of requirements for capabilities, even though they predominately support  preplanned requirements that are known to AFSOC well in advance of  their execution. Therefore, the officials stated, AFSOC should have  sufficient time to identify and communicate the requirement for ARC  capabilities to reserve component units to enable them to meet required  time frames (for example, no less than 180 days in the case of non- emergent requirements). However, according to these officials, they  routinely receive 90 or fewer days’ notice of when they are expected to  provide capabilities for a given requirement. Due to this truncated time  frame, the requirement must either be staffed using volunteers or receive  approval from the Secretary of Defense to involuntarily mobilize reserve  component personnel with limited notice.
Receiving limited notification can create challenges for the ARC unit  providing the capabilities for AFSOC requirements. For example, officials  at one unit we spoke with stated that they requested that AFSOC provide  at least 9 months’ notice prior to a mobilization to ensure that personnel  received adequate training, because the unit provides a range of  specialized capabilities. However, officials stated that what they generally  received was 60 to 90 days’ notice, and that within this time frame the unit  faced challenges in obtaining access to the equipment needed to train  personnel for specific missions. Officials at another unit we spoke with  stated that since 2015 they had received 60 or fewer days’ notice for their  support of AFSOC requirements, one of which was an involuntary  mobilization supporting a non-emergent requirement. An official explained  that while AFSOC’s communication of requirements and planning of  involuntary mobilizations has improved over time, the unit expects that  orders for its next mobilization will be provided with fewer than 180 days’  notice. The official explained that in addition to limiting ARC personnel’s  access to medical and retirement benefits, the abbreviated time frames  make it difficult for them to coordinate their absences with their civilian  employers. AFSOC officials acknowledged that they have been late to  notify units in the past and identified this as an area in which they are  working to improve. The officials explained that in some instances the late  notification is a result of factors outside of AFSOC’s control, such as  instances in which the Secretary of Defense’s process for approving  requirements is delayed.

			AFSOC Has Not Always Coordinated Directly with ANG and AFR Commands

We identified concerns regarding AFSOC’s practice of communicating  directly with reserve component units, rather than formally coordinating  with ANG and AFR commands, to develop potential requests for ARC unit  capabilities. For example, AFR officials stated that geographic proximity  to AFSOC frequently results in one unit’s receiving informal requests from  AFSOC for its capabilities. That unit provides remotely piloted aircraft  capabilities, which do not require personnel to deploy overseas. Officials  explained that AFSOC will contact that unit directly to request capabilities  to supplement the active duty personnel completing the same mission,  but commonly AFSOC will provide only a few days’ notice prior to the  requirement. According to these officials, personnel generally respond to  these requests by volunteering with limited advance notice.
AFSOC officials stated that communicating informally with the units to  determine the availability of their personnel and capabilities enables  AFSOC to expedite the identification of personnel potentially available to  meet a requirement. However, headquarters officials for both ANG and  AFR—who are responsible for identifying the specific personnel available  to meet a requirement—stated that these indirect communications  impede their ability to strategically manage and appropriately resource  units. For example, headquarters AFR officials identified an instance in  which changes to a unit’s anticipated contribution to a mission were  arranged with the unit, but not with officials at their higher headquarters at  the AFR. The requirement was originally for the AFR unit to supplement  an active duty unit already providing the capability for AFSOC, but was  expanded to require the AFR unit to have sole responsibility for providing  part of the capability. The absence of direct communication and formal  coordination between AFR headquarters and AFSOC during this  expansion led to differing expectations regarding the number of AFR  personnel needed to provide the capability required. AFR officials stated  that as a result of limited transparency into future requirements for that  unit, AFR headquarters did not request the appropriate level of funding for  the unit, thereby limiting the resources available to support the  requirement. AFSOC officials acknowledged that their use of informal  communication with units instead of coordinating with ANG and AFR  headquarters is not an ideal approach and could be improved.

			AFSOC Does Not Always Share Reliable Information about Mission Requirements and Resources

We identified concerns regarding the frequency with which AFSOC has  changed the information it has communicated to ARC units about  anticipated requirements, thereby creating unpredictability and impeding  those units’ ability to train for and ultimately provide the capabilities  needed to execute those requirements. While requirements may change  subject to combatant command needs, AFSOC’s availability to proactively  coordinate with both the combatant command and the ARC has been  limited. AFSOC officials stated that, due to their limited capacity to  manage involuntary mobilizations, they are often dedicating time only to  those mobilizations that require urgent attention, as opposed to refining  the details of the requirement and coordinating with the units in advance  of the mobilization.
ARC officials stated that the unpredictability resulting from the changes  that occur can introduce challenges to the units’ ability to execute  requirements. For example, officials at one unit stated that the location of  a previous requirement changed at least three times in the 60 days  preceding its involuntary mobilization. Officials explained that changes to  the location of the requirement meant that the capabilities required by  AFSOC also changed, because the unit provides intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that need to be supported  by specific communications equipment. Depending on the location, this  equipment may already be in place, or it may be that the unit must bring it  with them. In a different instance, the same unit arrived at a location to  provide its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and  found that the location lacked the communications equipment the unit  needed to effectively use its capabilities.
Further, ARC officials explained that changes regarding what capabilities  are needed can create training challenges unique to the reserve  component. ARC unit officials explained that while reserve component  personnel maintain a standard level of readiness at all times,  deployments may require them to train to a specific skill set to meet a  mission requirement. For example, special tactics squadrons supporting  AFSOC requirements can support three different mission sets, each of  which may require specialized training to prepare for a specific mission,  according to unit officials. Given the nature of the reserve component,  these personnel have to complete this training during the limited windows  of time in which they are called in from their full-time civilian jobs. As a  result, the ARC has limited flexibility in responding to changes in training  requirements. AFSOC officials acknowledged that the ARC can face  challenges in meeting training requirements and that the advanced  planning associated with involuntary mobilizations can help ensure that  units have enough time to meet training requirements.

		Other Air Force Entities Use Alternative Approaches to Planning, Coordinating, and Executing Involuntary Mobilizations, but AFSOC Lacks the Organizational Capacity

Other Air Force entities that provide ARC capabilities to meet Air Force  requirements through mobilization have established alternative  approaches to initiating, planning, and coordinating their respective  requirements for reserve component capabilities. Specifically, officials  from Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command, which are Air  Force components similar to AFSOC regarding mobilization of ARC units,  described entities established within their operations departments to  coordinate with the ARC when implementing the involuntary mobilization  process. These entities each consist of four to five individuals who are  tasked on a full-time basis with ensuring that the reserve components are  utilized in a predictable manner. The efforts of these entities include  coordinating with the ARC to create plans that cover at least 2 years of  anticipated rotational and preplanned requirements. While Air Combat  Command and Air Mobility Command officials stated that they are  responsible for coordinating a larger number of mobilizations than  AFSOC coordinates, they noted that all three follow the same Air Force  guidance with regard to the involuntary mobilization process.
Officials from an ARC personnel recovery unit that supports Air Combat  Command missions highlighted the benefits of the predictability that  comes from Air Combat Command’s planning efforts. According to  those officials, anticipated mobilizations are communicated to them in a  schedule that covers a span of 5 years. More than a year before the unit  is scheduled to involuntarily mobilize, Air Combat Command  communicates the specifics of the requirement for the mission. The  officials stated that, in their experience, these details rarely change once  they have been communicated to the unit. By contrast, as previously  discussed, we spoke with officials from an ARC special tactics squadron  that provides AFSOC with capabilities similar to those of the personnel  recovery unit described above, who stated that they regularly receive  only 60-90 days’ notice prior to being deployed. They stated that they  face difficulties in adequately training personnel to provide capabilities  within these time frames. AFSOC officials stated that this issue is driven  in part by the fact that units coordinate directly with requesting commands  to fill their desired requirements.
According to AFSOC officials, AFSOC does not have a headquarters  entity dedicated to managing the planning, coordination, and execution of  reserve component capabilities because, until recently, AFSOC did not  use its reserve components to support ongoing missions to the extent that  they do today. As a result, it was not considered necessary to have an  organizational entity dedicated to managing involuntary mobilizations.  Instead, AFSOC assigned the roles and responsibilities associated with  initiating, planning, and coordinating ARC mobilizations within its overall  process for managing AFSOC’s assignment and allocation of forces.  AFSOC and ARC officials stated that under this process, a single  individual at AFSOC is responsible for managing the involuntary  mobilizations as a secondary duty. AFSOC officials stated that, given the  scope of other assigned responsibilities, this individual focuses on  managing involuntary mobilizations about half of one day in a work week.
According to the officials, having a limited staff dedicated to initiating,  planning, and coordinating involuntary mobilizations results in AFSOC’s  responding to issues as they become urgent and impedes its ability to  utilize the ARC in a predictable and stable manner. AFSOC officials also  stated that the shift to using the ARC to support AFSOC’s steady state  requirements, along with the increasing use of involuntary mobilizations to  access ARC capabilities, have exposed the limitations of their capacity to  manage involuntary mobilizations. These officials added that creating a  more robust organizational capacity to manage the involuntary  mobilization of the reserve component could counteract some of the  challenges they have experienced in providing timely notification to ARC  units, directly coordinating with ANG and AFR commands, and identifying  and communicating reliable information about requirements to ARC units.
AFSOC officials attribute the challenges faced in implementing AFSOC’s  involuntary mobilization processes to the absence of adequate capacity to  manage involuntary mobilizations. Specifically, they acknowledged that  with additional capacity they would be better positioned to undertake the  efforts needed to (1) provide more timely notification to ARC units, (2)  coordinate with ANG and AFR commands, and (3) increase  communication with the commands generating requirements. While  officials acknowledged that some last-minute changes are unavoidable,  they told us that having more personnel dedicated to AFSOC’s  mobilization process could potentially lead to having more timely  notifications or better indications of imminent changes. Further, some  factors that can affect the involuntary mobilization process fall outside of  AFSOC’s control, such as delays in the decision making process at the  Secretary of Defense level and changes in combatant commander  requirements. Although AFSOC cannot control all factors that affect  involuntary mobilization of the ARC, increasing its capacity to manage  involuntary mobilizations would improve its ability to anticipate and  proactively address the challenges introduced by external factors.
AFSOC officials stated that in recognition of this need, the command’s  operations center has submitted multiple requests for additional  resources to the headquarters in order to create a more robust  organizational capacity to manage the involuntary mobilization of the  reserve component. For example, the request submitted in January 2019  stated that AFSOC currently does not provide the support and guidance  that ARC units need to properly execute the involuntary mobilization  process. The request sought one additional full-time position dedicated to  managing involuntary mobilizations and coordinating involuntary  mobilizations with the ARC. Although AFSOC officials told us that the  request was validated by AFSOC leadership, the validation of a request  does not ensure that it will receive funding. After competing against other  funding requests from other Air Force components, the Financial  Management Board did not fund the position in fiscal years 2018 or 2019  because those other requests received higher priority. As an alternative  to the full-time position requested by the operations center, AFSOC  officials identified ongoing efforts to coordinate with the ANG that would  result in the ANG’s allocating personnel to fill a temporary position at  AFSOC. The individual in this position would be responsible for  supporting the mobilization process. AFSOC officials stated that such an  arrangement would help address the capacity challenges they currently  face, but also noted that it would be a short-term solution, and highlighted  that the individual filling the position would need to be familiar with  AFSOC, ANG, and AFR processes to execute his or her duties. In  addition, AFSOC officials could consider realigning existing capacity  within the command to directly address the limited capacity to manage  involuntary mobilizations. However, AFSOC officials emphasized that the  command as a whole currently operates with limited capacity.
In the absence of the Air Force developing additional AFSOC  organizational capacity dedicated to the planning, coordination, and  execution of involuntary mobilizations, AFSOC will continue to be  impeded in its ability to manage involuntary mobilizations in accordance  with Air Force guidance, including providing the notice required to access  the ARC through involuntary mobilization in support of preplanned or  rotational requirements. Additionally, at its current capacity AFSOC will  likely face increasing challenges in providing timely notification to ARC  units, coordinating with ANG and AFR commands, and enhancing  communication with the commands generating requirements to help  solidify mission specifics, as the number of involuntary mobilizations  quadruple by 2021, as estimated by AFSOC officials. As a result, units  may not be fully prepared to support requirements or able to effectively  conduct their mission once in theater. Further, AFSOC will continue to be  impeded in coordinating with ANG and AFR commands in a manner that  enables the ARC to strategically manage and resource units in support of  AFSOC’s requirements.

	The ARC Does Not Provide Complete Information to AFSOC on Units Available for Mobilization or on Voluntary Deployments

		The ARC Does Not Have Consolidated Information on Reserve Component Units Available to Support Special Operations Activities

While the Air Force’s force-generation model provides the ARC with a 24- month picture of the units it anticipates will be used to meet potential Air  Force-wide deployments, the ARC does not have a comparable model  with information on which ARC units could be used to support AFSOC  requirements for special operations activities. According to officials, the  ARC does not have a force-generation model for two reasons. First, while  the Air Force model works for Air Force-wide requirements, it does not  apply to special operations-specific requirements because they are  unique to the Air Force’s special operations component, AFSOC.  According to AFSOC officials, their command deploys units and  personnel differently from typical Air Force units in order to maximize the  number of requirements they can support with a smaller force. Second,  the ARC has historically supported special operations activities using  volunteerism, which is much more flexible than involuntary mobilization  and requires less upfront planning or notification. As a result, ARC  officials did not feel the need to develop a force-generation model for  special operations requirements. ANG and AFR officials told us that ARC  units will sometimes keep a unit-level schedule of their potential  deployments, but that information is not available in a consolidated or  consistent format. AFSOC officials added that any force-generation model  for special operations should consider the limited capacity of some  special operations capabilities. Officials stated that some capabilities in  the ARC are limited to one unit, which results in AFSOC deploying parts  of units rather than the whole unit to cover more requirements.
ANG and AFR officials agreed that a force-generation model regarding  future deployments could help identify which ARC units would be  susceptible to deploy during a given period of time, which would be  beneficial for planning ARC deployments. Consolidated information on  potential unit deployments would provide units with advanced notification,  making it easier to accomplish deployment preparation activities and  helping ARC personnel make arrangements for their potential  deployments. For example, ANG officials told us that advanced  notification to units can give the ARC more time to incorporate needed  training into drill training. Furthermore, unit personnel would also have  more time to make arrangements with civilian employers or in their  personal lives, making their transition to active duty easier and making it  more likely that they will view mobilizations favorably in the future.
Additionally, these officials stated that, with such a model, ANG and AFR  could more easily identify and communicate which ARC units would be  available for mobilization to support special operations activities. AFSOC  officials stated that, in turn, this could provide AFSOC with more certainty  that it would have access to ARC forces when needed. According to ANG  and AFR officials, AFSOC officials have expressed some concerns about  whether their command will have access to ARC forces. Specifically,  since a substantial part of the total Air Force capability resides in the  ARC, AFSOC officials are not certain that the capacity of ARC units  supporting special operations will be able to meet future requirements.  The officials added that by identifying units or individuals susceptible for  deployment in advance, AFSOC would have more confidence in the  ARC’s ability to support the command’s requirements.
According to Air Force guidance, a predictable force-generation model is  used to ensure proper force readiness and rapid responses to emerging  crises. Specifically, Air Force Instruction 10-401, Air Force Operations  Planning and Execution, calls for the Air Force and its components,  including the ANG and AFR, to manage the deployment of its forces in  order to meet global requirements while maintaining the highest possible  level of overall readiness. The instruction calls for the Air Force to  accomplish this task by establishing a force-generation model that can be  used to manage the rhythm of force deployments to meet global  combatant command requirements. The intent of the force-generation  model is to establish a predictable, standardized pattern to ensure that  forces are properly organized, trained, equipped, and ready to sustain  capabilities while rapidly responding to emerging crises.
ANG officials told us that they have taken some initial steps to create a  force-generation model and consolidate the various unit-level schedules  of ARC forces supporting special operations activities. Specifically, the  ANG advisor to AFSOC was developing a consolidated schedule of ARC  units intended for use by AFSOC to identify ANG units that could mobilize  to support AFSOC requirements. However, according to AFSOC officials,  the ANG advisor was expected to retire soon, and we found that ANG  headquarters officials were not aware of this effort, and there were no  plans to institutionalize it. AFR officials were likewise not aware of any  similar effort to consolidate schedules for their units’ different capabilities  to support special operations activities. Without having a method for  providing consolidated information on reserve component units that are  available for deployment, the ARC will not have the information it needs  to successfully plan its deployments, or easily identify and communicate  to AFSOC which of its units are or will be available for mobilization.  Furthermore, AFSOC officials may continue to have concerns that they  will not have access to high demand ARC capabilities to deploy under a  mobilization.

		The ARC Does Not Have Complete Information on Voluntary Deployments

According to officials, although ANG and AFR units have a general  understanding as to how many volunteers they have supporting special  operations requirements at the unit level, the ANG and AFR lack a  mechanism for tracking volunteer deployment rates across the ARC.  Specifically, information on reserve components’ volunteer deployments  is not available in a form that facilitates tracking in order to understand  rates of volunteering or the contributions made by the ARC in supporting  special operations activities, according to officials.
The Air Force requires the ANG and AFR to track key data to ensure  proper management of ARC utilization and mission execution.  Specifically, Air Force Instruction 10-301, Managing Operational  Utilization Requirements of the Air Reserve Component Forces, calls for  the Air Force to identify full mission requirements for ARC utilization by  collecting, tracking, and organizing relevant data and prioritizing  requirements. It also states that these data are intended to aid in  allocating funding, matching units to requirements, executing  requirements, assessing each step of the process, and forecasting future  requirements. Additionally, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government establishes that management should obtain relevant data  from reliable internal and external sources in a timely manner to facilitate  effective monitoring.
ANG and AFR officials told us that voluntary deployments are more  difficult to track than are involuntary mobilizations. Specifically, the  statutory requirements for involuntarily mobilizing ARC units or personnel  make tracking them simpler. For example, according to officials the  Secretary of Defense is required to approve or be notified of involuntary  mobilizations, and ANG and ARC units receive specific orders, all of  which are tracked closely. Voluntary deployments, however, do not have  the same approval requirements.
Nevertheless, ANG and AFR officials told us that ARC units may have  some information, as detailed below, on the numbers of volunteer  deployments, although this information provides only a partial picture of  volunteerism.
Travel System Data: Officials from a reserve component unit we  visited reported that some of the information on voluntary  deployments could be compiled from travel systems used to send  ARC units and personnel overseas. However, these officials added  that matching travel records to the volunteer status of individuals  could be time-consuming, because the travel systems are not  designed to perform this function. Furthermore, unit officials told us  that this travel information would be incomplete even if it were  compiled, because it would not include units and individuals  supporting operational requirements from their home stations—that is,  not traveling outside their normal locations. For example, according to  unit officials, personnel supporting remote piloted aircraft would not be  included in the information collected from the travel systems because  they do no travel outside their normal duty stations to carry out their  missions. Without travel orders, the system would not show these  types of deployments. Unit officials told us that there could be several  cases like this one in which the information compiled from the travel  system or other sources could be incomplete.
Man-Day Estimates: An AFSOC official told us that the system used  to track military personnel appropriation man-days could be another  source used to track volunteerism among ANG and AFR units.  According to this official, AFSOC uses a data system to transfer man- days to the volunteering ARC unit. This official stated that the  system used to make these transfers may contain the information  needed to track volunteerism, but acknowledged that no one at  AFSOC was using the system for this purpose. Furthermore, ANG  and AFR officials confirmed that the data system is not currently used  for tracking rates of volunteerism among ARC units.
According to AFR officials, tracking volunteerism would allow them to  more easily document the ARC’s contributions to support special  operations and evaluate whether ARC forces were being effectively  utilized. Specifically, ANG and AFR officials expressed concerns that  different rates of individual volunteerism within and across ARC units may  result in a misleading picture of overall unit utilization. In some cases,  incomplete data on volunteerism can result in overstating unit  contributions. For example, the unit-level figures regarding deployments  are actually averages of all the individuals in the unit. Officials expressed  concerns that as a result of using averages, units may appear to be more  highly utilized than they actually are, due to the high rates at which some  individuals from the unit volunteer to deploy. According to ANG and AFR  officials, some ARC personnel volunteer at high rates because they prefer  the additional income or benefits from these deployments, while other  personnel from the same units may prefer to deploy less often. ARC  officials expressed concerns that this disparity may not be immediately  visible to ARC and AFSOC leadership. AFSOC officials told us that they  share some of these concerns.
Other officials expressed concerns that without good information on  volunteerism rates, the ANG and AFR could not effectively manage  operational tempo goals. To measure operational tempo, DOD has  established policies relating to how long military personnel are deployed  versus at home (referred to as dwell time, or dwell). For example, ARC  personnel who deploy for 7 months and are in dwell for 14 months would  have a deployment-to-dwell ratio of 1:2. For ARC units, DOD also tracks  the mobilization-to-dwell ratio, which is the ratio of how long ARC  personnel are involuntarily mobilized versus not mobilized. DOD guidance  establishes that the mobilization-to-dwell ratio for ARC units should be  1:5.
According to ANG and AFR officials, ARC voluntary deployments are not  factored into the dwell calculations for either ratio, making it more difficult  to ensure that deployments do not fatigue ARC forces. Additionally,  Special Operations Command policy specifies that ARC units supporting  special operations should maintain the same deployment cycle as active  duty units, which as a goal should be no less than a 1:2 deployment-to- dwell ratio. ANG, AFR, and AFSOC officials agreed that tracking  volunteer deployment rates more comprehensively and consistently  would provide greater perspective on how ARC units are utilized and help  them more effectively manage their operational tempo goals.
Officials stated that an additional consequence of having incomplete data  on volunteerism is that the overall contributions of the ARC can be  understated, because the full range of support that ARC units and  personnel are providing is not being documented. For example, a report  used by the Air Force to track force contributions from its components,  including the ARC, shows that the AFR contributed forces to support  special operations activities for about 6 months of an approximately 4- year period. However, according to AFR officials, the command’s  contribution to support special operations activities was much higher than  what is documented in the report. The officials stated that AFR also  provided volunteer support to AFSOC over the entire period but that its  contributions are not fully reflected in the report, because volunteers  supporting an AFSOC-assigned mission are counted among the  contributions made by other active duty forces, rather than by AFR.
Without complete information on volunteer deployment rates among  reserve component forces, the ANG and AFR may face difficulties in  ensuring the effective utilization of their forces to support special  operations activities, documenting force contributions from the ARC, and  managing operational tempo and deployment-to-dwell goals. Further, the  ARC will not have the information it needs to ensure effective  management of its force utilization and mission execution. Specifically, it  will not be able to determine whether units are being fully utilized,  because of the distorted or incomplete volunteerism information.

	Conclusions

With a substantial part of the total Air Force capability residing in the  ARC, AFSOC relies on mobilized ARC forces to support its operations.  Furthermore, AFSOC’s increasing use of ARC as an operational reserve  has highlighted the importance of the ARC’s and AFSOC’s planning and  information-sharing efforts. However, AFSOC’s implementation of its  mobilization process impedes its ability to provide the ARC with timely  notification of mobilizations, coordinate with ANG and AFR commands,  and share reliable information about requirements with the ARC. Without  resolving AFSOC’s organizational capacity challenge in managing  AFSOC requirements for reserve capabilities, AFSOC’s implementation  of this process is unlikely to improve.
AFSOC’s use of the ARC is also affected by the unavailability of complete  information regarding both the units available to mobilize and voluntary  deployment rates. Specifically, while the ARC is able to identify the units  anticipated to be available to support non-special operations  requirements, it does not have a method for communicating consolidated  information on the availability of units for special operations requirements.  Without such a method, AFSOC and the ARC do not have easily  accessible information about the current and future availability of ARC  units to support special operations requirements. In addition, voluntary  deployments are a key piece of the ARC’s support of AFSOC  requirements. However, the ARC has not developed a mechanism for  tracking the rate at which they occur. Without tracking volunteer  deployment rates, the ARC is limited in its ability both to ensure that its  forces are effectively utilized and to communicate the level of contribution  made by ARC volunteers in support of special operations requirements.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making three recommendations to DOD:  The Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with ANG and AFR, should  ensure that AFSOC has the organizational capacity to effectively initiate,  coordinate, and execute ARC mobilizations, to include ensuring timely  and reliable notification of requirements to those units. (Recommendation  1)
The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that the ANG and AFR  develop a method for providing AFSOC with consolidated information  regarding units available for immediate and future mobilizations to  support special operations activities, such as the Air Force provides to its  units with its force-generation model. (Recommendation 2)
The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that the ANG and AFR  develop a mechanism for tracking volunteer deployments to better  manage ARC force utilization. (Recommendation 3)

	Agency Comments

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one  recommendation and partially concurred with two recommendations.  DOD’s comments are restated below and reprinted in appendix I. DOD  also provided technical comments, which we incorporated where  appropriate.
DOD concurred with the first recommendation that the Secretary of the  Air Force, in coordination with ANG and AFR, should ensure that AFSOC  has the organizational capacity to effectively initiate, coordinate, and  execute ARC mobilizations, to include ensuring timely and reliable  notification of requirements to those units. In its response, DOD stated  that the Air Force continues to balance manning requirements across the  spectrum of operations. DOD also stated that fully manning AFSOC for  this staff function would be helpful, whether additional manpower is  programmed or AFSOC mitigates internally by reallocating manpower.  We believe that fully manning AFSOC for this staff function, if fully  implemented, would meet the intent of the recommendation. In its  comments on this recommendation, DOD also stated that the ARC has a  process in place to provide timely notification to ANG and AFR units once  requirements are known. The department added that the ANG  implemented the Agile ARC Mobilization Process on June 1, 2019, which  streamlined policy and procedural chokepoints and improved notification  timelines by an average of 60 days. We note that, while improvements in  the notification timelines would be beneficial, it is too soon to understand  the long-term effect of the implementation of this process.
DOD partially concurred with the second recommendation that the  Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that the ANG and AFR develop  a method for providing AFSOC with consolidated information regarding  units available for immediate and future mobilizations to support special  operations activities, such as the Air Force provides to its units with its  force-generation model. In its comments, DOD stated that the AFR  currently provides AFSOC with information on units available, using  Reserve Component Periods, and that the AFR will assess whether re- posturing in multiple Reserve Component Periods will provide a portion of  capability with greater flexibility. We agree that this is a reasonable  approach. However, as we noted in our report, consolidated information  on reserve component units that are available for deployment could  provide ARC units with advanced notification, making it easier to  accomplish deployment preparation activities and help ARC personnel  make arrangements for their potential deployments. Additionally, DOD  stated that current information technology initiatives with the Air Force  Integrated Personnel and Pay System will eventually provide the Air  Force with functionality allowing a single, integrated system of software  suites. According to the department, Air Force Integrated Personnel and  Pay System will support a rapid and accurate information flow from the  first identification of a requirement through the processing and delivering  of orders, allowing the Air Force to start pay and benefits in an auditable  manner. However, DOD did not identify a timeline for when that system  would be available. We believe that improvements in the flow of  information regarding ARC unit availability are necessary and would help  to ensure that the ARC can successfully plan deployments, or easily  identify and communicate to AFSOC which of its units are or will be  available for mobilization. We believe that if this planned system is  implemented as described, it would meet the intent of the  recommendation.
DOD partially concurred with the third recommendation that the Secretary  of the Air Force should ensure that the ANG and AFR develop a  mechanism for tracking volunteer deployments to better manage ARC  force utilization. In its response, DOD stated that tracking volunteer  deployments requires timely information from AFSOC to properly identify  the requirements, establish expeditionary ARC units, and document the  transaction when ARC members are activated. Further, it stated that in  the short term, the AFR will work with AFSOC on further developing use  of the Air Force Consolidated Planning Schedule to better define  requirements. While coordination with AFSOC could help improve the  tracking process, we believe that the ANG and AFR also need to develop  a mechanism for tracking volunteer deployments to better manage ARC  force utilization. Additionally, DOD noted that the planned information  technology initiative, which it described in its response to our second  recommendation, could also have benefits for tracking voluntary  deployments. We believe that if the planned system is able to fully track  voluntary deployments, it would meet the intent of the recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary for Personnel  and Readiness; the Chief of the National Guard Bureau; and the  Commanders of Special Operations Command, Air Force Special  Operations Command, and Air Force Reserve Command. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-5431, or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our  respective offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major  contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key  contributions to this report include Jim Reynolds, Assistant Director;  Adam Anguiano, Tracy Barnes, Adrianne Cline, Shylene Mata, Walter  Vance, and Cheryl Weissman.