Input:
	Introduction

This report is a brief summary of House and Senate procedures for reaching agreement on legislation. It discusses the provisions of House Rule XXII and Senate Rule XXVIII as well as other applicable rules, precedents, and practices. The report focuses on the most common and customary procedures. There are many exceptions, complications, and possibilities that are not addressed, and the House and Senate may modify or waive their procedures by unanimous consent or by other means.

	Acting on the Same Bill

The House and Senate must pass the same bill or joint resolution, and they must reach full and precise agreement on its text before it is submitted to the President for his approval or veto. The same requirements apply to a concurrent resolution and a joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment, although neither receives presidential action.
At some stage of the legislative process, therefore, the House must pass a Senate bill or the Senate must pass a House bill. The simplest way of meeting this requirement is for one house to pass its own bill and send it to the "other body," which then considers and passes it, with or without amendments. Frequently, however, House and Senate committees each develop their own bills on the same subject. In these cases, one house often debates and amends the bill reported by its committee but then amends and passes the corresponding bill that the other chamber has already passed.
For example, after the House passes a bill, it frequently takes up a bill on the same subject that it has already received from the Senate. The House then amends the Senate bill by striking out the text passed by the Senate (striking out all after the enacting clause) and replacing it with the text of the House bill it has just passed. The House then passes the amended Senate bill. In this way, the House passes two bills with exactly the same text, but the Senate bill is the one likely to become law because both houses now have passed it, although with different provisions. Much the same thing could happen in the Senate. After considering its own bill, the Senate, by unanimous consent, could take up and pass the House bill after amending it with the text of the Senate-passed bill. Because this action would take unanimous consent in the Senate, however, the Senate might choose instead to begin consideration of the similar House bill. The floor manager could offer as the first amendment to the House bill a full-text substitute consisting of the text of the Senate bill.
This process is usually routine, but it can become more complicated. For instance, the Senate may pass one bill on several related matters before the House passes two bills of its own that address the same subjects. After the House passes its two bills, it may take up the one Senate bill and replace the text of that bill with the texts of both of its own bills. In other instances, the House and Senate may confront political and procedural situations that make it convenient for them to include their versions of legislation on one subject as amendments to some third bill on an unrelated subject that serves as a convenient "vehicle." Such arrangements can be necessary because the House and Senate cannot begin the formal process of resolving their policy differences until these differences are embodied as amendments by one house to the version of the same bill as passed by the other.

	Amendments Between the Houses

After one house passes a bill and the other then passes it with amendments, the House and Senate may attempt to resolve the differences between their positions. When confronted with a major bill, the two houses have historically created a conference committee for this purpose. However, a conference may not be necessary if they can reach an agreement through informal negotiations and an exchange of amendments between the houses.
The amendments of one house to a bill from the other may be amended twice as the bill is sent ("messaged") back and forth between the House and Senate. Suppose, for example, that the Senate passes a House bill with amendments. The House can accept (concur in) the Senate amendments, in which case the differences are resolved. Alternatively, the House can amend the Senate amendments (concur in the Senate amendments with amendments). These House amendments are first degree amendments between the houses. The Senate can then accept (concur in) the House amendments to the Senate amendments, which would produce agreement. Or the Senate can concur in the House amendments to the Senate amendments with further Senate amendments, which are amendments in the second degree.
At this stage, the House can concur in the most recent Senate amendments, but it cannot propose new House amendments to them because they would be third degree amendments, which are not permitted. (Of course, exactly the same process can occur in reverse if the House passes a Senate bill with amendments.) In both chambers, the prohibition on third degree amendments between the houses can be waived. The House might do this by special rule, suspension of the rules, or unanimous consent. In the Senate, unanimous consent is necessary to agree to an amendment in the third degree, unless the House has already waived the rule, in which case further degrees of amendment are permitted in the Senate.
If the House and Senate adamantly defend their last amendments, they can send the bill back and forth several more times. In the unlikely event that neither house retreats from its last position or is willing to discuss a compromise in conference, the bill ultimately dies. It cannot be shuttled back and forth indefinitely.
This process rarely results in stalemate, because the two houses either reach agreement or decide to submit their differences to a conference committee. However, an exchange of amendments sometimes takes the place of a conference. Once the two houses pass their versions of the same bill, the members and staff of the House and Senate committees of jurisdiction often meet informally to compare the two versions and discuss a compromise. If they reach an agreement that other concerned Representatives and Senators also accept, the House can, for example, concur in the Senate amendment with a House amendment that embodies the negotiated agreement. If the Senate then accepts (concurs in) this House amendment, the House and Senate have resolved their differences through the informal equivalent of a conference committee.

	Considering Amendments from the Other House

House amendments to a Senate bill (or House amendments to Senate amendments to a House bill) are privileged for floor action by the Senate. This means there is no debate on whether to take up the House amendment. Instead, a Senator, most often the majority leader, typically requests that a House amendment be laid before the Senate. Motions to dispose of the House amendments—such as motions to concur or to concur with amendments—are debatable and, therefore, subject to filibusters. It is possible for the majority leader to move that the Senate concur in the House amendment and then propose motions that preempt all other available motions. This is often referred to as "filling the tree" on a motion to concur. If the majority leader can garner the necessary support to end debate on the motion to concur (60 Senators, assuming no vacancies), then both further amendment to the House amendment and extended debate can be avoided. The Senate sometimes arranges to consider a House amendment by unanimous consent.
Like the Senate, the House sometimes acts on Senate amendments by unanimous consent. Until the House officially disagrees to Senate amendments to a House bill (or Senate amendments to House amendments to a Senate bill), these amendments are usually not privileged for consideration on the House floor. No motion is in order to concur in the Senate amendments, with or without amendments. When there is little or no controversy, the House often accepts or amends the Senate amendments by unanimous consent. Otherwise, the House can usually do so only through a motion to suspend the rules or under a special rule recommended by the Rules Committee and adopted by the House. A motion that is privileged at this stage is a motion to disagree to the Senate amendments and go to conference, but this motion must be made at the direction of the committee that originally reported the bill to the House.
Both houses cannot consider the same bill at the same time, because the House or Senate can act only if it has the "papers." The papers are comprised of the official copy of the bill as passed by the house in which it originated, the official copies of amendments by either house, and the messages by which each house informs the other of the actions it has taken. After one house acts on a bill or amendments from the other, it returns all the papers with an accompanying message describing its action. Thus, the House and Senate always act in sequence as custody of the papers changes hands.

	Going to Conference

Before a conference committee is created to resolve disagreements between the two houses, the House and Senate must each state disagreement over a bill, either by disagreeing to the amendments of the "other body" or by insisting on its own amendments. So long as one house concurs in the amendments of the other and proposes its own amendments, there is no formal disagreement. But at any point during an exchange of amendments between the House and Senate, either house can propose that they can go to conference instead.
The two houses usually decide in one of two ways to establish a conference committee. When the Senate passes a House bill with amendments, for example, it can immediately insist on its amendments and request a conference with the House. The House almost always agrees to the conference, although it need not do so—for example, it could simply agree to the Senate amendments instead. At other times, however, when the Senate passes a House bill with amendments, it may merely send back the bill and the amendments in the hope that the House will accept the Senate's amendments, making a conference unnecessary. If the House does not accept the amendments, it can disagree to them and request a conference. The Senate normally then insists on its amendments and agrees to the conference, after which it informs the House and returns the papers. Of course, the equivalent of either sequence of events may occur after the House passes a Senate bill with amendments.
Both chambers sometimes agree by unanimous consent to the necessary procedural steps to send a measure to conference. In the House, if there is an objection to the unanimous consent request, then a privileged motion can be made, at the direction of the committee(s) of jurisdiction, to disagree to the Senate amendment (or insist on the House amendment) and request (or agree to) a conference with the Senate.
If unanimous consent cannot be reached in the Senate, then a motion can be made to authorize a conference committee, which is subject to debate under regular Senate rules. If a cloture motion to end debate is filed on this motion, however, it matures after just two hours of debate. If three-fifths of the Senate agrees to invoke cloture, then the Senate could immediately vote to approve the motion to authorize a conference. No further debate of the motion would be in order.

	Appointing and Instructing Conferees

Each house usually appoints its conferees (also known as managers) immediately after deciding to go to conference. The Speaker appoints House conferees. The Senate frequently decides, by unanimous consent, to authorize the presiding officer to appoint "the managers on the part of the Senate." The Senate could also empower the presiding officer to appoint conferees, or appoint conferees directly, through the motion to authorize a conference, discussed above. The chairman and ranking minority member of the committee or subcommittee that reported the bill are almost always conferees. They also play a major part in deciding who else is appointed. The committee or subcommittee leaders usually prepare a list of conferees from their chambers that the Speaker normally accepts and the presiding officer of the Senate always accepts. The party leaders may also become involved in selecting conferees, especially if the bill is particularly important, if it was reported by two or more committees, or if amendments to the bill from the other house touch the jurisdiction of more than one committee.
Most conferees are members of the committee that reported the bill. In the case of a bill that involves the jurisdiction of more than one committee, members of each committee are often appointed as conferees with authority only to negotiate an agreement with respect to the subjects or provisions of the bill that fall within the jurisdiction of their committees. Thus, some members may be designated as conferees for purposes of the entire bill while others are appointed only to address a specific section or title. Representatives may also be appointed as conferees for limited purposes when the Senate proposes a nongermane amendment that is within the jurisdiction of another House committee. In addition, the Speaker may appoint other Representatives who, for example, offered important floor amendments. The list of conferees generally reflects the party balance in each house.
The House and Senate do not have to appoint the same number of managers, and they frequently do not. House conferees vote as a delegation, as do Senate conferees, and a majority of each delegation must sign the conference report. Thus, three Representatives have the same voting power in conference as 30 Senators. Each house is likely to appoint a larger number of conferees when the bill involves the jurisdiction of more than one of its standing committees.
A Representative or Senator may move to instruct the conferees from his or her chamber immediately after that house agrees to go to conference but just before the conferees are appointed. For example, the House can instruct its managers to insist on the House position on a particular amendment, or the Senate can instruct its managers to recede to the House position on another amendment. However, instructions to conferees are never binding; no point of order lies against a conference report that is inconsistent with House or Senate instructions to its conferees. The House can also instruct its conferees if they do not report within 45 calendar days and 25 legislative days after being appointed (or 36 hours after being appointed during the last six days of a session).

	Conference Rules and Reports

Conference committee meetings are open to the public unless the conferees vote to close them, and the House must vote to authorize its conferees to do so. Both chambers also have guidelines concerning conference meetings, generally encouraging frequent meetings with open discussions, but these guidelines are often waived or in some cases are not procedurally enforceable.
Beyond these guidelines, there are virtually no House or Senate rules governing conference meetings. Conferees select their own chairman and usually work without formal rules on quorums, proxies, debate, amendments, and other procedural matters. Conferences are negotiating forums, and the two chambers allow conferees to decide for themselves how best to conduct their negotiations. It is most common that a conference committee holds a single public meeting, sometimes for members to offer opening statements only.
However, the House and Senate have important, and roughly the same, rules governing what decisions conferees can make. Conference committees are established to resolve disagreements between the House and Senate over their versions of the same bill. Therefore, the authority of conferees is limited to matters in disagreement. As a general rule, they may not change a provision on which both houses agree, nor may they add anything that is not in one version or the other. Furthermore, conferees are to reach agreements within the "scope" of the differences between the House and Senate positions. For example, if the House appropriates $10 million for some purpose and the Senate amends the bill by increasing the appropriation to $20 million, the conferees exceed their authority if they agree on a number that is less than $10 million or more than $20 million.
It is much harder to determine the scope of the differences when they are qualitative, not quantitative. Also, conferees have more latitude under some circumstances than under others. Under a previous practice, when one house would pass a bill and the other would then pass it with a series of separate amendments—each making a change in a different provision of the bill—these amendments were usually numbered, and it was relatively easy for the conferees to determine the scope of the differences over each amendment. This is generally not true, however, under modern practice when the Senate passes a House bill (or the House passes a Senate bill) with an amendment in the nature of a substitute that totally replaces the text of the bill. In this situation, which arises nearly all of the time, there is only one amendment in conference—for example, a Senate substitute for the House version of a bill. The two versions of the bill can take very different approaches to the same subject, making it difficult for the conferees to isolate every point of agreement and disagreement and to identify the scope of each disagreement. Under these circumstances, the conferees may write their own conference substitute, so long as it is a germane modification of the House and Senate versions.
If a conference agreement exceeds the scope of the differences or deals with a matter that is not in disagreement, the conference report is subject to a point of order when the House or Senate considers it. The House, however, typically protects a conference report against points of order by adopting a resolution reported by the Rules Committee waiving the applicable rules. The Senate, meanwhile, interprets the authority of its conferees generously, especially when they develop a conference substitute. Furthermore, the Senate can waive its rule with a three-fifths vote of Senators duly chosen and sworn (60 Senators if there are no vacancies).
The authority of Senate conferees is further limited by Senate Rule XLIV, paragraph 8. Under this rule, a Senator can raise a point of order against discretionary and mandatory spending provisions of a conference report if they constitute "new directed spending provisions," or what are sometimes called "air drops." Paragraph 8 defines a "new directed spending provision" as follows:
any item that consists of a specific provision containing a specific level of funding for any specific account, specific program, specific project, or specific activity, when no specific funding was provided for such specific account, specific program, specific project, or specific activity in the measure originally committed to the conferees by either House.
The Senate can waive these restrictions on the content of conference reports by a three-fifths vote of Senators duly chosen and sworn (60 Senators assuming no vacancies).
When the conferees reach full agreement, their staffs prepare a conference report that states how they propose to resolve each of the disagreements. Accompanying the report itself is a joint explanatory statement (also known as the statement of managers), which describes the various House and Senate positions and the conferees' recommendations in more detail. A majority of the House managers and a majority of the Senate managers must sign both the conference report and the joint explanatory statement. House rules require that House conferees be given an opportunity to sign the conference agreement at a set time and place. At least one copy of the final conference agreement must be made available for review by House managers with the signature sheets. Each chamber then debates and votes on the conference report in turn.

	Floor Action on Conference Reports

At the conclusion of a successful conference, the papers usually change hands. The conferees from the house that requested the conference bring the papers into conference and then turn them over to the conferees from the other house. Thus, the house that agreed to the conference normally acts first on the conference report. However, this is a practice that is not required by House or Senate rules.
The Senate usually takes up a conference report by unanimous consent, although a Senator can make a nondebatable motion to consider it. The report may be called up at any time after it is filed, but it is not in order to vote on the adoption of a conference report unless it has been available to Members and the general public for at least 48 hours before the vote. (This requirement can be waived by three-fifths of Senators duly chosen and sworn or by joint agreement of the majority and minority leaders in the case of a significant disruption to Senate facilities or to the availability of the internet.) Under Senate rules, a report is considered to be available to the general public if it is posted on a congressional website or on a website controlled by the Library of Congress or the Government Publishing Office.
When considered on the Senate floor, a conference report is debatable under normal Senate procedures; it is subject to extended debate unless the time for debate is limited by unanimous consent or cloture or if the Senate is considering the report under expedited procedures established by law (such as the procedures for considering budget resolutions and budget reconciliation measures under the Budget Act). Paragraph 8 of Senate Rule XXVIII states that, if time for debating a conference report is limited (presumably by unanimous consent), that time shall be equally divided between the majority and minority parties, not necessarily between proponents and opponents of the report.
A point of order may be made against a conference report at any time that it is pending on the Senate floor (or after all time for debate has expired or has been yielded back if the report is considered under a time agreement). If a point of order is sustained against a conference report on the grounds that conferees exceeded their authority, either by violating the "scope" rule (Rule XXVIII) or the prohibition against "new directed spending provisions" (paragraph 8 of Rule XLIV), then there is a special procedure to strike out the offending portion(s) of the conference recommendation and continue consideration of the rest of the proposed compromise.
Under the procedure, a Senator can make a point of order against one or more provisions of a conference report. If the point of order is not waived (see below), the presiding officer rules whether or not the provision is in violation of the rule. If a point of order is raised against more than one provision, the presiding officer may make separate decisions regarding each provision. After all points of order raised under this procedure are disposed of, the Senate proceeds to consider a motion to send to the House, in place of the original conference agreement, a proposal consisting of the text of the conference agreement minus the provisions that were ruled out of order and stricken. Amendments to this motion are not in order, and debate is limited only if it had been limited on the conference report. In short, the terms for consideration of the motion to send to the House the proposal without the offending provisions are the same as those that would have applied to the conference report itself.
If the Senate agrees to the motion, the altered conference recommendation is returned to the House in the form of an amendment between the houses. The House then has an opportunity to act on the amendment under the regular House procedures for considering Senate amendments discussed in earlier sections of this report.
Senate rules also create a mechanism for waiving these restrictions on conference reports. Senators can move to waive points of order against one or several provisions, or they can make one motion to waive all possible points of order under either Rule XXVIII or Rule XLIV, paragraph 8. If the motion to waive garners the necessary support, the Senate is effectively agreeing to keep the matter that is potentially in violation of the rule in the conference report.
In the House, the conference report cannot be considered unless it has been available in the Congressional Record or on the House document repository website for 72 hours. Copies of the report and the statement must also be available to Representatives for at least two hours before they consider it. These availability requirements are sometimes waived by a rule reported by the Rules Committee, and they do not apply during the last six days of a session. Typically, the House calls up a conference report under the terms of a special rule that protects the report against one or more points of order if the Rules Committee reports and the House adopts a resolution waiving the applicable rules.
The House debates a conference report under the one-hour rule, with control of the hour equally divided between the two parties. However, if both floor managers support the report, a Representative opposed to it may claim one-third of the time for debate. At the end of the first hour, the House normally votes to order the previous question, which precludes additional debate. If Representatives could make points of order against a report, sometimes the House first considers and agrees to a resolution, recommended by its Rules Committee, that protects the report by waiving the points of order.
Conference reports are not amendable. Each report is a compromise proposal for resolving a series of disagreements; the House prevails on some questions, the Senate on others. If the House and Senate were free to amend the report, they might never reach agreement. At the end of debate, therefore, each house votes on whether to agree to the report as a whole. However, the house that considers the report first also has the option of recommitting it to conference. But when one chamber acts on the report, it automatically discharges its conferees. As a result, the other house cannot vote to recommit, because the conference committee has been disbanded.
If the House and Senate agree to the conference report, the bill is enrolled (printed on parchment in its final form) and presented to the President for his approval or disapproval.

	Additional Resources

The report is based upon the original author's interpretation of the rules and published precedents of the two houses and an analysis of the application of these rules and precedents in recent practice (see "Acknowledgements"). Readers may wish to study the provisions of House and Senate rules and examine the applicable precedents—especially in the sections on "Senate Bills," "Amendments Between the Houses," and "Conferences Between the Houses"—in House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House and the corresponding sections on "Amendments Between Houses" and "Conferences and Conference Reports" in Riddick's Senate Procedure (Senate Document No. 101-28). There is also more detailed information on this subject in CRS Report 98-696, Resolving Legislative Differences in Congress: Conference Committees and Amendments Between the Houses , and CRS Report R41003, Amendments Between the Houses: Procedural Options and Effects .


Input:
	Background

The Coast Guard owns or leases more than 20,000 facilities consisting of  various types of buildings and structures. The Coast Guard’s shore  infrastructure is organized into five product lines and 13 asset types,  known as asset lines. For example, within its shore operations asset line,  the Coast Guard maintains over 200 stations along U.S. coasts and  inland waterways to carry out its search and rescue operations, as well as  other missions such as maritime security.
Much of the Coast Guard’s infrastructure is vulnerable to the effects of  extreme weather and can be costly to repair or replace after major  storms. From December 2005 through June 2019, the Coast Guard  received about $2 billion in supplemental appropriation funds to, among  other things, rebuild or relocate 15 facilities damaged by hurricanes.  During this time, the Coast Guard relocated facilities further inland or to  higher ground, upgraded facilities to be more resilient, and designed new  facilities with features to protect them from natural disasters. For  example, after being damaged by Hurricane Ike in 2008, the Coast Guard  relocated a regional facility in Houston, Texas further inland to help  protect the new facility from extreme weather. The facility was also  designed to withstand wind speeds of up to 115 miles per hour. In  February 2017, the Coast Guard’s Civil Engineering program also issued  guidance intended to increase the likelihood that new or recapitalized  buildings would be designed to withstand natural disasters, and to enable  the Coast Guard to better manage risks to its operations and personnel,  among other things.

	Almost Half of the Coast Guard’s Shore Infrastructure is Beyond Its Service Life, and Project Backlogs Will Cost at Least $2.6 Billion to Address

We found in February 2019 that the condition of the Coast Guard’s shore  infrastructure was deteriorating and almost half of it was past its service  life—resulting in (1) recapitalization and new construction and (2)  deferred maintenance backlogs of at least $2.6 billion as of 2018. In  2018, the Coast Guard graded its overall shore infrastructure condition  as a C minus based on criteria it derived from standards developed by  the American Society of Civil Engineers. Table 1 shows information about  the number of assets, replacement value, service life of, and condition  grades assigned by the Coast Guard for each of its asset lines for fiscal  year 2018.
The aging and deteriorating condition of the Coast Guard’s shore  infrastructure has led to at least $2.6 billion in deferred construction  projects and maintenance backlogs. With almost half of its infrastructure  past its service life, and given recent Coast Guard funding requests for its  shore infrastructure, it will take many years for the agency to address  these backlogs. For example, in 2018 the Coast Guard estimated that it  would take almost 400 years to address just the $1.774 billion  recapitalization and new construction backlog—assuming an overall 65- year service life and that funding would continue at the fiscal year 2017  appropriations level. This time frame estimate excludes the Coast  Guard’s $900 million deferred depot-level maintenance backlog. Table 2  provides information on the Coast Guard’s two shore infrastructure  backlogs as of August 2018.
Nevertheless, the size and estimated costs of the Coast Guard’s backlogs  may be understated. We found in February 2019 that the Coast Guard’s  estimated costs did not include hundreds—or the majority—of the  projects on the recapitalization and new construction backlog. For  example, we reported that there were 205 projects on the backlog without  cost estimates. Officials explained that they had not prepared cost  estimates for these projects because they were in the preliminary stages  of development.

	Coast Guard Has Taken Initial Steps toward Improving Its Management of Its Shore Infrastructure

Our previous reports have identified various steps the Coast Guard has  taken to begin to improve how it manages its shore infrastructure. Some  of the steps the Coast Guard has taken align with leading practices for  managing public sector backlogs and key practices for managing risks to  critical infrastructure, including identifying risks posed by the lack of timely  investment, identifying mission-critical facilities, disposing of unneeded  assets, and beginning an assessment of shore infrastructure  vulnerabilities. Specifically, the Coast Guard has:  Identified risks posed by lack of timely investment. In February  2019, we found that the Coast Guard had a process to identify,  document, and report risks to its shore infrastructure in its annual  shore infrastructure reports for fiscal years 2015 through 2018.  These reports identified the types of risks the Coast Guard faces in  not investing in its facilities, including financial risk, capability risk, and  operational readiness risk. The Coast Guard met this leading practice  to identify risk in general terms—for example, in terms of increased  lifecycle costs, or risk to operations.
Identified mission-critical and mission-supportive shore  infrastructure. In February 2019, we found that since at least 2012,  the Coast Guard had documented its process to classify all of its real  property under a tier system and established minimum investment  targets by tier as part of its central depot level maintenance  expenditure decisions. These tiers—which range from mission- critical to mission-supportive assets—were incorporated into guidance  that Coast Guard decision makers are to follow in their deliberations  about project funding, and to help them determine how to target  funding more effectively. For example, Coast Guard guidance for  fiscal years 2019 through 2023 prioritized expenditures on shore  infrastructure supporting front line operations, such as piers or  runways, over shore infrastructure providing indirect support to front  line operations, such as administrative buildings.
Assessed selected buildings for vulnerabilities. We issued a  report today that discusses the Coast Guard Civil Engineering  program’s efforts to conduct a vulnerability assessment of its owned  and occupied buildings, which the Coast Guard initiated in 2015 and  aims to complete in 2025. The Coast Guard calls this infrastructure  review the Shore Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment. The focus  of Phase I of this assessment, completed in 2019, was to determine  the vulnerability of certain occupied buildings to 10 natural disasters.  Further, the assessment results are intended to assist with  contingency planning by identifying which Coast Guard facilities are  likely to remain operational after a natural disaster.
During Phase I of this assessment, completed in 2019, the Coast  Guard analyzed 3,214 buildings, almost 16 percent of its  infrastructure, for vulnerabilities to disasters such as floods,  earthquakes, and hurricanes. The analysis identified Coast Guard- wide infrastructure vulnerabilities to coastal risks such as shoreline  loss, coastal erosion and earthquakes, as well as tsunami risks on the  West Coast of the United States, Alaska, Guam, and Hawaii, and  immediate and serious flood risks in Puerto Rico and the Gulf and  East Coasts. The Phase I report recommended that Coast Guard  units and contingency planners consider these vulnerabilities when  preparing contingency plans or making capital investments. The  Coast Guard has also initiated a follow up effort involving structural  analyses for buildings it believes to be more susceptible to damage  from earthquakes and wind. Officials involved said their aim is to  complete this effort in 2025.

	Coast Guard Has Not Fully Applied Leading Practices and Key Risk Management Steps in Managing its Shore Infrastructure

The Coast Guard has taken actions to begin to improve its shore  infrastructure management. However, as we previously reported, the  Coast Guard has not fully applied leading practices and key risk  management steps to improve its shore infrastructure management.  Specifically, we found, among other things, that the following actions  could help improve the Coast Guard’s shore infrastructure management  efforts:
Employ models for predicting the outcome of investments and  analyzing tradeoffs. In February 2019, we found that a 2017 Coast  Guard Aviation Pavement Study employed a model that found that the  Coast Guard could more efficiently prioritize investment in aviation  pavement. A subsequent Coast Guard aviation pavement plan  recommended actions to use the study results and potentially save  $13.8 million. However, we found that the Coast Guard had not fully  implemented its own recommended actions to achieve the cost  savings.
Additionally, we found that while a similar analytical approach to  efficiently prioritizing investments in aviation pavement could be  applied to all of the shore infrastructure asset lines, the Coast Guard  had not applied the approach to other asset lines. By not employing  similar models across its asset lines for predicting the outcome of  investments, analyzing tradeoffs, and optimizing decisions among  competing investments, the Coast Guard is missing opportunities to  potentially identify and achieve cost savings across other asset lines.  We recommended that the Coast Guard employ models for its asset  lines that would predict the investment outcomes, analyze tradeoffs,  and optimize decisions among competing investments. The Coast  Guard agreed with our recommendation but as of August 2019 had  not addressed it. The Coast Guard stated that it plans to assess the  use of modeling tools used by the Department of Defense as well as  other alternatives to enhance its real property asset management  capability. We will continue to monitor its actions.
Dispose of unneeded assets. In October 2017, we found that  disposing of unneeded assets, such as closing unnecessarily  duplicative boat stations, based on a sound analytical process,  could potentially generate $290 million in cost savings over 20  years. Specifically, the Coast Guard identified 18 unnecessarily  duplicative boat stations with overlapping coverage that could be  permanently closed without negatively affecting the Coast Guard’s  ability to meet its mission requirements, including its 2-hour search  and rescue response standard. In 2017, the Coast Guard affirmed  that its leadership believes the study remains valid, but as of  September 2019 it has not closed any stations. Figure 1 depicts the  extent of the Coast Guard’s overlapping boat and air station search  and rescue coverage, as identified by the Coast Guard, some of  which the Coast Guard determined to be unnecessarily duplicative.
In February 2019, we found that 5 of the 18 boat stations  recommended for closure had projects listed on the Coast Guard’s  current project backlog. For example, Station Shark River, in New  Jersey, was recommended for recapitalization in fiscal year 2017,  despite Coast Guard recommendations to close the station in 1988,  1996, 2007, and 2013. Notably, the Coast Guard has made multiple  attempts in previous years to close such stations but was unable to  due to congressional intervention, and subsequent legislation  prohibiting closures.
In October 2017, we recommended that the Coast Guard establish  and implement a plan with target dates and milestones for closing  boat stations that it has determined provide overlapping search and  rescue coverage and are unnecessarily duplicative. In February 2019,  we further recommended disposing of unneeded assets to more  efficiently manage resources and better position the Coast Guard and  Congress to address shore infrastructure challenges. The Coast  Guard agreed with our recommendations. As of September 2019, the  Coast Guard reported that it was considering changes in the  operational status of several stations, such as closing the stations  during the winter months when they conduct few, if any, search and  rescue cases. The Coast Guard estimated that it will continue to  consider changes until March 2020. These are positive steps, but we  continue to believe that it is important for the Coast Guard to dispose  of unneeded assets. Given the Coast Guard’s competing acquisition,  operational, and maintenance needs, and its existing $1.774 billion  project backlog of recapitalization and new construction projects,  these actions may help to mitigate some of its resource challenges.  We will continue to monitor the Coast Guard’s efforts to implement  these recommendations.
Report shore infrastructure project backlogs accurately. In  February 2019, we found areas in which the Coast Guard could  increase budget transparency for shore infrastructure by accurately  reporting project backlogs and costs in Congressionally-required  plans. Specifically, we found that the Coast Guard had not provided  accurate information to Congress necessary to inform decision- makers of the risks posed by untimely investments in maintenance  and repair backlogs. For example, the Coast Guard had not  provided complete information to Congress in its Unfunded Priorities  Lists of shore infrastructure projects, including information about  tradeoffs among competing project alternatives, as well as the  impacts on missions conducted from shore facilities in disrepair. We  also found that Coast Guard budget requests related to shore  infrastructure for fiscal years 2012 through 2019 generally did not  identify funding to address any backlogs of deferred maintenance or  recapitalization, except for one fiscal year—2012—when the Coast  Guard requested $93 million to recapitalize deteriorated/obsolete  facilities.
We also found that the Coast Guard had not provided accurate  information about its requirements-based budget targets for shore  infrastructure in its budget requests. According to Coast Guard  officials, a requirements-based budget is an estimate of the cost to  operate and sustain its shore infrastructure portfolio of assets over the  lifecycle of the asset, from initial construction or capital investment  through divestiture or demolition. Further, we found that Coast  Guard recapitalization targets showed a far greater need than was  reflected in the appropriations it requested from fiscal years 2012  through 2019. Specifically, Coast Guard targets for recapitalization of  shore assets indicated the Coast Guard needs $290 to $390 million  annually for its recapitalization efforts. However, its budget requests  for fiscal years 2012 through 2018 have ranged from about $5 million  to about $99 million annually.
We recommended that the Coast Guard include supporting details  about competing project alternatives and report tradeoffs in  Congressional budget requests and related reports. Without such  information about the Coast Guard’s budgetary requirements, the  Congress will lack critical information that could help to prioritize  funding to address the Coast Guard’s shore infrastructure backlogs.  While the Coast Guard agreed with our recommendation, in August  2019 officials reported that they will continue to develop budgets as  the agency has done but will include additional information in future  required reports to Congress. We will continue to monitor these  actions.
Fully implement DHS’s Critical Infrastructure Risk Management  Framework. In September 2019, we found that the Coast Guard has  taken some steps to improve the resilience of its shore infrastructure  by rebuilding storm-damaged facilities and initiating a vulnerability  assessment, but its processes to improve shore infrastructure  resilience are not fully aligned with the five steps DHS has identified  for critical infrastructure risk management (DHS Critical Infrastructure  Risk Management Framework). The five steps include: (1) setting  goals and objectives, (2) identifying critical infrastructure, (3)  assessing and analyzing risks and costs, (4) implementing risk  management activities, and (5) measuring the effectiveness of actions  taken.
We found that the Coast Guard is not positioned to provide decision  makers with complete details of which infrastructure facilities are  critical, and the type of information the DHS Critical Infrastructure Risk  Management Framework recommends for making cost effective risk  management decisions. The Coast Guard identified occupied  buildings that may be important to operations and assessed their  vulnerability through its Shore Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment  process, but this process did not identify all shore infrastructure  assets that are critical to its missions—such as aircraft runways—or  screen them for all vulnerabilities, such as flooding. Similarly, we  found that while the Coast Guard identified almost 800 buildings that  may be vulnerable to tornadoes and another 1,000 buildings  vulnerable to hurricanes, it has not analyzed the potential  consequences, such as economic losses, costs for rebuilding, and  impact on mission, should this infrastructure suffer damage from  those vulnerabilities.
Without a complete understanding of both the vulnerabilities of its  infrastructure and the consequences to its mission operations if its  infrastructure is damaged, the Coast Guard risks questionable  recapitalization investments for improving resilience when selecting  projects to fund. Such an understanding is especially important given  its existing project backlogs of at least $2.6 billion. The five steps of  the DHS Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Framework are  intended to guide decision making and prioritize actions to more  effectively achieve desired outcomes. Therefore, in September 2019  we recommended that the Coast Guard implement risk management  processes that more fully align with the five key steps outlined in  DHS’s Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Framework to better  guide its shore infrastructure investment decisions. The Coast Guard  agreed with our recommendation. It stated that it plans to make  progress towards implementing the recommendation while developing  and implementing its Component Resilience Plan, in accordance with  the recently mandated DHS Resilience Framework. It intends to  complete these efforts by the end of 2021. The Coast Guard also  intends to develop, by July 2020, goals and objectives for measuring  the effectiveness of actions taken to identify resilience readiness gaps  and resource needs. We will continue to monitor these efforts.
Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy  to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

	GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony,  please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or andersonn@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. In addition to the contact  above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director; Andrew Curry, Analyst-in-Charge;  Peter Haderlein; Landis Lindsey; Calaera Powroznik, and Molly Ryan  made key contributions to this testimony. Other staff who made key  contributions to the reports cited in the testimony are identified in the  source products.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.


Input:
	Background

		Aviation Maintenance Workforce

Different aviation industry employers have distinct workforce needs and  may require workers with specific skillsets depending on the type of work  performed. The workforce includes FAA-certificated mechanics and  repairmen, as well as non-certificated workers.
FAA-certificated mechanics inspect, service, and repair aircraft  bodies (airframe) and engines (powerplant), and only they can  approve an aircraft for return to service. It can take between 1 and 3  years to obtain the required education or training to become  certificated.
FAA-certificated repairmen service aircraft components and must  be recommended for certification by their employer to perform specific  tasks such as welding or painting. It can take more than a year to  obtain the required experience or training to become certificated. A  repairman certificate is only valid at the employer for which it was  issued.
Non-certificated aviation maintenance workers include individuals  who are supervised by certificated mechanics or repairmen in  performing repair work.

	Federal Data Reveal Some Demographic and Employment Information on Certificated Mechanics and Repairmen

Existing federal data shed light on key workforce characteristics such as  the number of FAA-certificated mechanics and repairmen, their age, sex,  and education. Specifically:
As of December 2018, about 295,000 individuals held a mechanic  certificate and about 35,000 held a repairmen certificate.
The median age of FAA-certificated mechanics and repairmen was 54  years old, according to our analysis of FAA data.
Three percent of all aviation maintenance certificate holders were  women as of December 2018.
Attending AMT school was the most common pathway certificated  individuals used to qualify for the FAA tests to become mechanics.
Existing federal data also provide some information on employment  characteristics such as the supply of certificated workers. Specifically,  FAA certificated about 8,600 mechanics and repairmen on average each  year for 2014 through 2018 (see fig. 1). BLS data project an annual  average of 11,800 job openings in the United States from 2018-2028 for  aircraft mechanics and service technicians due to growth and replacement, which include job openings for certificated and non- certificated workers.
There are, however, certain limitations to existing federal data. For  example, neither FAA nor BLS collects data on the race or ethnicity of  certificated individuals. In addition, FAA officials said the number of  certificated individuals likely overestimates the number of them working in  the aviation industry. It is unknown how many of the approximately  330,000 certificate holders are retired, deceased, or working in other  industries. Furthermore, BLS data indicate 136,900 individuals were  employed in the aircraft mechanics and service technicians occupation in  2018, but it is not clear how many of those jobs were filled by FAA- certificated workers.
There are also limitations to determining employment characteristics such  as pay for certificated workers, specifically. BLS publishes some data on  pay for aircraft mechanics and service technicians, such as average  hourly and annual wages. However, the occupational classification  system BLS and other federal statistical agencies use for aircraft  mechanics and service technicians does not distinguish between FAA- certificated and non-certificated workers, making it difficult to determine  employment characteristics such as pay for certificated workers,  specifically. This is in part because workers are classified by the work  they perform and not necessarily by certification or education, according  to occupational classification system principles. BLS officials said they  collected wage and employment data for certificated workers separate  from non-certificated workers in employer surveys conducted between  2000 and 2012, but stopped collecting these data in part because  employers inconsistently reported them.
Employers we interviewed, including air carriers and repair stations, had  differing perspectives on potential growth in demand for aviation  maintenance workers; some said they were experiencing difficulty finding  enough workers to meet their needs, while others said they were not  experiencing difficulty. Employers we interviewed for our 2014 report also  expressed varying levels of difficulty filling vacancies and recruiting  individuals for certain aviation professions, including aviation  maintenance workers. Small and medium-sized employers in particular  cited some challenges to hiring due to the wage they offered. Some  stakeholders we interviewed for our recent report voiced concerns about  the potential for a labor shortage. In addition to these views, two of the  three selected labor market indicators (unemployment rate and wage  earnings) we reviewed from 2013 through 2018 were consistent with  difficulties in hiring aircraft mechanics and service technicians, while the  other indicator (employment) was not.

	Government and Industry Programs Support the Workforce, but FAA Lacks Information That Could Advance Its Workforce Development Efforts

Several federal agencies such as DOD, DOL, VA, Education, and the  Department of Transportation administer grants or programs that support  individuals pursuing aviation maintenance careers or facilitate  coordination among different stakeholders to support them. For example:
DOD’s Military Services’ Credentialing Opportunities On-Line  (COOL) program. This program provides funding for service  members to obtain professional credentials related to their military  training and helps them translate their military experience into civilian  occupations.
DOL’s Registered Apprenticeship Program. DOL awards grants to  support Registered Apprenticeship Programs— employer-driven  training opportunities that combine on-the-job learning with related  classroom instruction. The program facilitates coordination among  different stakeholders such as industry, states, and educational  institutions to support apprenticeships and employment opportunities.
In addition, FAA established an Aviation Workforce Steering Committee in  February 2019, in part to coordinate efforts across FAA to address  various workforce related provisions included in the FAA Reauthorization  Act of 2018. Additional examples of federal grants or programs that  support this workforce can be found in our report. The report also  includes examples of states, industry employers, and AMT schools  coordinating or partnering to support the workforce including developing  career grants and military pathway programs.
Despite some of FAA’s recent efforts in support of this workforce, we  found that FAA does not routinely analyze, collect, or coordinate with  other stakeholders on certain data related to workforce development.
FAA’s strategic plan includes an objective on promoting the development  of a robust aviation workforce, and its Aviation Workforce Steering  Committee charter emphasizes providing diverse populations, including  youth, women, and minorities, with clear pathways into aviation careers to  expand the talent pool from which both government and industry may  recruit. However, neither the strategic plan nor the steering committee  charter provides specific information on how FAA plans to select and  measure any efforts it undertakes related to these objectives. Without  routinely analyzing its own data or leveraging others’ data, FAA may not  have certain information it needs to track or ensure progress toward its  workforce development goals.
We identified several areas in which improved data analysis, collection, or  coordination could assist FAA in measuring progress and understanding  how to target its resources in support of its workforce related objectives.  For example, FAA could use the demographic or pathway data it already  collects to identify patterns or relationships (such as the trend in female  certificate holders by pathway), which could be useful information as FAA  aims to increase opportunities for women to pursue aviation maintenance  careers. FAA could also use existing AMT school data (such as  enrollment or mechanic test pass-rate data) to analyze nationwide trends  or aggregate information across AMT schools to better understand the  AMT school pathway as a whole.
In our 2020 report that issued last week, we recommended that the  Aviation Workforce Steering Committee, as part of its ongoing efforts,  take steps to use existing FAA data and coordinate with other federal  agencies to identify and gather the information it needs to measure  progress and target resources toward its goal of promoting a robust,  qualified, and diverse aviation maintenance workforce. FAA agreed with  our recommendation.

	Revisions to FAA’s Decades-Old Mechanic Curriculum Requirements and Its Mechanic Testing Standards Are Ongoing

Even as FAA’s strategic plan states the agency’s focus on promoting the  development of a skilled aviation maintenance workforce to integrate new  technologies, the agency has acknowledged that the current curriculum  requirements for AMT schools and mechanic testing standards are  outdated. FAA officials, employers, and AMT School officials we  interviewed said the current curriculum requirements do not emphasize  commonly used modern aircraft technologies, such as avionics and  composite materials. Over the years, FAA has attempted several times to  revise curriculum requirements for AMT schools through the rulemaking  process, and efforts to revise these requirements are ongoing through  this process. FAA is also currently updating the testing standards for  mechanics.
FAA officials have noted several challenges to updating the curriculum  requirements including competing demands at the department level and  the extent of comments FAA has received from stakeholders in response  to proposed changes. In October 2015, FAA published a notice of  proposed rulemaking (NPRM) with the stated goal of updating the existing  AMT school curriculum. FAA issued a supplemental NPRM in April 2019  that expanded the scope of the NPRM it issued in October 2015.  Comments on the supplemental NPRM were due in June 2019. As of  October 2019, FAA officials said they were in the process of reviewing the  comments. FAA officials told us that a final rule will be published some  time toward the end of 2020.
In a separate effort outside of the rulemaking process, FAA is currently  updating the testing standards for mechanics. FAA has acknowledged  that current mechanic testing standards are also outdated. As a result,  aviation stakeholders have stated the mechanic tests include outdated or  irrelevant questions. For example, the practical test may include projects  on wood airframes and fabric coverings, which are not common to  modern commercial aircraft.
An FAA official noted that any delay in finalizing the rule would likely  result in a corresponding delay to finalizing the testing standards.  Delaying the release of the updated mechanic testing standards could  result in the prolonged use of outdated or irrelevant questions on the  mechanic tests. FAA officials said that once finalized and implemented,  the updated curriculum requirements for AMT schools and the mechanic  testing standards for individuals should be mostly aligned.
Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared remarks. I look forward to  answering any questions you may have.

	GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

If you or your staff have any questions about this statement, please  contact me at (202) 512-2834 or krauseh@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to  this testimony were Betty Ward-Zukerman, Assistant Director, Vashun  Cole, Chelsa Gurkin, Ellie Klein, Meredith Moore, Justin Reed, Andrew  Von Ah, and Chris Woika.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.