Input:
	Background

The vast majority of the 42 railroads subject to the statutory mandate to  implement PTC—including 30 commuter railroads, Amtrak, seven Class I  and four Class II and III freight railroads—are implementing one of three  types of PTC systems. These systems include the Interoperable  Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS), the Advanced Civil  Speed Enforcement System II (ACSES), and Enhanced Automated Train  Control (E-ATC). While these PTC systems are functionally similar, the  technologies they use differ. For example, to determine a train’s location,  ACSES and E-ATC rely on equipment embedded on the track while I- ETMS uses Global Positioning System information. ACSES and E-ATC  both supplement existing train control systems to provide all required PTC  functionality, while I-ETMS was designed as a new system to provide this  functionality.
As noted above, testing is one of the many steps to achieving full  implementation. Through multiple stages of testing, which are  summarized below, railroads must demonstrate that the PTC system  meets functional requirements.
Laboratory testing: locomotive and wayside equipment testing in a  lab environment to verify that individual components function as  designed.
Field testing: includes several different tests of individual  components and the overall system, such as testing each locomotive  type to verify that it meets functional requirements and field integration  testing—a key implementation milestone to verify that each PTC  component is integrated and functioning safely as designed.
Revenue service demonstration (RSD): an advanced form of field  testing in which the railroad operates PTC-equipped trains in regular  service under specific conditions. RSD is intended to validate the  performance of the PTC system as a whole and to test the system  under normal, real-world operations.
Using results from field and RSD testing, combined with other  information, host railroads must then submit a safety plan to FRA for  system certification and approval. We previously reported that these  safety plans have been up to 5,000 pages in length. Once FRA approves  a safety plan, the railroad receives system certification, which is required  for full implementation, and is then authorized to operate the PTC system  in revenue service. According to FRA officials, the FRA may impose  conditions to the PTC safety plan approval as necessary to ensure safety,  resulting in a conditional certification.
Interoperability is achieved when the locomotives of any host railroad and  tenant railroad operating over the same track segment can successfully  communicate with and respond to the other railroad’s PTC system,  allowing uninterrupted movements over property boundaries. For  example, when a locomotive enters another railroad’s territory as a  tenant, it immediately needs information about the upcoming track—such  as any temporary speed restrictions in place due to track work (see fig.  1).
To achieve interoperability, railroads have to complete a series of steps  including (1) additional installation work (such as installing equipment on  a tenant railroad’s locomotives) and scheduling (such as coordinating with  the relevant railroad to reach any needed agreements and identify dates  for testing), (2) laboratory testing, (3) field testing, and (4) RSD or  revenue service operations. Many railroads will complete much of the  implementation for their own PTC systems, such as starting RSD on  some or most of their track, before they begin to take steps to achieve  interoperability with other railroads. However, a railroad can take steps to  achieve interoperability with other railroads while simultaneously  completing field testing or other stages of testing on its own PTC system.
FRA is responsible for overseeing railroads’ implementation of PTC, and  the agency monitors progress and provides direct assistance to railroads  implementing PTC. For example, each railroad had to develop an FRA- approved PTC implementation plan that includes project schedules and  milestones for certain activities, and a railroad is required to report  quarterly and annually to FRA on its PTC implementation status relative  to its implementation plan. FRA also provides technical assistance to  railroads, addresses questions, and reviews and approves railroads’  documentation, including test and safety plans. FRA has a national PTC  project manager, designated PTC specialists in the eight FRA regions,  and approximately a dozen engineers, test monitors, and other staff  responsible for overseeing technical aspects of implementation. FRA also  has oversight tools, which includes authority to impose civil penalties  when a railroad fails to meet certain statutory PTC requirements. Since  2017, FRA reports that it has assessed nearly $400,000 in civil penalties  against railroads that failed to comply with their implementation plan  milestones or reporting requirements.

	Railroads Continue to Make Progress Implementing PTC, but Significant Work Remains to Achieve Interoperability

		Railroads’ Implementation of Their Own Systems Has Advanced, but Some Commuter and Smaller Freight Railroads Remain in the Early Stages of Testing

Since the end of 2018, some railroads have reported making progress on  testing and implementation of their own PTC systems. Figure 2 shows the  42 railroads’ reported progress by PTC implementation stage.
Six railroads—two Class Is and four commuters—reported to FRA that  they had implemented PTC on all of their own territories but had not  completed interoperability as of March 31, 2019, and almost all these  railroads reported being in this stage at the end of 2018. In addition, as  of March 31, 2019, no additional railroads beyond the four that were  complete at the end of 2018 reported reaching full implementation. Nearly  all railroads still implementing PTC plan to reach full implementation in  the last quarter of 2020, based on our analysis of railroads’ extension  requests.
Few railroads reported moving into RSD during the first quarter of 2019,  and the extent of RSD testing being conducted by railroads in this stage  varied considerably. Of the 19 railroads that reported RSD testing on  some portion of their own track as of March 31, about half (9 of 19)  reported RSD testing on more than 75 percent of their total route miles,  while about a quarter (5 of 19) reported RSD testing on less than 25  percent of their total route miles. RSD testing also varied between Class I  railroads and commuter railroads. On average, the 5 Class I railroads in  this stage reported RSD on 86 percent of route miles, while commuter  railroads reported an average of 39 percent of route miles in RSD.
Moreover, based on our analysis, 11 railroads—7 commuters and 4 Class  II and III railroads—reported that they remained in field testing as of  March 31, 2019. Similar to railroads in RSD testing, the extent of field  testing reported by railroads varied. Of the 11 railroads in field testing,  most (7) reported field testing on the majority or all of their route miles,  whereas 4 railroads—all commuters—reported conducting field testing on  less than half of their route miles. Based on railroads’ responses to our  questionnaire, railroads’ PTC implementation status did not change  significantly as of May 31, 2019; two additional railroads—both  commuters—began RSD testing on some portion of their track, and one  commuter railroad began field testing.

		Host Railroads Have Achieved Interoperability with Less Than 20 Percent of Tenants, but Nearly All Railroads Have Started Interoperability Planning

As of March 31, 2019, 11 of the 31 host railroads that must have  interoperable PTC systems reported to FRA that they had achieved  interoperability with at least 1 of their tenant railroads. Collectively, of  the 227 unique host-tenant relationships that require interoperability, FRA  reported that railroads had achieved interoperability for 38 (17 percent) of  these relationships. The number of tenants each railroad must work to  achieve interoperability with ranges from 1 to 31 railroads, based on  railroad reports to FRA. For example, Class I railroads, as host railroads,  average about 18 tenants, while commuter railroads average about 3  tenants. A railroad does not generally start work to achieve  interoperability with all the railroads it interoperates with at once,  according to FRA; instead a railroad will prioritize its interoperability work.  For example, representatives from one Class I railroad we interviewed  said it prioritized achieving interoperability in the following sequence: first  with commuter-railroad tenants given the need to ensure passenger  safety; second with other Class I railroads given the high total miles of  track they share; and finally with smaller Class III railroads. In addition, a  railroad may be in multiple interoperability steps (e.g., installing, testing)  with different tenants at the same time.
FRA counts a relationship as having achieved interoperability if the tenant  is operating PTC on all of the host’s track miles. This binary measure for  interoperability—that is, achieved or not—does not describe the extent to  which railroads have started work on interoperability or, according to  representatives from two railroads we interviewed, reflect when  interoperability has been achieved along most but not all of its host’s  track. Railroads reported to FRA that they had begun work on  interoperability for more than 90 percent of the remaining host-tenant  relationships that need to achieve interoperability. In particular, based on  their quarterly reports, railroads were installing for 82 host-tenant  relationships and testing for 89 host-tenant relationships as of March 31,  2019. Overall, the status of interoperability work did not vary much among  Class I, commuter, and Class II and III railroads.
FRA officials and others we spoke with could not provide an estimate of  how long it takes on average for two railroads to complete the individual  steps to achieve interoperability. Representatives from industry  associations we interviewed said that it can vary. An FRA specialist we  interviewed agreed, explaining that interoperability field testing, for  example, varies based on track availability. One railroad might complete  testing in 4 days while another railroad might need weeks because it can  only test at specific times. In its quarterly reports, FRA asks host railroads  to provide the scheduled date for completing interoperability testing with  each tenant railroad. As of March 31, 2019, seven railroads reported that  they did not anticipate completing interoperability testing with at least one  tenant until the last quarter of 2020.

		Railroads Continue to Report Challenges with Vendors and Software, and Face New Interoperability Challenges

In responding to our May 2019 questionnaire, most railroads reported that  vendor and software issues remain major or moderate challenges for  PTC implementation. As part of our ongoing work related to PTC, we  have reported that railroads have faced challenges associated with the  limited number of vendors that design PTC systems, provide the software  and hardware, and conduct testing. However, as representatives of half  of the railroads we interviewed emphasized, vendor and software issues  are more acute now because as the 2020 deadline nears, less time  remains to address these issues and associated delays. Software and vendor issues can be interrelated as a small pool of vendors develop and  update the software that supports railroads’ PTC systems.  Representatives from several railroads and FRA specialists we  interviewed said that software issues routinely arise in lab testing, field  testing, and RSD that require vendor revisions before a railroad’s PTC  implementation can continue. For example, representatives from one  railroad said that existing software defects affecting its PTC system must  be addressed and a new version of the software is needed before they  can start RSD. They added that they had no control over this process, as  they must rely on the vendor to provide reliable software. Representatives  from this railroad also noted that resolving software issues is often not  entirely within a railroad’s control due to the need for vendor support, in  contrast to some earlier challenges leading up to the 2018 deadline,  where, for example, the railroad itself had more control as it was installing  equipment and could more clearly track progress.
Moreover, the limited supply of vendors and high demand for services as  railroads work simultaneously to implement PTC by the 2020 deadline  continue to pose problems. For example, representatives from one  railroad said their vendor has consistently had issues meeting milestones  and delivering on its commitments. Representatives from a small railroad  said they had limited internal resources to implement PTC, making the  railroad’s progress heavily reliant on its vendor. Representatives from two  other railroads and FRA officials also highlighted implementation delays  caused by recalls for some locomotive equipment, which has caused  additional work for railroads as well as the vendor. Specifically, the  equipment had to be removed, sent in for repair, and then re-installed.
More than half of the railroads implementing PTC also responded to our  questionnaire that interoperability was a major or moderate challenge.  Railroads said that interoperability can be complicated by software issues  and coordinating host and tenant railroad schedules, when asked to  describe the biggest challenges to achieving interoperability. Fifteen railroads specifically mentioned software issues, and representatives from  several railroads noted that interoperability will require reliable software.  For example, one railroad reported that certain software functionality  remains to be developed, tested, and implemented to facilitate  interoperability and to address software reliability issues that have caused  system disruptions. Also, 14 railroads noted that scheduling time with  other railroads to begin interoperability testing can be cumbersome and  time consuming. For example, several railroads that we interviewed and  that responded to our questionnaire said that scheduling can be  complicated by whether other railroads have made enough progress on  their own PTC implementation to begin work on interoperability.
According to FRA officials, interoperability challenges also differ across  PTC systems and geographic areas. Below, we use the Northeast  Corridor and the Chicago metropolitan area—where most railroads are  implementing ACSES and I-ETMS, respectively—to illustrate the  challenges faced in working to achieve interoperability. However,  railroads in other areas or implementing other PTC systems may face  some of these same challenges or face additional different challenges.

			Northeast Corridor and Surrounding Area

Over a dozen railroads operating on the Northeast Corridor and in the  surrounding area are required to implement PTC. The Northeast Corridor  runs from Washington, D.C., to Boston, Massachusetts, and Amtrak  predominantly owns track on the corridor. Eight commuter railroads,  Amtrak, and most freight railroads are implementing a form of the ACSES  system on at least a portion of their equipment and track. In some cases,  railroads in the Northeast will be operating two different PTC systems  concurrently on the same track, which will add to the complexity of  interoperability, according to FRA. Examples of interoperability  challenges faced in the Northeast include:
Software issues. PTC software presents particular challenges in the  Northeast because software is being supplied by multiple vendors and  has been developed to accommodate railroads’ existing systems that  have different configurations. Therefore, according to FRA officials,  ACSES does not have a common set of requirements or  specifications. Also, even if two railroads use the same vendor for  their locomotive equipment or software, each railroad may use a  different version of software. In addition, representatives from two  railroads that operate in the Northeast told us they built different  software functionality into their PTC systems to accommodate their  own operations, so additional work is needed to resolve such  differences to achieve interoperability. In light of these software  issues, representatives from one industry association and one railroad  we interviewed said that Northeast Corridor railroads are discussing  creating a software management process to aid interoperability.
Boundary issues. A train needs to seamlessly operate PTC when it  crosses the boundary between two railroads’ territories, as previously  described. According to a rail industry association, as of June 2019,  there are about 20 boundaries on the Northeast Corridor where more  work is needed to ensure seamless operation. FRA officials and one  industry association said boundary issues are complex and time- consuming to resolve but not insurmountable. For example, FRA  officials said a railroad could install its own equipment such as  transponders and wayside devices across the boundary to create an  overlap between their system and that of the other railroad.
Securing PTC wireless communication. FRA requires that PTC  wireless railroad communications be encrypted. However, a solution  that aims to encrypt all PTC wireless communication and data  transmittal among railroads operating ACSES in the Northeast is  currently in lab development. In August 2016, Amtrak received a grant  from FRA to create this solution for ACSES. Amtrak originally planned  to implement this solution in December 2018, but Amtrak has  experienced delays and currently estimates that it will implement the  solution by January 2020. However, Amtrak has reported several risks  that it will need to overcome to meet this implementation deadline.  Further delays could affect railroads’ ability to fully implement PTC in  the Northeast by the December 2020 deadline. FRA noted it will  continue to monitor and support the railroads as they implement  security measures in the Northeast.

			Chicago Area

Ten I-ETMS railroads that operate in the greater Chicago metropolitan  area received extensions to implement PTC. Throughout PTC  implementation, FRA, industry associations, and railroads have identified  Chicago as a place where interoperability would be challenging due to the  dense freight, passenger, and commuter operations in the area.  Examples of such challenges include:
Software issues. According to FRA and railroads we interviewed,  software issues have slowed interoperability work by railroads  implementing I-ETMS. The underlying problem is the memory  available on the locomotive equipment, which is needed to store its  railroad’s track data, according to FRA and railroads we interviewed.  To be interoperable, the locomotive equipment also needs to store  and exchange multiple railroads’ track data, causing the memory to fill  up very quickly. According to railroad representatives, memory  limitations for I-ETMS locomotive equipment prohibited railroads with  large track data files—mainly the Class I freight railroads—from being  able to interoperate. The vendor for this equipment has been working  on a software solution for this problem, and according to a few  railroads we interviewed, the vendor delivered an interim software  solution in March 2019 that allowed the four largest Class I railroads  to achieve interoperability. However, this software was delivered 7  months later than initially planned, and an additional software solution  is still needed to allow the locomotive equipment’s memory to store  the data of all railroads operating I-ETMS, according to  representatives from two railroads and an industry association we  interviewed.
Other technical issues. Railroads in the Chicago area conducted  modeling to help ensure that sufficient communications capacity (e.g.,  spectrum and radio capacity) would be available to support PTC  interoperability in the region. According to one industry association,  while actual PTC operations in the area are minimal right now relative  to full expected operations, railroads must continue to monitor the  communications capacity as more railroads progress with their own  PTC implementation and start to interoperate. For example, railroads  may have to re-engineer their radio networks, such as re-routing  certain communications through different radio towers and other  network connections, if issues are subsequently identified.
Scheduling interoperability work with other railroads. Within the  Chicago area, the total number of railroads and the number of  railroads that have to be interoperable on a single line complicates  interoperability. Chicago is the busiest rail hub in North America and  handles one-fourth of the nation’s freight rail traffic. Nearly 500 freight  trains and over 700 passenger trains travel through the area on tracks  owned by several different railroads every day. For example, one  commuter railroad, for one of its lines, operates over track owned by  four host railroads that alternates with its own track. Achieving  interoperability for this line will involve sequencing and scheduling  with multiple railroads to activate PTC along the entire line, including  across the numerous boundaries between different railroads’  territories, according to representatives from that railroad. According  to one FRA specialist, work to achieve interoperability in the Chicago  area will ramp up in late 2019 or early 2020. As a result, many  railroads will have to coordinate schedules to sequence  interoperability work across the dozens of host-tenant relationships in  the area.

	FRA Is Assisting Railroads with Testing and Interoperability while PTC Workload Challenges Persist

FRA officials told us that the agency continues to provide assistance to  railroads on interoperability and to support railroads through the testing  process. In summer 2019, FRA began an effort to meet with all freight,  non-Class I tenant railroads that have to be interoperable with host  railroads required to implement PTC. FRA officials said they will use  meetings with these 72 individual tenant railroads to discuss PTC  requirements and review the railroads’ plans for implementing PTC with  their host railroads. FRA officials said they have also continued to meet  regularly with railroads still in field testing or starting RSD on their own  PTC systems. For example, FRA officials said the agency meets weekly  or monthly with each railroad that has not yet initiated RSD to provide  targeted technical assistance to resolve any issues. FRA and  representatives from one railroad also told us that FRA has met with  vendors to discuss specific equipment or software issues and to stress  the importance of resolving these issues. FRA also participates in  meetings held by the railroad industry’s PTC working groups, including  those focused on the Northeast Corridor and Chicago area, as needed.
In addition, FRA officials told us that they are working with industry to  improve the safety plan review process. Specifically, according to a June  FRA presentation, FRA is working with two railroads and an industry  association to create templates for streamlined, more consistent safety  plans for two types of PTC systems—I-ETMS and E-ATC. The goal of the  template is to reduce the burden on both railroads and FRA by using a  shorter format and, where possible, relying on standardized system  documents. FRA officials anticipate that the templates will be ready for  other railroads to use in fall 2019. In addition, FRA has contracted for  help in reviewing safety plans. However, representatives from four  railroads and two industry associations we interviewed noted that they  remained concerned about the amount of time it has taken FRA to review  safety plans. FRA reported in February 2019 that it took on average 331  days to review a safety plan.
While it is too early to determine the effect of FRA’s efforts to improve the  safety plan review process, much work remains for FRA in the next 18  months. According to FRA, 23 railroads will be submitting safety plans in  the next 12 months. While FRA has conditionally certified 13 PTC  systems as of March 31, 2019, these railroads, too, are required to  continue to work with FRA to provide additional documents to respond to  FRA’s conditions. Some of these railroads also plan to resubmit safety  plans for FRA to review, hoping to receive an unconditional certification  before the December 2020 deadline.
In March 2018, we reported that railroads had expressed a need for  additional clarification about applying for an extension and that FRA could  provide more consistent information to railroads. We recommended that  FRA identify and adopt a method for systematically communicating  extension-related information to railroads. In 2018, FRA held three  symposiums for railroads to consistently communicate information to help  railroads prepare to qualify for an extension and to understand what was  required to have a fully implemented PTC system. FRA held two similar  sessions in February and June 2019. Representatives from most of the  railroads we interviewed (six of eight) said they have been happy with the  communication with FRA, via these sessions as well as regular meetings  with FRA’s PTC field specialists and other staff. For example,  representatives of two railroads said it was helpful to have the FRA  Administrator attend the sessions with railroads and talk directly to  railroad representatives. In addition, clarity of information from FRA was  the lowest rated challenge in response to our questionnaire, with 29  railroads reporting this as a minor challenge or not at all a challenge.
While FRA has made improvements, the extended 2020 deadline for full  PTC implementation is less than 18 months away, and FRA and railroads  have substantial work to complete and challenges to address before that  deadline. Moreover, unlike the 2018 deadline, no additional extensions  are available beyond December 2020. In March 2018, we  recommended that FRA develop an approach to use the information it  gathers on railroads’ PTC implementation progress to prioritize the  allocation of resources to address the greatest risk. FRA agreed with  this recommendation, and while FRA officials have described testing and  interoperability as areas of focus in 2018 and 2019, they have not  articulated or demonstrated how, within these broad areas, they are  monitoring risk and prioritizing resources. For instance, FRA plans to  meet with all 72 tenant railroads in over 30 meetings rather than use the  data it collects from host railroads to target this outreach. In addition,  while FRA will have to review dozens of new and resubmitted safety  plans in the coming months, FRA officials have not identified how they will  prioritize these reviews relative to other reviews (e.g., other  documentation that railroads submit as they continue testing on their own  systems and for interoperability).
According to FRA, it has communicated to railroads in industry-wide  meetings that conditional certification for a PTC system is generally  sufficient to meet the statutory requirement for full implementation; FRA  noted this would only not be sufficient if a railroad’s PTC system did not  otherwise meet the technical requirements in regulations and one or more  of the conditions related to such non-compliance. However,  representatives from two railroads we interviewed also said it was unclear  whether conditional certification would be enough for a railroad to comply  with the 2020 deadline, and uncertainty remains about which conditions  must be addressed to meet the statutory requirement for full  implementation.
Related to system certification, representatives from three railroads and  one industry association we interviewed also said FRA still needed to  clarify how it would handle situations where a host or tenant railroad is not  fully implemented by the 2020 deadline. Although the FRA Administrator  has publicly said he will enforce the implementation deadline (which is  December 31, 2020, for most railroads) and recommend assessing the  maximum civil penalty against a railroad that did not meet its deadline,  FRA has not clarified if this would apply in situations where a host or  tenant relationship affects another railroad’s implementation. We continue  to see value in FRA developing a risk-based approach to allocating its  limited resources and will continue to monitor FRA’s actions on this  recommendation.
Going forward, FRA will also need to transition to overseeing PTC as a  routine part of railroad operations after the 2020 deadline. Similarly,  railroads will need to transition from implementation—largely done by  contractors—to operating and maintaining their own PTC systems.  Several railroads, in response to our questionnaire, said that they  anticipate difficulties funding ongoing operations and maintenance as well  as managing software and other updates. Therefore, December 31, 2020,  represents not only the deadline for full PTC implementation but also a  point after which railroads and FRA will face a new operational and  oversight environment.
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the  Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to  respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

	GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Susan Fleming, Director, Physical Infrastructure at (202) 512- 2834 or FlemingS@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony  are Susan Zimmerman (Assistant Director); Katherine Blair Raymond;  Delwen Jones; Emily Larson; Joanie Lofgren; Shannin G. O’Neill; Josh  Ormond; Madhav Panwar; Marcus Robinson; Maria Wallace; Crystal  Wesco; and Elizabeth Wood.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.


Input:
	Background

		EM’s Strategy for Addressing Tank Waste at the Hanford Site

From 1944 through 1988, the production of plutonium at Hanford  generated about 525 million gallons of radioactive and hazardous waste.  Some of the waste was dumped directly into the soil, some was encased  in drums or other containers and buried, and about 54 million gallons  were stored on-site in 177 underground tanks. Some of the waste stored  in the underground tanks is “high-level waste” (HLW) mixed with  hazardous chemicals that is to be vitrified—a process in which the waste  is immobilized in glass—prior to disposal. “Low-activity waste” (LAW) is  EM’s term for the portion of the tank waste with low levels of  radioactivity. EM estimates that LAW comprises more than 90 percent of  the volume in the tanks but contains less than 10 percent of the  radioactivity.
EM currently plans to treat much of Hanford’s tank waste in the WTP. The  WTP is the most technically complex and largest construction project  within EM. As figure 2 shows, the WTP consists of facilities that are  designed to separate waste into low-activity and high-level waste  streams. Once completed, the WTP is to treat the HLW and a portion of  the LAW in separate facilities using vitrification. The WTP consists of the  following facilities:
Pretreatment Facility. This facility is to receive the waste from the  tanks and separate it into HLW and LAW. Under the original WTP  design, all waste must first pass through this facility before it can be  treated. Tank waste to be sent to the pretreatment facility for  processing must meet specific physical and chemical characteristics,  known as waste acceptance criteria, and the waste must be certified  as having met these criteria before transfer from the tanks to the  pretreatment facility. For example, WTP waste acceptance criteria  may stipulate that waste meet certain requirements for chemical  composition, particle size, and density in order to be handled by the  pretreatment facility. Construction of this facility as originally designed  is about 40 percent complete.
LAW Vitrification Facility. This facility is designed to receive the  LAW and immobilize it by vitrification. The canisters of vitrified waste  will be permanently disposed of at another facility on the Hanford Site.  Construction of this facility is nearing completion, and EM plans to  complete commissioning of the facility no later than December 31,  2023. As currently designed, this facility would only have capacity to  treat a third to half of the LAW currently in the waste tanks. EM is  analyzing alternatives for treating the remaining LAW, known as  supplemental LAW.
HLW Vitrification Facility. This facility is designed to receive the  HLW and immobilize it by vitrification. The canisters of vitrified waste  will be stored on-site until a final repository is established.  Construction of this facility is about 40 percent complete.
Effluent Management Facility. The Effluent Management Facility is  being built to evaporate much of the liquid waste produced during  LAW processing and vitrification at the LAW Facility. Design work on  this facility is nearly complete and construction is under way. EM  plans to complete construction of this facility in December 2021.
Analytical Laboratory. This facility will be used to analyze the waste  at various stages of treatment, such as testing samples of the vitrified  waste to ensure that it meets certain criteria and regulatory  requirements for disposal. Construction of this facility is complete and  EM has begun startup and commissioning activities.
Balance of Facilities. These facilities consist of the 22 support  facilities that make up the plant infrastructure, such as cooling water  systems and silos that hold glass-forming materials. Construction of  these facilities is nearing completion, and EM has begun startup and  commissioning activities.

		Prior GAO Work on Technical Challenges Facing the WTP

The WTP has faced hundreds of technical challenges since the early  years of the project. These challenges ranged from effectively mixing the  waste prior to treatment to addressing potential erosion in the facility  piping. We have reported on these challenges in the past and have made  numerous related recommendations to EM. For example, in 2003 we  found that BNI and outside experts had concerns about the technology for  separating the waste—including problems associated with mixing the  waste during separations and evaporating water from the waste—and  they proposed more testing to resolve those challenges. We  recommended that EM consider further testing to resolve those  challenges before moving forward with construction of the pretreatment  facility. In early 2007, EM decided to build a pilot-scale facility for the  WTP to fully test pretreatment technologies before completing the full- scale design of the facility.
Similarly, in 2006 we found that the WTP continued to face numerous  technical challenges and that many of the technical challenges still had  not been addressed even though EM was moving forward with  construction on the pretreatment facility. We recommended that EM  resolve the technical challenges before moving forward. EM agreed and  took steps to ensure that the design of each WTP component was at least  90 percent complete before construction or installation.
In December 2012, we found that the WTP continued to face significant  technical challenges, even though construction was 55 percent complete,  and we recommended that EM not resume construction of the  pretreatment facility until the issues had been fully resolved. Because of  these ongoing challenges, in December 2012, EM’s WTP Engineering  Division issued a memorandum that recommended that all activities  affecting design, construction, and installation of structures, systems, and  components be stopped. According to the memorandum, stopping work  would help ORP avoid future nuclear safety and quality compromises and  substantial rework. Instead of stopping all work at the WTP, ORP  management stopped work only on those facilities that faced the most  significant technical challenges, namely, the pretreatment and HLW  facilities. As we discuss in this report, EM has not yet resumed  construction on the pretreatment and HLW facilities.
In 2015, we reported that because of ongoing problems hampering the  progress of the pretreatment facility at Hanford, EM was pursuing other  pretreatment alternatives (such as feeding the waste from the tanks  directly to the vitrification facilities) but had not properly defined the  mission need for the analysis or developed a reliable life-cycle cost  estimate for the alternatives being analyzed. We recommended that EM revise its analysis to consider a variety of alternatives without limiting  potential solutions and that EM further limit construction activities on the  pretreatment facility until aggressive risk mitigation strategies are  developed and employed to address the technical challenges. EM opted  to change the alternative pretreatment approach it had been pursuing and  in 2018 began design work on a different alternative pretreatment  approach.
In April 2018, we reported that seven of nine ORP quality assurance  experts expected rework would be needed for existing facilities, including  the pretreatment facility. In that report we noted that according to three  experts with knowledge about maintenance programs, BNI had not  established a fully effective WTP quality assurance program, particularly  for the pretreatment facility and HLW facility, and as a result, structures,  systems, and components at these facilities have deteriorated and been  damaged. We recommended that EM (1) determine the full extent to  which problems exist in all WTP structures, systems, and components,  (2) stop work in areas where quality assurance problems are recurring  until ORP’s Quality Assurance Division can verify that the problems are  corrected and will not recur, and (3) revise ORP’s organizational structure  so that the quality assurance function is independent of ORP upper  management. As of March 2020, EM had implemented one of our three  recommendations (revising ORP’s organizational structure), but had not  yet fully implemented the other recommendations.

		Regulatory Framework Governing the Hanford Cleanup

Cleanup of the Hanford Site is governed by two main documents. The  1989 Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order—or Tri- Party Agreement (TPA)—is an agreement among DOE, Ecology, and the  Environmental Protection Agency. The TPA lays out a series of legally  enforceable milestones for completing major activities in Hanford’s waste  treatment and cleanup process. The 2010 Consent Decree, as  amended, resolves certain disputes between Ecology and DOE and  addresses a subset of cleanup activities, including completing the  construction and achieving initial operations of the WTP and retrieving  waste from specified single-shell tanks. Among other things, the  consent decree requires DOE to do the following:
Begin treating LAW by 2023;
Substantially complete the construction of the pretreatment facility by
Start WTP operations by 2036.
The TPA requires DOE to complete the treatment and vitrification of all  HLW and LAW in the Hanford tanks by 2047.
In addition to oversight by Ecology and the Environmental Protection  Agency, DNFSB is responsible for, among other things, reviewing the  design of new defense nuclear facilities at DOE’s sites, including the  WTP. DNFSB, established in 1988, provides independent analysis,  advice, and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy—in the  Secretary’s role as operator and regulator of DOE’s defense nuclear  facilities—to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety at  these facilities. DNFSB is not authorized to issue regulations binding on  DOE apart from establishing reporting requirements. Instead, DNFSB  uses both informal interactions and formal communications with DOE to  help ensure that its concerns are addressed.
DOE Order 413.3B establishes program and project management  requirements for the acquisition of capital assets with the purpose of  delivering projects within budget, on time, and capable of meeting mission  performance. EM is required to manage its cleanup projects in  accordance with this order. In particular, Order 413.3B requires EM to  conduct an AOA that is consistent with the 22 AOA best practices we  identified. DOE also has an AOA guide, which describes suggested  approaches for DOE and its contractors to be consistent with the 22 best practices for an AOA process. The 22 best practices compile common  AOA policies and guidance used by different government and private- sector entities and incorporate experts’ comments. These best practices  include the following:
Define mission need,
Develop AOA time frame,
Establish AOA team,
Define selection criteria,
Weight selection criteria,  Include baseline (or status quo) alternative, and
Develop a life-cycle cost estimate for each viable alternative.

	EM Spent About $752 Million on the Pretreatment Facility in Fiscal Years 2013 through 2018, but Construction of the Pretreatment Facility Remains on Hold

From early fiscal year 2013 until the end of fiscal year 2018, EM spent  about $752 million to maintain the pretreatment facility and resolve  technical challenges. Over half of the $752 million went toward overhead,  oversight, and other costs to maintain the partially constructed facility.  The remaining costs went toward resolving technical challenges. Design  and construction of the pretreatment facility is on hold, and DOE’s budget  request for fiscal year 2020 states that EM plans to continue “limited  activities” on the pretreatment facility to keep the facility in a preservation  and maintenance mode. However, officials told us that EM does not have  a cost estimate for completing the pretreatment facility, and EM has no  plans to develop such an estimate in the near future.

		Over Half of the $752 Million Spent on the Pretreatment Facility in Fiscal Years 2013 through 2018 Went Toward Overhead, Oversight, and Other Costs to Maintain the Partially Completed Facility

From early fiscal year 2013—when work involving design and  construction of the pretreatment facility was suspended—until the end of  fiscal year 2018, EM spent about $752 million on the pretreatment facility.  Among other things, EM used this funding for resolution of the technical  challenges that led to the suspension of the facility’s construction,  overhead and project management, equipment purchase and  management, facility maintenance, BNI award and contract modification  fees, and EM oversight. (See fig. 3.)
Less than half of the $752 million spent on the pretreatment facility in  fiscal years 2013 through 2018 went toward resolving technical  challenges associated with the facility. According to EVM system reports,  EM spent approximately $323 million—or 43 percent of the $752 million in  total costs—on costs incurred by BNI to resolve the technical  challenges. This includes activities such as identifying research tasks  needed to resolve the technical challenges and performing testing, as  well as the cost of subcontracts to assist BNI in resolving the technical  challenges.
Pretreatment Facility Lifetime Overhead  Costs  In fiscal year 2019, Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI),  the prime contractor for Hanford’s Waste  Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP)— including the pretreatment facility—allocated  $1.5 billion in overhead costs to the pretreatment  facility in its Earned Value Management system  (for fiscal years 2001 through 2014) that had  previously been recorded in non-facility specific  accounts. What we refer to as overhead BNI  refers to as project services allocation or shared  services, which according to officials at the Office  of River Protection includes both traditional  overhead costs (such as light and power), as  well as the cost of common activities for multiple  facilities and the management system used for  those facilities. Prior to fiscal year 2015,  overhead costs for the entire WTP were  recorded in non-facility specific accounts. In  fiscal year 2015, BNI changed the way that it  accounts for these costs by allocating overhead  costs to each individual facility; however, at the  time, this change was only made for future  overhead costs for the entire WTP. In June 2019,  BNI also applied this change to pre-2015 costs,  which brings BNI’s total pretreatment facility  costs, from the beginning of the contract in  December 2000 through July 2019, to $3.4  billion—$1.5 billion of which are overhead costs.  However, this allocation of cost to each facility  from the project level shared services accounts  did not change the overall cost of the WTP  project. because of design changes. According to ORP officials, EM did not  pay a termination fee for procurements that were terminated because  of the vendor going out of business; however, for other terminated  procurements, EM might have to pay additional costs if the vendor  submits a claim for compensation to BNI, for which BNI in turn seeks  reimbursement from EM. In either case, there may be additional costs  related, for example, to picking up and transporting items.
Facility Maintenance. About $18.8 million—or 2 percent of the total  $752 million—went towards the costs of general facility maintenance.  According to ORP officials, facility maintenance includes activities  such as maintaining building access controls, maintaining installed  components, cleaning up waste from birds, removing snow and trash,  and conducting periodic walks of the facility to determine the condition  of materials in the building, among other things.
Award fees are an amount of money added to a contract, which a contractor may earn in  whole or in part by meeting or exceeding subjective criteria stated in an award fee plan  typically related to areas within quality, technical ingenuity, cost-effective management,  program management, and other unquantifiable areas. Award fees in the context of this  report refer to money earned by BNI based on its performance in carrying out work on the  pretreatment facility. In this report, contract modification fees refer to money negotiated  between BNI and EM based on a change in the contract agreed to by both parties. $153 million—the facility’s highest costs from fiscal year 2013 through  fiscal year 2018. (See fig. 4.) Contributing to the fiscal year 2017 costs  was a one-time $60 million contract modification fee for both the  pretreatment facility and the high-level waste facility that was  negotiated between BNI and EM. According to EM officials, EM and  BNI negotiated this fee for work completed by BNI in previous years  for which it had not been paid a fee. This work included developing  facility designs, resolving technical issues, and conducting reviews  and research studies.

		Design and Construction of the Pretreatment Facility Remain On Hold, and EM Does Not Have a Cost Estimate for Completing the Pretreatment Facility

Design and construction of the pretreatment facility have been on hold  since 2012. At the time construction was halted, BNI estimated that  construction of the facility was about 40 percent complete. In July 2018,  the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers reported that construction of the facility  was still about 40 percent complete. In a tour of the facility in May 2019,  we observed that construction remains on hold and that EM is instead  using the space inside the partially constructed building to conduct worker  training exercises. Additionally, DOE’s budget request for fiscal year 2020  states that EM plans to continue “limited activities”—such as maintaining  the existing facility, storing uninstalled equipment, and maintaining  records for quality assurance—on the pretreatment facility to keep the  facility in a preservation and maintenance mode. ORP officials told us in  September 2019 that EM does not plan to restart design and construction  activities on the pretreatment facility until alternatives for pretreating HLW  have been analyzed.
According to EM officials, EM does not have an updated cost estimate for  completing the pretreatment facility, as required under DOE Order  413.3B. This order requires EM to develop, maintain, and document cost  estimates in a manner consistent with methods and best practices  identified in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, as well as  other documents, including the Office of Management and Budget’s  Circular A-11, prior to DOE approving a performance baseline change.  EM’s last independently verified approved cost estimate for completing  the entire WTP was completed in 2006. At that time, EM estimated that  completing the pretreatment facility would cost approximately $2.5  billion. However, the pretreatment facility has surpassed that amount.  Specifically, through fiscal year 2018, EM spent about $3.8 billion on the  facility, including approximately $3 billion spent prior to halting  construction in 2012 and $752 million spent in fiscal years 2013 through  2018. EM was in the process of updating the cost estimate in 2012  when construction of the pretreatment facility was suspended, and  therefore EM’s update to the cost estimate was suspended as well.
ORP officials told us that they do not have plans to complete a cost  estimate for the pretreatment facility. According to these officials, they  cannot complete a cost estimate for the pretreatment facility until EM has  made a decision about the future of the facility and, if necessary, BNI  develops design changes to address technical challenges. The officials  explained that the development of design changes depends on the  prioritization of funding. They also explained that ORP’s highest funding  priority is to begin vitrifying some LAW as soon as possible by bypassing  the pretreatment facility using alternative technologies and sending the  separated LAW directly to the WTP’s LAW vitrification facility—an  approach known as Direct-Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW). Officials  told us that ORP’s second highest funding priority is the completion of the  HLW facility and that the pretreatment facility will not be a priority until EM  has made a decision on which pretreatment methods to use going  forward and updated the design changes for the facility as needed.

	EM Reported that Technical Challenges on the Pretreatment Facility Have Been Resolved, but EM Has Not Yet Designed or Engineered the Solutions

After EM halted construction on the pretreatment facility in 2012, EM  began working with BNI to address the longstanding technical challenges  associated with the design and construction of the pretreatment facility.  According to July 2019 correspondence between EM and BNI, both  parties consider these technical challenges to be resolved, and according  to ORP officials, pretreatment facility engineering and design followed by  its construction may now continue. However, based on our interviews with  EM and BNI officials, EM has not yet designed or engineered the  solutions. In addition, according to DNFSB officials, the DNFSB does not  consider the technical challenges to be resolved yet, though it continues  to review EM’s efforts.

		Since 2012, EM and BNI Have Worked to Resolve Technical Challenges with the Pretreatment Facility, and EM Reported that the Challenges Have Been Resolved

In late 2012, EM halted construction of the pretreatment facility, and EM  and BNI began work to resolve technical issues. In November 2012, EM  formed a design completion team responsible for resolving the technical  challenges. In May 2014, EM asked BNI to submit a plan for resolving the  challenges and resuming construction of the pretreatment facility. EM  ultimately identified eight key categories of technical challenges to be  resolved before resuming construction of the pretreatment facility (see  table 1 for a list of the eight categories, and see app. III for a more  detailed description of each category of technical challenges). The  majority of these categories involved portions of the pretreatment facility  intended to manage the HLW. For example, one category EM identified  involves preventing hydrogen from building up in the facilities’ piping and  vessels, which could cause an explosion. Another category involves  preventing corrosive waste from eroding treatment equipment, which  could cause a leak of radioactive materials.
In June 2014, BNI formed eight teams to address each category of  technical challenges. For example, to address the technical challenges  associated with mixing the waste in the pretreatment facility using a  technology known as pulse-jet mixing, the design completion team  developed a plan to standardize and test a new design to address pulse- jet mixing challenges. Similarly, to address concerns about the potential  weaknesses in equipment and piping located in rooms inaccessible to  humans once operations begin (known as black cells), EM formed a black  cell analysis team. BNI submitted interim updates to EM on the proposed  resolution of specific challenges as BNI addressed them. For example, in  December 2017, BNI informed EM of its resolution of the challenges  related to facility ventilation. Similarly, in September 2018, BNI informed  EM of its resolution of the challenges related to the black cells. BNI sent  similar correspondence on the other six categories of technical  challenges to EM throughout 2019. According to EM officials, EM and its  contractors provided DNFSB documentation and briefings on the  resolution of the technical challenges.
In June 2019, BNI informed EM that it considered all eight categories of  technical challenges to be resolved. In July 2019, EM subsequently  informed BNI that it agreed with BNI’s conclusions that the technical  challenges were resolved. According to ORP officials, “resolved” means  that all the required studies, calculations, and testing have been  completed and demonstrated to independent experts and EM that (1) the  issue is fully understood so that no further research is needed and (2) a  solution is ready for detailed design.

		EM Has Not Yet Designed or Engineered the Solutions, and the DNFSB Does Not Consider the Technical Challenges to Be Resolved

Although EM and BNI consider the technical challenges associated with  the pretreatment facility to be resolved, EM and BNI have not yet  designed or engineered the solutions. BNI acknowledged early in the  process that resolution of the technical challenges would involve not only  a conceptual solution, but also subsequent design, engineering, and, in  some cases, testing of the solutions before construction could resume on  the pretreatment facility. For example, in its June 2014 plan for  addressing the challenges, BNI noted that prior to making a decision to  proceed with construction of the facility, it would need to conduct a  number of additional steps, including updating the designs of the  pretreatment facility and assessing the nuclear safety basis and the  contract implications for the updated designs. In addition, ORP officials  told us that proposed revisions to the pretreatment facility would require  negotiation with Ecology. As of February 2020, EM and BNI had not yet  begun developing these required designs and engineering changes and  have no plans to do so until a decision is made on the future of the  facility. According to EM officials, ORP’s current priorities are to begin  DFLAW operations and to conduct an analysis of alternatives related to  the treatment of the HLW.
These next steps could involve significant work and potential rework to  the facility. According to EM officials, resolving the technical challenges  likely will require BNI to change its designs for the pretreatment facility  and conduct significant rework in portions of the facility that have been  completed. ORP officials said that they expect this design work to be  significant and do not expect it to be complete enough to proceed with the  construction of the facility until at least 2022, depending on the availability  of funding to support the design work. BNI’s plan going forward includes a  number of steps related to updating the pretreatment facility designs. As a  result of this significant engineering work still ahead, as we reported in  May 2015, EM likely will have to conduct rework of the existing facility  (which is 40 percent built), leading to further cost increases and schedule  delays. For example, BNI will need to redesign any existing components  and systems that have become obsolete since EM halted construction or  that need to be reworked to accommodate the technical solutions.
In addition, DNFSB officials have begun reviewing EM’s proposed  solutions, but they said that they do not consider the technical challenges  to be resolved. Although EM does not require DNFSB approval to restart  construction of the pretreatment facility, ORP officials said that they  consider the next step in the process to be DNFSB review of their  solutions. DNFSB officials, on the other hand, said that the process used  to review issues is as follows: (1) DNFSB raises a concern; (2) EM comes  up with a conceptual solution, presents it to DNFSB, and receives  feedback; and (3) EM then comes up with a design solution, presents it to  the DNFSB, and receives feedback. According to DNFSB officials,  because they have not been able to review the updated engineering and  design plans, they are not in a position to approve the proposed solution.  Since 2012, DNFSB has been reviewing EM’s proposed technical  solutions as part of its role to provide independent advice and  recommendations to DOE regarding the protection of public health and  safety at DOE facilities.
As of December 2019, DNFSB had officially commented on one of EM’s  proposed solutions—related to technical challenges surrounding the  pulse-jet mixers—and noted simply that EM’s and BNI’s work  “strengthens the technical foundation” for using the mixers and that  DNFSB would “continue to follow the design process.” With regard to  the remaining challenges, DNFSB officials said that for some, additional  deficiencies needed to be addressed. For others, DNFSB officials said  they were reviewing the details of EM’s proposed solution or needed  additional information from EM. For two of the categories of technical  challenges, DNFSB officials said they considered them to be operational  rather than safety issues and therefore DNFSB would not review EM’s  proposed solutions. (See table 2.)

	EM Has Not Yet Met Two Best Practices in Its Analysis of Alternatives to the Pretreatment Facility, and Regulators Have Concerns about EM’s Engagement

To begin treating LAW by 2023 as required, EM began pursuing  pretreatment alternatives in 2013 and has spent about $428 million on  developing these alternatives for LAW pretreatment capabilities that were  originally planned for the pretreatment facility. We reported in May 2015  that in analyzing alternative LAW pretreatment approaches, EM did not  meet two key steps outlined in best practices and DOE internal  guidance—define mission need and develop a life-cycle cost estimate for  its alternatives. We recommended that EM revise its mission need and its  cost estimates for the alternatives being reviewed. In April 2019, EM  began analyzing alternatives for treating HLW, and EM officials stated  that this analysis of HLW treatment alternatives would follow best  practices. However, as of February 2020, EM did not yet have a well- defined mission need statement for its HLW treatment AOA, nor did it  have life-cycle cost estimates related to the pretreatment facility, as called  for by best practices. In addition, Ecology, a key regulatory stakeholder  for the Hanford cleanup, has raised concerns about the AOA as well as  EM’s engagement with regulators during this process.

		EM Has Been Pursuing LAW Pretreatment Alternatives since 2013 to Begin Treating LAW by 2023

In 2013, to meet its deadline to begin treating LAW by 2023, EM began  work on a strategy to bypass the pretreatment facility and instead  separate out some of the LAW to remove most of the radioactivity from  the tank waste. This approach, called DFLAW, has involved several  different activities since 2013 such as constructing separate facilities and  infrastructure to accomplish this work, as well as modifying existing  facilities:
Direct-Feed Low-Activity Waste Modifications and Effluent  Management Facility. EM has spent $272 million on modifications to  the WTP to support the DFLAW approach, including designing and  constructing the Effluent Management Facility. The Effluent  Management Facility is intended to manage the high volume of  contaminated liquid generated through the processing of LAW. This  capability was originally designed to be located in the pretreatment  facility.
Low-Activity Waste Pretreatment System. In fiscal years 2014  through 2018, EM spent approximately $146 million on the Low- Activity Waste Pretreatment System. The Low-Activity Waste  Pretreatment System included designing a permanent facility to  receive and treat liquid waste, separating out the less radioactive  portion from the underground tanks in preparation for direct feed to  the WTP’s LAW facility. This function was originally intended to be  accomplished by the pretreatment facility. In November 2017, ORP  ordered work on this permanent facility to be suspended because,  according to EM officials, the cost estimates for completing it had  become too high and the urgency of meeting the pending treatment  deadline too great.
Tank Side Cesium Removal System (TSCR). EM spent about $6  million for work on a demonstration of the TSCR technology in fiscal  year 2018 after suspending the Low-Activity Waste Pretreatment  System. TSCR will be built next to an underground double-shelled  waste tank and will filter waste directly from the tank to remove solids  and cesium. The resulting waste will be pumped to a different  underground tank for storage until it can be sent to the LAW facility for  vitrification. This would enable the rest of the waste to be fed directly  to the WTP’s LAW facility. ORP plans this demonstration project to be  complete as early as 2021 and then, depending on the results, ORP  could decide to build additional TSCR units near other tank farms to  treat more of the tank waste.
In addition to DFLAW, EM briefly pursued a smaller-scale pretreatment  approach—known as the Test Bed Initiative—in which low-level waste  was drawn directly out of the underground tanks (using existing  processes and commercial facilities), grouted on site, and shipped to a  disposal facility in Texas. EM spent about $4.8 million in fiscal years  2016 through 2018 to design the technology and treat 3 gallons of waste  from the underground tanks. EM suspended the Test Bed Initiative in  June 2019.
In total, EM has spent about $428 million developing these alternative  pretreatment approaches for LAW, in addition to the $752 million spent on  the pretreatment facility since 2012. (See fig. 5.)

		EM Has Not Yet Met Two Best Practices or DOE Guidance in Analyzing HLW Treatment Alternatives

			Low-Activity Waste Analysis of Alternatives

EM began exploring alternative LAW pretreatment approaches as early  as 2006 in connection with its analysis of options for treating the  supplemental LAW at Hanford. In September 2013, in an effort to make  progress while working to resolve technical challenges on the  pretreatment facility, EM announced plans to pursue these alternative  LAW pretreatment approaches and received funding to do so. However,  as we reported in May 2015, EM did not properly define the mission need  for the analysis or develop a reliable life-cycle cost estimate for the  alternatives it analyzed prior to selecting its preferred alternative:
First, in May 2015, we found that EM had developed a narrow  statement of mission need that effectively excluded other potential  alternatives from being considered. This, we noted, was contrary to  DOE requirements in DOE Order 413.3B and our best practices for an  AOA process, which specify that statements of mission need should  not identify a particular solution such as equipment, facility, or  technology, to allow the analysis the flexibility to explore a variety of  alternatives without limiting potential solutions. We noted that by  narrowly defining the mission need in this way, EM effectively  narrowed the range of acceptable options and excluded from  consideration other alternatives to expediting waste treatment and  addressing the potential danger posed by the leakage of waste from  the tanks.
Second, we noted in May 2015 that in choosing its current approach  to treating LAW, EM did not develop a life-cycle cost estimate for its  Low-Activity Waste Pretreatment System approach and did not  develop life-cycle cost estimates for all of the alternatives before  choosing its course of action. Our AOA best practices and DOE’s  AOA Guide call for developing a life-cycle cost estimate for each  alternative, including all costs from inception of the project through  design, development, deployment, operation, maintenance, and  disposal.
We recommended in our May 2015 report that EM revise its mission need  statement and life-cycle cost estimate for the Low-Activity Waste  Pretreatment System. EM opted to change this alternative pretreatment  approach and in 2018 began designing and building TSCR, as noted  above. EM did not undertake an AOA process before making that  decision; instead, EM chose to pursue TSCR, a technology similar to one  being used at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. EM officials  said the decision to move forward on these LAW pretreatment  alternatives without an AOA process was based on the urgency of the  upcoming requirement to begin treating LAW by 2023. We continue to  believe that as EM pursues additional treatment alternatives, EM should  properly define the mission need for the analysis and develop a reliable  life-cycle cost estimate for the alternatives it is analyzing.

			High-Level Waste Analysis of Alternatives

In April 2019, EM initiated an AOA for treating the HLW in the tanks at  Hanford and plans to conclude the review and report its findings in  September 2020. According to the review team’s September 2019 study  plan, the review is to analyze 15 alternatives, including completing the  pretreatment facility as planned, repurposing the pretreatment facility, and  changing the current approach to pursue other pretreatment options.  Some of the other options the review team plans to explore include  sending HLW directly from the underground tanks to the HLW facility for  treatment, building alternate HLW pretreatment facilities, and shipping the  HLW to the Savannah River Site in South Carolina for treatment. (See  appendix IV for a list of the alternatives being analyzed.)
EM officials said that in undertaking this AOA for HLW treatment  alternatives, they plan to meet best practices for an AOA process and  those in DOE’s AOA Guide. They noted that, consistent with these AOA  best practices, EM has developed a time frame to complete the review,  established a review team, and defined and weighed selection criteria  against which to compare the alternatives. However, based on our  review, as of February 2020, EM had not yet met two key steps—defining  mission need and developing a life-cycle cost estimate for the baseline  alternative—that are among the best practices we identified for an AOA  process.
First, EM has not yet defined the mission need, which is the first  element in a successful AOA and is called for in DOE’s guidance for  conducting an AOA. One ORP official said that a succinct definition of  the mission need for the AOA does not exist but is or can be deduced  from the documents provided to the contractor conducting the  analysis. An official from DOE’s Office of Project Management  confirmed that there is no mission need statement and noted that  because the WTP began prior to the DOE Order requiring a mission  need statement, there is no such statement for the WTP or for the  current AOA. We have previously noted that defining the mission  need is the first step in the AOA process in order to ensure that the  AOA process does not favor one solution over another. We have  also previously noted that when a concise set of objectives is  established, it can ensure that the decision-making process stays  open to a range of potential options.
Second, as we noted earlier in this report, EM does not have an  updated cost estimate for the baseline (or status quo) alternative of  completing the pretreatment facility. As such, it is uncertain if or how  EM will have a life-cycle cost estimate to compare the baseline  alternative to the other alternatives it is analyzing. One of the best  practices for an AOA process calls for the inclusion of the cost to  pursue the baseline alternative (in this case, the cost of completing  the existing pretreatment facility), to provide a basis of comparison  among alternatives. However, EM officials told us that they do not  intend to update EM’s cost estimate for completing the existing  pretreatment facility because it is not a priority for ORP; instead,  ORP’s priority is beginning DFLAW operations. Without a life-cycle  cost estimate for EM’s baseline alternative, decision makers will not  have a complete picture of the costs and will have difficulty comparing  the alternatives because comparisons may not be based on accurate  information.
Without a defined mission need and a complete cost estimate for the  baseline alternative, EM’s AOA for HLW treatment alternatives will be  missing key elements that are necessary to provide decision makers with  the information needed to make the best decision going forward. EM’s  analysis and the subsequent decisions that are made based on that  analysis could be undermined as a result.

		EM and Ecology Disagree about the Adequacy of Ecology’s Engagement in the Process to Analyze Alternatives to the Pretreatment Facility

Officials from Ecology have raised concerns about EM’s lack of progress  on finishing the original pretreatment facility and EM’s shifting focus on  the pretreatment mission. In a letter to EM in May 2019, Ecology’s  director outlined a series of concerns related to the pretreatment mission  and stated that Ecology is not “conceding to, accepting, or acquiescing in  any alternative path forward that is different than what has been agreed to  in the TPA and Amended Consent Decree between our two agencies.” In  September 2019, ORP informed Ecology that a serious risk had arisen  that DOE might be unable to meet certain Amended Consent Decree  milestones related to, among other things, the construction of the  pretreatment facility. In the same month, ORP agreed to participate in  “holistic negotiations” to identify a new path forward for treating and  disposing of Hanford’s tank waste. As part of this agreement, the parties  involved—EM, Ecology, and the Environmental Protection Agency—could  use the services of a mediator to assist with negotiations, which may be  completed by July 31, 2020.
Ecology officials also said that EM has not adequately consulted with  them while making important decisions about the pretreatment mission  and facility. In particular, in January 2020, Ecology officials told us that  they had not been engaged early, often, or appropriately by EM regarding  EM’s changing plans to pretreat the tank waste and that they were  concerned about the possible negative impacts of EM diverting its  resources away from completing the pretreatment facility. According to  Ecology officials, they have been invited to key EM meetings but have not  been properly engaged in the decision-making process. In an October  2019 presentation to panelists from the National Academies of Sciences,  Engineering, and Medicine, Ecology officials noted their frustration with  “too many ideas that did not work out, resulting in long delays.” In  December 2019, because of concerns that EM was not providing access  to all of the information needed to make timely regulatory decisions,  Ecology issued a determination requiring EM to provide information as  required by the TPA within 30 days. In January 2020, after EM failed to  provide the information, Ecology fined EM $1 million and reiterated that  without access to this crucial data, it was nearly impossible for Ecology to  independently verify compliance with cleanup regulations.
According to officials at EM headquarters, engagement with Ecology is a  priority, and ORP officials said that since 2018, their engagement with  Ecology has improved. In particular, ORP officials noted that Ecology has  had representatives on a joint team tasked with exploring the options to  be examined under the HLW AOA and has a representative on the AOA  review team to observe the deliberations.
In September 2019, we outlined a risk-informed framework for making  cleanup decisions and recommended that EM incorporate this framework  into its cleanup policy across the entire DOE complex. DOE agreed with  this recommendation but has yet to respond with a plan to implement it. In  that report, we state that the risk-informed decision-making framework  can be applied to a range of cleanup decisions, from selecting a cleanup  approach at a single site to prioritizing cleanup activities across sites. The  risk-informed decision-making framework consists of several steps,  including engaging with stakeholders such as Ecology throughout the  decision-making process. In that report, we noted that the goal of  engaging stakeholder groups in a risk-informed cleanup decision should  be to incorporate their viewpoints and seek their acceptance of the  decision-making process as transparent and legitimate, rather than to  obtain their concurrence with the final decision. We also found that this  can best be accomplished when EM seeks stakeholders’ input and buy-in  to the process by providing meaningful opportunities for engagement  early in the process, communicating throughout the process, and  providing transparent, understandable information about the science and  rationale behind the final decision. Doing so can help improve the  likelihood that stakeholders will view the decision-making process as fair  and legitimate. By following the steps outlined in our risk-informed  decision-making framework as it makes decisions about the future of the  Hanford pretreatment facility, EM and stakeholders would have greater  assurance that EM’s decision-making process is transparent,  participatory, and credible.

	Conclusions

After nearly 20 years and with over $11 billion spent since EM awarded  the contract to design and build the WTP, the WTP is not complete and  has faced numerous technical challenges, cost overruns, and schedule  delays. According to a recent study by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  and EM’s Hanford Lifecycle Report, the largest and most complex portion  of the WTP—the pretreatment facility—is unlikely to be completed as  designed and scheduled. Since the early years of the project, we have  recommended that EM stop moving ahead on the pretreatment facility  until it resolves the numerous technical challenges or conducts a reliable  analysis of alternatives and determines a risk-informed, cost-effective  path forward. However, EM has yet to fully implement these  recommendations. EM officials reported that the technical challenges that  have plagued the project for years have been solved, but EM has not  developed the design and engineering changes needed to implement the  solutions. Instead, EM is focusing on analyzing alternatives to accomplish  the mission of the pretreatment facility and officials have stated that this  analysis will follow best practices we have identified and DOE guidance.  EM’s current AOA of HLW treatment alternatives is still under way, and  officials told us that they intend to follow best practices for developing an  AOA. However, as of February 2020, the AOA still lacks at least two key  elements of the best practices. First, without a clear statement of mission  need, it is unclear on what basis decision makers will consider and  assess the alternatives being considered. Second, without an updated  life-cycle cost estimate to complete the pretreatment facility, it is unclear  whether the HLW pretreatment alternatives being analyzed represent a  better path forward than completing the partially constructed pretreatment  facility as originally planned. Without these key elements of an AOA, EM’s  ultimate decision may not be the best option or be credible with  stakeholders. Throughout this decision-making process, EM’s  engagement with Ecology has not met the expectations of the regulator,  resulting in fines and further delays as all parties participate in an  ongoing, mediated negotiation on a path forward. By following the steps  outlined in our risk-informed decision-making framework as it makes  decisions about the future of the pretreatment facility, EM can ensure that  its regulators have greater assurance that EM’s decision-making process  is transparent, participatory, and credible.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making the following two recommendations to DOE:
The Secretary of Energy should direct the Assistant Secretary of  Environmental Management to ensure that EM’s final AOA for HLW  pretreatment at the Hanford Site includes a definition of mission need  and life-cycle cost estimates for the baseline or status quo alternative,  as called for in the best practices for an AOA process we have  identified and DOE guidance. (Recommendation 1)
The Secretary of Energy should direct the Assistant Secretary of  Environmental Management to follow the steps outlined in GAO’s risk- informed decision-making framework as EM makes decisions about  the future of the pretreatment mission; in particular, engaging the  Washington State Department of Ecology in the AOA process,  communicating with them throughout the process, and providing them  with transparent information about the rationale behind the final  decision. (Recommendation 2)

	Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the Department of  Energy. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix VI, DOE  concurred in principle with our recommendations and outlined a plan to  address the recommendations by December 31, 2020. DOE also  provided additional technical comments, which we have incorporated into  the report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Energy, and other interested parties. In  addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VII.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our report examines (1) the cost of pretreatment efforts from fiscal year  2013 through fiscal year 2018 and the status of the pretreatment facility,  (2) the status of the technical challenges facing the pretreatment facility,  and (3) the steps the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of  Environmental Management (EM) is taking to begin treating waste by  2023 as required and the extent to which EM has engaged with  regulators.
To determine the cost of the pretreatment facility, we reviewed Earned  Value Management (EVM) status reports from Bechtel National, Inc.  (BNI) and fiscal year totals for EM’s oversight costs and BNI’s award and  contract modification fees for the pretreatment facility for fiscal years 2013  through 2018 provided by officials in EM’s Office of River Protection  (ORP), which oversees the construction of the Waste Treatment and  Immobilization Plant (WTP) at Hanford. BNI’s EVM status reports give  actual costs for the work performed categorized by a number of different  activities, such as engineering to design the pretreatment facility and the  acquisition of plant equipment items to be installed in the pretreatment  facility. For reporting purposes, we combined BNI accounts with similar  activity descriptions and renamed them. To determine the activities  included in the accounts, we reviewed both the Work Authorization  Document, which describes activities covered by each account used in  BNI’s EVM status reports, as well as descriptions of major  accomplishments achieved each fiscal year included in the summary  status report.
To determine the cost of alternative pretreatment efforts, we reviewed  EVM status reports for the Direct-Feed Low-Activity Waste project, the  Low-Activity Waste Pretreatment System, and the Tank Side Cesium  Removal project for fiscal years 2014 through 2018. Because the Test  Bed Initiative project did not use an EVM system until fiscal year 2018, we  reviewed invoiced costs data for that project for fiscal years 2016 through  2018. To gain context on the planned capabilities of these projects, we  reviewed project presentations for pretreatment alternatives and  interviewed ORP and BNI officials to learn more about the progress made  in developing each project. To assess the reliability of all cost data for  both the pretreatment facility and alternative pretreatment efforts, we  reviewed documentation and officials’ responses related to data-gathering  processes, data storage systems, and data limitations for each of the  relevant sources to ORP. Based on this, we found all of the data sources  to be sufficiently reliable for our reporting objectives. Finally, to determine  the extent to which EM has established a cost estimate to complete the  pretreatment facility that is consistent with DOE policy set out in DOE  Order 413.3B, we interviewed officials about EM’s cost estimate to  complete the facility.
To examine the status of technical challenges facing the pretreatment  facility and to gather information pertaining to obstacles and risks of  project completion, we reviewed the following documents:
ORP’s 2018 briefing to the Washington State Department of Ecology  (Ecology) regarding the status of challenges,
BNI’s 2018 briefing about the status of the pretreatment facility,
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ 2018 report on the status of the
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s (DNFSB) 2017  technical report on WTP hazards.
We also interviewed officials from EM, regulators at Ecology, officials  from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and contractor officials  who are working to resolve these challenges to better understand the  status of the technical challenges, as well as any concerns they might  have. In addition, we interviewed officials from DNFSB—an independent  agency that provides analysis, advice, and recommendations to the  Secretary of Energy regarding the adequate protection of public health  and safety at DOE’s defense nuclear facilities—regarding DNFSB’s  assessment of the technical challenges and what additional steps, if any,  DOE needs to take to resolve the challenges.
To examine the steps EM is taking to begin treating waste by 2023 as  required, we visited the WTP construction site at Hanford in May 2019 to  observe the status of the construction of the pretreatment facility and  pretreatment alternatives. We reviewed historical documentation, such as  technical reports summarizing testing, and studies conducted by EM and  its contractors. These reports included Washington River Protection  Solutions’ 2014 low-activity waste (LAW) alternatives analyses summary  and its 2011 conceptual design report, and CH2M HILL Hanford Group’s  2006 LAW First Study. We interviewed DOE officials from headquarters  to discuss the status of and future plans for the WTP and DOE officials  from ORP at Hanford to gather information about the project. We also  interviewed ORP contractors regarding their ongoing and planned efforts  related to pretreatment of the tank waste and regulator officials from  Ecology to better understand their concerns and priorities.
To analyze the extent to which EM is following guidance and best  practices as it conducts its analysis of alternatives (AOA) of high-level  waste (HLW) treatment alternatives, we first interviewed DOE officials  and reviewed available documentation associated with DOE’s ongoing  AOA to determine the status of the draft AOA. We then reviewed the  steps EM is taking and compared them against DOE’s project  management requirements (DOE Order 413.3B) and guidance (DOE  Analysis of Alternatives Guide) and the best practices for an AOA process  that we identified in our prior work. Because EM was conducting its own  AOA concurrent with our review, we selected two key best practices in an  AOA process—define mission need and develop a life-cycle cost estimate  for the baseline (or status quo) alternative—because these two steps are  requisite for completing the remaining steps of an AOA. These steps are  also essential to ensuring that the other 20 best practices and the results  of the AOA are credible and based on accurate information. We also  noted best practices that EM officials noted EM has met thus far. In  addition, we compared EM’s decision-making process, in particular its  stakeholder engagement, against a framework for risk-informed decision- making we developed in our prior work. We developed this framework in  2019 to assist agencies in identifying and implementing the essential  elements of risk-informed decision-making. To create the framework, we  synthesized key concepts from relevant literature and input from experts  who participated in a meeting convened by the National Academies of  Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2019 to May 2020 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI) Cost Accounts

The Office of Environmental Management’s contractor for its pretreatment  facility, BNI, tracks its costs in its Earned Value Management system.  Costs are tracked through the use of different accounting codes that  represent the costs of different types of activities. For reporting purposes,  we combined BNI accounts with descriptions of similar activities and  renamed them. The table below lists the labels we used, the BNI account  codes included in each label, and selected examples of activities  described for each accounting code.

Appendix III: Technical Challenges Facing the Department of Energy’s Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant’s (WTP) Pretreatment Facility

Appendix III: Technical Challenges Facing the  Department of Energy’s Waste Treatment and  Immobilization Plant’s (WTP) Pretreatment  Facility Description  Inadequate pulse jet mixing can lead to the accumulation of solids in process vessels, resulting in  generation and accumulation of hydrogen and potentially leading to explosions. Settled sludge  layers will rise in temperature, increasing the hydrogen generation rate.  Up to 16 of the 177 underground tanks at Hanford contain large-size plutonium particles that could  settle onto internal surfaces of the pulse-jet mixer vessels, which use compressed air to mix the  waste. If the pulse-jet mixers could not then resuspend settled particles, an uncontrolled nuclear  chain reaction known as a criticality accident could occur.  In the Pretreatment facility and High-Level Waste (HLW) facility, the accumulation of hydrogen gas  in piping and small vessels can occur after the loss of off-site power or after an interruption of a  transfer of waste due to operator error and during normal operation in isolated pipe sections,  potentially causing an explosion.   Accumulating solids in pulse-jet mixing vessels could cause excessive air to be discharged in the  vessels. This discharge could cause premature erosion of vessel surface bottoms, all of which are  located in nonmaintanable areas called black cells. In addition, pulse-jet mixing vessels may need  structural modifications to account for abnormal environmental conditions, such as seismic events.   Because of uncertainties in waste feed characteristics, the vessel and piping design in the  Pretreatment facility and HLW facility may require revisions to account for the amount of wear the  equipment will need to withstand. Excessive wear could damage plant equipment and result in  interruption of operations or leakage of material from vessels and piping.  The potential incorporation of a Standards High Solids Vessel into Pretreatment requires a detailed  study to determine the feasibility and optimization of this design change. An additional opportunity  is created to revisit the capability to perform In service inspections in order to underpin resolution of  erosion/corrosion questions. The Project has not established an in-service inspection program.  Once WTP operations begin, equipment in black cells within the Pretreatment facility and HLW  facility must last for the WTP’s 40-year expected design life without maintenance because  significant failures of components installed in the black cells could impact the throughput and  mission duration of the WTP. Potential weaknesses in equipment and piping located within black  cells must be identified before WTP operations begin to ensure that timely repairs can be  conducted, should failure of these components occur.  Ventilation systems in the Pretreatment facility, HLW facility, and Low-Activity Waste facility must  be able to contain radioactive material that could be released from primary confinement. The  structural integrity of some internal vessel components in these facilities could be compromised if  seismic or other events beyond the design basis occur. The ventilation system must survive a  release of radioactive material without shutdown, plugging, or blowing out filters to continue to  provide confinement.

Appendix IV: High-Level Waste (HLW) Alternatives Being Analyzed by the Office of River Protection

Appendix IV: High-Level Waste (HLW)  Alternatives Being Analyzed by the Office of  River Protection Description  HLW is received, characterized, and pretreated in HLW Feed Preparation Facility;  contaminated liquids produced in the process are concentrated in a new HLW Effluent  Management.  HLW is sampled, characterized, and staged in the tanks. HLW is then pretreated in HLW  Feed Preparation Facility; contaminated liquids produced in the process are concentrated in  HLW Effluent Management Facility.  Same as previous alternative with some processes performed at a higher temperature.
HLW is transferred to the pretreatment facility for preparation and staging; then leached,  washed, and concentrated in the HLW Feed Preparation Facility. Contaminated liquids  produced in the process are concentrated in the pretreatment facility.  HLW treated using alternative technologies such as grouting or steam reforming. Would  require technology development, research and development, lab testing and technology  readiness assessment.  HLW is immobilized within existing tanks using alternative technologies. Would require  technology development, research and development, lab testing and technology readiness  assessment.  HLW in the tanks located furthest away from the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant  (in the western portion of the site) is pretreated and treated in new west area HLW Feed  Preparation Facility, HLW Effluent Management Facility, and HLW vitrification facilities.   HLW is received, characterized, and pretreated in in HLW Feed Preparation Facility;  contaminated liquids produced in the process are concentrated in new facilities. Pretreatment  facility repurposed to treat low-activity waste.
HLW is transferred to compliant mediums for transfer to Savannah River Site for treatment  and vitrification.  Fuels Material Examination Facility would be retrofitted to provide pretreatment capabilities.
HLW vitrification facility is abandoned; pretreatment facility is repurposed to pretreat and  vitrify HLW.  HLW is pretreated and vitrified at a near-tank mobile facility or in a centrally located facility  using bulk vitrification technology. Would require technology development, research and  development, lab testing and technology readiness assessment.  Same as the second alternative above with added filtering capability.
HLW is sampled, characterized, and staged in the tanks. Contaminated liquids produced in  the process are concentrated in HLW Effluent Management Facility.  Same as previous alternative with added step of concentrating the HLW in the HLW Effluent  Management Facility before sending it to be vitrified.

Appendix V: Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) Best Practices

The guidance below is meant as an overview of the key principles that  lead to a successful AOA process and not as a “how to” guide with  detailed instructions for each best practice identified. Conforming to the  22 best practices helps ensure that the preferred alternative selected is  the one that best meets the agency’s mission needs. Not conforming to  the best practices may lead to an unreliable AOA, and the customer will  not have assurance that the preferred alternative best meets the mission  needs. Table 6 shows the 22 best practices.

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Energy

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact Staff Acknowledgments:

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov  In addition to the contact named above, Amanda K. Kolling (Assistant  Director), Jeffrey T. Larson (Analyst in Charge), Mark Braza, Kelly  Friedman, Richard P. Johnson, Gwen Kirby, and Alan K. Smith made key  contributions to this report.