Input:
	Background

Resellers maintain large, sophisticated databases with consumer  information that can include credit histories, insurance claims, criminal  records, employment histories, incomes, ethnicities, purchase histories,  and interests. As shown in figure 1, resellers largely obtain their  information from public records, publicly available information (such as  directories and newspapers), and nonpublic information (such as from  retail loyalty cards, warranty registrations, contests, and web browsing).
Consumer information can be derived from mobile networks, devices  (including smartphones and tablets), operating systems, and applications.  Resellers also may obtain personal information from the profile or public  information areas of websites, including social media sites, or from  information on blogs or discussion forums. Depending on the context,  information from these sources may be publicly available or nonpublic.
In 1973, a U.S. government advisory committee first proposed the Fair  Information Practice Principles for protecting the privacy and security of  personal information. While these principles are not legal requirements,  they provide a framework for balancing privacy with other interests. In  2013, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  (OECD) developed a revised version of the principles (see table 1).
The Fair Information Practice Principles served as the basis for the  Privacy Act of 1974—which governs the collection, maintenance, use,  and dissemination of personal information by federal agencies. The  principles also were the basis for many Federal Trade Commission (FTC)  and Department of Commerce privacy recommendations and for a  framework for consumer data privacy the White House issued in 2012.

	Several Laws Apply in Specific Circumstances to Consumer Data That Resellers Hold

As we reported in 2013 and as continues to be the case, no overarching  federal privacy law governs the collection, use, and sale of personal  information among private-sector companies, including information  resellers. There are also no federal laws designed specifically to address  all the products sold and information maintained by information resellers.  Federal laws addressing privacy issues in the private sector are generally  narrowly tailored to specific purposes, situations, types of information, or  sectors or entities—such as data related to financial transactions,  personal health, and eligibility for credit. These laws include provisions  that limit the disclosure of certain types of information to a third party  without an individual’s consent, or prohibit certain types of data collection.  The primary laws include the following:  Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). FCRA protects the security and  confidentiality of personal information collected or used to help make  decisions about individuals’ eligibility for credit, insurance, or  employment. It applies to consumer reporting agencies that provide  consumer reports. Accordingly, FCRA applies to the three nationwide  consumer reporting agencies (commonly called credit bureaus) and to  any other information resellers that resell consumer reports for use by  others. FCRA limits resellers’ use and distribution of personal data—for  example, by allowing consumers to opt out of allowing consumer  reporting agencies to share their personal information with third parties for  prescreened marketing offers.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). GLBA protects nonpublic personal  information that individuals provide to financial institutions or that such  institutions maintain. GLBA sharing and disclosure restrictions apply to  financial institutions or entities that receive nonpublic personal information  from such institutions. For example, a third party that receives nonpublic  personal information from a financial institution to process consumers’  account transactions may not use the information or resell it for marketing  purposes.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996  (HIPAA). HIPAA establishes a set of national standards to protect  certain health information. The HIPAA privacy rule governs the use and  disclosure of an individual’s health information for purposes including  marketing. With some exceptions, the rule requires an individual’s  written authorization before a covered entity—a health care provider that  transmits health information electronically in connection with covered  transactions, health care clearinghouse, or health plan—may use or  disclose the information for marketing. The rule does not directly restrict  the use, disclosure, or resale of protected health information by resellers  or others not considered covered entities under the rule.
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA). COPPA  and its implementing regulations apply to the collection of information— such as name, email, or location—that would allow someone to identify or  contact a child under 13. Covered website and online service operators  must obtain verifiable parental consent before collecting such information.  COPPA may not directly affect information resellers, but the covered  entities are potential sources of information for resellers.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA). ECPA  prohibits the interception and disclosure of electronic communications by  third parties unless an exception applies (such as one party to the  communication consenting to disclosure). For example, the act would  prevent an internet service provider from selling the content of its  customers’ emails to a reseller for marketing purposes, unless the  customers had consented to disclosure. However, ECPA provides more  limited protection for information considered to be “non-content,” such as  a customer’s name and address.
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), Section 5. The FTC Act  prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.  Although the act does not explicitly grant FTC the specific authority to  protect privacy, FTC has interpreted it to apply to deceptions or violations  of written privacy policies. For example, if a retailer’s written privacy policy  stated customers’ personal information would not be shared with resellers  and the retailer later sold information to such parties, FTC could bring an  enforcement action against the retailer for unfair and deceptive practices.
Some states also have enacted laws designed to regulate resellers’  sharing of personal information about consumers. For example, in 2018,  Vermont passed a law that contains, among other requirements,  consumer protection provisions related to data brokers. Among other  things, the law requires data brokers to register annually and prohibits the  acquisition and use of brokered personal information through certain  means and for certain uses.

	Gaps Exist in the Consumer Privacy Framework

The scope of consumer privacy protections provided under federal law  has remained narrow in relation to (1) individuals’ ability to access,  control, and correct their personal data; (2) collection methods and  sources and types of consumer information collected; (3) new  technologies; and (4) some regulatory authorities. The examples in the  following sections are drawn from our earlier reports and remain pertinent  today.

		Federal Law Provides Individuals Limited Ability to Access, Control, and Correct Their Personal Data

In our 2013 report, we found that no federal statute that we examined  generally requires resellers to allow individuals to review personal  information (intended for marketing purposes), control its use, or correct  it. The Fair Information Practice Principles state that individuals should be  able to know about and consent to the collection of their information and  have the right to access the information, request correction, and  challenge the denial of those rights.
We also reported in 2013 that no federal statute provides consumers the  right to learn what information is held about them and who holds it for  marketing or look-up purposes. FCRA provides individuals with certain  access rights, but only when information is used for credit eligibility  purposes. And GLBA’s provisions allowing consumers to opt out of  having their personal information shared with third parties apply only in  specific circumstances. Otherwise, under federal law, individuals  generally cannot require that their personal information not be collected,  used, and shared. Also, no federal law we examined provides correction  rights (the ability to have resellers and others correct or delete inaccurate,  incomplete, or unverifiable information) for marketing or look-up  purposes.

		Laws Largely Do Not Address Data Collection Methods, Sources, and Types

Our 2013 report also found that federal privacy laws are limited in  addressing the methods by which, or the sources from which, resellers  collect and aggregate personal information, or the types of information  collected for marketing or look-up purposes. The Fair Information Practice  Principles state that personal information should be relevant, limited to  the purpose for which it was collected, and collected with the individual’s  knowledge or consent.
Federal laws generally do not govern the methods resellers may use to  collect personal information. For instance, resellers, advertisers, and  others use software to search the web for information about individuals  and extract and download bulk information from websites with consumer  information. Resellers or retailers also may collect information indirectly  (by combining information from transactions).
Current federal law generally allows resellers to collect personal  information from sources such as warranty registration cards and surveys  and from online sources such as discussion boards, social media sites,  blogs, and web browsing histories and searches. Current federal law  generally does not require disclosure to consumers when their  information is collected from these sources.
The federal laws that address the types of consumer information that can  be collected and shared are not comprehensive. Under most  circumstances, information that many people may consider very personal  or sensitive can be collected, shared, and used for marketing. This can  include information about physical and mental health, income and assets,  political affiliations, and sexual habits and orientation. For health  information, HIPAA rule provisions generally apply only to covered  entities, such as health care providers.

		Privacy Framework Largely Has Not Kept Pace with Changes in Technology

The current privacy framework does not fully address new technologies  such as facial recognition technology, privacy issues raised by online  tracking and mobile devices, and activities by financial technology firms.  The original enactment of several federal privacy laws predates these  trends and technologies. But in some instances existing laws have been  interpreted to apply to new technologies. For example, FTC has taken  enforcement actions under COPPA and revised the statute’s  implementing regulations to account for smartphones and mobile  applications.

			Facial Recognition Technology

One example of how privacy law has not kept pace with changes in  technology is the use of facial recognition technology, which involves the  collection of facial images and may be employed in a wide range of  commercial applications. In our 2015 report we concluded that the future  trajectory of this technology raised questions about consumer privacy.  We found that federal law does not expressly address the circumstances  under which commercial entities can use facial recognition technology to  identify or track individuals, or when consumer knowledge or consent  should be required for the technology’s use. Furthermore, in most  contexts federal law does not address how personal data derived from  the technology may be used or shared. The privacy issues stakeholders  raised about facial recognition technology and other biometric  technologies in use at the time of our 2015 report served as yet another  example of the need to adapt federal privacy law to reflect new  technologies. As such, we reiterated our 2013 recommendation that  Congress strengthen the current consumer privacy framework to reflect  the effects of changes in technology and the marketplace.

			Activities by Financial Technology Firms

The rise of financial services provided by nonfinancial firms—often  referred to as fintech—is another example of how new technology may  create privacy concerns. For example, fintech lenders offer a variety of  loans such as consumer and small business loans and operate almost  exclusively online. In our 2018 report, we noted that while these lenders  may still assess borrowers’ creditworthiness with credit scores, they also  may analyze large amounts of additional or alternative sources of data to  determine creditworthiness. We also found that some fintech firms may  collect more consumer data than traditional lenders. For example, fintech  lenders may have sensitive information such as consumers’ educational  background or utility payment information, and according to certain  stakeholders, these data may contain errors that cannot be disputed by  consumers under FCRA.
Furthermore, some data aggregators may hold consumer data without  disclosing what rights consumers have to delete the data or prevent the  data from being shared with other parties. A leak of these or other data  held by fintech firms may expose characteristics that people view as  sensitive. GLBA generally requires fintech firms and traditional financial  institutions to safeguard nonpublic personal information about  customers. Our 2018 report discussed that some fintech firms use new  technologies or mobile device features to mitigate data privacy risks and  that some regulators have issued guidance to consumers publicizing  practices that help maintain privacy when using online products and  services, including those provided by fintech firms. Regulators also have  issued GLBA guidance to businesses, including fintech firms,  recommending that they adopt policies and procedures to prevent, detect,  and address privacy threats.

			Internet Privacy Issues

Online tracking. In our 2013 report, we found that no federal privacy law  explicitly addresses the full range of practices to track or collect data from  consumers’ online activity. Cookies allow website operators to recall  information such as user name and address, credit card number, and  purchases in a shopping cart. Resellers can match information in cookies  and their databases to augment consumer profiles. Third parties also can  synchronize their cookie files with resellers’ files. Advertisers can use  third-party cookies—placed on a computer by a domain other than the  site being visited—to track visits to the websites on which they advertise.  While current federal law does not, with some exceptions, explicitly  address web tracking, FTC has taken enforcement actions related to web  tracking under its authority to enforce the prohibition on unfair or  deceptive acts. For example, in 2011, FTC settled charges with Google  for $22.5 million after alleging that Google violated an earlier privacy  settlement with FTC when it misrepresented to users of Apple’s Safari  web browser that it would not track and serve targeted advertisements to  Safari users. Google agreed to disable its advertising tracking cookies.
Mobile devices. In 2013, we also explained that no federal law  comprehensively governs applications software for mobile devices.  Application developers, mobile carriers, advertisers, and others may  collect an individual’s information through services provided on a mobile  device. However, FTC has taken enforcement action against companies  for use of mobile applications that violate COPPA and FCRA. The  agency also has taken action under the FTC Act. We and others have  reported that the capability of mobile devices to provide consumer’s  location engenders privacy risks, particularly if companies use or share  location data without consumers’ knowledge. ECPA might not apply if  location data were not deemed content and would not govern entities that  are not covered by ECPA. But FTC could pursue enforcement action if a  company’s collection or use of the information violated COPPA.
More recently, in January of this year, we issued a report on internet  privacy that reinforces what we reported in 2013. To varying extents,  internet content providers and internet service providers collect, use, and  share information from their customers to enable their services, support  advertising, and for other purposes. Consumers access such services  through mobile phones and tablets, computers, and other internet- connected devices. However, there is no comprehensive federal privacy  statute with specific standards. FTC has been addressing internet privacy  through its unfair and deceptive practices authority, among other statutes,  and other agencies have been addressing this issue using industry- specific statutes. We concluded that recent developments regarding  internet privacy suggest that this is an appropriate time for Congress to  consider comprehensive internet privacy legislation. To address such  privacy concerns, states and other countries have adopted privacy rules.  For example, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation,  which came into force in May 2018, is a set of privacy rules that give  consumers control over the collection, use, and sharing of their personal  information, and California passed its own privacy law in June 2018 that  becomes effective in 2020.

		Regulatory Authorities under Current Law May Be Limited

In February of this year, we reported that FTC does not have civil penalty  authority for initial violations of GLBA’s privacy and safeguarding  requirements, which, unlike FCRA, includes a provision directing federal  regulators and FTC to establish standards for financial institutions to  protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security of  customer records. To obtain monetary redress for these violations, FTC  must identify affected consumers and any monetary harm they may have  experienced. However, harm resulting from privacy and security violations  (such as a data breach) can be difficult to measure and can occur years  in the future, making it difficult to trace a particular harm to a specific  breach. As a result, FTC lacks a practical enforcement tool for imposing  civil money penalties that could help to deter companies from violating  data security provisions of GLBA and its implementing regulations. We  recommended that Congress consider giving FTC civil penalty authority  to enforce GLBA’s safeguarding provisions.
Additionally, in our January 2019 report, we found that FTC had not yet  issued regulations for internet privacy other than those protecting financial  privacy and the internet privacy of children, which were required by law.  FTC uses its statutory authority under the FTC Act to protect consumers  from unfair and deceptive trade practices. For FTC Act violations, FTC  may promulgate regulations but is required to use procedures that differ  from traditional notice-and-comment processes and that FTC staff said  add time and complexity. In addition, under this authority, FTC can  generally only levy civil money penalties after a company has violated an  FTC final consent order. In our recommendation that Congress consider  developing comprehensive internet privacy legislation, we also suggested  that such legislation consider providing rulemaking and civil money  penalty authorities to the proper agency or agencies.
In summary, new technologies have vastly changed the amount of  personal information private companies collect and how they use it. But  our current privacy framework does not fully address these changes.  Laws protecting privacy interests are tailored to specific sectors and uses.  And, consumers have little control over how their information is collected,  used, and shared with third parties for marketing purposes. As a result,  current privacy law is not always aligned with the Fair Information  Practice Principles, which the Department of Commerce and others have  said should serve as the foundation for commercial data privacy. Thus,  the privacy framework warrants reconsideration by Congress in relation to  consumer interests, new technologies, and other issues.
Chairman Crapo, Ranking Member Brown, and Members of the  Committee, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond  to any questions you may have.

	GAO Contacts

For further information on this statement, please contact Alicia Puente  Cackley at 202-512-8678 or cackleya@gao.gov. Contact points for our  offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this statement. In addition to the contact above, Jason  Bromberg (Assistant Director), William R. Chatlos, Rachel DeMarcus, Kay  Kuhlman (Assistant Director), Christine McGinty (Analyst in Charge),  Barbara Roesmann, and Tyler Spunaugle contributed to this statement.  Other staff who made key contributions to the reports cited in the  testimony are identified in the source products.
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Input:
	Background

Alaska’s location makes the United States an Arctic nation. Alaska has  over 6,000 miles of coastline, and is bordered by the Beaufort, Chukchi,  and Bering Seas; the Arctic Ocean; and the Bering Strait, whose  jurisdiction is divided between the United States and Russia (see fig. 1).  According to the 2010 Census, the U.S. Arctic coastal regions are home  to about 26,000 people, including the cities of Nome, located near the  Bering Strait, and Utqiagvik (formerly Barrow), the northernmost city in  the United States. The U.S. Arctic coastal region is sparsely populated  even by the standards of Alaska, which has the lowest population density  of any state in the nation. Specifically, this region accounted for about 4  percent of Alaska’s total population of approximately 710,000 according  to the 2010 Census. Alaska is also the largest state in the nation, and— given its size, terrain, environment, and population distribution—its  transportation system is unique. Much of Alaska’s rail and highway  infrastructure is located in the south central part of the state, and many  U.S. Arctic cities and villages are accessible only by air or water.
As Arctic waterways become more accessible due to declining sea ice,  opportunities have increased to use maritime transportation to bring  natural resources to market. The U.S. Arctic remains a frontier economy;  many of its products and much of the value of commercial activities derive  from natural resources. According to an assessment of undiscovered but  technically recoverable oil and gas resources by the Bureau of Ocean  Energy Management, the outer continental shelf regions of the U.S.  Arctic’s Chukchi and Beaufort Seas contain about 24 billion barrels of oil  and about 105 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The U.S. Arctic also  contains $1 trillion worth of minerals, such as zinc, nickel, and lead. The  extraction of these natural resources presents technical challenges and  requires large financial investments given the Arctic environment.
Although warming over the past decades has made trans-Arctic maritime  routes more accessible, Arctic sea ice extent remains seasonal, with most  shipping occurring during a narrow window extending from summer to  early fall. Arctic sea ice typically reaches its maximum extent in March  and its minimum in September each year; as a result, the shipping  season is typically from June through October. The minimum sea ice  extent in September 2019 was tied with 2007 and 2016 as the second  lowest on record since satellite observations began in 1979; the 13 lowest  extents in the satellite record have all occurred in the last 13 years. As  shown in figure 2, the September (minimum) sea ice extent in 2019 had a  much smaller coverage area than the median September extent from  1981 to 2010. This contraction of sea ice over time has increased  accessibility to the two key trans-Arctic maritime routes: the Northwest  Passage (NWP) through the Canadian archipelago, and the Northern Sea  Route (NSR) along the northern border of Russia. These two routes  enable shipments between non-Arctic destinations, such as between Asia  and Europe. However, most traffic in the U.S. Arctic is destinational,  meaning it transports goods to and from the U.S. Arctic. Such traffic  includes transporting natural resources extracted from the U.S. Arctic to  the global marketplace and shipping supplies to U.S. Arctic communities.
Maritime shipping in the U.S. Arctic involves challenges, given that the  region lacks many of the typical elements of a maritime transportation  system. See table 1 for examples of the types of maritime infrastructure  gaps that CMTS and federal agencies have reported in the U.S. Arctic.
Many federal agencies are involved with, and have a role in, U.S. Arctic  maritime shipping and infrastructure (see table 2). Although these  agencies’ missions are not specifically tied to the U.S. Arctic, they extend  to the U.S. Arctic like any other geographic region of the country.
Other state, local, and international organizations also play a role. For  example, the state of Alaska’s Department of Environmental  Conservation is involved with oil spill response. In addition, the North  Slope Borough, a municipal government that encompasses an area of  nearly 95,000 square miles along Alaska’s northern coast, has a search  and rescue department that provides airborne emergency response.  Alaska Native organizations represent communities that have inhabited  the Arctic region for thousands of years and have cultures that are  particularly sensitive to environmental changes, since they rely on hunting  animals such as whales, seals, and walruses. To represent local  concerns, the Arctic Waterways Safety Committee, which is comprised of  subsistence hunters and others, was created in October 2014 to develop  best practices for safe and efficient use of Arctic waterways. Alaska  Native Corporations are private entities that manage land and assets on  behalf of Alaska Natives. Lastly, international forums such as the Arctic  Council and international organizations such as the IMO also have a role  in establishing Arctic maritime policies and regulations.
For nearly 50 years the U.S. government has articulated its interest in the  Arctic through a series of strategies. For example, in 1971 a then- classified memo from National Security Council (NSC) under the Nixon  Administration called for the sound and rational development of the Arctic,  guided by the principles of minimizing adverse environmental effects,  promoting international cooperation, and protecting security interests,  including the preservation of the freedom of the seas. These same  priorities, along with promoting scientific research, were underscored by  the Reagan Administration in 1983. In January 2009, the George W.  Bush Administration issued an Arctic Region Policy, which outlined  priorities for maritime transportation in the Arctic including to facilitate  safe, secure, and reliable navigation and protect maritime commerce and  the environment. More recently, the Obama Administration issued a  National Strategy for the Arctic Region (National Strategy) in May 2013,  which identified three goals for the region: to advance U.S. security  interests, pursue responsible stewardship, and strengthen international  cooperation. Subsequent implementation plans for the National Strategy  indicated maritime shipping and infrastructure fell under all three of these stated goals. For example, “preparing for increased activity in the  maritime domain” fell under advancing U.S. security interests, “charting  the Arctic region” fell under pursuing responsible stewardship, and  “promoting waterways management” fell under strengthening international  cooperation.
As federal strategies related to the Arctic region have evolved over the  years, so have the interagency groups to implement and guide these  efforts. Interagency activity in the U.S. Arctic has historically been  coordinated through the NSC, including the 1971 and 1983 strategies. In  1984, legislation established the U.S. Arctic Research Commission as  well as the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC).  More recently, to enhance coordination of national efforts in the Arctic,  particularly those related to the 2013 National Strategy, a 2015 Executive  Order established the interagency Arctic Executive Steering Committee  (AESC). AESC is chaired by the Director of the Office of Science and  Technology Policy (OSTP), which is an office within the White House that  leads interagency science and technology policy coordination efforts.  AESC also includes NSC as a member, along with 20 other federal  departments and entities. The 2016 National Strategy Implementation  Framework assigned portions of the strategy’s areas of focus to  interagency groups; specifically, NSC was assigned responsibility for  advancing national security interests, OSTP for pursuing responsible  stewardship, and the Department of State for strengthening international  cooperation.
The U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS), which  was required in 2010 to coordinate the establishment of domestic  transportation policies in the Arctic to ensure safe and secure maritime  shipping, has issued several relevant reports, including a 10-year  projection of maritime activity in 2015, and a 10-year prioritization of  infrastructure needs in the U.S. Arctic in 2016—both of which were  directed by the 2014 National Strategy implementation plan.  More  recently, CMTS issued a 2018 report revisiting its 2016 near-term  recommendations for prioritizing infrastructure needs in the U.S. Arctic  and a 2019 update to its projections of Arctic maritime shipping activity  from 2020 to 2030.  These and other reports addressing maritime  infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic are listed in appendix I.

	Maritime Shipping in the U.S. Arctic Generally Increased from 2009 through 2019 but Remains Limited and Was Affected by Several Factors

		Maritime Shipping in the U.S. Arctic Increased from 2009 through 2019 with a Range of Vessel Types Represented

U.S. Coast Guard data indicate the number of vessels in the U.S. Arctic  increased from 2009 through 2019 (see fig. 3). The types of vessels the  U.S. Coast Guard tracks in the U.S. Arctic includes vessels conducting  marine scientific research; tugs that provide communities with supplies;  and adventurer vessels such as private yachts. U.S. Coast Guard data  also include bulk cargo vessels from the Red Dog mine, one of the largest  zinc mines in the world. The mine trucks its zinc ore to a facility on the  Chukchi Sea, where it is stored for maritime transport during the shipping  season. The U.S. Coast Guard District responsible for the U.S. Arctic  counts more types of vessels in its area of interest—such as research,  tug, and adventurer—than are typically counted for the purposes of  tracking commercial shipping.
Even at its peak, maritime shipping in the U.S. Arctic remained limited  compared to global commercial shipping, although CMTS recently  reported that the number of flag states, or countries where vessels are  registered, has increased. Specifically, the 307 vessels in the U.S. Arctic  in 2019 represented a small portion of the total number of shipping  vessels operating globally. For comparison, according to the United  Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in 2015 the world fleet of  commercial shipping vessels was approximately 89,000. However, in its  2019 traffic projections report, CMTS analyzed U.S. Coast Guard data  and other data sources and found that between January 2015 and  December 2017, the number of flag states in the U.S. Arctic increased.  CMTS noted this indicates a shift away from regionally focused operators  toward a more diverse and international set of operators. CMTS found  that the majority of vessels were flagged to the United States (about 41  percent) or Russia (about 24 percent) over this time period, with the  remaining 35 percent from 35 other flag states, each with a considerably  smaller percentage than the United States or Russia.
Given that a single vessel can make multiple trips per shipping season,  U.S. Coast Guard also measures maritime activity by the number of  transits that vessels make per year through the Bering Strait, a key  convergence point for trans-Arctic routes that connects the NWP and  NSR to the Pacific Ocean. According to U.S. Coast Guard data, the  number of transits through the Bering Strait has ranged from as few as  280 in 2009, to as many as 514 in 2015 (see fig. 4). There were far fewer  transits through the Bering Strait than through some other convergence  points for established major maritime transportation routes that have  more developed maritime infrastructure. For example, the number of  transits through the Panama Canal, which like the NWP connects the  Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, was almost 14,000 in 2018 and the number  of vessels that transited the Suez Canal, which like the NSR enables  shipping between Asia and Europe, was over 18,000.

		Factors Affecting Arctic Maritime Shipping Included Changes in Domestic and International Demand and Unpredictable Conditions

Stakeholders told us that along with factors such as demand that shape  shipping trends worldwide, factors unique to the Arctic also play a role,  such as potential cost savings due to shorter routes; additional operating  costs incurred by Arctic-capable ships; environmental hazards like  unpredictable weather and sea ice; and a lack of maritime infrastructure  typically found along shipping routes. The 20 stakeholders we interviewed  representing the shipping industry, research institutions, and state, local,  and Alaska Native groups among others, described the following factors  that affect U.S. Arctic maritime shipping.

			Domestic and International Demand

As mentioned earlier, diminished sea ice has presented opportunities for  maritime shipping of natural resources extracted from the Arctic, such as  oil, gas, and minerals. However, such activities decreased domestically  after Royal Dutch Shell, PLC (Shell) discontinued its offshore oil and gas  exploration of the Burger prospect in Alaska’s Chukchi Sea in 2015. As  shown in figure 4, the number of transits in the Bering Strait steadily  declined from 514 in 2015 to 369 in 2018. Specifically, CMTS reported  that Shell demobilized its drill ship, anchor handling vessels, and anti- pollution ships from the study area prior to the start of the 2016 shipping  season. One stakeholder said there was a reduction in the number of  seasonal transits after Shell suspended exploration activities, since Shell  had previously accounted for more than a hundred transits through the  Bering Strait. Other traffic related to domestic natural resource extraction  stayed at consistent levels. Specifically, representatives from the Red  Dog zinc mine reported that from 1999 to 2019 they consistently shipped  between 21 and 26 cargo vessels per year, averaging 24 vessels per  year over the 20-year period. Meanwhile, several stakeholders said  international activities related to natural resource development,  particularly in the Russian Arctic, have recently increased, and that  Russia has been investing heavily in Arctic infrastructure. The U.S. Coast  Guard attributed increased cargo traffic levels in 2016 to construction  projects in the Russian Arctic, particularly a liquefied natural gas (LNG)  facility on the Yamal peninsula (see fig. 3 above). In 2017, a Russian  LNG tanker, the Christophe de Margerie, became the first ship to transit  the NSR without being accompanied by an icebreaker.
Demand for tourism cruises in the U.S. Arctic has increased slightly  recently. A representative from an Arctic cruise industry association told  us that the overall cruise industry worldwide grows 5 to 10 percent a year  and that there is growing demand for expedition cruises to farther-flung  areas like the Arctic. In both 2016 and 2017, the cruise ship Crystal  Serenity transited the NWP with over a thousand passengers on board.  Stakeholders noted that cruise ship voyages in the U.S. Arctic, such as  the Crystal Serenity voyages, raised concerns for passenger safety given  the lack of infrastructure, particularly for search and rescue. However,  according to an Arctic cruise industry association representative, the  number of smaller ships purpose-built for Arctic conditions is growing; the  association estimates 25 to 30 such vessels are under construction.
Domestic and foreign research vessels have also increased in number in  the U.S. Arctic due to greater interest in the region’s changing  environment. For example, according to National Science Foundation  officials, their polar-capable vessel Sikuliaq entered service in 2016.  Internationally, China has increased its activity in the Arctic since gaining  observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013 and now operates two  icebreaking research vessels. One stakeholder said that such  investments by countries such as China may be the first step towards  achieving longer-term economic goals for those countries.

			Cost of Operations

Trans-Arctic routes can reduce travel time between certain destinations  compared to traditional routes and may therefore reduce fuel and labor  costs. For example, the route from Shanghai, China, to Northwestern  Europe via the NSR is 27 percent shorter than via the Suez Canal. The  operators of the Russian LNG tanker that transited the NSR in 2017, the  Christophe de Margerie, reported they completed the journey in 19 days,  30 percent faster than the Suez Canal. For reasons such as these,  according to news reports, Russia has announced plans to develop the  NSR and ship 80 million tons of goods through the route by 2024.  Similarly, an official from a Canadian ship owner and operator told us  that, depending on the vessel’s origin and destination, using the NWP can  be 10-15 days faster than using the Panama Canal, resulting in a cost  savings of $100,000 to $150,000.
Although trans-Arctic routes have the potential for cost savings due to  shorter distances, they require additional investments not necessary for  traditional routes that may offset those savings. For example,  representatives of one carrier said Arctic-capable ships cost three to four  times more than ordinary ships because they require more steel and  higher power output to withstand ice conditions. The additional steel also  limits the amount of cargo the vessel can carry; representatives from  another carrier noted every ton of steel used to construct the ship is a ton  of cargo that the ship cannot carry in order to recoup expenses. The size  of vessels that can safely operate in the region is also constrained by  draft limitations that specify the maximum weight and size at which ships  can navigate the shallow waters of the Arctic. By contrast, the trend  among ocean carriers over the past decades, which have capitalized on  advances in fuel-efficient engine technology, is toward constructing  increasingly larger vessels to capture economies of scale. In addition,  stakeholders told us that shippers operating in the Arctic must invest in  special onboard equipment and prepare for contingencies due to the lack  of maritime infrastructure usually found in traditional routes, such as  deep-draft ports, harbors of refuge, reliable communications, and search  and rescue infrastructure. Stakeholders noted Arctic voyages also require  additional training for crew members on navigating in ice conditions.
Shippers must determine whether the cost savings obtained from shorter  trans-Arctic routes outweigh the additional operating expenses. For  example, although Maersk, one of the largest shipping companies in the  world, successfully completed a trial passage of a container ship through  the NSR in September 2018, the company emphasized at the time that  the transit was a “one-off trial designed to gain operational experience in  a new area and to test vessel systems” and that it did not view the route  as a commercially viable alternative to existing routes. In a press release,  Maersk noted that the NSR was only feasible for around 3 months a year  and required the use of more costly ice-classed vessels. Despite this,  news reports in June 2019 indicate Maersk is exploring sending more  goods through the NSR in cooperation with a Russian icebreaker  company in response to demand for the transport of goods from Asia to  West Russia.

			Unpredictable Conditions and Lack of Infrastructure

Although diminished sea ice has prolonged the shipping season and  opened up shipping routes, environmental changes have also resulted in  less predictable conditions, such as more volatile weather and sea ice.  One stakeholder involved with Arctic research noted that the conditions  that have led to open waters can also lead to harsher conditions such as  strong low pressure systems, gale force winds, and storms. Such  conditions pose challenges for shipping—one shipper representative said  that it is difficult to load barges in shallow waters and that typically loading  and unloading activities have to be suspended with swells above 3 feet.  In addition, stakeholders told us variation in ice conditions from year to  year makes planning Arctic voyages difficult to do with reasonable  accuracy. For example, while warming trends might suggest that overall  sea ice diminishes further each year, one carrier representative noted its  vessel encountered severe ice conditions in June 2018. This  representative noted that diminished overall ice coverage can lead to  localized conditions with more mobile and older ice migrating into  shipping lanes. The unpredictable and harsh weather and ice conditions,  combined with the vast distances and lack of maritime infrastructure,  pose safety risks. For example, according to stakeholders, the “tyranny of  distance” in the Arctic stretches the limited search and rescue  capabilities, resulting in slow incidence response. Furthermore, a lack of a  designated harbor of refuge means vessels do not have a place to moor  safely in case of emergency. As a result, a representative from the  International Union of Marine Insurance noted that in the Arctic even a  minor incident, such as a small engine failure, can result in substantial  damages and even loss of life.

			Environmental Concerns

Some stakeholders we interviewed expressed concerns about impacts of  shipping on wildlife, including the species that Alaska Natives rely on for  food. One stakeholder noted that awareness has grown in the past 10  years of the environmental impact of shipping. Such impacts include  emissions containing sulphur oxide and black carbon from ships’ engines  that could damage the fragile Arctic ecosystem. As a result of such  environmental concerns, the IMO is currently considering a ban on heavy  fuel oil in the Arctic. In addition, in 2019 several major carriers, including  CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, and Mediterranean Shipping Company,  announced they would not pursue trans-Arctic shipping. Furthermore, in  2019 Nike and Ocean Conservancy launched the Arctic Corporate  Shipping Pledge, a voluntary commitment by consumer goods and  shipping logistics companies to not send ships through the Arctic. The  pledge also supports precautionary Arctic shipping practices to enhance  the environment and human safety, which may include a heavy fuel oil  ban and an evaluation of low impact shipping corridors that protect  important ecological and cultural areas. A representative of one carrier we  spoke with said a heavy fuel oil ban in the Arctic could increase the cost  of transporting cargo and, as a result, severely impact shipping in the  region.

	Agencies Have Taken Some Steps to Address Gaps in Maritime Infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic, but Federal Efforts Lack a Current Strategy and Consistent Leadership

While agencies have taken actions to address maritime infrastructure  gaps, federal efforts lack (1) a government-wide assessment of risks  posed by gaps in maritime infrastructure, (2) a current government-wide  strategy for addressing maritime infrastructure that includes goals,  performance measures, and appropriate responses to prioritized risks,  and (3) an interagency mechanism and consistent leadership to guide  agency actions related to maritime infrastructure. Without these elements,  federal agencies may lack information on which to base decisions and  prioritize actions, assurance that their investments are directed to  prioritized risks, and the ability to demonstrate progress in addressing  maritime infrastructure. Furthermore, agencies may miss opportunities to  work together and leverage resources towards achieving broader  outcomes.

		Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address Navigation and Other Gaps in U.S. Arctic Infrastructure

Agencies have taken some actions since 2013, when CMTS first reported  on gaps in U.S. Arctic infrastructure. For example, U.S. Coast Guard  reported that it has taken a flexible approach to addressing infrastructure  gaps by establishing seasonal, forward operating bases in the U.S. Arctic  as needed to provide search and rescue support in areas where major  shipping activity is occurring. See table 3 for selected examples of agency  actions.

		Federal Efforts Lack a Government-wide Risk Assessment to Inform Decisions in the U.S. Arctic

Although federal agencies have taken some steps to address gaps in  U.S. Arctic infrastructure, those efforts are not based on a government- wide assessment of the economic, environmental, and safety risks posed  by maritime infrastructure gaps to inform investment decisions in the U.S.  Arctic. Rather, agency officials said that they currently base Arctic  infrastructure decisions on their agency-specific missions, strategies, and  collaborative efforts. Specifically, agency officials said that securing the  resources to address U.S. Arctic infrastructure is challenging because  such projects must compete with other established agency mission areas.  For example, officials told us that infrastructure investments may not  compete as well against other agency-established priorities in other parts  of the country, in part, because the Arctic is an emerging region and  because of the considerable costs of developing infrastructure in the  harsh Arctic environment.
Leading management practices we reviewed note the importance of  assessing risks in order to select and prioritize countermeasures to  prevent or mitigate risks. A 2016 Office of Management and Budget  (OMB) circular emphasized the importance of risk assessment and called  for agencies to use a structured and systematic approach to identify risks  and assess the causes, sources, probability of the risk occurring, and  potential outcomes, and then prioritize the results of the analysis. Such  an approach can be used by decision makers to evaluate the  effectiveness of, and to prioritize, countermeasures relative to the  associated costs. Risk management is a widely endorsed strategy for  helping policymakers make decisions about allocating finite resources  and taking actions in conditions of uncertainty. Such a framework is  especially applicable to the U.S. Arctic given the uncertain conditions in  the region and safety and environmental risks described above.
Without a risk assessment, agencies lack assurance that their  investments are addressing the highest-priority risks. In particular, we  found that agencies’ actions to address maritime infrastructure gaps were  not fully consistent with the areas that the stakeholders we interviewed  identified as the most critical (see fig. 5). For example, 11 of the 20  stakeholders we interviewed identified charting Arctic waters as the  highest priority to address, and in May 2019 NOAA reported that it had  acquired nearly 1,500 square nautical miles of hydrographic survey data  in the Arctic over the prior 3 years. This is, however, less than 1 percent  of the over 200,000 square nautical miles of waters NOAA has identified  as significant to navigation in the U.S. Arctic. In addition, nine  stakeholders identified addressing gaps in communications in the U.S.  Arctic as a key priority. However, CMTS reports indicate no change in the  status of communications capabilities in the U.S. Arctic between 2013  and 2018.
CMTS has in the past noted the importance of conducting a risk  assessment to inform Arctic decision-making. Specifically, CMTS’s 2013  report noted that greater access to the U.S. Arctic and increased activity  presents additional risks for people, vessels, and the environment in the  fragile region and that managing that risk requires an in-depth  understanding of the issues and trade-offs associated with key decisions.  Although CMTS reported that developing an assessment tool that  provides a quantifiable level of risk and that accounts for the unique risk  elements in the Arctic was a challenge for the nation, it proposed a model  for determining risk that considered the likelihood of adverse events  actually occurring, vulnerability to damage, and potential consequences.  CMTS further stated that, given the rate at which other nations are  progressing with Arctic shipping and development, the United States  should decide the acceptable degree of risk for Arctic operations.
Although CMTS has provided useful information on maritime  infrastructure gaps to decision makers and described possible risks to the  U.S. Arctic, it has not systematically assessed the risks posed by these  gaps. For example, in 2016, CMTS made near-, mid-, and long-term  recommendations for addressing maritime infrastructure needs, but noted  this ordering was not intended to create a hierarchy of infrastructure  needs from most to least important. CMTS officials told us that they have  not systematically assessed risks posed by maritime infrastructure gaps  in the U.S. Arctic because CMTS’s priorities are established by its  member agencies, and that CMTS has not been directed to conduct such  an assessment by its members. However, CMTS is required by statute to,  among other things, coordinate the establishment of domestic  transportation policies in the Arctic to ensure safe and secure maritime  shipping and make recommendations with regard to federal policies that  impact the marine transportation system. Furthermore, according to  CMTS officials, there is nothing in CMTS’s authority that would prevent it  from doing a risk assessment.
Given its previous reports and work in the U.S. Arctic and its coordinating  role with its member agencies, CMTS is well suited to conduct a  government-wide assessment of the risks posed by gaps in maritime  infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic. For example, CMTS published a traffic  projections report in September 2019 that aimed to provide decision  makers with a wide-ranging portrait of potential changes in vessel activity  in the U.S. Arctic over the next decade. To inform its risk assessment,  CMTS can draw on the expertise of its member agencies, such as U.S.  Coast Guard and NOAA. For example, U.S. Coast Guard officials told us  that they have responded to the unpredictable economic changes in the  U.S Arctic—including fluctuations in the level and type of maritime activity  in the region—by investing in icebreakers and seasonal forward operating  bases, rather than developing permanent infrastructure. In addition,  CMTS can also draw on numerous reports discussing maritime  infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic that have been published since 2013, as  detailed in appendix I. For example, in 2019 the University of Alaska’s  Arctic Domain Awareness Center held a series of workshops on the  factors that impact the ability of the U.S. Coast Guard and other  stakeholders to conduct safe, secure, and effective operations in the  Arctic environment.
A government-wide risk assessment could better enable agencies to  evaluate potential U.S. Arctic infrastructure expenditures and assess the  extent to which these expenditures will mitigate identified risks. For  example, a report on the U.S. Coast Guard’s Arctic capabilities suggested  that a systematic analysis of needs and risks in the U.S. Arctic could help  the agency generate momentum for closing Arctic capability gaps. By  conducting such a risk assessment, agencies would have better  information on which to base decisions for agency expenditures in the  U.S. Arctic and prioritize appropriate actions in response to risks.

		Federal Interagency Efforts Lack a Current Strategy and Consistent Interagency Leadership to Guide Agency Actions Related to Maritime Infrastructure

We found that the federal interagency efforts to address U.S. Arctic  maritime infrastructure lack a current strategy and consistent interagency  leadership to guide agencies’ actions. Although several agencies have  developed strategies to guide their own agencies’ efforts, these do not  provide government-wide direction or establish current government-wide  goals, objectives, and performance measures as leading management  practices call for. Moreover, the federal agencies lack clarity on which  interagency entity is responsible for guiding federal efforts and providing  consistent leadership to ensure government-wide objectives are met.

			Current Strategy

The federal government lacks a current government-wide strategy for  addressing U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure gaps that includes key  characteristics, such as goals, objectives, and performance measures,  and appropriate responses to risks. Agency officials and stakeholders  said the 2013 National Strategy is outdated because conditions in the  U.S. Arctic have changed since 2013. In particular, agency officials said  national security is a growing concern in the Arctic. OSTP officials agreed  that conditions had changed in the Arctic, but could not state whether the  2013 National Strategy was still current. Our past work on interagency  collaboration found that written agreements documenting how  participating agencies collaborate, such as strategies, are most effective  when they are regularly updated and monitored. The changing  conditions in the Arctic described above make a current government-wide  strategy for maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic particularly  important.
In our past work, we have reported that complex interagency efforts— such as those to address maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic—can  benefit from developing a national strategy. Our prior work has identified  key characteristics of national strategies, which we refer to in this report  as a government-wide strategy, including: (1) problem definition and risk  assessment which addresses the threats the strategy is directed towards;  and (2) goals, objectives, and performance measures to gauge and  monitor results. Furthermore, our prior enterprise risk management work  has noted that risk assessment should include a ranking of risks based on  priorities in relation to strategic objectives, and that senior leaders should  determine if a risk requires treatment or not based on risk tolerance or  appetite. Leaders then review the prioritized list of risks and select the  most appropriate response to address the risk. These key  characteristics help managers determine the extent of investment needed  and facilitate effective targeting of federal resources; this is especially  important when multiple agencies are involved, as is the case with  maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic.
Although several federal agencies have recently updated their Arctic  strategies, these agency-specific Arctic strategies are not linked to a current government-wide strategy for the Arctic region and are not  specifically focused on addressing Arctic maritime infrastructure gaps.  Specifically:
U.S. Coast Guard. In April 2019, U.S. Coast Guard published its  Arctic Strategic Outlook, which supersedes its 2013 Arctic Strategy.  The updated strategy established three lines of effort: (1) enhance  capability to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic domain, (2)  strengthen the rules-based order, and (3) innovate and adapt to  promote resilience and prosperity. We recommended in 2016 that  the U.S. Coast Guard develop measures for assessing how its actions  have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps and design and  implement a process to systematically assess its progress.  However, as of February 2020, the U.S. Coast Guard has not  implemented these recommendations. U.S. Coast Guard officials  state that they are currently developing an implementation plan and  Strategic Metrics Framework for the Arctic Strategic Outlook.
U.S. Navy. In January 2019, the U.S. Navy published its Arctic  strategy, which updated its previous strategy from 2014. The  updated strategy included the following strategic objectives: defend  U.S. sovereignty and the homeland from attack; ensure the Arctic  remains a stable, conflict-free region; preserve freedom of the seas;  and promote partnerships to achieve the above objectives.
Department of Defense. In June 2019, Department of Defense  updated its 2016 Arctic strategy which included the following as part  of its approach: (1) building Arctic awareness, (2) enhancing Arctic  operations, and (3) strengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic.
NOAA. NOAA officials originally told us that they were working to  complete an update to NOAA’s strategic plan for the Arctic in 2019.  However, as of February 2020, officials told us that this update is  currently on hold pending the completion of a new government-wide  National Strategy. As mentioned previously, OSTP staff said they  could not state whether the 2013 National Strategy was still current,  and OSTP provided no additional information as to whether a new  strategy was in development. NOAA officials told us that the agency’s  current three priorities in the Arctic are (1) weather and water  (including weather and water research, observations, and Arctic  contributions to global weather monitoring); (2) blue economy  (including ocean mapping, seafood competitiveness, tourism, and  coastal resilience); and (3) innovative partnerships in Alaska and the  Arctic.
CMTS has taken some steps to monitor agencies’ progress in addressing  maritime infrastructure, but the current lack of performance measures  makes it difficult to monitor agencies’ progress over time. We reported in  2014 that CMTS was developing a process to monitor such progress and  noted that such monitoring would help agencies develop a shared  understanding of current priorities and actions needed. However, while  CMTS did issue reports that described the status of maritime  infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic in 2016 and 2018, the reports did not  include goals or performance measures to assess agencies’ progress.  According to officials, CMTS did not develop or include performance  measures to monitor agencies’ progress because it does not have the  authority to designate agencies’ priorities, and that agencies are best  situated to identify priorities in pursuit of their individual missions.
Priorities in the U.S. Arctic are currently based on each agency’s mission,  which makes it difficult to take a government-wide approach to  responding to risks. To improve unity of effort, the U.S. Coast Guard has  expressed support for a national approach to Arctic planning in both its  2013 and 2019 Arctic strategies. Without a current government-wide  strategy that includes goals and objectives, agencies lack assurance that  their investments are directed to prioritized risks. Furthermore, without  performance measures, agencies are not able to demonstrate, and  decision makers are unable to monitor, the extent to which agency  actions have addressed maritime infrastructure gaps.

			Interagency Leadership

We have previously reported that federal agencies use a variety of  mechanisms, including interagency groups, to implement interagency  collaborative efforts and that such mechanisms benefit from key features  such as sustained leadership and inclusion of all relevant participants,  such as stakeholders. We also reported that leadership should be  sustained over time to provide continuity for long-term efforts and that  having top-level commitment from the President, Congress, or other high- level officials can strengthen the effectiveness of interagency  collaborative groups. We also found that lack of continuity is a frequent  issue with interagency mechanisms that are tied to the Executive Office of  the President, particularly when administrations change, and that  transitions and inconsistent leadership can weaken a collaborative  mechanism’s effectiveness. In addition, our prior work has noted the  importance of ensuring that all relevant participants are included in the  collaborative effort, such as participants with the appropriate knowledge,  skills, and abilities to contribute.
There are many interagency groups involved in the U.S. Arctic, including:
AESC was established by Executive Order in 2015 to shape national  priorities and set strategic direction in the Arctic.
NSC Arctic Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) is the current  interagency forum for executive-level Arctic collaboration, according to  agency officials.
CMTS is the main forum for collaboration regarding maritime  infrastructure according to agency officials.
These interagency groups vary in the extent to which they meet the key  features noted above. Specifically:
Sustained leadership: Both the NSC, which, as mentioned  previously, has traditionally played a role in Arctic collaboration dating  back to 1971, and the AESC, which was chaired by the OSTP within  the White House, would have top-level commitment given their  proximity to the White House. However, according to agency officials,  the AESC has not met in the past 2 years and is now dormant. OSTP  staff told us that they are not aware of any current AESC activities.  Meanwhile, although CMTS has been active in the area of U.S. Arctic  maritime infrastructure for the past decade, CMTS officials said CMTS  does not sit within the Executive Office of the President. As a result,  CMTS officials note their role is to facilitate an interagency  partnership, share information among member agencies, and provide  information to decision-makers to support agencies’ efforts. CMTS’s  statutory authority addresses, among other things, the coordination of  federal policies that impact the maritime transportation system,  including in the U.S. Arctic, rather than the development and  execution of government-wide policies.
Inclusion of relevant stakeholders: The AESC, when it was active,  included a wide range of over 20 federal departments and entities,  including those less associated with maritime infrastructure such as  the Department of Agriculture. For the NSC Arctic PCC, we were  unable to verify the participants, so it is unclear whether relevant  stakeholders are involved. However, agency officials noted the PCC’s  focus is on national security rather than on maritime infrastructure,  which may indicate not all maritime infrastructure stakeholders are  included. Lastly, CMTS includes stakeholders involved directly with  maritime transportation. For example, officials from the U.S. Army  Corps of Engineers noted that they actively participate in CMTS,  including its Arctic Integrated Action Team, but do not participate in  other interagency groups, where they are often represented by higher- level Department of Defense officials.
The Executive Office of the President has not designated an interagency  group as responsible for developing or executing the administration’s  strategy for maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic. We have previously  reported that interagency efforts can benefit from the leadership of a  single entity to provide assurance that federal programs are well  coordinated and based upon a coherent strategy. Agency officials said  priorities in the U.S. Arctic have shifted to national security under the  current administration, which may have led executive-level interagency  collaboration efforts to move from AESC to the NSC Arctic PCC.  However, it is unclear whether the NSC Arctic PCC includes the relevant  stakeholders. Moreover, the shift in Arctic priorities to security issues  does not diminish the importance of Arctic maritime infrastructure. As  indicated in the 2013 National Strategy, maritime shipping and  infrastructure are a key component of overarching goals in the region like  advancing U.S. security interests, pursuing responsible stewardship, and  strengthening international cooperation.
Without an interagency mechanism with sustained leadership and  inclusion of relevant stakeholders to direct federal efforts related to U.S.  Arctic maritime infrastructure, agencies may miss opportunities to  leverage resources toward achieving a broader outcome. For example, as  noted earlier, stakeholders we spoke to identified communications as a  key infrastructure gap. According to U.S. Coast Guard officials,  communications is a whole-of-government effort, requiring partnerships  across agencies including the Department of Defense. Without an  interagency collaboration mechanism designated to lead these efforts, it  is unclear who has responsibility for such whole-of-government efforts to  address maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic.

	Conclusions

The U.S. Arctic, including the Bering Strait, is an essential part of the  increasingly navigable Arctic and a key convergence point for maritime  transportation routes connecting the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. The  risks inherent to Arctic shipping—including vast distances, extreme ice  conditions, and unpredictable weather—are exacerbated by gaps in  maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic. While agencies have taken  some actions to address these gaps, without a government-wide  assessment of risks posed by maritime infrastructure gaps in the U.S.  Arctic and a current strategy to address those risks, agencies lack  assurance that their actions are effectively targeting priority areas.
Without a strategy that includes goals, objectives, and performance  measures, agencies cannot demonstrate the results of their efforts, and  decision makers cannot gauge the extent of progress in addressing  maritime infrastructure gaps. In addition, without a designated  interagency group to provide sustained leadership, agencies lack the  ability to leverage resources to address maritime infrastructure and  achieve government-wide priorities in the complex and changing U.S.  Arctic.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

The U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System should:
Complete a government-wide assessment of the economic,  environmental, and safety risks posed by gaps in maritime  infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic to inform investment priorities and  decisions. (Recommendation 1)
The appropriate entities within the Executive Office of the President,  including the Office of Science and Technology Policy should:
Develop and publish a strategy for addressing U.S. Arctic maritime  infrastructure that identifies goals and objectives, performance  measures to monitor agencies’ progress over time, and the  appropriate responses to address risks. (Recommendation 2)
Designate the interagency group responsible for leading and  coordinating federal efforts to address maritime infrastructure in the  U.S. Arctic that includes all relevant stakeholders. (Recommendation  3)

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Executive Office of the  President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP); the U.S.  Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS); and the  Departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, Interior, State,  and Transportation for comment. With the exception of the Department of  Defense, all of these entities provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate. Only CMTS provided written comments,  which were transmitted via letter from the Department of Transportation,  and are reprinted in appendix II.
In its technical comments, the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S.  Coast Guard provided Arctic traffic data for the 2019 shipping season. As  stated in our report, we originally selected the decade of 2009 through  2018 for our analysis when designing our review, as 2018 was the most  recent year for which data were available at that time. In response to the  U.S. Coast Guard’s comments submitted in April 2020, we revised our  report to include data from the 2019 shipping season on (1) the number of  vessels in the U.S. Coast Guard District 17 Arctic area of interest and (2)   the number of transits in the Bering Strait, to ensure the report contained  the most current information available.
In its written comments, CMTS partially concurred with our  recommendation that CMTS complete a government-wide assessment of  the economic, environmental, and safety risks posed by gaps in maritime  infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic to inform investment priorities and  decisions. However, CMTS also noted several areas of disagreement  with our conclusions, which we address here:  First, CMTS noted that GAO’s draft report contained dated information  and that the 2019 data contradicts GAO statements that suggest a  decrease in vessel activity since 2015. CMTS noted that the 2019 data  shows that vessel traffic has increased steadily over the last decade, and  that although growth slowed between 2015 and 2017, “it did not stall.”  However, we dispute this characterization. The 2019 shipping data  included in this report emphasizes the finding from our draft report that  maritime shipping activity generally increased over the time period of our  review. However, this trend does not reflect a steady increase throughout  the entire timeframe or “slowed growth” between 2015 and 2017 as  CMTS indicates. Specifically, the data show year-to-year decreases in the  number of vessels from 2015 to 2017 in the U.S. Coast Guard District 17  Arctic area of interest (see fig. 3) and in the number of transits in the  Bering Strait from 2015 to 2018 (see fig. 4). CMTS’s own 2019 report  indicated that the number of vessels had decreased from a peak in 2015,  after Shell’s decision in 2015 to not pursue further exploratory drilling  efforts. As such, we stand by our description of the overall growth in  maritime activity in the U.S. Arctic since 2009, as well as the pattern of  declining traffic within that period from 2015 through 2018.
Second, CMTS also noted in its written comments that our use of data  from 2009 to 2018 in the draft report do not lead to the conclusions and  recommendation to assess infrastructure risks and prioritize future  investment in the Arctic. We dispute this characterization. Our decision to  include the 2019 data further emphasizes the finding in our draft report of  a general increase in maritime activity in the U.S. Arctic and the need for  an assessment of risks posed by gaps in maritime infrastructure. As we  note in the report, CMTS has reported that the U.S. Arctic does not have  the typical elements of a maritime infrastructure system such as a deep- draft port or robust communications infrastructure. These infrastructure  gaps exacerbate the inherent challenges of maritime activity in the  Arctic—vast distances, dangerous weather, and extreme ice conditions— that can pose safety risks to mariners and environmental risks to the  fragile Arctic ecosystem. While agencies have taken some steps to  address infrastructure gaps, without a risk assessment, agencies lack  assurance that their investments are addressing the highest-priority risks.  As such, we stand by our conclusion and recommendation that increasing  maritime traffic poses risks, and a government-wide assessment of those  risks would inform federal decisions on investments to appropriately  address risks.
Third, CMTS disagreed with GAO’s statement that a government-wide  risk assessment could better enable agencies to evaluate potential U.S.  Arctic infrastructure expenditures. Although CMTS agreed that  understanding infrastructure gaps is critical to improving the Arctic marine  transportation system, CMTS contends that such risk assessments are  the responsibility of each agency as directed by the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB). As we note in the report, many  agencies have a role in U.S. Arctic maritime shipping and infrastructure  and although agencies and others have conducted many reviews of  maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic (see appendix I), agency-by- agency assessments do not reflect or analyze risks from a government- wide perspective.
CMTS itself has previously noted the importance of evaluating risks on a  government-wide basis. Specifically, in 2013 CMTS noted that increased  activity in the U.S. Arctic presents additional risks for the people, vessels,  and the environment and that managing that risk requires an in-depth  understanding of the issues and trade-offs associated with key decisions,  such as how to prioritize investments. As our report states, CMTS stated  that developing a tool to assess the unique risk elements in the Arctic was  a challenge for the nation, and it proposed a model for determining risk  that considered the likelihood of adverse events actually occurring,  vulnerability to damage, and potential consequences. This model is  similar to the 2016 OMB circular, which called for agencies to, among  other things, assess the causes, sources, probability of the risk occurring,  and potential outcomes. As stated in our report, given its previous work  in the U.S. Arctic and its coordinating role with its member agencies,  CMTS is well suited to conduct a government-wide assessment of the  risks posed by gaps in maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic. As such,  we stand by our recommendation.
Based on these items, CMTS did not agree to perform and lead a  government-wide risk assessment. Instead, as an “alternate action” to  address GAO’s recommendation, CMTS noted it plans to update a table  of information published in its past reports on infrastructure gaps in the  U.S. Arctic and provide an inventory of existing risk assessments and  their criteria, which agencies can then use to improve their own  assessments to inform decisions. In our view, the proposed action  described by CMTS would not provide the same level of information  proposed by CMTS itself in 2013 and by OMB’s 2016 circular, which calls  for, among other things, assessing the causes, sources, probability of the  risk occurring, and potential outcomes.
As stated in our report, CMTS is uniquely positioned as a federal  interagency coordinating committee focused on the maritime  transportation system to draw on the expertise of its member agencies,  such as U.S. Coast Guard and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration, to complete this risk assessment. Moreover, CMTS is  required by statue to coordinate the establishment of domestic  transportation policies in the Arctic to ensure safe and secure maritime  shipping and make recommendations with regard to federal policies that  impact the marine transportation system. Furthermore, according to  CMTS officials, there is nothing in CMTS’s authority that would prevent it  from doing a risk assessment. As such, we stand by our recommendation  as written and do not believe CMTS’s alternate action is sufficient to  address the recommendation.
In comments provided via email, OSTP neither agreed nor disagreed with  the report’s recommendations. OSTP acknowledged the Arctic is of  critical national importance and noted interagency coordination can be  implemented through the entities of the National Science and Technology  Council, which is located within OSTP. OSTP noted the need for, and role of additional federal coordination, such as the Arctic Executive Steering  Committee, is under consideration by OSTP. We continue to believe that  the appropriate entities within the Executive Office of the President,  including OSTP, should designate the interagency group responsible for  leading and coordinating federal efforts to address maritime infrastructure  in the U.S. Arctic that includes all relevant stakeholders. As we note in our  report, without an interagency collaboration mechanism designated to  lead these efforts, it is unclear who has responsibility for whole-of- government efforts to address U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure.
In addition, we stand by our other recommendation to OSTP and other  entities within the Executive Office of the President to develop and  publish a strategy for addressing U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure that  identifies goals and objectives, performance measures to monitor  agencies’ progress over time, and the appropriate responses to address  risks. As we note in the report, without such a strategy agencies lack  assurance that their actions are effectively targeting priority areas and  decision makers cannot gauge the extent of progress in addressing  maritime infrastructure gaps.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Executive Office of the President; the U.S. Committee on  the Marine Transportation System; the Secretaries of Homeland Security,  Commerce, Defense, Interior, State, and Transportation; and other  interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or vonaha@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Reports Relevant to Maritime Infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic Published Since 2013

National Ocean Council. National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan.  Washington, D.C.: April 2013.
White House. National Strategy for the Arctic Region. Washington, D.C.:  May 10, 2013.
U.S. Coast Guard. United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy.  Washington, D.C.: May 2013.
U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System. U.S. Arctic Marine  Transportation System: Overview and Priorities for Action. Washington,  D.C.: 2013.
The White House. Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the  Arctic Region. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2014.
U.S. Navy. The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030.  Washington, D.C.: February 2014.
GAO. Maritime Infrastructure: Key Issues Related to Commercial Activity  in the U.S. Arctic over the Next Decade. GAO-14-299. Washington, D.C.:  March 19, 2014.
U.S. Department of Commerce. National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration. NOAA’s Arctic Action Plan: Supporting the National  Strategy for the Arctic Region. Silver Spring, M.D: April 2014.
GAO. Arctic Issues: Better Direction and Management of Voluntary  Recommendations Could Enhance U.S. Arctic Council Participation.  GAO-14-435. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2014.
Brigham, L. W. Alaska and the New Maritime Arctic Executive Summary:  Executive Summary of a Project Report to the State of Alaska  Department of Commerce, Community and Economic Development.  Fairbanks, A.K.: February 1, 2015.
The International Council on Clean Transportation. A 10-Year Projection  of Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region. Washington, D.C.: January  2015. This report was contracted and coordinated under the U.S.  Committee on the Marine Transportation System.
Executive Order No. 13689. Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in  the Arctic. 80 Fed. Reg. 4191. January 26, 2015.
The White House. Arctic Executive Steering Committee. National  Strategy for the Arctic Region Implementation Report. Washington, D.C.:  January 30, 2015.
Alaska Arctic Policy Commission. Final Report of the Alaska Arctic Policy  Commission.  Anchorage and Bethel, A.K.: January 30, 2015.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Alaska District. Alaska Deep-Draft Arctic  Port System Study:  Draft Integrated Feasibility Report, Draft  Environmental Assessment (EA), and Draft Finding of No Significant  Impact (FONSI). Nome, AK: February 2015.
GAO. Arctic Planning: DOD Expects to Play a Supporting Role to Other  Federal Agencies and Has Efforts Under Way to Address Capability  Needs and Update Plans. GAO-15-566. Washington, D.C.: June 19,  2015.
Arctic. Status on Implementation of the AMSA 2009 Report  Recommendations. Tromsø, Norway: April 2015.
World Economic Forum. Global Agenda Council on the Arctic. Arctic  Investment Protocol: Guidelines for Responsible Investment in the Arctic.  Geneva, Switzerland: November 2015.
U.S. Coast Guard. Arctic Strategy Implementation Plan. Washington,  D.C.: December 2015.
Arctic Economic Council, Telecommunications Infrastructure Working  Group. Arctic Broadband: Recommendations for an Interconnected Arctic.  Tromsø, Norway: Winter 2016.
Copenhagen Business School and Arctic Institute. Arctic Shipping:  Commercial Opportunities and Challenges. CBS Maritime, January 2016.
The White House. Arctic Executive Steering Committee. 2015 Year in  Review:  Progress Report on the Implementation of the National Strategy  for the Arctic Region. Washington, D.C.:  March 2016.
The White House. Arctic Executive Steering Committee. 2015 Year in  Review:  Progress Report on the Implementation of the National Strategy  for the Arctic Region; Appendix A, Implementation Framework for the  National Strategy for the Arctic Region. Washington, D.C.:  March 2016.
U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System. Arctic Marine  Transportation Integrated Action Team. A Ten-Year Prioritization of  Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2016.
GAO. Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy is Underway but Agency Could Better  Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps.  GAO-16-453. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2016.
Department of Defense. Report To Congress On Strategy To Protect  United States National Security Interests In The Arctic Region.  Washington, D.C.: December 2016.
RAND Corporation. Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia: Planning  for Regional Change in the Far North. RR-1731-RC. Santa Monica, CA:  2017.
U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System. Recommendations  and Criteria for Using Federal Public-Private Partnerships to Support  Critical U.S. Arctic Maritime Infrastructure. Washington, D.C.: January  2017.
Arctic Council, Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response.  Circumpolar Oil Spill Response Viability Analysis: Technical Report.  March 7, 2017.
Council of Foreign Relations. Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S.  Strategy of America’s Fourth Coast, New York, N.Y.:  March 2017.
Ocean Conservancy. Navigating the North: An Assessment of the  Environmental Risks of Arctic Vessel Traffic.  Anchorage, A.K.:  June 28,  2017.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Maritime Futures: The  Arctic and the Bering Strait Region.  Washington, D.C.: November 2017.
RAND Corporation. Identifying Potential Gaps in US Coast Guard Arctic  Capabilities.RR-2310-DHS. Santa Monica, CA: 2018.
U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System. Revisiting Near- Term Recommendations to Prioritize Infrastructure Needs in the U.S.  Arctic. Washington, D.C.: 2018.
Department of Defense. Report to Congress on Assessment of  Requirement for a Strategic Arctic Port. Washington, D.C.: January 2018.
Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Chief Financial Officer.    Arctic Search and Rescue:  Fiscal Year 2017 Report to Congress.  Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2018.
International Union of Marine Insurance. IUMI Position Paper: Arctic  Sailings. Hamburg, Germany: August 2018.
U.S. Coast Guard Acquisition Directorate, Research & Development  Center. Alaska AIS Transmit Prototype Test, Evaluation, and Transition  Summary Report for the Near Shore Arctic Navigational Safety  Information System (ANSIS). New London, C.T.: October 2018.
GAO. Arctic Planning: Navy Report to Congress Aligns with Current  Assessments of Arctic Threat Levels and Capabilities Required to  Execute DOD’s Strategy. GAO-19-42. Washington, D.C.: November 8,  2018.
Alaska Federation of Natives. Indigenous Engagement with Their  Countries’ Military and Civilian Services/ Government on Maritime Arctic  Issues. Anchorage, A.K.: December 2018.
RAND Europe. The Future of Arctic Cooperation in a Changing Strategic  Environment, PE-268-RC. Cambridge, United Kingdom: 2018.
U.S. Navy. Strategic Outlook for the Arctic. January 2019.
U.S. Coast Guard. Arctic Strategic Outlook. April 2019.
Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Annual  Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the  People’s Republic of China 2019. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2019.
Pompeo, Michael, R. Secretary of State. U. S. Department of State.  Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus. Remarks. Rovaniemi,  Finland, May 6, 2019.
Pompeo, Michael R. Secretary of State. U.S. Department of State.  Remarks. Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting. Rovaniemi, Finland, May 7,  2019.
Department of Defense. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy. Report to Congress on Department of Defense Arctic Strategy.  Washington, D.C.: June 2019.
U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System. A Ten-Year  Projection of Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region. 2020-2030:  Washington, D.C.: September 2019.
Congressional Research Service. Changes in the Arctic: Background and  Issues for Congress. Washington, D.C.: November 27, 2019.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District. Port of Nome Modification  Feasibility Study:  Draft Integrated Feasibility Report and Supplemental  Environmental Assessment. Nome, A.K.: December 2019.
Congressional Research Service. Changes in the Arctic: Background and  Issues for Congress. Washington, D.C.: January 23 2020.

Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Susan Fleming, Director; Matt  Barranca, Assistant Director; Emily Larson, Analyst in Charge; Chuck  Bausell; Geoff Hamilton; Georgeann Higgins; Ned Malone; John Mingus;  Jan Montgomery; Kaleb Mount; Fatima Sharif; Curtia Taylor; Sarah  Veale; and Laurel Voloder made key contributions to this report.