Input:
	Background

U.S. agencies implementing foreign assistance have individually and  jointly developed strategies to guide their efforts. While State’s, USAID’s,  and MCC’s strategies focus exclusively on foreign affairs or foreign  assistance, DOD’s, HHS’s, and USDA’s strategies—as well as those of  other agencies—address foreign assistance as part of larger portfolios of  programs.
State and USAID, which provide the majority of all foreign assistance,  develop joint foreign assistance-related strategies. The State-USAID  Joint Strategic Plan outlines top-level goals for State and USAID  efforts, including the use of foreign assistance, to inform strategies  developed by State and USAID bureaus, offices, and country teams.  Six joint State-USAID regional strategies (e.g., the State Bureau of  African Affairs–USAID Bureau for Africa Joint Regional Strategy)  identify regional bureau priorities that are intended to align with the  State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan and guide country-level planning for  joint integrated country strategies.
State, the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency, also develops strategies  for its functional bureaus, which implement foreign assistance  programs, and has participated in the development of a number of  multisectoral and global strategies. State’s Office of U.S. Foreign  Assistance Resources is responsible for coordinating foreign  assistance programs, including providing strategic direction for both  State and USAID. According to State documents, the Office of U.S.  Foreign Assistance Resources strengthens the integration of foreign  assistance with U.S. foreign policy priorities by guiding the  development of coordinated strategic plans for each U.S. overseas  mission at the country level (i.e., integrated country strategies), aiming  for a holistic, whole-of-government approach. It provides tools and  resources to assist bureaus, offices, and country teams in designing  foreign assistance programs, projects, and processes that can help  align with, and advance, broader strategic goals as well as monitoring  and evaluation of progress and results.
USAID, the lead U.S. foreign assistance agency, develops global,  regional, and country strategies in the areas of health, democracy and  human rights, water and sanitation, food security, education, poverty,  and the environment, among others.
MCC has developed one overall strategy document, related to its  mission of reducing poverty through country-led economic growth.  MCC also collaborates with stakeholders in and outside government  to develop and implement foreign assistance programs.
DOD performs security cooperation strategic planning,  implementation, and oversight to achieve national defense strategy  objectives. DOD also develops country-specific strategies for security  cooperation and other assistance, including humanitarian assistance  and efforts to build foreign partner security capacity.
HHS has developed, or is a party to, a number of strategies related to  global health, including strategies for specific diseases, such as  HIV/AIDS, malaria, and Ebola, and for immunization and emergency  preparedness. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  (CDC), a component of HHS, develops its own strategies, which  discuss CDC’s plans to combat infectious diseases worldwide.
USDA has contributed to jointly issued strategies in food security  related to two food aid programs that it administers—the Food for  Progress program and the McGovern-Dole International Food for  Education and Child Nutrition program.
In addition, these agencies implement foreign assistance programs under  the auspices of government-wide foreign assistance strategies developed  by the National Security Council, the Executive Office of the President,  and the Office of Management and Budget. These government-wide  strategies include, for example, the National Security Strategy and the  National Action Plan for Women, Peace, and Security.
The geographic focus of these six agencies’ foreign assistance strategies  ranges from country level to regional to global. For example, State,  USAID, and DOD have developed integrated country strategies, country  development cooperation strategies, and country cooperation plans,  respectively, applicable to the countries where they implement foreign  assistance. Similarly, State and USAID have six joint regional strategies  and DOD has strategies focusing on its various geographic areas of  command. In addition, various agencies, working both jointly and  independently, have developed a wide variety of sectoral, multisectoral,  agency-specific, and multi-agency strategies to guide global assistance  efforts.
Foreign assistance strategies are continuously developed and updated.  Some strategies emerge after the launch of a specific initiative, such as  the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), while others  are updated as part of agencies’ strategic management processes. For  example, State’s functional bureau strategies and its joint regional  strategies with USAID are periodically updated as bureau-level  components of State’s planning, budgeting, and performance  management cycle. Planning at the agency level is reflected in the State- USAID Joint Strategic Plan, updated most recently in February 2018, with  which bureau- and country-level strategies are expected to align. As we  have previously reported, strategies that consider relationships among  goals and objectives, interagency collaboration, and performance  assessment can improve federal management. In particular, these  considerations can help identify, eliminate, or better manage  fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in the federal government.

	Many Selected Foreign Assistance Strategies Addressed Key Elements We Identified That Help Promote Alignment, but Some Did Not

While many of the 52 foreign assistance strategies that we reviewed at  least partially addressed the key elements we identified related to  alignment of foreign assistance strategies, some did not address these  elements. Regarding interagency coordination, 40 percent of the  strategies generally identified roles and responsibilities for implementing  the strategies, while 33 percent generally identified interagency  coordination mechanisms; 23 percent and 38 percent, respectively, did  not address these elements. Regarding strategic integration, 58 percent  of the strategies we reviewed described linkages with U.S. foreign  assistance strategies in the same sector and 54 percent generally  described linkages with relevant higher- or lower-level U.S. foreign  assistance strategies; 21 percent and 25 percent, respectively, did not  identify such linkages. Regarding assessment of progress toward  strategic goals, almost all of the strategies generally established desired  results and a framework of goals and objectives and described activities  to achieve results; however, 21 percent did not identify milestones or  performance indicators and 21 percent did not outline plans for monitoring  and evaluation. We also found that the six agencies implementing most  U.S. foreign assistance do not have consistent guidance for strategy  development that could help ensure their strategies address the key  elements we identified.

		We Identified Nine Key Elements That Help Ensure Strategies Are Aligned and Planning Is Not Fragmented

On the basis of our prior reporting about U.S. government strategic  planning and interagency collaboration, we identified nine key elements  that are important for helping to ensure that agencies’ foreign assistance  strategies are well aligned in terms of implementation approach and  desired results and that planning among multiple agencies is not  fragmented. The nine elements we identified are associated with (1)  interagency coordination, (2) strategic integration, and (3) assessment of  progress toward strategic goals (see table 1). As we have previously  reported, fragmentation in the U.S. government refers to circumstances in  which multiple federal agencies are involved in serving the same broad  area of national need and opportunities exist to improve service delivery.

		Many Strategies We Reviewed Addressed Elements Related to Interagency Coordination, Strategic Integration, and Assessment of Progress, but Some Did Not

			Interagency Coordination

Implementing foreign aid involves the collaborative efforts of multiple U.S.  agencies, each of which brings specific contributions and statutory  authorities and has its own organizational structure, culture, and priorities.  Our prior work has shown that foreign assistance strategies that  consistently address (1) agencies’ roles and responsibilities and (2)  interagency coordination mechanisms can help guide the implementation  of various aspects of a strategy and the identification of agreed-on  processes for effective collaboration to resolve conflicts and better  manage fragmentation. Strategies that do not consistently address  elements related to interagency coordination miss opportunities to ensure  that agencies’ roles and responsibilities are clear and distinct and that  coordination mechanisms are well defined. As figure 1 shows, of the 52  strategies we reviewed, 40 percent generally identified agencies’ roles  and responsibilities and 23 percent did not address this element. In  addition, while 33 percent generally identified interagency coordination  mechanisms, 38 percent did not identify any such mechanisms.
Agencies’ roles and responsibilities. Forty percent (21 of 52) of the  strategies we reviewed generally defined agencies’ roles and  responsibilities. For example, USAID’s Strategy on Democracy, Human  Rights and Governance identified all agencies involved in its  implementation and laid out the roles and responsibilities of each agency  as well as USAID offices. Thirty-seven percent (19 of 52) of the strategies  partially defined agencies’ roles and responsibilities, which suggests the  potential for improvement in this area. For example, State-USAID joint  regional strategies identified the partners and stakeholders and  enumerated the activities that State and USAID or the embassy and  missions would undertake. However, most of those strategies did not  specify the individual agencies’ roles and responsibilities. Twenty-three  percent (12 of 52) of the strategies contained no information about  agencies’ lead, support, and partner roles.
Interagency coordination mechanisms. Thirty-three percent (17 of 52)  of the strategies we reviewed generally identified interagency  coordination mechanisms. For example, USAID’s Multi-Sector Nutrition  Strategy identified joint planning, funding, and programming mechanisms  for coordination among development and humanitarian assistance  agencies at country and regional levels in USAID and the U.S.  government as a whole. Twenty-nine percent (15 of 52) of the strategies  partially identified coordination mechanisms. For example, CDC’s Global  Health Strategy and USAID’s Global Health Strategic Framework both  described the agencies’ respective unique roles in global health but did  not specifically discuss how the agencies would work together to achieve  their goals. Thirty-eight percent (20 of 52) of the strategies did not discuss  interagency coordination mechanisms.

			Integration with Other Related Strategies

As our prior work has shown, agencies that establish strategies that align  with partner agencies’ activities, processes, and resources are better  positioned to accomplish common goals, objectives, and outcomes. Our  prior work has also determined that collaboration among federal agencies  working toward similar results can help ensure consistent goals and  mutually reinforcing program efforts that effectively manage  fragmentation. These agencies can use higher-level strategic plans as a  tool to drive interagency collaboration to ensure complementarities in  goals and objectives. To improve alignment of related strategies, each  strategy should address (1) integration with relevant sectoral strategies  and (2) integration with relevant higher- or lower-level strategies.  Strategies that do not consistently address elements related to strategic  integration do not clearly show whether objectives and activities align with  existing strategic priorities at the government-wide, sectoral, regional, and  country levels. As figure 2 shows, 58 percent of the strategies we  reviewed generally described linkages with at least one relevant sectoral  strategy, while 21 percent did not mention such linkages at all. In addition,  54 percent of the strategies generally described linkages with at least one  higher- or lower-level foreign assistance strategy, while 25 percent did not  describe any such linkages.
Integration with relevant sectoral strategies. Fifty-eight percent (30 of  52) of the strategies we reviewed generally identified or described  linkages with other, related U.S. government strategies. For example,  State’s Strategy for Women’s Economic Empowerment discussed how its  activities are designed to complement and reinforce those of the U.S.  National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, the U.S. Strategy to  Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally, and the U.S.  Global Strategy to Empower Adolescent Girls. About 21 percent (11 of  52) of the strategies we reviewed partially addressed this element. For  example, the strategy PEPFAR 3.0—Controlling the Epidemic: Delivering  on the Promise of an AIDS-Free Generation explicitly referred to the  PEPFAR Blueprint for Creating an AIDS-Free Generation and stated that  targeting interventions for populations at greatest risk for HIV incidence is  an important activity. However, the strategy did not discuss how its goals  and objectives relate to the strategies of the various agencies  implementing PEPFAR and did not refer to the other strategies pertaining  to PEPFAR. The remaining 21 percent (11 of 52) of strategies did not  mention any other relevant U.S. government strategies. (See app. II for  additional analysis of strategies by sector.)
Integration with relevant higher- or lower-level strategies. Fifty-four  percent (28 of 52) of the strategies we reviewed generally described their  relationship to relevant strategies at higher or lower levels of government.  For example, the U.S. Global Strategy to Empower Adolescent Girls  discussed its relationship to a policy framework that, according to the  strategy, is embodied in three higher-level strategies establishing gender  equality as an important element of U.S. foreign policy—the National  Security Strategy, the U.S. Global Development Policy, and the  Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. About 21 percent (11  of 52) of the strategies we reviewed partially addressed this element— that is, they discussed their relationship with higher- or lower-level  strategies in a limited way. For example, the U.S. Government Approach  on Business and Human Rights discussed priorities outlined in the  National Security Strategy, aligning activities of business with those  priorities, and noted efforts by State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human  Rights, and Labor to discuss human rights with businesses. However, the  U.S. Government Approach on Business and Human Rights did not  reference common goals or activities outlined in other relevant higher- level strategies, such as the U.S. Global Development Policy or the  Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. The remaining 25  percent (13 of 52) of strategies did not address their relationship with  strategies at other levels of government.

			Assessment of Progress toward Strategic Goals

Our prior work has shown that effective strategies clearly identify goals  and objectives and a means for assessing progress in achieving them  and that alignment of strategies and other plans can improve the  management of fragmentation. Therefore, our prior work has called for  agencies to develop strategies that identify and describe (1) desired  results, (2) activities to achieve results, (3) a hierarchy of goals and  subordinate objectives, (4) milestones and indicators, and (5) plans for  monitoring and evaluation. Strategies that do not consistently address  elements related to assessing progress may limit agencies’ ability to  specify and assess common goals and objectives and mutually  reinforcing results. As figure 3 shows, most of the strategies we reviewed  generally identified desired results, activities to achieve those results, and  a hierarchy of goals and subordinate objectives. However, fewer  strategies addressed how progress toward those goals and objectives  would be assessed. In particular, 63 percent generally identified  milestones and performance indicators, while 21 percent did not address  this element. In addition, 42 percent of the strategies generally outlined  plans for monitoring and evaluation, while 21 percent did not outline such  plans.
Desired results, activities to achieve results, and hierarchy of goals  and objectives. Ninety-two percent (48 of 52) of the strategies we  reviewed generally included a statement of desired results, and 90  percent (47 of 52) generally included a description of activities to achieve  these results. For example, MCC’s Next: A Strategy for MCC’s Future  stated the agency’s overall mission of reducing poverty through economic  growth and listed priority actions for each goal, such as exploring new  data sources for accurately identifying countries with high poverty rates.  In addition, about 83 percent (43 of 52) of the strategies generally  included a hierarchy of strategic goals and subordinate objectives. For  example, CDC’s Global Health Strategy included a clear hierarchy of  goals and subordinate objectives (see table 2). Six percent (3 of 52) of  the strategies did not identify desired results, 2 percent (1 of 52) did not  describe activities to achieve these results, and 10 percent (5 of 52) did  not include a hierarchy of goals and objectives.
Milestones and performance indicators. Sixty-three percent (33 of 52)  of the strategies we reviewed generally included milestones or  performance indicators. These strategies often incorporated milestones or  indicators as discrete components of each goal or subordinate  objective. For example, DOD’s Kenya Country Cooperation Plan  tracked discrete tasks with specific time frames, using color-coding to  designate stages of implementation. Fifteen percent (8 of 52) of the  strategies partially addressed milestones or indicators. For example, the  2016 updated joint State-USAID Strategy to Prevent and Respond to  Gender-Based Violence Globally included an annex listing indicators but  did not link them to the strategic objectives and planned actions. Twenty- one percent (11 of 52) of the strategies did not include any milestones or  performance indicators.
Monitoring and evaluation plans. Forty-two percent (22 of 52) of the  strategies we reviewed generally outlined monitoring and evaluation  plans. These strategies typically outlined such plans in a specific goal or  in a designated section or appendix. For example, USAID’s Kenya  Country Development Strategy included a section on monitoring and  evaluation planning. In this strategy, USAID committed to host donor  coordination and other stakeholder forums to monitor progress and to  establish a monitoring and evaluation “core team” to ensure that learning  is incorporated in decision making. Thirty-seven percent (19 of 52) of the  strategies partially addressed monitoring and evaluation planning. Some  of these strategies emphasized the importance of monitoring and  evaluation or made broad statements without outlining more specific  plans. For example, the State-USAID Joint Strategy on Countering  Violent Extremism noted that State and USAID will develop a results  framework for measuring progress that will be accompanied by clear,  well-developed, and well-resourced monitoring and evaluation plans. The  strategy also noted that State and USAID will, to the extent possible,  develop a common set of indicators to measure outputs and outcomes.  However, the strategy provided no additional details. Twenty-one percent  (11 of 52) of the strategies did not outline any monitoring and evaluation  plans.

		Agencies Do Not Have Consistent Guidance for Foreign Assistance Strategy Development That Addresses the Key Elements We Identified

The six agencies implementing most of U.S. foreign assistance do not  have consistent guidance for strategy development that could help ensure  their strategies address the key elements we identified. For example,  State and USAID guidance for strategy development includes many of  these elements but does not cover all strategies that these agencies are  involved in developing. Additionally, guidance for State’s and USAID’s  joint regional strategies, State’s functional bureau strategies, and  USAID’s country development cooperation strategies does not apply to  other State and USAID strategies, such as the joint State-USAID  integrated country strategies. DOD has also established guidance for  developing security assistance programs that addresses the key  elements we identified. However, DOD’s guidance does not explicitly  apply to the development of foreign assistance strategies. HHS, MCC,  and USDA have not established any guidance on foreign assistance  strategy development. Inconsistent guidance for developing foreign  assistance strategies has contributed to variations in the strategies’  addressing the key elements we identified related to interagency  coordination, strategic integration, and assessing progress toward  strategic goals.
Existing government-wide guidance requires agencies to address some  of the key elements of assessment of progress toward strategic goals that  we identified as being important for ensuring alignment of agencies’  foreign assistance strategies. In January 2018, the Office of Management  and Budget issued new guidance for agencies that administer foreign  assistance that includes some of the elements we used to assess the  strategies we reviewed. For example, the guidance recommends that  agencies ensure their programs have clear goals and objectives, align  their programs with higher-level strategies or objectives, and plan for  monitoring and evaluation while developing policies and strategies. In  addition, the Government Performance and Results Act, as amended,  requires agencies to submit strategic plans for program activities that  include general goals and objectives for the major functions and  operations of the agency, a description of how the goals are to be  achieved, and a description and schedule of program evaluations. The  act’s provisions were among the sources we used to develop the  desirable characteristics from which we derived the key elements we  identified. However, according to officials of State’s Office of U.S. Foreign  Assistance Resources, there is no government-wide guidance that  incorporates interagency coordination, strategic integration, and  assessment of progress toward strategic goals into the interagency  strategic planning process. In addition, the officials stated that there is no  overarching review mechanism for strategies outside of the core strategic  planning process for joint State-USAID strategies.
According to State officials, State’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance  Resources plays a significant role in promoting interagency coordination  by convening roundtables and working groups. By collaborating with the  five other agencies that implement most of U.S. foreign assistance to  establish guidance for developing foreign assistance strategies, the office  could help the agencies ensure that future strategies address the key  elements we identified. Consistent guidance for strategy development  could help the agencies align their strategies and better identify and  manage fragmentation in foreign assistance planning.

	Conclusions

U.S. foreign assistance often involves multiple agencies or a whole-of- government approach. Alignment of related foreign assistance strategies  can help agencies better identify and manage fragmentation. Moreover,  consistently addressing the key elements we identified related to  interagency coordination, strategic integration, and assessment of  progress toward strategic goals can help ensure that strategies provide a  clear and comprehensive picture of alignment.
Several of the six largest providers of U.S. foreign assistance in the three  sectors we reviewed have not issued consistent guidance for foreign  assistance strategy development that incorporates these key elements.  For example, some agencies have issued guidance that addresses many  of the key elements we identified related to interagency coordination,  strategic integration, and assessment of progress toward strategic goals,  but this guidance does not apply to all of these agencies’ strategies.
State’s Office of Foreign Assistance Resources leads interagency  strategic planning for the implementation of foreign assistance. This  office—which has responsibility for, and experience in, promoting  coordination among agencies involved in foreign assistance—is uniquely  placed to collaborate with other agencies implementing foreign assistance  to establish guidance for developing foreign assistance strategies that  addresses the key elements we identified. Such guidance would improve  the agencies’ ability to align future strategies and to identify and manage  fragmentation in foreign assistance planning.

	Recommendation for Executive Action

We are making the following recommendation to the Department of State:  The Secretary of State should ensure that the Director of the Office of  U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources leads an effort to establish, in  collaboration with the five other agencies that implement most of U.S.  foreign assistance, guidance for strategy development that addresses the  key elements we identified related to interagency coordination, strategic  integration, and assessment of progress toward strategic goals.  (Recommendation 1)

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, MCC, DOD, HHS, and  USDA for review and comment. We received substantive comments from  State, USAID, and MCC, which are reprinted in appendixes IV through VI,  respectively. In addition, we received technical comments from HHS,  which we incorporated as appropriate. State, USAID, MCC, USDA, and  DOD did not provide technical comments about our draft report.
In their substantive comments, State and MCC concurred with our  recommendation. USAID’s comments expressed support for our goal of  strengthening interagency coordination, strategic integration, and  assessment of progress across the federal departments and agencies  that implement U.S. foreign assistance. However, USAID suggested that  we issue our recommendation to the National Security Council or address  it jointly to State and USAID. We believe that our recommendation is  appropriately addressed to State, given the responsibility of State’s Office  of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources for coordinating foreign assistance  programs, including providing strategic direction for both State and  USAID.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Health and  Human Services, and State; the Chief Executive Officer of MCC; and the  Administrator of the USAID. In addition, the report will be available at no  charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix VII.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report examines the extent to which foreign assistance strategies  address key elements that we identified related to alignment of agencies’  efforts—specifically, elements related to (1) interagency coordination, (2)  strategic integration, and (3) assessment of progress toward strategic  goals. We focused on the six agencies that administer the largest  amounts of foreign assistance, according to fiscal year 2016 obligations  data: the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Health and  Human Services (HHS), and State (State); the Millennium Challenge  Corporation (MCC); and the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID). We limited our review to foreign assistance strategies that were  in effect during 2017. We further focused on strategies relating to health,  security, and democracy assistance, which account for the majority of  total foreign assistance obligations, according to fiscal year 2016 data.  We excluded strategies for other assistance sectors, such as  counternarcotics and other law enforcement activities that require  interagency coordination with domestically focused agencies outside the  scope of our review, such as the Departments of Homeland Security and  Justice.
To identify the strategies for this review, we asked the six agencies to  update a list of 63 government-wide, agency, multi-agency, regional,  sector-specific, and multisectoral strategies that they had provided for a  related report that we published in June 2017. We also asked the  agencies to provide country-level strategies for Afghanistan and Kenya,  two of the largest recipients of U.S. security and development assistance,  based on fiscal year 2016 obligations data. We obtained and initially  reviewed 72 strategies, which included the 63 strategies we identified for  the June 2017 report; 6 country-level strategies for Afghanistan and  Kenya; and 3 updated strategies covering national security, the  President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, and water and sanitation.  We determined that 52 of these 72 strategies incorporated goals or  activities related to health, security, or democracy assistance (see fig. 4).  These 52 strategies, which had been issued by December 2017 and were  current in that year, include 44 of those listed in our June 2017 report and  8 of those subsequently identified by the agencies.
We reviewed the 52 strategies to determine the extent to which they  addressed nine key elements we identified relating to the alignment of  multiple strategies. We identified these nine elements by reviewing prior  reports focused on foreign assistance in the security sector that assessed  the quality of various U.S. government strategies; articulated practices for  enhancing collaboration among federal agencies; or discussed  fragmentation, overlap, and duplication among government programs.  Those reports identified six desirable characteristics for government-wide  strategies and practices for enhancing agency collaboration. For the  purposes of this report, we selected three of these characteristics, related  to interagency coordination, strategic integration, and assessment of  progress toward strategic goals. We excluded three characteristics— purpose, scope, and methodology; detailed discussion of problems, risks,  and threats; and description of future costs and resources needed— because we did not consider them to be directly related to alignment of  strategies. The three characteristics we included comprised 15 elements,  9 of which we considered to be directly related to the alignment of health,  security, and democracy assistance sector strategies across multiple  agencies. We excluded 6 elements—for example, potential changes to  structure and details on subordinate strategies and plans for  implementation (e.g., enterprise architecture)—that we did not consider to  be directly related to this topic.
We reviewed the selected strategies using NVivo, a qualitative data  analysis software package. For each strategy, two reviewers, including at  least one with expertise in the area of foreign assistance addressed by  each strategy, independently identified text related to each of the key  elements we had identified. We used a standardized set of criteria in an  assessment instrument to consistently judge whether each strategy  sufficiently addressed these elements. This instrument contained  evaluative questions intended to gauge the presence of each element— for example, “To what extent does the strategy address the agencies  involved and their roles and responsibilities?”. Given the variety of  strategies we reviewed and reviewers’ varying expectations for the detail  and emphasis accorded the key elements we had identified, we rated the  strategies using a three-part scale focused on the presence of these  elements. We rated a strategy as generally addressing an element if the  strategy provided sufficient detail to understand the element in that  strategy; as partially addressing an element if the strategy mentioned it  but lacked sufficient detail; and as not addressing an element if the  strategy did not mention it. The two reviewers for each strategy  independently documented their judgments on the extent to which the  strategy addressed the key elements we had identified. Our initial coding  shows that the reviewers agreed in about 78 percent (363 of 468) of  these initial judgments. The reviewers reconciled their judgments, with  resolution of differences split roughly evenly between accepting the  higher and lower of the initial ratings. A supervisor reviewed each set of  ratings for internal consistency. The supervisor related any identified  issues, as appropriate, to the reviewers, who addressed them before the  supervisor recorded the review as final.
We examined these strategies and any appendixes included in the  documents that the agencies submitted, because these strategic  documents should broadly describe objectives and efforts—including  interagency coordination, strategic integration, and assessment of  progress toward strategic goals—needed to achieve them. We did not  review agencies’ efforts to implement the strategies and did not assess  the overall effectiveness of such efforts. Instead, we focused on the  extent to which the strategies we reviewed provided a clear picture of the  organization and management of U.S. foreign assistance efforts.
To measure the extent of strategies’ integration with other relevant  sectoral strategies and with higher- and lower-level strategies, we  performed a word search for references to the other selected strategies in  the same sector and to other strategies or sets of strategies (e.g.,  regional or country-level strategies) that we classified as either higher- or  lower-level strategies. We searched for such references in each of the 14  strategies that we classified as covering the health sector, the 12  strategies that we classified as covering the security sector, and the 8  strategies that we classified as covering the democracy assistance  sector. See appendix III for the results of this analysis.
We also reviewed agency guidance related to foreign assistance  strategies. We requested current versions of any relevant documentation  from each of the six agencies. State provided us with agency guidance for  developing its functional bureau strategies and joint State-USAID regional  strategies as well as a related template. State also provided guidance  documents related to its monitoring and evaluation policy and  performance management. USAID provided strategic planning and  implementation guidance for its country development and cooperation  strategies. HHS, USDA, and MCC did not provide—and, according to  agency officials, do not have—specific guidance related to what  constitutes a foreign assistance strategy. DOD provided guidance for  developing security assistance programs.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2017 to July 2018 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Listing of 52 Selected Foreign Assistance Strategies

The following list shows the 52 foreign assistance strategies that we  reviewed.  1.  Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Enduring  Leadership in a Dynamic World (2015)  2.  U.S. Global Development Policy (Sept. 22, 2010)  3.  State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan FY2014-2017 (Mar. 17, 2014)  4.  State Department, Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F),  Functional Bureau Strategy (2016)  5.  Millennium Challenge Corporation, NEXT: A Strategy for MCC’s  Future (Feb. 24, 2016)  6.  USAID Multi-Sectoral Nutrition Strategy 2014-2025 (May 2014)
Regional strategies (not specific to any single sector)  7.  State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs/USAID Bureau for Asia  Joint Regional Strategy (approved May 24, 2016)  8.  State Bureau of African Affairs/USAID Bureau for Africa Joint  Regional Strategy (approved Apr. 5, 2016)  9.  State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs/USAID Bureau for Middle East  Joint Regional Strategy, FY 2016-2018  10. State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs/USAID Bureau for  Europe and Eurasia Joint Regional Strategy, FY 2015-2018  (approved April 2015)  11. State Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs/USAID Bureau for Latin  America and the Caribbean Joint Regional Strategy, FY 2015-2018  12. State and USAID Joint Regional Strategy for South and Central Asia,  and Afghanistan and Pakistan, FY 2015-2018 (June 2014)  13. PEPFAR: Strategy for Accelerating HIV/AIDS Epidemic Control 2017- 2020 (September 2017)  14. 2016-2020 CDC Strategic Framework for Global Immunization (May  2016)  15. “U.S. Government Strategy for Reducing Transmission of the Ebola  Virus Disease in West Africa” (draft strategy, Sept. 30, 2015)  16. President’s Malaria Initiative Strategy 2015-2020 (April 2015)  17. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) Human  Resources for Health Strategy PEPFAR 3.0 (February 2015)  18. CDC Division of Parasitic Diseases and Malaria Strategic Priorities  19. The Global Strategy of the U.S. Department of Health and Human  Services (2015-2019)  20. State Department, Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator,  21. PEPFAR 3.0 Controlling the Epidemic: Delivering on the Promise of  an AIDS-Free Generation (December 2014)  22. HHS Strategic Plan, 2014-2018 (updated March 10, 2014)  23. HHS Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response Strategic  Plan (February 2014)  24. PEPFAR Blueprint: Creating an AIDS-Free Generation (November  2012)  25. USAID’s Global Health Strategic Framework: Better Health for  26. CDC Global Health Strategy 2012-2015 (June 29, 2012)  27. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December  2017)  28. State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal  and Abatement, Conventional Weapons Destruction Strategic Plan,  2017-2019  29. Department of Defense Guidance for Security Cooperation (Aug. 29,  2016)  30. Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent  Extremism (May 2016)  31. State Department, Arms Control, Verification and Compliance,   Functional Bureau Strategy (approved December 2015)  32. State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Plans & Initiatives,  Peace Operations Capacity Building Division, U.S. Global Peace  Operations Initiative Strategy: Strengthening the Effectiveness of  United Nations and Regional Peace Operations (October 2015)  33. National Security Strategy (February 2015)  34. State Department, Bureau of International Security and  Nonproliferation, Functional Bureau Strategy, FY 2015-2018 (January  2015)  35. State Department, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Functional  Bureau Strategy, FY 2015-2018 (January 2015)  36. State Department, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Functional Bureau  Strategy, FY 2015-2017 (January 2015)  37. National Strategy for Counterterrorism (June 2011)  38. Security Sector Reform (February 2009)  39. State Department, The Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues,  Functional Bureau Strategy (approved Mar. 27, 2017)  40. United States Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-based  Violence Globally (June 2016)  41. United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security  (June 2016)  42. U.S. Department of State Strategy for Women’s Economic  Empowerment (June 2016)  43. United States Global Strategy to Empower Adolescent Girls (March  2016)  44. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,  Functional Bureau Strategy, FY 2015-2018 (approved 2014)  45. U.S. Government Approach on Business and Human Rights (2013)  46. USAID Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance  (June 2013)
Country strategies (for Afghanistan)  47. Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in  Afghanistan. Report to Congress in Accordance With Section 1225 of  the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as Amended  (June 2017)  48. USAID Afghanistan Plan for Transition 2015-2018 (Jan. 6, 2016)  49. State/USAID Integrated Country Strategy: Afghanistan (February  2015)
Country strategies (for Kenya)  50. State/USAID Integrated Country Strategy: Kenya (approved Feb. 1,  2017)  51. DOD/USAFRICOM: Kenya Country Cooperation Plan FY 2017-2021  (Nov. 8, 2016)  52. USAID Kenya Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2014-2018  (May 2014)

Appendix III: Extent to Which Sectoral Strategies Addressed Interagency Coordination, Strategic Integration, and Assessment of Progress toward Strategic Goals

Our analysis of strategies we reviewed in the health, security, and  democracy assistance sectors found inconsistency in the extent to which  the strategies addressed selected, or key, elements that we identified  related to interagency coordination, strategic integration, and assessment  of progress toward strategic goals.

	Interagency Coordination

As figure 5 shows, about 30 percent (4 of 14) of the strategies in the  health sector and about 17 percent (2 of 12) in the security sector  generally identified interagency coordination mechanisms, while about 33  percent (4 of 12) in the security sector addressed agencies’ roles and  responsibilities. In contrast, 75 percent (6 of 8) of the strategies in the  democracy assistance sector generally addressed interagency  coordination mechanisms and 63 percent (5 of 8) addressed agencies’  roles and responsibilities.

	Strategic Integration

As figure 6 shows, in the health sector, 50 percent (7 of 14) of the  strategies generally addressed their relationship with at least one other  strategy in the same sector and about 43 percent (6 of 14) generally  addressed their relationship with at least one higher- or lower-level  strategy. In the security sector, about 58 percent (7 of 12) of the  strategies generally addressed their relationship with at least one other  strategy in the same sector and their relationship with at least one higher-  or lower-level strategy. In the democracy assistance sector, about 75  percent (6 of 8) of the strategies we reviewed generally addressed their  relationship with at least one other strategy in the same sector, while  about 63 percent (5 of 8) generally addressed their relationship with at  least one higher- or lower-level strategy.
Figures 7, 8, and 9 show the strategies in the health, security, and  democracy assistance sectors, respectively, that refer to higher- and  lower-level strategies as well as to other strategies in the same sector.

	Assessment of Progress toward Strategic Goals

As figure 10 shows, most strategies in the health, security, and  democracy assistance sectors generally identified desired results, a  hierarchy of goals and subordinate objectives, and activities to achieve  results. However, strategies in all three sectors were less consistent in  identifying milestones and performance indicators. Specifically, 57  percent (8 of 14) of health sector strategies, 50 percent (6 of 12) of  security sector strategies, and 50 percent (4 of 8) of democracy  assistance strategies generally addressed this element. In addition, while  71 percent (10 of 14) of strategies in the health sector outlined plans for  monitoring and evaluation, 17 percent (2 of 12) of security sector  strategies and 50 percent (4 of 8) of democracy assistance sector  strategies generally addressed this element.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development

Appendix VI: Comments from the Millennium Challenge Corporation

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, James Michels (Assistant  Director), Gergana Danailova-Trainor (Analyst-in-Charge), Timothy  Young, Kay Halpern, Steven Putansu, Mona Sehgal, Drew Lindsey,  Judith Williams, Leslie Holen, Ming Chen, Aniruddha Dasgupta, Mark  Dowling, Giff Howland, Neil Doherty, and Reid Lowe made key  contributions to this report.

Output:
Why GAO Did This Study

More than 20 federal agencies spend billions of dollars on U.S. foreign assistance each year. Six agencies—the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, and State; the Millennium Challenge Corporation; and the U.S. Agency for International Development—implement most of this assistance, using multiple strategies. State is responsible for coordinating their efforts. Questions have been raised about potential inefficiencies in implementing multiple foreign assistance strategies.
GAO was asked to review the alignment of U.S. foreign assistance strategies. This report examines the extent to which strategies include key elements GAO identified, related to interagency coordination, strategic integration, and assessment of progress, that help ensure alignment. These elements are based on GAO's prior work on strategic planning and interagency collaboration. GAO reviewed 52 strategies related to health, security, and democracy assistance that were current in 2017. These included government-wide, agency, multi-agency, and regional strategies as well as strategies for two countries. GAO also reviewed agency guidance and interviewed agency officials.

What GAO Found

Many foreign assistance strategies related to health, security, and democracy assistance that GAO reviewed at least partially addressed key elements GAO identified that help ensure the strategies are aligned. Prior work has found that consistently addressing these elements, related to interagency coordination, strategic integration, and assessment of progress, is important for, among other things, better managing fragmentation in strategic planning. However, some strategies did not address these elements (see figure). For example:
Interagency coordination . Twenty-three percent of the strategies (12 of 52) did not address agencies' roles and responsibilities, and 38 percent (20 of 52) did not identify specific interagency coordination mechanisms.
Strategic integration . Twenty-one percent of the strategies (11 of 52) did not address linkages with other related strategies, and 25 percent (13 of 52) did not address linkages with higher- or lower-level strategies.
Assessment of progress toward strategic goals . Twenty-one percent of the strategies (11 of 52) did not include milestones and performance indicators, and 21 percent (11 of 52) did not outline plans for monitoring and evaluation.
The six agencies implementing most U.S. foreign assistance do not have consistent guidance for strategy development that could help ensure their strategies address these key elements. Some agencies' guidance addresses many of the elements but does not apply to all of their foreign assistance strategies, while other agencies have no such guidance. The Department of State (State) plays a significant role in interagency coordination. By collaborating with other agencies to establish guidance that addresses the key elements GAO identified, State could help the agencies improve their ability to align future strategies and identify and manage fragmentation in foreign assistance planning.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that State lead an effort to establish, in collaboration with the five other agencies, guidance for developing foreign assistance strategies that addresses the key elements GAO identified related to interagency coordination, strategic integration, and assessment of progress. State concurred with GAO's recommendation.


Input:
T he unemployment insurance (UI) system has two primary objectives: (1) to provide temporary, partial wage replacement for involuntarily unemployed workers and (2) to stabilize the economy during recessions. In support of these goals, several UI programs provide benefits for eligible unemployed workers.

	Overview of Unemployment Insurance Programs

In general, when eligible workers lose their jobs, the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program may provide up to 26 weeks of income support through regular UC benefit payments. UC benefits may be extended for up to 13 weeks or 20 weeks by the Extended Benefit (EB) program if certain economic situations exist within the state. As of the date of this publication, although both the UC and EB programs are authorized, no state is in an active EB period. For an overview of EB, see the Appendix .

		Unemployment Compensation Program

The Social Security Act of 1935 (P.L. 74-271) authorizes the joint federal-state UC program to provide unemployment benefits. Most states provide up to a maximum of 26 weeks of UC benefits. Former federal workers may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) program. Former U.S. military servicemembers may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX) program. The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 ( P.L. 102-164 ) provides that ex-servicemembers be treated the same as other unemployed workers with respect to benefit levels, the waiting period for benefits, and benefit duration.
Although federal laws and regulations provide broad guidelines on UC benefit coverage, eligibility, and determination, the specifics regarding UC benefits are determined by each state. This results in essentially 53 different programs. Generally, UC eligibility is based on attaining qualified wages and employment in covered work over a 12-month period (called a base period) prior to unemployment. All states require a worker to have earned a certain amount of wages or to have worked for a certain period of time (or both) within the base period to be eligible to receive any UC benefits. The methods states use to determine eligibility vary greatly. Most state benefit formulas replace approximately half of a claimant's average weekly wage up to a weekly maximum. Additionally, each state's UC law requires individuals to have lost their jobs through no fault of their own, and recipients must be able to work, available for work, and actively seeking work. These eligibility requirements help ensure that UC benefits are directed toward workers with significant labor market experience and who are unemployed because of economic conditions.

			UC Financing

The UC program is financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under each state's State Unemployment Tax Act (SUTA). The 0.6% effective net FUTA tax paid by employers on the first $7,000 of each employee's earnings (equaling no more than $42 per worker per year) funds federal and state administrative costs, loans to insolvent state UC accounts, the federal share (50%) of EB payments, and state employment services.
SUTA taxes on employers are limited by federal law to funding regular UC benefits and the state share (50%) of EB payments. Federal law requires that the state tax be on at least the first $7,000 of each employee's earnings and that the maximum state tax rate be at least 5.4%. Federal law also requires each employer's state tax rate to be based on the amount of UC paid to former employees (known as "experience rating"). Within these broad requirements, each state has great flexibility in determining its SUTA structure. Generally, the more UC benefits paid out to its former employees, the higher the tax rate of the employer, up to a maximum established by state law. Funds from FUTA and SUTA are deposited in the appropriate accounts within the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF).

	Unemployment Insurance Benefits and the Sequester

The sequester order required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) and implemented on March 1, 2013 (after being delayed by P.L. 112-240 ), affected some but not all types of UI expenditures. Regular UC, UCX, and UCFE payments are not subject to the sequester reductions. EB and most forms of administrative funding are subject to the sequester reductions.

		FY2019 Sequester of Unemployment Insurance Benefits

The FY2019 sequestration order requires a 6.2% reduction in all nonexempt nondefense mandatory expenditures, but no sequestration reductions are applicable to discretionary programs, projects, and activities. As a result, EB expenditures are required to be reduced 6.2% (only on the federal share of EB benefits) for weeks of unemployment during FY2019. As of January 22, 2019, EB has not been activated in any state during FY2019.

	Unemployment Insurance and the Recent Partial Government Shutdown

The lapse in federal appropriations that occurred from December 22, 2018, until January 25, 2019, caused a partial government shutdown. As a result, during this lapse in appropriations, agencies without funding furloughed federal employees, and many federal employees excepted from furlough were working without pay.
Furloughed federal employees may be eligible for UCFE benefits. States are required to operate the UCFE program under the same terms and conditions that apply to regular state UC. Therefore, UCFE eligibility is determined under the laws of the state in which an individual's official duty station in federal civilian service is located. Federal employees who are in furlough status on account of a government shutdown are generally treated by state law as laid off with an expectation of recall. Depending on state laws and regulations, the state may have an option to not require federal employees to search for work given an expected recall.
However, according to guidance from U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), excepted federal employees who are performing services (but working without pay) would generally be ineligible for UCFE benefits based on states' definitions of "unemployment."
Private-sector workers who are furloughed or laid off due to the partial government shutdown because they were employed by government contractors or other businesses may be eligible for regular UC benefits. UC eligibility for these workers would be based on the requirements set out under the state laws in the state where they had worked.
In this climate, there has been congressional interest in assisting furloughed and excepted federal employees through the UI system. For example, as described below in the section on " Unemployment Compensation for Excepted Federal Employees During a Government Shutdown ," there are proposals to provide new authority to pay UCFE benefits to excepted federal workers who are working without pay.
The most recent lapse in federal appropriations began December 22, 2018, and ended on January 25, 2019, with the enactment of H.J.Res. 28 . Because retroactive pay for furloughed and excepted federal employees was authorized under S. 24 , the Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019 (enacted January 16, 2019), UCFE payments made to federal employee claimants during this lapse in appropriations may be deemed an overpayment, subject to state UC laws regarding overpayment recovery. According to guidance from the Office of Personnel Management on this issue
The state UI agency will determine whether or not an overpayment exists and, generally, the recovery of the UCFE overpayment is a matter for state action under its law; however, some state UI laws require the employer to recover such overpayment by collecting the overpayment amount from the employee. The Federal and state agencies will need to coordinate to determine the required action in accordance with the individual state UI law. Federal agencies are encouraged to develop lists or spreadsheets that can be provided to the state(s) containing the employees' names, social security numbers, and the amounts and periods of time covered by the retroactive payment.

	State UC Loans and Solvency Concerns

If a recession is deep enough and if state unemployment tax (SUTA) revenue is inadequate for long periods of time, states may have insufficient funds to pay for UC benefits. Federal law, which requires states to pay these benefits, provides a loan mechanism within the UTF framework that an insolvent state may use to meet its UC benefit payment obligations. States must pay back these loans. If the loans are not paid back quickly (depending on the timing of the beginning of the loan period), states may face interest charges, and states' employers may face increased net FUTA rates until the loans are repaid.
The U.S. Virgin Islands is the only jurisdiction with an outstanding loan. As of January 18, 2019, it had an outstanding loan of $68.4 million from the federal accounts within the UTF. At the end of 2017, fewer than half of states (24) had accrued enough funds in their accounts to meet or exceed the minimally solvent standard of an average high cost multiple (AHCM) of 1.0 in order to be prepared for a recession.

	Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments

Beginning in FY2015, DOL funded state efforts "addressing individual reemployment needs of UI claimants, and working to prevent and detect UI overpayments" through the voluntary Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessment (RESEA) program. RESEA provides funding to states to conduct in-person interviews with selected UI claimants to (1) assure that claimants are complying with the eligibility rules, (2) determine if reemployment services are needed for the claimant to secure future employment, (3) refer the individual to reemployment services as necessary, and (4) provide labor market information that addresses the claimant's specific needs. Section 30206 of P.L. 115-123 codified the authority for DOL to administer a RESEA program. It also set out various requirements for states to use certain types of evidence-based interventions for UI claimants under RESEA and allocated discretionary funding for RESEA across three categories (base funding, outcome payments, and research and technical assistance). State RESEA programs must include reasonable notice and accommodations to participating UI beneficiaries.
On April 4, 2019, DOL published a proposed methodology to allocate base RESEA funds and outcome payments. DOL requested state and public comments on this proposal by May 6, 2019.

	President's Budget Proposal for FY2020

The President's budget for FY2020 proposes changes to several aspects of the UI system. It would create a new required standard for state account balances within the UTF and a new benefit entitlement for paid parental leave financed through state unemployment taxes. The President's FY2020 budget also proposes a set of additional integrity measures, including the required use of certain databases to confirm UC eligibility and requiring Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits offset UI benefits.

		New Minimum Account Balance for State UTF Accounts

The President's budget proposal for FY2020 would require states to maintain a minimum level of solvency in their UTF account balances to be at least half (0.5) of the state's AHCM. The proposal would alter the rules for calculating the net FUTA rate, requiring a higher net FUTA rate on a state's employers if that state maintained an AHCM of less than 0.5 on January 1 of two or more consecutive years. The additional FUTA revenue would be deposited into the state UTF account and would be terminated once the state met the 0.5 AHCM criteria.

		Paid Family Leave Benefit

The President's budget proposal for FY2020 would require states to establish a paid parental leave benefit by 2020, using the UC program as its base for an administrative framework. States would be required to provide six weeks of benefits to a worker on leave or otherwise absent from work for the birth or adoption of the worker's child. States would have discretion to determine the parameters of eligibility and financing for this new paid parental leave benefit.

		UI Program Integrity

			Requirements to Use Particular Data Sources for Program Integrity

The President's 2020 budget would require states to use three specific data sources to confirm an individual's eligibility for UC benefits: the State Information Data Exchange System (SIDES, administered by Information Technology Support Center [ITSC] and DOL); the National Directory for New Hires (NDNH, administered by the Department of Health and Human Services); and the Prisoner Update Processing System (PUPS, administered by the Social Security Administration).

			Additional Integrity Proposals

The proposal would create several additional integrity measures, including
giving the Secretary of Labor the authority to implement new corrective action measures in response to poor state administrative performance within the program; allowing states to retain a percentage of UC overpayments for program integrity use; requiring states to deposit all UC penalty and interest payments into a special state fund, with these funds required to be used for improving state UI administration as well as providing reemployment services for UI claimants; and offsetting SSDI benefits to account for concurrent receipt of UI benefits.

	2018 DOL Proposed Rule on UC Drug Testing

Section 2105 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ; February 22, 2012) amended federal law to allow states to conduct two types of drug testing. First, it expanded the long-standing state option to disqualify UC applicants who were discharged from employment with their most recent employer (as defined under state law) for unlawful drug use by allowing states to drug test these applicants to determine UC benefit eligibility or disqualification. Second, it allowed states to drug test UC applicants for whom suitable work (as defined under state law) is available only in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing, to be determined under new regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor.
As required by  P.L. 112-96 , on August 1, 2016, DOL promulgated  20 C.F.R. Part 620 ,  a new rule to implement the provisions of the law relating to the drug testing of UC applicants for whom suitable work (as defined under state law) is available only in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing.
Amid concerns voiced by stakeholders about the 2016 DOL rule, Congress repealed this UC drug testing rule using the Congressional Review Act (CRA) via H.J.Res. 42 / P.L. 115-17 . On November 5, 2018, DOL published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to reissue the rule identifying occupations that regularly conduct drug testing for purposes of Section 2105 of  P.L. 112-96 . The CRA prohibits an agency from reissuing the rule in "substantially the same form" or issuing a "new rule that is substantially the same" as the disapproved rule, "unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule." Notably, this is the first time an agency has proposed to reissue a rule after the original version was disapproved under the CRA.
According to the 2018 NPRM, DOL has addressed the reissue requirements of the CRA by proposing a substantially different and more flexible approach to the statutory requirements than the 2016 Rule, enabling states to enact legislation to require drug testing for a far larger group of UC applicants than the previous rule permitted. This flexibility is intended to respect the diversity of states' economies and the different roles played by employment drug testing in those economies.
Comments on the proposed 2018 rule were required to be submitted by January 4, 2019.

	Legislative Proposals in the 116th Congress

		Unemployment Compensation for Excepted Federal Employees During a Government Shutdown

On January 16, 2019, Senator Richard Blumenthal introduced S. 165 , the Federal Unemployment Compensation Equity Act of 2019. This proposal would amend UCFE law and create a new permanent UCFE eligibility category for excepted federal employees who are unpaid but required to work during a government shutdown due to a lapse in appropriations. During any shutdown beginning on or after December 22, 2018, all excepted federal workers would be deemed eligible for UCFE benefits. Additionally, these employees would not be subject to a one-week waiting period (otherwise often required under state laws) before UCFE benefits were to be paid.
On January 23, 2019, Representative Debbie Dingell introduced H.R. 725 , the Pay Federal Workers Act. This proposal would also provide UCFE benefits in a similar manner to S. 165 , including permanently amending 5 U.S.C. Chapter 85 to provide federal authority for these benefits.
On January 23, 2019, Representative Anthony Brown introduced H.R. 720 . This proposal would deem excepted federal employees during a government shutdown to be eligible for UCFE during FY2019. The authority to provide UCFE to these excepted workers would expire at the end of FY2019.
On February 8, 2019, Representative Katie Hill introduced H.R. 1117 , the Shutdown Fairness Act of 2019. This proposal would deem excepted federal employees and unpaid military servicemembers during a government shutdown to be eligible for UCFE or UCX during FY2019. The authority to provide UCFE to these excepted workers would expire at the end of FY2019.

		Self-Employment and Relocation Assistance Benefits

On January 15, 2019, Senator Ron Wyden and Representative Danny Davis introduced S. 136 and H.R. 556 , the Economic Ladders to End Volatility and Advance Training and Employment Act of 2019 (the ELEVATE Act) . Among other provisions, this proposal would establish new self-employment and relocation assistance benefits for unemployed workers to be administered by the Social Security Administration, in consultation with DOL. The self-employment assistance benefits would provide weekly income replacement (half of prior earnings up to the maximum weekly benefit amount in the state) for up to of 26 weeks to individuals. They would be available to individuals who are (1) eligible for any type of UI benefit; or ineligible for any type of UI benefit, but became involuntarily unemployed over the previous 12 weeks; or were previously self-employed, but lost a hiring contract, and (2) have a viable business plan approved by their state department of labor, workforce board, or the Small Business Administration.
Additionally, Section 3 of S. 136 and H.R. 556 would provide up to $2,000 (or more, depending on family size) to fund to up to 90% of certain relocation expenses for eligible individuals and their families. In order to be eligible for this relocation assistance, an individual must be a (1) dislocated worker, (2) long-term unemployed individual, or (3) underemployed individual and also have filed a claim for relocation assistance and obtained suitable work with an expectation of obtaining such work in a new geographic region.

		Domestic Violence

On March 7, 2019, Representative Karen Bass introduced H.R. 1585 , the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019. Among many other provisions, Section 703 of H.R. 1585 would require states to consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits. The House passed H.R. 1585 on April 4, 2019.

		Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments

On March 14, 2019, Representative Stephanie Murphy introduced H.R. 1759 , the Building on Reemployment Improvements to Deliver Good Employment (BRIDGE) for Workers Act. This proposal would extend eligibility to any claimant of unemployment benefits, including those profiled as likely to exhaust benefits (rather than limiting eligibility to those who were profiled as likely to exhaust benefits). The House passed H.R. 1759 on April 9, 2019.

			Appendix. Extended Benefit Program

The Extended Benefit (EB) program was established by the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (EUCA; P.L. 91-373) (26 U.S.C. §3304, note). EUCA may extend receipt of unemployment benefits (extended benefits) at the state level if certain economic conditions exist within the state. As of the date of this publication, EB is not active in any state.
Extended Benefit Triggers
The EB program is triggered when a state's insured unemployment rate (IUR) or total unemployment rate (TUR) reaches certain levels. All states must pay up to 13 weeks of EB if the IUR for the previous 13 weeks is at least 5% and is 120% of the average of the rates for the same 13-week period in each of the two previous years. States may choose to enact two other optional thresholds. (States may choose one, two, or none.) If the state has chosen one or more of the EB trigger options, it would provide the following:
Option 1—up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's IUR is at least 6%, regardless of previous years' averages. Option 2—up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's TUR is at least 6.5% and is at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years; up to an additional 20 weeks of benefits if the state's TUR is at least 8% and is at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years.
EB benefits are not "grandfathered" (phased out) when a state triggers "off" the program. When a state triggers "off" of an EB period, all EB benefit payments in the state cease immediately regardless of individual entitlement.
The EB benefit amount is equal to the eligible individual's weekly regular UC benefits. Under permanent law, FUTA finances half (50%) of the EB payments and 100% of EB administrative costs. States fund the other half (50%) of EB benefit costs through their SUTA.

		Domestic Violence

On March 7, 2019, Representative Karen Bass introduced H.R. 1585 , the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019. Among many other provisions, Section 703 of H.R. 1585 would require states to consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits. The House passed H.R. 1585 on April 4, 2019.

		Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments

On March 14, 2019, Representative Stephanie Murphy introduced H.R. 1759 , the Building on Reemployment Improvements to Deliver Good Employment (BRIDGE) for Workers Act. This proposal would extend eligibility to any claimant of unemployment benefits, including those profiled as likely to exhaust benefits (rather than limiting eligibility to those who were profiled as likely to exhaust benefits). The House passed H.R. 1759 on April 9, 2019.

Output:
The 116th Congress has begun to consider several issues related to two programs in the unemployment insurance (UI) system: Unemployment Compensation (UC) and Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE). The lapse in federal appropriations that occurred from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019, created a partial government shutdown. As a result, agencies without funding furloughed many federal employees, and many federal employees excepted from furlough were working without pay during the lapse in appropriations. Furloughed federal employees may be eligible for UCFE benefits. Private-sector workers who are furloughed or laid off due to the partial government shutdown because they were employed by government contractors may be eligible for regular UC benefits. But, according to guidance from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), excepted federal employees who are performing services (without pay) would generally be ineligible for UCFE benefits based on states' definitions of "unemployment." In this climate, there has been congressional interest in assisting furloughed and excepted federal employees through the UI system.
UI legislative issues currently facing the 116th Congress include the following:
the effects of the FY2019 sequester order on UI programs and benefits, the role of UI in providing temporary income replacement during a government shutdown, state fiscal concerns related to financing UC benefits, reemployment services and eligibility assessments (RESEA), potential consideration of the UI proposals included in the President's FY2020 budget, and congressional oversight related to a proposed UC drug testing rule reissued by DOL after previously being disapproved using the Congressional Review Act.
In the 116th Congress, policymakers have introduced legislation related to UCFE benefits in response to the recent partial government shutdown (S. 165, H.R. 720, H.R. 725, and H.R. 1117), legislation to provide self-employment and relocation assistance benefits (S. 136 and H.R. 556), legislation to require that states consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits (H.R. 1585), and legislation to amend Title III of the Social Security Act to extend RESEA to all UC claimants (H.R. 1759).
For a brief overview of UC, see CRS In Focus IF10336, The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation.