Input:
	Introduction

This report provides background information and analysis on the following topics:
Various aspects of U.S.-Turkey relations, including (1) Turkey's strategic orientation; (2) U.S./NATO cooperation and how a Turkish purchase of an S-400 air defense system from Russia could endanger its acquisition of U.S.-origin F-35 aircraft; (3) the situation in northern Syria, including with Kurdish-led militias; (4) criminal cases of note since the failed 2016 coup attempt in Turkey; and (5) congressional proposals. Domestic Turkish developments, including politics under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's largely authoritarian and polarizing rule (with local elections scheduled for March 2019), and significant economic concerns.
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.

	U.S.-Turkey Relations

		Turkey's Strategic Orientation in Question

Numerous points of bilateral tension have raised questions within the United States and Turkey about the two countries' alliance. Turkish actions and statements on a number of foreign policy issues have contributed to problems with the United States and its other NATO allies, fueling concern about Turkey's commitment to NATO and Western orientation. For its part, Turkey may bristle because it feels like it is treated as a junior partner, and may seek greater foreign policy diversification through stronger relationships with more countries. In the months since the apparent October 2018 killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia's Istanbul consulate, some observers speculate that President Erdogan has sought to use information from the event to gain leverage in Turkey's dealings with the United States, and to boost Turkey's regional and global profile.
A number of considerations drive the complicated dynamics behind Turkey's international relationships. Turkey's history as both a regional power and an object of great power aggression translates into wide popularity for nationalistic political actions and discourse. This nationalistic sentiment might make some Turks wary of Turkey's partial reliance on other key countries (for example, the United States for security, European Union countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy). Moreover, Turkey's cooperative relationships with countries whose respective interests may conflict involves a balancing act. Turkey's vulnerability to threats from Syria and Iraq increases the pressure on it to manage this balance. Involvement in Syria and Iraq by the United States, Russia, and Iran further complicates Turkey's situation. Additionally, grievances that President Erdogan and his supporters espouse against seemingly marginalized domestic foes (the military and secular elite who previously dominated Turkey, the Fethullah Gulen movement, Kurdish nationalists, and liberal activists) extend to the United States and Europe due to apparent suspicions of Western sympathies for these foes.
Turkey's Middle Eastern profile expanded in the 2000s as Erdogan (while serving as prime minister) sought to build economic and political linkages—often emphasizing shared Muslim identity—with Turkey's neighbors. However, efforts to increase Turkey's influence and offer it as a "model" for other regional states appear to have been set back by a number of developments since 2011: (1) conflict and instability that engulfed the region and Turkey's own southern border, (2) Turkey's failed effort to help Muslim Brotherhood-aligned groups gain lasting power in Syria and North Africa, and (3) domestic polarization accompanied by government repression. Although Turkey shares some interests with traditional Sunni Arab powers Saudi Arabia and Egypt in countering Iran, these countries' leaders regard Turkey suspiciously because of the Turkish government's Islamist sympathies and close relationship with Qatar. Turkey maintains relations with Israel, but these have become distant and—at times—contentious during Erdogan's rule.

		U.S./NATO Cooperation with Turkey

			Overview

Turkey's location near several global hotspots makes the continuing availability of its territory for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. From Turkey's perspective, NATO's traditional value has been to mitigate its concerns about encroachment by neighbors. Turkey initially turned to the West largely as a reaction to aggressive post-World War II posturing by the Soviet Union. In addition to Incirlik air base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces command in Izmir. Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea through its straits pursuant to the Montreux Convention of 1936.
Current tensions have fueled discussion from the U.S. perspective about the advisability of continued U.S./NATO use of Turkish bases. Reports in 2018 suggested that some Trump Administration officials were contemplating significant reductions in the U.S. presence in Turkey. There are historical precedents for such changes. On a number of occasions, the United States has withdrawn military assets from Turkey or Turkey has restricted U.S. use of its territory or airspace. These include the following:
196 2— Cuban Missile Crisis . The United States withdrew its nuclear-tipped Jupiter missiles from Turkey as part of the secret deal to end this crisis with the Soviet Union. 1975— Cyprus. Turkey closed most U.S. defense and intelligence installations in Turkey during the U.S. arms embargo that Congress imposed in response to Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus. 2003— Iraq. A Turkish parliamentary vote did not allow the United States to open a second front from Turkey in the Iraq war.
Some of the plotters of an unsuccessful coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016 apparently used Incirlik air base, causing temporary disruptions of some U.S. military operations. This may have eroded some trust between the two countries, while also raising U.S. questions about Turkey's stability and the safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets. As a result of these questions and U.S.-Turkey tensions, some observers have advocated exploring alternative basing arrangements in the region.
The cost to the United States of finding a replacement for Incirlik and other sites in Turkey would likely depend on a number of variables including the functionality and location of alternatives, where future U.S. military engagements may happen, and the political and economic difficulty involved in moving or expanding U.S. military operations elsewhere. While an August 2018 report cited a Department of Defense (DOD) spokesperson as saying that the United States is not leaving Incirlik, some reports suggest that expanded or potentially expanded U.S. military presences in Greece and Jordan might be connected with concerns about Turkey.
Calculating the costs and benefits to the United States of a U.S./NATO presence in Turkey, and of potential changes in U.S./NATO posture, revolves to a significant extent around three questions:
To what extent does strengthening Turkey relative to other regional actors serve U.S. interests? To what extent does the United States rely on the use of Turkish territory or airspace to secure and protect U.S. interests? To what extent does Turkey rely on U.S./NATO support, both politically and functionally, for its security and regional influence?

			F-35 Aircraft Acquisition Endangered by Possible S-400 Acquisition from Russia

Turkey's plans to take delivery of an S-400 air defense system from Russia sometime in 2019 could hamper its acquisition of U.S.-origin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. Turkey is a member of the international consortium that has developed the F-35, and plans to purchase 100 of the aircraft. Training on the F-35 for Turkish pilots is now underway on U.S. soil, and the first aircraft is reportedly scheduled to leave the United States for Turkey sometime in 2020.

				S-400 Deal and Implications for NATO

Turkey justified its preliminary decision to acquire S-400s instead of U.S. or European alternatives by claiming that it turned to Russia because NATO allies rebuffed its attempts to purchase an air defense system from them. Turkey has also cited various practical reasons, including cost, technology sharing, and territorial defense coverage. However, one analysis from December 2017 asserted that the S-400 deal would not involve technology transfer, would not defend Turkey from ballistic missiles (because the system would not have access to NATO early-warning systems), and could weaken rather than strengthen Turkey's geopolitical position by increasing Turkish dependence on Russia.
For some observers, the S-400 issue raises the possibility that Russia could take advantage of U.S.-Turkey friction to undermine the NATO alliance. Previously, in 2013, Turkey reached a preliminary agreement to purchase a Chinese air and missile defense system, but later (in 2015) withdrew from the deal, perhaps partly due to concerns voiced within NATO, as well as China's reported reluctance to share technology.

				Possible Impact on F-35 Transaction

While U.S. officials express desires to avoid disruptions to the F-35's manufacture and rollout, they also express concern that Turkey's potential operation of the S-400 alongside the F-35 could compromise sensitive technology. According to one analysis, "the Pentagon fears that Turkey's operation of the S-400 would allow the Russian military to study how the F-35 stealth fighters [show up on] Russian-built air defense radars, and potentially facilitate the infiltration of [the F-35] computer system. This could compromise the F-35's effectiveness around the world." According to one Turkish press report, Turkey has taken a step intended to assuage U.S. concerns by insisting on an arrangement that allows Turkish technicians to operate the S-400 without Russian involvement, and Turkey may also allow U.S. officials to examine the S-400.
Congress has enacted legislation that has subjected the F-35 transfer to greater scrutiny. Under Section 1282 of the FY2019 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 115-232 ), DOD submitted a report to Congress in November 2018 on a number of issues affecting U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation, including the S-400 and F-35.
Much of the report was classified, but an unclassified summary said that the U.S. government has told Turkey that purchasing the S-400 would have "unavoidable negative consequences for U.S.-Turkey bilateral relations, as well as Turkey's role in NATO," including
potential sanctions against Turkey under Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44 ); risk to Turkish participation in the F-35 program (both aircraft acquisition and industrial workshare); risk to other potential U.S. arms transfers to Turkey, and to broader bilateral defense industrial cooperation; reduction in NATO interoperability; and introduction of "new vulnerabilities from Turkey's increased dependence on Russia for sophisticated military equipment."

				U.S. Offer of Patriot System as Alternative to S-400

In July 2018, a State Department official confirmed ongoing U.S. efforts to persuade Turkey to purchase a Patriot air defense system instead of an S-400. However, in October 2018, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar said that talks with U.S. and European air defense system suppliers had "not yielded desired results," and announced plans for Turkey to begin deploying the S-400 in October 2019. Previously, Turkish officials had indicated some concern about whether Congress would approve a Patriot sale, perhaps because of some congressional opposition for other arms sales to Turkey.
The unclassified summary of the November 2018 DOD report to Congress indicated that U.S. officials were continuing to offer a Patriot system to Turkey:
The Administration has developed an alternative package to provide Turkey with a strong, capable, NATO-interoperable air and missile defense system that meets all of Turkey's defense requirements. Parts of the package require Congressional Notification. Congressional support for Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales to Turkey is essential to provide a real alternative that would encourage Turkey to walk away from a damaging S-400 acquisition.
In December 2018, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that "the State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale [FMS] of eighty (80) Patriot MIM-104E Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM-T) missiles, sixty (60) PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $3.5 billion."
Reportedly, discussions between U.S. and Turkish officials over a Patriot sale are ongoing. Turkish officials have stated their intention to proceed with the S-400 purchase regardless of how negotiations over the Patriot sale proceed. In 2009, DSCA notified Congress of a possible FMS to Turkey of Patriot missiles and associated equipment, but the countries did not enter into a transaction for that equipment. Since 2007, Turkey has solicited a number of outside bids to sell it an air defense system, but has not finalized a transaction to date.

		Syria

			Background

Turkey's involvement in Syria's conflict since 2011 has been complicated and costly. During that time, Turkey's priorities in Syria appear to have evolved. While Turkey still officially calls for Syrian President Bashar al Asad to leave power, it has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (Asad's supporters) on some matters since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey may be seeking to protect its borders, project influence, promote commerce, and counter other actors' regional ambitions.
Turkey's chief objective has been to thwart the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) from establishing an autonomous area along Syria's northern border with Turkey. The YPG has links with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that for decades has waged an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish government while using safe havens in both Syria and Iraq. Turkey appears to view the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), as the top threat to its security, given the boost the YPG/PYD's military and political success could provide to the PKK's insurgency within Turkey. The YPG plays a leading role in the umbrella group known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which also includes Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements.
Since 2014, the SDF has been the main U.S. ground force partner against the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS/ISIL). Even though Turkey is also a part of the anti-IS coalition, U.S. operations in support of the SDF—largely based from Turkish territory—has fueled U.S.-Turkey tension because of Turkey's view of the YPG as a threat. As part of SDF operations to expel the Islamic State from the Syrian city of Raqqah in 2017, the U.S. government pursued a policy of arming the YPG directly while preventing the use of such arms against Turkey, and Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis announced an end to the direct arming of the YPG near the end of the year. Following the Raqqah operation, U.S. officials contrasted their long-standing alliance with Turkey with their current but temporary cooperation with the YPG.
After Turkey moved against IS-held territory in northern Syria as a way to prevent the YPG from consolidating its rule across much of the border area between the two countries (Operation Euphrates Shield, August 2016-March 2017), Turkey launched an offensive directly against the YPG in the Afrin province in January 2018. In Afrin and the other areas Turkey has occupied since 2016 with the help of allied Syrian opposition militias (see Figure 2 below) , Turkey has organized local councils and invested in infrastructure . Q uestions persist about how deeply Turkey will influence future governance in these areas .

			Implications of Announced U.S. Withdrawal

President Trump's announcement in December 2018 that the United States would withdraw approximately 2,000 U.S. troops stationed in Syria has major implications for Turkey and the YPG. The announcement came shortly after a call between Presidents Trump and Erdogan, during which Trump reportedly accepted Erdogan's offer to take responsibility for countering the Islamic State in Syria. U.S. officials have been cited as saying that U.S. troops will redeploy from Syria by summer 2019.
How a U.S. withdrawal would happen remains unclear, as does how Turkey and the many other actors in Syria would respond. Turkey has refused to agree to a demand from National Security Advisor John Bolton to guarantee the YPG's safety, with Erdogan insisting that Turkey should have a free hand with the YPG and other groups it considers to be terrorists. In January, amid reports that the U.S. military had begun preparing for withdrawal, President Trump tweeted that he would "devastate Turkey economically" if it hit the Kurds, and at the same time proposed the creation of a 20-mile-deep "safe zone" on the Syria side of the border. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo later said that the U.S. "twin aims" are to make sure that those who helped take down the IS caliphate have security, and to prevent terrorists from attacking Turkey out of Syria. Some sources suggest that U.S. officials favor having a Western coalition patrol any kind of buffer zone inside the Syrian border, with some U.S. support, while Turkey wants its forces and Syrian rebel partners to take that role.
Uncertainty surrounding the announced U.S. withdrawal from northeast Syria also applies to how Turkish forces might operate there. One analyst calculates that additional Turkish military intervention might focus on areas, such as Tal Abyad (aka Tell Abiad), that are less historically Kurdish than others, in an effort to reduce the YPG's control over territorially contiguous regions. Some observers express doubts that Turkish-supported militias would be able to counter the Islamic State as effectively as the YPG-led SDF, and one journalist has stated concerns about what could happen to the IS foreign fighters held by the SDF if Turkey clashes with the YPG. Turkish officials have requested U.S. air and logistical support for their potential operations, despite the two countries' different stances on the YPG. In a New York Times column in January, President Erdogan envisioned that if Turkish-backed forces gain control of predominantly Kurdish areas in Syria currently under YPG rule, these regions would be run by popularly elected local councils advised by Turkish officials. Various analyses surmise that a U.S. troop withdrawal would lead the YPG toward an accommodation with Russia and the Syrian government. A reference by Russian President Vladimir Putin to the 1998 Adana Protocol between Turkey and Syria suggests that Russia may seek to limit direct Turkish involvement in Syria under the premise that Syria's government would take greater responsibility for constraining YPG actions.
How U.S.-Turkey coordination plays out in northeastern Syria could influence Turkey's presence in western Syria, particularly in key contested areas like the town of Manbij and Idlib province. Russia and the Syrian government have sent forces near Manbij, possibly as a check on Turkish personnel there who are intent on eradicating YPG influence from the town. In Idlib, Turkey-backed forces stationed at points around the province appear to have failed to prevent territorial gains by Al Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) jihadists who also oppose the Syrian government. The HTS gains in Idlib may lead to a Russian-backed Syrian military operation there with the potential for new refugee flows to Turkey.

		Various Criminal Cases After 2016 Coup Attempt

A number of cases involving criminal allegations or detentions have generated controversy between the United States and Turkey since the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. Shortly after the attempt, Turkey's government called for the extradition of Fethullah Gulen (the U.S.-based former cleric whom Turkey's government has accused of involvement in the plot), and the matter remains pending before U.S. officials. Since the coup attempt, sharp criticism of U.S. actions related to Gulen's case has significantly increased in Turkish media. Additionally, Turkey's government has dismissed around 130,000 Turks from government posts, detained more than 60,000, and taken over or closed various businesses, schools, and media outlets. The government's measures appear to have targeted many who are not connected with Gulen.
As part of Turkish authorities' postcoup crackdown, they detained Pastor Andrew Brunson (who was released, after a two-year imprisonment, in October 2018) and a number of other U.S. citizens (most of them dual U.S.-Turkish citizens), along with Turkish employees of the U.S. government. Reports suggest that Congress and the State Department are trying to obtain the release of those currently detained, though the Administration lifted sanctions on senior Turkish officials following Pastor Brunson's release.
Separately, two prominent Turkish citizens with government ties were arrested by U.S. authorities in 2016 and 2017 for conspiring to evade sanctions on Iran. One, Reza Zarrab, received immunity for cooperating with prosecutors, while the other, Mehmet Hakan Atilla, was convicted and sentenced in May 2018 to 32 months in prison. The case was repeatedly denounced by Turkish leaders, who reportedly expressed concern about the potential implications for Turkey's economy if the case led U.S. officials to impose penalties on Turkish banks. This has not yet happened.

		Congressional Proposals

Bilateral tensions contributed to various legislative proposals by Members of Congress during the 115 th Congress. The most significant congressional action against Turkey to date has been an arms embargo that Congress enacted in response to Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. That embargo lasted from 1975 to 1978.
In the 116 th Congress, the House-passed Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( H.R. 648 ) contains foreign aid provisions that also have been introduced in the Senate Appropriations Committee. Section 7046(d) of H.R. 648 includes the following proposals regarding Turkey:
Requiring DOD to update its FY2019 NDAA report to Congress on Turkey's possible S-400 acquisition. The update, including a detailed description of plans to impose sanctions under CAATSA, is required by November 1, 2019. Until the report is submitted, funding cannot be used to transfer F-35 aircraft to Turkey. Restricting transfer of arms to Turkish P residential Protection Directorate (TPPD) . This restriction, which is subject to a few exceptions, would apply unless the State Department reports to Congress that members of the TPPD who were involved in a violent incident against protestors during a May 2017 Washington, DC, trip by President Erdogan have been "brought to justice."
H.R. 648 is less stringent than an earlier FY2019 appropriations bill ( S. 3108 ) from the 115 th Congress that would have prohibited transferring F-35s to Turkey if it purchased the S-400, and would have denied entry to senior Turkish officials involved in detaining U.S. citizens.

	Domestic Turkish Developments

		Political Developments Under Erdogan's Rule

President Erdogan has ruled Turkey since becoming prime minister in 2003. After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey's first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a "presidential system" of governance. Analyses of Erdogan sometimes characterize him as one or more of the following: a pragmatic populist, a protector of the vulnerable, a budding authoritarian, an indispensable figure, and an Islamic ideologue.
Erdogan's consolidation of power has continued amid domestic and international concerns about growing authoritarianism in Turkey. He outlasted the July 2016 coup attempt, and then scored victories in the April 2017 constitutional referendum and the June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections—emerging with the expanded powers he had sought. Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced in both elections. U.S. and European Union officials have expressed a number of concerns about rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey, including the government's influence on media and Turkey's reported status as the country with the most journalists in prison.
While there may be some similarities between Turkey under Erdogan and countries like Russia, Iran, or China, some factors distinguish Turkey from them. For example, unlike Russia or Iran, Turkey's economy cannot rely on significant rents from natural resources if foreign sources of revenue or investment dry up. Unlike Russia and China, Turkey does not have nuclear weapons under its command and control. Additionally, unlike all three others, Turkey's economic, political, and national security institutions and traditions have been closely connected with those of the West for decades.
Erdogan is a polarizing figure, with about half the country supporting his rule, and half the country against it. To obtain a parliamentary majority in the June 2018 elections, Erdogan's Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party ( Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi , or AKP) relied on a coalition with the Nationalist Action Party ( Milliyet Halk Partisi , or MHP). The MHP is the country's traditional Turkish nationalist party, and is known for opposing political accommodation with the Kurds. Local elections scheduled for March 2019 could be a significant barometer of domestic support for Erdogan under the difficult economic circumstances described below.

		Economic Concerns

The Turkish economy appears to be slowing down, with negative consequences both for consumer demand and for companies seeking or repaying loans in global markets. Economic growth was down from over 7% in 2017 to around 3% in 2018, with forecasts for 2019 at or below 1%. By the end of 2018, inflation had essentially doubled year-on-year to more than 20%. During 2018, the Turkish lira depreciated close to 30% against the dollar in an environment featuring a globally stronger dollar, rule of law concerns and political uncertainty, and significant corporate debt. In August 2018, amid U.S.-Turkey tensions on the Pastor Brunson matter, President Trump announced a doubling of tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum imports. This prompted retaliatory action from Turkey. The lira plunged in value, but recovered somewhat in the final months of 2018 after Turkey's central bank raised its key interest rate by 6.25% in September. In November 2018, the United States granted Turkey (along with seven other countries) a six-month exception from U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil.
Some observers speculate that Turkey may need to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a financial assistance package. This would be a sensitive challenge for President Erdogan because his political success story is closely connected with helping Turkey become independent from its most recent IMF intervention in the early 2000s. Before the central bank's rate hike in September 2018, some commentators voiced concerns about the bank's independence as Erdogan publicly opposed increasing rates. In January 2019, Turkey's parliament voted to grant Erdogan broader emergency powers in case of a financial crisis.
The government appears to be trying to stimulate growth via familiar measures to boost consumer demand. A former Turkish economic official has claimed that by offloading the "debt crisis of the real sector" onto the banking sector, the government has exacerbated the crisis. In his opinion, a "harsh belt-tightening policy" with or without the IMF is thus inevitable after the March 2018 local elections.

Output:
The United States and Turkey have been NATO allies since 1952 and share some vital interests, but harmonizing their priorities can be difficult. These priorities sometimes diverge irrespective of who leads the two countries, based on contrasting geography, threat perceptions, and regional roles.
Turkey's core security and economic relationships and institutional links remain with Western nations, as reflected by some key U.S. military assets based in Turkey and Turkey's strong trade ties with the European Union. However, various factors complicate U.S.-Turkey relations. For example, Turkey relies to some degree on nations such as Russia and Iran for domestic energy needs and coordination on regional security, and therefore balances diplomatically between various actors. Additionally, Turkey's president and longtime leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears to be concerned that the United States and some other Western countries harbor sympathies for some of the groups that have been marginalized domestically under Erdogan. Also, Turkey has played a larger role in the Middle East since the 2000s, but has faced a number of setbacks and has problematic relations with Israel and most Sunni Arab countries other than Qatar.
Bilateral relations between the Trump Administration and the Erdogan government have been difficult, but have improved somewhat since October 2018, when a Turkish court allowed Pastor Andrew Brunson to return to the United States after a two-year imprisonment. The following are current points of tension in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.
F-35 aircraft acquisition endangered by possible S-400 acquisition from Russia. Turkey's planned purchase of an S-400 air defense system from Russia could trigger U.S. sanctions under existing law and decrease Turkey's chances of acquiring U.S.-origin F-35 aircraft. The possible S-400 transaction has sparked broader concern over Turkey's relationship with Russia and implications for NATO. U.S. officials seek to prevent the deal by offering Patriot air defense systems as an alternative to the S-400.
Syria and the Kurds. Turkey's political stances and military operations in Syria have fed U.S.-Turkey tensions, particularly regarding Kurdish-led militias supported by the United States against the Islamic State over Turkey's strong objections. President Trump's announcement in December 2018 that U.S. troops would withdraw from Syria came after a call with President Erdogan in which Erdogan accepted responsibility for countering the Islamic State in Syria. Efforts to coordinate U.S. and Turkish actions related to a U.S. withdrawal have triggered debate about the possible consequences of Turkish intervention in northeast Syria, especially for those Kurdish-led militias, which have links with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). The PKK is a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that originated in Turkey and wages an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish government while using safe havens in both Syria and Iraq.
Congressional initiatives. Within the tense bilateral context, the 115th Congress required the Trump Administration—in the FY2019 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232)—to report on the status of U.S.-Turkey relations, with particular emphasis on the possible S-400 deal and its implications. The Department of Defense (DOD) submitted a mostly classified report to Congress in November 2018. Appropriations legislation proposed for FY2019 in the 116th Congress (H.R. 648) would require an update to the DOD report.
Turkey's domestic trajectory and financial distress. President Erdogan rules in an increasingly authoritarian manner, with his power further consolidated in June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. A number of developments (a globally stronger dollar, rule of law concerns and political uncertainty, significant corporate debt) led to a precipitous drop in the value of Turkey's currency during 2018. A major September 2018 interest rate hike by Turkey's central bank helped reverse some of the currency's downward slide, but concerns remain about Turkey's financial position and the possible consequences that higher interest rates might have for economic growth. Local elections are scheduled for March 2018 against the backdrop of these economic concerns.
The next steps in relations between the United States and Turkey will take place with Turkey facing a number of political and economic challenges. Given Erdogan's consolidation of power, observers now question how he will govern a polarized electorate and deal with the foreign actors who can affect Turkey's financial solvency, regional security, and political influence. U.S. officials and lawmakers can refer to Turkey's complex history, geography, domestic dynamics, and international relationships in evaluating how to encourage Turkey to align its policies with U.S. interests.


Input:
	Background

Over the past decade, the federal government has expanded financial  assistance to public and private stakeholders for preparedness activities  through various grant programs administered by DHS through its  component agency, FEMA. Through these grant programs, DHS has  sought to enhance the capacity of states, localities, and other entities,  such as ports or transit agencies, to prevent, respond to, and recover  from a natural or manmade disaster, including terrorist incidents. Two of  the largest preparedness grant programs are the State Homeland  Security Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative.
The State Homeland Security Program provides funding to support  states’ implementation of homeland security strategies to address the  identified planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise  needs at the state and local levels to prevent, protect against, respond  to, and recover from acts of terrorism and other catastrophic events.  FEMA allocated $402 million for the program in fiscal year 2017.
The Urban Areas Security Initiative provides federal assistance to  address the unique needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas,  and assists the areas in building an enhanced and sustainable  capacity to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from acts of  terrorism. FEMA allocated $580 million for the program in fiscal year  2017.
The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), awarded to the nation’s  56 states and territories, and the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI),  awarded to urban areas based on DHS’s risk assessment methodology,  are the largest of the preparedness grant programs, accounting for about  60 percent of Fiscal Year 2017 grant funding. See figure 1 for a history of  funding levels for these programs. Eligible candidates for the FY 2017  UASI program are determined through an assessment of relative risk of  terrorism faced by the 100 most populous metropolitan statistical areas in  the United States, in accordance with the Homeland Security Act of 2002,  as amended.

	FEMA Has Strengthened Its Coordination, Oversight, and Assessments of Grants But Challenges Remain in the Effectiveness of FEMA’s Grant Management

		FEMA Has Taken Some Steps to Address Coordination Challenges Between Headquarters and Regional Offices, But Some Challenges Still Remain

In February 2016, we reported that FEMA has taken some steps, but has  not fully addressed longstanding preparedness grant management  coordination challenges between its headquarters and regional offices.  We found that for several preparedness grant programs, FEMA  headquarters staff in GPD and regional staff share management and  monitoring responsibilities. For example, we found that assessments by  GPD and others since 2009 had recommended that regional offices,  rather than headquarters offices, be responsible for managing and  monitoring preparedness grants to avoid confusion and duplication, and  to strengthen coordination with state and local grantees. Further, in July  2011, we found that GPD had efforts underway to regionalize grant  management responsibilities and improve coordination of preparedness  grants, and that these efforts were consistent with internal control  standards. However, GPD officials reported that in 2012 it changed course and decided to continue sharing grant management roles between  headquarters and regions, referred to as a hybrid grant management  structure. GPD officials told us that they changed course because, among  other things, estimates that the costs of regionalization would be greater  than the annual savings FEMA identified in an earlier study and concerns  that inconsistent program implementation would occur across the regions,  and outweighed the potential benefits. GPD officials at that time said they  had taken steps to address coordination challenges associated with this  hybrid grant management structure.
However, we found in February 2016 that these challenges continue. For  example, states and FEMA regional officials told us that GPD staffs in  headquarters and regions did not always coordinate their monitoring  visits, which can be disruptive to the state emergency management  agency’s day-to-day operations. FEMA regional officials also reported  that GPD staffs in headquarters and regions sometimes provided  inconsistent guidance to grantees. Further, while GPD officials identified  some steps they plan to take to address the challenges, we found that  GPD lacked a plan with time frames and goals for addressing them. We  recommended that FEMA develop a plan with time frames, goals,  metrics, and milestones detailing how GPD intends to resolve  longstanding challenges associated with its existing hybrid grants  management model, which divides responsibilities between regional and  headquarters staff. FEMA, however, did not concur with our  recommendation, stating that it disagreed with our characterization of  longstanding challenges in managing preparedness grants. As we stated  in the report, multiple assessments dating back to 2009 have reported  challenges with the hybrid model. As also noted in our report, officials  from four FEMA regional offices and officials from three states within  those regions provided various examples of a lack of coordination  between headquarters and regional staff in managing preparedness  grants, including instances that took place in 2014 and as recently as  September 2015.
In October 2017, FEMA developed a plan—the Milestone Action Plan—to  track efforts aimed at improving coordination issues associated with its  hybrid grants management model, as we recommended in February  2016. The plan divides responsibilities for the management of  preparedness grants between regional and headquarters staff and  describes completed, ongoing, and planned efforts taken by FEMA to  improve grants management coordination along with steps taken, goals,  and time frames, among other things. For example, the plan shows that  FEMA developed and finalized the Monitoring Actions Tracker in August  2016, a tool shared by GPD in FEMA headquarters and staff in regional  offices. Through the tracker, GPD headquarters and regional staffs are  able to view planned and completed monitoring activities related to grants  management, as well as the status of any open corrective actions. In  addition to developing the Milestone Action Plan, FEMA officials  described other efforts taken to improve coordination issues. For  example, FEMA officials told us they increased the use of an online  collaboration tool, which allows for instant information sharing between  GPD and the regions. By taking these steps, FEMA should be better  positioned to track and evaluate efforts to improve regional coordination,  as we recommended in 2016.

		FEMA Has Taken Steps to Increase Oversight Across Preparedness Grant Programs

FEMA has been delayed in addressing the need for improved  coordination among grant programs identified in our prior work.  Specifically, we found in February 2012 that multiple factors contribute to  the risk of duplication among four FEMA preparedness grant programs— the State Homeland Security Program, Urban Areas Security Initiative,  Port Security Grant Program, and Transit Security Grant Program—as  these programs share similar goals, fund similar projects, and provide  funds in the same geographic regions. Further, we found that DHS’s  ability to track grant funding, specific funding recipients, and funding  purposes varies among the programs, giving FEMA less visibility over  some grant programs. Also, DHS’s award process for some programs  based allocation decisions on high-level, rather than specific, project  information, which could further contribute to the risk of duplication.  Although our February 2012 analysis identified no cases of duplication  among a sample of grant projects, the above factors collectively put  FEMA at risk of funding duplicative projects. As a result, in 2012, we  included these challenges in our annual report on duplication, overlap,  and fragmentation in federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives.  FEMA has not yet taken action to fully address our concerns.
We recommended in February 2012 that as FEMA developed its new  grants management information system (the Non-Disaster Grants  Management System, or ND Grants at that time), that the agency collect  project information with the level of detail needed to better position the  agency to identify any potential unnecessary duplication within and  across the four grant programs. In December 2012, FEMA officials  reported that the agency intended to start collecting and analyzing  project-level data from grantees in fiscal year 2014. Further, in December  2017, FEMA took actions to identify potential unnecessary duplication  across four preparedness grant programs, as we recommended in  February 2012. Although the development of FEMA’s grants  management information system is ongoing, FEMA issued guidance and  adopted interim processes to help identify potential duplication across  these preparedness grant programs until the system’s capabilities are  upgraded over the next several years. For example, in fiscal year 2014,  FEMA modified a legacy grants data system to capture more robust  project-level data—such as project budget data—for the Homeland  Security Grant Program, which includes the State Homeland Security  Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative.
In addition, in fiscal year 2017, FEMA procured a software visualization  tool and developed a set of standard operating procedures to assist staff  in identifying potentially duplicative projects. Specifically, the visualization  tool will use grants award data from the Port Security Grant Program, the  Transit Security Grant Program, and compare the grant programs named  above to highlight ZIP codes that contain multiple projects. These projects  will then be analyzed by FEMA officials. According to the standard  operating procedure, if duplication is suspected within a particular  geographic area, further collaborative reviews should be conducted in  coordination with the Office of Chief Counsel to determine appropriate  remedies. Using an interim approach to collect more specific project-level  data during the grant application process and utilizing the new software  visualization tool should help FEMA strengthen the administration and  oversight of its grant programs until FEMA implements its long-term  solution for the agency’s grants management information system.

		FEMA Is Validating Grant Performance Data,

In the area of performance assessment, we reported in June 2013 on  limitations in FEMA’s ability to validate the performance data it collects.  Specifically, we found that two of FEMA’s preparedness grant  programs—Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) and  Assistance to Firefighters Grants (AFG) programs—collect performance  information through a variety of reporting mechanisms but face  challenges in identifying verifiable program outcomes. These reporting  mechanisms collect performance data used by FEMA regional offices and  headquarters for different purposes. For example, headquarters focuses  on the development of future program priorities and on reporting progress  toward the National Preparedness Goal, while regions use program  information to monitor primary grant recipients for compliance. DHS  developed agency priority goals that reflect agency-wide, near-term  priorities. According to FEMA officials, the EMPG and AFG programs  have an indirect link to a DHS agency priority goal, as well as the National  Preparedness Goal, because they support states’ level of preparedness  for disasters. According to FEMA officials, neither program has a  standardized tool with which to validate the performance data that are  self-reported by recipients; additionally, the regions are inconsistent in  their approaches to verifying program performance data. We concluded  that the absence of a formal established validation and verification  procedure, as directed by the Office of Management and Budget’s  Circular No. A-11, could lead to the collection of erroneous performance  data.
In our June 2013 report, we recommended that FEMA ensure that there  are consistent procedures in place at the headquarters’ office and  regional level to ensure verification and validation of grant performance  data that allow the agency to attest to the reliability of EMPG and AFG  grant data used for reporting progress toward goals. DHS concurred with  our recommendation and stated that FEMA would explore effective and  affordable ways to verify and validate EMPG and AFG grant performance  data. In April 2015, FEMA officials reported that FEMA was in the process  of developing the data verification and validation checks of EMPG  grantee performance reporting. For example, according to FEMA officials,  they have revised reporting templates and uniform table definitions to  make it easier for grantees to submit accurate, complete, and consistent  information on programmatic activities such as the completion of training  and exercise requirements. However, these processes have not yet been  fully implemented, and FEMA officials have not yet provided similar tools  and checklists for the AFG program. In March 2017, FEMA grants  management staff provided us with documentation on the process FEMA  uses to verify and validate grantee data from the EMPG and AFG grant  programs, as we recommended. As a result of having a consistent  approach to verifying data, FEMA’s efforts should reduce the collection of  erroneous performance data.
In addition, as part of our September 2016 review of FEMA Fire  Assistance Grant program, we reported that FEMA officials said they  planned to develop and implement a consolidated grant management  system to integrate data used to manage fire grant programs with the  data gathered for FEMA’s other preparedness grants, and ultimately  better measure the impact of fire grants on national preparedness  efforts. Specifically, as we reported in May 2016, FEMA plans to develop  and implement a new Grants Management Modernization system to  provide agency-wide management for all of FEMA’s disaster and  preparedness grants. Further, we are currently performing an on-going  review of FEMA’s consolidated grant management system and plan to  report on this effort later this year.

		FEMA Has Made Progress Assessing Its Grant Preparedness Capabilities, but Continues to Face Challenges Developing a National Preparedness System

We also reported in March 2011 that FEMA needed to improve its  oversight of preparedness grants by establishing a framework with  measurable performance objectives for assessing urban area, state,  territory, and tribal capabilities to identify gaps and prioritize investments.  Specifically, we recommended that FEMA complete a national  preparedness assessment of capability gaps at each level based on  tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to enable prioritization of  grant funding. With such an assessment, FEMA could identify the  potential costs for establishing and maintaining capabilities at each level  and determine what capabilities federal agencies should provide. We  reported in March 2013 that FEMA has made some progress in assessing  its preparedness capabilities, but continued to face challenges developing  a national preparedness system that could assist FEMA in prioritizing  preparedness grant funding. For example, in March 2012, FEMA issued  the first National Preparedness Report, which describes progress made  to build, sustain, and deliver capabilities. In April 2012, FEMA issued  guidance on developing Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk  Assessments (THIRA) to facilitate the self-assessments of regional, state,  and local capabilities. FEMA requires state, territory, tribal, and urban  area governments receiving homeland security funding to annually  complete THIRAs and use the results to determine the resources required  to achieve the capability targets they set for their jurisdiction. However,  we found in March 2013 that FEMA faced challenges that may reduce the  usefulness of these efforts. For example, the National Preparedness  Report noted that while many programs exist to build and sustain  preparedness capabilities, challenges remain in measuring their progress  over time. According to the report, in many cases, measures do not yet  exist to gauge the performance of these programs, either quantitatively or  qualitatively.
FEMA has taken some steps to address our recommendation.  Specifically, FEMA reported in February 2018 that the agency has  developed capability-specific performance objectives that will enable a  national preparedness assessment of capability gaps, but no such report  has been issued at this time. FEMA reported that it plans on  implementing new methodology for some core capabilities in December  2018 and for all core capabilities by December 2019, and will be able to  provide complete results in 2020. In addition, FEMA reported that they  are developing a new Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk  Assessment (THIRA) methodology that will assist in measuring the  effectiveness of state and urban areas’ grant projects in reducing risk.  According to FEMA, the new methodology will measure changes in state  and urban area preparedness through the use of standardized capability  targets and key indicators that will show how FEMA preparedness grants  are being used to address gaps in capability targets. This should also  lead to a better understanding of the Nation’s overall preparedness.  Regardless, as of February 2018, FEMA had taken steps to assess  preparedness capabilities, but had not yet completed a national  preparedness assessment with clear, objective, and quantifiable  capability requirements against which to assess preparedness, as we  recommended. Developing such an assessment would help FEMA to  identify what capability gaps exist at the federal level and what level of  resources are needed to close such gaps.
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy  to respond to any questions you may have.

	GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

For questions about this statement, please contact Chris Currie at (404)  679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  include Aditi Archer (Assistant Director), John Vocino (Analyst-In- Charge), Dorian Dunbar, Alexandra Gebhard, Eric Hauswirth, Chuck  Bausell, Heidi Nielson, and Adam Vogt.

Related GAO Products

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Progress and Continuing  Challenges in National Preparedness Efforts GAO-16-560T: Washington,  D.C.: Apr 12, 2016.
Fire Grants: FEMA Could Enhance Program Administration and  Performance Assessment GAO-16-744: Washington, D.C.: Sep 15, 2016.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Strengthening Regional  Coordination Could Enhance Preparedness Efforts. GAO-16-38,  .Washington, D.C.: February 4, 2016.
Emergency Management: FEMA Has Made Progress since Hurricanes  Katrina and Sandy, but Challenges Remain. GAO-16-90T. Washington,  D.C.: October 22, 2015.
Emergency Management: FEMA Collaborates Effectively with Logistics  Partners but Could Strengthen Implementation of Its Capabilities  Assessment Tool. GAO-15-781. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2015.
Emergency Preparedness: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Interagency  Assessments and Accountability for Closing Capability Gaps. GAO-15-20.  . Washington, D.C.: December 4, 2014.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Opportunities to Achieve  Efficiencies and Strengthen Operations. GAO-14-687T. Washington,  D.C.: July 24, 2014.
National Preparedness: Actions Taken by FEMA to Implement Select  Provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of  2006. GAO-14-99R. Washington, D.C.: November 26, 2013.
National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Additional Steps  Are Needed to Improve Grant Management and Assess Capabilities.  GAO-13-637T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2013.
Grants Performance: Justice and FEMA Collect Performance Data for  Selected Grants, but Action Needed to Validate FEMA Performance Data.  GAO-13-552. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2013.
Managing Preparedness Grants and Assessing National Capabilities:  Continuing Challenges Impede FEMA’s Progress. GAO-12-526T.  Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2012.
Homeland Security: DHS Needs Better Project Information and  Coordination among Four Overlapping Grant Programs. GAO-12-303.  Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.  2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and  Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue.  GAO-12- 342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.
Port Security Grant Program: Risk Model, Grant Management, and  Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-12-47.
Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011. FEMA Has Made Progress in  Managing Regionalization of Preparedness Grants. GAO-11-732R.  Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2011.
Measuring Disaster Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in  Assessing National Capabilities. GAO-11-260T. Washington, D.C.: March  17, 2011.
Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs,  Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-11-318SP. Washington,  D.C.: March 1, 2011.
FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Efforts to Develop and Implement a  System to Assess National Preparedness Capabilities. GAO-11-51R.  Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2010.
Urban Area Security Initiative: FEMA Lacks Measures to Assess How  Regional Collaboration Efforts Build Preparedness Capabilities.   GAO-09-651. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2009.
Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants Based on Risk,  but Its Risk Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant Oversight  Can Be Strengthened. GAO-09-491. Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2009.
National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to  Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts.  GAO-09-369. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009.
Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’  Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs’ Impact  on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge. GAO-08-488T.  Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.
Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All-  Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington,  D.C.: July 11, 2005.
Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs  Has Improved, but Challenges Remain. GAO-05-121. Washington, D.C.:  February 2, 2005.
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Output:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through FEMA, provides preparedness grants to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to improve the nation's readiness in preventing, protecting against, responding to, recovering from and mitigating terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies.
According to DHS, the department has awarded over $49 billion to a variety of DHS preparedness grant programs from fiscal years 2002 through 2017, to enhance the capabilities of grant recipients. For example, the State Homeland Security Program which awards grants to the nation's 56 states and territories, and the Urban Areas Security Initiative which awards grants to urban areas based on DHS's risk methodology, are the largest of the preparedness grant programs (see figure).
This statement addresses progress and challenges in FEMA's efforts to manage preparedness grants and GAO's prior recommendations to strengthen these programs. This statement is based on prior GAO reports issued from March 2011 through February 2016 and selected updates conducted in December 2017 through April 2018. To conduct the prior work and updates, GAO analyzed relevant FEMA data and documentation and interviewed relevant officials.

What GAO Found

In February 2012, GAO identified coordination challenges among Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant programs that share similar goals and fund similar projects, which contribute to the risk of duplication among the programs. GAO recommended that FEMA take steps, as it develops its new grant management system, to collect project information with sufficient detail to identify potential duplication among the grant programs. FEMA has since addressed these recommendations. Specifically, in 2014, FEMA modified a legacy grants data system to capture more robust grant project-level data, and in fiscal year 2017, procured a software tool and developed a set of standard operating procedures to assist its staff in identifying potentially duplicative projects. These actions should help FEMA strengthen the administration and oversight of its grant programs. Furthermore, FEMA is also developing a new grants management modernization system to consolidate and better manage its grants. GAO is currently reviewing the system for this Committee and will report out next year.
GAO reported in March 2011 on the need for FEMA to improve its oversight of preparedness grants by establishing a framework with measurable performance objectives for assessing urban area, state, territory, and tribal capabilities to identify gaps and prioritize investments. Specifically, GAO recommended that FEMA complete a national preparedness assessment of capability gaps at each level based on tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to enable prioritization of grant funding. FEMA has taken some steps to address GAO's prior recommendation. Specifically, in February 2018, FEMA reported developing capability-specific performance objectives that will enable a national preparedness assessment of capability gaps. However, FEMA plans to finalize these efforts in 2020 and it is too early to tell how this will impact grant allocations. Until these efforts are completed, GAO will not be able to determine the extent that they address past challenges and recommendations.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made prior recommendations designed to address the challenges discussed in this statement. FEMA has taken actions to address some but not all of these recommendations.