Input:
	Background

		Training Is Important for Effective Grants Management

In fiscal year 2017, the federal government awarded approximately $675  billion in grants to state and local governments. As shown in figure 1,  approximately 80 percent of the grant dollars awarded by the federal  government in fiscal year 2017 came from the three agencies we  reviewed for this report—HHS, USDA, and Education.
A range of skills are needed to manage the various tasks associated with  the grants lifecycle. For example, during the award phase, grant staff at  federal grant-making agencies are to send all grantees a grant award  notification that provides details about the grant, including the amount of  the award; and the general terms and conditions of the grant, including  statutory and regulatory requirements. Figure 2 below illustrates the four  distinct phases of the grants lifecycle.
Given the billions of dollars in federal grants funding that are awarded  every year, effective training could help provide grants managers with the  skills and competencies they need to better manage and oversee those  dollars. As one example of the importance of rigorous grants  management and training, in April 2017 we found that Education grants  staff inconsistently documented key required monitoring activities and, as  a result, about $21 million in discretionary grants lacked the correct  documentation of grantee performance. We recommended that  Education establish and implement detailed written supervisory review  procedures for official grant files to provide reasonable assurance that  grant staff perform and document key monitoring activities. Education officials agreed with the recommendation and said they would develop a  department-wide standard operating procedure (SOP) that will, among  other things, provide standards for timeliness of documenting key  monitoring and administrative activities and require the periodic review of  grant files. Officials expect to complete the SOP by September 30, 2018.
In 2011, OMB established the Council on Financial Assistance Reform  (COFAR), an interagency group of executive branch officials with the  stated aim of creating a more streamlined and accountable structure to  coordinate financial assistance, including grants. In 2012 and again in  fiscal years 2016 and 2017, COFAR identified the need to develop a  qualified and professional workforce as one of six priorities to guide its  work on grants management reform. According to OMB staff, they  disbanded COFAR on June 15, 2017 as part of OMB’s efforts to reduce  grants-related requirements once COFAR had recommended policies and  actions to effectively deliver financial assistance. COFAR’s  recommendations resulted in the Uniform Administrative Requirements,  Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, which is  intended to improve performance, transparency, and oversight for federal  awards.
Moving forward, the responsibility of coordinating financial assistance  priorities was given to the Chief Financial Officers Council (CFOC), a  group of 24 agency chief and deputy chief financial officers that work  together to improve financial management in the U.S. government.  According to OMB staff, the controller of OMB’s Office of Federal  Financial Management is the chair of the CFOC. In addition, OPM is  responsible for providing leadership and guidance over federal agency  training to ensure the effective promotion and coordination of federal  agency training programs and operations. Further, the President’s  Management Agenda established “results-oriented accountability for  grants” as a cross-agency priority goal to “maximize the value of grant  funding by applying a risk-based, data-driven framework that balances  compliance requirements with demonstrating successful results for the  American taxpayer.”

		Certification Standards for the Grants Workforce

In 2013, we examined grant workforce and training issues and found  there were no specific government-wide training requirements for the  federal grants workforce. As of June 2018, this continued to be the  case. By contrast, there are government-wide training requirements for  the acquisitions workforce intended to help ensure its quality and  effectiveness. For example, OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy  (OFPP) provides government-wide guidance on managing the  acquisitions workforce. The Federal Acquisition Institute, which  coordinates with the OFPP, promotes the development of the civilian  acquisitions workforce. Further, OFPP has developed Federal  Acquisition Certification requirements for acquisition professionals serving  as contracting staff, contracting officer’s representatives, and  program/project managers. Notably, in fiscal year 2017, the federal  government spent approximately $166 billion more on grants to state and  local governments than it did on federal acquisitions. OMB staff explained that the acquisitions workforce faces more requirements  because contracts have more uniform requirements and are specified in  law. They stated that grants, on the other hand, are diverse and are  established by individual statutes with varying conditions.
Our work in the acquisitions area identifies the importance of providing  reasonable assurance of an appropriately trained staff through  certification. Certification programs are designed to ensure that  individuals attain the knowledge and skills required to perform in a  particular occupation or role by establishing consistent standards. For  example, for the acquisition workforce, OFPP requires a minimum set of  career-specific courses, along with education and experience  requirements, to obtain certification. To ensure acquisition professionals  remain current on acquisition policies and practices, OFPP also requires  the acquisition workforce to meet continuing learning requirements. See  appendix I for a comparison of training for the federal acquisition  workforce versus the federal grants workforce.
Education, HHS, and USDA delegate the decision to their various sub- agencies of whether grants employees should obtain professional grants  certifications. Of the 11 sub-agencies we reviewed, 3 at HHS—the  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Discretionary Grants Office,  the Health Resources and Services Administration, and the National  Institutes of Health—and 2 at Education—the Office of Special Education  and Rehabilitative Services and the Office of Post-Secondary  Education—required certification of some of their grants employees.  Officials at the remaining 6 sub-agencies offered certification to their  grants employees on an optional basis. USDA sub-agency officials said  they often recommend the certificate program to their grants employees,  and Education’s sub-agency officials at the Office of Elementary and  Secondary Education said they nominate staff to take the grants  certificate program whom they believe would benefit the office most by  receiving the training.
While COFAR officials explored the possibility of establishing certification  standards for the grants workforce by September 2015, OMB staff said  they determined that certification was not the most appropriate course of  action for the grants workforce for several reasons including risk  management and internal control concerns and the need for a variety of  skills for the grants workforce. As previously mentioned, OMB disbanded  COFAR in June 2017, and CFOC took over COFAR’s responsibilities.  When we spoke with OMB staff in the fall of 2017, they said their focus  had shifted from establishing certification standards for the grants  workforce to providing guidance on needed competencies and enabling  the grants workforce to obtain them.

	OPM, OMB, and CFOC Have Taken Some Steps to Help Provide Grants Training but Have Opportunities for Further Improvements

		OPM, OMB, and CFOC Developed a Grants Competency Model Among Other Steps

OPM, in consultation with OMB and the CFOC, took several steps to  ensure the federal grants management workforce has access to grants  management competencies and training. For example, OPM identified  grants management competencies that could be used in agency efforts  for workforce planning, training and development, performance  management, recruitment, and selection. After establishing grants  management competencies, OPM officials told us they established the  1109 job series partly because OMB and CFOC staff requested a new  grants management job series in response to the increased grant awards  and staffing needs created because of the 2009 American Recovery  Act. Figure 3 illustrates the timeline of the main steps taken by OPM,  OMB, and CFOC over the last decade.
In 2008, OPM initiated a government-wide study to identify critical  competencies for grants management work. After the government-wide  study was completed, OPM issued a memorandum to all federal agencies  announcing a grants management competency model that included  general competencies such as accountability, writing, and computer  skills. OPM also included technical competencies such as grants  management, financial analysis, and compliance. In our prior work, we  found that grants management competency models can be used to  establish an overall framework to guide agencies’ training efforts.
Before OPM established the 1109 job series in 2010, no other agency- specific job classification series existed for the many federal employees  responsible for carrying out managerial and administrative tasks related  to grants, including ensuring compliance with OMB and agency policies  and procedures. In the absence of a specific job classification, we  reported in 2013 that officials at selected agencies told us they had  classified these employees under a variety of other job series that did not  focus on grants, such as general, administrative, and subject-matter job  titles.
According to OPM officials, the agency’s development of the “Position  Classification Flysheet for the Grants Management Series (1109)”  leveraged the competencies and tasks from the Competency Model for  Grants Management and input from federal agencies’ subject matter  experts on grants management work.The Flysheet includes a job series  definition, a basic job title, general occupational information, and a link to  the position classification standard. The 1109 job series manage,  supervise, lead, or perform administrative business, policy, and analytical  work involving the: (1) management, award, or obligation of funds for  grants; (2) competitive or non-competitive evaluation of grants proposals;  and/or (3) administration or termination, and/or closeout of grants and/or  grants assistance and agreement awards. The work requires knowledge  of laws, regulations, rules, policies, procedures, and financial methods to  help ensure accountability of the grant funds.
As of fiscal year 2016, grant-making agencies reported 2,035 federal  employees in the 1109 job series, and HHS reported 38 percent of those  employees (see figure 4). We used fiscal year 2016 data to determine the  agency-wide numbers of 1109 job series employees because this was the  most recent set of full year data available at the time of our analysis.
The federal grants workforce also includes a wide range of employees in  other non-1109 job series positions. OPM does not collect data on grants  workforce employees in these other job series positions as they span a  large number of different job series that can vary by agency. Non-1109  employees working on grants typically possess expert knowledge in the  specific area necessary to meet a grant’s goals (e.g., announcing the  terms and conditions of a grant, recommending potential grantees, and  monitoring grantees’ progress in achieving the grants goals). Reflecting  the wide variety of federal programs that grants support, these individuals  typically possess expertise in a specialized program or subject.
A number of factors affect usage of the 1109 job series within agencies.  According to OMB staff, various agency employees have told them that  many agency employees would rather be classified as a subject matter  specialist, such as a scientist, rather than a grants management specialist  whose primary tasks are grants management under the 1109 job series.  In addition, OMB staff said that some agencies preferred recruiting staff  using a more general non-1109 job series classification. OMB staff also  said that some agencies indicated their grants workforce employees do  not want to be classified as grants specialists because the other job  series are more general and are a better fit in terms of the needed subject  matter expert skills and duties.
We found that one of our selected agencies, Education, does not use the  1109 job series at all because, according to Education sub-agency  officials, they require grants employees to have specialized grant program  content knowledge in the field of their grant program focus, such as  rehabilitation, special education, behavior science, and other areas (e.g.,  standards and assessments, state accountability systems). The sub- agency officials said that 1109 grants management specialists would not  have the specific content knowledge and experience associated with the  specific educational grant programs that Education requires. We also  found that over 61 percent of HHS grants workforce employees and over  90 percent of the USDA grants workforce was not part of the 1109 job  series.
OPM officials told us that, in April 2017, they started a government-wide  Grants Management Post Classification Implementation Study that may  change the Grants Management Classification Flysheet and revalidate  the Competency Model for Grants Management Work. OPM officials  developed the study after meeting with grant-making agency HHS and  will include a survey of the grants management workforce government- wide. OPM officials also stated they are in the final stages of developing  and clearing the government-wide survey and anticipate issuing it in the  fall of 2018. They said the study will take several additional months to  complete because the team must review the results of the government- wide survey and update competencies, job classifications, and  compliance policy/requirements.

		OMB and CFOC Have Provided Some Grants Training and Guidance, but Use Has Been Limited Among Selected Agencies

OMB’s role with the grants management workforce includes issuing  government-wide guidance and providing a framework that enables  agencies to take actions to align their grants training with OMB’s internal  control standards. In this role, OMB has taken some actions to provide  grants guidance for federal agencies that include the Career Roadmap  Report, Career Roadmap Builder, and Grants Training 101. However, we  found that almost all of the officials we interviewed at the 11 selected sub- agencies were not familiar with the Career Roadmap Report and Career  Roadmap Builder. Additionally, almost all of them did not mention using  Grants Training 101 as part of their grants workforce training.

			Financial Assistance Career Roadmap

OMB, in collaboration with the CFOC, COFAR, and federal awarding  agencies, developed the Financial Assistance Career Roadmap Report in  June 2017. OMB staff said that the Career Roadmap Report is one  vehicle used to address grants training for the federal agency grants  workforce. It is a tool for federal agencies to identify and document the  competencies needed for successful job performance of federal financial  assistance management professionals. According to the CFOC, the  competencies and related elements outlined in the Career Roadmap  Report are to be used to identify and prioritize training needs for the  federal financial assistance management workforce. This is an optional  tool for the federal grants workforce and may be customized to reflect an  organization’s unique requirements and specifications. That workforce  includes the grants management 1109 job series employees, as well as  employees performing grants responsibilities as program, finance, and  audit experts who are classified under other job series.
During the initial development of the Career Roadmap Report, a team  consisting of OMB staff and industrial and organizational psychologists  collected financial assistance research and documentation from OMB,  federal awarding agencies, and OPM. The team analyzed this information  to identify foundational competencies and create a draft competency  model which OMB reviewed. The team also facilitated two workshops  with specialists on financial assistance management to gather feedback  on the Career Roadmap Report. Figure 5 below shows the 14 different  competencies from the Career Roadmap Report that are divided into two  types of competencies: functional and leadership.
After the report’s release, CFOC developed and released an interactive  version called the Career Roadmap Builder available to the public  online. This version allows users to build their own customized financial  assistance management Career Roadmap based on their specific mission  and needs. To obtain a custom Career Roadmap Report, users complete  several steps in the Career Roadmap Builder involving selection of one or more of nine functional competencies; one or more of three job levels (foundational, practitioner, or one of three proficiency levels for each functional competency  (basic, intermediate, or advanced); an option to include a leadership competency; and one of three different leadership levels (entry, mid, or senior) and  a leadership proficiency rating (basic, intermediate, or advanced).
The user then receives a customized report with relevant competencies,  career levels, a sample of the associated developmental experiences and  recommended training courses.
Department-level officials we spoke with at HHS, USDA, and Education  were familiar with the Career Roadmap Report. However, almost all of the  officials we interviewed at the 11 selected sub-agencies were not aware  the Career Roadmap Report was available to them.
All but one of the officials we spoke with at four HHS sub-agencies  said they were unaware of the Career Roadmap Report and grants  management competencies.
While USDA’s agency-wide Federal Financial Assistance Committee  received a copy of the Career Roadmap Report in August 2017 and  discussed it at their monthly meetings, almost all of the officials at the  four USDA sub-agencies we reviewed said they had not received it.  However, three sub-agency officials were familiar with the report  because they had been involved with agency-wide efforts to provide  grants management competency support and information. All other  USDA sub-agency officials with whom we spoke were unfamiliar with  the Career Roadmap Report or the grants workforce competencies.
Almost all of the officials we interviewed at three Education sub- agencies were unaware of the Career Roadmap Report. However,  one official from one sub-agency was familiar with the Career  Roadmap Report as he had been part of the Career Roadmap Report  development process.
OMB staff stated they publicized the report by sending a “Controller Alert”  on July 3, 2017 to agency chief financial officers and to members of the  Financial Assistance Committee for E-Government notifying them of its  availability and OMB’s future plans to map it to existing training  resources, place it on OPM’s website, and develop an online interactive  tool including position competencies. However, we found it difficult to  locate the “Controller Alert” on the COFC website as it is not located on  the same tab where the Career Roadmap Report is published but instead  in a news section that users may not know to search. Further, OMB’s  “Controller Alert” states that it “does not constitute official guidance or  prescribe specific tasks for agencies beyond consideration of appropriate  steps to address the issue.” OMB did not issue any official government- wide memorandums to explain that it supported the Career Roadmap  Report, or that the report included updated competencies for both the  1109 and non-1109 job series workforce.
Our internal control standards state that management should internally  communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s  objectives. However, if all levels of an agency are not aware of  government grants workforce competencies and guidance, the agency  may not be able to ensure that grants workforce employees have the  training resources needed to develop and maintain skills to achieve the  objectives of grant awards.

			OMB Grants Training 101

OMB also worked with federal grant-making agencies, COFAR, and the  CFOC to establish Grants Training 101, a set of five online training  modules designed to provide federal officials a basic knowledge of grants  and cooperative agreements. According to OMB staff, the Grants Training 101 webpage states that the training is not designed to provide detailed  administrative, accounting, and audit requirements specific to statutory  provisions, agency regulation, and guidance because agencies need to  have flexibility in designing grants training programs to meet those grant- specific statutory requirements. OMB staff said they designed the training  modules in response to a request from the federal grants community for a  government-wide grants management training resource to ensure some  level of consistent training among grant-awarding agencies. In addition,  OMB staff said it was optional for agencies to incorporate Grants Training  101 into established grants training and that each agency is responsible  for the means by which they conduct grants management training.
Only one of the agencies we reviewed had plans to include OMB’s Grants  Training 101 as part of its grant-training program. HHS officials said they  are developing an internal online grants 101 course and plan to  incorporate parts of OMB’s Grants Training 101. However, most agency  and sub-agency officials we spoke with did not use OMB’s Grants  Management 101 as part of their grants workforce training. OMB staff  said that Grants Management 101 modules cover the grant lifecycle and  the requirements of the Uniform Guidance, and are intended to  complement other trainings that agencies provide to their grants  managers. OMB staff said that agencies make the decision whether to  use the Grants Training 101 modules and can integrate parts of the  training modules into their agency- specific training requirements. For  example, officials at one of the agencies—Education—stated they cover  many of OMB’s Grants Training 101 learning objectives through their  cross-cutting grant training program courses as well as sub-agency  specific training. Furthermore, OMB staff said that each agency would  have to internally monitor grants employees’ completion of the grants  training modules.

		OMB and CFOC Do Not Collect Detailed User Data or Feedback to Determine Usefulness of Grants Training and Guidance

OMB staff told us that OPM initially had the responsibility of hosting the  first two modules of Grants Training 101 on the OPM website while the  remaining three modules were under development. After these remaining  modules were completed, all five of the modules were moved to the  CFOC webpage. In addition, OPM was responsible for collecting the  Grants Training 101 user and completion data. OMB provided us the  Grants Training 101 data which totaled 1,277 users registered between  December 2015 and November 2017; however, we found that the data  were incomplete due to missing data fields.
OMB staff stated that the Grants 101 training website was moved to the  CFOC webpage so the general public can access it. The CFOC will not  collect data on the access dates, the agency names, or the number of  Grants Training 101 users; however, the CFOC will collect data on the  number of visitors that go to the Grants Training 101 website. OMB staff  also said that agencies can decide to track Grants Training 101 users  internally because OMB and the CFOC will not collect specific data on  users. In addition, OMB staff said OMB and CFOC have not collected any  formal Grants Training 101 feedback from users and have no plans to do  so. OMB reported that a total of 175 visitors went on the Career Roadmap  Report website between September 2017 and January 2018.
Our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government advise  management to process data into quality information that is appropriate,  current, complete, accurate, accessible, and provided on a timely basis.  It further states that management should also evaluate the processed  information and revise when necessary so that it can be used to make  informed decisions. In addition, our 2004 Human Capital Guide states  that it is increasingly important for agencies to be able to evaluate their  training and development programs to demonstrate how these efforts  help develop employees and improve the agencies’ performance. As  part of this approach, the Human Capital Guide also states that assessing  training and development efforts should consider feedback from  employees.
OMB, CFOC, and COFAR devoted time and multiple resources to  developing the Career Roadmap Report to identify and document the  competencies needed for successful job performance of federal financial  assistance management professionals. Obtaining more detailed user  information and regular feedback from federal agencies on the usefulness  of the Career Roadmap Report and the online Career Roadmap Builder  could help OMB and CFOC to evaluate the effectiveness of these grant  training tools. In addition, obtaining user information and feedback from  federal agencies on the usefulness of Grants Training 101 can also help  OMB and CFOC evaluate its effectiveness.

	HHS, USDA, and Education Vary in Following Selected Leading Training Practices

In 2004, we issued a framework of principles and key questions that  federal agencies can use to ensure that their training and development  investments are targeted strategically and are not wasted on efforts that  are irrelevant, duplicative, or ineffective. Our framework identifies four  components of the training and development process: (1) Planning, (2)  Design and Development, (3) Implementation, and (4) Evaluation. Within  each component, the guide identifies leading practices and questions for  agencies to consider when assessing each of these four components. We  compared current grants training practices at the selected agencies and  sub-agencies with selected leading training practices from the guide. We  found variation among sub-agencies in following those selected training  practices.
Planning: skills and competencies assessment. In our guide, we  stated that effective workforce planning and training begins with a skills  and competency assessment. A leading practice under this component is  that agencies use an organization-wide knowledge and skills inventory  and industry benchmarks to help identify performance problems in their  workforces. We stated that workforce planning should entail the  collection of valid and reliable data on such indicators as distribution of  employees’ skills and competencies.
Officials we interviewed at all the selected sub-agencies explained that  grants training needs are primarily identified by grants management  supervisors or self-identified by grants workforce employees. The training  needs are identified on an ad hoc basis during (1) manager evaluations or  observations of employee performance, (2) annual and semiannual  performance assessments, and (3) employee career individual  development plans.
When it came to implementing a more rigorous process involving a  knowledge and skills inventory or the collection of valid and reliable data,  we found varied use among the 3 agencies and 11 sub-agencies with  only some employing such a method.
The four HHS sub-agencies we reviewed assess new grants  workforce employees’ knowledge, skills, and abilities by identifying  skills gaps when onboarding new grants workforce employees,  through supervisor observation of employee performance, or  employee feedback.
In fiscal year 2015, USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS)  sub-agency started holding monthly meetings with its Regional  Grants Management Division Directors to identify national training  needs for its grants management staff. In fiscal year 2017, FNS  also conducted a nationwide qualitative survey of its grants  employees to identify training gaps and needs. The remaining  three sub-agencies we reviewed informally identify skills gaps and  training needs through ongoing discussions between supervisors  and grants employees and during annual performance  evaluations.
Officials from Education’s central Learning and Development  office stated they issue a department-wide competency  assessment and training needs assessment to the various  department sub-agencies annually or bi-annually. Officials from  Education’s Office of Elementary and Secondary Education sub- agency told us they also conduct their own grants workforce  learning needs assessment examining grants tasks, content  knowledge, and general skills. Officials at the other two Education  sub-agencies told us they assess skills gaps and training needs  through ongoing discussions between supervisors and grants  employees, supervisor observation of employee performance, and  also during annual performance evaluations.
Without a formal knowledge and skills inventory or collection of valid and  reliable data on the grants workforce’s skills and competencies, some  sub-agencies may be limited in identifying performance problems,  competency gaps, and training needs in their grants workforce.
Design and development: using a mix of approaches, sources, and  delivery. Design and Development involves identifying specific training  and development initiatives that the agency will use, along with other  strategies, to improve individual and agency performance. One of the  leading practices under this component is choosing the most appropriate  mix of centralized and decentralized management of training programs;  internal and external training sources; and training delivery mechanisms  (e.g., classroom, computer-based, on the job, etc.). All three agencies  provide the majority of their grants training at the sub-agency level. In  most cases, the sub-agencies use a mix of training sources and delivery  methods in developing and implementing their grants training programs,  including identifying training needs and training content, as detailed in  appendix III.
HHS and USDA primarily use decentralized approaches to grants training  while Education uses a hybrid approach of centralized and decentralized  grants training.
Although there is no overarching grants training program across  HHS, the department’s central offices provide topic-specific  training to Chief Grants Management Officers (CGMO) within  each sub-agency on an ad hoc basis as new grant policies or  requirements are developed. CGMOs then decide how to  disseminate this information within their respective sub-agencies  (e.g., through webinars, teleconferences, or ad hoc trainings). An  HHS council comprised of CGMOs also meets on a quarterly or  biannual basis to discuss new grants policy and requirements.  Further, HHS’s central grants offices are developing a  foundational “Grants 101” course to help standardize a baseline of  grants knowledge across all of HHS’s sub-agencies, which they  expect to complete by November 2018. Currently, the sub- agencies provide the majority of grants-specific training, which  focuses on grants topics and mission requirements relevant to  their specific areas.
USDA’s Office of Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) provides some  required training courses across the agency such as suspension  and debarment and federal appropriations law training; however,  these trainings are not specific to just the grants workforce  employees. The sub-agencies provide all grants-specific training.
Of the three selected agencies, Education provides the most  central office training. For example, Education’s OCFO provides  agency-wide training on discretionary and formula grants financial  and budgetary courses; Learning and Development provides  introductory grant courses; and Risk Management Services  provides risk-based grants training covering topics including cost  analysis, budgetary review, monitoring grants, and uniform  guidance. Additionally, Education’s sub-agencies provide mission-  and program-specific grants training to augment the centrally  provided trainings.
Centralized and decentralized training approaches may present different  advantages for agencies and sub-agencies. On the one hand, efficiencies  may be achieved by centralizing the design and delivery of some grants  training that has widespread applicability throughout the agency.  Additionally, if each sub-agency is responsible for implementing its own  grants training program, the potential exists for inconsistent grants  workforce training across the agency. On the other hand, each sub- agency is able to tailor the training to its own needs when it manages and  provides the training itself. In making this decision, it is important for  agencies to carefully analyze and consider trade-offs.
Implementation: establishing agency-level accountability.  Implementation involves ensuring effective and efficient delivery of  training and development opportunities in an environment that supports  learning. One of the leading training practices under this component is an  agency organization that is held accountable, along with the line  executives, for the maximum performance of the workforce. According to  our Human Capital Guide, there are different ways of ensuring  accountability, including establishing clear lines of authority in agency  policies, issuing agency-wide guidance to ensure consistency, and  establishing a central oversight office, among others.
We found variation among the three selected agencies in following this  leading training practice with HHS and Education having some agency  level of accountability but USDA having less.
HHS’ central Office of Grants Policy, Oversight, and Evaluation  assigns desk officers to work with sub-agency CGMOs in helping  them understand available training resources and needs. HHS  also has an Executive Committee for Grants Administration Policy  Council that meets quarterly to discuss regulations, policies, and  grants administrative requirements. This committee is made up of  CGMOs from each HHS sub-agency. HHS describes the roles of  officials involved in overseeing grants management in an agency- wide grants policy manual.
USDA has not defined roles for central offices to hold them  accountable for grants training. While its central OCFO provides  some guidance on federal financial assistance policies and grants  terms and conditions, and ensures department-wide training  requirements are met, USDA has no agency-wide grants training  guidance, no agency-wide grants manual, or a central office that  oversees grants training at the component level.
Education officials stated that the agency has two agency-wide  grants policy manuals and some Education offices have roles in  overseeing grants training. For example, the central Learning and  Development office provides some oversight of employee  development, training programs, and providers. Further,  Education officials stated that Risk Management Services  oversees Education’s licensure training program across the sub- agencies, and OCFO provides agency-wide training on financial  management of grants.
Holding a central office accountable for grants training can provide  agencies with reasonable assurance that training is being delivered  efficiently and effectively and that grant staff have sufficient  developmental opportunities. In this way, agencies can better ensure the  maximum performance of the grants workforce.
Evaluation: using data to assess training results. Evaluation involves  assessing the extent to which training and development efforts contribute  to improved performance and results. A selected leading training practice  under this component is the use of performance data (both qualitative and  quantitative measures) to assess the results achieved through training  and development efforts.
The three agencies we reviewed primarily conduct evaluation at the sub- agency level. The sub-agencies vary as to how they carry out their  evaluations and few use any quantitative performance measures to  determine if training was successful.
HHS officials stated the central offices do not measure the  effectiveness of training, nor is there centralized information  sharing on how well training works. Officials at the HHS sub- agencies we reviewed told us they primarily use informal feedback  such as ongoing conversations between employees and  supervisors after training completion and supervisor observations  of employee performance to determine if grants training is  successful. Officials at HHS’ Health Resources and Services  Administration also said they receive data regarding employee  scores on required grants training courses. Some HHS sub- agencies use an external vendor for some grants training and  employees complete a survey at the end of each of these courses,  but HHS officials do not see those results. HHS officials rely on  employee feedback after training completion to determine if  external vendor training is effective.
Officials at the USDA sub-agencies we reviewed told us they  primarily use informal feedback through supervisory review of  employee performance and employee individual development  training plans; internal local level reviews and audits of grant  processes; and some course completion surveys.
Officials at Education’s central Learning and Development office  told us they conduct electronic course evaluation surveys. Officials  at the Education sub-agencies we reviewed told us they primarily  use informal feedback from employees, supervisor observation of  an employee’s progress after training, and some course  evaluations.
While informal, qualitative feedback from employees taking grants training  is useful, it is not quantifiable or measurable. Using a balanced approach  that reflects feedback from employees as well as organizational results is  more effective in terms of evaluating the usefulness of grants training  efforts.
Many of the issues discussed above regarding following leading training  practices stem from limited oversight of the sub-agencies, which we  describe in the next section.

		Selected Agencies Provide Limited Monitoring and Oversight of Sub- agencies’ Grants Training Efforts Selected Agencies Cannot Readily Identify All Employees Working on Grants and Provide Limited Oversight of Sub- Agencies’ Grants Training Efforts

As previously mentioned, the federal grants workforce consists of  employees in the OPM Grants Management Specialist 1109 job series as  well as employees in various other OPM job series (referred to as non- 1109s in this report). HHS and USDA both employ 1109s as well as non- 1109s in their respective grants workforces while Education only employs  non-1109s. According to HHS, USDA, and Education officials, each sub- agency is responsible for identifying its grants workforce employees and  ensuring they receive needed grants training. However, the central offices  do not have a reporting mechanism tracking sub-agencies’ grants  workforce. After querying each sub-agency, at our request, officials from  the three agencies provided us with data on 1109 and non-1109 grants  personnel. As figure 6 shows, the majority of grants personnel at the  three agencies we reviewed are non-1109 employees.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that,  “Management should demonstrate commitment to recruit, develop, and  retain competent individuals.” Furthermore, internal controls state that  “management evaluates competence of personnel across the entity in  relation to established policies.” Since the agencies we reviewed cannot  readily identify their total grants workforce, they have limited ability to  evaluate the competence of grants personnel across the entity to ensure  they are receiving needed training.
Since the three agencies we reviewed do not centrally monitor their sub- agencies’ identification of grants employees, they cannot readily identify  the agency’s total grants workforce. Consequently, the selected agencies  do not have reasonable assurance that all employees working on grants  across their agency are receiving needed grants training and have the  necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to properly manage, administer,  and monitor grants.
Central offices at HHS, USDA, and Education provide limited oversight of  the types of training sub-agencies provide to their grants workforce. Our  Human Capital Guide identifies having an agency organization that is  held accountable, along with the line executives, for the maximum  performance of the workforce as a leading practice. Further, the guide  states that the agency’s training organization and line executives should  work together to establish control mechanisms to ensure that agency  employees successfully complete required and assigned training and  development. Additionally, the guide states that agencies must assign  authority and delegate responsibility to the proper personnel and  establish clear accountability for maximizing workforce performance.
However, as mentioned earlier, there is no overarching office responsible  at the selected agencies for overseeing the types of grants training sub- agencies provide. Additionally, the central offices at the selected agencies  do not evaluate sub-agency grants training efforts. We found variation  among the 11 sub-agencies’ grants training programs (as shown in  appendix III), which highlights the importance of central office oversight  for making sure the training variation is appropriate. As a result of these  issues, the selected agencies do not have assurance that grants training  provided across the various sub-agencies is sufficient in meeting the  needs of the various employees working on grants.
Since there is no overarching central office at any of the three agencies  we reviewed actively being held accountable for sub-agency grants  training programs, HHS, USDA, and Education cannot ensure that all of  the sub-agencies working on grants are sufficiently training their grants  employees. Without central agency oversight and accountability across  sub-agency grants training programs, not all grants employees may be  sufficiently trained on grants processes and procedures, which could  affect grant oversight in terms of grants employees monitoring grants  properly.

	Conclusions

Given the importance of grants as a tool to achieve federal objectives and  the large outlays the federal government makes to fund them each year, it  is critical that the people who manage these grants—the federal grants  workforce—be well-trained to handle their responsibilities. To help  provide training to this workforce, OPM, OMB, and CFOC created grants  management competencies, a grants job series, some grants training,  and a career roadmap. However, they have not widely publicized the  roadmap and some sub-agencies we reviewed were unaware of it.  Moreover, OMB and the CFOC are not collecting detailed data on users  or feedback, which limits their ability to determine how useful these  resources are to the federal grants workforce.
The selected agencies varied in following selected leading training  practices and they provided limited monitoring and oversight of their sub- agencies’ grants training efforts. Without sufficient monitoring and  oversight, the agencies cannot have reasonable assurance that their sub- agencies are sufficiently training their grants workforce so they have the  necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to properly manage, administer,  and monitor the billions of dollars that the federal government spends on  grants annually.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making a total of five recommendations, including two to OMB  and one to each of the selected agencies in our review. Specifically:  OMB’s Office of Federal Financial Management’s Controller (the CFOC  chair) should ensure CFOC formally publicizes the Career Roadmap  guidance among the 24 CFO agencies through memorandums, briefings,  trainings, regular CFOC meetings, or technical assistance and clearly  posts its “Controller Alert” on the CFOC website with the Career  Roadmap Report. (Recommendation 1)
The Director of OMB, working with CFOC, should (1) collect data metrics  regularly on the Career Roadmap Builder online tool and Grants Training  101 to determine how widely the resources are being used, and (2) obtain  periodic feedback from federal agencies on the usefulness of these tools  and any needed improvements. (Recommendation 2)
The Secretary of HHS should establish a process to monitor and evaluate  HHS’s grants training at the central office level. This process should  include (1) a method for identifying all employees working on grants  across the agency, and (2) oversight procedures to evaluate the  sufficiency of sub-agencies’ grants training efforts including the  incorporation of leading practices related to assessing competencies,  training approaches, accountability, and training results.  (Recommendation 3)
The Secretary of USDA should establish a process to monitor and  evaluate USDA’s grants training at the central office level. This process  should include (1) a method for identifying all employees working on  grants across the agency, and (2) oversight procedures to evaluate the  sufficiency of sub-agencies’ grant-training efforts including the  incorporation of leading practices related to assessing competencies,  training approaches, accountability, and training results.  (Recommendation 4)
The Secretary of Education should establish a process to monitor and  evaluate Education’s grants training at the central office level. This  process should include (1) a method for identifying all employees working  on grants across the agency, and (2) oversight procedures to evaluate  the sufficiency of sub-agencies’ grants training efforts including the  incorporation of leading practices related to assessing competencies,  training approaches, accountability, and training results.  (Recommendation 5)

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this product to Education, HHS, OMB, OPM, and  USDA for review and comment. In written comments reproduced in  appendixes IV and V respectively, HHS concurred and Education  generally concurred with our findings and recommendations directed at  them. Both agencies described the steps they were taking to implement  our recommendations. In an email, the Chief Learning Officer said that  USDA concurred with our findings and recommendation. In an email, a  Management Analyst said that OPM had no comments on the draft  report.
OMB staff provided us with oral comments stating that the agency  partially concurred with our first two recommendations. Specifically, for  our first recommendation, OMB generally agreed with our finding that the  Career Roadmap guidance should be better publicized. However, OMB  believes this is not its responsibility but rather the responsibility of federal  agencies. OMB stated that federal agencies could incorporate a method  into their improvement plans to ensure that sub-agencies are made aware  of the Career Roadmap Guidance. We believe that, as the federal  government’s central management agency and developer of the Career  Roadmap, OMB has a responsibility for ensuring that federal agencies  are aware of the Career Roadmap guidance by formally publicizing it  through memorandums, briefings, trainings, regular CFOC meetings, or  technical assistance.
For the portion of our first recommendation that discusses clearly posting  the “Controller Alert,” OMB stated it will look at the alert’s placement on  the CFOC website to see if the agency can make it more prominent. We  continue to believe that the “Controller Alert” should be easily accessible  to anyone visiting the website and should be located on the same page  as the Career Roadmap, where it would have greater visibility.
For our second recommendation, OMB agreed that user feedback data  regarding the Career Roadmap Builder and Grants Training 101 is useful.  However, OMB stated that while it will continue to collect data on the  number of users, it believes that federal agencies should be responsible  for collecting specific, detailed user data if they are using those  resources. We continue to believe that OMB and CFOC would benefit  from collecting specific, detailed user data on these tools, which they  devoted time and multiple resources to developing. Collecting detailed  data metrics that go beyond the number of users can help OMB and  CFOC to better evaluate the effectiveness of these grants training tools.  Additionally, OMB stated the agency is committed to working with CFOC  to review the Grants Training 101 module to determine how useful it is  and if any improvements or adjustments are needed.
All five agencies provided technical comments on the report draft, which  we incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Education,  HHS, and USDA and to the Directors of OMB and OPM. In addition, the  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao.gov.  Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made  key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Appendix I: Comparison of Federal Acquisition Training and Grants Workforce Training

Appendix II: Grants Workforce by Job Series for Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and Education as of March 2018

Appendix III: Grants Training Programs at the Departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and Education

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS is a large  agency with 11 sub-agencies administering a wide variety of health and  human services that takes a decentralized approach to training its grants  workforce. While HHS’ central Assistant Secretary for Financial  Resources (ASFR) office provides grant policy and regulatory guidance  updates to HHS sub-agencies, ASFR officials said they leave the decision  on how to implement grants training to each of those sub-agencies. The  selected sub-agencies we reviewed—the Administration for Children and  Families, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Health Resources  and Services Administration, and National Institutes of Health—all  implement their own grants training programs and procedures.
The four sub-agencies at HHS that we reviewed take different  approaches in how they implement their respective grants training  programs. For example, some sub-agencies require that grant personnel  take required courses while others make them optional; some provide  internal grants training while others also use the services of an external  training vendor; and some require certification while others make it  optional. Table 3 highlights some of the grants training programs’  characteristics at the four HHS sub-agencies we reviewed.
The Department of Agriculture (USDA). USDA is made up of 29  agencies and offices at more than 4,500 locations across the country and  abroad. While its central Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO)  provides some guidance on federal financial assistance policies and  grants terms and conditions, and ensures department-wide training  requirements are met, it, like HHS, leaves the decision on how to  implement grants training to each of its sub-agencies. The selected sub- agencies we reviewed—the Food and Nutrition Service, Forest Service,  National Institute of Food and Agriculture, and Rural Development—all  implemented their own respective grants training programs and  procedures. Table 4 highlights some of the grants training programs’  characteristics at the four USDA sub-agencies we reviewed.
The Department of Education (Education). Education approaches  grants training by combining both centralized and decentralized  approaches for its eight principal offices that conduct grant work.  Education’s central OCFO offers broad financial grants training such as  Oversight of Financial Management of Ed Formula/Discretionary Grants  and Discretionary Grant Budget Reviews. Education’s central Learning  and Development office offers broad introductory grants training such as  Introduction to Grants and Cooperative Agreements, Uniform  Administrative Guidance, and Cost Principals. According to Education  officials, Education’s Risk Management Services (RMS) offers risk  management-based grants training including Discretionary Grants  Overview, Conducting a Cost Analysis and Budget Review, Monitoring  Grants, Suspension and Debarment, and Risk Assessment and Risk  Mitigation. RMS also manages Education’s licensing program and  oversees training for new license holders geared towards grants  administration.
In addition to these central office trainings, each Education sub-agency  also provides specific training tailored for its mission as verified by the  three Education sub-agencies we reviewed—the Office of Special  Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), the Office of Elementary  and Secondary Education (OESE), and the Office of Post-Secondary  Education. For example, according to Education officials, OSERS trains  grant staff on the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act grant  application review process, and OESE recently identified a need for and  developed and taught a course on improving the grantee communication  process. Table 5 highlights some of the grants training programs’  characteristics at the three Education sub-agencies we reviewed.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Education

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Tom James (Assistant Director),  Jyoti Gupta (Analyst-in-Charge), Benjamin Adrian, Dawn Bidne, Jeff  DeMarco, Karin Fangman, Joseph Fread, Robert Gebhart, Shirley  Hwang, Serena Lo, Sharon Miller, Meredith Moles, Steven Putansu,  Kayla Robinson, Robert Robinson, Cynthia Saunders, Stewart Small, and  Dan Webb made key contributions to this report.

Output:
Why GAO Did This Study

In fiscal year 2017, the federal government awarded approximately $675 billion in grants to state and local governments. GAO was asked to review the federal grants workforce training. GAO reviewed (1) OPM's, OMB's, and the CFOC's actions to address the grants workforce's training needs; (2) the extent to which grants workforce training at selected agencies is consistent with leading practices; and (3) how selected agencies monitor and oversee training of their grants workforce. GAO selected HHS, USDA, and Education and several of their sub-agencies based on their grants spending and numbers of grants management specialists. GAO reviewed OPM and OMB memorandums and guidance, compared selected agency training practices against leading training practices, and interviewed officials.

What GAO Found

The Offices of Personnel Management (OPM) and Management and Budget (OMB) and the Chief Financial Officers Council (CFOC) have taken some steps to help ensure the federal grants workforce receives training. For example, OMB worked with the CFOC to issue five basic grants training modules and a “Career Roadmap” for grants managers; however, they did not widely publicize the resources. Many of the officials with whom GAO spoke at selected sub-agencies at the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Agriculture (USDA), and Education (Education) were unfamiliar with the Career Roadmap and made limited use of the training resources. Further, OMB and CFOC do not collect detailed user data or feedback, limiting their abilities to determine the usefulness of these resources.
GAO found that sub-agencies at HHS, USDA, and Education vary in following leading training practices for planning, designing, implementing, and evaluating their grants training programs. Additionally, HHS, USDA, and Education could not readily identify grants management specialists—the 1109 job series—or employees in other job series working on grants without querying each sub-agency. These agencies cannot do so because their central offices do not have a reporting mechanism tracking their sub-agencies' grants workforce. Further, agency central offices do not evaluate sub-agency grants training efforts. Without sufficient monitoring and oversight, the agencies cannot have reasonable assurance that their sub-agencies are sufficiently training their grants workforce so they have the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to properly manage, administer, and monitor the billions of dollars that the federal government spends on grants annually.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making five recommendations including that OMB, working with the CFOC, should (1) publicize the Career Roadmap and (2) collect data metrics and user feedback on its use. HHS, USDA, and Education should establish processes to centrally monitor and evaluate their grants training, including identifying the grants workforce and ensuring consistency with leading practices. HHS and USDA concurred, Education generally concurred, and OMB partially concurred with our recommendations. OPM had no comments on the report.


Input:
	Background

NNSA’s strategic materials programs include a broad range of activities.  The programs often include (1) building unique new facilities, (2)  modifying and repairing existing facilities and equipment, and (3)  developing and deploying new technologies for processing and producing  strategic nuclear materials. The programs may involve multiple NNSA  and DOE sites and multiple facilities at a given site. For example, since  the days of the Manhattan Project, a large portion of the nation’s uranium  mission has been executed at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak  Ridge, Tennessee, with uranium production and associated operations  housed in several nuclear facilities within the complex. These facilities are  in some cases more than 60 years old. NNSA’s uranium program is  coordinating efforts to build the UPF, invest in the infrastructure of  existing facilities to extend their lives, and develop and deploy several  new technologies that are expected to increase the efficiency and  effectiveness of uranium processing. Collectively, these uranium program  activities may take more than 2 decades to implement and cost several  billion dollars.
NNSA’s 2017 future-years nuclear security program estimate projected  that NNSA would need about $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2018 to carry out  its annual activities associated with the management of these strategic  materials programs (see table 1). NNSA documents indicate that the  agency expects to spend about $7.7 billion over the next 5 years on  activities related to managing its strategic materials. This spending, which  would represent about 12 percent of the approximately $63 billion NNSA  expects to spend on all weapons activities over this same time period,  includes: $4.8 billion for costs related to construction of facilities and other  capital equipment purchases that will be used to support the strategic  materials mission; and $2.9 billion for program costs related to general activities such as  reducing risk and ensuring sufficient supply, as well as the  consolidation, disposition, tracking, and accounting of nuclear  materials.
Program managers are an important part of the federal government’s  workforce. They interact with the managers of individual projects to  provide support and guidance on those projects but also must take a  broad view of the overall objectives of programs and an agency’s  organizational culture. According to leading practices outlined by the  Project Management Institute, organizations develop program plans,  capture and understand stakeholder needs, and establish processes for  maintaining program management oversight, among other activities.  Recognizing the importance of improving program management, in  December 2016 the President signed the ‘‘Program Management  Improvement Accountability Act” that required the Office of Management  and Budget to, among other things, adopt and oversee implementation of  government-wide standards, policies, and guidelines for program and  project management for executive agencies and assess the quality and  effectiveness of program management for these agencies. We have  previously reported on DOE’s and NNSA’s program management  challenges.
In March 2009, we found that NNSA and the Department of Defense  (DOD) established unrealistic schedules, did not establish consistent  cost baselines, and did not effectively manage technical risks in some  of their nuclear weapon life extension programs. These problems  resulted in delays, additional expenditures, difficulties tracking the  cost of the programs, and difficulties in meeting all of NNSA’s and  DOD’s technical objectives. We recommended that NNSA develop  and use consistent budget assumptions and criteria for the baseline to  track costs over time, among other actions. NNSA agreed with our  recommendations and made changes to its cost estimating  procedures.
In November 2014, we found that the lack of requirements for  programs meant that DOE could not ensure that it was developing  fully credible cost estimates for programs. We recommended that  DOE revise its program management directives to require that  programs develop life-cycle cost estimates in accordance with our 12  cost-estimating best practice steps. DOE agreed with our  recommendation but has not yet incorporated the best practice steps  into its program management directives.
In February 2016, we found that the B61-12 life extension program,  the most complex such program NNSA has undertaken to date, faces  ongoing management challenges in some areas, including staff  shortfalls and an earned value management system that has yet to be  tested. We did not make any recommendations but reiterated  previous recommendations such as those already mentioned.
In November 2016, we found that DOE and NNSA had not  established organization-wide policies or practices addressing leading  practices related to program management, and we recommended that  DOE do so. DOE did not agree or disagree with this  recommendation. NNSA, however, in late 2016 instituted a training  program for program management.
NNSA’s stockpile stewardship program has established strategic  materials as one of the major elements to sustain the nation’s nuclear  weapons stockpile. According to NNSA budget documents, the strategic  materials programs help ensure the sustainment of nuclear material  processing capabilities and fund the stabilization, consolidation,  disposition, tracking, and accounting of nuclear materials. Strategic  materials are generally not available, or are available only in limited  quantities, from commercial suppliers because of their specific properties  and use in nuclear weapons or for other national security purposes.  NNSA named strategic material program managers in 2014 and 2015 to  integrate, oversee, plan, and execute material strategies for uranium  (including domestic uranium enrichment), plutonium, and tritium.
In addition to the general program management challenges highlighted  above, we have also reported previously on challenges facing NNSA’s  strategic materials programs:  In July 2015, we found that NNSA had identified various challenges in  its lithium production strategy that may impact its ability to meet  demand for lithium in the future. These challenges included  insufficient supply of lithium material and constraints facing NNSA’s  efforts to replace the aging lithium production facility. We  recommended that NNSA objectively consider all alternatives, without  preference for a particular solution, as it proceeds with its analysis of  alternatives process. NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with our  recommendation but did undertake a formal analysis of alternatives in  2017, according to NNSA officials.
In August 2016, we found that NNSA had not documented important  requirements for its plutonium program at Los Alamos National  Laboratory in New Mexico. We recommended that, among other  things, NNSA should update its program requirements. NNSA outlined  actions taken and planned to address this recommendation.

	NNSA Has Defined Strategic Materials Program Requirements, Including Roles and Responsibilities for Program Managers

NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs has set program requirements for  the strategic materials programs and has established the roles and  responsibilities of the programs’ managers. NNSA defined these program  requirements in two documents issued in 2016 and 2017. Collectively  these documents set documentation requirements as well as established  the roles and responsibilities of the strategic materials program  managers. According to NNSA officials, these requirements apply to each  of the programs, including the lithium program. These requirements are  outlined below.
Program Execution Instruction (2016) – In January 2016, NNSA  approved a Program Execution Instruction that defines requirements  for carrying out NNSA defense programs, such as the strategic  materials programs. This instruction outlines a series of  requirements that vary based on the categorization—and therefore  the rigor—of management applied to a program. Of the four  categories outlined in the instruction—Standard Management,  Enhanced Management A, Enhanced Management B, and Capital  Acquisition Management—NNSA has generally designated the  strategic materials programs as “Enhanced Management B,” the most  rigorous designation applicable to this type of program, according to  NNSA officials. The “Enhanced Management B” programs are  required to have the following elements documented: a program plan,  a work breakdown structure that details the work elements necessary  to organize the total work scope with cost estimates, a decision  analysis, an integrated master schedule that includes the entire scope  of work required for the program’s successful execution, a  performance management approach, and a lessons learned/best  practices review. According to the instruction, if the scope, cost, and  schedule of a program are more complex, moving to a more rigorous  program management category is often required. According to the  instruction, when enhanced complexity and risk are associated with a  program, among other things, “Enhanced Management B” is the  appropriate designation. The instruction also allows for programs to  “tailor,” or modify, the application of certain requirements depending  on risk and other factors.
Program Management Policy for Weapons and Strategic  Materials Programs (2017) – NNSA issued a program management  policy in January 2017 that defines general roles and responsibilities  for all four strategic materials program managers. This policy  broadly outlines the managers’ authority and responsibilities for  managing the strategic materials; these responsibilities include  developing program documentation and managing risk. According to  NNSA officials we interviewed, the policy is based on NNSA’s  experience in implementing the uranium program in 2014. The policy  requires each of the strategic materials programs to develop a  number of guidance documents, including a mission strategy, mission  requirements, and a technology development plan. For each program,  the policy also requires the formation of a strategic materials mission  working group that is comprised of the key stakeholders involved in  the program.

	NNSA Officials Reported Progress in Meeting Strategic Materials Program Requirements but Challenges from Staffing Shortages

NNSA officials told us that they are making progress in implementing the  program requirements outlined for each of the strategic materials  programs, although some are further along than others. However, these  officials said that relatively few staff had been assigned to these  programs, which has challenged implementation efforts.

		Progress Reported in Implementing Program Requirements

For its two strategic materials programs established in 2014—uranium  and domestic uranium enrichment—NNSA officials told us that they are  generally meeting the strategic materials program management  requirements outlined in the Program Execution Instruction and the  Program Management Policy for Weapons and Strategic Materials.  NNSA officials identified documents for each program, including mission  strategy, mission requirements, program plan, and work breakdown  structure. For the other programs, according to agency officials, NNSA is  still working to meet these requirements, though the tritium program met  all requirements during the course of this review. More specifically,  according to agency officials:
The plutonium sustainment program has met some of the Program  Execution Instruction requirements to date, including having in place a  program plan, work breakdown structure, and decision analysis, but  not an integrated master schedule (although one is being developed,  according to agency officials). The plutonium program also has a  mission strategy in place, as called for by the Program Management  Policy for Weapons and Strategic Materials, but has not yet met the  other strategic materials program management requirements.  According to agency officials, those requirements are being  developed.
The tritium sustainment program has recently met the Program  Execution Instruction requirements as well, including having a  program plan, work breakdown structure, integrated master schedule,  and performance management approach in place. Additionally, the  program recently updated documentation to meet the Program  Management Policy requirements including revising its Strategic  Material Mission Working Group in 2017, according to agency  officials.
The lithium program is early in its development, and no program  manager has been appointed yet, pending senior NNSA leadership  decisions. NNSA has a lithium mission strategy, a mission  requirements matrix, and a technology development plan in place, as  required by the Program Management Policy for Weapons and  Strategic Materials, but the rest of the strategic materials program  management requirements are still in the process of being developed,  according to agency officials. NNSA officials said that even though the  lithium program is not subject to the same requirements, they intend  for it to meet all of the same requirements as the other strategic  materials programs.

		Staffing Challenges Reported

Officials from the Office of Defense Programs, including the strategic  materials program managers themselves, said that a shortage of staff has  presented a challenge in terms of implementing the requirements of the  strategic materials programs and meeting their missions. According to  NNSA officials, all of the strategic materials programs have been  assigned relatively few federal staff to implement the programs. The  officials also said that while they plan to have all five strategic materials  programs fully meet the requirements and operate as cohesive programs,  the lack of staff has hampered their efforts to do so. For example, the  plutonium manager said more staff were needed to successfully  implement the program, and the lithium lead point of contact said that at  least two full-time staff members would be required to accomplish the  work needed to make the lithium program meet program requirements.  Specifically, according to agency officials as of October 2017, in addition  to contractor support:  the uranium program had the program manager and two federal  staff assigned;  the domestic uranium enrichment program had the program  manager and one federal staff assigned;  the plutonium program had the program manager and one federal  staff member;  the tritium program had the program manager and no dedicated  staff, relying instead on staff in other programs such as a federal  program manager from a different program who acts as staff for this  program; and  the lithium program had the lead point of contact and no dedicated  staff, although a contracted senior technical advisor provides some  support.
NNSA officials cited competing agency priorities and current perceived  staffing limits as the primary impediments to assigning more staff to these  programs. First, according to agency officials, the relative newness of the  strategic materials programs and competing agency priorities to  modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure and modernize and extend  the lives of current nuclear weapons have meant that federal staff are in  high demand across the agency. This concern is consistent with issues  we have identified in our past work as well. For example, in April 2017,  we noted NNSA’s ambitious, costly, decades-long effort to modernize the  nation’s nuclear security enterprise. In addition to ongoing and planned  infrastructure modernization, some of which is associated with the  strategic materials programs, this modernization includes four ongoing  expensive weapons refurbishments and efforts to improve the agency’s  research, development, testing, and evaluation capabilities by, for  example, continuing efforts in advanced modeling, simulation, and  computing. Similarly, we found in September 2016 that the competing  agency priorities for infrastructure modernization and weapons  refurbishments had negatively affected another NNSA program: the  Enhanced Surveillance Program.
Second, NNSA officials said that they have limited flexibility when it  comes to increasing federal staff levels. Specifically, in each year that the  total number of federal employees at NNSA exceeds 1,690, the  Administrator is required by law to submit to the congressional defense  committees a report justifying such excess. In the NNSA Administrator’s  testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and  Water Development in June 2017, he stated that since 2010, NNSA’s  program funding had increased 28 percent, while its federal staffing levels  had decreased by 17 percent. He said that initial results from a yet-to-be- completed study by the Office of Personnel Management in support of the  Reform of Government Initiative indicate the need for a 20 percent  increase in federal staff at NNSA.
We have also previously reported that staffing shortages have affected  NNSA’s efforts to improve management capability. For example, we  reported in October 2014 that NNSA determined that inadequate levels of  federal staff had contributed to management problems with the UPF  project. As a result, NNSA increased staffing levels for the UPF project  office from 9 full-time equivalents in 2012 to more than 50 as of January  2014. According to NNSA officials, the additional staff enabled NNSA to  conduct more robust oversight of the contractor’s design efforts than was  previously possible. Similarly, in 2016, we found that the B61-12 life  extension program, the most costly and complex such program  undertaken to date, successfully requested that NNSA enlarge its  program office staff from 3 to 8 full-time equivalent staff to provide more  management capability. However, we found that even with this increase  in federal staff, some NNSA and DOD officials said that they believe that  NNSA needs two to three times more personnel in the federal program  manager’s office to ensure sufficient federal management and oversight.
One area that we noted in this review is that with regard to the strategic  materials programs, NNSA has not conducted a workforce needs  assessment. Strategic materials program officials acknowledged that they  had neither specifically assessed the number or skills of staff needed to  manage the strategic materials programs, nor did they have current plans  to do such an assessment. Our prior work on strategic human capital  management has identified certain activities or practices that can help an  agency strategically manage its human capital. These activities include  determining the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to  achieve the programs’ missions and developing strategies to address  gaps in the number, deployment, and alignment of staff needed. NNSA  officials said that individual offices have attempted over time to assess  resource and skill needs but that these efforts have been hampered by,  among other things, a lack of staff. By determining the critical skills and  competencies needed to achieve each strategic material program’s  mission and using this determination to develop strategies to address any  gaps in the number, deployment, and alignment of staff needed, NNSA  may find it has better information to justify increased staffing levels for its  strategic materials programs.

	Conclusions

Since 2014, NNSA has taken steps to establish programs to maintain and  modernize the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, including appointing  federal program managers for four of the five strategic materials  programs, as well as steps to establish and organize the programs  according to internal program management requirements. This is a  significant step given the importance, cost, and complexity of these  strategic materials programs. However, NNSA has made varying  progress implementing these strategic materials programs, in part  because these programs may not have been allotted staff and  management capacity commensurate with their cost and scope of work.
Although strategic materials program officials acknowledged staffing  limitations, they have not determined the critical skills and competencies  that will be needed to meet program requirements and, ultimately,  achieve the programs’ missions. By determining the critical skills and  competencies needed to achieve each strategic materials programs’  missions and using that determination to develop strategies to address  any gaps in the number, deployment, and alignment of staff needed,  NNSA may find it has more information to justify increased staffing levels  for its strategic materials programs.

	Recommendation for Executive Action

The NNSA Administrator should determine the critical skills and  competencies that will be needed for the strategic materials programs  and use this determination to develop strategies for addressing  challenges, if any, related to the number, deployment, and alignment of  program staff (Recommendation 1).

	Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to DOE and NNSA for their review and  comment. NNSA provided written comments, which are reproduced in full  in appendix II, as well as technical comments, which we incorporated in  our report as appropriate. In its comments, NNSA agreed with our  recommendation and stated that the recommendation is consistent with  the programs’ current evolution. NNSA further stated that it recognizes  the need to define the range of skills and competencies necessary to  execute the programs' critical missions and that it plans to identify the  complete set of core competencies needed for these programs by  December 31, 2018.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the National  Nuclear Security Administration, and other interested parties. In addition,  the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Strategic Nuclear Materials Managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Appendix I: Strategic Nuclear Materials  Managed by the National Nuclear Security  Administration (NNSA)
NNSA has established programs for ensuring the supply of each of the  following strategic materials as well as the capability to process them:
Uranium – National security needs for uranium are met using a large  existing inventory of previously enriched uranium. Although NNSA  has estimated that stocks are sufficient for projected needs, existing  uranium needs to be purified, machined, and recovered from existing  operations. The Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge,  Tennessee, is the NNSA site for conducting enriched uranium  activities, producing uranium-related components for nuclear  warheads and bombs, and processing feedstock for nuclear fuel for  the U.S. Navy. In 2004, NNSA decided to construct a new Uranium  Processing Facility (UPF) that consolidated the functions of four  separate uranium facilities into a single building. In 2014, NNSA, on  the advice of a peer review team, decided to pursue a uranium  program that includes a smaller UPF and, among other program  elements, modifications to existing uranium buildings and capabilities  to include several new uranium processing technologies. Construction  on the UPF continues at the Y-12 site, and NNSA continues to  request funds for that project. Fiscal year 2018 funds are to be used  for construction of some related subprojects. According to NNSA  officials, the UPF is expected to be complete by 2025 and cost no  more than $6.5 billion. NNSA estimates that additional investments  needed to upgrade existing uranium facilities will cost about $20  million per year for the next 20 years.
Domestic Uranium Enrichment – To produce tritium, the Tennessee  Valley Authority (TVA) must use unobligated uranium in certain  nuclear reactors, under an interagency agreement between  Department of Energy (DOE) and TVA. The United States has not  had a sustained uranium enrichment capability since the 2013 closure  of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, which was originally  constructed in 1952. In 2014, NNSA created the domestic uranium  enrichment program manager position with responsibility to sustain  the agency’s supply of low-enriched uranium for tritium production.
We currently have ongoing work reviewing the program’s plan to  ensure supply through 2060. NNSA estimated that over the next 5  years alone, these activities will likely cost more than $400 million.
Plutonium – A set of aging facilities at Los Alamos National  Laboratory provides the backbone of NNSA’s plutonium work, such as  certifying the safety of existing nuclear weapons’ plutonium pits and  producing new pits to extend the life of nuclear weapons in the  stockpile. NNSA conducts plutonium analysis in the Chemistry and  Metallurgy Research facility, which was built in the 1950s, but NNSA  plans to cease programmatic operations in this facility by 2019  because of its aging infrastructure and because it sits on a seismic  fault line. NNSA produces pits and conducts pit surveillance in the 38- year-old high-hazard, high-security Plutonium Facility 4 at Los  Alamos. Other important plutonium activities, such as NNSA’s  plutonium disposition efforts and the processing of plutonium used to  provide heat sources for space missions, are not included in the  plutonium manager’s portfolio because other program offices are  responsible for these activities, according to NNSA officials. Officials  said that these program offices coordinate capability and facility needs  with the plutonium program manager.
In August 2014, DOE cancelled plans to construct the nuclear facility  that was part of the overall Chemistry and Metallurgy Research  Replacement (CMRR), which was approved in 2005 to replace the  aging Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility. In its place, DOE  approved the implementation of the first part of NNSA’s new  plutonium strategy: the revised CMRR project, which includes a  subproject to remove contaminated equipment no longer in use in  Plutonium Facility 4, install new plutonium analysis equipment, and  modify an existing building to handle higher quantities of plutonium.  NNSA estimated that the CMRR project would cost from $2.4 billion to  $2.9 billion and be completed by 2024. In addition, in November 2015,  DOE approved the mission need for the implementation of the second  part of the strategy: building modular nuclear facilities to add high- hazard, high-security laboratory space at Los Alamos (the Plutonium  Modular Approach) to meet plutonium pit production requirements.  NNSA estimated that the Plutonium Modular Approach could cost  from $1.3 billion to $3.0 billion and be completed by the end of 2027.
Tritium – NNSA has relied on tritium produced many years ago;  recycling and recovery of existing tritium is currently the source of  most of the tritium in the stockpile, according to NNSA officials.  However, tritium decays relatively rapidly, and in 2015 NNSA  identified a need to produce additional tritium. To produce tritium,  lithium target rods—called tritium-producing burnable absorber rods— are irradiated in TVA’s reactors. The irradiated rods are transported to  DOE’s Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site in South  Carolina, where they are processed in a specialized facility to extract  and then prepare the tritium for nuclear warheads. NNSA requested  $9.8 million in design funds in fiscal year 2018 for construction of a  new tritium production capability. In its fiscal year 2018 budget  request, NNSA estimated that this facility would cost about $425  million and be approved for operations in 2027.
Lithium – Lithium is a key component of nuclear weapons and is  essential for their refurbishment. NNSA has a sufficient supply of  enriched lithium-6 (the isotope used in refurbishments and for tritium  production), but that lithium is stored in another form and must  undergo complex processing before it can be used for these  purposes. NNSA halted certain aspects of its lithium processing  operation—conducted at its Y-12 site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee—in  May 2013 due to the condition of the site’s 72-year-old lithium  production facility. Currently, NNSA is relying on a less complex but  also less efficient process that results in a loss of approximately 50  percent of material. In 2013, NNSA developed a lithium production  strategy that proposed a new lithium production facility, which the  agency estimated would cost more than $500 million. NNSA plans to  request $30.4 million in fiscal year 2019 for construction of this facility.  This strategy includes sustaining current infrastructure and deploying  new technologies to sustain lithium production.

Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact above, Jonathan Gill (Assistant Director), Alisa  Beyninson, Antoinette Capaccio, Jeff Larson, Cynthia Norris, and Kiki  Theodoropoulos made key contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: A Complete Scope of Work  Is Needed to Develop Timely Cost and Schedule Information for the  Uranium Program. GAO-17-577. Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2017.
Program Management: DOE Needs to Develop a Comprehensive Policy  and Training Program. GAO-17-51. Washington, D.C.: November 21,  2016.
DOE Project Management: NNSA Needs to Clarify Requirements for Its  Plutonium Analysis Project at Los Alamos. GAO-16-585. Washington,  D.C.: August 9, 2016.
Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA’s Budget Estimates  Increased but May Not Align with All Anticipated Costs. GAO-16-290.  Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2016.
Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA Increased Its Budget  Estimates, but Estimates for Key Stockpile and Infrastructure Programs  Need Improvement. GAO-15-499. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2015.
DOE Project Management: NNSA Should Ensure Equal Consideration of  Alternatives for Lithium Production. GAO-15-525. Washington, D.C.: July  13, 2015.
DOE and NNSA Project Management: Analysis of Alternatives Could Be  Improved by Incorporating Best Practices. GAO-15-37. Washington, D.C.:  December 11, 2014.
Project and Program Management: DOE Needs to Revise Requirements  and Guidance for Cost Estimating and Related Reviews. GAO-15-29.  Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2014.
Nuclear Weapons: Some Actions Have Been Taken to Address  Challenges with the Uranium Processing Facility Design. GAO-15-126.  Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2014.
Nuclear Weapons: Technology Development Efforts for the Uranium  Processing Facility. GAO-14-295. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2014.
Plutonium Disposition Program: DOE Needs to Analyze the Root Causes  of Cost Increases and Develop Better Cost Estimates. GAO-14-231.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2014.
Nuclear Weapons: Information on Safety Concerns with the Uranium  Processing Facility. GAO-14-79R. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2013.
Nuclear Weapons: Factors Leading to Cost Increases with the Uranium  Processing Facility. GAO-13-686R. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2013.
Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plans for Its  Uranium Processing Facility Should Better Reflect Funding Estimates and  Technology Readiness. GAO-11-103. Washington, D.C.: November 19,  2010.

Output:
Why GAO Did This Study

NNSA is responsible for ensuring a sustainable supply of strategic materials critical to the nation's nuclear security missions, as well as the capability to process these materials. NNSA estimates that strategic materials management activities will cost about $7.7 billion over the next 5 years.
The House Report accompanying H.R. 4909, a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, included a provision for GAO to review NNSA's management of its strategic materials programs. This report examines (1) the extent to which NNSA has, for these programs, defined requirements, including program manager roles and responsibilities, and (2) the progress of NNSA's implementation of those program requirements.
GAO reviewed NNSA program management policies and documents related to its strategic materials program manager positions and interviewed NNSA officials and program managers.

What GAO Found

The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages strategic materials programs for uranium, plutonium, tritium, and lithium—materials that are critical to national security. NNSA has set program requirements that each of the programs must follow and has established the roles and responsibilities of the program managers. NNSA has defined these requirements in two documents:
Program Execution Instruction (2016). Outlines requirements for program management documents, such as a program plan, cost and schedule estimates, and an integrated master schedule that includes the entire scope of work for successful execution.
Program Management Policy (2017). Outlines the program managers' authority and requirements for managing the strategic materials programs, such as managing risk, and requires each program to develop documents, such as a mission strategy and technology development plan.
NNSA officials reported that the agency is making progress implementing the requirements outlined for each of the strategic materials programs, although some of the programs are farther along than others. For example:
The uranium and domestic uranium enrichment programs established in 2014 are the furthest along and have developed the documents needed to meet strategic program requirements.
The plutonium program has met some of the requirements, such as developing a program plan, work breakdown structure, and decision analysis, but does not yet have an integrated master schedule.
The tritium program met the requirements during the course of GAO's review.
The lithium program, which is the newest, has made the least amount of progress and to date has developed only a mission strategy, a mission requirements matrix, and a technology development plan.
According to NNSA officials, shortage of staff assigned to the strategic materials programs has been the primary reason hampering progress in implementing the program requirements. For example, a lithium program manager has not yet been assigned, and all the other programs have identified the need for additional staff beyond the one or two staff currently assigned to each. According to officials, competing agency priorities and perceived staffing limits are the primary impediments to assigning more staff to these programs. However, GAO also found that NNSA has not determined the critical skills and competencies needed for these programs. GAO's prior work has identified certain activities or practices that can help an agency strategically manage its human capital. These activities include determining the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve the program's mission and developing strategies to address gaps in the number, deployment, and alignment of staff needed. By determining the critical skills and competencies needed for the strategic materials programs and using this determination to develop strategies to address any gaps in the number, deployment, and alignment of program staff, NNSA may have the information it needs to better justify increased staffing levels for the programs.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that NNSA determine the critical skills and competencies that will be needed for the strategic materials programs and use this determination to develop strategies for addressing any gaps related to the number, deployment, and alignment of program staff. NNSA agreed with GAO's recommendation.