Input:
	Background

The Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980 to clean up hazardous waste sites. The act gives EPA the authority to compel the parties responsible for these sites to clean them up. The act also created a $1.6 billion trust fund, known as Superfund, for EPA to implement the program and pay for cleanups. The Superfund program has two basic types of cleanups: (1) remedial cleanups, which are long-term cleanup actions at sites on the National Priorities List (NPL), EPA’s list of the nation’s worst hazardous waste sites, and (2) removal cleanups, which mitigate more immediate threats at both NPL and non-NPL sites. EPA’s removal cleanups include (1) emergency removals for threats requiring immediate action, (2) time-critical removals for threats requiring action within 6 months, and (3) NTC removals for threats where action can be delayed for at least 6 months in order to adequately plan for cleanups.
In March 1995, EPA surveyed site managers in the regions to obtain their estimates of the benefits and lessons learned from conducting NTC removals. EPA had initiated 81 such actions by then, and 40 were beyond the study phase. Our testimony today is based on the results of that survey and interviews of EPA headquarters and regional officials in charge of removals, state cleanup managers, private parties that used the NTC process, and representatives of environmental advocacy organizations. We did not independently validate EPA’s survey results. We performed our work from September 1995 through March 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

	NTC Removals Can Provide Valuable Benefits but May Have Some Disadvantages

Compared to traditional remediation, NTC removals significantly accelerate the study and design steps of cleanups at portions of sites, thereby reducing overall cleanup costs and more quickly protecting human health and the environment. However, increasing the use of NTC removals may increase the amount of EPA staff time required to oversee contractors. Also, using these removals could shift a portion of the cleanup costs from the states to EPA.

		NTC Removals Save Time and Money and Improve Environmental Protection

According to the site managers EPA surveyed, using the NTC program instead of the remedial program reduced the overall time spent on cleaning up portions of sites from about 4 years to 2 years, on average. In many cases, site managers reported time savings of more than 3 years. These savings occur primarily because NTC actions take much less time than remedial actions to study the contamination and design a cleanup method.
According to EPA technical and regional staff who manage cleanups, they use NTC actions when they are relatively certain about the nature of the contamination that is present and the type of cleanup method they should use. For such cleanups, they do not need to use the extensive study and design steps that the remedial program calls for. Like remedial actions, NTC actions also include steps, although abbreviated, for the public and the state to participate in planning the cleanup. Also, because EPA’s guidance requires that NTC removals generally meet states’ cleanup standards, the level of cleanup achieved with these removals is not expected to be significantly different from the level achieved with remedial cleanups.
The streamlined NTC process also results in reduced cleanup costs. According to EPA’s survey, conducting an NTC action costs, on average, about $3.6 million, or about $0.5 million less than a similar remedial action would have cost. In many cases, larger savings have been reported. For example, one private party estimated that conducting the cleanup as an NTC action instead of a remedial action reduced the cleanup costs by about $2 million—at least half of the total cleanup costs. Savings of more than $1 million have also been reported for federally funded cleanups.
Faster cleanups through the use of NTC removals also mean better protection of human health and the environment. According to EPA site managers, NTC removals can be used to clean up the portions of Superfund sites where contaminants pose a current risk to human health or could spread further in the environment. For example, EPA used the NTC process to accelerate a cleanup by more than 4 years at a chemical processing plant where contaminants in the soil were migrating toward a schoolyard. In another case, a private party used the NTC process to accelerate a cleanup by more than 4 years, removing contaminants from the soil and shallow groundwater before they could spread to deep groundwater, which is difficult and costly to clean up.

		NTC Removals Have Potential Disadvantages

While NTC removals demonstrate valuable benefits, they may also present some disadvantages, including the need for more staff time to monitor NTC cleanups, less ability for EPA to enforce cleanup agreements with private parties, and a potential for states to decrease their funding of a portion of the cleanup costs. Opinions vary about the significance of these disadvantages.
Under a remedial cleanup contract, EPA pays a contractor to conduct a fixed set of actions that both parties have agreed to at the start of the cleanup. In contrast, under an NTC cleanup contract, EPA pays a contractor for the company’s time and materials, but an EPA site manager directs the contractor’s actions. EPA technical and regional staff involved in NTC removals agree that time and materials contracts require almost daily on-site supervision, whereas remedial cleanup contracts do not. However, EPA site managers argue that close supervision of the contractor offers EPA greater control over the work and more flexibility to make adjustments.
Under its NTC removal authority, EPA may have more difficulty enforcing private party cleanup agreements than it would under its remedial authority. For a remedial action, EPA uses a consent decree issued by a court, whereas, for an NTC removal, it uses an administrative order issued by its regional management. EPA headquarters and regional officials involved in both processes are concerned about the potential for a private party to default on an NTC removal because an administrative order does not provide EPA with immediate penalties for enforcing a cleanup agreement. If a party does default, EPA may then have to fund the rest of the cleanup while the matter is being resolved in the courts. Private parties have told us, however, that even with the consent decree for remedial agreements, a default will also likely have to be resolved in the courts.
Finally, NTC cleanups may shift some portion of the cleanup costs from the states to the federal government. Under CERCLA and EPA’s regulations, a federally funded remedial action cannot proceed until the state in which the site is located agrees to pay 10 percent of the cleanup costs and to handle most of the follow-on operations and maintenance activities. Because the law generally does not require such state participation in removals, including NTC removals, the federal government may have to bear the costs of NTC removals without state support. However, some states already have voluntarily shared the cost of NTC removals and assumed the responsibility for operations and maintenance in exchange for quicker and less costly cleanups. Also, EPA removal guidance advises regions to obtain such state participation.

	NTC Removals Can Be Used to Clean Up the High-Risk Portions of Most Superfund Sites

The variety of sites, media, and actions addressed under the NTC process to date indicate a strong potential for using NTC removals to clean up portions of most Superfund sites, especially the high-risk portions. However, the remaining portions of many of these sites may still require some long-term action, such as groundwater restoration, which is more appropriately conducted under the full remedial process.
Like Superfund sites in general, NTC sites include manufacturing sites, landfills, mining sites, and chemical processing sites, among others. NTC removals have been used on relatively small and large areas, some exceeding 20 acres. While these actions have primarily addressed contaminated soil and shallow sources of groundwater, they have also been used to clean up sediment, surface water, and site debris. NTC removals have employed many of the same kinds of permanent cleanup actions as have the remedial program, including extracting contaminants from soil and shallow groundwater and treating contaminants. NTC removals have also relied on engineering controls to contain contamination.
NTC removals have been performed at so many different kinds of sites that, according to several site managers, they could be used for portions of almost any Superfund site. Currently, about 1,000 NPL sites await cleanup and about another 1,400 to 2,300 sites are estimated to be contaminated enough to be listed in the future. If we assume that NTC removals could be performed at all of these sites and that cost savings could average $0.5 million per site, the federal government and private parties could save from $1.2 to $1.7 billion over the life of the Superfund program by using NTC removals instead of remedial actions.
Site managers expected that for about one-third of the sites in the survey, no further action would be required beyond the NTC removal. The remaining sites most likely have portions that contain more complex contamination. Such sites would warrant a full remedial study and design, according to EPA cleanup managers. For example, contaminated groundwater may require decades of treatment and millions of dollars in cleanup costs. Such an investment would justify more extensive planning.

	Several Factors Constrain the Use of NTC Removals

Several factors have constrained the use of NTC removals, including the difficulty regions encounter in funding these actions and the current statutory limits on the time and costs that can be spent on NTC removals.

		Funding for NTC Removals Is Limited

According to regional cleanup managers, funding inflexibility limits the number of NTC removals they can conduct. Although spending for removals has increased gradually since 1992, it has represented only 9 to 17 percent of the total Superfund spending. Of this percentage, most must go to fund the hundreds of emergency and time-critical removals that regions conduct, leaving little for NTC removals. Although regions may have unobligated funds in their remedial budgets, EPA headquarters does not permit the regions to transfer these funds to their removal budgets. According to EPA budget officials in headquarters, the agency must allocate funds among many competing activities within the Superfund program and has an obligation to focus on the longer-term remedial program. Also, since the agency reports quarterly to the Congress on its Superfund expenditures, EPA has to account separately for its remedial and removal activities.

		Time and Cost Limits Set in Law Constrain the Use of NTC Removals

CERCLA limits the cost of removal actions financed by the trust fund to $2 million. Furthermore, the law states that a removal action cannot take more than 12 months to complete. EPA can justify a waiver of these limits if it demonstrates either that the situation is an emergency—unlikely for an NTC removal—or that the action is “consistent with the remedial action to be taken.” EPA’s regions have interpreted this latter requirement inconsistently. For example, according to a site manager in San Francisco, the regional counsel advised that an NTC removal be used only if a remedial cleanup plan had been signed. This region had conducted only one of the NTC actions in EPA’s survey. Also, according to the site manager in Boston, the regional counsel advised that an NTC removal be used only at an NPL site. That region had conducted five of the NTC removals.
More than half of the NTC removals in EPA’s survey had exceeded either the time or the cost limits. Proposed legislation to reauthorize Superfund, H.R. 2500 and S. 1285, would raise the limits on removals and relax the consistency requirements.
Mr. Chairman, this completes our prepared statement. We would be pleased to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
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Output:
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO discussed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) use of non-time-critical removals for hazardous waste cleanups, focusing on: (1) the advantages and disadvantages of non-time-critical removals; (2) the potential use of non-time-critical removals in Superfund cleanups; and (3) factors that inhibit the use of non-time-critical removals.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) on average the use of non-time-critical removals could expedite environmental cleanups by 2 years and reduce costs by about $500,000 over similar cleanup actions using the remedial removal process; (2) non-time-critical removals are successful because they have a streamlined planning process; (3) non-time-critical removals would require EPA to spend more time overseeing cleanup contracts and shift costs from states to EPA; (4) non-time-critical removals are a potentially useful tool in cleaning up portions of most of the 3,000 sites in the EPA Superfund inventory; (5) non-time-critical removals have not been used for a wide variety of cleanups because most Superfund funding has been spent on emergency removals; (6) additional factors that have limited non-time-critical removal use include EPA inability to shift funds between accounts and regions, and statutory limits on the duration and cost of non-time-critical removals; and (7) the proposed Superfund reauthorization legislation would ease the statutory limitations on non-time-critical removals.


Input:
	DHS Has Made Progress in Harmonizing International Aviation Security and Facilitating Compliance through Foreign Airport Assessments, but Can Further Strengthen Assessment Efforts

		DHS Has Made Progress in Its Efforts to Harmonize International Aviation Security Standards and Practices

DHS has increased its global outreach efforts. Historically, DHS and  its components, working with State, have coordinated with foreign  partners on an ongoing basis to promote aviation security enhancements  through ICAO and other multilateral and bilateral outreach efforts. For  example, DHS and TSA have coordinated through multilateral groups such  as the European Commission and the Quadrilateral Group—comprising  the United States, the EU, Canada, and Australia—to establish agreements  to develop commensurate air cargo security systems. On a bilateral basis,  the United States has participated in various working groups to facilitate  coordination on aviation security issues with several nations, such as  those that make up the EU, Canada, and Japan. The United States has also  established bilateral cooperative agreements to share information on  security technology with the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and  Israel, among others. In addition, TSA has finalized agreements with  ICAO to provide technical expertise and assistance to ICAO in the areas of  capacity building and security audits, and serves as the United States’  technical representative on ICAO’s Aviation Security Panel and the panel’s  various Working Groups.
In the wake of the December 2009 incident, DHS increased its outreach  efforts. For example, to address security gaps highlighted by the  December incident, DHS has coordinated with Nigeria to deploy Federal  Air Marshals on flights operated by U.S. carriers bound for the United  States from Nigeria. Further, in early 2010, the Secretary of Homeland  Security participated in five regional summits—Africa, the Asia/Pacific  region, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere—with the  Secretary General of ICAO, foreign ministers and aviation officials, and  international industry representatives to discuss current aviation security  threats and develop an international consensus on the steps needed to  address remaining gaps in the international aviation security system.  Each of these summits resulted in a Joint Declaration on Aviation Security  in which, generally, the parties committed to work through ICAO and on  an individual basis to enhance aviation security. Subsequently, during the  September 2010 ICAO Assembly, the 190 member states adopted a  Declaration on Aviation Security, which encompassed the principles of the  Joint Declarations produced by the five regional summits. Through the  declaration, member states recognized the need to strengthen aviation  security worldwide and agreed to take nine actions to enhance  international cooperation to counter threats to civil aviation, which  include, among other things    strengthening and promoting the effective application of ICAO Standards  and Recommended Practices, with particular focus on Annex 17, and  developing strategies to address current and emerging threats;    strengthening security screening procedures, enhancing human factors,  and utilizing modern technologies to detect prohibited articles and support  research and development of technology for the detection of explosives,  weapons, and prohibited articles in order to prevent acts of unlawful  interference;    developing and implementing strengthened and harmonized measures and  best practices for air cargo security, taking into account the need to  protect the entire air cargo supply chain; and    providing technical assistance to states in need, including funding,  capacity building, and technology transfer to effectively address security  threats to civil aviation, in cooperation with other states, international  organizations and industry partners.
TSA has increased coordination with foreign partners to enhance  security standards and practices. In response to the August 2006 plot to  detonate liquid explosives on board commercial air carriers bound for the  United States, TSA initially banned all liquids, gels, and aerosols from  being carried through the checkpoint and, in September 2006, began  allowing passengers to carry on small, travel-size liquids and gels (3 fluid  ounces or less) using a single quart-size, clear plastic, zip-top bag. In  November 2006, in an effort to harmonize its liquid-screening standards  with those of other countries, TSA revised its procedures to match those  of other select nations. Specifically, TSA began allowing 3.4 fluid ounces  of liquids, gels, and aerosols onboard aircraft, which is equivalent to 100  milliliters—the amount permitted by the EU and other countries such as  Canada and Australia. This harmonization effort was perceived to be a  success and ICAO later adopted the liquid, gels, and aerosol screening  standards and procedures implemented by TSA and other nations as a  recommended practice.
TSA has also worked with foreign governments to draft international air  cargo security standards. According to TSA officials, the agency has  worked with foreign counterparts over the last 3 years to draft  Amendment 12 to ICAO’s Annex 17, and to generate support for its  adoption by ICAO members. The amendment, which was adopted by the  ICAO Council in November 2010, will set forth new standards related to air  cargo such as requiring members to establish a system to secure the air  cargo supply chain (the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailers).  TSA has also supported the International Air Transport Association’s  (IATA) efforts to establish a secure supply chain approach to screening  cargo for its member airlines and to have these standards recognized  internationally. Moreover, following the October 2010 bomb attempt in  cargo originating in Yemen, DHS and TSA, among other things, reached  out to international partners, IATA, and the international shipping industry  to emphasize the global nature of transportation security threats and the  need to strengthen air cargo security through enhanced screening and  preventative measures. TSA also deployed a team of security inspectors to  Yemen to provide that country’s government with assistance and guidance  on their air cargo screening procedures.
In addition, TSA has focused on harmonizing air cargo security standards  and practices in support of its statutory mandate to establish a system to  physically screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft—including  the domestic and inbound flights of United States and foreign passenger  operations—by August 2010. In June 2010 we reported that TSA has  made progress in meeting this mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, but  faces several challenges in meeting the screening mandate as it applies to  inbound cargo, related, in part, to TSA’s limited ability to regulate foreign  entities. As a result, TSA officials stated that the agency would not be  able to meet the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo by the August 2010  deadline. We recommended that TSA develop a plan, with milestones, for  how and when the agency intends to meet the mandate as it applies to  inbound cargo. TSA concurred with this recommendation and, in June  2010, stated that agency officials were drafting milestones as part of a plan  that would generally require air carriers to conduct 100 percent screening  by a specific date. At a November 2010 hearing before the Senate  Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the TSA  Administrator testified that TSA aims to meet the 100 percent screening  mandate as it applies to inbound air cargo by 2013.
In November 2010 TSA officials stated that the agency is coordinating with  foreign countries to evaluate the comparability of their air cargo security  requirements with those of the United States, including the mandated  screening requirements for inbound air cargo on passenger aircraft.  According to TSA officials, the agency has begun to develop a program  that would recognize the air cargo security programs of foreign countries  if TSA deems those programs provide a level of security commensurate  with TSA’s programs. In total, TSA plans to coordinate with about 20  countries, which, according to TSA officials, were selected in part because  they export about 90 percent of the air cargo transported to the United  States on passenger aircraft. According to officials, TSA has completed a  6-month review of France’s air cargo security program and is evaluating  the comparability of France’s requirements with those of the United  States. TSA officials also said that, as of November 2010, the agency has  begun to evaluate the comparability of air cargo security programs for the  United Kingdom, Israel, Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia, and  plans to work with Canada and several EU countries in early 2011. TSA  expects to work with the remaining countries through 2013.
TSA is working with foreign governments to encourage the  development and deployment of enhanced screening technologies.  TSA has also coordinated with foreign governments to develop enhanced  screening technologies that will detect explosive materials on passengers.  According to TSA officials, the agency frequently exchanges information  with its international partners on progress in testing and evaluating  various screening technologies, such as bottled-liquid scanner systems and  advanced imaging technology (AIT). In response to the December 2009  incident, the Secretary of Homeland Security has emphasized through  outreach efforts the need for nations to develop and deploy enhanced  security technologies.
Following TSA’s decision to accelerate the deployment of AIT in the  United States, the Secretary has encouraged other nations to consider  using AIT units to enhance the effectiveness of passenger screening  globally. As a result, several nations, including Australia, Canada, Finland,  France, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Germany, Poland, Japan, Ukraine,  Russia, Republic of Korea, and the UK, have begun to test or deploy AIT  units or have committed to deploying AITs at their airports. For example,  the Australian Government has committed to introducing AIT at  international terminals in 2011. Other nations, such as Argentina, Chile,  Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Kenya, New Zealand, Singapore, and Spain  are considering deploying AIT units at their airports. In addition, TSA  hosted an international summit in November 2010 that brought together  approximately 30 countries that are deploying or considering deploying  AITs at their airports to discuss AIT policy, protocols, best practices, as  well as safety and privacy concerns.
However, as discussed in our March 2010 testimony, TSA’s use of AIT has  highlighted several challenges relating to privacy, costs, and effectiveness  that remain to be addressed. For example, because the AIT presents a  full-body image of a person during the screening process, concerns have  been expressed that the image is an invasion of privacy. Furthermore, as  noted in our March 2010 testimony, it remains unclear whether the AIT  would have been able to detect the weapon used in the December 2009  incident based on the preliminary TSA information we have received. We  will continue to explore these issues as part of our ongoing review of  TSA’s AIT deployment, and expect the final report to be issued in the  summer of 2011.

		DHS Has Made Progress in Its Efforts to Facilitate Compliance with ICAO Standards through Foreign Airport Assessments but Can Further Strengthen Its Efforts

TSA conducts foreign airport assessments. TSA efforts to assess  security at foreign airports—airports served by U.S. aircraft operators and  those from which foreign air carriers operate service to the United  States—also serve to strengthen international aviation security. Through  TSA’s foreign airport assessment program, TSA utilizes select ICAO  standards to assess the security measures used at foreign airports to  determine if they maintain and carry out effective security practices. TSA  also uses the foreign airport assessment program to help identify the need  for, and secure, aviation security training and technical assistance for  foreign countries. In addition, during assessments, TSA provides on-site  consultations and makes recommendations to airport officials or the host  government to immediately address identified deficiencies. In our 2007  review of TSA’s foreign airport assessment program, we reported that of  the 128 foreign airports that TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, TSA  found that 46 (about 36 percent) complied with all ICAO standards,  whereas 82 (about 64 percent) did not meet at least one ICAO standard.
In our 2007 review we also reported that TSA had not yet conducted its  own analysis of its foreign airport assessment results, and that additional  controls would help strengthen TSA’s oversight of the program. Moreover,  we reported, among other things, that TSA did not have controls in place  to track the status of scheduled foreign airport assessments, which could  make it difficult for TSA to ensure that scheduled assessments are  completed. We also reported that TSA did not consistently track and  document host government progress in addressing security deficiencies  identified during TSA airport assessments. As such, we made several  recommendations to help TSA strengthen oversight of its foreign airport  assessment program, including, among other things, that TSA develop  controls to track the status of foreign airport assessments from initiation  through completion; and develop a standard process for tracking and  documenting host governments’ progress in addressing security  deficiencies identified during TSA assessments. TSA agreed with our  recommendations and provided plans to address them. Near the end of  our 2007 review, TSA had begun work on developing an automated  database to track airport assessment results. In September 2010 TSA  officials told us that they are now exploring ways to streamline and  standardize that automated database, but will continue to use it until a  more effective tracking mechanism can be developed and deployed. We  plan to further evaluate TSA’s implementation of our 2007  recommendations during our ongoing review of TSA’s foreign airport  assessment program, which we plan to issue in the fall of 2011.

	Challenges Related to the Harmonization Process and TSA’s Foreign Airport Assessment Program May Affect DHS’s Progress

		Challenges Related to Harmonization

A number of key challenges, many of which are outside of DHS’s control,  could impede its ability to enhance international aviation security  standards and practices. Agency officials, foreign country representatives,  and international association stakeholders we interviewed said that these  challenges include, among other things, nations’ voluntary participation in  harmonization efforts, differing views on aviation security threats, varying  global resources, and legal and cultural barriers. According to DHS and  TSA officials, these are long-standing global challenges that are inherent in  diplomatic processes such as harmonization, and will require substantial  and continuous dialogue with international partners. As a result, according  to these officials, the enhancements that are made will likely occur  incrementally, over time.
Harmonization depends on voluntary participation. The framework  for developing and adhering to international aviation standards is based on  voluntary efforts from individual states. While TSA may require that  foreign air carriers with operations to, from, or within the United States  comply with any applicable U.S. emergency amendments to air carrier  security programs, foreign countries, as sovereign nations, generally  cannot be compelled to implement specific aviation security standards or  mutually accept other countries’ security measures. International  representatives have noted that national sovereignty concerns limit the  influence the United States and its foreign partners can have in persuading  any country to participate in international harmonization efforts. As we  reported in 2007 and 2010, participation in ICAO is voluntary. Each  nation must initiate its own involvement in harmonization, and the United  States may have limited influence over its international partners.
Countries view aviation security threats differently. As we reported  in 2007 and 2010, some foreign governments do not share the United  States government’s position that terrorism is an immediate threat to the  security of their aviation systems, and therefore may not view  international aviation security as a priority. For example, TSA identified  the primary threats to inbound air cargo as the introduction of an  explosive device in cargo loaded on a passenger aircraft, and the hijacking  of an all-cargo aircraft for its use as a weapon to inflict mass destruction.  However, not all foreign governments agree that these are the primary  threats to air cargo or believe that there should be a distinction between  the threats to passenger air carriers and those to all-cargo carriers.  According to a prominent industry association as well as foreign  government representatives with whom we spoke, some countries view  aviation security enhancement efforts differently because they have not  been a target of previous aviation-based terrorist incidents, or for other  reasons, such as overseeing a different airport infrastructure with fewer  airports and less air traffic.
Resource availability affects security enhancement efforts. In  contrast to more developed countries, many less developed countries do  not have the infrastructure or financial or human resources necessary to  enhance their aviation security programs. For example, according to DHS  and TSA officials, such countries may find the cost of purchasing and  implementing new aviation security enhancements, such as technology, to  be prohibitive. Additionally, some countries implementing new policies,  practices, and technologies may lack the human resources—for example,  trained staff—to implement enhanced security measures and oversee new  aviation security practices. Some foreign airports may also lack the  infrastructure to support new screening technologies, which can take up a  large amount of space. These limitations are more common in less  developed countries, which may lack the fiscal and human resources  necessary to implement and sustain enhanced aviation security measures.  With regard to air cargo, TSA officials also cautioned that if TSA were to  impose strict cargo screening standards on all inbound cargo, it is likely  many nations would be unable to meet the standards in the near term.  Imposing such screening standards in the near future could result in  increased costs for international passenger travel and for imported goods,  and possible reductions in passenger traffic and foreign imports.  According to TSA officials, strict standards could also undermine TSA’s  ongoing cooperative efforts to develop commensurate security systems  with international partners.
To help address the resource deficit and build management capacity in  other nations, the United States provides aviation security assistance— such as training and technical assistance—to other countries. TSA, for  example, works in various ways with State and international organizations  to provide aviation security assistance to foreign partners. In one such  effort, TSA uses information from the agency’s foreign airport assessments  to identify a nation’s aviation security training needs and provide support.  In addition, TSA’s Aviation Security Sustainable International Standards  Team (ASSIST), comprised of security experts, conducts an assessment of  a country’s aviation security program at both the national and airport level  and, based on the results, suggests action items in collaboration with the  host nation. State also provides aviation security assistance to other  countries, in coordination with TSA and foreign partners through its Anti- Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program. Through this program, State uses a  needs assessment—a snapshot of a country’s antiterrorism capability—to  evaluate prospective program participants and provide needed training,  equipment, and technology in support of aviation security, among other  areas. State and TSA officials have acknowledged the need to develop  joint coordination procedures and criteria to facilitate identification of  global priorities and program recipients. We will further explore TSA and  State efforts to develop mechanisms to facilitate interagency coordination  on capacity building through our ongoing work.
Legal and cultural factors can also affect harmonization. Legal and  cultural differences among nations may hamper DHS’s efforts to  harmonize aviation security standards. For example, some nations,  including the United States, limit, or even prohibit the sharing of sensitive  or classified information on aviation security procedures with other  countries. Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which limits the data  it can collect and share with other nations, demonstrates one such  impediment to harmonization. According to TSA officials, the United  States has established agreements to share sensitive and classified  information with some countries; however, without such agreements, TSA  is limited in its ability to share information with its foreign partners.  Additionally, the European Commission reports that several European  countries, by law, limit the exposure of persons to radiation other than for  medical purposes, a potential barrier to acquiring some passenger  screening technologies, such as AIT.
Cultural differences also serve as a challenge in achieving harmonization  because aviation security standards and practices that are acceptable in  one country may not be in another. For example, international aviation  officials explained that the nature of aviation security oversight varies by  country—some countries rely more on trust and established working  relationships to facilitate security standard compliance than direct  government enforcement. Another example of a cultural difference is the  extent to which countries accept the images AIT units produce. AIT units  produce a full-body image of a person during the screening process; to  varying degrees, governments and citizens of some countries, including  the United States, have expressed concern that these images raise privacy  issues. TSA is working to address this issue by evaluating possible display  options that would include a “stick figure” or “cartoon-like” form to  provide enhanced privacy protection to the individual being screened  while still allowing the unit operator or automated detection algorithms to  detect possible threats. Other nations, such as the Netherlands, are also  testing the effectiveness of this technology.
Although DHS has made progress in its efforts to harmonize international  aviation security standards and practices in key areas such as passenger  and air cargo screening, officials we interviewed said that there remain  areas in which security measures vary across nations and would benefit  from harmonization efforts. For example, as we reported in 2007, the  United States requires all passengers on international flights who transfer  to connecting flights at United States airports to be rescreened prior to  boarding their connecting flight. In comparison, according to EU and  ICAO officials, the EU has implemented “one-stop security,” allowing  passengers arriving from EU and select European airports to transfer to  connecting flights without being rescreened. Officials and representatives  told us that although there has been ongoing international discussion on  how to more closely align security measures in these and other areas,  additional dialogue is needed for countries to better understand each  others’ perspectives. According to the DHS officials and foreign  representatives with whom we spoke, these and other issues that could  benefit from harmonization efforts will continue to be explored through  ongoing coordination with ICAO and through other multilateral and  bilateral outreach efforts.

		Challenges Related to TSA’s Foreign Airport Assessment Program

Our 2007 review of TSA’s foreign airport assessment program identified  challenges TSA experienced in assessing security at foreign airports  against ICAO standards and recommended practices, including a lack of  available inspector resources and host government concerns, both of  which may affect the agency’s ability to schedule and conduct assessments  for some foreign airports. We reported that TSA deferred 30 percent of  its scheduled foreign airport visits in 2005 due to the lack of available  inspectors, among other reasons. TSA officials said that in such  situations they sometimes used domestic inspectors to conduct scheduled  foreign airport visits, but also stated that the use of domestic inspectors  was undesirable because these inspectors lacked experience conducting  assessments in the international environment. In September 2010 TSA  officials told us that they continue to use domestic inspectors to assist in  conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections— approximately 50 domestic inspectors have been trained to augment the  efforts of international inspectors. We also previously reported that  representatives of some foreign governments consider TSA’s foreign  airport assessment program an infringement of their authority to regulate  airports and air carriers within their borders. Consequently, foreign  countries have withheld access to certain types of information or denied  TSA access to areas within an airport, limiting the scope of TSA’s  assessments. We plan to further assess this issue, as well as other potential  challenges, as part of our ongoing review of TSA’s foreign airport  assessment program, which we plan to issue in the fall of 2011.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I look forward to  responding to any questions you or other members of the committee may  have at this time.

	Contacts and Acknowledgments

For additional information about this statement, please contact Stephen  M. Lord at (202) 512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this statement.
In addition to the contact named above, staff who made key contributions  to this statement were Steve D. Morris, Assistant Director; Carissa D.
Bryant; Christopher E. Ferencik; Amy M. Frazier; Barbara A. Guffy; Wendy  C. Johnson; Stanley J. Kostyla; Thomas F. Lombardi; Linda S. Miller;  Matthew M. Pahl; Lisa A. Reijula; Rebecca Kuhlmann Taylor; and Margaret  A. Ullengren.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Output:
Why GAO Did This Study

The attempted December 25, 2009, terrorist attack and the October 2010 bomb attempt involving air cargo originating in Yemen highlight the ongoing threat to aviation and the need to coordinate security standards and practices to enhance security with foreign partners, a process known as harmonization. This testimony discusses the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and challenges in harmonizing international aviation security standards and practices and facilitating compliance with international standards. This testimony is based on reports GAO issued from April 2007 through June 2010, and ongoing work examining foreign airport assessments. For this work, GAO obtained information from DHS and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and interviewed TSA program officials, foreign aviation officials, representatives from international organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and industry associations, about ongoing harmonization and TSA airport assessment efforts and challenges.

What GAO Found

In the wake of the December 2009 terrorist incident, DHS and TSA have strived to enhance ongoing efforts to harmonize international security standards and practices through increased global outreach, coordination of standards and practices, use of enhanced technology, and assessments of foreign airports. For example, in 2010 the Secretary of Homeland Security participated in five regional summits aimed at developing an international consensus to enhance aviation security. In addition, DHS and TSA have coordinated with foreign governments to harmonize air cargo security practices to address the statutory mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on U.S.-bound passenger aircraft by August 2010, which TSA aims to meet by 2013. Further, in the wake of the December 2009 incident, the Secretary of Homeland Security has encouraged other nations to consider using advanced imaging technology (AIT), which produces an image of a passenger's body that screeners use to look for anomalies such as explosives. As a result, several nations have begun to test and deploy AIT or have committed to deploying AIT units at their airports. Moreover, following the October 2010 cargo bomb attempt, TSA also implemented additional security requirements to enhance air cargo security. To facilitate compliance with international security standards, TSA assesses the security efforts of foreign airports as defined by ICAO international aviation security standards. In 2007, GAO reported, among other things, that TSA did not always consistently track and document host government progress in addressing security deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments and recommended that TSA track and document progress in this area. DHS and TSA have made progress in their efforts to enhance international aviation security through these harmonization efforts and related foreign airport assessments; however, a number of key challenges, many of which are beyond DHS's control, exist. For example, harmonization depends on the willingness of sovereign nations to voluntarily coordinate their aviation security standards and practices. In addition, foreign governments may view aviation security threats differently, and therefore may not consider international aviation security a high priority. Resource availability, which is a particular concern for developing countries, as well as legal and cultural factors may also affect nations' security enhancement and harmonization efforts. In addition to challenges facing DHS's harmonization efforts, in 2007 GAO reported that TSA experienced challenges in assessing foreign airport security against international standards and practices, such as a lack of available international inspectors and concerns host governments had about being assessed by TSA, both of which may affect the agency's ability to schedule and conduct assessments for some foreign airports. GAO is exploring these issues as part of an ongoing review of TSA's foreign airport assessment program, which GAO plans to issue in the fall of 2011. In response to prior GAO recommendations that TSA, among other things, track the status of foreign airport assessments, DHS concurred and is working to address the recommendations. TSA provided technical comments on a draft of the information contained in this statement, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.


Input:
	Background

DOE is responsible for managing defense nuclear waste and cleaning up contamination at sites involved in the past production of nuclear weapons. Among these challenges are the management and disposal of radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at sites in three states: Hanford in Washington, Savannah River in South Carolina, and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The production of radioactive materials for nuclear weapons generated 53 million gallons of radioactive waste stored in 177 tanks at Hanford, 37 million gallons in 49 tanks at Savannah River, and nearly 1 million gallons in 11 tanks at the INL. Some of these tanks are deteriorating and are known or suspected to have leaked, contaminating soil and groundwater. Of greatest concern are the tanks at Hanford, 67 of which are known or suspected to have leaked radioactive waste that has migrated through groundwater into the Columbia River. However, recent monitoring data indicate that the level of radionuclides in the Columbia River meets federal and state water quality standards. There are similar concerns about the possible contamination of the Snake River in Idaho and the Savannah River in South Carolina.
How to decommission (i.e., close) the tanks in a cost-effective and timely manner that mitigates environmental risk and potential exposure of workers has been the subject of controversy. DOE has argued that removing all of the waste in the tanks would take too long to respond to environmental risks from leaking tanks. DOE favors removal of the "pumpable" liquid waste and immobilizing (i.e., binding up) the sludge-like residual waste by filling the tanks with a cement grout to prevent leaks. The waste removed from the tanks classified as "high-level" would be stored for future disposal in a deep geologic repository (see below). Potentially affected states and environmental organizations raised questions regarding how much waste would be left in the tanks and whether the grout would thoroughly mix with the residual waste to solidify and contain it safely. Although the sludge-like consistency of the residual waste likely would not be as prone to leakage because of its semisolid form, whether pockets or layers of liquid waste may exist within the sludge-like residues and present greater risk of leakage is uncertain.
Although removing all of the waste in the tanks would eliminate the risk of contamination, this alternative poses other risks and challenges. DOE has argued that methods to extract the residual waste after the pumpable liquid waste is removed would generate a new hazardous waste stream that would need to be managed and disposed of safely to protect the environment. DOE also asserts that there would be significant risks of exposure to workers who would remove the residues and manage and dispose of the resulting new waste stream. Once a tank is cleaned, there would be additional risks to workers who would extract the tank from the ground, and there would be environmental risks from the management and disposal of the contaminated tank metal.

	Applicability of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act

How to dispose of the tank waste is further complicated by the legal issue of how much of the waste is "high-level." Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), high-level radioactive waste must be disposed of in a deep geologic repository. Consequently, the tank waste classified as high-level must be removed from the tanks, processed, and stored for disposal in such a repository. In July 1999, DOE issued internal agency Order 435.1 to classify residual tank waste as "waste incidental to reprocessing," rather than as high-level. In effect, this order would exempt the residual tank waste from NWPA requirements for disposal in a geologic repository. DOE proposed to dispose of the residual tank waste at Hanford, Savannah River, and the INL by grouting it in place, as discussed above. Sealing a tank using this method would depend on state concurrence, as DOE must obtain approval from the state where the tank is located before it can be closed with no further action to be taken.
DOE grouted residual waste in two tanks at the Savannah River site in 2000, with state concurrence. In 2002, DOE issued a Record of Decision to apply Order 435.1 to the closure of the remaining 49 tanks at the site, and to grout the residual waste it classified as incidental to reprocessing. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) legally challenged DOE's authority to dispose of the waste in this manner. The state of South Carolina and others filed as "friends of the court," due to concern that states would not have a role under Order 435.1 in determining how much of the residual waste would be left in the tanks. In 2003, a federal district court determined that DOE does not have the authority to classify any of the waste in the tanks as other than high-level, nor to dispose of it permanently on site through grouting or other means.
DOE appealed the 2003 ruling, and in 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the above district court opinion, ruling that the challenge to Order 435.1 was not "ripe" for review. The court noted that DOE had planned to implement Order 435.1 to grout the 49 tanks, but had not yet done so. Thus, the court determined that DOE had not violated the NWPA because it had not yet taken such action. The circuit court opinion resulted in allowing DOE to pursue activities under Order 435.1, and NRDC or others then could bring suit if they believed actions taken by DOE violate the law.

	Waste Disposal Authority in P.L. 108-375

Prior to the appeals court decision, DOE had asked Congress to enact legislation to clarify its authority for Order 435.1 and allow it to proceed with grouting the waste in tanks at Hanford, Savannah River, and the INL. After considerable debate, the 108 th Congress included provisions in Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for FY2005 ( P.L. 108-375 ) authorizing DOE to classify some of the tank waste in South Carolina and Idaho as incidental to reprocessing and to grout it in place. Congress did not provide this authority in Washington State, where most of the leaking tanks are located. Although this targeted authority is permanent, unless repealed by Congress, funding to implement it is subject to annual authorization and appropriation. An examination of provisions in Section 3116 of P.L. 108-375 follows.
Section 3116(a) authorized the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to classify tank waste in South Carolina and Idaho as other than high-level, upon making certain determinations. These determinations are (1) that the waste "does not require permanent isolation in a deep geological repository," as is required for high-level waste, and (2) that highly radioactive radionuclides have been removed from the waste to the "maximum extent practical." Assuming these requirements are met, the Secretary must determine if the radioactivity of the waste will exceed concentration limits for Class C low-level waste. However, the waste could be disposed of according to Class C performance objectives for human exposure , regardless of whether the concentration exceeds allowable limits. If the concentration does exceed allowable limits, the Secretary must consult with the NRC to develop a plan for the disposal of such waste. In any case, disposal also would be subject to a state-approved closure plan and state permit authorized under other law.
The performance objectives for Class C waste require "reasonable assurances" that concentrations of radioactive materials that may be released into the environment do not result in human exposure to specific levels of radiation. The ability of the grout to accomplish this objective would depend primarily on the extent to which it mixes with the residual waste to prevent leaks from the tank. However, even if a tank leaks, the performance objectives could still be met if the radioactivity decays to allowable levels before contamination migrates and results in human exposure. The objectives also require that protection of individuals from inadvertent intrusion be ensured after institutional controls are removed. Sealing the tanks with a cement grout could provide a barrier to intrusion, and institutional control of the grouted tanks, presumably would continue as long as the Savannah River site and the INL remain federal facilities. Although grouting of the residual waste would be subject to state approval, the authority of states is limited to the hazardous component of the waste. Thus, South Carolina and Idaho presumably would not have the authority to prevent the grouting of a tank based solely on objections to the radioactivity left in the tank, as long as Class C performance objectives are met.
In effect, Section 3116(a) authorizes DOE to grout the residual waste in tanks in Idaho and South Carolina, if it consults with the NRC in making the determination that the waste is not high-level and if it meets the performance objectives for disposing of Class C waste. Section 3116(b) requires the NRC to monitor DOE's implementation of this authority, in coordination with Idaho and South Carolina. If the NRC determines that DOE is not in compliance, it is directed to inform DOE, the state, and the congressional committees with relevant jurisdiction. Section 3116(c) clarified that the waste classification authority in subsection (a) would not apply to any material transported outside of covered states, which are defined as Idaho and South Carolina in Section 3116(d). In effect, the law does not allow DOE to reclassify waste shipped out of South Carolina or Idaho as "incidental to reprocessing" and to dispose of it as low-level waste in other states.
Section 3116(e) addressed the effect of the entire section on other laws and regulations and their application within Idaho and South Carolina. This provision stated that the authority in Section 3116(a) shall not "impair, alter, or modify the full implementation of any Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order or other applicable consent decree" for a DOE site. These documents specify federal and state requirements applicable to waste disposal and cleanup, and establish legally binding time frames for disposal and cleanup actions. Thus, it appears that Section 3116 leaves the existing agreements for Savannah River and the INL intact, and would not permit DOE to leave more waste in the tanks than previously agreed to. Other provisions in Section 3116(e) clarified that the authority in subsection (a) is binding only in Idaho and South Carolina and that it does not override certain other statutes relevant to waste disposal.
Section 3116(f) clarified the availability of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), for "any determination made by the Secretary or any other agency action taken by the Secretary pursuant to this section," and for any failure of the NRC to carry out its monitoring and reporting responsibilities. Although Section 3116 does not require public notice of actions taken pursuant to it, DOE may be required to provide notice under other federal laws, such as the National Environmental Policy Act and the APA. The disposal of the tank waste is also subject to a state-approved closure plan, the preparation of which may provide opportunity for public notice under state law.

	Waste Determinations

In implementing the authority in Section 3116, DOE must first determine what portion of the tank waste is classified as other than high-level and is therefore not subject to disposal in a geologic repository. In November 2006, DOE determined in consultation with the NRC how much waste would be left in the tanks at the INL, but DOE has not made such a determination at Savannah River, where the removal of the tank waste is not as far along. However, in January 2006, DOE did determine the portion of the retrievable waste at Savannah River that would be classified as other than high-level. This waste would be solidified and disposed of in vaults on site rather than in a geologic repository. Although the NRC concurred with DOE in issuing these waste determinations, the two agencies have disagreed about their respective roles in making future determinations of the tank waste that has yet to be classified for disposal.

	National Academy of Sciences Study

To inform decisions to dispose of the tank waste, Section 3146 of P.L. 108-375 authorized DOE to arrange for the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to study disposal alternatives at Savannah River, the INL, and Hanford. The NAS released its final report in April 2006. The NAS concluded that DOE's "overall approach" to remove most of the waste from the tanks and to grout the residual waste in place is "workable." However, the NAS noted that "clear, definitive" answers to certain questions were not possible because of insufficient information and technical, economic, and regulatory uncertainties, such as the lack of explicit authority for grouting tank waste in Washington State. The NAS acknowledged that using a cement grout is likely the most effective method currently available to immobilize the waste left in the tanks after all retrievable waste is removed, but noted that the long-term performance of the grout to safely contain the waste left in the tanks is uncertain and necessitates further research. However, the ability to reliably predict performance until all radioactivity decays to harmless levels appears doubtful, likely leaving some uncertainty for a substantial period of time, despite efforts to assess performance over the long-term.
The NAS also noted that many of the facilities to process the retrieved waste are not constructed or have ongoing problems, and that the regulatory deadlines for tank closure are years away, from 2016 to 2032. The NAS concluded that enough time likely remains to explore ways to remove more of the waste from the tanks before closing them. The NAS recommended that DOE delay the grouting of tanks with greater amounts of residual waste to allow for the development of technologies to retrieve a larger portion of the waste. Accordingly, the NAS recommended $50 million annually over 10 years for a research program to develop more effective methods to remove the waste from the tanks and to ensure the immobilization of residues left in them upon closure. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 ( P.L. 109-364 , H.R. 5122 ) authorized $10 million for DOE to establish such a program, subject to appropriations.

	Potential Implications for Environmental Cleanup

DOE estimates that the cleanup of the Savannah River site will be complete in 2025 at a cost of $32.1 billion, the INL in 2035 at a cost of $15.3 billion, and Hanford also in 2035 at a cost of $60.0 billion. The disposal of the tank waste at these sites is among the greater challenges to completing cleanup, along with remediation of existing soil and groundwater contamination. The authority in Section 3116 of P.L. 108-375 has implications in terms of cost and pace of cleanup at both Savannah River and the INL. Based on a 2002 assessment, DOE estimated that grouting residual tank waste at Savannah River would cost between $3.8 million and $4.6 million per tank, compared with a cost of greater than $100 million per tank to remove and dispose of all of the waste and to clean and remove the tank. The per tank closure costs at the INL likely would be lower because the tanks there contain less waste than those at Savannah River. DOE continues to assess alternatives and costs for the disposal of the tank waste at Hanford under other authorities, but a final decision has not been made.
Grouting the tank waste also has implications in terms of environmental risk. If the grout is effective in solidifying the residual waste and containing it safely, this disposal method could provide a less costly and faster means of addressing risks. On the other hand, the possibility of future leaks and resulting environmental contamination remains if the grout does not mix thoroughly with the residual waste to solidify it completely, as potentially affected states and environmental organizations have noted. Whether contamination resulting from tank leaks could migrate and present a potential risk of human exposure would depend on many factors, including the hydrological conditions of the site and the effectiveness of any engineered or natural geologic barriers to migration. If a grouted tank leaked and contamination resulted, the federal government would remain liable for cleanup according to applicable federal and state requirements. Depending on the extent of contamination, potential risk of human exposure, and remedial actions selected to address such risk, the time and costs to clean up contamination from tank leaks could offset the initial savings from grouting the residual waste.

Output: How to safely dispose of wastes from producing nuclear weapons has been an ongoing issue. The most radioactive portion of these wastes is stored in underground tanks at Department of Energy (DOE) sites in Idaho, South Carolina, and Washington State. There have been concerns about soil and groundwater contamination from some of the tanks that have leaked. DOE proposed to remove the "pumpable" liquid waste, classify the sludge-like remainder as "waste incidental to reprocessing," and seal it in the tanks with a cement grout. DOE has argued that closing the tanks in this manner would be a cost-effective and timely way to address environmental risks. Questions were raised as to how much waste would be left in the tanks and whether the grout would contain the waste and prevent leaks. After considerable debate, the 108th Congress included provisions in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for FY2005 (P.L. 108-375) authorizing DOE to grout some of the waste in the tanks in Idaho and South Carolina. Congress did not provide such authority in Washington State. This report provides background information on the disposal of radioactive tank waste, analyzes the waste disposal authority in P.L. 108-375, discusses the implementation of this authority, and examines relevant issues.