Input:
	Background

The increased threat of terrorism is an urgent national issue. The President directed the establishment of a commission on July 25, 1996, headed by Vice President Gore, whose charter included reviewing aviation security. The commission was charged with reporting to the President within  45 days its initial findings on aviation security, including plans to (1) deploy technology capable of detecting the most sophisticated explosive devices and (2) pay for that technology. In a classified report, we made recommendations to the Vice President, in his capacity as chairman of the commission, that would enhance the effectiveness of the commission’s work. Detection technologies are also important in the effort to stem the flow of drugs into the United States.
Detection technologies are typically developed for specific applications—some for aviation security, some for drug interdiction, and some for both. The major applications for the aviation security efforts of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) include the screening of checked baggage, passengers, cargo, mail, and carry-on items such as electronics, luggage, and bottles. FAA’s need for detection technology comes from its security responsibilities involving more than 470 domestic airports and 150 U.S. airlines, annually boarding over 500 million passengers with their checked baggage and carry-on luggage, and transporting mail and cargo.
Some advanced detection technologies are commercially available to serve aviation security applications. However, only one technology is currently deployed in the United States. That technology is being operationally tested at two U.S. airports.
Major applications for the drug interdiction efforts of the U.S. Customs Service include screening of cargo and containers, pedestrians, and vehicles and their occupants. Customs’ need for detection technology emanates from its responsibilities to control 301 ports of entry. Currently, over 400 million people, almost 120 million cars, and 10 million containers and trucks pass through these points each year.
Currently, Customs’ screening is done manually by inspectors with relatively little equipment beyond hand-held devices for detecting false compartments in containers.
The challenges in detecting explosives are significantly different than the challenges in detecting narcotics, as are the consequences in not detecting them. Customs and other drug enforcement agencies are concerned with much larger quantities than are aviation security personnel. Consequently, greater technical challenges are posed in attempting to detect explosives that might be used to bring down a commercial aircraft.
Two general groups of technologies, with modifications, can be used to detect both explosives and narcotics. The first group uses X-rays, nuclear techniques involving neutron or gamma ray bombardment, or electromagnetic waves, such as radio frequency waves. These technologies show anomalies in a targeted object that might indicate concealed explosives and narcotics or detect actual explosives and narcotics. The second group, referred to as trace detection technologies, uses chemical analyses to identify particles or vapors characteristic of narcotics or explosives and deposited on, or surrounding, objects, such as carry-on electronics or surfaces of vehicles. In addition to technologies, dogs are considered a unique type of trace detector because they can be trained to respond in specific ways to smells of narcotics or explosives.

	Spending on Detection Technologies

Since 1978, the federal government has spent about $246 million for research and development (R&D) on explosives detection technologies, including over $7 million for ongoing demonstration testing at the Atlanta, San Francisco, and Manila airports. During the same period, the government has spent about $100 million for R&D on narcotics technologies and a little more than $20 million procuring a variety of equipment to assist Customs inspectors, such as hand-held devices for detecting false compartments. The majority of the spending has occurred since 1990.
As shown in table 1, annual R&D spending on explosives detection technologies fluctuated from $23 million to $28 million during the first part of this decade, before increasing to $39 million for fiscal year 1996. The $14 million, or over 50 percent, increase from fiscal year 1995 is due principally to FAA’s funding of demonstration testing of a technology for screening checked baggage and to the funding of a counterterrorism application by the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG).
Annual spending on narcotics detection technology increased during the first part of the decade from $14 million to a peak of $20 million in fiscal year 1994 and then dropped $3 million from that peak, or 15 percent. The reason for this decline is reduced spending by the Department of Defense (DOD) as it shifted emphasis from one type of narcotics detection technology to other, less costly types of technologies to satisfy Customs’ needs.

		Congressional Direction

The spending on detection technologies that has occurred since 1990 has been due in large part to congressional direction. The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-604) directed FAA to increase the pace of its R&D. The act also set a goal of deploying explosives detection technologies by November 1993. However, it prohibited FAA from mandating deployment of a particular technology until that technology had first been certified as capable of detecting various types and quantities of explosives using testing protocols developed in conjunction with the scientific community.
FAA initially concentrated its efforts on developing protocols and technologies for screening checked baggage to address one of the security vulnerabilities that contributed to the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988. However, the goal of deploying such technology has still not been met. FAA has certified one system, and it is being operationally tested at two domestic airports and one airport overseas.
Congress tasked DOD in 1990 to develop narcotics detection technologies for Customs and other drug enforcement organizations. DOD has focused on developing “non-intrusive inspection” technologies to screen containers without the need for opening them. Customs is deploying a DOD-developed technology for trucks and empty containers, but it rejected another DOD-developed technology for fully loaded containers (see p. 8). Customs has identified containerized cargo at commercial seaports as its greatest unsolved narcotics detection requirement. According to Customs, it may be necessary to explore new methods of financing the systems that are technologically feasible for seaports, but high in cost.

	Characteristics and Limitations of Detection Technologies

Both aviation security and drug interdiction depend on a complex mix of intelligence, procedures, and technologies, which can partially substitute for each other in terms of characteristics, strengths, and limitations. For example, FAA evaluates information from the intelligence community in determining a level of threat and mandating security procedures appropriate to a specific time and place. These security procedures include bag matching and passenger profiling. FAA estimates that incorporating bag matching in everyday security could cost up to $2 billion, while profiling could reduce to 20 percent the number of passengers requiring additional screening. The Customs’ drug interdiction task has an analogous set of procedures and technologies and trade-offs.
Relevant trade-offs in selecting detection technologies for a given application involve their characteristics and costs, including issues of their effectiveness in detecting explosives or narcotics, safety risks to users of the technology, and impacts on the flow of commerce. For example, some highly effective technologies could be deployed now, but they are expensive, raise safety concerns, or slow the flow of commerce. These trade-offs are required for each of the major detection technology applications for FAA and Customs.
While areas of overlap exist, FAA’s aviation security applications generally relate to checked baggage, passengers, and carry-on items, and Customs’ drug interdiction applications generally relate to screening of cargo, containers, vehicles, and baggage. In addition to detection technologies, teams of dogs and their handlers are used for both aviation security and drug interdiction applications.

		Aviation Security Applications

			Checked Baggage

A system is available today for screening checked baggage that has been certified by FAA as capable of detecting various types and quantities of explosives likely to be used to cause catastrophic damage to a commercial aircraft, as is required by the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. However, the certified system is costly and has operational limitations, including a designed throughput of about 500 bags an hour with actual throughput much less than that number. Other less costly and faster systems are available, but they cannot detect all the amounts, configurations, and types of explosive material likely to be used to cause catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft.
FAA’s plans for developing detection technologies for checked baggage include efforts to improve the certified system, develop new technologies, and evaluate a mix of technologies. FAA believes that an appropriate mix of systems that individually do not meet certification requirements might eventually work together to detect the amounts, configurations, and types of explosive material that are required by the act.
Appendix I provides additional information about the various types of technologies available and under development for screening checked baggage, including the characteristics and limitations of those technologies, their status, the estimated range of prices for the technologies, and federal government funding for the technologies.

			Passengers

The National Research Council recently reported that X-ray and electromagnetic technologies produce images of sufficient quality to make them effective for screening passengers for concealed explosives. Future development efforts by FAA and TSWG are generally focusing on devices that detect explosives on boarding documents passengers have handled and portals that passengers would walk through. One type of portal uses trace detection technologies that collect and analyze traces from the passengers’ clothing or vapors surrounding them. The other type uses electromagnetic waves to screen passengers for items hidden under clothing.
The National Research Council also recently observed that successful deployment of these technologies is likely to depend on the public’s perception about the seriousness of the threat and the effectiveness of devices in countering the threat, which might also be considered intrusive or thought to be a health risk. (See App. II for more information about the various types of technologies available and under development for passenger screening.)

			Carry-on Items

Technologies available today for screening carry-ons for hidden explosives include conventional X-ray machines, an electromagnetic system, and trace detection devices. FAA has recently developed trace detection standards for inspecting carry-on electronics for explosives. In addition, FAA has “assessed as effective,” but not certified, three trace detection systems to be used during periods of heightened security. FAA expects to soon “assess as effective” three more trace detection systems. The more expensive trace technologies used for carry-on baggage are capable of detecting smaller amounts of explosives and narcotics. FAA’s future efforts are expected to include developing an enhanced X-ray device and screeners for bottles. (See app. III for more detailed information about technologies for screening carry-on items.)

		Drug Interdiction Applications

			Containers

Tests have shown that fully loaded containers can be effectively screened for narcotics with available high energy X-ray technologies (about 8 million electron volts or the equivalent of 50 to 70 times the energy of a typical airport-passenger X-ray). However, Customs rejected a DOD-developed high energy technology because it cost $12 million to $15 million per location, required a large amount of land for shielding, and raised safety concerns. Available low-energy technologies (the equivalent of 3 to 4 times the energy of a passenger X-ray) are less costly and safer but cannot penetrate full containers, so their use is limited to screening for hidden compartments in empty containers and objects concealed in trucks and trailers. About 4 to 25 containers per hour can be processed through low- and high-energy X-ray technologies depending on their configurations.
According to DOD and Customs officials, future efforts in container screening will include developing less expensive X-ray systems with higher energy levels, mobile X-ray systems, and more capable hand-held trace detection systems. Those efforts will also include evaluating nuclear-based techniques for inspecting empty tankers at truck and rail ports. (See  app. IV for additional information about technologies for screening cargo and containers.)

		Dog Teams

Dogs can be trained to alert their handlers upon detecting explosives and narcotics. FAA-certified dogs are trained to detect various types of explosive substances that might be concealed in aircraft, airport vehicles, baggage, cargo, and terminals. Customs’ dogs are trained to detect narcotics and in 1994 almost 6,000 drug seizures were attributable to dog teams. Currently funded projects include efforts to develop methods of bringing air samples to the dogs, or swabs from objects they are to inspect.

	Current Deployments of Detection Technologies

Despite the limitations of currently available detection technologies, other countries have deployed some of these technologies to detect explosives and narcotics because of differences in their perception of the threat and their approaches to counter the threat. These countries’ experiences provide opportunities to learn lessons about operational measures taken to deploy detection technologies, such as the amount of airport modifications needed to incorporate new technologies and the types of training provided to the operators of the new equipment, as well as the actual effectiveness of the technologies.
While Customs has deployed equipment such as hand-held devices, it is also deploying up to 12 low-energy X-ray systems to screen empty containers and trucks for narcotics along the Southwest border. On the other hand, some countries are using high-energy systems to screen fully loaded containers. The high-energy systems installed at ports of entry in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and China would have similar uses at seaports here, but Customs officials told us that the systems are too new for reliable operational data. They also told us that tests have not been conducted against Customs’ requirements and the technologies would also be too expensive in the quantities needed for nationwide deployment.
A high-energy nuclear system is being considered for deployment at the Euro Tunnel between France and the United Kingdom. The system would be used to screen for explosives concealed in trucks and their cargo being transported under the English Channel. This system could also be used to detect narcotics.
In the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium, we observed governments working closely with airport authorities to deploy explosives detection technologies. In two countries, airport authorities have generally embraced an approach that entails successive levels of review of checked baggage to resolve uncertainty about checked baggage. This approach can require complex systems for tracking throughout the entire baggage handling system. Instead of using only the FAA-certified system for checked baggage, these countries are using a mix of technologies. Their approach has been to implement technology that is an improvement on existing technology or procedures, rather than waiting for perfected technology.
Officials in the two other countries are waiting for the next generation of explosives detection technologies. They believe that X-ray technologies have generally reached their limits in detecting explosives.
All of the countries have also deployed trace detection technology for screening checked baggage or carry-on items, especially electronics.
FAA officials told us they cannot mandate the types of approaches used by other countries, although airlines could voluntarily adopt them, because of the statutory prohibition against mandating technology that is not certified.
With a combination of the best available technologies and procedures, including the use of the certified system for screening checked baggage, FAA estimates the incremental cost of the most effective security system for U.S. air travellers to be $6 billion over the next 10 years. On a per-passenger basis, FAA estimates the equivalent cost to be about $1.30 per one-way ticket.
Customs and FAA have deployed dog teams widely. Customs has deployed about 450 dog teams to airports, seaports, and land border ports. The cost to train a Customs’ dog and handler is about $6,000. FAA’s canine explosives detection program includes 29 U.S. airports with a total of 72 FAA-trained and certified dog teams. Of the 19 largest U.S. airports, 14 have FAA-trained and certified dogs. The five airports without certified dogs are Washington-National, Washington-Dulles, Baltimore-Washington International, New York-John F. Kennedy, and Honolulu. According to an FAA official, these airports do not have FAA-certified dog teams because airport officials are concerned about cost. The cost to train an FAA dog and handler is about $17,000 and the annual operating cost of a team, including the handler’s salary, is about $60,000.

	Agency Comments

Five agencies—FAA, DOD, Customs, TSWG, and ONDCP—provided comments on the technical accuracy of information contained in a draft of this report. We have incorporated their comments in this final report where appropriate.

	Scope and Methodology

To determine the amount of federal government spending for R&D on explosives and narcotics detection technologies, we obtained funding information from Customs, FAA, DOD, ONDCP, and TSWG covering periods as far back as the information was available. Although we identified the historical and current levels of funding, we generally focused on the period 1990 to the present because most technologies were developed and deployed during this period.
To obtain information on the characteristics and limitations of available and planned technologies for containers, checked baggage, passengers, and carry-on items, we requested project information from the same five agencies for each detection technology project they had undertaken since 1990. Additionally, we received briefings from developers of technology and manufacturers of equipment currently available on the market.
We analyzed major categories of technologies to identify a few characteristics common to each that can be used in making comparisons. We did not attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the technologies, nor did we assess whether the current funding level is adequate to develop reliable detection technologies.
We interviewed officials and gathered data primarily from the FAA, DOD, Customs, ONDCP, and TSWG to develop information on available and planned detection technologies. We also interviewed officials and visited ports of entry in Miami, Florida; San Juan, Puerto Rico; and Otay Mesa, California; and airports in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States.
We are sending copies of this report to the Vice President of the United States; Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Treasury, State, Defense, and Transportation; the Attorney General, Department of Justice; the Administrators, FAA and Drug Enforcement Administration; the Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service; and the Directors, ONDCP, Central Intelligence, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning explosives detection technology, please contact Gerald L. Dillingham at (202) 512-2834. If you have any questions regarding narcotics detection technologies, please call David E. Cooper on (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Application: Checked Baggagea

Funding (FYs 78-96)
X-ray source rotates around a bag obtaining a large number of cross-sectional images that are integrated by a computer, which displays densities of objects in the bag. $850,000 to $1 million $22.2 million (FAA)
Automatically alarms when objects with high densities, characteristic of explosives, are detected.
Relatively slow throughput; certified system requires two units to meet throughput requirement.
Commercially available. Achieved Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification in December 1994. FAA currently funding operational testing at three airports and also funding projects to improve throughput rate, reduce unit cost, and improve overall capabilities. Department of Defense (DOD) recently tested technology for detecting drugs in small packages.
Two different X-ray energies determine the densities and average atomic numbers of the target material.
Commercially available. FAA is developing an enhanced version that may meet certification standards. The U.S. Customs Service (Customs) plans to test this technology for drug detection. $2.1 million (FAA)
Currently none of the X-rays in this group meets certification standards for checked bags because they do not detect the quantities and configurations of the full range of explosives specified in the standards. (continued)
Funding (FYs 78-96)
Backscatter detects reflected X-ray energy, providing an additional image to highlight organic materials such as explosives and drugs near the edge of a bag.
Commercially available. FAA has several projects aimed at assisting this group of X-ray devices meet certification standards. $100,000 to $140,000 $100,000 (Customs) $2.2 million (FAA)
This group of X-ray devices generally does not automatically alarm and therefore requires an operator to interpret the image.
Technology is based on the detection of scatter patterns as X-rays interact with crystal lattice structures of materials.
FAA and Customs terminated projects due to significant technical problems. A foreign government and contractor are supporting development of this technology. $4.5 million (FAA) $270,000 (Customs)
Accelerator produces gamma rays that penetrate bags to detect presence of chlorine compounds in narcotics.
DOD is building a prototype to demonstrate proof-of-principle for airport baggage carousel application. Demonstration is expected in December 1996. $8.6 million (DOD)
Eventual system expected to be very expensive.
Six machines built and tested since 1989. FAA discontinued checked baggage portion of project in 1994, but it is now investigating carry-on application. DOD contractor now using FAA machines to test drug detection. radioactive source probe bags for presence of nitrogen or chlorine compounds. $6.6 million (FAA) $280,000 (DOD) $27,000 (Customs)
Automatically alarms on explosives or narcotics.
Cost, size, and false alarm rate were of concern to airline industry, President’s Commission on Terrorism and Aviation Security, and Customs. (continued)
Funding (FYs 78-96)
Radio frequency pulses probe bags to elicit unique responses from explosives and drugs.
Nonimaging technology that provides chemically specific detection and automatically alarms on explosives or drugs.
Commercially available. FAA has a prototype capable of detecting two types of explosives. Customs has a prototype capable of detecting cocaine base. $1 million (DOD) $350,000 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) $0.7 million (FAA) $1.6 million Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)
Currently does not meet FAA certification standards.
Detection of certain cocaine compounds needs improvement.
The Funding column indicates whether a specific technology was developed or is being developed for explosives detection, narcotics detection, or both. Generally, FAA and TSWG funding has supported explosives detection, while funding by DOD, Customs, and ONDCP has supported narcotics detection. Where a technology funding cell shows FAA or TSWG in combination with DOD, Customs, or ONDCP, that technology is generally capable of detecting both narcotics and explosives.

Application: Passengersa

Funding (FYs 78-96)
System is nonimaging, but will automatically alarm if drug is detected in the digestive tract of a swallower.
Requires about 30 seconds to screen a suspect.
Prototype developed and tested at an airport. Project was terminated because system emitted radio frequencies that interfered with airport operations and Customs decided against spending additional $165,000 on needed shielding. System is now sitting idle at a Customs’ storage facility. $1.3 million (ONDCP) $123,000 (Customs)
System will scan 360 degrees around a passenger and automatically pinpoint the location of all undeclared objects on the surface of the body.
Under development by FAA. Factory and airport testing to occur in 1997. $110,000 to $200,000 $1.6 million (FAA)
System will be capable of processing 500 passengers per hour.
System provides 360- degree imaging of the human body in order to detect weapons, explosives, and drugs concealed underneath clothing.
Under development by FAA. Fieldable prototype to be completed mid-1997 with airport testing to follow. $100,000 to $200,000 $5.3 million (FAA)
System does not provide automatic detection, but relies on an operator to spot the contraband.
System expected to process 360- 600 passengers per hour. (continued)
Funding (FYs 78-96)
Under development by FAA. Fieldable prototype completed in 1995. Factory and airport testing will begin in late 1996. $4.0 million (FAA) clothing collect vapor and particles while passengers are walking through the portal.
System will automatically alarm if explosive is detected.
Throughput is estimated to be 360 per hour.
Air flow dislodges vapor or particles from passengers walking through portals to test for explosives.
Two prototypes are being developed by FAA. $300,000 to $500,000 $2.5 million (FAA)
Systems automatically alarm if explosive is detected.
Throughput goal is 360 per hour.
Trace samples collected from passengers’ hands either through a token or document.
Under development by FAA. Field prototype to be available sometime in 1996. $65,000 to $85,000 $125,000 (FAA)
System will automatically alarm if explosive is detected.
Throughput is estimated to be 425 per hour.
IMS Document Screeners Collects trace samples $65,000 to $85,000 $430,000 (TSWG) from passengers’ documents.
Under development by TSWG. Project started in April 1996 and to be completed in 1998.
System will automatically alarm if explosive is detected.
Throughput is estimated to be 450 per hour. (Table notes on next page)
The Funding column indicates whether a specific technology was developed or is being developed for explosives detection, narcotics detection, or both. Generally, FAA and TSWG funding has supported explosives detection, while funding by DOD, Customs, and ONDCP has supported narcotics detection. Where a technology funding cell shows FAA or TSWG in combination with DOD, Customs, or ONDCP, that technology is generally capable of detecting both narcotics and explosives.

Application: Carry-on Luggagea

Funding (FYs 78-96)
Measures mobility of various chemicals through a gas in an electrical field.
Commercially available. For example, 125 units of a particular IMS system have been deployed overseas. $45,000 to $152,000 $2.3 million (FAA)
Fast, portable, and inexpensive.
Lower chemical specificity than mass spectrometry. $100,000 to $170,000 chromatography and mass spectrometry or chemiluminescence that separates mixtures using an absorbent material.
Commercially available. For example, 154 units of a chemiluminescence system have been deployed overseas. $2 million (FAA) $230,000 (TSWG)
High sensitivity and chemical specificity.
Produces evidence acceptable in court.
Expensive, slow, and bulky.
Do not automatically alarm, so dependent on operator interpretation of enhanced images.
Under development. $325,000 (FAA) $250,000 (TSWG)
Limited penetration of target objects. (continued)
Funding (FYs 78-96)
Radio frequency pulses probe hags to elicit unique responses from explosives and drugs.
Commercially available. A field prototype capable of handling small size packages was tested in Atlanta during the Olympics by airlines to screen electronics.
This is a product derived from funding the same technology listed in appendix I.
Nonimaging technology that provides chemically specific detection and automatically alarms on explosives or drugs.
Detection of certain cocaine compounds needs improvement.
System uses microwave technology to penetrate bottles and will discover when bottles do not contain the liquid that is expected. It is basically a discovery rather than detection system.
This is an FAA in-house project working with a commercially available device. FAA is currently testing field prototypes. $19,000 to $25,000 $77,000 (FAA)
System does not identify the liquid in the bottle.
System throughput is expected to be 720 bottles per hour. However, system is unable to penetrate certain types of bottles.
Automatically alarms if explosives detected.
Prototypes are available. $75,000 to $125,000 $974,000 (FAA)
Analysis time varies between 20 and 70 seconds per target. Manufacturer is working to shorten analysis time.
The Funding column indicates whether a specific technology was developed or is being developed for explosives detection, narcotics detection, or both. Generally, FAA and TSWG funding has supported explosives detection, while funding by DOD, Customs, and ONDCP has supported narcotics detection. Where a technology funding cell shows FAA or TSWG in combination with DOD, Customs, or ONDCP, that technology is generally capable of detecting both narcotics and explosives.

Application: Containers, Trucks, and Cargoa

Funding (FYs 78-96)
An accelerator generates gamma rays to penetrate the object to be screened. The gamma rays are preferentially absorbed by nitrogen nuclei. A significant decrease in the number of detected gamma rays indicates the possible presence of explosives.
Project was originally intended for checked bags and has been inactive since 1993. FAA may reactivate project for screening air cargo containers. $12.1 million (FAA)
System requires less shielding than other nuclear technologies.
An accelerator generates neutrons for bombarding target; induced gamma rays are measured to detect presence of narcotics or explosives.
System automatically alarms based on 3 dimensional images of elemental ratios of hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, and carbon.
DOD completed the project, but the system was not transitioned to Customs due to Customs’ concern with cost, size, operational, and safety issues. FAA conducted limited testing for checked baggage application in 1993 and it is now considering a new project for screening air cargo. TSWG is funding a counterterrorism application. $8 to $10 million $19 million (DOD) $ 5.3 million (FAA)  $6.2 million (TSWG)
System takes 20 minutes per analysis and would typically be combined with an X-ray system to speed throughput.
Requires a large amount of space and shielding, a radiation permit, and an FDA permit for use on food.
Also uses an accelerator to generate fast neutrons to probe bags; measurement of the transmitted neutron spectrum is used to detect explosives.
FAA has two ongoing projects and now believes technology might be more suitable for screening air cargo or containerized checked baggage than individual bags. $3.5 million (FAA) (continued)
Funding (FYs 78-96)
System is designed for propane and other gas or liquid tanker trucks but is adaptable to scan railcars.
Prototype being evaluated by DOD and Customs. $382,000 (ONDCP)
While open and unsheltered, system requires a radiation permit to operate.
Systems are designed to scan loaded trucks/containers and have throughput of 12-25 per hour depending on configurations.
Commercially available. DOD completed the project in Tacoma, Washington, but system was not transitioned to Customs due to Customs’ concerns with cost, safety, and operational issues. $12 to $15 million $15 million (DOD) $224,000 (Customs)
Required extensive shielding, radiation permit, and FDA permit if used on food.
System relies on operator’s interpretation of the X-ray images.
System is designed to scan empty trucks or containers.
Throughput is about six trucks per hour.
Commercially available. Customs has deployed one machine at Otay Mesa, California, and plans to deploy up to 11 more along the Southwest border. $3.7 million (DOD)
Relies on operator’s interpretation of the X-Ray images.
Systems are designed to scan empty or loaded trucks and containers depending on the energy level and to complement the fixed-site X-ray systems.
DOD is testing 450 KeV system and still developing machines at other energy levels. $1.75 to $6 million $10.8 million (DOD)
A 1 MeV system is designed for aircraft size cargo containers.
May also be useful for scanning passenger vehicles. (continued)
Funding (FYs 78-96)
Radio frequency wave probes objects, except that a magnet aligns hydrogen atoms prevalent in liquids.
Abandoned machine is in storage at major Southeastern seaport. $130,000 (Customs)
Abandoned FAA prototype for checked baggage was modified for Customs to scan frozen shrimp packages.
Machine short-circuited during storm and Customs decided against spending for machine repair.
Systems are based on gas chromatography, chemiluminescence, mass spectroscopy, surface acoustic wave, ion mobility spectroscopy, and biosensor technologies.
Many commercially available. DOD is developing some prototypes for use by Customs. $2,500 to $170,000 $240,000 (Customs) $2.4 million (TSWG) $4.7 million (DOD)
Sample collection steps are highly critical for the effectiveness of systems. Most existing systems use vacuum or wiping with a swab.
Most existing systems are not currently capable of detecting the extremely low vapor pressures of cocaine and heroin. (continued)
Funding (FYs 78-96)
System differs from other vapor detectors in that it draws air sample from a barometric chamber into which the object to be inspected has been shaken and subjected to heat cycles.
Under development by FAA. A fieldable prototype is expected to be tested by October 1996. $1.8 million (TSWG)
System automatically alarms if explosive is detected.
System may not work on a tightly sealed object.
System concentrates 400 litres of air to .5 cc of liquid.
Under development by FAA. $35,000 to $42,000 $1.3 million (FAA)
Biosensor specifically identifies the explosives detected.
System is suitable for use in cargo holds and interiors of aircraft, etc.
The Funding column indicates whether a specific technology was developed or is being developed for explosives detection, narcotics detection, or both. Genrally, FAA and TSWG funding has supported explosives detection, while funding by DOD, Customs, and ONDCP has supported narcotics detection. Where a technology funding cell shows FAA or TSWG in combination with DOD, Customs, or ONDCP, that technology is generally capable of detecting both narcotics and explosives.

Major Contributors to This Report

	National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C.

	Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C.

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Output:
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on explosives and narcotics detection technologies that are available or under development, focusing on: (1) funding for those technologies; (2) characteristics and limitations of available and planned technologies; and (3) deployment of these technologies by the United States and foreign countries.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) aviation security and drug interdiction depend on a complex and costly mix of intelligence, procedures, and technologies; (2) since 1978, federal agencies have spent about $246 million for research and development on explosives detection technologies and almost $100 million on narcotics detection technologies; (3) most of this spending has occurred since 1990, in response to congressional direction, and has been for technologies to screen checked baggage, trucks, and containers; (4) difficult trade-offs must be made when considering whether to use detection technologies for a given application; (5) chief among those trade-offs are the extent to which intelligence-gathering and procedures can substitute for technology or reduce the need for expensive technology; (6) decisionmakers also need to evaluate technologies in terms of their characteristics and limitations; (7) some technologies are very effective and could be deployed now, but they are expensive, slow the flow of commerce, and raise issues of worker safety; (8) other technologies could be more widely used, but they are less reliable; (9) still others may not be available for several years at the current pace of development; (10) despite the limitations of the currently available technology, some countries have already deployed advanced explosives and narcotics detection equipment because of differences in their perception of the threat and their approaches to counter the threat; (11) should the United States start deploying the currently available technologies, lessons can be learned from these countries regarding their approaches, as well as capabilities of technology in operating environments; and (12) the Federal Aviation Administration estimates that use of the best available procedures and technology for enhancing aviation security could cost as much as $6 billion over the next 10 years or alternatively about $1.30 per one-way ticket, if the costs were paid through a surcharge.


Input:
	Background

Iraq’s national government was established after a constitutional  referendum in October 2005, followed by election of the first Council of  Representatives (Parliament) in December 2005, and the selection of the  first Prime Minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, in May 2006. By mid-2006, the  cabinet was approved; the government now has 34 ministries responsible  for providing security and essential services—including electricity, water,  and education—for the Iraqi people. The Ministry of Finance is  responsible for tracking and reporting government expenditures. The Iraqi  government uses single-year budgeting, which generally requires that  funds be used by December 31, the end of Iraq’s fiscal year.
In March 2003, the United States—along with the United Kingdom,  Australia, and other members of the coalition—began combat operations  in Iraq. The original “coalition of the willing” consisted of 49 countries  (including the United States) that publicly committed to the war effort and  also provided a variety of support, such as direct military participation,  logistical and intelligence support, over-flight rights, or humanitarian and  reconstruction aid. Many nations and various international organizations  are supporting the efforts to rebuild Iraq through multilateral or bilateral  assistance. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 of October 16, 2003,  urged member states and international and regional organizations to  support the Iraq reconstruction effort. On October 23-24, 2003, an  international donors conference was held in Madrid, with 76 countries, 20  international organizations, and 13 nongovernmental organizations  participating.

	Limited Progress Has Been Made in National Reconciliation

Since GAO last reported on the status of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks in  September 2007, the number of enemy attacks in Iraq has declined. While  political reconciliation will take time, Iraq has not yet advanced key  legislation on equitably sharing oil revenues and holding provincial  elections. In addition, sectarian influences within the Iraqi ministries  continue while militia influences divide the loyalties of Iraqi security  forces.
The January 2007 U.S. strategy, New Way Forward in Iraq, is designed to  support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence and foster conditions for  national reconciliation by providing the Iraqi government with the time  and space needed to help address differences among the various segments  of Iraqi society. The number of enemy-initiated attacks on civilians, Iraqi  Security Forces, and coalition forces increased dramatically after the  February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. The increase in  the number of monthly attacks generally continued through June 2007. To  help quell the violence, the United States deployed about 30,000 additional  troops to Iraq during the spring of 2007, bringing the total number of U.S.  military personnel to about 164,700 as of September 2007.
As depicted in figure 1, enemy-initiated attacks declined from a total of  about 5,300 in June 2007 to about 3,000 in September 2007. However, the  recent decrease in monthly attacks was primarily due to a decrease in the  number of attacks against coalition forces. Attacks against Iraqi Security  Forces and civilians have declined less than attacks against coalition  forces.
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the incidents  captured in military reporting do not account for all violence throughout  Iraq. For example, they may underreport incidents of Shi’a militias fighting  each other and attacks against Iraqi security forces in southern Iraq and  other areas with few or no coalition forces.
In addition, according to a UN report released October 15, 2007, the Iraqi  people and government continue to confront major challenges resulting  from the devastating effects of violence. The UN reported that widespread  insecurity continues to make national dialogue challenging, and increasing  levels of displacement are adding to an alarming humanitarian crisis.
The Iraqi government continues to make limited progress in meeting eight  legislative benchmarks intended to promote national reconciliation. As of  October 25, 2007, the Iraqi government had met one legislative benchmark  and partially met another. Specifically, the rights of minority political  parties in the Iraqi legislature were protected through existing provisions  in the Iraqi Constitution and Council of Representatives’ by-laws. In  addition, the Iraqi government partially met the benchmark to enact and  implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in  October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008.
The benchmark requiring a review of the Iraqi Constitution has not yet  been met. Fundamental issues remain unresolved as part of the  constitutional review process, such as expanded powers for the  presidency, the resolution of disputed areas (such as Kirkuk), and power  sharing between federal and regional governments over issues such as the  distribution of oil revenue. In addition, five other legislative benchmarks  requiring parliamentary action have not yet been met. Figure 2 highlights  the status of the benchmarks requiring legislative enactment and  implementation.
Although State and Multinational Force-Iraq report progress in promoting  reconciliation at local levels such as Anbar province, at the national level,  sectarian factions within the Iraqi government ministries continue to  undermine reconciliation efforts. For example, ministries within the Iraqi  government continued to be controlled by sectarian factions and are used  to maintain power and provide patronage to individuals and groups.  According to an August 2007 U.S. interagency report, the withdrawal of  members of the Iraqi cabinet ended the Shi’a-dominated coalition’s claim  to be a government of national unity and further undermined Iraq’s already  faltering program of national reconciliation. In late August 2007, Iraq’s  senior Shi’a and Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders signed a unity  accord signaling efforts to foster greater national reconciliation. The  accord covered draft legislation on de-Ba’athification reform and  provincial powers laws, and established a mechanism to release some  Sunni detainees being held without charges. However, these laws have not  been passed as of October 25, 2007.
The Iraqi government has made limited progress in developing effective  and non-sectarian forces. Since 2003, the United States has provided about  $19.2 billion to train and equip about 360,000 Iraqi soldiers and police  officers, in an effort to develop Iraqi security forces, transfer security  responsibilities to them and to the Iraqi government, and ultimately  withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq. Iraqi security forces have grown in size  and are increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations. However, only  about 10 of 140 Iraqi army, national police, and special operations forces  are operating independently as of September 2007.
Several factors have complicated the development of effective and loyal  Iraqi security forces. First, the Iraqi security forces are not a single unified  force with a primary mission of countering the insurgency in Iraq. Second,  high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result in an  overstatement of the number of Iraqi security forces present for duty.  Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of Iraqi  security forces. According to the Independent Commission on the Security  Forces of Iraq, the Iraqi National Police is not viable and should be  disbanded. Fourth, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the coalition for  their logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities.

	United States and Iraq Lack Clear Strategies for Key Efforts

Three GAO reports illustrate a recurring problem with U.S. efforts in  Iraq—the lack of strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles and  responsibilities, and performance measures. Our reports assessing (1) the  National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI), (2) U.S. efforts to develop  planning and budget capacity in Iraq’s ministries, and (3) U.S. and Iraqi  efforts to rebuild Iraq’s energy sector show that clear strategies are needed  to guide U.S. efforts, manage risk, and identify needed resources.

		Developing a National Strategy for Iraq

The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq was intended to clarify the  President’s strategy for achieving overall U.S. political, security, and  economic goals in Iraq. In our 2006 report, we found that the strategy was  incomplete.  First, it only partially identified the agencies responsible for  implementing key aspects of the strategy. Second, it did not fully address  how the United States would integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis  and the international community, and it did not detail Iraq’s anticipated  contribution to its future needs. Third, it only partially identified the  current and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including maintaining  U.S. military operations, building Iraqi government capacity, and  rebuilding critical infrastructure. Without a complete strategy, U.S. efforts  are less likely to be effective. We recommended that the National Security  Council (NSC), along with DOD and State, complete the strategy by  addressing all six characteristics of an effective national strategy,  including detailed information on costs and roles and responsibilities.  NSC, State, and DOD did not comment on GAO’s recommendations. In  commenting on the report, State asserted that GAO misrepresented the  NSVI’s purpose—to provide the public a broad overview of the U.S.  strategy in Iraq, not to set forth details readily available elsewhere.  However, without detailed information on costs and roles and  responsibilities, the strategy does not provide Congress with a clear road  map for achieving victory in Iraq.
In addition, we have provided the Congress classified reports and briefings  on the Joint U.S. Embassy – Multinational Force-Iraq’s classified campaign  plan for Iraq.

		Building Capacity in Iraq’s Ministries

The development of competent and loyal Iraqi ministries is critical to  stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. To help Iraq develop the capability of its  ministries, the United States has provided about $300 million between  fiscal years 2005 to 2007. The Administration has requested an additional  $255 million for fiscal year 2008 to continue these efforts. However, U.S.  efforts lack an overall strategy, no lead agency provides overall direction,  and U.S. priorities have been subject to numerous changes. U.S. efforts  also face four challenges that pose risks to their success and long-term  sustainability. First, Iraqi government institutions have significant  shortages of personnel with the skills to perform the vital tasks necessary  to provide security and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people.  Second, Iraq’s government confronts significant challenges in staffing a  nonpartisan civil service and addressing militia infiltration of key  ministries. Third, widespread corruption undermines efforts to develop  the government’s capacity by robbing it of needed resources. Fourth,  violence in Iraq hinders U.S. advisors’ access to Iraqi ministries, increases  absenteeism among ministry employees, and contributes to the growing  number of professional Iraqis leaving the country.
Without a unified U.S. strategy that clearly articulates agency roles and  responsibilities and addresses the risks cited above, U.S. efforts are less  likely to succeed. We recommended that the State Department complete  an overall integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development efforts.  Congress should also consider conditioning future appropriations on the  completion of the strategy. State recognized the value of such a strategy  but expressed concern about conditioning further capacity development  investment on completion of such a strategy.

		Reconstructing Iraq’s Energy Sectors

The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the Iraqis’  lack of strategic planning in its critical energy sector. As we reported in  May 2007, it is difficult to identify the most pressing future funding needs,  key rebuilding priorities, and existing vulnerabilities and risks given the  absence of an overarching strategic plan that comprehensively assesses  the requirements of the energy sector as a whole. While the Iraqi  government has crafted a multiyear strategic plan for Iraq’s electricity  sector, no such plan exists for the oil sector. Given the highly  interdependent nature of the oil and electricity sectors, such a plan would  help identify the most pressing needs for the entire energy sector and help  overcome the daunting challenges affecting future development prospects.  For fiscal years 2003 to 2006, the United States made available about $7.4  billion and spent about $5.1 billion to rebuild Iraq’s oil and electricity  sectors. However, production in both sectors has consistently fallen below  U.S. program goals of 3 million barrels per day and 6,000 megawatts of  electrical peak generation capacity.
Billions of dollars are still needed to rebuild, maintain, and secure Iraq’s  oil and electricity infrastructure, underscoring the need for sound strategic  planning. The Ministry of Electricity’s 2006-2015 Electricity Master Plan  estimates that $27 billion will be needed to reach its goal of providing  reliable electricity across Iraq by 2015. According to DOD, investment in  Iraq’s oil sector is “woefully short” of the absolute minimum required to  sustain current production, and additional foreign and private investment  is needed. Moreover, U.S. officials and industry experts estimate that Iraq  would need $20 billion to $30 billion over the next several years to reach  and sustain a crude oil production capacity of 5 million barrels per day.  We recommended that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with relevant  U.S. agencies and international donors, work with Iraqi ministries to  develop an integrated energy strategy. State commented that the Iraqi  government, not the U.S. government, is responsible for taking action on  GAO’s recommendations. We believe that the recommendations are still  valid given the billions made available for Iraq’s energy sector and the U.S.  government’s influence in overseeing Iraq’s rebuilding efforts.

	Iraqi and International Contributions Have Played a Limited Role in Rebuilding Iraq

From the onset of the reconstruction and stabilization effort, the U.S.  strategy assumed that the Iraqis and the international community would  help finance Iraq’s development needs. However, the Iraqi government has  a limited capacity to spend reconstruction funds, which hinders its ability  to assume a more prominent role in rebuilding Iraq’s crumbling  infrastructure. The international community has provided funds for Iraq’s  reconstruction, but most of the funding offered has been in the form of  loans that the Iraqis have not accessed.

		Iraqi Government Has Spent a Small Portion of Its Funds on Reconstruction

The government of Iraq allocated $10 billion of its 2007 revenues for  capital projects and reconstruction, including capital funds for the  provinces based on their populations. However, available data from the  government of Iraq and analysis from U.S. and coalition officials show  that, while 2007 spending has increased compared with 2006, a large  portion of Iraq’s $10 billion in capital projects and reconstruction budget  will likely go unspent through the end of this year. Iraq’s ministries, for  example, spent only 24 percent of their 2007 capital budgets through mid- July 2007.
U.S. government, coalition, and international agencies have identified a  number of factors that affect the Iraqi government’s ability to spend  capital budgets. In addition to the poor security environment and “brain  drain” issues, U.S. and foreign officials also noted that weaknesses in Iraqi  procurement and budgeting procedures impede completion of capital  projects. For example, according to the State Department, Iraq’s  Contracting Committee requires about a dozen signatures to approve  projects exceeding $10 million, which slows the process.
As a possible reflection of Iraq’s difficulty in spending its capital budgets,  Iraq’s proposed 2008 capital budget declines substantially (57 percent)  from 2007 (see table 1).
As a percentage of its overall budget, Iraq’s capital expenditures will  decline from 24 percent in 2007 to 12 percent in 2008. We are conducting a  review of U.S. efforts to help Iraq spend its budget and will issue a  separate report at a later date.

		International Donor Contributions

As of April 2007, international donors have pledged about $14.9 billion in  support of Iraq reconstruction. In addition, some countries exceeded their  pledges by providing an additional $744 million for a total of about $15.6  billion, according to the State Department. Of this amount, about $11  billion is in the form of loans. As of April 2007, Iraq had accessed about  $436 million in loans from the International Monetary Fund. The remaining  $4.6 billion is in the form of grants, to be provided multilaterally or  bilaterally; $3 billion of that amount has been disbursed to Iraq. See  appendix I for pledges made at Madrid and thereafter for Iraq  reconstruction. In addition, 16 of the 41 countries that pledged funding for  Iraq reconstruction also provided troops to the multinational force in Iraq.
In addition to funds, some countries also contribute troops to the U.S.-led  coalition. As of September 2007, 26 countries were contributing 12,300  troops to multinational forces in Iraq. Compared with the 164,700 forces  from the United States, other coalition countries represent about 7 percent  of Multinational Forces in Iraq. From December 2003 through September  2007, the number of non-U.S. coalition troops decreased from 24,000 to  12,300 and the number of coalition nations contributing troops to military  operations decreased from 33 to 26. See appendix II for a comparison of  U.S and coalition troops from December 2003 through September 2007.

	Conclusion

As this committee is called upon to provide more resources to help  stabilize and rebuild Iraq, continued oversight is needed of the key issues  highlighted in today’s testimony. While U.S. troops have performed  courageously under difficult and dangerous circumstances, the continued  violence and polarization of Iraqi society as well as the Iraqi government’s  continued difficulties in funding its reconstruction needs diminishes the  prospects for achieving current U.S. security, political, and economic goals  in Iraq.
Of particular concern is the lack of strategic plans to guide U.S. and Iraqi  efforts to rebuild and stabilize the country. Our assessment of the U.S.  strategy for Iraq and recent efforts to build central ministry capacity show  that U.S. planning efforts have been plagued by unclear goals and  objectives, changing priorities, inadequate risk assessments, and uncertain  costs. Weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the lack  of strategic planning in Iraq’s energy sector, the sector that provides the  most government revenues.
Madam Chair this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other Members may have.
For questions regarding this testimony, please contact me on (202) 512- 8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this statement were  Stephen Lord, David Bruno, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern, Mattias Fenton,  Muriel Forster, Lisa Helmer, Dorian Herring, Patrick Hickey, Bruce  Kutnicky, Tetsuo Miyabara, Judith McCloskey, and Mary Moutsos.

Appendix I: Donor Pledges for Iraq Reconstruction (in thousands)

Appendix II: U.S. and Coalition Troops in Iraq (in thousands)

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Output:
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2003, the Congress has obligated nearly $400 billion for U.S. efforts in Iraq, of which about $40 billion has supported reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Congressional oversight of this substantial investment is crucial as the Administration requests additional military and economic funds for Iraq. This testimony summarizes the results of recent GAO audit work and proposes three areas for which continued oversight is needed: (1) progress in improving security and national reconciliation, (2) efforts to develop clear U.S. strategies, and (3) Iraqi and international contributions to economic development. We reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed agency officials, including the departments of State, Defense, and Treasury; and the U.S. Agency for International Development; the UN; and the Iraqi government. We also made multiple trips to Iraq as part of this work.

What GAO Found

Since GAO last reported in September 2007, on the status of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks, the number of enemy attacks in Iraq has declined. While political reconciliation will take time, Iraq has not yet advanced key legislation on equitably sharing oil revenues and holding provincial elections. In addition, sectarian influences within Iraqi ministries continue while militia influences divide the loyalties of Iraqi security forces. U.S. efforts lack strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles, and performance measures. The U.S. strategy for victory in Iraq partially identifies the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy and does not fully address how the United States would integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international community. U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministry capability lack an overall strategy, no lead agency provides overall direction, and U.S. priorities have been subject to numerous changes. The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the Iraqi government's lack of integrated strategic planning in its critical energy sector. The U.S. strategy assumed that the Iraqis and international community would help finance Iraq's reconstruction. However, the Iraqi government has limited capacity to spend reconstruction funds. For example, Iraq allocated $10 billion of its revenues for capital projects and reconstruction in 2007. However, a large portion of this amount is unlikely to be spent, as ministries had spent only 24 percent of their capital budgets through mid-July 2007. Iraq has proposed spending only $4 billion for capital projects in 2008, a significant reduction from 2007. The international community has pledged $15.6 billion for reconstruction efforts in Iraq, but about $11 billion of this is in the form of loans.


Input:
By some estimates there are approximately 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, of which 60% live in Asia. Only 15% of Muslims are Arab, while almost one third live in South Asia. The four nations with the largest Muslim populations, Indonesia (194 million), India (150 million), Pakistan (145 million), and Bangladesh (130 million), are in Asia. China also has a population of 39 million Muslims. Despite this, the Muslims of Asia are perceived to be on the periphery of the Islamic core based in the Arab Middle East. Muslims are a majority in Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in South Asia and Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia in Southeast Asia. (See map below) There are also significant minority populations in Khazakstan, India, Thailand, and the Philippines. Sizable Muslim communities are also found in Sri Lanka, China, Burma, and Singapore.
Islam is by some estimates the world's fastest growing religion. Mecca, in Saudi Arabia, is the spiritual center of Islam because Mohammad founded the religion there in 610. In 2002, Muslims constituted approximately 19% of the world's population as compared to 30% that were Christian. These percentages are projected by some to shift to 25% Christian and 30% Muslim by the year 2025.
Islam in Southeast Asia is relatively more moderate in character than in much of the Middle East. This moderation stems in part from the way Islam evolved in Southeast Asia. Islam came to Southeast Asia with traders rather than through military conquest as it did in much of South Asia and the Arab Middle East. Islam also was overlaid on animist, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions in Indonesia, which are said to give it a more syncretic aspect. Islam spread throughout much of Southeast Asia by the end of the seventeenth century. Islam in Asia is more politically diverse than in the Middle East.
Islam has been undergoing a revival in Asia. RAND analyst Angel Rabasa points to several factors that contribute to this Islamic resurgence in Asia. These include both domestic and external factors. Internally, the forces of globalization and the impact of Western culture have played a role, especially the effect of rapid industrialization and resulting urbanization. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 resulted in the overthrow of the authoritarian Suharto regime and created political space for Islamists in Indonesia. Muslim separatist insurgents have continued their struggle in the Philippines and Thailand while the Parti Islam se Malaysia has worked through the political system to promote an Islamist agenda while in opposition in Malaysia. External factors include the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, the export of Saudi-backed Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism, the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and the Afghan war against the Soviets.

	Different Schools of Islamic Tradition

The majority of Muslims are of the Sunni tradition, while 10-15% are Shiite. This difference stems from disagreement over the succession to the prophet Mohammad. In South and Southeast Asia, Shiites are a significant portion of the population in only Afghanistan and Pakistan. The puritanical Sunni sect of Wahhabism has played an important role in the resurgence of Islam in Asia. It stems from a 18 th Century movement founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab that preached a literal interpretation of the Quran and an orthodox practice of Islam. Historically there has been a close relationship between Wahhabism and the Saudi dynasty. Sufism is another more "mystical" variant of Islam, though its presence in Asia is small except for parts of South Asia.
The decline of Islamic power in the wake of European colonial expansion provoked two key schools of thought within Islam that continue to have relevance today. The traditionalist school believed that the cause for the decline of Islam could be traced to "moral laxity and departure from the true path of Islam." As a result, their response was to call for an Islamic revival. Others, known as reformers, felt that the decline was due to "a chronic failure to modernize their societies and institutions." The path of the reformers presents the question of whether it is possible to modernize without Westernizing. At its core this is a struggle over values: "... how to protect a society's cultural heritage and traditional practices in an age of globalization and how to develop a creative coexistence between modernization and traditionalism without Westernization."
It is thought by some analysts that if the United States and the West seek to make common cause with moderate elements within the Islamic world against violent extremists they would be well advised to do so in a way that is not perceived to be a threat to the Islamic world. The United States, through its association with globalization and a globalizing culture, is perceived as a threat by many leaders of the Islamic world who are seeking to preserve, or restore, traditional culture even as segments of the populations they lead are drawn to American culture. The disconnect between Muslim elites and their people in Asia can also be seen in the decreasing popularity of United States's foreign policy even as regional leaders seek to maintain close ties. Some analysts believe that as long as the Muslim world views the U.S.-led war against terror as a war against Islam there will be significant limits on the extent to which Muslim states will be able to cooperate with the United States in the war against terror. The problem is exacerbated by widespread Muslim opposition to United States policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

	Islamic Revival, Political Islam, Extremists, and Terrorists

The Islamic revival is changing the face of political Islam in Asia. The distinction to be drawn is between revivalists, who see religious change as an end in itself, and political Islam, or Islamists, who seek the Islamic revival as a means to the end of transforming the state. A further distinction is to be drawn between those who would work through the political process and those who would use violence to achieve their ends. The Islamic revival has a complex relationship to the level of extremism in Asia. While Islam in Southeast Asia has been moderate in character, it is undergoing a process of revivalist change in some segments of society. The resurgence is in part inspired by links to the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Some Southeast Asians returning from Islamic religious schools in the Middle East and Pakistan have returned with a new, radical, militant, Islamist, and extremist form of Islam that is more likely to be anti-American or anti-Western in character. There is also a significant number of violent extremists of returned Southeast Asians, and a larger number of South Asians, who had participated in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Some of the South and Southeast Asians who have been radicalized through these experiences have gone on to spread extremist ideology, particularly by linking with local Muslim extremist groups who tend to have more nationally or regionally defined goals and who are largely opposed to local moderate Muslims. From one perspective "the most effective policies towards Muslim Asia will be those that contain extremism while working with, rather than against, the Muslim majority's aspirations for social and economic improvement."
Connections between Islamic extremism and terrorist organizations in South Asia appear to be more extensive than they are in Southeast Asia. This stems in large part from closer interaction with the Middle East, strengthened recently by the presence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is also a function of long term conflict in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. The extremist Taliban regime gave sanctuary to Al Qaeda until it was crushed. Since that time remnant Al Qaeda forces have linked up with other Sunni extremist groups in South Asia including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. Pakistan has also experienced Sunni-Shiite conflict. An extensive array of Islamic schools known as madrassas , including some that teach a militant anti-Western and anti-Hindu perspective, operate in Pakistan. A coalition of Islamist political parties controls approximately 20% of the seats in Pakistan's legislature, as well as the Northwest Frontier Province. They also lead a coalition in Baluchistan. It has been reported that Al Qaeda fighters escaped to Bangladesh after the fall of Afghanistan to American and Afghan Northern Alliance forces and that Bangladesh veterans of the conflict in Afghanistan have played a role in establishing radical madrassas in Bangladesh. In India, while there exists significant inter-communal strife between Hindus and Muslims it is largely domestically focused with the exception of Pakistani based groups operating in Kashmir.
There are a number of Islamist groups in Southeast Asia that have linkages, either direct or indirect, to terrorist organizations. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Abu Sayyaf are examples of groups in the Philippines where Islamist ideology, secessionism, criminality, and linkages to international terrorist networks are evident. The terrorist Jemaah Islamiya (JI) organization, which seeks to establish an Islamic Khalifate across much of Southeast Asia and establish Islamic law, has ties to Al Qaeda. In Indonesia, the now reportedly disbanded Lashkar Jihad incited inter-communal strife between Muslims and Christians in Sulawezi and the Moluccas that created a struggle that can be exploited by terrorist groups such as JI. Lashkar Jundullah is another group that has been involved in inter-communal violence in the Moluccas and Sulawezi. The extremist Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) is an example of an organization in Southeast Asia established by veterans of the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In Thailand, separatists have mounted an insurrection in the Muslim southern provinces.
The relatively few Muslims of Northeast Asia are found in China for the most part. China is home to an estimated 17.5 to 36 million Muslims. The largest, most concentrated group is the Uighurs of Xinjiang Province in western China. The Uighur minority has experienced unrest of an Islamic character in recent years. Many Uighurs seek autonomy within China. Demographic trends arising from Han-Chinese in-migration are projected to make the Uighurs a minority in their home province.
The scope of the Islamic revival in Asia, and the extent to which increased religious fervor will translate into extremist positions or political power that will express itself in violent ways towards the West, is debated. Some see this phenomenon manifesting itself more in terms of increased piety among individuals within society without necessarily expressing itself politically. Karen Armstrong, author of Islam: A Short History , believes that because fear feeds extremism the war against terror should include a better appreciation of Islam in the West. It has been observed that U.S. counter-terrorism policy "tends to conflate political Islam and terrorism worldwide." A key distinction for some in this debate is the distinction between cultural or religious identity and political identity. An Islamic revival that finds its expression through cultural or religious means is not necessarily a threat, even as some in the Islamic world would manipulate it to their anti-American or anti-Western ends.
An examination of recent developments with political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia illustrate this point. Radical Islamist or extremist parties have not demonstrated broad appeal among Indonesian or Malaysian voters in recent elections even as some segments of these societies have experienced a resurgence of Islamic belief. The Islamist Parti Islam se Malaysia experienced significant electoral setbacks in the 2004 elections to the relatively more secular Barisan National Coalition of Prime Minister Badawi, who is himself regarded as a respected Islamic scholar. In Indonesia, Islamist parties, such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), made small gains based not on their Islamist agenda but on their anti-corruption and good governance policies. Secular and nationalist parties clearly are preferred by voters in Indonesia and Malaysia even as Islam remains a core value of the people. There are also fundamentalists in Southeast Asia that would introduce strict Islamic law but would not advocate the use of violence to do so. There is also a distinction to be made between those who would focus primarily on sub-national, national and regional objectives, such as secession for a Muslim province, rather than focus on the international agenda advocated by Al Qaeda.
Alienation and humiliation appear to be key concepts for understanding the Islamic resurgence in Asia and for understanding why individuals are drawn to terrorist groups. In discussing madrassas and pesantren in Indonesia, from which extremists have been recruited, Zachary Abuza has taken the position that the "radical fringe (of Islam) will continue to grow, as modernization leaves people more isolated and the political process leaves people more disenfranchised. The Islamists and their supporters will continue to gain in power unless the more secular Muslim community again provides a successful model of tolerant and modernist Islam that it has done fairly successfully for forty years." In this way, some analysts believe frustration from diminished expectations driven by economic malaise, the lack of effective political participation, and a sense of humiliation are at the core of why many Asian Muslims have become radicalized. It is thought by some that U.S. policies can help best by assisting moderate elements in Asia to "respond to mainstream Muslims' hopes for economic improvement and political participation ... education, balanced development, participatory governance, and civil peace" that will give hope to alienated individuals who might otherwise drift towards radicalism. Some observers feel that diminishing the ranks of alienated Asian Muslims will in turn restrict room for maneuver by extremists and terrorists by limiting active or passive support from the societies within which they operate.

Output: There exists much diversity within the Islamic world. This is particularly evident in Asia. This diversity is to be found in the different ethnic backgrounds and in the different practices of Islam. The Muslim world of Asia has been experiencing an Islamic revival. This has had an effect on moderate as well as radical Muslims. An understanding of the dynamics of Islam in Asia should help inform United States' policy to develop respect between America and Muslim peoples, to foster economic policies to encourage development of open societies, to support education in Muslim states, and to identify and prioritize terrorist sanctuaries in order to pursue more effectively the war against terror. This report will be updated.