Input:
	Background

Money laundering is the process used to transform monetary proceeds  derived from criminal activities into funds and assets that appear to have  come from legitimate sources. Terrorist financing is generally  characterized by different motives than money laundering and the funds  involved often originate from legitimate sources. However, the techniques  for hiding the movement of funds intended to be used to finance terrorist  activity—techniques to obscure the origin of funds and the ultimate  destination—are often similar to those used to launder money. Therefore,  Treasury, federal law enforcement agencies, and the federal financial  regulators often employ similar approaches and techniques in trying to  detect and prevent both money laundering and terrorist financing.
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress passed the USA  PATRIOT Act, which was enacted on October 26, 2001. Title III of the  PATRIOT Act amended the BSA. The BSA was enacted by Congress in 1970  and requires that financial institutions file reports and maintain records  with respect to certain transactions in currency and monetary instruments  that are determined to have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or  regulatory investigations and, as amended by the PATRIOT Act, these  records and reports also have a high degree of usefulness in the conduct of  intelligence or counterintelligence activities. As a result, the BSA helps to  provide a paper trail of the activities of money launderers for law  enforcement officials in pursuit of criminal activities. Congress has  amended the BSA several times to give the U.S. government a wider variety  of regulatory tools to combat money laundering. In addition to requiring  regulations for information sharing and customer identification programs,  Title III of the PATRIOT Act expands Treasury’s authority to regulate the  activities of U.S. financial institutions and requires a wide variety of types  of financial institutions to maintain anti-money laundering programs.
Agencies under the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Homeland  Security are to coordinate with each other and with federal financial  regulators in combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Within  Treasury, FinCEN, under delegated authority from the Secretary of the  Treasury, is the administrator for the BSA and supports law enforcement  agencies by collecting, analyzing, and coordinating financial intelligence  information to combat money laundering. As a bureau of Treasury, FinCEN  clears all BSA regulations through Treasury. In August 2004, FinCEN  created an Office of Compliance to oversee and work with the federal  financial regulators on BSA examination and compliance matters. FinCEN  signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the banking  regulators in September 2004 that laid out procedures for the exchange of  certain BSA information. The MOU requires that the federal banking  regulators provide information on examination policies and procedures  and on significant BSA violations or deficiencies that have occurred at the  financial institutions they supervise, including relevant portions of  examination reports and information on follow-up and resolution. FinCEN  will also provide information to the banking regulators, including  information on FinCEN enforcement actions and analytical products that  will identify various patterns and trends in BSA compliance. FinCEN has  been working on similar MOUs with SEC and CFTC; however, as of March  25, 2005, no effective dates have been set for either of them.
Department of Justice components involved in efforts to combat money  laundering and terrorist financing include the Criminal Division’s Asset  Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section and Counterterrorism Section,  the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, and Explosives, the Drug  Enforcement Administration, and the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys  (EOUSA) and U.S. Attorneys Offices. The Department of Homeland  Security’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) also  investigates cases involving money laundering and terrorist activities.
The federal financial regulators who oversee financial institutions and  examine them for compliance with anti-money laundering laws and  regulations include the federal banking regulators—the Federal Reserve,  OCC, OTS, FDIC, and NCUA—and SEC, which regulates the securities  markets, and the CFTC, which regulates commodity futures and options  markets. Because the U.S. securities and futures markets are regulated  through a combination of self-regulation (subject to federal oversight) and  direct federal regulation, the SROs also oversee compliance with anti- money laundering laws and regulations. Two of the SROs—NASD and  NYSE—oversee registered broker-dealers. NFA oversees futures  commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities. In  addition to NFA, a number of the futures commission merchants are  overseen by futures exchanges, including the New York Mercantile  Exchange, CME, and CBOT.

	Developing Regulations for CIP and Section 314 That Applied to a Wide Range of Financial Institutions Was Difficult and Complex

Treasury and the federal financial regulators encountered numerous  challenges as they developed regulations to implement sections 314 and  326. Key challenges related to implementing section 326 included  developing regulations that could be applied consistently across a financial  industry that has diverse business models, customer relationships, and  financial products. In addition, many financial institutions have  arrangements with other institutions to process customer transactions.  These arrangements and the need to build in a risk-based approach to  customer identification created concerns among the regulators and  industry about reasonable levels of accountability for verifying the identity  of customers. Developing regulations for section 314 presented practical  problems on how to develop a process for information sharing between law  enforcement and industry and a process that allows financial institutions to  share information with each other.

		Development of the CIP Requirement Highlighted Difficulties in Applying Requirements Consistently to a Wide Range of Financial Products and Businesses

Treasury and the federal financial regulators had to resolve several issues  through an interagency process when developing the regulations for CIP,  such as defining “customer” and “account” for the purposes of the  regulations and determining how much flexibility to give firms in verifying  the identity of customers. Because the regulations for CIP would apply to a  diverse financial industry, FinCEN and the regulators formed a working  group and gathered information from industry officials about their different  business models and customer relationships. According to FinCEN  officials, the interagency process employed to issue joint regulations was  the first that included Treasury and the seven federal financial regulators.  Specifically, Treasury and the five banking regulators (FDIC, Federal  Reserve, NCUA, OCC, and OTS) jointly adopted a CIP rule covering banks,  thrifts, and credit unions. Treasury and SEC jointly adopted separate rules  for broker-dealers and mutual funds. Treasury and CFTC jointly adopted a  rule for futures commission merchants and introducing brokers. As  shown in figure 1, the rulemaking process took over a year and a half to  complete.
Following the issuance of the joint notices of proposed rulemaking in July  2002, Treasury and the federal financial regulators collectively received  approximately 500 comments, many of which expressed concerns about  the types of accounts and customers that should be subject to CIP. For  instance, some comments questioned whether an account established as  part of an employee benefit plan should be subject to CIP regulations, the  extent to which the risk-based approach should be used, and the need for  Treasury and the federal financial regulators to be more specific about the  methods of verification. Other comments proposed that the entire process  be risk-based without any minimum requirements. Some comments also  addressed how financial institutions could rely on or share responsibility  with another institution for verifying the identity of a shared customer  account. This reliance aspect is important for some types of financial  institutions that have securities and futures products. For example, in the  securities industry, many brokers interact with customers (introducing  brokers) but rely on another broker for clearance, settlement, and custody  purposes (clearing firms). Typically under this arrangement the introducing  broker interacts with the customer by taking orders and making  recommendations and the clearing firm holds the customer assets.  Treasury and the regulators also considered how financial institutions  could verify customer identities for customers who open accounts by mail,  by phone, or over the Internet.
Treasury and the federal financial regulators ultimately established  minimum identification requirements and mandated that financial  institutions develop risk-based procedures for verifying the identity of each  customer to the extent reasonable and practicable. The verification  procedures included documentary and nondocumentary methods to cover  the variety of approaches customers use to open accounts. The final rules  published on May 9, 2003, provide a framework with minimum standards  for identifying customers, while allowing financial institutions flexibility to  design and implement CIPs according to risk-based procedures for  verifying identity based on their business lines, types of customers, and  methods of opening accounts. Figure 2 illustrates requirements for  identification and verification procedures.
In addition to establishing minimum identification standards and a risk- based approach for verification procedures, the final rule requires that  financial institutions develop CIPs that include procedures for (1) making  and maintaining a record of information required to be obtained from the  customer at the time the account is opened and retaining the information  for five years after the date the account is closed, (2) providing notice to  the customer that their identity will be verified, and (3) determining  whether a person appears on any list designated by Treasury (in  consultation with the federal financial regulators) as a federal government  list of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations that must be  checked by financial institutions as part of the CIP requirement. Treasury  has not designated a list for the CIP requirement at this time.
The final rule also allows financial institutions to rely on another financial  institution to perform any procedures of its own CIP for customers that the  two financial institutions share provided that, among other requirements,  the financial institution that is being relied on enter into a contract  certifying annually to the relying financial institution that it has  implemented its own anti-money laundering program and that it will  perform the specified requirements of the relying financial institution’s CIP.  The rule also requires that the financial institution being relied on is  regulated by a federal functional regulator. The final rules stated that  financial institutions were expected to be in compliance with the final rules  no later than October 1, 2003.
Treasury issued a Notice of Inquiry in July 2003 (see fig. 1) approximately 2  months after the final CIP rules had been adopted, soliciting additional  comments about two aspects of the final CIP rules that concerned some  interested parties, including members of Congress and law enforcement  officials. The Notice of Inquiry sought additional comments on (1) whether  and under what circumstances financial institutions should be required to  retain photocopies of identification documents relied on to verify customer  identity and (2) whether there are situations when the regulations should  preclude reliance on certain forms of foreign government-issued  identification to verify customer identity. Treasury received over 34,000  comments in response to the Notice of Inquiry from a wide variety of  individuals and entities, including members of Congress, the Department of  Justice, the financial services industry, advocacy groups, and interested  citizens.
Treasury did not make any changes to the final CIP rules for two reasons.  First, it concluded that requiring photocopies in all cases is not consistent  with the risk-based approach for CIP. In its official disposition of comments  to the notice, Treasury said that the decision to make photocopies should  be at the discretion of the financial institution rather than an across-the- board requirement. Second, Treasury decided that specifying individual  types of documents that cannot be relied upon to verify customer identities  did not make sense from a regulatory perspective because the relative  security and reliability of various identification documents that are  available is constantly changing. The comments received in response to the  Notice of Inquiry primarily related to encouraging Treasury to take an  official position on whether the Mexican consular identification document,  the Matricula Consular is a reliable document for verifying identification.  Treasury concluded that because the relative security and reliability of  identification documents are constantly changing, any list of unacceptable  documents would quickly become outdated and may provide financial  institutions with an unwarranted sense of security concerning documents  that do not appear on such a list. Therefore, Treasury decided not to  prescribe a specific list of documents that are acceptable or not acceptable  in the regulation, but rather committed to providing financial institutions  with information relating to the security and reliability of identification  cards.

		Developing Section 314 Regulations Required Balancing the Needs of Law Enforcement and Industry

When developing section 314 regulations, Treasury (through FinCEN) had  to determine the extent to which financial institutions should share  information about customers with law enforcement officials and with each  other. Treasury adopted final regulations in September 2002. Figure 3  shows the key dates in the rulemaking process for section 314.
For section 314(a), FinCEN implemented a process in which law  enforcement agencies provide information on potential suspects to  FinCEN. FinCEN distributes these 314(a) information requests across the  country to financial institutions that are required to search their accounts  and transactions to identify any matches.
The process was temporarily suspended in November 2002, based on  feedback from financial institutions that they were overwhelmed or  confused by the process. Some institutions did not know what to do with  the information requests, while others were not sure which accounts or  transactions to search. Following consultations with law enforcement and  the federal financial regulators to streamline the process, FinCEN resumed  314(a) information requests in February 2003. FinCEN and industry  officials agreed that, since the moratorium, FinCEN has implemented a  more streamlined process that has improved the clarity and efficiency of  314(a) information requests. Officials from FinCEN and law enforcement  agencies have also established procedures to vet requests sent by law  enforcement agencies to ensure that they are related to terrorist or  significant money laundering activities. (See fig. 4.) Before putting a name  on the information request list, FinCEN officials said that they follow up  with the requesting law enforcement agent to obtain more information to  determine whether the case merits the use of the 314(a) process and to  verify that the agent will be available to respond to any financial institution  that finds a match when the request goes out. FinCEN also sends each law  enforcement requester a feedback form on the usefulness of the  information obtained. For example, the feedback form asks if law  enforcement officials served grand jury subpoenas based on the  information obtained from the 314(a) process. In addition, law  enforcement officials said that they have taken steps to caution agents  against overusing the 314(a) process, and that the 314(a) process is not  meant to replace the need for a subpoena or more rigorous investigation  methods.
FinCEN sends out the 314(a) information request list every 2 weeks. The  information requests include suspects related to terrorist cases and  significant money laundering investigations. FinCEN tries to limit the  number of subjects on the bi-weekly information request. The request  contains as much identifying information as possible, such as dates of  birth, social security numbers, and addresses as well as aliases so the  number of records that are to be searched for can be extensive. Financial  institutions have 2 weeks to respond. Urgent requests can also be  distributed with shorter turnaround time when deemed necessary.
The rulemaking process for section 314(b) addressed the need to  encourage information sharing among financial institutions while still  protecting customers’ right to privacy and established a mechanism for  financial institutions to satisfy the statutory notice requirement. Section  314(b) of the PATRIOT Act allows financial institutions, upon providing  notice to Treasury, to share information regarding individuals, entities, and  countries suspected of possible terrorist or money laundering activities.  The final rule requires that to be protected by the safe harbor from liability  for sharing information pursuant to section 314(b), financial institutions  must comply with the procedures prescribed by the rule, including  providing notice annually to FinCEN of their intent to share information  with other institutions. The rule also requires that prior to sharing  information, a financial institution must verify that the financial institution  with which information will be shared has also filed a notice with FinCEN.  FinCEN determines that the notice requirement sufficiently reminds  financial institutions of their need to safeguard information that is obtained  using section 314(b).

	Treasury and the Federal Financial Regulators Have Reached Out to the Financial Industry to Assist It in Implementing CIP and Section 314 Rules, but Industry Concerns Remain

Treasury and the federal financial regulators have taken several steps to  help the financial industry understand and comply with the CIP and 314  information sharing regulations; however, the need for agency coordination  has slowed the issuance of additional guidance. Industry officials said that  although the government’s guidance has been helpful, it does not  completely address their questions and compliance concerns particularly  related to the CIP rule. The implementation of the 314(a) information  sharing process has highlighted the tension between law enforcement  officials’ duty to protect sensitive information and the need for information  from law enforcement to help industry monitor, identify, and report  possible financial crimes, including terrorist financing and money  laundering. Finally, industry officials said that they appreciate the safe  harbor provided by 314(b), but some officials said distinguishing possible  money laundering and terrorist activities from other types of financial  crimes not covered by section 314(b), such as fraud, has been difficult.

		Treasury and the Regulators Have Assisted Industry in Implementing CIP and Section 314 Requirements, but Interagency Coordination Has Slowed Issuance of Additional Guidance

Treasury and the federal financial regulators have sought to educate the  financial community to help it understand the new requirements, but the  need for interagency coordination has slowed regulators’ issuance of  additional guidance. Regulators and SROs used established, formal  channels (such as Web site postings and existing regulatory memorandums  distribution channels) to distribute guidance to firms describing the  regulations, clarifying when the regulations would become effective, and  offering advice about implementation. Officials from the regulatory  agencies and SROs also informed firms of the regulations and addressed  practical issues during numerous industry-related conferences, conference  calls, and training sessions. Moreover, agency officials said that during  compliance exams conducted before and soon after the regulations  became effective, examiners clarified particular aspects and helped firms  establish compliant programs.
Treasury and the federal financial regulators have provided specific  guidance related to the CIP rule and section 314 in the form of responses to  “frequently asked questions” or “FAQs.” In August and October 2003,  Treasury and SEC issued limited FAQ guidance related to mutual funds and  broker-dealers, respectively. In January 2004, Treasury and the banking  regulators jointly issued FAQ guidance that addressed several issues  related to CIP. Among other topics, the answers clarified the definitions of  a customer and an account in different situations and discussed how firms  should apply the rules to existing customers. In July 2004, Treasury and  CFTC issued FAQ guidance concerning CIP that was similar to the banking  regulators’ guidance.
FinCEN issued FAQs for the 314 information sharing regulations in  February 2003. These FAQs were initially posted on FinCEN’s public Web  site but, according to FinCEN officials, they were removed due to law  enforcement concerns that this guidance could give criminals an  advantage. FinCEN officials said they have now posted these FAQs to its  secure Web site that financial institutions access to obtain the 314(a)  information requests and will send the FAQs to a financial institution upon  request.
According to FinCEN, because of the joint nature of the CIP rules, all of the  affected regulators and FinCEN must coordinate when issuing guidance to  assure consistency in the implementation of the regulations. Such  coordination has slowed the issuance of further guidance. Similar to the  challenges they encountered in the rulemaking process, the financial  regulators and FinCEN face continuing challenges in developing guidance  that applies to diverse types of financial products and businesses. FinCEN  and the federal financial regulators began developing a second series of  CIP FAQs pertaining primarily to banks in early 2004. Some officials told us  that this guidance has taken longer to finalize because of difficulties  reaching agreements on which questions to address and how to answer  them. FinCEN officials told us that although some of the officials had  signed off on the draft FAQs, agreement was not reached among two of the  regulators on one outstanding question until February 2005. FinCEN  officials told us that, although these are questions pertaining to CIPs, some  questions have broader policy implications for the affected agencies.  FinCEN released the draft for internal approval by the financial regulators  on March 25, 2005, and the final CIP FAQs were jointly issued by Treasury,  FinCEN, and the banking regulators on April 28, 2005. Officials from CFTC  and FinCEN told us that they hoped guidance in the form of an FAQ  addressing the CIP issue related to customers of executing and carrying  brokers would be released soon, but it has also taken some time to finalize  the guidance. SEC officials told us that they have been waiting for the  second set of banking FAQs and will then adapt the first and second set of  CIP FAQs for securities firms.
The industry officials we spoke with largely agreed that the regulators have  provided valuable information and services helping them to understand the  regulations. Some officials lauded the time and effort regulators have taken  to inform firms of the new regulations and answer difficult, practical  questions.

		Industry Officials Believe That More Guidance from FinCEN and Financial Regulators Would Help Address Some CIP Implementation Challenges

Industry officials we met with said that while regulators’ guidance has been  helpful, it does not address all of their questions and concerns, thus making  it difficult for them to know if they are in full compliance with the  requirements. Industry officials said that although their institutions had  customer identification procedures in place prior to the PATRIOT Act, they  revised their forms, processes, and systems to meet the minimum CIP  requirements. Many industry officials said that CIP regulations have  challenged them to organize and document their identification procedures,  create new forms and processes to notify customers of the new  procedures, and reconfigure systems in order to store information required  by the regulations for the specified period. Industry officials also said that  implementing CIP has improved the consistency of customer identification  procedures across different business lines in their own institutions and  should improve consistency across the various financial sectors.
CIP FAQs that FinCEN and the federal financial regulators issued for bank,  securities, and futures firms in 2003 and 2004 responded to several of the  industry’s implementation concerns. For example, the FAQs for banks  discussed two issues banks raised during the public comment period in the  rulemaking process—(1) the extent to which banks should verify existing  customers and (2) how banks may identify customers using  nondocumentary sources of identification information. The one CIP FAQ  for securities firms clarified when an intermediary will be deemed the  customer for purposes of the CIP rule when opening a domestic omnibus  securities account to execute transactions for the intermediary customers.
Despite the guidance, industry officials remain concerned about some  challenges they raised during the comment period and have additional  concerns. For example, industry officials said they are still uncertain how  examiners determine that firms have taken appropriate steps to verify the  identity of customers when the CIP regulations allow firms to take a risk- based approach and give them the flexibility to tailor their procedures for  verifying customers’ identities according to their location, customers, and  products. Industry officials believe that they and their examiners may  reasonably disagree on the risks posed by certain customers and  subsequently disagree about when to take extra steps to verify the identity  of the customers. The officials expressed concern that examiners will  sanction firms who differed with them, despite the fact that the firms  followed what they believed were reasonable steps to determine the risk of  the customers and subsequently took reasonable steps to verify their  identity. For example, one industry representative told us that in a recent  exam an examiner questioned the firm’s designation of high-risk countries-- the firm planned to take more stringent steps to verify the identity of  customers depending on the risk ranking of high-risk countries. According  to the industry official, the examiner thought that two of the countries on  the risk matrix should have been placed in a higher risk category but did  not provide a basis for believing that certain countries should be higher on  the firm’s risk ranking.
Some industry officials also said that they were unsure how examiners  expected them to verify the identity of institutions and people when  reliable identification information is unavailable, such as for people from  countries where sources of identification may not be reliable. CIP rules  require that financial institutions collect a government identification  number for corporations as well as individuals. Some industry officials said  that a foreign government identification number for institutions or  corporations can be very difficult to verify and therefore the collection of  the identification number is virtually worthless. Also, one of the  documentary methods for verifying the identity of a corporation is to  obtain the articles of incorporation, but these documents can also be  difficult to use to verify identities for foreign entities. Some securities  industry officials told us that foreign incorporation documents are difficult  to obtain and sometimes impossible because the country does not make  this information available to the public. Similarly, officials from mutual  fund firms expressed uncertainty concerning how examiners will assess  their practices for verifying the identity of some customers processed  online or over the telephone. The officials explained that they often use  credit reports and other nondocumentary sources to verify these types of  customers, and such sources are not always available for some customers,  such as young customers or some senior customers.
Additionally, some industry officials expressed uncertainty about the  reliance provision of the CIP rule. Specifically, industry officials said that  they did not know the scope of a reasonable reliance agreement and which  firm is liable for mistakes. Even after regulators issued guidance on the  reliance provision in the first series of CIP FAQs, some industry officials  said that they remain uncertain about the scope of reasonable reliance  agreements in some instances. Industry officials in the futures industry told  us that they hope that the federal government will provide guidance on how  the CIP requirement affects the relationship between executing brokers  and carrying brokers in “give up” relationships. CFTC and NFA officials  said that the regulations suggest that for an executing broker to invoke the  reliance provision in give-up transactions, carrying brokers must certify  that they have verified the identity of each customer whose trades are given  up to the carrying broker, thus requiring numerous verifications, which  could overwhelm the daily operations of the firms with CIP requirements.  In February and March 2005, CFTC and FinCEN officials told us that they  were working to issue additional guidance concerning these give-up  relationships and they hoped it would be issued shortly. In addition, some  industry officials said that they avoid relying on other firms because they  did not know how examiners would determine which firm will be  responsible for mistakes. During the rulemaking process, officials from the  securities sector expressed this same concern. Some industry officials told  us that examiners did not fully understand the reliance provision. The  securities industry officials told us that the reliance provision was meant to  ensure that the CIP requirement did not result in duplicative efforts.  Because of these concerns, some firms may not take advantage of the  provision.

		Industry Officials Faced Some Implementation Challenges and Question Whether the 314(a) Information Sharing Process Improves Communication with Law Enforcement

The implementation of the 314(a) information sharing process has created  some practical challenges and highlighted the tension between law  enforcement officials’ duty to protect sensitive information and industry’s  need for information useful in identifying and reporting financial crimes,  including terrorist financing and money laundering. One challenge industry  officials said they faced was their inability to simultaneously search the  multiple customer databases they are required to search, which forces  them to search numerous databases individually. Some industry officials  told us that they have dedicated significant staff hours to conduct the  searches, developed search programs specifically for 314(a) information  requests, and hired third-party vendors to conduct the searches.
Despite the attempts to lessen the burden of the 314(a) process, some  industry officials said that they have been disappointed with how federal  law enforcement agencies appear to be using the process. Industry officials  said that they expected law enforcement officials to request information  only for select, serious threats and primarily terrorist-related activities;  however, they questioned the significance of some of the information  requests they have received because requesting law enforcement agents  have not followed up matches by sending subpoena requests or returning  telephone calls concerning the matches. FinCEN and law enforcement  agency officials responded that they continue to refine the process for  vetting requests and preventing agents from overburdening financial  institutions with unnecessary requests.
Also, some industry officials asked why law enforcement officials could  not provide more information about cases involving their institutions, how  to treat particular suspicious customers, and profiles of terrorists and other  criminals. The industry officials said that such information would help  them to recognize and report a potential criminal or terrorist and enable  them to update their criteria for assessing the risk of individual customers,  thus strengthening due diligence systems and improving their contributions  to law enforcement officials’ anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism  efforts. Law enforcement and FinCEN officials said that although they  greatly appreciate the information provided by firms via the 314(a) process,  providing feedback to firms on particular cases can be a challenge,  particularly when cases involve sensitive information. In August 2004, the  FBI created a list of terrorist financing indicators to assist financial  institutions in identifying and reporting suspicious activity that may relate  to terrorism. FinCEN forwarded this information to financial institutions  through the 314(a) distribution channels. Consistent with the statements of  the law enforcement officials we spoke with, the 9-11 Commission praised  the benefits of the section 314(a) information sharing process, but also  expressed concerns about the extent to which law enforcement should  share sensitive law enforcement or intelligence information. The 9-11  Commission noted that providing financial institutions with information  concerning ongoing investigations opens up the possibility that the  institutions may leak sensitive information, compromise investigations, or  violate the privacy rights of suspects.
In response to the industry’s request for more information concerning the  value of the 314(a) process, FinCEN periodically publishes 314(a) fact  sheets. These fact sheets provide industry with summary data on 314(a)  requests over a specific time period, including the law enforcement  agencies making requests and the number of search warrants, grand jury  subpoenas, and indictments attributable to information firms provide  through the 314(a) process. Regulators, industry officials, and law  enforcement officials also jointly publish semiannual Suspicious Activity  Report (SAR) Activity Reviews, which provide information on trends and  patterns in financial crimes and how industry’s contributions through  reporting suspicious activity and responding to 314(a) requests have helped  investigations. Furthermore, as stated in its Fiscal Year 2006-2008 Strategic  Plan, released in February 2005, FinCEN plans to seek faster and more  efficient technical channels for dialog between government and the  financial industry. For example, FinCEN officials told us that they hope to  use FinCEN’s new secure information sharing system to provide financial  institutions additional feedback information.

		Industry Officials Expressed Some Confusion about Types of Suspicious Activity That Can Be Shared under Section 314(b)

Although industry officials said section 314(b) is a helpful tool and has  enabled them to share information in a new way, some officials said it is  not always easy to determine if the suspicious activity is money laundering  or terrorist activity or other financial crimes. As noted earlier, section  314(b) of the PATRIOT Act provides a safe harbor for financial institutions  to protect them from liability for sharing information only if it relates to  individuals, entities, organizations, and countries suspected of possible  terrorist or money laundering activities. Some industry officials stated that  sometimes it is difficult to distinguish fraudulent activity from possible  money laundering, thus making it hard to determine if a firm can share  information about that activity with other firms participating in the 314(b)  network. As a consequence, some financial institutions may be reluctant to  use the 314(b) process.
On the positive side, industry officials who had used the process said that  the 314(b) provision has allowed firms to share useful information  regarding potential money laundering or terrorist activities with other  institutions that they previously had little or no interaction with. The  officials said that such sharing has helped them efficiently collect  otherwise unattainable information about customers, enabling their firms  to practice better due diligence. Furthermore, some officials from the  banking industry said the 314(b) safe harbor provision has encouraged  them to give and receive information that uncovers diverse criminal  activities because money laundering is a predicate to a wide variety of  crimes.

	Financial Regulators and SROs Have Updated Examination Guidance and Trained Examiners to Evaluate Compliance with CIP and Section 314

Since February 1 and October 1, 2003—when financial institutions were to  be in compliance with regulations for sections 314 and CIP of the PATRIOT  Act, respectively—banking, securities, and futures regulators and SROs  issued examination guidance and trained examiners to assess firms for  compliance with both provisions. The five banking regulators jointly issued  guidance for CIP and section 314. The SEC and the securities SROs we  reviewed issued final guidance for both provisions individually, and the  futures SROs we reviewed issued final guidance jointly in February 2004  through the Joint Audit Committee—a consortium of futures exchanges.  NFA updated and issued its guidance by October 2003 for both provisions.  All federal financial regulators and SROs continue to update staff on  changes to examination procedures and have trained examiners to assess  firms for compliance with CIP and section 314.

		All Financial Regulators and SROs Have Issued Final Guidance and Procedures for CIP and Section 314 and Used a Variety of Methods to Communicate Changes to Their Staff

The banking regulators jointly issued guidance and procedures for section  314 on October 20, 2003, and for CIP on July 28, 2004. Although banking  regulators did not issue final examination guidance for CIPs until several  months after the regulations took effect, examiners were assessing firms’  CIPs using draft or interim guidance beginning in October 2003. SEC issued  final guidance and procedures for broker-dealers in September 2003 and  April 2002 for mutual funds. SEC’s guidance for mutual fund examination  does not address examination for compliance with section 314(a) requests  to mutual funds. SEC officials told us that FinCEN is currently not  including mutual funds in the 314(a) process. Also, SEC officials said that  because mutual fund shares are typically purchased through a principal  underwriter, which is a registered broker-dealer, most mutual fund  accounts would likely be covered by broker-dealers who receive 314(a)  information requests.
Development of examination guidance for all of the federal financial  regulators and the SROs continues to evolve as events change the  requirements financial institutions must adhere to in order to maintain  sound anti-money laundering programs. FinCEN is working to provide  support to regulators that have been delegated compliance examination  responsibilities for financial institutions and has become more involved in  helping regulators develop examination guidance and best practices. For  example, federal banking regulators, working on an interagency basis  through the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)  and with FinCEN, have drafted joint examination guidance that was being  field tested as of March 2005. The targeted issue date for this guidance is  June 30, 2005. Banking agency officials told us that this is the first time  they have developed joint anti-money laundering guidance and procedures  and that they are more comprehensive than any they have issued in the  past. As part of this effort, the banking regulators plan to distribute the new  examination manual to examiners on a CD that will also include the most  current anti-money laundering examination guidance and procedures. SEC  officials told us that they also plan to revise the examination guidance and  procedures for broker-dealers and mutual funds based on lessons learned  from examinations conducted last year. FinCEN officials told us they  intend to also work jointly with SEC and CFTC to coordinate efforts among  securities and futures regulators and work together on new or revised  guidance and procedures. However, FinCEN officials told us that they have  not been involved with SEC and CFTC in developing examination guidance  to date and they are still in the process of establishing MOUs with the two  regulators.
All of the SROs in our review issued final examination guidance and  procedures for the CIP rule and section 314 of the PATRIOT Act. The  securities SROs issued final examination guidance for both provisions by  October 2003. However, NASD and NYSE began examining firms for  compliance with section 314 as early as October 2002 and January 2003,  respectively. The futures exchanges jointly issued final guidance for both  provisions in February 2004 through a consortium of futures exchanges  called the Joint Audit Committee. The CFTC, which performs regulatory  oversight of the Joint Audit Committee, conducts an annual review of all  Joint Audit Committee programs. The anti-money laundering program used  by the Joint Audit Committee is among the programs reviewed annually by  the CFTC. CME and CBOT had begun assessing firms for account  verification, which closely resembles the CIP requirement, by May 2002.  NFA updated its guidance to reflect the CIP requirement in October 2003  and April 2003 for section 314 and immediately began assessing firms for  compliance with both provisions. NFA officials said they expect to issue  revised examination guidance in 2005 for section 326 to address whether,  and under what circumstances, an executing broker in a give-up  transaction is required to apply its CIP to the give-up customer.
The federal financial regulators and the SROs included in our review told  us they have updated staff about changes to examination guidance and  procedures using a variety of techniques including teleconferences,  monthly or biannual staff meetings, interagency bulletins, email  notifications, and training sessions. For example, banking and securities  regulators including the Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC, SEC, and NASD use  teleconferences that are broadcast to headquarters and district offices to  update staff on changes to examination guidance, post updates on the  organization’s Intranet, or use biannual and monthly staff meetings. CFTC  and the futures SROs including, CBOT, CME, and NFA update staff through  monthly staff meetings and email. NCUA and NYSE send emails to staff  that outline or highlight major changes to examination guidance. The  banking regulators also issue agencywide regulatory bulletins and letters to  update examiners.

		Financial Regulators and SROs Updated Their Training Program and Have Begun to Train Examiners to Evaluate Financial Institutions for Compliance with the CIP Requirement and Section 314

All federal financial regulators and SROs in our review updated their anti- money laundering training to include CIP and section 314. The federal  financial regulators and SROs began including CIP and section 314 in  training for anti-money laundering examination staff between January 2002  and June 2003. Banking and securities regulators use formal training  courses that are both instructor-led and computer-based and industry  experts to train staff administering anti-money laundering examinations.  Banking regulators also send examiners to training offered by FFIEC.  Training at most futures SROs we interviewed is more informal and occurs  mostly on the job due to the relatively small examination staffs at these  organizations. However, NFA and CFTC offer instructor-led training.

			Banking Regulators Use Formal Training Courses and FFIEC to Provide Staff Training

All of the federal banking regulators provide instructor-led courses in anti- money laundering and Web-based training. This training introduces BSA  and PATRIOT Act requirements and includes standard presentations and  theoretical as well as hands-on training. Their anti-money laundering  training curriculum includes instruction in various examination techniques  designed to help examiners recognize potential money laundering risks  confronting financial institutions and to learn procedures for assessing the  soundness of an institution’s anti-money laundering program. The federal  banking regulators also send staff to conferences sponsored by trade  associations that offer multiday focused courses and provide informal  resources for self-training such as subscriptions to online newsletters.
However, each banking regulator approaches training differently. For  example, OTS and NCUA require all new staff to attend a basic training  course in anti-money laundering. According to OTS officials, regional  conference training, which is attended primarily by examiners, is an  important part of bringing examiners up to speed on anti-money laundering  examination procedures. NCUA also uses regional conferences to train  large numbers of its examination staff. For example, in 2002, NCUA used  regional conferences to provide training on sections 314 and 326 of the  PATRIOT Act to all examination staff.
FDIC and the Federal Reserve both have examiners that are anti-money  laundering specialists who serve as a training resource to other examiners.  Both agencies train examiners who are primarily responsible for  conducting anti-money laundering examinations. At the Federal Reserve,  anti-money laundering examination specialists interact on a daily basis  with examination staff engaged in anti-money laundering examinations to  offer case-specific guidance regarding the requirements. The Federal  Reserve also provides on-site examiner training at the individual Reserve  Banks, which emphasizes requirements under section 314 and 326 of the  PATRIOT Act as warranted. Similar to the Federal Reserve, FDIC uses staff  experienced in conducting anti-money laundering examinations as a  resource for examiners. Currently, FDIC has 321 anti-money laundering  specialists who serve as a resource and as trainers for other examiners.  However, FDIC recently trained every examiner on staff, approximately  1,721 as of 2004, in anti-money laundering requirements. In addition, many  of its supervisory and legal professionals are pursuing anti-money  laundering specialist certifications. OCC has four different training schools,  which all provide live, instructor-led training in anti-money laundering  requirements. Finally, in an effort to build up staff with anti-money  laundering expertise, OCC has a formal on-the-job training program for  anti-money laundering and finances certifications in anti-money laundering  examination for some of its examiners.
Banking regulators also send examiners to FFIEC’s interagency anti-money  laundering training workshops. We were able to attend one of these  workshops and observed that the course covered the CIP requirement and  section 314, in addition to other anti-money laundering requirements. The  course included lectures by experienced examiners, presentations by FBI  and Internal Revenue Service officials, reading materials, and case study  exercises. Many of the case study exercises demonstrated how to identify  suspicious transactions and how transaction testing could reveal  weaknesses in a financial institution’s anti-money laundering program.  Table 1 provides additional information about training at each of the  banking regulators.
Similar to the banking regulators, the securities regulators and SROs also  provide formal classroom instruction in anti-money laundering review and  some Web-based training, but their approaches differ. SEC provides  training to more seasoned staff in anti-money laundering while anti-money  laundering training is available to all staff at the securities SROs. However,  SEC and NASD are beginning to tailor training in anti-money laundering  review for newer staff. For example, beginning in 2005, SEC’s training for  new examiners will include an anti-money laundering workshop.  According to SEC, this effort responds to the increasing importance of anti- money laundering issues and serves to alert less experienced examiners to  SEC’s new coordination efforts with FinCEN. Similarly, NASD has recently  enhanced its new examiner training program through the implementation  of a formal classroom training program. As part of this 6-week course,  participants will go through 2 full days of training devoted to anti-money  laundering requirements, including the CIP requirement and section 314 of  the PATRIOT Act. NYSE provides training using a combination of internal  and industry experts. Its training program includes several sessions on anti- money laundering and is administered by both internal employees who  have an extensive knowledge of the area and outside experts from law and  accounting firms.
Securities regulators also coordinate with each other to provide joint  training for their examiners. In February 2005, SEC, NASD, and NYSE  prepared a 2-day training session devoted to anti-money laundering  requirements. This training included presentations from FBI, FinCEN,  industry experts, and officials from each of the three securities regulators.  The SROs also work together to provide training about timely and relevant  examination and compliance topics. According to NASD and NYSE  officials we interviewed, the SROs periodically prepare joint training  sessions, which cover topics such as anti-money laundering requirements.  Table 2 provides additional information about training at SEC and the  securities SROs.
Futures SRO officials at CBOT and CME told us that anti-money laundering  training was conducted primarily on the job because these organizations  have relatively small examination staffs. According to officials at these  organizations, more seasoned, senior staff is responsible for training new  staff on how to conduct anti-money laundering reviews. NFA also provides  on-the-job training; however, all examiners are required to attend formal  training in anti-money laundering such as instructor-led training sessions  and technical roundtables on various anti-money laundering issues. In June  and July 2004, the NFA’s compliance department conducted two technical  roundtables, which focused primarily on CIP requirements. In addition to  in-house training, NFA also hosts outside agencies, such as FinCEN, to  make presentations on relevant and timely issued related to anti-money  laundering requirements. NFA invites other futures SROs including CME  and CBOT to most of their training sessions. According to officials at all of  the futures SROs, on-the-job and formal, classroom training for  examination staff on the CIP requirement and section 314 started as early  as May 2002. The CFTC also provides in-house training opportunities for its  entire staff, which includes examiners who conduct oversight  examinations of SROs. The training covers all aspects of the anti-money  laundering regulatory requirements applicable to futures firms.

	Examinations and Enforcement Actions Highlight Progress and Difficulties in Overseeing Compliance with the CIP Requirement and Section 314

The federal financial regulators and SROs responsible for examining  financial institutions’ compliance with anti-money laundering laws and  regulations have conducted examinations that cover compliance with, and  have taken enforcement actions concerning, violations of both the CIP  requirement and section 314 and its corresponding regulations, but  coverage of these requirements varied in the examinations we reviewed.  Most of the examinations in our sample assessed whether financial  institutions had developed CIPs and procedures for complying with the  regulations implementing section 314(a), but specific aspects of the  procedures reviewed were not always documented. Some examinations  highlighted the difficulties examiners and financial institutions have  encountered in understanding CIP requirements. Compliance with section  314(b) and the implementing regulations was not routinely assessed in part  because information sharing under 314(b) is voluntary. The regulators and  SROs used informal actions to address the deficiencies or apparent  violations identified in the examinations in our sample. Since the  regulations became effective, some of the regulators have also taken  formal enforcement actions that include violations of the CIP requirement  and the regulations adopted under section 314(a). Finally, in conducting  our work for this objective, we encountered difficulties in obtaining the  information on examinations and violations from two of the regulators that  revealed weaknesses in their processes for tracking anti-money laundering  compliance.

		Most Examinations in Our Sample Reviewed CIP, but Coverage of Certain Aspects Varied

As shown in table 3, about 95 percent of the examinations in our sample  (168 of 176) documented some type of review of financial institutions’ CIP  procedures. However, coverage varied when we looked for (1) evidence  that the examiner reviewed CIP and (2) documentation of specific aspects  of the examiners’ reviews, such as reviewing the financial institution’s  methods of verifying customers’ identities or testing the CIP procedures.  When we reviewed the examinations for coverage of the CIP requirement,  we specifically looked for documentation that the examiner assessed  whether (1) the financial institution had developed a CIP and written  procedures for CIP; (2) the CIP procedures included collecting appropriate  customer information including the minimum requirements, such as date of  birth for individuals; (3) the CIP procedures included verifying customer  information using documentary or nondocumentary methods; (4) the  financial institution was using risk-based procedures for verification, such  as determining how much information to verify depending on its  assessment of the risk of the customer or type of account or collecting  additional information; and (5) the CIP had been adequately implemented  by testing a sample of accounts.
Generally, we saw documentation showing that examiners reviewed the  financial institution’s written CIP procedures. Most examinations in our  sample had evidence that the review included assessing written procedures  for CIP (157 of 176 or 89 percent), and the procedures included appropriate  customer identification information (144 of 176 or 82 percent) and methods  of verification (143 of 176 or 81 percent). Fewer examinations— approximately 56 percent (99 of 176)—assessed whether the financial  institution was using a risk-based approach. Our review leads us to believe  that the risk-based aspect of CIP is an area that could be difficult for both  financial institutions and examiners to interpret consistently, because  determining the level of risk of a customer or account can be difficult and  depends on several factors, such as the customer’s line of business, the  process used to open the account, and whether the customer is in the  United States or overseas.
Because it can be difficult to determine the customer’s risk level, it is not  surprising that some examiners would focus on reviewing the minimum  requirements, such as the requirements to collect minimum information on  customers. OCC officials told us that they developed some internal  guidance to assist OCC examiners in understanding the risk-based aspect  of CIP early in 2004 because some examiners were confused about it. This  guidance explained that limited identification and verification procedures  may be appropriate for local residents and businesses, but enhanced  procedures may be needed for nonlocal customers, non face-to-face  customers (such as customers who conduct transactions by mail,  telephone, and Internet), and high-risk accounts (such as private  investment corporations, offshore trusts, and foreign customers). The  guidance also provided examples of types of enhanced verification  procedures, such as customer callbacks, credit verification, and on-site  visits that could be used to verify the identity of higher-risk customers.  Finally, the guidance stated that for most banks a single set of procedures  for verifying the identity of customers would not be adequate. FDIC had  also incorporated some examples in examination guidance updated in  December 2004 that included examples of how CIP procedures may differ  depending on the risk of the customer or type of account. One example in  FDIC’s guidance explained when a bank may want to obtain more  information on a business or company. The guidance said that although  obtaining information on signatories, beneficiaries, principals, and  guarantors is not a minimum requirement for CIPs, in the case of opening  an account for a relatively new or unknown firm, it would be in the bank’s  interest to obtain and verify a greater volume of information on signatories  and other individuals with control or authority over the firm’s account. It is  important that examiners determine whether financial institutions have  developed risk-based procedures in addition to developing procedures that  meet the minimum requirements, because (1) the regulations require that  financial institutions develop risk-based procedures and (2) the risk-based  procedures allow for more rigorous verification procedures on those types  of customers thought to be more at risk of engaging in money laundering or  terrorist activities.
The results of our review of examinations showed considerable variation  when we looked for documentation showing whether the examiner tested  CIP procedures. We found that only about 43 percent (75 out of 176)  examinations tested procedures, in part because our review looked at  examinations during the early implementation phase and the examination  guidance issued by some regulators does not require that they test  procedures. Federal Reserve and FDIC officials said that during the early  phase of implementation examiners may have focused on reviewing the  procedures with the intent of testing procedures in the next examination  cycle. SEC officials said that since many of their broker-dealer  examinations that we reviewed were oversight examinations of  examinations conducted by NASD or NYSE, SEC examiners would not  always conduct testing. Officials from NASD and NYSE told us that some of  the smaller broker-dealers may not have opened any new accounts  between October 1, 2003, and the time of the examination and, therefore,  the examiner would not have tested accounts. NYSE officials also said that  CIP was not reviewed in one examination in our sample because the  examiner determined that the firm did not have any customers and did not  interact with the public.
The regulators and SROs varied in their examiner guidance for testing  procedures. The banking regulators use a risk-based approach to their  examinations that determines what procedures are performed. Under this  risk-based approach to examinations, the examiners first determine  whether the financial institution has a strong compliance program and a  history of compliance and then tailors the examination procedures based  on this risk assessment and review of past examinations. For example,  Federal Reserve officials explained that an examiner’s review of the  independent testing of an institution’s anti-money laundering procedures  may reduce the need for the examiner to also test certain procedures.  When the banking regulators issued their joint examination guidance and  procedures for CIP in July 2004, the guidance directed examiners to  determine whether and to what extent to test CIP procedures based on a  risk assessment, prior examination reports, and a review of the bank’s audit  findings. Although the SEC examination procedures for broker-dealers that  we reviewed did not include procedures for testing, an SEC official told us  that the initial request letters sent to institutions include a request for  customer account information so that examiners can test those accounts  for CIP compliance. SEC’s procedures that we reviewed for mutual funds  included procedures for sampling accounts and testing CIP procedures for  examinations of funds’ transfer agents that maintain customer account  information. NASD and NYSE have instructions that include sampling  accounts to determine whether the financial institution’s CIP procedures  are being implemented properly. The examination procedures used by NFA  and the futures exchanges also include procedures to test the CIP  procedures against a sample of high-risk accounts.
We also looked to see if examiners conducted any testing of high-risk  accounts because the results of such testing would provide a clearer  indicator of whether the financial institution was exercising more due  diligence on riskier accounts. We saw evidence that examiners tested a  sample of high-risk accounts for CIP compliance in 8 of 176 of the  examinations. Several regulatory officials told us that the institutions in our  sample may not have had high-risk accounts. For example, many of the  NFA examinations included documentation saying that the institution did  not have any high-risk accounts and therefore a sample of such accounts  were not tested. Also, NCUA and OTS officials said that the probability that  the institutions they regulate would have high-risk accounts was small.
Although most of the examinations had documentation that the examiner  had reviewed CIP, the documentation, such as the examination report or a  summary written by an examiner, did not always specify how the review  was conducted. Therefore, some of the variation in the results from our  examination review may also be due to differences in the way examiners  document their work. We observed a variety of methods for documenting  examination procedures that were conducted and examination results.  Some of the federal financial regulators and SROs used a system of  recording the completion of examination procedures, such as a  questionnaire or worksheet, which generally made it easy to follow what  the examiner had done but did not always include the same aspects that we  were reviewing. For example, NCUA examiners document their  examinations using a questionnaire. However, this questionnaire does not  ask the examiner to document whether he or she tested CIP procedures. In  the one instance in which we saw documentation of testing by NCUA, the  NCUA examiner had documented a deficiency in the credit union’s CIP  procedures based on looking at a sample of accounts. An FDIC official told  us that examiners may not document that they tested procedures unless it  showed a deficiency. Some examiners documented their review by making  notes on copies of the financial institution’s procedures. Finally, some  examinations, such as a few of the examinations conducted by the Federal  Reserve and OCC, used memorandums that discussed the findings of the  examination. However, the memorandums may not have specified all of the  aspects of CIP that were reviewed. In addition, OCC officials told us that  OCC does not require examiners to document every procedure that they  complete or what they do not do in an examination.

		The Results of Our Examination Review Highlighted Some Difficulties in Understanding CIP Requirements

Our review of some of the examinations in the sample revealed that  examiners and financial institutions may not always understand the  requirements for CIP or interpret them in the same way. The aspects of CIP  that raised questions about whether examiners or financial institutions  understand them are (1) the differences between CIP and know-your- customer procedures; (2) the differences between the requirements to  check government lists for CIP versus other government lists such as  OFAC; and (3) the extent to which a financial institution performs CIP  procedures for existing customers. Some confusion or lack of  understanding is to be expected during the early phases of implementing  new requirements. However, these differences in understanding have  resulted in inconsistencies in the examination process and may have  created further confusion and misunderstandings.

			CIP and Other Procedures That Require Customer Identification

A potential challenge to assessing compliance with CIP are the similarities  among CIP requirements and other procedures that require customer  identification for anti-money laundering purposes, including what has been  called “know-your-customer” or “customer due diligence” (CDD)  procedures. Also, although not an issue in the examinations we reviewed,  section 312 of the PATRIOT Act adds another customer due diligence  requirement and could lead to misunderstandings about appropriate due  diligence. Section 312 requires appropriate, specific and, where necessary,  enhanced, due diligence for correspondent accounts and private banking  accounts established in the United States for non-U.S. persons. FinCEN  adopted an interim final rule for section 312 on July 23, 2002. In the interim  rule, FinCEN noted that the requirements of this provision placed on  financial institutions are significant and therefore, additional time was  necessary to consider what is appropriate for the final rule.
As shown in table 4, CIP, know-your-customer procedures, and section 312  have some similarities. All three require some level of collecting customer  identification information and taking steps to verify that information and  the risk-based aspect of CIP could overlap or duplicate know-your- customer procedures and section 312 requirements. However, know-your- customer procedures typically require more information than CIP.  According to the 1997 BSA examination manual issued by the Federal  Reserve, a know-your-customer policy begins with obtaining identification  information and taking steps to verify information—similar procedures to  CIP. However, know-your-customer procedures also include obtaining  information on the source of funds used to open an account and  determining whether to obtain information on beneficial owners of certain  types of accounts such as trusts. One goal of know-your-customer  procedures is to collect sufficient information so that the financial  institution knows what to expect in terms of customer account activity so  that it can adequately monitor for unusual or suspicious activities.
In 6 examinations in our sample of 176, we found evidence that examiners  were confusing know-your-customer procedures with CIP. For example, in  1 examination, the examiner documented a review of CIP but the  documentation included a copy of the financial institution’s know-your- customer procedures that had been in place since 1997 and had not been  updated to include the minimum identification standards and other CIP  requirements, such as recordkeeping procedures. As a consequence, this  institution may be doing less than what CIP requires. In another  examination, the examiner reviewed the institution’s know-your-customer  procedures, which included the minimum CIP requirements but also  directed employees to do more due diligence than CIP may require  depending on a risk assessment of the account and customer. As a  consequence the examiner and institution may believe that compliance  with CIP requires more procedures than necessary. Draft examination  guidance that the banking regulators intend to issue in June 2005 may  improve understanding of the difference. The draft guidance explains that  customer due diligence begins with customer identification and  verification but also involves collecting information in order to evaluate the  purpose of the account to be able to detect, monitor, and report suspicious  activity. One regulatory official told us that the banking regulators now  refer to know-your–customer procedures as “customer due diligence.”

			CIP Requirements for Checking Government Lists

In 7 examinations, we found that the examiner confused the CIP  requirement to check government lists of suspected terrorists with another  government requirement to freeze assets and block transactions of  designated persons and entities. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets  Control (OFAC) requires financial institutions to freeze assets or block  transactions of people and entities on the List of Specially Designated and  Blocked Persons. Therefore, financial institutions check customers  against this list to ensure that they are in compliance. In these 7  examinations, the examiners noted that the financial institution was not  compliant with the CIP requirement to check government lists because the  institution was not checking customers against the OFAC list. However, as  FinCEN and the banking regulators noted in the first set of CIP FAQs, lists  published by OFAC whose independent requirements stem from statutes  other than the PATRIOT Act and are not limited to terrorism, have not been  designated for purposes of the CIP rule.

			Applying CIP to Existing Customers

Two examinations documented disputes or confusion about the extent to  which financial institutions should apply the CIP requirement to existing  customers who open new accounts. In one examination, the examiner cited  a CIP deficiency because the institution had not updated the address  information for all of its existing customers. However, the CIP rule only  applies when an existing customer is opening a new account and the CIP  rule does not expect institutions to update records on existing customers if  it has a reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of its customers. As  stated in FAQs for the CIP rule issued by FinCEN and the banking  regulators, a bank can demonstrate it has a reasonable belief that it knows  its customers’ true identities if it had comparable procedures in place prior  to October 1, 2003, or provide documentation showing that it has had a  long-standing relationship with a particular customer. In the other  examination, the institution and the examiners were familiar with the CIP  requirements but differed in interpreting the extent to which an institution  can develop a policy that exempts existing customers who open new  accounts. The institution disputed the examiners’ finding that it was not in  compliance with CIP because it had assumed it knew the identity of all of  its customers who had opened accounts prior to January 2000. The  institution argued that it had procedures in place prior to 2000 that were  similar to CIP procedures and therefore did not have to apply the CIP  requirement to existing customers who open new accounts.

		Most Examinations in Our Sample Covered Section 314(a), While about Half Covered Section 314(b) in Part Because It Is Voluntary

As shown in table 5, most of the examinations in our sample—about 76  percent—included a review of compliance with section 314(a), but  documentation of specific aspects of section 314(a) were somewhat less.  We found documentation in 58 percent (91 of 157) of the examinations in  which the examiner determined that the financial institution was receiving  314(a) information requests from FinCEN. We also looked for evidence of  whether the examiner tested the 314(a) procedures and found  documentation of testing for about 16 percent (25 of 157) of the  examinations.
Although many of the examinations had documentation that the examiner  had reviewed section 314(a), the documentation, such as the examination  report or a summary written by an examiner, did not always provide  enough specificity for us to determine if the examiner had verified that the  financial institution was receiving the requests or tested the procedures.  Also, in some cases, the examination procedures did not require that  examiners test 314(a) procedures. Neither NFA nor the exchanges require  in their examination guidance that examiners test the 314(a) procedures to  check if all of the required types of records are searched, but they do  require that the examiner determine if the financial institution responded  within 2 weeks if it had a customer account that matched a subject on the  314(a) request. An SEC official told us that it would be difficult to test the  314(a) procedures in many cases because many financial institutions  destroy the 314(a) information requests after they have searched their  accounts. The examination procedures for section 314(a) issued by the  banking regulators are also conducted under a risk-based approach. Under  the risk-based approach, examiners may determine the need to select a  sample of positive matches or recent 314(a) requests to test the  procedures.
The samples for SEC and NFA are smaller in our review of section 314(a)  because certain types of financial institutions do not typically receive the  314(a) information requests from FinCEN. According to SEC and FinCEN  officials, under the 314(a) process, information requests are generally sent  out to banks, credit unions, broker-dealers, and futures commission  merchants because these types of financial institutions have an established  infrastructure for capturing point of contact information. Also, SEC  officials told us that because mutual fund shares are typically purchased  through a principal underwriter, which is a registered broker-dealer, most  mutual fund accounts would likely be covered by broker-dealers who  receive 314(a) information requests. Therefore, SEC does not examine  mutual funds for compliance with section 314(a) at this time. SEC officials  said that because many of the examinations of broker-dealers in our sample  were oversight examinations of NASD and NYSE, some examinations  would not necessarily review all aspects of a financial institution’s anti- money laundering program.
The number of examinations in our sample of NFA examinations that  covered section 314(a) is fewer than for CIP because most of the  examinations included in our NFA sample were examinations of  introducing brokers. NFA officials explained that introducing brokers do  not typically receive 314(a) requests because under industry regulation  every customer of an introducing broker must also be a customer of a  futures commission merchant. Therefore, if introducing brokers were  required to conduct 314(a) searches, they would be searching the same  universe of customers covered by the 314(a) requests sent to futures  commission merchants. Also, two of the NFA examinations of futures  commission merchants did not cover section 314(a) because (1) NYSE and  NASD had recently examined one of the firms and had covered it and (2)  NFA limited the scope of the examination of the other firm based on prior  NFA examinations that found the procedures were adequate. The two  CBOT examinations did not cover section 314(a) because the examinations  we reviewed were conducted prior to the issuance of the futures  exchanges’ revised examination guidance and procedures in February 2004  that were updated to include section 314(a).
Some of the OCC and NYSE examinations also did not cover a review of  section 314 procedures because our review occurred during the early  implementation phase and their examination approaches were still  evolving. According to OCC officials, OCC examinations in our sample did  not always cover section 314(a) procedures because during this time  period OCC was in the process of implementing its approach to reviewing  the PATRIOT Act provisions. In February 2004, OCC issued guidance to its  examiners to identify those banks with a high risk money laundering profile  with the intent of giving those institutions a higher priority in the  examination cycle for covering the PATRIOT Act provisions. Because OCC  examiners were just beginning to review the PATRIOT Act provisions  during the time of our review, some examinations may have not covered all  aspects of the PATRIOT Act. OCC officials also said that some examiners  may have focused on CIP because CIP procedures are more complex. OCC  officials said that compliance with section 314 and the CIP requirement  would be examined in all large banks by March 2005 and in all small and  mid-sized banks by end of 2006. NYSE examinations did not always cover  section 314(a) procedures, in part, because NYSE examination procedures  were not clear about how examiners should review section 314(a)  procedures. Initially, NYSE had included an examination procedure  covering section 314(a) within its examination objective covering the firm’s  anti-money laundering program. NYSE officials created a separate  examination objective for section 314(a) while we were conducting our  review and told us that the revised questions and procedures were  incorporated into the anti-money laundering examination module in  December 2004.
As shown in table 6, about 55 percent of the examinations in our sample  covered section 314(b). The sharing of information with other financial  institutions pursuant to section 314(b) is voluntary. As a consequence,  some examiners may have chosen not to examine   for compliance with  section 314(b) regulations and some federal financial regulators and SROs  did not develop examination procedures for determining compliance with  section 314(b) regulations. SEC did not include section 314(b) in its  examination procedures for mutual funds because it is voluntary. The  futures SROs—NFA, CME, and CBOT—also did not include procedures for  examining compliance with section 314(b) regulations. An NFA official told  us that they did not review 314(b) because it is voluntary. Most of the  regulators and SROs that examined section 314(b) procedures emphasized  in their guidance that the provision is voluntary and financial institutions  can choose not to share customer information with other financial  institutions or share customer information without the benefit of the safe  harbor. However, financial institutions may choose to share information  without providing notice to FinCEN and be at risk of violating privacy laws.  An NYSE official told us that they assess compliance with section 314(b)  regulations to ensure that the financial institution will not violate privacy  laws. The procedures issued jointly by the federal banking regulators state  that the failure to follow the section 314(b) procedures is not a violation of  section 314(b) but could lead to a violation of privacy laws or other laws  and regulations.

		Federal Financial Regulators and SROs Generally Used Informal Actions to Address CIP and Section 314(a) Deficiencies and Violations

Because the regulations were new and many deficiencies and violations  were technical mistakes, the federal financial regulators and SROs mostly  took informal actions to address deficiencies and apparent violations  associated with section 314 and CIP. In our sample of 176 examinations, 32  examinations reported deficiencies or apparent violations related to  section 314(a) and 79 examinations reported deficiencies or apparent  violations relating to CIP requirements.
The federal financial regulators and SROs used different terms to classify  problems associated with section 314 and CIP and other elements of  institutions’ anti-money laundering programs. For example, some  regulators would generally identify section 314 or CIP problems as  “violations” or “apparent violations,” while some of the banking regulators  would use the term “deficiency” in some cases and “violation” in other  cases. Officials from one of the banking regulators told us that they are in  the process of developing guidance on the matter. To allow for comparison  and aggregation across the different regulators and SROs, we examined  problems identified as both violations and deficiencies for our analysis.  The varying terminology has an impact on the banking regulators’ reporting  systems, since some regulators track apparent violations but do not track  deficiencies. This issue will be examined in more depth in other work we  are conducting on the banking regulators and BSA examinations and  enforcement.
The types of section 314(a) deficiencies and violations in our sample  varied. Table 7 lists examples of the types of deficiencies and violations in  the examinations we identified as being minor or significant. We defined  those deficiencies and violations as minor when the financial institution  was generally receiving 314(a) requests and searching its accounts, but its  procedures needed enhancements. Those deficiencies and violations that  we defined as significant were situations in which the institution was not  receiving 314(a) requests or adequately searching accounts.
The severity of CIP deficiencies and violations also varied. We defined CIP  deficiencies and violations as being minor when the financial institution  generally had CIP procedures, but some aspects needed enhancements or  were incomplete according to the regulatory requirements. Situations in  which the institution did not have any CIP procedures or the examiner  found that the institution was generally not following its CIP procedures  we defined as significant. Table 8 lists some examples of minor and  significant CIP deficiencies and violations in our sample of examinations.
In many cases, the examinations included documentation showing that  institution management agreed to correct deficiencies or violations. In  several instances, the examination included documentation in which the  board of directors of the institution is directed to address the deficiencies.  For example, the Federal Reserve required a board of directors to address  a bank’s failure to maintain documentation of its 314(a) searches and to  address the violation within 30 days of the examination. Similarly, NCUA  noted that a credit union lacked CIP policies and procedures and directed  its board of directors to address the apparent violation within a specific  timeframe. Additionally, in a few cases, examiners documented that  deficiencies or violations were corrected during the exam. For example, a  financial institution examined by NASD updated its procedures for  addressing FinCEN information requests while examiners were on-site.

		Recent Formal Enforcement Actions Have Cited Violations of CIP and Section 314(a)

Although none of the examinations in our sample resulted in formal  enforcement actions, recent formal enforcement actions involved  violations of the CIP requirement and the regulations under section 314(a).  The federal financial regulators have independent statutory authority to  institute formal enforcement actions themselves, and they may also refer  BSA violations to FinCEN for formal enforcement action. Under  delegated authority, FinCEN is the administrator of the BSA and has the  authority to enforce BSA regulations. FinCEN’s Office of Compliance and  Regulatory Enforcement evaluates enforcement matters that may result in  a variety of remedies, including the assessment of civil money penalties.
The federal banking regulators have the authority to take formal  enforcement action if they determine that a financial institution is engaging  in unsafe or unsound practices or has violated any applicable law or  regulation. According to officials from the federal banking regulators,  they would take formal action, such as issuing a cease and desist order, if  they detected systemic or willful violations of the BSA. Violations of  formal agreements or orders, such as a cease and desist order, may result in  the assessment of civil money penalties. According to a September 2004  MOU among the federal banking regulators and FinCEN, the federal  banking regulators have agreed to promptly notify FinCEN of significant  BSA violations or deficiencies by financial institutions under their  jurisdiction. SEC officials said that significant and willful BSA violations  would be referred to its enforcement division, as well as FinCEN.  Similarly, NASD and NYSE have their own rules to enforce anti-money  laundering regulations and officials from NASD and NYSE said that they  would take formal actions and may make a formal referral to FinCEN if  they encountered certain BSA violations. Officials from CFTC and the three  futures SROs in our review also said that they would take formal action for  significant BSA violations under their own rules to enforce anti-money  laundering regulations as well as refer the violations to FinCEN.
We identified several formal enforcement actions taken by the federal  banking regulators and FinCEN that included violations of CIP that  demonstrate how violations of CIP and section 314(a) are enforced (see  table 9). Only one enforcement action—AmSouth—included a violation of  section 314(a). These enforcement actions generally consisted of civil  money penalties, supervisory or written agreements, or cease and desist  orders. In each of these actions, the financial institution agreed to comply  with the enforcement action.
Two of these enforcement actions provide additional examples of how CIP  has been confused with know-your-customer policies. In two of the cases  above, Beach Bank and BAC Florida Bank, FDIC’s cease and desist orders  cited institutions for violations of 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 by “failing to  implement an effective customer identification program and/or effective  ‘Know Your Customer’ policies and procedures.” While 31 C.F.R. § 103.121  requires banks to implement a CIP appropriate for their size and type of  business, it does not require banks to adopt know-your-customer policies  and procedures. Know-your-customer procedures generally require more  information than CIP.
We also identified five formal enforcement actions brought against broker- dealers for violations of CIP and section 314(a) requirements. According to  NASD, the firms that were the subject of the NASD enforcement actions in  table 10 were generally firms with limited risk profiles. Most of the firms  did not have extensive client bases, a large number of registered  representatives, and multiple branch offices. Therefore, the fine amounts  reflect both the smaller size and financial resources of the firms and the  lower risk of money laundering inherent in their business models.

		Regulators’ Processes for Tracking Examination Information Varied with Some Having Weaknesses That Could Affect Their Ability to Monitor Anti- Money Laundering Compliance

Reviewing examination data and 176 examinations across six regulators  and five SROs provided us an opportunity to see a wide range of practices  for managing anti-money laundering oversight programs. One of the key  practices that varied across programs was the tracking system used to  track examination information. The information that was provided to us on  the examinations and apparent violations that covered section 314 and CIP  raised broader issues about how the regulators and SROs track anti-money  laundering compliance information. To select our sample of examinations,  we requested information on the examinations and apparent violations that  covered section 314 and CIP, but two of the regulators could not easily  obtain this information from their tracking systems. Although we assessed  the reliability of the data we received, we did not conduct broad  assessments of the information systems and processes regulators and  SROs use to track examinations in this report, in part, because we have  other work reviewing the banking regulators’ anti-money laundering  examinations and enforcement programs and SEC’s examination programs  that both include reviewing how they track examinations. However, we  highlight the problems we encountered in this review because the  problems could affect regulators’ ability to monitor compliance with  sections 314 and CIP as well as other anti-money laundering requirements.
Generally, OCC, FDIC, OTS, and NCUA were able to respond to our data  request using their examination tracking systems and provide information  on examinations that would most likely cover section 314 and CIP by  identifying examinations that covered anti-money laundering compliance  and information on apparent violations. The information varied in  determining whether the examinations actually covered CIP and section  314 during the period of time between October 1, 2003, and May 31, 2004,  because the regulators began examining for these provisions at different  times. For example, OCC’s system is designed to capture examination areas  but examiners were not provided guidance to begin reviewing PATRIOT  Act provisions until late February 2004, and therefore, the system was not  always recording that they had performed modules covering the PATRIOT  Act sections for the period of our review. Also, NCUA officials told us that  we were more likely to be able to review examinations that covered section  314 and CIP in examinations completed on or after February 2004, because  those examinations were more likely to have used the revised examination  questionnaire for anti-money laundering compliance that had been  installed on computers in December 2003.
The Federal Reserve had some difficulty responding to our request because  the Federal Reserve’s existing automated tracking system for examinations  did not capture sufficient detail on whether its examinations cover a review  of anti-money laundering compliance. Although full-scope examinations  are all supposed to cover anti-money laundering compliance, many of the  Federal Reserve’s target examinations may also cover anti-money  laundering compliance, but their tracking system does not capture this  level of detail. Therefore, the Federal Reserve could not readily identify the  population of examinations that would most likely cover CIP and section  314. Also, although the Federal Reserve tracks information on apparent  violations, its tracking system does not track deficiencies. This distinction  was important to our information request because the Federal Reserve had  not had any apparent violations related to section 314 or CIP, but its  Federal Reserve Banks had reported deficiencies in quarterly reports to the  Federal Reserve Board. However, the information in the quarterly reports  was not sufficiently detailed enough for identifying specific examinations  that had deficiencies related to CIP or section 314. Therefore, the Federal  Reserve Board had to request this information from the 12 Federal Reserve  Banks who had to manually go through examination files and compile the  information. Federal Reserve officials told us that they are making  significant enhancements to the tracking system to capture additional  information on Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering compliance.
SEC’s examination tracking system is supposed to capture information on  whether the examination included certain focus areas, such as a review of  anti-money laundering compliance. However, when attempting to respond  to our information request on broker-dealer examinations, SEC discovered  that the information from its tracking system did not appear to be accurate.  According to an SEC official, SEC information on anti-money laundering  examinations for broker-dealers was not always accurate because  examiners were not always inputting all of the focus areas that they  covered, including anti-money laundering. Therefore, SEC conducted a  word search through its database of examination reports to identify  examinations that covered section 314 and CIP and identified about 26  examinations to respond to our information request. After our data request,  SEC officials emailed a reminder to examination staff of the importance of  accurately filling out all examination information in the tracking system,  including identifying when anti-money laundering is a focus area, and  asked that they review the accuracy of this information for completed  examinations and update it as necessary. For mutual fund examinations,  SEC used the same tracking system to identify all routine examinations of  mutual funds during our examination review period because anti-money  laundering was expected to be a focus area for all routine examinations  and did not encounter the same problem. NASD and NYSE were able to  identify examinations and apparent violations of section 314 and CIP using  their examination tracking systems.
The futures SROs provided us information without any difficulty.  According to an NFA official, once NFA had identified through its tracking  system the population of examinations that covered anti-money laundering  compliance and those examinations that included an apparent violation,  the examinations were reviewed to identify whether the apparent violation  was related to section 314 or CIP. CME and CBOT each only have  approximately 30 to 40 futures commission merchants at any point in time  that they track and had only completed a few examinations during the time  period for our examination review and therefore did not have difficulty  responding to our information request.

	Law Enforcement Officials Believe That Section 314(a) and CIP Have Been Valuable Tools in Terrorist and Money Laundering Investigations

Law enforcement officials praised the 314(a) process, stating that it has  improved coordination between law enforcement agencies and financial  institutions and indicated that CIP has also assisted investigations. The  314(a) process has resulted in discovery of additional accounts held by  suspects and issuance of grand jury subpoenas, search warrants, arrests,  and indictments. Most law enforcement officials we interviewed also  believed that CIP requirements have helped investigators by ensuring that  better and more detailed information is collected and maintained at  financial institutions. Although CIP and 314(a) processes are useful tools  for investigating money laundering and terrorist financing cases, the  decision to bring charges in specific cases is always discretionary.

		Law Enforcement Officials Believe That the Section 314(a) Process Has Improved Coordination with Financial Institutions and Has Led to More Efficient Investigations

Officials from the Department of Justice and other law enforcement  agencies told us that the 314(a) process has improved coordination  between law enforcement agencies and financial institutions and has  increased the speed and efficiency of investigations. Department of Justice  officials, including supervisory prosecutors in two U.S. Attorneys Offices,  with whom we spoke, said that the 314(a) process facilitated the flow of  information between financial institutions and law enforcement officials by  connecting FinCEN to approximately 20,000 financial institutions.
Investigators use the information FinCEN gathers from these financial  institutions as evidence in building cases against potential money  launderers and terrorist financers. FinCEN recently reported that the  314(a) system has processed 381 requests since it resumed operation in  February 2003. Of the total number of requests processed, 137 of them  were submitted by federal law enforcement agencies in the conduct of  terrorist financing investigations and 244 in the conduct of money  laundering investigations. FinCEN also reported that 314(a) feedback from  law enforcement requesters has been overwhelmingly positive. In  approximately 2 years, February 2003 through March 2005, 314(a) requests  submitted by law enforcement have resulted in the identification of  thousands of new accounts and transactions. According to information that  law enforcement provides to FinCEN, the 314(a) process has provided  information that helped support the issuance of more than 800 subpoenas,  11 search warrants, and 9 arrests. However, FinCEN officials cautioned  that this information represents feedback from only 10 percent of the cases  for which 314(a) information requests were made and that FinCEN does  not verify the accuracy of the data provided by law enforcement officials.
Almost all of the law enforcement officials we interviewed said that the  314(a) process improved the speed and efficiency of investigations by  allowing investigators to query a large number of financial institutions in a  short amount of time. One FBI official we interviewed showed us  information on how a 314(a) request led to identification of additional  suspect accounts across 23 states and 45 financial institutions. Prior to  submitting the request, the FBI was aware of only four accounts. One law  enforcement official told us that prior to section 314, law enforcement  officials often sent subpoenas to individual banks for information. They  could not, however, simultaneously request financial institutions across the  country to search accounts or transactions for groups of individuals or  even one person. According to FBI officials, the 314(a) process improves  the efficiency of investigations because agents spend less time finding the  suspect’s specific financial transactions or accounts. The results from a  314(a) request may also help law enforcement to eliminate false leads. One  prosecutor told us that the 314(a) process had been used 3 or 4 times  during investigations of terrorist financing or money laundering cases.  However, all of the law enforcement officials we interviewed told us that  they are very judicious in their use of 314(a) requests, in part, because they  were aware of the costs to the financial services industry and also because  submitting the request can expose a covert operation. For instance, it is  possible that a financial institution will take some action, permissible  under the law, but which has the unintended effect of compromising the  investigation.
According to some law enforcement officials, the 314(a) process also  allows investigators to track down sophisticated criminals who might  normally elude typical investigative approaches. For example, one  prosecutor told us that a potential money launderer or terrorist financer  with a lot of knowledge and sophistication about financial institutions  might have been able to circumvent traditional approaches used to collect  information, such as surveillance or tracing financial transactions to  individual financial institutions. However, in her view, the 314(a) process  has allowed investigators to cast a wider net thereby significantly  improving the investigative effort.

		Information Collected through CIP Can Assist Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Investigations

Many of the law enforcement officials we interviewed said financial  institutions are collecting and maintaining better and more detailed  information as a result of CIP requirements. One prosecutor told us that as  a result of section 326 regulations, grand jury subpoenas can be used to  obtain more substantive and detailed information on accounts. This  improvement was due to the fact that the CIP rule requires financial  institutions to consistently gather more information from a customer when  an account is opened. For example, investigators and prosecutors are now  able to receive social security numbers, dates of birth, and complete  addresses when they issue subpoenas. The same prosecutor told us that in  the past, subpoenaed account information concerning criminal suspects  was often incomplete. For instance, instead of a physical address they  would receive only a P.O. Box or mailbox associated with the account.  Standardization of account opening procedures has also made it easier for  law enforcement to make positive matches with suspects on 314(a) lists.  Prior to the enactment of the PATRIOT Act, some financial institutions  already had established policies and procedures to verify customer  identities, but the financial services industry overall was not subject to  uniform minimum requirements for identifying and maintaining customer  information. As a result, law enforcement officials did not always know  what kind of information they would acquire from institutions pursuant to  a subpoena or warrant.

		Successful Prosecutions of Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering Cases Depend on Numerous Factors

Although the CIP requirement and 314(a) requests have made useful  information available to federal prosecutors who are investigating and  prosecuting terrorist financing and money laundering cases, prosecution of  specific cases is always discretionary. Department of Justice officials,  including prosecutors in U.S. Attorneys Offices, said that case specific  factors continue to determine whether or not a prosecutor will bring  charges on a terrorist financing or money laundering case. There are no  specific monetary thresholds or criteria that determine when a prosecutor  will pursue a money laundering or terrorist financing case. One prosecutor  told us that these provisions helped prosecutors better understand the  financial lay of the land in anti-money laundering and terrorist financing  and that the use of the provisions by law enforcement leads to better  investigations. It is not feasible, however, to enumerate how many cases  were successfully prosecuted as a direct result of Suspicious Activity  Reports or 314(a) requests since each prosecution is unique and based on  many factors.
Prosecutors in two U.S. Attorney’s Offices also told us that the provisions,  while helpful, could not alter the fact that anti-money laundering and  terrorist financing cases are resource intensive and complex. Prosecutors  told us that reviewing transactions for a typical money services business or  currency exchange was time consuming and may typically involve review  of voluminous daily transaction records. Once the transaction analysis is  performed, the information then must be reviewed in coordination with  other evidence to determine if it can support proof beyond a reasonable  doubt, and whether the evidence used to build the case is suitable for  presentation in court.

	Conclusions

Since the passage of the PATRIOT Act, the U.S. government and the  financial industry have worked together to develop and implement the  regulations required by the PATRIOT Act. It was challenging to develop  joint regulations that covered so many sectors of the financial industry. The  financial industry has implemented procedures to comply with the  PATRIOT Act’s regulations, including the CIP requirement and the  information sharing provisions in section 314, but it has encountered  several challenges along the way and there are some concerns and issues  that remain outstanding. FinCEN, the federal financial regulators, and  SROs have made a concerted effort to reach out to and educate the  industry on its responsibilities for customer identification and sharing  information with law enforcement. However, the interagency process has  delayed the release of additional guidance for CIP. The implementation  challenges that industry officials shared with us demonstrate that the  government will need to continue its education efforts and work with  industry to resolve outstanding issues. Primarily, industry officials are  unclear about the regulators’ views on what constitutes sufficient  verification procedures for certain high-risk customers, such as foreign  individuals and companies and whether they and their examiners would  view a customer and the appropriate level of verification in the same way.  Therefore, industry officials would like to receive more guidance from  FinCEN and the regulators on issues such as these.
FinCEN, the federal financial regulators, and SROs have also taken steps to  implement section 314 and CIP and have begun examining financial  institutions and taking enforcement action for violations. However, our  review revealed examiner difficulties in assessing compliance with CIP that  could reduce its effectiveness at uncovering suspicious or questionable  customers or lead to inconsistencies in the way examiners conduct  examinations. Because our review found that not all examinations  documented a review of the risk-based aspect of CIP, we believe that some  examiners and financial institutions may not fully understand how the CIP  requirements should be applied to higher risk customers. The primary  reason that Treasury and the federal financial regulators adopted the risk- based approach to verifying customer identity was so that financial  institutions would be able to focus more effort on high-risk customers.  Also, some of the other difficulties we found in our review of examinations  highlight how inconsistent interpretations can occur during examinations.  For example, some examiners came to different conclusions about how the  CIP requirement is applied to existing customers that open new accounts.  Because examination findings can cause a financial institution to change its  practices, such inconsistencies could lead to significant variations in  policies and procedures among financial institutions based on differing  interpretations of the CIP requirements by examiners.
Although our review focused on two specific anti-money laundering  regulations, the enforcement of these regulations occurs under the broader  BSA regulatory structure and, hence, the results of our review should be  understood in this broader context. Enforcing the BSA, as amended by the  PATRIOT Act, is a shared responsibility among FinCEN and the federal  financial regulators. As the administrator of BSA, FinCEN has  responsibility for enforcement of the provisions added by the PATRIOT  Act, but FinCEN relies on the federal financial regulators to conduct  examinations and alert it to violations that warrant an enforcement action.  This arrangement is even more complicated for securities and futures  financial institutions because SEC and CFTC largely rely on the SROs to  conduct examinations and enforce rules and regulations. Since the passage  of the PATRIOT Act, FinCEN and the financial regulators have been  working more closely together to better coordinate BSA examinations and  enforcement and to improve the consistency of the information they  provide to the financial industry. FinCEN’s new Office of Compliance and  MOU with the federal banking regulators are good first steps in better BSA  oversight and enforcement. In addition, FinCEN and the federal banking  regulators have worked together to develop interagency anti-money  laundering examination procedures for the first time. FinCEN is in the  process of reaching similar MOU agreements with SEC and CFTC. Whether  in issuing guidance for industry or examiners, FinCEN will need the  continued cooperation of all seven financial regulators to effectively  address problems and inconsistencies in the U.S. anti-money laundering  regulatory system.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve implementation of sections 326 and 314 of the PATRIOT Act,  we are making two recommendations:   To build on education and outreach efforts and help financial  institutions subject to the CIP requirement effectively implement their  programs, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury, through  FinCEN and in coordination with the federal financial regulators and  SROs, develop additional guidance covering ongoing implementation  issues related to the CIP requirement. Specifically, additional guidance  on the CIP requirement that provides examples or alternatives of how to  verify the identity of high-risk customers, such as foreign individuals  and companies, could help financial institutions develop better risk- based procedures.
To enhance examination guidance covering the CIP requirement and  ensure that examiners are well-informed about CIP requirements, we  recommend that the Director of FinCEN work with the federal financial  regulators to develop additional guidance for examiners to use in  conducting BSA examinations. Specifically, the guidance should clarify  that complying with the CIP requirement is more than determining  whether the minimum customer identification information has been  obtained—the examiner should determine whether a financial  institution’s CIP contains effective risk-based procedures for verifying  the identity of customers. Secondly, the guidance should clarify how CIP  fits into other customer due diligence practices, such as know-your- customer procedures. Finally, the guidance should reflect the FAQs on  CIP issued for industry, which addressed the difficulties in  interpretation we observed for checking government lists and applying  the CIP requirement to existing customers.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the  Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security; seven  federal financial regulators (Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, OTS, NCUA,  SEC, and CFTC) and five SROs (CBOT, CME, NFA, NASD, and NYSE). We  received written comments from the Department of the Treasury, NCUA,  and SEC. These comments are reprinted in appendixes II, III, and IV. The  Departments of the Treasury and Justice, the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC,  SEC, CFTC, NASD, NYSE and NFA also provided technical comments and  clarifications, which we incorporated in this report where appropriate. The  Department of Homeland Security, OTS, CME, and CBOT had no  comments.
In its written comments, Treasury said that despite the considerable  educational and outreach efforts already undertaken by FinCEN, there was  still some confusion and lack of clarity on the part of both the federal  financial regulators and SROs, and the regulated industries and examiners  who conduct compliance inspections of these industries. Treasury  concurred with our recommendations that additional guidance would  improve implementation of these regulations. Treasury also commented  that, with the diversity of financial institutions that must comply with CIP  regulations, firms need the flexibility to implement programs tailored to  their own size, location, and type of business and to allow them to use a  risk-based approach to verify the identity of their respective customer  bases. In its written comments, NCUA also supported our  recommendations. Both agencies commented that Treasury and the federal  banking regulators plan to issue new BSA examination procedures in June  2005. In its written response, SEC commented that consistent with our  recommendation, the federal financial regulators are continuing to work  cooperatively to ensure that they provide consistent guidance on  interpretive and compliance issues. Concerning difficulties SEC had with  its examination tracking system when responding to our information  request, SEC also said that its staff is formulating improvements to the  existing automated tracking system.
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further  distribution of this report until 30 days after the date of this report. At that  time, we will send copies of this report to the Departments of the Treasury,  Homeland Security, and Justice; the Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, OCC,  OTS, NCUA, CFTC, SEC, NASD, NYSE, NFA, CBOT, CME, and interested  congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others on  request. In addition, this report will be available at no cost on our Web site  at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report please contact me  at (202) 512-2717 or Barbara Keller, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-9624.  GAO contacts and key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Scope and Methodology

To determine how Treasury and the federal financial regulators developed  the regulations for CIP and section 314 and identify challenges, we  reviewed documents related to the rulemaking process including comment  letters and the Federal Register notices of the final rules and interviewed  officials from Treasury (FinCEN), Justice, the federal financial regulators,  and SROs.
To identify the government’s education and outreach efforts, we  interviewed officials from Treasury (FinCEN), the federal financial  regulators, and SROs about how they have informed and educated the  industry and reviewed education and outreach materials provided to us. To  identify implementation challenges encountered by financial institutions,  we interviewed company officials and industry trade associations  representing banks, credit unions, securities broker-dealers, mutual funds,  futures commission merchants, and futures introducing brokers. We also  reviewed letters that company officials and industry representatives sent to  Treasury and the federal financial regulators during the rulemaking process  as well as after the final rules were issued that expressed concerns and  challenges they had about implementing procedures to comply with CIP  and section 314 regulations.
To determine the extent to which the federal financial regulators and SROs  have updated examination guidance and trained examiners on CIP and  section 314, we reviewed copies of draft and final versions of guidance;  collected information on examiner training courses related to anti-money  laundering and the number of examiners trained in 2002, 2003, and 2004;  and interviewed officials on their examination guidance and training  programs. We also observed one anti-money laundering training course  taught by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)  that provides training to bank examiners.
To determine the extent to which the federal financial regulators have  examined for compliance and taken enforcement actions on CIP and  section 314 regulations, we collected data on the number of exams  completed from October 1, 2003, through May 31, 2004, and the number of  violations for CIP and section 314 regulations for the same time period  from six federal financial regulators and five SROs. The data from the  regulators and SROs generally came from information systems and  reporting processes used to collect and track information on examinations  and violations. There was some variability in how the regulators and SROs  defined examinations, violations, and the start and end dates for  examinations and therefore the data are not comparable. However, we  determined that the data provided to us were generally reliable for our  purposes. Our data reliability assessments generally involved interviewing  officials about the management of the data and basic tests of the data to  determine if it appeared accurate. We attempted to select approximately 20  examinations from each regulator and SRO. To ensure that we would be  able to review a sufficient number of examinations with the types of  violations related to CIP and section 314 requirements and how the  regulators and SROs addressed violations, we sampled proportionally more  examinations that included violations of CIP and section 314 than  examinations without violations, though in some cases the number of  examinations that had such violations were less than 10 and, therefore, the  sample would not include proportionally more examinations with  violations. We reviewed a total of 176 examinations. However, the number  of examinations varied widely between organizations, and in the cases of  CBOT and CME, all available examinations were selected because the  number of examinations was small.   While the selections of individual  examinations were made randomly within the subsets of violation and  nonviolation examinations to minimize the possibility of bias in our  sample, the arbitrary totals selected were small in number and not  representative of the true ratio of violation to nonviolation examinations  within the organization nor the volume of examination activity across the  organizations. Therefore, these samples are not statistically representative.  However, our review of the examinations enabled us to describe the  approaches used by the regulators to examine for compliance and highlight  issues that may present challenges for examiners in interpreting the new  regulations and appropriately assessing financial institutions for  compliance. Table 11 displays the final sample size for each of the  regulators and SROs and also explains why some examinations initially  selected were not part of our final sample.
After selecting our sample of examinations, we requested the examination  reports and related workpapers associated with each examination from  each of the regulators and SROs. We developed a data collection  instrument to review the examination documentation. The data collection  instrument was developed by reviewing the regulation requirements for  CIP and section 314 and the examination procedures developed by the  regulators and SROs. After each examination was reviewed once using the  data collection instrument, a second person reviewed the examination  using the data collection instrument a second time to ensure the reliability  of our coding of the review questions and accuracy of data entry. We used  the results from the data collection instrument to determine how the  regulators and SROs reviewed compliance and how regulators and SROs  dealt with deficiencies and violations related to CIP and section 314. We  also identified formal enforcement actions that were completed during the  time of our review and included violations of CIP or section 314  regulations. Finally, we interviewed officials from FinCEN, the federal  financial regulators, and SROs about their examination and enforcement  policies.
To determine how these new regulations have and could improve law  enforcement investigations and prosecutions of money laundering and  terrorist activities, we interviewed officials representing several law  enforcement agencies, including the FBI and ICE, and Department of  Justice officials. We interviewed supervisory prosecutors from two U.S.  Attorneys offices as well as supervisory officials at the Asset Forfeiture and  Money Laundering Section and the Counter-Terrorism Section at the  Department of Justice who have been involved with money laundering and  terrorist cases and had experience with section 314 and CIP to better  understand the factors that are considered when deciding whether to  prosecute a money laundering or terrorist financing case. We also reviewed  information that FinCEN collects from law enforcement agencies on the  results of the 314(a) process.
We conducted our work in New York City, NY; Chicago, IL; and Washington,  D.C., between February 2004 and March 2005 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.

Comments from the Department of the Treasury

Comments from the National Credit Union Administration

Comments from the Securities and Exchange Commission

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contacts

	Staff Acknowledgments

William Bates, Davi M. D’Agostino, David Nicholson, Carl Ramirez, Omyra  Ramsingh, Adam Shapiro, and Kaya Leigh Taylor made key contributions to  this report.

Related Products

Anti-Money Laundering: Issues Concerning Depository Institution  Regulatory Oversight. GAO-04-833T. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2004.
Combating Money Laundering: Opportunities Exist to Improve the  National Strategy. GAO-03-813. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2003.
Internet Gambling: An Overview of the Issues. GAO-03-89. Washington,  D.C.: December 2, 2002.
Interim Report on Internet Gambling. GAO-02-1101R. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 2002.
Money Laundering: Extent of Money Laundering through Credit Cards is  Unknown. GAO-02-670. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2002.
Anti-Money Laundering: Efforts in the Securities Industry. GAO-02-111.  Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.
Money Laundering: Oversight of Suspicious Activity Reporting at Bank- Affiliated Broker-Dealers Ceased. GAO-01-474. Washington, D.C.: March  22, 2001.
Suspicious Banking Activities: Possible Money Laundering by U.S.  Corporations Formed for Russian Entities. GAO-01-120. Washington,  D.C.: October 31, 2000.
Money Laundering: Observations on Private Banking and Related  Oversight of Selected Offshore Jurisdictions. GAO/T-GGD-00-32.  Washington, D.C.: November 9, 1999.
Private Banking: Raul Salinas, Citibank, and Alleged Money  Laundering. GAO/T-OSI-00-3. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 1999.
Private Banking: Raul Salinas, Citibank, and Alleged Money  Laundering.  GAO/OSI-99-1. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 1998.
Money Laundering: Regulatory Oversight of Offshore Private Banking  Activities. GAO/GGD-98-154. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 1998.
Money Laundering: FinCEN’s Law Enforcement Support Role Is  Evolving. GAO/GGD-98-117. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 1998.
Money Laundering: FinCEN Needs to Better Manage Bank Secrecy Act  Civil Penalties. GAO/GGD-98-108. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 1998.
Money Laundering: FinCEN’s Law Enforcement Support, Regulatory,  and International Roles. GAO/GGD-98-83. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 1998.
Money Laundering: FinCEN Needs to Better Communicate Regulatory  Priorities and Timelines. GAO/GGD-98-18. Washington, D.C.: February 6,  1998.
Private Banking: Information on Private Banking and Its Vulnerability  to Money Laundering. GAO/GGD-98-19R. Washington, D.C.: October 30,  1997.
Money Laundering: A Framework for Understanding U.S. Efforts  Overseas. GAO/GGD-96-105. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 1996.

Output:
Why GAO Did This Study

Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, passed after the September 11 terrorist attacks, amended U.S. anti-money laundering laws and imposed new requirements on financial institutions. Section 326 of the act required the development of minimum standards for verifying the identity of financial institution customers. Section 314 required the development of regulations encouraging the further sharing of information between law enforcement agencies and the financial industry and between the institutions themselves. Because of concerns about the implementation of these new provisions, GAO determined how (1) the government developed the regulations, educated the financial industry on them, and challenges it encountered; (2) regulators have updated guidance, trained examiners, and examined firms for compliance; and (3) the new regulations have affected law enforcement investigations.

What GAO Found

Treasury (including its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)), the federal financial regulators, and self-regulatory organizations (SRO) overcame challenges to create regulations that apply consistently to a diverse financial sector and have used several outreach mechanisms to help the financial industry understand and comply with Customer Identification Program (CIP) requirements under section 326 and information sharing requirements under section 314. However, several implementation challenges remain. Industry officials told us some of their concerns have been addressed but they are still concerned about (1) how some CIP requirements will be interpreted during compliance examinations, (2) the lack of feedback from law enforcement on information provided by financial institutions through section 314(a), and (3) the extent to which they can share information with each other under section 314(b). The six federal financial regulators and five SROs in our review have issued examination guidance covering sections 326 and 314, subsequently trained examiners, and begun examining financial institutions for compliance with CIP and section 314. GAO's review of examinations showed progress, but coverage varied in part because the examinations were conducted during early implementation. One aspect of CIP that was not always covered in examinations was whether financial institutions had adequately developed a CIP appropriate for their business lines and types of customers. However, this aspect of CIP is critical for ensuring that the identification and verification procedures are appropriate for types of customers and accounts that are at higher risk of being linked to money laundering or terrorist activities. Some examinations also revealed implementation difficulties related to CIP that could lead to inconsistencies in the way examiners conduct examinations. For example, some examiners did not differentiate between the CIP requirement and other procedures that require customer identification information. Coverage in the examinations GAO reviewed of how institutions had implemented section 314 requirements was somewhat lower than for CIP, in part, because CIP received more attention from examiners and information sharing between financial institutions is voluntary. In the examinations GAO reviewed, apparent violations of the CIP requirement and section 314(a) regulations were mostly addressed through informal actions between the institution and the regulator. Officials from the Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies told us that CIP and section 314 have assisted them in the investigation of money laundering and terrorist financing cases. Some officials said that CIP has been useful because financial institutions have more information on their customers so they obtain more useful information when issuing grand jury subpoenas and other requests for information. Many officials said the 314(a) process had improved coordination between the law enforcement community and the financial industry and increased the speed and efficiency of investigations.