Input:
RS20717 -- Vietnam Trade Agreement: Approval and Implementing Procedure
Updated December 17, 2001

	Background (1)

After protracted negotiations and a one-year delay after its adoption in principle, the United States and Vietnam signed, on July 13, 2000, a comprehensivebilateral trade agreement. The key statutory purpose of the agreement is the restoration of nondiscriminatory tarifftreatment (2) ("normal-trade-relations" (NTR),formerly "most-favored-nation" treatment) to U.S. imports from Vietnam, suspended since 1951. Hence, theagreement contains a provision reciprocallyextending the NTR treatment and certain other provisions required by law for trade agreements with nonmarketeconomy (NME) countries. In addition, it containscomprehensive specific commitments by Vietnam in matters of market access (e.g., reduced tariff rates on importsfrom the United States), intellectual propertyrights, trade in services, and investment, such as the United States already has in force as a matter of general tradepolicy. To enter into force, the agreement mustbe approved by the enactment of a joint resolution of Congress.
Restoration of NTR treatment to Vietnam as an NME country is also contingent on Vietnam's compliance with the freedom-of-emigration requirement of theJackson-Vanik amendment (Section 402) of the Trade Act of 1974. (3) In the case of Vietnam, such compliance is achieved by an annual Presidential waiver of fullcompliance under specified statutory conditions; such waiver may be disapproved by the enactment of a jointresolution of Congress. The President has issuedsuch waivers for Vietnam since mid-1998, but in no instance has a disapproval resolution, if introduced, been passedby Congress, allowing the waiver to continuein force.

	Implementing Procedure

The statutory requirements and legislative procedure leading to the enactment and entry into force of a trade agreement with a nonmarket economy (NME)country, including Vietnam, are set out in detail in Sections 151, 404, 405, and 407 of the Trade Act of 1974 ( P.L.93-618 ), as amended. Section 151 has beenenacted as an exercise of the rulemaking power of either house and supersedes its other rules to the extent that theyare inconsistent with it. Its provisions can bechanged by either house with respect to its own procedure at any time, in the same manner and to the same extentas any other rule of that house (Section 151(a);19 U.S.C. 2191(a)).
All alphanumerical statutory references cited in this report are to sections of the Trade Act of 1974. While care has been taken to reflect accurately the meaning ofthe statutes, consulting the actual language of any statute is recommended in case of any ambiguity.
Functionally, the consideration and enactment of the approval resolution and the implementation of the agreement follow a specific expedited ("fast-track")procedure explained below. Additional information, based on past practice of implementing trade agreements withNME countries in general, but applicable alsoto Vietnam, is provided in footnotes
(1) Enactment necessary.
The agreement can take effect only if approved by enactment of a joint resolution (Section 405(c)); 19U.S.C.2435(c)).
(2) Transmittal of the agreement by the President to Congress.
The text of the bilateral trade agreement with Vietnam must be transmitted by the President to both houses ofCongress, together with a proclamation (4) extendingnondiscriminatory treatment to Vietnam and stating his reasons for it (Section 407(a); 19 U.S.C. 2437). While thereis no statutory deadline for the transmittal ofthe proclamation and the agreement to Congress after its signing, the law requires that the transmittal take place"promptly" after the proclamation is issued. (5)
(3) Mandatory introduction of approval resolution.
On the day the trade agreement is transmitted to the Congress (or, if the respective house is not in session onthat day, the first subsequent day on which it is insession), a joint resolution of approval (Sec. 151(b)(3); 19 U.S.C. 2191(b)(3)) must be introduced (by request) ineach house by its majority leader for himself andthe minority leader, or by their designees (Sec. 151(c)(2); 19 U.S.C. 2191(c)(2)). (6)
(4) Language of approval resolution .
The language of the resolution is prescribed by law (Sec. 151(b)(3); 19 U.S.C. 2191(b)(3)) to read, in thisparticular instance, after the resolving clause:
"That the Congress approves the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment with respect to the products ofVietnam transmitted by the President to the Congress onJune 8, 2001". (7)
(5) Committee referral .
The resolution is referred in the House to the Committee on Ways and Means and in the Senate to theCommittee on Finance (Sec. 151(c)(2); 19 U.S.C.2191(c)(2)).
(6) Amendments prohibited .
No amendment to the resolution, and no motion, or unanimous-consent request, to suspend the no-amendmentrule, is in order in either house (Sec. 151(d); 19U.S.C. 2191(d)).
(7) Committee consideration in the House . (8)
If the Ways and Means Committee has not reported the resolution within 45 days (9) after its introduction, the Committee is automatically discharged from furtherconsideration of the resolution, and the resolution is placed on the appropriate calendar (Sec. 151(e)(1); 19 U.S.C.2191(e)(1)).
(8) Floor consideration in the House.
(a) A motion to proceed to the consideration of the approval resolution is highly privileged and nondebatable;an amendment to the motion, or a motion toreconsider the vote whereby the motion is agreed or disagreed to, is not in order (Sec. 151(f)(1); 19 U.S.C.2191(f)(1)).
(b) Debate on the resolution is limited to 20 hours (10) , divided equally between the supporters and opponents of the resolution; a motion further to limitdebate isnot debatable; a motion to recommit the resolution, or to reconsider the vote whereby the resolution is agreed ordisagreed to, is not in order (Sec. 151(f)(2); 19U.S.C. 2191(f)(2)).
(c) Motions to postpone the consideration of the resolution and motions to proceed to the consideration of otherbusiness are decided without debate (Sec.151(f)(3); 19 U.S.C. 2191(f)(3)).
(d) All appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the House ofRepresentatives to the approval resolution are decidedwithout debate (Sec. 151(f)(4); 19 U.S.C. 2191(f)(4)).
(e) In all other respects, consideration of the approval resolution is governed by the rules of the House ofRepresentatives applicable to other measures in similarcircumstances (Sec. 151(f)(5); 19 U.S.C. 2191(f)(5)).
(f) The vote (by simple majority) on the final passage of the approval resolution must be taken on or before the15th day (11) after the Ways and MeansCommitteehas reported the resolution, or has been discharged from its further consideration (Sec. 151(e)(1); 19 U.S.C.2191(e)(1)).
(9) Committee consideration in the Senate (12)
An approval resolution adopted by the House of Representatives and received in the Senate is referred to theFinance Committee (Sec. 151(c)(2) and (e)(2); 19U.S.C. 2191(c)(2) and (e)(2)). (13) If the FinanceCommittee has not reported the resolution within 15 days after its receipt from the House or 45 days (14) after theintroduction of its own corresponding resolution (whichever is later), the Committee is automatically dischargedfrom further consideration of the resolution, andthe resolution is placed on the appropriate calendar (Sec. 151(e)(1); 19 U.S.C. 2191(e)(1)).
(10) Floor consideration in the Senate.
(a) A motion to proceed to the consideration of the approval resolution is privileged and nondebatable; anamendment to the motion, or a motion to reconsider thevote whereby the motion is agreed or disagreed to, is not in order (Sec. 151(g)(1); 19 U.S.C. 2191(g)(1)).
(b) Debate on the approval resolution and on all debatable motions and appeals connected with it is limited to20 hours, equally divided between, and controlledby, the majority leader and the minority leader, or their designees (Sec. 151(g)(2); 19 U.S.C. 2191(g)(2)).
(c) Debate on any debatable motion or appeal is limited to one hour, equally divided between, and controlledby, the mover and the manager of the resolution,except that if the manager of the resolution is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in opposition iscontrolled by the minority leader or his designee;such leaders may, from time under their control on the passage of the resolution, allot additional time to any Senatorduring the consideration of any debatablemotion or appeal (Sec. 151(g)(3); 19 U.S.C. 2191(g)(3)).
(d) A motion further to limit debate on the approval resolution is not debatable; a motion to recommit it is notin order (Sec. 151(g)(4); 19 U.S.C. 2191(g)(4)).
(e) The vote (by simple majority) on the final passage of the approval resolution must be taken on or before the15th day (15) after the FinanceCommittee hasreported the resolution, or has been discharged from its further consideration (Sec. 151(e)(2); 19 U.S.C. 2191(e)(2)).
(f) Although, unlike in the case of the House procedure (16) , this is not specifically mentioned in Section 151, the Rules of the Senate govern the considerationofthe approval resolution in the Senate in all aspects not specifically addressed in Section 151.
(g) If prior to the passage of its own approval resolution, the Senate receives the approval resolution alreadypassed by the House, it continues the legislativeprocedure on its own resolution, but the vote on the final passage is on the House resolution.
(11) President's implementing authority.
(a) After the joint resolution approving the trade agreement with Vietnam is passed
by both houses and signed by the President, it becomes public law, in effect, authorizing the President to putinto effect the already issued proclamation (17) implementing the agreement extending nondiscriminatory treatment to Vietnam (Secs. 404(a) and 405(c); 19 U.S.C.2434(a) and 2435(c)).
(b) Application of nondiscriminatory treatment is limited to the term during which the agreement remainsin force (Sec. 404(b); 19 U.S.C. 2434(b)) (see alsofootnote 19 and text which it accompanies).
(c) The President may at any time suspend or withdraw nondiscriminatory treatment of Vietnam (Sec. 404(c);19 U.S.C. 2434(c)) and thereby subject all importsfrom that country to column 2 tariff rates (i.e., full rather than NTR rates).
(12) Approval by Vietnam.
The agreement also must be approved by Vietnam. (18)
(13) Entry into force.
After the joint resolution of approval is enacted and the agreement is approved by Vietnam, the proclamation(see item (2) becomes effective, the agreemententers into force, and nondiscriminatory treatment is extended to Vietnam on the date of exchange of written noticesof acceptance of the agreement by the UnitedStates and Vietnam. A notice of the effective date of the agreement is published by the U.S. Trade Representativein the Federal Register . (19)
(14) Maintenance in force .
According to its own terms (Article 8 of Chapter VII - General Articles), the agreement with Vietnam remainsin force for a period of three years and isautomatically renewable for successive three-year terms unless either party to it, at least 30 days before theexpiration of the then current term, gives notice of itsintent to terminate the agreement. If either party ceases to have domestic legal authority to carry out its obligationsunder the agreement, it may suspend theapplication of the agreement, or, with the agreement of the other party, any part of the agreement. (20)
In addition, Section 405(b)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2435(b)(1)) limits the life of trade agreements restoring nondiscriminatory treatment to NME countries to an initial termof three years. Agreements may be renewable for additional three-year terms if a satisfactory balance of tradeconcessions has been maintained during the life ofthe agreement and the President determines that actual or foreseeable U.S. reductions of trade barriers resulting frommultilateral negotiations are satisfactorilyreciprocated by the other country. (21)

Output: The procedure leading to the entry into force of the U.S. trade agreement with Vietnam, including a reciprocalextension of nondiscriminatory treatment. calls for its approval by the enactment of a joint resolution of Congress,considered under a specific fast-track procedurewith deadlines for its various stages, with mandatory language and no amendments. After favorable reports on thelegislation in both houses, H.J.Res. 51,approving the nondiscriminatory treatment, was enacted on October 16, 2001; the agreement also was ratified byVietnam on December 4, 2001, and entered intoforce by exchange of notices of acceptance between the two parties on December 10, 2001. The functional sequenceof the legislative and executive steps involvedin the implementation of the agreement is described in this report.


Input:
RS20458 -- Vieques, Puerto Rico Naval Training Range: Background and Issues for Congress
Updated August 20, 2004

	Background information

The Vieques Training Range. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a U.S. territory in the Caribbean whose people are U.S. citizens. Vieques (pronounced vee-EH-kez) is a small Puerto Rican islandafew miles east of mainland Puerto Rico. The Department of the Navy (DON), which includes the Navy and Marine Corps,purchased the western and eastern ends of the island between 1941 and 1950; the two DON-owned parcels totaled about22,000 acres, or about two-thirds of the island. Almost all of the 8,000-acre western parcel, which was used primarilyas anaval ammunition depot, was returned by DON to the Municipality of Vieques on May 1, 2001. The remainingDON-owned14,000-acre eastern parcel was used by U.S. naval and other military forces since the early 1940s for training exercisesinvolving ship-to-shore gunfire, air-to-ground bombing by naval aircraft, Marine amphibious landings, or some combination. The parcel included a roughly 11,000-acre Eastern Maneuver Area for Marine Corps ground exercises and a roughly900-acre Live Impact Area (LIA) designed for targeting by live ordnance. The LIA was at the eastern tip of the island,several miles from the civilian-populated center section of the island, which has about 9,300 residents.
Until April 1999, the Navy used the Vieques training range about 180 days per year. Of these, about 120 days were forintegrated (i.e., combined land-sea-air) live-fire exercises (i.e., exercises with explosive ammunition) by U.S. Atlantic Fleetaircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups preparing to deploy overseas on regular six-month-longdeployments to the Mediterranean Sea or Persian Gulf. Until 2001, DON officials argued adamantly that there was no siteother than Vieques where Atlantic Fleet naval forces could conduct integrated live-fire training operations, and that suchtraining operations are critical to fully preparing U.S. naval forces for deployment.
Puerto Rican Discontent and Opposition. U.S. military activities in Puerto Rico had been a source of discontent among Puerto Ricans for several decades. Puerto Rican opposition to DON activitieson Vieques increased after 1975, when DON withdrew from Culebra, another small Puerto Rican island near ViequeswhereDON had conducted some of its live-fire training operations. After withdrawing from Culebra as a consequence of strongPuerto Rican opposition to DON's use of that island, DON consolidated its live-fire training operations at Vieques. PuertoRican dissatisfaction regarding military training activities on Vieques was driven by several issues: (1) lost potential foreconomic development due to lack of access to most of the island's land, interruptions to local fishing operations, and theeffect of DON's activities on reducing the potential for developing the island as a tourist destination; (2) the inadequacy ofDON economic development efforts intended to compensate the Vieques community for this economic loss; (3) damagetothe island's environment, ecology, natural resources, historic resources, and archaeological sites caused by DON trainingactivities; (4) concern that the incidence of cancer or other diseases might be increased by pollutants released into the localenvironment by DON training operations; (5) noise, especially from nearby ship-to-shore gunfire; (6) safety (the risk of anoff-range accident), and (7) perceived DON insensitivity in conducting its relations with the Vieques community.
April 19, 1999 Bombing Accident and Subsequent Impasse. On April 19, 1999, the pilot of a Marine Corps F-18 on a training mission mistakenly identified an observation post located just to thewestof the LIA (but still well within the overall range perimeter) as its intended target. The two 500-pound bombs dropped bytheplane struck the post, killing David Sanes Rodriguez, a Puerto Rican civilian employed as a security guard, and injuring fourothers. Following the accident, DON temporarily suspended its use of the range. The accident galvanized Puerto Ricanopposition to DON's activities on the island. Puerto Rican political leaders and overwhelming segments of Puerto Ricanpublic opinion soon declared their firm opposition to any further military training operations on the island and called forDONto withdraw from the island immediately and return the land to Puerto Rico. At the same time, dozens of demonstratorsentered the range (most of which was off-limits to the civilian population) and established several protest camps, preventingDON from easily resuming training activities there.
Rush Panel. On June 9, 1999, President Clinton asked Secretary of Defense William Cohen to establish a special panel to study the situation. The 4-member panel was chaired by Frank Rush,who was the acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for force management policy. The Rush panel, as it was called, releasedits report on October 19, 1999. The report recommended, among other things, that DON
should immediately conduct a priority assessment of the training requirements at Vieques with the objective of ceasing all training activities at Vieques within five years. The Navy should take necessaryprogramming actions to ensure that adequate resources are available to facilitate the identification and preparation ofalternative locations, to institute necessary changes in training methods, and to provide for restoration and transfer to PuertoRico of the Eastern Maneuver Area.
Clinton-Rossello Plan. On January 31, 2000, President Clinton announced an agreement with then-Governor of Puerto Rico Pedro Rossello on a plan for resolving the dispute over Vieques. Theplancalled for holding a referendum of the registered voters of Vieques to determine the future of DON activities on the island. The referendum, which was later scheduled for November 6, 2001, and subsequently rescheduled for January 2002, wouldpresent two choices. One would be for DON to cease training activities no later than May 1, 2003; the other would beforDON to continue training, including live-fire training, beyond that date. If voters choose the second option, OMB wouldsubmit a $50-million funding request to Congress to finance further infrastructure-improvement and housing projects on thewestern end of Vieques. Under the plan, DON would be permitted prior to the referendum to conduct exercises on therangefor no more than 90 days a year using only non-explosive ordnance, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)would submit a $40-million funding request to Congress to finance a series of community assistance projects on Vieques. Theplan also called for transferring DON lands back to civilian use.
Removal of Protestors and Resumption of Training. On May 4, 2000, more than 300 federal agents moved onto the training range and peacefully removed 216 demonstrators. On May 8, 2000,DON resumed training operations on the range using non-explosive ordnance. Hundreds demonstrators attempting toreenterthe range on various dates after May 4, 2000 were detained and removed by U.S. forces.
Congressional Activity and Legislation in 1999 and 2000. Hearings devoted to the situation on Vieques were held by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on September 22,1999, and by the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 19, 1999 (at which the Rush panel report was released). Several bills were introduced in September and October 1999 that proposed various measures for addressing the situation. Following the announcement of the Clinton-Rossello plan, Congress in 2000 debated the merits of the plan and acted ontheadministration's request for $40 million in community assistance funding and its proposed land-transfer legislation.
Congress appropriated the $40 million in community assistance funding as part of P.L. 106-246 ( H.R. 4425 ) ofJuly 13, 2000, the combined FY2001 military construction appropriation and FY2000 supplemental appropriations bill. TheFY2000 supplemental appropriations portion of the bill (Division B) contains a provision under the Operation andMaintenance, Defense-Wide section that provides $40 million to Vieques for conducting a referendum and for variouscommunity and economic assistance projects.
Congress authorized the $40 million, provided land-transfer legislation (with terms modified from those proposed under theClinton-Rossello plan), and approved other implementing legislation, as Title XV (Sections 1501-1508) of P.L. 106-398 ( H.R. 4205 ) of October 30, 2000, the FY2001 defense authorization bill. (See pages 365-373 and 879-881 of H.Rept. 106-945 of October 6, 2000, the conference report on H.R. 4205 .) Section 1502 provided for theMay 1, 2001 transfer of the ammunition depot on the western end of the island.
Position of Governor Calderon. On November 7, 2000, Puerto Rico elected a new Governor, Sila Maria Calderon, who took office on January 2, 2001. Calderon did not support theClinton-Rossello plan and pledged to take steps that would appear to break the accord.
Final Clinton Administration Actions. The Clinton Administration warned Governor Calderon that if Puerto Rico did not fulfill its obligations under the plan, DON would no longer be obliged toabideby the results of the November 6, 2001 referendum. On January 15 and 19, 2001, President Clinton issued two directivesconcerning Vieques. The first directed the Department of Health and Human Services to examine a new study showingthatresidents of Vieques suffer from a high incidence of vibroacoustic disease, an ailment affecting the heart and other internalorgans. The second directed DoD to find a long-term alternative to live-fire training on Vieques, on the grounds that voterswere likely to vote in the November 2001 referendum to permanently end training operations.
Initial Bush Administration Actions and Puerto Rican Response. The Bush Administration initially supported the Clinton-Rossello plan and held private discussions with Governor Calderon's office.OnMarch 1, 2000, the Bush Administration canceled training operations for an aircraft carrier battle group that were scheduledto take place at Vieques later that month. On April 11, 2001, the Navy notified the Puerto Rican government of its intentionto resume training operations at Vieques using inert ordnance (as required by the Clinton-Rossello agreement) starting April27, 2001.
In response, Governor Calderon promised to introduce legislation to tighten noise restrictions in a way that would effectivelyprohibit the Navy from engaging in ship-to-shore gunfire. She also accused the Defense Department of violating anunderstanding to suspend training operations on Vieques pending the outcome of independent reviews of studies on thehealth-effects of the training. Calderon introduced the bill and the Puerto Rican Legislature passed it on April 23. GovernorCalderon signed the bill into law, and on April 24, Puerto Rico filed a federal lawsuit to halt the Navy's exercise, arguingthatthe Navy's training activities would threaten public health and violate both the new noise-restriction law and the 1972 federalNoise Control Act. On January 2, 2002, the court dismissed the lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds, stating that Congressneverintended "to create a private action for violations by a federal entity of the state and local environmental noise requirements."
New Bush Administration Plan and Reaction. On June 14, 2001, the Bush Administration announced that it had decided to end military training operations at Vieques by May 1, 2003. Under theAdministration's plan, DON began planning for withdrawal from the island by that date, Secretary of Defense DonaldRumsfeld was to appoint a panel of retired military officers and other experts to seek effective training alternatives toVieques,and the Defense Department was to seek relief from the requirement to hold the November 2001 referendum (which wasrescheduled for January 2002) by asking Congress to pass legislation cancelling sections 1503, 1504 and 1505(b) of P.L.106-398 . After May 1, 2003, the DON-owned land on the eastern end of the island would be turned over to the InteriorDepartment.
Supporters of the military immediately criticized the Bush Administration's new plan on the grounds that it could lead toreduced readiness of U.S. naval forces and complicate the U.S. ability to maintain access to overseas training ranges inplacessuch as Okinawa and South Korea. Some opponents of continued military training operations on the island welcomed theplan because it established with finality that training operations would end by May 1, 2003, but other opponents of thetrainingoperations criticized the plan on the grounds that it didn't go far enough -- that training operations should end immediatelyrather than on May 1, 2003.
Governor Calderon welcomed the plan as far as it went but stated that she still wanted training operations to end immediately. She proceeded with her plan to hold a Puerto Rico-sponsored non-binding referendum on July 29, 2001 that gave votersonthe island an opportunity to vote in favor of an immediate cessation of training operations -- an option that would not beavailable at the separate January 2002 referendum to be held under the Clinton-Rossello plan. In the July 29 referendum,which drew 80.6 percent of the island's 5,893 registered voters, about 68 percent voted in favor of immediate cessationoftraining operations, about 30 percent voted to permit operations to continue indefinitely, and about 2 percent voted foroperations to cease by May 1, 2003.
On January 7, 2002, the Secretary of the Navy denied a November 2001 request from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commandant of the Marine Corps for a Navy battle group led by the carrier John F. Kennedy to train atVieques. Subsequent Navy battle groups, however, were permitted to train at Vieques.
Legislation in 2001 and 2002. The FY2002 defense authorization act ( P.L. 107-107 ; S. 1438 ) contains a provision (Section 1049) that (1) canceled the requirement for holding the January2002 referendum; (2) authorized the Secretary of the Navy to close the Vieques range, and terminate all Navy and MarineCorps operations at the Roosevelt Roads naval station that are related exclusively to use of the range, if the Secretarycertifiesthat "one or more alternative training facilities exist that, individually or collectively, provide an equivalent or superior leveloftraining" and are immediately available upon cessation of training on Vieques; (3) required the Secretary, in making thisdetermination, to take into account the written views and recommendations of the Chief of Naval Operations and theCommandant of the Marine Corps; and (4) transferred the range lands to the Department of the Interior if the range isclosed. In its report ( S.Rept. 107-151 of May 15, 2002) on the FY2003 defense authorization bill ( S. 2514 ), the SenateArmed Services Committee
directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report to the congressional defense committees on the plans for joint task force, combined-arms training of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groupsduring fiscal year 2003. This report should include a description of the locations where that training will be conducted, theuseof live munitions during that training, and a description of the naval and military capabilities to be exercised during training. Thereport should also describe the Secretary's progress regarding the identification of an alternate location or locations for thetraining range at Vieques. The committee directs the Secretary to provide this report no later than March 1, 2003. Thecommittee understands that, until such time as a decision is made by the Secretary of the Navy in accordance with Section1049 of [ P.L. 107-107 ], Navy and Marine Corps training will continue at Vieques as it is currently. (page311)
Closures of Vieques Range and Roosevelt Roads. DON conducted its final training operations at Vieques in February 2003. On April 30, 2003, DON closed the range and transferred the land totheDepartment of the Interior, which will use the land as a wildlife refuge, except the Live Impact Area, which will bedesignatedas a wilderness area. The Secretary of the Navy certified to Congress on January 10, 2003, that DON would ceasetrainingoperations on the island by that date, in accordance with Section 1049 of P.L. 107-107 . In making the certification, DoDstated that the Navy had identified alternative training sites that collectively will provide equivalent or superior training tothetraining options provided at Vieques. On March 31, 2004, as directed by Section 8132 of the FY2004 defenseappropriations act ( P.L. 108-87 / H.R. 2658 ), the Navy closed the supporting Roosevelt Roads naval station onmainland Puerto Rico.

	Potential Issues for Congress

Potential issues for Congress include the following: Are the Navy's alternative training sites and methods collectively providingan equivalent or superior level of training to that provided at Vieques prior to April 1999? How might the decision to closeVieques affect the U.S. ability to maintain access to overseas training ranges where there is local opposition to U.S.operations, such as Okinawa or South Korea? Does the decision to close Vieques set a precedent for managing disputesover ranges? Will it encourage other local populations to step up their opposition to U.S. training activities? Whateconomicimpact will the closure of the Roosevelt Roads naval station have on the surrounding community?

	Legislative Activity

FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill. In its report ( S.Rept. 108-46 of May 13, 2003) on the FY2004 defense authorization bill ( S. 1050 ), the Senate Armed Services Committee said itstrongly supported the Navy's plan to reduce its presence at Roosevelt Roads (page 300) and directed the Navy to reporttoCongress on the status of cleanup-related actions for Vieques (page 307). The report stated that
this committee intends to remain focused on the progress of cleanup and future use of the former Navy lands on Vieques.... The committee further expects the Secretary of the Navy to expeditiouslycomplete all environmental cleanup actions on Vieques Island, based on available funds, overall priorities, and applicablelaws. (Page 307)
FY2004 Defense Appropriations Bill. Section 8132 of the FY2004 defense appropriations act ( H.R. 2658 / P.L. 108-87 of September 30, 2003; H.Rept. 108-283 of September24, 2003, pages 50 and 344-345) directed the Navy to close Roosevelt Roads naval station no later than six months afterenactment of the bill, and to dispose of the property in accordance with the procedures and authorities of the BaseRealignment and Closure (BRAC) Act of 1990 (10 USC 2687). The House-passed version of the bill contained asomewhatdifferent provision (Section 8125) added by floor amendment.

Output: This report discusses the controversy leading up to the closure of the U.S. navaltraining range on the Puerto Rican island of Vieques, Congress' legislation directing the closure, and the potential impactof theclosure on military training and readiness. For a discussion of post-closure environmental cleanup issues atVieques,see CRS Report RL32533(pdf). (1) On April 30, 2003,the Department of the Navy (DON) closed its training range on Vieques. On March 31, 2004, as directed by Section 8132 of the FY2004 defense appropriations act (P.L. 108-87/H.R. 2658), the Navy closed the supporting Roosevelt Roads naval station on mainland Puerto Rico. This CRS report will beupdated as events warrant.


Input:
The prospect and potential for severe weather or other natural disasters on or immediately before election day, in addition to lingering hypotheticals about terrorist attacks in the United States, have brought attention to the possibility of postponing as well as the authority to postpone, cancel, or reschedule an election for federal office.
There is no provision in the United States Constitution which currently authorizes in express language any federal official or institution to "postpone" an election for federal office. The Constitution expressly delegates to the states the primary authority to administer within their respective jurisdictions elections for federal office, with a residual and superseding authority within the United States Congress over most aspects of congressional elections (other than the place of choosing Senators). Additionally, the Constitution provides an express authority in Congress over at least the timing of the selections of presidential electors in the states. As to the time established for holding federal elections under these express constitutional authorities, Congress has legislated, originally in 1845, a uniform date for presidential electors to be chosen in the states, and in 1872, a uniform date for congressional elections across the country.
In addition to the absence of specific constitutional direction, there is also no federal law which currently provides express authority to "postpone" an election, although the potential operation of federal statutes regarding vacancies and the consequences of a state's failure to select on the prescribed election day may allow the states to hold subsequent elections in "exigent" circumstances. A handful of states have provided in s tate law express authority to postpone or reschedule elections within their jurisdictions based on certain emergency contingencies, and others have provided general emergency provisions which might be applicable to election situations.
As to potential disruptions on or immediately before election day, particularly in regard to the presidential election, some of the confused scenarios and proposed solutions appear to stem from a misconception of the presidential election as being in the nature of a national referendum. The presidential election is, however, in essence a series of state (and District of Columbia) elections for presidential electors from that state (or jurisdiction) that the Congress has mandated, since 1845, to be held on the same day throughout the country. An event which may disrupt an election for presidential electors in one state, or in a part of one state, may not affect or impact at all the election for presidential electors in other states, or in other portions of the affected state.
Consistent with the states' authority over the administration and procedural aspects of elections to federal office within their jurisdictions is their initial responsibility for resolving issues of challenges and recounts in those elections. This authority and these procedures may be relevant in the case of disruptions, disasters, or violence at the polling places on election day which could conceivably cast into question the efficacy and legitimacy of a particular election result in that jurisdiction. The relevant state procedures could be applied after the fact of an election to resolve initial questions concerning the results of such elections.
It should be emphasized that while the states have the initial authority, or the "first cut" at resolving disputes and recounts in their respective jurisdictions regarding elections to federal office, the Constitution expressly provides that the final authority over the elections and returns of its own Members lies exclusively in each house of Congress. As to the elections for presidential electors, the Constitution expressly gives to the Congress the task of counting the electoral votes for President. Implicit within this explicit authority to count the electoral votes has been the practical necessity to determine which electoral votes to count. While Congress has established procedures and rules for counting the electoral votes and resolving disputed lists of electors, Congress has, by statute, specifically given the states a "safe harbor" time within which to formally resolve presidential electoral disputes, prior to the meeting of the Electoral College in December, which then would be considered "conclusive" upon the Congress in counting those electoral votes for President.

	Timing of Federal Elections

The United States Constitution does not require a uniform election date in the states for elections to the House or Senate, or for the selection of presidential electors. Rather, this has been done by Congress by the enactment of federal law.
The Constitution, while declaring in the "Times, Places and Manner" clause (art. I, §4, cl. 1) that the states have the general authority over the administration of even federal elections within their respective jurisdictions, expressly provides that the Congress may supersede a state provision regarding, among other things, the timing of congressional elections, and further provides that Congress may establish the time for the election of presidential electors in the states (art. II, §1, cl. 4). Under these express constitutional authorities, Congress has established uniform dates for the general elections to federal office within the states, which now are mandated to be held on the first Tuesday next following the first Monday in November in the appropriate even-numbered years.
It was not until 1845 that a uniform date for electing presidential electors in the states was mandated by Congress. Previous to that congressional enactment, the timing for selecting presidential electors could, and did, vary from state to state. Congress in 1844 and 1845 was, however, concerned about the allegations of fraud and corruption in the previous election (1840) for electors for President and Vice President in several states. It was asserted that some of the particular misconduct in that election appeared to have been encouraged, in part, because the states had differing dates for the presidential election, which allowed the alleged movement of populations and voters to key states having later elections (described as "pipelaying"). Congress sought to eliminate such opportunities for fraud and corruption by establishing a uniform day throughout the country for selecting the electors for President and Vice President, while assuring that those states that required an absolute majority to elect could continue to hold a run-off for presidential electors if needed in an election on a subsequent date.
The uniform date for congressional elections in the states was not established by the Congress until 1872. In first enacting this legislation, the Congress appeared to be concerned primarily with two factors, that is, the potential undue and unfair influence on elections in some states that earlier results and elections in other states may routinely have; and the burden on voters who in some states would have to go to the polls twice for two different general elections to choose federal officers in presidential election years.

	Federal Authority to Postpone

As noted, the United States Constitution does not provide express authority for any federal official or institution to postpone an election for federal office in a particular state, in any part of one state, or in all of the states. Specifically, there is no current constitutional authority residing in the President of the United States, nor the executive branch of government, to postpone, cancel, or reschedule elections for federal office in the various states. There might certainly be some potential emergency powers inherent in the President of the United States, as well as those delegated by statute, but there is no precedent for such powers being applied with respect to elections held in the various states for presidential electors, authority over which, as to the procedures and methods, has been expressly delegated in the Constitution to the states. It is possible that some scenarios could be imagined, however, where attacks, disruptions, and destruction are so severe and so dangerous in certain localities, particularly in crowded urban areas, that the President under a rule of necessity may look to protect the public safety by federalizing the state national guard and restricting movement and activities in such areas which would obviously affect the ability to conduct an election at those sites.
Unlike the President, Congress does have explicit constitutional authority over elections to federal office which is of an express, residual nature concerning congressional elections, and a broad implicit authority recognized by the Supreme Court to legislate to protect the integrity and proceedings of presidential elections (as well as express authority over the date of the selection of presidential electors). Congress could, therefore, pass legislation regarding dates, and emergency postponements and/or rescheduling times for elections to federal offices. The courts have recognized an expansive authority in the Congress to "provide a complete code" for federal elections within the states, including presidential elections and, within the parameters of the specific dates for the length and terms of federal offices established within the Constitution, Congress would appear to have the authority to exercise its legislative discretion with regard to emergency scheduling and rescheduling. As noted by the Supreme Court in the 19 th century with regard to Congress's authority over the conduct of elections for federal office in the states:
That a government whose essential character is republican, whose executive head and legislative body are both elective ... , has no power by appropriate laws to secure this election from the influence of violence ... is a proposition so startling as to arrest attention and demand the gravest consideration.
If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is superior to the general government, it must have the power to protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption .
Furthermore, in theory, Congress could also enact a law delegating to the executive certain authority in this area regarding emergency rescheduling. However, as a policy matter, and under the constitutional authority delegated to it, Congress has traditionally allowed the states, within the framework of the federal constitutional and statutory mandates, to exercise the substantive control over the procedures and administrative details of elections within their own respective jurisdictions.
It should be noted, and as discussed in more detail in the following sections, that there are existing provisions under current federal law regarding a failure of a state to make a selection on the prescribed election day with respect to both congressional elections (2 U.S.C. §8) and presidential elections (3 U.S.C. §2), which have traditionally left the details of such decisions up to the states.

	State Authority Over Election Procedures and Administration of Federal Elections

		State Authority Under United States Constitution

There is under our federal system of shared sovereignty a division of jurisdiction and authority which occurs in the case of elections to federal office under the provisions of the United States Constitution. In the first instance, the terms of federal offices and the qualifications of candidates eligible for federal offices are established and fixed by the agreement of the states within the instrument which created those offices, that is, the U.S. Constitution. The length of the terms of federal offices, as well as the qualifications for such offices, are thus unalterable by the Congress alone, or by any state unilaterally.
The Constitution expressly provides, however, that the individual states have the authority to administer elections for federal congressional office, while providing that Congress may generally supersede any such regulations. The Supreme Court has described this "Times, Places and Manner" clause of Article I, Section 4, as a "default provision; it invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections ... but only so far as Congress declines to pre-empt state legislative choices." The state legislatures also have express authority over the "manner" in which presidential electors in their state are to be chosen. Within certain constitutionally prescribed parameters, the states are also responsible to establish the qualifications for voting in their states in federal elections.
Finally, as to its own Members, the Constitution provides that each house of Congress expressly retains the authority to be the final judge of the results of their elections, and to judge those qualifications of their Members expressly prescribed the Constitution. Congress, in joint session, is also assigned in the Constitution the duty to count the electoral votes for President and to declare the winner.
Although Congress has a "residual and superseding" authority over congressional elections (and could, in theory, pass a detailed code for administering federal elections), Congress has generally allowed the states the primary responsibility to administer elections to federal office (and the states, in turn, have further devolved immediate administrative and supervisory control over many election procedures to local and county authorities within their jurisdictions). This policy of deferring to the states in the administration of all elections within their respective borders, including federal elections, has generally recognized the principle that because of the varying political cultures, practices, and traditions across the nation, and from state-to-state, that operational authority over most of the election mechanics is more efficiently left to the states and localities.
Under the states' "Times, Places and Manner" authority in the Constitution, the states may promulgate a broad range of regulatory and administrative provisions over the mechanics and procedures even for federal elections within their states regarding such things as forms of the ballots, "ballot access" by candidates (including new party or independent candidates), voting procedures, voting places, and the nominating and electoral process generally, to facilitate proper election administration generally, and to prevent election fraud, voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, and the proliferation of frivolous candidates, specifically.
The states' procedural and administrative authority over elections within their jurisdictions, including elections to federal office, includes the initial authority over election contests, protests, and recounts. As noted by the Supreme Court in Roudebush v. Hartke , even though the Constitution expressly gives each house of Congress the final authority over the elections and returns of its own members (Article I, Section 5), a state may adopt contest and recount provisions as one of the "safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved." The Court noted there:
Indiana has found, along with many other States, that one procedure necessary to guard against irregularity and error in the tabulation of votes is the availability of a recount. ... A recount is an integral part of the Indiana electoral process and is in the ambit of the broad powers delegated to the States by Art. I, § 4.
It is true that a State's verification of the accuracy of election results pursuant to its Art. I, § 4, powers is not totally separable from the Senate's power to judge elections and returns. But a recount can be said to "usurp" the Senate's function only if it frustrates the Senate's ability to make an independent final judgment. A recount does not prevent the Senate from independently evaluating the election any more than the initial count does. The Senate is free to accept or reject the apparent winner in either count, and, if it chooses, to conduct its own recount.
As to the presidential election, as noted, the state legislatures are granted express authority in the Constitution over the "manner" in which presidential electors are to be chosen. Although there remains some controversy over the Supreme Court's ruling in Bush v. Gore , where a federal court intervened to stop a state-ordered recount of the vote for presidential electors in Florida in 2000, the Court's per curium opinion left intact and affirmed, at least in theory, a state legislature's authority under the United States Constitution to enact protest or contest statutes and provisions regarding elections for presidential electors (although the implementation of that procedure as directed by the Florida courts was found by a majority of the Supreme Court to violate the equal protection and due process requirements of the United States Constitution). The primacy under the United States Constitution of the state legislatures in establishing the mechanisms for appointment of presidential electors and in fashioning recount and protest statutes was also emphasized by the Supreme Court in the decision preceding Bush v. Gore , that is, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, which had remanded to the Florida state courts the issue of the recount proceedings in the Florida presidential election of 2000. Under such authority, the state may be in the position to initially hear challenges to and to rectify voting problems or issues that arose in a presidential election because of disruptions in voting caused by natural or man-made disasters.

		Authority Under State Law to Postpone or Reschedule an Election to Federal Office

There are several state provisions which currently purport to give to certain specified state officials the authority to "postpone" or to reschedule an election within the state, prior to the holding of an election, for a number of emergency and exigent circumstances. Furthermore, other states may have general emergency powers which might be used, and might be broad enough, to allow the Governor or other state executive official to take action which may involve a postponement of an election. Because of the increased awareness of the threat from severe weather events, or from concern over hypothetical terrorist threats, state legislatures may in the future consider the adoption of additional provisions which set out the considerations and circumstances for the declaration of a postponement and/or rescheduling of an election within their jurisdiction, including elections to federal offices.

			Conformance With Federal Law

Does a state law or order instituting a rescheduling of an election to federal office within that state, or a portion of the state, impermissibly affect the date of such election in contravention of the federal laws that have established election day for federal offices to be the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November?

				Congressional Elections

The statutorily established date for elections for federal office—while it is clearly mandatory and not merely advisory—may not necessarily be an "absolute" such that no election subsequent to that date could be or should be recognized. In fact, as noted, the federal statutory scheme for congressional elections specifically provides for the contingency of a "vacancy" in the state delegation, whether that vacancy is caused by death, resignation, or incapacity, or by a "failure to elect at the time prescribed by law," by authorizing another time for the election to be prescribed by state law:
2 U.S.C. § 8 . Vacancies
The time for holding elections in any State, District, or Territory for a Representative or Delegate to fill a vacancy, whether such vacancy is caused by a failure to elect at the time prescribed by law, or by the death, resignation, or incapacity of a person elected, may be prescribed by the laws of the several States and Territories respectively.
The Supreme Court of the United States has found that the day established in 2 U.S.C. Section 7 for electing Senators and Representatives in the states is a mandatory date, and that a state's statutory scheme may not regularly permit or allow the "election" of such a federal official at an election held prior to the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November date. The Louisiana election provisions which designated as "elected" to Congress an open primary winner who received at least a majority of the votes cast in that primary election held prior to the general election, were therefore found to be a violation of the federal law setting the general election date. States that allow "early voting" in federal elections, however, have not been found by federal courts to be holding a prior election in violation of the federal statute, since it was found that the election would not be "consummated" before election day, or that such ballots would not be officially counted or tallied before federally prescribed election day.
Federal courts interpreting the federal statutes regarding the timing of elections to Congress have noted that a state's scheme for elections must be in general conformance with the date prescribed by federal law, at 2 U.S.C. Section 7, and may not routinely allow the election on an earlier date, but that certain "exigent" circumstances may permit the holding of an election for federal office at a subsequent time under 2 U.S.C. Section 8. The federal District Court in the District of Columbia in Busbee v. Smith , in a case affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, found that an exigent circumstance, such as the State of Georgia's reapportionment plan being refused preclearance by the Justice Department under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because of "discriminatory effects," allowed for an election to federal office in two congressional districts to be held on a subsequent date:
...[W]here exigent circumstances arising prior to or on the date established by [2 U.S.C.] section 7 preclude holding an election on that date, a state may postpone the election until the earliest practicable date. In this case, for example, Georgia will "fail[ ] to elect at the time prescribed by law" because its purposefully discriminatory conduct prevented it from securing Section 5 approval for constitutionally required changes in its voting procedures. As a result, we believe, that [2 U.S.C.] section 8 permits a reasonable postponement of the elections in the Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts.
This reasoning, as noted later by another federal court, would allow for the postponement of an election, and the holding of the election for federal office in the state at a later date, for a number of possible "exigent" circumstances, including "natural disasters" such as hurricanes, tied votes, or fraud. This federal court in Georgia found that the state's statutory requirement that a candidate—to be elected—receive a majority and not merely a plurality of votes in the general election, was such an exigent circumstance that could require the holding of a subsequent run-off election for Senator to be held on November 24, after the earlier November general election mandated by 2 U.S.C. Section 7 resulted in no candidate receiving a majority of the votes:
The court in Busbee acknowledged that 2 U.S.C. § 8 allows states, under certain circumstances, to hold elections at times other than those prescribed by 2 U.S.C. section 7. Id. at 524-25. In addition to the circumstances it specifically enumerates—death, resignation, personal incapacity—2 U.S.C. section 8 allows states to reschedule elections "where exigent circumstances arising prior to or on the date established by section 7 preclude holding an election on that date." Id. at 525. The court offered natural disasters, and the parties to the instant suit offer fraud and a tie vote as examples of 'exigent' circumstances warranting state rescheduling.

				Elections for Presidential Electors

The election for presidential electors presents somewhat different issues from those elections for congressional office because the language of the federal statutes for presidential electors varies from the language governing congressional elections. The statute concerning the timing and scheduling for congressional elections provides expressly that when there is a vacancy caused by death, resignation or incapacity, or when "such vacancy is caused by a failure to elect at the time prescribed by law," then a subsequent election may be scheduled. This language appears to be broad enough and, as noted above, has been interpreted by federal courts to actually permit a temporary postponement and rescheduling of a congressional election. The federal statute for presidential elections, however, expressly states that "[w]henever any State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors," but fails to "make a choice on the day prescribed by law," then the electors may be selected on a subsequent day in the manner established by the legislature of the state:
3 U.S.C. § 2 . Failure to make choice on prescribed day
Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may direct.
Does the wording of 3 U.S.C. Section 2 mean that the authority of the states to reschedule an election for presidential electors is contingent upon the state actually having "held an election for the purpose of choosing electors"? If so, then under this theory no prior postponement and rescheduling would be permitted state-wide, even a postponement for natural disasters such as an impending hurricane, or the destruction shortly prior to the elections of a number of polling places, since it would conflict with the federally scheduled time in 3 U.S.C. Section 2.
Certainly, the states could respond after-the-fact to disruptions on election day. If a regularly scheduled election is disrupted by natural or man-made disasters in a state, then the state could, under its general election contest and challenge procedures, find that the results of the election were not viable or valid. Pursuant to such finding, the state might order a new election or a continuation of the election in the affected areas (whereby those people who were not certified by election officials as having already voted could come to vote at a subsequent time), which would appear to be in conformance with federal law, both at 2 U.S.C. Section 8 (for congressional elections), as well as 3 U.S.C. Section 2, in the case of the election of presidential electors. In such cases, the state had clearly "held an election," but a choice was not necessarily made because the state has determined that the results could not fairly be ascertained on the prescribed election day.
However, if there is a disruption prior to an election, or anticipated at the time of election—such as in the case of a hurricane, for example—could an election for presidential electors not be held on the proscribed date, that is, be postponed and rescheduled in a particular state and still be in conformance with 3 U.S.C. Section 2? There is no clear and definitive authority on this question, nor do there appear to be specific legal precedents bearing upon this issue. Even though the purpose in 1845 of this particular provision at 3 U.S.C. Section 2, regarding the subsequent choosing of electors, was clearly to allow those states that required an absolute "majority" in a general election to be "elected" to hold a subsequent run-off election if no candidate's electors received such a majority, the language itself may be open to broader interpretation.
It may be contended in the first place that the express constitutional authority of the state legislatures over the selection of presidential electors at Article II, Section 1, clause 2, which language allows the state legislatures to enact statutory schemes to protect the validity of their elections for presidential electors in the state, including fashioning protest or contest procedures, may be consonant with such an authority in the legislature itself to temporarily postpone or to authorize by state law the postponement and rescheduling of state-wide elections by the state executive in certain emergency circumstances. One of the major points made by the Supreme Court in both the earlier Palm Beach County case, and the latter Bush v. Gore decision, was the primacy of the state legislatures' role in the manner of the selection of presidential electors. Although clearly the concepts of "time" and "manner" of election are not necessarily synonymous, this constitutional provision and the Supreme Court's deference to the state legislatures may arguably give credibility to states' attempts to statutorily prescribe a system whereby emergency procedures may be implemented with respect to all state-wide elections, including the general election for presidential electors, which provide that such elections, while certainly scheduled for the federally prescribed date, because of such emergency and exigent circumstances need to be rescheduled, postponed, or continued at a subsequent time.
Furthermore, it may be noted that in addition to Article II, Section 1, clause 2 of the Constitution, the federal law at 3 U.S.C. Section 5 (which was part of the original Electoral Vote Count Act of 1887), provides the state legislatures with further statutory authority to finally and conclusively resolve within the state protests, challenges, and contests of the election of presidential electors. One of the purposes of the original 1887 statute regarding counting of the electoral votes was to substantially devolve upon the states the burden for resolving conflicts over the election, selection, and appointment of those states' own electors for President and Vice President. As noted by the Supreme Court, this statute at 3 U.S.C. Section 5:
creates a "safe harbor" for a State insofar as congressional consideration of its electoral votes are concerned. If the state legislature has provided for final determination of contests or controversies by a law made prior to election day, that determination shall be conclusive if made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors.
Clearly, there is an understanding that the states were intended to have the principal and initial responsibility for resolving the conflicts, arguments, controversies and difficulties involved in the processes of selecting presidential electors in their respective states. If a challenge were raised to a state's selection of presidential electors because of a partial or complete postponement and rescheduling of the popular vote for presidential electors due to "exigent" circumstances, and such challenge was resolved in the state within the "safe harbor" timeframe, then the presumption would appear to exist that such determination would be "conclusive" on the Congress in accepting those electoral votes.
It is possible to argue, therefore, that to harmonize the provisions for elections to federal office, that is specifically the provisions for subsequent congressional elections at 2 U.S.C. Section 8 and the presidential provisions at 3 U.S.C. Section 2, and the authority devolved upon the states in 3 U.S.C. Section 5, that it would be logical to read the federal statutes as permitting a postponement and an election on a subsequent date for both Congress and presidential electors under the state's current laws when necessitated by emergency and exigent circumstances in the particular state. As long as the election and any subsequent challenges are resolved in time, such resolution would be "conclusive" on Congress in counting the presidential electoral votes. Such a supposition might be bolstered somewhat by the alternative, that is, that the federal law could work to disenfranchise the voters of a particular state when that state believes it is necessary to temporarily postpone entirely or partially the regularly scheduled state-wide elections because of some extraordinary and disastrous event in the state.
Finally, although both the authority and practical arguments would appear to provide support for placing the power for postponement of elections for federal offices within the particular states, there has been some concerns expressed, as a matter of policy as well as statutory interpretation, over allowing any state to postpone or otherwise reschedule an election for federal office within the entire state—particularly an election for presidential electors—based merely on the anticipation of events that may or may not happen, or on an event taking place in another state or in only one part of the same state. The grounds for any such postponement or rescheduling, as well as any express, implied, or inherent authority, would have to be examined initially under the applicable state law and procedure, and no blanket statement could be made with respect to the interpretation in all of the states.
There appears to be little legal or factual precedent to apply to such circumstances regarding an election in a state, particularly for presidential electors. Remembering that the presidential election is not necessarily in the nature of a national referendum, but is rather 51 simultaneous state/district elections for presidential electors, however, it may be asked as a matter of policy whether or not an event that occurred earlier in the state, or an event that occurs in a different state or in a different voting locality within the same state, would or should be enough to trigger a postponement of an election in the entirety of any particular state as a matter of good public policy. It has been argued that a violent disruption of an election in Manhattan, New York City, should not necessarily affect, or at least could not predictably affect, an election in Manhattan, Kansas. It may be noted that on the fateful day of September 11, 2001, despite the events unfolding in Manhattan in New York City, in Pennsylvania, and at the Pentagon in the Washington, DC, area, a primary election for federal congressional office—a contested congressional primary—on the South Shore of Massachusetts reportedly drew a larger than normal number of the voting age population. Similarly, a violent tropical storm hit Hawaii a day before a contested Senate primary election in the summer of 2014, and the executive authority of the state decided to proceed with the primary election in all of the state other than two precincts which were particularly devastated by Tropical Storm Iselle on August 8, 2014. The Chief Election Officer in the state of Hawaii decided to allow the election to continue and be held in those two precincts the next week, on August 15, 2014.
Problems and disruptions in one state clearly may not predictably (or necessarily) affect the turnout or the viability of the results of an election in another state. Similarly, natural or man-made disasters occurring, or anticipated to occur, in one part or region of a state may not predictably affect the turnout in another part of the state. To avoid the appearance of political maneuvering or gamesmanship, and to adhere more closely to the federal statutory scheme for the timing of elections for presidential electors, it has been argued that the more reasoned policy would be—absent the most extreme disruption and immediate "exigent" circumstance—to have the state conduct such an election as scheduled in as many localities and local jurisdictions as feasible, and then to deal with any implications of the disruptions subsequently, after having held the election, including re-votes or rescheduled votes in affected areas, under the state's contest and challenge procedures.

	Appendix: Constitutional and Federal Statutory Provisions

Constitutional Provisions: Congressional Elections
A rticle I, Section 2 , clause 1 . The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second year by the people of the several States ....
Article I, Section 2 , clause 4 . When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.
Amendment Seventeen . The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years ....
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided , That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
Article I, Section 4, clause 1 . The times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
Article I, Section 5, clause 1 . Each house shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members ....
Presidential Elections.
Article II, Section 1 , cl. 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:
Article II, Section 1, cl. 2. Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress....
Article II, Section 1, clause 4 . The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.
Amendment XII . The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, ... and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; – The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted ....
Dates of Federal Office Terms.
Amendment XX, Section 1 . The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20 th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3 rd day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.
Current Federal Statutory Provisions.
2 U.S.C. Section 1 . Time for election of Senators . At the regular election held in any State next preceding the expiration of the term for which any Senator was elected to represent such State in Congress, at which election a Representative to Congress is regularly by law to be chosen, a United States Senator from said State shall be elected by the people thereof for the term commencing on the 3d day of January next thereafter.
2 U.S.C. Section 7 . Time of election . The Tuesday next after the 1 st Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day for the election, in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of Representatives and Delegates to the Congress commencing on the 3d day of January next thereafter.
2 U.S.C. Section 8 . Vacancies . The time for holding elections in any State, District, or Territory for a Representative or Delegate to fill a vacancy, whether such vacancy is caused by a failure to elect at the time prescribed by law, or by the death, resignation, or incapacity of a person elected, may be prescribed by the laws of the several States and Territories respectively.
3 U.S.C. Section 1 . Time of appointing electors . The electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November, in every fourth year succeeding every election of a President and Vice President.
3 U.S.C. Section 2 . Failure to make choice on prescribed day . Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may direct.
3 U.S.C. Section 5 . Determination of controversy as to appointment of electors . If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State is concerned.

Output:
The prospect and potential for severe weather or other natural disasters, in addition to lingering hypotheticals about terrorist attacks directed at certain metropolitan areas, have brought attention to the possibility of postponing and/or the authority to postpone, cancel, or reschedule an election for federal office.
The United States Constitution does not provide in express language current authority for any federal official or institution to "postpone" an election for federal office. Although the Constitution does expressly delegate to the states the primary authority to administer within their respective jurisdictions elections for federal office, there remains within the Constitution a residual and superseding authority in the U.S. Congress over most aspects of congressional elections (art. I, §5, cl. 1), and an express authority in Congress over at least the timing of the selections of presidential electors in the states (article II, §1, cl. 4). Under this authority Congress has legislated a uniform date for presidential electors to be chosen in the states, and a uniform date for congressional elections across the country, to be on the Tuesday immediately following the first Monday in November in the particular, applicable even-numbered election years.
In addition to the absence of an express constitutional direction, there is also no federal law which currently provides express authority to "postpone" an election, although the potential operation of federal statutes regarding vacancies and the consequences of a state's "failure to select" on the prescribed election day (see 2 U.S.C. §8, and 3 U.S.C. §2) might allow a state to hold subsequent elections in "exigent" circumstances. It would appear that under Congress's express constitutional authority over the timing of federal elections that Congress could, at some time, enact a federal law setting conditions, times, and dates for rescheduling of elections to federal offices in the states in emergency or other exigent circumstances, and with the proper standards and guidelines could delegate the execution and application of those provisions to executive branch or state officials.
With regard to state laws and federal elections, in addition to the general protest, contest, and challenge statutes whereby the results of elections to federal office are initially adjudicated in the states, a handful of states have provided in state law express authority to postpone or reschedule elections within their jurisdictions based on certain emergency contingencies. The states' authority within the United States Constitution appears to be sufficient to enact legislation to deal with emergency and exigent circumstances concerning federal elections, as long as such laws do not conflict with federal law enacted under Congress's superseding constitutional authority. Federal courts have thus generally interpreted federal law to permit the states to reschedule elections to congressional office when "exigent" circumstances have necessitated a postponement. There may be different issues raised in the case of the election of presidential electors if the state attempted to hold the entire election within the state on a different date, because the federal statute regarding the "failure to make a choice" on the prescribed election day for presidential electors is different than that regarding congressional elections.
This report has been revised from an earlier version and will be updated as case law or events warrant.