Input:
	Background

Our nation’s border security process includes multiple mechanisms for  addressing potential terrorist threats to the United States. One of these  mechanisms is the visa revocation process. The visa revocation process is  a homeland security tool that can prevent potential terrorists from  entering the United States and can help immigration and law enforcement  officials identify and investigate potential terrorists already in the country.  The visa revocation process begins after consular officers at the  Department of State’s overseas consular posts adjudicate visa applications  for foreign nationals who wish to temporarily enter the United States for  business, tourism, or other reasons. After receiving a visa, foreign  nationals travel to ports of entry within the United States. At ports of  entry, inspectors from DHS’s Customs and Border Protection determine  whether the visa holder is admitted to the United States and, if so, how  long he or she may remain in the country. Once foreign nationals have  entered the United States, DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement  assumes responsibility for enforcing our immigration laws, including  ensuring that foreign nationals are eligible to remain in the United States.
According to State officials, most visa revocations on terrorism grounds  begin with information from the TIPOFF database, the U.S. government’s  primary terrorist watch list. The TIPOFF database includes individuals the  U.S. government suspects may have ties to terrorism. Information in the  TIPOFF database is provided by various federal agencies including the  FBI, State, and others. At the time of our previous report, this information  was managed by State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. In December  2003, TSC assumed responsibility for this function. TSC was officially  formed in December 2003 as a result of a presidential directive designed to  increase information sharing across agencies and to facilitate better  understanding between the intelligence and investigation communities. As  an interagency organization under the administration of the FBI with  representatives from State, DHS, and other federal agencies, part of its  role is to work with federal agencies to provide access to the TIPOFF  database. Figure 1 depicts the visa revocation process in effect during the  October to December 2003 time period we analyzed for this report as  described in agency procedures and as explained to us by agency officials.
State uses information in TIPOFF to determine if visa holders may be  suspected or actual terrorists. When TSC adds individuals in TIPOFF to  the Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS),  it provides a list of these names to Consular Affairs. State officials told us  that the entry of these names into CLASS and the Interagency Border  Inspection System (IBIS) should help prevent any of those individuals  from entering the United States because border inspectors will be alerted  to deny them entry. This lookout process does not completely address the  potential vulnerability posed by individuals already in the country.  Therefore, the visa revocation process is an important tool to help identify  individuals whom immigration and law enforcement officials should locate  and investigate. After TSC adds names to CLASS and IBIS, Consular  Affairs compares these names with its database of all visa holders and  sends an electronic spreadsheet back to TSC containing probable or  possible matches. TSC refines this list by identifying direct matches and  recommends that Consular Affairs revoke these individuals’ visas. It also  sends Consular Affairs an information package containing a summary of  the derogatory information that led TSC to the recommendation to revoke.
After determining that the revocation is appropriate, the Consular Affairs  officer posts a lookout in CLASS for the individual. According to State and  DHS officials, this lookout is then accessible in near real time to DHS  inspectors at border ports of entry through the IBIS database. CBP  inspectors at ports of entry use IBIS to check whether foreign nationals  are inadmissible and should be denied entry into the United States. When a  person comes to the United States by air or by sea, CBP inspectors are  required to check that person’s name in IBIS before he or she is allowed to  enter the country. After posting the lookout, the Consular Affairs officer  writes an internal case file memo summarizing the derogatory information,  creates a draft revocation certificate and cable for management review,  and forwards these materials to the appropriate officials within State.  Once these officials clear and sign the revocation certificate, Consular  Affairs sends a cable instructing the overseas post that issued the visa to  contact the visa holder, physically cancel the visa, and report all actions  taken to State. State also notifies other federal agencies of visa  revocations. Specifically, Consular Affairs’ Visa Office faxes a copy of the  revocation certificate to CBP. In addition, the Visa Office sends a copy of  the cable by email that includes the wording of the revocation certificate  to various other agencies, including CBP and ICE.
Upon receiving the notification from State, CBP determines whether the  individual may have already legally entered the United States by  electronically searching immigration records. If CBP determines that the  individual may be in the country, it notifies ICE. ICE officials also attempt  to determine whether the individual may be in the country. Once ICE  determines that an individual with a visa revoked on national security  grounds may be in the United States, ICE employees query law  enforcement and open source information to attempt to locate the  individual. If they determine that the individual is in the country, they  conduct an additional investigation in law enforcement and intelligence  databases and forward the results of this preliminary research to the  appropriate Special Agent in Charge (field) office or offices. The ICE  Special Agent in Charge office then coordinates with the FBI and conducts  an investigation to locate the individual and determine if the alien is in  compliance with all terms of his or her admission.

		FBI’s Role in Border Security

While FBI investigators do not play a formal role in the visa revocation  process, they play a key role in the U.S. government’s overall border  security efforts, including investigating suspected terrorists in the United  States. The FBI supports border security by (1) working to deny entry into  the United States of aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in,  or supporting terrorist activity and (2) aiding in supplying information to  locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already present in the  United States. According to FBI officials, the TIPOFF database is central  to the FBI’s efforts to track suspected terrorists in the United States. When  names of suspected terrorists are added to TIPOFF, this information may  originate from the FBI. When names are added to TIPOFF, the FBI may  forward investigative leads to the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force,  which in turn may relay information to one or more of the 84 Joint  Terrorist Tracking Task Forces throughout the country for investigation.

	Initial Actions Taken to Address Weaknesses Were Inadequate

Following our June 2003 report, State and DHS took some actions to  address weaknesses we identified in the visa revocation process, but these  actions did not adequately address all of the weaknesses we found. State  developed written procedures providing detailed instructions for  personnel to follow when revoking visas. DHS did not develop an  agencywide policy for visa revocations, but DHS’s Customs and Border  Protection developed a workflow outline related to its role in the visa  revocation process. Our review of visas revoked from October through  December 2003 showed that despite State’s and CBP’s initial actions,  weaknesses persisted in the visa revocation process.

		State Developed Initial Procedures in 2003, but DHS Did Not

After our June 2003 report, State developed written standard operating  procedures for processing visa revocations. These procedures were issued  on July 7, 2003, and included written instructions for consular officers to  follow once they decide to revoke an individual’s visa. Specifically, they  included directions for posting lookouts, preparing and finalizing  revocation certificates, and notifying appropriate State personnel of the  action taken. Additionally, these procedures provided instructions for  notifying both the overseas post that issued the visa and Homeland  Security officials. State published a less detailed version of these  procedures in its Foreign Affairs Manual on July 17, 2003, for use by  consular officers.
DHS did not develop an intra-agency policy regarding responsibilities for  handling visa revocation cases. However, following our June 2003 report,  DHS’s Customs and Border Protection developed a workflow outline  showing the steps for determining whether individuals with revoked visas  may be in the United States and, if so, notifying ICE immigration officials  to take specific actions. These procedures were designed to ensure that  appropriate lookouts were recorded and that, in cases in which the visa  holder had entered the United States prior to the visa revocation, all  research information from CBP was immediately relayed to DHS’s  Immigration and Customs Enforcement for investigation.

		Review of Revocation Process Identified Several Weaknesses

Our review of visas revoked based on terrorism concerns from October  through December 2003 indicated that, despite State’s and CBP’s initial  efforts, weaknesses remained in the visa revocation process. We found  that backlogs in cases to be screened, delays in forwarding the appropriate  intelligence to State, and delays in taking action to revoke visas all created  weaknesses in the visa revocation process. (See fig. 2 for the points of  delay we observed in our review of visas revoked over a 3-month period.)
We also found instances of delays in State’s notification to DHS. In  addition, conflicting records of how many individuals’ visas were revoked  for terrorism concerns during our reporting period and which of these  people may be in the United States suggest a risk that agencies may have  been prevented from taking appropriate action in some cases. Further, we  found that ICE was not consistently or promptly notified after CBP  determined that aliens with revoked visas might be in the United States.  We also found that ICE officials were generally unaware of the basis for  individual revocations. Additionally, we found that ICE waited more than 2  months to request that field offices investigate individuals with visas  revoked on terrorism grounds who may be in the country. Finally,  outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding the removal  of individuals based solely on their visa revocation.
Our review of all visas revoked on terrorism grounds from October  through December 2003 showed that delays occurred in identifying  individuals whose visas should be revoked. According to a State official, in  August and September 2003, there was a backlog of approximately 5,000  names of suspected terrorists in TIPOFF that had not been screened to  identify any visa holders. Therefore, there was a delay between identifying  individuals who may be suspected terrorists and determining whether they  had a visa. This official explained that the backlog developed in part  because of a quadrupling in the amount of counterterrorism intelligence  gathered after September 11 without a commensurate increase in staff  allocated to screen this intelligence information. She added that the  backlog was cleared in December 2003 following the temporary  assignment of additional staff from Consular Affairs.
Our review of a sample of 35 visas revoked based on terrorism concerns  showed that delays occurred in transmitting recommendations to  Consular Affairs to revoke visas. To eliminate the backlog of names to be  checked, Consular Affairs temporarily assigned two full-time employees to  screen these intelligence data from TIPOFF. TSC officials told us that  terrorism intelligence should be screened to identify visa holders as  quickly as possible. A TSC contractor who typically performs this duty  said that TSC normally sends an average of no more than six  recommendations for visa revocation per day. However, according to a  TSC official, during the time that the Consular Affairs staff were  temporarily assigned to screen intelligence, these staff waited until they  had collected large quantities of recommendations and sent them to  Consular Affairs in large batches. As a result, about 260 visa revocations  on terrorism grounds during the 3-month period we examined were  processed on 2 days, November 25 and December 1. This delay increased  the risk that some of these individuals could have entered the United  States before State was able to post the appropriate lookouts or revoke  their visas.

			State’s Lookouts Were Not Always Timely

Based on our review of a sample of visa revocations, the Department of  State did not always post lookouts in a timely manner. According to State  and DHS officials, posting this lookout is a key step in the border security  process because it is the primary mechanism for notifying border  inspectors that individuals’ visas have been revoked and should not be  admitted to the United States. State’s standard operating procedures  issued in July 2003 directed Consular Affairs officials to post a lookout for  an individual before the revocation is finalized. Although State posted  lookouts in all 35 visa revocations we examined in detail, we found that in  six instances, Consular Affairs did not do so until after the revocation was  finalized. In one case it took 8 days after the revocation certificate was  signed for Consular Affairs to post the lookout.

			Delays Occurred in Revoking Visas

Our review of 35 visas revoked based on terrorism concerns also showed  that delays occurred in Consular Affairs’ decisions to revoke visas after  receiving a recommendation to do so. State officials told us that it should  not take more than a week for them to complete the visa revocation  process after receiving a recommendation to revoke. We attempted to  determine how long it took Consular Affairs to revoke visas after receiving  a recommendation to do so for our sample of 35. However, this  information only existed for 6 of the 35 cases. In 3 of these cases, Consular  Affairs revoked the individuals’ visas within 10 days of receiving the  recommendation. However, in the other 3 cases, Consular Affairs took  much longer to act on the recommendation. For example, in one instance,  a Consular Affairs official told us that State officials deliberated for more  than 6 months before deciding to revoke the individual’s visa. According to  this official, Consular Affairs was deliberating whether the individual’s  connection to terrorism was strong enough to warrant revoking his or her  visa. In another instance, more than 17 months elapsed between the  recommendation to revoke and the actual revocation.

			State’s Notifications to DHS Were Not Always Timely

We also observed delays in the Department of State notification to DHS of  visa revocations. It is particularly important that these notifications are  timely when the alien whose visa is revoked may already be in the United  States so that DHS can locate and investigate him or her. Of the 35 cases  we reviewed in detail, CBP told us it received notification from State the  same day a revocation was finalized in 9 cases; within 1 to 6 days in 23  cases; and in 7 days or more in three cases.

			Agencies Reported Conflicting Information on Visa Revocations

State, CBP, and ICE each maintain separate records on visa revocations.  We found that for the October through December 2003 time period, each  agency reported different numbers of revocations based on terrorism  concerns. As shown in figure 3, State listed 338; ICE, 347; and CBP, 336.  We found that only 320 names were on all three lists and that some lists  contained names that were not on either of the other lists.
Instances where a name did not appear on all three lists show a potential  breakdown in the visa revocation process. We could not determine why all  of the names were not on all lists. However, we determined that some of  the names were not included because the agencies disagreed over whether  some of these individuals’ visas were revoked on terrorism grounds or  when their visas were revoked, and others were not included because we  were provided incomplete information. Regardless of the reason, this  discrepancy is a cause for concern because CBP and ICE may not have  taken timely action to determine if these individuals were in the country  and, if so, to locate and investigate them.
In our June 2003 report, we noted that State’s Visa Office neither kept a  central log of visas it revoked on the basis of terrorism concerns, nor did it  monitor whether notifications were sent to other agencies. In commenting  on that report, State said the Visa Office had changed its practices to keep  a log of revocation cases and maintain all signed certificates in a central  file. However, in conducting this review, Visa Office officials told us that  State did not maintain a formal list of all visas revoked. We also learned  that State, CBP, and ICE did not have a system in place to regularly  reconcile their separate records of visa revocations to ensure that each  agency has consistent information.

			CBP and ICE Disagreed on Which Individuals May Have Been in the Country

Our review of a sample of 35 visa revocations on terrorism grounds shows  that CBP and ICE records also conflicted regarding whether certain  individuals may have been in the country. In 3 of the 35 cases, CBP and  ICE disagreed about whether an individual may have been in the country  at the time of visa revocation and whether they might still be in the  country. In two of the instances, CBP did not believe the individual was in  the country and, therefore, did not refer the cases to ICE for investigation.  However, ICE special agents determined that both of these individuals  were and still are in the country—one is awaiting adjudication of a  political asylum claim, and the other has a pending application to become  a lawful permanent resident of the United States.
In another instance, CBP believed an individual was in the country when  his visa was revoked and subsequently notified ICE of the need to locate  and investigate him. However, because ICE did not use CBP’s notification,  it performed its own search of immigration records based on State’s  notification and concluded that the individual was not in the country.  Therefore, it did not investigate him. According to CBP data, this  individual has been in the country for more than a year.
These disagreements are due in part to the lack of clearly defined  responsibilities for each of the DHS components. Because of DHS’s lack of  an agencywide written policy regarding visa revocations, its component  units’ procedures are sometimes duplicative. For example, CBP’s written  procedures require its personnel to determine if individuals with revoked  visas may be in the United States and notify ICE of any such individuals.  According to ICE officials, they conduct their own record checks to  determine if individuals with revoked visas are in the country and rely  primarily on notifications from State to identify individuals on whom they  need to conduct records checks.
An ICE official told us that CBP and ICE have different responsibilities  regarding visa revocations and, as a result, may have different levels of  sensitivity to information regarding whether individuals with revoked  visas may be in the country. CBP’s primary responsibility is to post  lookouts to prevent individuals from entering the country. ICE’s primary  responsibility is to prevent any national security threats by enforcing  immigration laws once individuals have already entered the country.  Therefore, ICE officials told us that they initiate investigations of  individuals out of an abundance of caution, even if CBP may not believe  the individual may be in the country. They added that notifications from  CBP merely supplement ICE’s efforts to determine if individuals may be in  the country.

			ICE May Not Have Been Informed of Aliens with Revoked Visas Who May Be in the Country

Once they receive notification of a visa revocation from State, DHS  personnel at CBP should notify ICE if they determine that the individual  whose visa was revoked may be in the country. CBP’s workflow outline  states that CBP verifies that any lead information on individuals whose  visas are revoked and may be in the United States is immediately provided  to ICE for investigation. A CBP official confirmed that, because these  cases are highly urgent, they should be handled immediately. However,  CBP could not document that it had notified ICE promptly, or in several  cases, that it notified ICE at all. According to CBP data on the 35 cases in  our sample, 10 aliens may have been in the United States at the time of  their revocation. In 3 of these cases, CBP records indicate that ICE was  never notified that the alien might be in the country. In the other 7 cases,  CBP notified ICE but could not document that the notification occurred  until at least 3 months after the revocation.

			ICE Officials Are Generally Unaware of Basis for Individual Revocations

While ICE could readily identify which visa revocation cases were based  on terrorism concerns, agency officials stated that they often received no  derogatory information showing that individuals whose visas State had  revoked on terrorism concerns might pose a national security threat.  Because ICE personnel are responsible for fully investigating every case in  which the individual may be in the country, they expend resources  conducting investigations on individuals who they believe may pose little  or no threat to national security. According to ICE officials, the growing  number of visa revocation cases based on terrorism concerns places a  significant strain on their investigative resources, and ICE was forced to  pull agents off active investigations of known national security threats to  investigate visa revocation cases.
As discussed earlier, State officials told us that the vast majority of visas  revoked for terrorism concerns are based on derogatory information  contained in TIPOFF. According to TSC, of the 35 cases we examined in  detail, 32 of the individuals whose visas were revoked appeared in  TIPOFF. However, in May 2004, ICE officials told us that they were not  aware that most of State’s visa revocations on terrorism grounds are based  on information in TIPOFF. In June 2004, they informed us that their  records check located only 6 of the 35 individuals from our sample in  TIPOFF. Also in June, State officials told us they recently began providing  DHS with the TIPOFF record number for each individual whose  revocation was based on derogatory information in TIPOFF.

			ICE Initiated Field Investigations More Than 2 Months after Receiving Notification of Visa Revocation

Our review of 35 visa revocations on terrorism grounds from October  through December 2003 shows that ICE forwarded requests for field  offices to initiate investigations of individuals who may be in the United  States more than 2 months after receiving notification of the visa  revocation. ICE officials explained that requests sent to field offices  specify a date by which the field offices should complete their  investigations. These officials added that, in instances when the individual  is in TIPOFF and in the country, they take immediate action to locate and  investigate him or her. After receiving notification from State, ICE  determined that field offices should investigate 8 of the 35 cases we  examined in detail. In all 8 of these cases, ICE waited more than 2 months  to initiate field investigations. In 2 cases, ICE received notification from  the Department of State of the visa revocation in mid-October 2003 but did  not send a request to field offices to investigate these individuals until the  end of February 2004. In the other 6 cases, ICE received notification from  the Department of State of the visa revocation in early December but again  did not send a request to field offices to investigate these individuals until  the end of February.
ICE officials told us that it might have taken longer than it usually takes to  initiate these investigations because of an increase in their workload  resulting from the raising of the nationwide terror threat level to “code  orange” (high) during the period of our review. On December 21, 2003,  DHS raised the terror threat level from “code yellow” (elevated) to “code  orange” for 19 days. In June, ICE officials told us they were considering  revising their policies to ensure that all future investigations are initiated  promptly.

			DHS Investigated Individuals with Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds

Separate from our sample of 35 visa revocations, we reviewed the more  than 300 visa revocations based on terrorism concerns from October  through December 2003. According to ICE records, ICE determined that  64 of these individuals needed to be investigated because they might have  been in the United States at the time of revocation. ICE indicated it had  initiated investigations on all 64 of these individuals and has concluded a  majority of these investigations. Data provided by ICE show that these  investigations resulted in confirming departure of some aliens, clearing  others, and arresting 3 on administrative immigration charges. On June 8,  2004, ICE officials told us that they have no specific derogatory  information that would indicate that any of the individuals remaining in  the United States represent a threat to national security. We also noted  several cases where the visa revocation process prevented individuals  with visas revoked based on terrorism concerns from entering the United  States or helped remove them from the United States.

			Existing Law Does Not Expressly Provide for the Removal of Aliens Based Solely on Visa Revocations

Revocation of a visa is not explicitly a stated grounds for removal under  the Immigration and Nationality Act. State’s visa revocation certificate  states that the revocation shall become effective immediately on the date  the certificate is signed unless the alien is already in the United States, in  which case the revocation will become effective immediately upon the  alien’s departure from the United States. Therefore, if ICE special agents  locate an alien in the United States for whom the Department of State has  issued a revocation certificate that states that the alien’s visa is revoked  effective upon his or her departure, ICE would be unable to place the alien  in removal proceedings based solely on a visa revocation that had not yet  taken place. In light of the Department of State’s current revocation  certificate, the issue whether, under the current statute and regulations,  DHS would have the authority to initiate removal proceedings on the basis  solely of a visa revocation has not been litigated and remains unresolved  legally. According to DHS officials, if State changed the wording of the  certificate to make the revocation effective retroactively to the date of  issuance of the visa, the government would no longer be effectively barred  from litigating the issue. However, in June 2004 State and DHS officials  told us that they had reached an informal understanding that should the  wording of the revocation certificate be changed, it would not be changed  in all instances, but only on a case by case basis. In commenting on a draft  of this report, DHS stated that on a case by case basis DHS may ask that  State change its revocation certificate related to an admitted alien to make  the revocation effective retroactively to the date of issuance of the visa,  and State will consider such a request in consultation with DHS and the  Department of Justice.

	Recent Actions Taken to Address Identified Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process

Since we initiated our inquiry in January 2004, State and DHS have taken  additional actions to address identified weaknesses in the process. These  included revisions to visa revocation procedures, reviewing past  revocations, and taking steps to address legal and policy issues. In  addition, in mid-April, TSC identified visa revocations as a potential  vulnerability that could compromise homeland security and developed an  informal process for coordinating actions and sharing information relating  to visa revocations. However, we identified some weaknesses that still  need to be addressed.

		State Revised Its Procedures and Formalized Its System for Tracking Cases

In April and May 2004, State took several actions to improve its  performance in the visa revocation process, including revising its  procedures and formalizing its tracking of visa revocations. In the course  of responding to our inquiries, State’s Visa Office discovered that its  standard operating procedures had not always been followed correctly. In  response, the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs informed us  on April 27, 2004, that in light of the importance of visa revocation cases,  the procedures were revised to provide more explicit details for each step  in the process. For example, the procedures were revised to highlight the  importance of posting a lookout code into CLASS before the revocation  certificate is signed. Additionally, the Visa Office now requires its  personnel performing visa revocations to certify that they have completed  all steps in the process and to provide the date on which each step was  completed. At the end of the process, a designated supervisor must now  review the revocation file and certify that the standard operating  procedures were completed correctly. State revised these procedures  again in late May 2004 to further clarify which federal agencies should  receive notification of the revocation. Finally, the Assistant Secretary for  Consular Affairs told us that the Visa Office planned to formalize its  previously informal system for tracking visa revocations to make it a  definitive reference point for information about all visa revocations.

		CBP Reviewed Past Revocations to Provide Additional Information to ICE

Officials from CBP took two steps following the initiation of our review to  ensure that appropriate action was taken on prior visa revocations. On  March 25, 2004, CBP officials sent notifications to ICE regarding  individuals with visas revoked from October through December 2003 who  may be in the country. CBP officials told us that they sent these  notifications to ICE because, in responding to our inquiry, they determined  that they could not document previous notifications to ICE of these  individuals.
In May 2004, a CBP official informed us that CBP was performing a review  of all visa revocations in its lookout database to ensure that all appropriate  notifications had been sent to ICE. This review identified 656 individuals  with revoked visas who may be in the country. CBP provided this  information to ICE. We reviewed these data and determined that 34 of  these individuals’ visas were revoked based on terrorism concerns from  October through December 2003.

		ICE Assigned Staff to CBP and Developed Written Standard Operating Procedures

In January 2004, ICE assigned a special agent to CBP in order to assist  with information exchange and coordination of visa revocation issues.  According to DHS, if CBP determines that an individual whose visa was  revoked is in the country, ICE is notified immediately. Also, on March 1,  2004, ICE issued written standard operating procedures for all visa  revocation investigations. ICE officials acknowledged that prior to March  2004, ICE did not have a policy that specifically addressed visa  revocations. However, ICE explained that it had procedures for handling  all investigative leads received, including visa revocations. ICE’s March  2004 procedures outline the steps that ICE officials should take for cases  where an individual has entered the United States and subsequently has a  visa revoked. These procedures begin with the receipt of a visa revocation  cable from State and include steps for determining if individuals are in the  country, conducting records searches to determine where the individual  may be, and forwarding necessary information to field offices for further  investigation.

		State and DHS Took Steps to Address Legal and Policy Issues

In February 2004, officials from DHS, which has overall responsibility for  visa policy, told us they were considering a regulation relating to visa  revocations that could allow the removal of individuals from the United  States because their visas have been revoked by State. In June 2004, DHS  officials told us that they were still considering this regulation and were  coordinating with State and the Department of Justice. Additionally, DHS  was working with Justice to address questions regarding DHS’s authority  to issue such a regulation. State officials told us that making changes  regarding removal of persons with revoked visas would require both State  and DHS to make legal and policy decisions and establish a formal written  agreement regarding procedures.

		TSC’s Efforts to Improve the Visa Revocation Process

Since its formation in December 2003, TSC has taken actions to clarify its  role, increase its capacity to handle visa revocation cases, and analyze the  visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool. Specifically, in March  2004, TSC developed written standard operating procedures outlining the  process for screening intelligence information to identify visa holders who  may be terrorists and for recommending that Consular Affairs revoke  these individuals’ visas. TSC also recently began training additional staff to  screen terrorism intelligence for matches with visa holders. Previously, the  center had one full-time staff member dedicated to performing this  function.
TSC officials told us that, in mid-April 2004, TSC identified the visa  revocation process as a potential vulnerability to homeland security. As a  result, it developed a process for TSC to coordinate the sharing of  information on visa revocation cases. This process outlines  responsibilities for representatives from State, CBP, ICE, and the FBI who  are assigned to TSC. According to a TSC official, this process is designed  to coordinate the efforts of these representatives, without relying on  formal notifications transmitted among the agencies. When new names are  added to the TIPOFF database, all the agency representatives receive this  information at the same time. According to TSC’s new process, State  personnel assigned to TSC determine if the person has a valid visa; CBP  personnel determine if the individual may be in the country; and, if the  individual is in the country, ICE and FBI personnel determine if they have  open investigations of the individual. Because this process was developed  after the October to December 2003 time period, we did not assess its  effectiveness.
In April 2004, TSC also initiated a review of pending visa revocation cases  based on terrorism concerns to determine whether any of the individuals  in question were in the United States and whether DHS and FBI were  aware of their presence and had open investigations on them. A senior FBI  official assigned to TSC told us that as of May 27, 2004, this review was not  complete, but that, in some instances, law enforcement or immigration  officials needed to open investigations on some of these individuals.

		Additional Actions Are Needed to Improve the Visa Revocation Process

Despite the steps taken by State and DHS, additional actions are needed to  improve the visa revocation process. There is no governmentwide policy  outlining roles and responsibilities for the visa revocation process, and  State and DHS have not completed their discussions on legal and policy  issues related to removing individuals with revoked visas from the United  States. Although CBP and ICE have written internal procedures related to  their respective roles and responsibilities in the visa revocation process,  DHS has still not developed an agencywide policy governing the process.  As a result, CBP and ICE take responsibility for performing some of the  same tasks. While CBP’s workflow outline states that CBP is responsible  for determining if individuals with revoked visas are in the United States  and referring cases to ICE, ICE’s standard operating procedures indicate  that ICE staff are also responsible for performing this function. In some  cases, State, CBP, and ICE are not familiar with what the different  agencies’ policies and procedures expect of them. Because agency officials  do not always recognize what other agencies’ written policies expect of  them, important information may not be passed from one agency to the  next, and efforts may be duplicated. Further, since the agencies do not  have a system in place for routinely reconciling their visa revocation  records, there is a heightened chance that individuals with visas revoked  for terrorism concerns and who are in the country will not be investigated.
State’s and DHS’s written procedures also lack specific time frames for  completing individual steps in the process. For instance, State’s  procedures dated May 20, 2004 lack guidance on how quickly Consular  Affairs officials should act on recommendations from TSC to revoke  individuals’ visas. Further, they lack guidance on how quickly Consular  Affairs officials should notify the overseas post and other federal agencies  once the revocation certificate is signed. In addition, ICE’s written  procedures do not specify a time frame for referring cases to Special Agent  in Charge offices. This general lack of time frames is significant, given the  extent of delays we observed in the visa revocation process and the  potential threat posed by the individuals whose visas have been revoked.
State’s and DHS’s discussions of legal and policy issues regarding the visa  revocation process have not been completed. DHS officials told us that the  agencies continue to discuss possible mechanisms for addressing these  issues, including possibly changing the wording of State’s revocation  certificate or studying the feasibility of drafting a regulation to address  these issues. According to State and DHS, the complexity of these issues  have required an extraordinary amount of review and coordination with  various interested government agencies. As of June 2004, neither State nor  DHS could provide a time line for addressing these legal and policy issues.

	Conclusions

Our testing of the visa revocation process from October through  December 2003 identified several gaps in the process.  Since then, DHS  and State have taken several actions to improve the process.  DHS and  State believe that these actions will avoid the delays that were  experienced in the past. TSC’s recent initiative to coordinate the sharing of  information on potential terrorists should also improve the process.   Nevertheless, some additional actions are needed to further improve the  process. A governmentwide commitment is necessary to address the  weaknesses in the implementation of the visa revocation process so that it  can be a more effective antiterrorism tool.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To strengthen and improve the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism  tool, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security work jointly  with the Secretary of State and other appropriate agencies to take the  following two actions:    Develop a written governmentwide policy that clearly defines the roles  and responsibilities of the agencies involved in the visa revocation  process, including TSC. This policy should include directions for sharing  information and tracking visa revocation cases throughout the interagency  visa revocation process. It should incorporate performance standards  (e.g., time frames for completing each step in the process) and periodic  interagency assessments to determine whether information is being shared  among the agencies involved and appropriate follow-up action is being  taken and to reconcile data differences if they occur; and   Address outstanding legal and policy issues regarding the status of aliens  with visas revoked on national security grounds who are in the United  States at the time of the revocation. If these issues cannot be addressed,  the Executive Branch should, by October 1, 2004, provide Congress with a  list of specific actions (including any potential legislative changes) that  could help resolve them.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland  Security, State, and Justice for their comments.
The Department of Homeland Security said it generally concurred with the  report and its recommendations. DHS believes that our identification of  areas where improvements are needed will contribute to ongoing efforts  to strengthen the visa revocation process. DHS emphasized that persons  whose visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns may not be  terrorists and that revoking a visa is a precautionary measure to preclude  an alien from gaining admission to the United States until more  information is obtained to decide if the person should be admitted to the  United States.
The Department of State indicated that it believes that its handling of the  revocation process overall has been excellent and has improved over time.  State indicated it would consult with DHS regarding implementation of  our recommendations. State also provided additional information on the  visa revocation process and the procedures currently in effect.
DHS and State also provided technical comments, which we have  incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of  Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State, Secretary  of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General. We also will make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff  have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128.  Key contributors to this report were John Brummet, Jason Bair,   Elizabeth Singer, Mary Moutsos, Janey Cohen, and Etana Finkler.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

The scope of our work covered the interagency process for visas revoked  by the Department of State (State) headquarters on the basis of terrorism  concerns between October 1 and December 31, 2003. To assess the  policies and procedures governing the visa revocation process, we  obtained copies of written procedures from the Department of State and  the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  In addition, we interviewed officials from State, DHS, the Terrorist  Screening Center (TSC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
To assess the process for revoking visas on terrorism grounds, we  examined data and records provided by State’s Visa Office on visa  revocations from October through December 2003. The Visa Office  provided us an initial list of such revocations in February 2004 and an  amended list in April 2004. We also obtained information from CBP and  ICE on the number of visas revoked on terrorism grounds during this time  period and compared these data with that provided by State’s Visa Office.  We found that the total number of visa revocations differed among these  three data sources. We identified discrepancies and discussed these with  agency officials. In addition, we obtained copies of the official revocation  certificates for individuals whose visas State revoked during that time. We  determined that State made at least 338 visa revocations during this time  period, but we also determined that the data on visa revocations were not  sufficiently reliable to provide an exact count of the number of  revocations. However, the data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of  this report.
We used the Visa Office’s February 2004 list of 318 cases to draw a random  sample of 35 to review in detail. We cannot generalize from this sample to  the full universe of all cases because, after we had drawn our sample, the  Visa Office subsequently supplied us with an amended list of 338 cases.  For the individuals in our sample of 35, we obtained printouts from State’s  Consular Consolidated Database, which provided us with the individuals’  names, biographic data such as dates and places of birth, passport  numbers, and visa information such as issuing posts and types of visa. We  also obtained a copy of the cable sent by State headquarters to the post  that issued the visa that was revoked. This cable included a reference to  the specific section of the Immigration and Nationality Act that was used  as the basis for the revocation as well as a list of other agencies the cable  was sent to. The Visa Office also provided documentation of the lookouts  it posted in the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS).
We met with officials from TSC and State’s Visa Office to determine the  steps taken prior to finalizing visa revocations. TSC officials provided  copies of their written policies and procedures for dealing with visa  revocations and described the process it follows in such cases. TSC  officials also informed us whether individuals in our sample of 35 visa  revocations are in the TIPOFF database and, if so, when a  recommendation to revoke these visas was sent to State. To calculate the  length of time between the recommendation to revoke and the actual  revocation, we compared the information provided by TSC with the dates  on the revocation certificates provided by State.
To determine when State posted lookouts and notified other agencies of  visa revocations, we obtained information from the Visa Office. This  included printouts from the CLASS system showing when a lookout was  posted, who posted the lookout, and what lookout code was used. In  addition, we examined the revocation cables sent to other agencies. We  also obtained information from CBP and ICE regarding when they  received notification from State. We determined that the CLASS system  was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of showing when lookouts were  posted.
To determine if and when ICE officials were informed by CBP of  individuals with revoked visas who might be in the country, we obtained  documents from and spoke with officials from CBP. These officials  provided an electronic version of CBP’s Visa Revocation Case Tracking  Spreadsheet for the period we examined. This spreadsheet contained  information on all visa revocations during the period, not just those based  on terrorism concerns. The spreadsheet included the names, dates the  notifications of the revocations were received, dates of the most recent  entry and exit from the United States, and the date on which CBP  informed ICE that the individual might be in the country.
We also compared State, CBP, and ICE records regarding the number and  names of individuals with visas revoked based on terrorism concerns from  October through December 2003. We obtained lists of all such cases during  the period from State and ICE. We then compared these lists to one  another and to CBP’s Visa Revocation Case Tracking Spreadsheet.
To determine which individuals with revoked visas might be in the  country, we examined CBP’s entry and exit data in its Visa Revocation  Case Tracking Spreadsheet. These data are based on information from the  Nonimmigrant Information System, which does not have complete entry  and exit data (e.g., it does not include departure information if aliens fail  to turn in the bottom portion of their I-94 form when they leave the  country). As such, we determined that these data are not sufficiently  reliable for the purpose of determining which individuals with visas  revoked on terrorism grounds are in the country. In addition, because ICE  officials told us they do not rely on CBP to determine which individuals  might be in the country, we obtained additional entry and exit data from  ICE for our sample of 35 cases. To assess the reliability of the ICE data, we  interviewed officials who were knowledgeable about the data and  compared it with CBP’s data. Where we found discrepancies, we discussed  these cases with officials from both CBP and ICE. We determined that the  ICE data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing the  ongoing results of investigations of individuals that had been in the United  States with revoked visas; however, some investigations were still  outstanding and, in some cases, ICE officials were not completely certain  whether the individuals had actually departed the United States.
We obtained information on actions taken to locate and investigate  individuals in the United States with visas revoked based on terrorism  concerns. ICE officials provided us with summary data on all visa  revocations based on terrorism concerns during the period. In addition,  they provided detailed information on their efforts to locate and  investigate each of the 35 individuals in our sample. We also met with  officials from the FBI and the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force to  determine their activities regarding investigating individuals with visas  revoked based on terrorism concerns.
To determine the steps taken to improve the visa revocation process since  our June 2003 report, we met with State, DHS, FBI, and TSC officials.  From these officials we obtained copies of policies and procedures  developed since our previous report. We also obtained information on  changes in the visa revocation process since our prior report. In addition,  we met with State and DHS officials regarding the steps taken to resolve  outstanding legal issues regarding visa revocations. These officials  described the discussions they have had regarding changing the wording  of State’s certificate of revocation and DHS’s regulations. DHS declined to  provide us with a copy of a draft regulation they had prepared, noting that  it was the subject of ongoing intra- and interagency discussions.
We were briefed by FBI officials regarding their efforts to investigate  suspected terrorists in the TIPOFF database. However, we did not review  these efforts.
We conducted our work from January through June 2004 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland  Security’s letter dated June 17, 2004.

	GAO Comments

1.  We have revised the report to reflect the fact that, while ICE did not  have procedures specific to visa revocations prior to March 2004, it  had procedures that applied more generally to all investigative leads.  2.  Our report did not indicate that any of the individuals included in our  review were necessarily suspected or actual terrorists. The  Department of State revokes a person’s visa as a precautionary  measure after it learns that person might be a suspected terrorist. The  purpose of this revocation is to obtain additional information from the  person to determine if they are the same person that is suspected to be  a terrorist by requiring them to return to the consulate that issued their  visa. In commenting on our draft report, State explained that all of  these revocations were based on information suggesting possible  terrorist activities or links.  3.  Based on our analysis, we reported that ICE and CBP records  conflicted regarding whether specific individuals whose visas were  revoked on terrorism grounds were or may still be in the country. With  regard to one of these individuals, ICE concluded that the individual  was not in the country and therefore, it did not investigate him.  According to CBP data, this individual has been in the country for  more than a year. As a result of such discrepancies between agency  records, we are recommending that State and DHS conduct periodic  interagency assessments to determine whether information is being  shared among the agencies involved in the visa revocation process and  appropriate follow-up action is being taken and to reconcile data  differences if they occur.  4.  We acknowledge that ICE requests sent to field offices specify a date  by which they should complete their investigations. However, our  statement refers to a lack of time frames for sending requests to field  offices, not to a lack of time frames for those field offices to complete  their investigations.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter  dated June 23, 2004.

	GAO Comments

1.  The posting of lookouts in CLASS and IBIS is an important tool for  preventing potential terrorists from entering the country. However,  posting these lookouts is not designed to track individuals who  entered the United States before the Department of State revokes their  visas. As such, the visa revocation process remains a useful tool for  promptly identifying, locating, and investigating individuals who may  be in the United States and may pose a threat to homeland security.  2.  We acknowledge that the Department of State should appropriately  deliberate over visa revocation cases. However, State officials told us  that their involvement in the entire visa revocation process should take  no longer than one week. Given this standard, State’s delay in three  cases of more than 6 months appears excessive.  3.  This report includes a review of all 330+ visas revoked on terrorism  grounds from October through December 2003, including a detailed  review of a random sample of 35 cases. We chose to review this 3- month period to allow some time for the agencies involved to  implement our recommendations for improving the visa revocation  process contained in our June 2003 report. In addition to this report,  we previously reviewed all 240 visas revoked on terrorism grounds  from September 11, 2001 through December 31, 2002, and found  similar weaknesses. As noted earlier, posting CLASS and IBIS lookouts  is not intended to track individuals who entered the United States  before the Department of State revoked their visas. As such, the visa  revocation process remains a useful tool for promptly identifying,  locating, and investigating individuals who may be in the United States  and may pose a threat.  4.  In February 2004, we requested detailed information from State on 35  individuals whose visas State had revoked on terrorism grounds from  October through December 2003. In April, we received this  information. After reviewing the data, we discussed our preliminary  findings with the Managing Director of State’s Office of Visa Services,  including delays in State’s decisions to revoke three individuals’ visas.   The same day, we provided State the names of these three individuals  and requested information on why these delays occurred. In May, a  State official provided an explanation of State’s actions regarding these  individuals. However, we chose to exclude this information from our  report due to the sensitivity of the type of information involved.  5.  In February 2004, we requested detailed information (including when  lookout codes were entered) for a random sample of 35 visa  revocation cases. In April 2004, the Assistant Secretary of State for  Consular Affairs informed us that in researching and gathering this  information, State discovered that, in some cases, the officer  responsible for handling revocations did not enter the revocation  lookout code immediately into CLASS before the revocation certificate  was signed.  6.  Based on information State provided during the course of our review,  we note that State revises its standard operating procedures for visa  revocations as necessary. After reviewing our draft report, State  provided us with a revised copy of its standard operating procedures  dated June 17, 2004, which included more explicit time frames. We  believe this is a good step toward implementing our recommendation.  7.  In conducting this review, we requested a list of individuals whose  visas were revoked based on terrorism concerns from October through  December 2003 from State, CBP, and ICE. State asserts that the  conflicting records were probably due to different methodologies for  compiling various agencies’ lists. We note that we observed multiple  instances where conflicting records could not be explained by  differing methodologies. For example, in some cases the agencies  disagreed over whether the individuals’ visas were revoked based on  terrorism grounds and, in other cases, agencies did not initially provide  names that they later acknowledged should have been included in their  lists.
Given these conflicting records and the possible threat to homeland  security, we are recommending that State and DHS conduct periodic  interagency assessments to determine whether information is being  shared among the agencies involved in the visa revocation process and  appropriate follow-up action is being taken and to reconcile data  differences if they occur.  8.  We have updated our report to reflect the current status of State’s and  DHS’s discussions of legal and policy issues and have removed all  references to unresolved legal disagreements.  We have added  information reflecting a recent informal understanding reached by  State and DHS that, on a case by case basis, DHS may ask that State  revoke a visa retroactively.  However, we note that legal and policy  issues regarding the removal of individuals based solely on their visa  revocations continue to exist, and agency discussions on how to  address these issues have not been completed.    9.  During the course of our review, State’s and DHS’s discussions evolved  regarding legal and policy issues relating to removing individuals from  the United States based on visa revocations. Based on discussions with  State and DHS officials, we have removed any implied linkage between  revising the visa revocation certificate and a regulatory or statutory  amendment.

Output:
Why GAO Did This Study

The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing foreign terrorists from entering our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in June 2003 that the visa revocation process needed to be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in conjunction with the Departments of State (State) and Justice, develop specific policies and procedures to ensure that appropriate agencies are notified of revocations based on terrorism grounds and take proper actions. GAO examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified in its June 2003 report were addressed.

What GAO Found

GAO's analysis shows that the Departments of State and Homeland Security took some actions in the summer of 2003 to address weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified in its June 2003 report. However, GAO's review of visas revoked from October to December 2003, including a detailed review of a random sample of 35 cases, showed that weaknesses remained in the implementation of the revocation process, especially in the timely transmission of information among federal agencies. For example, delays existed in matching names of suspected terrorists with names of visa holders and in forwarding necessary information to State. In at least 3 of the 35 cases, it took State 6 months or more to revoke visas after receiving a recommendation to do so. In 3 cases, State took a week or longer after deciding to revoke visas to post a lookout or notify DHS. Without these notifications, DHS may not know to investigate those individuals who may be in the country. In 10 cases, DHS either failed to notify or took several months to notify immigration investigators that individuals with revoked visas may be in the country. It then took over 2 months for immigration investigators to request field investigations of these individuals. After GAO initiated its inquiry for this report in January 2004, additional actions were taken to improve the process, including revising procedures and reassessing the process. DHS and State believe these actions will help avoid the delays experienced in the past. In April and May, State revised its procedures and formalized its tracking system for visa revocation cases. In March, DHS developed new written procedures and acted to ensure that immigration investigators are aware of all individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country. State and DHS also took some steps to address legal and policy issues related to visa revocations. In April, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an interagency group organized under the FBI, identified the visa revocation process as a potential homeland security vulnerability and developed an informal process for TSC to handle visa revocation cases. However, weaknesses remain. For example, State's and DHS's procedures are not fully coordinated and lack performance standards, such as specific time frames, for completing each step of the process. Outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding the removal of individuals based solely on their visa revocation.


Input:
	Background

DOE is responsible for a diverse set of missions, including nuclear  security, energy research, and environmental cleanup. These missions  are managed by various organizations within DOE and largely carried out  by management and operating (M&O) contractors at DOE sites.  According to federal budget data, NNSA is one of the largest  organizations in DOE, overseeing nuclear weapons and nonproliferation- related missions at its sites. With a $10.5 billion budget in fiscal year  2011—nearly 40 percent of DOE’s total budget—NNSA is responsible for  providing the United States with safe, secure, and reliable nuclear  weapons in the absence of underground nuclear testing and maintaining  core competencies in nuclear weapons science, technology, and  engineering.
Under DOE’s long-standing model of having unique M&O contractors at  each site, management of its sites has historically been decentralized  and, thus, fragmented. Since the Manhattan Project produced the first  atomic bomb during World War II, NNSA, DOE, and predecessor  agencies have depended on the expertise of private firms, universities,  and others to carry out research and development work and efficiently  operate the facilities necessary for the nation’s nuclear defense. DOE’s  relationship with these entities has been formalized over the years  through its M&O contracts—agreements that give DOE’s contractors  unique responsibility to carry out major portions of DOE’s missions and  apply their scientific, technical, and management expertise.
Currently, DOE spends 90 percent of its annual budget on M&O  contracts, making it the largest non-Department of Defense contracting  agency in the government. The contractors at DOE’s NNSA sites have  operated under DOE’s direction and oversight but largely independently  of one another. Various headquarters and field-based organizations  within DOE and NNSA develop policies and NNSA site offices, collocated  with NNSA’s sites, conduct day-to-day oversight of the M&O contractors,  and evaluate the contractors’ performance in carrying out the sites’  missions.

	NNSA Does Not Have Reliable Enterprise- Wide Management Information on Program Budgets and Costs

As we have reported since 1999, NNSA has not had reliable enterprise- wide budget and cost data, which potentially increases risk to NNSA’s  programs. Specifically:  In July 2003 and January 2007, we reported that NNSA lacked a  planning and budgeting process that adequately validated contractor- prepared cost estimates used in developing annual budget requests.  Establishing this process was required by the statute that created  NNSA—Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2000. In particular, NNSA had not established an independent  analysis unit to review program budget proposals, confirm cost  estimates, and analyze budget alternatives. At the request of the  Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Senate  Committee on Appropriations, we are currently reviewing NNSA’s  planning and budgeting process, the extent to which NNSA has  established criteria for evaluating resource trade-offs, and challenges  NNSA has faced in validating its budget submissions. We expect to  issue a report on this work later this year.
In June 2010, we reported that NNSA could not identify the total costs  to operate and maintain essential weapons activities’ facilities and  infrastructure. Furthermore, we found that contractor-reported costs  to execute the scope of work associated with operating and  maintaining these facilities and infrastructure likely significantly  exceeded the budget for this program that NNSA justified to  Congress.
We reported in February 2011 that NNSA lacked complete data on (1)  the condition and value of its existing infrastructure, (2) cost estimates  and completion dates for planned capital improvement projects, (3)  shared-use facilities within the nuclear security enterprise, and (4)  critical human capital skills in its M&O contractor workforce that are  needed to maintain the Stockpile Stewardship Program. As a result,  NNSA does not have a sound basis for making decisions on how to  most effectively manage its portfolio of projects and other programs  and will lack information that could help justify future budget requests  or target cost savings opportunities. uncertainty over future federal budgets.to compare or quantify total savings across sites because guidance  for estimating savings is unclear and the methods used to estimate  savings vary between sites.
We found that it was difficult  The administration plans to request $88 billion from Congress over the  next decade to modernize the nuclear security enterprise and ensure that  base scientific, technical, and engineering capabilities are sufficiently  supported and the nuclear deterrent can continue to be safe, secure, and  reliable. To adequately justify future presidential budget requests, NNSA  must accurately identify these base capabilities and determine their costs.  Without this information, NNSA risks being unable to identify return on its  investment or opportunities for cost savings or to make fully informed  decisions on trade-offs in a resource-constrained environment.
NNSA, recognizing that its ability to make informed enterprise-wide  decisions is hampered by the lack of comprehensive data and analytical  tools, is considering the use of computer models—quantitative tools that  couple data from each site with the functions of the enterprise—to  integrate and analyze data to create an interconnected view of the  enterprise, which may help to address some of the critical shortcomings  we identified. In July 2009, NNSA tasked its M&O contractors to form an  enterprise modeling consortium. NNSA stated that the consortium is  responsible for leading efforts to acquire and maintain enterprise data,  enhance stakeholder confidence, integrate modeling capabilities, and fill  in any gaps that are identified. The consortium has identified areas in  which enterprise modeling projects could provide NNSA with reliable data  and modeling capabilities, including capabilities on infrastructure and  critical skills needs. In addition, we recently observed progress on  NNSA’s development of an Enterprise Program Analysis Tool that should  give NNSA greater insight into its sites’ cost reporting. The Tool also  includes a mechanism to identify when resource trade-off decisions must  be made, for example, when contractor-developed estimates for program  requirements exceed the budget targets provided by NNSA for those  programs. A tool such as this one could help NNSA obtain the basic data  it needs to make informed management decisions, determine return on  investment, and identify opportunities for cost saving.

	NNSA Needs to Make Further Improvements to Its Management of Major Projects and Contracts

A basic tenet of effective management is the ability to complete projects  on time and within budget. However, for more than a decade and in  numerous reports, we have found that NNSA has continued to experience  significant cost and schedule overruns on its major projects, principally  because of ineffective oversight and poor contractor management.  Specifically:  In August 2000, we found that poor management and oversight of the  National Ignition Facility construction project at Lawrence Livermore  National Laboratory had increased the facility’s cost by $1 billion and  delayed its scheduled completion date by 6 years. Among the many  causes for the cost overruns or schedule delays, DOE and Livermore  officials responsible for managing or overseeing the facility’s  construction did not plan for the technically complex assembly and  installation of the facility’s 192 laser beams. They also did not use  independent review committees effectively to help identify and correct  issues before they turned into costly problems. Similarly, in April 2010,  we reported that weak management by DOE and NNSA had allowed  the cost, schedule, and scope of ignition-related activities at the  National Ignition Facility to increase substantially., Since 2005,  ignition-related costs have increased by around 25 percent—from  $1.6 billion to over $2 billion—and the planned completion date for  these activities has slipped from the end of fiscal year 2011 to the end  of fiscal year 2012 or beyond.
We have issued several reports on the technical issues, cost  increases, and schedule delays associated with NNSA’s efforts to  extend, through refurbishment, the operational lives of nuclear  weapons in the stockpile. For example, in December 2000, we  reported that refurbishment of the W87 strategic warhead had  experienced significant design and production problems that  increased its refurbishment costs by over $300 million and caused  schedule delays of about 2 years. Similarly, in March 2009 we  reported that NNSA and the Department of Defense had not  effectively managed cost, schedule, and technical risks for the B61  nuclear bomb and the W76 nuclear warhead refurbishments. For the  B61 life extension program, NNSA was only able to stay on schedule  by significantly reducing the number of weapons undergoing  refurbishment and abandoning some refurbishment objectives. In the  case of the W76 nuclear warhead, NNSA experienced a 1-year delay  and an unexpected cost increase of nearly $70 million as a result of  its ineffective management of one the highest risks of the program— the manufacture of a key material known as Fogbank, which NNSA  did not have the knowledge, expertise, or facilities to manufacture.
In October 2009, we reported on shortcomings in NNSA’s oversight of  the planned relocation of its Kansas City Plant to a new, more modern  facility. Rather than construct a new facility itself, NNSA chose to  have a private developer build it. NNSA would then lease the building  through the General Services Administration for a period of 20 years.  However, when choosing to lease rather than construct a new facility  itself, NNSA allowed the Kansas City Plant to limit its cost analysis to  a 20-year life cycle that has no relationship with known requirements  of the nuclear weapons stockpile or the useful life of a production  facility that is properly maintained. As a result, NNSA’s financing  decisions were not as fully informed and transparent as they could  have been. If the Kansas City Plant had quantified potential cost  savings to be realized over the longer useful life of the facility, NNSA  may have made a different decision as to whether to lease or  construct a new facility itself.
We reported in March 2010 that NNSA’s plutonium disposition  program was behind schedule in establishing a capability to produce  the plutonium feedstock necessary to operate its Mixed-oxide Fuel  Fabrication facility currently being constructed at DOE’s Savannah  River Site in South Carolina. In addition, NNSA had not sufficiently  assessed alternatives to producing plutonium feedstock and had only  identified one potential customer for the mixed-oxide fuel the facility  would produce. In its fiscal year 2012 budget justification to Congress,  NNSA reported that it did not have a construction cost baseline for the  facility needed to produce the plutonium feedstock for the mixed-oxide  fuel, although Congress had already appropriated over $270 million  through fiscal year 2009 and additional appropriation requests totaling  almost $2 billion were planned through fiscal year 2016. NNSA stated  in its budget justification that it is currently considering options for  producing necessary plutonium feedstock without constructing a new  facility.
GAO, Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plans for Its  Uranium Processing Facility Should Better Reflect Funding Estimates and Technology  Readiness, GAO-11-103 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2010).
Senate Committee on Appropriations. We plan to issue our report  next month.
As discussed above, NNSA remains on our high-risk list and remains  vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOE has  recently taken a number of actions to improve management of major  projects, including those overseen by NNSA. For example, DOE has  updated program and project management policies and guidance in an  effort to improve the reliability of project cost estimates, better assess  project risks, and better ensure project reviews that are timely, useful and  identify problems early. However, DOE needs to ensure that NNSA has  the capacity—that is, the people and other resources—to resolve its  project management difficulties and that it has a program to monitor and  independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective  measures. This is particularly important as NNSA embarks on its long- term, multibillion dollar effort to modernize the nuclear security enterprise.

	NNSA’s Oversight of Safety and Security in the Nuclear Security Enterprise Has Been Questioned

Another underlying reason for the creation of NNSA was a series of  security issues at the national laboratories. Work carried out at NNSA’s  sites may involve plutonium and highly enriched uranium, which are  extremely hazardous. For example, exposure to small quantities of  plutonium is dangerous to human health, so that even inhaling a few  micrograms creates a long-term risk of lung, liver, and bone cancer and  inhaling larger doses can cause immediate lung injuries and death. Also,  if not safely contained and managed, plutonium can be unstable and  spontaneously ignite under certain conditions. NNSA’s sites also conduct  a wide range of other activities, including construction and routine  maintenance and operation of equipment and facilities that also run the  risk of accidents, such as those involving heavy machinery or electrical  mishaps. The consequences of such accidents could be less severe than  those involving nuclear materials, but they could also lead to long-term  illnesses, injuries, or even deaths among workers or the public. Plutonium  and highly enriched uranium must also be stored under extremely high  security to protect it from theft or terrorist attack.
In numerous reports, we have expressed concerns about NNSA’s  oversight of safety and security across the nuclear security enterprise.  With regard to nuclear and worker safety:  In October 2007, we reported that there had been nearly 60 serious  accidents or near misses at NNSA’s national laboratories since  2000. These incidents included worker exposure to radiation,  inhalation of toxic vapors, and electrical shocks. Although no one was  killed, many of the accidents caused serious harm to workers or  damage to facilities. For example, at Los Alamos in July 2004, an  undergraduate student who was not wearing required eye protection  was partially blinded in a laser accident. Accidents and nuclear safety  violations also contributed to the temporary shutdown of facilities at  both Los Alamos and Livermore in 2004 and 2005. In the case of Los  Alamos, laboratory employees disregarded established procedures  and then attempted to cover up the incident, according to Los Alamos  officials. Our review of nearly 100 reports issued since 2000 found  that the contributing factors to these safety problems generally fell into  three key categories: (1) relatively lax laboratory attitudes toward  safety procedures; (2) laboratory inadequacies in identifying and  addressing safety problems with appropriate corrective actions; and  (3) inadequate oversight by NNSA.
We reported in January 2008 on a number of long-standing nuclear  and worker safety concerns at Los Alamos.included, among other things, the laboratory’s lack of compliance with  safety documentation requirements, inadequate safety systems,  radiological exposures, and enforcement actions for significant  violations of nuclear safety requirements that resulted in civil penalties  totaling nearly $2.5 million.
In October 2008, we reported that DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and  Security—which, among other things, develops, oversees, and helps  enforce nuclear safety policies at DOE and NNSA sites—fell short of  fully meeting our elements of effective independent oversight of  nuclear safety.independently was limited because it had no role in reviewing  technical analyses that help ensure safe design and operation of  nuclear facilities, and the office had no personnel at DOE sites to  provide independent safety observations.
With regard to security:  In June 2008, we reported that significant security problems at Los  Alamos had received insufficient attention. The laboratory had over  two dozen initiatives under way that were principally aimed at  reducing, consolidating, and better protecting classified resources but  had not implemented complete security solutions to address either  classified parts storage in unapproved storage containers or  weaknesses in its process for ensuring that actions taken to correct  security deficiencies were completed. Furthermore, Los Alamos had  implemented initiatives that addressed a number of previously  identified security concerns but had not developed the long-term  strategic framework necessary to ensure that its fixes would be  sustained over time. Similarly, in October 2009, we reported that Los  Alamos had implemented measures to enhance its information  security controls, but significant weaknesses remained in protecting  the information stored on and transmitted over its classified computer  network. A key reason for this was that the laboratory had not fully  implemented an information security program to ensure that controls  were effectively established and maintained.
In March 2009, we reported about numerous and wide-ranging  security deficiencies at Livermore, particularly in the ability of  Livermore’s protective force to assure the protection of special nuclear  material and the laboratory’s protection and control of classified  matter. Livermore’s physical security systems, such as alarms and  sensors, and its security program planning and assurance activities  were also identified as areas needing improvement. Weaknesses in  Livermore’s contractor self-assessment program and the NNSA  Livermore Site Office’s oversight of the contractor contributed to these  security deficiencies at the laboratory. According to one DOE official,  both programs were “broken” and missed even the “low-hanging fruit.”  The laboratory took corrective action to address these deficiencies,  but we noted that better oversight was needed to ensure that security  improvements were fully implemented and sustained.
We reported in December 2010 that NNSA needed to improve its  contingency planning for its classified supercomputing operations. All three NNSA laboratories had implemented some components of a  contingency planning and disaster recovery program, but NNSA had  not provided effective oversight to ensure that the laboratories’  contingency and disaster recovery planning and testing were  comprehensive and effective. In particular, NNSA’s component  organizations, including the Office of the Chief Information Officer,  were unclear about their roles and responsibilities for providing  oversight in the laboratories’ implementation of contingency and  disaster recovery planning.
In March 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Energy announced a new effort— the 2010 Safety and Security Reform effort—to revise DOE’s safety and  security directives and reform its oversight approach to “provide  contractors with the flexibility to tailor and implement safety and security  programs without excessive federal oversight or overly prescriptive  departmental requirements.” We are currently reviewing the reform of  DOE’s safety directives and the benefits DOE hopes to achieve from this  effort for, among others, the House Committee on Energy and  Commerce. We expect to issue our report next month. Nevertheless, our  prior work has shown that ineffective NNSA oversight of its contractors  has contributed to many of the safety and security problems across the  nuclear security enterprise and that NNSA faces challenges in sustaining  improvements to safety and security performance.

	Concluding Observations

NNSA faces a complex task in planning, budgeting, and ensuring the  execution of interconnected activities across the nuclear security  enterprise. Among other things, maintaining government-owned facilities  that were constructed more than 50 years ago and ensuring M&O  contractors are sustaining critical human capital skills that are highly  technical in nature and limited in supply are difficult undertakings. Over  the past decade, we have made numerous recommendations to DOE and  NNSA to improve their management and oversight practices. DOE and  NNSA have acted on many of these recommendations, and we will  continue to monitor progress being made in these areas. In the current  era of tight budgets, Congress and the American taxpayer have the right  to know whether investments made in the nuclear security enterprise are  worth the cost. However, NNSA currently lacks the basic financial  information on the total costs to operate and maintain its essential  facilities and infrastructure, leaving it unable to identify return on  investment or opportunities for cost savings. NNSA is now proposing to  spend decades and tens of billions of dollars to modernize the nuclear  security enterprise, largely by replacing or refurbishing aging and  decaying facilities at its sites across the United States. Given NNSA’s  record of weak management of its major projects, we believe that careful  federal oversight will be critical to ensure this time and money are spent  in as an effective and efficient manner as possible.
With regard to the concerns that DOE’s and NNSA’s oversight of the  laboratories’ activities have been excessive and that safety and security  requirements are overly prescriptive and burdensome, we agree that  excessive oversight and micromanagement of contractors’ activities is not  an efficient use of scarce federal resources. Nevertheless, in our view,  the problems we continue to identify in the nuclear security enterprise are  not caused by excessive oversight, but instead result from ineffective  oversight. Given the critical nature of the work the nuclear security  enterprise performs and the high-hazard operations it conducts—often  involving extremely hazardous materials, such as plutonium and highly  enriched uranium, that must be stored under high security to protect them  from theft—careful oversight and stringent safety and security  requirements will always be required at these sites  It is also important in an era of scarce resources that DOE and NNSA  ensure that the work conducted by the nuclear security enterprise is  primarily focused on its principal mission—ensuring the safety and  reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. DOE has other national  laboratories capable of conducting valuable scientific research on issues  as wide-ranging as climate change or high-energy physics, but there is no  substitute for the sophisticated capabilities and highly-skilled human  capital present in the nuclear security enterprise for ensuring the  credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

	GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this testimony are Allison Bawden, Ryan T. Coles, and Jonathan Gill,  Assistant Directors, and Patrick Bernard, Senior Analyst.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Output:
Why GAO Did This Study

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible for managing its contractors nuclear weapon- and nonproliferation-related national security activities in laboratories and other facilities, collectively known as the nuclear security enterprise. GAO designated DOEs management of its contracts as an area at high risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. Progress has been made, but GAO continues to identify problems across the nuclear security enterprise, from projects cost and schedule overruns to inadequate oversight of safety and security at NNSAs sites. Laboratory and other officials have raised concerns that federal oversight of the laboratories activities has been excessive. With NNSA proposing to spend tens of billions of dollars to modernize the nuclear security enterprise, it is important to ensure scarce resources are spent in an effective and efficient manner.
This testimony addresses (1) NNSAs ability to produce budget and cost data necessary to make informed management decisions, (2) improving NNSAs project and contract management, and (3) DOEs and NNSAs safety and security oversight. It is based on prior GAO reports issued from August 2000 to January 2012.
DOE and NNSA continue to act on the numerous recommendations GAO has made in improving budget and cost data, project and contract management, and safety and security oversight. GAO will continue to monitor DOEs and NNSAs implementation of these recommendations.

What GAO Found

NNSA has successfully ensured that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe and reliable in the absence of underground nuclear testing, accomplishing this complicated task by using state-of-the-art facilities as well as the skills of top scientists. Nevertheless, NNSA does not have reliable enterprise-wide management information on program budgets and costs, which potentially increases risk to NNSAs programs. For example, in June 2010, GAO reported that NNSA could not identify the total costs to operate and maintain essential weapons activities facilities and infrastructure. In addition, in February 2011, GAO reported that NNSA lacks complete data on, among other things, the condition and value of its existing infrastructure, cost estimates and completion dates for planned capital improvement projects, and critical human capital skills in its contractor workforce that are needed for its programs. As a result, NNSA does not have a sound basis for making decisions on how to most effectively manage its portfolio of projects and other programs and lacks information that could help justify future budget requests or target cost savings opportunities. NNSA recognizes that its ability to make informed decisions is hampered and is taking steps to improve its budget and cost data.
For more than a decade and in numerous reports, GAO found that NNSA has continued to experience significant cost and schedule overruns on its major projects. For example, in 2000 and 2009, respectively, GAO reported that NNSAs efforts to extend the operational lives of nuclear weapons in the stockpile have experienced cost increases and schedule delays, such as a $300 million cost increase and 2-year delay in the refurbishment of one warhead and a nearly $70 million increase and 1-year delay in the refurbishment of another warhead. NNSAs construction projects have also experienced cost overruns. For example, GAO reported that the cost to construct a modern Uranium Processing Facility at NNSAs Y-12 National Security Complex experienced a nearly seven-fold cost increase from between $600 million and $1.1 billion in 2004 to between $4.2 billion and $6.5 billion in 2011. Given NNSAs record of weak management of major projects, GAO believes careful federal oversight of NNSAs modernization of the nuclear security enterprise will be critical to ensure that resources are spent in as an effective and efficient manner as possible.
NNSAs oversight of safety and security in the nuclear security enterprise has also been questioned. As work carried out at NNSAs sites involves dangerous nuclear materials such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, stringent safety procedures and security requirements must be observed. GAO reported in 2008 on numerous safety and security problems across NNSAs sites, contributing, among other things, to the temporary shutdown of facilities at both Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories in 2004 and 2005, respectively. Ineffective NNSA oversight of its contractors activities contributed to many of these incidents as well as relatively lax laboratory attitudes toward safety procedures. In many cases, NNSA has made improvements to resolve these safety and security concerns, but better oversight is needed to ensure that improvements are fully implemented and sustained. GAO agrees that excessive oversight and micromanagement of contractors activities are not an efficient use of scarce federal resources, but that NNSAs problems are not caused by excessive oversight but instead result from ineffective departmental oversight.