Input: Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S. 43, 56-66 (1993) (similar). In line with this mode of analysis, the court below, after concluding that the Medicare Act does not preclude general federal-question jurisdiction over a preenforcement challenge to the Secretary’s regulations, held that respondent’s APA notice-and-comment challenge was ripe but that its . constitutional vagueness claim was not. 143 F. 3d, at 1076-1077. express no view on the proper application of ripeness doctrine to respondent’s claims, I am confident that this method of analysis enjoys substantially more support in our eases than does the majority’s approach, which prescribes a case-by-case hardship inquiry at the threshold stage of determining whether preenforcement review has been precluded by statute. See ante, at 20 (<HOLDING>). While the majority’s variation would be Holdings: 0: holding that  1395u does not incorporate  405h where the aggrieved party can obtain no review at all unless it can obtain judicial review in a  1331 action 1: holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record 2: holding that a party to an administrative proceeding failed to effectively obtain judicial review where the party filed a response to another partys petition rather than a separate petition 3: holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review 4: holding failure to argue elements or obtain ruling on judicial estoppel precluded review


Input: not testify as a nonexpert fact witness about what he did and directly observed during the reenactment. Relying on several out-of-state cases, the court concluded that the relevant legal inquiry for admissibility of reenactment evidence generally is whether the reenactment was conducted under conditions substantially similar to those existing at the time of the event in question, otherwise the evidence would be excluded as irrelevant and likely to mislead the jury. See Loevsky v. Carter, 773 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Haw. 1989) (“[W]hen a test or experiment is an attempt to reenact the original happening, the essential elements of the experiment must be substantially similar to those existing at the time of the accident.”) (quotation omitted); State v. Leroux, 584 A.2d 778, 780-81 (N.H. 1990) (<HOLDING>). Even allowing for additional evidence offered Holdings: 0: holding that trial court could properly have found testimony explaining a videotaped reenactment was substantially more likely to mislead the jury than to be probative under rule 403 1: holding that although the instruction at issue could have been worded more specifically the jury instructions as a whole did not mislead the jury as to the law 2: holding that although portion of trial courts jury charge was inapplicable any error in providing it was harmless in light of the fact that charge considered as a whole was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury 3: holding that evidence necessary to the governments rebuttal of a defendants case could not be excluded under rule 403 but could have been if it was introduced only to bolster the prosecutions case 4: holding that admission of a summary chart was harmless because it was clear that the summary did not mislead the jury and the evidence introduced at trial was more than sufficient to prove the elements as to each defendant


Input: Court should afford deference to the interpretation of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and hold that mandatory detention applies to Petitioner. (Id. at 3-7.) Second, Respondent objects that Magistrate Judge Theiler never addressed its argument that Petitioner’s continued detention is lawful pursuant to INA § 236(a) and 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8 and 241.4(c). (Dkt. No. 19 at 7-9.) Respondent asserts these provisions permit the district director or the director of detention and removal to exercise discretion, and asserts that Petitioner therefore has received all the benefits of due process that he is entitled to. (Id. at 9.) Discussion A. Mandatory Detention Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under INA § 236(c), because that section only requires mandatory dete 7 (W.D.Wash.1997) (<HOLDING>). Petitioner is deportable because of his 2001 Holdings: 0: holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina  212c 1: holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review 2: holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel 3: holding that under permanent rules of hrira the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over claims of aliens ordered deported for crimes listed in ina and holding that district courts retain habeas jurisdiction over deportation orders of criminal aliens 4: holding that the plain meaning of the statute indicates that ina  236c applies to aliens immediately after release from custody and not to aliens released many years earlier


Input: (Doc. # 1-6 at 2.) Thus, Plaintiff was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Plaintiff brought this suit, accusing seven Defendants of eight causes of action— three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and five under state law. Plaintiff has since abandoned three of her state law claims; she maintains her claims for violations of the Alabama Constitution (Count IV) and for the tort of misrepresentation (Count VI). IV. DISCUSSION A. The State and its agencies are immune from suit. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from entertaining suits brought against unconsenting states. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against Holdings: 0: holding that a state university is not a person within the meaning of  1983 and therefore is not subject to suits brought under  1983 1: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 2: holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983 3: holding state university is not a person under  1983 4: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983


Input: 286 (2005). “[T]he intent to sell or [deliver] may be inferred from (1) the packaging, labeling, and storage of the controlled substance, (2) the defendant’s activities, (3) the quantity found, and (4) the presence of cash or drug paraphernalia.” Id. at 106, 612 S.E.2d at 176. “Although ‘quantity of the controlled substance alone may suffice to support the inference of an intent to transfer, sell, or deliver,’ it must be a substantial amount.” Id. at 105, 612 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting State v. Morgan, 329 N.C. 654, 659-60, 406 S.E.2d 833, 835-36 (1991)). In the present case, only 1.89 grams of marijuana was found on defendant’s person, which alone is insufficient to prove that defendant had the intent to sell or deliver. See State v. Wiggins, 33 N.C. App. 291, 294-95, 235 S.E.2d 265, 268 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 293 N.C. 592, 241 S.E.2d 513 Holdings: 0: holding that the finding of less than a half pound of marijuana alone was not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss 1: holding that evidence was sufficient to withstand a motion for acquittal where the threateninglanguage was not ambiguous 2: recognizing that a court may deny a motion to amend as futile if the proposed amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss quotations and citation omitted 3: holding that plaintiff who provides evidence of acts more severe than a lack of due care may withstand summary judgment motion on a failure to protect claim 4: holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony standing alone are insufficient to withstand a properlysupported motion for summary judgment


Input: from the unlawful interrogation in this case.” Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), we have held that “a failure to administer Miranda warnings, without more, does not automatically require suppression of the ‘fruits’ of the uncounseled statement,” but rather “[wjhere the uncounseled statement is voluntary ... the ‘fruits’ may be admissible in the Government’s case in chief.” United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1517 (6th Cir.1988); see also United States v. Crowder, 62 F.3d 782, 786 (6th Cir.1995). Lewis contends that the Sixth Circuit’s approach under Elstad, Sangineto-Miranda, and Crowder was undermined by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (<HOLDING>), and by the Tenth Circuit’s application of Holdings: 0: holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound 1: holding that mirandas warningbased approach to custodial interrogation was constitutionally derived and could not be overruled by legislative action 2: holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission 3: holding acts of voting to be quintessentially legislative and the introduction of a budget to be formally legislative 4: holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only


Input: 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992), or unless the IJ ignored probative evidence, an important possible inference or otherwise failed to make a reasoned analysis of the evidence before her as a whole, Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 890 (7th Cir.2007); Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir.2006); Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir.2005). To show that he is entitled to asylum, withholding of removal or CAT relief, Adekpe must show at a minimum that he is unable or unwilling to return to Togo because of persecution or a'well-founded fear of persecution on account of a political opinion, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A) & 1158(b)(1)(A) (discussing asylum); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-25,104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (<HOLDING>), or that he would more likely than not be Holdings: 0: holding that the standard for withholding of removal is a showing that it is more likely than not that a petitioner will face persecution upon her return 1: holding that an applicant who fails to satisfy the lower standard of proof for asylum necessarily fails to satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal 2: holding that the clear probability standard for withholding of removal is higher than the standard for asylum which requires only a reasonable possibility of persecution 3: holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum 4: holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal


Input: are given, a remand is presumed to be general. Moore, 131 F.3d at 598. Upon limited remand, the district court in Jeross was not required to “begin anew,” and thus could rely upon the procedural rights provided to the defendants prior to remand. See United States v. Ramsdale, 179 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir.1999) (noting that upon limited remand, when the issues under consideration are restricted, the defendant does not have a right to allocute under Rule 32). Here, unlike in Jeross, the remand was general as it contained no express limitation, thereby requiring the district court to conduct resentencing de novo. Accordingly, the district court was required to provide Garcia-Robles the right to be present and allocute. See United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145, 151 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). V. Next, Garcia-Robles asserts that the Holdings: 0: holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report 1: holding the district court need not provide de novo review where the objections are frivolous conclusive or too general because the burden is on the parties to pinpoint those portions of the magistrates report that the district court must specifically consider 2: holding that review of the construction of a sentencing statute is de novo 3: holding that sentencing upon general remand is to be de novo requiring the district court to consider new objections to the presentence report 4: holding in the criminal context that a district courts obligation to make a de novo determination with respect to the portions of a magistrate judges report and recommendation to which objections are made did not require a de novo hearing


Input: at [the stop’s] inception,” and then whether the officer’s subsequent conduct “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.” Id. Pursuant to this standard, we must first determine whether Amundsen’s driving justified the initial stop by providing reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. If so, we then must determine whether the field sobriety tests exceeded the scope of that stop. Our reasonable suspicion determination hinges on the district court’s finding that Amundsen had been weaving between lanes prior to the stop. We have held on multiple occasions that weaving between lanes provides reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1347-48 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, Holdings: 0: holding alj correctly held that officer had reasonable suspicion to make stop based on observation that driver crossed over shoulder stripe and was weaving within his traveling lane 1: holding that observations of a driver swerving from the outside lane straddling the center line and then swerving back to the outside lane gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving under the influence 2: holding that there was not reasonable suspicion to justify a stop because a vehicles one time straddling of the center line of an undivided highway is a common occurrence 3: holding that an officers observations of a vehicle weaving between the center line and the shoulder line four to five times over a distance of approximately five miles created reasonable suspicion that the driver was under the influence 4: holding officers observations of a vehicle crossing the center double yellow line of a twolane highway four times by less than one half of her car  once causing a vehicle in the oncoming lane of traffic to shift right within his lane but without the need for drastic evasive action  and crossing the fog line four times over a distance of at least 16 miles established probable cause for a traffic stop


Input: a citizen-informant's tip about a drunk driver is sufficient to give the police reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal behavior, ie., driving under the influence, even if the basis for the informant's conclusion is not fully explained. See id. However, whether a person is "smoking drugs" does not seem to fall within the realm of knowledge common to members of the public, unlike the ability to re hat the officer identifies as cocaine is sufficient to constitute probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) requires careful analysis because cocaine in its pure form, as the expert in this case test 2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043, 108 S.Ct. 2035, 100 L.Ed.2d 620 (1988); State v. Harrison, 287 Wis.2d 133, 703 N.W.2d 383U, 2005 WL 1577441, *2 (Wise.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). See also People v. Darby, 263 A.D.2d 112, Holdings: 0: holding that a smell associated with pcp was enough to establish probable cause 1: holding that because of officers experience detection of the smell of cocaine smoke reliably supported a probable cause determination 2: holding officer had probable cause after detecting an odor associated with cocaine because of officers experience from prior cocaine seizures 3: holding that the smell of marijuana gave the police probable cause to search the vehicle 4: holding that the smell of burning opium was sufficient to establish probable cause


Input: the complaint nevertheless. In either case, we reverse the District Court. A. The District Court’s Treatment of Mr. Richardson’s Reply to the Motion to Dismiss On the record at hand, we hold that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to consider Mr. Richardson’s complaint in light of his reply to the motion to dismiss. See Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1059 (D.C.Cir.1998). There are four factors that inform our holding that the District Court erred in refusing to consider Mr. Richardson’s reply to constitute an amendment to his original complaint. First, Mr. Richardson proceeded pro se before the District Court. Courts must construe pro se filings liberally. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). This point was recently emphasized in Holdings: 0: holding allegations of a pro se complaint to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 1: holding that the allegations in a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 2: holding allegations contained in a prisoners pro se complaint to less stringent standards than pleadings written by counsel in reversing a dismissal for failure to state a claim 3: holding that allegations of pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 4: holding that allegations in a pro se complaint are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers


Input: relationships with our sister states and “doing justice in order that justice may be done in return,” accept jurisdiction of Defendants’ appeal pursuant to the authority conferred by N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ l-277(a) and 7A-27(d). Notably, Defendants also contend that their appeal to this Court is permitted by N.C. Gen. Stat. § l-277(b), which provides that “[a]ny interested party shall have the right of immediate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant.” Thus, because the order being appealed from denied Defendants’ 12(b)(2) motion, Defendants contend that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under § l-277(b). See Data Gen. Corp. v. Cnty. of Durham, 143 N.C. App. 97, 99-100, 545 S.E.2d 243, 245-46 (2001) (<HOLDING>). However, while “[a] motion to dismiss based Holdings: 0: holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable 1: holding a decision denying a motion to dismiss an action for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable 2: holding that denial of counsel in section 1983 action is not immediately appealable 3: holding that a denial of a 12b2 motion for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground of sovereign immunity is immediately appealable 4: holding if immunity is raised as a basis in the motion for summary adjudication a substantial right is affected and the denial is immediately appealable


Input: evidence of arson. Oscar merely helped Mr. Long focus his investigation to determine the point of origin. The point of origin was then independently confirmed by separate an 2 (2d Cir.1998) (noting that even if decision to allow expert testimony was erroneous, “there was substantial additional evidence ... that an accelerant was used by the defendant”); Carr, 482 S.E.2d at 318 (finding harmful error because no other evidence of arson existed); People v. Dix, 242 A.D.2d 912, 662 N.Y.S.2d 879, 879 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (finding failure to lay proper foundation for accel-erant-sniffing dog evidence harmless since proof of guilt was overwhelming and there was no significant probability that error contributed to defendant’s conviction); State v. Simpson, 2002 Ohio 3717,¶ 78 (Ohio Ct.App. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 555 Pa. 86, 723 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a fiftynine minute detention to wait for a drug dog was reasonable where the officer requested the dog immediately after developing reasonable suspicion 1: holding that a dog sniff of a federal express package was a search 2: holding district courts finding of consent was not clearly erroneous when the defendant consented after officers told him they could get a drug dog even though the defendant knew the dog would alert 3: holding that even without testimony of handler of dog used for accelerant detection there was other evidence of accelerant 4: holding that motherowner of home in which attack occurred was not hable for attack by dog owned by sontenant where there was no evidence that she exercised dominion and control over the dog


Input: apply to his invasion of privacy claim. DOC argues the two-year statute of limitations applies for two reasons: first, because “[i]n-vasion of privacy by intrusion is an intentional act” and “[i]ntentional torts are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations” under RCW 4.16.100; and second, “invasion of privacy claims are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations” under Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co., 106 Wn.2d 466, 722 P.2d 1295 (1986). Br. of Resp’t at 38. We disagree with DOC and apply the three-year statute of limitations. ¶44 As noted, Emeson asserts an invasion of privacy by publication claim, not an invasion of privacy by intrusion. The tort invasion of privacy by publication does not include intent as an essential element. See Fisher, 125 Wn. App. at 879-80 (<HOLDING>). Thus, invasion of privacy by publication is Holdings: 0: holding that invasion of an identifiable customers account is not a necessary element proof under the statute 1: holding under section 1902a1 specific intent required as an element of section 1501 is the intent to cause the death of an individual 2: holding intent as an essential element to an invasion of privacy by intrusion and not listing intent as a required element of invasion of privacy by publication 3: holding that under delaware law the policys definition of personal injury as wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy applies only to damages incurred as a result of an invasion of an interest in real property 4: holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established


Input: Anthony R., 2010 ME 4, ¶¶ 8-9, 987 A.2d 532, 534. Error is obvious if it is “a seriously prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” Tibbetts v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 2010 ME 61, ¶ 10, 999 A.2d 930, 933 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 12] “When significant rights are at stake, due process requires: notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond to claims and evidence, and an impartial fact-finder.” GENUJO LOK Beteiligungs GmbH v. Zorn, 2008 ME 50, ¶ 18, 943 A.2d 573, 579. Because due process guarantees the right to respond to evidence, an adjudicator must afford a party the opportunity to rebut or challenge evidence offered against him or her. See In re Dustin C., 2008 ME 89, ¶ 7, 952 A.2d 993, 995 (<HOLDING>); Balian v. Bd. of Licensure in Med., 1999 ME Holdings: 0: holding that a mother in a child protection proceeding was afforded due process when she had notice of a hearing was represented by counsel and was given the opportunity to rebut evidence 1: holding defendant was afforded substantive and procedural due process at the administrative level when he was given seven days to respond to a prepenalty notice for negligence 2: holding mothers due process rights were not violated when her appointed counsel was allowed to withdraw and hearing was held without mother because the record showed mother did not inform counsel of her whereabouts after moving thereby frustrating counsels efforts to contact her and because mother was properly served with notice of the termination hearing 3: holding that evidence was sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding where mother allowed child to be in contact with individual who had physically abused her mother was not capable of caring for child on her own mother admitted at trial she had not found stable employment and child was doing well in her current placement 4: holding that where appellant was put on notice of disciplinary charges against him and was afforded opportunity to respond to boards recommendation demands of due process were satisfied


Input: initially receives the charges. EEOC’s receipt of charges on the FEPA’s behalf will automatically initiate the proceedings of both EEOC and the FEPA for purposes of ... Title VII. Worksharing Agreement Between Virginia Council on Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for Fiscal Year 1998. This Court has already determined that a unitary filing with the EEOC in which the complainant checked the box at the bottom of the standard EEOC charge form requesting that the charge be filed with both the EEOC and the state agency satisfies the requirement that plaintiffs commence proceedings under state law. See Capps, 67 F.Supp.2d 589. Other federal courts in Virginia have reached the same or similar conclusions. See Harris v. TJX Companies, Inc., 60 F.Supp.2d 562 (W.D.Va.1999) (<HOLDING>); Grimes v. Canadian American Transportation, Holdings: 0: holding that failure of eeoc to transmit charge to phrc within limitations period was subject to equitable tolling where plaintiff requested crossfiling in the cover letter attached to the eeoc charge on the first page of the charge itself and on an official form used by the eeoc for requests for dualfiling 1: holding that in light of a worksharing agreement between the state agency and the eeoc a charge of discrimination filed with the state agency was properly filed with the eeoc on the same date 2: holding that plaintiff had exhausted state remedies where eeoc transmitted charge to vchr pursuant to the worksharing agreement and vchr declined to investigate 3: holding that because veteran had never before submitted due process issue to bva he had not exhausted his administrative remedies and court declined to address merits of that claim 4: holding that the making of a complaint with the eeoc or the vchr setting forth a factual basis for employment discrimina tion is sufficient to commence proceedings under state law


Input: does not satisfy this requirement. See R. Doc. 28, Ex. A at 3. Mr. Mayberry’s claim that his termination was not for job-related misconduct and not subject to mandatory demotion is supported by his uncontroverted affidavit asserting that none of the other inmates involved received a similar retroactive demotion and loss of credits. It is further uncontroverted that no disciplinary committee recommended retroactive loss of good-time credits due to the April 7, 1998 incident as required by 57 O.S.1991 § 138. The State’s argument that it was impossible to provide Mr. Mayberry with a predeprivation hearing is without merit, and the cases on which it relies for that proposition are easily distinguishable. Compare Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (<HOLDING>), with Waldon, 861 P.2d at 313 (holding that, Holdings: 0: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional 1: holding that a civil cause of action for wrongful conversion of personal property is an adequate postdeprivation remedy for drugrelated property forfeitures 2: holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies 3: holding that postdeprivation tort remedy constitutes all the process that is due for unauthorized negligent and intentional torts by state officials 4: holding that meaningful postdeprivation hearing is sufficient to remedy unauthorized intentional deprivations of inmates property


Input: the same argument in the context of the Exemption 6 inquiry above. See Section III. B.l, supra (collecting cases and explaining that individuals do not lose their privacy interests simply because they are known to the public). Moreover, the names of third-parties in law enforcement records are almost always exempt from disclosure. See SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“[w]e now hold categorically that, unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is exempt from disclosure”). See also Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff Holdings: 0: holding that names and address of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c  are exempt from disclosure 1: holding the governments prior disclosure of requested information could not waive individuals privacy interests under exemption 6 and collecting cases involving exemption 7c 2: holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure   3: holding that in light of the stigma potentially associated with law enforcement investigations exemption 7c affords broad privacy rights to suspects witnesses and investigators 4: holding that nigcs individual background files are law enforcement records subject to exemption 7c and that in the absence of a waiver disclosure is not required by foia because individuals mentioned in law enforcement investigatory reports  have a presumptive privacy interest in keeping their names undisclosed


Input: a diversion process or go to juvenile court. Dated_ Dated_ Parent or Guardian (optional) Juvenile The above statement was read to the juvenile and signed by the juvenile on the date indicated. Representative of Diversion Unit” 3 State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 188, 713 P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796 (stating a defendant generally has no right to contest a prior conviction at a subsequent sentencing), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986). 4 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975) (requiring that before a defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel and represents himself pro se, “he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation”); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41-42, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) (<HOLDING>); City of Bellevue v. Acrey, 103 Wn.2d 203, Holdings: 0: holding that a parents statutory right to counsel in termination proceedings guarantees the right to effective counsel 1: holding that juvenile and his parents must be advised of the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings and the mothers knowledge that she could employ counsel was not an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a fully known right 2: holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings 3: recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings 4: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel


Input: 2. Clerk Fees The SFWMD is further presumptively entitled to recover the Clerk Fees under Appellate Rule 39, which like Rule 54 is read in conjunction with Section 1920. See Fed. R.App. P. 39 advisory committee’s note (observing that “[statutory authorization for taxation of costs is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1920”). Section 1920(1) provides that taxable costs include “Fees of the clerk and marshal.” Appellate Rule 39(e)(4) specifically, allows the district court to tax “the fee for filing the notice of appeal.” Although they are costs of appeal, costs enumerated in Appellate Rule 39(e) are “made taxable in the district court for general convenience.” Fed. R.App. P. 39(e) advisory committee’s note. See also King v. Gowdy, No. 02-CV-75136, 2008 WL 1820837, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Apr. 22, 2008) (<HOLDING>). 3. Mandate Fees Finally, none of the parties Holdings: 0: holding cafeteria management fee is not taxable even if it is bundled with the sales price of food 1: holding that because record did not contain notice of appeal in compliance with rule 3 there was no appellate jurisdiction and appeal must be dismissed 2: holding that appellate rule 66b does not authorize an interlocutory appeal that fails to comply with appellate rule 14 3: holding that 455 appeal fee is clearly a taxable cost citing section 19201 and appellate rule 39e4 4: holding that section 7263 authorizes this court to review fee agreements when appeal is properly before this court and when fee agreement has been filed with court at time appeal is filed


Input: reach, where it was readily accessible to him but not to the other occupants of the vehicle. In Taylor, the contraband was in carrying bags that were personal to someone other than the defendant. The lynchpin of the Court’s holding there was that it is not permissible to infer that someone merely occupying a room in which there are carrying bags belonging to another person knows the contents of those personal carrying bags. In this ease, by contrast, the white bag was not personal to someone other than the appellant, to a particular occupant of the car, or to anyone. The kind of evidence that in Taylor negated any reasonable inference of knowledge and possession is not present here. The white bag was an ordinary plastic bag. See Ford v. State, 37 Md.App. 373, 381, 377 A.2d 577 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Officer Webster testified that plastic bags Holdings: 0: holding the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the juvenile a front seat passenger of a vehicle occupied by four persons was in possession of marijuana recovered from a crumpled piece of newspaper behind the drivers seat 1: holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine 2: holding that evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of front seat passenger of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in paper bag in foot well of volkswagen on passengers side near gearshift in presence of marijuana smoke 3: holding that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant a rear seat passenger of a car for possession of marijuana based on the discovery of two marijuana seeds in the front of the vehicle 4: holding the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the defendant a front seat passenger of a vehicle occupied by three individuals was in constructive possession of marijuana found in white bag directly under the defendants seat


Input: the discovery deposition of the patient on January 22, 1999, because FAHC had erected an “intervening screen” which hid any wrongdoing. Dulude relies on Jones v. Pinkerton’s, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In Jones, the employer expressly prevented the plaintiff from learning about an investigation and report, and the court held that such factors that are outside of the plaintiff’s control may prevent the plaintiff from knowing he or she had suffered a legal harm. Id. at 457, 460. In the instant case, FAHC took no steps to hide any report or patient complaint and specifically referenced this particular patient in its termination letter on February 9, 1995. In addition, Dulude interviewed the patient involved in January 1995 and had the opportuni 07, 311 (D. Mass. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed. 1 Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) Holdings: 0: holding that the mere fact that some toys r us employees may have heard a rumor that the plaintiff was terminated for dealing drugs does not prove reckless publication 1: holding that the mere fact that the fda does not require a warning on a product label does not necessarily create a conflict 2: holding that the fact that the defendant did not handle the drugs is not dispositive of his involvement in drug dealing 3: holding anonymous tip that someone at the residence was dealing drugs did not amount to anything the tip was never substantiated and none of the occupants were ever charged with drug dealing 4: holding that evidence was insufficient to prove a conspiracy where the evidence did not show that individuals who sold drugs to the defendant knew that the drugs were meant to be resold


Input: he feared that he would be harmed if returned to Cóte d’Ivoire because of his former involvement with t that military forces continued to look for him or have any interest in harming him after 2005, or that former UDPCI members continued to face harm. Thus, given that Attobra did not provide any objective evidence that authorities in Cote d’Ivoire continued to look for him or have any interest in him, the agency reasonably concluded that Attobra failed to establish the requisite objective likelihood of future harm. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that a fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best”); Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for Holdings: 0: holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable 1: holding that a showing of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of future persecution 2: holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable 3: holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution 4: holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals


Input: 862 Mass. 684, 687, 290 N.E.2d 160, 162 (1972). See also Jacques B. Gelin & David W. Miller, The Federal Law of Eminent Domain § 4.1 (1982) (elaborating on the applicable legal standard); 4A Nichols at § 14A.01[2] (“Because it is proper for the trier to consider all elements which are a natural and proximate result of the taking and which could legitimately affect the price that a prospective purchaser would pay for the land, facts of the impact upon the remainder during the course of construction, although temporal i 5th Cir.1966) (recognizing viability of claim for severance damages based on prospective buyers’ likely fear of hazards arising from construction of power line carrying high voltage electricity); United States v. 33.5 Acres of Land, 789 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Easement and Right of Way, Holdings: 0: holding that local buyers fear of possible knapweed infestation legitimately affected calculation of severance damages 1: holding that increased fear of flooding was a matter that factfinder could properly consider in assessing severance damages 2: holding that stigma damages were properly included in calculation of severance damages where proximity of gas pipeline could trigger fears about possible mishaps 3: holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding 4: holding that severance pay policy was part of employment contract


Input: to start such a process could also subject the Company to liability, especially where WWL seems to have been seeking to determine whether its obligations to Marks included not only an approval of a technician—as he had requested—but also a covering of the cost of such repairs. Under such a rule, moreover, an employer would apparently be able to avoid liability only by immediately approving every disability-accommodation request that it received, even where there was no reason to believe harm might follow from a brief delay. Defendant, moreover, had no reason to believe that Marks would suffer any imminent harm from a brief negotiation period over the scope of his needed accommodations. Accord Ungerleider v. Fleet Mortg. Grp. of Fleet Bank, 329 F.Supp.2d 343, 355 (D. Conn. 2004) (<HOLDING>). This was similarly not a situation where a Holdings: 0: holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada 1: holding that a person must request a reasonable accommodation before he has been terminated he cannot wait until he is terminated and then months later  request reinstatement and demand a reasonable accommodation 2: holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation 3: holding failure to immediately approve request for accommodation even for employee with known disability did not constitute denial of reasonable accommodation where employer was working on solution over several months 4: holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation


Input: district court should not apply the less rigorous fairground-for-litigation standard and should only grant the injunction if the moving party establishes, along with irreparable injury, a likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. at 43 n. 6. Here, since the Station already has been closed, an order granting the plaintiffs motion to direct its opening would alter the status quo. As such, Hassan faces a heightened burden. He must establish both irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. b. Irreparable harm A showing of irreparable harm is considered the “single most important requirement” in satisfying the standard. See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143 F.3d at 696; Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir.1990)(<HOLDING>). “A moving party must show that the injury it Holdings: 0: holding that even though irreparable harm is not required it had been shown and weighed in favor of issuance of the preliminary injunction 1: holding that intangible injuries such as damage to advertising efforts and goodwill can be irreparable harm for purpose of a preliminary injunction 2: recognizing that irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction 3: holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction 4: holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief


Input: woman, who then conceived a child. Both the woman and her previous husband objected to the paternity action because the child was born during their marriage and had been found to be a child of their marriage during their dissolution action. McDaniels, 108 Wn.2d at 300-01. In remanding for a determination of paternity, the McDaniels court recognized that both the husband and the petitioner had established strong parenting relationships with the child, and that these relationships justified maintaining visitation between the child and both of the men even after paternity was established. McDaniels, 108 Wn.2d at 310, 313. An even more pointed recognition of the importance of the psychological bond between a child and a nonbiological parent was expressed in In re Marria 9 P.2d 1304 (1979) (<HOLDING>), cited with approval in In re Dependency of Holdings: 0: recognizing the due process rights of legal guardians who had raised child for over eight years and stood in loco parentis to the child to be given a full and meaningful opportunity to be heard at a dependency hearing under chapter 1304 rcw 1: holding that party standing in loco parentis has standing to seek custody of child 2: holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner 3: holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 4: holding that domestic partner who assumed a parental status over her partners child and performed parental duties with the partners permission stood in loco parentis to the child and had standing to seek partial custody and visitation


Input: 1995, writ denied) (plaintiffs equitable remedy of reinstatement not precluded); and City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209 (Tex.2000) (although the Court declined to rule on whether reinstatement can be a remedy for violations of the Texas Constitution, it affirmed the court of appeals' decision, 949 S.W.2d 406 (Tex.App.—Austin 1997), to reverse and remand the reinstatement issue to the trial court). 145 .Docket no. 44, at 27. 146 . See Board of County Commissioners, Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997); and Harris v. Victona ISD, 168 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 533, 145 L.Ed.2d 413 (1999). 147 . See Board of County Commissioners, Bryan County, Oklahoma, 520 U.S. at 404-05, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (<HOLDING>). 148 . See Baltazor v. Holmes, 162 F.3d 368, Holdings: 0: holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 1: holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under  1983 2: holding inter alia that a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory 3: holding that only deliberate conduct by a municipality which actually causes an injury is compensable under section 1983 4: holding that a municipality may only be held liable under  1983 for a policy practice or custom


Input: and filed with the assistance of his counsel during the course of the IJ proceedings. Furthermore, Liu explained in his second addendum that he was presenting the addendum because the “asylum application which was prepared and filed on my behalf by the travel agency did not fully state my reasons for seeking asylum,” whereas this addendum “fully and correctly state[d] why [he was] seeking political asylum.” Given this claim of completeness and accuracy of the second addendum, and considering that the incidents Liu omitted from that document are material to his claim of persecution and his reason for leaving China, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 446 F.3d 289, 296 n. 7 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the IJ considered and reasonably Holdings: 0: holding that jurisdiction was lacking to review an ijs determination that an asylum application was untimely when that determination was based on the fact that the petitioner offered no evidence other than his own testimony regarding his date of entry 1: holding that language in a merrill lynch customer account agreement that the plaintiff signed upon opening the first account  providing for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of its business  applied to the disputed second account even though the plaintiff did not sign a separate customer account agreement for the second account 2: holding that where the petitioner purported to provide an exhaustive account of the grounds for his claim of asylum that included no reference to his detention and beating this account of persecution was inconsistent with his later testimony before the ij 3: holding that abuse at the hands of a father constituted persecution because it was on account of his daughters religious beliefs 4: holding that an applicants failure to include any reference to his alleged detention and beating in his 1589 form is a self evident inconsistency that the agency may rely on without first soliciting an explanation


Input: committee notes (1972) (describing rationale underlying exception as “[t]he element of unusual reliability ... said variously to be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation”) (citation omit ted). Thus, the motivation of a record’s author is relevant to admissibility. Id. Not every item of business correspondence constitutes a business record. See, e.g., Breeden v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 115 F.3d 749, 754 (10th Cir.1997) (sustaining exclusion of letter from chiropractor proffered as “medical business record”); Timberlake Const. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 342 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). “It is well-established that one who prepares Holdings: 0: holding that court erred in admitting letter as business record where testimony was not adequate to establish that the letter was compiled as a matter of regular practice as opposed to one prepared in anticipation of litigation 1: holding that letters addressing dispute that was subject of litigation and that were written in anticipation of litigation did not fall under business record exception under rule 8036 of the federal rules of evidence and noting that it is wellestablished that one who prepares a document in anticipation of litigation is not acting in the regular course of business 2: holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation 3: holding that court erred in admitting letters written in anticipation of litigation as business records 4: holding that a rule 90211 certification of medical records was not testimonial noting that the court did not find as controlling the fact that a certification of authenticity under 90211 is made in anticipation of litigation what is compelling is that crawford expressly identified business records as nontestimonial evidence


Input: was based on the Commission’s conclusion that it was “possible in this case to follow the ordinance’s requirement to locate at an alternative site.” (Schill Deck Ex. H at 3.) On September 12, 2001, Verizon appealed the decision of the Commission to the City’s Board of Appeals, and on November 27, 2001, the Board denied Verizon’s appeal. II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS A. Jurisdiction I have jurisdiction over this action based on 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v), which permits unsuccessful applicants for permits for wireless facilities to bring actions “in any court of competent jurisdiction.” For purposes of review under § 332(e)(7)(B)(v), federal district courts are courts of competent jurisdiction. See Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ky., 227 F.3d 414, 421 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Aegerter v. City of Delafield, Wis., Holdings: 0: holding that when neither the petitioners state court briefs nor the state courts decision made any reference to any federal constitutional claim or cited any federal constitutional cases the lack of fundamental error found by the state court was a lack of fundamental error under arizonas state constitution 1: holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law 2: holding that term court encompasses trial by both judge and jury 3: holding that the reference to any court encompasses both state and federal courts 4: holding that favorable evidence encompasses both exculpatory and impeachment evidence and articulating the materiality standard


Input: D.E. Shaw Investment Group, LLC, D.E. Shaw Valence International, Inc., KBC Alternative Investment Management Ltd., and KBC Financial Products UK Ltd., and QVT Fund, LP)” via certified mail sent to the Bondholder entity or its corporate affiliate. (Aristocrat’s Letter 8/21/09.) The Bondholders do not contest corrected corporation may be served through an officer or agent explicitly or implicitly authorized to accept service of process.”); Boryk v. deHavilland Aircraft Co., 341 F.2d 666, 668-69 (2d Cir.1965) (finding service on the president of a subsidiary adequate and noting that the label attached to the agent and the agent’s lack of explicit authority to accept service was not determinative); In re Elec. & Musical Indus., Ltd., Middlesex, Eng., 155 F.Supp. 892, 893 (S.D.N.Y.1957) (<HOLDING>); accord Wright & Miller, supra, § 2454 Holdings: 0: holding that arson committed by stockholder who was the principal managing agent precluded recovery by the corporation 1: holding that a corporation could be served by delivering a copy of the subpoena to an officer or managing or general agent of the corporation and that the agent could be an individual a partnership or another corporation 2: holding that travel by an agent of defrauded corporation is imputed to the victim 3: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation 4: holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity


Input: 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992)). In a similar vein, Debtors also maintain rights that were bargained for under the Mortgage. See [Claim No. 11-1, Ex. 1]. The Mortgage allows Debtors to prepay the Mortgage without a prepayment penalty. Id. at 6. Specifically, the Mortgage provides that the payments will be due on or before the first day of each month “continuing consecutively until April 1, 2022 when the entire unpaid balance of principal and interest shall become due ankr. D. Conn. 1991); In re Moran, 121 B.R. 879, 883 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1990) (finding that “[i]f [a] mortgage allows pre-payment, the [d]ebtors may exercise this right,” notwithstanding § 1322(b)(2)). As in Gaetje, the Mortgage in this case specifically allows the Debtors to prepay prior to the April 2022 maturity date. Id. at *6 (<HOLDING>). Thus, in the instant case, Debtors proposal Holdings: 0: holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder 1: holding that where a mortgagee is acting on behalf of the note holder there is no disconnection between note and mortgage and the mortgagee may foreclose 2: holding that application note 6 is not mandatory 3: holding that there is no impermissible modification of the note because the very terms of the note allow for prepayment without a penalty 4: holding that the situs of debt  for purposes of the act of state doctrine  was not in dubai when the terms of the relevant promissory note provided that the note was payable in united states dollars at the place of the holders designation


Input: the structure of drug trafficking organizations and the role of drug couriers. Cira testified that a drug distributor would not have allowed the quantity of drugs in this case out of his control, and that, in his experience, he had never encountered a courier who did not know what was in his vehicle. Martinez never objected to the admission of Cira’s testimony in district court. Therefore, we review this claim for plain error. See United States v. Jones, 266 F.3d 804, 814 (8th Cir.2001). Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, Martinez contends admission of the testimony was error because he was not charged with conspiracy to import drugs and no evidence was presented to link him to an actual drug trafficking organization. See United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Martinez also contends admission of the Holdings: 0: holding that expert testimony concerning the structure of drug trafficking organizations is inadmissible where the defendant is not charged with a conspiracy to import drugs or where such evidence is not otherwise probative of a matter properly before the court 1: holding a fiveyear old drug conviction is probative of a defendants state of mind in a drug conspiracy case 2: holding that the district court committed prejudicial error in admitting expert testimony about the structure of drug trafficking organizations because the testimony portrayed the defendant as a member of such an organization and implied the defendant knew the drugs were in his vehicle 3: holding that expert testimony regarding the structure of drug trafficking organizations was inadmissible in a nonconspiracy importation case 4: holding that the district court complied with the requirements of  lb13alb where it made specific references to testimony in the record relating to the scope of the defendants involvement in the drug trafficking conspiracy noted that the relevant testimony was unrefuted and stated that the testimony was internally consistent


Input: a reasonable foundation upon which to make the offer, a finding which must be made by the trial court after conducting an evidentiary hearing thereon). Ormond Beach also claims that the trial court erred in denying its request for statutory offer of judgment attorney’s fees because its offer of judgment and amended offer of judgment “undeniably satisfied the requirements of section 768.79”. Ormond Beach argues that since it satisfied the procedural requirements of section 768.79 of the Florida Statute, the court trial erred in denying its request for fees. We disagree. Our supreme court has ruled that, upon voluntary dismissal of an action without prejudice, statutory offer of judgment attorney’s fees are not recoverable. See MX Investments, Inc., v. Crawford, 700 So.2d 640 (Fla.1997)(<HOLDING>). Thus, once the trial court recognized Holdings: 0: holding proper basis for award of fees 1: holding attorney fees not allowable as costs 2: holding a summary judgment to be final although motion to assess attorney fees remained pending because award of attorney fees is collateral to judgment 3: holding that offer of judgment statute does not provide a basis for an award of attorney fees and costs unless dismissal is with prejudice 4: recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs


Input: from Bagelmann. As in the Restatement example, the implied right in the present case follows logically from certain express terms of the agreement — i.e., the landlord’s right to sell or mortgage the property. And unlike in Bagelmann, the contract here contains an express term (the right to sell) to which the implied obligation (the right to show the property) can be attached. It would “destroy[ ] or injur[e] the right of [Alta Vista] to receive the fruits of the' contract” if we were to decline to find an implied right to show the premises to prospective buyers. See Am. Tower, 809 N.W.2d at 550. Other courts have agreed that the right to sell property implicitly includes the right to show it to prospective purchasers. See, e.g., Magliocco v. Olson, 762 P.2d 681, 685 (Colo.App.1987) (<HOLDING>); Glenn v. Keyes, 107 Utah 415, 154 P.2d 642, Holdings: 0: holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant 1: holding the landlord did not trespass when his agent entered the premises for the purpose of showing them to a potential tenant 2: holding landlord jointly liable when he knew of or acquiesced in the tenants trespass 3: recognizing the general rule that the landlord is not liable for dangerous conditions existing once the tenant takes possession of the premises 4: holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant despite retaining keys because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property


Input: a sum for abandoning his interest in the 2007 Mortgage so that Wells Fargo could go into state court to seek its reformation. Or, once the mortgage is avoided and preserved for the benefit of the estate, the Trustee might himself seek its reformation in state court. But what the Trustee cannot do in a Chapter 7 case is use the Bankruptcy Code to change the terms of an avoidable mortgage. Reformation of the 2007 Mortgage is reserved to the parties to that mortgage and/or the state court. For these reasons, approval of the Compromise in the form offered is not possible. Nor can the Court fashion its own remedy for liquidating the estate’s interest in the 2007 Mortgage in lieu of the Trustee’s judgment. See In re Central Illinois Energy, L.L.C., 406 B.R. 371 (Bankr.C.D.Ill. 2008) (<HOLDING>). C. Debtor’s Motion to Abandon Section 554(b) Holdings: 0: holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable 1: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt 2: holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement 3: holding that a settlement agreement in which the parties failed to agree upon the terms of a release was unenforceable 4: holding that a bankruptcy court cannot rewrite an agreement and by doing so approve terms that differ from those to which the parties agreed in evaluating a proposed settlement or compromise under rule 9019 the court must accept or reject the agreement as presented


Input: AEDPA that he was prejudiced by the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, or that it “so infected [his] trial with unfairness as to make [his] conviction a denial of due process”. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868. Moreover, this claim is not “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further”. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595. B. Next, Gutierrez seeks a COA for whether he was denied an impartial jury, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, because: (1) Harrell made a material misstatement that she had never been arrested or convicted of a crime of theft; and (2) the prosecution successfully challenged Gerald Becker for cause, based solely on his religious beliefs, in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (<HOLDING>). 1. In both his state and federal habeas Holdings: 0: holding that potential jurors may not be excluded merely because they voice general moral or philosophical reservations about the death penalty 1: holding statute stating that judge could excuse jurors was violated when jury commissioners excused jurors 2: holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing 3: holding prospective jurors may not be excused from jury service in a capital case because based on religious beliefs they voice general objections to the death penalty 4: holding that prospective jurors should have been excused for cause because they did not affirmatively state that their bias against the plaintiffs would not affect their ability to render an impartial verdict


Input: constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.1985) (same). Valdez next argues that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the district court’s sentence enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1) (firearm possession) and 3B1.1 (leader/organizer). However, the record overwhelmingly supports a finding that Valdez was a leader and/or organizer of the conspiracy, thereby qualifying him for an enhancement under § 3B1.1. And according to the testimony of a co-conspirator, Valdez possessed a firearm during the commission of the conspiracy and it was not “clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 3; see also United States v. Willard, 919 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Valdez’s sentence enhancement Holdings: 0: holding that the court cannot examine the underlying merits of the claims in determining whether to certify a class 1: holding that a trial court has a duty to examine the entire record including all physical documentary evidence in order to reach an equitable result 2: holding that the trial court must examine the entire course of criminal conduct in determining possession 3: holding that for purposes of determining whether complete diversity exists a court must examine the plaintiffs pleading as of the time of the petition for removai 4: holding that court must examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless


Input: language of the statute to suggest that such a limited interpretation was intended by the legislature. See generally State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, T11, 144 P.3d 1152 ("[Legislative] intent is most readily ascertainable by looking to the plain language of the statute."). To the contrary, regularity of contact appears to be irrelevant to this analysis, as the statute lists several individuals as being in a position of special trust whose relationship to the child may be even more remote than a cohabitant of a noncustodial parent, such as aunts and uncles, who may have infrequent contact with their nieces and nephews, and babysitters, who may come into contact with their charges only a single time. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(4)(h); see also Rowley, 2008 UT App 233, 113, 189 P.3d 109 (<HOLDING>). 8 . Although Watkins now argues that he Holdings: 0: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 1: holding that the special relationship exception did not apply because the decedent was not in defendants custody 2: holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school 3: holding that the position of special trust is not dependent on the closeness of the defendants relationship with the child 4: holding that courier is not in position of trust


Input: CURIAM. Petitioner Thomas Alfred Brydon appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition for relief. We affirm. Brydon pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court applied the career-offender provisions of United States Sentencing Guidelines §§ 4B1.1 & 4B1.2. The court determined that four prior Iowa convictions for operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent and one prior Iowa conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated qualified as predicate crimes of violence. Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Later, in United States v. Steward, 598 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding a felony conviction for driving while intoxicated dwi may be a crime of violence 1: holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b 2: holding that statute prohibiting driving while intoxicated applied to defendant driving on a private parking lot 3: holding that driving while intoxicated is not a violent felony pursuant to 18 usc  924e2b 4: holding that burglary is violent felony


Input: explained in 4 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 81.01, at p. 81-2: Degree of disability is calculated under most acts by comparing actual earnings before the injury with earning capacity after the injury. It is at once apparent that the two items in the comparison are not quite the same. Actual earnings are a relatively concrete quantity.... Earning capacity, however, is a more theoretical concept. It obviously does not mean actual earnings, since the legislature deliberately chose a different phrase for the post-injury earnings factor. See also Shiek, 2002 ND 85, ¶ 15, 643 N.W.2d 721 (noting the definition of disability is broader than lost wages, it means loss of earning capacity); Business Ins. Co. v. BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc., 23 P.3d 1261, 1265 (Colo.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Ruff v. Labor and Industry Review Comm’n, 159 Holdings: 0: recognizing this distinction 1: recognizing distinction between actual and per se conflicts of interest 2: recognizing distinction between actual wage loss and loss of future earning capacity 3: recognizing distinction between two types of waiver 4: recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel


Input: peril of fire. Plaintiffs contend that the term “any fire insurance policy” in the VPL refers to any homeowner’s insurance policy in Louisiana that covers fire and other perils, such as wind. Plaintiffs assert that there is no such thing as a single-peril fire policy in Louisiana, that the term “fire policy” is broadly used in the insurance industry to refer to a homeowner’s policy, and that Louisiana courts have applied the VPL to losses caused by perils other than fire. After extensive briefing and oral argument on the question of whether the VPL applies to hazards other than fire, the Court has concluded that it need not answer this question to resolve the dispute. Needless decisions of state law should be avoided as a ma La.1995), aff'd 106 F.3d 396, 1996 WL 773044 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); with Grice v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 359 Holdings: 0: holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue 1: holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment 2: holding that an insurer need not comply with the vpl with respect to the nonfire perils covered by the policy 3: holding the same with respect to an apartment 4: holding that the vpl requires an insurer to pay the full value of the policy only when a covered peril causes a total loss


Input: of the evidence, he helped prepare the terms that were the basis for the transaction, and he created the relationship between SBC and defendants which led to the December 1997 deal. On defendants’ version, defendants only worked with plaintiff on the April 1997 proposal, which expired on its terms in May 1997. SBC’s subsequent RFP created a new opportunity for defendants to bid on the SBC project, and defendants did not use plaintiffs assistance in successfully concluding that deal. On the present record, the available facts may support either conclusion and are too conflicted for us to determine whether Fieger procured the SBC sale and leaseback for Pitney Bowes. Accordingly, the district court must provide for a factfinder to resolve this dispute. See R.B. Ventures, 112 F.3d at 61 (<HOLDING>). The court has considered defendants’ other Holdings: 0: holding that the sort of trespasses to which the ecpa applies are those in which the trespasser gains access to information to which he is not entitled to see not those in which the trespasser uses the information in an unauthorized way 1: holding that the analysis to determine whether a claimant has established a reasonable basis to plead a claim for punitive damages is similar to the analysis applied to determine whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action 2: holding that plaintiff in erisa action was entitled to restitution under similar circumstances 3: holding that a factfinder must determine whether plaintiffs involvement in initial realestate development proposal which was not built entitled plaintiff to a commission for completed second proposal which involved plans similar to those for the initial proposal 4: holding it was improper for ninth circuit to determine that an aliens family constituted a particular social group for asylum purposes because proper course was to remand issue to board for initial determination


Input: Food Stores, 960 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1045, 122 L.Ed.2d 354 (1993). For this reason, any state law claims brought by the Claimants related to the Agreements, including their claims of unjust enrichment, are preempted by ERISA. Claimants’ state law claims may not simply be recharacterized as federal claims to circumvent the preemption requirement of ERISA. Lea v. Republic Airlines, Inc., 903 F.2d 624, 632-33 (9th Cir.1990). “ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982), creates an exclusive remedial scheme.” Id. at 631. “Congress’s express inclusion of several specific remedies in the statute represents an implicit exclusion of remedies not listed.” Bishop v. Osborn Transportation, Inc., 838 F.2d 1173, 1174 (11th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832, 109 S.Ct. 90, 102 Holdings: 0: holding a court may not award punitive damages 1: holding that punitive damages may be imposed against employer for tortious conduct of employee 2: holding that erisa did not permit employee to bring claim for punitive damages against employer 3: holding that punitive damages are not fines 4: holding unconscionable under california law employment contract compelling arbitration of claims employee most likely to bring against employer but not claims employer most likely to bring against employee and requiring first 125 of arbitration fees to be paid by employee


Input: to those under the comparator statutes — There are very important substantive differences between the Veterans’ Benefits Act and the Social Security Act ... especially between the service-connected disability ' compensation ... and the available benefits under the comparator acts. These differences render the Veterans’ Benefits Act, as a matter of statu tory construction, dissimilar to the Social Security Act.... Hannington v. Sun Life & Health Ins. Co., 711 F.3d 226, 233-34 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 285, 187 L.Ed.2d 152 (2013). “Congress has created a paternalistic veterans’ benefits system to care for those who served their country in uniform”. See, e.g., Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed.Cir. 2009); Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1262 (Fed.Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>) ; Nolen v. Gober, 222 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Holdings: 0: holding that a plantshutdown benefit is not an optional form of benefit 1: recognizing that the veterans benefit system is uniquely proclaimant 2: holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court 3: recognizing nonadversarial and proclaimant character of veterans benefits adjudication 4: holding that the interpretation of a veterans filings is a factual inquiry


Input: Letter, litigation concerning the other two events should be stayed pending arbitration of the March 2002 event. Although not mentioned by the parties, Ind.Code § 34-57-2-3(d) and (f) are relevant to this issue and provide: (d) Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an application for an order for arbitration has been made under this section (or IC 34^1-2-3 before its repeal), or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect to the issue only. When the application is made in such an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration must include such a stay. ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ (f) If the court determines that there are other issues between the parties that are not subject Md.App. 116, 801 A.2d 1104, 1126 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Appellants make no argument that the creation Holdings: 0: holding that unfair competition claims are arbitrable 1: holding that a settlement agreement is an arbitrable subject when the underlying dispute is arbitrable 2: holding that the nonarbitrable fraud claims had to be stayed pending resolution of the arbitrable issue because the fraud claims depended upon the arbitrable issues 3: holding that title vii and nyhrl claims are arbitrable 4: holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 are arbitrable


Input: that sanctions “should be limited to the consequential expenses and attorney’s fees, i.e., those incurred ‘because’ of the paper filed in violation.” (Weinstein Opening Brief at 27); (see also id. at 28). However, this argument is itself sanctionable as it ignores the plain language of Rule 9011, which expressly provides that when a party brings a motion for sanctions, “the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9011(c)(1)(A); see In re Cascade Energy & Metals Corp., 87 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir.1996) (affirming bankruptcy judge’s sanctions order where attorney was sanctioned for misquoting statute); see also Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 855 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Second, appellants contend that there is no Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not err by including in the amount awarded the costs and fees borne by defendantsappellees in bringing the motion for sanctions 1: holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing 2: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 3: holding that costs including attorneys fees imposed by a mexican court did not constitute a penalty 4: holding that trial court did not err


Input: part of their potential audiences would therefore be placed at a competitive disadvantage compared to carried stations in their efforts to attract local advertisers. See 1998 House Hearing at 68 n. 38 (statement of James J. Popham). Congress heard testimony that a station-by-station license would essentially enable satellite carriers to pick winners and losers in local advertising markets, undermining the efforts of emerging television networks to compete with the established broadcast networks: “Nothing could more surely dull the cutting edge of competition from new networks, their local affiliates, and innovative independent stations in local markets.” Id. at 59. In short, Con gress had substantial evidence for the judgment t, 466 U.S. 789, 807, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that Congress’s Holdings: 0: holding constitutional a tax on a private citizens interest in housing on government property received as part of the private citizens compensation 1: holding that a sublessee had no property interest taken by the city 2: holding that city had a substantial interest in preventing the visual assault on the citizens of los angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property 3: holding that a law prohibiting signs on public property in order to preserve aesthetics could be applied to politicalcampaign signs 4: holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling


Input: § TR 16-205.1. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 255, 923 A.2d 100 (2007) (“The purpose of [TR § 16-205.1 ] was to reduce the incidence of drunk driving and to protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take alcohol concentration tests; the statute was not meant to protect drivers.”); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jones, 380 Md. 164, 178, 844 A.2d 388 (2004) (stating that “the Legislature intended ‘to create procedures that would be an expedient and effective deterrent and sanction against drunk driving.’ ”) (citation omitted); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 373, 739 A.2d 58 (1999) (stating that the suspension of a license serves a remedial purpose, including protection of the public); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 475, 597 A.2d 939 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we conclude that the court erred Holdings: 0: recognizing that in interpreting a statute our primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the legislature 1: holding that contracts where the primary purpose is to restrain trade are void 2: holding that the determination and assessment of damages are not the primary purpose of a declaratory action 3: recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public 4: recognizing that the primary purpose of tr  162051 is protection of the public


Input: in driving, but merely her interest in driving a vehicle that displays a preferred set of vanity plates. Whether, in this particular case, this interest is substantial enough to be regarded as a “protected interest” under the Due Process Clause — a question which we need not answer — the interest does not appear to be as significant as, for example, the loss of income or public-assistance benefits. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). Accordingly, Perry’s interest does not weigh heavily in the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, and certainly it weighs less heavily than the state’s interest. As to the final relevant factor under Mathews v. Eldridge, there is little risk of an erroneous deprivation of an individual’s asserted intere Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Sabree v. Parking Violations Bureau, City of Holdings: 0: holding that towing of illegally parked vehicles without opportunity for prior hearing did not violate due process 1: holding that doctrine does not violate due process 2: holding that a district court grievance committees reliance on a state courts findings without holding an independent hearing did not violate the attorneys due process rights 3: holding that district court may order hearing as remedy for termination of public employee without due process 4: holding that due process was not violated in a twentyseven day delay in holding a hearing after an illegally parked vehicle was towed


Input: CURIAM: Jose Rodriguez Rueda petitions this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision summarily affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying his application for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l). Rueda contests the merits o 999) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction to Holdings: 0: holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of cancellation of removal based on a lack of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship 1: recognizing that the iirira strips the court of jurisdiction over the attorney generals discretionary extreme hardship determination but retaining jurisdiction over constitutional due process claims 2: holding that the transitional rules preclude direct judicial review of the bias discretionary determination of extreme hardship in suspension of deportation cases 3: holding under the predecessor to  1229bb that denials of suspension based on the  element of extreme hardship are discretionary decisions 4: holding that discretionary denials of motions to reopen are reviewed only for abuse of that discretion


Input: that she was afraid that it escalated and she would be raped. So, I want you to keep that in mind. It’s a pretty serious act of what happened.” The defendant claims that, in the course of the state’s closing argument excerpted here, the prosecutor made improper comments on facts that were not in evidence. We agree with the defendant. We now turn to the first step in our analysis of whether the defendant was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial by first determining whether summation statements made by the prosecution were improper. If they were not improper, there would be no need to address the second stage of analysis concerning whether substantial prejudice resulted to the defendant. “A prosecutor, in fulfilling his duties, must confine himself to the 124 A. 820 (1924) (<HOLDING>). By making the challenged remarks, the Holdings: 0: holding improper counsels argument that plaintiff was entitled to something for manner in which defense was conducted 1: holding that hearsay evidence is not acceptable in opposing a summary judgment motion 2: holding improper counsels argument that opposing counsel knew why plaintiff delayed in bringing action where opposing counsels knowledge was not in evidence 3: holding prosecutors argument that defense counsels goal was to keep evidence from the jury was improper 4: holding defense counsels rates to be an improper starting point in determining plaintiff counsels reasonable hourly rate


Input: 2020 and leaves his reversionary interest to a third party. Similarly, Neera would have an interest in a replacement home or annuity payment until 2030. We conclude, therefore, that partition does not give Appellees a “greater estate” than they already have. Rakesh Did Not Waive Right to Partition ¶ 20 Appellants also contend that partition is not permitted because the terms of the QPRTs do not expressly provide for partition and by entering into the QPRTs, the parties waived any right to partition. However, nothing in the QPRTs expressly precludes partition, and the voluntary or involuntary sale of the residence is permitted. ¶ 21 Generally, a waiver of the right to partition occurs if a partition would violate the parties’ agreement. See Cohen, 215 Ariz. at 65-66, 157 P.3d at 485-86 (<HOLDING>). The QPRTs, however, do not implicitly or Holdings: 0: holding right to testify was federal constitutional right 1: holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived 2: holding that the evidence supported the conclusion that husbands entry into estranged wifes home was unauthorized where husband had moved out wife had changed locks and husband entered house through window after removing screen 3: holding that the defendant waived the right to appeal his sentence including the terms and conditions of his supervised release when he agreed to a plea agreement that said he expressly waives his right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed on any ground emphasis added 4: holding wifes right to partition waived because she previously agreed husband alone had right to live in or sell house as he chose


Input: Bahl from perusing a collection of Playboy magazines, but it may not. This condition may prohibit Bahl from attending a Karen Finley performance, but it may not. ¶56 The lawfulness of these examples depends solely on the subjective belief of the particular person charged with monitoring Bahl’s community custody. The danger is that prohibiting “sexually explicit” or “erotic” material ultimately translates into prohibiting whatever the community custody officer finds personally titillating. United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 266 (3d Cir. 2001). Erotica, like art, is found in the eye of the beholder; yet enforcement of the law cannot be predicated on the subjective belief of the enforcer. Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1971) (<HOLDING>). ¶57 In sum, taking all the challenged terms Holdings: 0: holding unconstitutional a sexual harassment statute prohibiting conduct that alarmed or seriously annoyed the victim 1: holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied 2: holding an ordinance was unconstitutionally vague for prohibiting conduct entirely dependent upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed 3: holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague 4: holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague


Input: it takes a case to make its way to the Courts of Appeals, in the majority of the cases cited above the sale closings had already taken place, this distinction is not determinative. In those cases, the courts were not asked to draw a distinction between sales before closings and sales after closing. The critical step is approval by the bankruptcy court, not closing. See, e.g., In re Stadium Management Corp., 895 F.2d at 849; In re Vetter Corp., 724 F.2d at 55-56. Debtor has provided no case law which supports the proposition that appeal of an order authorizing a sale is not moot after approval of the sale but before closing. To the contrary, the courts that have examined this issue have held that the appeal is moot even before closing. See In re Southwest Products, Inc., 144 B.R. at 105 (<HOLDING>); see also In re Exennium, Inc., 715 F.2d 1401, Holdings: 0: holding appeal moot on this basis 1: holding that the fact that the sale may not be fully consummated does not prevent a determination that the appeal is moot because section 363m does not require the purchaser to take irreversible steps consummating the sale before the absence of a stay will render an appeal moot 2: holding that action challenging united states forest services approval of a timber sale became moot when challenged sale was halted as a result of an administrative appeal 3: holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser 4: holding that payment does not moot a confirmation request


Input: Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 436, 444 (S.D.Iowa 2009) (denying class certification for a proposed subclass finding inter alia the relief sought required extensive individualized inquiry to ascertain the class). b. Whether the Proposed Representatives Satisfy the Definition “The second ‘implicit requirement’ of Rule 23 is that each proposed representative is in fact a member of the proposed class____” In re Teflon, 254 F.R.D. at 363. While Christian necessarily meets the definitions Plaintiffs proffer, as she pre-paid for a documented six months of treatment under the care of Kerkhoff, who was at that time a member of The Masters Circle, for the above-mentioned reasons, the Court finds that the proposed class does not appropriately accommodate Rhiner’s circumstances. See id. (<HOLDING>). 3. Rule 23(b)(3) Even if Plaintiffs could Holdings: 0: holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial 1: holding that it was proper in determining certification to consider whether certification would foster the settlement of the case with advantage to the parties and with great savings in judicial time and services 2: holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion 3: holding that the court could not in good conscience grant certification under the second implicit requirement when the court was unable to establish membership with objective certainty 4: holding rule 54b certification invalid because unaccompanied by any statement of reasons and factors underlying trial courts decision to grant certification


Input: defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind.2011). Similarly, a plaintiff must establish that a duty of care exists to prevail on a claim of constructive fraud. Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (Ind.1996). “Absent a duty, there can be no breach, and therefore, no recovery for the plaintiff in negligence.” Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 398 (citation omitted). Old National asks that the Court adopt a “no customer, no duty” rule, which recognizes that a bank should not owe a duty of care to an “undefined and unlimited category of strangers who might interact with [the bank’s] customer.” Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir.2002); see also Athey Products Corp. v. Harris Bank Roselle, 89 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Old Na tional contends that because Purcell Holdings: 0: holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties 1: holding that duty to protect from criminal acts does not arise in the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm 2: holding that under illinois law a lender owes no duty to protect third parties from the credit risk of an insolvent borrower 3: holding that an agent owes a fiduciary duty to his principal 4: holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons


Input: Counsel’s predicate affidavit for constructive service reveals he knew Bland’s local counsel— with whom he was in contact throughout the settlement discussions — and where to reach him. In spite of that he sent the required notice of service by publication only to Bland’s old address which he knew would never reach him. When asked by the trial Judge if he had also sent a copy of the notice to Bland’s lawyer, he responded: “I felt that sending him a letter ... was above and beyond the call.” [sic! ] To the contrary, his failure to do so violated the essential notice required by due process. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), and Tulsa Prof. Collection Serv. Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) (<HOLDING>). We are left with notice to Bland only in the Holdings: 0: holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action 1: holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice 2: holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice 3: holding that notice by mail or other means as certain to insure actual notice is minimum constitutional precondition 4: holding that if persons identity is known under mullane due process requires notice by such means as is certain to ensure actual notice


Input: or while having his features artificially distorted shall, for the first of-fence be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than five years.... Whoever commits any offense described herein while armed with a firearm ... shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than five years. Mass. Gen. L. ch 265 § 17. As the parties agree, this creates a divisible statute because “dangerous weapon” is not defined in the offense conduct; thus not all armed robberies would constitute firearm offenses. The analysis of a divisible statute in the immigration context is analogous to the application of sentencing enhancements in the sentencing context. In the sentencing context, the court applies Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (<HOLDING>); in the immigration context, we apply a Holdings: 0: holding that a sentencing court in determining whether a burglary was a violent felony that resulted in an enhanced statutory minimum had to rely on charging documents elements of offenses plea colloquies and express findings by the trial judge and could not look to police reports or complaint applications 1: holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense 2: holding that a court can look only to the statutory elements charging documents and jury instructions to determine whether an earlier conviction after trial qualified as a violent felony under the acca 3: holding that inquiry under the acca to determine statutory elements of prior conviction is limited to judicial records and may not include documents that simply state facts such as police reports 4: holding that courts should look to the statutory definition of the crime charged rather than the actual facts of the individuals prior conviction to determine whether the crime qualifies as a violent felony under the acca


Input: 398 So.2d at 982. There, the court found that based on a suicide note, “a jury could conceivably find that the railroad’s negligence in hiring and training of supervisory personnel caused the stress that resulted in the' decedent’s uncontrollable impulse to kill himself. Under such circumstances, the defendant’s negligent or wrongful act would be actionable.” Id. Here, not only is “the broad scope of coverage afforded by [the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.§ 51],” id. inapplicable in this case, no suicide note exists, nor does anything alleged in the complaint plausibly suggest that Defendant Verduce drove Plaintiff beyond the point where he could rationally decide killing himself. See also Kelley v. Beverly Hills Club Apartments, 68 So.3d 954, 958 (Fla.3d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims of negligence Holdings: 0: holding unfair trade practices and consumer protection law applicable to residential leases 1: holding that a residential landlord has no duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts 2: holding that broker owed no fiduciary duty to client as a matter of law 3: holding that attorney breached duty to client by ignoring clients instruction to conduct particular discovery 4: holding apartment complex that contracted with addiction and mental health treatment facility to house facilitys residential clients owed no legal duty to protect a residential client from attempted suicide