Input: 10 . The Disciplinary Commission reviews questions of law de novo and defers to the hearing officer’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 58(b). 11 . Former Standard 9.32(j). 12 . Peasley received the FBI reports from the State Bar four months after he deposed Judge Nichols. But Peasley contends that he did not "revisit” those reports until after the hearing officer issued his decision. 13 . No explanation is given why Judge Nichols did not disclose this contact either before the hearing on the motion to dismiss or during his deposition in this proceeding. 14 . A judge’s findings in the underlying criminal case do not necessarily determine whether or not an ethical violation occurred. Cf. In re Wolfram, 174 Ariz. 49, 53, 847 P.2d 94, 98 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In addition, we also note that ”[o]nly in the Holdings: 0: holding that the postconviction court erred in finding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim proeedurally barred because the courts opinion did not comment specifically on the ineffective counsel argument and the overall holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jurys verdict could not be viewed as an adjudication on the merits of the ineffective assistance claim 1: recognizing claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel usually must be raised in collateral proceeding 2: holding that a trial courts finding of ineffective assistance of counsel in a rule 32 proceeding does not necessarily equate to a finding of a violation of our ethical rules 3: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 4: holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition


Input: the holding over and the continuing payment and acceptance of the agreed-upon rent creates a presumption that the lessee has effectively exercised an option to extend a lease that does not require the lessee to give notice of its decision to extend the lease — was then and continues to be the prevailing view. Carder, Inc. v. Cash, 97 P.3d 174, 181 (Colo.Ct.App.2003); Corthouts v. Conn. Fire Safety Servs. Corp., 2 Conn.Cir.Ct. 34, 193 A.2d 909, 912 (1963); Head v. Scanlin, 258 Ga. 212, 367 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1988); Sanders v. Middleton, 112 Me. 433, 92 A. 488, 489 (1914); Straus v. Shaheen, Inc., 310 Mass. 646, 39 N.E.2d 573, 574 (1942); Enter. Co. v. Americom Corp., 1 Neb.App. 1125, 510 N.W.2d 537, 540-41 (1993); Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100-01 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that where the rent payments during the original and extended terms were the same the lessees payment of rent and continued occupation of the leased premises standing along was insufficient  to establish that they had exercised their option to renew the lease for an additional term 1: holding that increase in rent combined with friction between tenant and landlord does not establish claim under fair housing act 2: holding that a landlord has a duty of reasonable care over common areas or other areas over which the landlord has retained control 3: recognizing that the burden is on the landlord in a lease dispute to establish that the lease contract had been breached and that such breach entitled the landlord to the possession of the property in question 4: holding over and paying the increased rent showed an intent to exercise the option and acceptance by landlord waived notice


Input: determining whether a private right of action for damages can be imphed under the Texas Constitution. We hold there is no impUed private right of action for damages arising under the free speech and free assembly sections of the Texas Constitution. InitiaUy, the officers argue that other jurisdictions have recognized state causes of action based on Bivens. Several states faced with the issue before us have found an im-pUed cause of action while others have rejected such an action. There is Uttle uniformity in how other ent Servs., Inc., 408 So.2d 711 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982), approved, 432 So.2d 567 (Fla.1983) (because the Florida Constitution is self-executing, remedy can be afforded absent statutory authorization); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 300 Md. 520, 479 A.2d 921 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, Inc., 390 Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action 1: holding that the act provides the exclusive procedures and remedies for common law causes of action based on allegations of deception fraud and misrepresentation 2: recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary 3: holding that because common law provides remedies an impued cause of action is not necessary 4: recognizing the cause of action


Input: the committee voted seventeen to three to recommend that the court reporter be required to make a record only “upon request.” Id. at 5422. But when the amended rules issued, the court exercised its prerogative to stay its course: “The official court reporter or court recorder must ... unless excused by agreement of the parties, attend court sessions and make a full record of the proceedings.” Tex.R.App. P. 13.1(a). In short, the Supreme Court of Texas has repeatedly rejected the concept of the court reporter being required to make a record only “upon request” and has instead opted for a mandatory duty “unless excused by agreement of the parties.” This well-considered judgment should be respected by this Court. 1 . See Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 508-09 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (<HOLDING>); Meredith v. Ellis, No. 11-04-00300-CV, 2005 Holdings: 0: holding that general objection did not preserve error on appeal 1: holding timely and sufficiently specific objection is required to preserve error 2: holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of hearing by failing to object 3: holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of trial by failing to object 4: holding that an objection is required to preserve error in court reporters failure to record bench conference and disapproving of holding in tanguma v state 47 sw3d 663 texappcorpus christi 2001 pet refd that rule dispenses with the requirement of an objection to preserve error


Input: Rule 29(c)). 9 . 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) states, in relevant part; It shall be unlawful for any person — (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 10 .It is not clear whether the government attempted to demonstrate that the pistol and rifle were acquired separately and at different times or places. If they did not make such a showing, the indictment under which Alanis was charged would be duplicitous under our recent holding in United States v. Buchmeier, 255 F.3d 415, 422 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The defense did not challenge the indictment Holdings: 0: holding that without such a showing the government may only charge the defendant with one violation of  922g1  regardless of the actual quantity of firearms involved 1: holding that when the indictment charges that a certain minimum quantity of drugs is involved in the offense proof of that quantity is a fourth element of the offense 2: holding that a prior conviction ie one for which the civil right to possess a firearm has not been restored is an element of a 922g1 violation 3: holding that the quantity of drugs involved in an offense does not support a downward departure because the legislature intended the quantity of drugs to be a determining factor in varying penalties 4: holding that because a jury need only agree that a defendant possessed a firearm in order to find a defendant guilty of violating  922g1 a unanimity instruction was not required where defendant was charged with one count of violating  922g1 and multiple firearms were listed in that count


Input: been severed, he has failed to show prejudice. Finally, Cornelio-Legarda correctly asserts the refusal to sever Count 10 resulted in the jury being told he had previously been convicted of a felony. The prior felony was stipulated to by Cornelio-Legarda and the stipulation was read into the record at the close of the Government’s case. The details of the prior conviction were not provided to the jury. The conviction was mentioned only briefly by the Government during its closing argument on the felon-in-possession charge when the prosecutor simply stated: “Mr. Cornelio has stipulated that he is a convicted felon.” On these facts, we cannot conclude Corne-lio-Legarda has met his heavy burden of showing actual prejudice. See United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 290 (10th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Cornelio-Legarda also argues the evidence was Holdings: 0: holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof 1: holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury 2: holding the refusal to sever firearm charges was not an abuse of discretion because the defendants prior conviction was mentioned only briefly during closing argument and limited to establishing the fact of the conviction as an element of the weapons offenses 3: holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime 4: holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense


Input: on a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment, and, consequently, the Fourth Circuit held, it was premature to resolve the issue of unconscionability without allowing the parties to “present evidence of the circumstances surrounding the original consummation of their contractual relationship,” including the existence of meaningful alternatives. See Carlson, 883 F.2d at 292-93 (observing, “unconscionability generally ... include[s] an absence of meaningful choice”) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (alteration in original). As discussed, plaintiffs have submitted no evidence to support a finding that Smith lack a reasonable alternative, or any other evidence to support a finding of procedural unconscionability. See Aron, 143 Cal. App.4th at 808, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, Smith’s reliance on Maniscalco v. Holdings: 0: holding that courts should address a procedural unconscionability defense to the enforcement of an arbitration provision 1: holding that the plaintiffs failure to meet any one of the elements requires dismissal of claim 2: holding in the context of a forumselection provision that the balancing of procedural and substantive unconscionability requires courts to consider each questionable forumselection clause on a casebycase basis and precludes the development of a brightline rule 3: holding that procedural unconscionability is properly evaluated at the time a contract is negotiated 4: holding claim of unconscionability requires showing of both procedural and substantive elements


Input: is whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding. The jury found that “LabCorp breached the license agreement by terminating it” for the Abbott test. LabCorp contends that it did not formally terminate the contract, because the contract requires that the licensee provide written notice. The record contains no evidence of a written termination. The record does show, however, that LabCorp stopped paying royalties on the total homocysteine tests. Refusal to pay royalties is a material breach of the license. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2000). A material breach, in turn, constitutes termination even where the license agreement termination clause does not expressly so provide. See Apex Pool Equip. Corp. v. Lee, 419 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>); see also Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to act in good faith  does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract 1: holding that repudiation alone gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach 2: holding that licensees use of photograph after license expired infringed licensors copyright 3: holding that after jury findings of dual breach unchallenged finding that defendants breach was not excused based on prior material breach of plaintiff constituted implicit finding that there was no material breach by plaintiff 4: holding that a licensees material breach implicitly gives rise to a licensors right to terminate


Input: case of In re White, No. 02-10378 (Bankr.N.D.W.Va. May 2, 2002), the court determined that a foreclosure sale was not complete so long as the debtor retained a legal interest in that property. White, however, never cited § 541(d) and assumed that the foreclosure sale could be avoided even though no party had brought an avoidance action to set aside the sale. 2 . In this regard, the Debtor has attempted to conjure an unsecured claim in his case by requesting that he be permitted to file a single unsecured claim — after expiration of the claims bar date — on behalf a creditor. See infra, Part 11(D). 3 . The reasonable value of property sold at foreclosure is deemed to be the amount realized at the sale. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 114 S.Ct. 1757, 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1994) Holdings: 0: holding that consideration received from a noncollusive real estate mortgage foreclosure sale conducted in conformance with applicable state law is an exchange for reasonably equivalent value 1: holding the real estate sale proceeds 2: holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage 3: holding that the new jersey real estate licensing act is applicable to the sale of a company through a stock sale 4: holding that in contrast to foreclosure of a mortgage secured by personal property foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need hot be at a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable


Input: to do so, one being the plaintiffs failure to respond to several of the defendant’s grounds for dismissal. No. Civ.A. 05-321, 2006 WL 508343, at *3 (D.D.C. March 1, 2006). This court determined that “[b]ecause the plaintiff only addressed some of the defendant’s challenges in her response, the Court will consider those challenges not addressed by the plaintiff in her response as conceded.” Id.; see also Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 577 (D.C.Cir.997) (“Where the district court relies on the absence of a response as a basis for treating the motion as conceded, we honor its enforcement of the rule.”). Sim ill employee at any time and for any reason, or for no reason at all[,]” Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., Inc., 597 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C.1991); see also id. at 33 (<HOLDING>). Both the ADA and the DCHRA provide “a Holdings: 0: holding that absent a law or collective bargaining agreement a municipal employee is an employee atwill 1: recognizing exception to atwill employment doctrine where employee is terminated by employer for refusing to violate municipal regulation 2: recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine 3: holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine 4: recognizing narrow whistleblower exception to the atwill doctrine


Input: County had a duty to warn the Osborns under the rescue doctrine because Dracobly assured Wiseman he would post flyers, failed to post flyers, and discouraged Wiseman from posting flyers. Id. In other words, it held Mason County had a duty to warn the Osborns because Wiseman relied on its assurances. But that cannot support a duty under the rescue doctrine unless the Osborns reasonably relied on Wiseman. And the Osborns fail to show such reliance. Because Mason County had no duty to warn the Osborns — under the rescue doctrine or any other theory of liability — it is entitled to summary judgment. A. Mason County Had No Statutory Duty To Warn the Osborns ¶8 The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the superior court’s conclusion th 925, 937, 968 P.2d 522, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d Holdings: 0: holding that the government may be an identifiable victim 1: holding public entities have no affirmative duty to warn of the release of an inmate with a violent history unless the inmate makes a specific threat against a specific identifiable victim or group of victims 2: holding all that is required to impose a duty to warn is that the defendant knew or should have known of a specific threat made to harm a specific person 3: holding that specific incidents of a victims conduct are not admissible to show that the victim was the first aggxessor 4: holding that common law duty to warn arises when a person being released from custody has made a specific threat of harm directed at a specific individual


Input: this argument is without merit. We have recognized that an IJ need not first identify the particular pieces of missing, relevant evidence, and show that this evidence was reasonably available to the applicant before relying on a lack of corroboration to support an adverse credibility finding. See Maladho Djehe Diallo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 633-34 (2d Cir.2006); cf. Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that an IJ must follow these steps in denying a claim based solely on insufficient corroboration, as opposed to adverse credibility). In light of the agency’s reasonable adverse credibility finding, it did not err in denying Herath Mudiyan-selage’s applications for relief. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a withholding of removal claim necessarily fails if the applicant is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the factual predicate for the claims is the same 1: recognizing that withholding of removal claims must fail if petitioner is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the claims are based on the same factual predicate 2: holding that although the ij did not explicitly analyze the cat claim the denial of the claim was linguistically separate from the denials of asylum and withholding under the ina 3: holding that when the asylum withholding of removal and cat claims are based on the same factual predicate a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each 4: holding that the agency need not analyze separately a withholding of removal claim based on the same facts as an applicants asylum claim


Input: exercise of discretion which is protected by FTCA § 2680(a).”). Further, “[u]nder a plain reading of this provision, practicability limits both the extent to which the USFS is required to eliminate safety hazards and the immediacy with which the USFS must correct high-priority hazards.” Tam v. United States, 905 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1230 (W.D.Wash.2012). Specifically, Section 2332.1 “requires the USFS to determine, within the confines of its many other responsibilities, how quickly to address high-priority hazards,” and to use “its discretion and policy judgment to choose which items to treat as ‘high-priority’ from among the nearly limitless category of potential hazards” present in a National Forest area. Id. at 1231; see also Elder v. United States, 312 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Notably, the discretion vested in the Forest Holdings: 0: holding that police officers charge to protect the public differentiated them from the public 1: holding that federal law can provide source of state public policy for determining whether discharge of employee violated clear mandate of public policy 2: holding that a national park service policy manuals broad mandate to warn the public of and protect it from special hazards involves the exercise of discretion in identifying such hazards 3: holding that for public policy reasons the mere filing of a bar complaint by a defendant against his attorney does not mandate removal of the attorney 4: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion


Input: Our decision in Pangle v. Bend-LaPine School District, 169 Or App 376, 10 P3d 275 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 558 (2001), is instructive. In Pangle, the plaintiffs, who sought to challenge a school district’s disciplinary decision, brought two actions, one seeking a writ of review, and the other seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief under ORS chapter 28, alleging that the school’s disciplinary decision violated various provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 379. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of review as untimely, and we affirmed that dismissal. Id. at 383. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ state law claims for declaratory and injunctive relief o 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiffs seek substantially the same Holdings: 0: holding that second sentence of  506a precludes deduction of hypothetical costs of sale in valuing chapter 13 debt ors real property to be retained by debtor 1: recognizing that a debt ors sequential filing of a chapter 7 petition and then a chapter 13 petition is the socalled chapter 20  2: holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration 3: holding that a corporate chapter 7 debt ors malpractice claim against its bankruptcy attorney was related to its bankruptcy case 4: holding that regarding claims for employment discrimination under ors chapter 659 the exclusivity provision of ors 341022 was inapplicable


Input: with S.182, § 1, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Bien. Sess. (Vt. 2006) (bill as introduced) (“[T]he court shall personally address the defendant in open court, advising him or her of and determining that he or she understands the following: ‘If you are not a citizen of the United Sta ould have informed him that he is subject to automatic denial of citizenship, which he describes as a “direct consequence” of his plea. The Rule 11 colloquy requires that the defendant know and understand the “direct consequences” of his plea in order to ensure that his waiver of constitutional rights is voluntary. See In re Parks, 2008 VT 65, ¶ 14, 184 Vt. 110, 956 A.2d 545 (“A trial court’s failure to satisfy any of the core objectives of Rule 11 — ensuring that the guilty plea is free of coercion, 708 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Rule 11(c)(7) mandates that the court put a Holdings: 0: holding that rule 11 does not require court to ensure that defendant understands consequences of nolo contendere plea on parole eligibility in sexual assault case 1: holding that conviction based on plea of nolo contendere bars subsequent  1983 claim because even though such a plea does not involve admission of guilt it does communicate acceptance of conviction and sentence 2: holding that the trial court had inherent power to grant or deny acceptance of a deferred acceptance of nolo contendere plea 3: holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense 4: holding consistent with hill and with every other circuit that has addressed the question that fedrcrimp 11c does not require trial courts to inform a defendant of parole eligibility consequences of a guilty plea


Input: when infringements occur during the limitations period recovery may be had for past infringements. Recovery is allowed only for those acts occurring within three years of suit and is disallowed for earlier infringing acts.’ ”) (citations omitted); see also Repp v. Webber, 914 F.Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (addressing motion contending that counterclaims filed in 1991 only reached acts of infringement occurring after 1988). In the instant case, after all, a finding that Armstrong’s claims against the defendants accrued in 1991 would mean that Armstrong could only recover damages for those infringing acts occurring less than three years prior to his initiation of the instant action. See Johnson v. Radio City Prods., Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4099(JSR), 1998 WL 171463, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 13, 1998) (<HOLDING>). However, if it is assumed for the sake of Holdings: 0: holding that acts occurring thirteen years before the acts in the instant case were not too remote given the similarity of the offenses 1: holding as to the admissibility of prior bad acts that allegedly took place fourteen and twelve years before the acts alleged in that case that the lapse of time between the defendants sexual acts    goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility 2: holding federal copyright laws threeyear statute of limitations not to bar acts of infringement occurring within three years of action despite fact that related earlier acts of infringement were barred 3: holding that acts of infringement occurring earlier than three years prior to suit are barred by section 507b but that triable issue of fact exists as to whether acts of copying and distribution occurred thereafter 4: holding that an individual could recover for acts occurring outside the statutory time period if at least one act occurred within the time period and the acts were part of the same hostile work environment


Input: 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) requires the court to revoke supervised release and to require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 4. The court must revoke supervised release in this ease under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1), as the defendant tested positive on three occasions for cocaine use and admitted to such use. 5. Chapter Seven of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines also applies to supervised release in this case. The Sentencing Guidelines’ treatment of revocation of supervised release is advisory rather than mandatory. These policy statements are only one factor the court shall consider in addressing modification of supervised release. See United States v. Schwegel, 126 F.3d 551 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 6. The Probation Office’s petition and Holdings: 0: holding that a sentencing court is required by 18 usc  3583g to revoke the defendants term of supervised release  unless defendant could come under the exception in 18 usc  3583d 1: holding that supervised release provisions remained advisory after amendments to 18 usc  3583 2: holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release 3: holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction 4: holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses


Input: frequently made, to accommodate conditions such as plaintiffs insomnia, Kleiner’s opinion is not framed in those terms. Rather, because Kleiner’s opinion does not proffer any specialized knowledge, and invokes legal standards (■ie., that defendants could have accommodated plaintiffs disability without significant impact, and that defendants retaliated against plaintiff), his opinion would “not aid the jury in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute [his] judgment for the jury’s.” See United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir.1994) (“When this occurs, the expert acts outside of his limited role of providing the groundwork in the form of an opinion to enable the jury to make its own informed determination.”); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363-64 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Kleiner’s second opinion — that defendants Holdings: 0: holding that fire expert should not have been sequestered where opposing expert testified to facts and theories not revealed prior to trial 1: holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded 2: holding that the district court should have excluded expert testimony in an excessive force case where the expert testified that defendants conduct was not justified or warranted under the circumstances and totally improper noting that the experts opinions merely told the jury what result to reach 3: holding that expert testimony should be excluded when jury is equally competent to form an opinion about ultimate fact issue or experts testimony is within jurys common knowledge 4: holding that using the opinions of an expert that were not testified to during trial which were irrelevant and solely used to destroy the credibility of the expert was not admissible


Input: or a balance of the conveniences is on the party seeking to proceed with the second action. See First City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Simmons, 878 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.1989). One such special circumstance warranting an exception to the first filed rule occurs when a party files a declaratory judgment action after receiving notice of a planned lawsuit by its adversary. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908; 99 S.Ct. 1215, 59 L.Ed.2d 455 (1979) (“When the declaratory judgment action has been triggered by a notice letter, this equitable consideration may be a factor in the decision to allow the later filed action to proceed to judgment in the plaintiffs’ chosen forum.”); Federal Insurance Co., 808 F.Supp. at 349-50 (<HOLDING>); Sharimalia Food Corp. v. Monarch Wine Co., Holdings: 0: holding first lawsuit and allegations in second lawsuit part of same transaction for res judicata purposes even though different theory of recovery and harm alleged in second lawsuit 1: holding that filing an answer  does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit 2: holding that a party may pursue what would be a compulsory counterclaim in a separate lawsuit but that party runs the risk of losing in the initial lawsuit and being bound by that result 3: recognizing that where first suit is filed in response to notice of a planned lawsuit by the plaintiffs adversary that lawsuit may be dismissed 4: holding that an injured former employees lawsuit was not barred by res judicata where he never authorized the union to represent his interest in a previous lawsuit over the same benefits


Input: to include the University of Notre Dame. Criminal statutes are strictly construed; “they may not be enlarged beyond the fair meaning of the language used.” Pridgeon v. State, 569 N.E.2d 722, 723 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). The fair meaning of the word “school” does not encompass a college or university. See Lawrence v. Cain, 144 Ind. App. 210, 216, 245 N.E.2d 663, 666 (1969) (stating that “the word ‘school’ by common usage, is considered local school corporations and does not generally include higher seats of learning which are usually referred to as colleges or universities.”); see also Pridgeon, 569 N.E.2d at 723 (noting that “[although the word ‘school’ has numerous meanings, this court excluded colleges and universities from the ‘common usage’ of this term in Lawrence ....”); cf. id. at 724 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that, within the meaning of our Holdings: 0: recognizing that property interest based on contractual relationship may arise  when a student enrolls in a college or university pays his or her tuition and fees and attends such school  1: holding that the words school property do not include a college or university 2: holding state university is not a person under  1983 3: holding that the university of maryland law school was a state agency 4: holding college school district immune from suit in federal court under eleventh amendment


Input: As an initial matter, the Court has serious doubts about whether Article V(l)(c) of the New York Convention authorizes this Court to deny confirmation of the Award on the ground that the arbitral panel ex ceeded its powers. Unlike Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, which states that an award may be vacated “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers,” Article V(l)(c) is not so broad; rather, Article V(l)(c) authorizes the Court to deny confirmation of an award if “[t]he award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.” See also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>); Mgmt. & Technical Consultants S.A. v. Holdings: 0: recognizing commonwealth court authority supporting proposition that arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction when they considered issues which were not properly presented in the demand for arbitration 1: holding that a court reviewing an arbitrators award in an act 111 grievance arbitration involves questions regarding 1 the jurisdiction of the arbitrator 2 the regularity of the proceedings 3 an excess of the arbitrators powers and 4 deprivation of constitutional rights 2: holding that an arbitrators award should have been vacated 3: recognizing that article vlc tracks in more detailed form section 10d of the federal arbitration act  which authorizes vacating an award where the arbitrators exceeded their powers  emphasis added 4: holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added


Input: not limited to claiming an abstract concept or algorithm (i.e., a mental process) may not be subject to the same requirements. 13 . See also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184, 101 S.Ct. 1048 ("Industrial processes ... are the types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.” (emphasis added)); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 722, 26 L.Ed. 279 (1880) (‘‘A manufacturing process is clearly an art, within the meaning of the law.” (emphasis added)); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788, 24 L.Ed. 139 (1876) ("A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”). 14 . See AT & T, 172 F.3d at 1355, 1358 (<HOLDING>); State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 ("[W]e Holdings: 0: holding that the trier of fact must consider the length of time and manner of use of trade dress the nature and extent of its use and efforts made in order to promote a conscious connection in the publics mind between the mark and the particular source of origin 1: holding the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the automobile prior to the upset and its value when prepared and presented to the plaintiff for acceptance 2: holding the aggregate value of the land and its improvements is the controlling value 3: holding that to establish a claim for abuse of process a claimant must demonstrate  an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings 4: holding patentable a process that uses the boolean principle in order to determine the value of the pic indicator and that required the use of switches and computers


Input: that Title VII hostile work environment plaintiffs need not prove a pattern, “steady barrage,” or other minimum quantum of discriminatory conduct in order to establish actionable harassment. See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 631 (2d Cir.1997) (“Of course, even a single episode of harassment, if severe enough, can establish a hostile work environment.”); Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir.1988) (“[P]laintiff need not prove that the instances of alleged harassment were related in either time or type. Rather all that the victim of racial harassment need show is that the alleged conduct constituted an unreasonably abusive or offensive work-related environment or adversely affected the reasonable employee’s ability to do his or her job.”); Rodgers v. W 170 (10th Cir.)(<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 983, 117 S.Ct. 437, Holdings: 0: holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment 1: holding that a claim of constructive discharge requires a showing of harassment that is more severe and pervasive than that required to show a hostile work environment 2: holding that harassing conduct not sufficiently severe and pervasive where conduct would not have affected the work environment of a reasonable person 3: holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination 4: holding in a 42 usc  1981 and 1983 context that although a single incident ordinarily will not give rise to a cognizable claim for hostile work environment  where the plaintiff was subjected to a physical assault in which he was punched in the ribs and  temporarily blinded by having mace sprayed in his eyes we cannot say that as a matter of law such an incident is not sufficiently severe in all the circumstances to create a hostile work environment


Input: In his pleadings, Ordonez alleged that Johnson had been negligent per se based on his failure to maintain an assured clear distance between the two vehicles as required by statute. At the close of Ordo-nez’s case, McCurdy moved for a directed verdict on that claim, alleging that Ordonez failed to present any evidence supporting a finding of negligence per se. The trial court entered a directed verdict on Ordonez’s negligence per se claims. At the charge conference, Ordonez requested an instruction on the negligence per se issue, which the trial court refused. To survive a directed verdict, it is axiomatic that a party must state a theory of recovery recognized at law. See Group Hosp. Servs. Inc. v. One & Two Brookriver Center, 704 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1986, no writ) (<HOLDING>). The trial court must submit jury instructions Holdings: 0: holding that trial court properly granted directed verdict when plaintiffs allegations were insufficient to state cause of action under the dtp a 1: holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim 2: holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict 3: holding insufficient the plaintiffs generic allegations 4: recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party


Input: the person. See, e.g., United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 269-70 (10th Cir.1989), in which the court recognized the distinction to be drawn between “standing to challenge a stop and standing to challenge a search.” The court pointed out, citing, inter alia, Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484, 83 S.Ct. at 415, 9 L.Ed.2d at 453, that “[e]ven if defendant lacks standing to challenge the search of the car, if the initial stop was illegal, the seized contraband is subject to exclusion under the 'fruit of the poison tree’ doctrine.” 875 F.2d at 269 n. 2. In United States v. Hill, 855 F.2d 664, 666 (10th Cir.1988) the court excluded evidence seized incident to an illegal arrest. Other cases and treatise writers have gone even further. E.g. United States v. Durant, 730 F.2d 1180, 1182 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 214 Holdings: 0: holding that the government must proffer clear evidence of an independent untainted investigation that inevitably would have uncovered the same evidence as that discovered through the illegal search 1: holding that a passenger has standing to challenge a stops constitutionality because the passenger is seized from the moment a car is stopped 2: holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress 3: holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile 4: recognizing that a passenger in an automobile that is stopped may on the basis that it was illegal move to suppress evidence uncovered as a direct result of the stop


Input: citations imposed upon Releo. The operative word in the statute is “for,” as it signals when a licensed electrician is needed. As it is written, a licensed electrician is required to install any conduit when the purpose of such conduit is “for carrying * * * electricity[.]” Section 5-6-2 (emphasis added). Clearly, the PVC conduit in this case was not to be used for the passage of air or water, but specifically for the carrying of electrical conductors and electricity. Further, we agree with the hearing justice that the petitioners’ argument—that the PVC conduit in question did not fall under § 5-6-2 because no wires or conductors were present within the PVC conduit itself—would reduce the term conduit in the statute to “mere surplusage.” In re Harrison, 992 A.2d 990, 994 (R.I.2010) (<HOLDING>). The substantial record developed below Holdings: 0: holding that a phrase should be interpreted consistent with the context of the statute in which it is contained 1: holding phrase based upon or attributable to is not ambiguous and rejecting secondary suit construction 2: holding that construction that neutralizes any provision of a contract should not be adopted if the contract can be construed to give effect to all provisions 3: holding that a statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: holding that no construction of a statute should be adopted that would demote any significant phrase or clause to mere surplusage quoting state v clark 974 a2d 558 572 ri 2009


Input: § 1252(a)(1). Although the jurisdictional statute strips us of jurisdiction over "any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section ... 1229b," 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we have interpreted that provision to apply only to discretionary aspects of the denial of cancellation of removal. See Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir.2003). Satisfaction of the continuous residency requirement is not such a discretionary decision and is thus subject to our review. See Mendez-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 428 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir.2005); Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585, 588 n. 4 (3d Cir.2005). 4 . Shah did raise the continuous physical presence issue in his reply brief, but that was insufficient to preserve the issue. See In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if Shah could raise his Holdings: 0: holding that a partys failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waived the issue even though the party raised the issue in his reply brief 1: holding that the petitioners failure to address an issue in the argument portion of his opening brief waived the issue 2: holding that issue raised for the first time in reply brief was waived 3: holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue 4: holding that failure to raise an issue in an opening brief waives that issue


Input: v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, 33 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied). Given that Section 501.008 of the Government Code precludes an inmate from filing suit until he has exhausted his remedies through the grievance system, an inmate’s failure to provide the required information subjects his suit to dismissal. See Smith, 33 S.W.3d at 341. The second purpose served by Section 14.005(a)’s requirements is that the information provided by the inmate will enable the trial court to determine whether the inmate has filed his claim within the time period specified by subsection (b). See Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied); but see Francis v. TDCJ-CID, 188 S.W.3d 799, 803-04 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2006, no pet.)(<HOLDING>). If the inmate does not file his suit within Holdings: 0: holding that even in absence of copy of written decision inmates affidavit and notations on grievance form provided trial court with information necessary to determine whether inmates suit was filed within statutory time period 1: recognizing first amendment retaliation claim where official filed a disciplinary report following an inmates filing of a grievance 2: holding that inmates have no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in access to grievance procedure 3: holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause 4: holding that district court erred in dismissing inmates complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmates allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms


Input: Ark. 142, 60 S.W.3d 464 (2001); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037 (Del. 2001); State v. Paul, 62 P.3d 389 (Okla.Crim. App.2003). Many of these states simply cited a case from the federal circuit that covers the state to support their approach to this issue. {33} We disagree with the reasoning of the Seventh and Fifth Circuits and the state courts that follow them because it ignores the scope requirement of the second-prong of the Terry test, which our case law has consistently recognized as appropriate to analyze traffic stops. As we said in Werner, an officer’s actions during the “investigatory detention must be reasonably related to the circumstances that initially justified the stop.” 117 N.M. at 317, 871 P.2d at 973; see, e.g., Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, ¶ 20, 126 N.M. 569, 973 P.2d 246 (<HOLDING>). We feel the cases relied upon by the Seventh Holdings: 0: holding that police officers are entitled to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a traffic violation 1: holding that where police officers had stopped a vehicle because they suspected that the motorist was intoxicated irrespective of whether the deputies were justified in detaining the motorist after he showed no signs of intoxication and even if they had not after approaching the motorist observed conditions raising a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot they were entitled to ask the motorist for permission to search his vehicle 2: holding that defendant was unreasonably seized under fourth amendment when officer detained him to ask questions unrelated in scope to the reasons that justified the initial traffic stop 3: holding that for purposes of determining whether the roadblock worked a fourth amendment seizure the controlling considerations are whether 1 the motorist was meant to be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock and 2 the motorist was so stopped 4: holding that any questions an officer asks of a stopped motorist must be reasonably related to the circumstances which justified his initial stop


Input: overreaching, or compromised independence). We do not presume to draft precise disclaimers for each of appellants’ four claims; we leave that task to the agency in the first instance. Nor do we rule out the possibility that where evidence in support of a claim is outweighed by evidence against the claim, the FDA could deem it incurable by a disclaimer and ban it outright. For example, if the weight of the evidence were against the hypothetical claim that “Consumption of Vitamin E reduces the risk of Alzheimer’s disease,” the agency might reasonably determine that adding a disclaimer such as “The FDA has determined that no evidence supports this claim” would not suffice to mitigate the claim’s misleadingness. Cf. FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 42-43 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Finally, while we are skeptical that the Holdings: 0: holding that defendants statement that it owned the rights to a trademark did not give rise to a false advertising claim under the lanham act 1: holding in a false advertising case under the lanham act that a proposed disclaimer would not suffice to cure the misleadingness of an advertising claim 2: holding that there must be a causal connection between an insureds advertising and an alleged injury to trigger coverage for an advertising injury 3: holding that both lanham act false advertising claim and a false advertising claim made under section 349 or section 350 require a showing that the advertisement was false or misleading 4: holding that while under a false association claim parties need not be direct competitors under a false advertising claim they do


Input: 273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir.2001) (rejecting claim that deposition testimony became a “judicial document” “because the Court reviewed it in order to decide whether or not to enter [a] protective order”); United States v. Wolfson, 55 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir.1995) (“We are not aware ... of any common-law principle that documents submitted to a court in camera for the sole purpose of confirming that the refusal to disclose them to another party was proper, are to be deemed judicial records open to the public.”); accord United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 209 (3d Cir.2007) (noting that “documents filed with the court are generally subject to the common law right of access, unless attached to a discovery motion”); Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 165 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). See generally Newsday, 730 F.3d at 167 n. 15 Holdings: 0: holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions 1: holding that there is a presumptive common law right to public access to all material filed in connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions  but no such right as to discovery motions and their supporting documents 2: holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions 3: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents 4: holding that there is no right of public access to documents considered in civil discovery motions


Input: of the ADA provide a definition for physical • impairment which includes “any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: musculoskeletal ...” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). The term impairment “cannot be divorced from its dictionary and common sense connotation of a diminution in quality, value, excellence or strength.” de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir.1986). Szalay’s physician testified that Szalay’s knee injury has a permanent, negative effect on his bending and climbing capabilities. Because Szalay’s condition so diminishes his abilities, it is a physical impairment as defined by the EEOC regulations. See Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 659 F.Supp. 1328 (S.D.Tex.1987) (<HOLDING>). Once the Court determines that an individual Holdings: 0: holding that for a plaintiff to prove that he has a record of impairment under 42 usc  121022b there must be a record of an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities 1: holding that workers compensating for pain in his right knee by dependence upon his left knee was insufficient to remove the rightknee injury from the schedule overruling masterbrand cabinets inc v ruggs 891 so2d 869 alacivapp2004 which had held that when the effect of a lefthand injury extended to the right hand because of the workers overuse of the right hand the lefthand injury should be treated as nonscheduled 2: holding that plaintiffs knee injury was considered an impairment because it prevented poleclimbing 3: holding that a plaintiffs bare allegation of a walking impairment was not sufficient to avoid summary judgment because the plaintiffs deposition testimony provides little support for the claim that his impairment rises to the level of a disability 4: holding that an allegation of impairment to freedom of expression demonstrated an irreparable injury


Input: stated: It is virtually impossible to resolve this dilemma on purely linguistic grounds. The ambiguity makes either the reading urged by the Plaintiff or by the Defendant possible. However, to accept Ethicon’s interpretation we must believe that the PTO, in reissuing the Fox Patent, intended to significantly expand the scope of that patent. Ethicon v. U.S. Surgical, 855 F.Supp. at 1514-15. At our recent hearing we were able to take a much closer look at the file history and from this we were convinced that the PTO did not intend to grant sweeping new scope in reissuing the Fox Patent. Initially, we must recognize that new Claim 24 must be understood in light of the other claims and the entire file history of the Fox invention. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d at 1056 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the terms used in Claim 24 must be Holdings: 0: holding that although term was not limited by the specification it was expressly defined in a narrow manner in the prosecution history 1: holding that in order to understand patent claims a court can take instruction from the other claims the specification and the prosecution history 2: holding that limitations from the specification should not be read into the claims 3: holding that a court can correct a patent claim for a grammatical error where the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims 4: holding that summary judgment was improperly granted in view of the need for careful interpretation of the original and reissue claims in light of the specification the prosecution history and the alleged industry practice


Input: a defense to the claims asserted. It is a "constitutional principle” that "limit[s] the federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III,” Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 64, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), therefore the Court considers Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity as attacking subject matter jurisdiction. 9 . FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753-54, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002) (explaining that "the Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the States' sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity .... the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890) (<HOLDING>). 10 . This suit primarily seeks declaratory Holdings: 0: holding that sovereign immunity barred a federal question suit against a state brought by one of its own citizens even though the text of the eleventh amendment only addresses suits brought by citizens of another state 1: holding that eleventh amendment bars federal suits against state courts 2: holding that the eleventh amendment protects a state from suit by its own citizens 3: holding state immune from suit brought by its own citizens 4: holding that utah did not waive its eleventh amendment immunity with respect to a suit brought in federal court because state statute provided for exclusive original jurisdiction in its own courts


Input: courts had held that “absolute immunity was conferred upon judges acting within their lawful powers, even where the actions allegedly involved serious misconduct,” and that this principle “was directly imported into the law of the United States as the common-law basis for judicial immunity.” This common law principle is most often used to immunize a judge from liability in civil litigation, but it has also been used to support the proposition that a judge cannot be compelled to testify about his or her thought process in making a decision in a case. See State v. Lewis, 656 So.2d 1248 (Fla.1994) (stating that a judge may not be examined as to his or her thought process in making a decision); Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Marks, 898 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). We can draw the same analogy to the Holdings: 0: holding order of contempt sentence without statutory opportunity for appeal was in error but nevertheless involved a judicial act subject to judicial immunity 1: recognizing that absolute judicial immunity is not grounded in any special esteem for those who perform judicial functions and certainly not from a desire to shield abuses of office but because any lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process itself 2: holding that individuals acting in a legislative capacity at a regional level are entitled to absolute immunity 3: holding that a hearing officer acting in a judicial capacity was entitled to claim judicial immunity and could not be compelled to give testimony about his mental process in deciding a case 4: recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction


Input: 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (requiring that a person be presently- — -not potentially or hypothetically- — substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability). “Mere 249 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir.2001) (“A person is ‘disabled’ under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1203, 152 L.Ed.2d 141 (2002); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir.2000) (“Major life activities include such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working.”); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Rather, the critical question before the Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs evidence showing that defendant refused to allow her to work as flight attendant because of her weight failed to demonstrate that defendant perceived her as substantially limited in any major life activity 1: holding that plaintiffs severe allergic reactions to peanutladen foods did not substantially limit major life activity of breathing because her ability to breath was otherwise generally unrestricted 2: holding that plaintiffs claim that she was disabled because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ada 3: holding that plaintiffs hernia condition was not sufficient to render her disabled under the ada 4: holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ada


Input: Landlord delivered no later than January 15, 2006.” Starr Pis.' Compl. Exs. P & Q, at ¶ 24.24. 11 .On July 23, 2008, APA and the remaining Defendants named in the Writ of Summons before the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, filed a Notice of Removal, seeking to remove the action to federal court based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1446. On July 31, 2008, Starr Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand, arguing that Defendants' removal to federal court was premature as a matter of law because Starr Plaintiffs had yet to file a complaint in the state court. Following a hearing on these motions, the Court granted Starr Plaintiffs’ motion to remand, relying upon the Third Circuit's decision in Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 223 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the case returned to Holdings: 0: holding that the one year limit applies only to removals based on something other than the initial pleading  that is only to removals pursuant to the second paragraph of 28 usc  1446b 1: holding that a writ of summons alone can no longer be the initial pleading that triggers the 30day period for removal under the first paragraph of 28 usc  1446b 2: holding other paper must be unequivocally clear and certain to start the time limit running for a notice of removal under the second paragraph of section 1446b 3: holding that removal under the second paragraph of  1446b did not apply and defendants therefore had removed outside of the thirty day time period triggered at the time of service of the complaint 4: holding that an initial pleading triggered the thirtyday time limit for removal under  1446b because it sets forth on its face express allegations as to the monetary amount of damages


Input: Those requirements include: (1) written notice to the parolee of the alleged parole violations, (2) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him, (3) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, (4) right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, (5) neutral and detached hearing body, and (6) written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the requirements of due process include informing a defendant of the range of penalties involved in the crime with which he is being charged. Commonwealth v. Zanine, 444 Pa. 361, 282 A.2d 367 (1971); see, e.g., United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1504 (9th Cir.1987) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>); see also Lanzetta v. Board of Probation and Holdings: 0: holding that waiver of counsel during pcr review requires a judicial inquiry into whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel 1: holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel 2: holding that a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel only after his sic is aware of the nature of the charges against him the possible penalties and the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation 3: holding that written waivers referring only in general terms to potential advantages of representation by counsel and potential disadvantages of selfrepresentation did not sufficiently demonstrate awareness of the dangers of selfrepresentation 4: holding that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel even though the exchange between the magistrate and the defendant was inadequate standing alone to inform the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation


Input: sentence ran concurrently to the federal sentence, and not vice versa. This analysis fails to take into account the effect of the Brazos County sentence, which the TDCJ re-commenced on November 28, 1998, before Mr. Thomas was sentenced in the federal case. After his federal sentence was imposed, he was returned to state custody, still serving a state sentence from Brazos County. Any time he served before being transferred to Burleson County custody was thus state time, not federal time. Also, although the federal sentence was imposed prior to his Burleson County sentence, under the applicable law his federal time did not actually begin to run until he was taken into federal custody, which only occurred on April 5, 2006. See Binford v. United States, 436 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). Finally, we Holdings: 0: holding that merely alluding to federal law does not raise a federal question 1: holding that a federal sentence does not commence until a prisoner is actually received into federal custody for that purpose 2: holding that a determination of whether the defendants actions constituted a taking under the louisiana constitution does not implicate any issues of federal law and thus does not provides a basis for a federal district court to exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction 3: holding that ncaa was not an indirect recipient of federal funds even though it received dues from schools that received federal funds 4: holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court


Input: checkpoints are inherently unconstitutional, the checkpoints the Court sanctions today are designed in such a way as to engender fright and concern in law-abiding motorists. Also, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial courts’ rulings, demonstrate neither empirical evidence of checkpoint effectiveness, nor that explicit, neutral guidelines for police conduct were issued and followed. The trial courts had sufficient evidence to hold that the checkpoints were conducted in an unreasonable fashion, and therefore, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 1 . State v. Rodriguez, 877 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Mo. banc 1994). 2 . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 3 . See State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995). 4 . See, e.g. Op. at 573-574 (<HOLDING>); Op. at 575 (holding that there is "no Holdings: 0: holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county 1: recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions  2: holding that evidence demonstrates that the checkpoints were modeled after the successful program in phelps county that evidence shows that the particular checkpoints at issue here were planned in such a way as to increase the likelihood of actually capturing drug traffickers that evidence also demonstrated that phelps county law enforcement officials who helped texas county officials operate the checkpoint had been told by drug couriers that they had been warned to avoid 144 a quick glance at a missouri road map reveals that us 60 is the other major westtoeast roadway across southern missouri 3: holding that defendants successful completion of pretrial intervention program in one county and the entry of a nolle prosequi as to the relevant charges in that county barred subsequent prosecution in a separate county for charges arising out of the same conduct 4: holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county


Input: damages which the plaintiff may seek in this case, including a description of the extent of Davis’ injuries and all medical expenses that he has incurred as a result of the May 30, 2003 motor vehicle accident; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the defendant has seven (7) days from the service of the plaintiffs response to show cause to this Court why it has subject matter jurisdiction and that this case should not be remanded to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Mississippi. 1 . Ford is both incorporated and has its principal place of business in a state other than Mississippi. See Notice of Removal, ¶ 3. The plaintiff is a resident and citizen of Jefferson County, Mississippi. Id. 2 . See St. Paul Mercury Indent. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938) (<HOLDING>). 3 .The complaint requests ''[a]ctual and Holdings: 0: holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint 1: holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith 2: holding that where the complaint requests a specific sum of damages that amount controls if made in good faith 3: holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law 4: holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith


Input: will not state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.” Turner, 233 Ill. 2d at 502-03. The Complaint here fails to state a cause of action. Although attorney honesty and fidelity are vital to the legal system and a matter in the public interest, we do not believe that a former law firm employee can be immune from the general rule of at-will employment merely by complaining to the Firm and its attorneys prior to being fired about deceitful but seemingly legal billing practices he no longer wishes to participate in. While we do not condone the Firm’s alleged misconduct here, we are not persuaded that plaintiffs allegation of “honesty and fidelity” in the legal system satisfies the supreme court’s “narrow definition of public policy” in retaliatory discharge cases. Id. at 507-08 (<HOLDING>). We affirm the dismissal of the Complaint. Holdings: 0: holding that based on the narrow scope of a retaliatory discharge action the general concept of patient safety by itself is simply inadequate to justify finding an exception to the general rule of atwill employment 1: holding that an atwill employee who alleges retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers compensation claim has stated a cause of action under pennsylvania law 2: recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge 3: recognizing general rule 4: recognizing narrow whistleblower exception to the atwill doctrine


Input: reasonably trustworthy information would lead a man of reasonable caution and prudence to believe that he will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime.” Moulden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (quoting Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex. Crim.App.1972)). In Parker v. State, the Texas- Court of Criminal Appeals held that “if [an] [ojfficer ... makes a traffic stop and, when the driver rolls down his window, the redolent odor of burnt marihuana wafts out, he may well have probable cause to believe that the person (or persons) inside that small, enclosed area has been or is committing the offense of possession of marihuana.” Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 597 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (citing Moulden, 576 S.W.2d at 818 (<HOLDING>)). Moreover, in Jordan v. State, the Court of Holdings: 0: holding the odor of burnt marihuana standing alone provided  peace offieers with the requisite probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the defendants vehicle 1: holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs 2: holding the odor of an etherlike substance in combination with other circumstances gave officers probable cause to search a vehicle 3: holding that probable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place 4: holding that the court of appeals properly concluded that the odor of marijuana emanating from defendants vehicle constituted probable cause to search the vehicle


Input: or motive.’ ” Duggan v. State, 285 Ga. 363, 366 (677 SE2d 92) (2009) (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150, 158 (115 SCt 696, 130 LE2d 574) (1995)). “ ‘If the statement was made later, proof of the statement does not assist the jury to evaluate the witness’s testimony because the reliability of the statement is subj ect to the same doubt as the trial testimony.’” Character v. State, 285 Ga. 112, 119 (674 SE2d 280) (2009) (citation omitted). Applying this principle, this Court has held that a co-defendant’s prior statement made with the alleged motive of currying favor with the State to obtain a plea agreement is not admissible as a prior consistent statement when the co-defendant testifies for the State at trial. See Mister v. State, 286 Ga. 303, 307 (687 SE2d 471) (2009) (<HOLDING>). See also Moon v. State, 288 Ga. 508, 511-512 Holdings: 0: holding that no constitutional violation occurred where state prosecutor did not allow defendant to withdraw guilty plea and reinstated additional charges after defendant violated plea agreement by failing to testify truthfully at codefendants trial 1: holding that a codefendants prior statements made at his guilty plea hearing were not admissible to corroborate his trial testimony because the witnesss guilty plea hearing did not predate any improper motive he may have had to testify against the defendant 2: holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea 3: holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari 4: holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional


Input: an advance of $1,000 in defense of a claim of back rent. He then entered an appearance in the case and filed an answer, but did nothing else while a judgment was entered against his client in the amount of $22,000. In a third client’s matter, McCartney required an advance payment of $23,500 to handle a real estate matter, but then took no action. While these clients attempted to contact McCartney, he closed his law office, absconded, did nothing to salvage his client’s interests, and subsequently failed to respond to his bar complaints. Moss’s behavior does not rise to the level in McCartney. However, Moss does have a past disciplinary record. We hold that the negotiated sanction is appropriate and in accord with case law. See Thompson v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 360 S.W.3d 238 (Ky.2012) (<HOLDING>). B.Dismissing Count Y: SCR 3.130(8.1)(b). The Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys failure to timely file application for suspension of deportation despite contrary representations to client constituted ineffective assistance 1: holding that plaintiffs failure to respond to argument warranted dismissal with prejudice 2: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client 3: holding that suspension for fortyfive days with requirement of paying restitution of 47950 to client plus costs was appropriate disciplinary sanction for attorneys conduct relating to representation of client in divorce action in failing to act with diligence failing to keep client informed failing to adequately explain matters to client and failing to return unearned advancefee upon termination of representation and for attorneys conduct in failing to respond to two letters from office of bar counsel seeking explanation of inconsistencies in attorneys response to bar complaint 4: holding thompsons earlier private admonition coupled with his new violations warranted a sixtyone day suspension to be partially probated with conditions thompson admitted the following violations a lack of diligence a failure to safekeep client property a failure to timely terminate representation upon disability a failure to communicate with clients and failure to return client files and unearned fees


Input: atffl 16-22. 40 . Doc. No. 41 at ¶ 35. 41 . In re Seaway Intern. Transport, Inc., 341 B.R. 333, 334 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2006). 42 . In re McCarn’s Allstate Fin., Inc., 326 B.R. 843, 852 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2005) ("Once a court determines that transfers are avoidable under Bankruptcy Code section 548 or under Florida Statutes section 726.105, (available to the Trustee under Bankruptcy Code section 544(b)), the Court must then look to Bankruptcy Code section 550 to determine the liability of the transferee of the avoided transfer.”); see also In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir.2005) (discussing re-coverability issues under § 550 for transfers avoided under § 544 and FUFTA). But see In re Jackson, 318 B.R. 5, 26 (Bankr.D.N.H.2004) subsequently aff'd, 459 F.3d 117 (1st Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 43 . In re Kingsley, 518 F.3d 874, 877 (11 th Holdings: 0: holding that the avoidance powers provide for recovery only if the recovery is for the benefit of the estate 1: holding that federal courts presiding over causes of action created by state law should apply state substantive law but federal procedural law 2: holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law 3: holding clear and convincing standard to prove fraud or fraudulent intent and preponderance of the evidence to prove other elements under  727 4: holding that because the plaintiff could not prove avoidance of the transfers under  548 and only proved elements of the state law fraudulent transfer causes of action through  544 the plaintiff was limited to the state law recovery scheme and not  550


Input: of the district court’s legal conclusions is de novo and thus less deferential. See id at 1216. But we give “due deference” to the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts of each case. Id. at 1216-17. In addition, we review all sentences — whether inside or outside the suggested Guidelines range — for “reasonableness” under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir.2008). A. To justify an offense level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), the district court had to find that Defendant possessed a firearm “in connection with another felony offense.” The additional felony offense identified by the district court, in this case, was kidnapping. See Cummings v. State, 968 P.2d 821, 832 (Okla.Crim.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Morris, 562 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding the felony conviction requirement of section 1202a1 was not satisfied because oklahoma courts did not view the deferred judgment as a conviction 1: recognizing that kidnapping under oklahoma law is a felony 2: holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony 3: holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law 4: holding that a defendant is guilty of the class a felony of kidnapping only if the jury finds that the evidence establishes both the class b felony of kidnapping as defined in rsa 63311 and the elements of a class a felony set forth in rsa 6331 ii


Input: of interference, in the context of an easement acquired by condemnation. In Blair v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 187 Wis. 552, 556-57, 203 N.W. 912 (1925), the court held that when an electric company has a right-of-way, it has the right to make a reasonable clearance for its wires by cutting down and trimming trees. "To hold otherwise," the court noted, "would be to jeopardize the efficient operation of the line and perhaps to subject to greater peril the public or those who may have occasion to be on or near the wires, for it is a well known fact that, especially in wet weather, trees touching high-voltage electric wires transmit the current to the ground, where it may do damage to persons or property." Id.; see also Klump v. Cybulski, 274 Wis. 604, 613-14, 81 N.W.2d 42 (1957) (<HOLDING>). The reasoning of these cases leads us to Holdings: 0: holding that the court must determine rights in condemnation ujnless  there is found in the deed of the plaintiffs granting the easement to the railroad company language indicating a purpose or operating to pass a larger or more extended right or easement than that which would have been acquired by judgment in condemnation proceedings   1: holding the easement a power company acquires by condemnation may include the right to cut down trees to provide sufficient clearance for its wires 2: holding that permanent easement arising from condemnation of pipeline easement reduced property value by 20 3: recognizing that an easement may entitle the easement owner to do acts which were not for the easement would constitute a nuisance 4: holding that when federal government acquires property through condemnation it must account for state and local property taxes interest and penalties


Input: the Supreme Court limited in Finley. In Finley, the plaintiff was attempting to bring non-federal defendants into a federal action based on a statute which is explicitly written to allow jurisdiction over only federal defendants. In the case at bar, a defendant is attempting to join a third- party defendant under the impleader rule which explicitly allows such an inclusion. The justice of the impleader rule is that it allows a defendant, who is itself in federal court against its will, to bring in parties who in fact may be more responsible to the plaintiff. Id. at 204-205. Further, the Sixth Circuit has recently applied the Finley rule to a situation with a “posture” or “context” analogous to the present case. See Stallworth v. City of Cleveland, 893 F.2d 830, 836-839 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); See also Hall American Center Associates v. Holdings: 0: recognizing loss of consortium claims 1: holding that the district court should not have exercised pendent party jurisdiction over the husbands loss of consortium claim and therefore the jurys verdict in his favor had to be reversed 2: recognizing cause of action for loss of consortium 3: holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse 4: holding that district court appropriately retained pendent jurisdiction over state claims where it had invested time and resources in the case


Input: Judge. Freddick Woodson appeals the revocation of his probation for committing a new offense. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison. We affirm. In doing so, we reject without discussion Mr. Wood-son’s suggestion that he was not properly advised of his probationary terms. See State v. Green, 667 So.2d 959, 960-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). We write briefly to explain that Mr. Woodson Holdings: 0: holding that due process does not require notice or hearing before writ of garnishment issues 1: holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice 2: holding that due process does not require defendant to receive verbal notice of standard probation conditions because all persons have constructive notice of states criminal statutes 3: holding that alien need not receive actual notice for due process requirements to be satisfied 4: holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action


Input: ured professor at the same time. (7/1/14 Liu Tr. at 74:18-75:2). The employment agreement required Dr. Liu to agree to the University’s Patent, Invention, and Copyright Statement. (Employment Agreement at 49) (7/1/14 Liu Tr. at 94:24-95:9.) In pertinent part, this statement provides that the University “has a valid interest” in Dr. Liu’s discovery or invention of patentable items. (Employment Agreement at 49). Further, Dr. Liu’s employment agreement explicitly required him to disclose all discoveries and inventions to the University and assign all inventions to the University. (Id. at 48-49) (“I hereby [agree to disclose my inventions], and assign to the University all discoveries and inventions.... ”)). Dr. Liu testified that he believed !he di , 601 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). ' Adaptix asserts Dr. . Liu was on a partial Holdings: 0: holding that due to the csra a federal employee has no independent right of action for damages against a supervisor who improperly disciplined the employee for exercising his first amendment rights 1: holding if an employee does not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern the employee has no first amendment cause of action based on his or her employers reaction to the speech 2: holding that the employers failure to interact with the employee does not preclude the employee from losing on summary judgment because the employee must still prove that a reasonable accommodation could have been made 3: holding that a sexual assault on a female employee was of a personal nature and not directed against the employee as part of the employment relationship 4: holding that the contractual language employee assigns his inventions has the effect of expressly granting rights with no further action needed on the part of the employee


Input: false. Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106). “[M]ere conclusory allegations of fraud are insufficient.” Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds as stated in Flood v. Miller, 35 Fed.Appx. 701, 703 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002). Broad allegations that include “no particularized supporting detail” do not suffice, Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001), but “statements of the time, place and nature of the alleged fraudulent activities are sufficient,” Wool, 818 F.2d at 1439. Allegations of fraud based on information and belief may suffice as to matters peculiarly within the opposing party’s knowledge, so long , Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). We recognize other portions of the complaint Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs speculations did not satisfy rule 9b requirements 1: holding a complaint failed to satisfy rule 9b where the allegations were lacking in detail 2: holding that charge of money laundering need not satisfy rule 9b 3: holding a broad claim with no factual support was insufficient to satisfy rule 9b 4: holding allegations that fraudulent statements were made during fourmonth period insufficient to satisfy rule 9b


Input: On the contrary, each of the co-conspirators testified under oath that his or her interview summary was true and correct. See e.g., PL’s Ex. 210 at 8-9 (Tr. Gnau G.J. testimony); PL’s Ex. 211 at 9 (Tr. Marcus G.J. testimony); PL’s Ex. 214 at 9 (Voss Grand Jury testimony); PL’s Ex. 269 at 10 (Tr. Spartin G.J. testimony); PL’s Ex. 204 at 10 (Peterson Grand Jury testimony). Had any of the co-conspirators testified falsely that he or she had told the plaintiff about the- illegal payoff scheme, the plaintiff would be rightly outraged, but that is not what occurred before the grand jury. Second, no legal requirement obliges prosecutors to include exculpatory information in presentations to the grand jury. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54-55, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Borda, 905 F.Supp.2d 201, Holdings: 0: holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant 1: holding that the government is not required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury 2: holding the prosecutor is required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury 3: holding that courts have no authority to require the government to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury because it would alter the grandjurys historical role 4: holding that the prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession


Input: may have led to discovery of admissible evidence, they present no intelligible explanation of how that is so, nor can we detect any; the requests have every indicia of the quintessential fishing expedition.”). Therefore, as Defendant’s subpoenas, seeking Plaintiffs entire employment file from his former employers, are not limited to seeking only those documents relevant to this FLSA overtime compensation action or the claims based upon an oral employment contract, they are overly broad on their face. See Hendricks, 275 F.R.D. at 255-56 (finding subpoenas to be overbroad because “compli anee with the subpoenas will result in defendants receiving a plethora of documents, the vast majority of which would be completely unrelated to any possible issue in this case”); Pena, slip op. at 3-4 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original); Barrington, 2007 WL Holdings: 0: holding that records relating to a student court were not education records 1: recognizing a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents including judicial records and documents 2: holding that subpoenas seeking any and all documents files and records reflecting or relating to the employment of each plaintiff were overly broad on their face 3: holding that subpoenas seeking the complete employment file of plaintiff including employment application payroll records medical records evaluations correspondence and all other records omitting nothing  were overbroad and could be quashed on that basis alone 4: holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception


Input: or death shall be applica ble for the full period during which compensation is payable.” In this case, the trial court awarded the employee TTD benefits of $771 per week from December 21, 2012, to July 1, 2013, which was the average weekly wage in effect at the time of the employee’s accident, but $788 per week from July 1, 2013 .to January 28, 2014, .based upon the director’s determination of the average weekly wage of the state as of July 1, 2013. The employer contends, and the employee concedes, that the increase in. the TTD benefits from July 1, 2013, mandated by the trial court was contrary to § 25-5- d for review was final and ordered that the petition would instead be treated as an appeal. See generally Ex parte Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC, 209 So.3d 496, 502 (Ala.Civ.App.2016) (<HOLDING>). Because the trial court’s ruling was a final Holdings: 0: holding that if a trial court enters a judgment finding that an injury is compensable ordering payment for medical treatment and awarding temporarytotaldisability benefits regardless of whether the amount of those benefits is specified in the judgment this court will treat such a judgment as final for purposes of appeal 1: holding that order finding that injury arose out of and in the course of the employment and awarding medical benefits was interlocutory order that would not support appeal 2: holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal 3: holding that even an order that establishes entitlement to a judgment is not final unless it  actually enters or renders a judgment  or includes specific language of finality necessary for a judgment  to be considered final for purposes of an appeal 4: holding trial court may make a judgment final for purposes of appeal by severing the causes and parties disposed of by the judgment into a different cause


Input: -activity to which the petition to seal pertains. Once the applicant receives the certificate of eligibility, he or she then petitions the court to seal the record. § 943.059, Fla. Stat. (2016). However, criminal records that “relate to” certain enumerated offenses, such as violations listed in section 907.041, Florida Statutes, which includes an act of domestic violence, cannot be sealed by the court. Id Here, the FDLE should have issued the certificate because Lazard satisfied the conditions of section 943.059(2). Then, upon a petition to seal, it would be for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Lazard’s offense “related, to” an act of domestic violence precluding his record from being sealed. See J.A.H. v. State, 198 So.3d 884, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (<HOLDING>), At this hearing, the court must consider all Holdings: 0: holding that before denying petition trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and state specific reasons for denying the petition 1: holding that an appeal denying a petition for what was essentially a petition for a new trial to reopen the criminal process was not separately appealable 2: holding that the trial court must consider these factors in denying appellants petition to transfer prior to trial 3: holding that untimely petition for postconviction petition divests trial court of jurisdiction 4: holding that district court error was not clear error in denying petition for mandamus


Input: representative of ISA in the Shields settlement; and (2) the FDIC’s mismanagement claims are different from the claims advanced by the shareholder plaintiffs in Shields. We are not persuaded. 1 The FDIC argues that “[t]he fact that one entity is a wholly owned subsidiary of another entity is insufficient to establish privity between the two entities for purposes of the defense of claim preclusion.” The FDIC raises four major contentions in support of this argument. First, the FDIC’s contention that “[t]he parent/subsidiary relationship of ICA and ISA, though potentially relevant, is not dis-positive” is unpersuasive in light of this court’s clear holdings to the contrary. See, e.g., Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific Malibu Dev. Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 920, 112 S.Ct. 1295, Holdings: 0: holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control 1: holding that parent corporation could not be held liable for any acts of whollyowned subsidiary although boards of directors of the two corporations overlapped in all other respects corporation had not disregarded subsidiarys corporate separateness had not involved itself directly in management of subsidiary and had not otherwise dominated or controlled subsidiary 2: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations 3: holding parent company bound in subsequent action by res judicata effect of judgment against subsidiary 4: holding that whollyowned subsidiary and partnership in which that subsidiary is the general partner may invoke the two dismissals of the subsidiarys parent and claim rule 41a1 res judicata


Input: above, we view the facts, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Henry, 652 F.3d at 527. Thus, on appeal from an award of qualified immunity, we generally “adopt[ ] ... the plaintiffs version of the facts.” Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276 (4th Cir.2011) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007)). In conducting this review, “[i]t is not our job to weigh the evidence.” Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 95 (4th Cir.1991). Accordingly, disputed questions of fact must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party at the summary judgment stage. See Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 Holdings: 0: holding that a probable cause determination is appropriate for summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact and no credibility issues 1: holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if the resolution of material issues depends upon credibility determinations 2: holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage 3: holding that in determining the propriety of summary judgment credibility determinations may not be made  4: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate


Input: a result of discriminatory and retaliatory animus. The District Court granted summary judgment to NASA, in part because the white co-worker Nurriddin offered as an alleged comparator was not sufficiently similarly situated. Nurriddin IV, 40 F.Supp.3d at 121. Nurriddin claims this was in error, and also spills much ink criticizing the District Court’s alleged reliance on whether he made out a prima facie case. We note that it is unclear whether the District Court believed that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a “similarly situated” employee outside of her protected class received a promotion as part of her prima facie case. See id. at 120 (citing Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1294 (D.C.Cir.2003)). Such a showing is not required. See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Brady, 520 F.3d at 494 n. 2 (“[T]o Holdings: 0: recognizing that prior decisions created confusion on this point 1: holding that cue review applies only to prior final decisions of agencies of original jurisdiction ros and not to prior decisions of the board 2: holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions 3: recognizing that this created a cooperative scheme 4: recognizing this rule