Input: As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed in Serrano, To what extent the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination bars the nonevi-dentiary use of immunized testimony is a difficult question. Neither Murphy [v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964)] nor Kastigar addressed this question, and lower courts have disagreed on the issue. The commentators are also divided over this issue. 870 F.2d at 16-17 (rejecting notion “that all nonevidentiary use necessarily violates the Fifth Amendment” and citing federal court decisions as split on the issue of non-evidentiary use of immunized testimony); see Ely, 708 A.2d at 1339-40 (discussing split of authorities regarding nonevidentiary use); State v. Gault, 551 N.W.2d 719, 724-25 (Minn.Cl.App.1996) Holdings: 0: recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue 1: recognizing divergence of opinion on nonevidentiary use of immunized testimony 2: recognizing that an owners opinion testimony on the value of his property cannot be based on naked conjecture or solely speculative factors 3: holding opinion testimony of sales should have been excluded because opinion not based on comparable sales 4: recognizing a divergence of opinion regarding the retroactive application of mennonite


Input: examined Rebolla-Sanchez’s statute of conviction, it would have been bound by this precedent to come to the same conclusion it already reached. Because remand to the district court to examine the statute underlying Rebolla-Sanchez’s felony conviction would only “be delaying] the inevitable,” we grant the government’s motion for judicial notice and affirm Rebolla-Sanchez’s sentence. See United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.2007). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. 1 . Plain error review, rather than harmless error review applies to this claim because Rebolla-Sanchez did not raise the issue before the district court. See United States v. Charles, 581 F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir.2009) Holdings: 0: holding that plain error review applies when a party fails to raise a claim before the district court 1: holding that plain error review applies to objections that were not raised when the district court asked the appropriate question at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing 2: holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error 3: holding that where a defendant fails to challenge his plea in district court he must establish plain error 4: holding that plain error review applies where the defendant fails to object to the lack of an opportunity to allocute


Input: show that: 1) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; 2) the harassment was based on her sex; 3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the condition of her employment and create a hostile or abusive atmosphere; and, 4) there is a basis for employer liability. Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir.2007). To satisfy the third prong, Wheeler must demonstrate that Antonacci’s behavior was both objectively and subjectively offensive. Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir.2004). Wheel er’s August 2007 complaint to Stobba provides sufficient evidence that she was subjectively offended by Antonacci’s comments, and Brady does not claim otherwise. See Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 807 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Courts look to several factors to determine Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs allegations of loosely related actions that she perceived to be hostile to her based on her race are insufficient to meet the heavy burden required to prove hostile environment 1: recognizing that a jury reasonably could find based on an employees complaints to a superior that the employee perceived her environment as hostile 2: holding that supervisors routine vulgar references to plaintiff could not support a hostile work environment claim because plaintiff was unaware of the comments and to show that he or she perceived the environment as hostile a title vii plaintiff must at least have been aware of those comments 3: holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive 4: holding that the fact that the offensive material was not directed specifically at the plaintiff does not as a matter of law preclude a jury from finding that the conduct subjected her to a hostile work environment based on her sex


Input: MOTION FOR REHEARING GRANTED PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See McCall v. State, 862 So.2d 807, 808 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (under the habitual felony offender statute, “a sentence includes the sanction of probation”) (appeal docketed for review in Florida Supreme Court, SC04-136); Render v. State, 742 So.2d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (probation is a “sentence” for habitualization purposes). We also certify conflict with Richardson v. State, 884 So.2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>) (appeal docketed for review in Florida Supreme Holdings: 0: holding that probation is not a sentence 1: holding a sentencing court is not required to grant probation 2: holding that it is sufficient grounds to revoke a probation if only one condition of the probation is broken 3: holding that probation is a sentence for habitualization purposes 4: holding that probation and suspension of sentence may not be revoked based solely on a violation or criminal offense that was committed before the offender was actually placed on probation


Input: to rule on a motion and therefore forgot to rule on a motion to strike. Reply at 2. The court finds this argument speculative at best. In light of the “relative unseemliness of a court’s altering a legal ruling as to the same litigants,” Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 953, the court needs greater justification to re visit Judge Johnson’s ruling than conjecture about whether she forgot something or felt rushed. Because the defendant fails to offer such justification, its motion for reconsiderat 650 F.2d 663, 666 (5th Cir.1981) (finding that the grant of summary judgment for the defendant "was so inconsistent with the plaintiff's request for leave to amend to state a new claim for relief as implicitly to deny the motion to amend”); Wimberly v. Clark Controller Co., 364 F.2d 225, 227 (6th Cir.1966) (<HOLDING>). The de fendant attempts to distinguish cases Holdings: 0: holding that wjhile it is certainly the better practice to specifically rule on all pending motions the determination of a motion need not always be expressed but may be implied by an entiy of an order inconsistent with granting the relief sought 1: holding death sentence need not be pending in order for this court to engage in review of issues on appeal 2: holding order granting motion to withdraw plea to be the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial because like a postverdict mistrial it returns case to posture it had been before trial 3: holding that the scheduling order merely prescribes the date by which all motions to amend shall be filed the date on the scheduling order does not confine the district courts consideration of the merits of such motions and does not preclude it from finding that an amendment would result in prejudice 4: holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation


Input: [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 54 . Under section 38.02 of the Penal Code, "[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has ... lawfully detained the person.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(b)(2). The offense is elevated from a class B to a class A misdemeanor if the person was a fugitive at the time of the offense. Id. § 38.02(d). 55 .See Sims, 84 S.W.3d at 809-10 (when deputy initiated investigative detention, he did not know appellant had given him incorrect spelling of his name; thus, officer's further detention could not be based on reasonable suspicion of violation of failure-to-identify statute); cf. Farmer v. State, 47 S.W.3d 187, 190-91 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (<HOLDING>). 56 . See People v. Miles, 343 Ill.App.3d Holdings: 0: holding that appellant was not lawfully detained for investigation of public intoxication when he gave false identification therefore trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his false identification statements 1: holding whether passenger was lawfully detained as witness to traffic violation when officer asked his name so that his false identification violated failuretoidentify statute not necessary to decide since other articulable facts justified continued detention 2: holding that police officer was not justified in detaining a passenger who exited and began to walk away from a lawfully stopped vehicle absent an articulated reason as to why it was necessary to detain the passenger for the officers safety 3: holding that officer may order driver out of vehicle once lawfully detained for traffic violation 4: holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation


Input: has not made any provision for deferring or staying adjudication as part of that disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1(a) (1998); cf. Minn. Stat. § 609.095(b) (1998) (providing that except in drug cases or by agreement of the parties, court may not refuse to adjudicate guilt). The supreme court has noted a trial court order providing for vacation and dismissal as part of a stay of imposition. City of St. Paul v. Froysland, 310 Minn. 268, 269, 246 N.W.2d 435, 436 (1976). But there is no precedential authority approving such a disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) (1998) (providing that if felony defendant given stay of imposition successfully serves probation the conviction is deemed to be a misdemeanor); United States v. Johnson, 43 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); State v. Clipper, 429 N.W.2d 698, 701 Holdings: 0: holding that probation is not a sentence 1: holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation 2: recognizing of course the suspension of the imposition of sentence and the grant of probation 3: holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal 4: holding that minnesota stay of imposition is sentence for purposes of federal sentencing guidelines even if no term of probation was imposed


Input: on April 11, 2001, in the District of Maryland. In the context of the foregoing, we must assess whether any of the Convicted Offenses are barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. First, we assess whether the Defendants’ § 846 conspiracy convictions are barred under the applicable double jeopardy principles. We readily conclude they are not barred, because, put most simply, the conspiracy offenses previously charged and mistried in the District of Columbia and Maryland do not implicate a double jeopardy analysis. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); United States v. Goodine, 400 F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Thus, even if the § 846 conspiracy offense Holdings: 0: recognizing this rule 1: recognizing rule 2: recognizing this as the general rule 3: recognizing foregoing rule as wellsettled 4: recognizing general rule


Input: that the scope of DuPont Dow’s waiver is the validity of the 107 patent, when the opinion of counsel relied on was related to the invalidity of the 107 patent and was provided in response to a request for an assessment of the validity of the patent. Moreover, in support of its position on the subject matter scope of the waiver in this case, DuPont Dow has failed to cite any patent infringement case where a party asserted reliance upon the opinion of counsel as a defense and the court limited the waiver to a subject matter more narrow than whether a patent was valid, not infringed, or unenforceable. See Def.’s Mem. at 5-8; see also Applied Telematics, 1995 WL 567436, at *3 (limiting the scope of the waiver to the issue of infringement); Mushroom Assoc., 1992 WL 442892, at *3 (<HOLDING>); Saint-Gobain, 884 F.Supp. at 34 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement 1: holding in a patent case that when the plaintiff brought the suit in federal district court it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to all the issues embraced in the suit including those pertaining to the counterclaim of the defendants 2: holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent 3: holding that alleged infringer waived privilege with respect to all documents pertaining to the infringement of the patent 4: holding that the objective prong for willful infringement is generally not met where an accused infringer relies on a reasonable defense to a charge of infringement


Input: State made no effort to distinguish Cox; in fact, the State’s brief does not even cite Cox. As previously discussed, the State was required to prove that when Phares induced Daniel Walker to pay him money, Phares intended to unlawfully deprive Walker of the money, ie., to take the money without performing the agreed-upon work. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 31.01(3)(A), § 31.03(a); see also Wilson v. State, 663 S.W.2d 834, 836-37 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (To prove theft, the State must show intent to deprive the complainant of property at the time the appellant accepted remuneration pursuant to the contract.). On this record, there is no evidence from which such a deceptive intent can be inferred. See Cox, 658 S.W.2d at 669-71; see also Phillips v. State, 640 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (<HOLDING>). As in Cox and Phillips, in the case sub Holdings: 0: holding that a paywhenpaid clause does not preclude a subcontractors recovery under the miller act payment bond because the federal legislation conditions payment of the subcontractor not on payment by the government to the contractor but rather on the passage of time from completion of the work or provision of materials 1: holding that an assignment was recognized by the government because the government issued a check made payable to the assignee as payment under the contract 2: holding that payment made in reasonable belief that it was required by an insurance contract was involuntary 3: holding that when the appellant and the complainants entered into a residential construction contract the complainants made a down payment and the defendant took measurements drew up plans but ultimately failed to perform under the contract the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant obtained the down payment by deception 4: holding that it was not essential to an action by a supplier on a payment bond under the miller act that a demand be made on the general contractor for payment  although there was evidence in the case from which it could be found that the materialman looked to the general contractor for payment  since the statute does not require a demand for payment but merely requires written notice of the claim


Input: ] the primary object of the patent laws” to promote future innovation. Id. Preemption is therefore part and parcel with the § 101 inquiry. For example, we have often cited the lack of preemption concerns to support a determination that a claim is patent-eligible under § 101. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2016); BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1352 (“[T]he claims of the ... patent do not preempt the use of the abstract idea of filtering content on the Internet or on generic computer components performing conventional activities.”). But we have consistently held that claims that are otherwise directed to patent-ineligible subject matter cannot be saved by arguing the absence of complete preemption. See, e.g., Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1150 (<HOLDING>); FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1098 (“But even Holdings: 0: holding that there was no federal question removal jurisdiction under the complete preemption exception to the wellpleaded complaint rule 1: holding that removal is proper based on complete preemption only when congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive 2: holding that an argument about the absence of complete preemption misses the mark 3: holding that a party did not waive its preemption defense where its answer did not specifically mention preemption but contained a broader defense that was capable of encompassing preemption 4: holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists


Input: even appeared at a review hearing smelling of the impurities of alcohol. The court found the only obstacle to Atwell achieving the goals in the performance agreement was her lack of cooperation, and that HRS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Atwell failed to substantially comply with s for termination because the evidence showed that the risk of future abuse was likely, considering Atwell’s past conduct, and that there is no reasonable basis to conclude that her behavior will improve. Hroncich v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 667 So.2d 804, 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The trial court appropriately determined that returning M.A. to Atwell would place M.A. at a significant risk of neglect and abuse. See In Interest of C.W., 616 So.2d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>). Atwell argues that termination of parental Holdings: 0: holding that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding may not file a counterclaim 1: recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights 2: holding that noncompliance with terms of agreement did not terminate agreement failure to comply with date requirement in termination procedure rendered termination ineffective and letter between nonparty and party could not terminate agreement 3: holding that termination of parental rights may be supported by past neglect in addition to failure to sub stantially comply with performance agreement 4: holding that generally parents have a due process right to participate in a permanency hearing because the opportunity to defend against charges of abuse and neglect may prevent a termination of parental rights


Input: a petition for review which challenges a removal order to limit its review to the facts in the administrative record, the court of appeals will not be in a proper position to rule on a “constitutionally based injunction on the execution of a removal order.” Id. In the absence of habeas jurisdiction in the district courts, Petitioner fears that she will be deprived of an adequate and effective forum for judicial review. In such a situation, Petitioner argues, § 106 of the REAL ID Act constitutes an unlawful suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Id. In order to avoid a Suspension Clause violation, Petitioner argues that this court should interpret § 106 so that her case is not transferred to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See St. Cyr., 533 U.S. at 299-300, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Holdings: 0: holding that the rule of strict construction does not require the court to assign the narrowest possible interpretation to the statute 1: holding that if an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is fairly possible we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems 2: holding that when a court is asked to construe an ambiguous statute it must defer to the interpretation set out in a regulation promulgated by the agency charged with administering the statute so long as the agencys interpretation is reasonable 3: holding that we are to apply the legislative intent underlying a statute and to construe the statute in such a way as to prevent absurdity 4: holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute


Input: under the old Maryland default judgment rule. See Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 609, 620, 541 A.2d 969 (1988) (concluding that trial judge would have been justified in refusing to strike a default judgment, even if it was timely filed, because the defendant f this case, it is nonetheless instructive. Based on the facts of this case and the clear policy regarding the treatment of default judgments under Maryland law, this Court concludes as a matter of law that a Maryland appellate court would have reversed Judge Angeletti’s decision to enter a default judgment. It is undisputed that Salomon had several meritorious defenses in the Jerome litigation, including res judicata, statute of limitations, and a general release. See Burris v. Richards, 79 Md.App. 554, 565, 558 A.2d 750 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the only real issue is whether it would Holdings: 0: holding that the three month limitation of faa  12 on a motion to vacate an award did not apply to a state court motion to vacate because the procedural aspects of the faa are confined to federal cases 1: holding that limitations is a meritorious defense for the purposes of a motion to vacate under rule 2613 2: holding that a defendant who fails to raise statute of limitations defense in a pretrial motion to dismiss or by requesting a jury instruction on limitations if there is some evidence that the prosecution is limitationsbarred waives that defense 3: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 4: holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second


Input: by September 30, 1994, the loss would be $55,768, and if she returned by March 31, 1995, the economic loss would be $132,752. 11 . A somewhat analogous issue has arisen under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. The ADEA allows for liquidated damages which are compensatory and punitive in nature. Because of this, a district court in Rhode Island declined to allow punitive damages under state law, as well as liquidated damages, reasoning that this would allow a double recovery for a single wrong. As it was not challenged on appeal, the First Circuit mentioned this outcome without comment. Keisling v. Ser-Jobs for Progress, Inc., 19 F.3d 755, 757, n. 1 (1st Cir.1994). See also Bailey v. Container Corp. of America, 660 F.Supp. 1048 (S.D.Ohio 1986) (<HOLDING>); but see Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 Holdings: 0: holding that language of contract did not limit plaintiffs recovery to liquidated damages 1: holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter 2: holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award 3: holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the fsla 4: holding that liquidated damages under userra are punitive and therefore subject to trial by jury


Input: of Jotun’s defense costs have not been recovered, Jotun may be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of defense paid by Jotun and not paid by Zurich. See Coleman, 418 F.3d at 525; Smith v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 807 So.2d 1010, 1022 (La.Ct.App.2002) (“[The insurer] must underwrite reasonable costs incurred by the insured.”). G. Jotun’s Ability To Recover Attorney’s Fees Incurred in the Instant Lawsuit With respect to Jotun’s claims that it be reimbursed for attorney’s fees and costs in this action, Liberty argues that Jotun cannot recover these fees pursuant to Louisiana law. Jotun claims that Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 22:658 and 22:1220 provide an award of attorney’s fees as a result of its having to enforce Liberty’s duty to defend. “ g, PA., 691 So.2d 715, 727 (La.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). Jotun has failed to allege in its Holdings: 0: holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed 1: holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith 2: holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage 3: holding that when the insured brings an action for a declaration of coverage and prevails absent a bad faith denial of coverage by the insurer attorneys fees incurred by the insured in the prosecution of that action are not incurred at the request of the insurer 4: holding that an insured could not recover attorneys fees pursuant to  22658 for litigating the coverage issue because the insurer did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and the insurers coverage defense was not frivolous


Input: to discern whether the amendment to the VWPA was intended to overrule Hughey “in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity.” The Second Circuit has found that it was not: Although Hughey involved the preamendment version of the VWPA, courts have extended its analysis to the amended version of that statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 437 (5th Cir.1998) (“That part of Hughey which restricted the award of restitution to the limits of the offense, however, still stands.”). We have approved of this analysis and, because the amended version of the VWPA contains identical language to the MVRA, we have further extended Hughey to the MVRA. United States v. Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 158-59 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Akande, 200 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the mvra is whether the loss is caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction 1: holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction 2: holding that the victim and witness protection act limits the amount of restitution to the loss caused by the specific conduct forming the basis of the offense of conviction 3: holding that the conduct underlying the offense of conviction thus stakes out the boundaries of the restitutionary authority under the mvra 4: holding that an award of restitution is only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction


Input: which would undoubtedly violate due process if true. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); United States v. Watts, 29 F.3d 287, 290 (7th Cir.1994). To establish such, a violation, the defendants must show that (1) the government acted in bad faith by not preserving evidence, (2) the exculpatory nature of the evidence was apparent before its destruction and (3) the defendant cannot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528; Watts, 29 F.3d at 290. The defendants produced no credible evidence that any evidence was actually destroyed. Whitacre never claimed he destroyed tapes; rather, he offered but then recanted an allegation that a friend to whom he sent some tapes destroyed the Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Andreas and Wilson counter that the FBI’s Holdings: 0: holding that informant acted under color of law when fbi supervised recording 1: holding that private doctor under contract with a state prison to provide medical care to prisoners acted under color of state law when he treated inmate 2: holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action 3: holding that a federal drug informant acting under the partial direction of the fbi and for pay was not a federal employee under the ftca 4: holding that cooperating witness under direction of fbi was acting under color of law


Input: are in violation of Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521, 525 (Fla.1993). In support, Dunn claimed that the information, police reports, and testimony from trial transcripts would establish that all of his charges occurred during a single criminal episode. He pointed out that he previously raised this claim, only to have it denied by the post-conviction court based on the erroneous finding that such a claim must be raised pursuant to rule 3.850, and that consideration under rule 3.850 would be impossible due to the two-year time bar. See Hubbard v. State, 773 So.2d 87, 88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). See also Speas v. State, 887 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (noting that a Hale claim may be raised in a motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a)); but see Calla-way v. State, 642 So.2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). Pointing to its previous denial of this Holdings: 0: holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion 1: holding that a sworn motion pursuant to rule 3850 is the appropriate method for resolution of hale issue 2: holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion 3: holding defendant was not barred from raising sentencing issue in rule 3850 motion by virtue of prior rule 3850 motion which did not raise any sentencing issues 4: holding that an involuntary plea claim is cognizable in a rule 3850 motion


Input: payment of any kind. Arredondo testified he did not know that the great-grandmother was losing her mental abilities. Arredondo was arrested on the charge of injury to a child in June 2000. He stayed in jail for two or three months and was released on probation. On December 8, 2000, he was arrested for violating his probation and was in jail until March 20, 2001, when he transfe could form a firm belief that reasonable efforts had been made to return the children to Arredondo but he did not regularly visit them or maintain contact with them. Evidence of similar force also exists illustrating that he made only minimal efforts to meet the requirements of his service plan after he had been re-incarcerated. See In re P. R., 994 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (<HOLDING>); In Interest of B.S.T., 977 S.W.2d 481, 486 Holdings: 0: holding the evidence sufficient to support a finding under subsection n when the defendant routinely missed her counseling sessions had at least ten different jobs lasting only a short period of time had lived at 13 to 17 different places attended only two anger management classes attended no parenting classes and only visited her child sporadically which resulted in a lack of bonding between them 1: holding that the alj erred in finding that the claimants mental retardation did not manifest itself before age 22 where the claimant attended special education classes dropped out of school in ninth grade had trouble with reading writing and math and had frequent fights with other children 2: holding that similar impairments do not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her impairment rendered the plaintiff unable to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes within a geographical area to which she had reasonable access 3: holding that the record did not belie the claimants iq of 58 where he attended special education classes did not live independently and dropped out of school at a low grade either in the sixth or eighth grade 4: holding that the plaintiffs inability to engage in frequent lifting of more than ten pounds  would not significantly restrict her ability to perform a broad range of jobs in various classes


Input: law. The fact that the state could have adopted a Luce-type rule and warned a defendant of its consequences without violating his constitutional rights does not mean, as the majority appears to believe, that the state’s violation was one of state law only. There are a number of actions a state may take without violating a defendant’s federal constitutional rights if a state statute or rule provides for them l constitutional right to testify in his own defense by the trial court’s unlawful threat to permit the prosecutor to introduce his prior conviction, that waiver is constitutionally invalid as a matter of federal law despite the fact that the state could have adopted such a rule constitutionally had it chosen to do so. Cf. Caputo v. Henderson, 541 F.2d 979, 982-84 (2nd Cir. 1976) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Galindo was not only unlawfully Holdings: 0: holding that it is not 1: recognizing that where a guilty plea is shown to be constitutionally invalid leave to withdraw the plea is constitutionally mandated 2: holding that a defendants guilty plea is not knowingly made and is hence constitutionally invalid and subject to reversal on habeas if it is based upon erroneous sentencing information provided by the judge 3: holding that the defendants guilty plea was entered into knowingly voluntarily and intelligently 4: holding that a sentence is subject to reversal if the trial judge selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts


Input: of conviction, [and Benris] conviction[s] [are] not ripe for appeal.” Ex parte Kelley, — So.3d at —. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Benris appeal. The State appears to concede that the Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in Kelley supports the position that no judgments of conviction have been entered in these cases but argues that this Court should nonetheless hold that the issuance of a sentencing order without the pronouncement in open court of a sentence is sufficient to enter Benn’s judgments of conviction. In Ex parte Kelley, the Alabama Supreme Court considered the State’s argument and rejected it, holding that nothing less than a pronouncement in open court of the defendant’s sentence will satisfy the sentencing element of a judgment of conviction. — So.3d — (<HOLDING>). “[T]his Court is bound by the decisions of Holdings: 0: holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment 1: holding that the trial courts written order was not the entry of a sentence sufficient to support a determination that a judgment of conviction was entered 2: holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment 3: holding that in the interest of judicial economy considering appeal from order denying posttrial motions and ordering entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff even though judgment was not actually entered 4: holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal


Input: proceeding to allow for issuance of a writ of error coram nobis to permit a collateral challenge to a judgment of conviction based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jarrett v. State, 2014 Ark. 272, 2014 WL 2566093 (per curiam). Again, a coram-nobis proceeding is an exceedingly narrow remedy that requires a showing of facts that were extrinsic to the record that would have prevented rendition of the judgment at trial. Pitts v. State, 2014 Ark. 132, 2014 WL 1096185 (per curiam). Petitioner’s claim that he was not afforded an adequate opportunity to present claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is not within the scope of such a proceeding. We decline to refashion the writ to afford petitioner a remedy. See Zulpo v. State, 2014 Ark. 14, 2014 WL 197837 (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). As the State urges and as we held in Williams Holdings: 0: holding that the flsa is not within the purview of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 1: holding that while an original bankruptcy proceeding where the state is not named as a defendant is not a suit an adversary proceeding directly against the state would be 2: holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding 3: holding issues within scope of administrative hearing are within the reviewing courts purview 4: holding that the scope of a coramnobis proceeding would not be expanded to include an argument outside the four categories recognized as being within the purview of a coramnobis proceeding


Input: to have less capacity than adults to understand their rights and privileges. See, e.g., Colo. Const, art. VII, § 1 (person under eighteen has no right to vote); § 13-22-101, C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen does not have competence to enter into contracts, to manage estates, to sue and be sued, or to make decisions regarding his or her own body, such as donating blood or organs); § 14-2-106(l)(a)(I), C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen needs to obtain parental consent before receiving marriage license); § 19-2-511(1), (juveniles subjected to custodial interrogation required to have parent or guardian present before waiving right to counsel); C.R.J.P. 3(a) (advisement for juveniles entering plea requires presence of a parent or guardian at initial appearance); Nicholas, 973 P.2d at 1219 (<HOLDING>). In acknowledging this special need to protect Holdings: 0: recognizing that inmates have no freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance 1: holding that a prisoner has no first amendment right to provide legal assistance to other inmates and that therefore prison officials did not violate the prisoners constitutional rights when they intercepted a letter containing legal advice that he sent to another prisoner 2: holding that where parents have previously stipulated that the children should be adjudicated as being in need of aid ocs still has the burden of proving in the subsequent termination of parental rights proceeding by clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of aid 3: recognizing special circumstances exception 4: recognizing that children have less capacity than adults to understand legal rights and therefore need special assistance


Input: only relies on a self-serving affidavit. Consistently, the Supreme Court has held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires “adequate time for discovery” before granting summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (stating that “summary judgment be refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition”). The presentation of a potential genuine issue of material fact weighed against the lack of corroborating evidence indicates the need for discovery prior to the resolution of a motion for summary judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Americable Int’l, Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 129 F.3d 1271, 1274 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Despite the fact that the plaintiff relies on Holdings: 0: holding that the court is in no position to decide  whether there is a genuine dispute  because the district court did not permit  any discovery before issuing its ruling 1: holding that an appellate court can affirm a district courts order on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law including grounds upon which the district court did not rely 2: holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact 3: holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports 4: holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide


Input: because CBFWA has alleged nineteen violations of the Agreement by BPA since 1991. However, because they are challenging only the decision to enter into the agreements, and are not suing for violations of the agreements, we do not consider this ground. 8 . BPA also cites Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 759, 767 (9th Cir.1986), for the proposition that, "[a]s a general rule, we will not consider issues not presented before an administrative proceeding at the appropriate time.” Insofar as Marathon Oil can be read to require exhaustion of administrative remedies before bringing a claim in federal court under section 10(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 704, it has been modified by the Supreme Court’s decision in Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Section 839d(l) provides: The Holdings: 0: recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to  1983 1: holding that a courts authority to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in actions brought under the apa is limited when neither the statute nor agency rules specifically mandate exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review 2: holding that under the apa exhaustion is a prerequisite to judicial review when expressly required by statute or when an agency rule requires appeal before review so long as the administrative action is made inoperative pending that review 3: recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a  1983 action 4: holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to a lawsuit under foia


Input: the MHSAA is not a federal aid recipient, it is nonetheless subject to Title IX. The premise of this argument is that because local Michigan school districts have “ceded control” over interscholastic athletics to the MHSAA, and because interscholastic athletic programs receive federal financial assistance, MHSAA has control over a federally funded activity and should be subject to Title IX. This precise issue was left unresolved by the recent Supreme Court decision in Smith which explicitly declined to consider whether, “when a recipient cedes controlling authority over a federally funded program to another entity, the controlling entity is covered by Title IX regardless [of] whether it is itself a recipient.” Id. at 930. Given that the Supreme Court has left this issue unresolved 9) (<HOLDING>). See also Kemether v. Penn. Interscholastic Holdings: 0: holding in part that the ncaa was subject to title vi because it exercised controlling authority over athletic programs receiving federal financial assistance 1: holding that title ix subjects state athletic association to suit under the theory that association controls athletic programs receiving federal aid 2: holding that the ncaa did not exercise controlling authority over school athletic programs 3: holding that federal programs that require uniform application necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules 4: holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours


Input: and misappropriation liability.” Cuban, 620 F.3d at 555; see also Yun, 327 F.3d at 1271 (acknowledging that after O’Hagan and before Rule 10b5-2 “it [was] unsettled whether non-business relationships ... provide the duty of loyalty and confidentiality necessary to satisfy the misappropriation theory”). Accordingly, the imposition of a duty to disclose under Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) when parties have a history, pattern or practice of sharing confidences does not conflict with Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, even if the rule were to conflict with the Court’s interpretation of deceptive devices, the Court “did not purport to adopt or apply the unambiguous meaning” of § 10. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 170 n. 11 (3d Cir.2008); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that Holdings: 0: holding that a courts prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion 1: holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law 2: holding that to foreclose a conflicting agency interpretation a prior court decision must hold that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute 3: holding that when a statutes terms are clear and unambiguous on their face there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning 4: recognizing court must enforce unambiguous contract according to its terms


Input: The plaintiff was thus entitled to some type of post-deprivation procedure. The plaintiff was afforded this post-deprivation remedy in the form of the two administrative appeals, brought pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415 and Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10-76L The plaintiff has not alleged that either of these appeals were procedurally defective. The court therefore concludes that the defendants afforded the plaintiff all the process that was due to him under the Due Process Clause. See Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 979 F.Supp. 147, 153 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (concluding that the plaintiffs, who requested and received an impartial hearing, were provided with an adequate post-deprivation remedy for alleged violations of the IDEA); see also “BD” v. DeBuono, 130 F.Supp.2d 401, 435 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (<HOLDING>). Based on the above, the court concludes that Holdings: 0: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional 1: holding that the appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal for his discovery violation allegations 2: holding that idea administrative procedures provided an adequate post deprivation remedy 3: holding that bivens plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies where administrative remedy program provided only for injunctive relief 4: holding that by its terms the idea does not require exhaustion where the relief sought is unavailable in an administrative proceeding under the idea monetary damages are not available so exhaustion is not required


Input: feed his dogs, which he did on a daily basis. The backyard was fenced on three sides with two-wire fencing, and the fourth side was enclosed by the neighbor’s wood privacy fence. The dogs were kept approximately 70 yards from the road, behind the house, in a central part of the back yard. Some of the dogs were chained to the ground near doghouse structures, and others were in pens surrounded by chainlink. Certainly the housing and shelter of animals is a common private use for one’s backyard. We recognize that Appellant did not have an ownership interest in the property, but that is just one factor to consider and not a requirement for a person to have standing to challenge improper police actions. See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that defendants had no standing where they conceded that they did not own the automobile searched and were simply passengers the owner of the car had been the driver of the vehicle at the time of the search 1: holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop 2: holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle 3: holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop 4: holding that passengers of a vehicle which they did not own had standing to challenge the validity of a traffic stop


Input: did not lack procedural safeguards because she, like the plaintiffs in the instant case, was covered by an agency regulation which promulgated its own elaborate personnel management regulations. Id. Third, it further stated that Fausto held certain federal employees were foreclosed from obtaining judicial review of personnel actions because Congress, in enacting the CSRA, established a comprehensive remedial scheme which was designed to “balance the legitimate interests of the various categories of federal employees with the needs of sound and efficient administration.” Id. (quoting Fausto, 484 U.S. at 445, 108 S.Ct. at 672). The court concluded that the CSRA provided NAF employees their exclusive remedy for federal employment personnel actions. Id. See also Pérez, supra, 680 F.2d 779 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs ask this Court to entertain their Holdings: 0: holding employees not entitled to dismissal pursuant to section 101106f where employees failed to present the trial court with a sufficient record to satisfy their burden 1: holding that a contractors employees were not within the scope and course of their employment when they deviated from their work to shoot at squirrels 2: holding naf employees were not employees within the appeal provisions of the civil service reform act of 1978 and therefore they were not entitled to appeal their terminations to the mspb 3: holding to the effect that a court must consider section 24 fifth in conjunction with the antidiscrimination provisions of the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 as amended which are codified at title 11 of the united states code 4: holding that the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 publ no 95598 92 stat 2549 precluded dismissal of cases pending before enactment of the reform act in order to refile under the act


Input: the capacity to prejudice the penalty-phase proceedings of a capital murder case. Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232; State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 276-77, 550 A.2d 117 (1988). ‘With the stakes so high, the possibility of prejudice on the penalty phase persists as a cause for continuing concern.” Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232. The use of two juries “commends itself when guilt-phase evidence is so prejudicial that the same jury could not fairly sit on both phases of the trial.” Id. at 133, 594 A.2d 232 (citing Monturi, supra, 195 N.J.Super. 317, 478 A.2d 1266). One instance in which the Court has required separate juries is when the State relies on aggravating factor c(4)(a), conviction of another murder. See Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 43-44, 594 A.2d 172 (<HOLDING>). Except for that specific category of cases Holdings: 0: recognizing the diminished importance of the state policy factor 1: recognizing that our finding that defendant is entitled to voir dire potential jurors on the possible blinding impact of the e4a factor most likely will require a twojury system for all capital cases in which the state seeks to prove that factor 2: holding that the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained 3: recognizing that court need not address each hahn factor if defendant does not raise issue relating to that factor 4: recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important


Input: for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s removal order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review “whether substantial evidence supports a finding by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that [Valenzuela] abandoned [her] lawful permanent residence in the United States.” Khodagholian v. Ashcroft, 335 F.Sd 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.2003). We deny the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the government met its burden of showing Valenzuela abandoned her lawful permanent resident status because the record does not compel the conclusion that she consistently intended promptly to return to the United States. See Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Chavez-Ramirez v. INS, 792 F.2d 932, Holdings: 0: holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial 1: holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period 2: holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent 3: holding that the only showing of intent required for a vcea claim is the intent to do the act involved 4: holding that removal for temporary employment with intent to return was not abandonment


Input: is the default sanction once a court determines that the party’s failure was neither substantially justified nor harmless. In Design Strategy, the Second Circuit applied the four-factor test when considering an argument that the district court had improperly excluded certain evidence, and affirmed the district court’s conclusion "that sanctions, including severe sanctions, were warranted.” 469 F.3d at 296-97. In other words, the Circuit referred to the four Patterson factors to assess the correctness of the district court’s “substantially justified or ... harmless” inquiry; it reviewed the district court’s decision to preclude not as such, but because under Rule 37(c)(1) that decision was, in the district court’s view, the logical consequence of its finding th d 1222, 1244 (D.N.M.2011) Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff was not prejudiced by defendants failure to disclose documents before her deposition because she had a unique familiarity with documents at issue 1: holding that when a plaintiff attaches documents to her complaint containing statements by the defendant that conflict with the plaintiffs allegations the plaintiff is not required to adopt every word in the documents as true 2: holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents 3: holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable 4: holding that admission of one defendants deposition was proper where she was present at the deposition even though she was represented at the time by the same counsel as her codefendants


Input: at the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds later if the justification for the initial force has been eliminated. See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir.1999) (finding issue of fact regarding whether officer was justified in firing on vehicle from side after stepping out of the way to avoid being run over, and explaining that “[a] passing risk to a police officer is not an ongoing license to kill an otherwise unthreatening suspect”); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1162 n. 9 (6th Cir.1996) (noting that analyzing separate segments of single encounter may be appropriate if “the officers’ initial decision to shoot was reasonable under the circumstances but there was no need to continue shooting”); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Bates ex rel. Johns v. Chesterfield Holdings: 0: holding that when fleeing felon tossed a mesh bag weighing four or five pounds toward the officer the officer would have been justified if he fired at that moment out of fear that the bag might knock his firearm out of his hand but that he was not justified in firing after bag hit him and fell to the ground without injuring him and suspect turned and ran 1: holding the opening and inventory of a shoulder bag was reasonable despite the possible alternative of securing the bag as a whole 2: holding that the opening of a makeup bag was justified when a woman had grabbed the bag when the officer turned away had resisted it being taken from her the bag felt heavy her companion had been armed the previous day and the officer and individual were alone 3: holding an officers reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed was sufficient justification for seizure of suspects makeup bag and exigent circumstances justified the subsequent warrantless search of the closed bag 4: holding that the owner of a shoulder bag located on the front seat of his girlfriends car had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag and its contents


Input: validity of the conviction is at issue, but because the jury needs to examine the circumstances of the offense (as well as any aspect of the defendant’s character or prior record) in order to decide intelligently the question of punishment. It is not error to inform the resentencing jury that the defendant has already been found guilty, and to tell the jury that its duty is to determine the punishment to be imposed, considering “all of the evidence” presented at the resentencing trial, and “all of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Transcript, Vol. 41 at 2851, 2857-59. See Alderman v. State, supra at 212 (11 b). 14. Potts complains of the state’s use of a prior conviction for murder based on a guilty plea that was not shown to be voluntary. See Pope v. State, supra at 195 (17) (<HOLDING>). Potts raised before trial the issue of Holdings: 0: holding that once the defendant raises the issue of intelligent and voluntary waiver with respect to prior guilty pleas the burden is on the state to establish a valid waiver 1: holding that record did not show voluntary or intelligent waiver 2: recognizing that the burden to establish a valid waiver of a constitutional right is upon the prosecution 3: holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act 4: holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary


Input: that the court erred in determining that her answer admitted paragraph seven of Burr’s complaint and that the court should have made its decision based on the trial evidence, not the pleadings. The court, however, did not rely solely on the pleadings. Rather, it began by accepting the ninety-foot admission in the pleadings, and then addressed the facts presented at trial to arrive at a final declaration of the location of the boundary line. [¶ 9] To the extent the court relied on Jordan’s admission it did not err in doing so. Admissions contained in a party’s pleadings are binding on those parties both at trial and on appeal. See M.R. Civ. P. 8(d); cf. Connolly v. Connolly, 2006 ME 17, ¶ 7 n. 1, 892 A.2d 465, 467; see also MP Assocs. v. Liberty, 2001 ME 22, ¶ 28, 771 A.2d 1040, 1048-49 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in the absence of a trial Holdings: 0: holding that parties are generally bound by the stipulations they agree to 1: holding that parties are bound by the stipulated facts in a pretrial order 2: recognizing stipulations the one at issue in particular are treated as contracts 3: holding that stipulations involving questions of law are not binding on the court 4: holding that parties are bound by admissions in pleadings


Input: to make ... antitrust claims ... inappropriate for arbitration.” American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir.1968). Since that time the foundations of the American Safety doctrine have been significantly eroded. Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 671 F.Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y.1987), adhered to, in part, dismissed, in part, on reconsideration, 685 F.Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.1988). The Supreme Court has held that nothing in the federal antitrust laws prohibits parties from agreeing to arbitrate antitrust claims arising out of international commercial transactions. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). Finding it “unneces U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The federal policy in favor of arbitration Holdings: 0: holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 are arbitrable 1: holding that claims under  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement 2: holding that claims under the securities act of 1934 and the rico statutes are arbitrable 3: holding that claims brought under section 10b of the securities exchange act and rico claims were arbitrable 4: holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement


Input: the color of state law and the jury must return a verdict for the defendant. (App.308-09.) This error was reinforced by the verdict form, which forced the outcome of the case to be determined by a single finding of fact: whether Dombroski ordered the landlord to open the door. In Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department, we held that the District Court failed to instruct the jury that punitive damages against the upper management of a company could only be awarded if upper management was involved in the violation. 174 F.3d 95, 122-24 (3d Cir.1999). We reversed the finding of punitive damages because the jury instructions “failed to provide proper guidance for the jury on a fundamental question.” Id. at 124; see also Beardshall v. Minuteman Press Int’l, 664 F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The District Court in this case did not Holdings: 0: holding that the plain error and harmless error standards of review merge in the ease of jury instructions because the duty to properly instruct the jury lies with the trial court 1: holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error 2: holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard 4: holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial


Input: approach is the correct one here. With the benefit of a full factual record — in this case, following years of discovery — plaintiffs in pattern and practice claims cannot rely on abstract legal concepts alone. Although abstract legal concepts may inform the Court’s analysis regarding the risk of error, GE must also demonstrate that the current procedures in fact result in an unacceptable rate of error. It would make little sense to ignore the empirical record altogether in favor of a hypothetical concern that the risk of error may be too high, a. Abstract Concepts According to GE, the crucial element missing from EPA’s pre-UAO issuance process is a neutral decision-maker. Although the Constitution does not require a neutral decision-maker, see, e.g., Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 968 (<HOLDING>), ample case law supports GE’s point that a Holdings: 0: holding such service satisfies due process 1: holding that a predeprivation opportunity to be heard satisfies the due process clause 2: holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 3: recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard 4: holding that an opportunity to be heard by a contracting officer the very person deciding whether the plaintiff is a responsible contractor satisfies due process


Input: without notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the employer; (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the employer pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 832. 4 . USCÍRF cites two cases arising under civil service employment laws, Suzal v. Director, United States Info. Agency, 32 F.3d 574 (D.C.Cir.1994) and Nat’l Treasury Empls. Union v. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 743 F.2d 895 (D.C.Cir.1984). Suzal and Nat’l Treasury Employees concern the definition of “adverse action” in a collective bargaining agreement, as it bears on the question of which employment disputes can be sent to arbitration. See Suzal, 32 F.3d at 579-80 (<HOLDING>); Nat’l Treasury Employees, 743 F.2d at 914-15 Holdings: 0: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 1: holding that nonrenewal of an appointment is not a removal under 5 usc  7512 and thus not an adverse action as defined in 5 usc  7512 2: holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b 3: holding that the expiration and nonrenewal of a term appointment is not an adverse action 4: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983


Input: a disregard for the employer’s interests. Under the circumstances, it must be concluded that the claimant was discharged for misconduct within the meaning of the unemployment compensation law. Id. at 76 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Fritzo v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 59 Pa.Cmwlth. 268, 429 A.2d 1215 (1981), a Pennsylvania court found willful misconduct based on a scenario analogous to the instant case: The claimant was a regular employee who fully comprehended her obligation to report for work on a given date. She testified her usual practice was to “ask” the floor lady’s permission to be absent. In this instance, the claimant deviated from that practice; the record discloses that, rather than tion Bd. of Review, 64 Pa.Cmwlth. 342, 439 A.2d 1342 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Several other jurisdictions have also held Holdings: 0: holding that single incident of failing to return to work after doctors visit without permission due to employees professed anxiety after being informed she may have skin cancer constituted willful misconduct related to work justifying denial of unemployment insurance benefits 1: holding that claimant committed willful misconduct when she did not return to work at the end of her leave and did not comply with her employers notification policy 2: holding that the claimant committed willful misconduct when she did not return to work at the end of her leave and did not comply with her employers notification policy 3: holding that single incident of leaving work early without receiving permission from supervisor to address problem of impending termination of electrical service to his home by employee on probation due to poor attendance record constituted willful misconduct related to work justifying denial of unemployment insurance benefits 4: holding that leaving work early without permission after having been previously warned constitutes misconduct


Input: a witness need not have specialized training in a particular field and may gain his expertise solely through work experience. Wileman v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 642, 647-48, 484 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1997) (qualifying bank official as expert in comparing signatures to determine authenticity). However, “[w]here a statute designates express qualifications for an expert witness, the witness must satisfy the statutory criteria in order to testify as an expert.” Commonwealth v. Allen, 269 Va. 262, 273, 609 S.E.2d 4, 11 (2005). Also, where a statute requires an individual to be licensed before working in a particular field, a witness not licensed in that field may ,not testify as an expert in that field. See Lee Gardens v. Arlington County Bd., 250 Va. 534, 539-40, 463 S.E.2d 646, 648-49 (1995) (<HOLDING>). In keeping with this principle, “[t]he Holdings: 0: holding prospectively that a vendees interest in a real estate contract constitutes real estate within the meaning of the judgment lien statute 1: holding equivalent automatic license revocation provision of colorado real estate statute unconstitutional 2: holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner 3: holding the real estate sale proceeds 4: holding witness not licensed as real estate appraiser could not testify as expert on real estate valuation where statute made it unlawful to engage in real estate appraisal without license


Input: Property Interest Plaintiffs final claim is that he was denied due process of law when the defendants deducted money from his inmate account without providing him notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the imposition of assessments concerning his destruction of government property. This states a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Holloway v. Lehman, 671 A.2d 1179 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996). See also Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1984) (inmate stated claim for due process deprivation resulting from deduction of money from his prison account); Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935 (10th Cir.1989) (allegations of freezing of inmate’s funds in his prison account sufficient to state civil rights claim for due process deprivation); Artway v. Scheidemantel, 671 F.Supp. 330 (D.N.J.1987) (<HOLDING>). Pennsylvania law provides that the Department Holdings: 0: holding invalid procedurally defective interim regulations that were issued without notice and comment and in the absence of good cause 1: holding that search warrant was constitutionally defective because it did not require notice 2: holding that prosecutors statements were not evidence and could not support restitution order 3: holding that procedures whereby amount of restitution were determined without a hearing were constitutionally defective 4: holding that notice was not constitutionally adequate where the clearcut statutory procedures for notification were not followed


Input: to the merits of the litigation.’ ”) (citation omitted); Hidahl v. Gilpin County Dep’t of Social Servs., 699 F.Supp. 846, 849 (D.Colo.1988) (denying attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988 where civil rights action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988. B. Before the district court, defendants sought sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, rather than attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court did not address defendants’ Rule 11 motion. That the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Branson’s complaint does not preclude it from imposing Rule 11 sanctions for filing a frivolous complaint. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 1080-81, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Westlake N. Property Owners Ass’n. v. City of Holdings: 0: holding that a district court could constitutionally impose rule 11 sanctions in a case in which was later determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 1: holding that an award of sanctions under rule 11 survives despite a later determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 2: holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case 3: holding that a district court had jurisdiction to impose rule 11 sanctions regardless of the existence of subjectmatter jurisdiction 4: holding that a district court may impose sanctions for abuse of judicial process pursuant to rule 11 even after it is determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims


Input: court’s confirmation of the plan would “create an unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for the Bankruptcy Court” to undo the portion of the plan that had been carried out and thus the appeal was equitably moot. See Roberts Farms, 65 Retail Stores, Corp., 216 F.3d 882, 884-85 (9th Cir.2000). Additionally, the Court of Appeals further explained, While the doctrine of equitable mootness focuses on whether it is, for all practical purposes, impossible to award effective relief, other equitable considerations center on whether it would be unfair to grant the relief requested. Therefore, even if an appeal is not equitably moot, a court may still hold that the equities weigh in favor of dismissing the appeal. See, e.g., In re Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 44 F.3d 1310, 1320 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Id. at 885. The first concept discussed above Holdings: 0: holding that an appeal was not equitably moot because the person who was issued the money was a party and was aware when the payment was made that the award would be appealed 1: holding that the plaintiff had established an entitlement to relief on the merits of the claim  and was therefore entitled to fees even though it was remanded to the agency for further action 2: holding that even though the appeal was not moot because effective relief was possible it was inequitable to require that the debtors counsel disgorge fees and costs awarded by the bankruptcy court 3: holding that an order to disgorge funds was final even though the order did not distribute the funds 4: holding that the case was not moot even though claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were no longer alive because the plaintiff had requested pecuniary relief


Input: exercised supervisory powers over persons who actively participated in the constitutional deprivation. Id. “An official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 if she acts with a deliberate or reckless disregard of plaintiffs constitutional rights, or if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at her direction or with her knowledge and consent.” Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996 (citing Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 498-99 (7th Cir.1979); Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir.1971); Wood v. Worachek, 618 F.2d 1225, 1233 (7th Cir.1980); Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993, 1000-01 (7th Cir.1980); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir.1974)); see also Hamilton v. Scott, N.D.Ill.1991, 762 F.Supp. 794, aff'd. 976 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff has acknowledged in deposition that Holdings: 0: holding that neglect was not excusable where the defendants did not do all that they were required to do after they received the summons and complaint in that they did not contact a lawyer or make any other arrangements with respect to their defense 1: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because they failed to demonstrate any likelihood that they would end up back in jail where alleged constitutional violations occurred 2: holding that an inmates complaint was not sufficient to state a claim against the director or warden of the prison absent an allegation that they were directly involved in the alleged misconduct or recklessly indifferent to the constitutional violations of which they had some knowledge 3: holding that district court erred in dismissing inmates complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmates allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms 4: holding that plaintiffs had standing because they were directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints were directed


Input: in the Schreiner Oaks Society, an honorary organization for substantial Schreiner contributors, all of which overpowered Estha’s mind. Despite these suggested inferences, the beneficiaries offer no evidence that any alleged influence subverted or overpowered Estha’s mind at the time of the will’s execution. Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922 (emphasis added). Even in cases exhibiting fairly egregious facts, courts have declined to find undue influence. See Guthrie v. Suiter, 934 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ)(finding no evidence of undue influence by brother and primary business ad-visor despite testatrix’s inability to care for herself and labotomy forty years prior to will execution); Green v. Earnest, 840 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied)(<HOLDING>). C. No Execution “But For” the Influence The Holdings: 0: holding that it is a violation of the fourth amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant 1: holding that the carrying out of an execution after the first execution attempt had failed did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment 2: recognizing that factors such as physical and mental condition of the maker of the instrument at the time of its execution including age any weakness or infirmity are probative evidence of undue influence 3: holding that despite testators death caused by the beneficiary shooting the testator a little more than a month after the third wills execution no evidence of undue influence existed at the time of the wills execution 4: holding that a release of such claims or other matters arising from the beginning of time to the date of execution of this agreement did not protect the defendant from liability arising from unconstitutional conduct that occurred after the agreements execution


Input: between Long Creek, Little River, Limehouse, and Lake Wylie, the Court can attest that the factual premise of Rickborn’s argument is an understatement. Nevertheless, that prevalence of pickups is not persuasive. The command to construe an exclusion against the insurer applies only when the exclusion’s meaning is ambiguous. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nivens, No. 0:12-cv-151-MBS, 2014 WL 4793987, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2014) (stating the rule applies “ ‘if doubt exists as to the extent or fact of coverage’ ” (quoting Buddin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 250 S.C. 332, 157 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1967)) (emphasis added)). As this Court has explained, exclusion A.7 is not ambiguous on the issue of whether a pickup is a private passenger auto. Cf. Home Indem. Co., 280 F.Supp. at 448 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Rickborn asserts it would be Holdings: 0: recognizing that certainly under many circumstances a pickup truck is used by its owner as a private passenger automobile but nonetheless holding that policy read as a whole unambiguously excluded pickups from that term 1: holding that a contract will be read as a whole and the intent of each part will be gathered from a consideration of the whole 2: recognizing that a statute should be read as comprehensive whole 3: holding pickup truck was not a private passenger automobile under policy although that term standing alone might be  ambiguous there was no room for misunderstanding whether it included pickups because separate defined policy term included pickups 4: holding that because public use of a beach was permissive the public was a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner


Input: (1982) (analyzing and sustaining Virginia statute under which Virginia Public Building Authority was charged with construction, maintenance, and operation of public buildings funded by Authority-issued notes and bonds and secured by State rental payments). Various other state courts have approved the issuance of bonds that are debt-serviced through future discretionary legislative appropriations. Again as in New Jersey, those courts have focused primarily on the discretionary nature of the state’s duty to make the appropriation, and clear language in the bonds informing purchasers that the State has no legal obligation to service the bond debt through future appropriations or otherwise. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories by the Colo. State Senate, 193 Colo. 298, 566 P.2d 350, 355 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Ky. Transp. Cabinet, 884 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted 1: holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes 2: holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature 3: holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language 4: holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature


Input: the initial order to be a final adjudication of Dudley’s repayment obligation. We analyze Dudley’s due-process claim with this understanding of the court’s action. We think the hearing provided to Dudley satisfied due process. It occurred pri- or to final judgment being rendered against him, and he was allowed to present evidence and argument with respect to the amount of the judgment as well as any repayment plan. Therefore, the hearing afforded Dudley was “at a meaningful time” and was conducted “in a meaningful manner” as required by the Due Process Clause. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 241. Even though Dudley was given the opportunity to be heard, he points out section 815.9 makes no provision for a hearing and so is unconstitutional on its face. See Fitch, 581 F.Supp. at 278 (<HOLDING>). The State argues Dudley has no standing to Holdings: 0: holding that a statute that does not provide for notice and a hearing is not unconstitutional because those provisions may be incorporated by implication to prevent a holding of unconstitutionality 1: holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact 2: holding evidence was not newly discovered because the underlying facts were well within the partys knowledge prior to the district courts entry of judgment 3: holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment 4: holding that imposition occurs at time of entry of judgment


Input: will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir.1995). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must meet the standard of “plausibility.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1970, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although the complaint need not provide “detailed factual allegations,” id. at 1964; see also ATSI Commc’ns v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 n. 2 (2d Cir.2007) (applying the standard of plausibility outside Twombly’s anti-trust context), it must “amplify a claim with some factual allegations ... to render the claim plausible.” Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-158 (2d Cir.2007) (emphasis in original) (<HOLDING>). The complaint must provide “the grounds upon Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs complaint was valid because despite general allegations it provided notice 1: holding that the statute of limitations did not commence  despite the filing of a prior complaint against another physician  until the defendants deposition made the plaintiff aware of the defendants involvement in the decedents death where the plaintiff failed to discover the defendants involvement because of the defendants misstatement concealment or fraud 2: holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief 3: holding that the plaintiffs complaint adequately alleged the personal involvement of the attorney general because it was plausible that officials of the department of justice would be aware of policies concerning individuals arrested after 911 4: holding that plaintiffs complaint against tribal officials was barred under doctrine of sovereign immunity because the officials votes individually had no legal effect and it was the official action of the band following the officials votes that caused plaintiffs injuries


Input: 467, 174 Ill.Dec. 829, 599 N.E.2d 913, 917 (1992); accord, Ratford v. State, 52 Md.App. 163, 447 A.2d 496, 500 (1982), aff'd in pertinent part, 296 Md. 289, 462 A.2d 1192 (1983). 12 . Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18 Cimt. C (1965). 13 . 424 SW.2d 627 (Tex.1967). 14 . 1d. at 629. 15 . Id. at 629-30. 16 . 190 Miss. 656, 1 So.2d 510 (1941). 17 . Id. at 511. 18 . See generally LaFave & Scott, supra note 4, § 7.15(b), at 303. 19 . 108 N.M. 208, 769 P.2d 1299 (App.1989), overruled on other grounds, State v. Fuentes, 119 N.M. 104, 888 P.2d 986, 988 (App.1994). 20 . Id. at 1301. 21 . 113 N.M. 437, 827 P.2d 152 (App.1992). 22 . Id. at 154-56. 23 . 766 So.2d 310 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2000). 24 . Id. at 311. 25 . Id.; see also People v. Harris, 65 Cal.App.3d 978, 135 Cal.Rptr. 668, 674 (1977) (<HOLDING>). 26 . See Harlow v. State, 820 P.2d 307, 309 Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of assault on victim that was subsequent to the arson for which defendant was tried was admissible to show defendants bent of mind toward violence directed at the victim 1: holding that indirect use of force constituted robbery when defendant tried to push a jewelry case lid open while the victim tried to hold it shut 2: holding that complaining witness was an accomplice as a matter of law despite her testimony that i didnt consent to it  when i had intercourse with my father i tried to get away but i couldnt do it i tried to get loose from him  i tried to get up and hit him but that didnt do no good he was so much stouter than i was was insufficient to establish that she was not an accomplice 3: holding that evidence the victim tried to keep defendant from fleeing the scene of a crime and defendant killed victim in order to escape supported the finding that murder was committed to avoid arrest 4: holding that where the states definition of robbery has on its face the element of use or threatened use of physical force a robbery conviction is properly used as a predicate under acca


Input: rather, it was an action for equitable apportionment of response costs already incurred by a PRP, who was unable to seek relief under § 107. Id. To accept the holding of the Tenth Circuit in Sun Company, the W.R. Grace court reasoned, would result in two separate statute of limitations periods and accrual mechanisms for CERCLA contribution actions. Id. “If a gap exists in the statute of limitations for CERCLA actions under § 113(f)(1), it is one to be resolved by Congress.” Id.; see also Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 1116, 1125 (N.D.Fla.1995) (refusing to borrow another statute of limitations where no triggering event under § 113(g)(3) had occurred or was likely to occur); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Service, 901 F.Supp. 906, 914 (M.D.Pa.1995) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 232 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. Holdings: 0: holding that the evidence was insufficient for the statute of limitations to bar recovery of a quantum meruit cause of action 1: holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim 2: holding that plaintiffs entering into a consent agreement with the epa did not trigger the running of the statute of limitations under  113g3 for purposes of a  113f1 contribution action and further distinguishing a  113f1 contribution action from a cost recovery action to which the limitations periods of  113g2 would apply 3: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 4: holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations


Input: case; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.7 (a). We begin by applying the actual words of the ethical rule to Martin’s case. First, we consider whether the presiding judge erred by viewing Martin’s original lawyers as necessary witnesses. There was no dispute that the lawyers were the only witnesses, other than the original trial judge whose integrity was already being disputed by the lawyers, who claimed to have any knowledge about what the judge might have said to the lawyers in chambers. Thus, as the parties agreed, the lawyers were necessary witnesses if the claim regarding the judge’s statements were to go forward. See Clough v. Richelo, 274 Ga. App. 129, 132 (1) (616 SE2d 888) (2005) (<HOLDING>). The lawyers stated at the hearing that they Holdings: 0: holding under georgia rule of professional conduct 37a that party seeking disqualification must demonstrate that the lawyers testimony is relevant to disputed material questions of fact and that there is no other evidence available to prove those facts 1: recognizing that state agencies might require the lawyer to prove the truth of the fact stated by supplying copies of the court documents or material that led the lawyer to the fact 2: holding that a lawyer is a  necessary witness if his or her testimony is relevant material and unobtainable elsewhere 3: holding that a lawyer is a necessary witness where the lawyers testimony is relevant to disputed material questions of fact and where there is no other evidence available to prove those facts 4: holding that evidence that defendant plaintiffs former client consistently failed to pay other lawyers was relevant to prove the element of intent to defraud


Input: to section 4177(d)(4) as section 4177(d)(4) defines fourth offenses as felonies. Therefore, we hold that only when an individual is convicted of a violation of 21 Del.C. § 4177(a), such violation occurring after three prior convictions under section 4177(a), may he or she be sentenced as a fourth-time offender under section 4177(d)(4). Conclusion We hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the Superior Court to admit the HGN evidence without the proper foundation. Because the error was not harmless, we reverse the appellant’s conviction for the June 25, 1995 incident and remand the case for a new trial. Consequently, we also set aside Zimmerman’s sentence for the Au person, bec o. 185, 1996, 1997 WL 70816 (Feb. 7, 1997) (ORDER). 9 . Id. at 356-62. 10 . See Ruthardt, 680 A.2d at 356 (<HOLDING>). Cf. McLain v. General Motors Corp., Holdings: 0: holding that hgn evidence is scientific and therefore must satisfy the pertinent delaware rules of evidence governing the admission of such evidence 1: holding that plaintiff must present such evidence 2: holding that the rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence there is therefore much to be said for the proposition that in proceedings where the judge himself is considering the admissibility of evidence the exclusionary rules aside from rules of privilege should not be applicable and the judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel 3: holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence is cured by the subsequent admission of the evidence 4: holding that scientific evidence must satisfy the pertinent delaware rules of evidence concerning admission of scientific testimony or evidence ie dre 401 402 403 702 and 703 and be relevant and reliable


Input: I believe the obligation to prove a knowing and willful violation of Maryland's licensing law is clear from the plain language of § 1960(b)(1)(A) and the Maryland law it references, I reject the Talebnejads’ argument that § 1960(b)(1)(A) is void for vagueness. See United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that penal statutes define crimes so that ordinary people can understand the conduct prohibited and so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is not encouraged.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the different scienter requirements made the statute ambiguous, I would reach the same result through applying the rule of lenity. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (<HOLDING>). A knowing and willful violation of Maryland's Holdings: 0: recognizing that the rule of lenity only applies if after considering text structure history and purpose there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the court must simply guess as to what congress intended 1: holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines 2: recognizing that the rule of lenity applies not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions but also to the penalties they impose 3: holding rule of lenity in the penal context to be a rule of last resort 4: holding that the rule of lenity ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered


Input: included “informant testimony, confirmed by independently verified evidence, that Carlos Powell was a major player in a drug trafficking ring in Detroit.” United States v. Powell, 943 F.Supp.2d 759, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2013). The affidavit stated that obtaining Carlos Powell’s cell-phone location information would assist in finding him and identifying his associates, the locations used to store narcotics, and the assets derived from the narcotic sales. Id. Importantly, the government does not ask us to decide whether the long-term tracking of cell phone location information in this case should be deemed a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The possibility that it could constitute a search was suggested in dicta in United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2851, 186 Holdings: 0: holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not 1: holding that while search incident to arrest could not justify search in that case probable cause plus exigency justified search 2: holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises 3: holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment 4: holding shortterm cellphone tracking was not a search


Input: policies. 24 . 182 La. 551, 162 So. 177. 25 . No. 6829, 1917 WL 1628 (La.App. Jan. 9, 1917). 26 . A “constructive total loss" occurs when a covered peril renders something economically, if not physically, useless. See Hart, 162 So. at 180 (finding a constructive total loss when building was 75% destroyed by fire, rendering it useless, and thus, demolished by city order); Briede, 1917 WL 1628, *3 (building insured for $10,000 was gutted by fire, requiring $8,330 to repair it to state before fire or $10,830 to repair it to pass current code, court concluded homeowner suffered constructive total loss). 27 . In both Langston v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., No. 53-219, slip op. (La. 25th Jud. Dist. Ct., Plaquemines Parish, Feb. 8, 2007) (unp 77 So.2d 774, 775-76 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). 30 . Compare Fla. Stat. § 627.702(1) (2003) Holdings: 0: holding that causation is a coverage question for the court when an insurer wholly denies that there is a covered loss and an amountofloss question for the appraisal panel when an insurer admits that there is a covered loss the amount of which is disputed 1: holding that the vpl requires an insurer to pay the full value of the policy only when a covered peril causes a total loss 2: holding that the repair or replace limitation of liability capped the insurers liability at the amount necessary to return the car to substantially the same condition as before the loss and did not include liability for loss due to stigma on resale 3: holding that if the insurer has any liability at all to the owner for a building damaged by a covered peril and deemed a total loss that liability is for the face amount of the policy citation omitted emphasis in original 4: holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue


Input: entities like GasPlus. See generally S. Rep. 106-150 at 5, 7, 10. And GasPlus’s interests were clearly regulated by the BIA’s decision to void the Management Agreement. Indeed, GasPlus’s basic argument in this lawsuit is that the BIA has imposed a greater burden on GasPlus (and the Nambe Pueblo) than what Congress intended when it amended Section 81. The prudential standing test, which “is not meant to be especially demanding,” Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Assoc., 479 U.S. 388, 399, 107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987), is therefore satisfied. The other standing requirements are also satisfied. GasPlus has suffered an injury in fact: namely, the loss of its rights and benefits arising from the Management Agreement. See, e.g., Idaho Power Co. v. F.E.R.C., 312 F.3d 454, 460 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The causation requirement is satisfied Holdings: 0: holding a deviation from the terms of a contract constitutes an impairment of contract 1: holding that even though an executive order mandating agency consideration of environmental justice concerns created no private right of action for an agencys failure to comply with that mandate the court would review the agencys action as an exercise of discretion under the apa and nepa 2: holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable 3: holding that an agencys interference with a private partys contract rights constitutes an injury in fact 4: holding that potential loss of a contract constitutes irreparable injury