Input: Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 67 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)). Similarly, the court can find no such exception with respect to plaintiffs Puerto Rico law claims. Courts will only find that a state has waived its own Eleventh Amendment immunity by legislative fiat where the same is “stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’ ” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S.Ct. 458, 53 L.Ed. 742 (1909)); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Laws 17 and 69 do include the Commonwealth Holdings: 0: holding that the statute must specify the states intention to subject itself to suit in federal court in order to constitute a waiver 1: holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling 2: holding that a states consent to suit in federal court must be unequivocally expressed 3: holding individual defendants subject to suit 4: holding in a patent case that when the plaintiff brought the suit in federal district court it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to all the issues embraced in the suit including those pertaining to the counterclaim of the defendants


Input: conduct at issue); Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.1998) (distinguishing discretionary from ministerial acts). The specific conduct Pahnke complained of is Deputy Sass’s order to leave her apartment immediately despite the fact that Pahnke presented him with notice of what she urges is her statutory right to a 24-hour deadline for removal. The district court found that both Sass and Har-grove served the notice and removed Pahnke from the apartment, and Officer Hargrove does not contend that this finding is erroneous. It is the immediacy of Pahnke’s removal by the offi y requiring officers to use red lights and siren “in a continuous manner” during vehicular pursuit imposed a ministerial duty); Brown v. City of Bloomington, 706 N.W.2d 519, 523-24 (Minn.App.2005) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 2006); Hyatt v. Holdings: 0: holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable 1: holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured 2: holding that the public duty doctrine applied to claims against the town and fire chief for negligence in responding to a fire call although plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show the special duty exception applied 3: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 4: holding that officers decisions to use lesslethal ammunition and to fire more than one round were discretionary but that departments procedure for making transition from lethal to lesslethal shells when loading weapon imposed a ministerial duty


Input: use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application.” 183 F.3d at 1006 (internal quotations omitted and emphasis added). This includes the time between the filing of Valdez’s legal challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence in the state appellate courts and his factual challenge under Romero in the superior court. See Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.2001) (“[PJost-conviction review is ‘pending’ — and thus AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled — from ‘the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.’ ” (quoting Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006) (emphasis in original)); Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The order in which Valdez filed his state Holdings: 0: holding that the limitations period is not tolled while a federal habeas petition is pending 1: holding that the untimely petition in that case tolled the aedpa statute of limitations 2: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of petition for certiorari to the united states supreme court seeking review of denial of state postconviction relief 3: holding that the aedpa statute of limitations was tolled for the entire period during which saffold pursued state habeas relief including the time between filings 4: holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional


Input: period, claimed serious physical injuries to neck, arms, and shoulders). With no additional alleg L 3822220, at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (granting summary judgment on tight handcuffing claim where plaintiff experienced 24 hours of swelling and went to hospital but no treatment was provided for wrists); Wang, 2012 WL 119591, at *7 (granting summary judgment where plaintiff was “shrieking in pain” from tight handcuffs but plaintiff, sought no medical attention and there was no evidence that the handcuffing caused actual physical injury); Abdul-Rahman, 2012 WL 1077762, at *7-8 (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings where only alleged injury was numbness and marks on wrists); Bender v. City of New York, No. 09-CV-3286 (BSJ), 2011 WL 4344203, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011) (<HOLDING>); Richardson v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps., Corp., Holdings: 0: holding that a plan administrators decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious even though an attending physician had submitted a form stating the plaintiff could sit for six hours stand for two hours and walk for two hours 1: holding that extremely tight handcuffing for nearly fourteen hours that left indentations in plaintiffs arms for over six hours did not amount to excessive force 2: holding that detention for three hours in a checkpoint station required probable cause 3: holding that to state a claim for wage violations under the flsa plaintiffs must provide at least some approximation of the overtime hours that defendants required them to work and a time frame for when those hours were worked 4: holding that seven hours was a reasonable amount of time to deliberate meaningfully about the choice


Input: is reached, or if the agreement is revoked, rejected by the court, or withdrawn or if the judgment is later vacated or reversed, neither the plea discussion nor any resulting agreement, plea or judgment, nor statements made at a hearing on the plea, shall be admissible against the defendant in any criminal or civil action or administrative proceeding. Both these rules “plainly preclude[ ] the state from using statements a defendant made during ‘the plea discussion,’ that is, statements made in a discussion that precedes the plea agreement and anything in the agreement itself, as well as statements made during a change-of-plea hearing.” State v. Campoy, 220 Ariz. 539, ¶¶ 13-14, 207 P.3d 792, 797-98 (App.2009); see also State v. Vargas, 127 Ariz. 59, 61, 618 P.2d 229, 231 (1980) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14 We agree that because Duran’s statements Holdings: 0: recognizing a presumption that a plea of guilty is final and binding if the plea was made during a properly conducted hearing pursuant to rule 11 of the federal rules of criminal procedure 1: holding that a courts inquiry as to disputed facts in connection with a prior conviction is limited to the terms of the charging document a plea agreement a transcript of the plea colloquy or a comparable judicial record 2: holding defendant could validly waive statute of limitations in effort to prevent being indicted during the completion of plea negotiations with the prosecution 3: holding that the government must be held to a promise made to a defendant during plea negotiations if that promise induced the defendants guilty plea 4: holding rules 410 and 174f preclude impeaching defendant with statements made in the expectation of a plea agreement including document  signed during plea negotiations


Input: The warmth of the hood is some evidence that the accident occurred a relatively short time before police arrived on the scene. See Warren v. State, 377 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. refd) (“The warmth of the hood and cab of the truck is some evidence that the accident occurred a short time before Deputy Drake arrived.”) (citing Rawls, 318 S.W.2d at 663). The facts that appellant smelled of alcohol and failed the field sobriety tests, there were no other pedestrians nearby who could have been involved in the crash, and there were no bars or establishments that sold alcohol in the area likewise support the trial court’s conclusion that appellant was intoxicated at the time he drove his car into the area and crashed on the median. See Weems, 328 S.W.3d at 175-76 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, appellant told police officers Holdings: 0: holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes 1: holding that evidence was sufficient to establish that appellant operated vehicle while intoxicated when vehicle was registered to appellants mother who testified that he had vehicle on night in question appellant was found fourtenths of a mile from accident scene in rural area and police and ems personnel saw no one else in area 2: holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion when he saw a vehicle moving with its lights off in the parking lot of a closed business in a rural area at 300 am 3: holding that plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employers motor vehicle carrier preparing to travel was very close to the vehicle and engaged in a task related to the vehicle and therefore was an occupier of a motor vehicle 4: holding the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the lessee driver of a vehicle had knowingly transported a handgun recovered from the trunk of the vehicle in question


Input: of death or serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out, and (3) lack of a reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm.” United States v. Moreno, 102 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir.1996) (citing United States v. Becerra, 992 F.2d 960, 964 (9th Cir.1993)). Duenas-Gonzalez was not entitled to a new trial on his claimed Brady violation or on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Contrary to Duenas-Gonzalez’s contention, no Brady violation occurred. The government offered neither false evidence nor perjured testimony. See United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that the prosecution’s inadvertent use of perjured testimony can constitute a Brady violation); Cf. United States v. Young, 17 F.3d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Nor did the government withhold evidence Holdings: 0: holding reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome 1: holding that a new trial was warranted where there is reasonable probability that the false testimony introduced by the government influenced the outcome of the trial 2: holding that there is a presumption that new evidence discovered by criminal defendant after trial is over would not change outcome of trial 3: holding that petitioner failed to establish a reasonable probability that had his trial counsel interviewed renee and called her as a witness at trial the trial outcome would have been different because renees testimony wholly lacked credibility 4: holding that a reasonable probability is one that in the judgment of the reviewing court is  sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding citation omitted


Input: F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2008) (once initial sanction is final, subsequent sanction would violate industrial double jeopardy principles); Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works c. 15.3.F.vii (7th ed. 2012). We do not, however, for the reasons explained below, interpret the award to preclude appropriate remedial action required by statute, including training and coun-selling, to address Ashe’s sexual harassment. General Laws c. 15 IB requires an employer to take some remedial action in cases of confirmed sexual harassment. See College-Town, supra at 162 (employer who is notified of sexual harassment in workplace and fails to take adequate remedial action violates G. L. c. 15IB, § 4); Modern Continental/Obayashi v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 445 Mass. 96, 104-108 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Trinh v. Gentle Communications, LLC, 71 Mass. Holdings: 0: recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action 1: holding school board liable for studentonstudent harassment if school officials knew of harassment and intentionally failed to take proper remedial action 2: holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor 3: holding school hable for sexual harassment by its employees only if the district knew or should have known and neghgently failed to take prompt effective remedial action 4: holding that employer who failed to take remedial action could be held liable for sexual harassment of employee by subcontractors employees


Input: “use of the knife as a weapon” was not justified by his explanation and his “use of the knife ... was clearly a use of the knife as a potential weapon.” There is evidence to support these findings. [¶ 19.] When Amundson opened the door to allow the agents to enter his apartment, he unquestionably possessed a knife. That possession constitutes using the knife as a potential weapon. Amundson attempts to justify his use of the knife, in this manner by asserting that he was uncertain who was at the door and that he was “scared.” However, Amundson had a reasonable alternative to using the knife as a potential weapon. For example, he could have insisted on identification before he opened the door or left the knife in the kitchen. See United States v. Lomax, 87 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Board’s findings, that Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court was not entitled to impose a threeyear mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon where the jury verdict did not specifically find actual possession 1: holding the defendant was a convicted felon within the purview of the federal statute prohibiting the receiving and possession of firearms by a convicted felon where the defendants prior conviction was based on an idaho state probated sentence 2: holding that the enhancement applied where the defendant possessed a firearm in connection with possessing methamphetamine 3: holding that the defendant a convicted felon was not legally justified in possessing a firearm because potentially effective legal options existed 4: holding that dual convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon violated double jeopardy


Input: stated in Nelson that "the required showing of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct. For example, a single severe act can be enough to establish a claim[.]” Nelson, 97 Hawai'i at 390, 38 P.3d at 109. 12 . HRS § 707-733, entitled "Sexual assault in the fourth degree,” provides in relevant part: (1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the fourth degree if: (a) The person knowingly subjects another person to sexual contact by compulsion or causes another person to have sexual contact with the actor by compulsion^] 13 . However, we recognize that there are situations in which name-calling or other verbal harassment constitutes "severe or pervasive” harassment. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705, 712 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 14 . We recognize that "[t]he courts ... must Holdings: 0: holding teasing and offhand comments even if offensive are not actionable harassment 1: holding that supervisors reactions to comments did not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination where comments were made six months prior to plaintiffs discharge and were unconnected to the discharge decision 2: holding that a supervisors repeated comments to an employee that the supervisor wanted to have sex with the employees fifteenyearold daughter were extremely severe because the comments were significantly more offensive than the typical crass comments we have found to be insufficient to constitute harassment in other cases 3: holding that the prosecutors repeated comments that the defendant could have denied knowledge of the drugs or rebutted the trafficking charge by testifying were so prejudicial as to constitute plain error 4: holding that in order to raise prejudicial comments of trial court on appeal defendant must object to comments when made and move for a mistrial


Input: claim, for chapter 13 plan purposes, i.e. a $73,906.98 general unsecured claim for Advanta for chapter 13 plan purposes, and a $43,339.19 general unsecured claim for Household for chapter 13 plan purposes. Section 524 does not support Debtors’ request that these unsecured claims be valued at zero for chapter 13 plan purposes, due to the prior chapter 7 discharge. V. Conclusion This opinion constitutes this Court’s findings and fact and conclusions of law with respect to this Court’s Order entered this sa s or partnerships) are not eligible to receive any discharge whatsoever in Chapter 7, though corporations and partnerships may be eligible to receive a discharge in Chapter 11. 16 . See supra, footnotes 12 and 13. 17 . Id. See also, In re Thompson, 182 B.R. 140 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1995) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that unless security interest or lien is avoided bankruptcy discharge has little if any impact on creditors ability to proceed in rem against property securing claim 1: holding that a party cannot waive in rem jurisdiction under florida law and a court proceeding pursuant to in rem jurisdiction must actually possess in rem jurisdiction over the property that is the subject of the matter 2: holding that a state tax lien was not judicial lien arising from judgment such that it could be avoided in bankruptcy by a chapter 13 debtor 3: holding that if a debt or had voluntarily granted a security interest that was later avoided the debtor was not entitled to exempt the interest recovered 4: holding that section 363f applies only to in rem interests which have attached to the property by way of either the debtors consent to a security interest or the creditors attachment of the property resulting in a lien


Input: raises issues of bankruptcy law for a debtor in bankruptcy in Rhode Island, this Court has jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs claim. For two reasons, however, the Court has limited jurisdiction over any potential class action. Usually debate about bankruptcy jurisdiction centers on whether ancillary actions impact the bankruptcy estate in such a manner that the bankruptcy court would need to resolve these ancillary actions to resolve the bankruptcy. If they do, jurisdiction is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) ; Williams v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 244 B.R. 858, 862 (S.D.Ga. 2000) (noting that for jurisdictional purposes bankruptcy class actions differ from other class actions because each has its own bankruptcy estate); McGlynn v. Credit Store, Inc., 234 B.R. 576, 584 (D.R.I.1999) (<HOLDING>). If the additional claims do not stem from the Holdings: 0: holding that where a proposed project does not alter the status quo then it does not have a significant impact 1: holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under title ix 2: holding that preemption under  1144a does not permit removal if the plaintiffs claim does not fall within the scope of  1132a 3: holding that title ii does not apply to the states 4: holding that a claim regarding postdischarge conduct that does not impact the bankruptcy estate in any way does not fall under title lls jurisdictional umbrella


Input: at the bottom that each of KPMG’s member firms is a “separate and independent legal entity” and describes itself as such. (Docket No. 174, App. at l). Several courts have declined to treat different firms as a single entity, holding them jointly and severally liable for one another’s acts, simply because they shared an associational name and/or collaborated on certain aspects of the relevant transaction. See In re AM Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 606 F.Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (dismissing complaint against Price Water-house entities outside the United States after rejecting argument that all Price Wa-terhouse affiliates worldwide were “in fact one entity, and acted as agents of one another”); Reingold v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 599 F.Supp. 1241, 1249, 1254 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Noonan v. Winston Co., 902 F.Supp. 298, Holdings: 0: holding where contributions to lobbying organization were generally not tax exempt exception for veterans organization was speakerbased discrimination not aimed at the suppression of ideas and satisfied rational scrutiny 1: holding that imposition of government fees did not violate exempt status of religious organization 2: holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did 3: holding that existence of dh  s international an organization composed of a large number of affiliated accounting firms did not prove dh  s was a single worldwide entity even though some brochures described dh  s us as a single cohesive worldwide organization 4: holding that an organization whose members are injured may represent those members even where the organization itself cannot show injury


Input: claims. See 13 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc. (2d ed.) § 3522 (1984 & Supp.2008); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (discussing the limited categories of cases where the Supreme Court has found complete preemption). The only circuit court to have considered whether the PMPA triggers the complete preemption doctrine is the Ninth Circuit, which found that it did not. Yorn v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 952 F.2d 408 (tbl.), 1992 WL 2872 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1992) (un-pub.). In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that “[wjhile the PMPA may provide Unocal with a viable pre-emption defense to Yorn’s common law claims, it is for the California courts to make this determinatio .D.Pa.1986) (<HOLDING>). Sunoco cites one instance where a federal Holdings: 0: holding that pmpa preempted new york statutory law governing the termination or nonrenewal of franchises but did not preempt state contract claim which did not involve the termination of the franchise relationship 1: holding that fraud claim concerning nonrenewal of franchise agreement was preempted by pmpa 2: holding that pmpa preempted state statute regarding the ter initiation and nonrenewal of franchises and state commonlaw claim 3: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims were preempted by pmpa because they sought to impose standards more stringent than the pmpa regarding the termination or nonrenewal of his franchise 4: holding state law claim premised on implied duty of good faith was preempted by the pmpa because it concerned the termination of a petroleum franchise


Input: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that “the presumption of reliability that serves as the premise for the public-records exception does not attach to third parties who themselves have no public duty to report.” Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013) (refusing to admit “third-party statements contained in a police report”). See also United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In general, statements by third parties who are not government employees ... may not be admitted pursuant to the public records exception but must satisfy some other exception in order to be admitted.”). Thus, the responses to the questionnaires must themselves fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rale. Cf. In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (<HOLDING>). Because the Spa does not contend that the Holdings: 0: holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made 1: holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay 2: holding that factors used in determining whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable to satisfy hearsay exceptions also apply to whether statements have sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness under confrontation clause 3: holding that thirdparty statements contained in dcfs caseworker reports constituted hearsay 4: recognizing that the united states constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception


Input: State v. Leach, 296 Md. 591, 463 A.2d 872 (1983), were the two Court of Appeals cases relied upon in Taylor. In Garrison, the defendant’s husband had possession of 173 glassine bags of heroin and was in the process of discarding the heroin in the toilet. The heroin was not in the plain view of the defendant, who was found in bed, in a bedroom not adjacent to the toilet where the drug was discarded. Garrison, 272 Md. at 126, 321 A.2d 767. In Leach, the defendant, with his brother, had “joint dominion and control ... over the entire apartment 2d 495 (1972) (evidence insufficient to support conviction when defendant was merely present in an apartment in which a woman’s purse and a cigarette case containing heroin were found); Puckett v. State, 13 Md.App. 584, 587-88, 284 A.2d 252 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Haley v. State, 7 Md.App. 18, 33-34, 253 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a thumbprint on an easily movable cup found beside a tent that was located six to fifteen feet away from marijuana plants was insufficient to prove that the defendant was manufacturing marijuana as there was no evidence suggesting when or where the defendant touched the cup 1: holding evidence of marijuana plants on premises defendant owned with his wife insufficient where marijuana plants were grown in an uncultivated area and there was a total absence of evidence of the defendants involvement 2: holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea 3: holding evidence of presence of marijuana plants on property puckett jointly owned with his wife was not sufficient to create rational inference that puckett was in possession of the marijuana 4: holding evidence insufficient for conviction of possession of marijuana amphetamines and barbiturates when those drugs were not found on the person of or in the same room as the defendant but were only found on other people on the premises


Input: approach to this issue, given the current split among the circuits. As might be expected, two camps have emerged following Salinas. On one side, courts have found that the government need not prove a link exists. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits occupy this camp. See United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303 (5th Cir.2002); United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir.2000); United States v. Grossi, 143 F.3d 348 (7th Cir.1998). In these decisions, courts often rely on earlier precedents, which refused to recognize any nexus requirement. Some also infer that because Salinas skirted the issue, rather than impose a requirement when it had the chance, that no requirement is necessary. See, e.g., Dakota, 197 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); Morgan, 230 F.3d at 1067 (Salinas no more Holdings: 0: holding that some federal connection to the misconduct is required 1: holding that no nexus is required in part because salinas left the nature of any necessary connection unanswered 2: holding that no nexus was required in a determination involving a stateless vessel 3: holding the connection is an element 4: holding that no federal nexus is required


Input: on appeal, therefore, turns on the legal question of the burden of proof. We review questions of law de novo. See Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Fe cts Liability § 8.04[7][b], at 8-228-27 (rev. ed.1999): As a practical matter, ... in most strict liability lawsuits, in most jurisdictions, whether or not there was a substantial change in the condition in the product is a non-issue. The product under consideration may be brand new, its very nature will obviate (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (affirming summary judgment because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the allegedly defective transmission had not been somehow replaced or substantially changed over the life of the automobile); Humphreys v. General Motors Corp., 839 F.Supp. 822, 827-28 & n. 6 (N.D.Fla.1993), aff'd, 47 F.3d 430 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Other courts have held that the defendant has Holdings: 0: holding that once the defendant has submitted to the control of the officer and the process of taking him or her to the police station  has commenced his or her arrest is complete and he or she is in custody for the purposes of the escape statute 1: holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment 2: holding that for a legal malpractice claim to accrue a plaintiff need not know the precise extent of his or her damages or even have suffered all of the damages attributable to his or her attorneys negligence 3: holding that plaintiff must on his or her own initiative prove that the product reached him or her without substantial change 4: holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own ineffectiveness


Input: a reasonable officer could have concluded that impoundment of the motorcycle was lawful based on the CaLVeh. Code. “If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate”. Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156-57 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”)). The only issue that is contested is whether Officer Faulk was acting out of personal animus towards Plaintiff. However, this dispute is over Officer Faulk’s subjective intentions, which is irrelevant in determining whether qualified immunity applies. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The only question the Court must decide is Holdings: 0: holding that the qualified immunity determination does not entail an inquiry into the officers subjective intentions merely his knowledge 1: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 2: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 3: holding that reasonableness for qualified immunity purposes requires an objective inquiry into the totality of the circumstances 4: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim


Input: that revenue sharing information was required by ERISA disclosure provisions: The allegedly omitted disclosures are not required by the language of the regulations and would instead require judicial expansion of the detailed disclosure regime crafted by Congress and the Department of Labor pursuant , to its statutory authority. ■Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that receiving this additional non-prescribed information would effectively enhance investment decisions. In assessing the likely return on an investment the fees netted against the return are certainly relevant, but knowing the subsequent distribution of those fees has no impact on the investment’s value. See In re Merrill Lynch Investment Management Funds Securities Litigation, 434 F.Supp.2d 233, 238 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (<HOLDING>). In the context of. the disclosure of Holdings: 0: holding inadmissible expert testimony that included statements that failure to disclose certain enumerated information would be a material omission under utah law that the material actually provided to investors did not meet disclosure requirements under the act and that the agreements at issue were securities under utah law 1: holding that a plaintiff alleging securities fraud must show that a defendant 1 made a material misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he or she had a duty to speak 2 with scienter 3 in connection with the purchase or sale of securities 2: holding that such information is not material under securities law 3: holding that omission of information about shares held in corporations was material even if the securities were worthless at the time 4: recognizing a duty of best execution under federal securities law


Input: Cummings touched Adam’s skin and said “ooh” is entirely ambiguous and does not plausibly allege intent to intimidate or humiliate Adam. Importantly, neither of these incidents plausibly demonstrates a “significant negative alteration in [Adam’s] workplace environment.” Adam’s argues that her alleged demotion from “intern” to “volunteer” damaged to her “career prospects.” Although being given a “less distinguished title” can be an adverse action, “a difference in job title alone—where the positions are identical in terms of work, pay and benefits—is not materially adverse.” Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 749-50 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). Adam has not alleged that interns had Holdings: 0: holding that a negative criticism or performance evaluation unaccompanied by a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment does not constitute adverse employment action 1: holding that a transfer and job title change from assistant vicepresident and manager of one bank branch to a loan officer position at a different branch alone is not enough to constitute a materially adverse employment action 2: holding that a job transfer was not an adverse employment action because the plaintiff enjoyed the same  rate of pay and benefits and her duties were not materially modified 3: holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action 4: holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits


Input: 103 (1981). Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, requires that once a court decides an issue necessary to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the same issue on a different cause of action between the same parties. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). Section 1738 requires application of both doctrines. See University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986). These principles are integral to our judicial system because they “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage rebanee on adjudication.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Respecting the finality of state court Holdings: 0: holding that in actions brought under 42 usc  1983 federal courts apply the states statute of limitation for personal injury 1: holding that qualified immunity under  1983 does not apply to actions brought under  521 2: holding that preclusion rules apply in 1983 actions 3: holding that nonmutual issue preclusion should not apply against the state government 4: holding that the ind trial rules do not apply to actions before the board


Input: strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them.”); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-07, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (“This accords with the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions, which we have applied in many varying contexts.”) (citation omitted); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985) (stating that “the question is reduced to whether, in light of the competing values at stake, we may rely on the crucial assumption that the jurors followed the instructions given them by the trial judge,” and answering that question in the affirmative) (quotation marks omitted); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1976 n.9, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (<HOLDING>). We have obediently followed and repeated the Holdings: 0: holding that a jury is presumed to follow a judges instructions 1: recognizing the crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury that jurors carefully follow instructions 2: holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions 3: holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions 4: recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions


Input: for criminal or otherwise wrongful conduct in benefits programs that it created, it explicitly did so — strengthening the State’s contention that Congress did not intend to completely occupy the retirement benefits field to the exclusion of state legislation peripherally affecting it. II. Conflict of State Law with FERS Jones’s last argument is that the State “cannot impinge on the federal government’s ability to dictate the terms on which employees seeking retirement will be subjected to criminal sanctions.” The fact that the enforcement of state laws does slightly concern the congressional prerogative to exclusively govern the postal system is not sufficient to support a claim of preemption. See, e.g., State ex rel. Danforth v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 527 S.W.2d 355, 362-63 (Mo.1975) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. National Fed’n of the Blind, Holdings: 0: holding the state law claims were not preempted 1: holding state law prohibiting lotteries was not preempted by postal power when lottery was conducted by mail 2: holding that a state law prohibiting a pass through of a gasoline tax to customers was preempted by federal law 3: holding state law regulating solicitation of funds by charitable organization was not preempted by postal clause when solicitation conducted by mail 4: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law


Input: v. Government of the United States Virgin Islands, 299 F.3d 207 (3d Cir.2002), we rejected the “manifest error” standard and the proposition that the Ap pellate Division should be treated “as if it were a local appellate or supreme court.” Id. at 211-12; see also Saludes v. Ramos, 744 F.2d 992, 993-94 (3d Cir.1984) (rejecting deferential standard of review for Appellate Division decision). In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that the District Court of the Virgin Islands “is essentially a federal creature, and not an insular appellate court.” BA Properties, 299 F.3d at 212. We also indicated in BA Properties that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, once it was established by the Virgin Islands Legislature, would possess an authoritative voice on matters of Virgin Islands law. Id. (<HOLDING>). We reinforced this position in a subsequent Holdings: 0: recognizing the virgin islands legislature as the sovereign author of local jurisdictional law including section 39c even before passage of the 1984 amendments to the revised organic act sometimes referred to as the virgin islands constitution 1: recognizing that any attributes of sovereignty the virgin islands has derive from the revised organic act 2: recognizing that virgin islands supreme court would essentially have the final word on the interpretation of local virgin islands law 3: holding that court is bound by prior panels interpretation of supreme court decision 4: holding that circuit court should defer to supreme courts interpretation of the act


Input: to credit and what reasonable inferences to draw from that evidence. For example, the panel opinion rejected the reasonable inference that Kotowski’s assailant fled before taking anything of value from the apartment because he heard her upstairs neighbor on the telephone with the police. Instead, the panel held that “no rational juror could conclude that the placement of this phone call frightened him off given the volume and duration of Mrs. Kotowski’s screams.” O’Laughlin III, 568 F.3d at 302. Although it would be entirely permissible for a jury to resist drawing this inference, an appellate court applying the Jackson standard does not have the freedom to pick between competing reasonable inferences in this manner. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 447 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The panel opinion’s method of analysis Holdings: 0: recognizing that circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to demonstrate a defendants guilt 1: holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict 2: holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence 3: holding that in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jurys verdict 4: recognizing that competing inferences are not enough to disturb the jurys verdict even in a case where the evidence of the defendants guilt was entirely circumstantial


Input: to enhance the sentence of an adult offender. See, e.g., People v. Bowden, 102 Cal.App.4th 387, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 513, 517 (2002) (“[T]he Tighe majority opinion is unpersuasive, and we decline to follow or extend its reasoning in the context of the Three Strikes law.”). But see People v. Smith, 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 901, 907-29 (2003) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on Tighe to argue against the use of a prior nonjury juvenile conviction to enhance a defendant’s sentence). Likewise, the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the Apprendi “prior conviction” exception includes nonjury juvenile adjudications, which can be used to enhance a defendant’s sentence. United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190-91 (11th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 551, 163 Holdings: 0: holding that a juvenile adjudication could not constitute a conviction for purposes of hawaiis repeat offender provision 1: holding that a juvenile adjudication may be used as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes 2: holding that a nonjury juvenile adjudication that  afforded all constitutionallyrequired procedural safeguards can properly be characterized as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes 3: recognizing that an inquiry into the conduct underlying a defendants juvenile adjudication may be admissible under rule 11608b nmra if the prosecution does not specifically question the defendant about the juvenile adjudication and does not otherwise present any evidence regarding the defendants juvenile adjudication 4: holding that juvenile adjudications may not be used for impeachment purposes because the disposition of a juvenile does not constitute a criminal conviction


Input: Id. at 738 (internal citation omitted); see Coldwell Banker & Co. v. Karlock, 686 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir.1982) (finding that “[a] real estate brokerage contract is generally characterized as a contract for personal services rather than a contract conveying an interest in land,” and performing a conflict-of-law analysis by assessing contacts with brokerage arrangements, including, inter alia, the situs of the property); Dorothy K. Winston & Co. v. Town Heights Dev., Inc., 376 F.Supp. 1214, 1218-19 (D.D.C.1974) (concluding that situs rule did not control contacts analysis and Florida broker’s law did not bar commission for a District of Columbia broker who procured a purchaser for property in Florida); see also Scott/Hubbard Co. v. Sika Chem. Co., 694 F.Supp. 1311, 1314-15 (N.D.Ill.1988) (<HOLDING>); Ames v. Ideal Cement Co., 37 Misc.2d 883, 235 Holdings: 0: holding that the situs of an acquired missouri corporation was not determinative of choiceoflaw question as to finders fee contract between a finder and a purchaser both nonmissouri corporations 1: holding that corporate law should apply because key question was legal effect of contracts between corporations 2: holding that securities of other corporations may of course be acquired by a delaware corporation 3: holding that while a state statute granted a foreign corporation the rights and privileges enjoyed by domestic corporations it did not transform such corporations into domestic or resident corporations 4: holding that plaintiff an officer and shareholder of a corporation with signatory authority over the corporations checking account was not a customer of the bank and could not file suit for wrongful dishonor of the corporations checks


Input: Co., 776 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (violation of firearm regulations); City of Ingleside v. Kneuper, 768 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex.App.—Austin 1989, writ denied) (criminal activity in connection with building inspections); Travis County v. Colunga, 753 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex.App.—Austin 1988, writ denied) (misuse of hazardous chemicals); City of Brownsville v. Pena, 716 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1986, no writ) (misuse of public property and funds). 34 . Fed. Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 405. 35 . City of San Antonio v. Heim, 932 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex.App.—Austin 1996, writ denied) (op. on reh’g). 36 . Bivins, 936 S.W.2d at 421; Colunga, 753 S.W.2d at 718-19. 37 . Stinnett v. Williamson S. 564, 574-75, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 1341, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959) Holdings: 0: holding that press release issued by acting director of office of rent stabilization regarding employee termination was within scope of directors official duties and absolutely privileged 1: holding positive press release was not actionable where plaintiffs have not alleged that any of the historical representations in that press release were false 2: holding that a state official can be held individually hable under  1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties 3: holding that prosecutors defamatory statements to the press after plaintiff was pardoned were absolutely privileged 4: holding that defamation claim fails because communication by employer to dc office of employment services is absolutely privileged


Input: approached Richard Teng and attempted to ascertain his identity. Id. While Donovan and Quinones were ascertaining Richard Teng’s identity, they were standing in the “open area.” Id. It took “a matter of minutes” to ascertain Richard Teng’s identity. Id. at 176. From the time that Donovan and Quinones entered the warehouse, they passed by a number of rows of stacked boxes and proceeded to have a conversation with a suspected fugitive in an “open area.” Throughout this period, an attack could have been launched from any of the aisles that Donovan and Quinones passed. In most of the published cases that this court has reviewed, the space from which an attack can be immediately launched is a relatively small space. See e.g., United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 213, 216-17 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Vargas, 2003 WL 21313721, at Holdings: 0: holding that protective sweep was justified incident to arrest outside residence where officers had reasonable suspicion that dangerous individuals were in apartment 1: holding that protective sweep was permitted of adjacent room of apartment where apartment consisted of two small rooms 2: holding that statements by defendant and apartment manager that defendant lived in the apartment where drugs were found demonstrated his control over the apartment even though no documents personal effects or keys were found 3: holding a protective sweep unconstitutional where officers had no information that any other persons were in the apartment 4: holding a landlord liable for injuries sustained in the laundry room of an apartment complex


Input: HRS § 11— 13 that Kaho'ohalahala was a Lanai resident, which is a conclusion of law reviewable under the right/wrong standard. Dupree states that the Board’s determination that Kaho'ohalahala was not a Lanai resident is entitled to “a presumption of validity[,”] citing Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai'i 217, 226, 941 P.2d 300, 309 (1997). In Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawaii), Inc. v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 112 Hawai'i 489, 146 P.3d 1066 (2006), this court identified the applicable standard of review as follows: An agency’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, while an agency’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. A conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous stand 0, 179 P.3d 1050, 1053, 1056-57 (2008) (<HOLDING>). B. Jurisdiction “The existence of Holdings: 0: holding that we consider an agencys expertise or special knowledge when  application of the regulation is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the agencys technical knowledge and expertise to the facts presented citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding that when an administrative agencys decision was a mixed question of fact and law a reviewing court should apply a clearly erroneous standard of review 2: holding that we show  deference to an agencys conclusions in the area of its expertise 3: holding that where both mixed questions of fact and law are presented deference will be given to the agencys expertise and experience in the particular field and the court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the ageneyt and that the chief election officer did not clearly err in rejecting signatures on a petition for inclusion on the presidential ballot citation omitted 4: holding that in general an agencys conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard but questions concerning whether an agency has followed proper procedures or considered the appropriate factors in making its determination are questions of law which are reviewed de novo


Input: or person associated with a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(o )(2). That provision makes clear that the state interests in enforcing consumer-protection laws and combatting deceptive business practices — the interests South Carolina and Tennessee seek to vindicate in their cases — do not tread on the federal interest in regulating the market for credit ratings. Moreover, that provision is, in itself, a recognition and vindication of the importance of the States’ interests in this case. That is, Congress intended for States to retain their ability to enforce their consumer-protection laws against NRSROs; it is for neither federal courts nor those NRSROs to question that judgment. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., 280 F.3d at 880 (<HOLDING>); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 902 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest 1: recognizing that an exercise of the police power necessary to safeguard the public safety and welfare can justify impairment of contractual rights and obligations 2: holding in a suit by cellphone providers that fjederal telecommunications law implicitly acknowledges the importance of the state interest in enforcing its consumerprotection statutes by leaving states some latitude to protect the public safety and welfare and safeguard the rights of consumers  quoting 47 usc  253b 3: recognizing the states interest in preventing deception of consumers 4: recognizing the importance of public welfare and conservation of water in administering its public waters


Input: the conduct, “if performed in other than legislative lations, they were fulfilling discretionary, policymaking functions implicating State budgetary priorities. As discussed supra, Plaintiffs claim that defendants acts were ultra vires, without authority, and null and void. Taking the allegations in the complaint as true, as the Court must do on a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendants were acting beyond the scope of their authority as public officials. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court finds that the allegations are sufficiently pled to defeat Defendants’ motion at this stage of the litigation. See Collin Cnty. Tex. v. Homeowners Ass’n for Values Essential to Neighborhoods (HAVEN), 654 F.Supp. 943, 949 (N.D.Tex.1987) (<HOLDING>). At this stage of the litigation, based upon Holdings: 0: holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity 1: holding that the plaintiffs allegations that the defendants actions were ultra vires in character and that they acted outside of their capacities as public officials arguably deprives the defendants of rule 12b6 dismissal based upon an absolute immunity defense 2: holding that a plaintiffs breach of contract claim failed because he could make no showing that the individual defendants acted in their individual capacities when they signed the contract on behalf of the employer housing authority 3: holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a  1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony 4: holding that the public policy considerations supporting public officials immunity required that the immunity be applied to bar contribution actions as well as direct actions


Input: times — three times during the first test and four times during the second test. Finally, Silman administered the “walk and turn” field sobriety test to Bullock twice. During these tests, Bullock started early both times, was unable to keep his bala ouston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd) (permitting ninety-minute detention because officers did not continue to hold appellant after all legitimate components of investigative detention had been completed). We overrule Bullock’s sole issue. Conclusion We hold that lay while awaiting arrival of rookie officer for on-the-job training in DWI investigation was for legitimate law enforcement purposes); Dickson v. State, No. 03-06-00126-CR, 2006 WL 3523789, at *3-4 (Tex.App.-Austin Dec. 6, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). 4 . See abo Smith, 2007 WL 700834, at *3-4. 5 Holdings: 0: holding delay in dwi investigation primarily for arrival of rookie officer for purpose of training was reasonable because delay furthered legitimate law enforcement purposes 1: holding fiveto fifteenminute delay in dwi investigation primarily so that another officer could bring a video camera to the scene was reasonable because delay furthered legitimate law enforcement purposes 2: holding that delay while awaiting arrival of dwi enforcement officer even though officer who initiated the stop was qualified to perform dwi investigation was for legitimate law enforcement purposes because dwi officer brought greater expertise to scene and could complete dwi investigation more rapidly 3: holding that legitimate law enforcement interests were served by local police officers delay while waiting for state police officer to arrive to conduct dwi investigation because state officers had more dwi experience and local officers needed to be available to respond to emergencies 4: holding approximately twentyminute delay in dwi investigation primarily to await arrival of dwi enforcement officer was reasonable because delay furthered reasonable law enforcement purposes


Input: keep an accurate record of these funds. Due to the nature of the position, the treasurer is in a unique position to monitor the financial affairs of the tribe and is more likely to discover improprieties as they arise. Moreover, as a member of the tribal council, the treasurer is charged with the duty of “safeguarding] and promot[ing] the peace, safety, morals, and general welfare” of the tribe. Informing tribal members of financial matters of tribal concern is consistent with the tribe’s sovereign power and that treasurer’s duty. Because there is no factual issue about the tribe’s duty to safeguard and promote the tribe, we conclude that Johnson had the authority to send the newsletters. See Diver v. Peterson, 524 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn.App.1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995) (<HOLDING>). Respondents argue that Johnson had an Holdings: 0: holding that disputes involving questions of interpretation of a tribal constitution and tribal law is not within the jurisdiction of the district court 1: holding that acoma tribal law was the law of the place because the tribal court could have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim 2: holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret a tribal constitution or tribal laws 3: holding that tribal attorney acted within the scope of his authority in making comments in newspaper and on television regarding the reasons for terminating tribal employees despite the fact that no lawsuit was currently pending because it was his duty to make public statements on internal tribal affairs 4: holding that a tribal housing authority established by tribal council pursuant to its powers of selfgovernment was a tribal agency rather than a separate corporate entity created by the tribe


Input: Ex parte Parker, 730 So.2d 168, 171 (Ala.1999). The Vanns also assert that, like the borrowers in Branch, they lacked bargaining power because they were sent to the defendant by the automobile dealer and because of their limited educations. The Vanns, however, presented no evidence indicating that they were unable to find an alternate lender or that the dealer required them to use First Community. Furthermore, the Vanns’ lack of education does not relieve them of their contractual obligations. “ ‘[A] person who signs an instrument without reading it, when he can read, can not, in the absence of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, avoid the effect of his signature, because [he is] not informed of its contents....’” Mitchell Nissan, Inc. v. Foster, 775 So.2d 138, 140 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Beck & Pauli Lithographing Co. v. Holdings: 0: holding that even though defendant stated he did not read and discuss psr with his counsel he could not show any error that affected his substantial rights 1: holding that the plaintiff could not avoid his contractual obligation because he read at only a sixthgrade level 2: holding plaintiff could not avoid release absent evidence he made reasonable effort to have document read to him 3: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 4: holding that the plaintiff filed suit within the statute of limitations even though he could not prove the time at which he mailed his petition


Input: programs therefrom. § 1053. Establishment of rules and regulations; penalties The Bureau of Correction shall establish rules and regulations for granting and administering release plans and shall determine those inmates who may participate in any plan. 61 P.S. §§ 1051,1053. As these statutes indicate, the Bureau of Corrections is empowered with discretion to grant release prior to the completion of a state prisoner’s sentence. See also Jamieson v. Robinson, 641 F.2d 138 (3d Cir., 1981) (Pennsylvania statutes governing pre-release programs vest broad discretion in the Board of Corrections with regard to location of pre-release centers, the types of programs available, and the administrative criteria for pre-reléase.); U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Cuyler, 447 F.Supp. 540 (E.D.Pa., 1977) (<HOLDING>). No provision is included whereby the Holdings: 0: holding that upon expiration of period of supervised release habeas petitioner was no longer in custody 1: holding that reasonableness review applies to a sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release 2: holding that prisoners notice of appeal deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court 3: holding that this title and regulations permitting release of state prisoners prior to expiration of their minimum sentence imposed broad discretion upon prison officials 4: holding that state prison officials enjoy wide discretion in regards to a prison boards finding of guilt


Input: individuals. See Park, 212 B.R. at 437. 9 . The court did not make clear what choices a nonresidential user had in the disposal of its wastewater. Indeed, the court specifically declined to consider whether nonresidential users had practical alternatives to using the Sanitation District’s sewer system: "[W]e are not free to consider the practical and economic factors which constrained Lorber to make the choices it did.” Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1066. 10 . The conflicting decisions may result from the failure of some courts employing the four-prong Lorber test to address, in addition, the critical question of whether a grant of priority status to a governmental claim meets the purposes and policy undergirding the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Hutchinson, 135 B.R. 890 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1992) (<HOLDING>). 11 . These "tax characteristics" may refer to Holdings: 0: holding that reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber 1: holding that michigan reimbursement claims were excise taxes under both lorber and suburban ii 2: holding that ohios reimbursement claims met the lorber criteria but were not excise taxes because they were not universally applicable to similarly situated entities and in addition disadvantaged private creditors with like claims 3: holding west virginias reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber suburban ii and the chateaugay district court decision 4: holding reimbursement claims were excise taxes under the lorber test without addressing the bankruptcy codes central policy of equal distribution


Input: the ... position with a person significantly younger and/or less qualified than [the] [p]laintiff’); Payne v. Malemathew, No. 09-CV-1634, 2011 WL 3043920, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2011) (dismissing a complaint where the plaintiff “pleaded nothing beyond the fact that he was the oldest employee in his department and was let go[,]” and collecting cases dismissing complaints containing similar barebones allegations); Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F.Supp.2d 420, 465 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (finding an age-discrimination claim to be “insufficient as a matter of law” because the complaint “merely allege[d] that [the] plaintiffs [were] over 40 years of age and were replaced by younger [employees]”); Zucker v. Five Towns Coll., No. 09-CV-4884, 2010 WL 3310698, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2010) (<HOLDING>); Foster v. Humane Soc. of Rochester and Monroe Holdings: 0: holding that a review of an employees 1989 performance was irrelevant to a determination of whether his performance was satisfactory at the time of his termination in august of 1990 1: holding that allegations concerning the plaintiffs satisfactory work performance termination and much younger replacement did not  by themselves  suffice to plead an age discrimination claim 2: holding that a prima facie case for discrimination requires the plaintiff to show that 1 he belongs to the protected age group 2 his job performance was satisfactory 3 adverse employment action was taken against him  in 4  circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination  3: holding age discrimination claim barred 4: holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination


Input: Detainer In his next claim, Appellant argues that the Board committed an abuse of its discretion by inquiring into the status of an INS detainer issued against Appellant because, according to Appellant, the Board has consistently used the absence of an updated status report as an arbitrary reason to deny parole. As noted above, however, a majority of this Court specifically held in Coady that “mandamus will not lie where the substance of the Board’s discretionary action is the subject of the challenge.” 770 A.2d at 290. See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 360, 490 A.2d 402 (1985) (“Where the action sought to be compelled is discretionary, mandamus will not lie to control that discretionary act”); Pa. Dental Ass’n v. Com. Ins. Dept., 512 Pa. 217, 516 A.2d 647, 652 (1986) (<HOLDING>). As noted previously, while Appellant’s first Holdings: 0: holding that it may not 1: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 2: holding that while a court may direct that discretion be exercised it may not specify how that discretion is to be exercised nor require the performance of a particular discretionary act 3: holding that peremptory challenges may not be exercised in a discriminatory manner 4: holding that where the statute in question required that the measure of fair market value shall be as determined by the secretary  the court cannot substitute its own discretion for properly exercised administrative discretion


Input: United States” of Fla. Stat. § 95.1 l(2)(a), as the exception to the more general scope of Fla. Stat. § 95.11(1), which reads: “of a court of record in this state.” Additionally, Kiesel applied (and the Balfour court relied on) the principle of statutory interpretation; which dictates that the latter portions of a statute, if in conflict with earlier portions, shall control. In interpreting Fla. Stat. § 95.11, the Kiesel (state) and Balfour (federal) courts found that Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(a) controls post-judgment collection proceedings. It is important to note, however, that the holding in Balfour was expressly limited to the facts of that case, which involved a “post-judgment discovery request,” six years after the initial default judgment was entered. See Balfour, 170 F.3d at 1051 (<HOLDING>). A few years later, in 2001, the Fourth Holdings: 0: holding that section 1001 controls over the limitations provision of the wrongful death statute 1: holding that when a statute and a guideline conflict the statute controls 2: holding that one year limitations period in insurance policy was reasonable and therefore enforceable to shorten the fifteen year statute of limitations for breach of contract 3: holding that under such unique circumstances the five 5 year statute of limitations controls 4: recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one


Input: remedies before suing the employer.’ ” Id. at 236, 20 OBR 290, 485 N.E.2d 757, quoting Anderson v. Alpha Portland Industries, Inc. (C.A.8, 1984), 727 F.2d 177, 185. The Tenth District noted that retirees come within one of several exceptions to the general rule that employees must attempt to use contract-grievance procedures. The reasons for this exception include that the union does not owe a duty of fair representation to persons who ax*e not members of the collective-bargaining unit and the possibility of potential conflicts of interest between retirees and active employees. Id. {¶ 32} Rutledge has been followed in a number of subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Featherstone v. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (Mar. 30, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-889, 1999 WL 177561, *3 (<HOLDING>). The board contends that these cases are Holdings: 0: holding that trial court properly granted motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff had failed to exhaust remedies available through exclusive grievance procedure 1: holding that a prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not utilize grievance procedures that permitted waiver of the time limit for good cause 2: holding that a retired teacher did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies because he was not subject to the grievance procedure in the collectivebargaining agreement 3: holding that plaintiff could not look to the courts for relief because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies under the adea 4: holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim


Input: If the defendant perceives the connection between his crime and his punishment, the retributive goal of the criminal law is satisfied, and only if the defendant is aware that his death is approaching can he prepare himself for his passing. Accordingly, I would hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it. See Garrett v. Collins, 951 F.2d 57, 59 (5th Cir.1992) and Lowenfield v. Butler, 843 F.2d 183, 187 (5th Cir.1988) (both quoting and relying on this excerpt from Justice Powell’s concurrence in Ford, 477 U.S. at 422, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (Powell, J., concurring), in denying competency-to-be-executed habeas relief); see also Fearance, 56 F.3d at 640 and Barnard, 13 F.3d at 876 n. 2 (<HOLDING>). Counsel for Panetti suggests this Court Holdings: 0: holding that competency standard for stand ing trial is same as standard for determining competency to waive right to counsel 1: holding that the standard for determining competency to plead guilty is whether the defendant has a rational understanding of the proceedings 2: holding that the fifth circuit has adopted the powell concurrence as the standard for competency to be executed 3: holding that no exception to the invited error doctrine has ever been adopted by this circuit 4: holding competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving right to counsel is same as competency standard for standing trial and disapproving contrary holding of masthers


Input: cases, “the judgment regarding likelihood of injury turns on whether the plaintiffs future conduct will occur in the same location as the third party’s response to the challenged governmental action.” Id. at 12; see also id. at 15. We concluded that plaintiffs must be able to allege a specific site of injury — “land that they intended to use that has been affected by [the government’s action].” See id. at 15. In this regard, the Federation’s allegations of injury suffice; because the Program acts directly on the land (rather than on third parties), we can be certain that the challenged agency action has affected the land areas that the Federation’s members use and that the anticipated response by third parties will concern those lands. Cf. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688-89, 93 S.Ct. at 2416 (<HOLDING>). The members’ affidavits make this clear. For Holdings: 0: holding that a claim must be facially plausible in order to survive a motion to dismiss 1: holding that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to the pslra 2: holding that more attenuated line of causation and more speculative eventual injury sufficed to survive a motion to dismiss 3: holding that making a nonfrivolous allegation is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 4: holding that the bare assertion that a dismissal without prejudice was favorable to the plaintiff was insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss


Input: explained in Jessup v. Luther, “[r]epresenta-tives of the press and general public must be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of ... access to documents.” 227 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Corbitt, 879 F.2d at 228-29 (entertaining newspaper’s request to see sealed pre-sen-tence report, and analogizing pre-sentence report to grand jury materials). To hold otherwise would raise First Amendment concerns. Cf. United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that the “common law right” of public access to- court records “supports and furthers many of the same interests which underlie those freedoms protected by the constitution”); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 604, 607, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 630, 110 Holdings: 0: holding that reasonable access includes general facility access without notice and patient access with twentyfour hour notice 1: holding that the first amendment right of access applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case 2: holding that there is no first amendment right of access to presentence reports 3: holding first amendment guarantees access to criminal trials and limitations on access are subject to strict scrutiny 4: holding that although prison inmates have a first amendment right to access to the courts prison officials may regulate law library access including reasonable time place and manner of access taking into account the administrative needs of the institution


Input: 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). 2 . This Court abrogated relaxed waiver in the PCRA context in Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (1998), and has since reaffirmed that such abrogation applies retroactively. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 580 Pa. 439, 861 A.2d 919, 928 n. 8 (2004); Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 744 A.2d 717, 725-26 (2000); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233, 724 A.2d 293, 303 (1999); Commonwealth v. Steele, 599 Pa. 341, 961 A.2d 786, 834-35 (2008) (Castille, C.J., concurring). This Court later abrogated the relaxed waiver doctrine in the direct capital appeal context in Commonwealth v. Freeman, 573 Pa. 532, 827 A.2d 385, 403 (2003). 3 . Commonwealth v. Huffman, 536 Pa. 196, 638 A.2d 961 (1994). 4 . Although there was n 2, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Commonwealth v. Miller, 585 Pa. 144, Holdings: 0: recognizing that within the world community the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved 1: holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the eighth amendment 2: holding the death penalty unconstitutional for mentally retarded defendants 3: holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty 4: holding that juveniles are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty


Input: that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is— (1) a judicial lien ... 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). Thus, under the statute, a debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien if three requirements are met: (1) there was a fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property; (2) the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled; and (3) the lien is a judicial lien. See Culver, LLC v. Chiu, 304 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir.2002). The parties do not dispute that Wilding has met the first and third requirements; Wilding had an interest in his house before the lien attached and the lien was a judicial lien. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Patriot Portfolio LLC v. Weinstein Holdings: 0: holding that the debtor must have had an interest in the property before the lien attached to take advantage of  522f 1: holding that  522f1 requires a debtor to have possessed an interest to which a lien attached before it attached to avoid the fixing of the lien on that interest 2: holding that debtor cannot take advantage of  522f after debtor has transferred his exempt property 3: holding that a debtors ability to utilize  522f to avoid a judicial lien is not dependent upon the debtor receiving a discharge   4: holding that section 363f applies only to in rem interests which have attached to the property by way of either the debtors consent to a security interest or the creditors attachment of the property resulting in a lien


Input: to the presen-tence report and had asserted that there were no errors in the report, requested that the trial court impose concurrent sentences. The trial court chose to follow Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. In contrast to Perez, the presentence report supported the trial court's decision, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that prior to sentencing the judge had reviewed and considered the information in the presentence report. Therefore, regardless of whether the factors enunciated at the sentencing hearing may have pertained exclusively to the gravity and cireumstances of the offense, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the statutorily prescribed factors. See, eg., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 854 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the trial court did not Holdings: 0: holding that mandate did not preclude the trial court from considering unconscionability argument on remand because that issue had not been decided by the trial court nor considered by this court in the first appeal 1: holding that trial court did not err 2: holding that although the trial court did not specifically refer to the factors in utah code section 7684012 the trial court complied with the statute by relying on presentence reports that included the pertinent information 3: holding that where the government filed an information identifying the conviction relied upon to enhance defendants sentence and counsel told the court that the defendant did not dispute the conviction the trial judges sentencing ritual here complied with the requirements of  851b 4: holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report


Input: deemed to be acceptable during the design stage. The state therefore waives immunity in an action to recover for injuries resulting from this failure to maintain. See, e.g., Springer, 13 P.3d at 802 ("[Tlhe waiver applies if the public entity allowed the condition of the building to fall from the general state of being, repair or efficiency at which the facility was originally built."); Swieckowski, 934 P.2d at 1385; Moldovan, 842 P.2d at 225. On the other hand, the state does not waive immunity for injuries that arise out of a dangerous condition which is inherent in the design of a highway-that is one which is intrinsic to the general state of being, repair, or efficiency of the road as initially constructed. § 24-10-108(1); Willer v. City of Thornton, 817 P.2d 514, 518 (Colo.1991) (<HOLDING>); Szymanski v. Dep't of Highways, 776 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a contract for the design construction and installation of a water tank was predominantly a contract for the sale of goods under the ucc 1: holding that the plaintiffs claim was moot because the construction project which was the subject of the dispute had been completed 2: holding that whether clause in construction contract providing that no damages would be available for delay was enforceable was a factual question where there was evidence that damages resulted from unreasonable delay beyond the contemplation of the parties 3: holding that the plaintiffs injuries were a result of the states failure to maintain and therefore finding a waiver of immunity under the cgia where the state allowed a rightofway fence adjacent to highway to fall into a state of disrepair thereby enabling a cow to run onto the highway and injure the plaintiff 4: holding that there was no waiver of immunity under the cgia where the plaintiffs injuries resulted from a sharp dip in the roadway that was part of the initial design and construction of the intersection


Input: knew it to be false.” Id. at 374. The plaintiff argued that the defendants had relied on this false information resulting in his loss of 60 days statutory good time credit and the withdrawal of his recommended parole release date, which was replaced by “a new date twenty-four months later, in effect delaying his eligibility for parole by two years.” Id. at 373. The Circuit Court “concluded] that Razzoli’s Privacy Act claim — not only in regard to the good time decision but also the parole eligibility determination— [was] not cognizable.” Id. at 376. Rather, the plaintiffs sole recourse was to file a petition for habeas relief, even though his “non-habeas claim would have [had] a merely probabilistic impact on the duration of [his] custody.” Id. at 373; see also Bourke, 269 F.3d at 1074 (<HOLDING>); Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 809 Holdings: 0: holding that because bops notification to petitioner that he was eligible for a sentence reduction was erroneous his status was not retroactively changed by the application of the new regulation 1: holding that a state prisoner must bring his claim in habeas only if by prevailing he would necessarily prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement 2: holding that husbands knowledge of his obligation of support and his subsequent election to enter employment that would substantially reduce his income and make it impossible to meet his obligations would not justify reduction in support 3: holding that prisoner could not file a petition for mandamus challenging the bops determination that he was ineligible to be considered for a reduction in his sentence although bourkes success on this claim would not necessarily result in his being released any earlier it would raise that possibility and thus have a probabilistic impact upon the duration of his custody 4: holding that that if the success of a  1983 damages claim brought by a prisoner would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence the prisoner may only bring the claim where the conviction or sentence has been invalidated


Input: that he was responsible. Our conclusion that the district judge did not violate Rule 11 and that Lucas’s guilty plea was valid does not dispose of this issue, because Apprendi applies to cases on direct review involving sentences imposed before Apprendi was decided. See United States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932, 936 (6th Cir.2000) (applying Apprendi where the district court sentenced the defendant before Apprendi was decided). We must therefore determine whether Lucas’s sentence of 210 months (17.5 years) in prison and a five-year term of supervised release withstands review under Ap-prendi. If Lucas had admitted responsibility for either the 595.8 grams of crack cocaine that the district court attributed to him, or the 54.2 grams that were in Horton’s car when Lucas -52 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). C. Amount of drugs attributable to Lucas Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants sentence did not violate apprendi where the actual sentence imposed did not exceed the maximum penalty corresponding to the quantity of drugs for which the defendant acknowledged responsibility nor was the sentence at the bottom end of a higher statutory range of penalties 1: holding that the defendants rights under apprendi were violated where the sentence was at the mandatory minimum for the judgedetermined drug quantity and the judge felt constrained by the statute to impose this sentence 2: holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory 3: holding where the statutory minimum sentence exceeds the guidelines sentence a substantialassistance downward departure begins at the mandatory minimum sentence 4: holding that a sentence was based on a mandatory statutory minimum sentence even though it was lowered under another statute


Input: 434 (9th Cir. 1983). However, exceptions to that rule exist. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9-10, 103 S.Ct. 927, 933-34, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (stays leaving plaintiff “effectively out of court”). In this case, the magistrate was free to recommend to the district court that Reynaga’s action be stayed: if the district court had then adopted the recommendation, we would have jurisdiction over Reynaga’s appeal of the district court’s order because the district court’s action would have “the practical effect of refusing an injunction,” Carson, 450 U.S. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 996, and would have left Reynaga “effectively out of court”. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9-10, 103 S.Ct. at 933-34. See also Marchetti v. Bitterolf, 968 F.2d at 964-66 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Here, however, the magistrate did not Holdings: 0: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus 1: holding that appellate jurisdiction exists over district court order staying  1983 action until plaintiff exhausts habeas corpus remedies 2: holding that habeas corpus petitions are premature until administrative remedies have been exhausted 3: holding that a federal district court has jurisdiction to stay an execution prior to the filing of a formal habeas corpus petition 4: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts


Input: state actor could be held to violate the right to familial association absent a showing of the actor's specific intent to interfere with the family's relationship. 35 . While decisions by other circuit courts are obviously not binding precedent here, the Supreme Court has instructed that a right may be clearly established even absent "controlling authority” from the Supreme Court or the governing circuit court if there is or was a "robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” from the other circuits establishing the right. Ashc 5 (8th Cir.2006) ("A defendant can be held liable for violating a right of intimate association only if the plaintiff shows an intent to interfere with the relationship." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 805 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs failure to allege compliance with these statutes did not bar his claim against members of county board of supervisors as individuals for illegal expenditures of public funds 1: holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law 2: holding that plaintiffs adequately alleged familial association claim with no discussion of specific intent 3: holding that plaintiffs must allege intentional action by the state to interfere with a familial relationship and noting that without adopting specific intent requirements for this claim courts risk constitutionalizing all torts against individuals who happen to have families 4: holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action


Input: upon him a criminal contempt sanction without the requisite due process protections. To resolve this issue, we must first decide whether the contempt orders were criminal or civil in nature, or both. See Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 896 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that a court may impose both civil and criminal sanctions simultaneously, when it wishes to both compel compliance and punish disobedience). The key distinction between civil and criminal contempt is the court’s purpose underlying its exercise of the contempt power. Berne Corp. v. Gov’t of the V.I., 570 F.3d 130, 139, 51 V.I. 1253 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Taberer, 954 F.2d at 896). But see Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 129 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1988) (<HOLDING>). If the court seeks to coerce someone to do Holdings: 0: recognizing that the stated purposes of a contempt sanction alone cannot be determinative 1: holding that a postjudgment contempt sanction for refusal to obey orders whether it is characterized as a civil or a criminal sanction is immediately appealable as a final order under  1291 2: holding that monetary sanction was not supportable as a compensatory civil contempt sanction because there was no proof of the amount of loss 3: recognizing that an order of restitution  is available as a freestanding sanction to be imposed alone or in combination with other sanctions 4: holding that incarceration for civil contempt cannot be imposed absent a finding by the trial court that the eontemnor has the present ability to purge himself of contempt


Input: to assert the decedent’s personal injury claim, however, does not change the fact that the decedent has been personally aggrieved and would not, therefore, eliminate the decedent’s justiciable interest in the controversy. Because a decedent’s survival claim becomes part of her estate at death, it follows that the estate retains a justicia-ble interest in the survival action. We therefore hold that, in a survival action, the decedent’s estate has a justiciable interest in the controversy sufficient to confer standing. See Landers, 369 S.W.2d at 35 (noting that a survival action seeks recovery for “damages sustained by the decedent and his estate as a result of the [wrongful] injuries.”) (emphasis added); see also Glickstein v. Sun Bank Miami, N.A., 922 F.2d 666, 670 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (footnote omitted). When a decedent has been Holdings: 0: holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision 1: holding that a legal malpractice claim arising from errors by an attorney in rendering estateplanning services is properly brought by the personal representative of the estate when excess estate taxes are paid by the estate in contravention of the decedents intended estate plan 2: recognizing that standing turns on whether the plaintiff can show an injury in fact traceable to the defendants conduct whereas the real party in interest concept entails identification of the person who possesses the particular right soixght to be enforced 3: holding that the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action to be redressable by the court 4: holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate


Input: court to give the plaintiff the opportunity to amend his pleading particularly in those cases where the new claims warrant development of facts to uncover the merits of the claims or where the claims allege facts which are disputed. See Conti v. Sanko Steamship Co., 912 F.2d 816, 818-819 (5th Cir.1990); Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 805 (9th Cir.1987). However, in this case, the record has been developed extensively and all other claims have been dismissed or decided at trial. Under these circumstances, we think that a remand to the district court simply to consider the merits of these two claims would be a waste of judicial resources because both Halbert’s libel and slander claims fail as a matter of law. Brown v. Texas A & M University, 804 F.2d 327, 334 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Halbert’s libel and slander claims are based Holdings: 0: holding that a remand on a claim that could not be supported by the record would be a waste of judicial resources 1: holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record 2: holding that a remand need not be ordered despite legal errors if remand would be futile 3: holding preponderance of the evidence must be against a claim before the claim can be denied where factual record is insufficient remand required 4: holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by record


Input: “strategic” decision entitled to deference is a “conscious, reasonably informed decision made by an attorney with an eye to benefitting his client”). In contrast, there is no allegation in this case that defense counsel failed to investigate the relevant alibi witnesses, or failed to file the required notice of alibi. The fact that defense counsel conducted a mock trial demonstrates that their decision not to call such witnesses was a quintessential strategic decision entitled to the highest level of deference under Strickland. While defense counsel promised alibi evidence during his opening statement, his failure to introduce the wives’ testimony does not, in and of itself, constitute constitutionally deficient performance. See Harrison v. Motley, 478 F.3d 750, 758-59 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, Holdings: 0: holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that trial counsels failure to call defendants family members as witnesses during penalty phase was reasonable trial strategy and not ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim for counsels failure to present the preindictment delay issue was without merit because there was no actual prejudice to the supposed alibi defense as the now unavailable witnesses would not have provided the defendant with an alibi for the time when the murder could have occurred 3: holding the failure to call alibi witnesses promised during opening statement was not ineffective assistance of counsel 4: holding that the failure to call certain witnesses was not ineffective assistance because witnesses already presented similar evidence and counsel is not required to present cumulative evidence


Input: by the statute. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); see Hovenkamp, ¶ 2362, at 234-35. With respect to the latter requirement, the Supreme Court has held that [a] private plaintiff may not recover damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act merely by showing “injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market.” Instead, a plaintiff must prove the existence of “antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Atlantic Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1884 (quoting Brunswick Corp. 429 U.S. at 489, 97 S.Ct. 690 (internal citations omitted)); see also J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 562, 101 S.Ct. 1923. (<HOLDING>). This requirement applies to all private Holdings: 0: holding that standing to raise a claim under  2a of robinsonpatman act is derived from section 4 of the clayton act 1: holding that to have standing to bring a  2a robinsonpatman claim a private plaintiff must make some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent 2: holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts 3: holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit 4: holding that plaintiff seeking injunction under clayton act  16 must allege an injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent


Input: with the Supreme Court’s own characterization of the same language in Burrage. And, by stating that its interpretation is tethered to the “plain language” of the statute, the majority is most assuredly at odds with its decision to.then “[bjroaden [its] analytical lens” and look beyond the statutory language for other signs of Congressional intent. Id. at 615. Generally, speaking, only ambiguity or the possibility of an odd result compels a court to look beyond the language of the statute it is interpreting. E.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 99, 127 S.Ct. 1534, 167 L.Ed.2d 449 (2007) (concluding that statutory language was susceptible to more than one meaning); Public Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In looking beyond the statutory' language, Holdings: 0: recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result 1: holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning 2: holding that a court can look beyond the statutory language when plain meaning would compel an odd result 3: holding that if statutory language is plain and unambiguous this court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent 4: holding that we may look beyond text of statute or rule where plain language is unambiguous but would lead to an absurd result that drafters cannot have intended