Input: Court subsequent to his trial. Effecting a significant change in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that in criminal prosecutions, unless a declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him, the Confrontation Clause forbids use against the defendant of the declarant’s out-of-court testimonial statements admitted for their truth. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Government does not dispute that the pleas, allocutions, and post-arrest statement made at a proffer session constitute “testimonial statements” of the sort barred by Crawford. We assume without deciding that this characterization is correct. Cf. United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at Holdings: 0: holding that in order to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment based on a plea of guilty or no contest a defendant must bring forward a full statement of facts including a transcription of the plea proceedings 1: holding that a plea allocution is a testimonial statement 2: holding that the defendant was entitled to have his plea accepted absent a sound reason for rejecting the plea 3: holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense 4: recognizing that a voluntary and understanding guilty plea entered without the benefit of a plea bargain waives all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea


Input: discrimination charge were invalid, the information sought in the subpoena is nonetheless within the scope of the EEOC’s investigative authority. During the course of the EEOC’s investigation, Milliren additionally alleged that she would be one of only two female LGMs out of 500 LGMs nationwide if she had completed the GMDP and that a female applicant was rejected for a manager position because she had children. Because the EEOC’s investigation into Milliren’s charge of individual gender discrimination revealed potential systemic gender discrimination, the EEOC had the authority to subpoena information relevant to systemic gender discrimination even absent a valid systemic charge by Milliren. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cambridge Tile Mfg. Co., 590 F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir.1979) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). III. We affirm the district court’s order Holdings: 0: holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc 1: holding that statements made to internal investigator of employer were made in an investigation under this subchapter where investigation was pursuant to a charge filed with eeoc 2: holding that plaintiff stated a discrimination claim despite not including a discrimination heading in eeoc complaint because the facts included in eeoc complaint were sufficient to trigger an investigation into whether plaintiff suffered an adverse action because of his religion 3: holding that general employment practices are relevant to eeoc investigation of individual disparate treatment claim 4: holding that the eeoc has authority to investigate a broader picture of discrimination that appears during the investigation of an individual charge


Input: snowshoe hare ruby-crowned kinglet pygmy nuthatch white-tailed ptarmigan white-crowned sparrow merriam’s turkey yellow-bellied sapsucker macgillivray’s warbler northern three-toed woodpecker Tr. Vol. XV, 190-95, 203-04. 10 . See Tr. Vol. XV, 178-79. 11 . See Tr. Vol. I, 162. 12 . See Tr. Vol. I, 125. 13 . As the Herrington court noted, the fact that a computer model is approved for use in this case does not necessarily justify agency use of the model in all future cases. Herrington, 768 F.2d at 1391. Rather, the agency is under a continuing duty to evaluate the accuracy of a computer model, through empirical testing if possible, and to abandon or improve the model if shown to be unreliable. Id. See also Ohio v. E.P.A., 784 F.2d 224, 226-31, affd, 798 F.2d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>). 14 . The EA cites to the work of Bartlet, Holdings: 0: holding that a motion for administrative reconsideration which congress did not order the agency to entertain which the agency dismissed in relevant part on procedural grounds and which the petitioner filed over sixty days after the agency acted cannot effectively extend  retroactively the thirtyday period congress specified for judicial review petitions 1: holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits 2: holding that while every agency use of  computer models need not be validated at each site for which the model is used where the statutory language required the agency to gather empirical data and where there was a factor which all parties agreed was significant but the effect of which was untested and unknown the agency was not entitled to rely on the model without empirically testing it at the site 3: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 4: holding that the power of any administrative agency to reconsider its final decision exists only where the statutory provisions creating the agency indicate a legislative intent to permit the agency to carry into effect such power


Input: officer questions [the suspect], tries to identify him[,] and attempts to gather additional information to ... dispel or confirm his suspicions.” Id. at 279-80, 720 S.E.2d at 78. Probable cause for a warrantless arrest “exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” Buhrman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 501, 505, 659 S.E.2d 325, 327 (2008) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981)); cf. Heien v. North Carolina, — U.S.-,-,-, 135 S.Ct. 530, 535, 539-40, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) (assessing whether the officer h 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (<HOLDING>); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 Holdings: 0: holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest 1: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law 2: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law 3: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same 4: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law


Input: 1994; (ii) that Montulli reviewed the design and software architecture of the cookies invention with John Giannandrea—Montulli’s supervisor and later Netscape’s Web browser division’s chief technology officer—during a series of design meetings in July and August 1994; and (iii) that Montulli thereafter began to reduce the invention to computer source code, which he began logging into the Netscape source code repository on October 3 or 4, 1994. Taken together, these facts supported a finding that, prior to the critical date, Montulli made an enabling disclosure that would have allowed Giannandrea, a person skilled in the art, to practice the claimed invention under the Federal Circuit’s decision in Robotic Vision Systems v. View Engineering, 249 F.3d 1307, 1312 n. 2 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). A. With respect to the “ready for patenting” Holdings: 0: holding that the second pfaff prong is satisfied despite no actual completion of such software  provided that there is a disclosure that is sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to write the necessary source code to implement the claimed method 1: holding that the specifications reference to a selector sufficed as one skilled in the art would have understood the term 2: holding that the determination of whether sufficient structure is disclosed in the specification to support a meansplusfunction limitation is based on the understanding of one skilled in the art 3: recognizing that source code is speech but not reaching the object code issue 4: holding that a specific pretext instruction is not necessary


Input: simply wrong. Under our reading of the policy, the CGL coverage does not completely subsume the CPPL coverage so as to render the latter superfluous. In some respects, the CGL coverage is more limited than the CPPL coverage. For example, the CGL coverage requires an “occurrence,” defined as an “accident.” The CPPL coverage does not require an “occurrence.” The CGL coverage also contains an exclusion for bodily injury that is “expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” The CPPL coverage does not contain an exclusion for expected or intended injuries. Finally, the CGL coverage applies to “bodily injury,” but the CPPL coverage applies to “injury.” “Bodily injury” is a narrower category than “injury.” See Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 822-25 (Tex.1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, an injury that arises out of Holdings: 0: holding that bodily injury does not include purely emotional injuries 1: holding that life sentence imposed for kidnapping with bodily injury was not cruel and unusual even if victims injuries were minor 2: holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury 3: recognizing that when a defendants negligence causes bodily injury the plaintiff can recover damages for past present and future medical expenses bodily injury and emotional distress 4: holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended


Input: 1.102-2(c)(1) ; quoting FAR 15.306(e)). Command argues, however, that the “procurement [was] tainted by an apparent or actual impropriety, conflict, unfair competitive advantage[,] or bias occasioned by the Murray/Lewis assistance to HCS,” the presence of which requires “(a) a thorough inquiry by the [CO], followed by [ (]b) appropriate ameliorative measures to ensure that HCS enjoys no unfair competitive advantage.” Pl. Mot. JAR at 28 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 31-35). FAR 1.102-2(c)(l) and FAR 3.101-1 require disqualification of a procurement offer- or where impropriety or the possibility of an unfair competitive advantage in the acquisition process is present. Pl. Mot. JAR at 28-29 (citing FAR 1.102-2(c)(1); FAR 3.101-1; see also NFK Eng’g v. United States, 805 F.2d 372, 377 (Fed.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Telecommunication Sys. Inc., B404496.3 (GAO Holdings: 0: holding that the fact that the incapacitated person has assets in the district alone provides a sufficient basis for keeping the case here 1: recognizing that the appearance of impropriety alone can be a sufficient basis to disqualify an offeror and finding that the agency reasonably decided to disqualify the offeror on that basis 2: holding that the agency cannot use insufficient evidence as a basis for finding no adverse impact 3: recognizing that circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to demonstrate a defendants guilt 4: holding that regarded as claim was reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability


Input: association with, supervision of, delegation of authority to, support for, training of, or participation in a private group practice with, a member or members of a particular class of health care practitioner or professional, or (E) any other matter that does not relate to the competence or professional conduct of a physician. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9). 18 . Respondents assert that Dr. Freilich's "asserted bad faith whistle-blower animus standard ... conflicts with HCQIA’s objective reasonableness standard.” 19 . Our holding is also consistent with cases in which we set forth a plaintiff's burden when faced with a defense motion for summary judgment under other totality of the circumstances tests. See, e.g., Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 681, 766 A.2d 617, 628 (2001) (<HOLDING>); see also Magee v. DanSources Tech. Servs., Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs burden at summary judgment in a case involving a totality of the circumstances test is whether the facts put forth by petitioners  examined in their totality and in the light most favorable to  the nonmoving party  might satisfy a trier of fact that the  test was met 1: holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances 2: holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable 3: holding that the level of detail in testimony is a relevant factor in the totality of the circumstances test of credibility employed by immigration judges 4: holding that the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all doubts are resolved against the moving party


Input: v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 198 (1st Cir.1999) (“Courts generally adhere to the principle that statutes relating to the same subject matter should be construed harmoniously if possible, and if not, that more recent or specific statutes should prevail over older or more general ones.”). 15 . Prior to Wyandotte., this Court explained that "[i]t was possible to find [the Wreck Act and Limitation Act] consistent and, indeed, complementary as long as the shipowner was able effectively to limit his liability merely by abandoning his vessel.” Univ. of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston, 557 F.2d at 451. 16 . In addition to the Wreck Act, courts have found that other later-enacted statutes impliedly repealed the Limitation Act for cases arising under those statutes. See Tug ALLIE-B, 273 F.3d at 948-49 (<HOLDING>); Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act 1: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the park system resource protection act 2: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the transalaska pipeline authorization act 3: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the oil pollution act 4: holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act


Input: law. See Anderson, ATI U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. It follows, then, that “[e]ntry of summary judgment indicates that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the losing party.” Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991). II. Schwartz’s Due Process Claims Are Denied A. Procedural Due Process In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court considered the question of what pre-termination process was due to a public employee who may only be discharged for cause. “The essential requirements of due process ... are notice and an opportunity to respond....” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1495, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (“Loudermill ”); see also Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, Holdings: 0: holding that organizations designated by the secretary of state as terrorist organizations must have the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner and must have the opportunity to present at least in written form such evidence as those entities may be able to produce to rebut the administrative record or otherwise negate the proposition that they are foreign terrorist organizations 1: recognizing fundamental fairness requires criminal defendants be granted a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense 2: holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner 3: holding plaintiff must prove that he or she was deprived of  an opportunity  granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case 4: holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case


Input: by the following: (i) where there is a contract of employment providing for a specific duration and termination without just cause occurs before expiration of-that duration, see Rosen v. Gulf Shores, Inc., 610 So.2d 366 (Miss.1992); (ii) where termination is retaliatory, because the employee reports or refuses to participate in an unlawful act,, see McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So.2d 603 (Miss.1993); and (iii) where a handbook does not sufficiently preserve the at-will nature of employment and the employer “completely ignores” specific progressive disciplinary penalties for rule infractions, thus giving rise to contractual obligations, see Bobbitt, 603 So.2d 356. See Byest v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-0009-DMB-JMV, 2014 WL 3891295, at *7 (N.D.Miss. Aug. 7, 2014) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff apparently contends that her claim Holdings: 0: recognizing that the legislature can create statutory exceptions to atwill employment 1: recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine 2: recognizing exceptions to immunity 3: recognizing doctrine 4: recognizing three exceptions to atwill doctrine


Input: distinct aspects of a combined criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture). Thus, trials are generally bifurcated based upon a recognition that judicial resources will be preserved if specific issues are separately tried. See Bolton v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 119 N.M. 355, 361, 890 P.2d 808, 814 (Ct.App.1994). If, as suggested by Defendant Esparza, a court were required to simultaneously resolve the criminal charges and the forfeiture matter, the clear policies underlying the use of bifurcated proceedings would be undermined. In addition, such a requirement would impermissibly interfere with the inherent ability of district judges to manage their dockets and to expedite the flow of cases through the courts. See State v. Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158, ¶ 28, 126 N.M. 238, 968 P.2d 328 (<HOLDING>). {22} Accordingly, we do not believe that Holdings: 0: recognizing district courts power to admit evidence for a limited purpose 1: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals 2: recognizing power of district courts to control movement of cases from filing to final disposition 3: holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws but declining to decide whether power to control means simply abstract power to control or actual exercise of the power to control internal quotations omitted 4: recognizing the power of federal courts to decide cases is restricted by the cases and controversies clause of article iii


Input: finding, the Court declines to determine whether a jury could find reasonably that Lee violated De Contreras’s Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant Lee on De Contreras’s Fourth Amendment claim. B. De Contreras’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against Lee and Mastaler for Fabricating Police Reports The record lacks any evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claim that Lee or Mastaler fabricated their police reports. Furthermore, as De Contreras was convicted on the charges alleged in the police reports (see April 9, 2012 Minute Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 7 (Doc. No. 42)), he cannot now challenge the validity of those police reports under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (<HOLDING>) Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff requesting relief under  1983 had no cause of action unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed expunged invalidated or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus 1: holding that to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid a 42 usc  1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal expunged by executive order declared invalid by a state tribunal  or called into question by federal courts issuance of writ of habeas corpus footnote omitted 2: recognizing that  1983 action does not accrue until conviction or sentence has been invalidated 3: holding that a claim for damages that would invalidate a conviction or sentence that has not already been invalidated or reversed on direct appeal by executive order by an authorized state tribunal or by a writ of habeas corpus is not cognizable under  1983 4: holding that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid a plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal expunged by executive order declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or called into question by a federal courts issuance of a writ of habeas corpus


Input: Although Joseph challenged the constitutionality of the drug-quantity determination in his sentencing memorandum, the Government points out that Dunbar did not make a constitutional challenge in the district court, and argues for plain-error review. The result is the same regardless whether our review is de novo or for plain error. According to the Court, Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury. Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (internal citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). However, Joseph and Dunbar do not challenge Holdings: 0: holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense 1: holding that  use certainly includes brandishing  a firearm quotation marks omitted 2: holding defendants minimum sentence could not be increased for brandishing a firearm where based on jury instructions jury convicted defendant of the lesser offense of carrying rather than brandishing the firearm 3: holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used 4: holding that the trial court was not entitled to impose a threeyear mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon where the jury verdict did not specifically find actual possession


Input: of Congress to regulate commerce” that power is vested in the legislative branch. Id. Therefore, it is not enough for TVA to show that it has condemned the land surrounding the waterway in question. As a federal corporation falling under the purview of the Executive Branch, TVA is not able to arrogate control over navigable waters by its own authority. See Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 724-25, 3 Wall. 713, 18 L.Ed. 96 (1866) (“Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States which are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie.”); United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426-27, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243 (1940) (<HOLDING>); Owen v. United States, 851 F.2d 1404, 1408-09 Holdings: 0: holding lake on private land was not navigable in fact and there was no right of public use and enjoyment as lake was not fed by or part of a navigable stream 1: holding that congress had the authority under the commerce clause to require private riparian land owners to obtain a license prior to construction of dams even where the river in question was not navigable but could potentially have been made navigable 2: holding that state ownership of submerged lands remains subject to congress paramount power over navigable waters under the commerce clause 3: holding that riparians owners have the right of access to the navigable part of the river  the right to make a landing wharf or pier  subject to such general rules and regulations of the legislature 4: holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states


Input: hearing that followed, the trial judge recanted on having the counselor arrested but admonished him outside the jury’s presence. When the jury returned, the trial judge attempted to give a curative instruction. During that instruction, however, the trial judge told the jury that his own behavior was “because the defendant’s lawyer was about ten miles out of limit.” Id. at 257, 589 A.2d at 554. Noting the arrest of counsel in the jury’s presence and his poorly-worded curative instruction, the Court of Special Appeals held that under the totality of the circumstances, the judge’s comments “painted such a prejudicial portrait of the defense counsel as to deny appellant his right to a fair trial.” Id., 589 A.2d at 555. See also Long v. State, 31 Md.App. 424, 432, 356 A.2d 588, 592 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In the case sub judice, the judge’s act of Holdings: 0: holding that a judges lengthy perjury warnings to a defense witness effectively drove the witness off the stand thereby denying the defendant his due process right to present his defense 1: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand 2: holding that trial judges order to arrest defense witness in front of jury and accompanying comments indicated his disbelief of the witness thus committing prejudicial error 3: holding that trial court has discretion to permit defendant to call accused witness to stand and permit witness to invoke fifth amendment privilege in front of jury where entire defense was centered on witness commission of crime 4: holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error


Input: See Michaels, 1998 WL 882848, at *14 (“[Defendant’s] transformative use of the Tape excerpts to produce an entertainment news story does not affect Lee’s market for the same service, because Lee is not in such a market.”). Balancing of Harm and Public Interest Similarly, it is doubtful that the balancing of harm and public interest warrant preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that even minimal interference with the First Amendment freedom of the press causes an irreparable injury. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); see also Barbnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 531-32, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001) (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the Holdings: 0: recognizing as a privacy right the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters 1: holding that bargaining unit employees have some nontrivial privacy interest in nondisclosure of their home addresses under the freedom of information act and concluding that that interest substantially outweighed the virtually nonexistent public interest in disclosure under foia and the privacy act not the nlra 2: holding that first amendment interest in publishing matters of public importance outweighed conversants privacy rights given fact that media outlet had played no part in illegal reception 3: holding that issues involving the local board of education were matters of public importance 4: recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern


Input: distributed. Inasmuch as the Ohio Legislature has not expressly adopted a discovery rule in libel and/or invasion of privacy cases and because of the single publication rule, the cause of action as to the plaintiff in her libel and invasion-of-privacy claims accrued in December 1975. Therefore, this Court concludes the present case is not timely filed. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS The plaintiff Donda R. Morgan also contends that she has brought an independent action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that this cause of action did not accrue until the first time she was aware of the picture. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a new and recognized theory of a tort action. See Yeager v. Local Union 20, supra (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the plaintiff has only Holdings: 0: holding that act did not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 1: recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 2: recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress 3: holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort 4: holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute


Input: upon a highway, it most certainly could have done so. Statutes providing for forfeiture of driving privileges or punishment for habitual violations of the traffic statutes are designed to protect the public from persons who have demonstrated that they are unable to obey traffic laws established for the safety of citizens and that their driving presents a hazard to life and property. See Owens v. State (1978), 178 Ind.App. 406, 382 N.E.2d 1312, 1314-1315. The absence of limiting language in L.C. 9-30-10-16 reveals the legislature's recognition that the danger to the public is equally as great on private property used by the public, such as shopping center parking lots and apartment complex roads, as it is on public highways. See Huey v. State (1987), Ind.App., 503 N.E.2d 623, 626-627 (<HOLDING>). Guidry contends that if .C. 9-30-10-16 is Holdings: 0: holding that corpus delicti of dwi is that someone drove or operated motor vehicle in public place while intoxicated 1: holding that indianas operating while intoxicated statute which states that a person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated commits a class a misdemeanor is not limited to operation of motor vehicles on public highways 2: holding that misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated constitutes a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a 3: holding dwi intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle in a public place is clearly not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16b 4: holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendants conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class c felony


Input: Recently, the Third Circuit has held that to establish a due process violation, and overcome qualified immunity, regarding a claim of government interference with familial relations, a plaintiff must establish that a child welfare worker, in removing a child from parental custody, possessed no objectively reasonable basis for believing that parental custody threatened the child’s welfare or safety. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir.1997). See also Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 517 (2d Cir.1996) (finding no due process violation where child welfare worker had objectively reasonable basis for believing parent represented threat to child’s welfare); Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The Croft decision, however, was decided Holdings: 0: holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child 1: holding child welfare worker entitled to qualified immunity where child removed on reasonable suspicion of abuse 2: holding a social worker treating the child was permitted to testify to statements the child made about the abuse including the victims identification of the perpetrator because the statements were necessary to the treatment of ensuring the continued safety of the child 3: holding the record does not show that the statement to the social worker was for medical treatment because the social worker testified that he questioned the child to determine whether he needed to notify child protective services of a case of suspected child abuse 4: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity


Input: judgment. We shall address the propriety of the granting of the summary judgment as to each defense separately. Defendants first challenge the trial court’s characterization of the Agreement as a “transaction or compromise”, which thereby precluded them from asserting their claim that the Agreement is subject to rescission on the basis of lesion. Under the law, a transaction or compromise, having between the interested parties a force equal to res judicata, may not be attacked on the basis of lesion. La.Civ. Code art. 3078; delaVergne v. delaVergne, 514 So.2d 186, 190 (La.App. 4th Cir.1987). However, a partition is susceptible to attack on the basis of lesion. La.Civ.Code art. 1398 (repealed by La.Acts 1991, No. 689, § 1); Oberfell v. Oberfell, 516 So.2d 424, 426 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue that the Agreement, which Holdings: 0: holding military service disability payments are community property 1: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 2: holding disability benefits from us civil service are community property 3: recognizing that a voluntary community property set tlement agreement may be rescinded for lesion beyond onefourth 4: holding that a written mutual release memorializing a compromise and settlement may be rescinded for fraud in its procurement


Input: treated as a predicate felony conviction for career offender status because, while the maximum sentence at the time he was convicted and sentenced was two years imprisonment, a change in the law the following year reduced the maximum sentence to 150 days. For career offender purposes, a “prior felony conviction” is any prior conviction “punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” even if the offense is not designated as a felony. USSG § 4B1.2, comment. (n.l). Polk objected to his career offender status on this ground in the district court, but at sentencing he acknowledged that settled Fourth Circuit law did not support his position. See United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 245 (4th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 435, 444-45 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>)); United States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 427 Holdings: 0: holding that the mere possibility of an upward departure beyond one year qualifies a kansas offense as one punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year 1: holding that to determine whether a north carolina conviction for a crime is punishable by a prison term exceeding one year a court is to consider the maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that crime upon a defendant with the worst possible criminal history internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted 2: holding that defendant has right to trial by jury before conviction of contempt punishable by severe punishment 3: holding that a prior north carolina conviction was for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year if any defendant charged with that crime could receive a sentence of more than one year 4: holding that determination of whether prior conviction was punishable by term of imprisonment exceeding one year is governed by law in effect on date of conviction


Input: Government has waived any possibility of a § 9.51 defense by failing to raise it in its answer. We find this contention to be without merit. The Government did assert a law enforcement officer’s privilege to use force in its motion to dismiss. Such an assertion suffices to raise the defense. See Terrell v. DeConna, 877 F.2d 1267, 1270 (5th Cir.1989) ("The defendant ... raised the defense of issue preclusion by a motion to dismiss. That motion was sufficient to raise the defense, and there was therefore no waiver.”). Further, the parties' joint pretrial order listed whether "federal agents were privileged to use reasonable force in effectuating the detention of [Villafranca].” Raising the defense there was also sufficient. See Vanhoy v. United States, 514 F.3d 447, 450-51 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). 3 . There is some dispute about whether the Holdings: 0: holding that defendant does not waive an affirmative defense if defendant raises it at a pragmatically sufficient time such as summary judgment and the defendants failure raise the affirmative defense in its answer did not cause the plaintiff prejudice 1: holding that the government did not waive an affirmative defense not pleaded in the answer because it raised the defense at a pragmatically sufficient time by listing the defense in the joint pretrial order 2: holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second 3: holding that the district court properly allowed the defendant who asserted the disputed defense as a contested issue of law in the joint pretrial order to pursue the defense despite the defendants failure to comply with rule 8c 4: holding that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded


Input: to a decision concerning the effective date for service-connected PTSD under these circumstances and thus it was error for the Board not to discuss its applicability. See Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 553 (2008) (requiring the Board to consider all theories of entitlement raised by the claimant or by the evidence of record). Because the Board has not yet made any factual findings pertinent to the application of this regulation, the appropriate remedy is for the Court to vacate the Board’s conclusion that the appellant cannot receive an effective date earlier than November 20, 2002, for his service-connected PTSD, and remand the matter so that the Board may address the applicability of § 3.156(c) in the first instance. See Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION After consideration of the Holdings: 0: recognizing that the court is not the appropriate forum for initial factfinding 1: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties 2: recognizing that booker error may occur even in the absence of judicial factfinding where district court treats guidelines as mandatory 3: holding that phone and facsimile communications to the forum purchase orders and payments sent to the forum a choice of law clause within the contract regarding the forum state and delivery of the product within the forum state were not enough to satisfy minimum contacts 4: holding that the situs of the alleged tortious conduct is relevant in choosing the most appropriate forum


Input: give me a chance. They said hateful things. They tased me without reason.’ And he wants you to believe that.” On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in permitting Baxter to testify that defendant had “nothing to say” to her in response to her request that he tell her his version of events. Defendant points out that he was in custody at the time and had a constitutional right, under Article I, section 12, and the Fifth Amendment, not to answer Baxter’s question. He argues that his statement to Baxter was an unequivocal invocation of that right, see State v. Avila-Nava, 356 Or 600, 618, 341 P3d 714 (2014), and that evidence of that invocation was not admissible at his criminal trial under State v. Smallwood, 277 Or 503, 505-06, 561 P2d 600, cert den, 434 US 849 (1977) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Ragland, 210 Or App 182, Holdings: 0: holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease 1: holding that defendants general objection to states specific questions regarding defendants failure to appear before grand jury was sufficient to put trial court on notice of objection based on defendants constitutional right to remain silent 2: holding that in context of criminal trial defendants right to remain silent cannot be compromised by prosecutorial comments that cast aspersions on its exercise 3: holding that evidence of a defendants invocation of the right to remain silent ordinarily is not admissible at the defendants criminal trial 4: recognizing that davis was concerned only with the right to counsel and not the right to remain silent


Input: or [2] operated to change materials to a ‘different state or thing.’ ” See PTO Supp. Br. 4 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 n. 9, 98 S.Ct. 2522). In Diehr, the Supreme Court confirmed that a process claim reciting an algorithm could state statutory subject matter if it: (1) is tied to a machine or (2) creates or involves a composition of matter or manufacture. 450 U.S. at 184, 101 S.Ct. 1048. There, in the context of a process claim for curing rubber that recited an algorithm, the Court concluded that “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.” Id (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70, 93 S.Ct. 253); see also In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295 (Fed.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Thus, a claim that involves both a mental Holdings: 0: holding that because a valid arbitration clause existed the parties had to arbitrate all disputes when the subject matter of the dispute has a reasonable relationship to the subject matter of the contract 1: holding that petitioners allegation of a due process violation was precisely the kind of procedural error which requires exhaustion 2: holding when a claim does not invoke a machine   101 requires some kind of transformation or reduction of subject matter 3: holding consent is irrelevant and estoppel does not apply when subject matter jurisdiction is in question 4: holding that premium reduction was legal where the insured had given consideration for reduction


Input: protection of the laws. The district court then stated, however, that “[b]efore there can be any liability under section 1983, there must be ‘a direct causal link’ between the personal conduct of Deputy Lopez or the municipal conduct of Sonoma County and the alleged constitutional deprivation, in this case the murder of Mar g that “our first inquiry in any case alleging mu nicipal liability under § 1983 is the question whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation”); Kibbe, 480 U.S. at 267, 107 S.Ct. 1114 (stating that “the Court repeatedly has stressed the need to find a direct causal connection between municipal conduct and the constitutional deprivation”) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Harris, 664 F.2d at 1125 (<HOLDING>) (footnote omitted). Neither court has used the Holdings: 0: holding that individuals can be held liable under  1981 only when they have been personally involved or directly participated in the discrimination 1: holding that even a temporary deprivation of first amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm 2: holding that liability under  1983 can be established by showing that the defendants either personally participated in a deprivation of the plaintiffs rights or caused such a deprivation to occur 3: holding that liability under  1983 requires a causal link to and direct responsibility for the deprivation of rights 4: holding that a superior can be held liable in his individual capacity if he participated in the deprivation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights


Input: involved. Critical to the application of DR-105(c) is that the clients give informed consent to the multiple representation. The issue, therefore, is whether Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had “differing interests” while they were both represented by BG & S and, if so, whether BG & S could have competently represented both Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor, and whether they provided BG & S with their informed consent to the dual representation. It is clear that Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had differing interests from the beginning of the representation. It is well settled that “[a] passenger will almost always be advised to assert claims against all other drivers, including the passenger’s driver.” Shaikh et al. v. Waiter, 185 Misc.2d 52, 54, 710 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (2000) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). In Pessoni v. Rabkin, 220 A.D.2d 732, 633 Holdings: 0: recognizing the conflict 1: holding that right to appeal claim of inef fective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel had disqualifying conflict of interest waived because record did not show that jordan would have pleaded not guilty but for alleged conflict of interest 2: recognizing conflict 3: holding that a lawyer representing both passenger and driver incurs a substantial risk of a disqualifying conflict of interest 4: holding that defense counsel suffered from an actual conflict of interest in representing two codefendants because had the attorney not been facing a conflict of interest he might have been able to negotiate a plea agreement on one defendants behalf in return for becoming a prosecution witness against the eodefendant


Input: not rest upon a few words taken out of context of the entire testimony.’ ” Id. at 803 (quoting Wilkes-Barre, City v. WCAB, 54 Pa.Cmwlth. 230, 420 A.2d 795, 798 (1980)). In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693, 698 (1971), this Court first adopted the rule permitting a “medical witness to express opinion testimony on matters based, in part, upon reports of others which are not in evidence, but which the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession.” We have further held that while an expert may base his opinion on facts of which he has no personal knowledge, those facts must be supported by evidence of record. Newcomer v. WCAB (Ward Trucking Corp.), 547 Pa. 639, 692 A.2d 1062, 1066 (1997); Casne v. WCAB (Stat Couriers, Inc.), 962 A.2d 14 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (<HOLDING>). This Court has explained: Collins v. Hand, Holdings: 0: holding that if an experts opinion is dependent upon information that is inaccurate or lacks support in the record it is deemed incompetent 1: holding that when an experts opinion regarding the relevant market is not supported by sufficient facts or when the record contradicts or renders the opinion unreasonable it cannot support a jurys verdict 2: holding that it is not the courts role to decide whether an experts opinion is correct 3: holding that a fear is not objectively reasonable if it lacks solid support in the record and is merely speculative at best 4: holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion


Input: Opinion w . Having concluded that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter, this Court nevertheless notes that Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) sets forth certain limitations on the constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final orders. Therefore, this Court has a duty to constantly inquire into its constitutional authority to enter a final order for any matter brought before this Court. In the first instance, this Court concludes that its denial of the Application is not a final order because the denial is without prejudice to the refiling of another application seeking approval of the Firm that includes the information discussed in this Memorandum Opinion. See WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (citing Anastasiadis v. S.S. Little John, 339 Holdings: 0: holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court 1: holding that a district courts dismissal that expressly grants leave to amend is not final and that a final judgment must be obtained before such a case becomes appealable 2: holding that denial of a postconviction motion without prejudice and with leave to amend is not a final appealable order 3: holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order 4: holding that when a district court expressly grants leave to amend it is plain that the order is not final


Input: statement that Shaw paid him $8,900 to bum Shaw’s house would likely make him vulnerable to a prosecution for “commission of a felony for hire.” Even though Russo’s statement implicates Shaw in the burning of the house, the statement that Shaw paid Russo to bum the house is a necessary predicate to the crime of “commission of a felony for hire." Therefore, Russo’s statement, even though it implicates Shaw, would be “self-inculpatory” under the reasoning of Williamson. See Williamson, 114 S.Ct. at 2436-37. See also United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (indicating that, because “statements against penal interest" is a firmly rooted hearsay exception, a court can infer the reliability of such evidence). But see United States v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff further argues that Russo’s Holdings: 0: holding that statements within a firmly rooted hearsay exception do not violate the confrontation clause 1: holding that it did not violate the confrontation clause of the united states constitution to convict defendant for conspiracy to distribute controlled substance based upon a lab report admitted under the federal business records exception rule because this exception was firmly rooted 2: holding codefendants confession incriminating defendant was not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule under roberts standard 3: holding that rule 8034 hearsay exception is firmly rooted for sixth amendment purposes 4: holding that the exception is not firmly rooted


Input: (noting that disability plan need not provide same benefits for all disabilities); Ford, 145 F.3d at 608 (“The ADA does not require coverage for every type of disability.”); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015-19 (6th Cir.1997) (en banc) (“The disparity in benefits [is permitted] by the ADA because the ADA does not mandate equality ...”); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (7th Cir.1996) (upholding plan that promised physical-disability benefits until age 65, but mental-disability benefits only for two years); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir.1996) (ruling that excluding one disability from coverage does not violate ADA if exclusion applies to all individuals); see also Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1061 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Today, this court joins the numerous courts Holdings: 0: holding that punitive damages may not be awarded  in suits brought under  202 of the ada and  504 of the rehabilitation act 1: recognizing there is some confusion among the circuit courts as to the availability of damages under  504 of the rehabilitation act and without expressing an opinion on the matter noting that courts generally agree damages are available for violations of  504 2: holding  504 of the rehabilitation act does not require equivalent benefits for different disabilities 3: holding that post2001 new york was clearly subject to suit under section 504 of the rehabilitation act 4: holding rehabilitation act applicable


Input: law upon which they had been relying to sue the RAC defendants on statutory grounds. See Brief for Appellants at 71. Prior to the notification, the crux of the concern of the RAC plaintiffs was that RAC officials failed to communicate federal rights to minority applicants. The RAC defendants provide no assurances, other than this notification, that the same behavior has not and will not continue. In fact, the plaintiffs provide some evidence, through the Warda Thomas and Felicia Stokes testimony and the RAC handouts, that RAC has not complied with this notification. Even assuming the defendants had ceased the allegedly illegal conduct, we will not dismiss the claims as moot if the harm is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pacific, 219 U.S. at 515, 31 S.Ct. at 283 (<HOLDING>). Otherwise, such orders effectively would Holdings: 0: holding ease not moot when challenged administrative order expired because icc proceedings are continuing and their consideration ought not be defeated by short term orders capable of repetition yet evading review 1: holding that challenge to expired fiveyear npdes permits originally issued eight years earlier was capable of repetition yet evading review 2: recognizing a mootness exception for abortion litigation because pregnancy  truly could be capable of repetition yet evading review  3: holding that we have no difficulty concluding that challenge to expired fiveyear npdes permit was capable of repetition yet evading review 4: holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review


Input: travel to Cuba); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 224, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 82 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984) (regulation banning most economic transactions in connection with travel to Cuba). 15 . Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 171-72, 99 S.Ct. 471, 58 L.Ed.2d 435 (1978) (statute denying Supplement Security Income benefits to persons outside of the United States for certain periods of time). 16 . Aznavorian, 439 U.S. at 177-78, 99 S.Ct. 471. 17 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659; Zemel, 381 U.S. at 14-16, 85 S.Ct. 1271; Agee, 453 U.S. at 306-308, 101 S.Ct. 2766; Wald, 468 U.S. at 240-243, 104 S.Ct. 3026. 18 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940)). 19 . Compare Aptheker at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (<HOLDING>) and Agee, 453 U.S. at 308, 101 S.Ct. 2766 Holdings: 0: holding that the judges restriction of the class was not an abuse of discretion 1: holding that an ordinance exempting certain signs from a general sign ban was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech 2: holding that the specific date restriction set forth in  541a5 controls and that  1306a1 does not eliminate that restriction 3: holding unconstitutional a travel restriction on communist party members 4: holding that restriction on government employee speech was unconstitutionally vague


Input: local branches of government. DECISION Because respondents’ remaining claims present a nonjusticiable political question, we reverse the district court’s order refusing to dismiss for lack of justiciability, without addressing appellants’ other assignments of error. Reversed. 1 . Although respondents supported their constitutional claims with allegations of segregation, respondents did not make a traditional segregation claim based on racial discrimination. Instead, respondents' claims are rooted in a purported right to an education of a certain quality under the Education Clause, Article XIII, section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution. A segregation claim based on racial discrimination is justiciable. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Appellants cite the following cases: Neb. Holdings: 0: holding that segregation in public education is a denial of equal protection of the laws 1: holding that the concept of separate but equal has no place in public education 2: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause 3: holding that wisconsin violated equal protection rights of handicapped children by denying them an education at public expense 4: holding that a claim of inadvertent errors in administration of election procedure without some allegation of intentional discriminatory conduct did not properly allege a denial of equal protection of the laws


Input: to dive, plaintiff was not relieved “of the duty to make this inquiry [as to the safety of diving] when diving for the first time into an unfamiliar pool.” .Id. In Murphy v. D’Youville Condominium Association, Inc., 175 Ga.App. 156, 333 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1985), the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that a factual dispute regarding the actual depth of the water prevented summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence. “[E]ven if the water level had been low, ‘[a]ppellant ... was under a duty to use ... his sight to discover any defects or dangers.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). The plaintiff was not permitted to recover because “by the exercise of very slight care [appellant] could have avoided the injury.” Id. at 3; see also La Croix v. State, 477 So.2d 1246, 1251 (La.Ct.App.) (<HOLDING>); writ denied, 478 So.2d 1237 (La.1985). Holdings: 0: holding that summary judgment was not appropriate because whether the danger posed by a swimming pool was known or obvious was a fact question 1: holding that the plaintiff could bring an action for negligent misrepresentation although the plaintiff could not sue on the contract because the contract was void 2: holding in dicta that plaintiff was eontributorily negligent by diving into a murky shallow pool without first determining that it was suitably deep for diving 3: holding that allegation that plaintiff relied on defendants representation by entering into a lease with it stated valid cause of action for negligent misrepresentation 4: holding that defendant must have placed plaintiff in a situation where it was abundantly clear that plaintiff was in grave personal peril for some specifically defined period of time for negligent infliction claim to be actionable


Input: our supreme court’s specific proclamation in Grady that imputation of income is permitted in spousal support cases: We have not dealt with this issue direcdy, but elsewhere it has been held that the court may consider the fact that a supporting spouse voluntarily changes employment so as to lessen earning capacity and, in turn, the ability to pay alimony and child support. Camp v. Camp, 269 S.C. 173, 236 S.E.2d 814 (1977). A court may in proper circumstances impute an income to a spouse according to what could be earned by the use of his or her best efforts to gain employment suitable to his or her capabilities. Klinge v. Klinge, 554 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. 1977). Grady, 295 Ark. at 97, 747 S.W.2d at 78-79 (emphasis added); see also Christianson v. Christianson, 671 N.W.2d 801, 806 (N.D. 2003) (<HOLDING>); Moore v. Moore, 242 Mich. App. 652, 619 Holdings: 0: recognizing the validity of the doctrine but holding no equitable tolling on the facts presented 1: recognizing that questions of changed conditions and the amount of child support must be resolved on the particular facts of each case 2: recognizing that missouri courts have often held that regulations may establish the appropriate standard of care in a negligence case 3: recognizing that other states have permitted imputing income in spousal support cases citing grady but holding that imputation not appropriate on facts of the case 4: recognizing contribution in the appropriate case


Input: See also United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1245 (7th Cir.1987). In United States v. Tranowski, 702 F.2d 668 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217, 104 S.Ct. 3586, 82 L.Ed.2d 884 (1984), the Court of Appeals allowed the government to appeal from district court’s denial of its motion to retry the defendant following reversal of the original conviction. The Court reasoned that such an appeal was permitted under Section 3731 because the district court’s order was “ ‘tantamount to a dismissal of the indictment ...,’ though not labeled a dismissal.” 702 F.2d at 670, quoting United States v. Esposito, 492 F.2d 6, 10 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135, 94 S.Ct. 879, 38 L.Ed.2d 760 (1974). See also United States v. Apex Distributing Co., 270 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir.1959) (<HOLDING>). We too hold that in the case before us the Holdings: 0: holding that a sufficiency challenge must be preserved in the trial court in a parental termination case to be reviewed on appeal 1: holding that an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved 2: holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal 3: holding that a petitioner must specify which issues form the basis of the appeal 4: holding that the direction the governments appeal must take or whether it may appeal at all is to be governed by the substantial basis of the orders sought to be reviewed rather than their designation and form


Input: 344, 354 (1910) (noting that it is the prerogative of the civil courts to determine the meaning and legal effect of civil contracts). An aggrieved party, including a criminal defendant, remains free to seek enforcement of the terms of a release in civil court. Our criminal courts are permitted to take note of these agreements in deciding whether to order restitution and in what amount, but these agreements in no way preclude a criminal court from ordering restitution when appropriate under statute. Id. In essence, the Haltom court upheld a restitution order in the amount of the victim’s medical expenses and lost earnings even though the victim had also received $100,000 — the limit of Haltom’s policy— from Haltom’s insurer. See also Crawford v. State, 770 N.E.2d 775, 781 (Ind.2002) (<HOLDING>). We are mindful, however, that elementary Holdings: 0: holding that restitution is a criminal penalty that negates the imposition of prejudgment interest 1: holding civil restitution judgment that was originally imposed as part of a criminal sentence nondisehargeable 2: holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function 3: recognizing criminal forfeiture as an aspect of punishment 4: holding that civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punishment and imposition of a restitution order is a form of punishment and part of a criminal sentence


Input: forth the exceptions). Consistent with Illinois law, the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department—which Anderson himself invokes as definitive of “the authorized time and space limits” 'of Moussa’s employment, Doc. 53 at 5—make clear that officers are tasked with “respond[ing] to ... law enforcement needs in different parts of the City,” and “protecting] ... life, limb and property in the City of Chicago.” Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department (“CPD Regulations”) at I.B.9 and II.A (Doc. 53-1 at 5, 7) (emphases added). The fact that Moussa was operating outside both the time and the place limits of his employment suffices, standing alone, to establish that he was not acting within the scope of his employment. See Adames, 330 Ill.Dec. 720, 909 N.E.2d at 757 (<HOLDING>). But Anderson also has not satisfied the third Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to satisfy the time and spacelimits criterion forecloses a finding that an employee acted within the scope of his employment 1: holding that the inquiry into whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment depends on the respondeat superior law of the state in which the tort occurred 2: holding that whether the tortious act was committed during the time the employee was on duty and whether the tortious act was committed while the employee was on the employers premises were both factors weighing in favor of finding the activity within the scope of employment 3: holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred 4: holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence


Input: and housekeepers. Thus, Reid has demonstrated that Reid's Housekeeping has a legitimate interest, ie., the good will with its current clients and housekeepers, worthy of protection by the covenant not to compete. See, e.g., Licocci v. Cardinal Assocs. Inc., 445 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind.1983) ("Indiana courts have held the advantageous familiarity and personal contact which employees derive from dealing with an employer's customers are elements of an employer's 'good will' and a protecti-ble interest which may justify a restraint[.]"); Sharvelle, 836 N.E.2d at 437 ("The continued success of [a medical] practice, which is dependent upon patient referrals, is a legitimate interest worthy of protection."); McGlothen v. Heritage Envtl. Servs., L.L.C., 705 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). B. Scope of the Covenant A covenant not to Holdings: 0: holding that a covenant not to compete that restrained the employee who worked at the management level of a cleaning and maintenance business and had gained the advantage of personal acquaintance with the employers customers from acting not only as a proprietor but also as an employee in furnishing janitorial services was unreasonable and beyond the seope of the employers legitimate interest of protecting its good will 1: holding that the seller of a business implicitly transferred a property right in the firms good will to the buyer and that the seller could not then impair that right by actively soliciting the customers of his former business 2: holding that monitoring telephone calls is in the ordinary course of business where the employer has reason to suspect an employee of disclosing confidential information to business competitor 3: holding that the employer had a protectible interest in its good will where the employee had direct contact with its customers and much of the employers business was repeat business 4: holding that any acts in which employee engaged with intent to woo plaintiffs wife away from him during business meetings and trips simply had no connection to business of employer


Input: showing presentment or the setting of a hearing date. The only suggestions of presentment appearing in the record include: (1) a statement in the motions for new trial that “THE DEFENDANT HEREBY PRESENTS THIS MOTION TO THIS HONORABLE COURT”; and (2) several anonymous notations and markings appearing on the copies of the motions for new trial filed with the trial court. This evidence is insufficient to establish presentment. Hiatt argues the inclusion of a statement in a motion for new trial reflecting “THE DEFENDANT HEREBY PRESENTS THIS MOTION TO THIS HONORABLE COURT” is an act of presentment. Courts have consistently rejected the notion that a statement, similar to the one at issue here, is suf 46, *12 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); Owens v. State, 832 S.W.2d 109, 111-12 Holdings: 0: holding a certificate of presentation appearing on the last page of appellants motion for new trial did not establish presentment 1: holding a certification of service and presentment was insufficient to establish the trial court received actual notice of the defendants motion for new trial 2: holding a statement in the motion for new trial entitled certificate of presentment in which appellate counsel stated the motion was handdelivered to the trial court insufficient to establish presentment 3: holding that certificate of presentment and docket entry noting filing of motion were insufficient evidence of presentment 4: holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed


Input: time after time. What I’m exceeded the bounds of its discretion when it, in effect, treated Ruperd’s failure to appear as a waiver of his right to a hearing on his motion to suppress. The state contends that the district court never ruled on whether Ruperd was entitled to another hearing on his motion because Ruperd never brought another notice of hearing for the district court to deny. However, as we have previously noted, the district court unequivocally stated to Ruperd and his counsel on multiple occasions that the motion to suppress would not be reheard because Ruperd failed to appear, not because it was waiting for counsel to file a notice of hearing. The law does not require the doing of a useless thing. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 554 (10th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We, consequently, conclude Ruperd was not Holdings: 0: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 1: holding that the court correctly denied a mistrial when the statement that the witness saw the defendant when the defendant was signing in as a condition of bail was brief and added nothing to the governments case 2: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand 3: holding that in order to show unavailability of a witness service of process by the defendant was not required when the witness had jumped bail and fled 4: holding that death of potential alibi witness did not cause actual prejudice because defendant failed to relate the substance of the testimony of the missing witness in sufficient detail and to show witness testimony not available from other sources


Input: Instead, the BIA found him ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT on the merits. Because the BIA did not order Fajardo-Alvarez removed based upon his offense and made a determination on the merits, we have jurisdiction to review the decision. See Unuakhaulu v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 931, 936-37 (9th Cir.2005). However, we lack jurisdiction to consider this petition on the merits. Fajardo-Alvarez failed to exhaust the critical issue of credibility in his appeal to the BIA, notwithstanding the IJ’s clear and unambiguous findings regarding adverse credibility. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004). We therefore have no basis to consider Fajardo-Alvarez’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT. See Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). PETITION DENIED. ** This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding where withholding of removal and cat claims were based on the same discredited testimony the bia properly concluded the adverse credibility finding was fatal to all claims 1: holding that when the asylum withholding of removal and cat claims are based on the same factual predicate a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each 2: holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of an adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility 3: holding that petitioners failure to exhaust the adverse credibility finding precluded this court from having jurisdiction to consider her claims of asylum withholding of removal and cat 4: holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility


Input: state law that required parents to send their children to a public school for a period of time because it “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (finding that “primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “[t]his Court has held that parents have the fundamental liberty to choose how and in what manner to educate their children”); Ohio Ass’n of Indep. Sch. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 422 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal 1: holding that while parents may not bring a title ix claim as individuals they may bring such claim on behalf of a deceased child 2: holding that liberty includes the right of parents to establish a home and bring up children and to control the education of their own 3: recognizing that because parents have a constitutional right to direct their childrens education organization has standing to bring claim on behalf of parents 4: recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children


Input: Co., 347 Mass. 285, 288 (1964) (internal citation omitted) (“The construction of an unambiguous written contract is a ‘pure question of law’ ”). Moreover. “[i]t is . . . elementary that an unambiguous agreement must be enforced according to its terms.” J.F. White Contracting Co. v. MBTA, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 937, 938 (1996). Accordingly, the Agreement's construction should be resolved by the court. See id. The court will limit its review to the document itself, rejecting parol evidence “to vary the unambiguous terms of the contract." Vakil v. Anaesthesiology Associates of Taunton, Inc., 51 Mass.App.Ct. 114, 119(2001). As part of the written contract, the Agreement’s indemnity clause will be construed by the court. See Herson v. New Boston Garden Corp., 40 Mass.App.Ct. 778, 782 (1996) (<HOLDING>). To construe the indemnity clause, the court Holdings: 0: holding that courts interpret indemnity provisions same as written contracts 1: holding extrinsic evidence may be used only to interpret not alter a written contract 2: recognizing that the rules of statutory construction apply when we interpret constitutional provisions 3: holding same 4: holding that the indemnity provisions to which gs  22b1 apply are those construction indemnity provisions which attempt to hold one party responsible for the negligence of another


Input: establish a principle of law. For the decisions of other courts to provide such “clearly established law,” these decisions must both point unmistakably to the unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and be so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that his conduct, if challenged on constitutional grounds, would be found wanting. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass’n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir.1988). When a claim to qualified immunity is raised within the context of a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must allege facts sufficient to indicate that the act in question violated clearly established law at the time the act was committed. See Dominque v. Telb, 831 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the plaintiff must effectively pass two Holdings: 0: holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right 1: holding that retaliatory discharge is a clearly established first amendment violation 2: holding that clearly established law is construed as supreme court or tenth circuit decisions on point or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts 3: holding that plaintiff is obliged to present facts that if true would constitute violation of clearly established law 4: holding that a federal court is obliged to determine its own jurisdiction for each case


Input: the revenues are subject to a valid security interest that was perfected by the filing of a UCC1. Therefore, they are cash collateral subject to the requirements of adequate protection. A bankruptcy court should apply the following standard when determining whether a debtor should be permitted to use cash collateral: (1) The court must establish the value of the secured creditor’s interest; (2) The court must identify risk to the secured creditor’s value rtgage Documents Magnolia has a perfected security interest in personal property, including accounts receivable and intangibles. If the hotel room receipts are considered “rents,” Magnolia has a lien under the First Rent Assignment. Debtor argues that because the Mechanicsburg Hotel is projected to generate a po 7 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2009) (<HOLDING>); In re Chatham Parkway Self Storage, LLC, Holdings: 0: holding that a state tax lien was not judicial lien arising from judgment such that it could be avoided in bankruptcy by a chapter 13 debtor 1: holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond 2: holding that a chapter 13 debtor had standing to avoid a judgment lien to the extent of her exemption amount but not the entire judgment lien 3: holding that it was disingenuous to offer replacement lien on postpetition rents because lender already had lien on rents 4: holding that replacement lien in rents is illusory because  552b provides lien on postpetition rents


Input: for the State. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 94 (“We can see no substantial difference between the function of the agency attorney in presenting evidence in an agency hearing and the function of the prosecutor who brings evidence before a court.”). Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti’s allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (<HOLDING>); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, Holdings: 0: holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity 1: holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a  1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony 2: holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing 3: holding that prosecutor retained absolute immunity despite allegations of witness intimidation in attempt to suppress testimony 4: holding that a prosecutor accused of knowingly presenting false testimony at trial is protected by absolute immunity


Input: activity in this case, and despite the invocation of other RICO language, the RICO claims must be dismissed because the complaint does not go beyond those labels and language to include sufficient factual allegations that raise a right to relief above a speculative level. This case arises out of a routine commercial dispute involving shippers (or sellers) of a specific and defined amount of paper materials (whether those materials are classified as solid waste or source-separated materials), railroad transporters of those materials, and buyers or potential recipients of the materials. It involves a specific number of railcars, a limited number of victims, and a closed, limited period of time. Moreover, although it appears that there on Ctrs., 863 F.Supp. 447, 460 (E.D.Mich.1994) (<HOLDING>). The allegations in the complaint simply do Holdings: 0: holding reliance is still an element of a 10b5 action and that the fraud on the market theory subject to rebuttal is applicable to meet the reliance element in securities fraud cases where corporations make materially misleading statements in an impersonal and efficient market 1: holding that a jury could find a nineteen month period of racketeering activity sufficient to satisfy continuity requirement 2: holding that three sales of used copy machines as new within approximately two years did not meet the continuity element 3: holding that allegations of isolated acts of fraud occurring over an eighteenmonth period did not meet the continuity element 4: holding that a six month closedended period did not satisfy the continuity requirement


Input: him leading up to the decision to seek his termination amounted to “progressive discipline” and were close enough in time to his purportedly protected speech to allow a reasonable fact finder to infer that the actions were taken because of that speech. That discipline, Kidwell contends, was composed of the following five incidents: the written reprimand on April 15, 2008; the restrictions on when and how he may meet with informants in late April 2008; the cancellation of his COPS Unit assignment in June 2008; the two-day suspension he received in September 2008; and the fact that the police department sought to terminate him following the car accident in September 2008. At the outset, we note that suspicious timing will “ ‘rarely be sufficient in and of itself to c 6-97 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In this case, there was a significant time Holdings: 0: holding that a two to threeday time period between the employees complaint and his discharge was sufficient 1: holding that motion to extend time period for filing dischargeability complaint must be made before the running of that period and that court lacks discretion to grant late filed motion to extend time to file dischargeability complaint 2: holding that a oneday time period between the employees complaint and her supervisors recommendation to fire her was sufficient 3: holding that the threeday grace period in fed rcivp 6e does not apply to motions for a new trial under fedrcivp 59 in part because the time period for filing those motions begins to run from entry of judgment 4: holding that a 17 month time period between the employees protected speech and his termination could not support an inference of causation


Input: settlement, the insurer may be liable to the insured to pay the verdict rendered against the insured even though the verdict exceeds the policy limit of liability. The reason for this rule is that the insurer ‘may not gamble’ with the funds of its insured by refusing to settle within the policy limits.”); Delaney v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1536, 1547 (11th Cir.1991) (“Georgia law is clear that in a case in which a liability insurer defending a claim brought against its insured refuses, in bad faith, an offer to settle within the policy limits, and an excess judgment is entered against the insured, the insured may recover the amount by which the judgment exceeds the policy limits.”);c/ Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ga. 583, 679 S.E.2d 10, 13 (2009) (<HOLDING>). To Nationwide’s predictable chagrin, it is Holdings: 0: holding that insured cannot bring an action against its insurer for bad faith failure to settle a claim in the absence of an excess verdict 1: holding action by judgment creditor of insured against insurer for bad faith failure to settle claim against insured not a direct action within section 1332c proviso 2: holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith 3: holding that a negligence claim against an insured and a bad faith claim against the insurer are not separate as the first must be proved to prevail on the second 4: holding that insured was not required to suffer an excess judgment before it could sue its excess insurer and primary insurer for bad faith failure to settle where it was alleged the insurers arbitrarily refused to settle and insured was required to pay 1 million in settlement to avoid near certainty of larger judgment that would exceed all available coverage


Input: on any of her claims against Legg Mason. Based on this disposition on the merits, the Court need not reach Defendants’ additional arguments concerning timeliness, administrative exhaustion, and the effect of the release of liability. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #49] is granted. The Clerk is directed to close this case. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . See, e.g., Rogers v. Apicella, 606 F.Supp.2d 272, 284-85 (D.Conn.2009). 2 . Sacco brings discrimination claims under both Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law. Because claims under both statutes are analyzed under the same framework, Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 n. 1 (2d Cir.2000), the claims will be grouped together here. 3 . See Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 222 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). "The critical issue” in such a case "is Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and it does not matter that the plaintiff was using state law as the vehicle to press her assertion 1: holding that a single offensive racist comment was not sufficient to establish a hostile work environment 2: holding that referring to a female colleague as dancing girl or call girl ignoring her except to comment on her appearance and another female employees quitting because of the same person was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment because the offensive utterances do not rise to the level required by the supreme courts definition of a hostile work environment 3: recognizing that a jury reasonably could find based on an employees complaints to a superior that the employee perceived her environment as hostile 4: holding that the fact that the offensive material was not directed specifically at the plaintiff does not as a matter of law preclude a jury from finding that the conduct subjected her to a hostile work environment based on her sex


Input: will be deemed non-final for the purposes of the exercise of appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 54(b). The application of Rule 54(b), either directly or by analogy, to the appeals of bankruptcy proceedings for the purpose of determining finality pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) establishes a much-needed, bright- line test for determining finality, providing certainty for litigants as to whether their appeals are final for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). This certainty has not been provided by prior caselaw interpretations of the word finality within the meaning of § 158(d). We are authorized to apply the procedural requirements of Rule 54(b) by analogy pursuant to the supervisory power of appellate courts. See United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 249-50 (6th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 980, 108 S.Ct. 478, 98 Holdings: 0: recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts 1: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals 2: recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants 3: holding pursuant to courts inherent supervisory power over courts that counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend indigent persons 4: holding that states may exercise their supervisory power to take custody of bank savings deposits


Input: itself cause such an appearance of impropriety as to prevent Palomo from receiving a fair trial. Therefore, we disagree with the trial court's reliance on a possible future appearance of impropriety to warrant the removal of the district attorney and Capital Crimes Unit. We also note that Palomo bases his argument on the method by which the prosecution obtained Padilla's personnel file, but Palomo has no standing to assert Padilla's physician-patient privilege. The physician-patient privilege is personal to the patient or her estate. Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo.App. 857, 362, 492 P.2d 862, 864 (1971). Courts routinely deny defendants the standing to assert a third party's right, including the physician-patient privilege. Knight v. State, 207 Ga.App. 846, 429 S.E.2d 326, 827 (19983) (<HOLDING>), People v. Wood, 447 Mich. 80, 523 N.W.2d 477, Holdings: 0: holding prisoners had no clearly established right to privacy in medical records in 1995 1: holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records 2: recognizing a constitutional right of privacy in mental health records 3: holding that every citizen has a constitutional right of privacy in his or her medical records 4: holding that defendant had no standing to assert his wifes privacy right pertaining to medical records introduced into evidence at trial


Input: and walked out slamming the door. Arredondo testified that he had never formally married the children’s mother. They had lived together intermittently at her great-grandmother’s house. He claimed to have worked at various jobs and that he provided for his children. However, the only time the children did not live at their great-grandmother’s house was for a few mo lustrating that Arredondo was unable or failed to provide a safe environment because of his vague and unstable employment history, lack of a permanent residence when out of prison, failure to obtain proper medical assistance for one child’s urinary tract infections and a prosthesis for another child, recurrent alcohol abuse, and failure to abide by the conditions necessary to stay out of prison. In re P.R., 994 S.W.2d at 416 (<HOLDING>). In summary, and without viewing the evidence Holdings: 0: holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included 1: holding that a child has a  1983 action against the state while in foster care where the state is deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that a foster home is unsafe yet places the child there or allows the child to remain there 2: recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment 3: holding there was a showing of an inability to provide a safe environment because of living at 13 to 17 different places in the last year an unstable employment history failure to obtain immunizations for the child and use of methamphetamines and marijuana the day before a courtordered psychologist evaluation 4: holding that the affiants profession of an intent to return to the places they had visited before  is simply not enough because such some day intentions without any description of concrete plans or indeed any specification of when the some day will be  do not support a finding of the actual or imminent injury that our cases require emphasis in original


Input: important to balance the duty to assist against the futility of requiring VA to develop claims where there is no reasonable possibility that the assistance would substantiate the claim. For example, wartime service is a statutory requirement for VA [NSC] pension benefits. Therefore, if a veteran with only peacetime service sought pension, no level of assistance would help the veteran prove the claim; and if VA were to spend time developing such a claim, some other veteran’s claim where assistance would be helpful would be delayed. 146 CONG. REC. S9212 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2000) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller). Thus, because the law as mandated by statute, and not the evidence, is dispositive of this claim, the VCAA is not applicable. See Smith (Claudus) v. Gober, 14 Vet.App. 227 (2000) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed.Cir.2002); Sabonis, Holdings: 0: holding that where payment toward judgment was for less than the total amount of principal and interest  owed that payment then did not terminate the accrual of interest on the remaining principal 1: holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest 2: holding that vcaa did not affect federal statute that prohibits payment of interest on past due benefits 3: holding that vcaa did not affect issue of whether federal statute allowed payment of interest on pastdue benefits 4: holding that  1322b2 prohibits modification of the interest rate on the loan on the debtors principal residence


Input: Craig v. United States, 523 A.2d 567, 568 (D.C.1987) (citing Ball, supra, 429 A.2d at 1360). The maximum penalties for the three offenses of which Hicks was convicted are as follows: Accordingly, contrary to Hicks’ contention, AWIS cannot be a “greater” offense than taking indecent liberties or enticement. B. Legislative Intent. Finally, Hicks contends that the legislature has explicitly forbidden convictions for taking indecent liberties and for enticement on facts such as those presented here. He relies on D.C.Code § 22-3501(d) (1989), which states that “[t]he provisions of this section [taking indecent liberties and enticement] shall not apply to the offenses covered by § 22-3502 [sodomy] or by § 22-2801 [carnal knowledge].” See Watson v. United States, 524 A.2d 736, 742 (D.C.1987) (<HOLDING>). Citing Brake v. United States, 494 A.2d 646, Holdings: 0: holding that state of new jersey is not a person under  1983 and thus not amendable to suit under that statute 1: holding that enticement and sodomy merge under  223601d 2: holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act 3: holding that under byrd kidnaping and sexualabuse convictions do not merge 4: holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act


Input: and stated that white males with inferior attendance records were retained. Nothing in Green’s EEOC charge related to incidents of harassment, nor did anything mention the dates on which they occurred. Because the facts alleged in Green’s EEOC charge form cannot be said to encompass a hostile work environment claim, we affirm the district court’s finding that his claim was therefore procedurally deficient. See Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466 (explaining that a Title VII complaint may encompass only the kinds of discrimination like or related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge). Unlike Title VII, § 1981 does not require that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. See Caldwell v. Nat’l Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>). As such, a hostile work environment claim Holdings: 0: recognizing that the test for intentional discrimination in suits under  1981 is the same as the formulation used in title vii discriminatory treatment cases 1: holding that white woman who sued under title vii to enjoin racially discriminatory employment practices was aggrieved person within meaning of the statute 2: holding that discriminatory employment practices are cognizable under title ix 3: holding that a plaintiff alleging discriminatory employment practices with regard to race has an independent remedy under  1981 without respect to exhaustion under title vii 4: holding that participation in an interracial relationship places a plaintiff in a protected class under title vii and  1981


Input: it encompasses a duty to refrain from implementation at all, unless and until an overall impasse has been reached on bargaining for the agreement as a whole.” Bottom Line Enters., 302 NLRB 373, 374 (1991). The Board recognizes two limited exceptions to requiring an employer to bargain to impasse: “[w]hen a union, in response to an employer’s diligent and earnest efforts to engage in bargaining, insists on continually avoiding or delaying bargaining, and when economic exigencies compel prompt action.” Id. The mandatory subjects of bargaining include “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Employees’ workloads, such as the number of rooms a housekeeper must clean at issue here, is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See HTH, 2011 WL 2414720, at *6 (<HOLDING>); see also Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts erroneous rulings violated respondents sixth amendment right to paid counsel of his choosing 1: holding that the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean is a mandatory subject of bargaining 2: holding that respondents violated  8a1 and 5 of the act uni laterally changing the housekeepers workloads by adding two additional rooms to clean per day 3: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act 4: holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation