Input: misconduct based on the patentee’s destruction of relevant documents and lodging of incomplete and misleading extrinsic evidence. 653 F.3d at 1324-25. This court also concluded that the record supported the district court’s finding that the patentee acted in subjective bad faith “by exploiting the high cost to defend complex litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement.” Id. at 1327. We held that the district court properly considered the patentee’s “ability to impose high costs to defend against its meritless claims,” and inducement of settlement payments by proposing low settlemept offers of “less than ten percent of the cost that [the accused infringer] expended to defend suit.” Id. at 1327; see Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in MarcTec, we affirmed the Holdings: 0: holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith 1: holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith 2: holding that evidence of counsels bad faith constituted unusual circumstances 3: holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims 4: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort


Input: AR016969. For each of these forms of take, NMFS set limits for that take and metrics designed to measure the take. AR016969-71. STANDARDS Summary judgment is appropriate if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). ■ All of plaintiffs’ claims at issue in the present motions are gov n Kraayenbrink, the APA’s standard of review will be applied to plaintiffs’ claim and plaintiffs must prove that NMFS’ failure to reinitiate consultation was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added); 632 F.3d at 481 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, if plaintiffs ■ prove that the Holdings: 0: holding that courts should review claims brought under the esa under the citizensuit provision of the esa or when the citizensuit provision is unavailable under the apa 1: holding that courts of appeals should review the facts necessary to determine whether an exemption to the flsa applies in a particular under the clearly erroneous standard 2: holding that judicial review under the apa is precluded when a remedy is available under a citizen suit provision of an environmental statute citations omitted 3: holding that when considering an agency action as to which the statute does not specify the standard of review the courts of appeals must proceed pursuant to the apas general standard of review for agency actions in 5 usc  7062a 4: holding that irrespective of whether an esa claim is brought under the apa or the citizensuit provision the apas standard of review applies


Input: for failure to pay a sanction, which more directly reflects misconduct by the party involved. Such misconduct itself might warrant dismissal if a plaintiff's financial circumstances eliminate the effectiveness of sanctions as a remedy or as a deterrent. See Herring v. City of Whitehall, 804 F.2d 464, 468 (8th Cir.1986) ("If the party is not capable of [paying discovery sanctions], the district court should then consider other sanctions. The ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice should only be used when lesser sanctions prove futile.”). Nevertheless, where dismissal is predicated on the nonpayment itself, as opposed to the underlying misconduct, the degree of that misconduct does not alter our analysis with respect to the significance of a party's inability to pay. See id. Holdings: 0: holding that district court abused its discretion by dismissing for nonpayment without inquiring into partys asserted inability to pay 1: holding that the decision whether to apply the exhaustion requirement in an erisa case is committed to the district courts sound discretion but that the district court abused its discretion by not dismissing the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 2: holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact 3: holding that the district court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing all 26 grounds in a  2255 motion where only certain claims were vague and conclusory 4: holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend


Input: under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . Plaintiffs have abandoned on appeal their claim that a July 1, 2002, letter signed by plaintiffs themselves, rather than their attorney, was a qualified written request. 2 . Plaintiffs’ attorney characterizes himself'as the appellant in this appeal, but he does not have standing to appeal the attorney-fee award. Weeks v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 230 F.3d 1201, 1213 (10th Cir.2000). We construe the attorney-fee appeal as part of the merits appeal brought by plaintiffs since they are patties to the appeal. Cf. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 854-55 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction. 3 . Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue 1: holding attorney lacked standing to challenge amount of attorney fees awarded plaintiffs not parties to the appeal 2: holding that attorney fees must be awarded where plaintiffs section 1983 claim was unreasonable and groundless 3: holding that chanenge to the amount of attorney fees was not preserved for appeal where appellants objection challenged only the entitlement to fees 4: recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees


Input: at *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82044, at *7 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, the plaintiffs argue that they are “consumers” of a “sale of services” contract concerning the management, marketing, and breeding of Ready’s Image as a stud, and that “Walmac Farm marketed itself as the stud farm at which Ready’s Image should be boarded and should stand stud.” [Record No. 110, p. 25] The transactions at the heart of this dispute, however, do not involve simple purchases. An offer of services to manage the stud career of a thoroughbred race horse is certainly not something sold to the general public, but would be a service highly particularized and unique to the particular parties and stallion involved. See, e.g., Princeton Healthcare Sys., 422 N.J.Super. at 473-74, 29 A.3d 361 (<HOLDING>); BOC Grp. v. Lummus Crest, 251 N.J.Super. 271, Holdings: 0: holding that a contract for the installation and implementation of a complex computer system did not constitute a consumer purchase covered by the njcfa and noting that the contract did not provide for simply the installation of a standardized computer software program but rather the design of a custommade program to satisfy the plaintiffs unique needs and the defendants active participation in implementation of this program 1: holding that a contract for the design manufacture and installation of two furnaces was predominantly a contract for the sale of goods and therefore subject to the uccs fouryear statute of limitations 2: holding that the implementation of a training program as opposed to the adoption of the program is not a discretionary function under the state tort liability act 3: holding that a contract for the design construction and installation of a water tank was predominantly a contract for the sale of goods under the ucc 4: holding that the ucc applies to a computer software license with an additional obligation to provide incidental services where the predominant thrust of the contract was the sale and support of the software


Input: by the Holubs and HTC to the 1996 abstract’s and lien’s validity came in their traditional summary-judgment motion, on which the trial court never ruled. Indeed, that traditional summary-judgment motion was superseded during abatement by the Holubs’ and HTC’s filing of what was in effect an amended, traditional summary-judgment motion on the same issue. See Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Finlan, 27 S.W.3d 220, 231 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied) (indicating, with respect to motion second summary-judgment motion that did not include word “amended” in title, that “[a] substituted or amended motion for summary judgment supercedes and supplants the previous motion....”); State v. Seventeen Thousand & No/100 Dollars U.S. Currency, 809 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the trial court never ruled on the Holdings: 0: holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  1: holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing 2: holding that a court must construe whether a motion however styled is appropriate for the relief requested 3: holding same with respect to motion styled simply second motion for summary judgment without containing amended in title 4: holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion


Input: trial court is statutorily mandated to order the payment of restitution unless the court finds that restitution is inappropriate." Snyder, 747 P.2d at 420; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (1999). It ¶ 8 Under both the United States and the Utah State Constitutions, due process requires criminal proceedings including sentencing to be based upon accurate and reasonably reliable information. See State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 1994). Thus, "[fJlundamental principles of procedural fairness in sentencing require that a defendant have the right to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual information upon which his sentence is based." Id. at 855. However, procedural fairness in sentencing is satisfied when "[djefendant had a full opportunity ... t .1998) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 10 Defendant did not object, question, or Holdings: 0: holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error 1: holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing 2: holding defendant entitled to full restitution hearing where he requested it at sentencing 3: holding trial court without jurisdiction to impose additional restitution because more than 60 days had passed between the sentencing hearing and the second restitution hearing 4: holding defendant may appeal order stemming from full restitution hearing even though motion for hearing filed ten days after sentencing


Input: the court sufficiently stated on the record the reasons for the sentences it was imposing.”). Accordingly, we hold that the district court’s failure to comply with the “written” statement requirement of § 3553(c)(2) does not render Williams’s sentence procedurally unreasonable. c. Williams also argues that the district court committed procedural error by selecting his sentence based upon the allegedly erroneous and conflicting factual finding that he intended to distribute crack cocaine to his girlfriend. Because Williams failed to raise this issue when the district court asked, “Does either party have any objection to the sentence just pronounced that’s not been previously raised?,” we review the claim for plain error. See United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872-73 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). To demonstrate plain error, Williams must Holdings: 0: holding that plain error review applies when a party fails to raise a claim before the district court 1: holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard 2: holding that we review for plain error whether the government breached its plea obligations when the defendant fails to object at sentencing 3: holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error 4: holding that plain error review applies to objections that were not raised when the district court asked the appropriate question at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing


Input: 292 Ga. at 452 (“The purpose of an indictment is to inform the accused of the charges against him and to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.”). 34 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 478. 35 Id. at 478-79 (punctuation omitted). 36 See former OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (2006). 37 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (punctuation omitted); see also State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 260 (2) (759 SE2d 500) (2014) (noting that “an indictment couched in the language of the statute alleged to have been violated is not subject to a general demurrer” (punctuation omitted)). 38 See OCGA § 16-5-20 (a). 39 Chase v. State, Til Ga. 636, 638 (1) (592 SE2d 656) (2004); accord Wyatt, 295 Ga. at 261 (2) (a). 40 Johnson v. State, 286 Ga. 432, 434 (687 SE2d 833) (2010); see Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (<HOLDING>). 41 OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). 42 OCGA § 17-8-58 (b); Holdings: 0: holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language 1: holding that possession of a controlled substance is a crime only if the defendant knowingly possesses the substance and has knowledge of the nature of that substance 2: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense 3: holding that knowledge that a substance is a controlled substance is an element of  952 4: holding that an indictment that is substantially in the language of the code is sufficient inform and substance


Input: we hold that it is not subject to an assertion of equitable estop-pel. As its name implies, equitable es-toppel embraces the notion that a party should not be permitted to profit by asserting rights against another when that party’s own inequitable conduct has lulled the other into action or inaction detrimental to its position. See Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. S.A.P., 835 So.2d 1091, 1096-97 (Fla.2002) (citing State ex rel. Watson v. Gray, 48 So.2d 84, 87-88 (Fla.1950)). The doctrine has been most commonly held to preclude a defendant from raising a statute of limitations defense when the defendant’s false representations mislead the plaintiff into failing to file suit within the limitations period. See Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1076 (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>); Rinker Materials Corp. v. Palmer First Nat'l Holdings: 0: holding that the timely filing of a discrimination charge with the equal employment opportunity commission is a requirement like a statute of limitations that is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling 1: recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa 2: holding that defendants may be estopped from raising defense of statute of limitations even though equitable estoppel is not listed in fla stat  95051 3: holding that equitable estoppel may bar a partys assertion of a statute of limitations 4: holding an evidentiary hearing on the applicability of equitable estoppel


Input: many seemingly anomalous situations. For example, mandatory withdrawal would be required whenever there is a challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under § 1334. 196 B.R. 791 (N.D.Ind.1995). In re Rimsat, Our conclusion that the' Tucker Act does not regulate “organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) is in harmony with other decisions involving federal laws of a jurisdictional nature. See In re CIS Corp., 140 B.R. 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y.1992)(jurisdietional issue of whether plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies provided by the Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) does not mandate withdrawal of the reference); In re Rimsat, Ltd. v. Russian Space Agency, 196 B.R. 791 (N.D.Ind.1995) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we conclude that the Holdings: 0: holding that the laws of the transferee district are applicable in a case transferred pursuant to 28 usc  1406a 1: holding that where jurisdiction was based on 28 usc  2201 venue was determined as per 28 usc  1391 2: holding that 28 usc  1331 does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity 3: holding that removal by a foreign sovereign is explicitly authorized by 28 usc 1441d and clearly cannot constitute waiver 4: holding that the provisions of title 28 in general and the foreign sovereign immunities act in particular are not laws regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce as contemplated by 28 usc  157d


Input: statements about ‘possible’ effects and ‘some risk’ do not constitute a ‘hard look’ absent a justification regarding why more definitive information could not be provided.” Id. at 1380. In the present case, plaintiffs allege that insofar as they relate to red-shouldered hawk, goshawk and marten, the cumulative impacts analyses are inadequate because they consist only of unsubstantiated generalizations and vague references. The Forest Service responds that the amount of detail required by NEPA varies according to the amount of harm that a proposed project may cause. Thus, the Forest Service argues that, in the present case, the EIS did not have to contain a high level of detail because the Northwest Howell project will not cause severe environmental harm. See Block, 690 F.2d at 761 (<HOLDING>); Nucleus of Chi. Homeowners Ass’n v. Lynn, 524 Holdings: 0: holding that the inquiry into whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment depends on the respondeat superior law of the state in which the tort occurred 1: holding that nsf must comply with procedural requirements of nepa when considering incineration of food waste in antarctica because 1 the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply because nepa is designed to regulate conduct occurring within the territory of the united states 2 the united states exercises legislative control over antarctica 3 any concerns about nepa interference with foreign policy were overstated because when foreign policy interests outweighed benefits of nepa compliance nepas requirements must yield and 4 broad language of the statute supports broad application of nepa requirements 2: holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case 3: holding that the rod and eis for a program were final agency action 4: holding that the detail that nepa requires in an eis depends upon the nature and scope of the proposed action


Input: was relevant to establishing Joshua’s motive, intent, or identity, on appeal the Government only contends the evidence is relevant to establishing Joshua’s motive. Evidence is relevant to motive if it helps establish why the defendant committed the offense. United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). The majority holds Joshua’s prior possession helps establish why he committed the charged offense without explaining how. The cases the majority cites in support of the relevancy of Joshua’s prior possession, United States v. Bitterman, 320 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.2003) and United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.2003), are readily distin ways: (1) the extrinsic act can cause the mental state, see e.g., United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831, 833 (8th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), or (2) the extrinsic act may be a consequence Holdings: 0: holding evidence of prior conviction of manslaughter admissible to show vengeful motive for sending threatening letters to witnesses 1: holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators 2: holding other crimes evidence admissible to show motive where motive was put in issue by defense at trial 3: holding that evidence of defendants threatening behavior toward a witness was admissible 4: holding that evidence of other crimes though generally inadmissible to show character is admissible to show for instance proof of motive or plan


Input: and he paid premiums for his policy,” reasoning that the statute already provides an offset for premiums). Respondent also argues that treating the UIM payments as collateral-source payments under the statute would result in a windfall to tortfeasors. The appropriate allocation of a potential windfall underlies both the common-law collateral-source rule and Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 1(2). The common-law rule sought to prevent tort-feasors from obtaining windfalls due to the injured claimant’s receipt of compensation from collateral sources. See Do, 779 N.W.2d at 858. Under the statute, by contrast, the evident concern is to preclude double recoveries by injured plaintiffs at the expense of defendants. Imlay, 453 N.W.2d at 331; Buck v. Schneider, 413 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). By directly abrogating the common-law rule Holdings: 0: holding that the collateralsource statute requires a reduction of the judgment only for payments made prior to the verdict 1: holding a provision criminalizing loitering which is defined as to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose void for vagueness where the provision was infierently subjective because its application depends on whether some purpose is apparent to the officer on the scene 2: recognizing that the collateralsource statute has the apparent purpose of preventing windfalls by plaintiffs at the expense of the defendants 3: recognizing the states interest in preventing deception of consumers 4: holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling


Input: trafficking is the offense, but previous sexual abuse or exploitation creates the enhancement. The requisite pattern for enhancement is a “pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of .a minor,” not, as Olfano seems to argue, a pattern of activity similar to the incident in question. We have not expressly addressed the difference-in-kind argument, aside from our holding in Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 794-95, that trafficking in child pornography is not sexual exploitation of a minor. Although we have yet to interpret section 2G2.2 in light of the 1996 amendments, several other courts of appeals have recognized that remote or unrelated instances of sexual misconduct can support a sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Ashley, 342 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Gawthrop, 310 F.3d at 414 (upholding a Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err 1: holding that an 80year sentence for production of child pornography was not disproportionate to the crime be cause of the devastating consequences of sexual abuse of children 2: holding that the district court did not err in using a previous conviction for gross sexual imposition to enhance a sentence for receiving child pornography 3: holding that mailing child pornography to another in the expectation of receiving similar materials in return constituted distribution for purposes of  2g22b2 4: holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment


Input: v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), which was decided a few days before Wade’s guilty plea, prevented the district court from enhancing her sentence based on facts not found by a jury. The district court overruled the objection, calculated a sentencing range of 18 to 24 months based on the total loss amount, recognized the advisory nature of the Guidelines, and sentenced Wade to 18 months imprisonment. Wade appeals, arguing that the district court violated the “constitutional” holding of Booker and violated her right to due process by treating the Guidelines as advisory in sentencing her for conduct that occurred pre-Booker. We review Wade’s constitutional challenges to her sentence de novo. See United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). If the sentence passes those challenges, we Holdings: 0: holding that confrontation clause claims are reviewed de novo 1: holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo 2: holding that a circuit courts entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo 3: holding that legal challenges to a district courts sentence continue to be reviewed de novo postbooker 4: holding that we review constitutional challenges de novo


Input: from the designation of the adults who will influence the child in school. Even a State’s considered judgment about the preferable political and religious character of schoolteachers is not entitled to prevail over a parent’s choice of private school.... It would be anomalous, then, to subject a parent to any individual judge’s choice of a child’s associates from out of the general population merely because the judge might think himself more enlightened that the child’s parent. To say the least ..., parental choice in such matters is not merely a default rule in the absence of either governmental choice or the government’s designation of an official with the power to choose for whatever reason and in whatever circumstances.” 530 U.S. at 78-79, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (Souter, J., con S.Ct. 625 (<HOLDING>); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at Holdings: 0: recognizing that because parents have a constitutional right to direct their childrens education organization has standing to bring claim on behalf of parents 1: recognizing liberty of parents  to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control as against law compelling publicschool attendance 2: recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 3: holding that liberty includes the right of parents to establish a home and bring up children and to control the education of their own 4: recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children


Input: presence of criminal activity at Pruett’s residence, but we nonetheless conclude that the executing officers did not act entirely without reason in relying on the magistrate’s determination that evidence of &■ crime would be found in the residence. Although our Circuit has not adopted a per se rule that evidence of a defendant’s drug trafficking establishes an inference that further evidence of drug trafficking will be found in the defendant’s residence, we have held that in applying the Leon exception, such evidence of a defendant’s drug trafficking indicated that officers acted reasonably in relying on a search warrant issued for the defendant’s residence. See United States v. Ross, 487 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir.2007); see also United States v. Marion, 238 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Pruett attacks the warrant Holdings: 0: holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on warrant 1: holding that executing officers reasonably relied on judges determination that there was probable cause to search motel room for evidence of drug activity even though search warrant affidavit failed to mention a connection between motel room and criminal activity 2: holding that a defendants prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance and felon in possession of a firearm helped support probable cause to search his motel room for evidence of burglary 3: holding warrantless search of motel room after occupant was arrested outside room for drug possession could not be justified as search incident to arrest absent other exigent circumstances 4: holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on the warrant


Input: Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.”). Although responsibility for maintaining this trust relationship with Indian tribes has historically been the exclusive prerogative of the federal government, the Supreme Court has recognized states may exercise the federal trust authority when specifically authorized to do so by a federal statute. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01, 99 S.Ct. 740, 761, 58 L.Ed.2d 740, 768 (1979) (<HOLDING>). There are generally two situations in which Holdings: 0: holding that federal legislation with respect to indian tribes  is not based upon impermissible racial classifications and noting that article i  8 of the constitution gives congress the power to regulate commerce  with the indian tribes 1: recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes  to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians 2: holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization 3: holding states in exercising the federal trust power over indian tribes pursuant to a federal statute authorizing them to do so may enact legislation that would be an otherwise unconstitutional exercise of state power 4: recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power


Input: cross the double-yellow center line two to three times, cross the fog line on the right-hand side of the roadway, and make an overly tight turn. He activated his blue lights in Orleans, but the defendant did not come to a stop until four-tenths of one mile into Brewster, as soon as was safe to pull over. At the suppression hearing, Officer Davis testified that when he activated his blue lights, he did not believe the defendant had committed any arrestable offenses. The evidence of the defendant’s erratic driving was objectively sufficient to give a reasonable officer in Officer Davis’s position reason to believe the defendant had committed the arrestable offense of operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See Commonwealth v. O’Hara, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 610 (1991) (<HOLDING>) ; Commonwealth v. Trudel, 42 Mass. App. Ct. Holdings: 0: holding among other things that the officers observations that the defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance without more did not establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime 1: holding police officer had probable cause to believe defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol 2: holding that the defendants speeds and marked lane violations at 300 am were sufficient to give officer reason to believe the defendant was operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor 3: holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion when he saw a vehicle moving with its lights off in the parking lot of a closed business in a rural area at 300 am 4: holding inter alia that experienced officers observations that the defendant was under the influence of either methamphetamine or cocaine did not by itself establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime


Input: that the debtors filed the functional equiv alent of a monthly net income statement in the form of Schedule J. This is too little and too late. Schedule J deals with a debtor’s current expenditures. In the process, it responds to a different filing requirement, contained in 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(l)(B)(ii). Although line 20 of Schedule J is called a “Statement of Monthly Net Income” and the advisory committee note to the official bankruptcy forms states that this line was added to Schedule J in 2005 “as required by § 521(a)(l)(B)(v),” there is no reason to think that Schedule J is a proxy for the statement of current monthly income required by section 521(a)(l)(B)(v). In fact, the case law suggests the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., In re Turner, 384 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr.D.Colo.2008) (<HOLDING>). We need not probe this point too deeply. Holdings: 0: holding debtors who devoted twothirds of their net disposable income to housing expenses did not propose a chapter 13 plan in good faith 1: holding that the statement of current monthly income was the presumptive amount of projected disposable income but presumption could be rebutted by the debt or upon a showing of substantial change of circumstances 2: holding that net farm income when applied to a producer in the fishing industry means net income from all fishing activity not just that income from a particular commodity and further providing that the regulations make it reasonably clear that the determination of   net fishing income is not to be made solely on the basis of tax return information if other information is relevant to determining the producers net income from all   fishing sources 3: holding that a chapter 7 debtors duty to file a section 521albv statement of monthly net income can only be fulfilled by filing form b22a 4: holding in prebapcpa case that chapter 7 filing was not a substantial abuse simply because debtors made unwise financial decisions that increased their monthly living expenses


Input: agrees the claimant may enter judgment against him or her for a sum collectible only from the insurance policy. The settlement must be reasonable to be binding on the insurer if policy coverage is found to exist. See Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729, 735 (Minn.1982). 3 . The dissent at the court of appeals labeled the majority's analysis "hypertechnical.” Metropolitan, 1998 WL 157358, at *4. 4 . The court of appeals reasoned that because Metropolitan chose not to include the phrase "arising out of” or “resulting from” as part of its exclusionary language, it was obligated to defend and indemnify Jennifer Miller. See Metropolitan, 1998 WL 157358, at *2 (citing Redeemer Covenant Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 71, 76-78 (Minn.App.1997), rev. denied (Minn., Oct. 2, 1997)) (<HOLDING>); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steele, 74 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding claim for injuries arising out of use of truck and not from negligent supervision excluded from coverage by auto exclusion in commercial general liability policy no claim that language in policy was ambiguous or unclear 1: holding that insurance company had duty to provide coverage for churchs negligent supervision of pastor under professional liability policy because policy did not contain clause excluding coverage for actions arising out of a criminal act or licentious immoral or sexual behavior 2: holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage 3: holding that a professional liability policy provided primary coverage over a general liability policy for acts committed by a pastor during counseling sessions 4: holding that a legal malpractice insurance policy that limited coverage to suits seeking damages and defined damages as excluding sanctions did not provide coverage for a sanctions motion against the insured


Input: Neesen ed., 1995)(stating that “’particular part’ exclusion operates to preclude coverage for the damage to real property which occurs while the insured is performing his work on it”). Consequently, the instant exclusion applies if Schauf was accomplishing work on the Sodaros’ house when he started the fire. At the time Schauf started the fire, he was in the Sodaros’ dining room finishing his cleaning of the spray equipment that he used to apply lacquer to the Sodaros’ kitchen cabinets thirty minutes earlier. When Schauf was cleaning his equipment, he was performing operations on real property within the meaning of this exclusion because he was performing part of his contract to paint the Sodaros’ house. See Goldsberry Operating Co. v. Cassity, Inc., 367 So.2d 133, 135 (La.Ct.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). As Schauf stated in his deposition, he Holdings: 0: holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled 1: holding that predecessor particular part exclusion barred coverage for damage to a switchboard upon which insured was adding circuit breakers 2: holding that particular part exclusion barred coverage for damage to entire apartment insured was renovating even though insured was working only on one part of apartment at time of damage 3: holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party 4: holding that predecessor particular part exclusion barred coverage for damage insured caused to well as it was lowering gun to depth at which insured was to use gun to perforate well


Input: 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981); Local 246 Utility Workers Union v. Southern California Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292, 297 (9th Cir.1996) (stating that the FLSA's "minimum wage and overtime provisions are guarantees to individual workers that may not be waived through collective bargaining”). 6 . 29 U.S.C. § 255(a); Maj. op. at 545. 7 . McLaughlin v. Richmond Shoe, 486 U.S. 128, 133, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988); Maj. op. at 545. 8 . See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(c) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”); Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714, 106 S.Ct. 1527, 89 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 9 . See McLaughlin v. Richmond Shoe, 486 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that courts of appeals should review the facts necessary to determine whether an exemption to the flsa applies in a particular under the clearly erroneous standard 1: holding that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies to  3bllc determinations 2: holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard 3: holding that clearly erroneous standard applies to review district courts determination of dangerousness under 18 usc  4246 4: holding that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies unless judgment is entered on the basis of documentary evidence alone


Input: nominal owner. This claim may be cognizable under New York rulings that have recognized ownership in persons other than owners of record. For example, in Ryen v. Terry (In re Terry), 56 B.R. 713 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1986), a bankruptcy trustee sued to recover a disability payment of $19,000 that the debtor had deposited in her mother's bank account. Although the mother had sole legal title to the funds, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion for turnover, holding that a bailment had been created by the debtor's deposit of funds into her mother's account, and that “[ujnder the bailment, the debtor did not transfer her equitable nor beneficial interests in those funds to her mother.” Id. at 715. See also Herzfeld & Stern v. Freidus, 69 Misc.2d 578, 330 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1st Dep't 1971) (<HOLDING>); Bottiglieri v. Berman, 55 Misc.2d 263, 284 Holdings: 0: holding that where both vessels had the same owner it was not an abuse of discretion to give 75 of the salvage award to the owner 1: recognizing a cause of action by the owner of contaminated property against a previous owner who allegedly caused the contamination 2: holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner 3: holding that stock in a housing cooperative that entitled the owner to the use of an apartment but not to any cash return was not a security 4: holding stock dividend payable to actual owner not owner of record


Input: (citations omitted); Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985) (adopting the RestaTEmENT (SEconp) or Torts § 46(1) (1965) in defining a claim for IIED). 49 . Id. at 1289. 50 . Id. Compare Lybrand v. Trask, 31 P.3d 801, 802-05 (Alaska 2001) (affirming superior court's dismissal of IIED claim because neighbor's conduct in painting biblical slogans on roof was not "outrageous") and Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 209 (Alaska 1995) (affirming trial court's directed verdict based on conclusion that physician's alleged misdiagnosis of patient as HIV positive was nol outrageous conduct even when doctor failed to warn patient that screening test upon which diagnosis was based was unconfirmed) with Teamsters Local 959 v. Wells, 749 P.2d 349, 358 (Alaska 1988) (<HOLDING>). Considered in isolation, Leykis's derogatory Holdings: 0: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 1: holding that threatening union members life if he did not convince his supervisorspouse to quit during strike was outrageous conduct as matter of law 2: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 3: recognizing union members vital concern in preserving jobs for union members 4: holding that the plaintiffs acted on behalf of all union members and reimbursing the attorneys fees from the union treasury such that all union members in effect equally contributed to the costs of litigation


Input: addition, AmMed Surgical shall provide this court with a copy of the bankruptcy court’s order. Order to show cause discharged. ALTENBERND and BLACK, JJ., Concur. 1 . Although it was the defendant/debtor that filed the notice of appeal, the appeal is considered to be the continuation of a proceeding "against the debtor,” under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). See, e.g., Crowe Grp., Inc. v. Garner, 691 So.2d 1089, 1089 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Miller Mining Co., 817 F.2d 1424, 1426 (9th Cir.1987), 2 . U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2. 3 .The same is true of rule 9.110(b), which also sets the notice-of-appeal deadline for final orders at thirty days from rendition. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank in Fort Myers v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 461 So.2d 208, 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) Holdings: 0: holding that identification of appellant in notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement and that the failure to name a party in a notice to appeal constitutes a failure of that party to appeal 1: holding that the 30day deadline to file a notice of appeal with the bia was not jurisdictional 2: holding 30day limit to be mandatory and jurisdictional 3: holding that in the appeal of a final order the fjailure to file any notice within the 30day period constitutes an irremediable jurisdictional defect 4: holding that the 30day notice of appeal requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional


Input: a multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) proceeding for the purpose of conducting coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings in cases involving injuries allegedly caused by Ortho Evra. With respect to the removing Defendants’ request for a stay, it generally is not the Court’s practice to allow cases in which the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is seriously at issue to remain pending long in federal court. The legal questions presented by the instant motion for remand are hardly novel ones for the Court, and they are quite as susceptible of resolution here as they are in the MDL court. See Weese v. Union Carbide Corp., Civil No. 07-581-GPM, 2007 WL 2908014, at *1 (S.D.Ill. Oct.3, 2007) (quoting Conroy v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 325 F.Supp.2d 1049, 1054 (N.D.Cal.2004)) (<HOLDING>). Turning then to the merits of Plaintiffs’ Holdings: 0: holding that filing of appeal to federal circuit divests this court of jurisdiction to consider motion to stay court order pending appeal 1: recognizing that pleadings filed in federal court while the federal court has jurisdiction become part of the state court record on remand 2: holding that it would be judicially inefficient to stay proceedings so that a motion for remand could be resolved by a transferee court given that tjhis court is as qualified to evaluate the factors establishing federal jurisdiction as any other federal court 3: holding that certification of a remand order divests federal court jurisdiction 4: holding that a transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit


Input: motion for summary judgment and determined that the instant lawsuit and the two preceding lawsuits, in 2 ent allegations — that she was improperly evicted, that Lennar filed a fraudulent IRS form 1099, and that the clerk of the court made an erroneous docket entry — either were raised and decided on the merits, or could have been raised, in one of the four previous actions. For res judicata purposes, identity of the thing sued for and identity of the cause of action are present because the relief requested and the theories of action m each of Jenkins lawsuits are indistinguishable. Because Universal is a subsidiary of Lennar, they are privies, and thus, the parties to each of the previous lawsuits are identical. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246, 1259 (Fla.2006) (<HOLDING>). Finally, because the defendants were sued in Holdings: 0: holding that cr 60b applies to criminal as well as civil judgments 1: holding that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action 2: holding that judgments on the merits in former proceedings are binding on the original parties as well as their privies 3: holding agreed judgments are treated as contract beiween parties 4: holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties


Input: 72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) ("Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes. Only where incident to a valid arrest, or in 'exceptional circumstances,’ may an exemption lie, and then the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it." (citations omitted)). 3 . See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 993, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) ("It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 4 . See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 88 S.Ct. a 878 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nickerson, 606 F.2d 156, 158 Holdings: 0: holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present 1: holding that it was error for the trial judge to answer a jurys question without giving defendants counsel an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responded 2: holding that identical error did not prejudice defendant because by giving the instruction the judge merely gave the jury the opportunity to overturn his own ruling 3: holding that district court did not err in giving an instruction identical to that proposed by jenkins 4: holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by giving the standard jury instruction for attempted manslaughter by act


Input: would certainly fall within the statute; however, at a minimum a physician, dentist, or hospital must have made use of that corporation or person in the physician’s, dentist’s, or hospital’s delivery of health-care services to the plaintiff-patient.” Ex parte Partners in Care, Inc., 986 So.2d 1145, 1148 (Ala.2007) (emphasis omitted). We are not asked in this case to revisit those cases in which this Court has held that the requirement that a person or corporation be “employed by” a physician, dentist, or hospital does not require an employment or equivalent contractual relationship, but requires only that the physician (or dentist or hospital) “make use of’ the person (or corporation) in question. See, e.g., Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 So.2d 319, 324-25 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Ex parte Partners in Care, Inc., 986 Holdings: 0: holding that a pharmacists filling of a doctors prescription for a patient is part of the physicians treatment of his or her patient so that the pharmacist was included within the amla definition of other health care provider 1: holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave 2: holding that under nebraskas physicians lien statute a physicians lien could not exceed the amount the health care provider agreed to accept for the services rendered to a patient even if the usual and customary charge for such services is greater than that sum because the statute extends such lien only to the amount due or debt of the patient to the hospital 3: holding that sanction of removal for nursing home attendant who was found to have hit patient suffering from dementia should be reduced to penalty of sixmonth suspension because act of hitting patient was isolated instance in which patient was aggressor 4: holding that defendant medical center which allowed a patient who would likely cause bodily harm to his wife if he had the opportunity to leave the center for a weekend could be liable for the patients actions of killing his wife and her paramour during that weekend because inter alia when the course of treatment of a mental patient involves an exercise of control over him by a physician who knows or should know that the patient is likely to cause bodily harm to others an independent duty arises from that relationship and falls upon the physician to exercise that control with such reasonable care as to prevent harm to others at the hands of the patient punctuation omitted emphasis supplied


Input: they “provide fellowship, care, and protection” for Mr. Salyer, who, “because of ... physical ... infirmity, cannot care for his own needs.” Because those services “may include household work related to the care of the aged or infirm person such as meal preparation, bed making, washing of clothes, and other similar services,” we find the regulation to be directly on point. Furthermore, we cannot say that this regulatory definition of “companionship services” is either “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” that it elucidates. Thus, we must give it “controlling weight.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The handful of cases that have considered the “companionship ser 1988) (<HOLDING>). The Cox court relied, in part, on McCune v. Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff analogous to ms salyer who did not work in private homes did not fall within the companionship services exemption 1: recognizing that generally services that benefit debtor are services that facilitate completion of a case 2: holding that plaintiff who provided similar services which were arguably attendant care services under state law fell within the exemption 3: holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001 4: holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity


Input: 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, to the extent there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their truth and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Determining whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. “Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the -mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not ‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to re or agency contracts like the one between the parties here. See, e.g., Scheerer v. Fisher, 202 N.C.App. 99, 103, 688 S.E.2d 472, 474 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the letter agreement does not Holdings: 0: holding agreement to compensate an agent or broker for services in the buying or selling of real estate need not be in writing 1: holding that if property description is to be supplied by writing to which reference is made in deed reference must be adequate to identify writing 2: holding insurers oral promise to settle a claim was an original undertaking and need not be in writing 3: holding that appellate court need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument issue or claim raised and properly before us on appeal 4: holding that a corporation could be served by delivering a copy of the subpoena to an officer or managing or general agent of the corporation and that the agent could be an individual a partnership or another corporation


Input: the preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer an impermissible ‘speaking demurrer.’”). However, pursuant to section 6107 of the Judicial Code, an exception exists by permitting a court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances. In pertinent part, section 6107 states: § 6107. Judicial notice of certain local government ordinances. (a) General rule. — The ordinances of municipal corporations of this Commonwealth shall be judicially noticed. (b) Manner of proving ordinances. — The tribunal may inform itself of such ordinances in such manner as it may deem proper and the tribunal may call upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such information. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6107(a), (b). See McClimans v. Board of Supervisors, Shenango Township, 107 Pa.Cmwlth. 542, 529 A.2d 562, 565-66 (1987) (<HOLDING>). If this Court can take judicial notice of and Holdings: 0: holding that order mandating disclosure of classified information to habeas petitioners counsel was an important issue entirely separate from the merits of this case 1: holding that defendants failure to obtain counsel despite opportunities to do so implied a waiver of counsel 2: holding that this court has explicit authority under section 6107 to contact counsel in order to obtain information regarding an ordinance 3: holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court 4: holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality


Input: its boundaries, so long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government.” Id. at 626-27, 73 S.Ct. at 467 (emphasis added). The Court observed that the sovereign rights in the dual relationship between the United States and Kentucky were not antagonistic in that instance, so that it is “friction, not fiction, which we must give heed.” Id. at 627, 73 S.Ct. at 467; see also Evans v. Comman, 398 U.S. 419, 423, 90 S.Ct. 1752, 1755, 26 L.Ed.2d 370 (1970) (rejecting notion of non-residency in state for voting in Maryland elections by those residing in a federal enclave and noting that “the relationship between federal enclaves and the [sjtate in which they are located has changed considerably”); M.R.S. v. State, 745 So.2d 1139, 1140 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1999) (<HOLDING>); Cobb v. Cobb, 406 Mass. 21, 545 N.E.2d 1161, Holdings: 0: recognizing howard holding that fiction of a state within a state has no validity to prevent exercise of power by state over federal area within its boundaries so long as there is no interference with federal jurisdiction 1: recognizing the uncertain state of federal law in this area 2: holding a state has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state 3: holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law 4: recognizing federal enclave remains within geographic boundaries of state


Input: and as Next Friend of Jonathan Espeche, a minor, take nothing by reason of her suit....” Because Espeche’s live pleading at the time judgment was signed, November 5, contained a claim on behalf of Jonathan, the record demonstrates the trial court considered Espeche's second amended original petition. 7 . In addition, there is a practical reason why Ritzell’s amended motion was not properly before the court. Had the trial court actually granted Ritzell leave to file the amended motion so close to the date of the hearing, Es-peche would have been entitled, pursuant to Rule 166a(c), to a period of time in which to file a response to the new ground presented in the amended motion. See, e.g., Sams v. N.L. Indus. Inc., 735 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ) Holdings: 0: holding that in a traditional motion for summary judgment the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a fact issue after the movant has facially established its right to judgment as a matter of law 1: holding that summary judgment was appropriate when no reasonable factfinder could have found for the nonmovant 2: holding nonmovant was entitled to the mandatory 21 day notice period when movant adds additional grounds for summary judgment 3: holding that if the movant cannot demonstrate conclusively that the nonmovant cannot prevail summary judgment is precluded 4: holding that once movant established right to summary judgment burden shifts to nonmovant to demonstrate otherwise


Input: was lengthy discourse between the parties prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Plaintiff suggests that all documents prepared prior to this date were created in the ordinary course of business, not in anticipation of litigation, and the burden rests on Defendant to show otherwise. Based on this record, Defendant has not provided this Court with sufficient information to determine which documents dated prior to May 28, 2002 that were identified in its Privilege Log are protected by the work product doctrine. Defendant failed to provide this Court with evidentiary proof of objective facts, via affidavits or deposition testimony, that documents before May 28, 2002, the date coverage was expressly denied, were prepared in anticipation of litigation. See, e.g., Totaltape, 135 F.R.D. at 201 (<HOLDING>). The Court will, therefore, find that no Holdings: 0: holding declaration or affidavit must support work product claim for documents listed solely as work product on privilege log 1: holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation 2: holding that the work product doctrine applied to a document prepared in anticipation of litigation and was therefore protected from disclosure under foia exemption 5 3: holding that a party failed in meeting its burden that documents were work product because the party resisting discovery failed to present affidavits or other evidentiary support for its contention that the documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation 4: holding that the moving party need not support its motion with affidavits or other evidence if the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial


Input: regarding an alien’s eligibility for § 1229b relief. See, e.g., Reyes-Vasquez v. Ashcroft, 895 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir.2005) (“Although the decision to grant cancellation of removal is a discretionary act by the Attorney General that we may not review, ... we may consider the predicate legal question whether the IJ properly applied the law to the facts in determining an individual’s eligibility to be considered for the relief.” (internal citations omitted)); Santana-Albarran v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 699, 703 (6th Cir.2005) (“The denial of relief based on the ground that the alien has failed to demonstrate a continuous physical presence ... is a non-diseretionary factual determination and properly subject to appellate review.”); Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, Holdings: 0: holding that whether an alien satisfies the continuous presence requirement of 8 usc  1229b is a nondiscretionary determination because it involves straightforward statutory interpretation and application of law to fact and is therefore reviewable 1: holding that an aliens continuous physical presence is broken if the alien was offered and accepted the opportunity to withdraw an application for admission 2: holding that the decision whether an alien meets the hardship requirement in 8 usc  1229b is  a discretionary judgment 3: holding that a determination regarding whether an alien met the continual physical presence requirement of  1229b was nondiscretionary and thus reviewable 4: holding that boards ruling that aliens continuous physical presence terminated when he voluntarily departed country was a reasonable interpretation of 8 usc  1229b 2012


Input: plaintiff] preemptively brought this action for declaratory judgment, seeking to avoid indemnity liability, does not alter the structural essence of the case.”); Aetna Cos. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 596 A.2d 414, 424 n. 19 (1991) (“Because this is a declaratory judgment action and the plaintiff insurer is invoking [issue preclusion] to avoid providing coverage, the [issue preclusion] invoked here is a hybrid form of offensive [issue preclusion].”); Revenue Cabinet, Commonwealth v. Samani, 757 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Ky.Ct.App. 1988) (“Offensive collateral estoppel or issue preclusion may be utilized, as was done herein, by an action for declaratory relief.” (Footnote omitted.)); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill.2d 378, 250 Ill.Dec. 682, 739 N.E.2d 445, 452 (2000) (<HOLDING>); cf. Davis v. Davis, 663 A.2d 499, 501 n. 3 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a suit for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable but is determined by the nature of underlying issue 1: holding that an action challenging the validity of a will may not be brought under ohios declaratory judgment act 2: recognizing that issue preclusion brought by a plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action is technically offensive   3: holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment 4: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action


Input: and to have that determination declared presumptive evidence of disability and inability to work, subject only to rebuttal by the defense. We begin our analysis with the Rules of Evidence and the principle that “hearsay statements that do not conform to the exceptions specifically enumerated in the Rules of Evidence are not admissible.” State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 175, 19 A.3d 985 (2011). It is clear that the SSA determination is hearsay and was proffered explicitly for the truth of the finding therein. “ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” N.J.R.E. 801(c). See Muench v. Twp. of Haddon, 255 N.J.Super. 288, 305-06, 605 A.2d 242 (App.Div.1992) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co., 107 Holdings: 0: holding that a report of findings by the new jersey division of civil rights did not qualify for any hearsay exception in a discrimination case brought under the lad 1: holding that a determination of a new jersey spill compensation fund arbitrator is reviewable by the appellate division 2: recognizing that pennsylvania had no interest in denying its residents the greater damages available under new jersey consumer fraud statutes for claims against a new jersey seller 3: recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey 4: holding that claims based on asserted violations of the lad and  1983 are not subject to the new jersey tort claims act


Input: 3 . In Oregon, the Circuit Court serves as the state trial court of general jurisdiction. Circuit Courts also review petitions for post-conviction review. Bailey’s Motion for a New Trial and petition for state post-conviction relief were therefore both heard at the Circuit Court level, albeit in different judicial districts. 4 . Although Strickler had not been decided at the time of the State court's judgment, that case simply articulated principles that were well established at the time the state court reviewed Bailey's Brady claim. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (review ing the requirements and discussing the materiality standard at length); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392 Holdings: 0: holding that material favorable to the accused must be either evidence which serves to impeach a government witness credibility or evidence which is directly exculpatory of the defendant  emphasis added 1: holding that the reference to any court encompasses both state and federal courts 2: holding that favorable evidence encompasses both exculpatory and impeachment evidence and articulating the materiality standard 3: holding that term court encompasses trial by both judge and jury 4: holding impeachment evidence falls within the brady rule


Input: the drainage easement is being taken for the private use of Developer and, as such, it is not authorized by the Pennsylvania Constitution or the Eminent Domain Code, and is affirmatively prohibited by PRPA. See Brief for Appellants at 12. Appellants acknowledge that a “taking does not lose its public character merely because there may exist in the operation some feature of private gain.” Appeal of Washington Park, Inc., 425 Pa. 349, 353, 229 A.2d 1, 3 (1967). They proffer, however, that, for the taking to be valid, the public must be the primary and paramount beneficiary, and the public entity involved must assume ownership and maintenance of the condemned lands and any improvements installed thereon. See Ormsby Land Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 276 Pa. 68, 70, 119 A. 730, 730 (Pa.1923) (<HOLDING>). Appellants assert that RAWA will not assume Holdings: 0: recognizing private right of action 1: holding that the fact that the city had delegated its municipal engineering functions to a private entity was dispositive in establishing that documents generated by the private entity were public records 2: holding that the crucial distinction that rendered the public entity liable for a private actors inaccessibility was that the public entity had contracted with the private actor for it to provide aid benefits or services to beneficiaries of the public entitys redevelopment program 3: holding that plaintiffs claims against private fiscal intermediary were subject to exhaustion requirement and that plaintiff may not circumvent the terms of section 405h simply because a private entity the defendant serves a public function 4: holding that land dedicated for a public street may not be leased to a private entity for private use


Input: Area School District, 882 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir.1989) “state officials may [not] escape liability arising from their policies maintained in deliberate indifference to actions taken by their subordinates”. 882 F.2d at 725. In addition, we noted that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 “where its policymakers made a ‘deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives’.” Id. (Citations omitted.) Here, the deliberate choice made by the Freeholders could be considered that of doing nothing. The district court found that Ryan possessed a third right of being housed in a “reasonably safe prison environment.” Ryan III, 708 F.Supp. at 626. The court based this right on our decision in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 856 F.2d 594, n. 14 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>), vacated sub. nom. Smith v. Stoneking, — U.S. Holdings: 0: holding a business owner must protect invitees against injury caused by third persons 1: recognizing that by 1979 state officials had duty to protect institutionalized persons from selfinjury or assault 2: holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons 3: holding that walmart was not under a duty to protect a patron from a criminal assault absent prior similar incidents at their facility or in the general area 4: holding that a school had no duty to protect pedestrian from student


Input: Br. of Resp’t at 41. But because Mudarri is not similarly situated to the Tribe, he has not shown any unlawful discrimination or violation of his equal protection rights. |49 Mudarri bears the burden of proving that the challenged statute and its application are unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett, 115 Wn.2d 556, 563, 800 P.2d 367 (1990). Amendment XIV, section 1 of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Thus, our federal constitution guarantees equal rights among individuals and classes of individuals. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; State v. Shawn R, 122 Wn.2d 553, 559-60, 859 P.2d 1220 (1993) (<HOLDING>). To prevail, Mudarri must prove that the Holdings: 0: holding members of two distinct pension plans were not similarly situated for equal protection analysis 1: holding equal protection under the federal constitution applies to similarly situated persons 2: holding that an equal protection violation may occur when similarly situated persons are not treated equally under the law quotation marks omitted 3: holding that a presentence defendant is not similarly situated with a postsentence convict and denial of sentence credit does not violate equal protection 4: holding that the equal protection clause is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike


Input: plaintiffs may have a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to require some form of prior notice, particularly if New York confers upon them the legal right to remain until they are afforded such notice. Compare State v. Dias, 62 Haw. 52, 609 P.2d 637, 639-40 (1980) (landowner’s long-term acquiescence to a trespasser’s presence can give the trespasser a cognizable privacy interest) with Amezquita, 518 F.2d at 11 (rejecting Fourth Amendment claim of squatters where “nothing in the record suggests that the squatters’ entry upon the land was sanctioned in any way by the Commonwealth”). While the Fourth Amendment normally requires little more notice than a knock on the door prior to a forced entry, see Wilson v. Arkansas, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995) (<HOLDING>), the process required by the Fourth Amendment Holdings: 0: recognizing principle 1: holding that the common law knockandannounce principle forms a part of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry 2: holding that commonlaw knock and announce rule is part of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry 3: holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure 4: holding that commonlaw knock and announce principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the fourth amendment


Input: unskilled labor to local companies for short-term assistance.” Smith v. Employers’ Overload Co., 314 N.W.2d 220, 222 (Minn.1981). Courts rely on contract principles to determine the nature of the employment relationship. Id. at 222-23. The duration of employment depends on the parties’ intent. Id. at 223. When addressing qualification for unemployment benefits, courts have applied these principles and distinguished between persons who complete assignments but do not seek new assignments and persons who accept but refuse to complete ongoing assignments. An employee who has completed an assignment but refuses to accept further assignments is not disqualified from unemployment benefits because the employment relationship has ended and the refusal does not constitute a quit. See id. (<HOLDING>); Mbong v. New Horizons Nursing, 608 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding  1001 prosecution for false statements in unemployment benefits not precluded by unemployment benefits statute specifically addressing topic 1: holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits 2: holding that employees who completed four separate oneday assignments intended only oneday employment contracts and qualified for unemployment benefits 3: holding that an employers interest in presence at and participation in a hearing on her former employees claim for unemployment benefits did not render the employer a party to that proceeding 4: holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits


Input: Gillie. On February 19, 1987, Mr. Gillie executed a note in the amount of $5,498.40, including interest at 12.51% per annum, payable to the Bank in 60 monthly installments of $91.64 each. The amount financed included credit life and credit health and accident premiums in the amount of $338.27. The note recited that it was secured by the June 19, 1985 security agreement and Table, Chairs and Entertainment Center. It also recited “Renew: 3245 1”, but there is no number 3245 1 on either of the previous notes. Again, Mr. Gillie signed no Security Agreement or Financing Statement. The note of April 21, 1986 was stamped “Paid by Renewal.” The parties stipulated that all three notes related to the same transaction and that the Bank advanced no new funds and added no new collateral when 85) (<HOLDING>); Booker v. Commercial Credit Corp. (In re Holdings: 0: holding that a creditors refinancing by renewal does not destroy a pmsi to the extent that the balance remaining on the original loan is transferred to the renewal note 1: holding that under north dakota law consolidation of a note secured by a pmsi in farm machinery with other goods resulted in a novation destroying the creditors pmsi 2: holding that under michigan law when debtors paid off the initial loan with the proceeds of refinancing the creditors pmsi in stereo expired 3: holding that under georgia law a creditors refinancing of a promissory note destroyed the purchase money nature of the creditors security interest in a wall unit which served as collateral 4: holding that under colorado law refinancing of a purchase money loan whereby an old note and security agreement were canceled and replaced by a new note and security agreement did not automatically extinguish the creditors pmsi in the debtors furniture the parties did not intend the new note to extinguish the original debt and security interest in that identical collateral remained almost no new money was advanced and the document specifically stated an intent to continue the pmsi


Input: party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. A “necessary” party must be joined if feasible — if they are “subject to service of process” and would “not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 19(a). If a court determines that a party is not “necessary” under Rule 19(a), “joinder, as well as further analysis, is unnecessary.” Local 670, et al. v. Int’l Union, et al., 822 F.2d 613, 618 (6th Cir.1987). The burden is on the moving party to establish that a party is necessary for purposes of Rule 19(a). Marshall v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 168 F.R.D. 606, 611 (E.D.Mich.1996); 5C Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1359 (3d ed.2013) (<HOLDING>). “The moving party may satisfy this burden Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties 1: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction 2: recognizing burden 3: recognizing that the burden is on a party making a rule 12b7 motion to establish that missing parties are necessary or indispensable to the action 4: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff


Input: v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 382 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir.1999)). If a plaintiff has alleged these three elements, the public employer may still avoid liability if it shows that the plaintiffs speech was likely to disrupt the government’s activities to an extent that outweighs First Amendment value of the speech. Mandell, 316 F.3d at 382-83; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (explaining that court must balance the interests of the employee “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”); Cobb, 363 F.3d at 102. Alterna 46 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Because all the speech for which Anemone Holdings: 0: recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern 1: holding public employees conduct and expression in internal investigation of employees at county prosecutors office to expose potential wrongdoing constituted matter of public concern 2: holding that employees allegation of corrupt and wasteful practices at municipal hospital obviously involved matter of public concern 3: holding that employees voluntary testimony is also inherently a matter of public concern 4: holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern


Input: proceedings the Petitioner [former wife] seeks to modify the same Final Judgment which was the subject of the 2 prior contempt proceedings in Duval County and a 3rd was filed shortly after the Petitioner’s Petition for Modification. The 3rd Contempt Motion is presently pending.” The former wife contends that the trial court erred by granting the former husband’s Motion to Dismiss where there were no proceedings pending in the Duval Circuit Court when she filed her Complaint in Miami-Dade County. We agree. The former husband acknowledges that the trial court erred by relying on his third motion for contempt when granting the Motion to Dismiss because this motion for contempt was filed after the former wife filed her Complaint in the Miami-Dade Circuit Court. See Amir, 896 So.2d at 794 (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). The former husband, Holdings: 0: holding that motion to transfer also must show either that county where action is pending is improper or that venue is mandatory in another county 1: recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue 2: holding that tr 76a required that the trial court grant the motion for change of venue from laporte county where laporte county was a party to the action despite the fact that it was also a preferred venue 3: holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings 4: holding that venue was improper in the county of death because no other event occurred there


Input: jurisprudence in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Sys., Inc., — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1744, 188 L.Ed.2d 829 (2014) and Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1749, 188 L.Ed.2d 816 (2014). Those decisions call into ques tion our two-part test for determining willfulness, In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed.Cir.2007) (en banc), and our de novo standard for reviewing the district court’s willfulness determination, Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (Fed.Cir.2012) (Bard II). See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed.Cir.2014) (O’Malley, J., concurring). This case demonstrates why de no t. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (<HOLDING>). It would also be consistent with the standard Holdings: 0: holding habeas corpus is not a civil action for purposes of the equal access to justice act provision for award of attorney fees to prevailing party 1: holding abuse of discretion is the proper standard for reviewing determinations of whether a litigants position is substantially justified for purposes of feeshifting under the equal access to justice act although the determination frequently turns on a purely legal issue 2: holding that the standard of review under rule 60 is abuse of discretion 3: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion 4: holding abuse of discretion is the proper standard for reviewing award of attorney fees in patent cases although questions of law may in some cases be relevant


Input: assumption is in error. On April 30, 1993, the court dismissed all the charges against Woodland without prejudice. In October of 1993, new charges were filed. During the approximately seven months separating the dismissal and the reinstatement of charges, Woodland was confined in a mental institution. This period of confinement involved no formal charges. Woodland was not held because he was an alleged criminal but because his mental health at the time warranted such confinement. This period should not be used to calculate a speedy trial violation. See Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706 (stating that time spent holding defendant on separate parole violation following formal dismissal of charges cannot be attributable to state); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 F.2d 371, 374 (10th Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>). The State filed new charges against Woodland Holdings: 0: holding that the constitutional right to a speedy trial includes the right to a reasonably prompt sentencing 1: holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy 2: holding that ajppellant can not complain of the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial because of his confinement in a state mental institution after dismissal of the former indictment 3: holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial 4: holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds


Input: Commc’ns, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 739 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.2013). “Due process prevents government actors from depriving persons of liberty or property interests without providing certain safeguards.” Id., citing Mathews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Due process calls only for “protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893. Due process does not always require “a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial____” Id. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893. This is not a case where “the evidence consists of testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.” Business Commc’ns, 739 F.3d at 380 (<HOLDING>). Rather, to reach its conclusion, NIGC relied Holdings: 0: holding due process required an opportunity for crossexamination when the decision depended on the credibility of individual witness testimony 1: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 2: holding that sentencing court did not violate defendants due process rights when it reasonably refused to recall a witness for crossexamination 3: recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required 4: holding that it was permissible for the state to test the credibility of appellants trial testimony by crossexamination


Input: of Captain Davison’s efforts, Chief Forte repeatedly had to address with the public, and once with Councilman Benson, accusations about the Plan’s impact on public safety and the likelihood of more deaths like Gallagher’s. Evidence in the record also indicates that Captain Davi-son’s relentless public opposition on behalf of the Union delayed implementation of Chief Forte’s Plan. From all of this evidence, we believe a jury could infer that Chief Forte’s repeated decisions not to promote Captain Davison were in part motivated by her constitutionally protected activities. Id. at 797 (“a plaintiff must prove an employer’s retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action”) (emphasis added); see also Campbell v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 155 F.3d 950, 959-60 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In addition, temporal proximity between Holdings: 0: holding that evidence that the defendants believed that the plaintiffs general outspokenness on security and corruption encouraged media criticism of the defendants was sufficient for a jury to infer causation in the retaliation claim 1: holding that because evidence was sufficient to support defendants  1962c convictions and jury could infer from evidence that defendants each manifested an agreement to participate in enterprises affairs evidence was sufficient to support defendants  1962d convictions for rico conspiracy 2: recognizing that jury may infer from the evidence that defendants money came from drug sales 3: holding that the plaintiffs argument rebutting the defendants legitimate nondiscriminatory reason on the plaintiffs discrimination claim also rebutted the defendants reason on the plaintiffs retaliation claim because they were the same 4: holding that the plaintiffs claim that city encouraged private individuals to trespass on the plaintiffs land was properly a fourth amendment rather than a substantive due process claim


Input: (Bankr.D.Mass.1996) (stating that as the drafters of the Code used the term "allowed claims” where they saw fit and, as Sections 1141(d)(2) and 523(a) do not limit their exceptions from discharge to "allowed claims” only, 502(b)(2) should not be read as a limitation on the exceptions from discharge). 2 . In re Harris, 16 B.R. 371 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1982) (agreeing with a series of cases holding that relief from the automatic stay should be granted if the debtor does not propose to pay the full amount of the claim, including post-petition interest but denying relief because the debtor in the case proposed to pay 100% of the claim, including post-petition interest); International Harvester Employee Credit Union, Inc. v. Daniel, 13 B.R. 555 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981) . 357 (Bankr.D.Conn.1981) (<HOLDING>); Citizens and Southern National Bank v. Holdings: 0: holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations 1: holding that the otherwise harmless violation of the automatic stay did not suffice to deprive the irs of the postpetition interest setoff to which  it would have been entitled had it first sought a lifting of the stay from the bankruptcy court 2: holding that a banks claim of irreparable harm through delay of postpetition interest payments was insufficient to lift the automatic stay under the provisions of section 1301 as the debtor proposed to pay 100 of the plan including postpetition interest 3: holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor 4: holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay


Input: an objection during the hearing that her condition precluded her from accepting a settlement agreement orally. In an affidavit prepared more than a year after the October 26, 1994, administrative hearing, the plaintiff claims that her attorney withheld information from her during settlement negotiations and that he prompted her to accept. Opponent’s Amended, Responsive Submission in Response to Exhibit D of the Court’s Order, at 6. However, apart from her bare allegations she offers no substantive evidence that her attorney’s behavior prohibited her from knowingly and voluntarily entering into a settlement. The plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence that she lacked the capacity to enter into a valid settlement agreement. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513 (<HOLDING>). V. Conclusion The defendant’s motion for Holdings: 0: holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage 1: holding that unverified complaints cannot be considered as evidence at the summary judgment stage 2: holding at summary judgment that the plaintiff had to show a reasonable jury could find the defendants allegedly anticompetitive conduct was a material cause of plaintiffs injury 3: holding that on a motion for summary judgment the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient and there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff 4: holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff


Input: relief,” on breach of fiduciary duty and equitable estoppel theories for making affirmative misrepresentations with knowledge beneficiary would be misled thereby, and stating that to “succeed under this [equitable es- toppel] theory of relief, an ERISA plaintiff must establish (1) a material misrepresentation, (2) reasonable and detrimental reliance upon the representation, and (3) extraordinary circumstances.” The Court of Appeals concluded employer breached its fiduciary duties, affirmatively misled the beneficiary and her participating spouse, and awarded the beneficiary an additional $150,000 on a supplemental accidental death and dismemberment policy that the participant spouse would have opted to purchase had he known all of the material facts); Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1301-03 (<HOLDING>); Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan 1: recognizing a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty in failing to provide relevant information under section 502a3 of erisa where the fiduciary had knowledge that its failure to provide the participant andor his beneficiaries with complete and accurate information would mislead them as to the coverages in effect 2: recognizing the right of a creditor to sue a corporate director for breach of fiduciary duty 3: holding a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty will not lie where the claim of breach is dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties 4: recognizing that when a beneficiary requests information from an erisa fiduciary who is aware of the beneficiarys status and situation the fiduciary has an obligation to convey complete and accurate information material to the beneficiarys circumstance even if that requires conveying information about which the beneficiary did not specifically inquire


Input: Trustees should not subsequently reopen the sale to receive additional bids on the property, even if it would result in a higher selling price. Talbert, 210 Md. at 45, 122 A.2d at 474 (asserting that “[o]nce having accepted a bid, the trustee should not reopen the sale merely to let in disappointed bidders” (citation omitted)); Gilden, 197 Md. at 42, 78 A.2d at 171. Subject to the review of the court, trustees perform various functions in connection with judicial sales for which they exercise personal discretion and judgment. In general, “trustees have ‘discretion to outline the manner and terms of the sále[.]’ ” Fagnani, 418 Md. at 385, 15 A.3d at 290 (quoting Simard, 383 Md. at 312, 859 A.2d at 200). In Jackson v. Townshend, 249 Md. 8, 238 A.2d 81 (1968), we noted: Unless th t 446 (<HOLDING>). A trustee is also entitled to exercise Holdings: 0: recognizing that the court has never held that a petitioner is limited to the exact contours of his or her argument to the agency 1: holding if there has been no termination of employment there has been no layoff or reduction in force 2: holding a substantially similar probation condition overbroad 3: holding that there has not been a misdescription of the property if the advertisement accords substantially with the exact situation and condition 4: holding that an insureds compliance with a condition precedent is not tested by the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer but only by whether the condition has been fulfilled by the insured under all the circumstances


Input: of success on the merits, the “sine qua non of th[e] four-part inquiry.” New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. 287 F.3d at 9. Diaz does not argue that the Legislature lacked the power to abolish his Advocate position. Instead, he disputes the existence of that historical fact. Specifically, he claims that the legislative history does not evince an intent to eliminate Diaz’s Advocate position and that Law 78 does not explicitly provide for his removal. While perhaps accurate, this argument misses the point. Article 75, after providing numerous reasons for doing so, unambiguously repealed the very Reorganization Plan which created Diaz’s job. In so doing, the Legislature abolished the position of Advocate. See Lewis v. United States, 244 U.S. 134, 144, 37 S.Ct. 570, 61 L.Ed. 1039 (1917) (<HOLDING>); Brame v. United States, 10 Cl.Ct. 252, 255 Holdings: 0: holding that the prohibition of section 35 article iii against the increase or diminution of compensation for public officers applied to the treasurer of calvert county and therefore even though the legislature retained the power to alter or abolish the office it could not change the treasurers salary while in office 1: recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole 2: holding that congressional repeal of an act creating an office had the effect to abolish it 3: holding that an outofstate attorney paying rent for a desk in an attorneys instate office had satisfied the office requirement 4: holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance  the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid


Input: title theory. In sum, the Debtors describe the decision in Atlantic Savings as judicially unsound and at odds w the Court, “guided by the language of the statutes and by decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreting the homestead statutes, must predict what the Supreme Judicial Court would do if confronted with the issue.” In re Garran, 274 B.R. 570, 574-75 (Bankr.D.Mass.2002). Though the SJC has not directly ruled on the issue at bar, this Court is satisfied that there exist sufficient signposts to enable this Court to fairly anticipate the outcome. The SJC has recently and repeatedly held Massachusetts to be a title theory state under common law. See J &W Wall Systems, Inc. v. Shawmut First Bank & Trust Company et al., 413 Mass. 42, 44, 594 N.E.2d 859, 860 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Murphy v. Charlestown Sav. Bank, 380 Mass. Holdings: 0: holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title 1: holding the title vii mixedmotive theory does not apply to adea claims 2: holding that massachusetts is a title theory state 3: holding that the state police is a state agency 4: holding that such a theory is viable under title vii