Input: does not contend that it is. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 16 .Kazakhstan’s contention that as a civil law jurisdiction it does not recognize common law torts, may be still further evidence that Kazakhstan did not intend to waive immunity for tort claims like those asserted here. See Kazakhstan Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, at 9-10. In light of the significant ambiguities concerning waiver noted in the text, we need not rely on this point to decide this case, and hence need not consider Kazakhstan's representation regarding its legal system. We note, however, that World Wide did not dispute that representation. See World Wide Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss. 17 . Cf. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 423, 116 S.Ct. 981, 985-86, 134 L.Ed.2d 47 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Watters, slip op. at 5-7 (concluding that the Holdings: 0: holding that claims not pursued within two years of their accrual fall outside of the federal tort claims acts limited waiver of sovereign immunity 1: holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law 2: holding in a breach of contract action brought by a government contract surety under the tucker act that the tucker act contains an unequivocal expression waiving sovereign immunity as to claims not particular claimants 3: holding that the tucker acts waiver does not extend to statutory claims 4: holding that rfras waiver of sovereign immunity did not extend to monetary damages the acts reference to appropriate relief was susceptible to more than one interpretation and thus was not an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity


Input: as to the reliability of the general theory and techniques of DNA profiling are valid under the Supreme Court’s holding in Daubert, and hold that in the future courts can take judicial notice of their reliability. If new techniques are offered, however, the district court must hold an in limine hearing under the Daubert standard as set out above. The fact that we have taken judicial notice of the reliability of the technique of DNA profiling does not mean that expert testimony concerning DNA profiling is automatically admissible under Daubert. A number of courts have required that the trial court further inquire into whether the expert properly performed the techniques involved in creating the DNA profiles. See People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup.Ct.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 Holdings: 0: holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law 1: holding that admissibility conditioned on a finding that the expert properly performed the protocols underlying dna profiling 2: holding that the burden of laying the proper foundation for the admission of the expert testimony is on the party offering the expert and admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that there was no ineffective assistance for failing to hire a dna expert because the defenses theory was that the defendants dna was planted so the dna evidence would not seem to be an issue 4: recognizing that in prior decisions the court had used the term inconclusive to mean that dna evidence did not exclude an individual but clarifying that in the future the term inconclusive would be used only when a dna sample does not contain enough dna to draw a conclusion dna is degraded or for other reasons a dna test yields no results or the examiner draws no conclusion


Input: stated that she informed him that she is unable to lift, push, pull, or carry any weight over 15 lbs. See id. at page 2. 9 . See also Miller v. Ameritech Corp., 214 Fed.Appx. 605, 608-609 (7th Cir.2007) ("To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must provide specific facts as to whether he is substantially limited in a major life activity ... conclusory allegations will not do.’’). 10 . See also Burks v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 756 (7th Cir.2006) ("bald and self-serving assertions in affidavits, unsubstantiated by any documentation or other testimony, are not sufficient to create a material issue of fact as to whether an impairment has substantially limited a major life activity.”) 11 . See also Soler v. Tyco Electronics, Inc., 268 F.Supp.2d 97, 107 (D.P.R.2003) (<HOLDING>); Ortiz-Molina v. MAI Del Caribe, Inc., 83 Holdings: 0: holding that the ij must make clean determinations of credibility 1: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 2: holding that impairment has not substantially limited the major life activity of lifting where an individual could clean his dishes clean the yard bathe his dog do the groceries take out the garbage and prepare his own meals 3: holding that for a plaintiff to prove that he has a record of impairment under 42 usc  121022b there must be a record of an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities 4: holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation


Input: The Eighth Circuit, in U.S. v. ■ Ferro, concluded that all other circuits which have considered the issue have specifically held that the statute is mandatory. United States v. Ferro, 321 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir.2003)(finding that involuntary hospitalization was mandatory where district court had determined that defendant was incompetent); id. at 761 (“[U]pon our own reading of the statute, we conclude that after determining that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial, a district court is required to commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for a reasonable period of time to evaluate whether treatment would allow the trial to proceed.”). See United States v. Filippi, 211 F.3d 649, 651 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir.1990)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Azure, 279 F.Supp.2d 1093, Holdings: 0: holding the statutory burden is on the defendant to prove he is incompetent to stand trial 1: holding waiver of right to counsel at sentencing not voluntary when trial court tried to dissuade discharge of counsel defendant believed incompetent for the waiver to be voluntary the trial court must inquire into the reasons for the defendants dissatisfaction with his counsel to ensure that the defendant is not exercising a choice between incompetent or unprepared counsel and appearing pro se 2: holding that the statute is mandatory and that once the district court found that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial it did not have authority to circumvent his commitment to the custody of the united states attorney general for hospitalization until it could be determined whether probability existed that the defendant would regain capacity to be tried 3: holding that it would be improper for a united states district attorney to prosecute a defendant using information the prosecutor had obtained while acting as the accuseds private attorney 4: holding that if the attorney general issues a scope certificate the action must be removed to federal court and the united states must be substituted as the party defendant by the plain language of 28 usc  2679d2 no discretion is given to the district court


Input: and her father-in-law Nathan Drollinger brought a § 1983 challenge to the terms and conditions of Rosanna's state court probation. One of the probation conditions restricted Nathan's ability to associate with Stephanie Drollinger (Rosanna’s daughter and his granddaughter). The Drollinger court held that this condition implicated Nathan’s protected liberty interest in the society of his granddaughter. 552 F.2d at 1227. It held that the state violated due process by not giving Nathan a hearing before imposing the condition as a term of Rosanna’s parole agreement. Id. The court, however, offered no analysis of the nature, source, or extent of the grandfather's interest. It devoted only a two-sentence footnote to the subject. 7 . See Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994) (<HOLDING>); In re Adoption of Taylor, 678 S.W.2d 69, Holdings: 0: holding grandparent visitation statute serves compelling state interest in maintaining grandparentgrandchild relationship where grandparents had raised child for period of time but agreeing with trial court that something more than childs best interest must be established to serve compelling state interest 1: holding that grandparent has no protected liberty interest in the visitation of a child of whom she once had custody 2: holding that grandmother who had intermittent custody of her grandchild had no protected liberty interest in the continued custody of the child 3: holding there is no protected liberty interest in maintaining the foster family relationship 4: recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection


Input: contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia following John Doe’s birth.” II [¶ 10] The State argues the trial court should not have entertained Stegall’s motion to dismiss. The State contends Stegall unjustly benefitted from absconding and, under the fugitive-dismissal rule, her motion should have been denied. [¶ 11] The fugitive-dismissal rule “allows courts to dismiss an appeal of a defendant who escapes during the pen-dency of his or her appeal.” State v. Bell, 2000 ND 58, ¶ 4, 608 N.W.2d 232. We are unable to find any ease law that suggests this rule should be applied to a defendant who absconds during pre-trial or trial proceedings, and we decline to extend its application. [¶ 12] A motion to dismiss a criminal information is governed by 1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. J.Z., 228 Wis.2d 468, 596 N.W.2d 490 Holdings: 0: holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child 1: holding that an unborn child is not a dependent for purposes of the neglect statute 2: holding a mothers ingestion of a controlled substance while pregnant does not constitute child abuse as an unborn child is not a person for purposes of criminal prosecution 3: holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute 4: holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child


Input: promises, or agreements, orally or otherwise, respecting the subject matter of the Franchise which is nor embodied herein or set forth in the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular for Prospective franchisees.” Id. 10 . Although such an argument was not explicitly discussed by Defendants in their Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Papa John’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Material Facts, the Davis court discussed the exception to the general rule that statements of future prediction, such as future profit, cannot be considered fraudulent. No Kentucky cases specifically address the exception to the general rule of future predictions not being actionable, and the Sixth Circuit has not discussed this specific point. See De Roode v. Sheppey, 32 F.2d 634, 638-639 (6th Cir.1929) (<HOLDING>). The exception applies if the party making the Holdings: 0: holding that when a contract is signed by one party but not the other the manifestation of consent by the nonsigning party is sufficient to bind that party 1: holding that deflated estimates of value by one having superior knowledge do not constitute misrepresentations when other party is given all information asked 2: holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law 3: holding that notice occurs when party charged with having notice has actual knowledge or when from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists 4: recognizing superior court must conduct an  on the record examination to determine defendants voluntariness and knowledge


Input: 1982). Despite the similarity of facts, we decline to adopt the reasoning of either. The Taylorville Eisner court suggests that "collateral" transferred under the third sentence of UCC sec. 9-402(7) retains any after-acquired property "obligation" under which it was originally secured. Id. at 669. Under this reasoning, any property acquired by the transferee at any time after the initial transfer is "infected" with perfection under the financing statement listing the trans-feror as debtor. We reject this reading of sec. 9-402(7) because it ignores the four month limitation of sec. 9-402's second sentence and unreasonably burdens a potential creditor with a duty to inquire as to the source of title of all the transferee's assets. The Sac City court concluded that a s 117 (9th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>); and Matter of Lintz West Side Lumber, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that the debtor in possession could utilize the strongarm powers of the trustee to avoid an unperfected security interest even though the debtor knew of the interest prior to bankruptcy because the two are distinct entities and the debtor in possessions responsibility is to preserve the estates assets for the benefit of the creditors 1: holding a filing under hatfield wayne l sufficient to perfect an interest in the assets of a corporation called hatfield construction company 2: holding a filing under mccauleys reprographics and mapping insufficient to perfect a security interest in the assets of the debtor corporation 3: holding a filing under john and mayella lintz insufficient to identify the debtor corporation 4: holding that  727a2a does not apply to the transfer of the assets of a corporation in which the debtor is a shareholder


Input: by the term of the Act. See § 1415(c)(2)(B) (requiring local school board to respond to the complaint); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404.2 (SRO may modify IHO’s IEP for a child and order relevant “board” [of education] to comply with such modified IEP). As it is the local education agency, not the SRO or State Education Department that is responsible for N.S.’s IEP, it is therefore the School District that is the proper defendant in this action. Adding State Defendants as defendants not only is without support in the “text and structure” of the Act, Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 531, 127 S.Ct. 1994, but disrupts the state’s scheme of imposing primary responsibility for the delivery of special education services upon local school districts, Gulino, 460 F.3d at 366; see also Polera, 288 F.3d at 483-86 (<HOLDING>) (bracketed material added); Adrian, 2001 WL Holdings: 0: holding that damages are not relief that is available under the idea 1: holding that the local educational agency is the appropriate target of a suit under the idea and that private entities cannot be held liable under the statute as the idea obligates the statenot the private schoolto ensure that such children are provided special education and related services in accordance with an individualized education program  2: holding that because the idea contemplates a remedy that seeks changes to a students special education program compensatory damages therefore are not available 3: holding that punitive damages are available in an intentional discrimination action even if the jury does not assess compensatory damages 4: holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated


Input: position of Henholder, not owner. Id. ("The Court, in effect, views a conditional land contract as a sale with a security interest in the form of legal title reserved by the vendor. Conceptually, therefore, the retention of the title by the vendor is the same as reserving a lien or mortgage"). Ownership of the property was transferred to Smith upon execution of the land sale contract, and Jackson had no duty at the time of the accident to maintain the tree as provided by the city ordinance. Conclusion The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jackson is affirmed. SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, J.,, concur. RUCKER, J., dissents with separate opinion in which DICKSON, J., concurs. 1 . Dorothy Jackson was not named as a defendant. Ray Scheible, Travis's father, was name .2006) (<HOLDING>); Reed v. Beachy Const. Corp, 781 N.E.2d 1145, Holdings: 0: holding that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs first amendment claim of improper removal 1: holding thatit landlords right of entry was not dispositive of control over snow removal 2: recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself 3: holding over 4: holding over of tenant after expiration of term effect of landlords acceptance of rent


Input: 85 N.C. App. 281, 290, 354 S.E2.d 746, 751 (citing Fisher v. Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 486, 490, 111 S.E. 857, 860 (1922), and Chew v. Leonard, 228 N.C. 181, 185, 44 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1947)), disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 638, 360 S.E.2d 107 (1987). As I read the relevant c N.C. App. 402, 406, 626 S.E.2d 755, 758 (2006), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 219, 642 S.E.2d 247 (2007), the agreement at issue here provides for a single standard for use in determining the price to be charged for the provision of heat rather than contemplating the use of multiple appraisals without specifying any means for reconciling the inevitable differences between the opinions devel oped by multiple appraisers. In addition, unlike the situation in Chappell v. Roth, 353 N.C. 690, 693, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (2001) (<HOLDING>), and Rosen v. Rosen, 105 N.C. App. 326, 328, Holdings: 0: holding that an oral compromise and release agreement was unenforceable where there was no written stipulation between the parties 1: holding that a settlement agreement in which the parties failed to agree upon the terms of a release was unenforceable 2: holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party 3: holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable 4: holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement


Input: Ass’n of Hawaii, 99 [Hawa recognize a divorce obtained in a foreign country where neither party was a domiciliary of that country: Regardless of its validity in the nation awarding it, the courts of this country will not generally recognize a judgment of divorce rendered by the courts of a foreign nation as valid to terminate the existence of the marriage unless, by the standards of the jurisdiction in which recognition is sought, at least one of the spouses was a good-faith domiciliary in the foreign nation at the time the decree was rendered. R.F. Chase, Annotation, Domestic Recognition of Divorce Decree Obtained in Foreign Country and Attacked for Lack of Domicil or Jurisdiction of Parties, 13 A.L.R.3d 1419, 1425 (1967). See e.g., Carr v. Carr, 724 So.2d 937, 940 (Miss.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); Bruneau v. Bruneau, 3 Conn.App. 453, 489 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a husband unlawfully attempted to name a beneficiary other than his daughter who was the irrevocable beneficiary pursuant to a separation agreement in a divorce decree 1: holding that the jurisdiction of the divorce court with regard to support and maintenance is statutorily determined unless otherwise provided by agreement incorporated into the divorce decree 2: holding that wife had standing to seek disinterment where death of husband occurred prior to entry of decree of divorce 3: holding that dominican court had insufficient jurisdiction to issue divorce decree to two persons domiciled in north carolina and citing to annot 13 alr3d 1419 stating that the great weight of authority in this country is that divorces granted in foreign countries to persons who are domiciliaries of the united states are not valid and enforceable 4: holding that for mississippi court to recognize validity of divorce decree husband obtained in dominican republic husband would have to demonstrate he traveled to dominican republic with intent to remain there and not solely for purpose of securing a divorce


Input: and the restrictions and limitations that he believed should be placed on Myers’ ability to work. ECF No. 27-2 at PagelD #: 302 (A.R. 151). There is no other medial opinion in the record from a treating physician that speaks to whether any restrictions on Myers’ ability to work are warranted. Significantly, this evidence was submitted in response to the initial denial that only imposed restrictions and limitations from the last day worked through four weeks for mononucleosis; and from, .the last day worked through six weeks post-operative of a March 29, 2013 surgery — neither of which were due to Lyme disease. Dr. Joseph’s summary letter contradicts this limited finding of limitation and restriction, yet United’s second denial letter does not address it. See Conger, 474 F.3d at 268 (<HOLDING>); Houston, 246 Fed.Appx. at 301 (finding that Holdings: 0: holding that trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for rule 11 sanctions without adequate explanation 1: holding that the plan administrator abused its discretion when it ignored contrary evidence without explanation 2: holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator 3: holding that a plan administrator must address any reliable contrary evidence 4: holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses


Input: of each of the burglaries. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) (permitted uses of other-bad-acts evidence). His presence near eight burglaries over 5 months, where each burglary was characterized by substantially similar circumstances pointing to a common culprit or culprits, is powerful identity evidence. With regard to whether the evidence from the different burglaries was capable of separation by the jury, and whether Appellant was unduly prejudiced by the decision not to sever the cases, the trial court notes that the verdict speaks for itself: Appellant was acquitted of several burglaries and conspiracy counts, indicating that the jury clearly was able to parse the evidence involved in each individual case. See TOO at 11. We agree. See Commonwealth v. Dozzo, 991 A.2d 898, 903 (Pa. Super. 2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court Holdings: 0: holding that each defendants actions in a  1983 case must be considered individually 1: holding that the jury found the ajppellant not guilty of all charges in one case and not guilty of three out of four charges in a second case demonstrating the jury considered each case and each charge separately and did not cumulate the evidence 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants request for severance because the district court nullified any prejudicial error when it repeatedly admonished the jury throughout the trial to consider the evidence only against the defendant to whom it related and at the end of trial gave the jury instructions that admonished the jury to consider separately each offense and evidence in support of each offense 3: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge 4: holding that an exception to the charges having to do with contributory negligence  charges two three and four was insufficient to preserve issue for appeal


Input: knew or should have known that Flores was a foreign national. As a foreign national of Mexico, the Vienna Convention applies to Flores. ¶ 17 Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal statutes and treaties are the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. Acts of Congress are on full parity with treaties. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1355, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998). However, rights under a treaty and rights under a federal statute are not the equivalent of constitutional rights. Id.; see also, Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (C.A.4),cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1144, 118 S.Ct. 26, 138 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1997); Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (C.A.2, 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014, 115 S.Ct. 572, 130 L.Ed.2d 489 (1994)(<HOLDING>). ¶ 18 In order to gain relief from a violation Holdings: 0: holding that state rights are equivalent to federal rights in this area 1: holding that patria potestas rights under mexican law are custody rights under the hague convention 2: recognizing us obligations under article 22 of the vienna convention 3: holding that rights under vienna convention are not the equivalent of fundamental rights such as the right to counsel 4: holding right to be fundamental


Input: guard against later, frivolous claims of ineffective assistance, trial courts could adopt certain measures to ensure that defendants are fully informed, such as by documenting the terms of the negotiation process, by requiring that all plea offers be in writing, and by making any formal offers part of the record. See Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1408-09. Here, however, defense counsel had already indicated on the record that he had fully discussed the plea offer with Hemp-hill. The district court’s comments then went much farther than documenting the plea offer or informing Hemphill of its terms, as contemplated in Frye. The district court clearly implied that a plea would be preferred, and it twice specifically stated that it would approve the Government’s plea deal. See Miles, 10 F.3d at 1139 (<HOLDING>). Hemphill’s case is similar to United States Holdings: 0: holding that immunity agreements are analogous to plea agreements and are enforced under principles of contract law within the constitutional safeguards of due process 1: holding that identical all agreements language  this policy contains all of the agreements between the parties  is an integration clause 2: holding that the statements by the court went well beyond a mere rejection of the agreements and explanation for it they suggested at the very least the agreements that would be acceptable 3: holding that the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements 4: holding that agreements other than fullfledged collective bargaining agreements may be contracts within the meaning of  301


Input: includes the concomitantrightto waive counsel’s assistance and proceed to represent oneself at criminal proceedings. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Commonwealth v. El, 602 Pa. 126, 134, 977 A.2d 1158, 1162 (2009). The right to appear pro se is guaranteed as long as the defendant understands the nature of his choice. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. In Pennsylvania, Rule of Criminal Procedure 121 sets out a framework for inquiry into a defendant’s request for self-representation. Pa.R.Crim.P. 121. Where a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently seeks to waive his right to counsel, the trial court must allow the individual to proceed pro se. See, El, supra; Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326, 1335 (1995) (<HOLDING>). To ensure that a waiver of counsel is Holdings: 0: holding that record did not establish knowing waiver 1: recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary 2: holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver 3: holding that a defendants waiver of the right to testify must be knowing informed and intelligent 4: recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver


Input: appeal the decision of the contracting officer “to an agency board of contract appeals.” Section 609 provides that “in lieu of appealing the decision of the contracting officer ... to an agency board, a contractor may bring an action directly on the claim in the United States Court of Federal Claims.... ” An aggrieved contractor must first submit his claim to the contracting officer and receive a decision before a suit can be commenced in the Court of Federal Claims because, as the Court of Federal Claims noted, “completion of these steps is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a complaint relative to the claim in this court.” Christian Appalachian Project, Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl.Ct. 595, 587 (1986). See also Thoen v. United States, 765 F.2d 1110, 1116 (Fed.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims Holdings: 0: holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim 1: holding with respect to a certified claim that congress has determined that submission of a  claim to the contracting officer in the first instance is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a suit in the claims court 2: holding that this court has discretion to hear arguments presented to it in the first instance provided that it otherwise has jurisdiction over the claim 3: holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim  4: holding that the united states court of federal claims does not have jurisdiction over a new claim or a claim of different scope that was not previously presented and certified to the contracting officer for decision


Input: and had two students with Florida addresses enrolled in its online classes; the court concluded that the record evidence was insufficient to establish the “continuous and systematic general business contacts” required to confer general jurisdiction. Id. With regard to Columbia’s website, the court observed that the mere existence of a website does not-tend to show that a defendant is directing its business activi risdiction was established pursuant to section 48.193(l)(a)(l). We disagree. Specific jurisdiction requires a connection or “connexity”- between the enumerated activity in Florida and the cause of action. Schwartzberg v. Knobloch, 98 So.3d 173, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). ' In the instant case, Gilbert alleged that Aegis solicit K-BMK, 2012 WL 1606068 (D. Haw. May 8, 2012) (<HOLDING>). Because Gilbert failed to allege sufficient Holdings: 0: holding that requirements of apprendi were not met where facts on which sentence enhancement was based were not charged and submitted to the jury 1: holding that where hawaii residents submitted online job application to nonresident defendants submitted to preemployment screening and training in texas worked in iraq and signed employment contracts in texas and iraq claims for illegal disparate treatment during employment did not arise out of defendants purported solicitation activities in hawaii particularly where solicitation activities were not directed to hawaii residents 2: holding an ordinance regulating doortodoor solicitation unconstitutional in part because there was no evidence of a special crime problem related to doortodoor solicitation in the record 3: holding protestor waived its right to challenge a solicitation amendment by not objecting to its terms during the bidding process 4: holding party that filed motions for summary judgment directed verdict and jnov preserved complaint drat issue should not have been submitted to jury even though party submitted jury questions on same issue


Input: the appeal). 40 . 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). 41 . Healey v. Chelsea Res., Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 624 (2d Cir.1991) (citing 78 Cong. Rec. 8669 (May 12, 1934) (explanatory memorandum of Senator Fletcher, sponsor of proposed section 11(e))). 42 . Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 505 ("the Copyright Act”) ("In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party ... the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs ”) (emphasis added); Adsani, 139 F.3d at 75 (finding the Copyright Act a fee-shifting statute for purposes of a Rule 7 bond). 43 . See P. Mem. at 8-9 (citing In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 124, 128 (S.D.N.Y.1999)). 44 . Cf In re Air Cargo, 2010 WL 1049269, at *2 (<HOLDING>); In re AOL Time Warner, 2007 WL 2741033, at *4 Holdings: 0: holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed 1: holding that an appeal is perfected when the appeal bond is filed 2: holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute 3: holding delay damages cannot be included in an appeal bond because the underlying statute did not provide for the inclusion of such costs 4: holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond


Input: government has breached the clear terms of the agreement. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034-35; Thompson, 25 F.3d at 1562-63; Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528. Accordingly, to succeed on her immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate that an agreement was reached with the government under the terms of which the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation. In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a “meeting of the minds.” Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 17 comment c (1981). Thus, in the parlance of contract law, to succeed on her transactional immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate at least a meeting of the minds that the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 Holdings: 0: holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement 1: holding failure to establish terms of an oral loan agreement precluded the existence of a breach of contract claim 2: holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement 3: holding that in order to establish liability under the ada the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the statute 4: holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity


Input: nervousness to the calculus, the government has not surmounted the reasonable suspicion hurdle. Because the detention was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, anything resulting from it is excludable as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 88 S.Ct. 407. D. Sugar’s Standing The government concedes Stark’s standing because he knew where the key to the closet was, but argues that Sugar has no standing to contest the seizure because he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the locked closet in which the drugs were found. See United States v. Soule, 908 F.2d 1032, 1034 (1st Cir.1990). The “person who claims [Fourth Amendment] protection” must have a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421 (<HOLDING>). While defendants acknowledge that they did Holdings: 0: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search 1: holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle 2: holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile 3: holding that passengers of a vehicle which they did not own had standing to challenge the validity of a traffic stop 4: holding that defendants had no standing where they conceded that they did not own the automobile searched and were simply passengers the owner of the car had been the driver of the vehicle at the time of the search


Input: 1183, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1013 (1995). Lawyers who are preparing to leave a law firm face a dilemma, caught between the fiduciary obligations they owe the other members of their firm, on one hand, and the duty of being able to adequately represent clients who choose to follow them to their new place of employment, on the other hand. As a practical matter, then, cases have recognized that some preliminary preparations by lawyers who are leaving a firm must be allowed, and that it is appropriate for lawyers in these circumstances to make arrangements, prior to their departure, to obtain new office space, equipment, and other materials necessary for the practice of law. Bray v. Squires, 702 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 393, Comment e (1958) (<HOLDING>). Discussing a similar question, the Supreme Holdings: 0: holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes 1: holding that plea agreement with drug enforcement agency agent not enforceable when agent was not authorized by united states attorney to enter agreement 2: holding that a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 3: recognizing that authorized representative may be general or only for a certain claim 4: recognizing that agent may make certain preparations for own venture prior to termination of agency


Input: Tex. Const, art. V, § 8; see Dubai Petrol. Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex.2000). Thus, the real question presented by these motions to dismiss is not Lapi-ner’s “standing” in the jurisdictional sense of that term. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160-61, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (explaining that the term “jurisdictional” properly applies only to prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and persons (personal jurisdiction) that implicate a court’s adjudicatory authority). Instead, as the plurality opinion and many other courts recognize, the question before us is whether Lapiner should be treated as a party for purposes of appeal. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 6-7, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (<HOLDING>); City of San Benito v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Holdings: 0: holding question whether unnamed class member has standing to appeal does not implicate courts subjectmatter jurisdiction but instead whether he should be considered a party for purposes of appealing the trial courts approval of the settlement over his objection 1: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 2: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case 3: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction 4: holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal


Input: officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In a 2006 publication, the United States Department of Justice reported that 6,000 police officers are assaulted each year, and ten are killed. United States v. Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 349 (D.C.Cir.2007). 6 . See, e.g., State v. Abner, 889 So.2d 52, 53-54 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); People v. Super. Ct. (Galbreath), 104 Cal.App.3d 988, 164 Cal. Rptr. 116, 117 (1980); State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 547 A.2d 10, 22-23 (1988); Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 632 S.E.2d 645, 646 (2006); State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 367 (Minn.2004); State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 748 N.E.2d 520, 527 (2001); Commonwealth v. Reppert, 2002 PA S 3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115, Holdings: 0: holding that questions on transportation of contraband must be justified by reasonable suspicion even when they do not extend the duration of the stop 1: holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring 2: holding that the delay of approximately two minutes that occurred prior to the police officer developing reasonable suspicion to further investigate the defendants identity was de minimis and did not unreasonably extend the duration of the traffic stop 3: holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation 4: holding that even a de minimis extension of a traffic stop is unconstitutional absent reasonable suspicion


Input: the victim had no further contact with the defendant. I The defendant’s first claim is that the trial court violated his constitutional right to equal protection and due process’ when it declined to instruct the jury regarding “constancy of denial.” 1 At the center of the defendant’s argument is his contention that the constancy of accusation doctrine is unconstitutional and unfair. The defendant, therefore, contends that the constancy of denial instruction is constitutionally required to offset the harmful impact of the constancy of accusation instruction. We disagree. It is well settled that the doctrine of constancy of accusation does not violate an accused’s right to confrontation, equal protection or due process. See State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 290-91, 677 A.2d 917 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Kelley, 229 Conn. 557, 563-67, 643 Holdings: 0: holding that doctrine does not violate right of confrontation 1: holding prior statement subject to crossexamination when made does not violate confrontation clause 2: holding that doctrine does not violate due process 3: holding coconspirator hearsay exception does not violate confrontation clause 4: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection


Input: the injury and the disability. The injury by itself does not fulfill the statutory requirement; rather, the resultant loss and disability are the key. As the Appellate Division stated in this case, a plaintiff must show that “the injury had a serious impact on the plaintiff and her life.” 250 N.J.Super. at 470, 595 A.2d 522. That requirement seems to comport with the New York cases. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Tracey, supra, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (requiring plaintiff to establish “ ‘permanent loss’ ” or “ ‘permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member’ ” by “competent medical proof”). The same case holds that “subjective complaints unsupported by credible medical evidence do not suffice.” Ibid.; accord Scheer v. Koubek, 70 N.Y.2d 678, 518 N.Y.S.2d 788, 512 N.E.2d 309 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Compare Waldman v. Dong Kook Chang, 175 Holdings: 0: recognizing that pain is a completely subjective phenomenon and that secretary must consider all available evidence in assessing complaints of pain 1: holding threshold not met by subjective complaints of transitory pain unsupported by objective evidence 2: holding that alj may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimants pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimants pain 3: holding that alj properly evaluated credibility where he cited specific instances where claimants complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record 4: holding that alj should have included complaints of pain in hypothetical question


Input: was purely functional and was not intended to warn boaters of the sill’s existence. Further, the district court found that the sill continued to perform its function in its current completely submerged condition. Because we conclude that the district court’s negligence finding based on the failure to place a warning sign at the sill’s location was not clearly erroneous, appellants’ argument that the failure to maintain the sill was not within the discretionary function exception is irrelevant. Throughout the proceeding appellants asserted that the United States was negligent for failing to maintain the sill in its original condition. Indeed, the district court found that as originally designed the sill extended across the entire width of the cut and the edge 467, 473 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>), appeal after remand, 897 F.2d 795 (5th Holdings: 0: recognizing that initial decision to place buoy 60 from wreck was a protected discretionary function but moving the buoy another 250 away from the wreck without notifying the public was a negligent act not within the discretionary function exception 1: recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver 2: holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision  3: holding that decision to establish recreational swimming area was discretionary but failure to replace buoy secured by an anchor that injured a swimmer was not within discretionary function exception 4: holding that an agent acting outside his delegated authority is not protected by the discretionary function exception


Input: use of Stitt’s name and likeness on its own album covers. While the album cover itself is arguably misleading in some respect, Sun Trading has presented no concrete evidence of the likelihood of or actual consumer confusion. “Likelihood of injury ... will not be presumed, but must be demonstrated,” Johnson & Johnson, 631 F.2d at 190, and, here, Sun Trading has offered nothing more than its mere “subjective belief’ that it has been, or is likely to be, injured. See id. at 189. It has conducted no consumer surveys tending to demonstrate confusion, nor has it presented any circumstantial evidence of confusion, such as proof that Evidence’s release of the “Sax Storm” album has caused Evidence to realize an increase in sales to the detriment of Sun Trading’s own sales. Of id. at 190-91 (<HOLDING>). Without some evidence that the repackaged Holdings: 0: holding that proof of phenomenal sales success substantial advertising expenditures unsolicited media coverage requests from third parties to license the use of plaintiffs design and defendants deliberate attempt to imitate plaintiffs trade dress sufficed to create serious questions going to the merits even in the absence of consumer surveys 1: holding that plaintiffs proof of increase in defendants sales and a corresponding decrease in plaintiffs sales testimony from a consumer witness that she changed products based on defendants false advertising and survey evidence of consumer confusion was enough to prove a likelihood of competitive injury resulting from the defendants advertising 2: holding that defendants conduct amounted to substantial and nonisolated activity within florida for purposes of general jurisdiction where its advertising strategy was designed to generate product sales in florida and its dollar volume of sales was substantial 3: holding that there must be a causal connection between an insureds advertising and an alleged injury to trigger coverage for an advertising injury 4: holding that defendants advertising campaign help to alleviate confusion


Input: 1307 (4th Cir.1986)). In making this decision, the district court must draw all reasonable inferences arising from the proof, and resolve all factual disputes, in favor of the plaintiff. Id. For actions removed to federal court from the state courts of North Carolina, the personal jurisdiction inquiry requires the court to ask whether its exercise of jurisdiction over an individual interferes with that individual’s Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty interests. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta Int’l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062, 1065 (4th Cir.1982) (the two-step personal jurisdiction analysis is collapsed into a single question of due process in actions removed to federal court from North Carolina) (citing Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 231 S.E.2d 629, 630 (1977) (<HOLDING>)) One surviving claim against the Individual Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute 1: holding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to jury trial to defendants in serious criminal cases in state courts 2: holding that proof of fraud necessarily establishes a violation of north carolinas unfair and deceptive trade practices statute nc gemstat  7511 3: holding that north carolinas longarm statute extends to the limits of due process 4: recognizing that the ohio longarm statute does not extend to the limits of due process and focusing the inquiry on whether defendant established sufficient business contacts with ohio


Input: for Sixth Amendment purposes. The court noted that the “Sixth Amendment protections can be bypassed[ ][i]f the defendant ... admits the fact otherwise committed to the jury.” Id. at 387. A defendant may admit facts through “guilty pleas and stipulations, a defendant’s own statements in open court, and representations by counsel.” United States v. Revels, 455 F.3d 448, 450 (4th Cir.2006) (citations omitted). “Any admission of fact must, of course, be of sufficient clarity and kind to justify taking the fact from the jury.” Milam, 443 F.3d at 387. Whether a defendant has admitted a fact for Booker purposes depends upon where a defendant’s “verbalizations ... fall along a spectrum” from silence to “statements such as T admit,’ or the functional equivalent thereof.” Revels, 455 F.3d at 450 (<HOLDING>). Here, the presentence report attributed to Holdings: 0: holding that sentencing court may not adopt facts from codefendants presentence report that was not disclosed to defendant 1: holding that defendant did not admit facts supporting sentencing enhancement where he lodged blakely objection and replied no sir to courts inquiry as to whether he had objections to anything contained or omitted from the presentence report 2: holding that appellant properly preserved booker claim by citing blakely in his written objections to the psi and reminding the court at sentencing of his blakely objection 3: holding that the defendants prior conviction referenced in his presentence report could be taken as admitted because he had made no objection to the facts in his report 4: holding that sentencing upon general remand is to be de novo requiring the district court to consider new objections to the presentence report


Input: Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 501-02 (7th Cir.2005). An applicant seeking withholding of removal “bears the burden of demonstrating that loss of life or freedom is more likely than not” if she returned to her home country, Kobugabe, 440 F.3d at 901, but an applicant’s credible testimony can sustain this burden of proof without corroboration, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). On the other hand, an IJ may find an applicant’s testimony incredible if she “fails to present certain foundational evidence.” Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 502 (7th Cir.2004). While these two concepts can become easily conflated, they are distinct. Essentially, an IJ may disbelieve an applicant because she fails to provide corroborating evidence, and subsequently deny her claim. See id.; Zaid 630 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Though the IJ may have implicitly found that Holdings: 0: holding that where the ij finds the petitioner to be credible his testimony must be accepted 1: holding an ij must to address a petitioners explanation for inconsistencies to rely upon them as the basis for an adverse credibility finding 2: holding that an ij failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he disbelieved applicants testimony 3: holding substantial evidence supported the denial of cat relief where the petitioners cat claim was based on the same testimony the ij found not credible and the petitioner pointed to no other evidence that the ij should have considered 4: holding that an ij made an explicit credibility when the ij found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies


Input: automatically discoverable information does exist in their files.”); see also State v. Silva, 2012 ME 120, ¶ 10, 56 A.3d 1230 (concluding that no discovery sanction on the State was necessary given the disclosure of the evidence as soon as it was available; the State’s own inability to use that evidence in preparing for trial; the probable inadmissibility of the evidence; and the possibility that the evidence inculpated, rather than exculpated, the defendant). [¶ 11] Next, we review de novo Carr’s contention that the court denied Juror # 75 his equal protection right to sit on a jury by making him an alternate given his inability to deliberate past 5:08 p.m. for religious reasons. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A; State v. Poole, 2012 ME 92, ¶¶ 5, 8, 46 A.3d 1129 (<HOLDING>). Assuming, without deciding, that Carr has Holdings: 0: holding that to assert a viable equal protection claim plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were differently treated from others who were similarly situated to them 1: holding equal protection under the federal constitution applies to similarly situated persons 2: holding that the equal protection clause is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike 3: holding members of two distinct pension plans were not similarly situated for equal protection analysis 4: holding that an equal protection violation may occur when similarly situated persons are not treated equally under the law quotation marks omitted


Input: his sentence. Hanson advised appellate counsel that he would like to contest the application of § 4B1.4 to his case, which resulted in a higher offense level and longer sentence because Hanson was classified as an armed career criminal. Hanson forfeited this objection by not raising it in the district court, and so we would review the court’s determination only for plain error. United States v. Williams, 258 F.3d 669, 672 (7th Cir.2001). We could find no error here, plain or otherwise, because Harris has two convictions for burglary, and convictions for sexual intercourse without consent and for escape. Counsel is correct that these convictions qualify as violent felonies under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brown, 273 F.3d 747, 750 Holdings: 0: holding a burglary must be of a building or structure in order to qualify as a violent felony for acca purposes 1: holding that attempted burglary as defined by florida law is a violent felony under acca 2: holding that burglary is violent felony 3: holding that escape from secure custody is a violent felony 4: holding that coerced sex is violent felony


Input: opportunity to respond to his allegation that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. Petitioner now seeks review of the BIA’s order in this court. We review “the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.” Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir.2005). Our review “is limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and whether the matter of exercise has been arbitrary or capricious.” Id. (quotation omitted). Petitioner’s brief to this court contains no argument concerning the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen. Therefore, he has abandoned the issue. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir.2005) (citing Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>)). Instead of addressing the BIA’s denial of Holdings: 0: holding that the appellant abandoned an issue to which he only made passing references 1: holding that issues not raised in the initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned 2: holding that issues are deemed abandoned when the brief only makes a passing references to an issue 3: holding that issues not raised in an initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned 4: holding that issues not raised in an appellants initial brief are deemed abandoned


Input: Co., 55 Ill. App. 3d 91, 98 (1977). Moreover, if the promisee bargains with the promisor to render a performance directly to a third party, in nearly every case the promisee will have intended to benefit that third party. Fox Lake, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 911. Here, Advanced clearly stands to benefit from the contract between McCormick and Berbee. Thus, this court must determine from the language of the contract and the circumstances surrounding the parties whether the benefit to Advanced is direct or incidental. Although the intent of the parties must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the cases cited by the parties to this appeal provide examples on both sides of this issue. Courts have held that the benefit was direct in the following cases: (1) Carson Pirie Scott, 346 Ill. at 261 (<HOLDING>); (2) Resnik, 78 Ill. 2d at 386-87 (determining Holdings: 0: holding prior to gonzaga that medicaid provision requiring nursing facilities to provide certain services was intended for the benefit of the recipients and not for the benefit of the facilities 1: holding that the parties purchase agreement did not require a showing of prejudice for plaintiff to assert that defendant waived its claim for indemnification 2: holding that where purchaser had taken possession and paid part of the purchase price the statute of frauds did not bar enforcement of a purchase agreement 3: holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods 4: holding that an agreement to purchase certain goods from a named vendor and pay for them if the hotel company did not was for the direct benefit of the vendor


Input: opinion articulates, see concurring and dissenting opinion at 129-30, 34 P.3d at 1028-29 (specifically, prongs (l)(b) and (2)), and believes thal we have . 2 (5th Cir.1993) (observing that, "[i]n the wake of Muniz, ... a routine booking question exception to the Fifth Amendment exists” and citing, inter alia, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (asserting that "[i]t is well established that Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services" and citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 21 . We expressly decline to adopt, as a Holdings: 0: holding that there was no interrogation where the police asked only routine booking questions that did not relate even tangentially to criminal activity moreover there is no evidence that the defendant was particularly susceptible to these questions or that police somehow used the questions to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant 1: holding that routine booking questions do not violate the constitutional protection against self incrimination as they do not constitute interrogation 2: recognizing routine booking question exception observing that the underlying rationale for the exception is that routine booking questions do not constitute interrogation because they do not normally elicit incriminating responses and holding that where questions regarding normally routine biographical information are designed to elicit incriminating information the questioning constitutes interrogation subject to the strictures of miranda   citations omitted 3: holding that questions regarding a defendants name address height weight eye color birth date and current age constituted custodial interrogation but fell within the  routine booking question exception which exempts from mirandas coverage questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services but observing that that the exception would not apply to questions posed during the booking process that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions citations and internal quotation signals omitted 4: holding that questions concerning the place and date of birth fall within the routine booking question exception to miranda


Input: is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded''). GINSBURG, Circuit Judge, concurring: We have held that actions based upon denial of security clearance do not merely fail to state a claim, but are beyond the reach of judicial review. See Bennett, 425 F.3d at 1001 (“Because the authority to issue a security clearance is a discretionary function of the Executive Branch and involves the complex area of foreign relations and national security, employment actions based on denial of security clearance are not subject to judicial review”); Ryan, 168 F.3d at 524 (<HOLDING>); Krc, 905 F.2d at 395. That a plaintiff makes Holdings: 0: holding that denial of the opportunity to work overtime is an adverse employment action sufficient to make out a prima facie case under title vii 1: holding an adverse employment action based on denial or revocation of a security clearance is not actionable under title vii 2: holding that denial of a bonus was not an adverse employment action 3: holding that a verbal threat of being fired is not an adverse employment action for purposes of title vii 4: holding that termination is an adverse employment action


Input: accounts steadily shrank during the marriage, as husband regularly invaded it for various purposes, including paying obligations to his former spouse, supporting the parties’ lifestyle and, after their separation, acquiring the Johnson Road property for himself and his new partner. The parties agreed that the total value of those accounts at the time of trial was $135,893. As husband sees things, the trial court awarded wife an equal interest in both the retirement accounts and the Johnson road property as a sanction for perceived discovery violations. According to husband, he did not violate any discovery orders and, thus, the trial court abused its discretion in equally dividing those assets. See, e.g., Stronach v. Ellingsen, 108 Or App 37, 40, 814 P2d 175, rev den, 312 Or 151 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Wife differs in her understanding of the Holdings: 0: holding that generally speaking discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion 1: holding that denial of joinder motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion 2: holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion 3: holding that the dismissal of a frivolous action reviewed for abuse of discretion 4: holding that denial of discovery in habeas proceedings is reviewed for abuse of discretion


Input: of his actual innocence. Accordingly, the court will deny claim six as procedurally barred. F. Claim Seven: Post-conviction Proceedings Violated Petitioner’s Due Process And Equal Protection Rights In his seventh claim, petitioner contends that the Delaware Supreme Court’s summary affirmance of his post-conviction appeal violated his right to equal protection and due process. He complains that the State Supreme Court failed to give a thorough and comprehensive review and analysis of his Massiah claims. The court concludes that this claim alleges a state law claim that is not cognizable on federal habeas relief, because petitioner’s ultimate criticism is with the Delaware State Courts’ analysis in a state collateral proceeding. See Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>)(emphasis in original); see also Lambert v. Holdings: 0: holding habeas petitioners may show cause for such default in specific circumstances in states that require petitioners to raise iatc claims in initial state habeas proceedings rather than on direct appeal 1: holding that the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioners conviction what occurred in the petitioners collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas proceeding 2: holding federal habeas proceeding was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies when petitioners direct appeal from resentencing was still pending in state court at the time he sought habeas relief 3: holding that once federal jurisdiction has attached it is not defeated by the petitioners release prior to completion of the proceedings on his habeas application 4: holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law


Input: explanation for the delay and state when a decision on the claim may be expected. Moreover, in Hollock v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 415 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc), this Court opined that “the broad language of Section' 8371 was designed to remedy all instances of bad faith conduct 'by an insurer’s, whether occurring before, during or after litigation. Therefore, we acknowledge ... that [a]n action for bad faith may also extend to the insurer’s investigative practices[.]” (quoting O’Donnell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 A.2d 901, 906 (Pa.Super.1999)). Implicit in Hollock’s holdings is the requirement that the insurer properly investigate claims prior to refusing to pay the proceeds of the policy to its insured. See Condio v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 899 A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super.2006) (<HOLDING>). Bombar v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 92-93 Holdings: 0: holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint 1: holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith 2: holding that use of plaintiffs mark is in good faith even though other aspects of defendants behavior may have evidenced bad faith 3: holding insurer not liable for bad faith when it denied insureds claim based on a good faith dispute regarding the interpretation of a rule 4: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort


Input: have dismissed tortious interference claims as preempted by ERISA, those cases typically involve a situation in which an entity seeks to utilize the interference claim to duplicate relief available under ERISA. For example, when a participant or assignee argues that,' with respect to a particular claim for payment, the claims administrator (or some affiliate thereof) “interfered” with payment under the plan by unfairly denying the claim, courts have found that the interference claim is preempted. See, e.g., Adkins v. Unum Provident Corp., 191 F.Supp.2d 956, 959 (M.D.Tenn.2002); Steele v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 499 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1041 (E.D.Tenn.2007); Ctr. for Special Procedures v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 09-6566(MLC), 2010 WL 5068164, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2010) (<HOLDING>). Here, the interference claim does not relate Holdings: 0: holding that insurer could not tortiously interfere with its own insurance plan 1: holding only that although a party cannot interfere with its own contract a supervisor who is not an officer of a plaintiffs employer is not a party to the plaintiffs employment contract and therefore can interfere with it 2: holding that state malpractice claims against insurer for negligently failing to obtain replacement insurance plan was not preempted 3: holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents 4: holding that insurance certificate holder could not maintain negligence action against insurer when certificate holder was not insurers customer did not discuss insurance coverage with insurer and did not make any specific request to procure insurance coverage


Input: and a Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Contract. That letter stated that the MHFA was "constrained to vigorously enforce” the state notice provisions for the benefit of low income tenants and that the agency would "employ the courts to compel compliance by HUD with the terms of the Contract,” if necessary. (Appellant's Add. at AD-15-16.) We conclude that the prior, thréát of a court action against HUD in the context of a Section 8 housing contract and a different property does not justify a preenforcement suit by Forest Park II in this Section 236 loan prepayment context, where no threat of enforcement action was made and no First Amendment or other constitutional rights are at issue. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988) Holdings: 0: recognizing that plaintiffs had standing to allege infringements of their first amendment rights where the record established that they had been threatened with enforcement of the statute and that such enforcement would cause them injury 1: recognizing the cause of action 2: holding that to bring a  1983 cause of action there must be some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action and that a preenforcement suit is justified where there exists a wellfounded fear of enforcement that would infringe upon the exercise of first amendment rights 3: holding that not all adverse action taken against a public employee in retaliation for exercising first amendment rights is sufficient to support a cause of action under  1983 4: holding that to bring a cause of action in federal court requires that plaintiffs establish at an irreducible minimum an injury in fact that is there must be some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action


Input: regarding issue one and will remand to Commerce on this issue. The Final Results are otherwise affirmed in all respects. Commerce shall have until October 15, 2012 to complete and file its remand redetermination. Plaintiff shall have until October 29, 2012 to file comments. Defendant shall have until November 9, 2012 to file any reply. It is SO ORDERED. 1 . Certain Polyester Staple Fiber From Taiwan, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,955 (Dep' rmal value contribute to the calculation of the dumping margin. In contrast, when using offsetting, "sales made at less than fair value are offset by those made above fair value. This means that some of the dumping margins used to calculate a weighted-average dumping margin will be negative.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d 1351 at 1355 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Further citations to the Tariff Act of Holdings: 0: holding that 19 usc  167735a is ambiguous and that offsetting is also a reasonable interpretation 1: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 2: holding that 19 usc  167735 is ambiguous and that zeroing is a reasonable interpretation 3: holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation 4: holding that when relevant contract language is ambiguous interpretation is turned over to the factfinder


Input: in a way that is ‘illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.’ ” United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 280, 178 L.Ed.2d 184, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 281, 178 L.Ed.2d 184, and - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 488, 178 L.Ed.2d 309 (2010). DISCUSSION I. Conviction Fasthorse was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B), which prohibits “knowingly ... engaging] in a sexual act” with a person who is “physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act.” See also id. § 2246(2) (defining “sexual act”). Fasthorse contends that there was 68 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Williams, 89 F.3d 165, 168 Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant must show that the victim had previously been exposed to a sexual act and that the prior sexual act was sufficiently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the experience and ability to contrive or imagine the molestation charge 1: holding that a court must first determine whether the intent of congress is clear or instead the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue 2: holding that evidence was insufficient where the record was silent with respect to the hourandahalf period in which the sexual act occurred 3: holding that where the record is insufficient to show that the alleged error occurred the presumption that the trial court acted without error must prevail 4: holding that error will not be presumed from a silent record and that without the relevant transcript there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error and the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged error in the record


Input: of stock — that occurred at the time of the purchase or sale of stock would be deemed to arise from that purchase or sale. Put differently, in claimants’ submission, a claim must be predicated on illegality in the stock’s issuance to be subordinated under § 510(b). Since the actionable conduct in this case (Telegroup’s breach of contract) occurred after claimants’ purchase of Telegroup’s stock, claimants contend that the District Court erred in subordinating their claims. Telegroup would read § 510(b) more broadly, so that claims for breach of a stock purchase agreement, which would not have arisen but for the purchase of Telegroup’s stock, may arise from that purchase, even though the actionable conduct occurred after the transaction was completed. Telegroup further argu .E.D.Mo.1990) (<HOLDING>). Telegroup contends that appellants’ claims Holdings: 0: holding that claims for erisa violations arose from the purchase or sale of debtors securities 1: holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtors securities 2: holding that claims that debtor fraudulently induced claimants to retain debtors securities arise from the purchase or sale of those securities 3: holding that claims for breach of the debtors agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of those securities for purposes of  510b 4: holding that plaims for breach of a merger agreement arise from the purchase or sale of debtors securities


Input: of law or unwarranted inferences cast in the form of factual allegations. See Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir.2000). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide the grounds of the entitlement to relief, which requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, — U.S. —, —, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). That is,“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the claims set forth in a Holdings: 0: holding that a charge of discrimination must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests quoting conley v gibson 355 us 41 47 78 sct 99 2 led2d 80 1957 1: holding that laches dismissal is on the merits under federal rule 41 2: holding uncharged acts of violence evidence of  the background of the charges the parties familiarity with one another and their concert of action  quoting united states v oleary 739 f2d 135 136 3d cir1984 cert denied 469 us 1107 105 sct 782 83 led2d 776 1985 cert denied 493 us 821 110 sct 78 107 led2d 44 1989 3: holding that the ninth circuit erred in granting habeas relief because the state courts decision was not an unreasonable application of strickland v washington 466 us 668 104 sct 2052 80 led2d 674 1984 4: recognizing that the supreme court disavowed the oftquoted rule 12b6 standard of conley v gibson 355 us 41 4546 78 sct 99 2 led2d 80 1957


Input: the plaintiff was financially able to retain an attorney this was a "special circumstance” that would allow the court to deny it an award of attorney’s fees. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the matter with some instructions. On remand the Chancery Court determined that the ability to pay attorney’s fees was not an appropriate special circumstance; thus, Wilmington Materials was entitled to and awarded attorney's fees pursuant to § 1988. 17 .2000 WL 1724326, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 168. 18 . The court determined that Wilmington Materials had a vested right to utilize the property because it had "incurred expenses in reasonable reliance of its belief that the Code permitted its intended use.” Wilmington Materials I, 1993 WL 280411 at *2, 1993 Del. Ch. Lexis 145. 19 . Id. 20 . Id. (<HOLDING>); and Wilmington Materials II, 1994 WL 384458, Holdings: 0: holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency 1: holding that although plaintiff was entitled to fees under  1988 there were special circumstances which allowed the chancellor in his discretion to deny an award 2: holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under  1988 3: holding that under 42 usc  1988 which allows the award of attorneys fees in a civil rights action under  1983 a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorneys fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust  quoting srep no 941011 p 4 1976 4: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife


Input: "hopelessly entangled” resulting in significant harm to numerous claimants; (2) the claimants were enticed into investing in a fraudulent Ponzi scheme, and Bonham used investment funds to pay other investors and for personal benefit, and (3) Bonham, WPI and APFC should be treated as alter egos because insufficient funds were available to cover all of the creditors’ claims. See id. at 96-97. 7 . This court has previously discussed the doctrine, but never considered a direct challenge to the bankruptcy court's power to employ it. See Gill v. Sierra Pacific Constr., Inc. (In re Parkway Calabasas), 89 B.R. 832 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1988), aff’d, 949 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir.1991); cf. United States v. Alaska Nat’l Bank of the North (In re Walsh Construction, Inc.), 669 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Anaconda Building Materials Co. v. Newland, Holdings: 0: recognizing that uniting power to prosecute and power to sentence in executive would raise constitutional concerns 1: recognizing such limitations in dicta 2: holding that the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized but rather includes the power to take actions without which the power of recognition might be thwarted 3: recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power 4: recognizing in dicta power to substantively consolidate entities but noting that power to be used sparingly


Input: prior breaches of the Agreement. Since each of these three changes were material and implemented over Mar-schuetz’s objection without his written approval, we conclude that Supermarket committed a prior breach of the employment Agreement. Accordingly, we hold that Supermarket is barred from enforcing the restrictive covenant in this Agreement. Point granted. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court granting Appellant Supermarket’s petition for a permanent injunction against Marschuetz is reversed. In addition, the circuit court’s order that court costs are taxed against Marschuetz is hereby reversed, and costs are taxed to Supermarket. GARY M. GAERTNER, SR., P.J., and GEORGE W. DRAPER III, J„ concur. 1 . See generally Forms Mfg., Inc., 705 S.W.2d at 70 Holdings: 0: recognizing a right to contribution 1: holding that no modification of the original employment contract occurred when the employer unilaterally issued a new handbook 2: holding that an agreement to arbitrate is illusory if as here the employer can unilaterally modify the contract 3: holding that employer may use afteracquired evidence of resume fraud to avoid liability for breach of an employment contract if it can show that it had the power to void the contract due to reliance on material misrepresentations even where the employer was unaware of that power when the breach occurred 4: holding that an employer committed a material breach of an employment agreement where it unilaterally changed salesmans compensation structure to require a monthly minimum contribution not originally bargained for


Input: in order to get the merger done. Other employees stated that the iPCS network was too “immature” and that management at AirGate was aware of this problem. Id., ¶ 60. Plaintiffs aver that AirGate’s statements were misleading and “untrue when made because, according to numerous confidential sources cited, iPCS’s physical infrastructure and network was outdated, inadequate and would take years to upgrade and complete.” Id., ¶ 102. The court finds that the statements about the network buildout could come within the PSLRA’s safe harbor for forward-looking statements because they contain both current fact and future prediction. See Ehlert, 245 F.3d at 1317 (court considered registration statement in its en tirety to determine whether statements were forward looking); Harris, 182 F.3d at 806 (<HOLDING>). However, unlike the other statements raised Holdings: 0: holding that defendants failure to anticipate future events did not constitute securities fraud 1: recognizing that missouri courts have often held that regulations may establish the appropriate standard of care in a negligence case 2: recognizing that forward looking conclusions often rest on both historic observations and assumptions about future events 3: recognizing that harassment often lacks the permanence that discriminatory actions have 4: recognizing that observations made during a psychiatric examination contain a subjective element


Input: the Attorney General intended to restrict the authority of the FBI to promise an informant immunity, he could and would have said so plainly. For example, on January 10, 1975, the Attorney General issued an Order, available to members of the public, that expressly stated that “Investigative Agents and Attorneys are not Authorized to make representations to witnesses regarding funding, protection, or relocation.” Department of Justice Order OBD 2110.2, P 7(d) (Jan. 10, 1975) (emphasis in original). The Order also provided that such promises could be made “by authorized representatives of the U.S. Marshals Service only.” Id. This legal limitation on the authority of prosecutors and investigators was recognized and respected by the courts. Doe v. Civiletti, 635 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the United States Attorneys Manual Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on an oral representation that the atwill provision of his employment contract did not apply to him when he entered into the contract that expressly contradicted the oral representations 1: holding that trial court properly barred certain questions about witness who was in federal witness protection program 2: holding service of process defective when the receipt card was signed by someone who was not the registered agent 3: holding that oral representations of a strike force attorney and dea agent did not commit the marshals service with regard to placing someone in the witness protection program 4: holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service


Input: of months from filing to trial for civil cases.” AL & PO Corp. v. Am. Healthcare Capital, Inc., No. 14 C 1905, 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The defendant notes that the time to disposition, in shorter'in this district than in Minnesota, while the time to trial is quick er in Minnesota- than in Illinois. Where the two statistical measures point in different directions, some courts have held that they cancel one another out. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. RPM Int’l, Inc., 223 F.Supp.3d 110, 117-18 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Because these statistics essentially cancel one another out, this factor is neutral.”). Other courts, however, have held that the time to disposition is the more important metric. See, e.g., AL & PO Corp., 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (<HOLDING>); Fernandes v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., Holdings: 0: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision 1: holding that the time to disposition is more important than time to trial 2: holding that where the law is unsettled at the time of trial but settled by the time of appeal the plainness of the error should be judged by the law at the time of appeal 3: holding that appellate courts analyze plain error by reference to the law as of the time the appeal is decided rather than the extant law at the time of the disputed trial court ruling 4: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required


Input: for each form of relief sought”). 1. Injury The injury must be an “injury in fact,” meaning “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not- “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ ” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); then quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983))). There is no “legally protected interest” in maintaining the privacy of one’s bank records from government access. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 Holdings: 0: holding that defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in contents of locked safe stored in his apartment but owned by third party 1: holding bank clients had no legitimate expectation of privacy in banking information revealed to a third party 2: holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed 3: holding that a bank customer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank 4: holding that the defendant cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the governments acquisition of his subscriber information including his ip address and name because it had been revealed to a third party internal quotation marks omitted


Input: lieu of child support and spousal support. If the parties had intended payments for spousal support, they could have included that language in the order. In addition, the Consent Order provides that Mallory and appellee will have the use and possession of the family home until 2004. The use and possession statute’s sole purpose is for the benefit of the child or children of the family. Md.Code (1973, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-206 of the Family Law Article; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980). A parent’s or spouse’s needs are of no consideration except as those needs contribute to, or reflect upon, the obligation she or he owes to the children. Barr v. Barr, 58 Md.App. 569 at 585, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984). See Also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in addition to any order that the Holdings: 0: holding that individual debtors may use chapter 11 to save the family home from foreclosure 1: holding that a wife with a child from a prior relationship was not entitled to use and possession of the family home 2: holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees 3: recognizing that reciprocal obligations of parent and child are essentials of the family relationship 4: holding that wife was entitled to prejudgment interest on alimony and child support arrearages from the date those payments were due


Input: for the foreseeable future whatever shortage now exists. The second purpose identified by the City is to protect the investment that the tenants make in their mobile homes. Although the park owners agree that the tenants do make an investment in their homes, they dispute that that investment needs protection, pointing to the escalating prices that the tenants have been receiving upon the sale of their coaches. The evidence is uncontro-verted that sales prices for coaches in the parks consistently increased during the years prior to the imposition of rent control. Nevertheless, if the City reasonably determined that the possibility existed that the tenants’ investments were threatened, it might be justified in taking steps to protect them. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 12-13, 108 S.Ct. at 857-58 (<HOLDING>). The dynamic relationship between the sales Holdings: 0: holding that a consumer reporting agency which gives a consumer report to the attorney representing the agency is not subject to the fcra because the attorney is not a traditional third party 1: holding that the government has standing to appeal a district courts dismissal of an fca qui tam action over the governments objection even though the government did not formally intervene in the action 2: holding that order denying representation to class of future claimants in bankruptcy proceeding is equivalent to denial of request to intervene and order denying right to intervene is appealable final order 3: holding that noerrpennington extends to situations where the government enters into a contractual relationship with a private entity at least in situations where the government engages in a policy decision and at the same time acts as a participant in the marketplace  4: holding that the government may intervene in the marketplace to protect consumer welfare


Input: October 1. 6 . On appeal, appellee questions whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear this case because Congress has not provided for judicial review of the denial of Medicare Part B claims. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, -n. 4, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 2018 n. 4, 80 L.Ed.2d 622, 632 n. 4 (1984); United States v. Erika, 456 U.S. 201, 102 S.Ct. 1650, 72 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982). As appel-lee concedes, however, the broad jurisdictional bar recognized in Ringer does not preclude a party from raisi n. 11 (E.D.Tex.1985) ("[Cjonstitutional challenges are cognizable if they are aimed at the Medicare Act itself. Such claims arise solely under the Constitution, and therefore escape section 405(h)’s grasp.”). Cf. Johnson v. Robi-son, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). Because appellants Holdings: 0: holding that veterans suit is not barred by 38 usc  211a because ajppellees constitutional challenge is not to any such decision of the administrator but rather to a decison of congress to create a statutory class entitled to benefits that does not include 10 conscientious objectors who performed alternative civilian service 1: holding that where the board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 usc  7104e the period within which to appeal to the court of appeals for veterans claims did not commence to run 2: holding that a class plaintiff who seeks to assert statutory rights to protect a class of which he is a member is not asserting rights antagonistic to any members of that class 3: holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract 4: holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court


Input: official conduct. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges does not alter applicable law. — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015). Whatever ramifications Obergefell may have for sexual relations beyond the approval of same-sex marriage are unstated at best, but Obergefell is expressly premised on the unique and special bond created by the formal marital relationship and children of that relationship. Id. at 2594-95. Obergefell does not create “rights” based on relationships that mock marriage, and no court has so held. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 1 . The alleged fact dispute does not exist, nor would it be material if it did. While Coker and Golden maintain they were ordered to "cease all contact” with the other (10th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Of course, even if such rights existed Holdings: 0: holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii 1: holding that baltimore city cannot be liable for police officers alleged tortious conduct where the officer was acting in a governmental capacity 2: holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report 3: holding that the illinois statutory definitions of sexual penetration and sexual conduct cover clearly distinct conduct and that therefore the statute was not unconstitutionally vague 4: holding that governmental actions restricting police officers sexual conduct of an extramarital affair were reasonable


Input: Jersey Racing Comm’n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1318 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In order to succeed on a claim of deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to termination of a specific employment position, a plaintiff must first establish a property interest in the employment.”) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972)). “To have a property interest in a job or job benefit, an employee must have a legitimate claim of entitlement, not just a unilateral expectation.” Latessa, 113 F.3d at 1318 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). “Cognizable property interests can be created by sources such as state law and implied or express contracts.” Miller v. Twp. of Readington, 39 Fed. Appx. 774, 775-76 (3d Cir. 2002) 1987) (<HOLDING>). The burden thus shifts to Davis to show that Holdings: 0: holding that court erred as matter of law in failing to enter judgment for employer at close of plaintiffs implied employment contract action 1: holding that once the plaintiffs fixed term of employment expired he had no property interest as a matter of law 2: holding that plaintiffs had no vested interest in former interpretation of state law 3: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 4: holding that an assistant professor hired for a fixed term of one academic year had no property interest in his job because the terms of his employment allowed that his contract not be renewed


Input: Kennedy). The judgment of conviction having been vacated, the present defendant is treated as a charged, not as a convicted child pornographer. The question now posed is whether the pretrial condition of curfew with electronic monitoring mandated by the Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied in view of this court’s finding that electronic monitoring is not needed to avoid flight or any danger to children or to society. The answer: The Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant under present circumstances. B. Constitutionality The Eighth Amendment provides “excessive bail shall not be required.” U.S. amend. VII. This limit of federal authority applies to the states. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 601 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Crowell, Nos. 06-M1095, Holdings: 0: holding that adam walsh act violates fifth amendments guarantee of procedural due process 1: holding that adam walsh act does not violate procedural due process require excessive bail or violate separation of powers 2: holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing 3: holding that dna act violates neither substantive nor procedural due process under the fifth amendment 4: holding that adam walsh act does not prohibit inspection by defense expert