Input: court’s determination that Martinez suffered a 5-percent loss of earning capacity was clearly wrong because it was based upon an analysis which took into account Martinez’ preexisting condition. A preexisting condition cannot be considered in the determination of a claimant’s loss of earning capacity. In addition, there is absolutely no evidence on the record that Martinez was previously compensated for a prior loss of earning capacity. Finally, we note that Nebraska’s workers’ compensation statutes do not prohibit a claimant from concurrently receiving statutory benefits for separate injuries arising out of separate accidents, so long as the combined payments do not exceed the maximum weekly rate allowed by statute. See Vega v. Iowa Beef Processors, 264 Neb. 282, 646 N.W.2d 643 (2002) (<HOLDING>). This would entitle Martinez to be compensated Holdings: 0: holding that determination of causation in permanent disability hearing not barred by estoppel because wlhether an industrial accident caused temporary total disability or permanent partial disability are two distinct questions 1: holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury 2: holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability 3: holding that claimant may simultaneously receive unemployment benefits and workers compensation for temporary partial disability where statute only precludes receipt of workers compensation for temporary total or permanent total disability if claimant is receiving unemployment benefits 4: holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits


Input: also places any child under the age of seventeen within the jurisdiction of the South Carolina Family Court. 7 .As Appellants did not raise the issue on appeal, we will not address the District Court’s finding that the level of force used by the arresting officers to retrieve the baggie from Bell's mouth did not violate Bell's Fourth Amendment rights. 8 . The District Court also correctly concluded that Sheriff Cannon cannot be held liable under Section 1983 in his official capacity. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“We hold that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons’ under § 1983.”); see also Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947 (D.S.C.1988) aff'd 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir.1989) Holdings: 0: holding that a newly elected county sheriff was responsible under applicable texas law for the decision not to rehire sheriffs deputies who had campaigned for the ousted incumbent 1: holding that in south carolina sheriffs and deputies are state officials 2: holding that south carolina waived eleventh amendment immunity where county treasurers empowered to act on behalf of the state litigated state claims in federal court represented by the state attorney general 3: holding that  1324 preempted south carolina law creating state crimes for harboring both relating to harborers and aliens themselves 4: holding that sheriffs deputies were not employed in the service of marshall county and that the county personnel board therefore had no jurisdiction to review their respective terminations ordered by the sheriff


Input: be held liable for acts of infringement if that defendant is either contribu-torily or vicariously liable for another’s direct act of infringement. Where those acts of infringement occur within the United States and a plaintiff seeks to hold a foreign defendant contributorily or vicariously liable for those acts, it has been held that subject matter jurisdiction may exist, and that the exercise thereof does not conflict with the doctrine of nonextraterri-toriality. See Blue Ribbon Pet Prods., Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 66 F.Supp.2d 454, 461-68 (E.D.N.Y.1999); Stewart v. Adidas A.G., No. 96 Civ. 6670(DLC), 1997 WL 218431, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.30, 1997); GB Marketing USA Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co., 782 F.Supp. 763, 773 (W.D.N.Y.1991); c.f. Metzke, 878 F.Supp. at 760 (<HOLDING>). As the Honorable Lawrence K. Karlton held in Holdings: 0: holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable 1: holding that public entities may be held vicariously hable for the negligent acts of their individual employees 2: holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party 3: holding despite defendants claim that it could not be held hable for infringing acts of thirdparties that defendant could be held liable for foreign third partys infringement if it knew or should have known that third party maru fungs copies of ms metzkes designs would be distributed by nonmay retailers in the united states 4: holding that the individual defendant does not have to be in privity of contract with the plaintiff to be held liable under  1981


Input: there is a presumption that the Legislature intended the two to coexist and that it “did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.” Id. Therefore, the statute with more specific language “relating to a particular subject will prevail over the general terms of another statute.” Id. ANALYSIS AND DECISION [¶ 8.] 1. Whether a guardianship proceeding commenced by a non-parent and based upon allegations of abuse and neglect is a proper proceeding to terminate the custodial rights of a natural parent. [¶ 9.] Proceedings instituted under the South Dakota Guardianship Act, set forth in SDCL chapter 29A-5, are not the proper means of transferring custody from a parent to a non-parent without a prior determination of a parent’s unfitness. See Blow v. Lottman, 75 S.D. 127, 59 N.W.2d 825 (1953) (<HOLDING>) overruled on other grounds by Matter of Holdings: 0: recognizing that injury is a prerequisite to liability 1: holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention 2: holding that a coa is a jurisdictional prerequisite 3: holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial courts exercise of discretion to award fees 4: holding mothers disqualification as custodian is prerequisite to award of custody to any other person


Input: to the First Complaint except for some minor additional language added to Count II. Majority Opinion ¶ 3. The modified claims were fully addressed by Judge Robinson and I agree with his analysis and the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Second Complaint under Rule 1-012(B)(6). The minor wording modification made to Count II did not establish an issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiffs’ individual loan under Count II was preempted under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. Plaintiffs have failed to provide this Court with any authority to support their position that a personal loan impacting their business relationships and commercial credit avoids preemption under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. See Jojola v. Fresenius Med. Clinic, 2010-NMCA-101, ¶ 7, 149 N.M. 51, 243 P.3d 755 (<HOLDING>). As a result, the rewording of Count II was Holdings: 0: recognizing that where a party fails to provide any authority for an argument we will presume that none exists 1: holding that an issue is waived when a party fails to provide adequate citation to authority 2: holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error 3: holding that a party waives an argument if the party fails to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support of the argument 4: holding when a party fails to provide arguments or supporting authority for his assertion the party is deemed to have abandoned the issue


Input: limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” TEX. R. EVID. 701. 10 . Detective Reynolds testified that he had worked for the Harris County Sheriff’s Department for over twenty years, had been a detective for twelve years, and had been assigned to the Homicide Division for ten years, where he had been involved in investigating hundreds of homicides. 11 . “Inference” has been defined as "[a] conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them” and”[t]he process by which such a conclusion is reached.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (8th ed.2004). 12 . The medical examiner w 11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 579 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible 1: holding that although cause of dystonia unknown experts opinion regarding causation based on temporal relationship between plaintiffs workrelated injury and onset of condition was sufficient to support commission s finding that dystonia was caused by compensable injury 2: holding experts demonstration of shaken baby syndrome using infant mannequin was not substantially similar when mannequin had to be shaken harder than in real life and number of oscillations of head needed to cause injury was unknown 3: holding egregious conduct occurred when infant was shaken forcefully enough to break bones 4: holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury


Input: thousands of jobs that exist in the national economy. Id. Social Security Ruling 00-4p SSR 00-4p prescribes guidelines for treating VE occupational testimony in conjunction with the information contained in the DOT. The ruling imposes upon an ALJ an “affirmative responsibility” to identify and obtain a reasonable explanation of any conflicts between a VE’s testimony regarding the requirements of a specific job and the information provided in the DOT, which, with the companion publication Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“SCO”), is the primary source of job requirements relied upon in making disability determinations. SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2, *4; see also Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 557 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) The language of the ruling is mandatory, not Holdings: 0: holding that under the first amendment where there is no proof of actual malice damages are limited to actual injury which excludes punitive damages but is not limited to outofpocket loss 1: recognizing that ssr 004ps scope is limited to expert testimony concerning the actual requirements of a job 2: holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions 3: holding that recovery is limited to actual compensatory damages 4: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive


Input: issue of expenses until counsel provided the court with invoices, receipts, and supporting affidavits (including the descriptions and nature of each expense and the reasons therefore). Sandra Jasso’s counsel filed supplements in the form of spreadsheets showing the amount, date, and description of expenses incurred in this case. The district court ruled that Sandra Jasso’s counsel did not provide adequate documentation in the form of invoices or receipts, as requested, but rather only provided its in-house expense spreadsheet. Thus, the district court denied Sandra Jasso’s counsel all requested expenses. The district court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing these . expenses after counsel did not comply with its order. See Glass v. U.S., 335 F.Supp.2d 736, 742-43 (N.D.Tex.2004) (<HOLDING>). Counsel for Sandra Jasso also requested Holdings: 0: holding that court was required to award an attorneys billing rate where defendant had submitted no evidence on fees 1: holding that timely filed motion for sanctions which requested an award of over 40000 in attorneys fees requested a substantial change in the judgment 2: holding that failure to produce supporting documentation regarding billing statements of counsel after an order to was a factor in denying requested attorneys fees 3: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees 4: holding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering chiropractor to disclose the identity of all patients that had any type of connection to the plaintiffs attorneys and to produce all billing records for services rendered to attorneys or patients


Input: (applying a formula to divide varying sources of commingled funds because “equity dictates that all ... funds be distributed on a pro rata basis”), rev’d on other grounds, 875 F.2d 76 (4th Cir.1989); In re Leedy Mortgage Co., 111 B.R. 488, 489 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990) (disallowing differential distribution of funds based on the “precept that preferences or priorities to creditors should be carefully assessed and allowed only when legally or equitably justified”); In re Independence Land Title Corp. of Ill, 18 B.R. 673, 674 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1982) (“[I]t would thwart the general bankruptcy principle of equality of distribution to creditors of equal status if this court allowed [defendant] to receive all the funds held by the trustee.”); In re Johnson, 121 N.J. 244, 244, 579 A.2d 815, 815 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Cases granting one party distribution Holdings: 0: holding that under 42 usc  407a social security benefits commingled with other nonexempt funds in a bank account remain exempt if the funds are reasonably traceable to social security income 1: holding the commissions recommendation that the attorney be ordered to refund his clients funds could not be adopted because the stipulation failed to detail the amount of such funds and no witness testimony or evidence was taken on the matter 2: holding that companys president was trustee of trust funds because he had control and direction over the funds 3: holding that in a case where a suspended attorney commingled funds between his attorney trust account and attorney business account and the funds could not be traced claimants state of new jersey and clients security fund reached an amicable agreement to divide the funds equally 4: holding both a party and his attorney liable to repay funds withdrawn in violation of a stay where the attorney violated this courts orders and concealed the fund


Input: 11. Mattingly v. United States, 939 F.2d 816, 818-19 (9th Cir.1991) (the government is not exempt from Rule 11 sanctions on the ground of sovereign immunity); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668 (10th Cir.1988) (28 U.S.C. § 2412 waives government sovereign immunity as to Rule 11 sanctions); United States v. Gavilan, 849 F.2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir.1988) (the government is subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure when it enters a claim as a civil litigant); see Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F.Supp. 1421, 1537 (N.D.N.Y.1989); Joseph v. United States, 121 F.R.D. 406, 413-14 (D. Hawaii 1988); National Association of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D.Cal.1987); Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F.Supp. 512 (N.D.Cal.1984); cf. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 21 ERC (BNA) 2153 (N.D.Cal.1984) (<HOLDING>). 79 . There is no evidence that the other Holdings: 0: holding that an administrative agency is not subject to a contempt proceeding for failure to comply with an order 1: holding that mothers failure to appeal prior contempt order precluded her challenge to prior order in appeal from later order entered based upon prior contempt order 2: holding that even though an executive order mandating agency consideration of environmental justice concerns created no private right of action for an agencys failure to comply with that mandate the court would review the agencys action as an exercise of discretion under the apa and nepa 3: holding that the failure to appear in court pursuant to a court order can constitute direct criminal contempt 4: holding the director of the united states environmental protection agency in contempt for failure to comply with court order


Input: under the policy. Thus, the provision would only be upheld under KRS § 304.14-370 if it gave the party one year from the date of denial to sue. Unfor al limitation provisions under the parameters set by KRS § 304.14-370. However, these cases provide more confusion than guidance. Both courts considered the same limitation provision in light of KRS § 304.14-370, and yet, they reached two different conclusions about the clause’s validity and impact on the plaintiffs claims. Compare Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 403 F.3d 401 (6th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs claim was barred by a KRS § 304.14-370 compliant provision requiring a party to sue “within one year of the inception of loss”) with Tennant v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 04-54, 2006 WL 319046 (E.D.Ky. Feb. 10, 2006) (<HOLDING>). These decisions will be analyzed in detail Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs legal malpractice claim was not ripe until the appeal had been exhausted because plaintiffs harm remained speculative until then 1: holding that same limitation provision violated krs  30414370 as to the plaintiffs claim because it did not accrue until denial of the plaintiffs claim for coverage 2: holding that the uscfc did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim because plaintiffs claim of negligence sounds in tort 3: holding similar allegations supported that the plaintiffs negligence claim did not accrue until plaintiffs loan payments exceeded his ability to pay 4: holding that because plaintiffs iied claim is based on the facts that support plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim plaintiffs iied claim did not accrue until the charges against them were dismissed


Input: v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir.2006) ] strongly undermines that position. Moreover, we see no reason why considerations relevant to loss causation in a civil fraud case should not ollow the Second Circuit in expressly applying Dura Pharmaceuticals’s civil principle to criminal securities fraud sentencing. We decline to do so for two reasons. First, we believe that the primary policy rationale of Dura Pharmaceuticals for proscribing overvaluation as a valid measure of loss does not apply in a criminal sanctions context. Second, application of Dura Pharmaceuticals’s civil rule to criminal sentencing would clash with the parallel principles in the Sentencing Guidelines, which have persuasive value in federal courts. See United States v. Staten, 466 F.3d 708, 710 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). As noted, Dura Pha'rmaceuticals rejected the Holdings: 0: holding that alj committed reversible error in failing to consider whether a claimants failure to seek treatment was due to his financial circumstances 1: holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to consider cumulative error in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that any error by a district court in applying a sentencing enhancement is harmless if it did not change a defendants total offense level 3: holding that failure to consider guidelines note in applying sentencing enhancement was reversible error 4: holding that the defendants substantial rights were not affected by a sentencing guidelines enhancement even in the absence of a specific finding by the district court because the evidence amply supported the enhancement


Input: orders, were signed on April 28, 1998, August 18, 1998, and December 15, 1998. 75 . The first order (signed in December 1997) did not order the mother to pay any child support, but ordered the father to pay $100. The remaining three orders directed each parent to pay $100. 76 . The parents had undergone individual psychological testing in 1997, before the children were removed, pursuant to the initial Child Safety Evaluation and Plan that CPS had implemented in April 1997. The psychiatric evaluations ordered after removal were to be new, additional evaluations that were distinct from the previous psychological testing. 77 . In re A.R.R., 61 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (Sixth Amendment); In re B.B., 971 S.W.2d 160, 172 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Arteaga v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Holdings: 0: recognizing that the statutory right to counsel in parental termination cases requires that the appointed counsel provide effective assistance 1: holding that in parental termination proceedings the parent is entitled to effective assistance of counsel 2: holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel 3: holding that the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel does not extend to parental termination proceedings without identifying any specific constitutional provision 4: holding that the sixth amendment right does not extend to parental termination cases although the parent contended the right to effective counsel stemmed from tex famcode  107013


Input: interlocutory issue. Rule 14(B) states that such a motion "requesting the Court of Appeals ac-eept jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of the trial court's certification." Ind.App. R. 14(B)(2)(a). As such, we do not have jurisdiction over this issue and it must be dismissed. See Anonymous Doctor A v. Sherrard, 783 N.E.2d 296, 299 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (dismissing an appeal when the appellant failed to petition the Court of Appeals to accept jurisdiction pursuant to Appellate Rule 14(B)). The Guillaumes argue that Appellate Rule 66(B) should allow our court to accept jurisdiction of the issue at this stage. We disagree and have previously declined such suggestions. See Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Yaeger, 838 N.E.2d 449, 450 (Ind.2005) (<HOLDING>). Because this issue is dismissed, we do not Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review 1: holding that because record did not contain notice of appeal in compliance with rule 3 there was no appellate jurisdiction and appeal must be dismissed 2: recognizing that the waiver rule is wholly consistent with the bias rule of practice as an appellate body 3: holding that a failure to comply with rule 28a10 provides an appellate court a basis for disregarding the appellants arguments 4: holding that appellate rule 66b does not authorize an interlocutory appeal that fails to comply with appellate rule 14


Input: does not expressly guarantee any right to counsel as does the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to require that, once a suspect is in custody and subject to interrogation, the police apprise the suspect of his right to contact an attorney, and to have the attorney present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-71, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Once a suspect asserts this Fifth Amendment, or Miranda-based, right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until counsel is physically present during the interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Importantly for Teixeria, this Miranda-based Holdings: 0: recognizing the right to counsel on appeal 1: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 2: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel 3: holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings 4: holding that the right to have counsel present means the right to have counsel physically present during the interrogation not merely the right to consult an attorney by telephone


Input: those arguments raise constitutional issues).” United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991). Instead of developing his excessive-fines-clause argument, Crespo devoted his brief to attacking our jurisdiction and the ALJ’s initial decision. Crespo’s complete lack of development of this argument is sufficient to find waiver, especially given that this area' of law is quite unsettled. As an initial matter, it is not even clear that the excessive fines clause applies to civil monetary damages. See United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 453-54 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that it is not established that treble damages under False Claims Act are “fines”); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Even if we were to accept that a penalty paid Holdings: 0: holding that punitive damages are not fines 1: holding that the fines imposed by the challenged city ordinances are not excessive even if the excessive fines clause is applicable 2: holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa 3: holding that excessive fines clause does not apply to civiljury award of punitive fines 4: holding a court may not award punitive damages


Input: not necessarily or immediately result in his earlier release, but would set in motion a process that will have that consequence if he prevails. In Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 808-10 (D.C.Cir.1988) (en banc), this court had held that a federal prisoner seeking to challenge his parole eligibility date was required to proceed in habeas, even though success upon his claims would not necessarily result in his earlier release. Later, however, in Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1055-57 (D.C.Cir. 1998), we permitted a District of Columbia prisoner to challenge his parole eligibility date in a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the latter case, we relied primarily upon two Supreme Court cases, Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (<HOLDING>), and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that the district court mischaracterized a state prisoners  1983 claim as a petition for writ of habeas corpus because the prisoner did not attack his conviction challenge the fact or length of his confinement or seek immediate release from prison 1: holding that that if the success of a  1983 damages claim brought by a prisoner would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence the prisoner may only bring the claim where the conviction or sentence has been invalidated 2: holding that to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid a 42 usc  1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal expunged by executive order declared invalid by a state tribunal  or called into question by federal courts issuance of writ of habeas corpus footnote omitted 3: holding that a state prisoner must bring his claim in habeas only if by prevailing he would necessarily prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement 4: holding that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid a plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal expunged by executive order declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or called into question by a federal courts issuance of a writ of habeas corpus


Input: of the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties.... 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Thus, to invoke the federal officer removal statute, Thornburg must both act under an officer of the United States and have averred a colorable federal defense. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 133-34, 109 S.Ct. 959. We address each of these requirements in turn. 1. Whether Thornburg “act[s] under” an officer of the United States such that removal under the federal officer removal statute is available to him Bell argues that this Court should remand her claim to state court because, based on this Court’s decision in Cromelin, Thornburg cannot take advantage of the federal officer removal statute and remove the case under § 1442(a)(1). See Cromelin, 177 F.2d at 277 (<HOLDING>). Thornburg, however, claims that he is Holdings: 0: holding that a section 1983 suit against an officer in his or her official capacity is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent 1: holding that a bankruptcy trustee is an officer of the court appointed by the court directed by the court and paid by the court but is in no sense an agent or employee or officer of the united states 2: holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide 3: holding that an officer or employee of the tennessee valley authority was not an officer or employee acting under the authority of the united states or any department or any officer of the government thereof within the meaning of a criminal statute first enacted in 1884 4: recognizing that this court and the united states supreme court have embraced the notion that so long as the sentence imposed is within the maximum limit set by the legislature an appellate court is without power to review the sentence


Input: date. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal for a failure to state a conspiracy claim. The Walker court noted that Rule 9 was inapplicable, and held that “it is enough in pleading a conspiracy to merely indicate the parties, general purpose, and approximate date, so that the defendant has notice of what he is charged with.” Id. The Walker court also distinguished its holding from its earlier holding in Ryan v. Mary Immaculate Queen Center, 188 F.3d 857, 859-60 (7th Cir.1999), which Sanchez cites in support of his specificity argument, because the plaintiff in Ryan “did not so much as hint at what role he might have played or agreed to play” in the alleged conspiracy. Walker, 288 F.3d at 1007; see also, Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The other cases cited by Sanchez are also Holdings: 0: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 1: holding that a complaint under section 1983 must contain more than naked improbable unsubstantiated assertions without any specifics 2: holding that a person alleging a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights must do more than simply aver that a conspiracy existed 3: holding that complaint alleging a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights cannot survive motion to dismiss based on conclusory allegations of conspiracy which are not supported by references to material facts 4: recognizing that ryan cannot be read to require that a complaint alleging conspiracy under  1983 contain more than notice of time scope and parties involved


Input: objectives, and spirit of the statute based on good sound reasoning.’ ” Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tenn.2001) (quoting State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn.1995)). Component parts of a statute are to be construed, if possible, consistently and reasonably. See State v. Alford, 970 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tenn.1998). Aiding in our interpretation of legislative intent are the maxims of nosci-tur a sociis and ejusdem generis. Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1060 (6th ed.1990); see also Hammer v. Franklin Interurban Co., 209 Tenn. 399, 354 S.W.2d 241, 242 (1962) (<HOLDING>). The doctrine of noscitur a sociis permits Holdings: 0: holding that the phrases in connection with and associated with are synonymous with the terms with respect to with reference to and relating to which mean connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation 1: holding that statutory terms should be construed with reference to their associated words and phrases 2: holding that if the statutory terms are unambiguous a courts review ends and the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its words 3: recognizing that in the absence of a statutory definition statutory terms are construed in accordance with their ordinary or natural meaning 4: holding that the meaning of doubtful terms or phrases may be determined by reference to their relationship with other associated words or phrases noscitur a sociis


Input: an identical regulatory exclusion under similar facts, the court stated: Although the language “based upon or attributable to” is awkward when used in conjunction with the language “any action or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation” the court finds the FDIC’s construction of this exclusion to be strained and unreasonable. (Footnote omitted). Reading the endorsement as a whole, without placing undue emphasis on the words “based upon or attributable to, ” it is clear that the insured’s intent was to exclude coverage for any loss resulting from any action brought by or on behalf of the FDIC in any capacity against a bank director or officer. (Footnote omitted). Accord, Continental Casualty Company v. Allen, 710 F.Supp. 1088, 1097 (N.D.Tex.1987) (<HOLDING>). See also, McCuen v. International Insurance Holdings: 0: holding that language almost identical to the language in the policy at issue in this case ie due proof conveys discretionary authority 1: holding that a standard wcel policy with a maritime endorsement is an ocean marine policy 2: holding that the language in an identical endorsement in an mgicissued 1983 d and o liability policy is not ambigu ous 3: holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical 4: holding it is settled that in construing an endorsement to an insurance policy the endorsement and the policy must be read together and the words of the policy remain in full force and effect except as altered by the words of the endorsement


Input: unoriginal, and are not entitled to protection. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282 (noting that originality in copyright means that the work “was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works)”). Even to the extent that Lyons’s ACVSMR Bylaws cover topics that are required for inclusion by the Manual, however, her choices in expressing and organizing those topics are original. See Situation Mgmt., 560 F.3d at 61. The decision to include those topics in the first instance, however, is not entitled to protection because it was dictated by the Manual’s instructions, and thus did not require independent creativity. See Manual 8-9 (listing topics that must be addressed in a specialty organization’s bylaws); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 348, 111 S.Ct. 1282 (<HOLDING>). 3. Substantial Similarity Analysis After Holdings: 0: holding that wjhile trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written child custody orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review 1: holding that government officials are provided with qualified immunity so long as their actions could have been reasonably thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated 2: holding that while trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review 3: holding that that choices as to selection and arrangement are entitled to copyright protection only so long as they are made independently 4: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause


Input: this element.by showing either (1) the defendant “is enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the enterprise” or (2) “the.predicate offenses are related to the activities of that enterprise.” App. at 4689-90, see United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir.1980)). The government does not have to show that the defendant’s motive in committing the predicate act was to further the affairs of the enterprise. In fact, a defendant can commit a predicate act that is detrimental to the enterprise so long as the evidence establishes the requisite nexus between the predicate act and the enterprise. Pro-venzano, at 200 (<HOLDING>). D. Evidence of Uncharged Acts. Irizarry Holdings: 0: recognizing that by accepting bribes in exchange for allowing violations of a collective bargaining agreement the defendant was conducting the rico enterprise local union through racketeering activity even though the union was harmed by the racketeering activity 1: holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union 2: holding that union members had standing to bring rico claims for reduced compensation under collective bargaining agreement 3: holding that there was abundant evidence to support the charge against a union member for helping organize a nonaflcio local union of a different name where the union member admitted at the hearing that he contacted local contractors for the purpose of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement for new union and serving as the new unions business manager 4: holding that to prevail under civil rico plaintiff must prove that defendants participated in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity


Input: the sorts of factors that courts have long charged the Board with balancing. We conclude that the broad legal views outlined in Otis II are reasonably defensible approaches for determining when plant re-locations are mandatory bargaining subjects under the NLRA. IY. Analysis op the Present Case Having determined that Otis II is not fatally flawed on its face, our inquiry is not over. It remains to determine whether the Otis standard, acceptable in its broad outlines, has been properly applied to the particular facts of the case before us. Despite the deference we owe the Board, for reasons that follow, we conclude that its decision in this ease falls short of the standards of reasoned decisionmaking that we customarily require in judicial review. A. The Findings of the 7, 958 (1986) (<HOLDING>); DeSoto, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 788, 789 (1986) Holdings: 0: holding that court did not prejudice defendant by limiting his counsel to preestablished limitations on inter alia the scope of crossexamination 1: holding that a decision to move did not turn upon labor costs but rather was motivated by inter alia a foreclosure action 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying inter alia costs for internal copying of documents by prevailing defendants counsel produced for discovery 3: holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted 4: holding inter alia that expert testimony was not required to prove damages for emotional distress in an abuse of process claim


Input: not constitute ineffective assistance. With regard to Valerie Goins, trial counsel testified that he decided not to call her as a witness because she would have testified that Howard returned home that night around 12:30 a.m., which was inconsistent with the statement Howard provided to law enforcement about being with Patricia and her cousin all night. As previously noted, the determination as to which defense witnesses will be called is “purely a matter of trial strategy and tactics, and trial strategy and tactics do not equate with ineffective assistance of counsel.” And given trial counsel’s reasonable explanation for his strategy here, his decision to not call Goins as a witness certainly did not render his assistance ineffective. (b) , 290 Ga. 574, 575 (2) (722 SE2d 763) (2012) (<HOLDING>). 38 Mitchell v. State, 290 Ga. 490, 492 (4) Holdings: 0: holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that defendants conclusory allegation that trial counsel failed to object to leading questions without specifying such instances did not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 3: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 4: holding that defendant failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to the states leading questions when there was no evidence that such failure was not based on trial strategy


Input: the entire cause, including related claims under laws that are not themselves money-mandating. The Court of Federal Claims rejected Mr. Filipczyk’s argument, holding that all claims brought before the Court of Feder al Claims must independently relate back to a money-mandating statute. See Synernet Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed.Cl. 375, 382 (Ct.Cl.1998). It appears to us from the record in this case that the Court of Federal Claims erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain arguments that were not directly based on a money-mandating statute. Claimants in the Court of Federal Claims may argue issues based on violations of the Constitution or of a statute or regulation to support their claims for monetary relief under money-mandating statutes. Holley, 124 F.3d at 1467 (<HOLDING>); see also Trek Leasing, Inc. v. United States, Holdings: 0: holding that the court of federal claims had jurisdiction to decide an alleged due process violation related to his claim for damages under a moneymandating statute 1: holding that the court lacks jurisdiction over an alleged violation of the due process clause because the clause does not obligate the government to pay money damages 2: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 3: recognizing a plaintiffs  1988 claim predicated on an alleged violation of his substantive due process rights 4: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute


Input: relief from judgment pursuant to rule 1.540(b)(1), (2), or (3). In support of its argument that the foreclosure judgment is void, Sterling cites Shields v. Flinn, 528 So.2d 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). In Shields, the Third District declared a judgment void two years after the entry of the judgment because the defendant, over whom the court had personal jurisdiction, had been given no notice of the trial date and had not appeared for the trial. Id.; see also Hammett v. Hammett, 510 So.2d 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (concluding in a one-paragraph opinion that a party’s failure to receive notice of hearing at which the judgment was entered entitled that party to relief from the judgment pursuant to rule 1.540(b)(4)); Falkner v. Amerifirst Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 489 So.2d 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>). These Third District cases, however, predate Holdings: 0: holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order 1: holding that plaintiffs dismissal of personal injury action and subsequent dismissal of declaratory judgment action concerning extent of tortfeasors insurance coverage did not trigger double dismissal rule 2: holding that a plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of his claims with prejudice constituted a final order that was appealable 3: holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order 4: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered


Input: 784 F.Supp. at 603.2 When plaintiffs urge a supplemental EIS should be conducted based on effects already adequately considered by-the original EIS, a supplemental EIS is not required. Cronin, 919 F.2d at 449; Headwaters, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1178; Hickory Neighborhood Defense League, 893 F.2d at 63; and Texas v. United States Forest Serv., 654 F.Supp. 296, 298 (S.D.Tex.1987). The burden is on the plaintiff to show that grounds exist requiring the preparation of an EIS. Robertson, 784 F.Supp. at 606. In Robertson, the district court held that when the timber cutting proposed in a site-specific project did not differ significantly from the timber cutting anticipated and evaluated in the programmatic EIS, no supplemental site-specific EIS was required. Id. See also Cronin, 919 F.2d at 449 (<HOLDING>); Headwaters, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1180 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff in a reverse discrimination case need show only that he is a member of a protected group and whites are a protected group under title vii 1: holding that the forum selection clause at issue encompassed both contract and tort claims 2: holding that plaintiffs statistics did not shed any light on the legally relevant issue because they did not indicate the group of applicants who were interviewed or even the group of applicants found qualified or the group of all applicants 3: recognizing women as a distinct group 4: holding supplemental eis not necessary for sitespecific timber sale where programmatic eis considered effects of both clearcutting and group selection and sitespecific project authorized group selection


Input: for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Maxwell-Jolly, 2010 WL 599171 (Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-958). The Court is not persuaded, as the Commissioner’s argument appears to run contrary to a body of cases involving freestanding claims brought under the Supremacy Clause. For instance, the Supreme Court has reached the merits of a preemption claim concerning a statute enacted pursuant to Congress’s spending clause authority. See PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155 L.Ed.2d 889 (2003) (plurality opinion) (involving Medicaid Act). Although PhRMA was a plurality decision, “seven Justices assumed both that the federal courts have jurisdiction and that a claim was stated for spending clause preemption.” Planned Parenthood of Houston, & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 331-32 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Thompson, 362 F.3d at 819 n. 3 Holdings: 0: holding that no federal court other than the supreme court may entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a judgment of a state court 1: recognizing that the statute vesting this court with the supreme judicial power of the territory implicitly repealed 1 vic  4 2: holding that the petitioners federal habeas action accrued when a witness executed an affidavit recanting the testimony he gave during a prisoners murder prosecution not on the date that the state supreme court rejected the prisoners claim 3: recognizing that supreme court implicitly rejected the contention that asserting the preemptive force of federal spending clause legislation is itself no claim 4: recognizing as foreclosed the contention that recent supreme court decisions limit almendareztorres holding to cases where a defendant has admitted the prior convictions during a guilty plea


Input: detailed expert reports that were explored at a lengthy deposition. In essence, he compared C & F’s sales and growth rates to comparable competitors. Except in certain respects not relevant here, the admissibility of evidence is governed by the law of the forum. See Restatement (Second), supra, § 138. Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting — a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge — but that is not dispositive. See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it “was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability”); see also Hammond v. Int’l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (<HOLDING>); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, Holdings: 0: holding automobile exclusion in general liability policy did not apply because plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision and training was a separate and distinct theory of recovery from the use of an automobile 1: holding that an engineer whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair could testify in a products liability action involving tractors 2: recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law 3: holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school 4: recognizing the significance of control in strict products liability


Input: (“The mere assertion by the petitioner that there was insufficient evidence, without more, cannot support a finding of deprivation of due process.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 . In the complaint, in addition to the specific allegation against defendant Knight, Grinter alleges "defendants” violated his "equal rights” in violation of § 1981. "This court has adopted the requirement that a plaintiff allege with particularity all material facts to be relied upon when asserting that a governmental official has violated a constitutional right.” Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir.2002). Such "conclusoiy, unsupported statements” are "insufficient to state a claim.” Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.2001). 3) (<HOLDING>), and Jones Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 801, 807 Holdings: 0: holding that the prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies as to each defendant later sued 1: holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim 2: holding that a prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies even though his grievance was untimely 3: holding that an alien must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief from detention 4: holding that a prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not utilize grievance procedures that permitted waiver of the time limit for good cause


Input: not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way ...” Expert Discovery: Pertinent Portions ofMass.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4) “Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable . . . and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows: (A)(1) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion ...” Discussion It is well settled that “the conduct and scope of discove 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, in some instances, if a court Holdings: 0: holding no due process violation with respect to hearings for protective orders against domestic abuse 1: holding that production of documents without seeking a protective order waives the right to such an order unless there is a showing of good cause for the delay 2: holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint 3: holding that to gain a protective order the party must make particularized showing of good cause with respect to any individual document 4: holding that to survive a motion for summary judgment a party must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial


Input: in the area of and similar to Kleinholz’s. United States v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301, 1306 (8th Cir.1984) (“An anonymous tip from an informer may serve as a basis for probable cause as long as its reliability is established through corroboration.”). Additionally, though neither party or the court below seems to find the fact relevant law enforcement had just arrested Kleinholz’s companion on Klein-holz’s front porch for possession of marijuana and other drug paraphernalia. Most importantly, however, law enforcement smelled ether: a substance known to be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. United States v. Francis, 327 F.3d 729, 736 (8th Cir.2003). The smell of ether might alone support a finding of probable cause. See United States v. Clayton, 210 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). But certainly such an odor coupled with other Holdings: 0: holding that an officer had probable cause to search bags in the trunk of the car when he opened the trunk and smelled a strong odor of methamphetamine 1: holding officer developed probable cause for a search based on his immediate perception of an odor associated with methamphetamine production 2: holding the odor of an etherlike substance in combination with other circumstances gave officers probable cause to search a vehicle 3: holding that although pcp has no odor because streetlevel pcp is mixed with other substances that have a distinct odor an officers recognition of that odor was sufficient to establish probable cause 4: holding officer had probable cause after detecting an odor associated with cocaine because of officers experience from prior cocaine seizures


Input: however, imposed upon the police the duty to inform the juvenile of that right, and we cannot do so where the statute is silent. Hence, this case is very similar to K.M. v. State, 335 Ark. 85, 983 S.W.2d 93 (1998), where we recently held that a juvenile does not have a right to assert the insanity defense in the adjudication phase of a delinquency proceeding because no such right could be found in the constitution or the juvenile statute. Although we may question the prudence of giving a juvenile a right without imposing a corresponding duty on the police to inform the juvenile of that right, that is a policy decision properly left to the legislature, and not this court. See Norton v. Hinson, 337 Ark. 487, 989 S.W.2d 535 (1999); McDonald v. Pettus, 337 Ark. 265, 989 S.W.2d 9 (1999) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we affirm the trial Holdings: 0: holding that jurisdiction to decide whether a debt belongs to one of the classes that would bring it within the scope of section 523a3b lies exclusively in the bankruptcy courts 1: holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion 2: recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision 3: holding that the determination of public policy lies almost exclusively in the legislative domain and the decision of the general assembly in that regard will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of palpable error 4: holding that the primary obligation for the disclosure of matters which are essentially in the prosecutorial domain lies with the government


Input: its end of their bargain and to deliver what was promised. The striking feature of a typical no-injury class is that the plaintiffs have either not yet experienced a malfunction because of the alleged defect or have experienced a malfunction but not been harmed by it. Therefore, the plaintiffs in a no-injury products liability case have not suffered any physical harm or out-of-pocket economic loss. Here, the damages sought by the Coghlans are not rooted in the alleged defect of the product as such, but in the fact that they did not receive the benefit of their bargain. Coghlan v. Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 455 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001). The Fifth Circuit also noted that “the determination that there has been no injury in [cases like this] must be an evidentia-ry one.” Id. at 455 (<HOLDING>). Most courts recognize that the failure to Holdings: 0: holding that a trial court entered judgment on the pleadings where the decision did not depend on any document outside the pleadings 1: holding that district court acted prematurely by dismissing case on the pleadings 2: holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence 3: holding court must have evidence to support dismissal before dismissing a case for fraud on the court 4: holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim


Input: obtained [the funds] in the first place, but no longer [has] a valid claim to retain them” because they were “in excess of his fee for the services rendered” in the Oxford actions and (2) that he “was not found to have himself violated the securities laws and has not been alleged to have committed other acts of fraud by the SEC.” Id. at 24, 27 (citing In re Sherman, 491 F.3d at 959). The SEC argues in contrast that there is no “consensus” among courts that § 523(a)(19) applies only when the debt derives from a securities law violation by the debtor. Id. at 10. The SEC contends that none of the cases cited by Sherman involved a nominal defendant and that In re Matthews is the only case presenting similar facts. Id. (citing Case No. 07-10108-BH (Bankr.W.D.Okla. Dec. 12, 2008) (<HOLDING>)). The SEC argues that the court in In re Holdings: 0: holding that puffery is not actionable under the securities laws 1: holding that the defendant was nondisehargeable where the plaintiff estab lished a violation of oklahoma securities laws by showing that defendants were in possession of funds that belonged to other investors 2: holding that the in connection with requirement of rule 10b5 was satisfied where investors were injured as investors through respondents deceptions and the scheme to defraud and the sale of securities coineided 3: holding that morrison precludes securities claims brought by us investors who purchase securities on a foreign exchange even where those securities are also listed on a us exchange 4: holding that nyseg telling its investors that it would not compromise its financial integrity was not actionable under the securities laws


Input: the option. Rentrak would not have been prevented legally from selling Dixon registered stock. 6 . The purpose of the holding period prior to resale is to assure that purchasers of unregistered stock “have assumed the economic risks of investment, and therefore are not acting as conduits for sale to the public of unregistered securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of an issuer.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1999), Preliminary Note. 7 . Rentrak also argues that Dixon failed to meet his evidentiary burden in opposing summary judgment on his stock option claim. This argument fails. Rentrak identifies no evidence that it brought forth such that the burden would have shifted to Dixon to produce evidence in support of his claim. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the entire dispute centered on Holdings: 0: holding nonmoving partys affidavit created genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an employment relationship 1: holding that once the moving party meets its burden the nonmoving party is obliged to produce evidence in response 2: holding that nonmoving party need not produce evidence unless moving party first brings forth evidence either tending to prove lack of genuine issue of material fact or challenging existence of element of cause of action 3: holding that when the moving party submits a properly supported summary judgment motion the nonmoving party must produce affirmative evidence to demonstrate genuine issue of fact and may not rely simply on denials or allegations in pleadings 4: recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case


Input: assign all inventions to the University of Washington in which it had an interest: Q. Did you understand that if you were doing research work for Washington using their facilities, that they would own the patents resulting from that work? A. Yes. * * * Q. Was it your—although you didn’t read this document, was. it your understanding that you had assigned to the University all discoveries and inventions in which the University has an interest? A. Yés. - (7/1/14 Liu Tr. at 97:9-12; 98:14-18). According to Defendants, Dr. Liu’s employment agreement constitutes an “automatic” assignment that, upon conception, immediately assigned his inventions to the University of Washington with no further required action on his part. See Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1253 (Fed.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Holdings: 0: holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness 1: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits 2: holding that claims against corporate officers for mismanagement belong to the corporation 3: holding agreement stating inventions shall belong and that employee hereby conveys transfers and assigns to its employer constitutes an automatic assignment 4: holding that whether an employee decides to assist the charging party or refuses to assist the  employer the employer may not retaliate against the employee because this decision of the employee constitutes participation in an investigation or proceeding under title vii


Input: a February 3, 2011, work injury. Employer contends that simply telling Brian Yoder that he fell, even if true, did not satisfy the Act’s notice requirements. Accordingly, the claim petition should have been denied. The claimant has the burden of proving all elements necessary to support an award of benefits. Inglis House v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Reedy), 535 Pa. 135, 634 A.2d 592, 595 (1993). Section 311 of the Act requires the claimant to inform his employer of a work injury within 120 days of its occurrence. If he fails to do so, he is ineligible for compensation. 77 P.S. § 631. This deadline cannot be extended where the claimant asserts that he told a fellow employee of the injury. Canterna v. United States Steel Corporation, 12 Pa.Cmwlth. 579, 317 A.2d 355, 357 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Timely, notice “protect[s] the employer from Holdings: 0: holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury 1: holding clear and convincing evidence established that the claimants attempted suicide was the result of a mental injury suffered subsequent to a compensable injury 2: holding claimants status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for workrelated injury 3: holding that limitations period begins to run on date notice was received at claimants residence even if claimant did not receive it until a later date 4: holding a claimants injury report to a fellow employee did not satisfy the act because the claimants supervisor did not learn of the injury until six months later


Input: notes that the Secretary has averred that a search for the claims file has been made in the OGC, the Board, and all ROs. Id. at 20; July 17, 1998, Motion at 2; June 17, 1998, Motion at 1. Because, for the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the petition is without merit, the Court will deny as moot the Secretary's motion to strike that petition. “The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.” Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976). Before a court may issue a writ, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) a clear and indisputable right to the writ and (2) a lack of adequate alternative means to obtain the relief sought. See In Matter of Fee Agreement of Cox, 10 Vet.App. 361, 370 (1997) (<HOLDING>), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Cox Holdings: 0: holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider claims under the all writs act 1: recognizing the all writs act gives federal courts authority to issue writs of coram nobis to correct fundamental errors in criminal proceedings where the person is no longer in custody 2: holding that removal to federal court was proper for claims asserted under all writs act 3: holding that this court has power under 28 usc  1651 to issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law 4: holding that this court has authority in appropriate circumstances to issue writs under all writs act 28 usc  1651a


Input: § 78dd-l et seq. (2000). 3 . United States v. Kay, 200 F.Supp.2d 681, 686 (S.D.Tex.2002). 4 . United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 369 (5th Cir.1999). 5 . United States v. Hogue, 132 F.3d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir.1998). 6 . United States v. Bearden, 423 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir.1970) (citations omitted). 7 . United States v. Ramirez, 233 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir.2000). 8 . Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). 9 . Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 10 . United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). 11 . United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Naranjo, 259 F.3d 379, 383 Holdings: 0: recognizing principle 1: recognizing this as the general rule 2: recognizing this rule 3: recognizing same principle 4: recognizing this principle as a settled rule


Input: challenge out-sourcing decisions under statutes that were designed to promote that practice. See Courtney, 297 F.3d at 461; Am. Fed. of Gov’t Emps., Local 2119, 171 F.3d at 471; Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., 883 F.2d at 1042-54. Subsequent to these decisions, as well as the Federal Circuit’s decision in AFGE, Congress passed a specific provision authorizing certain federal employees to challenge the outcome of public-private competitions conducted under Circular A-76. See Pub.L. No. 108-375, § 326(a)(2), 118 Stat. 1811, 1848 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3551(2)(B)). There is no comparable provision authorizing the suit by plaintiff here. 23 . For similar rulings involving efforts to enjoin the termination of a contract, see Data Monitor Sys., Inc. v. United States, 74 Fed.Cl. 66, 71-72 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Griffy’s Landscape Maint. LLC v. United Holdings: 0: holding that the awardee of a contract may not challenge the decision to terminate that contract by invoking the courts bid protest jurisdiction 1: holding that a denial of a bid protest without holding a hearing did not deprive a disappointed bidder of any property rights because there is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a government contract unless the contract actually is awarded 2: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction under the bid protest provisions of section 1491 to enjoin a contracting agencys termination of a contract 3: holding that size protest filed postaward may be controlling if contracting officer decided to reaward the contract 4: holding that in bid protest cases  a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure


Input: under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir.2001); Sheikh v. Chertoff, No. C 03-05604, 2006 WL 463506, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10110 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 23, 2006). Federal courts lack jurisdiction to grant habeas relief where the petitioner seeking that relief is not in fact “in custody” at the time the petition is filed. Id. Relevantly, section 2241(c)(3) provides that the “writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless ... [she] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Although Petitioner is not, literally, a prisoner of the INS, courts th Cir.2001) (same); Galaviz-Medina v. Wooten, 27 F.3d 487, 493 (10th Cir.1994) (same); Mustata v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1021 n. 4 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1299 Holdings: 0: holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional 1: holding that no specialized skill or distinctive knowledge was needed to represent an alien at asylum and withholding of deportation hearings 2: holding a final deportation order places an alien constructively in custody1 because of the specialized meaning those words have in the context of an immigrationrelated habeas petition 3: holding that so long as the petitioner is subject to a final order of deportation an alien is deemed to be in custody1 for purposes of the ina 4: holding that habeas review is  for any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation


Input: in human experience”). In the present case, the wife’s right not to become a parent seemingly conflicts with the husband’s right to procreate. The conflict, however, is more apparent than real. Recognition and enforcement of the wife’s right would not seriously impair the husband’s right to procreate. Though his right to procreate using the wife’s egg would be terminated, he retains the capacity to father children. On the . Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 487, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 1346, 99 L.Ed.2d 565, 576-77 (1988) (finding state action in probate court’s involvement in administration of Oklahoma’s statute requiring decedent’s creditors to present claim within two months of publication of notice) and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265, 84 S.Ct. 710, 718, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 697-98 (1964) (<HOLDING>) with Davis v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 59 Holdings: 0: holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law 1: recognizing that a federal habeas court does not rule on errors in the application of state law especially rulings regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence 2: holding that application by alabama courts of alabama rule of law regarding libel constituted state action 3: holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law 4: recognizing district court application of the same rule


Input: violated Doyle in his closing argument. First, he impeached Fields’ trial testimony that he did not remember the stabbing by calling attention to his response, “I ain’t saying nothing,” to the question of whether he had stabbed Fodness raised by Officer Mattson during his first post -Miranda warnings interview. See supra note 2. Second, the prosecutor also referenced Fields’ response, “I won’t talk to you about that without an attorney,” to questions by Detective Norlin regarding what happened when Fodness and Fields were in the bushes across the street from the Pomp Room. See supra note 2. Under Greenfield, both of the statements that the prosecutor used to impeach Fields’ trial testimony were invocations of Fields’ Miranda rights. Cf. Greenfield, 474 U.S. at 295, 106 S.Ct. at 640 (<HOLDING>). Further, Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. at Holdings: 0: holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible 1: holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights 2: holding that defendants invocation of miranda rights is inadmissible to prove defendants sanity 3: holding that defendants request to call his mother to get an attorney was an invocation of miranda rights requiring that further questioning must end 4: holding that evidence of a defendants invocation of the right to remain silent ordinarily is not admissible at the defendants criminal trial


Input: address challenges raised for the first time on appeal in numerous cases." On the particular cireum-stances presented, we decline to do so. 29 This concession "raises the question of the extent to which defendant is entitled to appellate review of this issue." People v. Allman, 2012 COA 212, 114, 321 P.3d 557. The Allman division recognized "two lines of authority in Colorado on this question in criminal cases." Id.; see People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 932 (Colo.App.2011) (describing Colorado law on reviewing an unpreserved constitutional challenge as in a "muddled state.") (J. Jones, J., specially concurring) 30 The position that a constitutional challenge to a statute should not be entertained for the first time on appeal derives from People v. Lesney, 855 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Colo.1993) (<HOLDING>), and People v. Cagle, 751 P.2d 614, 619 Holdings: 0: holding constitutional challenge to void statute may be raised for first time on appeal 1: holding issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review 2: holding that issues not properly presented to the bankruptcy court  cannot be raised  for the first time on appeal 3: holding that a constitutional challenge to a statute is not properly preserved for appellate review if as here it is not presented to the trial court and is raised for the first time on appeal 4: holding an issue not raised to the family court is not preserved for appellate review


Input: or practice of the employer ... [which] is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation ...” Abbamont, Barratt and Mehlman clearly involved complaints regarding actions of the employer. In Abbamont, it was the employer’s failure to provide a safe school environment; in Barratt, the employee accused the secondary employer of commercial bribery; in Mehlman, the employer was selling gasoline with an unhealthy benzene content. See also Delran Ed. Ass’n. v. Bd. of Educ., 277 N.J.Super. 538, 543-44, 650 A.2d 7 (App.Div.1994) (suggesting that retaliation against teacher for refusing to obey school superintendent’s order to give confidential pupil records to independent contractor would violate CEPA); Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 236 N.J.Super. 451, 460, 566 A.2d 215 (App.Div.1989) (<HOLDING>). Employers, of course, act through their Holdings: 0: holding that retaliation against inhouse attorney for refusing to join a scheme to cheat a competitor is covered under cepa 1: holding that a plaintiff can prove illegal retaliation under   1981 in the same manner as he establishes retaliation under title vii 2: holding that interference and retaliation are two separate theories that can be advanced under the fmla and that termination is evidence of retaliation 3: recognizing exceptions for retaliation against whistle blowers and retaliation against filers of workers compensation claims 4: holding that but for standard applied to retaliation case brought under texas law


Input: privilege to avoid liability here. See Petta, 44 S.W.3d at 579-80; see also Saldaña, 2001 WL 85862, at *1. S. Were the Requirements of § 9.51(a) Satisfied? Given that the Government can invoke the § 9.51(a) privilege, we must then ask whether the agents’ conduct conformed to the requirements of § 9.51(a). The district court’s findings, which are not clearly erroneous, indicate that the agents were (1) “peace officers” who (2) identified themselves as officers when they entered the Salon, (3) reasonably believed the arrest of Villafi'anca was lawful based on his resistance, (4) made clear their purpose to arrest Villafranca, and (5) used force reasonably believed to be immediately necessary to make the arrest. See also Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1276-77 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Hinojosa, 834 F.2d at 1231 (concluding that a Holdings: 0: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim 1: holding that deputies use of a police dog is subject to excessive force analysis 2: holding that ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing a lawyer into court was a judicial act 3: holding that the right to be free from the use of excessive force has been well established since 1976 4: holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied


Input: CURIAM. Affirmed. See Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Adams v. State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>); see also Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138, 141 Holdings: 0: holding that section 89313 as amended by section 893101 florida statutes 2002 is constitutional 1: recognizing that the 1992 amendment to section 8930216 florida statutes changed the law 2: holding florida sexual predators act section 77521 florida statutes 2000 to be unconstitutional as violating procedural due process 3: holding that arbitration is not a civil action as that term is used in section 76873 florida statutes 1991 4: holding that the legislature amended section 8120142d florida statutes now renumbered as section 8120143c in 1992 to omit habitual offender penalties for the crime of felony petit theft


Input: violating the First Amendment. Beyond their general reliance on R.A.V., the defendants are imprecise as to the specifics of their First Amendment contention. Nonetheless, we will briefly explain why the First Amendment does not bar their convictions and sentences on any of the usual grounds: first, the statutes under which the defendants were prosecuted, 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), and 42 U.S.C. § 3631, are facially valid; second, the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; and, third, the statutes are not unconstitutional as applied in this ease. We will then explain why prosecu-torial comments about the defendants’ racial animus and Klan membership were permissible, and why the district court’s comments on the same subjects at sentencing wer 1 (9th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860, 108 S.Ct. 173, 98 Holdings: 0: holding  3631 not vague or overbroad 1: holding that the prohibition against fighting in fla admin code r 33601314  24 was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad 2: holding the ordinance as applied to entertainers performing at a sexuallyoriented business is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad 3: holding  241 not vague or overbroad 4: holding  241 and 3631 not vague


Input: See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401-02, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1788, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (“Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts."). 3 . If this case were brought under general maritime law, and no cause of action were available under admiralty statutes, punitive damages would be "theoretically" available. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1091 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846, 106 S.Ct. 136, 88 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985). But see Boykin v. Bergesen D.Y. A/S, 822 F.Supp. 324, 326 (E.D.Va.1993) (<HOLDING>); Gaines v. Ampro Fisheries, 836 F.Supp. 347, Holdings: 0: holding that general maritime law preempts state law 1: holding punitive damages not recoverable for retaliatory discharge claim under general maritime law 2: holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions 3: holding punitive damages unavailable for survival claims under general maritime law 4: recognizing loss of society damages as remedy available under general maritime law


Input: liability under the law of the state where the accident occurred. See Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws § 17.56 (4th ed. 2004) (citing cases showing split of authority whether insureds must prove they are legally entitled to recover under law of state where policy was issued or state in which accident occurred, for purposes of UM or UIM coverage). This application of Crossley is supported by cases from other jurisdictions cited in that opinion. See, Bachman v. American Mutual Insurance Co. of Boston, 338 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Kan. 1972) (concluding in action against decedent’s insurer that plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden of showing uninsured motorist was liable for injuries to plaintiff’s son); Noland v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 413 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Mo. App. 1967) (<HOLDING>). This application of Crossley, supra, is also Holdings: 0: holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled 1: holding that waiver of um coverage was ineffective under south carolina law because insurer did not adequately advise insured party about um coverage 2: holding public policy of um statute not violated by exclusion of um coverage for passenger of vehicle driven by excluded driver 3: holding that where missouri insured was injured in missouri when car in which she was riding was struck by separate uninsured vehicle driven by her husband and where missouri law precluded wife from suing husband insured was not entitled to um benefits because coverage was provided only when um motorist was legally responsible for damages noting that action against insurer was upon contract not tort and that the terms of the contract govern 4: holding that while the owner of several vehicles by paying a single premium for um coverage applicable to only one of them secures um coverage for himself and his family while occupying the uninsured vehicles as well as the insured vehicle the number of uninsured motorist coverages available to be stacked should be based upon the number of coverages for which uninsured motorist premiums were paid


Input: and support of the child in accordance with their respective means. Until established by a court order, the minimum child support obligation of a parent who fails to furnish maintenance, education, and support for his child, following a continued absence from the home, is the obligor’s share of the amount shown in the support guidelines, commencing on the first day of the absence. 4 . See Shaughnessy v. Shaughnessy, 1999 WL 692085 (Del.Fam.Ct.1999) (affording father credit in the amount of $7,571.42 against back child support for mortgage payments made to the mother and/or the mortgage holder); Lynch v. Lynch, 422 So.2d 703, 706 (La.Ct.App.1982) (reversing a circuit court's deletion of father's credit for house payments); Lauria v. Lauria, 45 A.D.3d 535, 845 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Fogarty v. Fogarty, 284 A.D.2d 300, 725 Holdings: 0: holding that it was within the courts discretion to credit fathers arrearages for onehalf of the mortgage payments that he made 1: holding that fathers investment account with stock brokerage firm was not a multipleparty account available for payment of child support 2: holding that the insurer was entitled to credit against the owners claim in the amount paid to the mortgagee 3: holding that the court erred in failing to credit fathers child support account for the entire amount that he paid for the mothers mortgage 4: holding that mortgage payments should not be regarded as child support because it was a contractual legal obligation that built fathers equity


Input: determine total loss, restitution victims and restitution amount. J.A. 30113. 2 . As a general matter, restitution is part of a criminal sentence. See United States v. Bu-chey, 810 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir.1987) ("Criminal restitution ... is part of the sentencing process [and thus] is fundamentally 'penal' in nature.”); see also United States v. Snider, 957 F.2d 703, 706-07 (9th Cir.1992) (“Restitution imposed as a component of the defendant’s sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy.”); United States v. Satter-field, 1A3, F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that Congress intended "to treat restitution as one of the options available to the district court in imposing an appropriate sen tence”). In fact, we have previously held that restitution F.3d 969, 973-74 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Tucker v. Waddell, 83 F.3d 688, 690 n. 1 (4th Holdings: 0: holding issue waived because it was not mentioned in brief but was only raised in notice of appeal 1: holding that an issue mentioned in a brief but not addressed is waived 2: holding argument not raised in opening brief but raised for the first time in reply brief was waived 3: holding issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal 4: holding an issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal


Input: the Tax Court relied on its previous opinion in Manocchio v. Commissioner, supra, which reached the equal treatment issue. However, at the time that Manocchio was decided by the Tax Court, the Commissioner had not issued Revenue Ruling 83-3 which disallowed the deduction of educational expenses that were allocable to a portion of the veterans’ educational benefits other than flight training. This ruling, however, was prospective only. After the Tax Court had rendered its decision in this case, the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits reached different conclusions as to whether the application of Revenue Rulings 80-173 and 83-3 have resulted in the disparate treatment of similarly situated taxpayers. Manocchio v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 1400, 1404 & n.2 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Baker v. United States, 748 F.2d 1465 (11th Holdings: 0: holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction 1: recognizing this distinction 2: holding that a law survives rational basis review so long as there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification 3: holding rational basis as standard for commerce clause inquiries 4: recognizing heightened rational basis scrutiny


Input: to Officer Rucker, "[h]e could have had money and you wouldn’t have" found it. 10 . Testimony "so unbelievable, on its face that it defies physical laws” would be "incredible as a matter of law”. United States v. McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1086, 106 S.Ct. 861, 88 L.Ed.2d 900 (1986). 11 . The federal, reasonable-doubt standard is articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 12 . Knox refers here to La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 15:438 (West 1981) which states that "[t]he rule as to circumstantial evidence is: assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” 13 . Compare State v. Williams, 423 So.2d 1048, 1052 (La.1982) (<HOLDING>) with State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 468 n. 3 Holdings: 0: recognizing that kotteakos sets out the harmlesserror standard for nonconstitutional errors 1: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 2: holding that larevstatann  15438 west 1981 sets standard above federal law 3: recognizing that section 103 sets forth the standard and so synergism of a known combination is not required 4: holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied


Input: ground or theory apparent on the record." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 1158 (emphases, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). ' 51 Whether an employee such as Carsey owed a fiduciary duty to his employer is unclear under Utah law. See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, ¶ 22 n. 2, 94 P.3d 179 ("We need not, and do not, decide today whether all 'mere employees' owe fiduciary duties to their employers to not compete with the employer's legitimate business interests."). However, we need not grapple with this issue here, as we agree with Carsey that CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim is preempted by the UTSA. [ 52 Examination of the factual allegations underlying CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim shows that this claim is b 857-58 & n. 3 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 153 NH. Holdings: 0: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it was completely dependent on the facts concerning misappropriation of trade secrets 1: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it was solely dependent upon misappropriationoftradesecret facts 2: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba 3: holding copyright act preempted photographers misappropriation claim when claim did not have extra element such as breach of fiduciary duty 4: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because the factual allegations supporting that claim involved only the misappropriation of  information


Input: Saulpaugh whole, its failure to apply a compound rate of interest to its calculation of damages constituted an abuse of discretion. See Clarke, 960 F.2d at 1153. On remand, however, the district court may wish to deny interest for specific years if it concludes that a delay in the litigation was the result of dilatory tactics by the plaintiff. We leave this determination to the district court in the first instance. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Saulpaugh the remedy of front pay. The award of front pay is discretionary, and where as here the district court makes a specific finding that an award of back pay was sufficient to make a plaintiff whole, no abuse of discretion can be found. Cf. Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). V. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees Saulpaugh next Holdings: 0: holding that it is within the courts discretion to award both reinstatement and punitive damages for violation of  2114 although finding that the district courts decision not to award such remedies did not constitute an abuse of discretion 1: holding that an award of compensation for future lost earnings or front pay is an equitable matter for the court not the jury 2: holding that failure to award front pay because the district court impliedly found that other relief was sufficient did not constitute an abuse of discretion 3: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 4: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife


Input: statutes where possible and the legislative history of the Whistleblower Law. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that claims brought under the Whistle- blower Law are torts subject to the OTCA and that whistleblower remedies are not directly in conflict with the OTCA. Dr. Rabkin’s jury award of $500,000 under the Whistleblower Law must accordingly be remitted to $200,000 as set forth in the OTCA. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court in the appeal brought by OHSU. We now turn to Dr. Rabkin’s cross-appeal. VI. ,We review a district court’s ruling regarding equitable reinstatement for an abuse of discretion. Gotthardt v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir.1999); see also Cancellier v. Federated Dep’t Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). “The district court abuses its discretion Holdings: 0: holding that reinstatement in an age discrimination case lies within the discretion of the trial court after careful consideration of the particular facts of the case 1: holding that whether dismissal or transfer is appropriate lies within the sound discretion of the district court 2: holding that the weight accorded to evidence lies largely within the discretion of the agency 3: holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion 4: holding that the decision whether to grant reconsideration lies largely within the discretion of the trial court


Input: is subjected to the heightened pleading standard of Iqbal and Twombly ”). Again, this is a matter of both fairness and common sense. To state a claim of direct infringement, a complaint need allege no more than what is required by Form 18. Confronted with such a claim, a defendant seeking a declaration of noninfringement can hardly be expected to plead facts supporting such a judgment in much detail. The defendant can do little more, at the pleading stage, than deny the plaintiffs allegations. A claim of indirect infringement, on the other hand, will presumably have met the relatively stringent standards of Twombly and Iqbal, and will allege specific facts showing how the defendant is alleged to have induced or cont Inc., No. CV 11-7658, 2012 WL 681765, at *3 (C.D.Cal. Feb. 8, 2012) (<HOLDING>) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(g)). In addition, Holdings: 0: holding that conclusory allegation in complaint was insufficient to demonstrate that defendant offered to sell goods within new york 1: holding that stating that the court erred without advancing reasons why is insufficient appellate argument 2: holding that conclusory allegation of conspiracy without supporting factual averments insufficient to state claim 3: holding that conclusory allegation of patent invalidity is insufficient and noting that there are at least seven reasons why a patent might be invalid 4: holding that vague conclusory statements are insufficient


Input: v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 63 Fla. 122, 58 So. 182, 184 (1912). 46 . Fla. Stat. § 726.105(l)(a). 47 . Fla. Stat. § 726.105(l)(b). 48 . Fla. Stat. § 726.106(1). 49 . In re Phoenix Diversified Investment Corp., 2011 WL 2182881, *4 (Bankr.S.D. Fla. June 2, 2011). That determination is made on the specific facts of the case and the circumstances relevant to the transaction. In re 21st Century Satellite Communications, Inc., 278 B.R. 577, 582 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2002). 50 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 115-1, SAM Case, Doc. No. 61-1. 51 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 50. 52 .See Goldberg v. Chong, 2007 WL 2028792, *6 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2007) (noting that a transferor may not manufacture an illusory debt merely to satisfy the statute). Cf. In re Southmark Corp., 138 B.R. 820, 830 (Bankr. N.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>). 53 . 138 B.R. at 830. 54 . At the time, the Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment 1: holding that judgment debtor received reasonably equivalent value when judgment creditor received payment under a supersedeas bond and subsequently released its judgment 2: recognizing holding in miner that a judgment creditor can file a new action to seek to pierce the corporate veil of a judgment debtor and hold individual shareholders and directors liable 3: holding llcs were entitled to notice of proceedings supplemental instituted by a judgment creditor to attempt to obtain judgment debtors interests in the companies to pay judgment debt 4: holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular


Input: limit their inquiry to the facts stated in the complaint and the documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint”). 8 . See International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264 (5th Cir.1991) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). 9 . See id. 10 . Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 11 . See Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 506 (5th Cir.1999). 12 . See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 13 . See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). 14 . See id. 15 . Gonzalez v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 610 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir.1980). 16 . See Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Ci F.Supp. at 994. 24 . Plt.'s Supp. at Ex. E. 25 . See Gonzalez, 610 F.2d at 245-46 Holdings: 0: holding that the state was estopped to argue that the 90day notice period  expired on a date prior to the expiration date it cited to the claimant 1: holding that the eeoc has the authority to rescind one ntrs and replace it with another but only if it gives both parties notice of its intent to do so within the 90day period provided by the initial ntrs 2: holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties 3: holding in the context of the 90day period during which a plaintiff must bring suit after receiving a right to sue letter that in the absence of a recognized equitable consideration the court cannot extend the limitations period by even one day 4: holding that the 90day evaluation period begins to run from the time notice of a claim has been filed even though the public agency requests additional information after that date