Input: Judge. Devin Lavonne Bryant appeals his judgment and sentence for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as against victim Leugim Freytes-Calderon. We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Bryant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and we therefore affirm. Bryant argues that bec 5th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>); Parker v. State, 389 So.2d 336, 337 (Fla. 4th Holdings: 0: holding that evidence was sufficient where there was testimony that appellant was seen threatening the victim and that other people were afraid 1: holding that evidence was sufficient to establish aggravated assault where appellant was seen pointing and firing a gun at two women 2: holding that evidence was sufficient where appellant verbally threatened victim and pointed gun at him and then at a group of people causing everyone to scatter 3: holding that evidence that victims body was found naked that victim had been seen pushing the defendant away before she was shot and that there were possible finger marks on one of the victims thighs was insufficient evidence to support attemptedrape conviction 4: holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed


Input: Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C.Cir. 1998), on reh’g, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C.Cir. 1999), is inconsistent with the Navegar line of cases. As the court explained, however, the plaintiff police officers in that case complained of an ongoing constitutional injury due to the conflict between local law enforcement duties and the federal law at issue. See Fraternal Order, 152 F.3d at 1001. Navegar and its progeny, as well as the present case, deal with the potential of prosecutions that could cause injury only in the future, if at all. 4 . Plaintiffs in each case asked for and were granted dismissal without prejudice rather than transfer so that they could appeal immediately. They did appeal, but neither appeal was successful. See Dearth v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 413 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Hodgkins v. Mukasey, 271 Fed.Appx. 412 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff generally may not appeal a voluntary dismissal without prejudice because it is not an involuntary adverse judgment against him 1: holding that a voluntary dismissal moots a case 2: holding that this court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a stipulated voluntary dismissal with prejudice unless it was intended to settle the case 3: holding appeal improper since the dismissal was voluntary 4: holding the plain legal prejudice test applies to voluntary dismissal under the code


Input: of Rule 37(b)(2)(i) or (iv) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, or if the defendant seeks review of the sentence and there was no plea agreement concerning the sentence, or if the issues presented for review were not waived as a matter of law by the plea of guilty or nolo contendere and if such issues are apparent from the record of the proceedings already had. The defendant may also appeal as of right from an order denying or revoking probation, and from a final judgment in a criminal contempt, habeas corpus, extradition, or post-conviction proceeding. See Moody v. State, 160 S.W.Sd 512, 516 (Tenn.2005) (stating that Rule 3(b) “does not authorize a direct appeal of a dismissal of a motion to correct an illegal sentence”); State v. Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tenn.2002) (<HOLDING>); State v. Leath, 977 S.W.2d 132, 135 Holdings: 0: holding the state does not have an appeal as of right under rule 3c from a trial courts order expunging public records 1: holding that under the doctrine of direct estoppel a law firms failure to appeal the bankruptcy courts earlier order barred it from challenging the courts holding on its appeal from a subsequent order 2: holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception 3: holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records 4: holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of records protected by tennessee rule of criminal procedure 16


Input: denial of the early retirees' claims. MATTHEWS, Justice, not participating. 1 . AS 39.35.150(a) (1977). 2 . Id. 3 . Former AS 39.35.150 (1974). 4 . Former AS 39.35.150(a) (1974) (emphasis added). 5 . Former AS 39.35.150(b) (1974). 6 . Former AS 39.35.680(1) (1960). The definition now appears in AS 39.35.680(2) and is substantively the same, but has been retitled "actuarial adjustment." 7 . The State of Alaska Public Employees Retirement System Board adopted this interpretation in its November 1980 decision, In the Matter of the Appeal of Walter L. Kubley. 8 . Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Alaska 1981); see also Sheffield v. Alaska Pub. Employees' Ass'n, Inc., 732 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Alaska 1987). 9 . Hammond, 627 P.2d at 1056, 1057; see also Sheffield, 732 P.2d at 1085 (<HOLDING>). 10 . The applicable statute provided that Holdings: 0: holding that the state cannot make changes to the retirement system that will diminish a members benefits without providing an offsetting advantage 1: holding in postamendment case that offsetting social security retirement benefits against permanent total disability payments rationally related to reducing wagereplacement benefits for retired workers 2: holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed 3: holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa 4: holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits


Input: however, that private contractual arrangements are not subject to constitutional requirements of objective standards. Id. 20. In the private sector, standards of reasonableness are commonly applied or implied which take into account the facts and the circumstances. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 55-1-102(3) (1961) (stating that under the Uniform Commercial Code, “parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable”); Watson Truck & Supply Co. v. Males, 111 N.M. 57, 60, 801 P.2d 639, 642 (1990) (every contract imposes upon parties a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement); Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 241, 638 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1982) (<HOLDING>). 21. Although New Mexico has never dealt Holdings: 0: holding that the right to support is not subject to waiver by either parent 1: holding that the right of approval is subject to standards of reasonableness implied by law 2: holding that there is no constitutional right to refuse chemical testing under the implied consent law 3: holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration 4: holding that unilateral right to select independent counsel is subject to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing


Input: A.M.C. 1578, 1580-81 (E.D.Va.1982); Wyche v. Oldendorff, 284 F.Supp. 575, 576-77 (E.D.Va.1967); Saridis v. S.S. Paramarina, 216 F.Supp. 794, 797 (E.D.Va.1962). Furthermore, although the Fourth Circuit has not addressed this issue in any exhaustive opinion, it has rejected the theory that the time charter entitles an injured longshoreman to recovery as a third party beneficiary. See Bernard v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 1134, 1135-36 (4th Cir.1973) (per curiam) (noting that “charter party created no contractual duty to the longshoreman on the part of the United States as time charterer”). Other jurisdictions have also agreed that .Ed.2d 278 (1982) and mandate amended on different grounds, 702 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.1983); Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., Ltd., 542 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). However, the Court finds that that authority Holdings: 0: holding that a charter party creates no contractual duty towards a longshoreman on the part of a time charterer 1: holding that clause 8 of the nype charter party expressly makes the time charterer hable for the vessels neghgence 2: holding that clause eight requires time charterer to indemnify shipowner for any damages awarded because of injury to longshoreman 3: holding that clause eight imposes liability on time charterer for injuries to longshoremen 4: holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages


Input: the BIA’s substantive review of the IJ’s decision .was flawed.” Id. At oral argument, Awe’s attorney acknowledged that he had missed the briefing deadline, but argued that “his mistake was not fatal because the Notice of Appeal gave the BIA a ‘fair appraisal’ of the issues to be addressed in Awe’s appeal.” Id. at 513. We held that Awe’s notice argument was waived because he failed to present it to the court prior to oral argument. However, we continued: Even assuming Awe had not waived his right,to challenge the BIA’s procedural dismissal, we note that 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2)(i)(D) explicitly gives the BIA authority to dismiss procedurally defective appeals, and we have condoned the BIA’s use of this power in cases similar to this one. See Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498, 499 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); accord Rioja v. Ashcroft, 317 F.3d 514, Holdings: 0: holding that reply brief is appropriate forum to rebut new material raised in appellees brief 1: holding that a party may pursue an issue not raised in its initial brief where a substantial change in law occurs after the brief was filed 2: holding that a party abandons claims that he does not argue in his brief 3: holding that appellate counsels admitted failure to timely file the brief constituted good cause to grant motion for belated brief 4: holding summary dismissal appropriate where party indicated he would file brief requested and received 30day filing extension and never filed brief nor explained why he had not


Input: perceived to be false benefits that would contravene the rules of professional conduct for accountants; she was unable to identify any other benefits, and she was later terminated. Such evidence satisfies the Lorenz standard for purposes of our limited consideration on appeal of a directed verdict. IV. In conclusion, we hold that professional codes may be a source of public policy for purposes of a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Mariani properly relied on Rule 7.3 of the Colorado State Board of Accountancy Rules of Professional Conduct as a source of public policy. She further presented evidence sufficient to satisfy the prima facie requirements of Lorenz. On the evidence Mariani adduced at trial, reasonable jurors could 0 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Mo.Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>); Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Holdings: 0: holding that where statutory or regulatory provisions which evidence the public policy themselves provide a remedy for the wrongful discharge provision of a further remedy under the public policy exception is unnecessary 1: holding that public policy must be evidenced by constitutional or statutory provisions 2: holding that the courts may not declare public policy without a basis in either the constitution or statutory provisions 3: holding that public policy may be found in letter or purpose of constitutional statutory or regulatory provisions in judicial decisions of state and in certain instances in professional codes of ethics 4: holding that sources of public policy include legislation administrative rules regulations or decisions and judicial decisions and in certain instances a professional code of ethics


Input: rule apply in this case, this court simply notes that Southmark failed to complain of this omission on appeal, and thus, waived any objections to the bankruptcy court's sua sponte consideration of res judicata. 13 . See also Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1196 (3d Cir.1993) ("the denial of a Rule 11 motion does not foreclose the assertion of a subsequent malicious prosecution suit ...."); cf. Port Drum Co. v. Umphrey, 852 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir.1988) ("If Rule 11 did expand substantive rights, it would be invalid under the Enabling Act” because it regulates procedure rather than create a new substantive right or an independent cause of action). 14 . Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. v. Adams, 897 F.2d 183, 189 (5th Cir.1990). 15 . See also In re Howe, 913 F.2d at 1143-47 (<HOLDING>). 16 . We have also held that a debtor does not Holdings: 0: holding based on  1127b that only the proponent  of a chapter 11 reorganization plan can seek to have it modified 1: holding that remedies provided in the bankruptcy code for enforcing a chapter 11 plan of reorganization are not exclusive 2: holding that claims raised in later litigation were barred because they could have been fully litigated in chapter 11 reorganization process 3: holding that the defendants habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have been or was raised in his postconviction motion 4: holding that debtor whose plan of reorganization had been confirmed by bankruptcy court could not later bring lender liability claims against creditors where those claims could have been raised in bankruptcy proceeding


Input: prohibition. Finally, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that it was “objectively reasonable” for Jones to believe that he was acting lawfully. Jennings, 2005 WL 2043945, at *5. In reviewing the district court’s grant of immunity on JMOL, I assume arguendo that the evidence is taken in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. A. Effect of the Jury’s Verdict Two thoughts should be removed from the picture at the outset. First, Jones did not break Jennings’ ankle with reckless or callous indifference to Jennings’ federal rights. Second, he did not knowingly violate the law. The jury verdict cannot, as a matter of law, be taken to establish these points because they were not elements of the claim that went to the jury. There was no basis for punitive damages here. S 92) (<HOLDING>). The majority reasons that the jury, by its Holdings: 0: holding that once probable cause is established officer is not required to investigate further 1: holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself 2: holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest 3: holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had 4: holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity


Input: a separate taxable entity to receive income, however, as the creation alone will not guarantee that the entity is deemed to have earned the income in question. [¶ 11] The general principle mandating that corporations be recognized as separate, taxable entities from their owners creates some tension with the requirement that income be taxed to the party who earns it. Recognizing that tension, in 1982 the United States Tax Court noted that, in the corporate context, simply identifying who earned the income may be inadequate to allow a determination of how the income should be taxed because corporations can act, and thus earn income, only through their agents. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 890-91; see also Haag v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 604, 611 (1987); cf. State v. Placzek, 380 A.2d 1010, 1015 (Me.1977) (<HOLDING>). That inadequacy is highlighted when Holdings: 0: holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity 1: recognizing as a matter of federal law that an action to redress injuries to a corporation cannot be maintained by a shareholder in his own name but must be brought in the name of the corporation 2: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation 3: holding that a corporation is held responsible for acts not within the agents corporate powers strictly construed but which the agent has assumed to perform for the corporation when employing the corporate powers actually authorized and in such eases there need be no written authority under seal or vote of the corporation in order to constitute the agency or to authorize the act 4: recognizing that agents of a corporation may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed in the name of the corporation


Input: in their closing arguments and may advance all legitimate arguments and draw logical inferences from the evidence. See McArthur, 801 So.2d at 1039^40. Moreover, prosecutors in specific are not limited to a robotic presentation on behalf of the State. See Diaz v. State, 797 So.2d 1286, 1287 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). However, “[a] criminal trial is a neutral arena wherein both sides place evidence for the jury’s consideration; the role of counsel in clos ing argument is to assist the jury in analyzing that evidence, not to obscure the jury’s view with personal opinion, emotion, and nonrecord evidence.” Ruiz, 743 So.2d at 4. Unfortunately, prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument is neither a new nor fading phenomenon. See, e.g., Crew v. State, 146 So.3d 101, 111 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (<HOLDING>); Freeman v. State, 717 So.2d 105, 106 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that the cumulative effect of the prosecutors comments which as seen above are welldocumented errors denied appellant a fair trial 1: holding that cumulative  effect of multiple errors worked to deprive defendant of fair trial although  some errors standing alone would be subject to plain error review and others might be harmless 2: holding that although neither of the trial courts errors when considered in isolation were necessarily sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial the cumulative effect of the errors created sufficient prejudice to deny defendant a fair trial 3: holding that plain error is the appropriate standard of review when a defendant objects to a prosecutors comments at trial does not move for a mistrial and then on appeal argues that the comments deprived him of a fair trial 4: holding that a number of errors may be deemed harmful in their cumulative effect


Input: form, governs. See 10 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 6006.01[3][a] (15th ed.1998). For example, many asset sales include assignments of executory contracts and/or unexpired leases, and courts generally allow a motion to sell to be treated as a motion to assume or assign those contracts and leases being sold as long as all substantive and notice requirements for assumption and assignment are strictly followed. See, e.g., Chbat v. Tleel (In re Tleel), 876 F.2d 769, 770-771 (9th Cir.1989). Other courts have held that approval of an agreement in a stipulation regarding the assumption or rejection of unexpired leases may be sufficient to put the other parties to those leases on notice. See, e.g., Elliott v. Four Seasons Properties (In re Frontier Properties, Inc.), 979 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Lindsey v. ITPE-NMU Welfare Plan (In re Holdings: 0: holding that issuance of an order to show cause satisfied this requirement 1: holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable 2: holding that a stipulation as to the law is generally not binding upon the courts 3: holding that challenge to oneyear residency requirement for divorce action was not moot even though plaintiff had since satisfied requirement 4: holding that courtapproved stipulation satisfied notice requirement for assumption of contract


Input: lender knew there were some consignment goods for sale, there is absolutely no record evidence as to whether the gallery was “generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.” § 679.1021(l)(t)lc. Consignor presented no evidence as to who or how many creditors the gallery had when he placed his painting there for sale in 2006. Similarly there is no evidence that lender knew this paint consignor must show that a majority of the consignee’s creditors were aware that the consignee was substantially engaged in selling the goods of others by consignment sales, and the majority is determined by the number of creditors, not by the amount of their claims. See Valley Media, 279 B.R. at 126; In re Wicaco Mach. Corp., 49 B.R. 340, 344 (E.D.Pa.1984) (<HOLDING>). Again, here the consignor had no idea who or Holdings: 0: holding that  567203 did not exempt life insurance proceeds paid to the debtor spouse against the claims of her own creditors 1: holding that debtor did not prove that defendant creditors violated automatic stay under 11 usc  362a with respect to their actions in a state court lawsuit because the creditors actions involved a counterclaim that debtor asserted and were in response to that counterclaim 2: holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor 3: holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures 4: holding that 20 of creditors knowing of consignment relationship does not satisfy general knowledge requirement notwithstanding that such creditors represented 63 of claims against debtor


Input: report falls into this category, then the 21-day deadline to object to the report was never triggered, and the trial court was required to dismiss Haskell’s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.851(b) (requiring claim against defendant who has not been timely served with expert report must be dismissed); Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 549 (defining minimum requirements for document to be considered expert report). If we hold that Haskell’s report is not so deficient as to constitute no report at all, then any objections to the report have been waived and the trial court lacked the authority to dismiss Haskell’s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(a) (providing 21-day deadline to object to deficient expert report); Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2007) (<HOLDING>). If there are multiple defendants in a suit, Holdings: 0: holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal 1: holding that a partys failure to raise objections to the report and recommendation waives the partys right to review in the district court 2: holding that the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute waives the issue on appeal 3: holding defendants failure to object timely waives its right to challenge expert report 4: holding failure to object within 21day deadline waives objections and trial court must deny motion to dismiss


Input: is a component of the right to petition for redress of grievances, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Given the close relationship between an inmate filing a grievance and filing a lawsuit — indeed, the former is generally a prerequisite for the latter — our jurisprudence provided a strong signal that offic have recognized an inmate’s right to be free from retaliation for filing a grievance under the First Amendment (albeit without referencing a particular clause). Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[Inmate’s] allegation that he was falsely charged with misconduct in retaliation for filing complaints against Officer Wilson implicates conduct protected by the First Amendment.”); Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 998 (10th Holdings: 0: recognizing class i to be the most severe category of disciplinary rule violations 1: recognizing first amendment retaliation claim where official filed a disciplinary report following an inmates filing of a grievance 2: recognizing refund claim could be barred if there was any valid local limitations law in force when the claim was filed 3: holding that the taxpayer met the claim requirement where the taxpayer first filed a timely letter with the irs that requested a refund and subsequently filed a formal refund claim 4: holding that state waived its eleventh amendment immunity by filing proofs of claim in bankruptcy proceedings


Input: category of II, the probation officer set Peterson’s sentencing range at 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment. At the sentencing on January 23, 2009, Peterson challenged the USSG § 2S1.3(b)(2) enhancement, contending that the enhancement did not apply because her structuring offense did not involve “a pattern of unlawful activity,” which is defined as “at least two separate occasions of unlawful activity ..., without regard to whether any such occasion occurred during the course of the offense or resulted in a conviction for the conduct that occurred on that occasion.” USSG § 2S1.3, comment, (n.3). According to Peterson, if the structured money came from one source, here her safe deposit box, there could be only one offense, see United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), and thus no pattern of unlawful activity, Holdings: 0: holding due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the charged offense and new york law that requires the defendant in a second degree murder prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter when no element of the charged offense is presumed does not violate the due process clause 1: holding the proper unit of prosecution for indecent liberties is the number of discrete acts 2: holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution 3: holding that the structuring itself and not each individual deposit is the unit of prosecution in a structuring offense 4: holding that test for whether two offenses are not the same is whether each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not


Input: rather than evidence presented in a representative fashion or via documentary evidence, is unclear.” Medlock v. Host Int’l, Inc., No. 12-cv-2024-JLT, 2013 WL 2278095, at *5 (E.D.Cal. May 22, 2013). Indeed, a number of courts, including the Medlock court, have recognized that PAGA plaintiffs can often satisfy their burdens of proof without undue reliance on individualized evidence. See id.) see also Plaisted v. Dress Barn, Inc., No. 12-cv-1679-ODW, 2012 WL 4356158, at *2 (C.D.Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) (recognizing that individualized or fact-intensive evidence of damages is not required under PAGA, because PAGA only permits recovery of “statutory penalties in fixed amounts per violation”); Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., No. 11-cv-1600 PSG, 2013 WL 146323, at *3-4 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 14, 2013) (<HOLDING>). Uber does not explain why Gillette cannot Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 1: recognizing the statelaw privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant 2: recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing 3: holding that there was little risk litigation of representative paga claim would require a series of highly individualized fact intensive mini trials because the burden would be on defendants to prove that the labor code was not violated and such proof could be drawn easily from defendants own records 4: holding the states reference to the defendants lack of remorse was error because it was a comment on the defendants assertion of his constitutional rights to plead not guilty and require the state to carry its burden of proof


Input: also held that the constitutional protections against double jeopardy prohibited retrial of the defendant on the habitual criminal charges. Id. at 754-55. In the present case the prosecution argues, and the court of appeals agreed, that Mason is distinguishable because Moore’s attorney verbally acquiesced in the trial court’s decision to preempt the jury’s consideration of the habitual criminal counts. Although this distinction exists, we conclude that it lacks legal significance. We have recognized that the trial of habitual criminal charges, in contrast to an ordinary sentencing hearing, must be conducted “in accordance with the same procedural and constitutional safeguards traditionally associated with a trial on guilt or innocence.” People v. Quintana, 634 P.2d 413, 419 (Colo.1981) (<HOLDING>). See also People v. Chavez, 621 P.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy may be waived pursuant to a bargainedfor plea 1: holding that an amendment to a felony information on the day of trial charging the defendant as a habitual criminal was not error 2: holding that constitutional protections against double jeopardy apply to a defendant prosecuted as an habitual criminal 3: holding that suspension of a drivers license for conduct already sanctioned in a criminal case did not violate defendants constitutional rights against double jeopardy because it served a remedial purpose beyond the criminal penalties 4: holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court


Input: age at the time (Gibbs Dep. at 18), it is possible that he was merely relating his own experiences about his ability to heal post-injury. See MacDonald v. United Parcel Serv., 430 Fed.Appx. 453, 460 (6th Cir.2011) (“MacDonald testified that Bowen told him to ‘move your old ass’ during the contentious events of January 25, 2007, but Bowen is only three years younger than MacDonald, so even viewed in the light most favorable to MacDonald, this statement does little for him.”). And the comment was accompanied by Ilardi’s advice that exercise would be good for Gibbs’ healing. (Id. at 37.) In this context, the comment does not require the conclusion that Ilardi harbored discriminatory feelings towards workers over fifty. Cf. Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The same does not hold true for the comment Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants comment that the plaintiffs upcoming fiftyfifth birthday was a cause for concern was too ambiguous to give rise to an inference of age discrimination and therefore was not direct evidence 1: holding that a prima facie case for discrimination requires the plaintiff to show that 1 he belongs to the protected age group 2 his job performance was satisfactory 3 adverse employment action was taken against him  in 4  circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination  2: holding that the hiring and firing of an employee by the same actor within a period of a few years gives rise to an inference that age discrimination was not the motive behind the termination 3: holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference 4: holding in age discrimination case that plaintiffs dismissal did not give rise to an inference of discrimination when job was subsequently offered to an older individual


Input: this Lawsuit? Our conclusion that the D’Oench doctrine has not been preempted by statute is reinforced by an examination of Motorcity’s argument that §§ 1821(d)(9)(A) and 1823(e)(1) are inapplicable because Motorcity repaid its loan to Southeast before the FDIC was appointed receiver. Pointing to § 1823(e)(l)’s reference to an “agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the [FDIC’s] interest ... in any asset acquired by it,” Motorcity contends that § 1823(e)(1) does not bar any claims against the FDIC that do not affect the value of a specific asset of the bank, such as a note, acquired by the FDIC. Because it repaid its note, Motorcity argues that there is no longer any specific asset to which the alleged oral agreements relate. See Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 37 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78 Holdings: 0: holding that section 1823e is narrower than the doench doctrine and that section 1823e applies only to cases involving a specific asset 1: holding that  1823e applies only when the fdics interest in a specific asset would be impaired by the alleged secret agreement 2: holding that claims that do not diminish or defeat the fdics interest in any specific asset are nevertheless doench barred in light of the established purpose of the doench  doctrine to protect the fdics reliance on the banks records 3: holding that defendant defrauded fdic when actions diluted value of fdics security interest thereby being likely to frustrate and impair the fdics ability to realize the benefit of the interest 4: holding that the commonlaw doench doctrine applies to bar suit even when the rtc does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement


Input: To issue a certificate, FERC must determine that the public will be well-served by the company’s proposed development; the Commission may also impose terms and conditions it believes the public convenience and necessity require. The Act further provides that [w]hen any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid [for the owner’s property interests] ... it may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h); see Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, 776 F.2d 125 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The company’s exercise of this eminent domain Holdings: 0: holding that floating barge moored to shore remaining in same place for approximately seven years and used as work platform to clean and strip cargo and gas from barges was not a vessel 1: holding that the natural gas act authorizes acquisition of gas storage easements by eminent domain 2: holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective 3: holding that an individual is presumed to intend the natural consequences of the individuals actions 4: holding that under fedrcivp 71a federal procedure governs condemnation actions brought under the natural gas act


Input: ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Felix I. Lessambo, pro se, appeals from the September 29, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, /.) dismissing the complaint on summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the District Court’s June 2009 decision granting the motion for partial judgment on the pleadings because that decision was not designated in Lessambo’s notice of appeal, as required by Rule 3(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, insofar as Lessambo challenges the Holdings: 0: holding that mothers failure to appeal prior contempt order precluded her challenge to prior order in appeal from later order entered based upon prior contempt order 1: holding that the appeal was properly before the court where the appellant appealed from an order amending a prior order without appealing from the prior order 2: holding that when a notice of appeal specified one district court order while failing to reference another an appeal from the unmentioned order cannot be considered 3: holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order 4: holding that because the district courts order failed to comply with rule 58 appellants notice of appeal cannot be considered late


Input: on the estate of tenancy by entirety: The effect of the Married Women’s Property Acts was to abrogate the husband’s common law dominance over the marital estate and to place the wife on a level of equality with him as regards the exercise of ownership over the whole estate. The tenancy was and still is predicated upon the legal unity of husband and wife, but the Acts converted it into a unity of equals and not of unequals as at common law. No longer could the husband convey, lease, mortgage or otherwise encumber the property without her consent. The Acts confirmed her right to the use and enjoyment of the whole estate, and all the privileges that ownership of property confers, including the right to convey the property in its entirety, jointly with her husband, dur . 618, 619 (1891) (<HOLDING>). RBS admits that when property is held in Holdings: 0: holding that husband and wifes failure to recite marital status in the deed did not defeat tenancy by the entirety 1: holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead 2: holding that marital property was not attachable for the sole debts of the husband because it was held in tenancy by entirety 3: holding that property held by husband and wife in tenancy by entirety cannot be reached by husbands creditors absent fraud 4: holding that property held by husband and wife in tenancy by entirety is exempt from attachment or execution for the sole debts of husband


Input: speedy and adequate remedy otherwise provided by law.... [Rleview shall be limited to a determination of whether the body or officer has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its dis cretion, based on the evidence in the record before the defendant body or officer. (Emphasis added.) Under this Rule, our review of the issue before us is limited to determining whether the court of appeals properly upheld the district court's conclusion that the zoning authorities of Colorado Springs abused their discretion or exceeded their jurisdiction. Ultimately, the resolution of this issue turns on whether the Zoning Code grants the zoning authorities the power to deny the development plan of a permitted use. See Sherman v. City of Colorado Springs Planning Comm'n, 680 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Colo.App.1983) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 763 P.2d 292, 294 (Colo.1988). As Holdings: 0: holding that a local governmental body exceeds its jurisdiction under crcp 106a4 when it exercises discretion it does not have 1: recognizing that member of local governmental body does not necessarily act in legislative capacity when participation takes form of vote 2: recognizing that although there was no property in a dead body at common law  the one whose duty it is to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes and that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or mutilating it in any way 3: holding that if a contract surrenders or contracts away governmental functions then it exceeds the scope of a governmental entitys powers and is void 4: holding the circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if it fails to apply or misapplies statutory factors


Input: to progress under the program may result in further disciplinary action and even separation from the United States Air Force.” R. 388. 11 . Section X491(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, provides, in pertinent part: To provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded by the judgment, the court may, as an incident of and collateral to any such judgment, issue orders directing restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records, and such orders may be issued to any appropriate official of the United States. (Emphasis added). 12 . Although this court generally lacks jurisdiction to grant declaratory and injunctive relief, we note that 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2), ma 1336, 1340, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (<HOLDING>). 17 . There is some doubt about whether Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to allege affirmative misconduct on the part of the government 1: holding that statements by an american consular officer that petitioners mother could not return to the united states because of her pregnant condition did not constitute affirmative misconduct sufficient to estop the government from relying on petitioners foreign birth to deny citizenship 2: holding that erroneous oral advice did not constitute the type of affirmative misconduct that would be sufficient to estop the government from relying on a valid regulation requiring that certain social security benefit applications be in writing 3: holding that attorneys admission to an element of the offense in the petitioners presence at a deportation hearing was binding on the petitioners 4: holding that a ceremonial marriage performed under the laws of a foreign power by a foreign consular officer on united states territory was invalid because it did not comply with the laws of new york state


Input: Stated differently, identification procedures are not per se unduly suggestive, but must be shown to be so under the circumstances unique to each case. Cothran argues that the identification procedures used in this case were unduly suggestive because both Harper and Cooper identified him: (1) while he was handcuffed; (2) after they saw officers take him out of a paddy wagon; and (3) after the police had told them that someone was in custody and had asked them to determine if that person was the robber. However, it is not enough that Cothran was identified under these circumstances. Police “show-ups,” like the ones used in this case, are not generally unduly suggestive. State v. Williams, 717 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Mo.App.E.D.1986); State v. Moore, 925 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Mo.App.E.D.1996) (<HOLDING>). We have upheld identifications made while the Holdings: 0: holding that the friend of an eyewitness to a robbery who called the witness to view the defendant as he was being arrested by police was not acting as an agent of the state but rather a private citizen and therefore the protections of the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule for improper identification procedures did not apply to the eyewitnesss identification at the showup 1: holding that police seizure of weapon in plain view even though appellant was handcuffed and under the control of the officers was lawful because there were other occupants in the house who were not handcuffed and who would have had access to the weapon 2: holding that showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive where defendant was handcuffed and placed under police spotlight 3: holding that a showup identification was not impermissibly suggestive where it took place immediately after the unlawful conduct and was necessary to avoid arresting the wrong person 4: holding that a showup identification was valid even though the suspect was handcuffed


Input: CURIAM. Brett C. Kimberlin appeals the district court’s order denying his motion filed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), in which he sought reconsideration of the court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Kimberlin v. Dewalt, No. CA-99-979-2 (E.D.Va. Oct. 20, 2000). In addition, we decline to consider the claims Kimberlin raises for the first time on appeal. See Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). We dispense with oral argument because the Holdings: 0: holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered 1: holding that issues raised for first time on appeal generally will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice 2: holding claims raised for first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances 3: holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally waived absent exceptional circumstances 4: recognizing that issues raised for first time on appeal generally are not considered absent exceptional circumstances


Input: James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 210 n. 6, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007). Campbell hopes that the dissents in those cases will persuade us to find the statute unconstitutionally vague. However, we are bound by the existing precedent to the contrary. Thus, the district court did not err in overruling Campbell’s objection to his sentence based on the alleged vagueness of the ACCA. Campbell also argues that his previous convictions for third-degree burglary and fourth-degree aggravated assault are not violent felonies under the ACCA, in order to preserve these issues for further appeal. However, he concedes that we have held to the contrary. See United States v. Coleman, 655 F.3d 480, 482-83 (6th Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1045, 181 L.Ed.2d 768 (2012) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rodriguez, 664 F.3d 1032, Holdings: 0: holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act 1: holding that thirddegree burglary is a violent felony 2: holding that attempted burglary as defined by florida law is a violent felony under acca 3: holding that coerced sex is violent felony 4: holding a burglary must be of a building or structure in order to qualify as a violent felony for acca purposes


Input: false on “[pjrimarily medical evidence but also what was related to [him] about her visit to California by family members” as well as McCullough’s testimony. Id. However, trial counsel did not introduce medical evidence even though such a report existed, or the testimony of family members, or any other evidence to prove the falsity of the California Claim. Id. at 125-126. McCullough’s counsel also did not object when the prosecutor, clearly improperly, referred to uncharged misconduct during closing argument or during rebuttal when the prosecutor stated: “California, I wish I could charge it, but that’s not my jurisdiction. I wish I could charge in California what he did to her, what she testified that he did to her, what she told Diane Bowers that he did to he 978 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). Trial counsel’s cross-examination of Bowers Holdings: 0: holding that trial counsels failure to object to the prosecutors repeated pervasive and clearly improper references during closing arguments to similar transactions committed by the defendant constituted deficient performance and amounted to prejudice that required a new trial 1: holding that omissions of informants criminal history from warrant affidavit did not support suppression where the affiant did not know the exact nature of the criminal history 2: holding that trial counsels performance in failing to object move to strike or request an admonishment of the jury with respect to the defendants criminal history was deficient and that it could not be said that the references to the defendants criminal history did not impact the jurys decision where the evidence was not overwhelming and reversing for a new trial 3: holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel 4: holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category


Input: rights,” not determinative.) [original emphasis]. Numerous decisions support this Court’s conclusion that the defendant’s waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made. See, e.g., Tennell v State, 348 So.2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (only interrogating police officer and fourteen year old boy present when Miranda rights given and defendant signed written waiver, and officer “satisfy[ied] himself that the appellant understood [his rights].”); C.J. v State, 376 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (eleven year old boy held not to have understood rights he waived); Fields v State, 402 So.2d 46, 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (“while a juvenile may waive his Miranda rights, the state bears a ‘heavy burden’ in establishing that the waiver is valid.”); Hall v State, 421 So.2d 571, 573 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied, 430 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1983); State Holdings: 0: recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial 1: recognizing that distinguishing trespassers from nontrespassers is a heavy burden 2: recognizing burden 3: holding defendant was not entitled to jury instructions on lesserincluded offenses because his request did not constitute a waiver of the statute of limitations on those offenses such a waiver must be knowingly intelligently and voluntarily made 4: recognizing states heavy burden of establishing that the waiver was intelligently made


Input: the record.” PL Mot. at 18. Moreover, it is well established that military decisions are “subject to judicial review and can be set aside if they are arbitrary, capricious or not based on substantial evidence.” PI. Mot. at 18 (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 303, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983)). Since the Complaint alleges the BOI’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or not based on substantial evidence, and that the Navy failed to follow “measured tests and standards,” this case is justiciable. PL Mot. at 18. Plaintiff adds that although “decisions which affect the conduct of military operations, strategy or tactics” are not justiciable, “personnel decisions” are reviewable by the courts. Pl. Mot. at 20-21 (citing Adair v. England, 183 F.Supp.2d 31, 50 (D.D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>)). The Government replies that the suggestion Holdings: 0: holding that chilling effect claim must still be rooted in specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm to convey standing 1: holding that a trial courts statutory interpretation is given no deference on review 2: holding that courts have inherent power to hire and require salaries be paid to secretaries clerks probation officers and assistants 3: holding that the militarys policies to hire retain and promote chaplains  relate to qualityoflife issues for military personnel and have no specific operational strategic or tactical objective and therefore require less deference 4: holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm


Input: and acceptance of responsibility as mitigating factors. See Sensback, 720 N.E.2d at 1164-1165. 2. Lack of Criminal History Page argues that the trial court gave no weight to his lack of criminal history. We disagree. The trial court recognized Page’s lack of criminal history as a miti-gator but discounted the value of this miti-gator. Specifically, the trial court stated, “The court finds as mitigating circumstances that he has some criminal history, arguably it’s not significant, but a weapons charge and another pending crime of violence along with these three crimes of violence, I don’t think the mitigators are worth much.” Transcript at 34. Page asks us to review the weight given to this mitigating factor for abuse of discretion, which we cannot do. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (<HOLDING>). B. Aggravators Page appears to argue that the Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it gave aggravating factors considerable weight 1: holding that the relative weight or value assignable to aggravating and mitigating factors properly found is not subject to review for abuse of discretion 2: holding that a trial courts weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion 3: holding that trial court retains wide discretion to apply or reject mitigating and aggravating factors as well as to interpret meaning of individual factors and its determination must be upheld absent abuse of discretion 4: holding imposition of the death penalty proportionate where the trial court found two aggravating circumstances ccp and contemporaneous murder two statutory mitigating factors and a number of nonstatutory mitigating factors


Input: did not present these arguments in any of his post-conviction motions to the trial court. Furthermore, Payne did not appeal his convictions and did not seek to withdraw his guilty pleas (nor can he do so now, in light of the time that has passed since his convictions). Under these circumstances, Payne may pursue these arguments only through habeas corpus proceedings. Judgment affirmed. Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. Decided October 27, 2005 Reconsideration denied November 30, 2005 Andrew W. Payne, Jr., pro se. Dennis C. Sanders, District Attorney, William P. Doupé, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 See Martin v. State, 277 Ga. 227, 228 (3) (587 SE2d 650) (2003). 2 (Emphasis supplied.) 3 See generally State v. Allen, 262 Ga. App. 724, 727 (2) (586 SE2d 378) (2003) (<HOLDING>); OCGA§ 17-7-70.1 (a) (2) (“[a]ll laws relating Holdings: 0: holding that ocga  911111 offers substantive protection beyond the procedural consideration related to the timing of the filing of the verification 1: holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt 2: recognizing that ocga  911111 embodies both a procedural and substantive component 3: holding that a defendants statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his sixth amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses 4: recognizing that ocga 177701 relates primarily to felonies charged by accusation


Input: v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 72, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993) ("The basic rationale behind our ripeness doctrine is to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements, when those disagreements are premised on contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Furthermore, as discussed above, because all states owe due process obligations to “any person,” without regard to state borders, if a neighboring state is later poised to close an abortion provider upon which a Mississippi woman relies, she could sue to enjoin that closure. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 129, 149, 155-56, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (<HOLDING>). For the same reason, there is no basis for Holdings: 0: holding that a termination of a government contract does not constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property without just compensation or without due process of law 1: holding that citizens of iowa and wisconsin could bring suit to enjoin minnesota officials from enforcing state law setting railroad rates that allegedly deprived them of property without due process of law 2: holding that where state law treats goodwill as property business goodwill is a property interest entitled to protection the owner cannot be deprived of it without due process 3: holding young applicable in an action to enjoin state officials from enforcing a law in violation of the commerce clause 4: holding that licenses issued under minnesota law do not create property interests in renewal that are protected by due process clause


Input: protest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1515(b). Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. However, such a request cannot cure a timing defect in the underlying protest. For Plaintiff’s claim to be within the Court’s jurisdiction, the referenced protest must first be filed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1514. As Plaintiff’s protest was untimely, Plaintiff’s subsequent request for accelerated disposition could not revive it. The Court therefore holds that the protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely and improperly filed. Moreover, Plaintiff’s subsequent acts failed to cure or amend its original protest. Because Plaintiff failed to file a valid protest, Customs’ decisions are final and this Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). New Zealand Lamb Co. v. United States, 40 F.3d 377, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Hambro Auto. Corp. v. United States, 66 Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that refusal by customs officials to reliquidate entries became final and conclusive upon the importer when it failed to file a protest within the previously mandated sixtyday limitations period 1: holding that the ninetyday time period under the federal rule is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a partys death and that mere reference to a partys death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution 2: holding that although the jurisdiction limitation also works to make decisions final and conclusive upon the government unless it acts to revise them within the limitations period there was no such decision that triggered the ninetyday period and consequently a failure to invoke jurisdiction 3: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period 4: holding that the courts jurisdiction is limited to the appeal of final board decisions that are adverse to the claimant


Input: defendant, plaintiff has failed to establish that he filed a refund claim for the second quarter of 1988, as required before filing a suit for refund. Def.’s MTD at 7; see I.R.C. § 7422(a). In his objection to defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff included a Form 843 refund claim dated April 7, 2000, and received May 2, 2000. Pl.’s Obj. Exh. B. This claim is for the tax period from January 1987 through 1988. Id. As discussed above, the IRS denied plaintiffs refund claims for the second, third, and fourth quarters of 1987 on February 14, 1997. Def.’s MTD Exh. A. Filing a second claim for these tax periods, as plaintiff appears to do with his Form 843 claim in exhibit B, does not alter the statute of limitations for those claims. See Jones v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 424, 425 (1992) (<HOLDING>); I.R.C. § 6532(a)(4) (“Any consideration, Holdings: 0: holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived 1: holding that although the filing of suit and service of citation interrupt the running of the statute its dismissal for want of prosecution will have the same effect as if the suit had never been filed 2: holding that taxpayers filing of a second set of claims after the first set had been disallowed had no effect on the running of the statute of limitations 3: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 4: holding neither a lack of prejudice to the defendant nor the running of the statute of limitations constitutes good cause


Input: that the appellant is ... unable to provide now or in the future.” The record demonstrates that S.O. is doing very well in her foster placement. Esser and Jones testified that S.O. has formed a strong bond with her siblings, and that maintaining a relationship with her siblings is in her best interest. But even if maintaining S.O.’s out-of-home placement with her siblings is in her best interest, that is not a sufficient reason to terminate her father’s parental rights. The best interest of the child is a “paramount” concern, but termination of parental rights is contingent upon a finding under MinmStat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b), that at least one of the statutory conditions, such as palpable unfitness, is met. MinmStat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2012); see also R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 54-55 (<HOLDING>). II. Appellant also argues that he was never Holdings: 0: recognizing policy and ruling that person who failed to file counterclaim when childs paternity was being determined in earlier litigation should not be allowed to bring later suit to establish that he was childs natural father as this would not be in the childs best interests 1: holding that it was error to base a tpr decision solely on the childs best interest 2: holding that a modification of custody should not be based on one parents default because it is the childs best interests that are at stake 3: holding that a childs preference regarding parental contact is not determinative of the best interest analysis and that a court must assess a childs best interest in light of all statutory factors 4: holding that when information which potentially undermines the best interest of the child as well as the interest sought to be protected by the legitimation statutes and the policy of this state it must first be tested in light of the best interest of the child standard


Input: an illegal contract. B. Application of Claim Preclusion to Claim in This Case Under Article I, Section 24 of the Iowa Constitution. We first consider whether the doctrine of claim preclusion applies under the circumstances of this case. Here, the parties are identical, there is no doubt that the article I, section 24 claim could have been brought in the prior proceeding, and there was a final judgment on the merits in the first action. Arnevik, 642 N.W.2d at 319. Further, no additional evidence would have been required to litigate the constitutional question in the first proceeding, in contrast to our other cases allowing parties to litigate separate claims involving the same contract in two proceedings. See Westway Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Iowa 1982) (<HOLDING>). Although not raised by the parties, there is Holdings: 0: holding that prior adjudication barred a claim that arose out of the same transactions and that could have been raised in prior suit 1: holding that claim preclusion did not bar fire insurer from bringing a second action against its coplaintiff in first action 2: holding district court dismissal of plaintiffs present action did not constitute prior action  and thus did not count as third strike 3: holding claim preclusion did not foreclose plaintiffs second action even though it arose out of the same lease agreement as that of a prior action 4: holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it arose out of the same conduct as a preempted contract claim


Input: 1089, 1089 (5th Cir.1998) (per curiam). 47 . United States v. Gornto, 792 F.2d 1028, 1033 (11th Cir.1986) (collecting cases); see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 465 n. 38, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978). 48 . United States v. Vasquez, 677 F.3d 685, 692 (5th Cir.2012) (per curiam). 49 . See United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 179 (5th Cir.1994) ("Since a justification defense such as duress is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant. To succeed, the defendant must prove each ele ment of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” (internal citation omitted)); United States v. MMR Corp. (LA), 907 F.2d 489, 499 (5th Cir.1990) (withdrawal is an affirmative defense). 50 .See United States v. Barton, 992 F.2d 66, 68-69 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 51 . United States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, Holdings: 0: holding that in reviewing a defendants motion for judgment of acquittal based on insanity which the defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence the court must determine whether no reasonable jury could have failed to find that the defendants criminal insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence 1: holding presumption overcome based on competent substantial record evidence which the judge could reasonably find to be clear and convincing 2: holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence 3: holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied 4: holding that the state must establish insanity and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence in order to confine an insane convict beyond his criminal sentence when the basis for his original confinement no longer exists


Input: with HUD. To receive funding under the contract, BHA was required to provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing to low income households, and it was required to comply with HUD’s regulations. BHA could only use HUD funding for eligible work items, and an employee could not use the money for personal gain. After HUD’s review of BHA’s annual agency plan, it could conduct civil audits or a variety of other options in the event of the appearance of impropriety or noncompliance with the regulations. Based on this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the converted funds were federal and that HUD maintained sufficient supervision and control over BHA. See McRee, 7 F.3d at 980; see also United States v. Hope, 901 F.2d 1013, 1020-21 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Further, Trent’s conviction under § 666(a)(1) Holdings: 0: holding that defendant violated section 4b when she misappropriated pool participant funds by soliciting funds for trading and then trading only a small percentage of those funds while disbursing the rest of the funds to investors herself and her family 1: holding that funding obtained through hud through its loan program retained its federal character where the funds could be applied only toward eligible program activities could not be diverted into interest bearing accounts or used for the benefit of another loan applicant and grantees were required to repay the federal government for misappropriated or misapplied funds 2: holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college 3: holding that agent of corporation who used corporate funds to secure personal loan was initial transferee 4: holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college because the language of the section does not distinguish between direct and indirect receipt of federal funds


Input: 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.2000). Instead, Burns appears to concede his federal habe-as petition is untimely but argues application of the one-year limitations period to a person in his position raises serious constitutional questions. See Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir.1998). After reviewing the record and considering the claims Burns is attempting to raise in his § 2254 petition, we reject his argument that applying the limitations period in this case renders the habeas remedy inadequate or ineffective. See Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir.1998). Burns asserts he is illiterate and was denied counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings, resulting in his inability to ap peal his conviction. Cf. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 376-380 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The record contradicts these assertions. Holdings: 0: holding habeas review was available to federal prisoner claiming actual innocence who was barred from bringing a successive  2255 motion because the denial of collateral review would raise sufficiently serious constitutional questions under the eighth amendment and the due process clause 1: holding in a  2255 case that the failure to raise a bailey claim on direct review can be overcome by a showing of actual innocence 2: recognizing that after iirira habeas review remains available  to raise substantial constitutional questions 3: holding that a prisoner cannot use the savings clause of 28 usc  2241 to escape the restrictions on successive  2255 motions and the failure to raise an available claim earlier 4: holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review


Input: with respect to civil proceedings. The D.C. Circuit has neither recognized nor rejected that the First Amendment affords the public a right of access to civil proceedings. The government interprets the D.C. Circuit’s silence as a denial of the right. Quoting Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, the government argues that the D.C. Circuit has never “indicated that it would apply the [First Amendment right-of-public-aceess] test to anything other than criminal judicial proceedings.” 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C.Cir.2003). In Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, however, the third party was not seeking access to judicial records in civil proceedings; rather, it sought Department of Justice investigation information on individuals detained for immigration violations. 331 F.3d at 934-35 (<HOLDING>). The Court is unaware of any D.C. Circuit Holdings: 0: holding that the first amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings 1: recognizing that first amendment provides qualified right of access to judicial documents 2: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents 3: holding that the first amendment right of public access does not extend to nonjudicial documents compiled during an executive branch investigation 4: holding that there is no right of public access to documents considered in civil discovery motions


Input: mailing in order to obtain the search warrant needed for its inspection. We only hold that on the facts of this case ...a 29-hour delay between the mailing[] and the service of the warrant cannot be said to be “unreasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 253, 90 S.Ct. at 1032-33 (emphasis added); see Place, 462 U.S. at 705 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. at 2643 n. 6 (Van Leeuwen “[ejxpressly limit[ed] its holding to the facts of the case”); see also Anderson, 663 F.2d at 938 (interpreting Van Leeuwen as providing that “[t]he legality of the continuing detention of [validity seized] luggage depends on whether such detention is reasonable, in light of all the surrounding circumstances ” (emphasis added); United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S.Ct. 3551, Holdings: 0: holding that the circuit judge did not have the authority to extend the thirtyday time limit for filing a notice of appeal 1: holding that van leeuwen did not place an outer time limit on the detention of impersonal objects 2: holding that the crossappeal time limit is jurisdictional 3: holding that claims consideration in bankruptcy has no express time limit 4: holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute


Input: date of filing the claim required under such section unless the Secretary renders a decision thereon within that time, nor after the expiration of 2 years from the date of mailing by certified mail or registered mail by the Secretary to the taxpayer of a notice of the disallowance of the part of the claim to which the suit or proceeding relates. 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1). Because Congress has explicitly provided for suits against the IRS for refunds only if the claimant files a complaint within two years of the agency’s decision to deny a refund claim, courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain challenges brought later. The jurisdictional nature of the two-year time limit has been recognized by this and other courts. See, e.g., Compagnoni v. United States, 173 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 Holdings: 0: holding that full payment of the assessment is also required for tax refund suits brought in the united states court of federal claims 1: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states 2: holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations 3: holding that sovereign immunity bars an attorneys lien against the united states 4: holding that sovereign immunity does not bar extinguishment of united states junior lien in proceeding in which united states was not a party


Input: at a specific customer’s site. Other Customer Engineers, including Smith, were "on 'Call” or "reactive” — they responded to different customer service calls and traveled between customer sites. 5 . In its reply brief, HP cites Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 357 (5th Cir.2001), to contend that "Smith must establish that he was clearly more qualified than the person retained to establish pretext in a WFR context.” D. Reply Br. 8. The court has not considered this argument. First, the part of Celestine that HP cites addresses a claim for failure to promote and train. Second, this assertion is directly refuted — at least in the context of an age discrimination case — by EEOC v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089, 1096 n. 5 (5th Cir.1994) (age discrimination case) (<HOLDING>). 6 . HP Customer Engineers were referred to Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not commit reversible error in charging jury that reasonable certainty was the proper standard for establishing the value of plaintiffs lost earnings and that some evidence was all that was required in this matter 1: holding that it was reversible error for district court to charge jury that plaintiffs were required in reduction of force case to show that they were clearly better qualified than the employees retained 2: holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to consider cumulative error in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 3: holding that district court erred by requiring plaintiffs to show that they were better qualified than employees who were promoted in order to make a prima facie case 4: holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge


Input: the victim of a crime prevents a sentencing court from ordering restitution. The other circuits, however, have generally held that “a release by the victim does not preclude or cap restitution of losses as part of criminal sentencing in a case where there is no double recovery.” United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 619 (1st Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir.1998) (concluding “that district courts possess the discretion to impose restitution orders in spite of civil settlements” because of “the rehabilitative and retributive functions” of restitution), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1808, 143 L.Ed.2d 1011 (1999); United States v. Vetter, 895 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hairston, 888 F.2d 1349, Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement 1: holding that a district court may order restitution despite a settlement agreement 2: holding that the existence of a prior bankruptcy settlement does not preclude a subsequent criminal restitution order 3: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt 4: holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not


Input: Inc., 334 Ill.App.3d 926, 268 Ill.Dec. 750, 779 N.E.2d 364 (2002); Lewis v. Collinsville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 158 Ill.App.3d 411, 110 Ill.Dec. 722, 511 N.E.2d 899 (1987); Williams v. Naylor, 147 Ill.App.3d 258, 100 Ill.Dec. 912, 497 N.E.2d 1274 (1986). However, where allegations of civil rights violations are framed only in terms of federal laws, such as the claims involved in this case, the Illinois courts have been much less clear. Compare Stykel v. City of Freeport, 318 Ill.App.3d 839, 252 Ill.Dec. 368, 742 N.E.2d 906, 914 (2001) (determining that a trial court may consider federal civil-rights claims joined with an administrative review of a distinct claim before the circuit court); Stratton v. Wenona Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 1, 133 Ill.2d 413, 141 Ill.Dec. 453, 551 N.E.2d 640 (1990) (<HOLDING>); with, Faulkner-King, 168 Ill.Dec. 874, 590 Holdings: 0: holding that a  1983 claim is an independent original action rather than a review proceeding even when it challenges an administrative action 1: holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the administrative record conducted under the administrative procedure act 2: holding that courts may review nonconstitutional claims 3: holding that this court may independently review the administrative construction of a statute 4: holding that  1983 claims may be joined with an administrative review


Input: implies that the trustees hold title to the Trust as joint tenants, a provision consistent with the rule that co-trustees must act in unison. Other jurisdictions have recognized the principle that co-trustees must not act independently of one another. See, e.g., Colburn v. Grant, 181 U.S. 601, 606, 21 S.Ct. 737, 739, 45 L.Ed. 1021 (1901) (recognizing the principle that “cotrustees may not act independently of one another, nor ignore each other in the management of the trust”); Union Bank & Trust Co. of Helena v. Penwell, 99 Mont. 255, 42 P.2d 457, 462 (1935) (stating “it is clear that both under our statutes and the general rule under the common law the act of one only of the trustees is not sufficient”); Cooper v. Federal Nat. Bank of Shawnee, 175 Okla. 610, 53 P.2d 678, 682 (1936) (<HOLDING>). The principle that two trustees must exercise Holdings: 0: holding that trustees fiduciary duty exists independent of any clause in trust agreement 1: holding that trustees did not breach their fiduciary duty by deciding to set independent contribution rates for each local union 2: holding that cotrustees cannot act independent of one another and the disagreement between the trustees in this case renders the act of each a nullity 3: holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective 4: holding that trustees act of conveying entire corpus terminated the trust


Input: a startling event.” [¶ 40.] The remaining statements were admitted under SDCL 19-16-7, which provides: A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of. mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health, is not excluded by § 19-16-4, even though the declarant is available as a witness, but a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed is excluded unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declar-ant’s will. The court explained that the evidence, “which describes the emotional, physical, and verbal abusive acts by the Defendant towards the victim and his controlling nature is relevant to show ... the state of mind of both the vict 728, 730 (2001) (<HOLDING>); State v. Murillo, 349 N.C. 573, 509 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding victims statements to coworkers admissible to rebut defendants claim that they had a good marriage 1: recognizing exception under state constitution 2: holding that victims statements were hearsay admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and constitutionally permissible under ohio v roberts citations omitted 3: holding victims statements admissible under state of mind exception to rebut defendants claim of accident andor suicide 4: holding victims statements were admissible under state of niind exception to show gun was not accidentally fired


Input: to Grant to accommodate situation where appellant’s sentence of seven days time served was too short to raise ineffectiveness claim in PCRA petition). But see Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d 991 (2003) (declining to apply Salisbury/Ingold exception, where appellant was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment and a concurrent 3 years’ probation and still had almost two years to litigate PCRA petition). ¶ 29 The Salisbury/Ingold exception is premised on the PCRA statute at 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(f) (referring to PCRA’s eligibility requirement that petitioner is “at the time relief is granted” currently serving sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for crime on which petition is based) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 548 Pa. 544, 699 A.2d 718 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 30 Instantly, appellate counsel has raised Holdings: 0: holding that a habeas petitioner must be in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed 1: holding that a petitioner may amend a habeas petition rather than filing a second or successive petition when the first petition has not yet reached a final decision 2: holding that under section 9543a1 a pcra petitioner is not eligible for relief where the petitioner has completed serving the sentence before final adjudication on the petition 3: holding pcra statute requires that petitioner must be currently serving sentence of imprisonment parole or probation on underlying crime not only when petition is filed but also when decision on petition is rendered 4: holding that probation is not a sentence


Input: S.Ct. 1362. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated in a decision five years before Garner that “the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ ... but on whether any such change ... increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” California Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995). This approach has been taken by a number of other courts in the wake of Garner as well. See, e.g., Henderson, 260 F.3d at 1217 (“[Petitioner] could still prevail upon a showing that ... a ty for the proposition that parole guidelines cannot be considered “laws” for purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause). But see Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 250, 251 (D.C.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming the guidelines at issue in Holdings: 0: holding that the federal parole guidelines at issue were not laws within meaning of ex post facto clause 1: holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation 2: holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause 3: holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker 4: holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause


Input: when, under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court might well conclude that Rodrigues had failed to state a claim because he has not alleged that Pacheco had notice of the charge or an opportunity to conciliate. The Court need not resolve this difficult question, however, because it determines below that the plaintiff has stated a colorable state law claim against Pacheco for interference with contractual relations. 2. Interference with Contractual Relations Genlyte argues that the claim against Pacheco for tortious interference with contractual relations is preempted by c. 151B. The weight of authority holds otherwise. While c. 151B’s remedial scheme preempts all other state statutory causes of action, see, e.g., Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 557-558, 664 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1996) (<HOLDING>), an employee is not foreclosed, under Holdings: 0: holding a pleading will not be sufficient to state a claim under the civil rights act if the allegations are mere conclusions 1: holding that civil rights claims under 42 usc  1981 and 1982 are personal injury tort claims 2: holding that c 151b precludes claims under mass gen l c 214  1c civil rights act and equal rights act 3: holding that damages based on the abstract value of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in action under civil rights act of 1871 4: holding that  16 of the urban mass transit act  1656 of the federalaid highway act and other acts created no substantive rights sufficient to invoke  1983


Input: its general experience as to how much time a case requires. In order to exercise its discretion fairly, a district court needs flexibility in deciding whether to reduce a fee request and, if so, by how much. B. In the instant case, the defendants’ challenge to the amount of time spent by Gross tests the outer limits of the specificity requirement. Although the issue is a close one, we hold that the challenge meets this requirement. We also hold, with less difficulty, that the challenge to the fee award requested by McGahen was raised with sufficient clarity. However, we hold that the district court erred by reducing the fee request for Gross’s law clerk, because it was never challenged by the defendants. Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 2469-70, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The district court reduced the time spent by Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys fees awards are available under  1988 for frivolous actions 1: holding that a law clerks time is recoverable as part of attorneys fees under  1988 2: holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees 3: holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered 4: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under  1988


Input: protest jurisdiction into pre-procurement decisions. As plaintiffs characterize in responding to defendant’s criticism of their failure to cite authority for their assertions of OCI violations: “[o]f course there are no cases directly on point; there was no such jurisdiction in this Court or in any other forum prior to this case.” (Pls.’ Resp./Reply Def.’s Mot. Dismiss/Opp’n Pls.’ Mot. J. and Cross-Mot. J. AR 12, ECF No. 88.) No viable lack of good faith and fair dealing has been established by plaintiffs in this matter. D. Waiver Defendant contends plaintiffs’ claimed errors in the “procuring method” were waived by failing to timely raise them. (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 3, ECF No. 79.) See Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2007) (“Blue & Gold Fleet”) (<HOLDING>) Id. Because the protestor was aware that the Holdings: 0: holding that plain error review applies where the defendant fails to object to the lack of an opportunity to allocute 1: holding that plain error review applies when a party fails to raise a claim before the district court 2: holding protestor waived its right to challenge a solicitation amendment by not objecting to its terms during the bidding process 3: holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal 4: holding that a party who has the opportunity to object to the terms of a government solicitation containing a patent error and fails to do so prior to the close of the bidding process waives its ability to raise the same objection subsequently in a bid protest action in the court of federal claims


Input: tort," and their "accrual dates are linked to the accrual date[s] of the underlying tort[s]." Prince George's County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 19 A.3d 859, 877 & n. 22 (2011); see Filmservice Labs., Inc. v. Harvey Bernhard Enters., Inc., 208 Cal.App.3d 1297, 256 Cal.Rptr. 735, 742 (1989) ("[Nlo cause of action exists for conspiracy, per se. Whether or not a cause of action for conspiracy is timely must be determined by reference to the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying cause of action. In this case the underlying cause of action is ... time-barred. That being the case we find the ... cause of action for conspiracy is also time-barred.") (citations omitted); Meyer Land & Cattle Co. v. Lincoln County Conservation Dist., 29 Kan.App.2d 746, 31 P.3d 970, 977 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Schlotthauer v. Sanders, 153 A.D.2d 731, 545 Holdings: 0: holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication 1: holding that the plaintiffs stated a claim for conspiracy because they alleged an actionable tort 2: holding that plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim was barred by section 343909c 3: recognizing that although civil conspiracy is a separate actionable tort a conspiracy claim is barred where the underlying tort is barred by the applicable statute of limitations 4: holding that where summary judgment is granted on the underlying tort claims a conspiracy claim must also fail


Input: should also consider whether mandamus will allow the court to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments and whether mandamus will spare litigants and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings. In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding). Because a trial court’s temporary orders are not appealable, mandamus is an appropriate means to challenge them. See, e.g., In re Derzapf 219 S.W.3d 327, 334-35 (Tex.2007) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief and directing trial court to vacate its temporary orders granting grandparents access to grandchild); Little v. Daggett, 858 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex.1993) (orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>); Dancy v. Daggett, 815 S.W.2d 548, 549 Holdings: 0: holding that mandamus is an appropriate remedy because the trial courts issuance of temporary orders is not subject to interlocutory appeal 1: holding that mandamus is appropriate to challenge temporary orders because they are not subject to interlocutory appeal 2: holding that mandamus is appropriate to challenge temporary orders 3: holding that mandamus is appropriate remedy because temporary order granting visitation is not appealable 4: holding that a temporary order granting emergency relief and temporary child custody under the domestic violence act is not immediately appealable


Input: as a result of Defendant’s disposal of C8. As to loss of use, Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot show any loss of use of its property as a result of C8 contamination. Throughout litigation, Plaintiff has argued that the C8 contamination interfered with its Five-Year Plan, originally drafted in 1995, which includes the blueprint to expand its water supply to three areas: Decatur Township 250, Barlow Township 261, and Palmer Square. Further, Plaintiff has alleged that the C8 contamination hindered its plans to drill a new production well. First, regarding the Five-Year Plan, Defendant responds that the Plaintiff cannot sustain an injury under private nuisance to expand into land it does not yet own. Gevelaar v. Millennium Inorganic Chemicals, 2013-Ohio-435, ¶¶ 30-31, 2013 WL 501745 (<HOLDING>). Next, Defendant avers that these plans are Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff could not recover medical bills that were discharged in bankruptcy 1: holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent 2: holding defendant that did not present its own claim under chapter 38 could not recover attorneys fees 3: holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did 4: holding that the plaintiff could not recover fees for time spent on unsuccessful motions


Input: with prejudice.”); LaPrade v. Lehman, 490 A.2d 1151, 1155 (D.C.1985) (“In the exercise of its discretion under Rule 41(b), the trial court 'should first resort to the wide range of lesser sanctions which it may impose.’ ”) (quoting Garces v. Bradley, 299 A.2d 142, 144 (D.C.1973)). 58 . Techniarts Video, 572 A.2d at 1054 (citations omitted). 59 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Granville v. Hunt, 566 A.2d 65, 66 (D.C.1989). 60 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173. 61 . See id. ("When the conduct calling for sanctions consists of delay, ... relevant factors include the length of the delay and the resulting prejudice, if any, to the defendant."). 62 . 680 A.2d at 438. 63 . Id. 64 . See Lofton v. Kator & Scott, 802 A.2d 955, 957-58 (D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>); Dobbs v. Providence Hosp., 736 A.2d 216, 220 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend 1: holding that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing a case after the parties allowed it to lay dormant for at least fourteenandahalfmonths 2: holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention 3: holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case 4: holding that the decision whether to apply the exhaustion requirement in an erisa case is committed to the district courts sound discretion but that the district court abused its discretion by not dismissing the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies


Input: decisions of trial counsel in deciding whether a decision not to file a motion constitutes neglect). The Board thus erred in finding neglect. Failure to Communicate Brice’s second allegation is that Schoeneman failed to return her telephone calls for three weeks, which we regard as an allegation that Schoeneman failed to keep his client reasonably informed. Rule 1.4 (a) of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct requires a lawyer to “keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.” The guiding principle for evaluating conduct under this rule is whether the lawyer fulfilled the client’s “reasonable ... expectations for information.” D.C. Rules of Profl Conduct R. 1.4 cmt.; cf, e.g., In re Karr, 722 A.2d at 21 (<HOLDING>). Brice admits that she and Schoeneman spoke Holdings: 0: holding that an attorney violated rule 84d when he failed to perform any effective action on behalf of his client 1: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client 2: holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client 3: holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case 4: holding that a failure of an attorney to provide a copy of a brief to a client violated rule 14a


Input: also provided that “in order to convict of manslaughter by intentional act, it is not neces sary for [the] State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated intent to cause death.” This instruction did not require the jury to find that Mr. Jasper intended to kill the victim. See Daniels v. State, 72 So.3d 227, 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (finding 2008 amended instruction not fundamentally erroneous), review granted, 79 So.3d 744 (Fla.2012) ; Moore v. State, 57 So.3d 240, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“Because the instruction given differs from the instruction given in [State v.]Montgomery [, 39 So.3d 252 (Fla.2010)], and the jury was also instructed on manslaughter by culpable negligence, we find no fundamental error.”); but cf. Haygood v. State, 54 So.3d 1035, 1036, 1038 (Fla. 2d DCA) (<HOLDING>), review granted, 61 So.3d 410 (Fla.2011). At Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by giving the standard jury instruction for attempted manslaughter by act 1: holding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to argue the trial court committed fundamental error in giving the thenstandard jury instruction for manslaughter by act even though controlling precedent in the district had approved the instruction when the instruction had been found fundamentally erroneous in another district and conflict between the two districts would have allowed defendant to seek relief in the supreme court 2: holding erroneous jury instruction on manslaughter by intentional act not fundamental error where trial court also instructed jury on manslaughter by culpable negligence 3: holding jury instruction on lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter by act which required finding of intent to kill constituted fundamental error and required reversal of defendants conviction for seconddegree murder 4: holding that erroneous manslaughter instruction that defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim did not constitute fundamental error certifying question  if a jury returns a verdict finding a defendant guilty of seconddegree murder in a case where the evidence does not support a theory of culpable negligence does a trial court commit fundamental error by giving a flawed manslaughter by act instruction when it also gives an instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence