Input: by guileful, covinous, or fraudulent devices and practices are, must, or might be in any ways distur :06-466-HMH, 2007 WL 39428 (D.S.C. Jan. 4, 2007) (unpublished), this court voided a cash transfer of $300,000.00 under the Statute of Elizabeth. In deciding the issue, the court held that “[b]ased on the broad language and equitable nature of the Statute ... the transfer of funds ... is a ‘transfer’ under the broad and plain language of section 27-23-10(A).” Id. at *3 (citation omitted). Other courts in this district reached analogous conclusions. See In re Hanckel, 512 B.R. 539, 551 (Bankr.D.S.C.2014) (finding an ownership interest in a company subject to the statute and setting aside its transfer as a fraudulent conveyance); In re Hoffman, 194 B.R. 943, 959-61 (Bankr.D.S.C.1995) (<HOLDING>); Future Grp., II v. Nationsbank, 324 S.C. 89, Holdings: 0: holding that an emergency petition by an insurance commissioner in her capacity as liquidator of an insurance company that was whollyowned by the debtor holding company was not an exercise of police and regulatory powers because it sought to take control of the debtors assets to allow certain policyholders and creditors to gain a pecuniary advantage over other creditors of the debtors estate 1: holding that the transfers at issue were not fraudulent transfers because  they did not diminish the debtors estate 2: holding that a debtor in bankruptcy may claim as exempt the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy insuring the life of the debtor that is payable to a beneficiary other than the debtor under dccode ann  314716a2001 despite the absence of the term cash surrender from the statute 3: holding transfers of cash totaling 32350000 made by a debtor to an insider creditors company void under the statute 4: holding that a profit of 35 million in insider trading by the president and ceo of the company was sufficient to plead scienter because that corporate insider sold 40 of his stock holdings in the company and several other corporate insiders sold large positions in the company


Input: Owens’s lengthy criminal history or because Owens was wearing baggy clothes that could have easily concealed a weapon; and the officer did not testify that the stop of the vehicle occurred in a high crime area. In short, nothing of substance appears in the record to justify the frisk of Owens except for the inarguable fact that he was a passenger in a vehicle driven by someone who possessed a crack pipe. Although further questioning may have revealed that the officer did have, in fact, articulable and independent suspicions that Owens was armed or dangerous, those reasons were not explicitly brought forth during the brief suppression hearing. 21 . United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir.1971). 22 . See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 922 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that the automatic companion rule as expressed in benyhill was insufficient to justify a fullblown search of an arrestees companion but the rationale may be sufficient where a search is limited to a pat down  1: holding that reasoning which would justify the arrest by the search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest  will not do 2: holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee 3: holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest 4: holding that while search incident to arrest could not justify search in that case probable cause plus exigency justified search


Input: ought to be subject to liability under § 10:5-12(a) because “public officers” are specifically included in the § 10:5-5(e) definition of “employer.” Although “public officers” is not defined in the LAD, it is difficult to conceive of a definition of that term that does not encompass a police inspector and a police captain, which are, respectively, the second and third highest ranking positions in the Atlantic City Police Department. All of this is to say that, even if we did not have the benefit of New Jersey state court decisions and were completely left to our own devices, the question of whether Rifiee and Madamba could be liable under LAD § 10:5-12(a) is, as the majority acknowledges, a close one. Maj. Op. at 125. But see Tyson v. CIGNA Corp., 918 F.Supp. 836, 839 (D.N.J.1996) (<HOLDING>). In matters involving state law, however, our Holdings: 0: holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability 1: holding that there is no individual liability under title vii 2: holding no individual liability under the adea 3: holding that fmla does not impose individual liability 4: holding that  10512a does not provide for individual liability because it does not include any of the phrases that so clearly provide a basis for individual liability under other subparts of lad


Input: moves into the realm of res judicata.”). The doctrine of issue preclusion “comes into play when an issue involved in a prior decision is the same issue involved in a subsequent action.” See Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 (10th Cir.1987). If the bankruptcy court’s turnover order, which the debtors did not appeal, “actually and necessarily decided” the exemption issue, principles of issue preclusion could prevent the debtors from raising this argument in an appeal from a subsequent order. See id. (noting that issue preclusion does not apply unless “the issue is actually decided in the first action” and “it was necessary to decide the issue in disposing of the first action”); see also In re Albrecht, 233 F.3d 1258, 1260-61 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Turshen v. Chapman, 823 F.2d 836, 839 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order 1: holding that under the doctrine of direct estoppel a law firms failure to appeal the bankruptcy courts earlier order barred it from challenging the courts holding on its appeal from a subsequent order 2: holding that an issue not raised on direct appeal of sentence is barred by the law of the case from presentation in a subsequent appeal 3: holding that notice indicating appeal was from judgment on date of jury verdict was insufficient to preserve appeal from earlier order granting summary judgment 4: holding that under the law of the case doctrine an issue of fact or law decided on appeal may not be reexamined by the appellate court on a subsequent appeal


Input: argue that the arbitrator must make that decision. Because the court already determined that the arbitrator must decide whether this matter may proceed on a class or collective basis (doc. 62 at 8), defendants contend that the court also must hold that it is the arbitrator who must decide whether the effective vindication exception applies to invalidate the arbitration agreement. Plaintiffs never respond to this argument in their Reply. Doc. 68. Arguably, their failure to do so amounts to a waiver of this issue. See In re FCC 11-161, 753 F.3d 1015, 1100-01 (10th Cir. 2014) (rejecting petitioners’ argument because their reply brief was silent on an issue and made no attempt to rebut the respondents’ argument); see also Cayetano-Castillo v. Lynch, 630 Fed.Appx. 788, 794 (10th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Hardy v. City Optical, Inc., 39 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that an appellant who does not respond to an argument in its reply brief  waives as a practical matter anyway any objections not obvious to the court to specific points urged by the appellee  because the court is not required to do his work for him and dissect the appellees plausible argument 1: holding that if an appellee raises an argument not addressed by the appellant in its opening brief the appellant may reply  citation omitted 2: holding that a reviewing court must address an appellees reply as to preservation of error and an alternative argument in an appellees reply 3: holding a party waives an argument made for the first time on reply 4: holding that an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived


Input: set forth above, the court disagrees. The defendant cites EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir.1981) in support of its decision. That decision, however, supports this court's conclusion. In Sears, Roebuck & Co., the circuit court rejected the EEOC’s decision to litigate those claims that it did not attempt to conciliate. Id., 650 F.2d at 19. Here, by contrast, the defendant asks this court to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims because the plaintiff was unwilling to conciliate as to a specific issue. PL's Opp'n at 24 & n. 16. 5 . Judicial inquiries of this sort run afoul of Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d at 709 (indicating the inappropriateness of judicial intrusion into internal agency actions) and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 468 (D.C.Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The defendant argues that the FEC's Holdings: 0: holding that it would offend due process to permit criminal prosecution of an individual for invoking a privilege against selfincrimination in hearings before a state legislative commission after having been assured of his right to do so by the chairman members and counsel of the commission 1: holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did 2: recognizing the commission as an institutional agency not a mere composition of its individual members 3: recognizing standing for an environmental group based on the adverse effect of an international commerce commission decision on its members 4: recognizing an exception allowing parties to raise for the first time on review  challenges that concern the very composition or constitution of an agency


Input: Moore, 917 F.2d at 221 (quoting United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 154 (6th Cir.1979)). Further, the degree of proof requires “a strong showing of factually specific and compelling prejudice.” United States v. Benton, 852 F.2d 1456, 1469 (6th Cir.1988). Petitioner has fallen far short of presenting sufficient justification for severance. Thus, Petitioner’s claim regarding ineffective assistance must, in turn, be denied. In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will be denied. This case is dismissed. The Court finds that based on the record, Petitioner’s arguments and applicable case law, a certificate of appealability should not be issued. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). See Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1064 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). An Order consistent with this Opinion will be Holdings: 0: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus 1: holding that the rule applies for purposes of habeas corpus under section 2254 2: holding that district courts have authority to grant certificates of appealability under the recently amended habeas corpus framework 3: holding a court cannot issue and make returnable to it a writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner is outside the courts authority 4: holding that order denying relief under fedrcivp 60b in a habeas setting is the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding subject to the certificate of appealability requirement of 28 usc  2253c1a 2000


Input: to the stop and subsequent search of Scott Brooks’s car and person. Because of his vehicular flight prior to arriving at the checkpoint, Scott Brooks was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes by the show of police authority by virtue of the checkpoint signs or the checkpoint itself. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-29, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (no seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes when a defendant did not acquiesce in the show of police authority); id. at 629, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (“Assuming that [the officer’s] pursuit ... constituted a ‘show of authority’ in enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled.”); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Latta v. Keryte, 118 F.3d 693, 700 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that for purposes of determining whether the roadblock worked a fourth amendment seizure the controlling considerations are whether 1 the motorist was meant to be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock and 2 the motorist was so stopped 1: holding that where police officers had stopped a vehicle because they suspected that the motorist was intoxicated irrespective of whether the deputies were justified in detaining the motorist after he showed no signs of intoxication and even if they had not after approaching the motorist observed conditions raising a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot they were entitled to ask the motorist for permission to search his vehicle 2: holding that a fleeing motorist was not seized for fourth amendment purposes until the law enforcement officers were successful in stopping the motorist at a roadblock 3: holding that police officers are entitled to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a traffic violation 4: holding that where the police roadblock was intended to stop brower by physical impact and did so a seizure occurred


Input: claims regarding the disciplinary proceeding were not related to the same incident and did not involve common questions of fact or law as in his claims against Niak and Kimich. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Branum’s claims against Niak and Kimich for improper joinder. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 20; Arrington, 414 F.2d at 693. Branum’s appeal is without arguable merit and is frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir.1983). As such, his appeal is dismissed. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), as does the district court’s dismissal of the complaint. See Adepegba v. Hammons, 108 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir.1996); Patton v. Jefferson Corr. Ctr., 136 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Branum has previously accumulated two Holdings: 0: holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations 1: holding that an evidentiary hearing may be used to develop the factual basis of a prisoner complaint 2: holding prisoner cannot avoid strike by improperly joining claims to complaint 3: holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court 4: holding that where plaintiffs claims are timely on the face of the allegations of the complaint a court should strike the affirmative defense of statute of limitations


Input: on. Our decision that due process does not require full judicial or trial-type proceedings is far from novel. See Pinnacle, 648 F.3d at 717; Buckingham v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 603 F.3d 1073, 1082-83 (9th Cir.2010); United States v. Clifford Matley Family Tr., 354 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir.2004); see also Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 266, 107 S.Ct. 1740, 95 L.Ed.2d 239 (1987) (“We conclude, however, that as a general rule the employer’s interest is adequately protected without the right of confrontation and cross-examination, again so long as the employer is otherwise provided an opportunity to respond at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (<HOLDING>). ASSE argues that oral cross-examination is Holdings: 0: holding that a verdict form specifying the jurys mitigation findings is not required 1: holding that federal law applies because judicial estoppel relates to protection of the integrity of the federal judicial process 2: recognizing the need for judicial economy in family issues as well as  the need to avoid fundamental unfairness 3: holding that the constitutionally required process need not take the form of a judicial or quasijudicial trial 4: holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating


Input: “(I)ssue preclusion requires that the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted in the present action was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” TLT Const. v. A. Anthony Tappe & Assoc., 48 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 5 (1999). M. and J. filed the application for criminal process against Benoit in the Leominster District Court on February 14, 1997, and thus were plainly parties in the district court adjudication. To establish S. was in privity with M. and J., there “has to be a ‘sufficient legal identity’ between the interest of the person allegedly represented and the prior litigant for the later claim to be precluded.” Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 250 (1980) (citation omitted). See Boyd v. Jamaica Plain Co-Operative Bank, 7 Mass.App.Ct. 153, 158 (1979) (<HOLDING>). A “nonparty to a prior adjudication can be Holdings: 0: holding that the current party was sufficiently identified with the parties to the prior litigation 1: holding that prevailing party was entitled to attorneys fees under an option contract which had expired prior to litigation because the parties were litigating their performance under the terms of the contract 2: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees 3: holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack 4: holding res judicata did not bar current litigation when prior litigation between the parties involved one breach of obligation under a joint venture agreement and instant litigation was based upon a different cause of action from a subsequent interference with the same agreement


Input: also paying the defending party’s post-offer costs. Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63. Because the Rule 68 offeree does not have the luxury of refusing the offer to assure that she has not bound herself to any terms that may later become unfavorable, she may construe the offer’s terms strictly, see id., and ambiguities in the offer are to be resolved against the offeror, Nordby, 199 F.3d at 393; Nusom v. Comh Woodbwm, Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir.1997). Evidence extrinsic to the offer’s terms should not be considered. See Chambers v. Manning, 169 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.Conn.1996) (citing cases); Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63 (“[Cjourts should be reluctant to allow the offeror’s extrinsic evidence to affect th[e] construction [of the Rule 68 offer.]”); see also Clark v. Sims, 28 F.3d 420, 424 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). We thus reject Appellants’ argument that its Holdings: 0: recognizing that settlement discussions do not constitute an offer of judgment 1: holding that unsworn pleadings do not constitute proper summary judgment evidence 2: holding that defendant has failed to provide any support for the novel argument that plaintiff should be denied fees because in defendants view plaintiffs counsel acted unreasonably in failing to accept defendants settlement offer and that consideration of settlement discussions on a motion for attorneys fees is barred by federal rule of evidence 408 3: holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell 4: holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added


Input: that although states are free to grant citizens greater protection based on state constitutional provisions than the United States Supreme Court divines from the United States Constitution, most states that have addressed the use of drug-detecting canines have followed United States v. Place in holding that their use does not constitute a search); see generally Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Use of Trained Dog To Detect Narcotics Or Drugs As Unweasonable Search In Violation Of Fourth Amendment,. 150 ALR. Fed. 399 (2001). Those courts reason that dog sniffs are not searches because they are only minimally intrusive and because they occur in places where individuals do not have heightened expectations of privacy. E.g., United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); State v. Paredes, 167 Ariz. 609, 810 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest 1: holding that there is no intrusion on a legitimate privacy interest where a dog sniff of an automobile reveals only information regarding contraband items and concluding that society does not recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in the public airspace surrounding a vehicle where the odor of narcotics escapes from the interi or of a vehicle into that public airspace 2: holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest 3: holding that society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy 4: holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle during a traffic stop conducted absent reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity did not violate the fourth amendment because it did not implicate any legitimate privacy interest


Input: Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation. 297 F.3d at 703. She testified the 27.6 grams of pseudoephedrine found at the defendant’s residence could theoretically produce “the highest possible yield” of 25.39 grams of methamphetamine. 297 F.3d at 703-04. The Eighth Circuit found this evidence insufficient, stating, “Quantity yield figures should not be calculated without regard for the particular capabilities of a defendant and the drug manufacturing site.” 297 F.3d at 705. See also United States v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating “the relevant inquiry is not what a theoretical maximum yield would be, or even what an average methamphetamine cook would produce, but what appellants themselves could produce”); United States v. Eschman, 227 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>); Buelna v. State, 20 N.E.3d 137, 146 (Ind. Holdings: 0: holding record is viewed in light most favorable to verdict 1: holding that when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government 2: holding courts cannot quantify yield figures without regard for a particular defendants capabilities when viewed in light of the drug laboratory involved 3: holding that a probable cause determination must be viewed in light of the observations knowledge and training of the law enforcement officers involved in the warrantless search 4: holding that in ruling on a summaryjudgment motion record evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to nonmovant


Input: As noted in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 382, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1778, 26 L.Ed.2d 339, 346 (1970), [t]he doctrine found practical justification in the fact that the punishment for the felony was death of the felon and the forfeiture of his property to the Crown; thus, after the crime had been punished, nothing remained of the felon or his property on which to base a civil action. [Giardina, supra, 111 N.J. at 423 n. 1, 545 A.2d 139.] 3 The issue regarding conscious pain and suffering also arises where an accident victim never regains full consciousness before dying, barring recovery under a survival statute even where the victim survives for a considerable length of time after being injured. See Tri-State Poultry Coop. v. Carey, 190 Md. 116, 57 A.2d 812, 814-18 (1948) (<HOLDING>). GARIBALDI, J., concurring. I agree that Holdings: 0: recognizing as separate from pain and suffering 1: holding conscious pain is necessary element to maintenance of survival action and even survival of injuries for considerable length of time cannot form basis for recovery of damages unless decedent consciously experienced pain and suffering 2: recognizing as an element of pain and suffering 3: holding that claims for pain and suffering are the separate property of a spouse 4: holding that plaintiffs made a sufficient claim for damages for predeath pain and suffering by decedent


Input: agreed to withdraw his claim of mental retardation. The PCRA court did not authorize the parties to raise new issues in the written submissions filed in support of the already established claims. Nevertheless, Elliott raised for the first time in his 2010 Supplemental Brief the discrete contention that he was entitled to a new trial pursuant to this Court’s holding in Brooks, i.e., that trial counsel is deemed ineffective if he fails to meet with the defendant in person prior to trial. Because Elliott did not include in his PCRA petition the claim alleging trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to meet with him prior to trial, and did not obtain permission to amend his petition to include the same, the issue is waived. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 613 Pa. 510, 35 A.3d 4, 14 (2012) (<HOLDING>); Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(B) (providing that the Holdings: 0: holding no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely pcra petition 1: holding that the constitutional nature of the violations alleged in a pcra petition has no effect on the application of the pcra jurisdictional time bar 2: holding that a pcra petitioner may not raise new claims by merely supplementing a pending pcra petition without court authorization because to do so would wrongly subvert the time limitation and serial petition restrictions of the pcra 3: holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition 4: holding that because an untimely pcra petition was premised on claims that were cognizable under the pcra the statutory writ of habeas corpus was unavailable


Input: time before February 23, 2001, because, when he was discharged, there was no order in place and covering this time period that required him to pay child support. “Section 523(a)(5) clearly requires that the support obligation be established by court order.” In re Hutchison, 270 B.R. 429, 433 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.2001). The language of section 523(a)(5), however, provides no time limitation on when the order of support must be entered for the support obligation to be nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Moreover, Husband provides no authority for his assertion that the nondis-chargeability of support obligations is limited only to prospective support payments or to support awards entered before the discharge in bankruptcy. Indeed, there is case law to the contrary. See Hutchison, 270 B.R. at 431 (<HOLDING>). Here, Husband was ordered to pay retroactive Holdings: 0: holding that it was error for the trial court to determine the issue of child support without a child support guidelines worksheet 1: holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation 2: holding that child support should have been made retroactive 3: holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 4: holding that the trial court had erred in imposing an obligation to pay child support when clear and convincing evidence established that the husband was not the father of the child


Input: N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. We find that Gonzalez’ status as a signatory to the agreements to cure default entered with Wilshire provides her with standing under the CFA. In the circumstances presented, Wilshire’s arguments regarding the lack of privity between Gonzalez and Wilshire arising from the making of the initial loan and the issue of her status as a “consumer” of that loan are irrelevant. A separate contractual relationship between Gonzalez and Wilshire exists that involves the loan, but does not arise directly from it. Further, we find that the monetary damages that Gonzalez claims to exist as the result of Wilshire’s allegedly unconscionable practices, if proven, constitute the statutorily-required “ascertainable loss.” Weinberg v. Sprint, Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 237, 801 A.2d 281 (2002) (<HOLDING>). We disagree with the motion judge’s Holdings: 0: holding that a deposition is the time for the plaintiff to make a record capable of surviving summary judgment  not a later filed affidavit 1: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed 2: holding a ruling on a motion for summary judgment adjudicating the rights of a party is a final judgment subject to appeal 3: holding that to have standing under the cfa a private party must plead a claim of ascertainable loss that is capable of surviving a motion for summary judgment 4: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed


Input: than from isolated words. [Citations omitted.] The plain language used in ¶ 11(A) clearly and unambiguously provides for automatic 10-year renewals “unless an instrument signed by a majority of the then owners of the lots has been recorded. . . .” The covenant prescribed a definite period of 10 years for modification by a majority of the then lot owners. The 10-year automatic extension language would be rendered meaningless if the covenant could be amended by a majority vote (less than unanimous) at any time on or after June 27, 1997. Thus, the plain language of the covenant causes the reference to “periods of ten years” to be a restriction regarding the frequency of amendment by less than a unanimous vote. See Scholten v Blackhawk Partners, 184 Ariz 326; 909 P2d 393 (Ariz App, 1995) (<HOLDING>); Illini Fed S&L Ass’n v Elsah Hills Corp, 112 Holdings: 0: holding that an amendment of restrictive covenants passed during the running of an automatic 10year extension period was not effective until the end of the 10year extension period 1: holding that amendments of the restrictive covenants passed during the initial 20year term would not take effect until the beginning of the automatic 10year extension period 2: holding that an amendment passed two years into a 10year automatic extension period was not effective until the 10year extension period expired and stating that to hold otherwise would render the extension provision meaningless 3: holding that government was not entitled to extension of time limit under 21 usc  8811 to rectify oneday delay in filing where government was aware of the circumstances contributing to the delay prior to the expiration of the time limit and could have requested an extension before the deadline expired 4: recognizing the prejudice of an extension to a defendant who would be required to litigate events that occurred more than eight years earlier


Input: of burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of explosives in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) limit that part of the definition to crimes against property. As noted above, that argument is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. It is also contrary to United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2005, 131 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1995). In Mobley, we concluded, “[wjhile it is possible to infer a property restriction into the structure of the statute, a plain reading of the words suggests that it covers any crime of various enumerated types, and also those crimes of whatever variety that involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. at 696. See also United States v. O’Neal, 937 F.2d 1369, 1372 (9th Cir.1990)(<HOLDING>). Our conclusion in Mobley was based in part on Holdings: 0: holding that failure to stop for a blue light is a violent felony under armed career criminal statute because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another 1: holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another 2: holding that misdemeanor drunk driving by its very nature involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injuiy to another 3: holding that vehicular manslaughter qualifies as a violent felony under section 924e2bii in that it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another  4: holding that attempted burglary under florida law qualified as a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 18 usc  924e2biihereinafter acca because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another


Input: not walked away, Pulliam responded that he could have “hung on and kept [Yinger]” despite the company’s impending financial collapse, but that Yinger “made the choice to send [him] unemployment separation papers” instead. Nicholes similarly testified that the company “had no intention of not letting [Yinger] come back on [April 17],” and that he was terminated only because he failed to show up for work following the expiration of his FMLA leave. PPI’s shifting and inconsistent explanations for not holding open Yinger’s job create a genuine issue of fact as to PPI’s undue hardship defense. See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1179 (stating summary judgment should be denied if plaintiff establishes genuine dispute as to employer’s affirmative defense); see also C.R.. Eng., 644 F.3d at 1038-39 (<HOLDING>). Because Yinger has demonstrated multiple Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext was insufficient because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer did not honestly believe its proffered reasons for its action 1: holding that a plaintiff may satisfy his burden by demonstrating such weaknesses implausibilities inconsistencies incoherencies or contradictions in the employers proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted nondiscriminatory reasons 2: holding that pretext for ada discrimination can be shown if proffered reasons for employment action are so incoherent weak inconsistent or contradictory that a rational factfinder could conclude they are unworthy of belief brackets and quotation omitted 3: holding that if factfinder rejects employers proffered nondiseriminatory reasons as unbelievable it may infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination without additional proof of discrimination 4: holding that plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating that an employers proffered reason for an adverse employment action has no basis in fact


Input: worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). The Government argues that Haselwander’s fee claim should be rejected because there is no “evidence” that Haselwander is worth less than $2 million. We disagree. The record in this case is adequate to show that Haselwan-der’s net worth is less than $2 million. In addition to counsel’s uncontested statement to this effect on behalf of his client, the record also includes a letter from Ha-selwander to Senator Lugar, in which he says, “My wife and I are just mid-level State of Indiana employees, and we cannot afford to pay for the current very high costs of college educations.” Joint Appendix 80. Nothing more is necessary. See, e.g., Hirschey v. FERC, 760 F.2d 305, 309 n. 19 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Sosebee v. Astrue, 494 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that record documents may show that a plaintiff meets the financial qualifications specified in 28 usc  2412d2b 1: holding that where jurisdiction was based on 28 usc  2201 venue was determined as per 28 usc  1391 2: holding that under 28 usc  1292b the appellate courts may review only matters in the order not all issues in the case 3: holding that venue for litigation was proper based on 28 usc  1441 regardless of whether defendant was doing business in the district within the meaning of 28 usc  1391 4: holding that plaintiff could not establish prima facie case of discrimination where plaintiff failed to meet minimum qualifications for job


Input: long as a ‘person has obtained a benefit from another by fraud, duress, or the taking of undue advantage.’ ’ ” Id., quoting Newington Ltd. v. Forrester, No. 3:08-CV-0864-G, 2008 WL 4908200, at *4 (N.D.Tex. Nov. 13, 2008), in turn quoting Baisden v. I’m Ready Prods., Inc., No. H-08-0451, 2008 WL 2118170 at’ NO (S.D.Tex. May 16, 2008). Unjust enrichment occurs when a person has wrongfully obtained a benefit or has passively received one which it would be unconscionable to retain. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Mims, 405 S.W.3d 319, 339 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.). Usually if a valid, express contract exists covering the subject matter of the parties’ dispute, a plaintiff cannot recover under a quasi-contract theory such as unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. d 915, 921 (5th Cir.1957) (<HOLDING>). Cashman’s Motion for Summary Judgment (# 86) Holdings: 0: holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine 1: holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate 2: holding that gas company was entitled to restitution of difference between contract rate and price paid under invalid rate order set by regulatory board 3: holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate 4: holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract


Input: that Plaintiffs Complaint is untimely. As already noted, it is undisputed that the Union convened plant employees at a meeting on December 20, 2001 to discuss the two-year extension to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Plaintiff did not attend that meeting. On May 17, 2002, Plaintiff filed a charge with the NLRB asserting a claim arising out of the same facts alleged here. Obviously, then, Plaintiff was aware of the facts giving rise to this cause of action by May 17th at the latest. The present Complaint, however, was filed on August 9, 2004, well over two years after that date. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims under 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2) are untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. See Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 149 N.J.Super. 20, 30, 372 A.2d 1355 (App.Div.1977) (<HOLDING>), affd, 76 N.J. 284, 386 A.2d 1310 (1978). That Holdings: 0: holding accrual of cause of action for purposes of statute of limitations occurs on the date on which the right to institute and maintain a suit first arises 1: holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale 2: holding that a single cause of action arises out of the same set of facts 3: holding that for statute of limitations purposes the injury in a section 10b action occurs at the time of plaintiffs entry into purchase agreement not on later date when plaintiffs failed to receive expected payment 4: holding that accrual date begins to run on the date the employee is notified unambiguously of the adverse employment action


Input: and that he had a right to rely on the representation to him that he did not owe child-support arrearages. DOR appealed this order. DOR argues that the circuit court erred in three ways: (1) by considering the doctrines of laches and estoppel in the absence of an attempt by the father to plead these issues or prove them at an eviden-tiary hearing; (2) by applying the doctrines of laches and estoppel without sufficient evidence; and (3) by vacating the final order establishing arrearages on the basis of a violation of due process. We decline to address the first argument because DOR failed to object to the circuit court’s consideration of the doctrines at issue, even though it had a clear opportunity to do so. See Matar v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 944 So.2d 1153, 1157-58 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). DOR provided arguments on the applicability Holdings: 0: recognizing that an appeal has never been an evidentiary proceeding so appellate court will not consider evidence not presented to the lower tribunal because function of appellate court is to determine whether lower tribunal committed error based upon the issues and evidence before it 1: holding on appeal the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct and the burden is on the appellant to present to us a sufficient record from which we can determine whether the lower court has erred in the respect complained of 2: holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court 3: recognizing that the preservation requirement applies even to issues of due process when there has been a clear opportunity to present the argument on appeal to the lower tribunal 4: holding that the general rule that issues not raised in the lower court may not be addressed on appeal applies only to appellants


Input: U.S.C. § 727 when the evidence showed the existence of a pattern of concealment of assets? 5. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in reaching the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof necessary to deny the debtor a discharge of his debts to the plaintiff pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(6) and 523(a)(4) when the evidence showed that the debtor stole accounts receivable from the partnership he maintained with the plaintiff-appellant? II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review A district court hearing an appeal from a Bankruptcy Court reviews the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact under the “clearly erroneous” standard, see Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8013, while its conclusions of law are reviewed under the de novo standard. See In re AroChem Corp., 176 F.3d 610, 620 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); In re Bennett Funding Holdings: 0: holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings 1: holding that we review the bankruptcy court decision independently accepting its factual findings unless clearly erroneous but reviewing its conclusions of law de novo 2: holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo 3: holding that we review agency determinations of law de novo 4: holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo


Input: Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); see also Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Malley and stating that police officer is entitled to qualified immunity where grounds for probable cause stated in warrant application were objectively reasonable). “[T]he standard for determining the reasonableness of an official’s belief in the existence of probable cause is whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have, known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he therefore should not have applied for the war rant under the conditions.” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092; but see Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1500-01 (3d Cir.1993)) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, Holdings: 0: recognizing that a defendant acts with reckless disregard when he displays a high degree of awareness of  probable falsity 1: holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety 2: holding that in order to prevail on a  1983 claim for unlawful arrest a plaintiff needed to satisfy the test enunciated in franks v delaware 438 us 154 171 98 sct 2674 57 led2d 667 1978 which requires a showing that the maker of the affidavit either stated a deliberate falsehood or acted with a reckless disregard for the truth proof of negligence or innocent mistake is insufficient a plaintiff must  demonstrate that the police officer acted with reckless disregard for the truth as well as prove that the officer made the statements in his affidavits with a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity 3: holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause 4: holding trial courts finding omission of information was not intentional or with reckless disregard for truth was not clearly erroneous


Input: for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.. 1 . In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs assert that Tabura and Diaz each had 160 hours of paid time off, citing Kellogg’s policy manual. But the parties’ undisputed facts before the district court indicated, instead, that Diaz earned 200 hours paid time off annually. 2 . On appeal, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC”) filed an amicus brief on Plaintiffs' behalf and participated in oral argument. 3 . The Supreme Court, in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2031-32, 192 L.Ed.2d 35 (2015), indicated that a "failure to accommodate” claim is a claim for "disparate treatment” and thus must ultimately satisfy the general elements of a "disparate treatment” claim. 4 . McDonnell D r. 1998) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease Control Holdings: 0: holding that to demonstrate prejudice resulting from counsels deficient performance that caused a defendant to forgo a favorable plea offer a defendant must show that he would have accepted the offer to plead and that there is a reasonable probability neither the prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer from being accepted or implemented 1: holding that it was reasonable that counsel would not anticipate that the prosecution would attempt to offer inadmissible polygraph evidence 2: holding that to prove ineffectiveness where defendant rejected plea offer upon advice of counsel defendant must show he would have accepted the offer had counsel advised correctly the state would not have withdrawn its offer the court would have accepted the offer and the resulting sentence would have been less severe 3: holding police departments offer for officer who objected for religious reasons to being assigned to guard abortion clinic to transfer to another district that would not require such duty was a reasonable accommodation because it would have eliminated conflict 4: holding that in light of the defendants failure to engage in the interactive process liability would be appropriate if  reasonable accommodation would otherwise have been possible


Input: Second, "[o}rderly procedure ... requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory ... of recovery to the trial court." Dansie v. City of Herriman, 2006 UT 23, ¶ 30, 134 P.3d 1139 (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The policy of judicial economy is most directly frustrated when an appellant asserts unpreserved claims that require factual predicates. For this reason, the preservation rule should be more strictly applied when the asserted new issue or theory "depends on controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial." James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982) (<HOLDING>). {16 The second consideration underlying the Holdings: 0: holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it 1: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 2: holding that a letter utilized by the appellant in his argument would not be considered on appeal because it was not properly before the trial court 3: holding that trial court made sufficient findings of fact when it dismissed appeal 4: holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact


Input: award of attorney’s fees against DOR in actions to determine paternity and support pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2010). See § 742.045, Fla. Stat. (2010) (“The Department of Revenue shall not be considered a party for purposes of this section; however, fees may be assessed against the department pursuant to s. 57.105(1).”); Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.003(2)(b) (“[T]he department shall pay any fees assessed by the court pursuant to Section 57.105(1), F.S.”). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court is authorized to enter an award of attorney’s fees against DOR pursuant to section 57.105(1) if the facts support such an award. See State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. Office of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Cook v. Carr, 501 So.2d 30, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>); Collins v. Brodzki, 574 So.2d 1157, 1158 Holdings: 0: holding that removal of suit against physicians employed by a federally funded community health center to federal court by the defendants on the ground that they were covered under the public health service act was improper as the department of health and human services had not yet made a determination whether defendants should be deemed to be employees 1: holding that a proper determination of the questions of law  cannot be made in the absence of suitable findings 2: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 3: holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees 4: holding that section 57105 fees can be awarded against the department of health and rehabilitative services filing a paternity suit on behalf of the mother if there is a proper finding of a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact


Input: that it did not challenge, in its administrative case brief, the finding of state-ownership or the resulting rate assigned to Shanxi DMD after the Preliminary Results. See CAC Reply Br. at 1. CAC, however, claims that the doctrine of exhaustion does not apply because, relative to the rates assigned to the mandatory respondents and the all-others rate, Shanxi DMD received a more favorable rate in the Preliminary Results and whs therefore not required ‘to act against its interests by filing a brief contesting Shanxi DMD’s PRC entity-based rate. Id. at 4-10. Congress has granted the court discretion to “where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.” 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d); see Hebei Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 28 C.I.T. 1185, 1196 (2004) (<HOLDING>). The exhaustion doctrine provides “that no one Holdings: 0: recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 1: recognizing that issue exhaustion is a mandatory although not jurisdictional requirement 2: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 3: recognizing that congress inclusion of the phrase where appropriate grants the court discretion thereby clarifying that the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional 4: holding that the ftcas exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional


Input: by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Arthur Lee Hairston, Sr., appeals from the district court’s order granting in part his 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (2006) motion for reduction of sentence. On appeal, Hair-ston asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to give him a full resentencing hearing and that the district court failed to provide sufficient reasoning for the chosen sentence. We affirm. Hairston’s claim that he was entitled to a full resentencing pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d 247, 251 (4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 2401, 173 Holdings: 0: holding that resentencing is required 1: holding that proceedings under  3582c2 do not constitute a full resentencing of the defendant 2: holding that booker and kimbrough do not apply at resentencing proceedings under  3582c2 3: holding that the rules governing criminal cases apply to  3582c2 proceedings 4: holding that  3582c2 does not authorize a resentencing but merely provides for a sentence reduction within the bounds established by the sentencing commission and that booker does not apply to  3582c2 proceedings


Input: railroad employee, brings this action under FELA, which provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiff in this case. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, et seq. See Rivera v. Union Pacific jected the argument that FELA is not preempted by the FRSA, based on the analysis that FELA is a negligence based statute and “[l]ike common law negligence claims, FELA negligence claims may not be used to impose duties beyond those imposed by Congress or the FRA— that is, FELA claims may, indeed, be subject to preemption.” In re Amtrak “Sunset Ltd.” Train Crash, 188 F.Supp.2d 1341, 1349 (S.D.Ala.1999) (citing Thirkill v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 950 F.Supp. at 1107-08); accord Rice v. Cincinnati New Orleans & Pac. Ry., 955 F.Supp. at 740-41;) see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the question to be determined is Holdings: 0: holding that the meaning of doubtful terms or phrases may be determined by reference to their relationship with other associated words or phrases noscitur a sociis 1: holding that a breach of duties that a fiduciary contractually assumes beyond those duties imposed by law is considered to arise out of contract 2: holding that insider transaction did not fall within scope of  547c2 3: holding that declaratory judgments fall outside the scope of the court of claims jurisdiction 4: holding that legal duties imposed on railroads by the common law fall within the scope of these broad phrases


Input: which was sovereign immunity. While it is true that where the basis of a dismissal is unclear, the jurisdictional ground controls and thus the dismissal does not preclude a future action, see Remus Joint Venture and Envl. Disposal Sys., Inc. v. McAnally, 116 F.3d 180, 184 n. 5 (6th Cir.1997); Restatement (First) of Judgments § 49 cmt. C (1949), it is not clear that a dismissal based on sovereign immunity is sufficiently jurisdictional for the purposes of claim preclusion. Compare Touvell v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 422 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir.2005) (“The Eleventh Amendment provides a type of sovereign immunity, and deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction”), with Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. \2006) (<HOLDING>). Undoubtedly, this is a point of heavy Holdings: 0: holding that congress had no power under article i to abrogate state sovereign immunity 1: holding that the exercise of judicial power under article iii of the united states constitution requires an actual case or controversy 2: holding that dismissal pursuant to a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity is with prejudice 3: holding that the sovereign immunity defense may be raised for the first time on appeal 4: recognizing that a defense based on sovereign immunity is not coextensive with the limitations on judicial power in article iii


Input: of at least ten years, and it could have imposed a sentence of up to thirty-two years. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A), (8)(a), (10)(a), (10)(b)(IX). But had the amendment not been made and had Manyik been convicted of aggravated robbery under section 18-4-802(l)(d), the court could have imposed a prison sentence of as few as four years, and it could not have imposed a sentence over sixteen years. • § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A), (10)(a), (10)(b)(IX). Thus, the amended information charged a more serious offense than that which was originally charged. ¶ 52 Because an amended information which charges a more serious crime necessarily charges an additional or different offense within the meaning of Crim. P. 7(e), the amendment was impermissible. Cf. People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 259 (Colo.1996) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). ¶ 53 A division of this Holdings: 0: holding that a jury instruction listing additional modes of sexual penetration than those listed in the information did not impermissibly amend the charge of sexual assault becausein part the added modes of sexual penetration did not change the applicable statute sentence or level of offense 1: holding that the clergy sexual conduct statute requires general intent and does not impose strict liability because the act of sexual penetration must be intentional 2: holding that penetration of anus and penetration of sexual organ although found in same subsection of section 22021a1b are separate offenses 3: holding that medical report was not material for brady purposes where report at best showed lack of vaginal penetration of sexual abuse victim penetration was not necessary for conviction of sexual abuse of a minor under iowa law 4: holding that the illinois statutory definitions of sexual penetration and sexual conduct cover clearly distinct conduct and that therefore the statute was not unconstitutionally vague


Input: is binding on all municipalities. It is undisputed that Do-Wop’s facility is within 1,000 feet of a residential zone. Do-Wop contends that because the Legislature made its facility non-compliant, it is entitled to protection under the MLUL, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68. That statute permits a use to continue indefinitely after it has been rendered nonconforming by a zoning amendment. The statute more specifically provides that “[a]ny nonconforming use or structure existing at the time of the passage of an ordinance may be continued upon the lot or in the structure so occupied.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68. Contrary to Do-Wop’s assertion, that statute does not conflict with N.J.S.A. 2C:34-7. The plain language of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 protects only preexisting noncon uper. 82, 90, 645 A.2d 788 (App.Div.1994) (<HOLDING>). As we observed two years ago, “N.J.S.A. Holdings: 0: holding petition nominating candidate under socialist party violated the act where socialist labor party was entitled to protection of party name protection act 1: holding that preexisting nonconforming use must conform with requirements of subsequentlyenacted freshwater wetlands protection act 2: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause 3: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the park system resource protection act 4: holding that pinelands commission regulation adopted pursuant to pinelands protection act act trumped mluls preexisting nonconforming use protection because act expressly provided that its implement ing regulations superseded mlul when there was a conflict


Input: remedy is itself unconstitutional; that under Booker we should review his sentence for reasonableness; and that his sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). We reviewed Spielvogel’s sentence in Spielvogel II and Spielvogel III, however, and he presented none of these arguments in those appeals. We explicitly said in Spielvogel III that “Spielvogel has abandoned his Apprendi/Blakely/Booker issue.” No. 03-13135, slip op. at 4. Nothing in the § 2255 court’s order requires that we revisit a sentence we affirmed in Spielvogel II and Spielvogel III, and the sentence before us is the same sentence. These arguments are also barred by the law of the case. See United States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1560-61 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Spielvogel’s convictions and sentences are Holdings: 0: holding an issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal 1: holding that an issue not raised on direct appeal of sentence is barred by the law of the case from presentation in a subsequent appeal 2: holding that under the law of the case doctrine an issue of fact or law decided on appeal may not be reexamined by the appellate court on a subsequent appeal 3: holding that under the doctrine of direct estoppel a law firms failure to appeal the bankruptcy courts earlier order barred it from challenging the courts holding on its appeal from a subsequent order 4: holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived


Input: employer might apply a salary retention policy in a discriminatory fashion or use such a policy as a vehicle to perpetuate historically unequal wages caused by past discrimination, these potential abuses do not provide valid bases to adopt a per se rule that declares all salary retention practices inherently discriminatory. Rather, these risks simply highlight the need to carefully examine the record in cases where prior salary or salary retention policies are asserted as defenses to claims of unequal pay. In particular, it is important to ensure that employers do not rely on the prohibited “market force theory” to justify lower wages for female employees simply because the market might bear such wages. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (<HOLDING>). In addition it is important to ensure that Holdings: 0: holding that to establish a prima facie equal pay act claim the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are substantially equal 1: holding that although women may have been willing to work for lower wages than men and market forces therefore dictated that an employer could pay women less than men reliance on such a market force theory nevertheless became illegal once congress enacted into law the principle of equal pay for equal work 2: holding that the mere allegation that a female professor was paid less than a male colleague for equal work stated a claim under the equal pay act 3: holding that reliance may be established by proof that securities not traded on the open market could not have been issued at all but for a fraudulent scheme of the defendants the plaintiff still had to prove that he relied on the integrity of the offerings of the securities market 4: holding that  disposable retirement pay  from military pension was equal to gross retirement pay less federal income taxes


Input: criminal, formal or informal; where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.’ ” ■ Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1141, 79 L.Ed.2d 409, 418 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 38 L.Ed.2d 274, 281 (1973)). When the State “compels testimony by threatening to inflict potent sanctions unless the constitutional privilege is surrendered, that testimony is obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment.” Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805, 97 S.Ct. 2132, 2135, 53 L.Ed.2d 1, 7 (1977 t.App.1995) (finding potential violation of Fifth Amendment where defendant refused to take polygraph test as part of court-ordered therapy made a condition of probation); Gilfillen v. State, 582 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>); In re Welfare of J.W., 415 N.W.2d 879, 882-84 Holdings: 0: holding that a probationers challenge to a condition of his probation was moot in light of the supreme courts reversal of the underlying conviction and the probationers apparent completion of probation  1: holding that an order requiring the agency to search the records did not constitute courtordered change in the relationship of the parties 2: holding trial court could not make completion of courtordered treatment program requiring an admission of guilt a condition of probation 3: holding state had violated the defendants fifth amendment rights and consequently was prohibited from using any of the information revealed during courtordered treatment program in later separate criminal prosecution 4: recognizing that probation condition required probationer to enter into and successfully complete a sex offender treatment program but finding that no condition of probation was imposed that required him to admit to a counselor the sexual acts charged


Input: “good cause” is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Price, 385 Md. 261, 276-77, 868 A.2d 252 (2005) (dealing with good cause for a postponement of trial); ... Johnson v. State, 348 Md. 337, 345-56, 703 A.2d 1267 (1998) (whether to permit filing of a belated insanity plea). Id. at 205, 960 A.2d at 1224-25 (one citation omitted). I agree with the majority that subpart (b) of Rule 4-326 applies, and so there must be “good cause” to exclude particular evidence from the jury room. See Majority Op. at 599-602, 4 A.3d 507-09. But videotapes are a special kind of evidence, and certainly replaying one in the jury room runs the risk of overemphasis. See Wright, 72 Md.App. at 218, 528 A.2d at 500; see also Brooks v. Holtz, 661 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 2003) (<HOLDING>); State v. Frazier, 99 Wash.2d 180, 661 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding trial court acted within its discretion in excluding expert testimony 1: holding that it was within the trial courts discretion to refuse any additional discovery and that the courts refusal to allow additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion 2: holding that a trial courts determination that additional viewing of a videotape of an accident scene would overemphasize that such evidence was reasonable and that the court acted within its discretion in refusing to allow the videotape to go into the jury room during deliberations 3: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver 4: holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion


Input: trade practices. Whether an act is unfair or deceptive within the meaning of 93A depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. See Glickman v. Brown, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 229, 234 (1985). An act is unfair or deceptive if it is “ ‘within any recognized conception of unfairness’ or is ‘immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous’ or ‘causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).’ ” Id., quoting PMP Associates, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 596 (1975). Gear claims that Goba’s delay in generating punch lists and misrepresentation of items to be completed that Goba knew or should have known were completed constitute unfair and deceptive acts under 93A. The courts have recognized that “a negligent misrepresentati , 440 (D.Mass. 1991) (<HOLDING>); Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F.Sup. 892, Holdings: 0: holding that the owner could maintain a 93a claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the thirdparty beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor 1: holding that an abutter could not bring a 93a claim because there was no business relationship with the defendant 2: holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93a action against a prior owner of the land who was not the seller because there was no business connection between the two parties 3: holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages 4: holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute


Input: against BLMIS disallowed, and the Petitioners dispute the Objectors’ putative derivative claim pending in the New York State Supreme Court against Sentry’s managers and advisors on the bases that, inter alia, (i) the Objectors lack standing and (ii) the actions were commenced in violation of BVI law. Based on the facts before the Court at this time, these unliquidated, contingent, and disputed claims should be given no greater weight for COMI purposes than any of the Debtors’ other substantial litigations relating to assets that are pending in Ireland and the BVI. In any proceeding for foreign recognition, of great concern to the Court is the potential for mischief and COMI manipulation, as recently expressed by the Fifth Circuit in In re Ran, 607 F.3d 1017, 2010 WL 2106638, at *8 (<HOLDING>). Thus, even courts that have recently Holdings: 0: holding that to reopen a case an alien must show that the new evidence would likely change the result 1: recognizing in dicta that the case before it involving an individual and not an entity did not involve a recent change of domicile by the party in question and a similar case brought immediately after the partys arrival in the united states following a long period of domicile in the country where the bankruptcy is pending would likely lead to a different result 2: holding that in the context of a challenge to a states lethal injection protocol the mere possibility of a trial date in another case involving similar issues does not affect the balancing of the equities in this case 3: holding that a change in personal circumstances in the united states does not constitute a change in country conditions and therefore does not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen 4: recognizing a change in domicile based on the principle a guardian of an incompetent person acting in good faith has the rightto permanently change the wards domicile to another jurisdiction unless the court having control over the ward objects


Input: . Appellants' own testimony at trial confirms that they experienced various health problems with the dairy herd in 2004, in addition to the unusual fluctuations in milk production which Appellants do not dispute. See supra note 6. We therefore accept the trial court's findings concerning the timing and nature of the property damage sustained by the dairy herd. As the Superior Court admirably noted, it is not the role of an appellate court to reweigh the evidence. 13 . The Superior Court’s discussion of the multiple trigger theory of liability in Consulting Engineers was central to its trigger of coverage analysis in that case, and therefore carries precedential value given this Court’s adoption of that court’s opinion. See Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 543 Pa. 578, 673 A.2d 898, 904 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Even if we agree with Appellants that Holdings: 0: holding that notwithstanding the above and beyond language on the disposition form the discussion at resentencing revealed that the trial court understood its obligation to and its intent to give the defendant credit for time served 1: holding where an appellate court affirms trial courts grant of summary judgment on a particular ground the appellate court need not discuss the remaining grounds 2: holding that appellant waived the issue on appeal by not raising it in its opening brief even though the lower courts decision was based on that point 3: holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment 4: holding that when this court per curiam affirms on the basis of the lower courts opinion it not only signals agreement with the result but also with the rationale employed in reaching its final disposition on matters essential to its holding


Input: First, the proposed Second Amended Complaint makes clear that Plaintiff was separated from her colleagues before she brought her discrimination claim to HR. See id. ¶ 17 (alleging that Groff “segregated” Plaintiff “[s]hortly after denying [her] request for a promotion”). Accordingly, there can be no causal relationship between her complaint to HR and that conduct. Second, Plaintiff does not specify when Defendant reduced her break time or subjected her attendance to more scrutiny, so the court cannot infer that those actions arose in response to her protected activity. In any event, even if those acts did commence after Plaintiff first exercised her statutory rights, they do not support a hostile work environment claim. See Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 130-31 (D.G. Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>); Hussain v. Gutierrez, 593 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 Holdings: 0: holding that a failure to make out a hostile work environment claim effectively disposes of the constructive discharge claim as well 1: recognizing that a constructive discharge claim and a hostile work environment claim are not equivalent because a constructive discharge claim imposes a higher standard 2: holding defendants belief that his work was unfairly criticized is not sufficient for constructive discharge 3: holding that nonselection for a desirable position assignment to undesirable duties sharing a small office and being criticized did not make out a hostile work environment causing constructive discharge 4: holding that a claim of constructive discharge requires a showing of harassment that is more severe and pervasive than that required to show a hostile work environment


Input: 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Moreover, suits against a state, brought in federal court, for violation of a state law, are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even if the court would otherwise have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429, 438 (6th Cir.2000). Plaintiff has not'pointed the Court to any provision of state or federal law that would waive Maryland’s sovereign immunity, and the Court does not find a waiver in any of the state or federal statutes that plaintiff cites as the basis for his claims. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (<HOLDING>), quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, Holdings: 0: holding that a statute shall not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication 1: holding that courts will only find a waiver of sovereign immunity  by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction 2: holding that indiana courts will only engage in statutory interpretation if the language of the statute is ambiguous 3: holding that we will not grant relief unless the indictment is so obviously defective as not to charge the offense alleged by any reasonable construction 4: holding same as to an easement by implication


Input: him that Hill and Russell shot the other girl. Barnes stated he could “hear them screaming in his head.” Edwards testified that Russell was present when Barnes made these statements and that Russell did not say anything, but was just “sitting there lik ry factor weighs very slightly in favor of the admissibility of the Vogt Street extraneous offense to prove Russell’s intent as the primary actor or as a party to Chapa’s capital murder. 2. Factor Two — Irrational, Indelible Impression The second Montgomery factor, the potential of the extraneous offense evidence to impress the jury “in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way,” here weighs heavily in favor of exclusion of the Vogt Street offense. See Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487, 504, 506-07 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); Manning v. State, 84 S.W.3d 15, 23 Holdings: 0: holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment 1: holding trial court abused its discretion under rule 403 by admitting despicable story written by defendant about sex enjoyed by men and women with both willing and unwilling young girls in prosecution for possession of child pornography 2: holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial 3: holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion under rule 403 by allowing evidence that provided background for the crime charged 4: holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact


Input: certain product is encompassed by Comment k have followed two distinct paths. Many Courts have concluded that Comment k is applicable to all prescription drugs. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.1980); Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 245 Cal.Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470 (1988); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21 (Okl.1982); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 90 Wash.2d 9, 577 P.2d 975, 977-78 (1978). Other Courts, however, have limited the application of Comment k to “circumstances when it is shown that the product is incapable of being made safe given the present state of human knowledge but possesses such a high degree of social need so that its use is warranted provided warnings are adequate.” Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); see also, Wheelahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814 Holdings: 0: holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control 1: holding that plaintiffs infringement claim against defendants laterdeveloped product would be barred by laches and estoppel found applicable to earlier product if subsequent product is equivalent to earlier one under doctrine of equivalents 2: holding that whether a product is within comment k should be determined on a case by case basis where it is shown that the product is unavoidably unsafe and product of exceptional social need 3: holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury 4: holding statements of product superiority and that product was industry approved were puffery


Input: severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.’ ” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.1982)). b. Constructive Discharge A constructive discharge occurs when' an employer makes an employee’s working conditions so intolerable and unbearable because of his or her protected status that á reasonable person in that employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign. Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir.1989). Thus, a plaintiff claiming constructive discharge must show more than just a Title VII violation by her employer. Coffman v. Tracker Marine, L.P., 141 F.3d 1241 (8th Cir.1998); Tidwell v. Meyer’s Bakeries, Inc., 93 F.3d 490, 495 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>);. Drake .v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Holdings: 0: holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge 1: holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract 2: holding although there was some evidence plaintiff subjectively believed conduct he reported violated the law there was legally insufficient evidence this belief was reasonable 3: holding that although there was evidence of discrimination by the employer based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the employer had constructively discharged the plaintiff 4: holding prima facie case of discrimination includes showing of adverse employment action constructive discharge could satisfy element of adverse employment action but there was no constructive discharge where evidence did not support that discrimination rather than actual performance problems prompted reprimands and poor evaluations


Input: C.A. No. 16721, mem. op. at 11, 1999 WL 1009210,. Steele, V.C. (Oct. 25, 1999). 45 . Michelson v. Duncan, Del.Supr., 407 A.2d at 224 (quoting Kaufman v. Shoenberg, Del. Ch., 91 A.2d 786, 791 (1952)); see also Saxe v. Brady, Del.Ch., 184 A.2d. 602, 610 (1962); Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d at 1115-16, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 62, at *36 (quoting In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 368-69 (1998)). 46 . Steiner v. Meyerson, Del.Ch., C.A No. 13139, mem. op. at 2, 1995 WL 441999 at *1, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *3, Allen, C. (Jul. 19, 1995). 47 . Compl. ¶ 10. 48 . Id. at ¶ 22. 49 . Id. atV21. 50 . Id. atV21. 51 . In re 3COM Corp. Shareholders Litig., mem. op. at 12-14. 52 . See Steiner v. Meyerson, mem. op. at 13-14, 1995 WL 441999 at *5, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *16-17 (<HOLDING>). 53 .But, of course, the complaint fails to Holdings: 0: holding that as a matter of law claim stated in amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint 1: holding that a complaint stated an unfairness claim but did not state a claim satisfying the more rigorous waste standard 2: holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied 3: holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference 4: holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity


Input: midnight. Thus it was May 27, not May 26, when Harper fell from the tree. 5 . We have considered all of Harper's other arguments and find they lack merit. Harper claims, for example, that defendants could not have heard Perkins alert them to the gun in the tree because both defendants said they saw Harper holding the gun. Yet Harper testified that Gourley tasered him immediately after Perkins shouted the gun’s location. From this testimony, which we must credit at summary judgment, we can only infer that defendants tasered Harper in response to Perkins's cry. The evidence does not support alternative inferences, e.g., that defendants would have tasered Harper even if they knew plaintiff could not reach the gun. See Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 1996) Holdings: 0: holding movant may not raise new grounds for summary judgment in reply to nonmovants response 1: holding that a superior court justice may not choose between conflicting inferences at summary judgment stage 2: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed 3: holding court need not withhold summary judgment if nonmovants inferences implausible 4: holding that nonmovants failure to except or respond cannot supply by default the grounds for summary judgment or the summary judgment proof necessary to establish the movants right


Input: that an employer must also ignore.” Id. (Emphasis added.) Although the Court’s holding was technically limited to the disparate treatment claim before it, one cannot read that opinion without receiving the strong impression that the Supreme Court is suggesting that the ADEA does not encompass a disparate impact claim. The Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas concurred, noting that “there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA” Hazen, 507 U.S. at 618, 113 S.Ct. at 1710. Fifth, of those courts that have considered the issue since Hazen, there is a clear trend toward concluding that the ADEA does not support a disparate impact claim. DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 41 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding no individual liability under the adea 1: recognizing cause of action under section 504 based on claims of disparate impact 2: holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the adea 3: holding that in title vii disparate impact case an employer may rebut prima facie case of disparate impact by demonstrating that the employment policy at issue is related to the employees job performance and justified by business necessity 4: holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea


Input: to enter no judgment prior to the close of the evidence.” Id. In light of the substantial evidence supporting the court’s finding of causation, see infra, we cannot conclude that the district court's decision not to rule on the Rule 52(c) motion was an abuse of discretion. Riverboat also asserts that, in reviewing the district court’s decision, we should evaluate the record at the close of the plaintiffs' case^— the time at which the motion was made— rather than the record as a whole. Riverboat's position is not supported by our case law nor by Rule 52(c). The defendants can point us to no rule of law that prohibits us, in reviewing the district court’s Rule 52(c) order, from evaluating the record as a whole. See Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 578 F.2d 721, 723-24 (8th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). 30 . See, e.g., Gaffney Test., Tr.I at 260-62 Holdings: 0: holding that when ruling on a rule 50 motion the record should be taken as it existed when the trial was closed 1: holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered 2: holding that the only question on a rule 35a motion is whether the sentence imposed was illegal on its face  emphasis added 3: holding that once a defendant introduces evidence on its own behalf it waives the right to dismissal under rule 41b now rule 52c  and stating that in such situations the sufficiency of the evidence is tested on appeal by viewing the entire record even when the trial judge reserved ruling on the motion when made emphasis added 4: holding that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error


Input: See McClintic v. McClintic, 39 A.3d 1274, 1279 n. 2 (D.C.2012) ("[S]ince the District of Columbia derives its common law from Maryland, decisions of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on questions that have not been determined by [this court] are of great weight.”) (first alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 . See Durr, 722 So.2d at 135 (stating that in other jurisdictions, "[cjonsent has been found to be a valid defense when the touching ... does not violate an established rule, such as in athletic events. It may also be a viable defense when the person being touched was made aware of the risks prior to consent, and in professions and occupations involving invasions of one’s physical integrity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Shelley, 929 P.2d at 491-92 (<HOLDING>); Brown, 364 A.2d at 30 ("There are a few Holdings: 0: holding that punching another person is a statutory assault 1: holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime 2: holding that consent is not a valid defense to hazing 3: holding that consent is not a defense to punching another player during a basketball game because such contact was not foreseeable in the game 4: holding that consent is not a defense to a violation of  5231


Input: Second, his immediate family is his only tie to this jurisdiction, and his children are currently in his homeland of Venezuela. Third, he does not appear to have any ties to his community based on his short period of residency. For example, the Defendant and his wife own no property on the island, they own two cars, one registered in his spouse’s name and the other in her employer’s name. Fourth, the Defendant has not been employed during his stay in Puerto Rico because he does not have a “work visa.” Finally, were Defendant to flee to Venezuela, the United States has presented evidence that suggests his extradition would be illegal under the Venezuelan Constitution. Thus, the Court finds that Defendant is a flight risk. See United States v. Perez-Franco, 839 F.2d 867 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The fourth factor that the Court must Holdings: 0: recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome 1: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 2: holding that the defendant cannot overcome this presumption of service merely by denying that he did not receive the complaint 3: holding noncitizen defendant was not entitled to be released on bail pending trial for possession of heroin despite lack of criminal record and strong presence of his family in jurisdiction because he could not overcome the presumption that he would not flee the jurisdiction 4: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present


Input: 1316, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2001). If the specification does not contain an “adequate disclosure” of the structure, the patent violates § 112, ¶ 6 and the claim should be found indefinite. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed.Cir.1994). The function expressed in the '780 Patent is “means for reducing the absorption of laser energy at a wavelength of about 1.4-2.2 micrometers.” CardioFocus submits that the phrase should be construed to cover the following corresponding structure: specially treated fiber that has been purified to reduce the concentration of hydroxyl ions including fused silica optical fiber part no. 822W manufactured by Spectran Corporation and equivalents thereof. That structure is adequately described in the specification, CardioFocus explains, as Holm (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). CardioFocus points to a specific product that Holdings: 0: holding that a claim was not indefinite for using the term selector because it was a standard component and its structure was well known in the art 1: holding that the specifications reference to a selector sufficed as one skilled in the art would have understood the term 2: holding that what is important is not simply that the element at issue is defined in terms of what it does but that the term as the name for a structure has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art 3: holding that use of term black box did not render the claim indefinite because that term was known in the field to represent video standard detector circuitry 4: holding black box labeled sel was sufficient structure because it was a well known electronic structure and performs a common electronic function


Input: a statutory argument that Shepard and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) should be applied to a district court’s categorization of a particular prior conviction for purposes of § 4B1.1 (i.e., whether the conviction was a drug offense, a crime of violence, and not related to the other conviction), or how the district court should arrive at that categorization when sentencing under an advisory guidelines system. Thus, he has waived that argument. See United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1299 n. 1 (11th Cir.2005) (declining to address the Booker implications of firearm and role enhancements because appellant did not challenge those enhancements in his initial brief); see also Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. 1 . Compare United States v. Spell, Holdings: 0: holding that issues not raised in an appellants initial brief are deemed abandoned 1: holding that issues not clearly raised in initial briefs are considered abandoned 2: holding that issues not raised in an initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned 3: holding that issues not raised in the initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned 4: recognizing that we lack jurisdiction to consider issues not raised in the parties briefs


Input: 331 U.S. at 376. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court relied on two theories in concluding that Kendall’s opinion was a clear and present danger to the fairness of the Ford case. Neither passes muster. According to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, Kendall’s opinion was punishable because it “called the very integrity of [its mandamus] decision into question” by “blatantly accusing], without proof, the Justices ... of gross dereliction of their sworn duties and of committing illegal acts.” Yet Kendall’s criticism of the decision to issue mandamus — even if it unfairly impugned the Justices’ motives — is simply not enough. His after-the-fact critique “could not affect [the Justices’] ability to [fairly] decide” how to rule on the petition for a writ of mandamus. Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 348 (<HOLDING>). And the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s Holdings: 0: holding that criticism of judicial action already taken even though the cases were still pending on other points or might be revived by rehearings was not enough to satisfy the clearandpresentdanger standard 1: holding the dismissed defendant was not precluded from obtaining its reasonable attorney fees under 1317201 even though the action was still pending against another defendant 2: holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met 3: holding that a remand should be limited to cases in which further action must be taken by the district court or in which the appellate court has no way open to it to affirm or reverse the district courts action under review 4: holding that reinstatement is prospective even though it contemplated changing the result of an action  already taken


Input: statute provides that Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.... 18' U.S.C. § 1964. The plain language of this statute allows plaintiffs who successfully bring suit under RICO to recover costs and attorney’s fees. It does not, however, provide a remedy for defendants who successfully defend against a RICO suit. Although Hunt argues that case law compels us to find in his favor, the two cases he cites have nothing to do with a defendant receiving costs or fees under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). See Brandt v. Schal Assocs., 960 F.2d 640 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Zenith Ins. Co. v. Breslaw, 108 F.3d 205 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that a prevailing rico defendant may receive attorneys fees under federal rule of civil procedure 54d 1: holding that a court may award attorneys fees in a successful lmrda action 2: holding that california rule modeled almost word for word on rule 11 of the federal rules of civil procedure does not allow a pro se attorney litigant to recover sanctions in the form of an award of attorneys fees 3: holding that successful rico defendants may receive attorneys fees under federal rule of civil procedure 11 4: holding federal rule of civil procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding


Input: by this entry that Delgado would return to work after twelve additional months of leave and that AstraZeneca should have understood as much by reading between the lines, Delgado has not told us whether Sánchez submitted any supporting medical documentation when he faxed the form to AstraZeneca—let alone that any such documentation supported what Delgado views as Sánchez’s implicit assertion that she would have been able to return to work after twelve more months of leave. This barren record strikes us as a rather meager attempt, in the circumstances of this case, to demonstrate that the requested accommodation would have been effective. Nonetheless, given our obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Helgado, we assume that she ha 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 Holdings: 0: holding that a person must request a reasonable accommodation before he has been terminated he cannot wait until he is terminated and then months later  request reinstatement and demand a reasonable accommodation 1: holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation 2: holding that request for additional leave after employee had already received nine months of leave was unreasonableaccommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months 3: holding failure to immediately approve request for accommodation even for employee with known disability did not constitute denial of reasonable accommodation where employer was working on solution over several months 4: holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada