Input: on her right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see Commonwealth v. Halley, 582 Pa. 164, 870 A.2d 795 (2005). She argues that dismissing her PCRA petition because she is no longer serving a sentence would deny her any opportunity to vindicate this constitutional right and therefore would deny her due process. Turning to the specific requirements of due process, Petitioner relies on the procedural due process guarantee of the opportunity to be heard. See Com. Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342, 684 A.2d 1060, 1064 (1996) (<HOLDING>). She argues specifically that she was denied Holdings: 0: holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 1: recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard 2: holding that an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard 3: holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard 4: holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner


Input: was overworked or that his job duties were otherwise burdensome. Mota, 261 F.3d at 521, is similarly distinguishable. In Mota, the plaintiff presented evidence that, during his employment as a visiting professor, the university “stripped [him] of his duties as principal investigator on certain projects.” Significantly, the university limited Mota’s ability to serve as principal investigator only “on certain projects,” and there was no indication that being a principal investigator on those projects was a significant part of his job as a visiting professor. Id. In contrast, Thompson alleges that he lost his ability to perform his essential job functions in all investigations, not just on certain projects. Compare id., with Schirle, 484 Fed.Appx. at 898, and Lavalais, 734 F.3d at 633 (<HOLDING>). For the above reasons, Thompson states a Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff successfully pleaded an adverse employment action where the plaintiff alleged facts indicating that his duties were so restricted on the midnight shift that it is as if he is not a sergeant 1: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 2: holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action 3: holding that once a plaintiff has pled facts in the complaint indicating that the statute of limitations is a complete or partial bar to an action it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead either in the complaint or in amendments to it facts establishing an exception to the affirmative defense 4: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff


Input: show and what must be shown to resolve the fac tual dispute at trial. Whether otherwise reliable testing procedures were performed without error in a particular case goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Only if a party challenges the performance of a reliable and relevant technique and shows that the performance was so particularly and critically deficient that it undermined the reliability of the technique, will evidence that is otherwise reliable and relevant be deemed inadmissible. “Of course, once a particular theory or technique has satisfied § 36-18-30, a court may take judicial notice of that theory or technique’s reliability. See [Ex parte ] Perry, 586 So.2d [242] at 251 [ (Ala.1991) ]; [United States v.] Beasley, 102 F.3d [1440] at 1448 [ (8th Cir.1996)] (<HOLDING>); [United States v.] Martinez, 3 F.3d [1191] at Holdings: 0: holding pcr motions alleging an illegal sentence are not subject to the timebar 1: holding that reliability of the polymerase chain reaction pcr method of dna typing would be subject to judicial notice in future cases 2: recognizing that pleadings in the underlying case are subject to judicial notice by an appellate court 3: holding that the reliability of the restriction fragment length polymorphism rflp procedure was subject to judicial notice 4: holding that another courts decision is a proper subject of judicial notice


Input: carving out exceptions for certain kinds of markets. E.g., UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 216, 110 S.Ct. 2807 (citing Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 744, 97 S.Ct. 2061); Del. Valley, 523 F.3d at 1124 (same). Neither do they depend on case-specific factors. See UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 216-17, 110 S.Ct. 2807 (observing that Illinois Brick’s rationale “will not apply with equal force in all cases” and that its economic assumptions “might be disproved in a specific case,” but affirming its brightline rule regardless). The exceptions cover situations where either Illinois Brick’s concern over multiple recovery and apportionment does not apply, or its policy of encouraging private antitrust suits would be stymied by mechanical application of its bright-line rule. See Shamrock Foods, 729 F.2d at 1214 (<HOLDING>); Royal Printing, 621 F.2d at 326 n. 7 Holdings: 0: holding that the policy considerations identified in illinois brick do not apply in coconspirator cases 1: holding that state substantive rules of decision apply in federal diversity cases 2: recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings 3: holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases 4: holding that state courts must apply the federal pleading standard in fela cases


Input: limestone on right of way); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965) (defining trespass as unauthorized entry by “thing” or person); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 13 at 70 (5th ed.1984) (same). When such a tangible invasion occurred, the element of damages was presumed. Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 175 Kan. 719, 721, 267 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan.1954). As the bankruptcy and district courts noted, however, some courts have adopted a “modern” view of trespass that recognizes intangible invasions. See, e.g., Public Service Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 390 (Colo.2001) (“[W]e now hold that, in Colorado, an intangible intrusion may give rise to claim for trespass.... ”); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 686-88, 709 P.2d 782, 788-89 (Wash.1985) (<HOLDING>); Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523, Holdings: 0: recognizing that an expression of opinion about monetary value is not a representation of fact which gives rise to an action for fraud 1: holding deposit of microscopic particulates gives rise to action for trespass 2: holding that the unique nature of psychotherapistpatient relationship gives rise to a duty of care to the patient 3: holding that the failure to act in good faith  does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract 4: holding that repudiation alone gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach


Input: to sign the declination statement. As a result, on January 21, 2003, Military Personnel Flight officials properly executed the declination statement in his absence. See AFI 36-2110 ¶ 2.29.6.3.1. (If the career airman refuses to sign AF Form 964, the Military Personnel Flight will administer the form on behalf of the career airman with an accompanying statement signed by the person who counseled the airman.). Thus, substantial evidence supports the Correction Board’s determination that Mr. Young’s PCS declination statement and the corresponding decimation code were not erroneous or unjust. Because the assignment declination code was appropriate, Mr. Young was not entitled to reenlistment or a promotion prior to his date of separation on April 12, 2005. See Dodson, 988 F.2d at 1208 (<HOLDING>); see also Dysart, 369 F.3d at 1313-15 Holdings: 0: holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 1: holding defendant had no constitutional right to a mitigation specialist or a right to an effective one 2: holding a prisoner has no constitutional right to a job in prison 3: holding that no serviceperson has a right to enlist or to reenlist in the armed forces unless specially granted one 4: holding a party has no standing to appeal unless he or she is an aggrieved party an individual who is not a parent in the eyes of the law has no legal interest in the child and therefore has no standing to appeal


Input: they qualified as an excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. As well, we agree with Haygood that the circuit court erred in distinguishing this case from Crawford on the bases that the statement in Crawford (1) was taken in a custodial interrogation and (2) was not an excited utterance. First, the fact that the statements here were not taken at a police station during custodial interrogation, although a proper factor to consider, is not dispositive. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (considering the difference in the level of formality between the interview in the station house in Crawford and the frantic 911 call in Davis as one of the factors in determining whether the statements from the 911 call were testimonial); Hammon, 547 U.S. at 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (<HOLDING>); Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1166-67 (considering the Holdings: 0: recognizing the crawford interrogation was more formal but determining the interrogation of hammons wife was formal enough in considering that factor and determining the wifes statements were testimonial 1: recognizing that there are no formal procedures for determining the validity of rs 2477 claims 2: holding that edwards protection only extends to interrogation and that denial of counsel is only one factor to be considered in determining whether  consent was voluntarily given but it is not a decisive fact 3: holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an allegedly coerced interrogation where the taped interrogation was played for jurors and the defendant crossexamined the witness at length about the interrogation 4: holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel


Input: in 1995 and 1997 and by the accompanying comments. Accordingly, we hold that the stock of closely-held corporations is a security within the meaning of Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-8-102 (Supp.1998). Because this conclusion cannot be reconciled with our holding in Blasingame, that case is overruled to the extent that it stands for the proposition that closely-held stock is not a security within the meaning of the UCC. D. Other Jurisdictions Our holding brings Tennessee within the majority of states that have addressed this issue and have concluded that the stock of a closely-held corporation is a “security” under the UCC. See Giuffre Org., Ltd. v. Euromotorsport Racing, Inc., 141 F.3d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir.1998); In re Hryniewicz, 222 B.R. at 18; In re Turley, 213 B.R. 857, 861 (C.D.Cal.1997) (<HOLDING>) (rev’d on other grounds, 172 F.3d 671, 675 Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of frauds found in chapter 8 of mississippis ucc applies to the sale of shares of stock in a corporation comprised of only twelve shareholders 1: holding that the statute of frauds of chapter 8 of kansass ucc applies to the sale of 50 of banks stock 2: holding that subrogation rights are not security interests under ucc article 9 3: holding that closelyheld stock is a security under chapter 8 of californias ucc 4: holding that chapter 8 of colorados ucc applied to the sale of shares in a corporation whose entire stock was held by one individual


Input: a third party beneficiary of an agreement made by others has the burden of proving that he was intended by the makers of the agreement to be such beneficiary.” A prospective third-party beneficiary may prove the intent of the parties to an agreement by relying on the unambiguous language of the agreement itself, Valdez v. Cillessen & Son, Inc., 105 N.M. 575, 581, 734 P.2d 1258, 1264 (1987), or, in the absence of such language, on extrinsic evidence such as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement, Permian Basin Inv. Corp. v. Lloyd, 63 N.M. 1, 7, 312 P.2d 533, 537 (1957). A number of courts have applied these general principles of contract law in cases involving the scope of a general release. See, e.g., Neves v. Potter, 769 P.2d 1047, 1053-54 (Colo.1989) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 586 Holdings: 0: holding parol evidence is admissible to show mistake 1: holding that parol evidence is admissible to resolve a contractual term that is ambiguous 2: holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties 3: holding that parol evidence is admissible to establish a condition precedent to the existence of a contract 4: holding that parol evidence is admissible to determine intent of parties


Input: succeed, Pearson’s participation must have somehow harmed Iglesias’s defense. Anticipating our conclusion that estoppel requires a showing of prejudice, the Athridges maintain that prejudice should be presumed in this case. This argument stands on firmer ground: An insured may be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, depending on the amount of control the insurer exercised over the defense. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 384 F.2d 316, 318 (D.C.Cir.1967); Diamond, 476 A.2d at 657-58. Assuming the Athridges were entitled to this presumption, summary judgment was still proper because Aetna rebutted the presumption with uncontroverted evidence that its participation did not harm Iglesias. Cf. Curtis v. Cuff, 537 A.2d 1072, 1075 (D.C.1987) (<HOLDING>). To begin with, Iglesias knew that Aetna would Holdings: 0: holding that where uncontroverted evidence rebuts a presumption that a defendant consented to the drivers use of his vehicle the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 1: holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law 2: holding that a drivers knowledge that there are concealable weapons in the car available for the drivers use is evidence of possession 3: holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence 4: holding that delay caused by or consented to by a defendant is not unreasonable


Input: witnesses. Williams failed to produce the kinds of expert witnesses which may have been helpful in proving his claim that his plea was affected by drug-induced confusion. On this record and on the face of the pleadings which raised the colorable claim which required an eviden-tiary hearing, abundant doubt is raised concerning Williams’s need for the assistance of counsel. That doubt should have been resolved in his favor. Id. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion in at least two cases involving a trial court’s denial of appointment of counsel for an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim that included alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to interview witnesses. See Witherspoon v. State, 634 So.2d 208, 209-10 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. State, 499 So.2d 24, 26 (Fla. 4th Holdings: 0: holding that counsels failure to call an expert rebuttal witness does not constitute ineffectiveness the pcra petitioner must demonstrate that an expert witness was available who would have offered testimony designed to advance his cause 1: holding that trial court erred in denying appointment of counsel where court had no information concerning petitioners education or ability to represent himself petitioner presented no expert testimony concerning competency of defense furnished by trial counsel petitioner did not call alibi witness to testify at hearing and effective crossexamination may have revealed that counsels own problems with federal government interfered with his representation of petitioner 2: holding that petitioner was not deprived of the right to effective assistance of counsel at sentencing where petitioner did not cooperate with counsel regarding the investigation and identification of mitigating evidence imposed restrictions upon counsel and refused to submit to further psychological or psychiatric testing 3: holding that trial court abused its discretion in denying petitioners request for counsel in evidentiary hearing where petitioner had requested counsel and had indicated in his motion that all documents had been prepared by prison law clerk he had only ninthgrade education he had no training in the law and he lacked the skills necessary to participate in hearing 4: holding that trial courts failure to consider appointing counsel for petitioner in evidentiary hearing was improper where record revealed petitioners lack of education and sophistication petitioner had limited participation in hearing and record indicates that there was abundant doubt raised concerning gordons need for the assistance of counsel


Input: 340). California courts have uniformly rejected IIED claims related to foreclosure actions, including allegedly wrongful foreclosure. See, e.g., Baidoobonso-Iam v. Bank of America, No. CV 10-9171, 2011 WL 5870065, at *5 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (“to the extent that Collier’s claim is solely predicated on the foreclosure of his property, California courts have held that such conduct does not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); Smith v. Wachovia, No. C 09-01300, 2009 WL 1948829, at *4 (N.D.Cal. July 6, 2009) (allegations that defendant “wrongfully and intentionally initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings” were “not so extreme as to exceed the bounds of civilized society”); Davenport v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 725 F.Supp.2d 862, 884 (N.D.Cal.2010) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff provides no response to Defendant’s Holdings: 0: holding that tobacco companies statements that they would report on the results of their research into the health effects of cigarettes were not an undertaking to warn customers of those effects 1: holding that the sound of a television on the inside of the house and the presence of a car in the driveway were sufficient to form the basis of the reasonable belief that the suspect was in the home 2: holding that the legal incidence of the kansas fuel tax falls on the distributor 3: holding that when a person entrusts effects to another and the police discover those effects in the others home by means of a search that violates article i section 9 the search also violates the entrustors rights under article i section 9 4: holding that the act of foreclosing on a home falls shy of outrageous however wrenching the effects on the borrower


Input: regard to the third factor concerning the issue of primary liability, the majority concludes that Far East was primarily liable for the debt which it paid; to wit, the letter of credit which it issued in favor of the Surety. The majority reasons that the letter of credit agreement between Far East and the Surety created a separate and independent obligation for which Far East bore primary responsibility to pay. As support for this proposition, the majority relies on San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bank Leumi, 42 Cal.App.4th 928, 933, 50 Cal. Rptr.2d 20 (1996), and Western Sec. Bank v.Super. Ct., 15 Cal.4th 232, 933 P.2d 507, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 (1997), both of which confirm the “independent” nature of letters of credit. Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal.4th at 248, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507 (<HOLDING>); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 42 Cal.App.4th at Holdings: 0: holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient 1: holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation 2: recognizing that strict compliance with  1557 is required 3: recognizing that an issuer has the primary obligation to pay on letter of credit such that literal compliance with the letter of credits terms for payment is all that is required 4: holding that strict compliance is not required


Input: In re Gearheart, No. 07-70232, 2007 WL 4463342 (Bankr.E.D.Ky. Dec. 14, 2007); In re Logan, No. 07-70212, 2007 WL 4414784 (Bankr.E.D.Ky. Dec. 14, 2007); In re Fuller, No. 07-81703, 2007 WL 3244113 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. Nov. 2, 2007); In re Oliveira, 378 B.R. 789 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.2007); Herrin v. Green Tree-AL, LLC, 376 B.R. 316 (Bankr.S.D.Ala.2007), aff'g In re Herrin, No. 06-12249-WSS-13, 2007 WL 1975573 (Bankr.S.D.Ala. July 3, 2007); In re Bartolome, No. 07-10731-DHW, 2007 WL 2774467 (Bankr.M.D.Ala. Sept. 21, 2007); In re McLain, 376 B.R. 492 (Bankr. D.S.C.2007); In re Manning, No. BK 07-70190-CMS-13, 2007 WL 2220454 (Bankr.N.D.Ala. Aug. 2, 2007); In re Cox, No. 07-60073, 2007 WL 1888186 (Bankr.S.D.Tex. June 29, 2007). But see In re Shepherd, 354 B.R. 505 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2006) (<HOLDING>), rev’d, In re Shepherd, 381 B.R. 675 Holdings: 0: holding that the antimodification provision of 11 usc  1322b is applicable to a mobile home irrespective of whether the home is attached to the real property on which it sits 1: holding that the definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa protects holder of secured claim in a mobile home that is debtors principal residence from modification under 11 usc  1322b 2: holding that the addition of a definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa did not change the scope of the 11 usc  1322b antimodification provision and  1322b remains applicable only to real property 3: holding that a lien on the debtors mobile home which was the debt ors principal residence as defined by 11 usc  10113aa was not subject to modi fication under 11 usc  1322b 4: holding that the definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa does not operate to extend the antimodification provision of 11 usc  1322b to structures that are not real property


Input: 21, 2012, supplement and treated that supplement as a Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion seeking relief from the default judgment, it could not have conferred jurisdiction on the trial court because, although the allegation that Thurmond erroneously expected to be given notice of a hearing before a judgment was entered against him could be treated as an allegation of "mistake” pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., (1) the September 21, 2012, supplement contains no allegations that could be treated as alleging grounds specified in Rules 60(b)(2), (3), (4), or (5), Ala. R. Civ. P.; (2) it contains no allegations of aggravating circumstances that would justify its being treated as a Rule 60(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, see Noll v. Noll, 47 So.3d 275, 278-79 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (<HOLDING>); (3) it was untimely because it was not filed Holdings: 0: holding that where a court considering a rule 12b6 motion relies on matters outside the pleading the motion must be treated as a rule 56 motion for summary judgment 1: holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment 2: holding that a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment when plaintiffs counsel relied upon facts outside the four corners of the complaint during oral argument of the motion 3: holding that a motion that alleged rule 60b1 grounds could not be treated as a rule 60b6 motion in the absence of allegations of aggravating circumstances 4: holding that when ruling on a motion under rule 60b1 the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact unless a request is made


Input: the time of the physical injury that caused it; or b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at- the time of the “occurrence” that caused it. {¶ 10} CGL policies are not intended to protect business owners against every risk of operating a business. In particular, [these] policies * * * are not intended to insure “business risks” [see generally Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims under Commercial General Liability Policies, 30 Tort & Ins.L.J. 785 (1994)] — risks that are the “ ‘normal, frequent, or predictable consequences of doing business, and which business management can and should control or manage.’ ” [Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schauf 967 nc., 348 S.C. 559, 565-566, 561 S.E.2d 355 (2002) (<HOLDING>). {¶ 11} Here, all of the claims against which Holdings: 0: holding that an agent breaches its duty to use reasonable care and diligence in procuring insurance when it fails to provide an insurance policy that covers the contents of the insureds business as the insured had requested 1: holding that a cgl policy such as the one at issue here does not insure against claims for defective or negligent workmanship or construction because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident and therefore claims for defective or negligent workmanship do not constitute an occurrence under the policy 2: holding that under a cgl policy an insurer had no duty to defend its insured in an action resulting from faulty workmanship and that a cgl policy  is not intended to insure business risks ie risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which business management can and should control or manage rowland h long the law of liability insurance  10011 specifically the policies do not insure an insureds work itself but rather they generally insure consequential risks that stem from that work id 3: holding an attorney does not have a duty to insure or guarantee that the most favorable outcome possible and because no amount of work can guarantee a favorable result attorneys would never know when the work they do is sufficiently more than adequate to be enough to protect not only their clients from error but themselves from liability 4: holding that a claim of faulty workmanship that results in damage to property other than the work product is an accident and that a cgl policy is not intended to insure business risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which businesses can control and manage    a cgl policy does not insure the insureds work itself rather it insures consequential damages that stem from that work    as a result a cgl policy may provide coverage for claims arising out of tort breaches of contract and statutory liabilities as long as the requisite accidental occurrence and property damage are present


Input: redress, Ms. Feral must have visited and intend to visit ranches that hunt captive antelopes without an otherwise valid permit under Section 10. Second, the plaintiff must adduce some evidence that Ms. Feral’s alleged injury is imminent. Although the plaintiff argues in its brief that Ms. Feral “intends to continue monitoring canned hunting ranches and visiting the antelope on these ranches,” see Pl.’s Mem. at 34, Ms. Feral’s declaration states only that she will “continue to monitor the Y.O. Ranch and other sport-hunting facilities.” See Feral Decl. at ¶41. Ms. Feral does not describe how she intends to “monitor” the Y.O. Ranch, whether by subsequent visits or otherwise. According to the record, Ms. Feral’s last visit to a ranch containing captive antelope occurred in 2006. t. 2130 (<HOLDING>); WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, Holdings: 0: holding that the government must demonstrate that the accused had some knowledge of the conspiracys unlawful aims emphasis in original 1: holding that the affiants profession of an intent to return to the places they had visited before  is simply not enough because such some day intentions without any description of concrete plans or indeed any specification of when the some day will be  do not support a finding of the actual or imminent injury that our cases require emphasis in original 2: holding that trial court may modify sentence on the same day as the assessment of the initial sentence and before the court adjourns for the day 3: holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included 4: holding that the affiants profession of an tent to return to the places they had visited beforewhere they will presumably this time be deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered speciesis simply not enough to establish standing


Input: decision in Goodman and recognized that Minnesota’s personal injury limitations period governed section 1981 actions. See Rhodes, 709 F.Supp. at 168; Rice, 677 F.Supp. at 612. In Rhodes, the court acknowledged that the courts of this district had applied the two-year statute of limitations for section 1983 claims following the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson. See Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F.Supp. 461, 463-65 (D.Min 615 (8th Cir.1995) (analogizing section 1983 claims and section 1981 claims with claims brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and recognizing that in Minnesota, section 1983 claims are governed by the six-year limitations period); see also Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 76-77 (Minn.Ct.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Although Owens only speaks to section 1983 Holdings: 0: recognizing that owens clarified wilson and designating the sixyear limitations period in section 54105 subd 15 as the applicable limitations period for section 1983 claims 1: holding that the limitations period in section 13  214a takes precedence over the limitations period for personal injuries found in section 13  202 of the code 2: holding that placement of a contractual limitations period in a section entitled claims was reasonable 3: holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made 4: holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims


Input: engaged in the following colloquy with Juror Five. THE COURT: Juror [Five] was the verdict of guilty as to both counts your verdict when you were in the jury room? JUROR [FIVE]: The first one was, yes, but not the second one. THE COURT: And as to the second issue, did you vote to convict on the second count? JUROR [FIVE]: Yes. THE COURT: Is that your verdict now? JUROR [FIVE]: Yes. THE COURT: Is it freely and voluntarily made by you as you sit here now? JUROR [FIVE]: Yes. THE COURT: So you are good with the verdict as it stands? JUROR [FIVE]: Well, can you explain becau 733 SE2d 36) (2012) (punctuation omitted); accord Powell v. State, 271 Ga. App. 550, 551-52 (610 SE2d 178) (2005). 13 McCullough, 317 Ga. App. at 855; see Steele v. State, 270 Ga. App. 488, 492 (606 SE2d 664) (2004) (<HOLDING>). 14 See McCullough, 317 Ga. App. at 855-56 Holdings: 0: holding that in determining whether a crime is a continuing offense the court must focus on the nature of the substantive offense and not on the specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue 1: holding that the sentencing courts conclusion that there was simply no way to avoid the base offense level did not indicate mandatory application of the guidelines 2: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense 3: holding that extrinsic offense evidence was admissible to prove intent where the prosecutor stated that she anticipated the defendant would deny his intent to be involved in the charged offense and defense counsel did not even mention that he would refrain from contesting the intent issue 4: holding that courts announcement that it would deny firstoffender status b ased on the nature of the offense did not indicate mechanical sentencing policy


Input: any other requested relief, shall be entitled to recover damages equal to the actual expenses incurred by the defendant in responding to the notice from the requestor pursuant to Section 4 of this act, and the expenses of litigation directly related to obtaining judgment quieting title in the defendant or asserting an affirmative defense with respect to the interest or apparent interest forming the basis of the action against the defendant, including costs and reasonable attorney fees. 2 . Mitchell also argues that the dock agreement was not binding on her. This issue was resolved by the district court's order granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and cannot be raised in this proceeding. Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 1990 OK 66, n. 27, 796 P.2d 276, 283 n. 27 (<HOLDING>). 3 . As Mitchell notes, the agreement among Holdings: 0: holding that postconviction relief claims which either were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal were properly denied without an evidentiary hearing 1: holding that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action 2: holding that judgments on the merits in former proceedings are binding on the original parties as well as their privies 3: holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action 4: holding that ujnder res judicata or claim preclusion a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties  from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in the prior action


Input: against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), which is mentioned, provides for a 120-day period. Nobles and Hales’s proposed amended complaint could relate back if it met the requirements of either Rule 15(c)(1) or Rule 15(c)(3). Saxton v. ACF Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959, 966 n. 11 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Rule 15(c)(3) sets forth the federal rule for Holdings: 0: recognizing strictness of maryland rule in a diversity case 1: holding that a proposed amendment seeking to change a defendant in a diversity case could relate back under either rule 15c1 or 15c3 2: holding that in order for a defendant to remove a case to federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction there must be complete diversity of citizenship both at the time that the case is commenced and at the time that the notice of removal is filed 3: holding that state law provides the standard of review for a denial of a rule 50 motion in a diversity case 4: holding that statutory change in diversity requirements is not other paper


Input: covenant not to sue the licensee. Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citation omitted). In turn, this court has held that a covenant not to sue deprives a court of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 855 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citing Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed.Cir.1995)). Accordingly, a licensor who has implicitly covenanted not to sue a licensee by virtue of the license agreement itself cannot seek a declaratory judgment of infringement. Moreover, in light of LabCorp’s continuing royalty payments on the panel test, Lab-Corp cannot itself challenge the validity of a claim for which it continues to pay royalties. Cf. Gen-Probe Inc., 359 F.3d at 1382 (<HOLDING>). The district court’s opinion concerning the Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court 1: holding that persons not parties to a contract did not have standing to seek declaratory judgment on contracts validity 2: holding that a licensee who continued paying royalties to the licensor did not have sufficient apprehension of suit giving rise to declaratory judgment subject matter jurisdiction 3: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action 4: holding that immunity applies to suit for declaratory judgment that plaintiff was entitled to continue paying for mudshell at the price specified in its contract with the government


Input: did not apply because the wife had failed to file her petition with the clerk until after the sale. 43 Kan. at 596-97. Similarly, in Graham v. Pepple, 129 Kan. 735, 284 Pac. 394 (1930), a wife filed a petition for divorce asking for 53% acres in Washington County as alimony. The husband later sold this land to a third party. The Kansas Supreme Court held the real estate was sufficiently described for purposes of lis pendens because the husband owned only one 53%-acre tract in Washington County: “If the derelict husband had owned a hundred acres and she had merely laid claim to some undefined portion of it,” there may have been sufficient ambiguity in the description to uphold the transfer to the third party. 129 Kan. at 737; see also Rumsey v. Rumsey, 150 Kan. 49, 90 P.2d 1093 (1939) (<HOLDING>). In the context of mechanic’s hens, which also Holdings: 0: holding that words which expressly refer to adequate legal description provide nucleus of description that is legally sufficient for statute of frauds 1: holding that a void decree has no legal effect 2: holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect 3: holding to the same effect 4: holding divorce petition giving full legal description specific enough to generate lis pendens effect


Input: non-violent refusal to submit to arrest and such minor forms of resistance as running from a policeman or trying to shake free from his grasp. Such conduct is also excluded from Section 242.1[Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function] and thus is not criminal under any provision of the Model Code.” § 242.2 cmt 2. The American Law Institute’s decision not to recommend criminalization of this type of conduct reflected the considered judgment that the charge of r 38-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (<HOLDING>). But see Commonwealth v. Montoya, 457 Mass. Holdings: 0: holding that force exerted against an officer after an arrest is complete cannot be used as the basis for prosecuting one for resisting arrest 1: holding that it is equally wellestablished that a suspects mere flight to escape arrest does not violate the resisting arrest statute 2: holding avoiding arrest is not the same as resisting arrest 3: holding that conviction for speeding did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim arising from acquittal on charges of resisting arrest and attempted escape 4: holding that resisting arrest is lesser offense of assault on an officer


Input: would not influence him or cause him to assign greater weight to the testimony of law enforcement officials. (R. 72-73). Barker also did not raise his hand when asked by the trial court if anyone had any bias or prejudice that would influence their verdict. (R. 8) Further, Barker stated during individual voir dire that he [had] no opinion about the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and that he wold enter the jury box and decide the case solely on the evidence presented at trial. This allegation is directly refuted by the record; thus, it fails to state a claim and does not establish that a material issue of fact or law exists as required by Rule 32.7(d). Therefore, this allegation is hereby denied by the Court. See Gibby v. State, 753 So.2d 1206, 1207-1208 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P. “... Duncan Holdings: 0: holding that postconviction proceeding is a civil suit 1: holding that misadvice of counsel as to the length of a sentence is a basis for postconviction relief if not refuted by the record 2: holding that where the coercion alleged to enter a plea is legally insufficient or conclusively refuted by the record there is no need to hold an evidentiary hearing or appoint conflictfree counsel 3: holding that a postconviction claim that is refuted by the record is without merit 4: holding that second state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit was properly filed


Input: by the Rose Foundation and others had no effect on the decision to sue Mr. Hurwitz,?” Williams responded, "Absolutely so.” 84 . See, e.g., Schwarzer, 104 F.R.D. at 196 (“Were a court to entertain inquiries into subjective bad faith, it would invite a number of potentially harmful consequences,, such as generating satellite litigation, inhibiting speech and chilling advocacy.”). 85 . 126 S.Ct. at 1704. 86 . Id. at 1704 n. 7. 87 . Id. at 1706 ("The connection, to be alleged and shown, is the absence of probable cause.”). 88 . Id. 89 . See, e.g., Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir.1985) (affirming Rule 11 sanctions for improper purpose where a party brought a removal petition solely to delay the judgment in a case); Morley v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 66 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11 Holdings: 0: holding that rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate when a motion is filed in part for a legitimate purpose even when the motion includes certain evidence which is assertedly presented for an improper purpose 1: holding that rule 11 is not properly used to sanction the inappropriate filing of papers where other rules more directly apply 2: holding that filing a supplemental complaint to intimidate the defendant into a large settlement was an improper purpose while also finding other rule 11 violations internal quotations omitted 3: holding that under chevron step two courts may not disturb an agency rule unless it is arbitrary or capricious in substance or manifestly contrary to the statute internal quotations omitted 4: holding that filing of an administrative complaint did not meet the requirement that the employee seek counseling prior to filing


Input: trust between individuals, free expression and individuality, or as stated by the court in Thorpe, the “confidence and sense of security in dealing with one another.” 424 N.E.2d at 258. While it is certainly true that surreptitious recording of conversations between citizens can have a chilling effect of such forms of freedom, this effect is rendered de minimis “when one is aware, or reasonably should be aware, that he or she is speaking to a police officer.” City & Borough of Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1984) (tape recording of defendant’s conversation with police officer was properly admitted into evidence at trial, when defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that he was speaking to police officer); People v. Suite, 161 Cal. Rptr. 825, 829 (Ct. App. 1980) (<HOLDING>); In re A. W., 982 P.2d 842, 847 (Colo. 1999) Holdings: 0: recognizing lack of requirement to prove reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to intercepted wire communications 1: holding that police officer had no reasonable expectation of privacy while in his official capacity he interrogated suspect in jailhouse 2: holding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in statements made to companion while seated in police car 3: holding that defendants reliance on cases decided on a reasonable expectation of privacy standard was sorely misplaced when he sought to suppress recordings of telephoned bomb threats to police observing that it was ludicrous for defendant to argue that his calls to police were confidential communications 4: holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his fourth amendment claims related to recordings as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances


Input: specific acts indicating that propensity. Although the State does not advance this argument in its brief, it might be claimed that the defendant had done so by giving direct testimony in which he indicated that he “would” not “under any circumstances” “ever” have hired someone to kill his mother or have told Pope that it was “okay” to kill her. However, we do not believe that such ■ ambiguous statements, which appear to have been made in the context of attempting to show that the defendant had a close and loving relationship with his mother, and, hence, no motive to kill her, can be fairly construed as an unequivocal assertion of good character that would justify cross-examination about prior violence against others generally. Compare United States v. Collier, 29 M.J. 365 (C.M.A.1990) (<HOLDING>), with State v. Guritz, 134 Or.App. 262, 894 Holdings: 0: holding that discharge of a police officer for the choice to enter into a relationship with the wife of his superior officer on the force was rational 1: holding that defendants constitutional right to travel was not abridged when he was ordered not to make contact with the victim he attempted to rape 2: holding that a defendants answer on direct examination that he would have at eased if ordered to do so by a particular superior officer was not an unequivocal assertion that he possessed the character trait of obedience to orders because the defendants answer could be explained by showing a special relationship to that superior officer 3: holding suspects contradictory answers on miranda waiver form that he would answer questions without an attorney and that he wanted to talk to a lawyer to be ambiguous 4: holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself


Input: filed a complaint against Guest Services, Inc., alleging that her discharge was wrongful. Ms. Washington claimed that her co-worker’s conduct in spraying the food with cleaning fluid contravened applicable District of Columbia health and food regulations, and that Guest Services had dismissed her (Ms. Washington) “for protesting safety, health, and food code violations on the part of the defendant.” On June 17, 1996, Guest Services filed a motion for summary judgment. Guest Services argued that Ms. Washington was an at-will employee and that her allegations, even if true, did not bring her within the only public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine that had been recognized by this court at the time. See Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C.1991) (<HOLDING>). On July 23, 1996, the trial judge granted Holdings: 0: holding that an atwill employee may not be discharged for refusal to violate the law 1: holding that an atwill employee may bring a cause of action under section 1981 2: holding that an atwill employee can be discharged for any reason or no reason unless employee is discharged for reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy 3: holding that absent a law or collective bargaining agreement a municipal employee is an employee atwill 4: holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law


Input: at a residence in Carroll County by officers of the 24th Judicial District Drug Task Force and the Carroll County Sheriffs Department. The appellant, although not the “target” of the search, was at the residence during its execution and was detained by law enforcement officers. “With his left hand, he pulled out a [pill] bottle... [and] threw it to the ground.” The pill bottle contained 6.4 grams of a white powdery substance, later identified as cocaine. Analysis During voir dire of the venire, the State exercised a peremptory challenge against a young African-American male. The juror was discharged and excused from the courtroom. Defense counsel objected to the juror’s removal as being a possible violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The State provided the court with several Holdings: 0: holding that courts must entertain a challenge to a private litigants racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in a civil trial 1: holding that racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 2: holding that private litigants in civil cases may not use peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner 3: holding that peremptory challenges may not be exercised in a discriminatory manner 4: holding that allowing a defendant fewer peremptory challenges than authorized or than available to and exercised by the prosecution does not in and of itself amount to structural error


Input: Miranda - warnings - specifically - acknowledging his right to exercise at any time the right to remain silent, and he indicated that he understood that right. The agents never threatened or implied that a refusal by Ko-verman to make a statement would result in discharge. The CBI policy stating that if an employee is "requested to make a statement in the course of an official Bureau investigation, members shall make full, complete and truthful statements" also does not support an objectively reasonable fear of termination. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the Fifth Amendment does not give an accused the right to lie. Lachance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 265-66, 118 S.Ct. 753, 139 L.Ed.2d 695 (1998); cf. Hoffler v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 27 P.3d 371, 376 (Colo.2001) (<HOLDING>). The mere requirement that a witness testify Holdings: 0: holding that absolute immunity extends to statements made in the course of judicial proceedings but not to preliminary investigations prior to the institution of criminal charges 1: holding that the doctrine of commonlaw privilege that grants immunity to witnesses in quasijudicial proceedings does not extend to disciplinary proceedings against a state employee who makes false statements in the course of an official investigation 2: holding that the debtors false statements about the location of assets of the estate were material to the proceedings 3: holding a continuance of lawyer disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of related criminal proceedings is not constitutionally required 4: holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review state disciplinary proceedings against attorney


Input: from other circuits to support his argument that the beaches are a public forum. Tellingly, these cases involve parks and beaches readily available to the general public where property use was not limited to recreation by deed restriction or otherwise. See, e.g., Naturist Soc’y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1992); Paulsen v. Lehman, 839 F.Supp. 147, 158-61 (E.D.N.Y.1993). In contrast, IVGID has historically limited access to the beaches to certain persons for recreational uses only because it is required to do so by the restrictive covenant. The beaches here are similar to properties where the government has restricted access or only allowed the public to use portions for limited, non-expressive purposes. See, e.g., Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 455 F.3d at 920 (<HOLDING>); Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 Holdings: 0: holding that the courthouse lobby was a nonpublic forum 1: holding that a courthouse was a nonpublic forum but an unenclosed courthouse plaza was a designated public forum 2: holding that the fact that a speech regulation is now being enforced  is not enough to convert the property into a nonpublic forum 3: holding that the airspace surrounding honolulus beaches was a nonpublic forum partly because of the traditional limitations on use of and access to airspace 4: holding first amendment guarantees access to criminal trials and limitations on access are subject to strict scrutiny


Input: claims that could have been brought either in the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction or in admiralty. Panek’s contract with Con-cordia was sufficiently maritime in nature to fall within the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735, 81 S.Ct. 886, 889, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (marine insurance contracts); Carroll v. Protection rcised jurisdiction over the counterclaims either under its “supplemental jurisdiction” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, or admiralty, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, at least with respect to the breach of contract and negligence claims. Having concluded that Rule 9(h) could be invok laimant has elected to proceed in admiralty is whether he demanded a jury trial. Lewis v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 620, 627 (E.D.Va.1993) (<HOLDING>); cf. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hansen, 125 Holdings: 0: holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction 1: holding that a demand for a trial by jury is inconsistent with an intent to proceed in admiralty 2: recognizing that parties had right to trial by jury in trespass action but holding that parties waived that right under cr 3804 by not filing a demand for a jury trial 3: holding in action involving single claim that if claim sounded only in admiralty there would be no right to a jury trial but if federal question was present as a separate and independent basis for federal jurisdiction then the jury demand must be honored 4: holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures


Input: jurors 7, 9, 20, 41,43, 65, and 84 as those who expressed concerns about the facts of the case. None of these individuals were ultimately empaneled: five were excused for cause because they stated they could not be fair and impartial, one was stricken by the defense using a peremptory challenge, and one was not selected. See State v. Rackley, 2000-NMCA-027, ¶ 9, 128 N.M. 761, 998 P.2d 1212 (explaining that “[t]he jury selection process, including the excusal of jurors for cause, insures that a defendant is tried before an impartial jury”). Finally, Defendant had two remaining peremptory challenges at the conclusion of jury selection and has not offered an explanation as to why she did not exercise those challenges. See State v. Isiah, 1989-NMSC-063, ¶ 29, 109 N.M. 21, 781 P.2d 293 (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v. Holdings: 0: holding that a white defendant can object to the exclusion of minority jurors through the use of peremptory challenges 1: holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause 2: holding that is not the fact that a jury is all white or all black that violates batson rather it is the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors 3: holding that the defendant was precluded from asserting error where the defendant had used all of his peremptory challenges and did not ask for more 4: holding that where a defendant does not use all of his or her peremptory challenges the defendant may not complain of prejudice for failure to dismiss prospective jurors


Input: the State has met its burden to prove the child engaged in acts of delinquency, the statute has not supported such review since 1965 and urges us to adopt a standard of review identical to the review we conduct in criminal cases. Such a standard would require us to determine whether, viewing the light in the evidence most favorable to the State, any reasonable fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the delinquent acts. See State v. Bash, 670 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Iowa 2003). As the State describes, before 1965, proceedings under chapter 232 were “in equity.” Iowa Code § 232.13 (1962). Thus our review on appeal was de novo, as it is in all equity cases. See Iowa R.App. P. 6.907. However, chapter 232 was substantially revised in 1965 App.2006) (<HOLDING>); In re A.D., 771 A.2d 45, 48 Holdings: 0: holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction 1: holding that an appellate court considers all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and grants the state all reasonable inferences 2: holding that in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jurys verdict 3: holding that when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government 4: holding that in reviewing sufficiency of evidence in juvenile adjudication the appellate court considers the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and affirms if those inferences constitute substantial evidence


Input: of the laws of the forum state and may have the minimum contacts with the forum state sufficient to meet the due process requirements of the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the forum state. In conclusion, we hold that the signing of a guaranty by a nonresident of a debt owed to a New Mexico creditor does not in and of itself constitute a sufficient contact upon which to base in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident. Rather, the circumstances surrounding the signing of such obligations must be closely examined in each case to determine whether the quality and nature of defendant’s contacts with New Mexico justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction over him in an action on the obligation. Here, the Hiatts did nothing more tha on, Inc., 558 F.Supp. 1118, 1123-24 (N.D.Ill.1983) (<HOLDING>). 3 . We note that in Hunter-Hayes Elevator Co. Holdings: 0: holding that a choice of law provision is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 1: holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction 2: holding no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor 3: holding that nonresident defendants failure to make payments in florida coupled with forum selection clause sufficient for court to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant 4: holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant where defendant assignee received patents from assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction in part because the unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state


Input: both Sergeant Boggs’ and Sheriff Peters’ testimony that they did not initially consider Davis a suspect as a factor in its analysis. See Davis, 554 So.2d at 1101. Because neither Sergeant Boggs nor Sheriff Peters communicated his belief to Davis, the court agrees with Davis that the officers’ subjective intent is not relevant to the objective question of whether Davis was in custody. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-25, 114 S.Ct. 1526. Even if the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ statement, when taken in isolation, is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, however, the court is confident that the state appellate court’s decision, as a whole, constitutes a proper application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Cf. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) (internal footnote omitted). The court Holdings: 0: holding that pursuant to 28 usc  2254d1 if  the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry 1: holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end 2: holding that review under  2254d1 is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits rejecting the petitioners claim that the federal habeas court could consider evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing 3: recognizing an appellate court may affirm a trial courts decision that reached the right result regardless of the trial courts reasoning 4: holding that it is axiomatic that this court can affirm a circuit court if the right result is reached even if for a different reason


Input: council’s decisions were based on recommendations by the Bureau, those recommendations involved precisely the sort of delegated responsibility that earmarks the exercise of discretionary judgment. Plaintiffs alternative theory appears to be that defendant had a duty to succeed in executing a traffic management strategy that would prevent accidents. That assertion is incorrect. Immunity is not defeated merely because defendant’s choice of traffic management and control devices did not prevent the tragic loss of life in this case or, for that matter, because plaintiffs expert testified that another strategy likely would have been more effective in reducing the incidence of speeding. See Garrison v. Deschutes County, 162 Or App 160, 167-68, 986 P2d 62 (1999), rev allowed 329 Or 650 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In Garrison, the plaintiff argued that the Holdings: 0: holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility 1: holding that in granting summary judgment the trial courts disregard of the plaintiffs proffered expert testimony was not erroneous because that testimony would go not to the question of whether defendants decision took safety into account but rather would go to the question of the quality of the decision 2: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for mistrial where the trial court sustained defendants objections to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information and instructed the jury to disregard the question 3: holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been 4: holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous


Input: of action. The components of proximate cause are cause in fact and foreseeability. The test for cause in fact, or “but for causation,” is whether the act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have occurred. A finding of cause in fact may be based on either direct or circumstantial evidence, but cannot be supported by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation. 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex.2003) (citations omitted). In explaining further, the court went on to remind: “as we have frequently said, some suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, which is not the same as some evidence. We have also said that an inference stacked only on other inferences is not legally sufficient evidence.” Id. at 728 (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). “Expert opinions must be supported by facts Holdings: 0: holding that experts opinion that doctor performed surgeries in order to avoid financial losses due to insurance deductibles was nothing more than conjecture and speculation 1: holding that mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient under a preponderance standard 2: holding that causation cannot be proved based on speculation 3: holding that burden of clear and convincing proof cannot be satisfied by mere conjecture or speculation 4: holding that experts opinion on proximate causation amounted to no more than mere conjecture and speculation as to events surrounding accident


Input: at the close of the preliminary hearing that the court "has sufficient information based on the preliminary hearing to indicate that there's probable cause on Count II," which charged third-degree sexual assault, also a felony. Thus, there is no dispute that Powers was properly bound over for trial on at least one felony. See State v. (John) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 536, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). A prosecutor may include in an information any counts that are "transactionally related to a count on which the defendant is bound over," regardless of whether the State established probable cause at the preliminary hearing to believe that the defendant committed the transactionally related felonies. Id. at 537; see also State v. (Scott) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 479, 483, 544 N.W.2d 400 (1996) (<HOLDING>). There can be no question that count one of Holdings: 0: holding that a determination of probable cause does not bar a state law malicious prosecution claim where the claim is based on the police officers supplying false information to establish probable cause 1: holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it 2: holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury 3: holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where the officers corroboration of events that occurred during the controlled buy as set forth in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause 4: holding that the state need only establish probable cause that a felony occurred as to one count in a set of transactionally related counts for there to be a valid bind over on that set and need not establish probable cause that the specific felony alleged in each count was committed


Input: United States, No. 13-11603 (11th Cir. June 21, 2013). II. DISCUSSION The denial of a § 2255 motion to vacate presents a mixed question of law and fact, and we review the district judge’s factual conclusions for clear error and questions of law de novo. Rhode v. United States, 583 F.3d 1289, 1290 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and, consequently, must be construed liberally. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam). District judges must resolve all claims for relief raised in habeas proceedings, regardless of whether relief is granted or denied. Clisby, 960 F.2d at 935-36 (involving a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition filed by a state prisoner); Rhode, 583 F.3d at 1291 (<HOLDING>). When a district judge fails to address all of Holdings: 0: holding  2254 applies to administrative proceedings 1: holding that 60day time limit for notice of appeal in civil cases not 10day limit in criminal cases applies to  2255 proceedings 2: holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings 3: holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings 4: holding clisby applies to  2255 proceedings


Input: where the damage can be characterized as being continuous or progressive.” Wrecking Corp. of Am., 574 A.2d at 1350 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., Leafland Group-II, Montgomery Towers Ltd. Partnership v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 118 N.M. 281, 881 P.2d 26, 27, 29 (1994) (reciting that, after purchasing an apartment building and obtaining an all-risk policy thereon, the insured learned of the presence of asbestos in the building and received an appraisal stating that the asbestos diminished the building's value by $1.75 million; and holding that the insured could not claim coverage under the policy because the "claimed loss occurred prior to the time the insurance was purchased”). 15 . Accord Citizens Bank of Oregon v. Am. Ins. Co., 289 F.Supp. 211, 214 (D.Or.1968) (<HOLDING>); Fitchburg Sav. Bank v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Holdings: 0: holding that bank incurred a loss when it made a loan upon the collateral of pledged stock certificates 1: holding that a court should consider pledged collateral when determining the amount of the intended loss 2: holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor 3: holding that a bank customer was not bound to arbitrate where the signature card that was signed referenced a collateral document which contained an arbitration clause but the bank never sent the customer a copy of the collateral document 4: holding that bank was equitably estopped from recovering against stock broker for conversion of stock certificates that were assigned in blank and that broker had sold for a bank employee who misappropriated the stock certificates from the bank


Input: over the conduct of non-Indians on fee land when the conduct “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Id. at 566, 100 S.Ct. at 1258 (the “tribal interest” test). Yakima Nation asserts that we should apply the Colville test and hold that it has authority to zone non-Indian fee land under that test. Because we conclude that Yakima Nation has authority under the more stringent tribal-interest test employed in Montana, we need not determine whether the Colville analysis is appropriate to determine tribal authority over non-Indians. We recently held that “[i]t is beyond question that land use regulation is within the Tribe’s legitimate sovereign authority over its lands.” Segundo, 813 F.2d at 1393 (<HOLDING>). Zoning, in particular, traditionally has been Holdings: 0: holding city could not enforce through administrative adjudication a city ordinance limiting vehicle weight 1: holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff 2: holding that a city could not apply its rent control ordinance in conflict with tribal ordinance to nonindians on reservation trust land 3: holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance 4: holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law


Input: between Nobri-ga and the victim of his Hawaii AFHM conviction does not fall within any of the four categories prescribed by § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), the government did not establish that Nobriga had .previously been convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” Nobriga’s motion to dismiss should therefore have been granted. Nor is there any question as to whether we should correct the error. As our above analysis indicates, the district court’s error was plain and prejudiced Nobriga. A plea based on an offense that the defendant could not have committed as a matter of law satisfies Cotton’s third prong — whether the error affected substantial rights. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781; see also United States v. Choy, 309 F.3d 602, 607-08 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). That Nobriga did not raise this ultimately Holdings: 0: holding that prosecutorial error does not warrant reversal unless substantial prejudice results 1: holding under a plain error analysis that a failure to charge the jury with an essential element did not warrant reversal of the conviction where the evidence supporting that element was overwhelming 2: holding that even if evidence admitted in error admission must result in material prejudice to warrant reversal 3: holding that a plain error that is fatal to a conviction is sufficient to warrant reversal 4: holding that even if there is error in failing to award nominal damages to a plaintiff such error is not a basis for reversal


Input: or management of the partnerships. According to Nichols, his involvement was limited to signing documents. Despite Nichols’ efforts to distance himself from his partnerships’ activities within the state of Florida, it was proper for the trial court to consider these activities in determining that Nichols had continuous and systematic general business contacts in Florida. Florida courts have recognized that, because a limited partnership gains its identity from its general partners, the limited partnership’s contacts with a particular forum may be attributed to the general partners. Kelly v. Department of Insurance, 597 So.2d 900 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Levinson v. Brosche, 578 So.2d 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). See also Vespe Contracting Co. v. Anvan Corp., 433 F.Supp. 1226 (E.D.Pa.1977) (<HOLDING>). In addition to these partnership activities, Holdings: 0: holding that limited partner does not have standing to sue for injuries to partnership that merely diminish value of that partners interest 1: recognizing same principle 2: recognizing that same principle applies where defendant is general partner of limited partnership which in turn is general partner of limited partnership with contacts with state 3: holding that the information contained in the certificate of limited partnership binds the partnership and the partners with respect to third parties 4: recognizing partnership by estoppel only with respect to claims by persons who have reasonably relied upon outward representations of partnership


Input: on the basis of sex is the sine qua non of a Title IX sexual harassment case.” Id. In the context of a Title IX sexual-harassment claim, “the plaintiff ‘must always' prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations,’ but in fact constituted discrimination ‘because ... of sex.’ ” Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998)); see, e.g., id. at 67 (affirming dismissal of Title IX claim “[i]n the absence of conduct cre 1st Cir.2002) (affirming jury finding of sexually hostile work environment where female plaintiff was subject to “humiliating sexual remarks and innuendos” on a daily basis for over a year);, Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>); Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish constructive notice because the plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that the oil was on the floor for any length of time 1: holding that male coworkers conduct in inter alia repeatedly calk ing plaintiff a whore slut bitch and cunt over the course of months could constitute sexual harassment 2: holding that evidence that male employees consistently called plaintiff whore floor whore curb whole curb side cunt and bitch a male employee pushed plaintiff against a wall and placed his knee between her legs and other men made comments to plaintiff that a woman had no place in a car dealership was sufficient to establish sexual harassment 3: holding that there was substantial similarity between plaintiff and her male predecessors job 4: holding that the plaintiff had a right of privacy in the contents of a settlement agreement that stated that the plaintiff had sued his employer for failing to hire him because he was a single gay male and because his employer suspected that he had aids


Input: term.”). Notwithstanding the existence of section 5-13-70, the courts in Cowart I and Cowart II co 6, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (“[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.”); id. (“Therefore, a statute is not to be construed in derogation of common law rights if another interpretation is reasonable.”); State v. Prince, 316 S.C. 57, 66, 447 S.E.2d 177, 182 (1993) (“[I]t is presumed that no change in common law is intended unless the Legislature explicitly indicates such an intention by language in the statute.” (citing Nuckolls v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 192 S.C. 156, 161, 5 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1939))); Nuckolls, 192 S.C. at 161, 5 S.E.2d at 864 (<HOLDING>); id. (“[T]he rules of the common-law are not Holdings: 0: holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent 1: holding that when construing a general enactment and a more particular enactment within the same statute and when the plain language of the two subsections cannot be otherwise reconciled the more specific subsection should be given effect 2: holding that statutory language is conclusive in absence of clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary  3: holding property code provision was subject to commonlaw rescission principles because it was not intended to be punitive 4: holding that it is presumed that no change in the commonlaw was intended by the legislatures enactment of a statute on the same subject unless the language employed clearly indicates such an intention


Input: either be on the persons of the assailants or about the premises where they lived.”). Second, Chambers argues that the police exceeded their authority under the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8953, thereby invalidating the search warrant, because the shooting occurred in Harrisburg, was investigated by Harrisburg police, and Harrisburg police obtained the search warrant, but the warrant was approved by a Swatara magistrate and executed in Swatara Township. Even if Chambers’s interpretation of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act were correct, however, he does not explain how a violation of state law would be relevant to the federal constitutional analysis required here. Cf Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176-78, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Chambers’s argument that the Holdings: 0: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 1: holding that a warrantless arrest on probable cause does not violate the fourth amendment even if state law required the police to have prior authorization 2: holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment 3: holding that arrest in backyard violated fourth amendment 4: holding that state law is immaterial for fourth amendment search analysis and refusing to suppress evidence obtained illegally under state law after warrantless arrest because the arrest rules that the officers violated were those of state law alone and as we have just concluded it is not the province of the fourth amendment to enforce state law that amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained from a constitutionally permissible arrest


Input: its submissions. See, e.g., NSK Ltd. v. United States, 17 CIT 590, 593, 825 F.Supp. 315, 318-19 (1993). Lastly, because Chengde delayed requesting correction until after the ITA had issued the Final Results, the requirement of administrative finality necessarily outweighed its belated concern for correctness. See Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1345, 1352-54 (Fed.Cir.), reh’g denied, 434 F.3d 1345, cert, denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 577, 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006)(distinguishing requests to correct errors at the final-result versus preliminary-result stages); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. Kanzen Tetsu Sdn. Bhd., 334 F.3d at 1292 (“there is a strong interest in the finality of Commerce’s decisions”); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. United States, 26 CIT at 351, 201 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (<HOLDING>). Thus, under these circumstances, where (1) Holdings: 0: recognizing the tension between extrarecord evidence and a recordbased standard of review 1: holding that under  1988 consideration of the results obtained relative to the relief requested is required 2: recognizing the tension between finality and correct result and denying relief where party requested correction after final results had issued 3: recognizing the possibility but denying relief 4: recognizing but refusing to resolve tension between bradley and bowen


Input: a right possessed by all [Tennessee] residents,” not a right created by federal law. Fin. & Trading Ltd. v. Rhodia S.A., No. 04 Civ. 6083(MBM), 2004 WL 2754862, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004) (Mukasey, J.). Notwithstanding the fact that S & P is an NRSRO, and thus subject to federal regulation, Tennessee’s claims “may be assessed entirely by applying [state] common law standards to the facts in this case.” Id. at *7. The contrast with Grable and its progeny is telling — and dispositive. In Grable, the plaintiff would “necessarily” have had to show a violation of federal law even if the defendant had never removed the case to federal court and even if the defendant had never invoked federal law as a defense. See 545 U.S. at 314-15, 125 S.Ct. 2363; see also Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1065 (<HOLDING>); Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that an alien must show error and substantial prejudice in order to prevail on a due process claim 1: holding that the first grable requirement was met where the plaintiff in order to prevail on his legal malpractice claim had to show that he would have prevailed on his claim under federal patent law 2: holding that the plaintiffs state statutory claim against volkswagen did not give rise to federal question jurisdiction under grable since the claim was based on alternative theories some of which had no necessary federal element 3: recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance 4: holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed


Input: statutes control over more general statutes.” City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 149, 879 P.2d 1078, 1082 (1994). This principle, however, is inapplicable since section 9-508 and section 54-2050 address two different issues— the former the enforceability of commission agreements and the latter the standards of professional conduct for real estate brokers. Section 9-508 specifically sets forth the requirements of a "valid” commission agreement. I.C. § 9-508. Section 54-2050, on the other hand, was enacted as part of the Idaho Real Estate License Law, which governs the professional conduct and dealings of real estate brokers and salespersons. See I.C. §§ 54-2001 to -2080. Section 54-2050 only indicates that brokerage agreements “must 1082, 1085 (1978) Holdings: 0: holding a party breaches a plea agreement by acting in a manner not specifically prohibited by the agreement but still incompatible with explicit promises made in the agreement 1: holding that the earnest money agreement indicating a full legal property description was attached to agreement incorporated property description by reference where the description was always with the earnest money agreement and the broker testified that the legal description was kept side by side with the earnest money agreement in the brokers files 2: holding that even though an agreement was approved by the family court it retained its character as an agreement for purposes of legal analysis 3: holding that a settlement agreement in which the plaintiff agreed to drop all claims against the defendants in exchange for a specific sum of money was enforceable despite the fact that the agreement did not specify whether the plaintiffs promise would take the legal form of a release or a covenant not to sue 4: holding that where one party had received a written agreement and conformed his conduct to that agreement for an extended period of time but failed to sign the agreement he was equitably estopped from denying the validity of the agreement


Input: Aug. 18, 2006), 988 So.2d 1078 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) ], held that equi le tolling is not available in a case such as this one. Moreover, because Rule 32.2(c) does not establish a jurisdictional bar, the trial court has the power to hear an untimely petition because the running of the limitations period would ‘not divest the circuit court of the power to try the case.’ Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536, 539 (Ala.2006). “Further, as Ward points out, under federal habeas corpus practice, the federal courts have held that equitable tolling is available for a § 2244 petition, notwithstanding that the word ‘shall’ appears in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)(estab-lishing procedures for petitions for the writ of habeas corpus). See, e.g., Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir.2003)(<HOLDING>); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that where client was abandoned by attorney due to attorneys mental illness equitable tolling may be appropriate 1: holding that attorneys mental illness may justify equitable tolling 2: holding that equitable tolling under  2255 would be allowed if at all only for extraordinary circumstances 3: holding that equitable tolling may be available where the attorneys behavior was outrageous or the attorneys incompetence was extraordinary 4: holding that mental incapacity is an extraordinary circumstance that may warrant equitable tolling


Input: the second element of her sexual harassment claim, in relating how she was harassed, plaintiff claims that she was harassed because Herron and Lohse instructed co-workers to “keep track of’ plaintiff and that rumors about her were discussed at work. Dkt. 58 at 19. Plaintiffs claim that Herron and Lohse instructed co-workers to “keep track of’ her is conclusory. Moreover, even if this allegation were proved, plaintiff claims that defendant’s actions were covert. It is unclear how plaintiff was “harassed” by those actions if she was not even aware of them. With respect to the third element of her claim, plaintiff is unable to show that the alleged harassment was “because of’ her sex. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 1002, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (<HOLDING>). In support of her argument that she was Holdings: 0: holding that in a discrimination case plaintiff must prove that firing was a result of intentional discrimination 1: holding that a plaintiff claiming sexual harassment must always prove that the conduct at issue  actually constituted discrimination  because of  sex  emphasis added 2: holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination 3: holding that a charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of sex did not support a complaint for hostile environment sexual harassment 4: recognizing that a plaintiff can demonstrate that samesex harassment is because of sex by showing that the conduct was motivated by the coworkers sexual desire for persons of the same sex


Input: happened,” and that “[i]f a plaintiff alleges multiple discriminatory acts, each individual act ordinarily triggers a new clock for filing charges alleging that act” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)), adopted by 2012 WL 4364492 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012), affd, 549 Fed.Appx. 15 (2d Cir.2013); Everett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 904 N.E.2d 733, 751 (2009) (finding that a claim for refusal to rehire an employee two years after termination constituted an independent claim that accrued when the request was denied, and noting that “the failure to rehire an employee is considered a discrete, separate act that does not draw other allegedly discriminatory acts into its scope”); cf. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Second, it is unclear when the statute of Holdings: 0: holding that in the first amendment employment context harassing speech must constitute constructive adverse employment action to be actionable 1: holding that a proposed termination is the very type of discrete act   identified  as separate actionable unlawful employment practices 2: holding in the context of a title yii claim that discrete acts such as termination  or refusals to hire are separate retaliatory adverse employment decisions that each constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice  3: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 4: holding that each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice  for which an administrative charge must be filed


Input: are the jurisdictional contacts of the other for the purposes of the International Shoe due process analysis.” Id. at 653 (emphasis in original). The Court has already determined that Biomeasure and Ipsen Pharma are not the “same entity” for jurisdictional purposes. Accordingly, Ipsen Pharma is not a “mere continuation” of Biomeasure, and it is not subject to this Court’s jurisdiction as a successor-in-interest to Biomeasure. In acquiring the '186 patent, Ipsen Pharma may have submitted to the jurisdiction of the District Court for the District of Columbia, see 35 U.S.C. § 293, but it did not submit to jurisdiction in Louisiana simply because the patent may have arisen out of research in Louisiana. See Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Purdue Research Foundation v. Holdings: 0: holding that personal jurisdiction was lacking when the only contact by defendant with forum state was initiated by plaintiffs counsels paralegal for the sole purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction 1: holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum 2: holding that foreseeability of causing injury in texas though not determinative is important consideration in establishing minimum contacts 3: holding that although an automobile is mobile by its very design and purpose thus indicating that it is foreseeable that a particular automobile may cause injury in a forum state  foreseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the due process clause 4: holding that foreseeability of causing injury in forum state is not sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction


Input: the circuit court is to “hear the testimony of witnesses and try the case de novo.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-l-159(a). While the record of the juvenile court proceedings is required to be provided to the circuit court on appeal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-l-159(c), the circuit court is not limited to that record. On the contrary, the circuit court in a dependency and neglect proceeding may not rely solely on the record made before the juvenile court, but under Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-1-159(c) must try the case de n fact in support of the ultimate issues, we review the factual findings pursuant to Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d), de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re A.T.P., No. M2006-02697-COA-R3-JV, 2008 WL 115538, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan.10, 2008) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d Holdings: 0: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 1: holding that findings of fact in a dependency and neglect action for severe child abuse are presumed to be correct unless the evidence preponderates against them 2: holding that actions for neglect and dependency governed by uccja 3: holding a woman may be prosecuted for child neglect and endangering a child for prenatal substance abuse 4: holding that findings of fact made in administrative proceedings are considered to be prima facie correct and that where a district court has heard and considered additional evidence  we review its findings of fact for clear error


Input: After discussing these and other findings by Dr. Scardigli, the ALJ sweepingly concluded: In reviewing the record in its entirely, we find that the opinion of Dr. Scardigli that Mr. Schonewolf was unable to work is inconsistent with her narrative and clinical findings. (R. 16.) This is hardly an explanation as to why Dr. Scardigli’s opinion is unreliable, as the ALJ never even attempts to explain why Dr. Scardigli’s conclusions are inconsistent with her own findings. The ALJ has no basis for concluding that his interpretation of Dr. Scardigli’s findings is valid while her own conclusions are unreliable; or if he has such a basis, he never discusses it in his opinion. The ALJ, therefore, invalidly substitutes his medical conclusions for those of the physician. Kent, 710 F.2d at 115 (<HOLDING>). The ALJ’s dismissal of Dr. Scardigli’s Holdings: 0: holding that the corroborating evidence need not be medical evidence if the appellant explains why medical evidence is not available 1: holding that an aljs own medical analysis which is contrary to medical evidence is invalid 2: holding that review of medical history during an examination assisted doctors medical conclusions 3: recognizing that prison officials should defer to medical professionals on medical matters 4: holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment


Input: that the new evidence Chen submitted in support of her Falun Gong claim, including the letters, would not “affect the outcome of her proceedings,” where she failed to overcome the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Kaur, 413 F.3d at 234. Finally, the record supports the BIA’s finding that Chen failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief under the CAT. We note that the BIA inaccurately found that Chen’s evidence did not address the treatment of individuals repatriated to China. Nevertheless, the BIA cannot be said to have abused its discretion in denying Chen’s motion without “more particularized evidence” that she was more likely than not to be subjected to torture if returned to China. Cf. Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for Holdings: 0: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners argument that the evidence in the record clearly establishes that he is more likely than not to face torture if removed citation quotation marks and brackets omitted 1: holding that cat applicant must establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to his native country 2: holding that to qualify for protection under the convention against torture an alien must show that he will more likely than not be tortured in his home country if removed 3: holding that a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to conclude that the petitioner would more likely than not be subjected to torture if removed to china based solely on the fact that she had illegally departed china without more particularized evidence 4: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien established that he will more likely than not be tortured if  removed


Input: Cir. 1974); Kerbs v. Fall River Industries, Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974); Lawrence v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 398 F.2d 267 (1st Cir. 1968); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951, 88 S.Ct. 1043, 19 L.Ed.2d 1143 (1968); Harrison v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, 435 F.Supp. 281 (W.D.Mich.1977); Starck v. Dewane, 364 F.Supp. 466 (N.D.Ill.1973); Nemitz v. Cunny, 221 F.Supp. 571 (N.D.Ill.1963), the Seventh Circuit has expressly declined to take a position on the question, Hidell v. International Diversified Investments, 520 F.2d 529, 536-37 n.15 (7th Cir. 1975). See also Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 342 F.Supp. 1162, 1163-64 (N.D.Ohio 1971); Rosen v. Albern Color Research, Inc., 218 F.Supp. 473, 475-76 (E.D.Pa. 1963) (<HOLDING>). The absurdity of holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that the hobbs act did not apply to the robbery of a computer company executive in his home even though the crime may have prevented him from getting to work or making busi ness calls because his only connection with interstate commerce was his employment by a business engaged in interstate commerce 1: holding that local telephone calls are inadequate to satisfy jurisdictional requisite of interstate commerce 2: holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce 3: recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce 4: holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce