Input: for a trial on the merits. ¶ 32. The circuit court found that the Appellants’ negligence claim against Barlow Eddy Jenkins, P.A. (Barlow Eddy) failed because the Appellants did not pres ent any competent evidence to demonstrate that Barlow Eddy’s actions were the proximate cause or proximate contributing cause of Robert Gary Rogers’s (Rogers) injuries. Although the circuit court correctly pointed out that evidence of OSHA’s regulations are not admissible in Mississippi to show negligence, OSHA’s standards and regulations may be “admissible as a measure to show reasonable care consistent with industry standards.” Wilkins v. Bloodsaw, 850 So.2d 185, 188(¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2003); see also Accu-Fab & Constr., Inc. v. Ladner, 778 So.2d 766, 771(¶ 21) (Miss.2001) (overruled on other grounds) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 33. The Appellants presented two expert Holdings: 0: holding that safety standards regarding the safe design and use of trampolines including astm standards were admissible on the issue of the defendants negligence even though the defendants were unaware of the standards 1: holding that oshas regulations were admissible as a measure of reasonable care consistent with industry standards 2: holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure 3: holding that although compliance with administrative safety regulations did not establish due care it was evidence of due care 4: holding that an experts testimony that a victims symptoms were consistent with administration of a date rape drug were admissible


Input: Alaska consumer fraud act); Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 6-l-113(2)(a) (the court may award three times the actual damages, or $500, whichever is greater, if it is proven that the defendant engaged in bad faith conduct); Quist v. Specialties Supply Co., Inc., 12 P.3d 863, 867 (Colo.Ct.App.2000) (where the court held plaintiff was precluded under principles of collateral estoppel from challenging the amount of actual damages fixed by the judgment, but holding that collateral estoppel did not preclude plaintiff from pursuing enhanced punitive damages); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1345.09(B)(the injured party may seek and the trial court in its discretion may rescind the contract or award treble the actual damages or $200, whichever is greater); Crye v. Smolak, 110 Ohio App.3d 504, 674 N.E. 2d 779 (1996)(<HOLDING>). Connecticut, Delaware and Kentucky make no Holdings: 0: holding that treble damages are appropriate under ohio law when the seller engages in an unconscionable practice or deceptive act 1: holding treble damages under the civil theft statute are punitive 2: holding that a plaintiff may receive both treble damages under rico and state law punitive damages for the same course of conduct 3: recognizing that an award of treble damages for an antitrust violation and punitive damages for common law tortious interference with business relations based on same conduct would be duplicative holding that punitive and treble damages cannot both be awarded and indicating that a special jury verdict in this situation would be appropriate 4: holding that treble damages under the housing and rent act are remedial in nature


Input: for the proposition that “an insured cannot recover from an insurer for attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by it in defense of suit against it in an absence of showing that those items have actually been paid.” We decline, however, to follow that opinion’s isolated preference for physical payment. Rather, “it [i]s not necessary that [an attorney’s] fee be paid to enable [an insured] to recover, but when he established that he [i]s obligated to pay, and that the fee is reasonable ... his cause of action accrued.” Royal Indem. Co. v. Schwartz, 172 S.W. 581, 584 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1914, writ dism’d w.o.j.); see also Oliver B. Cannon and Son, Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 519 F.Supp. 668, 675-76 (D.C.Del.1981) (recognizing that an insured x.App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, we decline Hartford’s invitation Holdings: 0: holding attorney fees may be allowed for expenses incurred for default 1: holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact 2: holding in an appeal from a postanswer default judgment that third prong of craddock test required appellant to offer to reimburse appellee for legal expenses he incurred in obtaining default judgment even though most of the fees incurred had not been paid 3: holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment 4: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid


Input: 3 . Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). 4 . D.C.Code § 48-904.01(a)(l) (2001). 5 . D.C.Code § 48-1103(a) (2001). 6 . Gant, supra note 2, 129 S.Ct. at 1714-15. 7 . Id. at 1715. 8 . Id. 9 . Arizona v. Gant, 216 Ariz. 1, 162 P.3d 640, 646 (2007). The Arizona Supreme Court added: "The State has advanced no alternative theories justifying the warrantless search of Gant's car, and we note that no other exception to the warrant requirement appears to apply.” Id. The court therefore did not inquire into the good-faith exception to suppression of evidence under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. 10 . See Griffith, supra note 3, 479 U.S. at 328, 107 S.Ct. 708. 11 . See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 12 . Id. at 909, 104 S.Ct. 3405. 13 . Holdings: 0: holding that evidence should not be suppressed if police officers acted in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate 1: holding that evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is not barred by the exclusionary rule 2: holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not bar the use of evidence obtained by police officers acting in good faith and with reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant 3: holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to evidence obtained by police officers acting in reasonable reliance on search warrant later held invalid 4: holding suppression of evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is not required


Input: It is, in any event, incorrect. If Rooney receives a declaratory judgment that the discharge was valid and the revocation invalid, “release ... would follow automatically since, in a second action for a writ of habeas corpus, the prior judgment would have res judicata effect.” Monk, 793 F.2d at 366. It thus does “not matter that he ha[s] not asked for release.” LoBue, 82 F.3d at 1083. Nor may Rooney “avoid the requirement that he proceed by habeas corpus by adding a request for relief that may not be made in a petition for habeas corpus.” Monk, 793 F.2d at 366. Accordingly, habeas corpus is Rooney’s exclusive remedy. See id. (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973)); cf. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The problem for Rooney is that, because his Holdings: 0: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 1: holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc  1983 2: holding that a state prisoner may not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under 42 usc  1983 3: holding that 42 usc  1396aa13a is enforceable in a suit under  1983 4: holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 usc  1983


Input: 106-11 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of the variable annuities were “in connection with” the security); Korsinsky, 2002 WL 27775, at *5 (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of a stock were “in connection with” the stock); Hardy, 189 F.Supp.2d at 18 (same). In contrast, courts have found that the “in connection with” element was not met when the plaintiff did not allege that the fraud concerned the value of the security or the consideration received in return. See Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd., 193 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the authority to extend credit did not concern the value of a security or the consideration received); Spielman, 2001 WL 1182927, at *5 (<HOLDING>); Laub v. Faessel, 981 F.Supp. 870, 871 Holdings: 0: holding that the same must pertain to the value of the security and where the facts indicated they did not 1: holding that a plaintiff satisfied rule 9b by pleading which machines were the subject of alleged fraudulent transactions and the nature and subject of the alleged misrepresentations 2: holding that the alleged misrepresentations concerning the transaction fees charged by a broker did not concern the value of a security or the consideration received 3: holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage 4: holding that plaintiff was entitled to sue under rule 10b5 for the difference between the price and the value received from the sale of the security where as here the evil is not the price at which plaintiff bought but the fact of being induced to buy


Input: not err in her evaluation of the medical evidence or in discounting Casey’s subjective complaints. Casey challenges the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. May’s RFC opinion, directing us to Nevland v. Apfel where we reversed an ALJ’s decision because he relied on the opinions of nontreating, nonex-amining physicians in determining the claimant’s RFC. 204 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir.2000). But as we recognized in Eichelberger v. Barnhart, Nevland addressed the evidence necessary to satisfy an ALJ’s burden of proof at step five in the disability analysis; Nevland does not preclude the ALJ’s reliance on a reviewing physician’s report at step four when the burden is on the claimant to establish an inability to do past relevant work. 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir.2004); see also Masterson, 363 F.3d at 737-39 (<HOLDING>). “It is well settled that an ALJ may consider Holdings: 0: holding that the alj properly relied on the assessments of a nonexamining physician and not claimants treating physicians in determining the rfc at step four 1: holding that the alj properly discounted a treating physicians report where the physician was unsure of the accuracy of his findings and statements 2: holding that the commissioner must determine a claimants rfc based on all of the relevant evidence including medical records observations of treating physicians and others and an individuals own description of the limitations 3: holding that the alj erred in failing to give the findings and assessments of the treating physicians any weight when the medical evidence and claimants testimony supported a diagnosis of cfs 4: holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician


Input: 184-192; Pl. Opp. at 8 n. 15. 186 . See FAC ¶¶ 351-358; Pl. Opp. at 8 n. 15. 187 . See FAC ¶¶ 279-287; Pl. Opp. at 8 n. 16. 188 . See FAC ¶¶ 206, 372. 189 . See id. ¶ 300. 190 . See id. ¶¶ 222-228, 318-324, 387-393. 191 . See id. ¶¶ 229-234. - 192 . See Berman v. Sugo LLC, 580 F.Supp.2d 191, 202 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (dismissing a breach of contract claim where counterclaim plaintiff failed to "set forth a single fact relating to the formation of the contract, the date it took place, the contract’s major terms, the parties to the contract, or [counter-defendant's] assent to its terms”) (quotation marks omitted). 193 . See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. 194 . See Levy v. Bessemer Trust Co., N.A., No. 97 Civ. 1785, 1997 WL 431079, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1997); Sedona Corp., 2005 WL 1902780, at *20 (<HOLDING>). 195 . See FAC ¶¶ 3, 61-64, 189, 281, 291, Holdings: 0: holding failure to establish terms of an oral loan agreement precluded the existence of a breach of contract claim 1: holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract 2: holding breach of contract claim not preempted as a straightforward breach of contract action as it alleged violation of specific covenant 3: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 4: holding that a laundry list of alleged breaches of myriad alleged oral and written agreements was insufficient to provide defendants with notice of the breach of contract claim


Input: persons affected.” State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 202, 205 (Ct.App.1986). In any equal protection analysis, the court must: first, identify the classification that is being challenged; second, articulate the standard under which the classification will be tested; and third, determine whether the standard has been satisfied. Id. at 500, 725 P.2d at 205. Accordingly, in order for Rome to prevail, he is required to show that he, by virtue of some classification, was treated differently than a person who does not share that classification, However, I.C. § 18-1401 does not create a classification. The statute applies to “every person” who enters a building with the intent to commit any theft or felony. See State v. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307, 316, 324 P.3d 1006, 1015 (Ct.App.2014) (<HOLDING>). It is true, as Rome points out, that Idaho Holdings: 0: holding that statute which defined sexual contact as any touching of the anus breast or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person was not vague 1: holding that a statute applied to any person who sexually abused and exploited a vulnerable adult and did not treat the defendant differently on account of any classification 2: holding that language in a merrill lynch customer account agreement that the plaintiff signed upon opening the first account  providing for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of its business  applied to the disputed second account even though the plaintiff did not sign a separate customer account agreement for the second account 3: holding that the plaintiff who alleged he was subjected to discipline and a disciplinary proceeding not applicable to any other police officer under the collective bargaining agreement but not alleging any classbased discrimination failed to state a claim as the plaintiff did not show how he was treated differently from others similarly situated emphasis added 4: holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident   4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor


Input: whereas before ... they were exempt from the requirements of § 327. The difference is significant because § 327 authorizes the trustee to employ an attorney ‘with the court’s approval.’ ” Id. In Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538-39, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004), the Court succinctly stated: [W]e hold that § 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds, unless they are employed as authorized by § 327. If the attorney is to be paid from estate funds under § 330(a)(1) in a Chapter 7 case, he must be employed by the trustee and approved by the court. This reading of the statute shows “that the revised § 330 means what it says.” Weinschneider, 395 F.3d at 403; see also In re Oliver, 511 B.R. 556, 561-62 (Bankr. W.D.Wis.2014) (<HOLDING>). Without citing any authority, Jones argues Holdings: 0: holding that where an attorney serves as trustee and attorney for the trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding the attorney must distinguish time spent in each role 1: holding that where the insurer retains an attorney to represent the insured pursuant to an insurance policy the attorney acts in the capacity of an independent contractor for the insured 2: holding the district courts conclusion that the attorney should receive no compensation was an abuse of discretion because we are confident that some legitimate time was expended by the attorney 3: holding that an attorney could not receive compensation from the estate pursuant to  330 because the chapter 7 trustee never sought to hire the attorney pursuant to  327 whose employment would have also required court approval 4: holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable


Input: waived arguments that might have supported such jurisdiction.”). 6 . The Department of Labor asserts that Taylor has standing to pursue her claims, even in the absence of injury, simply because defendants breached duties owed to her pursuant to ERISA. This argument, however, was not raised by the parties in their appellate briefs. Accordingly, we will not consider this issue. Cellnet Commons, Inc. v. FCC, 149 F.3d 429, 443 (6th Cir.1998) ("While an amicus may offer assistance in resolving issues properly before a court, it may not raise additional issues or arguments not raised by the parties."). 7 . Entry of final judgment, alone, is not a basis upon which to deny a motion to intervene. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394-96, 97 S.Ct. 2464, 53 L.Ed.2d 423 (1977) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Following the filing of a notice to Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to reconsider filed after the entry of final judgment must be considered a motion to correct error 1: holding that a motion to intervene filed ten weeks after the commencement of the action was timely 2: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed 3: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed 4: holding that a motion to intervene filed after final judgment should have been granted


Input: does not violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 435 U.S. at 340-41. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that giving the instruction was “like waving a red flag in front of the jury,” finding this assertion premised on an “indulgence in two very doubtful assumptions” that (1) jurors would not notice the defendant did not testify absent the instruction, and (2) jurors would disregard the instruction not to give weight to the defendant’s failure to testify. Id. at 340. 7 The right to testify was extended to criminal defendants in Vermont by Public Act No. 40, § 1, 1866 (predecessor to 13 V.S.A. § 6601). 8 Baker's ruling is no longer controlling in light of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (<HOLDING>), and the 1955 statutory amendment. 1955, No. Holdings: 0: holding that admitting evidence of a defendants prior statement to an investigator proffered by the commonwealth did not violate the defendants fifth amendment rights by forcing him to testify to dispute it 1: holding that a defendants fifth amendment rights were violated when an interpreter was withdrawn by the court 2: holding that state prosecutor violated fifth amendment by telling jury that a defendants failure to testify supports an unfavorable inference against him 3: recognizing that the fifth amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on a defendants failure to testify 4: holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify


Input: that Tull required courts to determine statutory damage awards. The Court noted that in Tull, it was “presented with no evidence that juries historically had determined the amount of civil penalties to be paid to the [government,” while in Feltner there was “clear and direct historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright cases, set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff.” Id. at 354-55, 118 S.Ct. 1279. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the historical nature of the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury in federal cases involving punitive damages. Its decisions, taken together, indicate that this right includes the right to a jury determination regarding the amount of punitive damages. See Capital Solutions, 695 F.Supp.2d at 1152 (<HOLDING>). Rule 38, by preserving “the right to a trial Holdings: 0: holding that the seventh amendment does require that the jury also be allowed to determine the amount of any punitive damages awarded 1: holding that curtis suggests that the amount of punitive damages is a question for the jury under the seventh amendment 2: holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa 3: holding that directed verdict does not violate seventh amendment 4: holding that punitive damages may be awarded for egregious violations of the lmrda


Input: provides that the “applicable commitment period” of a plan “shall be” either (A) subject to subparagraph (B), ... (i) 3 years; or (ii) not less than 5 years, if the [debt- or’s] current monthly income ..., when multiplied by 12, is not less than [the median annual family income in the applicable state]; and (B) may be less than 3 or 5 years, whichever is applicable under subpara-graph (A), but only if the plan provides for payment in full of all allowed unsecured claims over a shorter period. Id. § 1325(b)(4). The debtor’s “current monthly income” and “disposable income” are calculated according to statutorily defined formulae. See id. § 101(10A) (defining “current monthly income”); id. § 1325(b)(2) (defining “disposable income”); see also Lanning, 130 S.Ct. at 2469, 2471-74, 2478 (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed that Debtors’ current Holdings: 0: holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added 1: holding that courts must cjonsider  the practical effect of a putative  judgment on the state treasury emphasis added 2: holding that courts must calculate projected disposable income which is not statutorily defined using a forwardlooking approach emphasis added 3: holding that the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that defendant committed a crime emphasis added 4: holding that an application is  pending from the time it is first filed  emphasis added


Input: of Green to section 693 of the Probate Code, the trial court could dispense with further proceedings and sua sponte appoint a guardian. In other words, if section 692 grants to a trial judge the power to conduct a preliminary trial and dismiss the proceeding if the applicant fails to prove incapacity, then section 693 must surely permit the same court to appoint a guardian if incapacity is established in that same pretrial hearing. Given this result and its supposed validity, we again wonder why the legislature enacted section 643 if the trial court has the power to sua sponte grant final relief prior to a jury trial. But, because the legislature enacted section 643, the latter must be given meaning. See Holt v. F.F. Enterprises, 990 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). We cannot ignore it. Rather, our duty is to Holdings: 0: holding that each provision of a statute must be afforded meaning when possible 1: holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute 2: holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts 3: holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous 4: holding that each element required under the act must be included in the written notice and each element must be sufficiently clear and accurate


Input: organized and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada, with its principal place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada.” In response, Wade averred in his answer, “Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph one (1) of Plaintiffs petition.” Further, Wade’s first affirmative defense averred, “The court lacks jurisdiction to hear and enter orders regarding this matter because the Plaintiff is not in good standing with the State of Nevada and is therefore restricted from bringing suit or participating in litigation.” As a threshold matter, Wade’s cursory denial of AllStar’s paragraph one is inadequate under Rule 55.13. It is well established that a general denial of allegations of corporate capacity or existence fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 55.13. See id. (<HOLDING>); Student Loan Mkt. Ass’n v. Holloway, 25 Holdings: 0: holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself 1: holding bare allegation of social friendship insufficient 2: holding that making a nonfrivolous allegation is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 3: holding that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to the pslra 4: holding that a denial of each and every allegation is insufficient under rule 5513


Input: in the state’s insurance market. In addition to this competitive disadvantage, the Legislature considered the practical “business difficulties” confronting all insurers as a result of such possible catastrophic claims, such as the difficulty in determining the amount of reserves to keep on hand. It was thought that the creation of such an association of insurers would alleviate the competitive inequity of these catastrophic claims by spreading their cost throughout the industry, and also increase the statistical basis for prediction of the overall cost of such claims, making the management of these liabilities easier. See House Legislative Analysis, SB 306, March 13,1978. [In re Certified Question, supra at 714 n 2.] 19 T laims Ass’n, 177 Mich App 538 (1989), aff'd 434 Mich 901 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 27 In re Certified Question, supra at 723. Holdings: 0: holding that insured cannot demand reimbursement for defense insurer had no opportunity to control if insured does not promptly notify insurer of facts triggering coverage 1: holding that indemnitees could recover their attorneys fees and costs from an indemnitor despite the fact that the fees and costs had been paid directly by an insurer and noting that the indemnitor is not relieved from liability either on the theory that the insurer is entitled to reimbursement out of the indemnitees recovery  or that the defendant should not benefit from a contract providently made and paid for by the plaintiff  2: holding that the plaintiff insurer was not entitled to reimbursement from the mcca 3: holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith 4: holding that the insurer was entitled to credit against the owners claim in the amount paid to the mortgagee


Input: was, under the totality of the circumstances, insufficient to taint McLeod’s confession as involuntary. There fore, we hold that the State carried its burden of proving that McLeod’s confession was voluntary. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for an order or proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., concur. ALMON, SHORES, KENNEDY, and BUTTS, JJ., concur in the result. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2 . There was evidence to indicate that McKissick and his girlfriend had visited McLeod's wife at McLeod’s residence; that McLeod returned home and became angry when he saw McKissick sitting at the kitchen table; that McLeod ir.1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170, Holdings: 0: holding that an officers promise to bring defendants cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor did not make confession involuntary 1: holding that agents promise to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation does not render a subsequent confession involuntary 2: holding that confession was voluntary although agents had promised to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation 3: holding that federal agents indication to defendant that his cooperation would be reported to the united states attorney did not make defendants confession involuntary 4: holding that cooperation was insufficient where the defendants cooperation was based on his confession to the charged crimes


Input: See Brzonkala v. Morrison, 272 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir.2001) (rejecting the applicability of the common benefit doctrine, given that the plaintiffs did not identify a strategy for “shiftpng] costs with some exactitude to those bene-fitting” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, the plaintiffs urge us to find attorneys’ fees appropriate because the defendants “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Hall, 412 U.S. at 5, 93 S.Ct. 1943 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the “bad faith” requirement has been interpreted strictly by this court. See Satoskar v. Indiana Real Estate Comm’n, 517 F.2d 696, 698 (7th Cir.1975) (“The standards for bad faith are necessarily stringent.”); see also Singer Co. v. Skil Corp., 803 F.2d 336, 341 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). We find no need to liberalize the rule in Holdings: 0: holding that if the town acted in bad faith in negotiations and litigation which prevented construction then the plaintiffs on remand cannot be deemed to have lost any rights to vest that they would have been able to exercise in the absence of bad faith 1: holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims 2: holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint 3: holding the carew rule to be inapplicable to claims of insurer bad faith 4: holding that use of plaintiffs mark is in good faith even though other aspects of defendants behavior may have evidenced bad faith


Input: of the patrol car. Within seconds after Brett Jarman’s exit, Six Feathers ran head-on into Tarrell’s vehicle. Brett Jar-man fired four shots at Six Feathers, but, as the District Court noted, it is unclear whether the shots were fired “before, during, or after the collision.” Mem. Op. and Order at 5 (July 31, 2002). Six Feathers died at the scene. The District Court denied the summary judgment motions of Brett Jarman and Tarrell. Subsequently, based on the motions of Tarrell and Brett Jarman, the District Court issued an order of clarification because it believed its prior ord used excessive force during their seizure of Six Feathers “under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Seiner, 304 F.3d at 812; Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). In determining whether this use of force in Holdings: 0: holding that an initially reasonable seizure can become an unreasonable seizure that violates the fourth amendment when officers refuse to return seized property 1: holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon 2: holding seizure of evidence in plain view reasonable under fourth amendment 3: holding that a fourth amendment seizure of a fleeing suspect occurs only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied  4: holding a fourth amendment seizure oceurs when an officer fatally shoots a fleeing suspect


Input: Keziah v. W.M. Brown & Son, 888 F.2d 322 (4th Cir.1989), the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant was affirmed on plaintiffs IIED claim when plaintiff alleged, among other things, that her telephone messages were withheld and used by male sales representatives to usurp her sales leads, information was secretly removed from her files and mail, and she was harassed, humiliated, and otherwise subject to an adverse employment environment. Id. at 326-27 (citing Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club, 79 N.C.App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116 (1986)). Furthermore, claims of IIED based upon sexual harassment generally include a combination of explicitly obscene language, sexual advances, and/or sexual touching. Compare Poole v. Copland, Inc., 348 N.C. 260, 261-62, 498 S.E.2d 602, 603 (1998) (<HOLDING>), with Guthrie v. Conroy, 152 N.C.App. 15, 24, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs allegations that her supervisor was a lesbian and that she made improper remarks to her including telling the plaintiff to invite her to lunch and making comments about plaintiffs coworkers private lives and sexual preferences   and on one occasion approaching the plaintiff from behind hugging her and whispering in her ear a request for a cookie from another table did not suffice to establish a hostile working environment 1: holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where a supervisor allegedly touched plaintiffs hand and thigh lifted her dress hem repeatedly asked her to lunch told her that she was beautiful stared at her and called her home on numerous occasions at night and asked about personal matters 2: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 3: holding that conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive where the female plaintiffs supervisor frequently tried to get plaintiff to date him using many direct as well as indirect propositions for sex including following her into the restroom repeated attempts to touch her breasts place his hands down her pants and pull off her pants and enlisting the assistance of others to hold her while he attempted to grope her 4: recognizing an iied claim sufficient to go to a jury where defendant repeatedly used explicitly obscene language to describe what he would do to plaintiff touched his genitals in her presence while propositioning plaintiff or gesturing toward her obscenely and stood behind her with his pants unzipped suggesting he would show plaintiff what a real man felt like


Input: 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit discussed at length the purpose and intent behind the Act as follows: “Congress enacted EMTALA in response to its concern that hospitals were ‘dumping’ patients (who were) unable to pay, by either refusing to provide emergency medical treatment or transferring patients before their emergency conditions were stabilized. Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1993). Through EMTALA, Congress sought ‘to provide an adequate first response to a medical crisis for all patients,’ Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (daily ed. October 23, 1985) (statement of Senator Dole)); see also, Brooker v. Desert Hospital Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 Holdings: 0: holding that hospital did not violate emtala by failing to follow a thrombolysis protocol because by its very terms the protocol was not expressly applicable to patients in the er 1: holding that emtala applies to any and all patients 2: holding that a company providing administrative purchasing and financial services to a hospital was not a hospital and thus could not be held directly liable under emtala 3: holding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering chiropractor to disclose the identity of all patients that had any type of connection to the plaintiffs attorneys and to produce all billing records for services rendered to attorneys or patients 4: holding that doctors do not have to accept patients


Input: explicitly and on the record as to whether Mother validly intended to waive her right to contest the termination.”). If the parties were not prepared to address the issue, the trial court should have ordered a brief continuance. Here, such a continuance would have given the parties an opportunity to propose arrangements for Mother to participate even though she cbuld not be physically present, see Ruth Anne E., 1999— NMCA-035, ¶¶ 28-29, 126 N.M. 670, 974 P.2d 164 to develop evidence as to whether Mother had voluntarily waived her due process rights, see Stella P., 1999-NMCA-100, ¶¶ 30-31, 127 N.M. 699, 986 P.2d 495 or to gather evidence that reasonable efforts had been made to contact Mother without success, cf. In re Dependency of A.G., 93 Wash. App. 268, 968 P.2d 424, 428-30 (1999) (<HOLDING>). {13} We recognize that Mother’s right to Holdings: 0: holding that mother did not waive the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to raise it in her first responsive pleading ie her answer to dhrs  petition to terminate her parental rights because the mother sought leave to amend her answer to include the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction  dhr did not object to that motion and  the juvenile court allowed the mother to amend her answer 1: holding that a mother in a child protection proceeding was afforded due process when she had notice of a hearing was represented by counsel and was given the opportunity to rebut evidence 2: holding mothers due process rights were not violated when her appointed counsel was allowed to withdraw and hearing was held without mother because the record showed mother did not inform counsel of her whereabouts after moving thereby frustrating counsels efforts to contact her and because mother was properly served with notice of the termination hearing 3: holding indigent mothers due process rights were not violated by trial courts failure to appoint attorney ad litem for her until six months after parental termination suit was filed against her where counsel was appointed giving mother a year to prepare for trial when department of protective and regulatory services made clear its intent to pursue dualtrack of both termination and reunification 4: holding that evidence was sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding where mother allowed child to be in contact with individual who had physically abused her mother was not capable of caring for child on her own mother admitted at trial she had not found stable employment and child was doing well in her current placement


Input: are distributed without affording an opportunity for creditors to present and enforce claims. Id. at 965. The trust fund doctrine was developed to protect creditors who are otherwise without a remedy. Bowers-Siemon Chemicals Co. v. Bowers (In re Bowers-Siemon Chemicals Co.), 139 B.R. 436, 450 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992). Andeo fails to provide any legal authority to support its proposition that this doctrine applies where a debtor has filed a bankruptcy petition. Furthermore, in this ease, the disputed funds were not distributed without affording Andeo an opportunity to enforce its claims through the bankruptcy process. Therefore, as in Bowers, I conclude that the purpose of the trust fund doctrine is satisfied and the doctrine does not apply here. See, e.g., Bowers, 139 B.R. at 450 (<HOLDING>). Andco’s third theory for imposing a Holdings: 0: holding the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing inapplicable when a witness had been deported during the period of time the defendant had been a fugitive 1: holding that creditor did not have actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filing where the debtor informed creditor of the possibility that a bankruptcy case would be filed 2: holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust 3: holding that an anticipated tax refund was property of the bankruptcy estate as of the date the bankruptcy case was filed 4: holding that the trust fund doctrine was inapplicable where the corporation had filed bankruptcy


Input: the expiration date of the batch.” 21 C.F.R. § 211.180(a). These records “shall be readily available for authorized inspection” by the FDA at any time. 21 C.F.R. § 211.180(c). We think that the requirement to maintain records for FDA inspection satisfies the requirement that the uses be reasonably related to the development and submission of information to the FDA. It is not disputed by the parties that these records are produced in order to develop and submit to the FDA proof that the Amphastar products comply with a Federal law. The fact that the FDA does not in most cases actually inspect the records does not change the fact that they are for the “development and submission of information under a Federal law.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); cf. Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 207, 125 S.Ct. 2372 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we consider this information Holdings: 0: holding that class ii medical devices which are not subject to a rigorous premarket approval process and thus cannot receive patent term extensions are nonetheless covered by the safe harbor 1: holding that uses which are not ultimately included in a submission to the fda are nonetheless exempted by the safe harbor 2: holding that arguments which are not sufficiently developed are waived 3: holding that sanctions under rule 11 are unavailable unless the motion for sanctions is served on the opposing party for the full twentyone day safe harbor period before it is filed with or presented to the court 4: holding that rules which are genuinely responsive to safety concerns are exempted from preemption


Input: of State Laws Applicable to Credit Card Transactions, OTS Op. Letter, No. P-96-14, 1996 WL 767462, at *5. 17 . Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 611, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937); Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ). 18 . Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003; Richardson v. Richardson, 424 S.W.3d 691, 697 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2014, no pet.). 19 . Tex. Estates Code § 201.003; Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 317, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935) (“It is, however, the rule in this state 'that the community estate passes charged with the debts against it.’ ”). 20 . Tex. Estates Code § 453.002; Shepherd v. Ledford, 926 S.W.2d 405, 412-15 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1996), aff'd, 962 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1998). 21 . Cf. Wilson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 48 F.Supp.3d 787, 796-97 (E.D.Pa.2014) Holdings: 0: holding that the surviving spouse of the borrower could not maintain a respa claim in her individual capacity because she never assumed the deceaseds loan 1: holding under a similar statute ownership of property was transferred to surviving joint tenants upon the death of the joint tenant by operation of law thus defeating the homestead claim of deceaseds spouse 2: holding where among other things the borrower signed confirming the transaction had not been rescinded on the date the loan closed she stated a claim for violation of tila 3: holding that nonsignatory wife asserting in her individual capacity claims for damages such as her own mental anguish and loss of consortium earnings companionship society and inheritance lacked the type of privity contemplated for the contracting parties to bind her to a contract that she did not sign in her individual capacity 4: holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity


Input: before us, it would not salvage the day. There is nothing talismanic about the phrase “procedural harm.” A party claiming under that rúbric is not relieved from compliance with the actual injury requirement for standing. See, e.g., Munoz-Mendoza, 711 F.2d at 425-26 (requiring, as a precondition to standing, that plaintiffs who allege procedural harm also show “injury in fact”). Thus, one who asserts procedural harm as the basis for standing must set forth particulars that serve to indicate a distinct and palpable injury. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206. Put bluntly, a party must set forth a sufficient panoply of facts to show that his injury is real as opposed to being theoretical or abstract. See Capital Legal Found. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). In the case of an association, this Holdings: 0: holding that hypothetical injury was insufficient for standing 1: holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision 2: holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation 3: holding that because fact of injury was a distinct question from quantum of injury common proof could establish classwide injury even though amount of damage to each plaintiff was uncertain 4: holding that a plaintiffs claim of injury stemming from alleged procedural harm is insufficient to ground standing where the harm is uncoupled from any injury in fact or tied only to an undifferentiated injury common to all members of the public


Input: the application of law to undisputed fact are reviewed de novo. See Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008). As an initial matter, because Huang fails to challenge the agency’s denial of his claim for CAT relief before this Court, any such challenge is deemed waived. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005). Regarding Huang’s asylum and withholding claims, we find that the agency reasonably concluded that Huang was not eligible for relief as a result of his mother’s sterilization. See Shao Yan Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 417 F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir.2005) (determining that “the children of those victimized by coercive family planning policies” are not per se eligible for asylum); see also Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Huang does not challenge the Holdings: 0: recognizing that the harm suffered by family members in combination with other factors  would presumably only be persecution where  the applicant not only shares or is perceived to share the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family members but was also within the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident 1: holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution 2: holding that an asylum applicant cannot claim past persecution based solely on the harm that was inflicted on a family member on account of that family members political opinion or other protected characteristic 3: recognizing that an applicant may be able to demonstrate persecution based on persecution of family members where the applicant shares  the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family member was in the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident citing jorgetzoc v gonzales 435 f3d 146 150 2d cir2006 4: holding that an alien cannot claim asylum based on persecution that is personally motivated


Input: that the unmarketability of one person’s title should not delay the payment of other entitled parties’ royalties, but it is not clear whether the unmarketa-bility of part of one person’s title justifies a delay in paying the rest of that same person’s proceeds. While the issue is not free from doubt, we believe that the Arkansas Supreme Court would not interpret this provision as excusing a delay in the payment of royalties on the interest in which Howell’s title was marketable. See Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas, 10 U.Ark. Little Rock L.J. 5, 25 (1987-88) (“the Arkansas Supreme Court is likely to interpret section 53-525 in favor of the ... party entitled to receive lease proceeds” (citing, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 288 Ark. 338, 705 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (1986) (<HOLDING>)). This is a case of “a company ... withholding Holdings: 0: holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury 1: holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made 2: holding that the statute does not begin to run until at least a demand has been made upon the government but determining that the facts of that case made it unnecessary to choose between the date of demand and the date of actual payment as the triggering date for the running of the statute of limitations 3: holding that the time limits in section 53525 begin to run as soon as the oil or gas is delivered not when payment is actually made 4: holding that because an indemnitor is not liable until the indemnitee actually makes payment interest does not accrue until the payment is made


Input: Servs., L.P. v. Perez, 792 F.3d 554, 560 (5th Cir. 2015). To the extent that the award is based merely on repeated filings, it is unclear that a court’s inherent powers can do the same work as Rule 41(d), which is necessarily backward-looking. Rule 41(d) concerns the award of costs from a previous action. In contrast, a court's inherent power gives it the "authority to impose sanctions in order to control the litigation before it." Positive Software Sols., Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Cotp., 619 F.3d 458, 460 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and 'citation omitted) (emphasis added). This court has repeatedly vacated sanctions that punish conduct that did not occur in front of the district court: See, e.g., Matter of Case, 937 F.2d 1014, 1023-24 (5th Cir. 1991); Positive, 619 F.3d at 463 (<HOLDING>); FDIC v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 593-94 Holdings: 0: holding that unless that power is restricted by the principal an agent under a california statutory healthcare power of attorney has the power to execute applicable admission forms including arbitration agreements 1: recognizing inherent power of federal district court to sanction conduct abusive of judicial process 2: holding that monetary sanction was not supportable as a compensatory civil contempt sanction because there was no proof of the amount of loss 3: holding that the court had no power to sanction conduct that occurred in an arbitration 4: holding that trial courts have the power to sanction parties for bad faith abuse of the judicial process not covered by rule or statute


Input: The trial itself only lasted two days, and was followed by two telephone conferences and two in-person hearings. On the other hand, the City heavily litigated this case, particularly after it lost at trial, requiring the Church to respond in kind. The Court will bear these factors in mind, as well. C. Results Obtained A major dispute between the parties is whether and to what extent any fee award should be reduced or enhanced. After calculating the appropriate rate and number of hours worked, “the court has the opportunity to adjust the lodestar to account for other considerations that have not yet figured into the computation, the most important being the relation of the results obtained to the work done.” Dillard, 213 F.3d at 1353; see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (<HOLDING>). In rare or exceptional cases, like those Holdings: 0: holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal 1: holding that the transaction must be fair and equitable and in good faith 2: holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived 3: holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims 4: holding that a fee application based on claims that were interrelated nonfrivolous and raised in good faith may still be excessive where the applicant achieved only partial or limited success


Input: Court rejects the debtor’s argument that the reimbursement debt is invalid. B. Constitutional Defenses 1. Ex Post Facto First, the debtor argues that the retroactive application of the 1990 ASO is an ex post facto law in violation of the Constitution. This argument is flawed because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal cases or punitive legislation. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, the debtor contends that Holdings: 0: holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause 1: holding that because of its civil nature section 881 is not subject to the ex post facto clause 2: holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive 3: holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation 4: holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause


Input: of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, and the me or benefit need not necessarily be commercial.” Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, ¶ 1, 351 N.E.2d 454 of syllabus (Ohio 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977) (emphasis added). Thus, Ohio law prohibits the publication of another’s name or likeness in a commercial use that draws from that persons “reputation, prestige, or other value associated with him, for purposes of publicity.” Id. at 231, 351 N.E.2d 454. Nevertheless, several exceptions exist to this common law right. First, incidental use of one’s name or likeness is permissible. See e.g., Vinci v. American Can Company, 69 Ohio App.3d 727, 591 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio 1990) (<HOLDING>) Second, one’s name and appearance, in and of Holdings: 0: holding that member of a large class of health care providers available to the insured was only a potential and incidental beneficiary of the contract and thus not entitled to recover thereunder 1: holding that informational blurbs about charles vinci the 1956 and 1960 weightlifting olympic gold medalist on dixie cups was merely incidental to the promotion of the dixie cups and thus permissible 2: holding that service and notice in a technical sense are incidental where the main purpose of obtaining the appearance of parties and their participation is accomplished 3: holding that the mention of olympic athletes names was incidental to the promotion of dixie cups and thus not a violation of ohios common law right of appropriation because the use was purely informational and there was no implication that the athletes used supported or promoted the product 4: holding that an incidental beneficiary does not have standing to sue for breach of a contract


Input: v. Dobrayel (In re Dobrayel), 287 B.R. 3, 12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)). As to the second criteria under Section 523(a)(2)(A), false representation requires that the defendant “(1) made a false or misleading statement; (2) with the intent to deceive; and (3) in order for the plaintiff to turn over money or property to the defendant.” In re Chase, 372 B.R. at 129 (citing In re Dobrayel, 287 B.R. at 12). “‘[I]ntent to deceive may be established through circumstantial evidence and inferred from the totality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing H.K. Deposit & Guar. Ltd. v. Shaheen (In re Shaheen), 111 B.R. 48, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). The plaintiff must also establish that his reliance was justifiable. Id.; see also Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 61, 70-72, 116 S.Ct. 437, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Whether justifiable reliance is established Holdings: 0: holding that a creditors reliance under  523a2a need only be subjectively justified and not objectively reasonable 1: holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law 2: holding standard under section 523a2a is justifiable reliance 3: holding that  523a2a requires justifiable but not reasonable reliance 4: holding that in fraud and nondisclosure claims a plaintiff must show actual and justifiable reliance


Input: behavior by failing to investigate or to take any remedial measures following Mr. Loy’s arrest. Although the failure to investigate may give rise to § 1983 supervisory liability, Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1457 (6th Cir.1990) Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 188 (6th Cir.1985), no sua sponte investigation by Sexton was warranted here. The reports describing the arrest, including statements by Deputy Elliott and the two Children’s Services workers, do not indicate that Elliott used excessive force or unlawfully entered the Loy residence. In the absence of a “strong” indication of unconstitutional conduct, Sexton’s failure to conduct an investigation was reasonable and he cannot be hable as a supervisor under § 1983. See Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, unlike Márchese, 758 F.2d at 188, Holdings: 0: holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor 1: holding that supervisors were not hable because they possessed no information indicating a strong likelihood of unconstitutional conduct by their subordinate 2: holding that supervisors are not personally hable as employers under the adea either 3: holding that deliberate indifference is not the mere possibility a harm will occur rather a strong likelihood 4: holding that plaintiffs necessarily demonstrated irreparable harm because they showed a substantial likelihood that their first amendment rights had been infringed


Input: Judge Byrd’s July 13, 2007 order, imposing sanctions under Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11 for his filing of the 2007 Complaint for Custody. The sanctions against both Upson and Merkle were imposed in the form of an attorney’s fee award to Wallace, who proceeded pro se in both matters. We address the two appeals together because both require the resolution of a common issue: whether a trial court can impose a sanction of attorney’s fees, pursuant to the court’s inherent power or pursuant to Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11, to be awarded to an attorney appearing pro se as a litigant. We hold that it cannot. Sanctions Under Superior Court Domestic Relations Rule 11 Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11 sanctions are available when a “pleading, motion, or other paper” that is sig 3d 1365, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We are persuaded by the foregoing authorities Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance 1: holding that the language of fed rcivp 37 a rule that allows for sanctions regarding discovery violations does not allow a pro se lawyer to receive fees for his own time 2: holding that a motion for rule 37 sanctions is dispositive 3: holding that new jersey rule patterned on fed r civ p 11 precludes a pro se attorney litigant from receiving attorneys fees because such fees are not actually incurred 4: holding that california rule modeled almost word for word on rule 11 of the federal rules of civil procedure does not allow a pro se attorney litigant to recover sanctions in the form of an award of attorneys fees


Input: up and documenting the fish kill, and any future costs associated with stream restoration. Having found PFBC meets the Findley factors, we now address the specific question of whether PFBC, as an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, has statutory authority and/or implicit power to bring a cause of action in West Virginia under West Virginia common law. PFBC’s authority to bring this action must be either expressly conferred by the legislature or given by necessary implication. See Commonwealth v. Am. Ice Co., 406 Pa. 322, 178 A.2d 768, 773 (1962) (“Only those powers within the legislative grant, either express or necessarily implied, can be exercised by the administrative body.”); see also Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex.2007) (<HOLDING>) powers expressly conferred by the legislature; Holdings: 0: recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1 1: holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law 2: holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable 3: recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state 4: recognizing separation of powers doctrine


Input: the jury.”). This is particularly true where the arrest occurred on January 31, 2007, over four years prior to the incident which gave rise to this action. Accordingly, evidence of Goodman’s prior arrest to establish that she in fact engaged in acts of prostitution is excluded. In addition to using this evidence to establish truthfulness of any alleged defamatory statements, Defendants also seek its admission on the question of defamation damages. Although Goodman’s, San Diego arrest may be minimally relevant to her reputation at the time she was detained at the Cosmopolitan, reputational damage is presumed in a slander per se action like this one, as explained below in the Court’s discussion of Goodman’s defamation claim. See Branda v. Sanford, 97 Nev. 643, 637 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1981) (<HOLDING>). This is because “[a]t the heart of the libel- Holdings: 0: recognizing distinction between actual and per se conflicts of interest 1: holding that under south carolina law slander is actionable per se where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery 2: holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under missouri law 3: recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages 4: recognizing continued vitality of kassowitz on what is slander per se


Input: S. Kreindler et al., 15 N.Y. Practice Series, N.Y. Law of Torts § 12:38 (2013) (“A restaurant owner, as a landowner, has a duty to make the premises reasonably safe for persons on the property. Accordingly, a restaurant owner must take appropriate measures to protect persons on the premises from foreseeable criminal acts of third persons.”). Evidence of prior criminal acts sufficiently similar to the instant act can demonstrate foreseeability. See, e.g., Maysonet v. KFC, Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 906 F.2d 929, 931 (2d Cir.1990); Jacqueline S. v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 598 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163, 614 N.E.2d 723 (1993). Here, Gray adduced evidence that she was physically assaulted by a group of loud and profane customers whom she asked to be quiet 584 N.Y.S.2d 64, 64 (1st Dep’t 1992) (<HOLDING>). Nor is it a case in which the prior assaults Holdings: 0: holding that no seizure occurred where officers boarded bus and began questioning passengers gave passengers no reason to believe that they required an answer and tjhere was no application of force no intimidating movement no overwhelming show of force no brandishing of weapons no blocking of exits no threat no command not even an authoritative tone of voice 1: holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify 2: holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant 3: holding in a similar factual situation that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because it had no actual or constructive possession of the letters of credit involved 4: holding that defendant had no duty where tjhere was no evidence of a pattern of criminal activity or of even one similar incident involving different patrons


Input: and the substantive basis” for the claims it asserts under Counts I (unconstitutional vagueness), Count III (violation of the Administrative Procedures Act), and Count IV (procedural due process violation). In Salfi, the Court held the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to an eligibility statute was a claim arising under the Act within the meaning of § 405(h) even though the claim also arose under the Constitution. Likewise, in Ringer, the Court held the plaintiffs’ claim that the Secretary failed to comply with the rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act arose under the Medicare Act within the meaning of § 405(h). 466 U.S. at 614, 104 S.Ct. at 2021. See also Good Samaritan Medical Ctr. v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 776 F.2d 594, 597-98 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Livingston Care Ctr., 934 F.2d at 722 Holdings: 0: holding hospitals equal protection claim arises under the medicare act 1: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause 2: holding that an equal protection claim was no more than a first amendment claim dressed in equal protection clothing and was thus subsumed by and coextensive with the first amendment claim 3: holding that the state law violated equal protection principles 4: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection


Input: this opinion. CAYCE, C.J.; HOLMAN and McCOY, JJ., dissent without opinion. 1 . Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). 2 . Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.Ap officers' information that described vehicle, including license number, contained parole violator constituted reasonable suspicion to check for warrants). 61 . See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415-16, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); see also Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon 2005). 62 . Neese v. State, 930 S.W.2d 792, 801 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1996, pet. ref'd) (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. at 417). 63 . See Quick v. State, 999 S.W.2d 79, 80-81 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 64 . See Domingo v. State, 82 S.W.3d 617, 622 Holdings: 0: holding that claims for false arrest and imprisonment under  1983 accrue at the time of the arrest 1: holding evidence legally insufficient 2: holding that evidence was legally insufficient to support statutory fraud finding because appellant was not actually aware of real estate agents misrepresentations 3: holding that because appellant was not under arrest or detained at time he gave officer a false name the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction for failure to identify 4: holding evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction for violation of sex offender registration requirement


Input: issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The burden of showing an absence of a genuine issue of material fact is initially on the moving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 996) (allowing a malicious prosecution claim to proceed under § 1983). While the Third Circuit has held that a plaintiff must have been "seized” in order to proceed with a malicious prosecution claim under section 1983, it has set a very low threshold for a finding of seizure. See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Gatter’s post-indictment restrictions, which Holdings: 0: holding that postindictment restrictions on the plaintiff such as requiring him to post a bond attend all court hearings contact pretrial services on a weekly basis and prohibiting him from traveling outside of new jersey constituted seizure for the purpose of a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim 1: holding the same for malicious prosecution 2: holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor  3: holding that section 1983 claims alleging due process violations stemming from malicious prosecution are unavailable when a state malicious prosecution action exists 4: holding that a plaintiffs allegations that the defendant seized him pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor are sufficient to state a  1983 malicious prosecution claim alleging a seizure that was violative of the fourth amendment


Input: alleges that an unauthorized surgical procedure was performed, the burden is on plaintiff to prove that the operation that was performed was not authorized by him). In Appellants’ view, by proving that the “contact” or “touching” was not consented to, the patient establishes that it was “offensive,” which is sufficient to make the unauthorized surgery a de facto battery. Thus, they conclude, there is no need to instruct the jury on the elements of an “actual” battery. Appellants further argue that the trial court’s jury charge requiring proof of the surgeon’s intent to harm is inconsistent with well-settled case law establishing that a patient may pursue a claim for lack of consent even where no physical injury resulted from the unauthorized surgery. See Montgomery, 798 A.2d at 749 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Appellants point out that the Holdings: 0: holding that courts lack jurisdiction to address merits of a claim where party raising the claim is found to lack standing to maintain suit 1: holding that a lack of consent claim is actionable even if the subject surgery was properly performed and the overall result is beneficial 2: holding that lack of justiciable interest resulted in lack of standing to pursue claim and that lack of standing deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to act 3: holding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent 4: holding that claim for sons suicide was not actionable


Input: of Columbia. See Travelers Indem. Co., 321 A.2d at 150-51 (noting that, under Maryland law, loss of consortium is deemed an injury to the marital relationship and not an independent tort); Carey v. Foster, 345 F.2d 772, 776 (4th Cir.1965) (noting that Virginia does not recognize cause of action for loss of consortium). However, no choice of law problem is presented because the law of consortium in Maryland and Virginia is less favorable to Fetisoff’s "arising out of’ argument than District of Columbia law. Thus, the law of the relevant jurisdictions is not "different,” see Eli Lilly & Co., 764 F.2d at 882, because the result reached is the same no matter which jurisdiction’s view of consortium is applied. 8 . See Rollins v. District of Columbia, 265 F.2d 347, 349 (D.C.Cir.1959) (<HOLDING>). 9 . 211 Cal.App.3d 431, 259 Cal.Rptr. 382 Holdings: 0: recognizing that loss of consortium is a right of action separate from that of the spouse 1: holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse 2: holding that recovery for loss of consortium is a right  separate and apart from right of injured spouse to receive compensation for personal injuries 3: holding that plaintiffs claim for loss of consortium can proceed even where the injured spouse was contributorily negligent 4: holding that a loss of consortium is separate and independent from the primary action


Input: Doggett, 663 A.2d at 517 n. 8, and we “will not question” the value fixed by the appraiser that the parties have chosen “in the absence of fraud or mistake.” Id. at 515. However, when an appraiser must interpret the meaning of a legal document — a contract between parties — before he may perform his appraisal, that interpretation is subject to judicial review. A court “will defer to the appraiser’s interpretation of the lease as long as it is reasonable and does not exceed the appraiser’s authority,” Doggett, 663 A.2d at 516, but the court noted in Marceron that unlike the actual appraisal of value, which is accorded deference, an appraiser’s interpretation of his instructions as set forth in a contract is “clothed with no presumption of correctness.” Marceron, 258 F.2d at 158 (<HOLDING>). The interest that the parties intended the Holdings: 0: holding that the damage for tenancy at sufferance during the holdover period was the monthly rent under the lease versus the apartments fair market value because the lease contained a provision requiring lease payments beyond the lease term 1: holding that the appraisers interpretation of the lease was unreasonable on its face because they had appraised the value of a single lot instead of the entire tract contrary to the language of the lease 2: holding that former employees of a brokerage firm who had a contractual right to a share of any commission received by the firm upon extension of a lease were not entitled to a share of the commission received when the landlord and tenant entered an amendment to the lease which extended the duration but also added new terms this was a new lease not an extension of the prior lease 3: holding that the lessors interest in the leased property was subject to liens because it was perfectly obvious that the parties knew that the improvements at issue were the pith of the lease and that except for them the lease would not have been executed and because the improvements were essential to the purpose of the lease 4: recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the termination of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination but gave the lessee a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election


Input: under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”)). ¶ 25 The liberal construction afforded workers’ compensation legislation exists because Arizona’s Workers’ Compensation Act is remedial legislation enacted to protect employees injured in the course of their employment. Hopkins, 176 Ariz. at 177, 859 P.2d at 800 (citing Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 62 Ariz. 398, 402-03, 158 P.2d 511, 513 (1945)). In fact, where doubt exists as to the proper construction, courts in workers’ compensation eases should adopt the construction that will best effectuate the purpose of compensating the claimant for his disability. Id. (citing Bonnin v. Indus. Comm’n, 6 Ariz.App. 317, 320, 432 P.2d 283, 286 (1967)); see also Aitken v. Indus. Comm’n, 183 Ariz. 387, 392, 904 P.2d 456, 461 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, in workers’ compensation cases, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the waiver rule is procedural not jurisdictional and we may suspend it in our discretion citations omitted 1: holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed in the employees favor and any doubt in its construction is thus resolved in favor of the employee 2: holding that where the existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict  it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury internal quotation marks and citations omitted 3: recognizing that we have consistently applied workers compensation laws liberally remedially and in a manner insuring that injured employees receive maximum available benefits and the overriding theme of the system as evidenced by our constitution statutes and case law has been to preserve a claimants opportunity to be made whole to the fullest possible extentnothing more or less citations omitted 4: holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage


Input: does not dispute that the medical reports and corresponding TWCC-69 Forms are privileged under the Medical Practice Act and the right to privacy, we hold that the documents are not discoverable and thus, we need not decide whether the litigation exception applies. Here, Locke seeks medical reports relating to thousands of non-party claimants without their consent. He argues that the physician-patient privilege and right to privacy do not preclude him from obtaining redacted TWCC-69 Forms like the ones he offered below. However, “merely because a person ... has filed a claim with an insurance company does not necessarily mean the person ... has consented to making his medical records public.” See In re Dolezal, 970 S.W.2d 650, 652-53 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi, 1998, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, to the extent that other documents, Holdings: 0: holding that court was required to award an attorneys billing rate where defendant had submitted no evidence on fees 1: holding attorneys testimony on all work performed sufficient to support attorneys fees award even though no time records presented 2: holding that failure to produce supporting documentation regarding billing statements of counsel after an order to was a factor in denying requested attorneys fees 3: holding that emtala applies to any and all patients 4: holding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering chiropractor to disclose the identity of all patients that had any type of connection to the plaintiffs attorneys and to produce all billing records for services rendered to attorneys or patients


Input: is shown by motive of partiality, prejudice or oppres sion, or is induced by corruption. State v. Loewe, 756 S.W.2d 177, 184 (Mo.App.1988). Similarly, a sentencing court has great discretion in applying Section 558.046. Section 558.046 states “the sentencing court may reduce any term of sentence or probation pronounced by the court or a term of conditional release or parole pronounced by the state board of probation and parole ...” The use of the word “may” is indicative of the amount of discretion a sentencing court has in regards to sentence reduction. Under the current statute, the sentencing court is not even required to consider sentence reduction, but has a right to do so. See State v. Simmons, 660 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Mo.App.1983); Benson v. State, 504 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo.1974) (<HOLDING>). In addition to a reduction of any term of Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court is required to enter sentencing order for probation violation that reflects the trial courts oral pronouncement that gives the defendant prison credit for time served on a split sentence prior to sentencing 1: holding that probation is not a sentence 2: holding a sentencing court is not required to grant probation 3: holding that revocation of probation is merely an extension of a sentencing proceeding 4: holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum


Input: a particular degree, license, or education. Id.; Leaf, 590 N.W.2d at 535 (“[N]o particular education is required; experience is sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert.”); Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Iowa 1994) (“Although licensing carries a presumption of qualification to testify in the given field, ‘learning and experience may provide the essential elements of qualifica tion.’” (quoting Ganrud v. Smith, 206 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Iowa 1973))). Rule 5.702 does not impose a requirement for how an expert is to become qualified and does not distinguish between whether an expert is qualified or unqualified based on whether he or she belongs to a particular profession or has a particular degree. Ranes, 778 N.W.2d at 689; see also Hutchison, 514 N.W.2d at 888 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the witness does not need to be a Holdings: 0: holding that refugees who have already acquired lpr status are ineligible for a  209c waiver in light of the language in that adjustment of status can be granted to an alien who has not acquired permanent resident status 1: holding that no tax liens may attach to property after the fdic acquired title 2: recognizing expertise acquired through experience is every bit as good as expertise acquired academically 3: holding statute requiring dealers to keep records of all motor vehicles acquired as junk is lawful 4: holding that equity acquired due to improving property is subject to cap


Input: Agreement constituted a contract, through which Appellants ratified a prior transaction. Therefore, even if the CFA note and mortgage were in fact invalid, Appellants’ argument would still fail because a ratification of a former transaction is clearly not a transfer within the meaning of the fraudulent conveyance statutes. By the time ratification occurs, the unauthorized or voidable transfer transaction has already been completed and, at that point, may only be voided or ratified. See In re Best Prods. Co., Inc., 168 B.R. 35, 57 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994) (“A fraudulent transfer is not void, but voidable; thus, it can be ratified by a creditor who is then estopped from seeking its avoidance.”); see also Cohen v. Treuhold Capital Group, LLC (In re Cohen), 422 B.R. 350, 371 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (<HOLDING>). When Appellants executed the Agreement, any Holdings: 0: holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal 1: holding that questioning of a juvenile by a principal in presence of a police officer did not constitute an interrogation because principal was sole questioner and was not acting as an agent for police 2: holding that defendant was not an agent because alleged principal did not control means by which the defendants accomplished their duties 3: holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser 4: holding that an unauthorized property transfer effectuated by an agent and not evidenced by a signed writing could be subsequently ratified by the principal


Input: F.2d at 400. Quarles also claims that the law firm seeks recovery on a sworn account under section 38.001(7) and that such recovery is not available because the law firm did not present the proper affidavit necessary for recovery under a sworn account. We need not inquire as to whether the affidavit in the record is somehow deficient so as not to satisfy Tex.R.Civ.P. 185, since we hold that the law firm need not seek recovery of attorneys' fees only under section 38.-001(7), as section 38.001(1) allows recovery of attorneys' fees on a claim for "rendered services," section 38.001(2) on a claim for "performed labor," and section 38.001(8) on a claim for "oral or written contract." See Youngblood v. Wilson & Cureton, 321 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). B. As stated earlier, the law firm's Holdings: 0: holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001 1: holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed 2: holding fees mandatory under predecessor statute of  38001 3: holding defendant could not recover attorneys fees under predecessor to statute 38001 when defendant did not present contract claim 4: holding that predecessor to section 38001 codified with no changes as section 38001 et seq contained no requirement that the contract sued upon have a provision providing for attorneys fees


Input: given the defendant, a foreign state to be served under section 1608(a), was insufficient to meet the requirements of the FSIA. See also Shen v. Japan Airlines, 918 F.Supp. 686, 692 (S.D.N.Y.1994). The Seventh Circuit similarly required strict compliance under section 1608(a) in Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense De La Carne, 705 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir.1983). In that case, noting that section 1608(a) “delineates the ‘exclusive procedures’ for effecting service of process upon a foreign state,” the court refused to excuse the plaintiffs service on the Nicaraguan Ambassador in lieu of the head of the foreign affairs ministry. See also Magnus Elec., Inc., v. Royal Bank of Canada, 620 F.Supp. 387, 389 (N.D.Ill.1985), aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 830 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The District of Columbia Circuit, holding Holdings: 0: holding that noncompliance with the fsiajs literal requirements though it certainly did provide notice deprives this court of personal jurisdiction 1: holding that where it was erroneous for the district court to take judicial notice it certainly cannot be said that such notice was mandatory and therefore ire 201d is inapplicable 2: holding that an effective notice of appeal must be filed for this court to have jurisdiction to hear the case 3: holding that at a bare minimum the district court was required to provide a pro se prisoner with fair notice of the summary judgment rule requirements 4: holding that late notice of the bond did not excuse supplier from its obligation to comply with statutory notice requirements


Input: 697, 698, 759 P.2d 335, 336 (1988) (per curiam) (“There is no authority, statutory or otherwise, that allows avoidance of the will contest limitation by designating an action as one on a claim or for a declaratory judgment based on purported invalidity of a will.”); Lipsey v. Lipsey, 660 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Tex.App.1983) (“[W]e hold the validity of the entire will cannot be ques tioned through a declaratory judgment proceeding.”); Howard Hughes Med. Inst. v. Lummis, 596 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex.Civ.App.1980) (“To allow the declaratory judgment mechanism to determine the validity of HHMI’s claim that a valid will exists would impermissibly subvert the statutory scheme and time limitations established by the probate code.”); Henry v. Cottingham, 253 S.C. 286, 293, 170 S.E.2d 387, 391 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Farthing v. Farthing, 235 N.C. 634, 635, 70 Holdings: 0: holding that an action challenging the validity of a will may not be brought under ohios declaratory judgment act 1: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action 2: holding that a claim for a declaratory judgment which sought nullification of a probate courts orders is precisely the type of claim encompassed by the rookerfeldman doctrine 3: holding that south carolinas declaratory judgment act is not a vehicle for the nullification of such instruments nor is it a substitute or alternate method of contesting the validity of wills 4: holding that the declaratory judgment act is a procedural device


Input: of McCoy’s false statements in connection with the loan application, but there is no evidence that they were affected by McCoy’s perjury in the 1995 bankruptcy proceeding — much less that they were “directly and most seriously affected.” McCoy does not contend that either institution relied upon that false testimony. Indeed, the SBA does not appear to have participated in the bankruptcy proceeding at all, while Adams National won every significant issue contested therein. See McCoy’s Waste Indus. & Mfg., Inc. v. Adams Nat’l Bank, Adv. No. 94-0096, slip op. at 1, 50-52, 1995 WL 908054 (Bankr. D.C. Oct. 4, 1995). It is therefore difficult to discern how either entity could have been adversely affected by McCoy’s perjury. Cf. United States v. Norris, 217 F.3d 262, 272 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Guidelines further provide that “[f]or Holdings: 0: holding there was no assumption where neither the bankruptcy court nor the debtor exhibited any intention of assuming the contract 1: holding that civil forfeitures are neither punishment nor criminal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause 2: holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support 3: holding that for purposes of 18 usc  3663 creditors in bankruptcy proceeding were not victims of perjury when they neither relied on the false testimony nor incurred any losses as a consequence thereof 4: holding reasonable fee in contract action included fees incurred in related bankruptcy proceeding


Input: in the case which supports it.” Benik v. Hatcher, 358 Md. 507, 519, 750 A.2d 10 (2000); Zeller v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 67 Md.App. 75, 80, 506 A.2d 646 (1986); Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md. 186, 194, 401 A.2d 651 (1979); Levine v. Rendler, 272 Md. 1, 13, 320 A.2d 258 (1974). 6 . Our holding is consistent with other cases that have considered this issue. See Vieregger v. Robertson, 9 Neb.App. 193, 609 N.W.2d 409, 414 (2000)(where instruction to jury imposed burden of proof that doctor had to be the cause and not a cause of the injury to be considered a proximate cause, court ruled that “an instruction that the burden of proof is to show that a doctor's negligence was a cause is what is required.’'[(emphasis added); Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963, 587 N.W.2d 885, 891 (1999)(<HOLDING>)(emphasis added); Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Holdings: 0: holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury 1: holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible 2: holding that whether the negligent acts of parties combined to become the proximate cause of the injury was a question for the jury 3: holding proximate cause required for claim of breach of special duty 4: holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury


Input: are you aware of whether or not Eligió [Saenz] has any other method of getting to a public roadway, other than through Mrs. Thrash’s property and through your property? A. He’s even going through my, my easement that I bought outright several times, and also through the ranch, through other places. [Emphasis added] Q. Through what other places sir? A. Through mine and Bazans and Manuel Reyes too. He’s been using it, not right now because he locked the gates. [Emphasis added] Xavier Reyes’ testimony raises a genuine issue of material fact on whether the Saenzes have other possible legal means of access to their property and on whether access across the Reyeses’ property is a necessity, as opposed to a mere convenience. See Mitchell v. Castellaw, 151 Tex. 56, 246 S.W.2d 163, 168 (1952) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION We conclude the Saenzes failed to Holdings: 0: holding it is a question of fact 1: holding that whether the defendants confession was voluntary was a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review 2: holding that an error pertaining to a mixed question of law and fact under state law is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding 3: holding that probable cause determination presents a mixed question of law and fact 4: holding the question of necessity is one of mixed law and fact and accordingly one for the fact finder in the ordinary case


Input: meant by an “unfair or discriminatory practice” based on sex. Vivian, 601 N.W.2d at 874. The legislative history of the sex discrimination provision of Title VII is not substantial. Nevertheless, the federal courts which have examined Title VII’s legislative history have found personal grooming codes that reflect customary modes of grooming having only an insignificant impact on employment opportunities do not constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of the Act. See, e.g., Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401-02 (6th Cir.1977); Knott, 527 F.2d at 1252; Dodge, 488 F.2d at 1337. Several federal appellate courts have considered Title VII in the context of personal grooming codes regulating hair length. Every federal appellate court w . 593, 795 P.2d 602, 604 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Because there was no discrimination on the Holdings: 0: holding that the court may only make a facial inquiry into the validity of the certification 1: recognizing that source code is speech but not reaching the object code issue 2: holding that the apparent conflict between two subsections of the tax code renders the facial meaning of the statute ambiguous 3: holding personal grooming code which allows females to wear jewelry but prohibits men from wearing facial jewelry was not sexually discriminatory under state statute 4: holding that since limitations section in internal revenue code allows for suits against a sovereign its requirements are jurisdictional


Input: F.2d 294, 297-98 (9th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging inherent sovereign immunity of territories); cf. Davis v. Knud-Hansen Memorial Hospital, 635 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing Virgin Islands' sovereign immunity generally). 2 That a state may voluntarily contribute to a judgment is insufficient to confer immunity on a state agency and thus is irrelevant to the alter ego question. Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661 (citing, inter alia, Kovats v. Rutgers, the State Univ., 822 F.2d 1303, 1309 (3d Cir. 1987). Furthermore, that a state agency faced with a large judgment against it "might be compelled to rely on increased state subsidies" has expressly been rejected by the Third Circuit as insufficient to accord the agency with alter ego status. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 819; see Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the thrust of this first Holdings: 0: holding that  1983 does not override a states eleventh amendment immunity 1: holding that a complaint that fails to meet the pleading requirements does not invoke the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity 2: holding that  1983 does not override states eleventh amendment immunity 3: holding that states appropriation to agency of funds to meet any shortfall does not trigger immunity 4: holding negligence in supervision and evaluation of student in governmental units custody does not trigger waiver of immunity


Input: factors, the Burnet court relied on Snedigar, which had in turn relied on Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. 223. The Snedigar court’s holding (with the Burnet court’s deletions italicized) is as follows: We . . . hold that when a trial judge chooses one of the harsher remedies allowable under CR 37(b), the reasons for that choice should he clearly stated on the record. We further hold that when the most severe sanction of default or dismissal is ordered, it must be apparent from the record that the trial court explicitly considered whether a lesser sanction would probably have sufficed, and whether it found the Associated Mortgage due process factors [of willfulness and substantial prejudice] to be present. 53 Wn. App. at 487 (emphasis added); Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. at 228-29 (<HOLDING>). The Burnet court also cited a line of cases Holdings: 0: holding that a trial court had the authority to impose a default judgment as a sanction for violating a rule 16 scheduling order pursuant to rule 37b2 stating we agree with the basic premise that a default sanction can under certain circumstances be an appropriate response to a violation of a rule 16 order after all the express terms of rule 37 permit a trial court to impose sanctions when a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery 1: holding that district courts order granting motion for default judgment was erroneous  because a default judgment cannot be entered until the amount of damages has been ascertained  2: holding that a postjudgment contempt sanction for refusal to obey orders whether it is characterized as a civil or a criminal sanction is immediately appealable as a final order under  1291 3: recognizing that courts have discretion to exclude evidence as a sanction for violation of a discovery order 4: holding that the sanction of a default judgment authorized by cr 37b2c is a harsh remedy which should only be granted where there has been a willful or deliberate refusal to obey a discovery order which refusal substantially prejudices the opponents ability to prepare for trial


Input: plan. Tex. Fam.Code §§ 7.001, 7.003; (6) seek spousal maintenance if they separate or divorce. Tex. Fam.Code § 8.051; (7) enjoy the benefit of the “zone of privacy” that heterosexual married couples enjoy in the form of evidentiary privileges between spouses. Tex.R. Evid. 504; (8) enjoy succession rights under state laws of intestacy. Tex. Prob.Code § 45; or (9) have the right to make burial or other decisions regarding the handling and disposition of one another’s remains. On October 3, 2013, Plaintiffs Holmes and Phariss applied for a marriage license from the Bexar County Clerk Riekhoffs office. Defendant Rickhoff refused to issue a license because Holmes and Phariss are both men. This denial establishes an Article III injury. See Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Bishop, 962 F.Supp.2d at 1273-74, Holdings: 0: holding article iii courts may not exercise executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature 1: holding that article iii courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists 2: holding that courts have consistently treated a license or permit denial pursuant to a state or federal administrative scheme as an article iii injury 3: holding that the exception applies where a state administrative agency operates pursuant to a federal legislative scheme 4: holding that federal courts may not consider other issues before resolving standing an article iii jurisdictional matter