Input: to reject the claim, noting that it fails not on the evidence but on the law. The requirements of activity beyond the scope of employment, malice, and personal gain invoked by Cohen are referenced out of context. That heightened standard applies when a corporate officer is accused of tortiously interfering with, or inducing the breach of, a contract between that officer’s employer corporation and a third party. See, e.g., Maillet v. Frontpoint Partners, L.L.C., No. 02 Civ. 7865(GBD), 2003 WL 21355218, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2003) (“Under ... New York law, officers and directors are only hable for interfering with their own, company’s contracts if they exceed the scope of their authority.” (emphasis added)); The High View Fund, L.P. v. Hall, 27 F.Supp.2d 420, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (<HOLDING>); Petkanas, 303 A.D.2d 303, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 2 Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference 1: holding that corporate law should apply because key question was legal effect of contracts between corporations 2: holding that a director of a corporation may be held hable for tortious interference with the corporations contracts if she exceeds the scope of her corporate authority in causing the breach of those contracts emphasis added 3: holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous 4: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims


Input: S.W.3d at 638; Gutierrez-Gomez, 321 S.W.3d at 682. When the record is silent regarding the consequences of conviction in the context of a guilty plea, we must infer that the defendant did not know the consequences of his plea. VanNortrick, 227 S.W.3d at 710-11; Gutierrez-Gomez, 321 S.W.3d at 682; Kelley v. State, 237 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd). A reviewing court may also consider record facts from which one would reasonably infer that a defendant did know the consequences of his plea. Burnett, 88 S.W.3d at 638; Gutierrez-Gomez, 321 S.W.3d at 682. Only a few Texas cases outline the sort of record evidence that would support an inference that appellant was aware of the consequences of his guilty plea. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Gomez, 321 S.W.3d at 682-84 (<HOLDING>); Hwang v. State, 130 S.W.3d 496, 500-01 Holdings: 0: holding record insufficient to support inference appellant knew consequences of his plea when record is silent about whether appellant was actually informed that a guilty plea could result in his deportation 1: holding that absence of defendants from part of voir dire discussing trial publicity with prospective jurors was error under rule 43 2: holding that the extent to which parties may examine prospective jurors on voir dire lies within the trial judges discretion 3: holding statements during voir dire and oral motion in limine were merely opaque references to deportation but  silent about whether appellant was actually informed that a guilty plea could result in his deportation and insufficient to support inference appellant knew consequences of his plea 4: holding trial judges statement during voir dire that appellant likely would be automatically deported if released on probation along with references to deportation by defense counsel and prospective jurors supported inference that appellant knew consequences of plea


Input: OPINION AND ORDER HUVELLE, District Judge. On September 27, 1999, a Missouri jury awarded more than $20 million to a plaintiff injured in an August 29, 1997 collision between the vehicle in which she was a passenger and an Amtrak train. Following the verdict, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) notified its excess insurers — defendants Lexington Insurance Company, St. Paul Reinsurance Company Limited ., 357 F.Supp.2d 287 (D.D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). At issue here are the requirements of the Holdings: 0: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period 1: holding in the alternative that plaintiffs establishment clause claims were barred by laches 2: holding that amtraks second suit seeking reimbursement under the policies covering the period from october 1 1996 to september 30 1997 was neither barred by the relevant statute of limitations nor the doctrine of laches 3: holding that the plaintiffs claims under  22a452 were barred by the statute of limitations but declining to decide which statute to apply 4: holding that constitutional claim that paternity suit should not be barred by statute of limitations is waived by failing to raise the issue before the trial court


Input: the protest in question here. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s protest fails to present a timely, valid challenge to Customs’ acceptance of MPF tender, as Plaintiff filed that protest more than ninety days after Customs’ decision. Based on the analysis above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely filed, as Plaintiff failed to file it within ninety days of the Customs decisions that it seeks to challenge. Plaintiff, however, sets forth one additional argument to support its contentions that it filed a timely protest. CRMC appears to argue that its subsequent actions cured the defects of the untimely protést. Plaintiff claims that it properly filed, on February 10, 2000, a request for accelerated disposition t. App. 113, 117, 603 F.2d 850, 853 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Everflora Miami, Inc. v. United States, 19 Holdings: 0: holding that although the jurisdiction limitation also works to make decisions final and conclusive upon the government unless it acts to revise them within the limitations period there was no such decision that triggered the ninetyday period and consequently a failure to invoke jurisdiction 1: holding that the proper focus when determining the starting point of the limitations period  is upon the time of the discriminatory acts not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful  2: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over customs allegedly erroneous duty assessments because the importer failed to timely protest liquidation which thereby made the customs decision final and conclusive upon the parties 3: holding that refusal by customs officials to reliquidate entries became final and conclusive upon the importer when it failed to file a protest within the previously mandated sixtyday limitations period 4: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period


Input: a discretionary support trust when the purpose of the trust is to furnish the beneficiary with support, and the trustee has the discretion to pay the income or principal to the beneficiary, as the trustee deems necessary for the support of the beneficiary. In re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2004). The county argues that because our court of appeals held that a county could consider the assets of a discretionary support trust to • determine a beneficiary’s eligibility for county funding of mental health services, the county should be able to reach those same assets to reimburse it for the funds it expended on Anderson’s behalf for community-based mental health services under chapter 225C. See Strojek v. Hardin County Bd. of Supervisors, 602 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Iowa Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). Generally, in a discretionary support trust, Holdings: 0: holding the assets of a discretionary support trust could be considered when determining a mentally handicapped beneficiarys eligibility for living expenses 1: holding that a public trust that exercised control over the beneficiarys employment did not change the benefit plan into a government plan because the trust did not establish the plan or control it 2: holding that necessary expenses such as living expenses are not considered a squandering or secreting of marital property such that reimbursement or a setoff should be ordered 3: holding that a trust beneficiarys state law claims concerning investment of trust assets in affiliated mutual funds satisfied the in connection with a purchase or sale of security requirement of slusa 4: holding that the wifes testimony outlining the family living expenses constituted evidence from which the trial court could find that  the needs of the children exceed  the maximum support pursuant to the guidelines


Input: for ten years and public policy forbids an attack based upon informalities and irregularities in the procedure which led to the adoption of the ordinance, when ... property owners affected by it have conformed to its provisions, and have fixed their status accordingly.” (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). 11 . It is also possible that mandatory minimum sentences have been imposed pursuant to Section 9719 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9719 (requiring a three-year minimum prison sentence for certain offenses committed while impersonating a law enforcement officer), albeit we observe that the Superior Court has declared Section 9719 unconstitutional on substantive grounds based on Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (<HOLDING>). See Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 117 Holdings: 0: holding that any fact other than fact of prior convictions which increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that other than fact of prior conviction any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt 2: holding any fact other than prior conviction that increases statutory mandatory minimum is element of offense that must be submitted to jury and found beyond reasonable doubt 3: holding that any fact that increases mandatory minimum is element that must be proved beyond reasonable doubt 4: holding that under the sixth amendment any fact which increases the penalty for a crime  eg by triggering a mandatory minimum sentence must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt


Input: specifically named two of its Texas employees and its accounting department, made factual statements about its provision of financial services that RSL contends were false and defamatory, and solicited participants in a class action lawsuit against the company. Wilkerson made his comments on websites that included a map and photograph of RSL’s Houston offices and that would be of particular interest to Texas residents investigating local firms that provide financial services, like RSL. Wilkerson complained of RSL’s acts undertaken in Texas, and— as the allegedly defamatory posts indicate — Wilkerson was aware that RSL is a resident of and has its principal place of business in Texas, where any harm was suffered. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex.2002) (<HOLDING>). I would hold that Wilkerson’s “interaction” Holdings: 0: holding that personal jurisdiction is proper if party has sufficient minimum contacts 1: holding that foreseeability of causing injury in texas though not determinative is important consideration in establishing minimum contacts 2: holding that sufficient minimum contacts exist when nonresident defendant purposefully directed action toward texas 3: holding minimum contacts were necessary for personal jurisdiction over defendant 4: holding that foreseeability of causing injury in forum state is not sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction


Input: it effectively reduced the rate of future benefit accruals. Foot Locker submits that the version of ERISA in effect at the time of the challenged notice did not require such disclosure, that any deficiency was cured by subsequent summary plan descriptions, and, in any event, that Osberg’s § 204(h) claim is time-barred. Here, we need not determine whether Osberg’s § 204(h) notice claim is either timely or valid because § 204(h) does not, in any event, afford him the remedy he seeks, i.e., a pension benefit calculated under the cash balance plan but “with an opening balance equal to the value of the retirement annuity he had already earned under the old formula.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 5. See 10 Ellicott Square Court Corp. v. Mountain Valley Indem. Co., 634 F.3d 112, 125 (2d Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). This is because insufficient notice in Holdings: 0: recognizing this court may affirm for any reason supported by the record 1: holding that we may affirm a district court if its holding was right for any reason 2: recognizing that the court of appeals can affirm a grant on summary judgment on any basis made apparent by the record 3: recognizing that this court may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record quotation omitted 4: recognizing ability to affirm for any reason that finds support in record


Input: the General Counsel alleged both a § 8(d) contract modification and a § 8(a)(5) unilateral change, and that the Board therefore erred in failing to apply the clear and unmistakable waiver standard to their unilateral change claim. Alternatively, the Unions argue that the sound arguable basis standard incorporates the clear and unmistakable waiver standard. A. The General Counsel’s Allegations As a preliminary matter, the Board contends that the Unions are barred under Section 10(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), from arguing that the General Counsel alleged a § 8(a)(5) unilateral change violation because the Unions did not move for reconsideration of the Board’s sua sponte holding. See Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 665-66, 102 S.Ct. 2071, 72 L.Ed.2d 398 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. Holdings: 0: holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration 1: holding that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the board had erred in finding that certain picketing was lawful because no party had raised the issue to the board either during the initial proceedings or on motion for reconsideration 2: holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings 3: holding that the denial of enforcement on the basis that the board lacked a proper quorum did not deprive the board of jurisdiction to consider the case anew 4: holding that an associations president who was not a party before the board of appeals was not entitled to appeal the boards decision granting a zoning application that his association had opposed in the board proceedings


Input: explanation that any such discrepancy was a result of miscommunication with his lawyer. See Majid,i v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Hariyanto argues that he corrected the error regarding his religion with the asylum officer during his asylum interview, but he failed to exhaust this contention before the BIA and the Government has raised this failure to exhaust in its brief; we therefore decline to consider this issue. See Lin Zhang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-20 (2d Cir.2007) (describing the issue exhaustion requirement as an “affirmative defense subject to waiver”). The adverse credibility finding was also based on Hariyanto’s failure to submit sufficient evidence corroborating his claim. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Maladho Djehe Diallo v. Gonzales, Holdings: 0: recognizing that an applicants failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question 1: recognizing distinction made in maynard that one accomplices outofcourt statement may corroborate the incourt testimony of another accomplice but outofcourt testimony of a testifying accomplice cannot be used to corroborate his own testimony 2: holding that a failure to corroborate ones testimony with supporting evidence cannot form the sole basis for an adverse credibility determination 3: holding that when the ij has reason to question an aliens credibility material and easily available corroboration may be required 4: holding that an ij may not use general information contained in a state department report to discredit specific testimony regarding an applicants personal experience


Input: of marine corporal). Moore argues that this administrative remedy cannot bar her Bivens action because Congress has not declared that such a remedy is a substitute for recovery under the Constitution or that it views it as equally effective. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19, 100 S.Ct. at 1471-72. Moore is correct that judicial review of her claim under the APA does not automatically preclude her Bivens claim. But she is wrong in asserting that the adequacy of the remedy determines when an administrative remedy precludes a Bivens claim. A finding of preclusion is premised only on an alternative scheme and some indication that Congress deliberately elected not to include complete relief. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. at 2467-68; Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 837 (9th Cir.l991)(<HOLDING>). We have held that administrative remedies Holdings: 0: holding that the csra precludes even those bivens claims for which the act prescribes no alternative remedy because it found no inadvertence by congress in omitting the remedy 1: holding that rendition is remedy for no evidence 2: holding the privacy act to constitute a special factor precluding a bivens remedy 3: holding that the courtcreated bivens remedy is unavailable when congress through the social security act provided an alternative mechanism for a plaintiff to vindicate his due process rights 4: recognizing a bivens remedy for undocumented immigrants who were subjects of a raid by federal immigration officials reasoning that if a bivens remedy were precluded the present plaintiffs would have no forum in which to seek a remedy for the defendants alleged constitutional violations


Input: law of the case.”); Wollan v. U.S. Dept. of Int. Bureau of Land Management, 997 F.Supp. 1397, 1403 (D.Colo.1998)(finding reliance on expert report improper stating that an expert’s “legal opinion as to what the homestead laws say or do not say ... in inappo-site .... Where the ultimate issue is a question of law, the opinion of a legal expert, even a lawyer, interferes with the judge’s role as ‘sole arbiter of the law’ and should not be allowed.”). In addition to prohibiting legal expert testimony which defines the governing law, courts have also prohibited legal expert opinion which applies the law to the facts. Many courts have held that the judge is the sole arbiter of the law and its application to the facts. See, Marx & Co. v. Diners’ Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 508-11 (2d Cir.1977)(<HOLDING>); Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, Holdings: 0: holding that where trial court erred in applying established law to the facts of the case it must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to address the issue 1: holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo 2: holding that under the facts of that case the action primarily involved a custody dispute and therefore that the trial court erred in determining the case by applying the dependency statute 3: holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision 4: holding that the trial court erred in permitting a lawyer to offer his opinions concerning securities law and the application of that law to the contract in dispute


Input: Appellant's interpretation of the CDCA unlicensed lenders, like Appellant, would be permitted to charge exorbitant fees, while at the same time lenders licensed under the CDCA are limited to charges of $50 annually. See 7 P.S. § 6217.l.D. The Department and the amici reason that lenders would have no incentive to obtain a license in order to charge higher interest rates, because they could capture that increase by charging high fees, thus rendering the statute useless at protecting the public against usury. 9 . Moreover, this Court has recognized that choice-of-law agreements can be avoided when the terms offend Commonwealth public policy even in disputes between contracting parties. See McIlvaine Trucking, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (States), 570 Pa. 662, 672-73, 810 A.2d 1280, 1286 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Pennsylvania courts have consistently held Holdings: 0: holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act 1: holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period 2: holding that the parties choiceoflaw agreement as relating to workers compensation was appropriately avoided where it offended state public policy as reflected in express provisions of the pennsylvania workers compensation act 3: holding that the provisions of the workers compensation act must be satisfied or the action is not maintainable in the courts 4: holding that provisions of section 40115102 are applicable to the determination of the status of truck drivers as employees or independent contractors under the workers compensation act and discussing legislative history indicating intent to apply these provisions both to workers compensation and unemployment compensation matters


Input: into at Plaintiffs urging. Lastly, Plaintiff does not allege, nor do the facts suggests the existence of fraud or undue influence at the time the Agreement was drafted and signed. After considering all the relevant factors, this Court concludes that the forum selection clause agreed to by the parties is reasonable and appropriate in this particular matter. Therefore, under Bremen, and its more local progeny, this Court holds that, pursuant to the Agreement, proper venue for resolution of this matter is in Salt Lake City, Utah. TRANSFER As noted above, having upheld the forum selection clause, this Court finds that in the interest of justice transfer of this matter to Utah pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is most appropriate. Janko v. Outboard Marine Corp., 605 F.Supp. 51 (W.D.Okla.l985)(<HOLDING>), See also Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 Holdings: 0: holding that a forum selection clause should control absent a strong showing that it be set aside as unreasonable unjust or invalid 1: holding that a forum selection clause should not be enforced where a consumer is told by a corporate agent to ignore boilerplate contract language containing a forum selection clause where there is a material difference in bargaining power and where the forum designated by the contract has little to do with the transaction and is gravely inconvenient for the parties and witnesses 2: holding that corporations owned and controlled by the party signing the contract containing the forum selection clause may be bound by the clause 3: holding that when action arising under contract containing venue selection clause is filed in court other than that specified in clause case will be transferred to forum selected by contract unless venue selection clause is unreasonable and unjust or invalid due to fraud or overreaching 4: holding that a forum selection clause was not enforceable against defendants that were not parties to the contract


Input: as in the present cases, the debtors have not claimed the entire amount of their interests in property exempt but instead have claimed a precise value amount of their interests exempt. See In re Shoemaker, 155 B.R. at 555. Id. at 60 (footnote omitted). The district court concluded that: Taylor simply does not address whether a debtor’s valuation of property becomes conclusive in the absence of a timely objection pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(i) and Rule 4003(b). A number of courts have addressed this issue, however. Some courts have concluded that no challenge to the value of the property may be asserted after the period for objections to a debtor’s exemptions has expired. See In re Okoinyan, 135 B.R. 691 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1991); cf. In re Wiesner, 39 B.R. 963, 965 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1984) (<HOLDING>) (citing In re Walsh, 5 B.R. 239 Holdings: 0: holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included 1: recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack 2: holding that bill of review brought in wrong court constitutes collateral attack 3: holding that a collateral attack on exemptions by means of an application for appraisal outside the court ordered fifteen day period for objections is barred 4: recognizing collateral attack on void order


Input: Maine People’s Alliance and Natural Resources Defense Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting S.Rep. no. 98-284, at 59 (1983)). Thus, the operative word in section 6972(a)(1)(B) is “may” and a plaintiff need not establish an incontrovertible “imminent and substantial” harm to health and the environment. The existence of a potential harm to health and the environment is enough, when “there is a reasonable prospect that a serious, near-term threat to human health or the environment exists.” Id. at 279. Other courts have determined that passive migration at an inactive disposal site constitutes an imminent and substantial endangerment under the RCRA. See United States v. Price, 523 F.Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J.1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3rd Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 Holdings: 0: recognizing right of prisoners to seek relief under 42 usc  1983 for denial of access to the courts 1: holding that  13611 authorizes an attorney fee award even when nominal damages are recovered 2: holding that 42 usc  1988 authorizes the grant of attorneys fees for services on appeal though statute does not specifically so provide 3: holding that  1132a3b authorizes the award of appropriate equitable relief to a beneficiary for violations of erisa 4: holding that 42 usc  6972a authorizes relief restraining further leaking of waste from a landfill and noting that it also authorizes a general cleanup of even dormant waste sites if necessary to cure a present threat to public health or the environment


Input: to a broad class or range of jobs. Indeed, she believes that she can perform the dealer job, despite her disabilities, as evidenced by her attempt to obtain employment as a dealer following her termination. She just cannot perform the job at nighttime (or apparently between the hours of 4 a.m. and noon). Such a schedule-specific job restriction is not sufficient to qualify as a substantial impairment on her ability to work. See Cotter v. Ajilon Services, Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting argument that doctor’s order that the plaintiff needed to take frequent breaks to avoid stress and to avoid prolonged overtime demonstrated a substantial impairment of the plaintiffs ability to work); see also Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Chiles Holdings: 0: holding that an employer did not regard the plaintiff as disabled 1: holding that when an employer takes steps to accommodate an employees restrictions it is not thereby conceding that the employee is disabled under the ada or that it regards the employee as disabled 2: holding that an employer did not regard an employee with an impaired ankle as disabled where it encouraged her to work in a position that required walking 3: holding that an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as disabled simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job 4: holding that an employer did not regard the employee as disabled because it called the employee back from disability leave to work on a special project


Input: other evidence; (in) the seriousness of the litigation and the issues involved; (iv) the role of the government in the litigation; and (v) the possibility of future timidity by government employees who will be forced to recognize that their secrets are violable. Dairyland Power, 77 Fed.Cl. at 338 (quoting In re Subpoena Served Upon Comptroller of Currency, 967 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C.Cir.1992)); see also Sikorsky Aircraft, 106 Fed.Cl. at 579. B. Procedural Requirements To assert the deliberative process privilege, the government must meet several procedural requirements. First, the agency head (or her delegee) must personally consider the documents and “assertf ] the privilege in the form of a declaration or affidavit.” Pac. Gas, 70 Fed.Cl. at 134 n. 8; see also Marriott, 437 F.3d at 1308 (<HOLDING>). The purpose of this requirement is to ensure Holdings: 0: holding that failure to timely assert attorneyclient privilege constitutes waiver 1: recognizing privilege 2: holding that an agency may not delegate its public duties to private entities 3: holding that the head of a state administrative agency was protected by executive privilege and could not be forced to appear in court and answer questions about funding of the agency 4: holding that an agency head may delegate authority to assert the privilege when carefully undertaken


Input: standard to be applied, therefore, it would provide an additional basis for concluding that the Government Defendants are not arrangers under § 9607(a)(3). 278 . Carson Harbor objects that the Partnership Defendants' motion is based on new arguments that were not raised in their initial motion for summary judgment in 1997. It asserts the court should refuse to consider these arguments because they should have been raised in the initial motion. The Partnership Defendants’ position has changed materially because of the prior proceedings in this case. All but one of the claims against these defendants has now been dismissed. Accordingly, the court finds that it is appropriate to consider any new arguments raised in the motion. See F.D.I.C. v. Kooyomjian, 220 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 279 . First Amended Complaint, Ex. C, ¶ 4 Holdings: 0: holding that where the plaintiff is pro se the court must consider as evidence in his opposition to summary judgment all of plaintiffs contentions offered in motions and pleadings where such contentions are based on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and where plaintiff attested under penalty of perjury that the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct 1: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering successive motions for summary judgment when each of fdics motions reflected material changes in the posture of this litigation and was grounded on meritorious contentions 2: holding that the trial court grants or denies motions for summary judgment on the basis of what is contained in the motions for summary judgment and the responses thereto 3: recognizing that the district court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on motions for relief from judgment 4: holding that motions to dismiss should have been converted into motions for summary judgment where the district court relied upon contract documents submitted by the defendant


Input: Court to decide, given that the public trust doctrine governs a large portion of the property at issue, is "whether it constitutes an uncompensated taking to require [Plaintiffs] to construct and maintain the Walkway and its- landscaping to facilitate the public’s enjoyment of its public trust right.” See Def.-Int. Reply at pp. 13-14. In this regard, Plaintiffs assert that the public trust doctrine does not extend to the State’s requirement that Plaintiffs, and others, construct and maintain a walkway on the "public trust property” along the Hudson River. See PI. Response at p. 3. However, such requirements are well within the State's police power in the area of land use regulation. See, e.g. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal.4th 854, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, 911 P.2d 429, 450 (1996) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 929, 117 S.Ct. 299, Holdings: 0: holding that the measure of damages for breaching a building construction contract is ordinarily such sum as is required to make the building conform to the contract 1: recognizing that the court has the power to grant leave upon certain conditions 2: holding that the requirement to provide art or a cash equivalent is more akin to traditional land use regulations imposing minimal building setbacks parking and lighting conditions landscaping requirements and other design conditions such as color schemes building materials and architectural amenities such  conditions have long been held to be valid exercises of the citys traditional police power and do not amount to a taking merely because they might incidentally  impose a cost in connection with the property 3: holding that the failure to articulate  orally that conditions  5d13d2 and 3 apply to a defendants sentence of supervised release does not create a conflict with the judgment imposing these conditions 4: holding that a civic center building or recreational building on property dedicated to the city as park property was inconsistent with its use as a park


Input: jurisdiction as to certain Defendants, premised upon section 379(a), would violate the Ex-Post-Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. I, § 9, cl. 3. Nonetheless, we do not base our finding of federal jurisdiction upon section 379(a) and, therefore, there is no constitutional violation. 2 . A few of the Defendants make a final argument concerning the container in which the salt was transported. This argument is baseless and not supported by the allegations. The issue concerning containers is whether the containers which held the adulterated milk were in interstate commerce. Defendants misunderstand the issue and we, therefore, decline to discuss their contention. 3 . As we find the interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement is satisfied by Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. Holdings: 0: recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce 1: holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce 2: holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute 3: holding that tavern that  purchased beer from outofstate vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute 4: holding that interstate commerce nexus is established where defendant stole less than 100 from bar that imported beer from outofstate


Input: motion would stand alone for the trial court's consideration. 3 . For example, as with the Holubs’ and HTC's post-abatement summary-judgment pleadings, the Law Firm’s post-abatement, traditional summary-judgment motion sought the same relief that its traditional motion for partial summary judgment had, albeit for different reasons. Additionally, the post-abatement motion’s prayer requested a ruling only on that motion; it did not request a ruling on the Law firm's pre-abatement motion for partial summary judgment on which the trial court had not yet ruled. Finally, the post-abatement motion incorporated evidence, implicitly indicating that it would stand alone for the trial court’s consideration. 4 . See In re Estate of Swanson, 130 S.W.3d 144, 148 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 5 . One of our sister courts of appeals has Holdings: 0: holding that defendant bore burden of establishing right to summary judgment on basis of statute of repose defense 1: holding that a defendant who fails to raise statute of limitations defense in a pretrial motion to dismiss or by requesting a jury instruction on limitations if there is some evidence that the prosecution is limitationsbarred waives that defense 2: holding that defendant cannot raise the statute of limitations defense in a noevidence summary judgment motion which otherwise shifts the evidentiary burden 3: holding that the defendants waived their affirmative defense of unenforceability by failing to raise the defense in response to the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted 4: holding defense of statute of limitations not waived when asserted in a motion for summary judgment rather than in the answer


Input: Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., Fla. Dist.Ct.App., 356 So.2d 1337, 1338-39 (1978)). “Additionally, the phrase, ‘injury arising out of has within the context of no-fault statutory schemes been read to mean an injury which originates from, is incidental to, or has some connection with the use of a motor vehicle.” Id. (citing to Padron, 356 So.2d at 1338-39). This Court has also interpreted the word “occupying” as used in § 2118(a)(2)(c) several times. Messick v. Reliance Ins. Co., C.A. No. 94C-07-188, 1995 WL 465181, Barron, J. (July 26, 1995) (Mem.Op. at 6); see also Carter v. Nationwide Ins. Co., Del.Super., C.A. No. 92C-01-016, 1992 WL 240479, Steele, J. (Aug. 26, 1992); Adamkiewicz v. Milford Diner, Inc., Del.Super., C.A. No. 90C-JA-23, 1991 WL 35709, Steele, J. (Feb. 13, 1991) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., Del.Super., Holdings: 0: holding that police officer plaintiff who was injured approaching a vehicle he had stopped from the rear which lurched backward was an occupier of a motor vehicle under either a geographic perimeter or vehielerelatedtask test 1: holding that plaintiff who slipped on ice while approaching her car lacked the necessary nexus with the yehicle and therefore was not an occupier of a motor vehicle 2: holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether plaintiff who was approaching a car to enter it as a passenger was occupying a motor vehicle 3: holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  4: holding that plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employers motor vehicle carrier preparing to travel was very close to the vehicle and engaged in a task related to the vehicle and therefore was an occupier of a motor vehicle


Input: any person or the United States from pursuing any other remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of any law prohibiting discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or economic status in the selection of persons for service on grand or petit juries. The Fifth and the Eighth Circuits read § 1867 to mean a defendant pursing a constitutional challenge to a jury pool need not comply with its provisions. See United States v. De Alba-Conrado, 481 F.2d 1266, 1270 n. 5 (5th Cir.1973) (citing the plain language of the statute and the legislative history in holding the procedures set forth in the Act are not applicable to constitutional challenges to a jury venire); United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit, meanwhile, applies § Holdings: 0: holding failure to comply with  851b was harmless error in part because defendant did not comply with  851c procedures for challenging prior convictions 1: holding the failure to comply with the act does not bar defendant from raising a constitutional challenge to jury selection procedures 2: holding that plaintiffs failure to exhaust available grievance procedures does not bar her title vii claims 3: holding that failure to include an issue in statement of issues did not bar the appellant from raising the issue in its opening brief 4: holding that the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute waives the issue on appeal


Input: a covenant not to compete, and in fact, the document is entitled “AGREEMENT FOR COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE.” Therefore, the question is: does the description contained in Orix’s security agreement sufficiently identify the right of Stephens to receive payments under the covenant not to compete so as to give Orix a valid security interest? Indulging every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant, Orix, we hold that under § 9.110 the description “property of every kind and nature, wherever located, now or hereafter acquired” is insufficient as a matter of law to cover the right to receive payments under the covenant not to compete. The phrase used in the security agreement “property of every kind and nature, wherever located” c.2d 780, 315 N.Y.S.2d 937, 8 U.C.C.Rep.Serv. 738 (1970) (<HOLDING>); In re JCM Coop. Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. Holdings: 0: holding that an unpaved public street a short distance from the policyholders home was not part of the insured premises because it was not used in connection with the residence premises 1: holding that the application of the enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense is proper only if there is a clear connection between the firearm that was used in the other offense and the one that was used in the offense of conviction 2: holding tila applies only to credit transactions secured by real or personal property used or expected to be used as the principal dwelling of the debtor 3: holding description which used phrase articles of personal property now or hereafter attached to delivered for use installed in or used in connection with said premises sufficient to cover air conditioning and heating equipment 4: holding that the phrase return of income used in 26 usc  6012 is synonymous with the phrase return of tax used in 26 usc  6151


Input: — a variety of their people to get all the documents for — reference the fish pond together. And it took some time. I mean, he’s not — he’s not the only reporter that we end up having to do work for. Although MacPherson testified that the reason for the delay was that assembly of the eleven pages “took some time,” she could not remember when she first asked that the documents be assembled or when she received the assembled documents. In the 108 days it took to fill the request, she only remembers making three phone calls to two people in an effort to get the request filled. ¶ 31 Although a request for voluminous documents that are not all located in the same place might justify some delay in responding to a document request, cf. Cleaver v. Kelley, 415 F.Supp. 174, 175-76 (D.D.C.1976) (<HOLDING>), similar delays have been upheld only with Holdings: 0: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity 1: holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents 2: holding that the duty of disclosure affects not only the prosecutor but the government as a whole including its investigative agencies 3: holding that state and local government agencies were not persons under the fca 4: holding that the failure of two government agencies to process a disclosure request within the time provisions of the foia was not in effect a denial of the request because those agencies were faced with an unpredictable backlog of requests that were being processed in chronological order


Input: prior convictions, and that he initially lied to the police because he did not think that they would believe him due to these convictions. The defendant’s defense to the charges was self-defense and his credibility was a critical aspect of the case. The jury was specifically instructed that in weighing the testimony of a witness, one of the factors they should consider was whether the witness had ever been convicted of a crime. Thus, the nature of the defendant’s prior felony convictions, which would have included the fact that the defendant had never used a weapon, threatened, or harmed anyone during the commission of these felonies, was relevant, and therefore, the trial court erred in precluding the defendant’s testimony. See Lawhorne, 500 So.2d at 522; Williams, 730 So.2d at 779 (<HOLDING>). The defendant also contends that the trial Holdings: 0: holding that it was error for the trial court to allow the state to question the confidential informant on direct examination about her lack of felony charges when there was no prior attack of the witnesss credibility 1: holding that stipulation of the appellants undisputed prior convictions was harmless error and reasoning that blakely v washington which does not require a jury determination of prior convictions provides implicit support for the conclusion that a harmless error analysis is appropriate 2: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error 3: holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present 4: holding that the trial courts error in not allowing defendant to testify on direct examination as to nature and circumstances of prior convictions was not harmless error where credibility of the defendant was critical to the deliberations of the jury


Input: in the investigation of the house fire. Fatchett and Kalman moved to dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and the district court granted the motion. On appeal, Gavitt maintains that the dismissal was premature. Count II alleges that Fatchett and Kal-man misrepresented evidence in reports and testimony, resulting in a denial of due process and contributing to Gavitt’s wrongful conviction and imprisonment. R. 1, Complaint at 41-42, Page ID 41-42. In essence, the claim is that Fatchett and Kalman misrepresented that “they had considered and excluded all accidental causes of the house fire, when in fact they had not even attempted to consider and eliminate all accidental causes of the house fire before they erroneously presumed that the fire was caused by incen (7th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>). Gavitt does not challenge the above Holdings: 0: holding that under oklahoma law a bad faith claim  premised on inadequate investigation must be supported by a showing that material facts were overlooked or that a more thorough investigation would have produced relevant information 1: holding that there is no constitutional duty to do a better investigation and that a decision not to conduct a more thorough investigation does not invade an accuseds rights 2: holding investigation was not deficient in part because counsel hired an experienced death penalty investigator who conducted a thorough investigation into defendants history 3: holding that an insurer has a duty to conduct an investigation reasonably appropriate under the circumstances 4: holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report


Input: because the notice of appeal mentioned both the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiffs action and the district court’s decision denying Plaintiffs Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion for relief from that decision, we have jurisdiction to review both of those decisions. See Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). See generally Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (construing pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally). In his appellate brief, however, Plaintiff also challenges the district court’s decision to deny his later-filed Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration. Because Plaintiff never filed a separate notice of appeal from that denial, we have no jurisdiction to consider it. See Bowles v. Russell, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2366, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 F.3d 1155, Holdings: 0: holding that the 30day notice of appeal requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional 1: holding timely notice of appeal under fed rapp p 4a is jurisdictional 2: holding time for filing notice of appeal under rule 8002 is jurisdictional 3: holding that timeliness of filing of notice of appeal is a jurisdictional issue 4: holding that the appeal was timely filed because federal rule of appellate procedure 4a provides inmates with sixty days to appeal the denial of a  2255 motion


Input: also explained herein. 7 . The Court considers Plaintiffs’ allegations of a Fifth Amendment right to privacy as analogous and indistinguishable from the courts have recognized as a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy. See Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Schs., 385 F.3d 935, 941-42 (6th Cir.2004) (explaining that intimate association and privacy rights find protection in the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003))). Courts have recognized that there are associational freedoms attached to the First Amendment. Christensen v. County of Boone, Il., 483 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). However, the freedom to enter into Holdings: 0: holding that njeither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute and congress may prohibit federal employees from participating in political activities in view of its interest in maintaining a nonpartisan work force 1: holding that regulating the location of adult films does not violate the first amendment and citing as support the proposition that reasonable regulations of the time place and manner of protected speech where those regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests are permitted by the first amendment 2: recognizing first amendment retaliation right 3: recognizing a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the first amendment citing jaycees 468 us at 618 104 sct 3244 4: recognizing even federal constitutional right of association does not apply to the right of one individual to associate with another


Input: “unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense,” id at § 2D1.1 cmt. n.ll(A). To determine the applicability of this enhancement, the district court may consider all relevant conduct. Id. at § lB1.3(a)(l)(A)-(B). Since .the court may consider all relevant conduct, it follows that the court’s assessment is not “limited to the charged conspiracy.” See, e.g., United States v. Shippley, 690 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that “a § 2Dl.l(b)(l) enhancement applies if a dangerous weapon was present or possessed during uncharged drug trafficking activity that constitutes relevant conduct under § 1B1.3” (citing United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 982 (10th Cir. 1993))); see also United States v. Mitchell, 528 Fed.Appx. 800, 806 (10th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). Further, we have held Holdings: 0: holding that the  2d11b1 enhancement is not limited to the charged conspiracy 1: holding that the  2d11b1 enhancement was proper where a firearm and drugrelated items were found in the defendants residence where he had also engaged in conspiratorial conversations 2: holding that the defendant on remand may show his eligibility for the safety valve reduction by a preponderance of the evidence even where a  2d11b1 enhancement applied 3: holding that heightened evidentiary standard of proof is not required where the sentencing enhancement is based entirely on the extent of the conspiracy to which the defendant pled guilty 4: holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges


Input: pg. 21.) These symptoms were all noted by Dr. Rumore and are consistent with the Plaintiffs diagnosis of fibromyalgia. (AR at 267-69.) See also SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869 (July 25, 2012.) (noting that the symptoms of fibromyalgia can include widespread pain as well as “fatigue, cognitive or memory problems (‘fibrofog’), waking unre-pressed, depression, anxiety disorder, or irritable bowel syndrome ... ”). Moreover, numerous courts have agreed that fibromyalgia is a medical condition which can reasonably be expected to cause pain. See Green-Yownger, 335 F.3d at 108 (2d Cir.2003) (“[The plaintiffs] complaints of pain in her back, legs, and upper body, fatigue, and disturbed sleep are internally consistent and consistent with common symptoms of fibromyalgia.”); Sarchet, 78 F.3d at 306 (<HOLDING>); Johnston v. Barnhart, 378 F.Supp.2d 274, 281 Holdings: 0: recognizing that one of fibromyalgias principal symptoms is pain all over 1: holding that the principal must have control and supervision over the details of the agents work 2: recognizing that one of the many symptoms of bipolar disorder is the denial that anything is wrong 3: holding that agency relationship existed where principal paid plaintiff directly and written agreement stated agent was signing on behalf of principal 4: recognizing that the determination is an equitable one


Input: when he rejects a settlement offer for full relief on the specific claims he asserts.”). B On appeal, Fitzgerald contends that the VA’s settlement proposal was not an offer of full relief because it did not offer him compensatory damages for emotional injuries that allegedly led to his hospitalization. Although Fitzgerald recognizes that he never specifically asked the VA or the EEOC for compensatory damages, he argues that Title VII claimants can obtain compensatory damages for emotional injuries only in actions brought in federal district court, not in administrative proceedings. He therefore maintains that he cannot be faulted for failing to ask the VA for compensatory damages because it is beyond the power of the VA to offer such. Cf. Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Fitzgex'ald also contends that it would be Holdings: 0: holding that an alien must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief from detention 1: holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court 2: holding that the prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies as to each defendant later sued 3: holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim 4: holding that state prisoner seeking only monetary damages in  1983 suit need not exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to  1997e if such remedies do not provide for the award of monetary relief


Input: those grants and found them inadequate to justify the restriction. It did not consider the stations’ positions as holders of broadcast licenses. There is, perhaps, good reason for the Court to have hesitated to give great weight to the government’s property interest in the spectrum. First, unallocated spectrum is government property only in the special sense that it simply has not been allocated to any real “owner” in any way. Thus it is more like unappropriated water in the western states, which belongs, effectively, to no one. Indeed, the common law courts had treated spectrum in this manner before the advent of full federal regulation. See Chicago Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station, 111. Circuit Ct., Cook County, Nov. 17, 1926, reprinted in 68 Cong. Rec. 215-19 (1926) (<HOLDING>); see also Thomas W. Hazlett, “The Rationality Holdings: 0: holding that it is well settled that while one tenant in common may acquire homestead rights in the common property the rights so acquired are not superior to the rights and remedies of the other joint owners he can acquire no such rights as will prejudice or in anywise interfere with the rights of the other tenants in common 1: holding that failure to use irrigation water rights on conveyed property for more than ten years did not sever water rights from said property absent compliance with statutory requirements 2: holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially 3: recognizing rights in spectrum acquired by reason of investment of time and money in application of the resource to productive use and drawing on analogy to western water rights law 4: recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest


Input: in the Northern District of Georgia in 1990, nothing more. Since Orozco merely repeated the same information known to him when he talked with the government before his sentencing, he is not eligible for a Rule 35(b) motion under the exception for information that is not known by the convicted defendant until more than a one-year period after sentence imposition. Congress has enacted several revisions of Rule 35(b) and, thus, has shown attentiveness to changing the specific terms of this rule. We are not at liberty to add terms or posit an interpretation that differs from the explicit language of Rule 35(b), particularly when we can decide this ease within the plain terms of the rule. See Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 567, 572, 103 S.Ct. 1356, 1364, 75 L.Ed.2d 281 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Carey, 120 F.3d at 512 (“Whether we agree Holdings: 0: holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language 1: recognizing that federal courts are not authorized to add specific language that congress did not include in a carefully considered statute 2: recognizing that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts 3: holding that when the language of a statute is clear courts should not substitute their judgment for that of congress and should enforce the statute according to its terms 4: holding that the plain language of the diversity jurisdiction statute permitted a workmens compensation claim to be filed as an original action in federal court even though congress clearly intended to prohibit the removal of such claims congress used language specifically barring removal of such cases from state to federal courts and at the same time left unchanged the old language which just as specifically permits civil suits to be filed in federal courts in cases where there are both diversity of citizenship and the prescribed jurisdictional amount in this situation we must take the intent of congress with regard to the filing of diversity cases in federal district courts to be that which its language clearly sets forth congress could very easily have used language to bar filing of workmens compensation suits by the insurer as well as removal of such suits and it could easily do so still


Input: generate sufficient revenues to settle the judgment against it. These measures may include but are not limited to a combination of those specified in Conclusion Of Law Numbers 3-9 [of the Order]. According to the Commission, Engelman retains discretion at this stage to choose the means by which it can raise revenue, whether it elects to sell some combination of the assets identified in the Order or to utilize other means not considered by the Commission or the ALJ, including entering into agreements with Shields Brothers to restructure the debt. There is scant authority construing the forced-sale prohibition contained in article XI, apart from a handful of cases involving liens against public building projects. See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (<HOLDING>); City of LaPorte v. Taylor, 836 S.W.2d 829, Holdings: 0: holding that a valid judgment hen is enforceable against the property of the estate recovered by the trustee 1: holding that a reasonable contractedfor limitations period that is not contrary to public policy is generally enforceable 2: holding that waivers of  2255 collateral attack rights must be expressly stated to be enforceable 3: holding that the legislatures rules of procedure are not reviewable except on constitutional grounds 4: holding that builders hen is not enforceable against public buildings and grounds except as expressly permitted by statute


Input: to establish a necessary element of the crime: the existence of a single scheme involving theft of $5,000 worth of property from the water department. The standard of review for a claim of insufficient evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Ellzey, 874 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir.1989) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). There is ample support for allowing the government to aggregate several acts to establish the $5,000 threshold required for prosecution where the multiple conversions are part of a single scheme. See, e.g., Sanderson, 966 F.2d at 189 (<HOLDING>). The district court instructed the jury in Holdings: 0: holding that for the government to be sued on a contract pursuant to the tucker act there must be privity of contract between the plaintiff and the united states 1: holding that when one steals paint and supplies and then orders employees to use such materials in private contract work both actions will be considered components of the larger single fraudulent act of theft from the local government 2: holding in a breach of contract action that a state statute established that employees have a right to rely on the layoff and termination procedures advanced by their employers and that to the extent that the government employer considered factors in addition to seniority ability and merit the countys termination of the plaintiffs employment was in violation of the county personnel management act 3: holding that a change in employer from one federal contractor to another caused employees no lack of work 4: holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders


Input: but he was not charged under that statute. The third superseding indictment sought forfeiture based on other statutes, see 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C); 28 U.S.C. § 246, which authorize forfeiture of proceeds from “specified unlawful activity,” including mail fraud, and contain no requirement about “affecting a financial institution,” 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C); 28 U.S.C. § 2461; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (defining “specified unlawful activity” and incorporating the offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), which include mail fraud, into this definition). Because Foley does not argue that forfeiture was improper under section 981, the statute upon which the government sought forfeiture, Foley’s argument is frivolous. Cf. United States v. Jennings, 487 F.3d 564, 584-85 (8th Cir.2007). (<HOLDING>); United States v. Edelkind, 467 F.3d 791, 799 Holdings: 0: holding that when a plea agreement or consent order does not explicitly prohibit seeking the forfeiture of substitute assets via civil forfeiture under  981 the statutory scheme controls and requires the forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to  2461c and 853p 1: holding that 28 usc  2461c authorizes criminal forfeiture of proceeds from general mail fraud via 18 usc  981a1c 2: holding that  2461 allows for criminal forfeiture of the proceeds of general mail fraud 3: holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for making false claims against the government under either the false claims statute 18 usc  287 or the mail and wire fraud statutes 18 usc  1341 1343 4: holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001


Input: may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education.... ” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17). In light of these definitions, defendants’ attempt to characterize the program at Jewel Manor as “treatment,” rather than “education,” must fail. The concept of education under the Act clearly embodies both academic instruction and a broad range of associated services traditionally grouped under the general rubric of “treatment.” Any attempt to distinguish academics from treatment when defining “educational placement” runs counter to the clear language of the Act. There can be no question that plaintiffs’ assignment to Jewel Manor was an educational placement within the meaning of the Act. See, e.g., Kruelle v. New Castle County School District, 642 F.2d 687, 693 (3rd Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). See also, Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Holdings: 0: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance 1: holding that loss of earnings was sufficiently encompassed by general prayer for relief 2: holding that the uniform commercial code specifically encompassed a software licensing agreement 3: holding that a residential placement is encompassed within the term special education 4: holding that subcontractor can recover in quasicontract from contractor for work not encompassed in the agreement between the two


Input: a union election, explaining that “[t]he plaintiff voluntarily-thrust himself into the controversy- by campaigning for .reelection to the position of secretary-treasurer of Local-526” and that “[i]n the context of a union election campaign, the plaintiff, as an incumbent, should expect criticism of his record.” Materia v. Huff, 394 Mass. 328, 475 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1985) (collecting cases). New Jersey’s intermediate appellate court held that a candidate in an election for a seat on the board of a condominium association was a public figure for the limited purpose of statements made in the context of his election because he chose to involve himself in a “hotly contested” race. Gulrajaney v. Petricha, 381 N.J.Super. 241, 885 A.2d 496, 505 (App. Div. 2005); accord Verna, 852 A.2d at 214 (<HOLDING>). A California court has taken the further step Holdings: 0: holding that a candidate for a planned unit development associations board was a limited purpose public figure because as a candidate for election to the associations board of directors plaintiff thrust himself into a spotlight which justified viewing him as a public figure for the limited purpose of his candidacy 1: holding that taxpayer could not have presented substantive due process claim to the board of assessment review because of the limited jurisdiction of that board 2: holding candidate for house of representatives had standing to challenge election regulation exempting opponents of selffinancing candidates from certain campaigncontribution limits where plaintiff candidate had declared his candidacy and was demonstrably a selffinancing candidate whose opponents would imminently receive expanded access to campaign funding 3: holding that candidate for state medical board voluntarily placed herself in position of public attention given strong public interest in board appointees qualifications 4: holding that an associations president who was not a party before the board of appeals was not entitled to appeal the boards decision granting a zoning application that his association had opposed in the board proceedings


Input: debtor’s employer prior to obtaining a final judgment against the debtor; (5) disclosing or threatening to disclose information concerning the existence of a debt known to be disputed by the debtor without disclosing that fact; (6) communicating with the debtor or any member of the debtor’s family or household in an abusive or harassing manner; (7) threatening any action which the principal creditor does not normally take in the usual course of business; (8) claiming a right, or attempting or threatening to enforce a right, if the right does not exist; (9) using a communication that falsely simulates legal or judicial process or otherwise gives the appearance of being authorized, issued or approved by the government or an attorney; and (10) fail .S.2d 207, 430 N.E.2d 1260 (N.Y.1981) (<HOLDING>). The mere fact that New York State has chosen Holdings: 0: holding that new york alcoholic beverage control law preempted local law 1: holding that new york law applies to this matter 2: holding guilderlands local law was preempted by new york state law which provided a comprehensive scheme for funding road construction 3: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 4: holding the state law claims were not preempted


Input: at 605. The district court found this and similar statements sufficient to support its conclusion that, “[i]n essence, the Seipels wish merely to have a voice in controlling the timing and processing of this lawsuit (which is no concern of theirs) in the hope that, if they succeed in obtaining a judgment in the Territorial Court, they can satisfy it by recourse to the $250,000.” Mountain Top, slip op. at 4. This argument- fails to recognize the scope of interests encompassed in Rule 24(a)(2). Proposed inter-venors need not have an interest.in every aspect of the litigation. They are entitled to intervene as to specific issues so long as their interest in those issues is significantly pro-tectable. See, e.g., Harris 820 F.2d at 599; Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 962 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1141, 1142 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error 1: holding that the defendant waived the right to challenge a suppression ruling on appeal 2: holding that nonminority employees had the right to intervene to challenge the promotional remedy but not to contest the existence of past discrimination 3: holding that if no notice was given prior to the institution of an action a condition precedent to the right to bring the action does not exist and the buyerplaintiff has lost the right of his remedy 4: holding that in order to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment based on a plea of guilty or no contest a defendant must bring forward a full statement of facts including a transcription of the plea proceedings


Input: factual findings are insufficient to qualify him as a “leader, manager, or supervisor.” According to Brown, “it appears that Clark may have been using Brown” for a place to stay, and for food, alcohol, and drugs. Thus, he contends “[t]he fact that he and Brown went out together a few times to deliver Brown’s crack cocaine, and Clark happened to be the driver, does not categorically place Clark in the position of being “controlled” by Brown.” Brown may well be correct such evidence would not, as a matter of law, suffice to establish a defendant’s role as a supervisor or manager. The problem, however, is his view of the evidence, as recited above, differs markedly from the district court’s view. “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the district court’s 8th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, I concur in the majority’s Holdings: 0: holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live 1: holding that there was a sufficiently direct relationship between restricting the defendants selfemployment as a roofer and his bank fraud conviction when the defendant used his roofing business to facilitate the fraud and after his initial sentence he failed to provide information about his business activities to his probation officer 2: holding that an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum based exclusively on activities undertaken after his arrival in the united states so long as he demonstrates that authorities in his country are aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities 3: holding that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to state a claim for wrongful discharge where he alleged he was discharged due to his political affiliation and activities 4: holding that a defendant may be seen as supervising the four drivers he used in his criminal activities


Input: 487 A.2d at 287 (quoting Stebbins-Anderson Co., 117 A.2d at 910) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A judgment creditor’s lien cannot attach to a seller’s - bare legal title in the property after the seller has conveyed equitable title, because the seller’s legal title is a mere “technicality.” Wolf Org., 705 A.2d at 46. Nor can the judgment creditor’s lien attach to the seller’s equitable interest in the property, because that interest has already become “vested in another.” Id. Moreover, the Maryland doctrine of equitable conversion protects the security interest of a purchaser regardless of the purchaser’s compliance with the recordation statutes. The recordation statutes protect only bona fide purchasers. See Lewis v. Rippons, 282 Md. 155, 383 A.2d 676, 680 (1978) (<HOLDING>); see also Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that the question of whether a bankruptcy trustee or a putative lessor was entitled to the proceeds of an equipment sale depended on whether a true lease was involved when the lease is intended as a security interest article 9 applies however a bona fide lease is not affected by article 9 1: holding a tape of a telephone call was admissible because one party to the call consented to the recording 2: holding section 365d4 inapplicable to saleleaseback arrangement because not true and bona fide lease 3: holding that because a party was not a bona fide purchaser the recording statute availed him not 4: holding plan was not bona fide because the employees never earned more than the guaranteed hourly wage


Input: agreement. Where, as here, the Offer Letter specifies benefits payable on discharge, the employee is entitled to those benefits if the termination amounts to a constructive discharge. See Robinson v. Kingston Hosp., 55 A.D.3d 1121, 1122, 866 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (3d Dep’t 2008) (observing that, despite plaintiff’s being at-will employee, change in employment terms would entitle her to contractual severance benefits if it amounted to constructive discharge). In rejecting Scott’s claim of constructive discharge and accepting Harris’s claim of resignation, the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that a salary in the reduced amount of $150,000 could not be deemed so abusive as to render continued employment untenable. See Pena v. Brat-tleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); accord Morris v. Schroder Capital Mgmt. Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff alleging constructive discharge must prove deliberateness of the employers action and intolerability of the working conditions 1: recognizing constructive discharge where employer rather than acting directly deliberately makes employees working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would be forced into involuntary resignation 2: recognizing doctrine of constructive discharge under federal civil rights act and national labor relations act where employer knowingly permits working conditions to become so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign 3: holding employee resigned and was not constructively discharged because there was no evidence that employer deliberately created working conditions that led to her resignation 4: holding that defendant interfered with plaintiffs right when the employer forced her to choose between resignation and working without leave


Input: that costs were unreasonable. See, e.g., Kern County v. Ginn, 194 Cal. Rptr. 512, 516 (1983); Horner v. Marine Eng’r’s Ass’n., 1 Cal-Rptr. 113, 117 (1959). TCW has failed to demonstrate that the deposition in question was not reasonably necessary at the time it was taken. The interpreter fees in the amount of $300.00 will accordingly be allowed by the Court as costs. E. Depositions 28 U.S.C. § 1920 permits deposition expenses to be awarded as costs. Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Lab, Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1990). TCW is correct in stating that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld decisions of district courts that deny costs for depositions solely because they were not used at trial. Wash. State Dept. of Transp. v. Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). The Ninth Circuit has never, however, stated Holdings: 0: holding that court reviews trial courts decision to release a defendant for abuse of discretion 1: holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion 2: holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous 3: holding that decision on waiver of affirmative defense normally is within district courts discretion 4: holding that denial of amendment is within discretion of trial court


Input: Throughout the trial, Frantz indicated that he thought the requested tape had particular significance to his defense. Despite the damaging statement on the tape that the robber was armed, Frantz believed that the tape could impeach the credibility of the government’s most knowledgeable witness, Diana Villalobos. Villalobos, the cashier whom Frantz allegedly approached to rob, was the sole witness who described the entire sequence of the robbery. She was also the only witness to testify that she saw Frantz with a gun; the police officers who responded to the scene did not report seeing Frantz with a gun and never recovered one. Accordingly, during his two-day trial, Frantz three times tried to introduce the tape or its transcript, and Lamb told the judge during on ir.1992) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). (2) How the reply to the jury’s request Holdings: 0: holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required 1: holding that a defendants faretta rights were violated by his exclusion from bench conferences covering important issues including the admission of evidence 2: holding that defendants right to be present does not extend to bench conferences on legal and scheduling issues in which defense counsel participated and to which defendant could not have made a meaningful contribution 3: holding unrecorded objection made at bench did not preserve error regarding admission of evidence 4: holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence is cured by the subsequent admission of the evidence


Input: WL 1468435, at *3 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 30, 2015) ("Upon default and the acceleration of the loan, the maturity date advances and any subsequent payment is no longer considered a voluntary prepayment. The lender forfeits the collection of a prepayment premium in such a scenario unless the parties' agreement contains a 'clear and unambiguous’ clause requiring payment of the prepayment premium upon default and accel- ' eration. This general rule created the problem that a borrower might actually intentionally default to acquire the right to prepay without penalty, so lenders began including provisions in loan documents to ensure the prepayment penalty would be enforceable after default.”) (citations omitted)). 26 . S. Side House, 451 B.R. at 269 (citations omitted). 27 . Id. at 270. 28 . Id. (<HOLDING>). 29 . United Merchants and Mfrs., Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that a preexisting or antecedent debt may constitute sufficient consideration to support a mortgage 1: holding mortgage lenders claim for a postdefault postacceleration prepayment premium pursuant to escape clause in mortgage documents that prohibited debtor from evading prepayment fee by tendering full amount of debt postforeclosure had to be disallowed because the debtor in proposing to pay mortgage debt over time in plan of reorganization was not tendering full amount of debt and was not attempting to prepay this accelerated debt 2: holding that a mortgagee could enforce mortgage covenants requiring the mortgagors to keep the property free of encumbrances even after it foreclosed by advertisement and purchased the property for the full amount of the mortgage debt because the mortgage covenants concerned title to the mortgaged property rather than repayment of the debt 3: holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt 4: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or


Input: at a hearing, examining trial, or trial, the court shall appoint a qualified interpreter to interpret the proceedings in any language that the deaf person can understand, including but not limited to sign language. Tex.Code CRIm.Proc.Ann. art. 38.31(a). Article 38.31 implements the constitutional right of confrontation, which includes the right to have trial proceedings presented in a way that the accused can understand. Salazar v. State, 93 S.W.3d 339, 340 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. dism’d untimely filed). Prior to September 1, 2003, Article 38.31 applied to a juvenile, but not to his parents or guardian unless the parents or guardian testified. See In the Matter of G.I., No. 05-95-01323-CV, 1997 WL 303754, * 3-4 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.)(not designated for publication)(<HOLDING>). In 2003, the Legislature amended Section Holdings: 0: holding that a  15 lien did not apply because that section does not require reimbursement for an injury not compensable under c 152 1: holding that letter stating an annual salary did not embody the terms of any agreement between the parties as it did not specify a beginning date duration of time and did not require acceptance signatures 2: holding that search warrant was constitutionally defective because it did not require notice 3: holding that article 3830 did not require appointment of interpreter for juveniles parents who did not speak english 4: holding that time was not compensable where the employer provided but did not require use of a shuttle


Input: opening brief could have been more precise, we believe he did adequately raise the certified issues there. He identified each of the certified issues as section headings and explicitly referenced precedents regarding the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing, as well as the district court’s ruling below noting that a denial of Faretta rights is subject to harmless error analysis. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 37-38. Therefore, it is appropriate to reach the merits of the certified issues. HALL, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I believe that Ramirez waived the issues certified for appeal, and so I dissent. A habeas petitioner who fails to address the issues certified for appeal waives those issues. Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In Holdings: 0: holding that in general we will not ordinarily consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and distinctly argued in appellants opening brief 1: holding that issues which are not specifically and distinctly argued and raised a partys opening brief are waived 2: holding issues that are not specifically raised and argued in a partys opening brief are waived 3: holding that issues not argued specifically and distinctly in a partys opening brief are waived internal quotation marks and citations omitted 4: holding that a court need not review arguments not specifically and distinctly raised in a partys opening brief


Input: on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, filed a complaint against Jeffrey G. Lerman and Jeffrey G. Lerman, P.C., (the “Defendants” or “Lerman”), alleging that, while acting in the capacity of debt collector, the Defendants sent him a debt collection letter (the “Letter”) that violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1962. Presently before the Court is a motion by the Defendants to dismiss the class action complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ.P.”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. I. BACKGROUND The following facts are derived from the complaint and the Letter which is attached to the complaint as exhibit A. See Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). On or about August 19, 2005, the Defendants Holdings: 0: holding that 1 the complaint is deemed to include any documents incorporated in it by reference and any document upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint and that the court may consider such documents on a motion to dismiss pursuant to fedrcivp 12b6 1: holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint 2: holding that for the purpose of deciding a motion to dismiss the complaint includes any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference 3: holding that a written statement could not be regarded as an affidavit sufficient in law for any purpose because it was not sworn to by any one or before any officer 4: holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint


Input: 892 F.2d at 159. In the instant ease, however, there was not an abundance of evidence on Steward’s intent to defraud the bank. Steward gave conflicting testimony on the issue, once admitting she pleaded guilty to having an intent to defraud, but twice informing the jury she did not intend to defraud the bank. Other than Steward’s conflicting testimony, the government’s limited harmlessness analysis does not reference any evidence of Steward’s intent to defraud, the very element it had to prove to establish Nickl’s guilt. The prosecution was not permitted to use Steward’s guilty plea for the purpose of establishing she had the intent to defraud NBA, because Steward’s intent to defraud was an element of Nickl’s crime. See United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1304 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, when the presiding judge remarked that Holdings: 0: holding coconspirators guilty plea is admissible as an aid to the jurys assessment of witness credibility but not as substantive evidence of a defendants guilt 1: holding that testimony regarding witness credibility is prohibited unless it is admissible as character evidence 2: holding that entering a guilty plea is an admission of guilt and a waiver of the right to jury trial 3: holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators 4: holding that police officers testimony as to the victims prior inconsistent statements made to him on day of the alleged crime were not admissible as substantive evidence and could not be used to support a finding of guilt


Input: present or, more plainly, ‘from the moment of the wrong.’ ” See Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 808 F.Supp. 1187, 1190 (D.N.J.1992) (quoting Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 274, 300 A.2d 563 (1973)). If equity dictates, however, New Jersey will apply the “discovery rule” which will delay the accrual of a cause of action until the injured party discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should discover, that the elements of a clai 5 (1953) (quoting Ash v. Cohn, 119 N.J.L. 54, 58, 194 A. 174 (E. & A. 1937)) (discussing the distinction between a malicious prosecution claim, which requires a favorable termination of the criminal proceedings, and abuse of process, which does not); Pisano v. City of Union City, 198 N.J.Super. 588, 593, 487 A.2d 1296 (Law Div.1984) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, because Michaels did not file Holdings: 0: holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated 1: holding that false arrest and false imprisonment claim were not duplicative 2: holding that a false arrest claim accrues at the latest when the criminal prosecution is dismissed 3: holding that unlike malicious prosecution claim false arrest claim accrues on the date of the arrest 4: holding that claims for false arrest and imprisonment under  1983 accrue at the time of the arrest


Input: concealment rule states that when facts essential to the cause of action are fraudulently concealed, the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff has discovered such facts or could have done so in the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Bricker v. Putnam, 128 N.H. 162, 165 (1986). Here, the rule is inapplicable because, as the trial court found, the plaintiff knew, or “in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the causal r 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (NewYork courts “do not generally regard the accountant-client relationship as a fiduciary one” (quotation omitted)), there is no support in our case law for the proposition that a limitations period is tolled in fiduciary cases until the fiduciary discloses his or her misconduct. See Furbush, 149 N.H. at 430-31 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, despite the defendants’ failure to Holdings: 0: holding that although the defendantattorney did not disclose to the plaintiff his failure to file a claim in a timely manner the limitations period on the legal malpractice claim began to run when the plaintiff could reasonably discern that he suffered some harm caused by the defendants conduct 1: holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run 2: holding that the statute of limitations for an attorney malpractice suit did not begin to run until the client had suffered some actual damage 3: holding that the statute of limitations for a miscalculation of benefits claim began to run at the time at which some event other than a denial of a claim should have alerted the claimant to his entitlement to the benefits he did not receive 4: holding that statute of limitations for malpractice begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged malpractice


Input: that the post-petition earnings of Mr. Markosian are property of the chapter 7 estate by operation of § 541(a)(7), we reject that argument. Section 541(a)(7) makes property of the estate any interest in properly that the estate (not the debtor) acquires after the case. Here, the bankruptcy court found that the bonus constituted earnings from personal services of Mr. Markosian under § 1115(a)(2) and that ruling was not appealed. Thus, the earnings fall within the earnings exception stated in § 541(a)(6). We note however that there may be chapter 11 cases which are converted to chapter 7 where it is necessary to separate earnings from personal services by an individual from the earnings of a business. See FitzSimmons v. Walsh (In re FitzSimmons), 725 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir.1984) Holdings: 0: holding noncompete payments were not exempt from the debt ors bankruptcy estate as earnings from postpetition services under  541a6 because the noncompete agreement was inextricably intertwined with the debtors sale of stock that was an includable bankruptcy asset that predated debtors bankruptcy petition 1: holding that where the debtor is the owner of a policy insuring his own life and listing his wife as the beneficiary upon his death the proceeds of the policy including the cash value thereof are exempt from the claims of the insureds creditors 2: holding that proceeds of a personal injury settlement are not exempt under missouri law 3: holding that where subchapter s corporations revenue was generated from professional accounting services of its sole shareholder or from personal services performed under him funds generated by the business which shareholder withdrew to pay personal expenses although not denominated wages for purposes of bookkeeping could be considered wages for purposes of calculating preinjury wage 4: holding that only the debtors earnings from his own personal services were exempt under 541a6 as opposed to all profits generated by his law practice


Input: in a way regarded as offensive.” Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985), overruled, in part, on other grounds, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987); accord Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir.2006). Economic harm may constitute persecution; however, “an applicant for asylum must demonstrate a severe economic disadvantage.” Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 173 (BIA 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[t]he economic difficulties must be above and beyond those generally shared by others in the country of origin and involve noticeably more than mere loss of social advantages or physical comforts.” Id.-, see also Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Yang’s assertion, the BIA did not Holdings: 0: holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable 1: holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property  damage claims 2: holding that an asylum applicant must show at least a deliberate imposition of a substantial economic disadvantage in order for the harm to constitute economic persecution 3: holding that an asylum applicant must make a showing of a particularized threat of persecution 4: holding that to constitute persecution harm must be more than harassment


Input: There must be some “clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case." Id. at 205. More specifically, a judgment is final for purposes of appeal when (1) a judgment expressly disposes of some, but not all defendants, (2) the only remaining defendants have not been served or answered, and (3) nothing in the record indicates that plaintiff ever expected to obtain service on the unserved defendants, such that the case “stands as if there had been a discontinuance” as to the unserved defendants. In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d 181,187 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex.1962)); see also M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674-75 (Tex.2004) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>)', In re Miranda, 142 S.W.3d 354, 357 Holdings: 0: recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision 1: holding that the decision in mcmillan survives apprendi 2: holding that an award of sanctions under rule 11 survives despite a later determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 3: holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision 4: holding that decision in penn survives lehmann


Input: a reasonable accommodation for the employee’s limitations is low: an employee need only “inform the employer of a need for an adjustment due to a medical condition using plain English and need not mention the ADA or use the phrase reasonable accommodation.” Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1112 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although an employee is not required to use any particular language, the employer’s duty is not triggered unless the employee or his or her representative “provides the employer with enough information that, under the circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know of both the disability and desire for an accommodation.” Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir.1999); see also Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, 127 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The employee’s request for an accommodation Holdings: 0: holding that temporary employee status for workers compensation purposes is determinable as a matter of law where the particular undisputed critical facts compel that conclusion and present no triable issue of fact 1: holding that no issue of material fact existed as to the reasonableness of an employers response where the offending employee was promptly suspended and fired 2: holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation 3: holding failure to immediately approve request for accommodation even for employee with known disability did not constitute denial of reasonable accommodation where employer was working on solution over several months 4: holding no triable issue of fact existed where employee had not asked for accommodation