Input: it were armed and dangerous, the use of a shotgun to penetrate the iron gate or security door that was protecting the front entrance of the residence was not unreasonable. We further conclude that the Nevada “knock and announce” statute, NRS 179.055, was not violated. Several of the officers at the scene testified that they announced their presence by yelling something to the effect of “Police officer. Search warrant,” prior to penetrating the premises. Immediately thereafter, shots were fired from the interior of the residence. We therefore hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the officers substantially complied with NRS 179.055 and properly entered the apartment under exigent circumstances to execute the warrant. See United States v. Fox, 790 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Nev. 1992) (<HOLDING>). 6. King contends that the State failed to Holdings: 0: holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient 1: holding fourth amendment not violated by failure to announce where compliance would have increased officers peril 2: holding that a sentence not in compliance with the mandatory provisions of a sentencing statute was illegal and appealable 3: holding that compliance with an officers orders is a material fact when deciding whether the officers use of force was reasonable 4: holding that noncompliance with nrs 179055 was justified where compliance with statute would have placed officers in great physical peril


Input: if § 1141 were to take precedence over § 553, then set off would only be allowed if written into the plan and § 553 would be rendered meaningless. Id. at 1277. If the court denied set off, the creditor would be required to fully pay its debt to the debtor while only receiving a fraction of the money it is owed. Id. Since the De Laurentiis decision, a majority of courts considering the issue have extended its reasoning to the chapter 13 context and have held that a creditor’s right to set off is not extinguished by confirmation of the plan under § 1327. See In re Whitaker, 173 B.R. 359, 362-63 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1994); In re Womack, 188 B.R. 259, 261-62 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1995); In re Orlinski, 140 B.R. 600, 603-4 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1991). See also, In re Wiegand, 199 B.R. 639, 641 (W.D.Mich.1996)(<HOLDING>). As in the De Laurentiis case, set off rights Holdings: 0: holding a party who survives summary judgment should not be subject to sanctions for asserting frivolous claims 1: recognizing that a critical safeguard set forth in miranda is a persons right to cut off questioning 2: holding that the creditors right to equitable relief constituted a dischargeable claim 3: holding that a creditors right to set off survives a final discharge ofdebt 4: holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor


Input: of an abuse of process claim, but does not state that 134 . For the purpose of an abuse of criminal process claim, an arrest may be considered as "regularly issued process.” See Widget, 2013 WL 1104273, at *8 (citing Cook, 41 F.3d at 80; TADCO Constr. Corp. v. Dormitory Auth. of N.Y., 700 F.Supp.2d 253, 272 (E.D.N.Y.2010)). I also note that the fact that Pinter’s arrest may not have been based on probable cause, and thus could be considered “irregular” criminal process, is not fatal to Pinter’s claim. Cook illustrates that irregular process — in that case, an arraignment known to be based on an arrest lacking probable cause — can constitute abuse of criminal process. See Cook, 41 F.3d at 80. 135 . See Ketchuck v. Boyer, No. 10 Civ. 870, 2011 WL 5080404, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011) (<HOLDING>). 136 . See Def. Mem. at 16, n. 3. 137 . N.Y. Holdings: 0: recognizing that an arrest based on probable cause cannot be the basis of a claim for false arrestimprisonment 1: holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest 2: holding that arguable probable cause provides an objectively reasonable justification for issuing process and thus gives rise to qualified immunity against an abuse of process claim no less than against a false arrest claim 3: holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest 4: holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity


Input: is void. See Zanger, 548 So.2d at 748. The information in this case did not contain the exact judicial circuits involved but stated that the crimes occurred in two or more judicial circuits and were part of a related conspiracy. In Nuckolls the court considered a similar argument that the information failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the court because it did not properly allege facts to show the jurisdiction of the OSP to file the charges. The court rejected the challenge, finding that the information contained the general statutory language which was sufficient to fulfill the jurisdictional requirements. That language is identical to the language in the information in this case. See Nuckolls, 677 So.2d at 15; see also Winter v. State, 781 So.2d at 1116-17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). Although in 2009 the Legislature amended Holdings: 0: holding that allegation of cipa violation is sufficient to confer standing 1: holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language 2: holding that similar language provided a sufficient general jurisdiction allegation 3: holding similar language to be a valid disclaimer 4: holding that the language was intended as guidance for the attorney general


Input: viewpoint or race. It is important to examine the proffered justifications for a college’s selective denial of recognition to an organization. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. at 184-85, 92 S.Ct. at 2347-48. Mere disagreement with the group’s philosophy is not an adequate ground for denial of First Amendment rights because a state college cannot “restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent.” Id. at 187-88, 92 S.Ct. at 2349. “ ‘[T]he freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.’ ” Id. at 188, 92 S.Ct. at 2349 (quoting Communist Party of the United Stat 737 F.2d 1317, 1333 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1001, 105 S.Ct. 1860, Holdings: 0: holding that where university has opened its forum to other similar student groups its denial of recognition to homosexual student group was the sort of viewpoint based discrimination forbidden by perry and was invalid under the first amendment unless the university could support this discrimination by providing a compelling reason for its actions 1: holding that a university creates a public forum when it makes its facilities generally available to registered student groups 2: holding that communications between the university of colorados counsel and former employees of the university concerning activities during their period of employment may be protected by the attorneyclient privilege under the rationale presented in upjohn but holding that the university waived the privilege by disclosing the documents 3: holding that public school violated homosexual students first amendment right to speech and expression when it banned him from bringing a samesex date to the prom notwithstanding that the student and another homosexual student had previously been assaulted by other students and that the school was forced to provide additional security and escorts 4: holding that university violated first amendment by expelling student for printing indecent newspaper despite student code prohibiting indecent conduct or speech


Input: expert witness, testified that the existence of an annual renewable employment agreement between the Foundation and D’Unger was consistent with generally accepted accounting practices and corporate governance standards regarding how corporate officers are employed and compensated. The Foundation’s by-laws provide that “[ejection or appointment of an officer or agent shall not of itself create contract rights.” In light of that evidence, D’Un-ger’s testimony about his understanding of the one-year, renewable term of his employment with the Foundation, standing alone, will not support a finding that the Foundation agreed to an employment contract that limited its right to terminate D’Unger. See Williams v. First Tenn. Nat’l Corp., 97 S.W.3d 798, 804 (Tex.App.Dallas 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). D’Unger was required to present probative Holdings: 0: holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law 1: holding where employee handbook and employment offer letter disclaimed creation of employment contract that employees testimony of his understanding of terms of agreement did not raise fact issue of specific express and clear agreement contradicting the express provisions of the personnel manual and the employment offer letter 2: holding offer of continued atwill employment did not constitute consideration for the arbitration agreement 3: holding that under arkansas law employment is atwill unless personnel manual or employment agreement contains express provision that employee shall not be discharged except for cause 4: holding that whether a personnel policy manual modifies an employment contract is a question of fact


Input: the violation as well as restore and compensate the employee. Id. Again, because these remedies adequately promoted the relevant public policy, the Cudney court was unwilling to recognize a common law tort remedy. See 172 Wn.2d at 536, 538. ¶15 In Cudney, our Supreme Court additionally held law enforcement action available under Washington statutes criminalizing drunk driving adequately protected the public from drunk driving. Id. at 536-38. There, the employee reported to his private employer that his supervisor drove a company vehicle while intoxicated. Id. at 527-28. But the employee did not inform l court issued another opinion applying Korslund and Cudney, and our Supreme Court denied review of that case despite Piel. See Weiss v. Lonnquist, 173 Wn. App. 344, 353-60, 293 P.3d 1264 (<HOLDING>), review denied, 178 Wn.2d 1025 (2013). ¶18 Our Holdings: 0: holding that a breach of the rules of professional conduct would not justify setting aside a divorce judgment and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 1: holding that the rules of professional conduct are selfimposed internal regulations and do not play a role in determining the admissi bility of evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 2: holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 3: holding that where the conviction was final the disciplinary commission was not authorized to assume the roles of both an accusatory tribunal and the ultimate determiner of guilt and that the separation of responsibility between the disciplinary board and the disciplinary commission provides constitutional due process 4: holding the misconduct reporting and disciplinary process prescribed by the washington rules of professional conduct rpc 33 and 83 adequately promoted attorney candor toward the tribunal


Input: DiGiacinto also reviewed Molina’s 1999 MRI and concluded that her bulging discs were not caused by the accident but were instead degenerative. Her examining physician, Jacobson, testified that Molina should have been able to perform her normal daily functions within a week following the accident. Sosina, the most recent doctor to examine Molina, also concluded that there was no objective evidence of a relevant limitation. Molina has failed to sufficiently counter this evidence. The evidence of Molina’s bulging discs is inadmissible because it is based solely upon an unsworn report from a doctor who has not submitted a sworn affidavit or otherwise participated in this litigation. See, e.g., Friedman v. U-Haul Truck Rental, 216 A.D.2d 266, 627 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (App. Div.2d Dep’t 1995) (<HOLDING>). In any event, even assuming the admissibility Holdings: 0: holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another 1: holding purposely inflicts  serious injury and intended to cause serious injury convey the same specific intent such that it is impossible to commit one without the other 2: holding that it was a double jeopardy violation to convict and sentence for both dui with serious bodily injury and driving without a valid license with serious bodily injury based on an injury to a single victim 3: holding unsworn declaration as opposed to an affidavit sworn to before a notary public admissible to prove serious injury under 28 usc  1746 4: holding unsworn mri report inadmissible to establish serious injury


Input: interlocutory orders prior to the entry of judgment ....”) (emphasis added). 15 . Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l)(A)(ii). 16 . Id.-, see also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2363 (3d ed. 2015). 17 . First Nat’l Bank of Toms River, N.J. v. Marine City, Inc., 411 F.2d 674, 677 (3d Cir. 1969). 18 . E.g., Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2012); De Leon v. Marcos, 659 F.3d 1276, 1283 (10th Cir. 2011); SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010); Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2007); Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984). 19 . Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989). 20 . Small ay Int’l. Co., 600 F.3d 878, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). See also 15A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Holdings: 0: holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well 1: holding that the parties stipulation of dismissal with prejudice was a final judgment 2: holding that the circuit courts order concluding that it was without jurisdiction to entertain a complaint because the case had been dismissed without prejudice constituted a final order because all other claims either had been refiled or dismissed with prejudice 3: holding that because the claims were dismissed with prejudice there was a final judgment for purposes of appellate review 4: holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed


Input: King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). By contrast, "[g]eneral jurisdiction arises when a defendant maintains 'continuous and systematic’ contacts with the forum state” and permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant “even when the cause of action has no relation to those contacts.” Id. (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). Only specific jurisdiction over OMsignal is alleged to exist in this case, and on the record before the Court, it is apparent that OMsignal’s contacts with Georgia would not permit this Court to exercise general jurisdiction over OMsignal. 5 . See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Holdings: 0: recognizing a split of authority 1: recognizing that takings cases are based on the proper exercise of statutory and regulatory authority 2: holding that the affiants statement  based upon his belief  did not demonstrate the personal knowledge required by fedrcivp 56e 3: holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted 4: recognizing zippo as a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an internet web site


Input: 999 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.); Clemons v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 879 S.W.2d 385, 391 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). When the language of the insurance .policy is unambiguous, it is the court’s duty to give the words used their plain meaning. Clemons, 879 S.W.2d at 391. Here, the policy unambiguously required the insured, Perrotta, to submit to an EUO and sign and swear to it. Perrotta relies on Century Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 135 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.Civ.App.— Austin 1939, no writ) for the proposition that his failure to sign and return the EUO was not a material breach of the policy. Hogan, however, is distinguishable. In that case, the insured provided a reason for not signing the EUO: the notary was unab 736 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1996, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Pogo Holding Corp. v. New York Property Ins. Holdings: 0: holding insureds failure to comply with notice provision in insurance policy resulted in no coverage for a newly acquired car 1: holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed 2: holding that a policy with an excess other insurance clause provides no coverage until a policy with a pro rata other insurance clause is exhausted 3: holding insureds failure to comply with terms of policy requiring him to sign and return an euo was a material breach 4: holding that liability insurance policy that expressly excluded coverage for the insureds intentional acts did not cover punitive damages award assessed against the insured and stating in dictum that public policy forbids insurance coverage for punitive damages


Input: not illegal. She ignores that the Administrative Judge disbelieved her explanation that Asenlix, taken pursuant to a valid prescription, caused her positive drug test. In light of that credibility assessment it is irrelevant whether “illegal drugs” includes drugs prescribed outside of this country. Fuentes’ arguments are relevant only to issues the Administrative Judge never reached. Fuentes offers this court no logical or con vincing reason to reverse the Board’s decision on liability. II. Whether or not a penalty was reasonable we must leave to the sound discretion of the agency unless the Board’s affirmance of the penalty is not supported by substantial evidence or the penalty amounts to an abuse of discretion. See Gonzales v. Def. Logistics Agency, 772 F.2d 887, 889 (Fed.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the Board that the authorized Holdings: 0: holding that it is not 1: holding the court will not disturb the decision of the abcmr unless it was arbitrary capricious contrary to law or unsupported by substantial evidence 2: holding that the trial court has broad discretion in granting denying dissolving or modifying injunctions and unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated appellate courts will not disturb the trial courts decision 3: holding that when plaintiffs argue an inconsistent jury verdict this court will not disturb the trial courts denial of a motion for a new trial absent a showing of abuse of discretion 4: holding that the court will not disturb a penalty unless it exceeds the range of permissible punishment or is so harsh and unconscionably disproportionate to the offense that it amounts to an abuse of discretion  citation omitted


Input: damages, costs and attorney’s fees become available remedies for non-payment of claims against any insurer that does business in Florida and also against any affiliated insurer. 3 . I reject the Commissioner’s assertion that plaintiffs cannot raise their federal constituJ tional claims in federal court. This is an action seeking injunctive relief against the Commissioner in his official capacity. The longstanding doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), squ act is a citizen of the state at issue at the time when the contract is entered, the state does not, for that reason alone, obtain jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising under the contract. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Francosteel Corp. v. M/V Charm, 19 F.3d 624, Holdings: 0: recognizing that even entry into contract with citizen of state does not necessarily subject party to jurisdiction in state 1: holding that a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen 2: holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract 3: recognizing that a citizen can sue the state in state court to attempt to obtain a discharge of a student loan and allowing the debtor to refile in state court 4: holding that state senator who was attorney for party to contract with state was in violation of  109


Input: U.S.C. § 1252(a), Congress provided for judicial review of final orders of removal issued by the BIA. Moreover, Section 1252(b)(1) states that “[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under [§ 1252(a)(1) ], ... [t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act, a non-criminal alien could seek judicial review of the BIA’s decision through either (i) a petition for review, which was required to be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s issuance of its final order of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), or (ii) a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, for which there was no time limit. See Luya Liu v. INS, 293 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). On May 11, 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Holdings: 0: holding that noncriminal aliens could seek review of the agencys orders through either a petition for review or a  2241 petition 1: holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review 2: holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law 3: holding that if defendant could establish ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to file petition for review in his direct appeal then appropriate remedy would be to allow filing of petition for review out of time 4: holding that review under  2241 still available notwithstanding express language in iirira barring review by any court of final orders of removal for aliens deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense and distinguishing between direct and collateral review


Input: advanced by Justice CORRIGAN— limiting MCR 3.501(F) tolling to identical claims that were asserted or may have been asserted in an initial complaint — would frustrate the very purpose of MCR 3.501. Further, we perceive no sound reason for the limitation that Justice CORRIGAN would place on MCR 3.501(F). For example, just as the filing of a class action that does not meet the requirements for class certification generally tolls the period of limitations with respect to all persons within the class described in the complaint, American Pipe, supra, the filing of a class action by a person who does not meet the requirements to serve as the class representative also tolls the period of limitations. See, e.g., Birmingham Steel Corp v Tennessee Valley Auth, 353 F3d 1331, 1333 (CA 11, 2003) (<HOLDING>); Lynch v Baxley, 651 F2d 387 (CA 5, 1981) Holdings: 0: holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory 1: holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint 2: holding that where named plaintiff was employee of class counsel district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification 3: holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity 4: holding that the district court abused its discretion by decertifying the class without permitting class counsel reasonable time to determine whether a new class representative could be substituted


Input: 1301-02 (1978)); see also Maniscaclo v. Kenworthy, No. 03-P-626, 815 N.E.2d 656 (table), 2004 WL 2185422, at *3 (Mass.App.Ct. Sept.28, 2004) (per curiam) (“Where, as here, [the] affidavit is uncontradicted other than by the deputy’s return, the affidavit controls.”). Similarly, federal courts have held that an affidavit denying agency, standing alone, may be sufficient to overcome the presumption of proper service created by the return of service. See Hornick v. S. & M. Trucking Co., 208 F.Supp. 950, 952 (M.D.Pa.1962); Metropolitan Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 16 F.R.D. 391, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y.1954); Puett Elec. Starting Gate Corp. v. Thistle Down Co., 2 F.R.D. 550, 551 (N.D.Ohio 1942); see also Ellibee v. Leonard, 226 Fed.Appx. 351, 356 (5th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 452 F.2d 510, Holdings: 0: holding that a 16 month relationship was not of sufficient length 1: holding that agreements established agency relationship 2: holding averments of defendants sufficient to refute agency relationship 3: holding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish an agency relationship for service to be effective 4: recognizing that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact


Input: argues that the trial court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim because under these facts the search could not be justified as a search incident to arrest where the police had a preplanned intention to arrest him and search the car for investigation of other crimes. He also contends that the search was illegal because the items removed from the car (videotapes, computer disks, and a briefcase) were taken to a remote site (the police department) and “searched” at a later time. Pugh is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction claims unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that he is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient nt v. State, 765 So.2d 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). It is not clear from this record why Pugh’s Holdings: 0: holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle 1: holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not 2: recognizing that a search incident to a lawful arrest permits a law enforcement officer to conduct a warrantless search of a container located in the area of the arrestees immediate control 3: holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle 4: holding that search of golf bag was not legal as search incident to arrest because it was not in passenger compartment of vehicle or otherwise within arrestees immediate control


Input: different phone calls between Alvarez and Grabe— without specifying the date or the content of those calls—is not enough to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s requirement to “specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent ... state where and when the statements were made, and ... explain why the statements were fraudulent.” Anatian, 193 F.3d at 88; see also Colony at Holbrook, 928 F.Supp. at 1231; McGee, 2009 WL 2132439,. at *5. Also, the calls were between Alvarez and Grabe, not Alvarez and the Town. Indeed, the Complaint does not allege that Alvarez made any fraudulent communication with the Town that could provide a basis for fraud liability. As for Carillo, Pacheco, and Casasola, the Town allege Ltd., No. 12 CIV. 8248 LLS, 2013 WL 5882928, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2013) (<HOLDING>). In any event, the Complaint fails to plead Holdings: 0: holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes 1: holding that  charges should be given more precise content by taxes and fees  2: holding that a plaintiff must plead with specificity as to the statements or omissions considered to be fraudulent the speaker when and why the statements were made and an explanation of why they were fraudulent 3: holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable 4: holding that plaintiff explained why statements were fraudulent where the complaint alleged that defendants statements requested port fees and customs taxes  but no such fees or taxes were due


Input: 342 N.C. 813, 823, 467 S.E.2d 428, 433-34 (1996) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723 (alteration in original)). However, “[although custodial interrogation must cease when a suspect unequivocally invokes his right to silence, an ambiguous invocation does not require police to cease interrogation immediately.” State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 438, 629 S.E.2d 137, 145, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1021, 166 L. Ed. 2d 413 (2006). Defendant’s statement that he “was not going to snitch” when asked the correct name of an accomplice is not a clear invocation of his right to silence. At most, his response was ambiguous and did not require officers to cease their questioning or seek clarification. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371-72 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Finally, defendant contends that he was Holdings: 0: holding that interrogation must cease if the suspect unambiguously asserts his right to counsel 1: holding that after a suspect unambiguously requests counsel the suspects responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request 2: holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel 3: holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously 4: holding suspect must unambiguously request counsel before applying rule established in edwards that police questioning must cease once suspect requests counsel during interview


Input: an injunction ordering issuance of a permit is a proper remedy for a violation of the sitting provisions of the facilities sitting subsection of the TCA); New York SMSA, L.P. v. Town of Clarkstown, 99 F.Supp.2d 381, 389-90 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (recognizing an injunction is the proper remedy for a violation of the sitting provisions of the facilities sitting subsection of the TCA, but declining to grant an injunction on the facts of the case); Group EMF, Inc. v. Coweta County, 50 F.Supp.2d. 1338, 1350-51 (N.D.Ga.1999) (granting mandamus relief to plaintiff by ordering board of commissioners to grant a permit and concluding remand would frustrate intent of TCA to provide relief on an expedited basis); 360 Communications Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 50 F.Supp.2d 551, 564 (W.D.Va.1999) (<HOLDING>); Iowa Wireless Servs., L.P. v. City of Moline, Holdings: 0: holding enforcement of the tcas substantive provisions through  1983 would distort the scheme of expedited judicial review and limited remedies created by the tcas remedial provisions after identifying the express private remedy in the tca  332c7 the court concluded that congress did not intend this remedy to coexist with an alternative remedy available in a  1983 action 1: holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy 2: holding injunctive relief ordering issuance of a permit is the remedy that best serves the tcas goal of expediting resolution of actions and granting such an injunction 3: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction 4: recognizing a permanent injunction as a means of ordering specific performance


Input: appeal waiver. 14 F.Supp.2d 816, 819 (E.D.Va.1998). The court concluded that the defendant could still file a petition under § 2255 if his claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel or challenged the voluntariness of the guilty plea. Id. In sum, a § 2255 waiver should not bar ineffective assistance of counsel claims or claims that a guilty plea was involuntary, just as direct appeal waivers do not bar those claims. General enforcement of § 2255 waivers, subject to the same exceptions as direct appeal waivers, aligns with precedent from other district courts in this Circuit that have indicated a defendant’s waiver of the right to file a § 2255 motion is as valid as a waiver of the right to a direct appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 113 F.Supp.2d 879, 898 (E.D.Va.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Tayman, 885 F.Supp. 832, 834 Holdings: 0: holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver 1: holding the court of appeals had subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding a defendants waiver of appellate rights in a plea agreement 2: holding that the united states breach of the plea agreement releases the defendant from the appeal waiver 3: holding that a plea agreement with a waiver of direct appeal rights does not include a waiver of collateral remedies because the government could have included a waiver of collateral rights in the plea agreement and chose not to do so 4: holding that a waiver of right to appeal contained in a plea agreement is enforceable


Input: arrest matched an exemplar print of Haward’s left index finger. Haward cross-examined Officer Knapp but did not offer a fingerprint expert of his own. The jury ultimately found Haward guilty of one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. In this court Haward first argues that the district court did not properly conduct its Daubert hearing to determine the admissibility of fingerprint evidence under Rule 702, a determination that we review de novo. See United States v. Cruz-Velasco, 224 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir.2000). Specifically, he contends that fingerprint evidence is inadmissible under Daubert because it is not “scientifically” based. The standards of Daubert, however, are not limited in application to “scientific” testimony alone. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the idea that fingerprint Holdings: 0: holding that the district court properly admitted expert testimony under daubert that was based on inter alia the doctors clinical experience and review of the medical records 1: holding that daubert applies not only to testimony based on scientific knowledge but also to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge 2: holding that the general principles of rule 702 recognized by the daubert decision are applicable to other species of expert testimony 3: holding that daubert does not create a new framework for analyzing proffered expert testimony based upon technical or other specialized knowledge  4: holding that the basic gatekeeping obligation of daubert applies to all expert testimony


Input: alleged forced sterilization. In re J-S- 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 523 (A.G. 2008). Instead, in order to establish eligibility for relief on family planning grounds, a partner must demonstrate past persecution based on his own “other resistance” to a coercive population control program or a well founded fear that he will be subject to persecution for such “resistance.” Id. Even assuming that Chen-Xu established that he engaged in other resistance, he failed to challenge on appeal to the BIA the IJ’s finding that he did not demonstrate past persecution. Thus, we decline to review as unexhausted Chen Xu’s argument in his brief to this Court that his two day detention and 12,000 RMB fíne amounted to persecution. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 121-22, 124 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In any event, the agency reasonably found Holdings: 0: holding that issue exhaustion is mandatory even if not a statutory jurisdictional requirement 1: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 2: holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 3: holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional 4: recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional


Input: stating its reasons for imposing the sentence it did, the district court did not state it was doing so for the purpose of making White eligible for any BOP treatment program. Furthermore, according to the government, Tapia made clear a sentencing “court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.” 131 S.Ct. at 2392. Finally, the government argues this court should discount the district court’s inclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(D) in the list of factors it considered in deciding to vary upward from the advisory range because that reference came as part of a “formulaic recitation of the statutorily enumerated sentencing factors.” See United States v. Collins, 461 Fed-Appx. 807, 810 (10th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). The government’s arguments as to the absence Holdings: 0: holding a sentencing court is not obligated to expressly weigh on the record each of the factors set out in  3553a 1: holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances 2: holding in similar circumstances that a formulaic recitation of the sentencing factor set out in  3553a2d supplies little indication that a court lengthened a sentence for rehabilitative purposes 3: holding that no discovery is permissible in similar circumstances 4: holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor


Input: Some of the prerequisites for review by extraordinary writ are arguably met here. The district court’s order brings about a serious intrusion into Vidrine’s privacy and his mental and emotional health, and the question presented is a novel issue of importance affecting privacy interests and the contours of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In addition, the district court’s use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 was likely a “clear abuse of discretion.” E.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 109-12, 85 S.Ct. 234. Vidrine did not put his mental or physical health “in controversy” as a disputed merits issue, Fed.R.CivP. 35(a)(1); rather, his mental health is only relevant to whether he may be made to sit for a deposition, cf, e.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 118-19, 121, 85 S.Ct. 234 (<HOLDING>); Acosta v. Tenneco Oil Co., 913 F.2d 205, 209 Holdings: 0: holding that rule 35 does not permit sweeping examinations of a party who has not affirmatively put into issue his own mental or physical condition by asserting his mental or physical condition either in support of or in defense of a claim and that mere relevance to the case is insufficient 1: holding that a medical impairment is deemed  severe  when alone or in combination with other medically determinable physical or mental impairments it significantly limits an individuals physical or mental ability to do basic work activities 2: holding that emotional distress requires a showing of either physical symptoms or mental illness 3: holding that evidence of an impaired mental condition that does not rise to floridas definition of insanity is not admissible 4: holding testimony about plaintiffs mental and physical state before treatment by physician was relevant


Input: (15) and OCGA § 16-6-8 (d) at their plain meaning, avoiding an interpretation that would result in surplusage, and applying the last-enacted rule, we conclude that “public place” includes “jails and penal and correctional institutions of the state and its political subdivisions” only in the context of the public-indecency statute. Therefore, as a matter of law, Singletary cannot be/could not have been convicted of affray for engaging in a fight in th attery charge. 4 See OCGA § 16-11-32 (a); see also In the Interest of X. W., 301 Ga. App. 625, 630 (4) (688 SE2d 646) (2009) (though challenged on other grounds, upholding adjudication of delinquency based on affray that occurred inside public-school restroom). See generally Watson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 562, 564 (1) (583 SE2d 228) (2003) (<HOLDING>). 5 See generally OCGA § 16-1-3 (containing Holdings: 0: holding that pjarticipants in the affray must intend to fight unwilling participants or those acting solely in selfdefense lack the necessary intent footnote omitted 1: holding the defendant sufficiently raised a selfdefense justification in a murder prosecution while thoroughly evaluating selfdefense burden of proof jurisprudence but declining to address applicable burden of proof for raising selfdefense in the virgin islands 2: holding that defendant properly raised selfdefense but passing on the applicable burden of proof for establishing selfdefense in a voluntary manslaughter prosecution in the virgin islands 3: holding that preservation of error in the trial court is not necessary as to lack of standing 4: holding that iiriras permanent rules lack the clear statement of the congressional intent necessary to eliminate habeas review


Input: damages which are fairly attributable to defendants’ conduct, etc., speak to the practical considerations of why such a claim should not be allowed. Simply put, plaintiff cannot show that defendants’ alleged conduct was the proximate cause of its injuries. Id. at 944-945. The same conclusion has been reached in every other cigarette case alleging breach of a special duty of which this Court is aware. See, e.g. Wright v. Brooke Group, 652 N.W.2d 159, 178 (Iowa 2002) (“We do not think the defendants’ statements that they would report on the results of them research into the health effects of cigarette smoking was an undertaking to render a service to its customers.”); Ky. Laborers Disk Council Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Hill & Knowlton, Inc., 24 F.Supp.2d 755, 774 (W.D.Ky. 1998) (<HOLDING>); Mass. Laborers’ Health & Welfare Fund v. Holdings: 0: holding that any member of the general public can initiate an action to raise issues involving the public trust in air water or other natural resources of the state 1: holding that the crucial distinction that rendered the public entity liable for a private actors inaccessibility was that the public entity had contracted with the private actor for it to provide aid benefits or services to beneficiaries of the public entitys redevelopment program 2: holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver 3: recognizing an individuals right of privacy in the content of health records and noting that health records are the property of the health care entity maintaining them 4: holding that cigarette manufacturers pledges of resources to assist the scientific and public health communities with tobacco research did not undertake to do anything specific for any particular person or entity


Input: such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization’s constitution and bylaws.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1). “The law does not require that a collective bargaining agreement be submitted to a local d 654, 666 (7th Cir.1992) (same); Ackley v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463, 1476 (9th Cir.1992) (same); Cumis-key v. Seafarers Int’l Union and Curtis Bay Towing Co., 1988 WL 54041, at *1-2, 1988 Dist. LEXIS 4720, at *4 (E.D.Pa. May 25,1988) (same). Cf. Bunz v. Moving Picture Machine Operators’ Protective Union Local 221, 567 F.2d 1117, 1121 (D.C.Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Here, there is no express requirement in the Holdings: 0: holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity 1: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 2: recognizing violations of section 101a1 where union officials circulated inadequate or misleading information about matters to be voted upon 3: holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union 4: holding no right under section 101a1 to vote on matters relating to collective bargaining agreements


Input: uncertain guide to the meaning of “official of the United States.” In fact we need not look to the legislative history to determine the meaning of the term. The provision of the FCA that immediately precedes § 3731 makes it the duty of the Attorney General to diligently investigate violations of the statute and identifies only private relators and the Attorney General — not other government agencies — as parties who may sue under the statute. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) & (b)(1). For this reason, we agree with those courts that have concluded that the term “official of the United States charged with responsibility to act,” as used in § 3731(b)(2), means pertinent Department of Justice officials. Accord, United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 791 F.Supp. 354, 363 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Macomb Contracting Corp., Holdings: 0: holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under  1346 1: holding that the official charged with responsibility to act must be an official within the doj with the authority to act in the circumstances 2: holding without discussion that the official of the united states charged with responsibility could only have been the appropriate official of the civil division of the department of justice which alone has the authority to initiate litigation under the act 3: holding that bribing a public official does not amount to a conspiracy with that official to extort the briber under the hobbs act 4: holding that the color of law element may be satisfied by the fact that an official gains access to the victim in the course of official duty


Input: & Guaranty Co., 996 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo.1999). To determine the ordinary meaning of a term in an insurance contract, the Missouri Supreme Court “consults standard English language dictionaries.” Id. If there is no ambiguity, the court need not resort to construction of the contract, but rather the intent of the parties is determined from the four corners of the contract. Id. “To ascertain the intent of the parties to an unambiguous contract, we give the language used its natural, ordinary, and common sense meaning, and consider the entire contract, along with its object, nature and purpose.” Robbins, 27 S.W.3d at 496. The absence of a definition of “managerial” in the contract does not, by itself, create ambiguity. See Burns v. Plaza West Associates, 979 S.W.2d 540 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). The ordinary, common sense meaning of acts Holdings: 0: holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts 1: holding that the definition of supplier under the ocspa is substantially broader than the definition of debt collector under the fdcpa 2: holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract 3: holding that in the absence of a statutory definition a term should be accorded its ordinary meaning 4: holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling


Input: we would not consider it binding, or even persuasive, in determining whether to grant a writ for habeas corpus. “Section 2254(d) requires us to give state courts’ opinions a respect ful reading, and to listen carefully to their conclusions, but when the state court addresses a legal question, it is the law ‘as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ that prevails.’ ” Williams, 529 U.S. at 387, 120 S.Ct. at 1510. We find that the analysis set forth by Johnson is much more compelling. Because the 1997 Amendments do not impose a mandatory minimum sentence, see infra, petitioner’s reliance on Smith is misplaced. Likewise, Meeks does not apply to this case, because it dealt with sentencing statutes and not parole guidelines. See generally Newland, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32 (<HOLDING>). We agree that it is reasonable to interpret Holdings: 0: holding that an amendment passed two years into a 10year automatic extension period was not effective until the 10year extension period expired and stating that to hold otherwise would render the extension provision meaningless 1: holding that extension of a federal grand jurys term was within the discretionary powers of the district court 2: holding that the extension of meeks by the smith court was inappropriate 3: holding that an amendment of restrictive covenants passed during the running of an automatic 10year extension period was not effective until the end of the 10year extension period 4: holding that a district court may not construe an untimely notice of appeal as a motion for extension of time


Input: 397 (1994). Accord Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1496, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 924, 110 S.Ct. 2617, 110 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); and Hodge v. Prince, 730 F.Supp. 747, 751 (N.D.Tex.1990), affirmed 923 F.2d 853 (5th Cir.1991). 132 . Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d at 820. 133 . Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir.1993), quoting Chrissy F. v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, r.1973). 139 . See Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d at 762. 140 . See Tighe v. Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 43 (5th Cir.1996). 141 . Degrate v. Godwin, 84 F.3d at 769. 142 . See Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d at 1329; and Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 622 (5th Cir.1985). 143 . See Eason v. Thalet 14 F.3d 8, 9-10 (5th Cir.1994), (<HOLDING>); Pembroke v. Wood County, Texas, 981 F.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that although prison inmates have a first amendment right to access to the courts prison officials may regulate law library access including reasonable time place and manner of access taking into account the administrative needs of the institution 1: holding that prison conditions are those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population 2: holding that the total denial of all access to the law library for seven months violated the plaintiffs constitutional right of access to the courts 3: holding that allegations of a total denial of all access to the prison law library for 25 days following a prison riot stated a constitutional violation 4: holding that during a postriot lockdown refusal of access to main law library is constitutional as long as access to basic law library for initial legal research is permitted


Input: court have jurisdiction to review a claim by employees that their union violated the NLRA by charging agency fees for nonrepresentational purposes, which also is arguably an unfair labor practice. Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 742-43, 108 S.Ct. 2641, 101 L.Ed.2d 634 (1988); see also Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 74, 110 S.Ct. 424, 107 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989); Storey v. Local 327, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 759 F.2d 517, 520 (6th Cir.1985) (when Garmon applies, “neither state nor federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction”); id. at 522 (“Though state interference ... was involved in Garmon, the Supreme Court made it clear that pre-emption applies to federal district c me); Hardeman, 401 U.S. at 237-39, 91 S.Ct. 609 (<HOLDING>); Serrano v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 790 Holdings: 0: holding that congress referred claims under the labormanagement reporting and disclosures act not to the nlrb but to the federal courts even when the conduct at issue is also an arguably unfair labor practice 1: holding that the nlrb general counsels decision to issue an unfair labor practice complaint is unreviewable because inter alia review would invade the realm of prosecutorial discretion 2: holding that gannon preemption does not constitute complete preemption for removal purposes because  7 and 8 of the nlra do not create jurisdiction in the federal district courts instead those provisions vest jurisdiction in the nlrb to determine unfair labor practices and state courts are as able to determine if jurisdiction belongs in the nlrb as are the federal district courts 3: holding that federal district courts have jurisdiction over violations of collective bargaining contracts even if such violations are also unfair labor practices subject to nlrb jurisdiction 4: holding that a federal district court may decide whether an activity is an unfair labor practice under the nlra when the matter is raised as a defense to a claim under an independent federal remedy over which the federal district courts do have jurisdiction


Input: evidence for a reasonable [factfinder] to find that the employer’s asserted non-[retaliatory] reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally [retaliated] against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?” Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. In other words, did the plaintiff “show both that the reason was false, and that ... [retaliation] was the real reason.” Weber, 494 F.3d at 186 (alterations in original and internal quotations omitted) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742). The court must consider whether the fact-finder could “infer [retaliation] from the plaintiffs prima facie case and any other evidence the plaintiff offers to show that the actions were [retaliatory] or that the non-[r .D.C. May 29, 2008) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff may establish a causal Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff demonstrated pretext in part by establishing a causal connection 1: holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury 2: holding that the plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection 3: holding that causal connection exists where investigation was initially caused in significant part by the disclosure 4: holding that plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection her complaints and the adverse action


Input: to those who have requested the evidence be preserved creates an inequity for plaintiffs — like Justo here — who are hampered in their ability to request preservation. This argument misses the point. The essential reason for a spoliation claim is its deterrent effect on miscreant defendants. This purpose is served only when an actual duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff has been willfully or recklessly disregarded. See Grand Hall Enter. Co. v. Mackoul, 780 So.2d 275, 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(finding no basis to award sanctions based on a spoliation allegation where the defendant had not intentionally destroyed the evidence and was not under a court order to preserve the evidence); Pennsylvania Lumberman’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 724 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(<HOLDING>). That is not the case here. In fact, Holdings: 0: holding no intentional spoliation occurred where defendant was not on notice that evidence was relevant to claim 1: holding that there was no actual prejudice where the defendant has the functional equivalent of the notice required 2: holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs 3: holding that no spoliation claim existed where the defendant was not under any statutory or contractual duty to maintain or preserve the transformer in question and no evidence showed the defendant received actual notice before destroying the transformer 4: holding that to consider whether to apply a spoliation sanction the evidence must be relevant to an issue in the case and the party who destroyed the evidence must be under a duty to preserve the evidence


Input: count does not remove the circuit court’s jurisdiction over a misdemeanor count when the misdemeanor count arises from the same incident as the felony count.” 897 So.2d at 405. I agree with the State that the misdemeanor DUI charge upon which Marshall is now to be sentenced arises out of the same incident as did the felony DUI charge upon which Marshall was originally convicted. I therefore concur in the result reached by the main opinion. See also Davis v. State, 806 So.2d 404, 409 n. 1 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (Shaw, J., concurring in the result and noting that “it would appear that a fourth DUI offense, in the absence of proof of three previous DUI offenses, necessarily arises from the same act that gave rise to the felony DUI charge”); Hankins v. State, 989 So.2d 610 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (<HOLDING>). 2 . If Justice Lyons's description of the Holdings: 0: holding that dui conviction merges with aggravat ed assault by vehicle while dui conviction 1: holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony 2: holding that prior dui conviction could be used to enhance an offense to felony even though defendant did not have appointed counsel where defendant could not have been imprisoned for more than six months and was not in fact imprisoned 3: holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction 4: holding that the defendant was not guilty of felony dui because the state was unable to prove that the defendant had three prior dui convictions but remanding the case to the circuit court for resentencing without reference to any potential jurisdictional problem


Input: The complete Revised Organic Act of 1954 is found at 48 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1645 (1994), reprinted in V.I. CODE Ann., Historical Documents, Organic Acts, and U.S. Constitution at 159-60 (1995 & Supp. 2003) (preceding V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 1) [“Revised Organic Act”]. 4 By contrast, involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing during the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony or during the negligent commission of a lawful act. Knight, 764 F. Supp. at 1048. 5 Carlock did not challenge the trial court’s self-defense jury instruction below, nor does he challenge it on appeal. 6 Decatur testified that when he first saw Carlock outside of th f witnesses, standing alone, is sufficient to uphold a conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 344 (3d Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Jacobs v. Redman, 616 F.2d 1251, 1255 (3d Holdings: 0: recognizing distinction made in maynard that one accomplices outofcourt statement may corroborate the incourt testimony of another accomplice but outofcourt testimony of a testifying accomplice cannot be used to corroborate his own testimony 1: holding that uncorroborated testimony of one witness is sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction 2: holding that uncorroborated accomplice testimony may provide the exclusive basis for a criminal conviction 3: holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated 4: holding that the uncorroborated testimony of an informant may be sufficient to sustain a conviction


Input: contends was exceeded by the restitution order. Section 3663A(b)(l)(B) of Title 18 authorizes the district court to impose a restitution order for “an amount equal to the greater of the value of the property on the date of ... loss ... or the value of the property on the date of sentencing.” See also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (“In each order of restitution, the court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court (emphasis added). Bearden was ordered to pay restitution in an amount equal to the value of the stolen laptop computers, as calculated by the district court. This figure thus does not exceed the “statutory maximum” found in the restitution statutes. Accord United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1054 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Bearden was potentially subject to Holdings: 0: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance 1: holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious 2: holding that prison conditions are those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population 3: holding that the courts statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature and is thus not subject to waiver or estoppel 4: holding that  3663a is in this respect like a statute that permits the judge to impose any term of years up to life in prison and thus is not governed by apprendi


Input: see also Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 943 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that a property interest may arise from an express or implied contract, as well as a state statute or regulation). The plaintiffs assert that defendants deprived them of a property interest in an expected degree from an accredited state institution. Illinois courts have not identified clearly a property right in post-secondary education. However, Illinois courts have found that the payment of tuition to an educational institution ordinarily gives rise to an implied contract that the school will award a degree upon the student’s satisfaction of the degree requirements established by the school. See Johnson v. Lincoln Christian Coll., 150 Ill.App.3d 733, 103 Ill.Dec. 842, 501 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Illinois Benedictine Coll., 112 Holdings: 0: recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach 1: holding that violation of accountants duties mandated by statute did not create a cause of action based on breach of implied contract for employee 2: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach 3: holding that a student who allegedly completed all the requirements for a diploma but had not been given a diploma stated a cause of action for breach of an implied contract 4: holding that the failure to act in good faith  does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract


Input: these documents also indicate that “[n]ot all Christians ... have found themselves to be targets of ethnic-religious persecution” and that “[t]he ongoing insurgency affects every segment of the population, Sunni, Shi’a, and non-Muslim alike.” Christians In Iraq at 2. According to a 2005 U.S. Department of State report, “insurgents and terrorists kidnapped and killed government officials and workers, common citizens, party activists participating in the electoral process, civil society activists, members of security forces, and members of the armed forces, as well as foreigners.” Id. at 5. At the merits hearing, Hanna himself conceded that Iraq was in the middle of a “very bad” civil war. Such a generalized or random possibility of harm in the country of removal is insuffici Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Toma v. Gonzales, 179 Fed.Appx. 320, 324 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that substantial evidence supported ijs conclusion that petitioners claims were consistent with general civil strife in iraq rather than  targeted persecution against christians 1: holding that iraqi petitioner who failed to establish past persecution nonetheless had a wellfounded fear of future persecution because evidence of country conditions supported the conclusion that the iraqi government would persecute as traitors any evacuees who returned to iraq 2: holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination 3: holding that ijs adverse credibility was not supported by substantial evidence where there were significant communication and translation problems  during the asylum hearing and the discrepancies at issue were not crucial to petitioners claim 4: holding that substantial evidence supported an adverse credibility finding where inter alia the petitioners claimed guerrilla persecution on their asylum applications but later claimed government persecution


Input: 21.) The conversation captured by Riddle’s digital recorder belies this assertion and makes clear the extent of his intrusion, which included ordering Modrell to remain in one place and threatening to handcuff him. Riddle has not identified, and this Court cannot discern, any law-enforcement interest that justified encroaching on Modrell’s privacy and freedom of movement in this way. d. Duration of Seizure The fourth McArthur factor considers whether the length of the seizure was reasonably related to the law-enforcement interest at stake. Scmgineto-Miranda accounts for this factor as part of its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, see supra note 7. A two— to three-hour delay to procure a search warrant is not per se unreasonable. Compare McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332, 121 S.Ct. 946 (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Song Ja Cha, 597 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that an initially reasonable seizure can become an unreasonable seizure that violates the fourth amendment when officers refuse to return seized property 1: holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement 2: holding that there was no fourth amendment seizure where delivery of package was not delayed because it is the extent of the interference with the defendants possessory interest in the property that determines whether a seizure has occurred 3: holding that a twohour residential seizure was not excessive 4: holding the eighth amendment succinctly prohibits excessive sanctions it provides excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted


Input: 75, 76, 81, 83, 84, 91, 92, 94, 102, 105. The court finds these alleged statements insufficient because they are unaccompanied by facts which demonstrate their accuracy or Defendants’ involvement or control in their preparation. Moreover, as recently determined by one court in this district: “a plaintiff cannot meet the requirements of the PSLRA and Rule 9(b) merely by pleading the specific time, place, and contents of misleading statements by a specifically identified analyst. Rather, to hold a defendant liable for misleading statements published by a third party, the plaintiff must at least identify the defendant who provided the information that the third party made public to the market.” Barrie, 2002 WL 1841631, * 3; see also Suna v. Bailey Corp., 107 F.3d 64, 72-73 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In none of the paragraphs alleging statements Holdings: 0: holding that even if defendants knew that the company had inventory problems  that fact standing alone does not show that defendants knew that the statements in their prospectus or other representations were materially false or misleading at the time the material statements were made 1: holding that plaintiffs did not satisfy particularity requirement where plaintiffs assertions were based in part on the statements of unnamed former employees 2: holding rule 16 does not apply to oral statements other than statements of the defendant 3: holding that a plaintiff must plead with specificity as to the statements or omissions considered to be fraudulent the speaker when and why the statements were made and an explanation of why they were fraudulent 4: holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading


Input: the two- year statute of limitations applicable to actions for personal injury or property damage caused by exposure to hazardous chemical substances. 86. CEPA does not provide a statute of limitations. City of Bridgeport v. Santa Fuel, Inc., No. CV 980357102, 1999 WL 203794, at *3 n. 3 (Conn.Super.Ct. Apr.l, 1999). As this Court noted in Ca-labrese, 170 F.Supp.2d at 268, there has been considerable disagreement among the Connecticut courts as to which statute of limitations to apply to state environmental actions. See, e.g., Doty v. Mucci 238 Conn. 800, 805 n. 6, 679 A.2d 945 (1996) (refusing to reach the issue of the applicable statute of limitations for § 22a-452 claims); Electroformers, Inc. v. Emhart Corp., No. 29 78 91, 1993 WL 28904, at *4-6 (Conn.Super.Ct. Jan.29, 1993) (<HOLDING>); Nielsen v. Siotix Tools, Inc., 870 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs claims under  22a452 were barred by the statute of limitations regardless of whether  52577c  52582 or  52577 was applied 1: holding that the plaintiffs claims under  22a452 were barred by the statute of limitations but declining to decide which statute to apply 2: holding that section 1 claims of direct purchasers of buspirone products were not barred by the statute of limitations 3: holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations 4: holding that the plaintiffs claims under conn gemstat  22a16 were barred by the threeyear statute of limitations in conn genstat  52577 which began to run when the vendor caused the contamination of the property even though this was prior to the plaintiffs ownership of the contaminated property


Input: FIFRA preempted Plaintiffs failure to warn claims and which relied on Med-tronic only for the proposition that courts must look first to the language of an express pre-emption clause and that the word “requirements” presumptively includes state causes of action as well as laws and regulations. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 571. The court in Hawkins also relied on a New Jersey Appellate Division decision in which that court explicitly distinguished Medtronic from Cipollone and concluded that FIFRA preempts state law failure to warn claims. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 572 (citing Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 294 N.J.Super. 53, 682 A.2d 724 (App.Div.1996)). Other courts have also continued to find FIFRA pre-emption after Medtronic. See Koch v. Shell Oil Co., 173 F.R.D. 288, 289-90 (D.Kan.1997) (<HOLDING>); Cuevas v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 956 Holdings: 0: holding that those state law claims specifically related to labeling and packaging are preempted by fifra 1: holding that medtronic does not alter clear tenth circuit law holding that commonlaw labeling claims are preempted 2: holding that the federal cigarette labeling and advertising act did not preempt plaintiffs state law claims 3: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 4: holding the state law claims were not preempted


Input: of a plan...”); § 1121(b) (“...only the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief’). I find persuasive an additional reason why “under a plan confirmed” should be construed to describe eligible transfers rather than to impose a temporal restriction on the transaction itself. As a description, “under a plan confirmed” embodies an intent to exclude ordinary course of business and non-debtor transactions from the scope of § 1146(c). These meanings lie within the definition of “under” and are necessary to apply the provision. If Congress intended to encourage plan confirmation, it follows that Congress would facilitate the process by providing tax relief for only those transfers necessary for the plan, rather th 124-25 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1995) (<HOLDING>); cf., The Baldwin League of Independent Holdings: 0: holding that debtors cannot claim an exemption in a homestead after trustee avoided the transfer of the property as a fraudulent conveyance because the transfer by the debtors was voluntary 1: holding that new yorks notice to judgment debtors satisfied due process by specifying that a procedure existed to adjudicate exemption claims and advising debtors to contact an attorney even though the notice did not inform judgment debtors of the specific steps to be taken to test exemption claims 2: holding it was irrelevant that irss collection of 100 section 6672 liability against responsible nondebtor debtors principal officer and major shareholder would affect the debtors reorganization although nondebtors financing was necessary for debtors reorganization bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the irs at debtors request on behalf of nondebtor 3: holding that transfers between nondebtor third parties not subject to  1146c exemption even if transfer necessary to finance acquisition of debtors property 4: holding that grant or denial of debtors claim of property exemption is final appealable order


Input: by the Keeper or designee unless the Keeper disapproves a nomination ....”); id. § 60.6(t) ("Any person or organization which supports or opposes the nomination .,. may petition the Keeper during the nomination process either to accept or reject a nomination .... Such petitions received by the Keeper prior to the listing of a property ... will be considered by the Keeper and the nomination will be substantively reviewed.”); id- § 60.15(a)(4) ("Properties removed from the:National Register for procedural error shall be reconsidr ered for listing by the Keeper after correction of the error or errors by ... the Keeper, as appropriate,”); Friends of the Atglen-Susquehanna Trail, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 252 F.3d 246, 253 (3d Cir.2001) (citations omitted); Moody Hill, 205 F.3d at 558 (<HOLDING>). 22 . This conclusion does not alter the fact Holdings: 0: holding that an iowa statute requiring a foreign corporation to hold a certificate of authority to transact business in the state was preempted by the nba as the statute pertained to national banks because it infringed on the powers provided to national banks by the nba 1: recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state 2: holding that the keeper has independent authority to determine whether properties are eligible for listing on the national register and to name them to the national register without the agreement of state agencies 3: holding that so long as the seller did not have an agreement with the buyer during the term of the listing agreement it was free to delay selling until after the listing agreement had expired even where the delay was for the purpose of escaping the payment of a commission 4: holding a states regulation of wyoming national guard was insufficient to implicate a special sovereignty interest because of the dual federal and state nature of national guard service


Input: continuing. {21} Defendant further argues that this order was an acquittal on the refusal basis for aggravated DWI, apparently under the theory that it somehow finalized or solemnized the trial court’s oral comme implicated in this case. The Ratchford exception is limited to an oral grant of a new trial being effective to defeat automatic denial provisions built into the rules of criminal procedure. 115 N.M. at 570-71, 855 P.2d at 559-60. The cases involving discharge of a jury can be distinguished because in those cases the proceedings were terminated and the fact-finder was discharged by the oral comments of the judge, while here, proceedings were ongoing and the court expressly reserved ruling on the aggravated DWI charge. Rodriguez, 2004-NMCA-125, ¶ 14, 136 N.M. 494, 100 P.3d 200 (<HOLDING>); Reyes-Arreola, 1999-NMCA-086, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. Holdings: 0: holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract 1: holding that a delinquency proceeding places a juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the double jeopardy clause 2: holding that oral declarations of mistrial which discharge the jury are unlike other oral decisions by the trial court which are not binding and are subject to change until a final written order or judgment is entered 3: holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract 4: holding that oral discharge of jury terminated jeopardy


Input: with the meaning of the word ‘appeal’ in the context of [Article] VI, Section 27.” Hicks, 105 N.M. at 287, 731 P.2d at 983. {23} In Hicks, this Court held that, because criminal actions in metropolitan court were not of record at that time, “the right of appeal in such actions is the right to a trial or hearing de novo in the district court[, and] [i]n de novo proceedings, the district court is not in any way bound by the proceedings in the lower court.” Id. (citation omitted). We held that the district court was required to independently determine whether the requirements of the metropolitan court were complied with and thus remanded the case to district court to make such a determination. Id. Compare State v. Spillman, 2010-NMCA-019, ¶ 6, 147 N.M. 676, 227 P.3d 1058 (filed 2009) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-001, 147 N.M. 673, Holdings: 0: holding that where a defendant fails to challenge his plea in district court he must establish plain error 1: holding that before a defendant could contest the validity of a plea entered in metropolitan court by appealing to district court he had to first move to set aside his plea in metropolitan court because in an ontherecord appeal to district court that court is the equivalent of an appellate court 2: holding that the district court had jurisdiction to order restitution of award overturned on appeal even in the absence of a remand from the appellate court 3: holding that because a claim was never raised in the district court this court would not consider it for the first time on appeal 4: holding that if the defendant fails to file a motion in the trial court to withdraw his plea he cannot attack it for the first time on appeal


Input: v. United States, 53 Fed.Cl. 241, 244 (2002) (“[O]nly plaintiffs who are in privity of contract with the government can have standing to bring a claim in this court.”) (citations omitted); see also Centex Corp. v. United States, 52 Fed.Cl. 599, 603 (2002). In contrast, parties who sue as shareholders, with no independent stake in the outcome other than through their ownership interest in the corporation, are not in privity of contract and have no basis to allege injury for breach. See Glass v. United States, 258 F.3d 1349, 1354-55 (Fed.Cir.2001) (shareholders did not have standing to sue because they were not third-party beneficiaries to the contract, but at most incidental beneficiaries); First Hartford Corp. Pension Plan and Trust v. United States, 194 F.3d 1279, 1289 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); F.D.I.C. ex rel. Karnes County Sav. and Loan Holdings: 0: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 1: holding that shareholders had failed to maintain their status as shareholders by selling their shares after they had filed their complaint and therefore had lost standing to maintain a derivative suit 2: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office 3: holding that in order for a plaintiff to file suit against the government on a contract claim in the court of federal claims a plaintiff must have either direct privity or thirdparty beneficiary status 4: holding that shareholders had standing to bring derivative suit against the government but not direct suit due to lack of privity


Input: 52 O.O. at 178, 116 N.E.2d at 424. The constitutionally secured guarantee of equal protection under the law “ ‘implies that all litigants similarly situated may appeal to courts for both relief and defense under like conditions, with like protection, and without discrimination.’ ” Conley v. Shearer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 288, 595 N.E.2d 862, 866, quoting Sexton v. Barry (C.A.6, 1956), 233 F.2d 220, 224. When, as here, a legislative classification implicates neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class, the classification is invalid only if it bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. Adkins v. McFaul (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 350, 351, 667 N.E.2d 1171, 1173. See, also, McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 (<HOLDING>). As we noted above, the probate division and Holdings: 0: holding that a factual finding may be set aside if it rests on an erroneous view of the law 1: holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment 2: holding that family courts conclusions will not be set aside if supported by findings 3: holding that a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived of to justify it 4: holding that motion to dismiss should be denied if in view of what is alleged it can reasonably be conceived that the plaintiffs  could upon a trial establish a case which would entitle them to relief


Input: neutral. Accordingly, the court must determine whether the defendants’ actions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and whether there are sufficient alternative channels of communication. 1. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest The determination of whether the Village’s restriction on Sandefur’s speech was narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest is a legal rather than a factual question. See Mesa v. White, 197 F.3d 1041, 1046 & n. 5 (10th Cir.1999); White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1528-29 (D.C.Cir. 1984). It is thus appropriate for resolution on summary judgment when no material underlying facts are in dispute. See MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 243 F.3d 1021, 1034 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). It is well-settled that a local government Holdings: 0: holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information 1: holding 18 usca  922g8 passes constitutional muster because it is a reasonable restriction on the right to bear arms and is narrowly tailored to support a compelling government interest 2: holding on summary judgment that a regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest 3: holding that such classifications are permissible only when suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest 4: holding restrictions embodied in content neutral statute must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest while leaving open sufficient alternative channels of communication


Input: the School District’s automatic appeals as its own. Because I do not believe that Starwood automatically appealed the 2013 and 2014 assessments pursuant to section 518.1(b) of the Law, I would conclude that the School District’s unilateral discontinuance of its appeal would not thwart that provision. I would also hold that the trial court did not err in permitting the School District to unilaterally discontinue its appeal without seeking leave of court. Pa. R.C.P. No. 229 reflects the “longstanding practice in Pennsylvania” that an appellant may choose to discontinue its appeal on its own initiative. Fancsali v. University Health Center of Pittsburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 761 A.2d 1159, 1161 (2000); see Farrington v. Department of Transportation, 35 Pa.Cmwlth. 373, 387 A.2d 136, 138 (1978) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 489 Pa. 400, 414 A.2d 128 (1980). Pa. Holdings: 0: holding that release must specifically name or otherwise specifically identify the persons to be discharged 1: holding that unilateral discontinuances are permitted where not specifically prohibited by the governing statute 2: holding that parties not specifically identified are not released 3: holding issues that are not specifically raised and argued in a partys opening brief are waived 4: recognizing that a reading of the oregon criminal statute indicates that the acts prohibited are those which are performed upon the mother rather than any action taken by her


Input: his part in referring these criminal charges to court-martial. See Arts. 1(9) and 22(b), UCMJ, 10 USC §§ 801(9) and 822(b). As Justice Frankfurter said in Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 558, 78 S.Ct. 1263, 2 L.Ed.2d 1531 (1958): Audi alteram partem — hear the other side! — a demand made insistently through the centuries, is now a command, spoken with the voice of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ... whenever any individual, however lowly and unfortunate, asserts a legal claim. However, notwithstanding the error made by the trial judge in not ordering a possible accuser under Article 22(a) to be questioned about his motives in referring charges against Captain Rockwood, I would hold this error harmless. See United States v. Jeter, 35 MJ 442, 446-47 (CMA 1992) (<HOLDING>). In my view, any reasonable Division Holdings: 0: holding error to be fundamental when record shows jurisdictional defect 1: holding that a violation of the forum defendant rule is a jurisdictional defect 2: holding jurisdictional defect voids judgment when defect exposes such personal jurisdictional deficiencies as to violate due process 3: holding that the district court which erred in its conclusion that there was jurisdictional defect abused its discretion in denying a plaintiffsmotion for leave to amend his complaint because the proposed amendment would not cure the jurisdictional defect 4: holding defect in referral by accuser not jurisdictional


Input: evidence that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.” INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). An application filed after one year may also be considered “if the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application within the period specified____” INA § 208(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). Nevertheless, § 1158(a)(3) provides that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3); Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). This jurisdiction stripping provision remains Holdings: 0: holding that ij properly based adverse credibility finding on omission in asylum application where omitted fact went  to the heart of the asylum claim  citation omitted 1: holding that because the ij denied an asylum application as untimely we lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the final order of removal as it pertained to the asylum claim 2: holding that a properly filed motion to reopen is a prerequisite to the filing of a new asylum application when the petitioner is under a final removal order 3: holding that it was within the discretion of the bia to deny a motion to reopen because it was not accompanied by an asylum application 4: holding that when an ij issues a decision granting an aliens application for withholding of removal without a grant of asylum the decision must include an explicit order of removal designating a country of removal


Input: notice to or the presence of either attorney and without any formal record. Her later questioning of the two officers on the stand may have brought some of the substance of this in-chambers interview into formal evidence, but, as with her call to the pharmacy manager, it is impossible for this Court to know what further information may have been shared behind the closed doors of chambers. Thus, it is impossible to adequately review whether or not the private conversation inappropriately affected the judge’s decision. This fact highlights one of the reasons ex parte contacts with a judge are impermissible when they address a matter pending before the judge: They leave no record for the reviewing court on appeal. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 356 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Wis. 1984) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 18. Our Code of Judicial Conduct supports Holdings: 0: holding that after review the minutes were unambiguous and the trial judge erred in admitting parol evidence 1: holding that trial judge sitting as finder of fact erred by making unnoticed and unrecorded visit to accident scene because in part such actions are outside the record and therefore beyond this courts reach in its review 2: holding that a challenge to the proper weight of the evidence is a question of fact outside this courts jurisdiction 3: holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review 4: holding that this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative fact finder who heard the testimony and was in a position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses because evidence is weighed by the administrative agency and not by the courts


Input: false and fraudulent information similar to the fourteen returns at trial. The government cited interviews with about twenty people conducted as part of the criminal investigation, another ten interviewed separately, and taxpayer statements that appeared in the audit files indicating that the taxpayers didn’t provide the false information. The district court did not clearly err in finding that this evidence supported a pattern of deception attributable to Littrice and that by excluding from the group of 662 returns all cases in which the taxpayer contested their audit or where no additional tax was due, the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the remaining returns reflected Littrice’s relevant conduct. Cf. United States v. Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 282 (4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 279, 178 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to county on monell claim where plaintiff presented no evidence that similar conduct occurred in the past 1: holding that the district court did not err in finding a pattern of numbers reported for various deductions that was strikingly similar to the returns proven fraudulent at trial established relevant conduct when the taxpayers agreed to pay the assessments without protest 2: holding that district court did not clearly err in giving twolevel enhancement for similar conduct 3: holding that trial court did not err 4: holding that district court did not err in finding that similar scheme involved sophisticated means


Input: F.3d 98, 100 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 183-84 (2d Cir.2001)). We readily conclude that Duncan had sufficient warning to satisfy the due process concerns articulated in Rogers v. Tennessee. We have carefully reviewed each argument asserted on appeal, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment, sentence, and forfeiture of the district court are AFFIRMED. 1 . In his initial brief, Duncan made this Ap-prendi-type argument only with respect to the drug type issue, and not with respect to the other two enhancements referenced in any of the briefs, i.e., the firearm and role enhancements. Accordingly, he is not entitled to have this Court entertain the argument with respect to those other two enhancements. See United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241(11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 830 Holdings: 0: holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief 1: holding party failing to adequately brief complaint waived issue on appeal 2: holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal 3: holding that defendant waived his blakely claim as issue on appeal by failing to raise it in his initial brief 4: holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief


Input: the party agreed to do so.” And in AT&T Mobility v. Concepción, the Supreme Court struck down a California rule of decision because it allowed co . Merrill Lynch, 626 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Tyco Int’l Ltd. Sec. Litig., 422 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 2005) ("A determination that a party has waived its right to arbitrate is reviewed de novo, whereas the district court’s findings of fact are subject to 'clear error’ review.”); Hoover v. Am. Income Life Ins. Co., 206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 312, 319 (2012) ("The waiver issue may be reviewed de novo when the question is whether the superior court properly applied the correct legal standard to the undisputed facts.,..”); LAS, Inc. v. Mini-Tankers USA, Inc., 342 Ill.App.3d 997, 277 Ill.Dec. 547, 796 N.E.2d 633, 636 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Guttchen v. Gabriel, 49 P.3d 223, 225 Holdings: 0: holding that review of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is under the de novo standard 1: holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo 2: holding that because the facts are not in dispute the court should review the arbitration waiver de novo and gathering federal cases holding the same 3: recognizing de novo standard of review 4: holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo


Input: theory to worker’s compensation case for exposure to toxic substancesXquoting Owens-Illinois, supra, 138 N.J. at 451, 650 A.2d 974); Universal-Rundle Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 319 N.J.Super. 223, 243-44, 725 A.2d 76 (App.Div.1999), certif. denied, 161 N.J. 149, 735 A.2d 574 (1999)(using continuous trigger theory to determine respective liability resulting from clean-up costs relating to soil and groundwater contamination); Sayre v. Ins. Co. of North Amer. 305 N.J.Super. 209, 211-12, 701 A.2d 1311 (App.Div.l997)(affirming trial court’s use of continuous trigger liability analysis for progressive indivisible injury resulting from environmental contamination and cleanup of manufacturing site); Gottlieb v. Newark Ins. Co., 238 N.J.Super. 531, 537, 570 A.2d 443 (App.Div.l990)(<HOLDING>). Cf. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ply Gem Indus. Holdings: 0: recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey 1: holding that under new jersey law any party that maintains minimum contacts with the  state that are continuous and substantial will be subject to personal jurisdiction 2: holding that continuous trigger theory reflects the law of new jersey allowing plaintiffs to seek recovery for chemical poisoning claims under successive policies 3: holding that a writ of execution under new jersey law is not an action against the consumer 4: recognizing that pennsylvania had no interest in denying its residents the greater damages available under new jersey consumer fraud statutes for claims against a new jersey seller


Input: to the superior court of the county in which the inferior court is located . . . .” (§ 1466, subd. (a).) 3 Defendant concedes as much in this court. 4 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham (1967) 388 U.S. 307 [18 L.Ed.2d 1210, 87 S.Ct. 1824] (following so-called collateral bar rule, with certain exceptions); Ex parte Purvis (Ala. 1980) 382 So.2d 512, 514-515 (same); Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs. (1985) 197 Conn. 141 [496 A.2d 476, 481] (same); Dade County Classroom Teachers’ Ass’n v. Rubin (Fla. 1970) 238 So.2d 284, 288 (same); Dept. of Rev. v. Universal Foods Corp. (1993) 318 Or. 78 [862 P.2d 1288, 1291-1292] (appeal from contempt adjudication may not collaterally attack underlying order, with certain exceptions); but see Wood v. Goodson (1972) 253 Ark. 196 [485 S.W.2d 213, 217] (<HOLDING>); Phoenix Newpapers, Inc. v. Superior Court Holdings: 0: recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack 1: holding that dhss motion to reconsider was a collateral attack on a bia order 2: recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time 3: holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack 4: recognizing collateral attack on void order


Input: who had committed similar or more severe offenses than those Molloy was accused of were either not disciplined or, if disciplined, were first afforded their rights under the Officers’ Bill of Rights, the jury was entitled to infer that the Chiefs proffered explanation for his more harsh treatment of Molloy — the state police’s advice that she was refusing to cooperate with them and the ostensible advice that the granting of rights was unnecessary where, although suspended, she was still being paid — was a pretext. Essentially the same evidence also allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that the plaintiff had carried her burden of proving that the Chief had discriminated against Molloy because of her gender in violation of Title VTI. See Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Molloy was suspended without being offered Holdings: 0: holding that an employees attempt to prove actual discrimination requires more substantial evidence than a prima facie case because evidence of pretext and discrimination is viewed in light of the employers justification 1: holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination 2: holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason 3: holding that in a discrimination case plaintiff must prove that firing was a result of intentional discrimination 4: holding that a plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination