Input: “undesirables” in the office, office romances, the personal use of office equipment, too much time spent on out-of-office travel, and the like. The majority of Plaintiffs complaints are simply reports of personal or managerial shortcomings of her colleagues and supervisors — spending too much time on-out-of-office travel, using an office copy machine for personal needs, asking the office assistant to fix a home computer, not properly securing office files, a , 504 (Minn.1991) (concluding that a report about behavior that “seems distasteful and ... ill-advised, but that is not ... illegal” is not protected under the MWA). Ultimately, even if the Court assumes that all the facts occurred as Plaintiff reported them, none constitutes a violation of the law. Kratzer, 771 N.W.2d at 22-23 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). For Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff is obliged to present facts that if true would constitute violation of clearly established law 1: holding the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of the case 2: holding there was no evidence a reasonably prudent employee in similar circumstances would have believed facts reported by plaintiff were a violation of law 3: holding that the proper standard to apply  is to assume that the facts have occurred as reported and then determine  whether those facts constitute a violation of law or rule adopted pursuant to law 4: recognizing that when the facts alleged in the administrative complaint are not disputed this leaves only conclusions of law to be drawn as to whether the admitted facts constitute a violation of the statutes as charged and penalties to be imposed


Input: as intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizurcs are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause.” Id. at 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248. The Court cautioned that "detention for custodial interrogation—regardless of its label—intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.” Id. at 219, 99 S.Ct. 2248. To the extent that the record in this case supports an inference that Acosta was brought to the customs detention area and placed in an interrogation room in order to effect a transfer of "custody" to and permit questioning by the DEA, the rule of Dunaway arguably comes into play. Cf. United States v. Codd, 956 F.2d 1109, 1111 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 10 . As to whether the officers could Holdings: 0: holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance  the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid 1: holding that two and onehalf hour detention at airport police office was analogous to the de facto arrest in dunaway 2: recognizing a nonresident who receives the most votes for elected office does not hold the office but not discussing the de facto officer doctrine 3: holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave 4: holding that a de facto arrest had occurred where petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found  but rather was taken  to a police car transported to a police station and placed in an interrogation room


Input: Courts in rendering opinions” on certain matters). This court concludes that, under Hawaii law, if an underlying action is dismissed against a nonconsenting defendant because it was a necessary condition of settlement with the other defendants in the underlying litigation, the dismissal with prejudice is not a dismissal on the substantive merits of the case and is therefore not a termination in favor of the nonconsenting defendant for malicious prosecution purposes. See Villa, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d at 649 (finding that “even where a defendant does not agree to a settlement made on his behalf, his or her dismissal from the lawsuit pur suant to that settlement will not be viewed as a favorable termination as long as it was a necessary condition to settlement”); Haight, 244 Cal.Rptr. at 490 (<HOLDING>). This rule comports with Hawaii’s public Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered 1: holding that a dismissal in the interest of justice can be a favorable termination under certain circumstances 2: holding that a dismissal of a defendant who did not agree to settlement is not a favorable termination if dismissal of that defendant was a condition of settlement 3: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt 4: holding that plaintiffs dismissal of personal injury action and subsequent dismissal of declaratory judgment action concerning extent of tortfeasors insurance coverage did not trigger double dismissal rule


Input: it may ‘skew[] the fairness of the entire system.’ ” Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 600 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686). In this case, the delay did not cause Ashburn any pretrial incarceration because Ashburn was already in prison for another offense. Thus, while Ashburn argues on appeal that “[w]here a defendant is incarcerated during delay, like Mr. Ash-burn, ‘he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense,’ ” it was not the delay which caused this prejudice. Ash-burn also does not claim any actual prejudice to his defense. In fact, the government claims that the delay, if anything, harmed its case because one of the witnesses (an individual who had found the body), died prior to trial. Ashburn, though, h Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Because Ashburn was not denied his Sixth Holdings: 0: holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial 1: holding that the constitutional right to a speedy trial includes the right to a reasonably prompt sentencing 2: holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds 3: holding that delay resulting from prior incompetence to stand trial does not violate speedy trial guarantee 4: holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial


Input: bankruptcy petition no such judgments had been entered against either Montana or the Crown. Their “requests” are also not “demands,” they explain, because those requests are not personal injury, wrongful death, or property damage claims, and thus they did not “aris[e] out of the same or similar conduct” as the claims subject to the injunction. See id. § 524(g)(5)(B). While those arguments reflect some creativity, they are ultimately unpersuasive. Montana’s and the Crown’s assertion that a “claim” arises when it fully accrues is based on the now-rejected reasoning of Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re Frenville), 744 F.2d 332, 335-36 (3d Cir.1984), which we explicitly overruled in In re Grossman’s, Inc., 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir.2010) (en banc). See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 121 (<HOLDING>). The law in this Circuit now is that “a claim Holdings: 0: holding that discovery accrual rule applies to causes of action under michigan law for fraud 1: recognizing obligation to read the language of the statute in light of previously established common law 2: holding that the ordinary observer test should be the sole test for determining whether a design patent has been infringed 3: holding that the accrual test previously established in frenville should be and now is over ruled 4: holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established


Input: rule applies. The limited duty rule is an exception to general negligence principles, and more particularly, to the application of the business invitee standard of care in the commercial context. The dissent apparently prefers not to consider public policy and fairness concepts if the result is to hold the owner of the commercial enterprise responsible for its negligence when it does not adequately protect its business invitees, at least outside of the spectator seating areas. But, the Court is required by its common law precedents to examine the owner’s duty in those circumstances, and to consider which of the parties is best able to bear the burden of foreseeable harm within the stadium. See Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Group, Inc., 135 N.J. 182, 194, 638 A.2d 1288 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of City of Clifton v. Holdings: 0: holding that the substantial relationship test also concerns the duty of loyalty to a former client 1: holding that the unique nature of psychotherapistpatient relationship gives rise to a duty of care to the patient 2: holding that relationship between plaintiff and tortfeasor nature of risk and ability and opportunity to exercise care are relevant concerns to imposition of duty 3: holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence  that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions     and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise 4: holding that a duty of care may arise out of a contractual relationship between two parties


Input: the required analysis to determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply. On appeal, although our review of the available facts might lead us to reach the same ultimate decision to suppress the evidence, we are not in a position to reach out and undertake an analysis that is better left to the District Court in the first instance. See United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir.2010) (“While it appears at first blush that suppression might be inappropriate in this case, we will remand to the district court for the purpose of re-examining the facts and balancing the interests as required by Herring.”); United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 67, 68 (2d Cir.2010) (“[0]n remand, the district court may consider whether the circumstances of this search, considered i 0th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 846 Holdings: 0: holding that the government cannot rely upon affidavits not attached to the warrant itself to satisfy the particularity requirement 1: holding plaintiffs fraud claim failed rule 9b particularity requirement which in turn meant deceptive trade practices claim failed the particularity requirement 2: holding that a roving wiretap surveillance warrant meets the fourth amendments particularity requirement 3: holding that an incorporated affidavit did not provide particularity because the government offered no evidence that the affidavit or any copies were ever attached to the warrant or were present at the time of the search 4: holding that plaintiffs did not satisfy particularity requirement where plaintiffs assertions were based in part on the statements of unnamed former employees


Input: of the Court may be viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 993, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The narrowest ground for the court's disposition in Williams is that of the lead opinion and Justice Thomas: the subject report was not testimonial. But, as the Arizona Supreme Court recently explained, the plurality's 'primary purpose' test nor Justice Thomas's solemnity standard can be deemed a subset of the other; therefore, there is no binding rule for determining when reports are testimonial." State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, 306 P.3d 48, 63 (2013) (citing United States v. Alcon Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). We agree, and apply Williams accordingly. [¶ Holdings: 0: holding an issue not preserved when one ground is raised to the trial court and another ground is raised on appeal 1: holding that animal husbandry operations were included in the definition of farm even if the animals do not touch the ground graze on the land or feed from crops grown on the land and holding that land used to support buildings used in the production of agricultural products is a productive use of the land 2: holding that there is no first amendment or common law right of access to documents which played no role in a judicial decision 3: holding that when no single standard  legitimately constitutes the narrowest ground for a decision on that issue there is then no law of the land 4: holding that the deed and not the historical description of the land determines what land constitutes the forfeitable property


Input: waivers, deletions, changes or amendments shall be effective during the life of this Agreement, unless evidenced in writing, dated and signed by the parties hereto.” Agreement § 16.1. Defendants argue that the term “parties” encompasses individual employees as well as the collective bargaining unit, while Plaintiffs dispute that interpretation. Plaintiffs’ own discussion of the application of the integration clause nevertheless calls on the court to interpret the CBA. For this reason, I am satisfied § 301 preempts the breach of contract claims because “at the very least,” this court “would be required to interpret the CBA to determine whether it was intended to be the sole agreement between the parties.” DiGiantommaso v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 632 F.Supp.2d 85, 89 (D.Mass.2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Cavallaro A, 678 F.3d at 5-7 (1st Holdings: 0: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 1: holding a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty will not lie where the claim of breach is dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties 2: recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach 3: holding that a cause of action for breach of a purported implied contract would require interpretation of a cba and the totality of the parties contractual relationship 4: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach


Input: the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of die United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 2 . Inferior officers may be appointed by the President alone, the heads of departments, or the judiciary, as Congress may determine, but it is undisputed that no inferior officer was involved in the civil enforcement action here. 3 . Nor can Congress confer the Executive's unique Article III standing to private individuals. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (<HOLDING>); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex Holdings: 0: holding that private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by congress courts may not create a cause of action absent statutory intent 1: holding that congress cannot confer the executives standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through citizensuit provisions 2: holding that congress cannot consistent with the constitutional principles of the separation of powers confer standing on a qui tam plaintiff who has suffered no cognizable injury to allow that plaintiff to prosecute an fca action on the governments behalf 3: holding that congress did not intend to give individuals a right to enforce  specific provisions of  nclb 4: holding congress must unambiguously confer federal rights on the plaintiff


Input: close a loophole that had allowed preferences in the form of set offs.” In re Elcona Homes Corp., 863 F.2d 483, 486 (7th Cir.1988). Section 553(a)(3) modified a Bankruptcy Act provision that prohibited setting off debt intentionally incurred for such a purpose by effectively limiting the determinative inquiry to whether the creditor intended to offset the recently acquired debt. In re Butcher, 79 B.R. 741, 746 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1987) (quoting DuVoisin v. Foster (In re S. Indus. Banking Corp.), 48 B.R. 306, 309 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1985)). The Section 553(a)(3) exception to setoff “prevents the courts from rewarding creditors who persuade a debtor to engage in conduct which has the effect of impermissi-bly improving the creditor’s position among the other creditors.” Woo , 568 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Factors that courts consider when evaluating Holdings: 0: holding that the debtors deposit of funds was not in the ordinary course of business and was for the purpose of creating a setoff right for the bank 1: holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale 2: holding that for setoff purposes    a debt is due when the bank has the power to deem the debt due not when the bank actually exercises that power 3: holding that boat repair was done in the ordinary course of business of river transportation company 4: holding that the payment of a settlement from estate funds is not within the ordinary course under  363b


Input: odor, found twenty-four days after the year 1995 had concluded, tended to show that the conspiracy to obtain and deliver cocaine had taken place during 1995. Moreover, because of the narcotics odor on the bills, the evidence had the requisite probative value for admission into evidence without the danger of "unfair prejudice." See Evid. R. 408 (emphasis supplied). Because the State successfully proved the relevancy, probative value, and lack of unfair prejudice of the $5000-showing that the $5000 was evidence of charged conduct in 1994-95-there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence. However, to preclude argument on the matter, the better course would have been to amend the dates on the charging information. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 728 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Ind.2000) (<HOLDING>). Howard attempts to analogize his case to Holdings: 0: holding that information was not fatally defective because while defendants name did not appear in the charging part of the information it did clearly appear in the caption and in the verification of the charge by the district attorney 1: holding that rules of criminal procedure prohibited the state from amending the indictment at the close of the trial to include additional methods of csp because such amendment substantially prejudiced defendant 2: holding that states amendment of the charging information at the close of states case in chief was permissible because amending the date of the charged crimes did not affect browns defense 3: holding that the amendment of the indictment was permissible under the statutory predecessor to code  192231 because the amendment did not within the meaning of the statute change the nature of the offense charged in the original indictment 4: holding that an amendment to a felony information on the day of trial charging the defendant as a habitual criminal was not error


Input: of crack cocaine in the ‘kangaroo pouch’ of defendant’s boxer briefs, or the ‘fly area . . . where the two pieces of fabric overlap. Fowler,_N.C. App. at __, _S.E.2d at _. On appeal, this Court held that “the search[] of defendant’s person constituted [a] strip search,” noting that, “[djuring [the] search]], defendant’s private areas were observed by [the law enforcement officer].” Fowler, _N.C. App. at _, _S.E.2d _. However, we also held that there was ample reason to believe that the defendant would be carrying drugs, that the second “strip search” took place at a “discreet” location, and that exigent circumstances (consisting of the defendant’s familiarity with processing procedures at the jail and his repeated requests not to be taken there) justified a strip .2d 30, 37 (1989) (<HOLDING>). A helpful manner in which to give content to Holdings: 0: holding that a panel of the court of appeals is bound by a prior decision of another panel of the same court addressing the same question but in a different case unless overturned by an intervening decision from a higher court 1: holding stare decisis applies when one court of appeals panel is faced with previous decision of different panel 2: holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court 3: holding that where a panel of the court of appeals has decided the same issue albeit in a different case a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent unless it has been overturned by a higher court 4: holding that a panel of this court is bound by a holding of a prior panel but is not bound by a prior panels dicta


Input: as McGinley v. Houston, 282 F.Supp.2d 1304 (M.D.Ala.2003), aff'd, 361 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir.2004), points out, Establishment Clause jurisprudence would be unworkable if it were any other way: "For this court ... to hold that the removal of ... objects to cure an Establishment Clause violation would itself violate the Establishment Clause would ... result in an inability to cure an Establishment Clause violation and thus totally eviscerate the [E]stablishment[C]lause.” Id. at 1307 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 9 . Because Vasquez failed to state a claim under the Establishment Clause, we also deny his request for leave to amend his complaint to add a claim for nominal damages. See generally Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) Holdings: 0: recognizing that when actual damages cannot be proved with the required certainty nominal damages alone are recoverable 1: holding that under  1983 violations of constitutional rights are actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury 2: holding that nominal damages are appropriate for deprivations of constitutional rights that do not result in actual injury 3: holding that plaintiff waived the right to nominal damages in an excessive force case because nominal damages were not requested until after the verdict 4: holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative


Input: “virtually every significant class action case would need to be litigated in California”). However, it has a characteristic that all of these Costco management districts except the Southern District of California lack: it is the most appropriate forum for litigating the claims of at least one named plaintiff. Furthermore, it is a forum for which there has been no showing of inconvenience for Costco, due to defendant’s strong contacts here and the agreement of the parties to travel to witnesses’ own locales for purposes of discovery. The Northern District is the plaintiffs chosen forum, and as such it is entitled to some deference. In class actions, this deference is reduced where a plaintiff lacks contacts with the chosen district. See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). In judging the weight to be accorded to the Holdings: 0: holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent 1: holding individual defendants subject to suit 2: holding that when an individual brings a derivative suit or represents a class the named plaintiffs chosen forum is given less weight 3: holding that in the rule 23 class action context named plaintiff may appeal a denial of class certification even if his or her individual claims had been satisfied through the entry of judgment 4: holding that after a class is certified the controversy may exist  between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot


Input: to be paid and which are not, and when.” Id. at 757. As stated in Anderson: A person need not be an officer, director, employee, or shareholder of a company to be held accountable as a responsible person. The test is whether the person had control of the disbursements of the taxpayer, that is, whether ‘he had the final word as to what bills should or should not be paid, and when.’ It is not necessary that such control be exercised exclusively by the person; it may be exercised jointly with others. Id., 561 F.2d at 165 (citations omitted; emphasis added). In the cases where third party lenders have been held hable under § 6672, the lender has exercised control over the disbursements of the taxpayer. See Commonwealth National Bank of Dallas v. United States, 665 F.2d 743 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Merchants National Bank of Mobile v. United Holdings: 0: holding successor national bank liable for punitive damages judgment against bank that merged into successor national bank 1: holding the bank liable where the bank had almost complete control over the operation of the company during its last three quarters of operation and where withheld taxes were not paid to the irs on instructions from the bank 2: holding a bank officer who informed a third party that it would be safe to extend 8000 credit to bank customer although customer did not have an open account at the bank could be held liable for the material misrepresentation 3: holding a bank liable where a bank officer held checks that were intended to pay the irs for withheld taxes 4: holding that a bank customer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank


Input: for the “prevailing competitive price” for glass repair based upon “prices charged by a substantial number of repair facilities in the area * ⅜ * as determined by a survey.” Because Glass Service’s prices typically exceed what State Farm has determined by a survey to be the prevailing competitive price, State Farm is not obligated under the policy to pay the excess. State Farm was justified in informing insureds of this policy limitation and in suggesting alternative vendors whose charge would be fully covered under the policy. See Minn.Stat. § 72A.201, subd. 4(5) (making it an unfair claims practice to fail to notify an insured of all available benefits which the insured may be eligible to receive); see also DeBonaventura v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 419 A.2d 942, 951 (Del.Ch.1980) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, State Farm’s representations to its Holdings: 0: holding that the first element in a prima facie case of tortious interference with prospective business advantage is the existence of business expectancy 1: holding no improper interference with prospective business opportunity of repair shops by directing insureds to preferred shops or informing them they would otherwise have to pay difference 2: recognizing the tort of interference with prospective contractual relations as a subspecies of the broader tort of interference with prospective economic advantage 3: holding that the difference between interference with contract and prospective relations is that second tort requires showing of malice 4: holding that under colorado law tjortious interference with a prospective business relation requires a showing of intentional and improper interference preventing formation of a contract


Input: and convincing evidence of abuse inflicted by Smith. I believe this was error. An allegation.of an accident does not equate to the admission of an intentional act of child abuse for purposes of demonstrating evidence of a prior bad act. See State v. Northcutt, 372 S.C. 207, 218-19, 641 S.E.2d 873, 879 (2007) (reversing a death penalty conviction when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim’s spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, accidental and therefore not relevant to show the nature of defendant’s relationship with the victim). This is particularly true where, as is the case here, Smith did not have exclusive custody and control over the victim. See State v. Cutro, 332 S.C. 100, 105-06, 504 S.E.2d 324, 326-27 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, DSS was unable to determine who Holdings: 0: holding admission of prior bad acts of child abuse was reversible error when the defendant did not have exclusive control over the children during the period when the prior bad acts occurred 1: holding that the more similar the prior bad act is to the charged crime the more relevant the prior bad act becomes toward proving intent 2: holding that it is error for a trial court to admit evidence of prior bad acts without properly conditioning the jurys use of that evidence 3: holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime 4: holding as to the admissibility of prior bad acts that allegedly took place fourteen and twelve years before the acts alleged in that case that the lapse of time between the defendants sexual acts    goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility


Input: served as its Chief Executive Officer, and sat on its Board of Directors. According to the Fund, Mr. Reynolds actively participated in the day-to-day management of Greystone and made “decisions related to its operations and eventual closure in 2011.” Even accepting the Fund’s assertion that Mr. Reynolds actively managed Grey-stone, an assertion he denies, the Fund cannot show the necessary minimum contacts. The Fund argues that any actions Mr. Reynolds took in his official capacity as an owner and operator of Coleridge and Jelniki are attributable to Coleridge and Jelniki. The record, however, contains no credible allegations Mr. Reynplds routinely acted on behalf of Coleridge and Jelniki when he discharged any of his duties as an officer and director of Greystone. See id. at 943 (<HOLDING>). For example, the Fund asserts in its Holdings: 0: holding that to establish that subsidiary is agent of parent for jurisdictional purposes the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the parent notwithstanding the maintenance of corporate formalities 1: holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham 2: holding that because the corporate parent and subsidiary defendants before it observed all of the corporate formalities necessary to maintain corporate separateness notwithstanding the parents active involvement in the subsidiaries operations the evidence did not establish that the entities were alter egos of one another 3: holding constitutional due process requires that personal jurisdiction cannot be premised on corporate affiliation or stock ownership alone where corporate formalities are substantially observed and the parent does not exercise an usually high degree of control over the subsidiary 4: holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper


Input: 316 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir.2003) (“Severino admitted — more than once — that he had no way to challenge the validity of the prior conviction.... The error was harmless.”); United States v. Williams, 298 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.2002) (where both government’s information and PSI disclosed convictions used for enhancement and defendant did not challenge through § 851(c) or at sentencing, “any error resulting from the district court’s failure to comply with the procedures of § 851(b) was harmless error”); United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1525 (D.C.Cir.1997) (per curiam) (“Although failure to comply strictly with the statute’s requirements is error, here the error was harmless.”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 71 F.3d 1537, 1541 & n. 4 (10th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by United States Holdings: 0: holding that failure to comply with  851b was harmless in part because defendant did not object to prior convictions listed in presentence report 1: holding that a sentencing court may warn a defendant of the possibility of a sentence enhancement 2: holding failure to comply with  851b was harmless error in part because defendant did not comply with  851c procedures for challenging prior convictions 3: holding that the district court lacked authority to revisit the application of the career offender enhancement in a  3582 motion because that enhancement was not affected by a retroactive amendment 4: holding that failure to comply with  851b was harmless because defendant was properly put on notice that the government was seeking an enhancement and defendant concluded that no valid grounds existed for challenging the convictions or enhancement after research


Input: as the starting date for calculating Gasser’s delay in filing suit. Thus, although the court credited Gasser’s testimony at least to the extent that this meeting took place, it failed to draw reasonable inferences in favor of Gasser about what took place during this encounter. Given Gasser’s testimony that at the conclusion of the meeting he felt that Infanti would comply with the agreement, and that he saw no evidence that Infanti was not complying with the agreement until 1986, a reasonable inference would be that Gasser had no reason to sue until at least 1986, a difference in the delay period that might well have made a difference in the final outcome. See, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia s.p.a., 944 F.2d 870, 878-79, 20 USPQ2d 1045, 1052 (Fed.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Alternatively, based on Gasser’s testimony Holdings: 0: holding based on similar facts and a delay of three and onehalf years that it would have been an abuse of discretion for the district court to have held that these circumstances resulted in laches 1: holding abuse of discretion is established if district court decision was based on an error of law 2: holding that delay for three and onehalf years was unreasonable under rule 60b6 3: holding a three and onehalf year delay was unreasonable 4: holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add count when no prejudice resulted from two and onehalf year delay and facts underlying new and old counts were similar


Input: Iowa. Nor can we say that Aidco’s actions were targeted to have an effect in Iowa. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, 104 S.Ct. at 1487. When a business seeks to promote its products and solicit the customers of its competitors, it necessarily wishes to have customers believe that its products are superior and to place its competitor’s products in a less favorable light. Although this promotion and solicitation may have an effect on a competitor, absent additional contacts, this effect alone will not be sufficient to bestow personal jurisdiction. We do not mean to imply that we approve or disapprove of Aidco’s actions, only to point out that the holding of Calder cannot be read as broadly as Hicklin wishes. See also Keystone Publishers Serv., Inc. v. Ross, 747 F.2d 1233, 1234 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons stated above we affirm the Holdings: 0: recognizing the tort of interference with prospective contractual relations as a subspecies of the broader tort of interference with prospective economic advantage 1: holding that foreseeability of causing injury in forum state is not sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction 2: recognizing the tort of wrongful interference with anothers business relations 3: holding that interference with contractual relations occurring outside of iowa and causing injury in iowa is not sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction in iowa 4: holding that the statute of limitations for a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations begins to run when the contract in question has been breached


Input: of reasonableness, and such amounts ordinarily cannot be recovered without evidence showing the charges were reasonable. Fort Worth Hotel Ltd. P’ship, 977 S.W.2d at 762-63; see Murnan, 916 S.W.2d at 589; GATX Tank Erection Corp., 693 S.W.2d at 620; Bradley v. Castro, 591 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1979, no writ); Frost Nat’l Bank of San Antonio v. Kayton, 526 S.W.2d 654, 666-67 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Allright, Inc. v. Lowe, 500 S.W.2d 190, 191 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ). These cases hold that a plaintiff cannot recover damages just by proving how much it spent. It must also provide evidence that the amount spent was reasonable and necessary. But see Liptak v. Pensabene, 736 S.W.2d 953, 958 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1987, no writ) (<HOLDING>) (citing English v. Fischer, 649 S.W.2d 83, Holdings: 0: holding that the testimonies of three qualified expert witnesses about the damages done to a house by termites and their opinions as to what the repairs would cost was some evidence that the cost of repairs was reasonable and necessary although those words were not used in their testimonies 1: holding that using the opinions of an expert that were not testified to during trial which were irrelevant and solely used to destroy the credibility of the expert was not admissible 2: holding that if despite repairs there remains a loss in actual market value estimated as of the collision date such deficiency is to be added to the cost of repairs 3: holding that the total cost of repairs could be found to be a fair measure of the plaintiffs total damage 4: holding where a house sold by defendant was found to fall short of the sellers promises and where it could not be repaired to the promised condition defendants liability could not be limited to the cost of repairs however if the repairs had been adequate to restore the house to its promised condition and if plaintiff had claimed additional consequential damages for example water damage to a rug from the leaky roof the limitationofremedies clause would have been effective


Input: recovery of those litigation expenses. We disagree. “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. One petitioning for the writ of mandamus must show ‘(1) a clear legal right ... to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ ” Ex parte City of Irondale, 686 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Ala.1996) (quoting Ex parte Johnson, 638 So.2d 772, 773 (Ala.1994)). See also Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala.1991); and Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.2d 682, 684 (Ala.1989). As discussed above, LaConsay and Wet-zel did attempt to appeal from the probate court’s October 17, 2006, order, but the circuit court dismissed those appeals because the proba pp. 2003) (<HOLDING>). In the second appeals, the circuit court Holdings: 0: recognizing a defendants right to appeal when a court fails to award litigation expenses in a condemnation action 1: recognizing no right to damages if landowner retains reasonable access to property after a condemnation 2: recognizing the right to counsel on appeal 3: holding that defendant forfeits right to have issue considered on appeal when he fails to object to misconduct at trial 4: holding that there is no right to monetary compensation for a regulatory taking in an inverse condemnation action


Input: but seeks a review and reversal of the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment. But see In re Rodriquez, 258 F.3d at 759 (finding the appeal moot because the appellant was challenging the sale of property from the bankruptcy estate where there was no stay pending appeal); Wintz, 219 F.3d at 812 (finding the appeal moot because the appellants failed to obtain a stay pending appeal and thus were barred from attempting to overturn the sale of the property from the bankruptcy estate). In the final analysis, though, this panel cannot provide relief. If we were to rule in favor of Appellant on the summary judgment issue, Appellant could perhaps seek money damages from the proceeds of the sale received by the bankruptcy estate. See In re Popkin & Stem, 223 F.3d 764, 766 n. 2 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, obtaining money damages equal to the Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief 1: holding that the loss of trade secrets cannot be measured in money damages 2: holding that even if the sale cannot be undone nor property specifically awarded parties may still receive money damages for their loss 3: holding that attorneys fees may be awarded against a public official even when the official is immune from money damages 4: holding that the loss of money from a bank account does not constitute irreparable harm because that loss can be compensat ed by money damages


Input: caused by the intoxication of the dram shop patron. The last sentence of the portion of section 123.92 quoted above provides that the dram shop may assert an affirmative defense that the intoxication was not a proximate cause of the patron’s injurious action. See Gremmel v. Junnie’s Lounge, Ltd., 397 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Iowa 1986) (defense that intoxication was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries was available upon showing that animosity between combatants and not intoxication precipitated assault). The rise of the claim created by section 123.92 extending liability to liquor purveyors is mirrored by the recent genesis of separate common law actions against those who sell or provide liquor in violation of criminal statutes. See Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 191-92 (Iowa 1977) (<HOLDING>); Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Iowa Holdings: 0: holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury 1: holding iowa code section 63113 which is now section 6317 contains no provision for posttrial motions on appeal from a small claims court judgment 2: holding a common law cause of action exists against a nonlicensee who furnishes alcohol to a minor in violation of iowa code section 12347 where the minor subsequently causes the plaintiffs injuries 3: holding in a case in which negligence was based on the illegal sale of alcohol to a minor in violation of iowa code section 12343 now section 12347 that proximate cause was an issue to be resolved by the finder of fact 4: holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury


Input: Protective Proceedings, and Durable Power of Attorney Act of 1986) which provides a system of limited and general guard-ianships for incapacitated individuals and protective proceedings concerned with management of their estates. See also Super. Ct. Prob. R. 301-334 (governing intervention proceedings). 2 . D.C.Code § 46-404 provides that proceedings to annul a marriage on behalf of a lunatic and certain others may be instituted by a next friend. 3 .Appellant sought to amend his complaint to preclude appellee from making a claim against the decedent's estate because of the terms of a prenuptial agreement. However, the court held that leave of court was not required to amend the complaint because no responsive pleading had been filed. See Wilson v. Wilson, 785 A.2d 647, 649 (D.C.2001) (<HOLDING>). No issue concerning any subsequently filed Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant waived its impropervenue defense where its responsive pleading which asserted the defenses of failure to state facts to state a claim and failure to join a necessary party  did not assert the defense of improper venue 1: holding that a motion to dismiss was not a responsive pleading under rule 15 2: holding that for purposes of super ct civ r 41b demand is not jurisdictional but an element of the shareholders claim 3: holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading not merely title of pleading 4: holding that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of super ct civ r 15a which permits a party to amend once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served


Input: Plaintiff failed to establish personal jurisdiction over Ho because he does not have constitutionally sufficient “minimum contacts” with Washington. Id. at 801. In particular, Plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing that Ho “expressly aimed” his conduct at Washington. Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir.2012) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984)). Although Ho may have received reports about the activities of Dressel Investment Ltd. and he may have participated in some decision-making, his participation did not rise to the level of the “guiding spirit” or “alter ego” of Dres-sel. See, e.g., RSL-3B-IL, Ltd. v. Symetra Life Ins. Co. (In re Rapid Settlements, Ltd.), 166 Wash.App. 683, 271 P.3d 925, 931 (2012) (<HOLDING>). Nor do Plaintiffs allegations of fraud Holdings: 0: holding that one company was the alter ego of another where among other things the ownership of both entities has been held out to third parties as identical with an identical place of business 1: holding that pleading was insufficient where the plaintiff failed to among other things set forth the dates of any fraudulent statements 2: holding individual defendant liable where he among other things made inquiries into the business obligations under the flsa 3: holding that a subsidiary is not an alter ego of its parent even when the corporations are closely tied through stock ownership shared officers financing arrangements and the like 4: holding evidence of virtually identical offense was relevant to show intent among other things in trial of charged offense


Input: In Griggs v. Barnes, 262 Ala. 357, 78 So.2d 910 (1955), our Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he essence of custody is the companionship of the child and the right to make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health, and religion.” 262 Ala. at 363, 78 So.2d at 916. Moreover, in J.S., this court observed: “The common law recognized a right of parents to determine with whom their child would associate. In contrast to parents, grandparents generally had no common-law right to visitation if the parents objected. Ex parte Bronstein, 434 So.2d 780 [ (Ala.1983) ]; Ronald W. Nelson, “Troxel v. Granville: The Supreme Court Wades Into the Quagmire of Third-Party Visitation,” 12 No. 6 Divorce Litig. 101 (June 2000).” — So.2d at-. See Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285 (N.D.1999) (<HOLDING>). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399, Holdings: 0: recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children 1: holding north dakotas grandparentvisitation statute unconstitutional on the basis that it burdened the parents fundamental right to control their childrens associations 2: holding right to be fundamental 3: recognizing that because parents have a constitutional right to direct their childrens education organization has standing to bring claim on behalf of parents 4: recognizing that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care custody and control of their children


Input: “[had] nothing to do with denat-uralization.” Id. at 38 n. 5. I agree with the First Circuit’s sound reasoning. For the foregoing reasons, I cannot accept the majority’s conclusion that Pullman-Standard and Anderson overruled— by implication — Baumgartner and its progeny. It follows that our precedent, Lim v. Mitchell, which relies on Baum-gartner's progeny, controls the appellate standard of review in this case. Thus, we are required to conduct an independent review of the evidence in the record to determine whether that evidence is sufficient to satisfy the government’s heavy burden to show by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a Mexican citizen, not a United States citizen. See supra Part III.A; United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). IV. THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO PROVE ITS CASE Holdings: 0: holding that a three judge panel is free to reexamine the holding of a prior panel when the supreme court has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable 1: holding a three judge panel  cannot reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior panel unless an intervening supreme court decision undermines an existing precedent of the ninth circuit and both cases are closely on point internal quotations and citation omitted 2: holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel 3: holding that a three judge panel is not bound by prior circuit precedent if an intervening decision of a higher authority undercuts the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable 4: holding that threejudge panel cannot disregard or overrule circuit precedent


Input: facial neutrality.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217. We must look beyond the text of the ordinance and examine whether the Borough enforces it on a religion-neutral basis, as “the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.” Id. at 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Because Ordinance 691 is neutral and generally applicable on its face, if the Borough had enforced it uniformly, Smith would control and the plaintiffs’ claim would accordingly fail. The Borough insists it has done so, but the record shows otherwise. Indeed, the Borough has tacitly or expressly granted exemptions from the ordinance's unyielding language for various secular and religious-though never Orthodox Jewish-purposes. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953) (<HOLDING>). From the drab house numbers and lost animal Holdings: 0: recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion 1: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise 2: holding that limitations placed upon the religious activities of two prison groups found to be religious organizations were reasonable under the circumstances 3: holding that exclusion of religious groups from universitys open forum policy violated the first amendment 4: holding that city violated free exercise clause by enforcing ordinance banning meetings in park against jehovahs witnesses but exempting other religious groups


Input: condition during Gretillat’s employment. Gretillat does not respond to Care Initiatives’s arguments in her Resistance. “When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported ... [and] the adverse party does not ... respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The court finds summary judgment is appropriate as to Gretillat’s alleged inabilities to squat, crawl, crouch and kneel. Summary judgment as to Gretillat’s alleged inabilities to squat, crawl, crouch and kneel is appropriate because an employer is not required to make an accommodation for the physical limitation of an employee unless the employer has knowledge that such a limitation exists. See, e.g., Miller v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 629-30 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Care Initiatives could not have discriminated Holdings: 0: holding that the employers failure to interact with the employee does not preclude the employee from losing on summary judgment because the employee must still prove that a reasonable accommodation could have been made 1: holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation 2: holding that although of course an employee is not required to modify his religious beliefs a reasonable accommodation need not be on the employees terms only 3: holding that the burden of proving that the employee did not make reasonable efforts is on the defendant 4: holding defendant was not required to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee because the employee did not apprise defendant that she suffered from a mental impairment


Input: to the FDIC’s assignee, a bridge bank), cert. denied sub nom. Rogers v. FDIC, 498 U.S. 1083, 111 S.Ct. 954, 112 L.Ed.2d 1042 (1991); Porras v. Petroplex Sav. Ass’n, 903 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir.1990) (extending the D’Oench doctrine’s protection to transferees of assets from the FSLIC in purchase and assumption transactions); FDIC v. First Nat'l Fin. Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir.1978) (rejecting the argument that the D’Oench doctrine does not apply to the FDIC as receiver). Courts also applied the D’Oench bar to secret agree ments between borrowers and a subsidiary of the failed financial institution under the regulatory agency’s control. See Victor Hotel Corp. v. FCA Mortg. Corp., 928 F.2d 1077, 1083 (11th Cir.1991); Robinowitz v. Gibraltar Sav., 23 F.3d 951, 956 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 725, 130 Holdings: 0: holding that no complete innocence exception to the doench doctrine exists 1: holding that the doench doctrine extends broadly to cover any secret agreement adversely affecting the value of a financial interest that has come within the rtcs control as receiver of a failed financial institution including the financial interest of a whollyowned subsidiary 2: holding that the doench doctrine extends to claims involving a wholly owned subsidiary of the failed financial institution in receivership 3: holding that doench applies to secret side agreements made by subsidiaries and subsubsidiaries of the failed institution in receivership 4: holding that the commonlaw doench doctrine applies to bar suit even when the rtc does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement


Input: to the Commissioner under the statutory and constitutional mandates that already apply to him rather than to give him detailed and rigid directives through rules. See Diaz v. State of Florida, 945 S2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006) (“In light of the exigencies inherent in the execution process, judicial review and oversight of the Department of Corrections’] procedures is preferable to [APA] administrative proceedings.”), overruled on other grounds by Darling v. State, 45 S3d 444, 453 (Fla. 2010). See also Brown v. Vail, 237 P3d 263, 270 (Wash. 2010) (“The [execution] protocol itself is not an order or directive subjecting a person to a penalty or sanction, but rather a procedure for carrying out an already imposed penalty.”); Abu-Ali Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 SW3d 292, 312 (Tenn. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Rather than adopting a detailed rule Holdings: 0: holding that the management of executions is ill suited to apa rulemaking 1: holding that claimant is entitled to ongoing medical treatment if such is geared toward management of the claimants injury 2: holding cafeteria management fee is not taxable even if it is bundled with the sales price of food 3: holding that a seaman is entitled to maintenance and cure even if he falls ill or is injured while ashore as long as he is subject to the call of duty 4: holding the lower court properly opened the confessed judgment but erred in setting aside the executions and the attachments stated plaintiff is fairly entitled to this security pending the proceedings upon the opened judgment unless security equivalent to it and approved by the court is substituted for it


Input: it was seeking an administrative claim for only the post-petition portion of the first quarter of 1995, which is from March 3, 1995 through March 31, 1995. The Debtors conceded that the administrative claim was proper to the extent that it covered only the post-petition portion of the first quarter of 1995. The claim of the IRS for administrative expenses for the post-petition portion of the first quarter of 1995 is allowable to the extent that it seeks taxes, fines and penalties. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(B)(C). The Court will determine whether post-petition interest is an administrative expense. 4 . Prior to the Court's decision, one circuit court had addressed the issue. See United States v. Friendship College, Inc. (In re Friendship College, Inc.), 737 F.2d 430, 433 (4th Cir.1984) Holdings: 0: holding that interest on postpetition taxes incurred by the debtor during chapter 11 reorganization is an administrative expense 1: holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor 2: holding that an individual debtor not engaged in business is eligible for chapter 11 3: holding in a case where a chapter 11 trustee was appointed after a period during which the debt or had operated as debtor in possession that a chapter 11 trustee has two years from the date of his appointment not from the commencement of the chapter 11 case to bring avoidance actions 4: holding that licensor was entitled to administrative expense priority claim where debtor remained in possession postpetition of real property under a license agreement


Input: the existence of that state of facts at the time that the law was enacted must be assumed.”). The judicial deference which must be given to the legislature under “rational basis” review is illustrated by case law. For instance, in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949), the Court upheld an ordinance on Equal Protection grounds which banned advertising on trucks, but exempted those trucks advertising their own products. The Court stated that the law was designed to promote public safety and that the city “may well have concluded” that those advertising their own products would not present the same traffic problem. Id. at 110, 69 S.Ct. 463. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (<HOLDING>); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause 1: holding that a state ban on nonreturnable milk containers while permitting the use of other nonreturnable containers did not offend the equal protection clause since the legislature might have determined that even a limited ban would promote greater use of environmentally desirable alternative containers 2: holding that the states reapportionment plan might violate the equal protection clause 3: holding that a state weapons ban did not violate equal protection principles because the plaintiffs challenge related to classifications among weapons not persons 4: holding that racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment


Input: clearly intended that the defendant’s right to appeal an issue would be preserved. See United States v. Elizalde-Adame, 262 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir.2001); Markling, 7 F.3d at 1313. The cases examining the intent to preserve the right to appeal typically lack a written plea agreement, however, which is a significant difference from the case now before us. Written plea agreements are contracts, and we interpret them according to general principles of contract law. United States v. Hernandez, 544 F.3d 743, 750 (7th Cir.2008). Thus, unlike those cases involving verbal agreements, we look to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intentions — possibly found, for example, in a plea colloquy — only when the written contract is ambiguous. Cf United States v. Given, 164 F.3d 389, 396 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). In this context, we have the power to review Holdings: 0: holding that an unambiguous plea agreement is entitled to great evidentiary weight 1: holding that the district court properly declined to consider extrinsic evidence where the plea agreement was unambiguous 2: holding extrinsic evidence contradicting language in will inadmissible when will is unambiguous 3: holding that a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether a contract is ambiguous 4: holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties


Input: Id. at 94-95. 12 . Id. 13 . Id. at 95. 14 . Id. 15 . Id. 16 . AS 18.70.080(a)(2). 17 . AS 08.40.240. 18 . O’Callaghan, 996 P.2d at 94. 19 . AS 18.70.080. 20 . AS 08.40.240-250. 21 . See AS 08.40.210; Ch. 132, § 9, SLA 1988. 22 . See H. Fin. Comm. Minutes (March 22, 1988) (comments of Eugene R. Rutland, Executive Director, Mechanical Contractors of Fairbanks). 23 .Id. 24 . See 13 AAC 50.020(12)(b) (1988) (adopting Uniform Mechanical Code by reference to Uniform Building Code). 25 . 858 P.2d 621, 624 n. 1 (Alaska 1993). 26 . Stepovak—Shumagin Set Net Ass’n v. State, Bd. of Fisheries, 886 P.2d 632, 637 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Gilbert v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, 803 P.2d 391, 398 (Alaska 1990)). 27 . O'Callaghan v. Rue, 996 P.2d 88, 94-95 (Alaska 2000). See also Gilbert, 803 P.2d at 397 (<HOLDING>). 28 . Mechanical Contractors also claims that Holdings: 0: holding that when a prison regulation impinges on inmates constitutional rights the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests 1: holding that pma process is not specific regulation because the requirements are not contained in formal regulation 2: holding that perfection not required for regulation to be reasonable courts task is simply to determine whether regulation is reasonably related to agencys statutory mandate 3: holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot because the regulation had been substantially amended 4: holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation


Input: did not have a reasonable belief that he was opposing an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII when he filed his complaint regarding Defendant Fetter’s alleged harassment and ridicule. See McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir.2001) (citation omitted). As will be discussed below, at best, Plaintiff is merely attempting to allege that he was retaliated against in violation of the First Amendment. Even though Plaintiff may believe that Defendants’ actions were wrongful or even spiteful, the courts have repeatedly emphasized that “Title VII is not a general ‘bad acts’ statute.” Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 176 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir.1999) (quotation and other citation omitted); see also Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Montanile v. National Broadcast Co., Holdings: 0: holding that a sixmonth gap between the protected activity and the employees termination was insufficient to infer that the protected activity was a contributing factor 1: holding that the term protected activity refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination quotation and other citation omitted 2: holding that informal complaints to superiors about discrimination constitute protected activity 3: holding that qualified immunity turns upon the objective legal reasonableness of the officers action assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: holding the term earnings for purposes of  541a6 is not limited to wages and salary but refers to all income generated by an individual citation omitted


Input: by the record. See United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 77 (3d Cir.1996). The Government’s central argument is that Lowe did not submit to the initial show of authority because he failed to show his hands in response to the officers’ commands. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has explained that “[an individual] sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.” Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400. The Government’s argument invites us to add “unless the police have instructed him to stand up” to the analysis. Neither Supreme Court precedent nor the law of our Circuit supports such a qualification. See id. (explaining that responding to a show of authority by staying put is a means of passively submitting to that authority); Campbell, 332 F.3d at 206 (<HOLDING>). Instead, failure to submit has been found Holdings: 0: holding that no valid arrest had taken place before the search of the defendants person was conducted even though prior to that point a police officer had approached the defendant displayed his badge informed the defendant of his suspicions that the defendants luggage contained drug contraband informed the defendant of his constitutional rights and detained the defendant for twenty minutes after he had accompanied the officers to a police office located in the airport 1: holding that even though defendant stated he did not read and discuss psr with his counsel he could not show any error that affected his substantial rights 2: holding that the defendant submitted to a show of authority by remaining in place even though he declined the police officers initial request to roll down his window and refused to provide the officer with his identification 3: holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live 4: holding that police may approach citizen and ask that he roll down the window as long as the officers do not detain the citizen or create the impression that the citizen may not leave


Input: diversity between adverse parties that arises from a single accident." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(A) permits removal of a civil action to a federal district court if "the action could have been brought in a United States district court under 1369 of this title ...." 7 . Nor do we, as we affirm the district court's jurisdiction under CAFA. 8 . 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1453(a) (“Definitions. — In this section, the terms 'class’, ‘class action’, 'class certification order’, and ‘class member’ shall have the meanings given such terms under section 1332(d)(1).”). 9 . See, e.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 658, 666-67, 99 S.Ct. 2529, 61 L.Ed.2d 153 (1979) (citing United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941)) (<HOLDING>); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, Holdings: 0: holding that under 28 usc  194 applying to land disputes between a tribe and a white person a state was not a person but observing that there is nevertheless no hard and fast rule of exclusion  and much depends on the context the subject matter the legislative history and executive interpretation 1: holding that a state agency is not a person subject to suit under federal false claims act 2: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 3: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 4: holding that a person who cut and removed timber pursuant to the direction of the person in possession of the property but without the written consent of the company holding legal title to the land could be held liable under the gtccs


Input: direction and discretion of the child's parents."); of CCRS, 892 P.2d at 258 (comparing cases from other jurisdictions, in which babysitters or temporary caregivers were determined not to have "physical custody" of a child, with case of the prospective adoptive parents at issue, who had total care of the child with the intention that they would ultimately adopt the child). 110 Accordingly, when determining whether a nonparent, who shares physical care of a child with a parent, has standing under section 14-10-123(1)(c), a court considers the nature, frequency, and duration of the contacts between the child and nonparent and between the child and parent. See .S., 264 P.3d at 625; LF., 121 P.3d at 270; In re V.R.P.F., 989 P.2d 512, 514 (Colo.App.1997); see also E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 554 (<HOLDING>). { 11 For example, in EZ.L.M.C., the partner Holdings: 0: holding that the requisites for in loco parentis status are the actual care and custody of a child by a nonparent who assumes parental duties because the parent  generally due to his or her absence  is unable or unwilling to care for the child 1: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 2: holding that the modification order itself must be signed before the child turns eighteen 3: holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school 4: recognizing that nonparent standing turns on the quality of the relationship between the nonparent and the child


Input: by her pro bono counsel. 7 . Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA”) (effective April 24, 1996). 8 . Section 5103 states: § 5103. Transfer of erroneously filed matters (a) General rule. — If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a court ... of this Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the ... matter, the court ... shall not quash ... or dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the ... matter shall be treated as if originally filed in a court ... of this Commonwealth. A matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court ... of this Commonwealth shall be transferred by the other tribunal to the proper court ... where it shall be treated as if orig .2000) (<HOLDING>). 11 . We invite our Supreme Court to look at Holdings: 0: recognizing that the supreme court maintained the trial courts fact finding authority without setting a new standard in booker 1: holding that statute could not grant jurisdiction to dis trict courts of appeal over nonfinal arbitration order because the florida constitution reserved to the florida supreme court the power to define the interlocutory jurisdiction of district courts 2: holding a per curiam affirmance from a florida district court of appeal is not renewable by the florida supreme court 3: holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction 4: holding florida constitution grants supreme court exclusive authority to set deadlines for postconviction motions therefore legislation setting time limits is unconstitutional


Input: F.3d at 909 (noting that a “full evidentiary record” had already been developed); Mateo-Mendez, 215 F.3d at 1045 (noting that district court’s factual findings on the relevant issue were “unequivocal”); McElyea, 158 F.3d at 1021 (finding that, after a full inquiry into the relevant issue, “[t]he record ... does not contain any information” that would suggest an alternative factual finding), or where there was a failure of proof after a full inquiry into the factual question at issue, see Reyes-Oseguera, 106 F.3d at 1484 (stating that the government had offered insufficient evidence to support a finding of reckless endangerment); Ponce, 51 F.3d at 829 (finding that the government had offered no evidence to support sentencing at criminal history category III); Becerra, 992 F.2d at 967 (<HOLDING>). Here, in contrast, there was no offer of Holdings: 0: holding that the government had offered insufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant jose becerra knew about or could have anticipated that the drug transaction in question could have involved 25 kilograms of cocaine 1: holding evidence of prior drug sales admissible under 404b to show knowledge and intent where defendant claimed he did not know that the gym bag he took possession of contained two kilograms of cocaine 2: holding that government did not suppress evidence when defendant knew about the existence of the evidence and could obtain it through the exercise of reasonable diligence 3: holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine 4: holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract


Input: exist, the defendant must establish the following: “(1) the State possessed evidence favorable to the accused because it was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State willfully or inadvertently suppressed the evidence; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced.” Allen v. State, 854 So.2d 1255, 1259 (Fla.2003). Prejudice exists if the suppressed evidence was material. See id. at 1260. Finally, evidence is material if a reasonable probability exists that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have led to a different result at the proceeding. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The claim based on notes from police brainstorming sessions is clearly without merit. Overton was provided the Rou (<HOLDING>). During the evidentiary hearing, it was Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant insufficiently pled the brady claim because he failed to assert how the evidence was material or how he was prejudiced by the states nondisclo sure 1: holding that the information contained in the police files with regard to other possible suspects was not brady material 2: holding that the brady claim was insufficiently pled in the rule 3851 motion because the defendant presented no factual basis that the disputed item ever existed or contained exculpatory information 3: holding that record must show that evidence is exculpatory for defendant to establish brady violation 4: holding that there was no brady violation because the exculpatory effect of the disputed documents was merely speculative


Input: statement is relevant to understanding the purpose of the relocation provision with respect to the broader interests of Section 17.52.515, the Court denies this objection. ■ ■ 29 . Plaintiffs also cite a single case from the Oregon Supreme Court to argue that the on-site/offsite distinction in Section 17.52.515 runs afoul of the liberty of speech clause. Opp'n at 24 (citing Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 340 Or. 275, 132 P.3d 5, 18 (2006)). The Court does not consider this case persuasive. The Ninth Circuit has rejected the approach suggested by Outdoor Media Dimensions, explicitly recognizing that the onsite/offsite distinction is not content-based under the California Constitution. See Vanguard Outdoor, LLC v. City of L.A., 648 F.3d 737, 747-48 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). In the absence of any authority to the Holdings: 0: holding that restriction of medicaid funding to those abortions that are necessary to save the life of the mother violates equal protection guarantee of new jersey constitution although same restriction does not violate united states constitution 1: holding that an arbitration agreement that was invalid due to unconscionability was not enforceable 2: holding that definition of seizure under state constitution differs from that under us constitution 3: recognizing exception under state constitution 4: holding that offsite sign ban was a contentneutral restriction that was not facially invalid under california constitution


Input: to Aquino’s lawsuit, had no obvious motive to misrepresent the coverage limit. Moreover, as noted, the company’s representation of liability limits (as “100,000 CSL”) coincided with language used in the declaration page (“$100,000 Combined Single Limit”) to describe coverage limits for property damage and bodily injury. Thus, because Pearson’s statements resulted from a reasonable, albeit mistaken, interpretation of the insurance policy, they are not actionable under Chapter 93A. See Guity, 36 Mass.App.Ct. at 343, 631 N.E.2d 75 (“A plausible, reasoned legal position that may ultimately turn out to be mistaken ... is outside the scope of the punitive aspects of the combined application of Chapter 93A and Chapter 176D”); United States ex. rel. Metric Electric, 301 F.Supp.2d at 70 (<HOLDING>). Even assuming arguendo that Pearson’s Holdings: 0: holding that summary judgment on chapter 93a claim is appropriate when summary judgment is granted on fraud claim and chapter 93a claim is solely based on the underlying claim for common law fraud 1: holding that where there was no evidence of the claimed underlying violation and where there were no unique arguments related to the chapter 93a claim defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs chapter 93a claim 2: holding that a closing protection letter offering to indemnify a mortgage company was not an insurance contract where although issued by an insurance company there was no distribution of the risk 3: holding that inaccuracies did not give rise to a violation of chapter 93a where there was no deliberate misrepresentation of underlying facts and no indication that the insurance company did not believe its conclusions to be true at the time 4: holding that a city may not be held liable under  1983 where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers


Input: requires courts to analyze whether convenient and suitable access exists between the public roadway and the private parcel, or between some commercially useful location within the property and the point on the perimeter connecting the property to the public roadway. Whether there is reasonably convenient and suitable access to a parcel does not depend on whether the landowner prefers a different point of access. Grossman, 571 N.W.2d at 51. It is generally true that we consider the commercial use the complaining property owner wishes to make of the parcel when evaluating whether reasonably convenient and suitable access exists. See, e.g., Johnson, 263 N.W.2d at 607. (considering the commercial use of a bus company); County of Anoka v. Esmailzadeh, 498 N.W.2d 58, 61-62 (Minn.App.1993) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1993). But these Holdings: 0: holding that the district court erred in failing to consider all of the employers proffered evidence of legitimate business reasons for the plaintiffs termination 1: holding the district court erred when it did not consider the disruption of business caused by a roadway modification that may have interfered with large vehicles accessing the property 2: holding that the district court erred when it relied on the governments representation that the property sought by the defendant had been destroyed because the government did not submit any evidence of the propertys destruction 3: holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm 4: holding circuit courts injunction interfered with the general operations of the agency


Input: demonstrate that Qwest was entitled to forbearance in the Phoenix MSA.”). However, the Commission moved the goalpost. It criticized Qwest’s evidentiary showing again, this time because Qwest failed to present evidence that consumers consider wireline voice services and wireless voice services to be substitutes, such that the latter materially constrains the price of the former. Specifically, the Commission observed, “Knowing the percentage of households that rely exclusively upon mobile wireless is insufficient to determine whether mobile wireless services have a price-constraining effect on wireline access services.” Id. at 8654, ¶ 59. This kind of goalpost-moving does not reflect an optimal mode of administrative decisionmaking. ulatory Comm’n, 584 F.2d 1084, 1087-88 (D.C.Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); Verizon Tel., 570 F.3d at 304 (“[I]t is Holdings: 0: holding that when the agencys decision was based on an erroneous and completely unsupported assumption the decision was arbitrary and capricious 1: holding that an agencys sudden shift in the nature of proof required of the regulated party was not sufficiently explained and necessitated remand 2: holding that an agencys sudden unexplained shift in the kind of data that a regulated party was required to submit was arbitrary 3: holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable 4: holding that it was not arbitrary and capricious for an agency to change course when one of its basic assumptions in earlier rulemaking was contradicted by new data


Input: sentences for multiple offenses ran concurrently. United States v. Martin, 526 F.3d 926, 940 (6th Cir.2008). Alexis’s three drug offenses meet the first and second Hill tests. Fifteen days separated the first and second offenses, and ten days separated the second and third offenses. “Because each offense occurred on a separate day, there is a distinct separation between the beginning and ending of all three offenses.” Banner, 518 Fed.Appx. at 406. Additionally, during the time separating Alexis’s offenses, he had the ability to cease his criminal conduct and withdraw without committing a subsequent offense. We have held that periods of time far shorter than ten days between offenses qualify as separate episodes. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 381 Fed.Appx. 495, 506 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Because Alexis was convicted of illegally Holdings: 0: holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank 1: holding that evidence the victim tried to keep defendant from fleeing the scene of a crime and defendant killed victim in order to escape supported the finding that murder was committed to avoid arrest 2: holding that a robbery defendant was not entitled to a compulsion instruction in the absence of a claim that he or the victim was the target of a specific threat forcing the defendant to participate in the robbery 3: holding that two robberies committed within hours of each other were not part of a common scheme or plan when the defendant did not originally plan to rob his second victim 4: holding that a defendant committed separate offenses when he robbed multiple individuals within minutes at the same location because he retreated on foot to the corner of the block or to hide behind cars between every robbery each time making a conscious decision to return to the scene to rob another victim


Input: v. State, 696 So.2d 901, 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Keller v. State, 586 So.2d 1258, 1261-62 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Perez v. State, 566 So.2d 881, 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). However, in Chaeld v. State, 599 So.2d 1362, 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), the court held that a jury instruction based on Faison was not applicable when a charge alleges false imprisonment. The Chaeld court held: This so-call Faison instruction must be given upon the defendant’s request whenever the state charges kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony under § 787.01(l)(a)2. It has no application when the charge alleges that the defendant kidnapped the victim with any of the other specific intentions identified in § 787(l)(a)l, 3 or 4. See Bedford v. State, 589 So.2d 245, 251 (Fla.1991) (<HOLDING>). Because the Faison instruction is implicated Holdings: 0: holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury 1: holding that defendant charged with conspiracy to manufacture marijuana and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute was not entitled to specific buyerseller instruction even though support for such instruction existed because court gave a complete instruction reciting all the elements of conspiracy 2: holding that a defendant charged with kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim is not entitled to a faison instruction 3: holding that the first amendment prohibits criminal sanctions for true statements made with an intent to inflict harm 4: holding that life sentence imposed for kidnapping with bodily injury of 14yearold victim was not cruel and unusual punishment even though bodily injury was slight given circumstances attendant upon offense


Input: overturned unless no reasonable juror could have found that the govern ment disproved either element of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 180 (4th Cir.1992). In this case, the Government produced evidence that undercut at least the element of predisposition. Whether to believe this evidence or accept Mannar’s conflicting evidence was a question for the jury. United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir.1994). The fact that the jury could not reach a verdict on the first count does not amount to a finding of entrapment; even if it did, it would not preclude a rejection of that defense for the second count. See United States v. Vaughn, 80 F.3d 549, 552-53 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Mannar also asserts that the district court Holdings: 0: holding that jury finding of entrapment in may and june offenses did not extend to august offense 1: holding that erroneous exclusion of evidence regarding defendants lack of criminal record was not harmless in prosecution for drug offenses in which defendant asserted entrapment 2: holding that where jury was instructed on both a greater offense and lesserincluded offense and the jury convicted on the lesserincluded offense the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense 3: holding that in the conviction and sentencing for criminal offenses committed in the course of one criminal episode it is the intent of the legislature that there be a separate conviction and sentence for each criminal offense unless one of the offenses is a degree of the other a necessarily included lesser offense subsumed in the other or both offenses are identical 4: holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand


Input: of evidentiary privilege of the FRE applies to all stages of proceedings before bankruptcy- judges. Under the FRE, “evidentiary privileges in federal question cases are governed by federal common law”. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 2625, 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989). Courts have uniformly held that the “banker-depositor privilege was not recognized at common law” and “does not exist in the Federal Courts”. United States v. Prevatt, 526 F.2d 400, 402 (5th Cir.1976); Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir.1969); Reiserer v. United States, 479 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir.2007) (under Federal common Law, “[i]t is well settled that there is no privilege between a bank and its depositor”). See also, Sneirson v. Chemical Bank, 108 F.R.D. 159, 162 (D.Del.1985) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, even assuming state law creates “a Holdings: 0: holding that a bank customer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank 1: holding that statute making child welfare agency records confidential but disclosable pursuant to a court order did not create an absolute privilege for such records 2: holding that a claim of privilege to bank records pursuant to federal public policy was without merit 3: holding that production of documents without a claim of privilege waives the right to later claim that privilege 4: recognizing the statelaw privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant


Input: the party with whom the plaintiff expects to do business.” Schuler v. Abbott Laboratories, 265 Ill.App.3d 991, 203 Ill.De\c. 105, 639 N.E.2d 144, 147 (1993). Because Cook did not name any particular third party with whom he had a reasonable expectation of a business relationship, or toward whom Winfrey directed her interfering actions, the court concluded that the complaint was inadequate. Cook responds to this dismissal by identifying Illinois cases holding that the plaintiff may point to an identifiable “class” of third parties with whom he had a business expectancy (and toward whom the defendant directed her interfering actions), rather than a single third party. See, e.g., River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 281 Ill.App.3d 154, 217 Ill.Dec. 410, 667 N.E.2d 499, 507 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Darien, Holdings: 0: holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party 1: holding in addition to the requirements in 23a and 23b the plaintiff must also show  that the class is indeed identifiable as a class 2: recognizing that either party to a divorce action may bring in third parties who claim an interest in the property alleged to be community or third parties themselves may intervene and have their rights therein determined 3: holding that a plaintiff must allege either an interference with specific third parties or an identifiable class of third persons 4: holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties


Input: v. Fed. Express Corp., 440 F.3d 558 (2d Cir.2006), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2914, 168 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007). We note, however, that because the EEOC in Holow-ecki did not issue a right-to-sue letter or otherwise treat the questionnaire as a charge, id. at 563, Holowecki is notably different from the case before us. In addition, as explained above, Mr. Jones reasonably believed that the questionnaire constituted a charge. 5 . Because Mr. Jones does not assert a pattern-or-practice claim, we do not decide whether the pattern-or-practice method of proof is available to individual plaintiffs. We note, however, that other circuits have held that this method of proof is not available in a private, non-class suit. See Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding because the plaintiffs erisa claim is based on alleged circumstantial evidence  the eighth circuit analyzed the claim under the mcdonnell douglas framework 1: holding that without a link to the challenged decision stray remarks did not constitute indirect evidence of discrimination sufficient to satisfy the final prong of the mcdonnell douglas framework 2: holding because libels erisa claim is based on alleged circumstantial evidence  we analyze it under the mcdonnell douglas framework 3: holding that general employment practices are relevant to eeoc investigation of individual disparate treatment claim 4: holding that a patternorpractice claim is not available to individual plaintiffs although patternorpractice evidence may be relevant to proving an otherwiseviable individual claim for disparate treatment under the mcdonnell douglas framework


Input: an intention to call a telephone number or party not listed by him on the required MITS “Number Request Form,” see supra p. 281, even assuming he were to elect to utilize the MITS. Instead, since there can be no secre tive acquisition of information already provided to the DOC, see supra pp. 288-89 (noting that “secretive” interceptions presume lack of knowledge), Gilday simply assumes, sub silentio, that any putative number(s) and person(s) he might call would not already have been known to the DOC before the call was placed. Absent evidence on this critical point, however, there can have been no pri-ma facie showing that any surreptitious or secretive “interception” would occur, let alone did occur, within the meaning of the Massachusetts Wiretap Act. See Jackson, 349 N.E.2d at 340 (<HOLDING>). In all events, as noted above, see supra p. Holdings: 0: holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law 1: holding that a secretive interception has occurred unless both parties to the call had actual knowledge of the intrusion 2: holding that it seems clear that when the contents of a  communication are captured or redirected in any way an interception occurs at that time but also since the definition of interception includes the aural acquisition of the contents of the communication the interception must also be considered to occur where the redirected contents are first heard 3: recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge 4: holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties


Input: to its property interest in federal Medicaid and Medicare funds and injury to its liberty interest in its reputation. Id. at 1139, 1142. The court found that an informal administrative hearing held prior to the reimbursement ban satisfied due process and that a full evidentiary hearing was not required. Id. at 1145; see also Vencor Nursing Ctrs., L.P. v. Shalala, 63 F.Supp.2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C.1999) (although nursing facility had a constitutionally-protected interest in not being terminated from the Medicare/Medicaid program, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction because plaintiff did not show likelihood of success on the claim that HHS termination procedures violated due process); Pressley Ridge Schools, Inc. v. Stottlemyer, 947 F.Supp. 929, 940 (S.D.W.Va.1997) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 134 F.3d 1218 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that a statutory entitlement to payment for reasonable and necessary medical treatment cannot give rise to a property interest until the payments in question have been proven to be reasonable and necessary 1: holding the medicaid act permits enforcement under  1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures 2: holding that a plaintiff in an erisa denial of benefits case bears the burden of proving her entitlement to contractual benefits 3: recognizing entitlement to government benefits and finding that state medicaid agency violated  45523 which only permits temporary withholding of payment when it suspended payments indefinitely 4: holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law


Input: Although public policy arguments are not resolved by juries, they require that the court understand what happened to a plaintiff, a question only answered after a. judge has heard evidence detailing the circumstances that resulted in an injury. See Lodge, 246 Conn. at 578, 717 A.2d 215 (resolving public policy question after trial); Jaworski, 241 Conn. at 408, 696 A.2d 332 (same). To address public policy for the first time at this stage in the litigation deprives the Munns of the opportunity to rebut Hotch-kiss’s version of events. How, for example, could the Munns have known that they needed to offer evidence of “the normal expectations of the participants in the activity under review”? Even if Hotchkiss had adequately preserved its argument, however, it should not be excused from (<HOLDING>). There is no public policy exemption Holdings: 0: holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate 1: holding that new yorks public policy does not bar insurance coverage for disparate impact employment discrimination but noting that the state of new york insurance department has stated that it is against public policy to provide insurance coverage for intentional acts of discrimination 2: holding first that tortfeasor could have foreseen that victims employers insurance premiums might increase and then deciding that public policy precluded liability for those increases 3: holding first that injuries sustained during contact sports were foreseeable then deciding that public policy insulated the defendant from liability for those injuries 4: holding that a standard employers liability policy is not an ocean marine policy


Input: salutary protection of the people against their own representatives which such legislation is designed to secure. Luzerne Township v. Fayette County, 330 Pa. 247, 252, 199 A. 327, 330 (1938). Because there was no meeting of the minds, no compliance with the statutory provisions necessary to properly execute a binding agreement on County’s behalf and no material fact at issue, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment must be affirmed. ORDER AND NOW, this 11th day of June, 1997, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County in the above-captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED. PELLEGRINI, J., concurs in the result only. 1 . Act of July 3, 1986, P.L. 388, as amended, 65 P.S. §§ 271-286. 2 . See Keenheel v. Pennsylvania Securities Commission, 134 Pa.Cmwlth. 494, 579 A.2d 1358 Holdings: 0: holding that section 13 of the sunshine act 65 ps  283 grants the court discretion to invalidate any or all official actions taken at illegally closed meetings 1: holding that the official charged with responsibility to act must be an official within the doj with the authority to act in the circumstances 2: holding that a state official can be held individually hable under  1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties 3: holding texas open meeting act prohibiting governmental body from conducting closed meetings during which public business or public policy over which the governmental body has supervision or control is discussed to be contentneutral because closed meetings 1 prevent transparency 2 encourage fraud and corruption and 3 foster mistrust in government 4: holding that state officials may be personally liable for actions taken in their official capacity