Input: adult male; siblings may or may not amount to "substantial family ties,” and if one of his brothers in San Diego was a citizen, two were not. Although the phone number belonged to Awadallah at a former address, it is hard to see why that matters to the investigation. Whether Awadallah was in fact cooperating was surely as unknown to Agent Plunkett as it was to the district court and as it is to us. As to the "box-cutter,” the tool is multi-purpose, and Agent Plunkett expressed no view as to why Awadallah had one. 21 . We assume for purposes of this discussion, without deciding, that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from a material witness arrest warrant as well as from a search warrant. See United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983 (2d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). 22 . In arguing that a Holdings: 0: holding that where an arrest was premised on both legally and illegally obtained evidence the validity of the arrest would depend on whether the untainted information considered by itself establishes probable cause 1: holding that the validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime the mere fact that the subject is later acquitted of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest 2: holding in the alternative that even if handcuffing a suspect did convert the detention into an arrest the arrest was justified by probable cause 3: holding that arrest was unsupported by probable cause but granting qualified immunity to defendants who made the arrest in reliance on communications with other officers 4: holding that hearsay evidence is considered valuable evidence in testing probable cause to arrest


Input: Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999). For instance, a state law placing conditions on public access to arrestees’ home addresses is not subject to a facial challenge on free speech grounds because the government is under no obligation to make those addresses public at all. Id. Here, however, CNS asserts its First Amendment right of access to judicial and other public proceedings. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). It is highly doubtful that “California could decide not to give out [the complaints] at all without violating the First Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added); cf. Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Though the government may sometimes withhold Holdings: 0: holding that the rigorous first amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case 1: holding that the first amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings 2: holding that there is no first amendment right of access to presentence reports 3: recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings 4: holding that the first amendment right of access applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case


Input: of services other than a lawyer at state expense. ¶10 The specific provision at issue here, CrR 3.1(b)(2), broadly describes the various stages of a criminal proceeding to which the right to counsel attaches, “including sentencing, appeal, and post-conviction review.” But the right is not limitless. We must also discern the plain meaning of CrR 3.1(b)(2), while taking into account related court rules and controlling case law. ¶11 The various stages of a criminal proceeding listed in CrR 3.1(b)(2) are more specifically covered elsewhere. For example: (1) CrR 3.1( to counsel under CrR 3.1 or CrRLJ 3.1 beyond what is constitutionally required. That stage is at the beginning, and our motivation was the preservation of evidence. See State v. Templeton, 148 Wn.2d 193, 211, 59 P.3d 632 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Robinson argues the plain language of CrR Holdings: 0: holding that there is no right to counsel beyond the initial direct appeal and thus no right to counsel in collateral attacks 1: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 2: holding crrlj 31b1 extended right to counsel beyond the constitution pursuant to rulemaking authority regarding preservation of evidence 3: holding that agency has the authority to issue regulations prohibiting deceptive practices pursuant to its general rulemaking authority and noting in the statute indicates that statutory cease and desist proceedings were intended to be exclusive 4: holding that there is no right to counsel beyond the initial direct appeal and thus no right to counsel on discretionary review


Input: Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir.1991). We are dubious whether this is such a case. However, even upon scrutiny, we find no basis to conclude that section 924(e)(1) violates the Eighth Amendment. Although Mitchell’s sentence is a severe punishment for felony gun possession, when viewed in the context of his three burglaries, it is no more severe than that found acceptable in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1145, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (upholding a mandatory life sentence with the eligibility of parole after twelve years for a defendant who had obtained $120.75 by false pretenses, and who had previously committed two similar crimes), and therefore does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Accord United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 27 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 846, Holdings: 0: holding that the four year sentence imposed by the district court was appropriate as it was comparable to the five year sentence for perjury or obstruction of justice 1: holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imposed for felony grand theft under californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment 2: holding fifteen year hfo mandatory minimum sentences on the three robbery convictions were required to run concurrently with the twentyfive year nonhfo mandatory minimum on the murder sentence 3: holding that the fifteen year minimum sentence imposed under section 924e does not violate the eighth amendment 4: holding in a five to four decision that a twentyfive year minimum sentence for stealing three golf clubs pursuant to californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment and that any criticism for the statute is properly directed at the legislature


Input: and that appellant complained of chest and wrist pain. All of the officers testified that there were no other pedestrians in the area, and Officer Berry testified that there were no bars or establishments that sell alcohol in the area. All three officers testified that appellant appeared intoxicated, and Officer Slight testified that appellant smelled of alcohol and failed all three field sobriety tests that were administered to him. Even without knowing the exact time span between when the accident occurred and when Officers Garcia and Berry arrived on the scene, this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that appellant was intoxicated while he was driving the vehicle. See Kuciemba, 310 S.W.3d at 462 (<HOLDING>); Weems v. State, 328 S.W.3d 172, 177 Holdings: 0: holding that circumstantial evidence may support temporal link between defendants intoxication and his driving 1: holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence 2: holding that a temporal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action may in some cases be sufficient to create an inference of retaliation 3: holding in driving under influence case that circumstantial evidence may serve to establish operation of vehicle 4: holding that the link between a defendants property and a plaintiffs childhood exposure to lead paint and dust may be established through circumstantial evidence even if expert opinion testimony is not available


Input: the instigation of the insured and/or his employees; 3) assault/battery at the direction of the insured and/or his employ ees; and 4) assault/battery due to an omission by the insured and/or his employees. Hudson asserts that the use of the word “omission” in the exclusion means “in this context is that the assault and/or battery was caused by something the insured or his employees neglected or failed to do, which is significantly broader than merely saying the assault and/or battery was actively done by the insured or his employees.” (Doe. 47 at 4). Hudson references Seventh and Second Circuit case law as support for its claim that the exclusion applies via use of the word “omission.” See generally United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Entertainment Group, Inc., 945 F.2d 210, 212-215 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) and United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Waterfront New Holdings: 0: holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled 1: holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party 2: holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured 3: holding that j5 exclusion did not bar coverage for claim against insured by third party arising out of insureds damage to third partys property 4: holding that the exclusion in liability policy for any claim asserting cause of action arising out of assault andor battery if caused by omission by insured andor his employees precluded coverage in negligence action alleging that minor customer was sexually assaulted in insured theaters washroom due to theaters failure to take certain precautions


Input: the evidence does not support the application of the exigent circumstances doctrine discussed in Herring. Nonetheless, the intrusion into the motel room was justified by the objective of law enforcement to detain, if not arrest, Wright and Powell for their involvement in the Victim’s murder. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (“[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.” (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, I concur in upholding the trial Holdings: 0: holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause 1: holding that probable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place 2: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 3: holding the petitioners act of retreating into her house could not thwart a warrantless arrest when it was set in motion in a public place upon probable cause 4: recognizing the defense of good faith and probable cause in  1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest


Input: ORDER Petitioner Beniamino Baldi, a native and citizen of Italy, seeks review of the June 7, 2011, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Beniamino Baldi, No. A012 099 608 (B.I.A. June 7, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. While we generally lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal issued against an alien, such as Baldi, who was found removable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony, we retain jurisdiction to review colorable constitutional claims or questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); Durant v. INS, 393 F.3d 113, 115 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Baldi argues that the BIA abused its Holdings: 0: holding that court of appeals statutory jurisdiction over final orders of removal extends to reinstatement orders 1: recognizing that both final and nonfinal orders may be the subject of motions for reconsideration 2: holding that there are two standards in review of orders on motions to vacate defaults simple abuse of discretion for orders denying relief and gross abuse of discretion for orders granting relief 3: holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders 4: recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal


Input: 11. Courts have adopted different definitions. Stranz v. Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. (In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.), 281 B.R. 154, 160 (Bankr.D.Conn.2002) (citing cases). Some courts adopt the narrow view that a personal injury tort claim is “a tort [claim] with[ ] trauma or bodily injury.” Id. at 160 (citing In re Atron Inc. of Mich., 172 B.R. 541 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1994); Perino v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 107 B.R. 453 (S.D.N.Y.1989)). Other courts adopt the broader view and define a personal injury tort claim as one that arises out of “any injury which is an invasion of personal rights.” Id. (quoting Leathem v. von Volkmar (In re von Volkmar), 217 B.R. 561, 566 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1998)); see also Thomas v. Adams (In re Gary Brew Enters. Ltd.), 198 B.R. 616, 619-20 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1996) (<HOLDING>). After comparing the narrow and broad Holdings: 0: holding that the states personal injury statutes of limitation should be applied for claims under section 1983 1: holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim 2: holding that claim brought under section 1983 of the civil rights act constituted a personal injury tort claim because section 1983 confers a general remedy for injuries to personal rights 3: holding that a civil rights deprivation is a personal injury tort 4: holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim


Input: to personalty is an injury to, or interference with, possession, unlawfully, with or without the exercise of physical force.' ” Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Vowell Constr. Co., 161 Tex. 432, 341 S.W.2d 148, 150 (1960) (quoting 87 C.J.S. Trespass §§ 8, 9). Thus the intentional entry of a scraper into a space lawfully occupied by a cable was held to be a "violation of a property right which gave rise to a cause of action regardless of negligence.” Id. Because we focus on an element common to all of the Palmas’ claims, we need not determine whether the Palmas’ claim for negligent trespass differs from the type of trespass claim recognized in Mountain States. 3 . The cases on which the Palmas rely concerning lay opinion are Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 667-70 (Tex.2007) (<HOLDING>); Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, Holdings: 0: holding there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant did not intend to perform when the promise was made 1: holding that where a patient is in possession of his faculties and in such physical health as to be able to consult about his condition and where no emergency exists making it impracticable to confer with him his consent is a prerequisite to a surgical operation by his physician 2: holding that the question presented is whether he adduced sufficient evidence from which a factfinder reasonably could conclude that the nature and severity of his injury significantly restricted his ability to walk as compared with an average person in the general population 3: holding that an attorneys twentyeight years of experience appearing before courts should have served to heighten his knowledge as to the appropriateness of his representations 4: holding that nonexpert evidence of the plaintiffs state of general health before the wreck as compared to his physical condition afterwards was sufficient to allow a layperson of common knowledge and experience to conclude that his wreck made it necessary to transport the plaintiff to an emergency room and be physically examined while there


Input: than one central reason, and “an asylum applicant need not prove which reason was dominant.” Parussimova, 555 F.3d at 741 (9th Cir.2009). Because mixed motive analysis exists in cases governed by the REAL ID Act, a petitioner may have been persecuted both because of legitimate investigatory reasons and because of his political opinion (imputed or actual), his religion, or other protected ground. The dissent seemingly fails to grasp this point. In short, even if a petitioner’s persecution occurs during the course of a legitimate investigation or prosecution, neither -Dinu nor any of our other cases requires that the BIA or our court ignore direct or indirect evidence that a persecutor was also motivated to harm the applicant on account of a protected ground. Cf. Li, 559 F.3d at 1109 (<HOLDING>). If a petitioner has presented evidence that Holdings: 0: recognizing that police may be motivated by both prosecutorial aims and religious hatred in a prereal id case 1: holding that extortion motivated in part by political opinion could qualify as persecution 2: recognizing that both final and nonfinal orders may be the subject of motions for reconsideration 3: holding that harm purely motivated by wealth is not persecution 4: holding that a police officers words during an assault make clear that he was motivated by a protected ground


Input: the supervision of a Sergeant and told her to clean the basement. (Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 39; PL’s Opp’n 22.) Although she does not identify the times when she was denied overtime opportunities, she claims that, at least between 2004 and 2006, she was offered fewer overtime opportunities than other lieutenants. (PL’s 56.1 Stmt. ,¶ 49.) She also alleges that being placed at the busy front desk interfered with her ability to complete substantive work. (PL’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 62-64, 70-71.) Upon considering all of Plaintiffs allegations and examining them based on the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable juror could find them to rise to the level of a hostile work environment pursuant to Title VII or NYSHRL. See, e.g., De la Cruz v. City of New York, 783 F.Supp.2d 622, 644 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (<HOLDING>); Gibson v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., No. 07 Civ. Holdings: 0: recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context 1: recognizing that the elements of title vii sexually hostile work environment claims apply to icra sexually hostile work environment claims 2: holding that a hostile work environment is a form of discrimination that is actionable under the statute 3: recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 4: holding that allegations of work reassignment schedule changes increased scrutiny of plaintiffs work and a supervisors stray remarks were insufficient to establish hostile work environment


Input: claim and argued that his constitutional right to due process and fundamental fairness was violated because the sentence he received was different, and more onerous, than the sentence he bargained for with the State. We explained that the defendant’s argument was rooted in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 433, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499 (1971), where the Supreme Court held that the defendant’s due process right was violated when the State promised to refrain from making a sentencing recommendation at the defendant’s trial as part of the plea agreement and then failed to honor that promise. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 185. Citing approvingly to Santobello, and our decision in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 326-27 (1996) (<HOLDING>), we declared that a defendant has a due Holdings: 0: recognizing ambiguous terms of plea agreement are construed against government 1: holding that both the state and the defendant are bound to the terms of a plea agreement under santobello 2: holding federal court is not bound by terms of plea agreement between defendant and state authorities 3: holding that a federal habeas court may grant specific performance of a plea agreement in the face of evidence that the state has breached the terms of such an agreement 4: holding that when a court accepts a fixed plea agreement it is bound by the agreements terms


Input: based upon legally sufficient evidence. To the extent that Moye is claiming that the verdicts were against the “weight of the evidence” under People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y.1987) (citations omitted), such an argument raised only-issues of New York state law and accordingly cannot provide a basis for habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (permitting federal habeas corpus review only where the petitioner has alleged that he is in state custody in violation of “the Constitution or a federal law or treaty”). Federal courts routinely dismiss claims attacking a verdict as against the weight of the evidence on the basis that they are not federal constitutional issues cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Ex parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 148 (2d Cir.1922) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 263 U.S. 255, 44 S.Ct. 103, 68 L.Ed. Holdings: 0: holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence   1: holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus 2: holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 3: holding a court cannot issue and make returnable to it a writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner is outside the courts authority 4: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus


Input: proceeds among actual damages, interest, and punitive damages. 1 . Federal Insurance Company, the station’s insurer for liabilities in excess of $22 million, denied coverage on the ground that the station had not suffered liability in excess of $22 million. This court upheld that decision. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Srivastava, 2 F.3d 98 (5th Cir.1993). 2 . For the law governing the taxable years in question, see 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 1988) (excluding from gross income the "amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness”). 3 . See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(4) (including interest within gross income); O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 117 S.Ct. 452, 136 L.Ed.2d 454 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The 1992 deficiency represents the Holdings: 0: holding that back pay awards are not excludable from gross income under 26 usc  104a2 1988 because the overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that an award of back pay under title vii does not constitute the legal remedy of damages 1: holding that punitive damages are excludable from gross income under 26 usc  104a2 2: holding that money received in compensation for emotional injuries is taxable income pursuant to  61a because the 1996 amendments to  104a2 would make little sense if  61a did not include compensation for personal injuries 3: holding that punitive damages are not awarded on account of personal injuries or sickness pursuant to 26 usc  104a2 and therefore constitute gross income 4: recognizing that recklessness or even gross negligence is insufficient to support punitive damages


Input: the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court. 1 Some state constitutions at the time of the founding lacked just compensation clauses and took property even without providing compensation. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1056-1057 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Framers of the Fifth Amendment apparently disagreed, for they expressly prohibited uncompensated takings, and the Fifth Amendment was not incorporated against the States until much later. See id., at 1028, n. 15. 2 Compare ante, at 479, and n. 8 (majority opinion) (noting that some state courts upheld the validity of applying the Mill Acts to private purposes and arguing that the “ “use by the public’ test” “eroded over time”), with, e. g., Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 338-339 (1877) (<HOLDING>); Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 204 Holdings: 0: holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege 1: recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public 2: holding that the words and provisions of a statute must be construed in a harmonious way 3: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public 4: holding it essential to the constitutionality of a mill act that the statute should require the use to be public in fact in other words that it should contain provisions entitling the public to accommodations


Input: to violence and to a breach of the peace. Syl. Pt. 1, Mauck v. City of Martinsburg, 167 W.Va. 332, 280 S.E.2d 216, 217-19 (1981). Insulting words which tend to violence and to a breach of the peace include “vituperative epithets” and “traditional racial slurs.” Mauck, 280 S.E.2d at 219. Here, Penn invokes the second cause of action articulated by the Mauck court, namely, that Kidder’s comment constituted insulting words which tend to violence and to a breach of the peace. Kidder’s comment, however, while a crude sexual remark, was neither a vituperative epithet nor traditional racial slur of the type which the Supreme Court of Appeals have held to be actionable under section 55-7-2. See Mauck, 280 S.E.2d at 219; compare with Covey v. Fields, 177 W.Va. 481, 354 S.E.2d 413, 414 (1987) (<HOLDING>); see also Cunningham v. Martin, 170 W.Va. 411, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs conclusory allegations were insufficient to make out prima facie case for mere department status of foreign corporation defendant 1: holding so where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had colluded to claim falsely that the plaintiffs physician had informed the claims adjuster that the plaintiff had been released to work and where the plaintiff was later discharged from employment and denied workers compensation benefits 2: holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct 3: holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position 4: holding that plaintiff tendfed to make out a prima facie case under section 5572 where testimony was given to the effect that defendant had accused plaintiff of having a yellow streak up his back a foot wide and that defendant threatened to either pound or grind plaintiffs head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting  accused plaintiff of participating in homosexual and oedipal dalliances and attributed to him a canine lineage  and impugned plaintiffs wifes chastity and virtue in a gross manner


Input: of section 13-305 of the Consumer Protection Act. The court was notified that the same legal issue was one of several issues that would be subject to the Division’s authority to provide injunctive relief after the determination of the administrative action. Thus, even after obtaining declaratory judgment in its favor as to the validity of the proposed advertisement, Luskin’s could still be subject to an adverse administrative order enjoining the implementation of the proposed advertisement. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court should not have granted declaratory judgment because it would not “serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Id.; see, e.g., Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 406, 347 A.2d 842 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Primary Jurisdiction Additionally, we Holdings: 0: holding that an insurer will not be estopped from denying coverage merely because the underlying case proceeds to judgment before the declaratory judgment action is resolved 1: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action 2: holding that in a declaratory judgment action it is the character of the impending action not the plaintiffs defense that determines whether there is federal question jurisdiction 3: holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment 4: holding that filing of infringement action twelve days after complaint for declaratory judgment obviated the need for a declaratory judgment in this case


Input: rule of general immunity applies only in the co-employees context, and application of the provision does not result in the loss of general immunity by an employer”). 11 . Vallejos’ own expert did not state in his affidavit that use of the makeshift rope, without the safety features or warnings, constituted an imminent or clear and present danger. The affidavit simply stated that Infinity failed to maintain a safe workplace. This is not helpful in distinguishing between negligence and gross negligence. See, e.g., Marquez v. Heim Corp., 632 So.2d 85, 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (reversing summary judgment because plaintiff’s expert testified that using the machine without a guard created a clear and present danger to the operator). 12 . See Bakerman v. Bombay Co., 961 So.2d 259, 265 (Fla.2007) (<HOLDING>). 13 . When Lawton was decided in 1986, the Holdings: 0: holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others 1: holding that the statute is mandatory 2: holding the connection is an element 3: holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of  one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others 4: holding that concealment is just one factor to consider and is not a mandatory element


Input: then assessed liquidated damages against plaintiff by unilaterally modifying the contract to reduce the total contract price. Plaintiff subsequently submitted a claim to the contracting officer seeking the remission of the liquidated damages in the Coast Guard’s possession, which the contracting officer denied. In such circumstances, there is both a government claim against plaintiff for liquidated damages and a claim by plaintiff against the government for the remission of retained liquidated damages. See K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 107 Fed.Cl. at 587-88 (citing Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 465, 480-82 (1991)). And, there is both a final decision on the government’s claim for liquidated damages, see Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), and a final decision on plaintiffs claim for Holdings: 0: holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim 1: holding that a contractor must provide the contracting officer with adequate notice of the basis and amount of the claim 2: holding that the contracting officer effectively made a final decision on the government claim for set off by declining to pay the contractor the balance due on the contract 3: holding that the finality of a contracting officers determination was suspended during his review of a request by the contractor to reconsider the final decision 4: holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim


Input: stimulant in question was possessed or distributed in sufficient quantity to have a stimulant effect on the central nervous system. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(d) lists methamphetamine as follows: (d) Stimulants. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on t effect on the central nervous system” as limiting the provision to cases where methamphetamine appears in a quantity or concentration proven to have the prohibited effect. We disagree. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12 is a list of those drugs that Congress and the Attorney General have determined to be controlled substances and “where Congress intended the quantity of a substance to be dispos .1975) (<HOLDING>). These decisions date back over thirty years, Holdings: 0: holding that similar language evidences a congressional determination of the actual depressant effect of the listed substances 1: holding that similar language provided a sufficient general jurisdiction allegation 2: holding similar language to be a valid disclaimer 3: holding that language similar to the above did not exclude other methods of notice 4: holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language


Input: a white BMW. Appellant was not driving a white BMW at the time he was stopped. In fact, Sergeant Kasper could not identify any characteristic that Appellant had in common with Powell aside from his race, a trait that is shared by all African-American males in the City of Wilkes-Barre. ¶ 11 “Driving while black” is not among the violations identified in the Motor Vehicle Code. Because the officer’s identification of Appellant was predicated solely upon a vague racial description, we agree with Appellant that articulable and reasonable grounds for the stop did not exist. Consequently, the stop was invalid and all evidence flowing therefrom should have been suppressed as fruits of the unlawful stop. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 543 Pa. 612, 618-620, 673 A.2d 915, 918-919 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, Holdings: 0: holding that trial court properly suppressed evidence where officer did not possess articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect that defendant violated motor vehicle code the officer did not see defendant drive erratically commit a traffic violations or engage in any conduct indicating that he was under the influence of alcohol 1: holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger 2: holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation 3: holding police officer had probable cause to believe defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol 4: holding that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to stop the defendant for obstructing traffic because there was no evidence of intent to impede or hinder traffic where the vehicle was only briefly stopped in the roadway and the officer approaching the vehicle from behind did not have to stop or drive around the defendants vehicle


Input: is a matter of consent between the parties, and one cannot be required to submit to arbitration a dispute which it has not agreed to submit to arbitration.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Service Agreement, unlike the APA and Employment Agreements, does not contain a broad arbitration clause in its “Remedies” section; rather, the Service Agreement contemplates arbitration only of disputes regarding the narrow issue of a new compensation arrangement in the event of certain regulatory changes. If the parties intended to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the Service Agreement, they could have easily included the same broad arbitration provision in that agreement. See Alticor, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 669, 672 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Although we rejected a similar argument in Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court not the arbitrator must decide a challenge to an arbitration provision based on public policy 1: holding that claims against a broker under the securities laws and rico were subject to arbitration pursuant to a provision requiring the arbitration of any dispute relating to the customers accounts 2: holding that a dispute arising out of an insurance policy was not covered by the arbitration provision in the parties separate premium payment agreement because if the party had intended to subject this dispute to the arbitration provision it could easily clearly and unequivocally have done so either by including an arbitration provision in the insurance policy itself or by adding to the above arbitration provision 3: holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added 4: holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision


Input: Felipe Lugo, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action without leave to amend. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and we review for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to amend, Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir.1982). We affirm. The district court correctly dismissed Lugo’s complaint because he failed to allege that the defendants were acting under color of state law. See O’Guinn v. Lovel-ock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Because Lugo has failed to explain how the Holdings: 0: holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim 1: holding that a defendants personal involvement in an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights is a necessary element of a  1983 complaint 2: recognizing such a claim under  1983 3: holding an allegation of damages is a necessary element of any claim under  2605 4: recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim


Input: inference, however, is totally lacking because the corrective work contained three important elements that were not present in the original plans: (1) a waterproofing agent was added, (2) expanding foam insulation sealed any gaps between the structural support and the Styrofoam block, and (3) butyl caulk sealant was applied to the top of all T superstructures. A party claiming a breach of contract must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there was a contract, (2) that the other party breached the contract and, (3) that the party asserting breach of contract suffered damages as a result of the breach. Stevenson v Brotherhoods Mut Benefit, 312 Mich 81, 90-91; 19 NW2d 494 (1945); Residential Ratepayer Consortium v Pub Serv Comm, 198 Mich App 144, 149; 497 NW2d 558 (1993) (<HOLDING>); see M Civ JI 142.01. This standard means the Holdings: 0: holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence 1: holding the fedrevid 801d2e requires proof of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence and allows consideration of the offered declaration as part of the proof of the conspiracy 2: recognizing that the preponderance of the evidence is the quantum of proof in civil cases 3: holding that the standard of proof in revocation proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence 4: holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard


Input: it must be the latter. Any different approach would impose an impossible burden on the police. It would mean that they could never search closed containers within a dwelling ... without asking the person whose consent is being given ex ante about every item they might encounter. We note that there is no possibility of such a rule for automobile searches, because the Supreme Court has already authorized this type of container search in that context. See Ross, supra; Houghton, supra. Our conclusion here rests in part on the discussion in Houghton that indicates that the container rule rests on general principles of Fourth Amendment law that do not depend on the special attributes of automobile searches. Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1042 (emphasis in original); see also Ladell, 127 F.3d at 624 (<HOLDING>). Reinforcing these traditional principles, Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants sister could consent to a search of only the common areas of their shared house and her own bedroom and explicitly stating that the sister could not consent to search the defendants bedroom because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own bedroom 1: holding that appellants mother had the authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom defendant lived with parents rentfree for four years mother owned the house appellants bedroom door was open mother knocked whenever appellants door was locked and there were no restrictions placed on mothers right to enter bedroom 2: holding that child cannot consent to search of parents bedroom 3: holding that a mother had apparent authority to consent to a search of her adult sons bedroom including a closed vinyl bag found in the bedroom 4: holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult sons bedroom including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed


Input: 3. Victim of extortion Relying on Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 53 S.Ct. 35, 77 L.Ed. 206 (1932), and cases from other circuits, Fernandez requested an instruction that the government prove he was not a victim of extortion: In general, a victim of extortion is not a participant (co-conspirator or aider and abettor) in the extortion, even though payment may facilitate the activities of a RICO organization. Thus, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt any defendant charged in this case was not a victim of extortion. This instruction was not supported by law. No case cited by Fernandez suggests that a low-level member of a RICO conspiracy can escape conviction simply because high er-ups exacted payment from him. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 119-23, 53 S.Ct. 35 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762, 766-71 Holdings: 0: holding a condominium association had no duty to a woman who had committed suicide after the association removed the womans dog because while the association knew the dog was essential to the womans will to live the association had no authority to prevent the womans suicide 1: holding that a womans consent to be transported for prostitution does not amount to a conspiracy with her transporter to violate the mann act 2: holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept 3: recognizing that  2422a liability does not require a defendant to create out of whole cloth a womans desire to travel to engage in prostitution 4: recognizing that the pregnant womans ability to assert her own rights is beset with obstacles including her desire to protect her privacy


Input: rule 9(b) was applicable to RICO claims. See Tr. at 30 (Court). Mr. Bird, Plaintiffs’ counsel, and Mr. Bregman, Leslie Robins’ counsel, both thought rule 9(b) applies. See id. at 43 (Bird), 44 (Breg-man). It appears, however, based on the Court’s own research, that the standards of rule 9(b) do not apply to RICO claims in this situation. The Tenth Circuit has applied rule 9(b) only to RICO cases where the underlying racketeering acts were themselves acts of fraud that would be subject to rule 9(b) if pled independently as causes of action. See Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir.1989). In other areas of RICO, however, the standard, more generous requirements of rule 8 apply. See Robbins v. Wilkie, 300 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir.2002)(<HOLDING>). In defending the sufficiency of their Holdings: 0: holding that to rebut presumption plaintiff need only allege specific facts not plead evidence 1: holding that plaintiffs cannot claim that a conspiracy to violate rico existed if they do not adequately plead a substantive violation of rico 2: holding that plaintiff need only plead damages in rico cases sufficient to meet rule 8s requirements 3: holding that district court properly dismissed a complaint containing a purported one thousand causes of action for failing to meet rule 8s requirements 4: holding a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to establish that a plausible contract exists but need not plead every detail of the contract


Input: under the Fourth Amendment. III. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we hold that probable cause to arrest the appellant did not grow stale. Accordingly, his seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the circuit court did not err in denyi asive authority to support his argument that probable cause to arrest for an observed offense dissipates based merely on the passage of time. 6 . The Supreme Court of Virginia reached a similar conclusion in a case involving a search warrant for blood and hair samples. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 529 S.E.2d 769 (2000). The Court tested the warrant "for 'staleness’ by considering whether the facts alleged ... provided probable cause to believe, at the time the search actually was conducted,” that it "would lead to the 1 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 8 . On the facts of this case, we need not Holdings: 0: holding that probable cause to believe certain individuals were members of a conspiracy did not give probable cause to search the contents of the room in which they were arrested 1: holding that probable cause did not fade away merely because the police arrested the defendant the following day 2: holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry 3: holding that even though the plaintiff was incarcerated for only one day before his extradition hearing the complaint was sufficient to establish a due process violation at the pleadings stage because it alleged among other things that the defendants falsely arrested the plaintiff without probable cause and with deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs rights 4: holding that probable cause to stop a vehicle was supported by the fact that the defendant had previously been arrested for illegally transporting liquor


Input: to understand how someone who believed that he became the “lead man” in September 2000 should not reasonably have been aware that he was not actually in that position or being paid commensurately until February 2001. Sixth Circuit precedent is clear that in Title VII actions, “the starting date for the 300-day limitations period is when the plaintiff learns of the employment decision itself, not when the plaintiff learns that the employment decision may have been discriminatorily motivated. Indeed, this focus on the discriminatory act is consistent ... with Supreme Court precedent and the statutory language of Title VII.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir.2001); see also Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Thus, February 2001 is clearly not the Holdings: 0: holding that the insurer is not bound by acts of the agent which are beyond the scope of his authority when the insured has notice of the limitations upon an agents authority or when the circumstances are sufficient to suggest that an inquiry should be made as to such limitations 1: holding that the proper focus when determining the starting point of the limitations period  is upon the time of the discriminatory acts not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful  2: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision 3: holding that the court may only consider the discrete acts that occurred within the appropriate time period 4: holding that an individual could recover for acts occurring outside the statutory time period if at least one act occurred within the time period and the acts were part of the same hostile work environment


Input: "best practices” model, PL's Opp’n at 42, he offers nothing to support this assertion, see geiterally id. at 40-41. 17 . The plaintiff's individual EEO complaint, which he filed in 1997, was dismissed and subsumed by the class action, at which point he became a named plaintiff in the case. Pl.'s Opp'n at 41-42. The parties eventually settled the Conanan litigation under a consent decree in 2001. Id. at 42. 18 . Although the defendant briefly suggests that the January 2004 e-mail does not qualify as protected activity, Def.'s Mot. at 25, the email contains allegations of discrimination against the African-American members of the Task Force in receiving foreign assignments, and thus likely does constitute protected activity. See Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted); see also Sumner Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination 1: holding that a title vii cause of action is limited to those discrimination allegations in the complaint that have been under the scrutiny of a formal eeoc complaint 2: holding that the conduct complained of must be an unlawful employment practice under title vii 3: recognizing ageplusgender discrimination claim when complaint brought claims under adea and title vii 4: holding that not every complaint garners its author protection under title vii  the complaint must in some way allege unlawful discrimination not just frustrated ambition


Input: legal standard.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir.2011) (same); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-51 (4th Cir.2008) (finding that because alien was removable by reason of an aggravated felony conviction, § 1252(a)(2)(C) prohibited evaluation of the factual merits of his CAT claim and alien could not “repackage[ ] his ... argument ... in an attempt to create a reviewable legal question where there is none”); Jean-Pierre v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir.2007) (same); Tran v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir.2006) (“Pursuant to § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D), our review of Tran’s CAT claim is limited to questions of law or constitutional issues.”). But see Issaq v. Holder, 617 F.3d 962, 970 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Lemus-Galvan v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1081, Holdings: 0: holding that the jurisdictional bar applies to the denial of deferral of removal under the cat 1: holding that preemption under  1144a does not permit removal if the plaintiffs claim does not fall within the scope of  1132a 2: holding a decision under the cat to deny even deferral of removal does not fall within the jurisdictionstripping provisions of either  1252a2b or  1252a2c 3: holding that the jurisdiction stripping provision found at 8 usc  1252a2c applies only to removal orders not to applications for asylum withholding of removal or cat relief 4: holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility


Input: that there was evidence that Johnson attempted to correct his course after losing control). But a defendant can be deemed negligent for failing to take an action that she should have taken, just as she can be deemed negligent for taking an action that she should not have taken. In this instance, as the majority points out, "[the evidence here showed that Johnson lost control of his vehicle upon encountering the snow patch." Maj. op. at 118; see also id. at 18 ("An investigation of the scene revealed that Johnson lost control of his vehicle when he hit an icy patch of snow on the road."). Thus, the question is whether Johnson acted reasonably-either in taking or failing to take action-after he hit the ice patch and lost control of the vehicle See, eg., Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1059 (<HOLDING>). The Jury said yes. {88 Second, the majority Holdings: 0: holding that the attorneys conduct must be viewed in light of the totality of the cireumstances to determine whether that conduct constitutes a violation of colo rpc 8ah 1: holding that the court must determine whether the employees consent to the settlement agreement was knowing and voluntary 2: holding that the jury must determine whether the partys conduct was reasonable under the cireumstances 3: holding that trial court must determine whether fifth amendment violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding that jury instructions must allow the jury to determine the issues presented intelligently


Input: raise a substantial question regarding the appellant’s guilty plea. United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F.2008). “By pleading guilty, an accused does more than admit that he [committed] the various acts alleged in a specification; “he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.’” United States v. Campbell, 68 M.J. 217, 219 (C.A.A.F.2009) (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989)). During the plea inquiry, Appellant admitted under oath each of the elements of the offense of indecent exposure, including that he exposed himself to public view. When an accused pleads guilty, there is no requirement that the government establish the factual predicate for the plea. United States v. Faircloth, 45 M.J. 172, 174 (C.A.A.F.1996) (<HOLDING>). “The factual predicate is sufficiently Holdings: 0: holding that in a guilty plea ease the court would not speculate as to the true victim of larceny with respect to copayees on a check 1: holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea 2: holding that the defendant remains the master of his case particularly with respect to the entry of a guilty plea 3: holding entry of guilty plea waives challenges to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea  emphasis added 4: holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional


Input: to be drawn in his favor. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-159, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). I. TITLE IX Section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that “no person in the United States shall on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). A “program or activity” includes “all the operations of ... a college, university, or other post-secondary institution, or a public system of higher education .. any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2)(A). In most Title IX cases, the plaintiff attempts to demons 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Yellow Springs, etc. v. Ohio High Sch. Ath. Holdings: 0: holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college because the language of the section does not distinguish between direct and indirect receipt of federal funds 1: holding that ncaa was not an indirect recipient of federal funds even though it received dues from schools that received federal funds 2: holding that kentucky high school athletic associa tion qualified as agent of the state and as recipient of federal funds so as to be subject to title ix when association received dues from member schools which received federal funds 3: holding that ohio high school athletic association was not a recipient of federal funds because it did not receive direct federal assistance and it did not receive money from local schools who were recipients of federal assistance 4: holding that kentucky high school athletic association was an indirect recipient of federal funds because it was created by state law its functions were determined by the kentucky board of education and it received dues from member schools who received federal funds


Input: and tops that conclusion with the assumption that the judge determined the amount “as somewhat larger.” The term “underproved” appears to be another way of saying that Wife has proved her reasonable needs to a certain extent but failed to prove any need beyond that point. As such, the trial court would be engaging in speculation as to Wife’s needs beyond the expenses she had been able to prove. An award of maintenance cannot stand without evidence to support it. Wofford v. Wofford, 858 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Mo.App. 1993). Because Wife testified that she did not know how much she would incur for electricity, car maintenance, or rental insurance, the trial court could not have considered these expenses in determining maintenance. M.A.Z. v. F.J.Z., 943 S.W.2d 781, 790 (Mo.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). The majority properly points out if Wife “had Holdings: 0: holding that income and expense statement did not constitute substantial evidence to support maintenance award when wife conceded her lack of knowledge about actual expenses 1: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 2: holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted 3: holding trial court erred in finding purported wife unavailable to testify and admitting her sworn prior statements in lieu of her live testimony where record did not support courts ruling in light of its own finding that remarriage of wife and defendant was fraudulent and wife did not refuse to testify if claim of privilege was denied 4: holding that a wife could be held liable for the negligent failure to prevent or warn the victims about her husbands sexually abusive behavior when the wife had actual knowledge or special reason to know that the husband was likely to abuse a particular person or persons


Input: a comparison of Lentz’s handwriting exemplars with the questioned handwritten documents in the government’s possession would have revealed that Lentz was indeed the author of the questioned documents. Although the Fourth Circuit has not squarely addressed this issue, published authority from other circuits is divided on this question, but the better reasoned, ap posite decisions favor Lentz’s “authorship” argument over the government’s “consciousness of guilt” argument in the circumstances presented here. To be sure, several circuits have allowed the government to present evidence of a defendant’s refusal to provide a handwriting exemplar as evidence of that defendant’s consciousness of guilt for the offense charged, as the government here requests. See, e.g., Askew, 584 F.2d at 963 (<HOLDING>). These decisions, however, are inapposite, as Holdings: 0: holding that while the government was required to prove that the defendants phone call crossed a state line  the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew of the interstate nexus 1: holding in a prosecution for the interstate transportation of forged securities that the government was permitted to prove and comment on a defendants refusal to produce exemplars as tending to prove his guilt of the offense charged 2: recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence 3: holding due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the charged offense and new york law that requires the defendant in a second degree murder prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter when no element of the charged offense is presumed does not violate the due process clause 4: holding that the government need not prove that interstate transport was foreseeable in order to obtain a conviction under 18 usc  2314 which prohibits the interstate transportation of stolen goods


Input: Even if an updated psychological evaluation had been conducted at the time of the original posteonviction hearing, the results would in all probability be invalid at the time of a second hearing well over one year later. Consequently, such evidence could not have been discovered at the time of the original 1981 hearing and should have been allowed one year later at the 1982 hearing. The state argues that the report should have been obtained and offered at the first hearing, and argues that if petitioner believes his counsel erred in failing to do this, the petitioner ought to pet ffirming a dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus seeking to relitigate issues decided against petitioner in a previous habeas corpus proceeding); State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Ware v. State, 284 Minn. 525, 169 N.W.2d 16 Holdings: 0: holding that defendant could not raise in a  2255 motion an issue previously decided on direct criminal appeal 1: holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived 2: holding that where the fourth amendment question was raised at trial but not preserved on direct appeal in the state court the defendants failure to raise the issue on appeal in the state courts did not suffice to avoid stone 3: holding that petitioner in posteonviction proceeding may not raise matter that he raised and which was decided against him on direct appeal 4: holding in part that a convicted defendant is not entitled to raise in a posteonviction proceeding any matter which he raised on direct appeal or which he knew about but did not raise in his direct appeal


Input: who are in the habit of making such judgments. Yet, the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit have admonished hearing officers and reviewing courts alike when they substitute personal opinions or judgments as to proper educational policy, and best placements for the disabled student, in the place of the local educators’ expert judgments. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034; Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1000-01. These courts have also reminded hearing officers and reviewing courts that school districts are not required to provide a disabled child with the best possible education. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The result reached here is properly deferential to Jane’s educators’ unanimous determination that the Interlude placement was appropriate. See Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1001 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the hearing officer’s conclusion Holdings: 0: holding that whenever the local agency refuses or wrongfully neglects to provide a handicapped child with a free appropriate education that child can be best served on the regional or state level 1: recognizing that a parent can petition for postminority support for a disabled child 2: holding that local educators deserve latitude in determining the iep most appropriate for a disabled child 3: holding that the situs of the alleged tortious conduct is relevant in choosing the most appropriate forum 4: holding that review of nonfinal orders determining child custody in child dependency proceedings is not encompassed by rule 9130a3ciii which permits review of nonfinal orders determining child custody in domestic relations cases


Input: the Sixth Amendment concern addressed in Justice Stevens’ opinion, see supra, the Court nevertheless believes that, under a “reasonableness” standard, it has the obligation to take any Sixth Amendment concerns it has into account in order to reconcile the holdings in both parts of the majorities of the Booker deci sion. In this case, while Defendant believed he was sending child pornography to a minor, he actually distributed such pornography to an adult undercover police officer. Under Justice Stevens’ opinion in Booker, the Court would have held that the Government had failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant distributed child pornography to a minor, as the police officer was not a minor. See United States v. O’Daniel, 328 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1183 (N.D.Okla.2004) (<HOLDING>). The Court does not believe it may ignore this Holdings: 0: holding the same under blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004 1: holding that blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531159 led2d 403 2004 did not overrule almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 2: holding that after blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004 statutory maximum is the maximum that this particular defendant can face in light of his criminal history and the facts found by a jury or admitted by the defendant 3: holding that blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004 and state v schofield 2005 me 82 895 a2d 927 do not retroactively apply to cases on collateral review 4: holding that the safety valve provision of 18 usc  3553f is not unconstitutional under apprendi 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 or blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004


Input: who have taken authorized maternity leave. See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1207, 113 L.Ed.2d 158, 178 (1991); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 1996). When interpreting' discrimination claims under Iowa Code chapter 216, we turn to federal law, including Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1998) (“In deciding gender discrimination disputes, we adhere to the Title VII analytical framework. ...”); Fuller v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 576 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Iowa 1998) (“In considering a disability d 00 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Nelson v. Wittem Group, Inc., 140 Holdings: 0: holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness 1: holding federal statute covers situation where employer refused to rehire employee because she might become pregnant again 2: holding that an employer must remedy situation of sexual harassment 3: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits 4: holding that where employer acknowledges respondeat superior liability for the conduct of its employee direct negligence claims become duplicative


Input: have been raised in one of these conversa tions, particularly given Li’s testimony that she intended to let her mother know about her pregnancy. Further, the BIA and IJ appropriately faulted Li because the record was “barren of reliable corroboration.” Li failed to submit a statement from her father, aunt, sister, or mother. See Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 164 (indicating that an applicant’s failure to corroborate her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question). In addition, the IJ was not required to show that this evidence was reasonably available to Li before relying on a lack of corroboration to support the adverse credibility finding. See id. at 164 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the IJ accurately observed that, Holdings: 0: holding that a claimants claim is barred when administrative remedies that are clearly required under an erisa plan are not exhausted 1: holding that strict compliance is not required 2: holding that resentencing is required 3: holding that these steps are not required when the applicant is not otherwise credible 4: holding that it is not


Input: CURIAM. Reginald Wilkerson seeks a writ of mandamus regarding a motion for postconviction relief filed in 2001. We grant the petition. In his petition, Wilkerson states he filed his motion in February 2001, and, that after the trial court denied relief, he moved for rehearing. Wilkerson claims that the trial court never ruled on the motion for rehearing. At our request, the State filed a response which confirms the filing of the motion for rehearing. In response to Wilkerson’s 2010 motion to hear and rule, the trial judge apparently wrote a memo denying rehearing. We agree with the State’s concession, however, that this memo does not constitute a properly filed written order. See State v. Wagner, 863 So.2d 1224 (Fla.2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we grant the petition and remand Holdings: 0: holding that signed court minutes are not proper orders 1: holding that orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable as collateral orders 2: holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders 3: holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291 4: recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal


Input: any mention during cross examination of his dishonorable discharge from the Marines. The court granted defendant's motion. Despite the ruling, the State's attorney asked a question about the circumstances of his leaving the Marines and he replied, "I deserted." State v. Smith, supra at 427. Defendant did not object to the question, did not move to instruct the jury to disregard the answer, and did not move to strike the answer. The Supreme Court held that defendant's motion to exclude the evidence was sufficient to preserve the error for appeal, concluded the error was prejudicial and ordered a new trial. As Smith demonstrates, a ruling on a motion to exclude evidence is not necessarily merely advisory and tentative. Accord, State v. Brooks, 20 Wn. App. 52, 59-60, 579 P.2d 961 (1978) (<HOLDING>) (citing State v. Smith, supra). If such a Holdings: 0: holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal 1: holding that a defendants failure to object or join in a codefendants objection to an issue bars the defendant from raising the issue on appeal 2: holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered 3: holding defendant failed to preserve for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence that was the subject of the motion in limine where defendant failed to object to evidence when offered at trial 4: holding that failure to object does not preclude raising the issue on appeal where erroneous evidence is offered in violation of an order in limine


Input: states, in pertinent part: “Affirmed by Memorandum. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. The appellant, Addie Lee Thomas, appeals her conviction and her subsequent sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment for the murder of her common law husband. Thomas raised two issues on appeal. Thomas first contends that the trial court committed reversible error by not allowing a Batson hearing following the state’s use of nine of its ten peremptory strikes against black members of the venire. The original veni-re pool consisted of 47% black members and the final empaneled jury was 50% black. The trial court did not make a clearly erroneous ruling by finding that a prima facie case of discrimination was not established against the state. See Harrell v. State, 571 So.2d 1270 (Ala.1990) (<HOLDING>).” In Harrell v. State, 555 So.2d 263 (Ala. Holdings: 0: holding that blacks who were not subjected to racial discrimination had standing under title vii to sue over discrimination against other blacks 1: holding that while proper statistical evidence can be the most important vehicle for showing class discrimination the plaintiff failed to compare the percentage of blacks hired for given jobs with the percentage of blacks qualified for those positions and it was not sufficient to merely show that black managers formed a smaller percentage of the manager pool than did managers of other races 2: holding that the prosecutors use of four of his five peremptory strikes to remove blacks was sufficient to establish a prima facie case 3: holding that without more the mere fact that the prosecutor used a high number of strikes to remove women from the venire is insufficient to establish a prima facie case 4: holding that a prima facie case of discrimination is not established merely by the number of peremptory strikes against blacks in cases where the percentage of blacks on the empaneled jury is higher than the percentage of the venire pool


Input: such as evaluations of all of KT.’s IEP goals, may also be useful. (Def.’s Mot. at 8-10.) “[T]he record in an IDEA case is supposed to be made not in the district court but primarily at the administrative level[.]” Reid, 401 F.3d at 527 (Henderson, J., concurring). Thus, although the Court is “troubled at the prospect of further delay,” Nesbitt I, 532 F.Supp.2d at 125, it will remand this case to the Hearing Officer for further proceedings that should be conducted as expeditiously as possible. The Officer should supplement the record with the information needed to “best correct” KT.’s educational “deficits,” Reid, 401 F.3d at 526, and to “determine an appropriate award of compensatory education” based on the District’s failure to provide K.T. with an FAPE. Brown, 568 F.Supp.2d at 54 (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Holdings: 0: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision 1: recognizing appropriateness of compensatory education award and holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory education if she prevailed in her claim that she was denied a fape for several years 2: holding that the plaintiff had established an entitlement to relief on the merits of the claim  and was therefore entitled to fees even though it was remanded to the agency for further action 3: holding so where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had colluded to claim falsely that the plaintiffs physician had informed the claims adjuster that the plaintiff had been released to work and where the plaintiff was later discharged from employment and denied workers compensation benefits 4: holding that plaintiff was entitled to an award but remanding to the hearing officer to gather further evidence because plaintiff miscalculated the relevant time that the student had been denied a fape


Input: names reduce[d] their ability to obtain satisfactory commercial affiliation by licensing agreements.” Id. at 459. Upon finding in favor of the golfers, however, the court in Palmer relied upon the defendant’s use of the golfers’ pictures and cited cases wherein recovery was permitted for an invasion of privacy where a picture of a famous person was used. Id. at 461 (“Where defendant sold lockets with removable photographs of plaintiff in each one, it was held that plaintiff-actress could recover for this invasion of her privacy.”) (emphasis added) (citing Lane v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66, 11 N.Y.S.2d 199 (S.Ct.1939)); (“Where defendant inserted pictures of plaintiffs, widely known baseball players, in containers of popcorn and chewing gum, recovery was permitted.” r.2005) (<HOLDING>); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants use of players likenesses in parody trading cards violated the right of publicity 1: holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury 2: holding that the right of publicity is descendible 3: recognizing protection against appropriation for the defendants advantage of the plaintiffs name or likeness 4: holding that the defendants use of a models likeness in connection with the packaging and promotion of its hair care product violated the right of publicity


Input: standards, the decision whether to submit lesser offense instructions is not a decision for the defendant, but rather for defense counsel after consultation with the defendant. Recent cases analyzing the effect of this change have concluded that under the current ABA standards, the decision whether to request lesser offense instructions is for defense counsel. See Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1167 (10th Cir.2004) (based on change in third edition, "(whether to argue a lesser-included offense is a matter to be decided by counsel after consultation with the defendant"); Simeon, 90 P.3d at 184 (relying in part on the change in the ABA standards to hold that the decision to request lesser offense instructions rests with counsel); Mathre v. State, 619 N.W.2d 627, 629-31 (N.D.2000) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, we note that several Holdings: 0: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense 1: holding that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to consult with defendant about seeking lesser offense instructions because under current aba standards the decision is not one that must be made by defendant 2: holding that counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think that a rational defendant would want to appeal 3: holding that counsel may not be deemed ineffective under strickland for failing to object to jury instructions where this court previously upheld validity of those instructions 4: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel


Input: have observed that DCF is “probably the most prominent and frequently used post-Weinberger method of appraisal.” Wer-theimer, 47 Duke L.J. at 628. In different legal contexts, Arizona courts have long recognized DCF as a viable valuation method. See, e.g., Pima County v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 115 Ariz. 175, 177, 564 P.2d 398, 400 (App.1977); Crystal Point Joint Venture v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 188 Ariz. 96, 101, 932 P.2d 1367, 1372 (App.1997). Although the DCF method is by no means the only appropriate corporate valuation method, the trial court did not err by relying on the DCF method evidence presented at the valuation hearing on the record presented by the parties in this case. See Maricopa County v. Barkley, 168 Ariz. 234, 239, 812 P.2d 1052, 1057 (App.1990) (<HOLDING>). ¶34 Appellants do not so much contest Raben’s Holdings: 0: holding that experts may rely in part on internet research 1: holding that a trial court has discretion to qualify experts and rely on various methods in making a valuation determination 2: holding that presumption of correctness defeated when taxpayer alleged assessors valuation was discriminatory and presented evidence of discriminatory valuation methods 3: holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for  trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis 4: holding that appellate court in affirming trial courts decision may rely in part on a ground not presented to trial court


Input: bound by the rules and regulations in the MHSAA’s handbook. Trail, 163 So.3d at 276. Although the MHSAA is a private, voluntary association, it is uniquely situated due to its substantial entwinement with government. By statute, the local school boards are empowered to regulate athletic programs. Miss.Code Ann. § S7-7-301(q). (Rev.2013). But the school-boards have delegated their statutory authority to regulate athletics to the MHSAA. Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass’n. v. Coleman, 631 So.2d 768, 774 (Miss.1994). And because the MHSAA’s authority is derived from statutory authority, its actions are “state action for the purpose of constitutional analysis.” Id.; see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291, 298, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In Trail, we recognized that, because student Holdings: 0: holding that expert report that sufficiently addressed certain claims against doctor employed by professional association was sufficient as to claims against professional association based on doctors negligence because the doctors negligence is imputed to the association under the professional association act 1: holding a condominium association had no duty to a woman who had committed suicide after the association removed the womans dog because while the association knew the dog was essential to the womans will to live the association had no authority to prevent the womans suicide 2: recognizing the irony that a state officials conduct may be considered  state action for fourteenth amendment purposes yet not for purposes of the eleventh amendment 3: holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action 4: holding that regulatory enforcement by a highschool athletic association was state action for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment due to the pervasive entwinement between the athletic association and public schools and officials


Input: claim. VI. State Law Claims The Report recommended the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims because it recommended summary judgment on the ADÁ claim. However, because the court does not grant summary judgment on the ADA claim, the state law claims must be addressed. a. Violation of Public Policy Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for “violation of public policy,” arguing the District breached its own policies when it failed to accommodate Plaintiffs disability. Compl. ¶¶ 26-29. To the extent Plaintiff is asserting a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, such a claim is not available because a statutory remedy exists. See Barron v. Labor Finders of South Carolina, 393 S.C. 609, 713 S.E.2d 634, 637 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Further, Plaintiff was not terminated; Holdings: 0: holding that where statutory or regulatory provisions which evidence the public policy themselves provide a remedy for the wrongful discharge provision of a further remedy under the public policy exception is unnecessary 1: holding that public policy claims are unavailable where the statute in question provides the employee with a wrongful discharge remedy 2: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for a tort action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy applied to the plaintiffs erisa  510 claim 3: holding a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is not available where the employee has an existing statutory remedy 4: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy


Input: the EAJA for determining whether a party is entitled to fees. Id. at 456. Accordingly, in Claro, we discussed at length when a party has “incurred” fees for purposes of the EAJA. Id. Because the EAJA does not provide a definition of the term “incurred,” we examined the term’s ordinary meaning. 579 F.3d at 464. After examining the definition of “incurred” in Webster’s Dictionary — “to become liable or subject to,” or to “bring down upon oneself’ — and Black’s Law "Dictionary — “to suffer to bring on oneself a liability or expense,” id. at 456 (citations and brackets omitted), we concluded that the general rule is that fees are incurred “when the litigant has a legal obligation to pay them.” Id. at 464-65 (citing Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d 1407, 1414-15 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1164 Holdings: 0: holding that under the eaja a litigant did not incur fees when his former employer agreed to pay his legal fees and expenses 1: holding that under the eaja a prevailing party with an unconditional right to be indemnified for his legal expenses by a solvent third party had not incurred attorneys fees 2: holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees 3: holding that the buckhannon rule governs an application for fees under the eaja 4: holding that a court has broad discretion in awarding attorney fees under the eaja but is not required to make an award in all cases where a party seeks supplemental or increased fees


Input: the Garmon doctrine is applicable subject to the existing exceptions. If it involves the NLRA and another federal statute, then the Garmon doctrine is inapplicable as a general rule unless the underlying federal claim is illegal only by way of the NLRA. That is, if the defendant’s conduct is perfectly legal but for the proscriptions of the NLRA, then those determinations of potential illegality should be left to the expertise of the NLRB. Likewise, if the conduct in question is federally chargeable independent of the NLRA (even if it is also arguably covered by the NLRA), then the Garmon doctrine does not apply because the two implicated federal statutes may both be given their intended purpose. See, e.g., Smith v. Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 125 F.3d 751, 754-57 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. International Brotherhood of Holdings: 0: holding that garmon preemption is inapplicable in eases involving the americans with disabilities act 1: holding that a private party may bring an action in a federal district court seeking injunctive relief on the basis of garmon preemption for only arguably protected or prohibited activity 2: holding that  502a may serve as an independent basis for preemption where  514a the blanket erisa preemption provision is inapplicable 3: holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists 4: holding that garmon preemption provides no basis for removal jurisdiction in federal court and observing that the lower courts are uniform in finding that garmon preemption under the nlra does not completely preempt state laws so as to provide removal jurisdiction


Input: have found a scar sufficient to constitute serious physical injury. See State v. Nival, 42 Conn.App. 307, 678 A.2d 1008 (1996)(where jury observed the victim’s one-half-inch facial scar and evidence was presented that the scar was permanent there was sufficient evidence to create jury question as to whether the victim had suffered a serious physical injury); State v. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d 708 (Minn.Ct.App.1985)(a long scar present two and one-half years after the injury was a serious permanent disfigurement); State v. Bledsoe, 920 S.W.2d 538 (Mo.Ct.App.1996)(a one- and-one-half-inch cut on the victim’s chin leading to scarring, a one-and-one-half-inch scar on lower lip, and a sear between her eyes constituted serious disfigurements); State v. Pettis, 748 S.W.2d 793 (Mo.Ct.App.1988)(<HOLDING>); People v. Wade, 187 A.D.2d 687, 590 N.Y.S.2d Holdings: 0: holding that specific intent is not element of assault resulting in serious bodily injury 1: holding that serious physical injury as applied to firstdegree assault would include a fourinch permanent scar as a result of a knife wound 2: holding that variance between indictment alleging that defendant threw a knife at the victim and proof that the knife fell out of the defendants hand as he was stabbing the victim was not fatal to conviction for aggravated assault 3: holding that victims injuries went beyond serious injury necessary to indict for an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill or inflict serious injury and constituted the permanent disfigurement contemplated by ncgs  14324 4: holding that variance between indictment alleging that defendant held knife to victims neck and proof that defendant only pointed knife at victim was not fatal to conviction for aggravated assault


Input: of tolling. Id. at 1474. Accordingly, the Court finds that federal law, not state law, governs whether the limitations period in this case was tolled; and § 657-13 does not operate to toll t rom other jurisdictions are sharply divided on this issue. One line of cases holds that mental incompetency may not toll federal statutes of limitations. E.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 635 F.Supp. 1472 (E.D.Mo.1986) (and cases cited therein) (mental incompetency does not toll DelCostello six month period on hybrid claims). However, most of the decisions relied upon in Harris involved claims against the federal government and therefore are called into question by the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, another line of eases Holdings: 0: holding that equitable principles apply to child support proceedings 1: holding tolling principles do not apply because the purpose of the statute of repose is clearly to serve as a cutoff 2: holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations 3: holding that we lacked jurisdiction to review the veterans courts determination that equitable tolling did not apply in the case before it 4: holding that equitable tolling principles apply to suits against the united states in the same manner as they apply to private parties


Input: . . . .” Rich, 39 N.H. at 336. In Little we said: [An act] mak[ing] the parties to pending suits, not excepted from its operation, competent witnesses on the trial thereof,... is not unconstitutional as being retrospective . . . inasmuch as it establishes no new rule for the decision of those causes, and violates no vested rights of the parties thereto, but is a mere regulation of the proceeding for enforcing remedies, by prescribing a rule for the admission of existing evidence therein — an exercise of the acknowledged powers of every government. Little, 39 N.H. at 509. Thus, we affirm our prior holdings and conclude that the statutory and other similar evidentiary privileges abrogated by RSA 135-E:10, I, are creatures of public policy and subject to retrospective alteration or e 3) (<HOLDING>). Even if such a right did exist, it would not Holdings: 0: recognizing right to be free from unjustified intrusions on personal security 1: recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 2: recognizing that state constitution provides mentally ill persons with certain fundamental liberty interests such as the right to be free from unjustified intrusion upon their personal security 3: holding that terminally ill patients do not have a fundamental liberty interest in committing suicide 4: holding right to be fundamental


Input: not dealing with what the law calls sexual penetration. He admits to Detective Herrick that she was defending herself. He says that his fingers may have gone in her vagina. And you, again, you get to decide whether that can happen inadvertently, especially under the circumstances urider which this would admittedly perform. Because he said “I talked about Chris from Barrow and that was a sexual matter.” 1 . Op. at 774. 2 . See Op. at 774 (citing AS 12.45.045(a) ("In prosecutions for the crimes of sexual assault in any degree, ... evidence of the complaining witness’ previous sexual conduct may not be admitted nor may reference be made to it in the presence of the jury....”)). 3 . 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska App.1985). 4 . See id.; Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Alaska App.1995) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Covington, 703 P.2d at 442. 6 . Op. at Holdings: 0: holding that court was within its discretion to refuse to consider reports that did not meet the supreme courts standards for admitting reports into evidence 1: holding corporate officer liable as aider and abettor in filing of false reports even though reports were not authorized or approved of by officers 2: recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial 3: holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence 4: recognizing that we have consistently held that a party who wishes to introduce evidence of past false reports of sexual assault bears the threshold burden of establishing the falsity of the past reports


Input: proceeding. See, e.g., San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1070 (11th Cir.1996). Even if that were a holding and the law of the circuit, it would not resolve this case, because here the INS never filed the order to show cause to commence removal proceedings. This case is about an order to show cause that was served on the alien but never filed with the immigration court. 14 . It appears that a few district courts have reached the same conclusion as the First Circuit in Wallace, that a removal proceeding has effectively begun when an order to show cause is served upon the alien. See Canela v. United States Dept. of Justice, 64 F.Supp.2d 456, 458 (E.D.Pa.1999); Dunbar v. INS, 64 F.Supp.2d 47, 52 (D.Conn.1999); see also Mercado-Amador v. Reno, 47 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1224 (D.Or. 1999) (<HOLDING>). 15 . To the extent that Congress contemplated Holdings: 0: holding that a deportation proceeding commenced after an order to show cause issued 1: recognizing that aliens whose proceedings are commenced with a notice to appear on or after april 1 1997 are subject to removal proceedings under iirira while aliens whose proceedings were commenced with an order to show cause before april 1 1997 were subject to deportation proceedings under prior law 2: holding that summons issued nearly seven months after the show cause order was entered was not issued immediately as required by statute 3: holding that lawful domicile terminates when show cause order is issued 4: holding that because petitioners proceedings commenced after the enactment of iirira petitioner was statutorily ineligible for suspension of deportation


Input: 2000e-5(f), which qualifies the statutory right to intervene, refers only to cases brought by the U.S. Attorney General. That clause is not grammatically connected to the words “the Commission,” making it inapplicable to actions filed by the EEOC. Moreover, because the EEOC is precluded by the same subsection of this statute from bringing suits against a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, that phrase could not have been intended to apply to suits that were filed by the EEOC. Thus, the statute provides an unconditional right of intervention to aggrieved persons in cases brought by the EEOC. EEOC v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, 384 F.Supp. 1264 (D.S.D. 1974); see also Truvillion v. King’s Daughters Hospital, 614 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); EEOC v. Contour Chair Lounge Co., 596 F.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing that court may intervene in arbitration proceeding by invoking equitable powers 1: recognizing this as the general rule 2: recognizing this presumption 3: recognizing the right to intervene in cases like this 4: recognizing this rule


Input: See 2006 Haw. Sess. Laws at 28-30; 2006 Haw. Senate Journal of 23rd Legislature at 1200 & 1277; 2006 Haw. House of Representatives Journal of 23rd Legislature at 1497 & 1653. However, proceeding to the second step of the Sacks framework, it appears that application of § 134-7(a) would not have an impermissible retroactive effect in this case. Specifically, the Lautenberg Amendment was enacted in 1996 and, therefore, defined gun rights at the time Plaintiff was convicted in 1997. Accordingly, it appears that the application of § 134-7(a) would not have an impermissible retroactive effect because the state law does not take away or impair rights Plaintiff had before the law was enacted. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-270, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the Court concludes that Holdings: 0: holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment 1: holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases 2: recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively 3: recognizing that new law did not apply to claims that accrued prior to enactment 4: holding that a court examining if a law should be applied retroactively should consider whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment