Input: proximity to a suspected drug location is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion on the part of police.”), when combined with other factors, the high crime nature of an area may support a stop. See United States v. Brown, 159 F.3d at 149-50. In this ease, the area around Seventh and Jefferson Streets, although considered a high crime area, is also a residential neighborhood. Officer Prado admitted that the area is a residential neighborhood in his testimony. In fact, McCray’s grandmother lived very near the scene of the stop. In addition, although 10:45 p.m. is late, it is not unheard of for neighbors in a community to stand outside and talk late on a summer evening. But see United States v. Dover, Crim A. No. 96-181,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17415, at *11 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 26, 1996) (<HOLDING>). It is certainly not suspicious conduct for Holdings: 0: holding that a group of men standing with known drug traffickers who fled when officers approached established reasonable suspicion 1: holding that an officers observation of a man holding his hand out with a group of other men looking down at his open palm in an high drug trafficking area late at night constituted reasonable suspicion 2: holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion when he saw a vehicle moving with its lights off in the parking lot of a closed business in a rural area at 300 am 3: holding that the fact that a group of men surrounding a car parked in a marked bus stop dispersed upon the approach of investigating officers was relevant to a reasonable suspicion determination 4: holding that police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity after observing a group of men huddled around a closed store at 2 am


Input: rejecting Djigo’s explanations. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir.2005). Because the only evidence of a threat to Djigo’s life or freedom depended upon his credibility, his failure to exhaust precludes success on his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief where all three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. 2 . Djigo challenges the IJ's adverse credibility finding in his brief to this Court, but did not do so before the BIA. We nonetheless address the adverse credibility determination because the government does not argue that the issue is unexhausted. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 461 F.3d 101, 119-20 (2d Cir.2006) Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion of issues is waived if not raised by the government 1: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 2: holding that issue exhaustion is not jurisdictional and thus waived if not raised by the government 3: holding issues not raised in appellate brief are waived 4: holding that issues not raised before a district court are waived on appeal


Input: met their burden, and that inquiry into the deliberative process is precluded by Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This Court agrees that the Koenigs waived any claim of juror bias by not advising the Court of these allegations at a time when the Court could have done something about them. This Court conducted voir dire to find out whether any member of the jury panel recognized any of the defendants or had provided goods or services to Coastal. One member of the panel was excused due to his familiarity with the defendants. None of the jurors acknowledged any relationship or familiarity before they were empaneled. Waiver has been found where juror misconduct was only alleged, as in the Koenigs’ case. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 667 F.2d 729, 730, 734 (8th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Waiver has also been found where there was Holdings: 0: holding that where possible juror misconduct is brought to the trial judges attention he or she has a duty to investigate and to determine whether there may have been a violation of the sixth amendment 1: holding that it was not constitutionally permissible for the state to respond to defendants invocation of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him prior to the trial de novo  2: holding that litigants have a duty to disclose their objection to a prospective juror by promptly bringing the matter to the attention of the trial court 3: holding that although this court affords broad discretion to the district court in determining the type of investigation necessary to determine juror bias the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove the same 4: holding that the defendant by not bringing his knowledge of possible juror bias to the attention of the district court prior to verdict waived his right to a new trial


Input: to alleviate the confusion. 239 Ga. at 128-129. 8 See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Myszka, 246 Ga. 571, 572 (272 SE2d 302) (1980) (distinguishing a continuing, abatable nuisance from a permanent nuisance); Brand v. Montega Corp., 233 Ga. 32, 33 (209 SE2d 581) (1974) (“In a surface-water invasion case, the continuing invasions amount to a continuing trespass which is the equivalent of a continuing nuisance.”); City of Gainesville v. Waters, 258 Ga. App. 555, 558 (574 SE2d 638) (2002) (“Where a nuisance is not permanent in its character, but is one which can and should be abated by the person erecting or maintaining it, every continuance of the nuisance is a fresh nuisance for which a fresh action will lie.”); City Council of Augusta v. Boyd, 70 Ga. App. 686, 688 (29 SE2d 437) (1944) (<HOLDING>). 9 This Court in Hibbs v. City of Riverdale, a Holdings: 0: recognizing that subject matter jurisdiction can be questioned at any time and with respect to any claim 1: holding that it is not 2: holding standing cannot be waived and may thus be raised at any time 3: holding that the nuisance is not permanent because it can be abated at any time 4: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision


Input: 381 F.3d 965 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc); Weitzel v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the Dep’t of Commerce, 240 F.3d 871 (10th Cir.2001); Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d 227, 238 (2d Cir.2000); Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 603-04 (8th Cir.1999); Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir.1998); Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 137-39 & nn. 5-6 (7th Cir.1995); Kyricopoulos v. Town of Orleans, 967 F.2d 14, 15 n. 1 (1st Cir.1992); Traverso v. Penn, 874 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir.1989); Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851, 109 S.Ct. 135, 102 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). The Fifth Circuit has provided conflicting opinions on this issue. Compare Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Allen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, Holdings: 0: holding no retroactive application 1: holding that when plaintiff has proven injury but has failed to prove the amount of damages the plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages 2: holding that because there was no distinction between the damages caused by actions of defendants in a prior case and actions of the defendant in this case the plaintiff suffered a single indivisible injury allowing for one cause of action 3: holding that younger has no application in actions seeking only damages 4: holding that the period for seeking judicial review of denial of con application not expressly ruled upon by the conrb begins to run at the time that application has been denied by operation of law


Input: rights of a contracting entity and the United States regarding any contract executed pursuant to Federal reclamation law. The United States, when a party to any suit, shall be deemed to have waived any right to plead that it is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and shall be subject to judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 43 U.S.C. § 390uu. We conclude that this statutory provision waives sovereign immunity in this case, where appellants are seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the Westlands and San Benito contracts. Accord Sumner Peck Ranch, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 823 F.Supp. 715, 748 (E.D.Cal.1993) (<HOLDING>). Id. at 673-74 (footnote in original). The Holdings: 0: holding that  390uu waives sovereign immunity from contract claims for injunctive relief and specific performance 1: holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official 2: holding that immunity from suit precluded claim for breach of contract for sale of county property and request for specific performance of contract 3: holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law 4: holding city waives immunity by entering into contract


Input: investigator/handler of an accelerant detection canine was introduced. See id. at 850. The investigator concluded that accelerants had been used “based on his own personal investigation and observations.” Id. No ac-celerants were found on a sample taken from the fire scene. See id. The court concluded that the testimony was based on “scientific principle ... sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the field of arson investigation.” Id. Thus, the “use of dogs to detect accelerates [was] not a new or novel scientific principle.” Id. ¶ 24 Similarly, we conclude that the use of canines to help detect the presence of accelerants as an investigative tool is generally accepted within the fire investigation community. See Fitts v. State, 982 S.W.2d 175, 183 (Tex.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also NFPA 921: Guide for Fire and Holdings: 0: holding that product rule method of dna statistical evidence is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community 1: holding that expert opinion based on scientific technique is inadmissible unless technique is generally accepted as reliable in relevant scientific community 2: holding that calculations done by applying product rule were generally accepted in relevant scientific community 3: recognizing that training and technique for canine accelerant detection is accepted by arson investigation community 4: holding that ems training lieutenants position met criteria because the lieutenants developed coordinated implemented and conducted ems training programs  prepared lesson plans and training aids supervised delivery of training and tests and evaluated new equipment


Input: the website looked like Heather. But in analyzing a judicial deception claim, we need not scrutinize police investigative tactics in this fashion. 10 . As discussed above, the materiality of an omission is an issue for the court. 11 . The Ewings quote Shirk's testimony from Prater and Memory's trial, but the officers obviously did not have this information at the time they prepared the warrant affidavit. The Ewings also fault the officers for not asking Shirk more questions, such as whether he had been drinking, how long he looked at the female, whether her helmet face shield was up or down, and what the lighting conditions were. But judicial deception claims do not require an inquiry into the quality of the police investigation. See generally Gates, 462 U.S. at 235-36, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (<HOLDING>). 12 . After the Ewings' arrest, Contreras did Holdings: 0: holding that allegations in a pro se complaint are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 1: holding that the complaint submitted by a pro se plaintiff must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 2: holding that the allegations in a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 3: recognizing that because affidavits are typically drafted in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation by nonlawyers they must be read with an understanding of that context and accordingly held to a lower standard of scrutiny than that applied to pleadings filed in more formal proceedings 4: holding that affidavits for search warrants must be interpreted in a commonsense and realistic fashion because they are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation


Input: treatment that resulted from the injuries and that the charges are reasonable. 136 The Gorostietas claim it was error for the trial court not to allow Marie Gorostieta to read or testify as to the contents of the medical bills she received as evidence of their reasonableness. Parkinson argues that any testimony offered by Marie Gorostieta regarding the medical bills would have been hearsay. We find it unnecessary to address whether this evidence would have been hearsay because this court has already ruled that under the best evidence rule, a witness may not testify as to material contained in exhibits that have been previously denied admission. See Intermountain Farmers Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Utah 1978); see also State v. Ross, 573 P.2d 1288, 1289-90 (Utah 1978) (<HOLDING>). To allow a witness to so testify would Holdings: 0: holding that trial court erred in allowing police officer to testify to contents of telephone records that were not introduced into evidence 1: holding that trial court erred by not allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence of prior dealings with the defendant 2: holding that records relating to a student court were not education records 3: holding trial court erred in finding violations based only on officers testimony based on review of probation records where states failure to admit records into evidence rendered officers testimony hearsay 4: holding that the trial court erred in allowing an equitable reduction in the amount required to redeem the subject property


Input: or by failing to grant his motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for an extension of time. {91} We uphold the constitutionality of the Capital Felony Sentencing Act. The evidence supports the jury’s findings of the aggravating factors charged. The evidence also supports the jury’s findings that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The facts of Clark’s case support the conclusion that the jury did not impose his death sentence under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. Taking Clark, the circumstances of the crime, and other similar New Mexico cases into consideration, Clark’s sentence of death was neither excessive nor disproportionate. We affirm Clark’s sentence. Finally, we conclude tha 91) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See State v. Dodd, 120 Wash.2d 1, 838 Holdings: 0: holding the court lacked jurisdiction where the defendant failed to file a notice of appeal on the attorneys fee issue because a supplemental notice of appeal is required for us to have jurisdiction over an attorneys fees issue that becomes final subsequent to the initial notice of appeal 1: holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence 2: holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding 3: holding that a capital defendant must receive a meaningful appeal with the benefit of an adversary proceeding with diligent appellate advocacy addressed to both the judgment and the sentence but allowing the defendant to file a pro se supplemental brief setting forth his personal positions and interests with regard to the subject matter of this appeal 4: holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se


Input: with a significant portion of the proceeds from the sale of the Ambassador building. Cox’s and Trahan’s testimony that Thad had check cashing privileges at a casino and that he gambled the day before filing for bankruptcy was merely cumulative evidence of Thad’s gambling proclivities. Given the substantial non-gambling evidence supporting Thad and Theresa’s convictions (discussed below), and the cumulative nature of Cox’s and Trahan’s testimony, there is not a “significant possibility’ that the evidence had a substantial impact on the jury’s verdict. See Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d at 210; see also United States v. Hall, 500 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir.2007) (“The erroneous introduction of cumulative evidence was harmless error.”); United States v. Mortazavi, 702 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Any error in admitting Cox’s and Trahan’s Holdings: 0: holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt 1: holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt 2: holding that the trial courts erroneous admission of an experts opinion that the defendant was guilty was harmless where the prosecution produced overwhelming evidence of guilt 3: holding that the admission of a family photo was harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence in support of the conviction 4: holding that any error in admission of demonstrative aid was harmless because evidence of defendants guilt was overwhelming


Input: or prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.” Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). In the case of pre-award protests, we have repeatedly limited standing under § 1491 to those bidders who have a “substantial chance” of securing the award and who have been disadvantaged by the government procurement decision they challenge. In Rex Service Corp. v. United States, we held that a contractor did not have standing because it did not “establish that it had a ‘substantial chance’ of receiving the contract” and thus “prove a direct economic interest as a putative prospective bidder.” 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006); see also Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In CACI Field Services, Inc. v. United Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea 1: holding that a protester must show only that there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for that error 2: recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings 3: holding that a contractor failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error 4: holding that a protester is not required to show that but for the alleged error the protester would have been awarded the contract instead a protester must show there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract but for the alleged error


Input: 1988 or 1990, he was pushed and heard shots fired; this is the only harm he endured in Mexico and it does not amount to persecution. See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir.2011) (finding no error in BIA’s conclusion that an applicant who was beaten and detained for two days did not establish persecution because the injuries “required no formal medical attention and had no lasting physical effect”). While Cardonar-Contreras argues that the murders of his father and grandfather contribute to the cumulative harm he suffered, which amounts to persecution, those deaths both occurred before he was born. Accordingly, the murders of his father and grandfather were not acts intended to harm or threaten Cardona-Contreras. Cf. Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In the absence of past persecution, to Holdings: 0: recognizing that an applicant may be able to demonstrate persecution based on persecution of family members where the applicant shares  the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family member was in the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident citing jorgetzoc v gonzales 435 f3d 146 150 2d cir2006 1: holding that no wellfounded fear was established where the attacks on family members failed to show a pattern of persecution tied to the petitioners 2: recognizing that the harm suffered by family members in combination with other factors  would presumably only be persecution where  the applicant not only shares or is perceived to share the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family members but was also within the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident 3: holding that an asylum applicant cannot claim past persecution based solely on the harm that was inflicted on a family member on account of that family members political opinion or other protected characteristic 4: holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution


Input: treatment program and was specifically told by the trial court that if he failed to admit his offense his probation would be revoked. When he failed to make the required admissions, his probation was revoked. This is precisely the situation proscribed by our supreme court in Morrow and the United States Supreme Court in Murphy. In Morrow, the court noted revocation of probation is a penalty that cannot be imposed for exercising the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 590 N.W.2d at 793. Similarly, in Murphy, the Supreme Court acknowledged a state may not revoke probation “because a probationer refused to make nonimmunized disclosures concerning his own criminal conduct.” 465 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. at 1148; see also Mace v. Amestoy, 765 F.Supp. 847, 852 (D.Vt.1991) (<HOLDING>); People v. Elsbach, 934 P.2d 877, 881 Holdings: 0: holding that the state failed to rebut the defendants testimony that he was forced to leave his approved residence and could not reach the probation officer to inform him of his move 1: holding a person in a probation setting can not be forced to incriminate himself without the state granting him immunity first 2: holding that testimony of probation officer that landlord told him probationer moved from approved residence was hearsay and could not support revocation of probation without additional nonhearsay evidence 3: holding that under statutes in effect at the time a court may not by revocation and granting a second period of probation extend the total time on probation beyond five years as the statutes do not speak of terms of probation but speak in plain language of the total time which may be spent on probation for a felony 4: holding that probation is not a sentence


Input: ” Citing United States v. Johnson, 909 F.2d 1517, 1519 (D.C.Cir. 1990). (Emphasis added.) In United States v. Woods, 568 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, regarding heroin possession: “[A]s long as the statute does not graduate the gravity of the crime of possession of heroin by the quantity possessed, we see no indication that Congress intended to permit a multiplication of the offenses of possession at any given time by a defendant upon evidence that the heroin may merely have been separately packaged or stashed. Woods, 568 F.2d at 513 (Emphasis added.). Woods also explains that the sentencing potentialities permit one conviction to accommodate an inclusive possession conviction. See also, United States v. Williams, 480 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir. 1973), (<HOLDING>). Further, the cases the majority cites as Holdings: 0: holding that 30 pallets were the cogsa packages where the bill of lading stated that there were 30 packages 1: holding that statutory maximum is twenty years when drug quantity is not charged as element of offense and found by jury beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding separate convictions for drug transactions occurring four or five days apart were properly counted as separate convictions 3: holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible 4: holding that only one offense should have been charged when four separate packages of the same drug were found


Input: employment. Consequently, Miller was required to comply with K.S.A. 12-105b(d)’s notice requirements, which she failed to do, and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Flores was dismissed. 916 F. Supp.1101. Garcia raises state law claims against the police department and the officers acting within the scope of their employment. We agree with the district court that Garcia’s claims could give rise to a number of actions whereby the appellees could be hable in Kansas, namely assault, battery, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and damages for racial profiling. All of these types of claims are covered by K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 12-105b(d)’s notice requirement. See Knorp v. Albert, 29 Kan. App. 2d 509, 513, 28 P.3d 1024, rev. denied 272 Kan. 1418 (2001) (<HOLDING>); King v. Pimentel, 20 Kan. App. 2d 579, Holdings: 0: holding in age discrimination case under adea that same considerations are pertinent when deciding single employer issue for public entities as for private entities and applying nlrb test to resolve the question noting that where government entities are concerned court also must keep constitutional separation of powers issues in mind 1: holding that public entities may be held vicariously hable for the negligent acts of their individual employees 2: holding that notice statute applies to both municipal entities and employees of municipal entities acting within the scope of their employment 3: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom 4: holding that although municipalities are persons within the meaning of 42 usc  1983 no municipal liability lies under that statute unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort


Input: concur in the result. Although I agree with much of the substan tive analysis presented by the majority in its treatment of various of Appellant’s claims, I have sufficient differences with various elaborations that I am unable to supply a full joinder. In particular, as pertains to Part II of the majority opinion — which addresses Appellant’s claim of deficient stewardship by virtue of his attorneys’ failure to seek suppression — I agree with Appellant that the PCRA court erred in its conclusion that an anonymous 911 report of a domestic disturbance, coupled with a responding officer’s “gut feeling,” meets the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement so as to justify entry by police into a residence. Accord Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 232-36 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The majority references no decision which is Holdings: 0: holding that 911 call reporting domestic dispute and child telling officer that a man with a gun was inside fighting with her mom constituted exigent circumstances that justified warrantless entry into home 1: holding the fourth amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspects home in order to make a routine felony arrest 2: holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry 3: holding that a warrantless entry by police into an apartment based on an uncorroborated anonymous 911 report of a mentally ill man  acting crazy and possibly in possession of a gun violated the fourth amendment 4: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment


Input: been very emphatic that, except in cases where only one inference can be drawn from the facts, negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability are questions of fact for the jury. See St. Clair v. Denny, 245 Kan. 414, 781 P.2d 1043, 1047 (1989); Baker v. City of Garden City, 240 Kan. 554, 731 P.2d 278, 281 (1987); Gard, 400 P.2d at 1000, 1002; Rowell, 176 P.2d at 595. As might be expected in an area of the law in which so much depends on the factual scenario of the particular case, the holdings of the Kansas cases that address causation are not clearly dispositive of the issue. However, we find that those cases whose facts most closely approximate those of the instant case support the conclusion that the district court improperly granted summary judgment. See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (<HOLDING>); Rowell, 176 P.2d at 597 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury 1: recognizing the cause of action 2: recognizing the availability of a cause of action by manufacturer against supplier under consumer fraud act 3: recognizing cause of action 4: holding that demurrer improperly granted because dropping bottle of flammable liquid was reasonably probable such that it was not an intervening cause in action against bottle manufacturer


Input: so the fact that the Mossberg shotgun was found in the apartment is not evidence that he participated in the burglary; and (2) the accomplice, Do, testified that it was he who placed the shotgun in Cao’s closet, not Cao himself, and thus the officer’s recovery of the stolen gun from Cao’s closet is insufficient corroboration of Do’s testimony. We disagree. While the recovery of the stolen shotgun in Cao’s apartment standing alone does not establish his guilt, it is evidence that tends to connect Cao to the commission of the Greenside burglary. See, e.g., Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 633 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (stating that appellant’s possession of stolen property is a factor that connects appellant to offense); Edwards v. State, 106 S.W.3d 833, 843 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Do testified that he and Cao opened Le’s safe Holdings: 0: holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accuseds car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car 1: holding that recovery of trash containing stolen property from outside appellants apartment is factor that tends to corroborate accomplice testimony 2: holding that the value of property taken includes cash that was stolen but not transferred from stolen car to getaway car because property removed from its rightful owner is properly considered taken even if it is immediately thereafter recovered 3: holding that exclusive possession of recently stolen goods warrants the inference that he stole all of the property for which the defendant is accused of taking provided all the property was stolen at the same time emphasis added 4: holding that the property owners testimony alone placed the value of the stolen property above the amount necessary to constitute grand larceny


Input: protections afforded to the debtors by the Bankruptcy Code and the automatic stay, specifically because the Adversary Proceeding will determine whether the debtors were in default and thus whether Bank of America is entitled to recover from the guarantors. This, the court believes, is precisely what the "unusual circumstances” exception encompasses. 10 . Bank of America contends that with respect to the "unusual circumstances” exception, the debtors were required to demonstrate "unusual circumstances” as well as satisfy the standard for issuance of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the exception in a way that supports Bank of America's position. See Solidus Networks, Inc. v. Excel Innovations, Inc. (In re Excel Innovations), 502 F.3d 1086, 1096 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s Holdings: 0: holding that the unusual circumstances exception was not a separate basis for staying nondebtor litigation from the traditional preliminary injunction standard 1: holding that the standard for permanent injunction is the same as that for preliminary injunction with the one exception being that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than likelihood of success 2: holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified 3: holding that court can consider inadmissible evidence in the context of a motion for preliminary injunction 4: holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction


Input: have a number of tools at their disposal in exercising their Section 8(c) rights to express their views on union organizing efforts. An employer is permitted, for example, to express its views about union representation to masses of employees, in mandatory meetings, on company time, so long as such speech does not occur within 24 hours of an election. See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 NLRB 427, 429 (1953); Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 NLRB 400, 409 (1953). Employers may dispatch supervisors to engage in one-on-one discussions during work time with employees about the negative effects of union representation, see, e.g., NLRB v. Lenkurt Elec. Co., 438 F.2d 1102, 1107-08 (9th Cir.1971), and may disseminate written anti-union materials, Beverly Enterprises-Hawaii, Inc., 326 NLRB 335, 336 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Our opinions have faithfully reiterated our Holdings: 0: holding that an employees private arbitration agreement with her employer precluded her from filing suit against the employer under the adea 1: holding that employees failure to comply with employers rule requiring employees to notify employer when a temporary job placement ended did not constitute gross misconduct because the violation was an isolated incident and employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious  or indeed any consequences as a result of employees unavailability 2: holding that the employer did not engage in objectionable conduct when its supervisors handed out flyers even at a time when the employer was enforcing its otherwise valid nodistribution rule against employees 3: holding that the employer had not demonstrated the employee was discharged for gross misconduct because the conduct was an isolated incident and the employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious  or indeed any consequences as a result of the employees conduct 4: holding unconscionable an arbitration agreement requiring employees to arbitrate claims against the employer but not requiring the employer to arbitrate claims against the employees


Input: error in the trial court’s exercise of discretion. This assignment of error is without merit. II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE JURY WAS SELECTED ¶ 7. Robinson assigns error to the trial court’s method of jury selection. Robinson’s only claim rests on a vague recitation of Rule 4.05(2) of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court without any additional argument or citation to authority in support thereof. Robinson maintains a full panel of accepted jurors was not tendered to him after the State exercised its first round in the jury selection. Robinson is incorrect and misinterprets the selection procedure outlined in URCCC 4.05(2). Under URCCC 4.05(2) a full panel of jurors, meaning twelve, are tendered by the State after electing to exer , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (<HOLDING>), neither of which are applicable to the Holdings: 0: holding that generally an unsworn statement by counsel is not evidence in the context of a batson hearing 1: holding that evidence of the same name and that the former conviction was in same city and same court as the present case and the fact that the defendant did not offer any testimony to rebut the prima facie evidence of identity was sufficient to establish identity 2: holding that probation does not constitute a sentence 3: holding that a defendants confirmation of a psrs findings does not waive a challenge on appeal where there is no conceivable strategic reason for not objecting to a sentence at a higher offense level 4: holding that racial identity between the objecting defendant and the excluded jurors does not constitute a relevant precondition for a batson challenge


Input: 486, or are acting pursuant to an entity’s policy, id., at 473-474. Meyer also made clear that the threat of suit against an individual’s employer was not the kind of deterrence contemplated by Bivens. See 510 U. S., at 485 (“If we were to imply a damages action directly against federal agencies ... there would be no reason for aggrieved parties to bring damages actions against individual officers. [T]he deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost”). This case is, in every meaningful sense, the same. For if a corporate defendant is available for suit, claimants will focus their collection efforts on it, and not the individual directly responsible for the alleged injury. See, e. g., TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443, 464 (1993) (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>); id., at 490-492 (O’Con-nor, J., dissenting) Holdings: 0: holding that a rico enterprise may consist of individuals associated in fact with corporations 1: recognizing that corporations fare much worse before juries than do individuals 2: holding that a corporations principal place of business for determining diversity jurisdiction under 28 usc  1332c1 is the nerve center meaning the corporations headquarters or the place where a corporations officers direct control and coordinate the corporations activities 3: recognizing that diversion of substantial corporate assets to the debtors management or to other corporations owned by management constituted mismanagement at best and fraud or dishonesty at worse 4: recognizing that the confrontation clause may provide greater rights in cases tried before juries than in bench trials


Input: work rules, and without proper authorization weighs strongly in favor of finding the UP 9484 was not “in use” at the time of the accident. However, Johnson argues the UP 9484 was nevertheless “in use” for three rea sons. First, the UP 9484 did not have blue flags placed on it, which Johnson argues should be dispositive, applying the Fifth Circuit’s bright-line test from Trinidad, 949 F.2d at 189, yet relying on a different dispositive factor borrowed from Wright, 574 F.3d at 622. Second, Johnson argues the UP 9484 was not located within the diesel shop and was therefore still on its “unitary journey to the point of repair,” citing Brady v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 303 U.S. 10, 58 S.Ct. 426, 82 L.Ed. 614 (1938), and misquoting S. Ry. Co. v. Bryan, 375 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1967) (<HOLDING>). Third, Johnson argues his conduct necessarily Holdings: 0: holding a defective railroad vehicle is in use under the saa where hauling  is in progress or in immediate contemplation because the handling of it for that purpose is a part of its unitary journey from the point of discovery of disability to the repair shop 1: holding that there is no unitary business in part because there is no flow of international business 2: holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation 3: holding that the the statement of the purpose of the law in question in the committee report is not conclusive and reiterating that the question is whether the law is reasonably calculated to achieve a legitimate police power purpose 4: holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ada


Input: 144 (11th ed.2005) (emphasis added). Here, the song file is never returned because, according to Plaintiff, Pandora deletes the file upon completion of the song. See Compl. ¶ 20. Moreover, merely alleging that subscribers “borrow” sound recordings does not suffice to identify the particular conduct the subscriber undertakes to use the file. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere eonclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Plaintiff also fails to confront the fact that Pandora’s Terms of Use, which govern a subscriber’s use of the Pandora internet radio service, foreclose any borrowing or use of any temporary song file supplied by Pandora. Cf. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). In particular, the Terms of Use plainly state Holdings: 0: holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement 1: holding misuse of copyright because of limitations imposed on licensing agreement 2: recognizing a presumption that the issuance of a permit by the state engineer allowing recognized irrigation water rights to be shifted to other users works as severance of those water rights from the land 3: holding that the uniform commercial code specifically encompassed a software licensing agreement 4: holding that licensing agreement controlled the scope of the users rights in the software


Input: record justifying the increase. Accordingly, the increased sentence violated Church's right to due process. By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed. 1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-1996 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 2 We initially granted the State's petition to review the court of appeals' decision regarding the multiplicity of the two child enticement charges, but later dismissed the petition as improvidently granted after the State changed its position and conceded multiplicity. See State v. Church, 2000 WI 90, 236 Wis. 2d 755, 613 N.W.2d 848. 3 Additional cases in which the North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), presumption has been held not to apply include: Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1972) (<HOLDING>); and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 Holdings: 0: holding that there is a presumption of vindictiveness when a harsher sentence is imposed after a defendant exercises his right to a de novo review 1: holding that the possibility of vindictiveness does not inhere in a twotier system of appeals with the right to a de novo hearing after conviction in an inferior court 2: holding that presumption of vindictiveness is inapplicable in a system which gave a convicted defendant the right to a trial de novo in another court 3: recognizing de novo standard of review 4: holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo


Input: California Court of Appeal’s harmless error analysis was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas relief. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have addressed Medina's other arguments in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. 2 . A "pedicab” is a bicycle with a passenger compartment attached to the rear. 3 . The Sixth Circuit took the lead by following the first approach in Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 371-72 (6th Cir.1999); see also Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 718 (6th Cir.2003). By contrast, the Tenth Circuit has elected to pursue the second approach. See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.2003); see also Saiz v. Burnett, 296 F.3d 1008, 1012-13 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits have reserved judgment. See, Holdings: 0: holding that when presented with petitioners claim based upon state and federal law and the state court confined its analysis  to state law aedpa deference does not apply 1: holding that if the state court correctly applied chapman federal courts do not apply brecht unless the state courts chapman analysis violated aedpa 2: holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law 3: holding that where state rules of civil procedure apply to courts of the state they do not apply to adjudicatory proceedings before state agencies 4: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts


Input: only challenge the “collateral issue” of the “Attorneys’ Fees Award.” In that the trial court left open for future determination the amount Defendants would be taxed, Defendants’ appeal of this collateral issue is interlocutory. Since the trial court did not certify the Attorneys’ Fees Award issue for immediate appellate review, Defendants may challenge the Attorneys’ Fees Award in this appeal only to the extent that the Award affects a substantial right. Defendants make a number of arguments in their brief challenging the Attorneys’ Fees Award; however, their only argument based on a substantial right is their contention that the award is “in derogation of [Defendants’] sovereign immunity.” See McClennahan v. N.C. Sch. of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (<HOLDING>), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 220, 642 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that there is no due process right to appellate review 1: holding that rule 60b jurisdiction is lacking for appeals raising issues decided either explicitly or by necessary implication by this court 2: holding that appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the coa 3: holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court 4: holding that appeals raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to immediate appellate review


Input: this issue. Gogri Decl. ¶ 11. Such an event would not negate the fact that plaintiff's numerous medical conditions nevertheless constitute a substantial limitation on his ability to walk. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (defining substantial limitation as either a total inability to perform major life activity or a significant restriction on the same). 7 . The Ninth Circuit has yet to rule on this issue, but courts are generally in agreement that whether barrier removal is readily achievable is an affirmative defense. See Colorado Cross Disability Coalition v. Hermanson Family Ltd. P’ship, 264 F.3d 999, 1002-03 (10th Cir.2001); Gathright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2006). See also Lentini v. Calif. Ctr. for the Arts, 370 F.3d 837 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). In Colorado Cross, the Tenth Circuit Holdings: 0: holding that laches is an affirmative defense 1: recognizing laches as an affirmative defense 2: holding that whether an accommodation fundamentally alters a service or facility is an affirmative defense 3: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 4: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense


Input: mandatory. The trial court further explained its rationale when it denied Defendant’s .request to submit Instruction A: And as the Court indicated, I think the instruction will be knocked down by the Supreme Court at some point because this is argumentative.... The trial court’s basis for refusing Instruction A was not arbitrary or unreasonable, nor does it indicate a lack of careful consideration. See Davis, 203 S.W.3d at 799. Therefore, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion because MANOR 3d 310.02 (2016) was discretionary before its effective date of January 1, 2016. Moreover, Defendant, has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s .refusal to give Instruction- A was arbitrary and unreasonable. See, e.g., State v. Casey, 517 S.W.3d 570, 574-75 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (<HOLDING>). Point II is denied. Point III—The Trial Court Holdings: 0: holding that the court did not abuse its discretion by tracking the statutory language in the instruction 1: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the date of filing the petition for dissolution as the valuation date for equitable distribution 2: holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not submitting jury instruction maicr 3d 31002 2016 prior to its effective date 3: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial 4: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits


Input: Cir.1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863, 115 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1991); Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.1990); Williams v. Luna, 909 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1990); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 417, 107 L.Ed.2d 382 (1989); and Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir.1989). 91 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. See also Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d at 76-77, and Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d at 284-85, (both upholding the dismissal as frivolous of civil rights lawsuits on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity). 92 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833; Siglarv. Hightower, 112 F.3d at 193, (<HOLDING>); Hicks v. Gamer, 69 F.3d 22, 25 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that emotional distress requires a showing of either physical symptoms or mental illness 1: holding that a state prisoner may not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under 42 usc  1983 2: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 3: holding that under south dakota law compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires manifestation of physical symptoms and intentional infliction of emotional distress requires an extreme disabling emotional response 4: holding that title 42 usc  1997ee requires proof of a physical injury before a prisoner can recover for emotional or mental distress and that verbal abuse is not actionable under section 1983


Input: § 1983 claim to the extent that she alleges a procedural due process violation. Because the Court cannot resolve evidentiary issues in the context of a motion to dismiss, however, Ms. Rhyce will be allowed to amend her complaint, but the Court cautions that she should do so only if there is good cause. c. Substantive Due Process Defendants next attack Ms. Rhyce’s § 1983 claim that her substantive due process rights were violated. Relying on McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994), Defendants argue that property interests created by state law, such as a property interest in employment, are not subject to substantive due process protection. It appears that most circuits are now of that view. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142-43 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, in Schaper v. City of Huntsville, Holdings: 0: holding parents custodial rights are a fundamental interest guaranteed due process protection 1: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 2: recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim 3: holding a tenured state employee has a property right to continued employment and must be accorded due process before serious disciplinary sanctions 4: holding that plaintiffs tenured public employment is not a fundamental property interest entitled to substantive due process protection  thereby joining the great majority of courts of appeals that have addressed this issue and citing cases


Input: squarely stand for the proposition that indictment clause claims are immediately appeal-able because the Court may have assumed that trial would proceed according to the indictment. 4 . See also 420 U.S. at 125 n.26, 95 S.Ct. at 869 n.26 (“Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition that they appear for trial.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Pickard, 207 F.2d 472, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1953) (absent arrest, prosecution by information may proceed without oath or affirmation of probable cause); Church v. United States, 412 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1969) (same). But cf. United States v. Millican, 600 F.2d 273, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1979) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct. 1274, Holdings: 0: holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where the officers corroboration of events that occurred during the controlled buy as set forth in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause 1: holding that issuance of an order to show cause satisfied this requirement 2: holding irs need not meet any standard of probable cause to obtain enforcement of a summons   3: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 4: holding that a summons is sufficient restraint to invoke probable cause requirement where failure to appear on summons may result in issuance of warrant


Input: the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the finding that Officers Gutierrez and Martinez were designees of the school’s principal for purposes of section 810.097(2). A review of the record demonstrates that neither officer testified that he had received either express or implied authorization from the principal to restrict access to school grounds. Although both officers testified to their positions as Miami-Dade County School Police officers and to their jurisdictional assignments, neither officer testified further regarding his duty or authority. The testimony supporting the officers’ designee status in this case is even weaker than the testimony that we held in D.J. II did not support a finding of the warning individual’s designee status. See 67 So.3d at 1035 (<HOLDING>). Because an essential element of the offense Holdings: 0: holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace was competent evidence to support the  finding that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos 1: holding that the testimony of an obligor as to amount of payments was sufficient evidence to support findings of actual support paid 2: holding that security guards testimony that her job was to monitor students behavior did not amount to competent substantial evidence to support a finding that the guard was a designee of the schools principal for purposes of section 8100972 3: holding that competent substantial evidence did not support the trial courts conclusory finding that husband had the present ability to pay and noting that the presumption of section 61145a florida statutes is rebuttable 4: holding that transfer rule denying eligibility to students transferring from public to private schools did not violate the students rights to due process or equal protection of the laws as provided by the fourteenth amendment


Input: of minimal value compared to other medical opinions that squared with treatment records. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.2012) (quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir.2009)). The “ALJ is the final arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence” such as those in the record here. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041-42 (9th Cir.2008). Nor did the ALJ err in granting only minimal weight to Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) scores. The ALJ is not required to assign GAF scores controlling weight in the face of other conflicting record evidence. The ALJ was likewise justified in affording limited weight to the treating physicians’ medical opinions. See Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The ALJ provided specific, cogent reasons for Holdings: 0: holding that a treating physicians diagnosis could be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record 1: holding that the alj must make findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in order to reject the contradicted opinion of a treating physician 2: holding that the alj erred in failing to give the findings and assessments of the treating physicians any weight when the medical evidence and claimants testimony supported a diagnosis of cfs 3: holding that a treating physicians opinion may be rejected if it is brief conclusory and unsupported by medical evidence 4: holding that the testimony of a nonexamining medical advisor does not constitute evidence sufficient to override the treating physicians diagnosis


Input: A. To begin the analysis of this issue, it is helpful to place the clergy sexual conduct statute in the context of the variety of third-degree criminal sexual conduct crimes described in Minn.Stat. § 609.344 (2006). That section criminalizes sexual penetration that occurs in various defined situations and, most significantly, removes consent as a defense to that penetration in many situations. In this latter respect, section 609.344 is at odds with the general notion in criminal law that consenting adults have a protected right to engage in sexual contact. The United States Supreme Court has held that a state may not generally criminalize sexual contact between consenting adults in the privacy of their home. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The Court implied that this general rule may Holdings: 0: holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 1: holding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to jury trial to defendants in serious criminal cases in state courts 2: holding the right to marry is a central part of the liberty protected by the due process clause 3: holding that private sexual contact between consenting adults is a liberty right protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 4: holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment


Input: n. 5), the Court need not reach this issue. 27 . 11 Del. C. § 1336(j). Since, as stated above, the Delaware Wiretap Statute is patterned after the federal wiretap statute, it is especially informative to consider the legislative history of t 276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169, 194 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 924, 112 S.Ct. 337, 116 L.Ed.2d 277, reh’g denied, 502 U.S. 1009, 112 S.Ct. 650, 116 L.Ed.2d 667 (1991) (reiterating that the statements found in DeLancie and Donaldson that police may monitor conversations of pretrial detainees only to ensure security and the public’s protection, but not to discover information that may be used against such detainees at trial); Donaldson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cal.Supr., 35 Cal.3d 24, 196 Cal.Rptr. 704, 672 P.2d 110, 116 (1983) (<HOLDING>); DeLancie v. Superior Court of San Mateo Holdings: 0: holding that purpose of the amendment was to clarify the definition of the word maintain 1: holding before the advent of the federal rules of evidence that the use of a tax return for the purpose of impeachment was proper 2: holding that effect of suit rather than the purpose for which it was brought is controlling for purposes of the fifth factor 3: holding that title iii only proscribes unlawful interceptions defined as listening or monitoring of telephone conversations not the recording of monitored conversations hence if monitoring is lawful recording is always lawful 4: recognizing that delancie implied that secret monitoring of conversations between detainees and visitors undertaken for the purpose of gathering evidence for use in criminal proceedings rather than to maintain the security of the jail was unlawful


Input: ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 11 . This circuit has already determined that the ninety-day statutory deadline for filing a motion to reopen may be tolled. See Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (10th Cir.2002). Accordingly, it is not a jurisdictional limit and should not be raised sua sponte. Other circuits are in accord. See Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1190-93 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 130-34 (2d Cir.2000). My colleagues apparently assume that the filing deadline contained in § 1229a(c)(6)(B) is similarly not a jurisdictional restriction. Cf. Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 405-06 (3d Holdings: 0: holding that an aliens departure based on an in absentia removal order does not necessarily deprive an ij of jurisdiction to decide a motion to reopen 1: recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal 2: holding that the 180day filing deadline is jurisdictional and mandatory 3: holding that the 180day filing deadline applicable to motions to reopen from removal orders filed in absentia is not jurisdictional 4: holding that district court had no authority to reopen appeal period when motion was filed beyond 180day limit


Input: only have been escalated by less than three percent per year. Further evidence that the cement contract was not overvalued came from Mr. McCarthy who had offered the contract to a related company who chose not to take it for $1.58 million. Aggregate Industries was in a good position to value this cement in an arm’s length transaction. Plaintiffs have not proved that it was improperly valued at $1.58 million. The court deemed Allen’s valuation not credible. The court determined that his valuation method was “highly flawed” and that Allen arbitrarily increased the value of the cement by six percent. The district court’s findings are based upon the credibility of Allen’s testimony, which we do not reweigh on appeal. See Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 456 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). After carefully reviewing the record, we find Holdings: 0: holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings 1: holding that findings of fact are reviewed for clear error 2: holding that a determination as to a defendants credibility for a safety valve reduction is a factual finding that is reviewed for clear error 3: holding that factual findings underpinning a credibility determination are virtually never clear error 4: holding that factual findings in sentencing context are reviewed for clear error


Input: for duty exam was indeed job-related and necessary to determine if he could carry out his duties. The reasoning of several of our sister circuits is consistent with our endorsement of the plain language of the EEOC regulations. See Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 676 (1st Cir.1995) (finding that if the plaintiff were “treated as an existing employee returning from disability leave, ... the employer would be able to demand medical certification of ability to return to work”); Hogan v. Bangor and Aroostook R.R. Co., 61 F.3d 1034, 1036 (1st Cir.1995) (concluding that an employee was entitled to reinstatement after suffering collapsed lung as soon as medical evidence indicated he was fit to return); Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 941 F.2d 437, 438 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). We concur in the reasoning of these circuits. Holdings: 0: holding that an employee who was hospitalized for psychiatric treatment was required to provide medical certification as to ability to return to work 1: holding that a tortfeasor is required to pay the expenses of over treatment or unnecessary medical treatment unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith  2: holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously 3: holding that an employer need not accommodate with indefinite leave an employee who is unable to return to work in any role 4: holding that a state is required to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals


Input: Yagman, Thomas’s attorney. See United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 656 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1985)). 2. Thomas also contends that the district court erred when it dismissed the FAC, which alleged constitutional claims and civil RICO claims. But, Thomas’s opening brief presented no argument or record citations to support his contention that the court erred when it dismissed his constitutional claims. Therefore, Thomas waived these claims on appeal. See Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. La. Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1548 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Ninth Circuit Rule 28—1(b); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (<HOLDING>). And, the district court did not err when it Holdings: 0: holding that mere recitation of bare elements of a cause of action is insufficient to survive dismissal 1: holding that the bare assertion that a dismissal without prejudice was favorable to the plaintiff was insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss 2: holding that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to the pslra 3: holding that mere continuity of employment  is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action 4: holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action


Input: designed to impair their opportunity to seek legal redress. Plaintiffs further claim that the City’s actions were arbitrary and irrational (substantive due process violation). Defendants respond that the City’s decision to grant the special use permit was a rational exercise of its discretion, and plaintiffs were afforded adequate opportunity to be heard. B. Jurisdiction This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. An appellate court reviews a grant of sum mary judgment de novo. Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857 (6th Cir.1997). C. Procedural Due Process 1. A person’s right not be deprived of property without due process of law is a fundamental tenet of federal constitutional law. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiffs allege a number of ways in Holdings: 0: holding that in order to prove a denial of due process a party must show that he was arbitrarily and capriciously deprived of a cognizable property interest rooted in state law 1: holding that privileges licenses certificates and franchises qualify as property interests for purposes of procedural due process but that due process only becomes relevant where such property is deprived 2: holding that an alien is not deprived of due process if he or she receives actual notice of a denial of an application to withhold deportation 3: holding that although the parking citation that the plaintiff received did not indicate where and how to contest the allegation the plaintiff was not deprived of procedural due process because he received a summons to appear in court via first class mail before he was deprived of any liberty interest 4: holding that the root requirement of due process is that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest


Input: Lagunas to at least ten years incarceration.” Lagunas I, 214 Fed.Appx. at 845. Thereafter, the United States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission) issued Amendment 706 which modified the Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c) downward two levels for crack cocaine, effective November 1, 2007, and retroactive as of March 3, 2008. In February 2008, Mr. Lagunas filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the changes in the Drug Quantity Table and the resulting two-level reduction in offense levels. See Lagunas II, 309 Fed.Appx. at 266. Following appointment of counsel for Mr. Lagunas and pleadings filed by the parties, the district court filed an order denying Mr. Lagunas’s § 3582(c) mot U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2335, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the Act directed the Sentencing Holdings: 0: holding the minimum mandatory threemonth custodial sentence for second offenders under former dwi provisions of njsa 39450 reflects the intention to prohibit suspended sentences 1: holding the revised mandatory minimum sentences in the fair sentencing act applied to preaet offenders sentenced after august 3 2010 2: holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory 3: holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies 4: holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based


Input: in a given case. The establishment of these time boundaries is a legislative prerogative. That body has the right to fix reasonable periods within which an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the limitation period.... It should not be the province or function of this court to intrude upon an area peculiarly within the channel of legislative action."). 4 . See also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 115 Utah 183, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (1949) ("[NJone of the constitutional guarantees embodied in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States are absolute rights. All of them are subject to some regulation by the state."). 5 . See, e.g., People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 435 (Colo.1993) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Iowa Holdings: 0: holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights 1: recognizing that statute of limitations questions may be resolved on a motion to dismiss 2: holding constitutional challenge to void statute may be raised for first time on appeal 3: recognizing that reasonable time limitations may be placed on the exercise of constitutional rights 4: recognizing that rights under article i section 11 are subject to reasonable limitations


Input: acquittals on others indicate that the jury was not unanimous regarding any of the counts. But even if his speculation is accurate, it-would provide no basis for interviewing the jurors because juror testimony with regard to a verdict’s validity is limited to whether “extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.” Fed.R.Evid. 606(b). K. Kennedy’s theory of a compromise verdict fits none of these exceptions. Rather, it is an allegation of improper “internal influence,” which this court has held cannot provide a basis for post-verdict juror interrogation. See United States v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 380-81 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Helm v. Bunch, No. 88-5120, 869 F.2d 1490, Holdings: 0: holding that the trial courts in camera interviews were within its discretion because the defendant had waived his right to be present during the juror interviews 1: holding that juror interviews were not permissible where the alleged jury misconduct of premature deliberations constituted internal influence 2: holding that rule 606b precludes any inquiry into the validity of the verdict based on juror testimony regarding racial or ethnic comments made during the course of deliberations but that the rule against juror impeachment cannot be applied so inflexibly as to bar juror testimony in those rare and grave cases where claims of racial or ethnic bias during jury deliberations implicate a defendants right to due process and an impartial jury internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding a new trial required when juror is replaced by an alternate during jury deliberations 4: holding that the district courts dismissal of a juror after five weeks of deliberations violated the defendants right to a unanimous jury because the record evidence suggested the juror found the evidence insufficient for a conviction


Input: stage (Pl.’s Class Cert. Mem. at 26). Individual issues, however, would predominate even before the damages stage. Because plaintiff will not be able to prove class-wide, company-wide discrimination with statistical evidence alone, a jury would need to consider each putative class member’s claim individually to determine liability. To prove that an individual plaintiff suffered gender discrimination under disparate impact or disparate treatment theories of Title VII or the Equal Pay Act, an individualized inquiry into each putative plaintiffs circumstances would be necessary to determine whether employment actions taken toward a particular employee were based on gender or instead on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. See Warren v. Solo Cup Co., 516 F.3d 627, 629-30 (7th Cir., 2008) (<HOLDING>); Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 672-73 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that same standard applies to equal pay act and title vii wage discrimination claims 1: holding that if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the equal pay act the employer may raise one of four statutory defenses attributing the difference in pay to i a seniority system ii a merit system ni a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or iv a differential based on any other factor other than sex 2: holding that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of age discrimination the employer must show that the discharge was based on reasonable factors other than age  and if the employer meets that burden the plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in the discharge 3: holding that to establish a prima facie equal pay act claim the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are substantially equal 4: holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions


Input: cannot deny authorization of a [nonmember PCP] based on past practices.” Former OAR 436-015-0070(2) (2002). Managed Healthcare does not challenge DCBS’s general authority to adopt the rule at issue. See ORS 656.726(4)(a) (providing that DCBS director may “[m]ake and declare all rules and issue orders which are reasonably required in the performance of the director’s duties”). Neither does Managed Healthcare contend that DCBS adopted the rule without complying with the applicable rulemaking procedures. Instead, and as noted above, Managed Healthcare argues only that DCBS exceeded its statutory authority by adopting an otherwise valid rule that conflicts with clearly stated statutory policy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 573, 687 P2d 785 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Managed Healthcare relies on several Holdings: 0: holding that ors 30905 did not make ors 12250 applicable to claims brought under that statute because ors 12250 applies only to limitations contained in ors chapter 12 1: recognizing that basis for challenging administrative rule under ors 1834004b 2: recognizing this rule 3: recognizing general rule 4: recognizing rule


Input: in the corresponding psychiatric evaluation.” McRae I, 139 N.C. App. at 391,394, 533 S.E.2d at 560, 562. In this case, defendant’s competence has never been assessed, let alone at a relevant time. Thus, it is clear that a retrospective determination of defendant’s competence would not be possible here and we do not need to remand for the trial court to make such a determination. Because defendant’s competence to stand trial has never been evaluated and “[g]iven the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable circumstances, we cannot conclude that such a procedure would be adequate here.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 183, 43 L.Ed. 2d at 119-20 (citations omitted); see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403, 4 L.Ed. 2d 824, 825 (1960) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s Holdings: 0: holding that appellant must present some evidence of a subsequent change in competency or some new evidence in a manner analogous to newly discovered evidence in a motion for new trial to complain of a denial of a second competency hearing 1: recognizing the difficulty of retrospectively determining the defendants competency as of more than a year ago and ordering a new trial and hearing as to the defendants present competence 2: holding that competency standard for stand ing trial is same as standard for determining competency to waive right to counsel 3: holding that the state does not have to prove a defendants competency to stand trial 4: holding that a trial court must conduct sua sponte a competency hearing when the information known to the trial court at the time of the trial or plea is sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding the defendants competence


Input: child who is incapacitated by a disability. See id. at 117; Sininger v. Sininger, 300 Md. 604, 479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (1984) (interpreting what is now Md.Code Ann., Fam.Law § 13-102(b) (1991), which requires parents to support adult children who cannot be self-supporting due to mental or physical infirmity). While parents may be under a legal obligation to support an adult child in some cases, the District of Columbia courts have not addressed the question of postmajority parental recovery of expenses in such a ease, and the plaintiffs have cited no authority from other jurisdictions to support their position. They rely on Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., 748 F.2d 740 (2nd Cir.1984), but that case is inapposite because it concerned the statutory definition of majority. See id. at 754-55 (<HOLDING>). Michael A. Lasley is not a minor under Holdings: 0: holding age discrimination claim barred 1: holding that as 2330155 applies the twentyone day period for payment to ppi payments 2: holding that parental right to recover medical expenses extends beyond age eighteen to age twentyone because parental support obligation continues until twentyone 3: holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference 4: holding that sixth amendment prejudice resulted from an unasserted error that added six to twentyone months to the defendants sentence


Input: possessed by the Secretary of the Interior by reason of the trust and restriction-so that thereafter all questions pertaining to the title were subject to examination and determination by the courts, appropriately those in Nebraska, the land being there.” Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 508 n. 19, 106 S.Ct. 2039 (quoting Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S. 431, 439, 48 S.Ct. 366, 72 L.Ed. 640 (1928)). Based on this language in the Indian General Allotment Act, courts have determined that “the protections of the Nonin-tercourse Act do not apply to land which has been rendered freely alienable by Congress, held by private parties, and subsequently acquired by an Indian tribe.” Cass Cnty., 643 N.W.2d at 696; see also Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom Cnty., Wash., 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Mashpee Tribe v. Watt, 542 F.Supp. 797, 803 Holdings: 0: holding that county law enforcement officers lacked jurisdiction to arrest indian at ballpark located on indian trust land 1: holding that the state did not have jurisdiction over crime committed on land held by the bureau of indian affairs for the use and benefit of a discrete indian community 2: holding that a nevada state court had no jurisdiction to entertain a civil action filed by a nonindian against an indian for events that occurred on indian land 3: holding that once congress removes restraints on alienation of indian land the protections of the nonintercourse act no longer apply 4: holding that the arrest of an indian on indian land was illegal because the state had no jurisdiction over the reservation to enforce its laws  including the execution of a search warrant  unless congress consented to the states jurisdiction


Input: unlike in Alvarado, Guinto had no remedy available “as of right” to bring these issues before the BIA. See Alcaraz v. I.N.S., 384 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) (discretionary remedies such as motions to reopen or motions to supplement are not remedies available “as of right”). Further, in Alvarado, the allegedly foreclosed legal argument had been available at the very outset of the removal proceedings. See Alvarado, 759 F.3d at 1125, 1127 (noting removal proceedings were instituted in August 2009 whereas the intervening legal authority was decided in January of that year). Here, Descamps was decided over a year after Guinto exercised his last available administrative remedy as of right. Given such circumstances, we hold the issue has been exhausted. See Alcaraz, 384 F.3d at 1158-60 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider Holdings: 0: holding there was no jurisdictional bar under 8 usc  1252d to reviewing legal issues that arose after arguments to the bia were made 1: holding that where issues were not considered by the bia remand is appropriate 2: holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to review legal arguments not raised before the bia 3: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 4: holding that the bia does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to reconsider where the motion merely repeats arguments that the bia has previously rejected


Input: of the state. See 457 U.S. at 842, 102 S.Ct. 2764. The defendants attempt to bolster their argument by analogizing to Rendell-Baker, arguing that the social workers employed by Lutheran, like the school teachers in Rendell-Baker, are not state actors. One court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, however, has recognized that foster care agencies are different from other state contractors and the school teachers in Rendell-Baker because they perform a function that is exclusively the prerogative of the state, namely the removal of children from their homes. See Estate of Earp v. Doud, 1997 WL 255506 *2 (E.D.Pa.1997) In Estate of Earp, the action was brought by the natural parents of Adam Earp, who was involuntarily removed from his mother’ .Ill.1989) (rev’d on other grounds) (<HOLDING>). In reaching the above conclusion, Judge Holdings: 0: holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child 1: holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child 2: holding that when a state obtains an order to remove a child from his home and takes the child into protective custody it is exercising affirmative state power over the child to the extent that it has a due process obligation to assume responsibility to provide for the childs basic needs 3: holding that a child has a  1983 action against the state while in foster care where the state is deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that a foster home is unsafe yet places the child there or allows the child to remain there 4: holding that failing to remove a child from a foster home is not an affirmative act under the statecreated danger exception even where the officials investigation revealed obvious dangers to the childs safety


Input: Mills was not there. In light of Mills’s continued missed appointments and the officer’s continued inability to locate him, Mills was charged with first-degree escape in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-169(a). On June 2, 1998, he was convicted of this crime. The PSR. relied on this conviction as a predicate violent felony conviction in recommending that Mills be sentenced under the ACCA. At a sentencing hearing held on January 22, 2007, the district court rejected Mills’s objection to the classification of this offense as a violent felony for purposes of sentencing him under the ACCA. Employing the “categorical approach,” see Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), and relying on United States v. Jackson, 301 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), the court concluded that it was required to Holdings: 0: holding that escape is categorically a violent felony under the acca 1: holding that escape from secure custody is a violent felony 2: holding prior to chambers that a walkaway escape is categorically a violent felony 3: holding that attempted burglary as defined by florida law is a violent felony under acca 4: holding fleeing police officers in a vehicle was a violent felony under the acca


Input: the statutory policy of “furthering the successful pi-osecution of meritorious claims” was best served by a rule that “creates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case.” Id. at 438, 111 S.Ct. 1435. Permitting a fee award to a pro se litigant, even one who is a lawyer, would instead “create a disincentive to employ counsel.” Id. Accordingly the Supreme Court held that pro se lawyers did not fall within the scope of the fee-shifting provision. Although Kay was decided pursuant to section 1988, its reasoning is not confined to that statute. Indeed, both this Court and other “courts of appeals have [since Kay] denied attorney’s fees to pro se attorneys under a variety of fee-shifting statutes .... ” Zucker v. Westinghouse Elec., 374 F.3d 221, 228-29 (3d Cir.2004); see id. at 229 (<HOLDING>); see also SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 41 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances 1: holding attorneys fees not available to pro se attorney litigant in a federal freedom of information act action 2: holding that attorney fees awarded under the common fund doctrine do not constitute part of a plaintiffs claim against the defendant and cannot be considered for amountincontroversy purposes 3: holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under  1988 4: holding that a shareholderobjector who represents himself as a pro se lawyer is not entitled to attorneys fees under the common fund doctrine


Input: cases in this circuit usually receive, at most, forty minutes of oral argument. A very limited number, including en banc cases, receive an hour. This frivolous appeal was the exception and was given about double the customary time. 3 . See R.262 (“Tate’s complaint asserts that Tate is not a member of any gang, much less a gang leader. But his complaint, while containing language that it is under oath, is signed not by Tate, but his counsel.... Therefore Tate has failed to provide admissible evidence....”). The majority makes much of the fact that the magistrate judge addressed the evidentiary value of Tate's complaint sua sponte, but he had the authority to do so. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ( F.3d 655, 667 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Peterson, 414 F.3d 825, 827 Holdings: 0: holding that a decision is final when it leaves nothing more for the court to do 1: holding attorneys affidavit that does nothing more than assemble properly authenticated evidence is still not admissible because it is not based on personal knowledge 2: holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress 3: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 4: holding that it is not


Input: has considered personal grooming codes prohibiting men but not women from wearing long hair has found the codes to be non-discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII. See Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir.1998); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir.1996); Barker, 549 F.2d at 401; Earwood v. Cont’l Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir.1976); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir.1976); Knott, 527 F.2d at 1252; Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir.1975); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir.1974); Dodge, 488 F.2d at 1337; Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1126 (D.C.Cir.1973). We agree wit Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 37,016 (E.D.N.Y.1987) (<HOLDING>); Lockhart v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 102 Holdings: 0: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 1: holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability 2: holding that title vii prohibits discrimination based on any race including caucasian 3: holding unwritten personal grooming code which allows females to wear earrings but prohibits men from wearing earrings does not constitute a violation of title vii 4: holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine


Input: tell the jury to disregard the accomplice’s testimony, See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 3.18, it does require that corroborating evidence “affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony and point to the guilt of the defendant in some substantial degree.” Sorg, 275 Minn. at 5, 144 N.W.2d at 786. First, we consider that the requirement for the instruction is based on the fact that the “credibility of an accomplice in inherently untrustworthy.” Lee, 683 N.W.2d at 316. Chapman agreed to cooperate with officers and do a controlled buy in order to avoid criminal charges and jail. Therefore, it is relevant that Chapman was afforded leniency in exchange for his cooperation because he could have been charged with possession or second-degree manslaughter. See Rodriguez, 2007 WL 1412880, at *2 (<HOLDING>). Second, the prosecutor relied heavily on Holdings: 0: holding that seconddegree manslaughter was not a crime of violence and thus was not an aggravated felony warranting an aliens removal 1: holding on rehearing that the interests of justice would be better served by remanding for new trial on the offenses of seconddegree murder and voluntary manslaughter 2: holding that the lower court properly charged the jury on voluntary manslaughter where defendant testified he was in fear of the threat of physical assault 3: holding that erroneous manslaughter instruction that defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim did not constitute fundamental error certifying question  if a jury returns a verdict finding a defendant guilty of seconddegree murder in a case where the evidence does not support a theory of culpable negligence does a trial court commit fundamental error by giving a flawed manslaughter by act instruction when it also gives an instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence 4: holding that drug user was properly charged with seconddegree manslaughter after he cooked a lethal dose of heroin for the victim


Input: 96 S.Ct. 984. However, “[a] prosecutor’s administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606. A defendant pleading absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that it is justified by the function in question. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). The defendants’ argument that they are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity prevails only in part. They are correct that they have absolute immunity for offering the tape recording into evidence at the hearing because in doing so they were functioning as advocates. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. 984 (<HOLDING>); see also Butz, 438 U.S. at 516-517, 98 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages under  1988 in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the states case including deciding which evidence to present 1: holding that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from  1983 suits for initiating a prosecution and presenting the case at trial 2: holding that state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution 3: holding prosecutors immune from civil suits for initiating prosecutions and presenting cases 4: holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity


Input: it did not reach the question of immunity. Given the conclusions we have reached, however, it is necessary for us to do so. Under § 820.2, a public employee cannot be held liable for any injury resulting from “his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” The City correctly asserts that § 820.2 applies to county social workers engaged in investigating allegations of child abuse, and extends to other public employees whom those social workers “reasonably enlist to assist in the investigation.” Newton v. County of Napa, 217 Cal.App.3d 1551, 266 Cal.Rptr. 682, 687 (Cal.App.1990); Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 222 Cal.App.3d 869, 271 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519-20 (Cal.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). This immunity provides complete protection Holdings: 0: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 1: holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed in the employees favor and any doubt in its construction is thus resolved in favor of the employee 2: holding that social workers immunity is designed to protect the continu ing exercise of  discretion in favor of the protection of minor children 3: holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record 4: holding that under mayfield the exercise of discretion based on a mistaken premise of law can be a failure to properly exercise discretion


Input: provide just punishment for the offense.... ”). We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this case. The district judge relied upon a variety of factors relevant to a sentencing determination under § 3553(a), some of which indicated that the Guideline range underestimated the seriousness of Mr. Johnson’s crime. Further, we are unable to disagree with the district judge’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors that he considered justified the variance in this case. We “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although there may be other reasonable sentences that the district judge could have chosen, we uphold the district judge’s sentence. See id. (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the sentence handed Holdings: 0: holding that retrial did not violate the double jeopardy clause where reversal based on trial error distinguishing reversal for insufficient evidence 1: holding that the fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal 2: recognizing that the mere plausibility of a different outcome is not sufficient to justify reversal 3: holding that no court has the authority to substitute a different sentence for that which is required by law 4: holding that the outcome of the case could have been different if the trial court had imposed the appropriate burden


Input: at 5. Unlike the cases cited above, the cessation of the “collection process” here was not conditioned on the full payment of the debt, see Kramsky, 00-CIV-2936 at 5, and there was no demand for immediate payment that contradicted the validation notice. Savino, 164 F.3d at 84. The letter that Trans-Continental sent to plaintiffs contained the required validation notice, and it was not overshadowed by the other language in the notice. The validation notice was printed directly beneath the request for payment in full, in the same font size, and on the same page. Cf. Sokolski, 53 F.Supp.2d at 311 (noting that the validation notice was at the bottom of the page, in single spaced, significantly smaller typeface); Unger v. Nat’l Revenue Group Ltd., No. Civ. A. 99-3087, 2000 WL 1897346, *3 (<HOLDING>). The contested statement also did not indicate Holdings: 0: holding the government was within its rights to garnish wages where there was a minimum monthly payment schedule and restitution was due in full immediately 1: holding that the full payment rule literally requires full not partial payment and rejecting the argument that a partpayment remedy is necessary when a taxpayer is too poor to pay the full amount of the tax 2: holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the court of federal claims 3: holding that the validation notice is overshadowed where a debt collector serves a consumer with process initiating a lawsuit during the validation period without clarifying that commencement of the lawsuit has no effect on the information conveyed in the validation notice 4: holding that the validation notice was overshadowed by language that payment in full is due now that was in larger print