Input: 368, 376 (2008) (“An employer may be found directly liable for discrimination under G. L. c. 15 IB, § 4, if it is notified of sexual harassment in its workplace and fails to take adequate remedial action”). See also Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination Guidelines: Sexual Harassment in the Workplace § VI.6 (2002) (“When an employer concludes that sexual harassment has occurred, the employer must take prompt remedial achon designed to end the harassment and prevent future harassment. What constitutes appropriate remedial action depends upon the circumstances”). Title VII similarly requires employers to take remedial achon when they become aware that one of their employees has engaged in sexual harassment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (<HOLDING>). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1999) Holdings: 0: recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action 1: holding that summary judgment was properly granted in an employers favor because the employer promptly took remedial action  reasonably calculated to end the harassment  once it knew or should have known about a harassing coemployees behavior citing kopp v samaritan health sys inc 13 f3d 264 269 8th cir1993 2: holding that employer has affirmative defense to vicarious liability for supervisors conduct if 1 employer acted promptly and reasonably to prevent and correct the alleged harassment and 2 employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive opportunities offered to her 3: holding that employers are vicariously liable for harassment of employees unless employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior emphasis supplied 4: holding that employers are liable for failing to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which managementlevel employees knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known


Input: citation with a .demand for more trial-like procedures, much less a jury trial. . The point, rather, seems to have been that while.fhe Cabinet acquiesced in the court’s informal manner of proceeding, it did, so only with the- understanding that such proceedings could not give rise to a "serious” penalty. ... 15 . The Cabinet provides no authority for this assertion, but the claim is certainly plausible. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (“In order ' for a state to be eligible for payments under this Part [Part E of Title 42, Chapter 7, Sub-chapter IV, Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance], it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which ... provides that ... reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the perma (<HOLDING>); United States v. Droganes, 728 F.3d 580 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity 1: holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official 2: holding that sovereign immunity was implicated and violated by the bankruptcy courts criminal contempt citation against a government agency the irs 3: holding that district courts award of monetary sanctions for contempt violated the sovereign immunity of the united states but also reversing on other grounds 4: holding that sovereign immunity barred claim for compensatory sanctions against the government


Input: stating that Bill’s Forestry owed the IRS $161,502.69. By May 1989, Bill’s Forestry had collected approximately 94% of the crew members’ signatures on 4669 Forms, and it filed those with the IRS. Thereafter, negotiations between Bill’s Forestry and the IRS broke down. Relying on Agent Brown’s report and before reviewing the 4669 Forms, the IRS issued a letter to Bill’s Forestry “proposing adjustments” (an increase) in the amount of $161,502.69 to Bill’s Forestry’s taxes. Bill’s Forestry appealed. Bill’s Forestry, through counsel, notified IRS Appeals Officer Steve Cantrell that it considered the IRS’s position to be contrary to Grady Felder Trucking Co. v. United States, 218 Ct.Cl. 645 (1978), and Jones v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cases (CCH) ¶ 9,120, 1978 WL 1245 (E.D.Tex.1978) (<HOLDING>), rev’d in part, 613 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir.1980) Holdings: 0: holding that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor lies in the common law and not under an express provision of the act 1: holding that a tree cutter was an independent contractor not an employee for purposes of the taxpayers withholding of income fica and futa taxes but denying the taxpayer attorneys fees incurred in litigating the action 2: holding that under the mwa the question of whether an employee was an independent contractor or an employee was a question of statutory interpretation 3: holding that plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys fees for time spent litigating the fees issue on appeal under title viis attorneys fee provision 4: holding that when the insured brings an action for a declaration of coverage and prevails absent a bad faith denial of coverage by the insurer attorneys fees incurred by the insured in the prosecution of that action are not incurred at the request of the insurer


Input: 23 I. & N. Dec. 319 (BIA 2002), and In re Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 2002), do not require that the hardship be “substantially beyond the ordinary hardship” (as each expressly states). She argues that those decisions require instead only a “hardship that would place the Petitioner in a small select group of persons suffering a unique form of hardship that is selective rather than too substantial or unconscionable.” (Petr.’s Br. at 8.) Whatever that standard might mean, there is no support for it in the BIA’s decisions. In re Andazola-Rivas and In re Reciñas expressly reaffirmed the standard set forth in In re Monreal-Aguinaga, and Jimenez’s argument to the contrary “does not even reach the level of being colorable.” Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Jimenez argues that the IJ Holdings: 0: holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court 1: holding that a judge did not act in clear absence of all jurisdiction where he had colorable authority to take the action in question 2: recognizing that appellate counsel is under no duty to raise every colorable claim suggested by a client 3: holding that similar argument did not raise a colorable question of law for purposes of jurisdiction 4: holding that government lost right to raise lack of expectation of privacy argument on appeal when it failed to raise argument below


Input: the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. Regarding Defendant’s arguments that various statistical calculations should be held inadmissible under Rules 401, 402, or 403, the Court observes that Defendant himself acknowledges that “statistical probabilities are basic to DNA analysis.” Davis, 40 F.3d at 1075. The Court finds that statistical calculations accompanying DNA evidence are relevant and “of consequence,” under Rules 401 and 402. Careful presentation of statistical evidence, with explanations by experts — either the Government’s or Defendant’s — can ensure that the jury is not misled or confused, and that there is no other type of unfair prejudice. See Fed.R.Evid. 403; Chischilly, 30 F.3d at 1158 (<HOLDING>). To the extent that Defendant disagrees with Holdings: 0: recognizing that rule 608b prior bad acts evidence admissible as probative of truthfulness is subject to rule 403 balancing 1: recognizing the possibility but denying relief 2: recognizing possibility of problems but holding there was no rule 403 violation in admitting statistics 3: holding that an error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction 4: recognizing rule


Input: make a deal for her client, not that there was a fully integrated cooperation agreement on the table for acceptance. This is best illustrated by the paucity of detail regarding the terms of the “agreement” Bicknese allegedly reached with Meyer. Bicknese and Meyer never discussed such critical details as what level of cooperation would be required of Kozak in order for her to satisfy the purported cooperation agreement nor who would determine whether Kozak had fulfilled her part of the cooperation agreement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the court concludes that no meeting of the minds can be found to have existed between Meyer and Bicknese for a cooperation agreement for Kozak. Because the court concludes that there was no meeting of the minds necessary for the creation ir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Fourth Street Pharmacy v. United States Dep’t Holdings: 0: holding that cooperation was insufficient where the defendants cooperation was based on his confession to the charged crimes 1: holding that confession was voluntary although agents had promised to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation 2: holding that county officers were neither agents of the united states nor did they have any duty to investigate federal consequences of actions before securing defendants cooperation 3: holding that united states attorney was not required to abide by a secret service agents promise to a defendant to drop federal charges in exchange for defendants cooperation where the united states attorney never sanctioned the agreement and the promise was clearly outside the agents authority 4: holding that federal agents indication to defendant that his cooperation would be reported to the united states attorney did not make defendants confession involuntary


Input: for purposes of placing surveillance equipment. The only jurisdictional limitation the government acknowledges is that the listening post must be located in the issuing court’s jurisdiction. Of course, the statute does not refer to a “listening post,” and none of the cases cited by the government addresses the jurisdiction of the issuing court to authorize law enforcement officers to covertly place a listening device on private property. All of those cases addressed phone taps, and as the Seventh Circuit explained, “a tap is not placed in the telephone handset itself; it is attached to the telephone line at some distance from the handset.” United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir.1997); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (<HOLDING>), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, Holdings: 0: holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not 1: holding that a wiretap was not a search because tjhere was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants 2: holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house 3: holding that the defendants entry into the foyer of a fraternity house was an entry into a dwelling 4: holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises


Input: its citizens the rights and privileges of United States citizenship. Feliciano-Grafals, 309 F.Supp. at 1296; Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431, 434 (3d Cir.1966) (stating that Puerto Rican citizens are also citizens of t cognized that “Puerto Rico occupies a relationship to the United States that has no parallel,” neither the Court nor Congress has suggested that Puerto Rico should not be considered part of the United States for purposes of predicate offenses in our criminal justice system. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 596, 96 S.Ct. 2264. In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has rejected the contention that when “Puerto Rico became a commonwealth its courts ceased to be within our system of government.” Americana, 368 F.2d at 438-39 (<HOLDING>); see also Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 Holdings: 0: holding this rule does not deny full faith and credit 1: holding that texas is required to extend full faith and credit to valid judgments from other states 2: holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state 3: holding that constitutional error was waived even though petitioner repeatedly used the phrase full faith and credit because petitioner did not cite to the federal constitution or to any cases relying on the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution 4: holding that puerto rican judgments are entitled to full faith and credit


Input: likewise was entitled to summary judgment); Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 248 F.3d 738, 748 (8th Cir.2001) (en banc) (declaring “where arresting police officers are absolved of liability to arrestees, the City ordinarily is not liable”); Thomas v. Dickel, 213 F.3d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir.2000) (reasoning “[b]ecause we have found that the officers’ stop of the plaintiffs’ car did not violate their fourth amendment ] rights, it follows that the plaintiffs’ claim against the city (inadequate training and municipal custom) must likewise fail”); Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 628 (8th Cir.1996) (declaring decision that officers’ conduct did not violate plaintiffs constitutional right to privacy disposed of related claims against the city); Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). We have reviewed Tennessee v. Garner and Holdings: 0: holding city cannot be found liable on either a failuretotrain theory or a municipal custompolicy theory unless a defendant police officer is found liable on an underlying substantive claim 1: holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory 2: holding that where no underlying constitutional violation occurred the city cannot be liable under monell 3: holding that a party can be held liable for securities fraud on an agency or a respondeat superior theory 4: holding that a municipality cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory


Input: new contract to which conventional contract principles apply, construed in accordance with relevant state law.”). One such restriction is that a reaffirmation agreement is enforceable only if “the debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any time prior to discharge or within 60 days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, by giving notice of recision to the holder of such claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4). Although the method for giving notice of rescission under § 524(c)(4) is not statutorily provided or defined, at least two courts have concluded that a reaffirmation agreement may be effectively rescinded by giving oral notice of the recision to the creditor. See In re Polkus, 2008 Bankr.LEXIS 3223, at *4, 2008 WL 5099967 at *2 (Bankr.D.Ariz. Dec. 3, 2008) (<HOLDING>); Booth v. Nat’l City Bank (In re Booth), 242 Holdings: 0: holding issues argued orally but not addressed in brief were waived 1: holding that failure to include in writing requirement violated  1692ga4 2: holding that jones act claims can be brought either in admiralty or at law 3: holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city 4: holding that  notice can refer to transmitting a fact either orally or in writing


Input: exact point in time and circumstances that the deposit may have become refundable, Monroe was not proven to have had the fraudulent intent necessary for embezzlement. Larceny under § 523(a)(4) necessitates a showing that the debtor wrongfully took property from its rightful owner with fraudulent intent to convert such property to its own use without the owner’s consent. In re Rose, 934 F.2d 901 (7th Cir.1991). Larceny was not proven by preponderance of evidence; certainly there was no proof taking the case out of an ordinary commercial issue as to contract deposit monies potentially returnable but subject to claimed offset rights for asserted breach of contract. Monroe’s lack of fraudulent intent also supports a finding that Monroe did not engage in larceny. In re Rose, 934 F.2d at 903 (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION The Debtor-Defendant prevails on Holdings: 0: holding that a rico plaintiff must allege at a minimum the time place and content of the alleged misrepresentations on which he or she relied the fraudulent scheme the fraudulent intent of the defendants and the injury resulting from the fraud 1: holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner 2: holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default 3: holding that the principal of a corporate debtor does not become a transferee by the mere act of causing the debtor to make a fraudulent transfer 4: holding that larceny requires that the debtor wrongfully and with fraudulent intent takes property from its owner


Input: employment action complained of’). Consequently, it is difficult to gauge the full significance of Reeves’s remark. See Bennett v. Solis, 729 F.Supp.2d 54, 68-69 (D.D.C.2010) (emphasizing the importance of the context in which allegedly discriminatory remarks were made to their probative value in establishing pretext). Ultimately, the Court must conclude that a reasonable juror could find that Hyson’s non-promotion was based to some extent on her gender. Although, as described above, the facts that Hyson was interviewed while Celin was not and that Hyson had a higher score than Celin on the online test do not give rise to an inference of discrimination by themselves, they might do so in combination with Reeves’s remark. Cf. Pederson v. Mills, 636 F.Supp.2d 78, 84-85 (D.D.C.2009) (<HOLDING>). Such a determination would likely come down Holdings: 0: recognizing that the plaintiffs mere assertions that the defendant had a discriminatory intent were inadequate without substantial factual evidence to raise an issue to preclude summary judgment 1: holding that repeated remarks about need to bring in new blood or young blood by one of the decisionmakers were not stray remarks and may permit inference of discrimination 2: holding that discriminatory remarks made nearly a year before the challenged employment decision could not support an inference of discrimination 3: holding that biased remarks by decisionmakers in combination with evidence of a minor qualification gap in favor of the plaintiff were sufficient to support  an overall inference of discriminatory preference and preclude summary judgment for the defendant 4: holding that remarks made by decisionmakers could be viewed as reflecting discriminatory animus


Input: “protracted” is “to draw out or lengthen in time; prolong.” Id. Following the same logic, we held in Fleming v. State that the word “impairment” means “[t]he fact or state of being damaged, weakened, or diminished” for purposes of the aggravated battery statute. 833 N.E.2d 84, 89 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). Smith argues that Officer Wheeler’s injury cannot fall under the second prong of the aggravated battery statute because “the tooth was neither a bodily member or organ.” Appellant’s Br. p. 8. While there is no Indiana precedent for the notion that a tooth is a bodily member or organ for purposes of our aggravated battery statute, several other jurisdictions have analyzed similar statutes and arrived at that conclusion. See, e.g., Rivers v. State, 255 Ga.App. 422, 565 S.E.2d 596, 597 (2002) (<HOLDING>); McBeath v. State, 739 So.2d 451, 455 Holdings: 0: holding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated battery when the bodily member that is lost or rendered useless in the battery is a tooth 1: holding that aggravated battery of peace officer encompasses both insulting or provoking contact and battery resulting in bodily harm 2: holding that tooth was a member and loss of tooth consti tuted serious bodily injury for purposes of aggravated battery statute 3: holding that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of manslaughter 4: holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery


Input: the plaintiff. [Cit.]” Kitfield v. Henderson, Black & Greene, 231 Ga. App. 130, 135 (6) (498 SE2d 537) (1998). A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress will not succeed where the defendant uttered “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. [Cit.]” Jenkins v. General Hospitals of Humana, 196 Ga. App. 150, 152 (395 SE2d 396) (1990). Additionally, we have held that neither the filing of a lawsuit or threat to file a lawsuit is sufficient to establish humiliating, embarrassing, or frightening conduct which will give rise to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Rolleston v. Huie, 198 Ga. App. 49, 51 (2) (400 SE2d 349) (1990). See also Moses v. Prudential Ins. Co., 187 Ga. App. 222 (369 SE2d 541) (1988) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, the evidence Holdings: 0: holding that theft from the person of another under wisconsin law is not a crime of violence as a matter of law and can only qualify as such if there are sufficient facts in the indictment to indicate that a serious threat of violence occurred 1: holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence 2: holding that threat occurring 36 days before possession of firearm not present threat 3: holding that a telephone threat to resort to physical violence and to litigation does not state a claim 4: holding that confession was coerced because it was prompted by a credible threat of physical violence where official told defendant that defendant was in danger of physical harm at hands of other inmates and offered to protect defendant in exchange for a confession


Input: to avoid arrest or prosecution, then he could not have used it to take the wrecker and could not have committed a robbery with a firearm. In Oklahoma, however, the intent to rob and the intent to eliminate a witness can exist simultaneously and not be inconsistent. See Spears v. State, 900 P.2d 431, 440 (Okla.Crim.App.1995) (“killing may precede, coincide with or follow the robbery and still be done in the commission of a robbery with a dangerous weapon”); see also Wackerly v. State, 12 P.3d 1, 14 (Okla. Crim.App.2000) (robbery and murder can be contemporaneous and evidence may be sufficient to support finding murder was committed to avoid arrest or prosecution), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1028, 121 S.Ct. 1976, 149 L.Ed.2d 768 (2001). See generally Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475 (<HOLDING>). Here, the evidence of one gunshot wound to Holdings: 0: recognizing that federal courts are bound by pronouncements of the california supreme court on applicable state law 1: holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state 2: holding that state courts in construing and interpreting state law are not bound by the decisions of federal courts 3: holding that federal courts are bound by state interpretations of state law 4: holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law


Input: the division of authority between federal and state governments,’ the inquiries under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment ‘are mirror images of each other.’ Specifically, the Court noted as follows: “ ‘If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.’ “Id “Thus, even if plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that § 601 intrudes upon a domain traditionally left to the states, it is constitutional as long as it falls within the commerce power. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2400-01, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 [ (1991) ] (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1346-47 Holdings: 0: recognizing that constitution grants authority for congress to enact  4248 as necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the constitution internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding that as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority a court should not vacate his decision 2: holding that congress may impose its will on the states as long as it is acting within the powers granted by the constitution 3: holding that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from an action arising from the states breach of that contract 4: holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states


Input: Plaintiffs, this Court concludes that the Leases remain in full force and effect and that the title to the oil and gas in place remains vested in MSB. Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ trespass to try title suit and suit to quiet title necessarily fail. E. The Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover their attorneys’ fees pursuant to chapters 37 or 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Because the Court has concluded that the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied in its entirety, the Court further concludes that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover their attorneys’ fees under chapter 37 of the Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem. Code. City of Houston v. Harris County Outdoor Advertising Ass’n, 732 S.W.2d 42, 56 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 7, 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). The Court also concludes that the Plaintiffs Holdings: 0: holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees 1: holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered 2: holding that fees are not recoverable for work for which the client could not be charged 3: holding that attorneys fees are not recoverable for a nonprevailing party in a declaratory judgment action 4: holding that while the nonprevailing partys financial condition is not appropriate to consider in determining whether to award attorneys fees it is appropriate to consider when determining the amount of the attorneys fees


Input: life and death for Fields. Beyond Officer January’s and Tichenor’s testimony, the list goes on and on. III. Conclusion Sherman Lamont Fields was sentenced to death based on testimony that he was never able to confront. That is precisely the evil that the Confrontation Clause was meant to protect against. That troubling fact cannot be remedied by categorizing the testimony as speaking to selection as opposed to eligibility factors. The jury’s difficulty in agreeing on a sentence and the number of mitigating factors found highlight how artificial that distinction can be. I would find that the Confrontation Clause applies to capital sentencing as it is structured under the FDPA and remand this case for resentencing. 1 . Compare Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1254 (11th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mills, 446 F.Supp.2d 1115, Holdings: 0: holding that the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses applies to capital sentencing hearings 1: recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings 2: holding that the confrontation clause applies only to trials and not to sentencing hearings 3: holding no right to crossexamine in grand jury proceedings 4: holding that the right applies at capital sentencing in particular


Input: decision and whatever the significance attributed to Bun’s youth, the trial court found it was outweighed by the severity of his crimes, his criminal history, and his lack of remorse. 6 We note that trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he made a conscious decision not to object to Lawson’s testimony because he believed the testimony was admissible and he did not want the judge to think he was “hiding anything.” Under Georgia law, a defendant’s juvenile court records can be considered by a trial court in the sentencing phase after conviction of a felony, and in fact, Bun’s juvenile records were admitted at the sentencing hearing for the trial court’s consideration. See OCGA § 15-11-703. See also Burrell v. State, 258 Ga. 841 (7) (376 SE2d 184) (1989) (<HOLDING>). BENHAM, Justice, dissenting. For the reasons Holdings: 0: recognizing that all evidence admitted during merits phase of a contested trial can be considered in sentencing 1: holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase 2: holding that counsels failure to investigate the defendants personal and psychiatric history constituted ineffective assistance during the penalty phase but not during the guilt phase 3: recognizing that former ocga  151138 b now codified at ocga  1511703 specifically provides that a defendants juvenile records may be introduced during the sentencing phase of trial 4: recognizing that an inquiry into the conduct underlying a defendants juvenile adjudication may be admissible under rule 11608b nmra if the prosecution does not specifically question the defendant about the juvenile adjudication and does not otherwise present any evidence regarding the defendants juvenile adjudication


Input: 1103(c)(5) and section 1109(b)); In re Jones, 37 B.R. 969 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1984) (section 1109(b)); In re Chemical Separations Corp., 32 B.R. 816 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1983) (section 1109(b)); In re Joyanna Holitogs, Inc., 21 B.R. 323 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (section 1109(b)). Cases in the courts of appeals are scarce, but this Court has indicated approval of that view. See Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1363 (5th Cir.1986) (suggesting that section 1109(b) provides a basis for the standing of a creditors’ committee); Fuel Oil Supply & Terminaling v. Gulf Oil Corp., 762 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir.1985) (expressing approval of bankruptcy cases such as In re Toledo Equipment and In re Joyanna Holitogs); see also In re STN Enterprises, 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); see generally Blain & Erne, Creditors’ Holdings: 0: holding that bankruptcy courts can authorize creditors committees in chapter 11 proceedings to sue derivatively to avoid fraudulent transfers for the benefit of the estate notwithstanding hartford underwriters 1: holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor 2: holding that  1103c5 and 1109b imply a qualified right for creditors committees to initiate suit with the approval of the bankruptcy court 3: holding that contracts are not binding before court approval because the debtorinpossession operates as a fiduciary any actions taken by the debtor are to be in the best interests of the creditor body as a whole for that reason  the debtors actions are subject to  review by the creditors of the estate and the bankruptcy court 4: holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added


Input: that the trial court erred in listing McCracken on the verdict form so as to permit the jury to apportion fault between him and Rowell. We agree. Appellants correctly argue that McCracken’s act of committing suicide by jumping in front of a fifty-thousand pound tractor-trailer traveling at seventy miles per hour was an intentional, rather than a negligent, act. See Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 137 F.3d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir.1998) (affirming the trial court’s refusal to -include the name of a teenage boy who committed suicide on the verdict form because the boy’s suicide constituted an intentional act). Therefore, McCracken’s name should not have been, and should not be, included on the verdict form. See id.; see also Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 702 So.2d 232, 233-34 (Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 723 Holdings: 0: holding that section 319s mandate that the employer is subrogated  to the extent of compensation payable does not mean that the sole right to recover from the tortfeasor is in the employer rather the right of action against the tortfeasor remains in the injured employee and suit is to be commenced in his name 1: holding that a typographical error on the jury verdict form was harmless error because the trial court polled the jurors after the mistake was discovered to make sure that they understood the verdict that they had entered 2: holding that right of one joint tortfeasor to implead a second joint tortfeasor and have the jury apportion the damages according to their relative degrees of fault was not merely a procedural right but a substantive right 3: holding that it was error to permit the name of a nonparty intentional tortfeasors name to appear on the verdict form so as to permit the jury to apportion fault between the nonparty and the negligent tortfeasor 4: holding that it would be inequitable to allow a town to deny a permit based on a new ordinance after the property owner was denied a permit three times and brought suit to determine the validity of the prior ordinance


Input: Trust Claims Under California state law, a constructive trust may be imposed on property as. a remedy for things “wrongfully detain[ed],” Cal. Civ.Code § 2223 (West Supp. 1996), or “gain[ed] ... by .fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act,” id. § 2224. Taylor advances two arguments for why its payments from Advent came from funds held. in constructive trust. r First, Taylor claims that the payments came from wrongfully diverted Coastal funds which Advent held in constructive trust for Coastal’s benefit. This claim is without merit. Under California law, Taylor has no right to seek the imposition of a constructive trust on Coastal’s behalf. Sobel Bldg. Dev. Partners v. Broach (In re Sexton), 166 B.R. 421, 425 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994) (<HOLDING>). Second, Taylor claims that the payments came Holdings: 0: recognizing constructive trust as appropriate equitable remedy 1: holding plans suit against law firm for constructive trust was a suit for appropriate equitable relief 2: holding that under california law a constructive trust may be sought only by the equitable owner of the trust res not by a creditor of the equitable owner 3: holding that the statute of limitations cannot bar appellants claim that a constructive trust should be imposed  because a constructive trust is an equitable remedy and therefore not subject to the statute 4: holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust


Input: § 3553(a)(7) to justify the magistrate’s decision to depart. Guideline § 5K2.0 permits departure based on “ ‘mitigating circumstance[s] of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.’ ” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). The sentencing judge may not depart unless he or she has legal authority under the Guidelines to do so. United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (notmg that “legal authority” is first of three-part test for departure under the Guidelines). Although in United States v. Miller, 991 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.1993), and United States v. Berlier, 948 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.1991), we analyzed the related question of the scope of § 3E1.1 departures based on pre-trial restitution Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Guideline § 5K2.0 requires that the Holdings: 0: holding that the district court was not required to state affirmatively on the record that it knew it possessed the authority to depart downward 1: holding that this court does not review decisions of a district court not to depart downward unless the record reflects that the district court was not aware of or did not understand its discretion to make such a departure 2: recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart 3: holding that district court may not depart downward to preserve defendants ability to make restitution 4: holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart


Input: (Tex.1986). Those decisions — which do not involve mortgage assumptions — are inapplicable here because Mrs. Brush’s assumption of her father’s mortgage was not a modification of Wells Fargo’s prior agreements with him. As Wells Fargo notes, a transféree’s agreement to assume a loan is a new promise and does not necessarily extinguish the transferor’s personal obligation under the loan. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgage) § 5.1(b)(2) (“When mortgaged real estate is transferred with assumption of liability ... the transferor remains personally liable for the covenants in the mortgage and for the obligation secured by the mortgage, to the extent such liability existed prior to the transfer.”); Shockey v. Page, 354 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1962, writ ref d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); Helge v. Am. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 124 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the patent exhaustion doctrine is only applicable if there is an unconditional sale and that private parties retain the freedom to contract concerning conditions of sale 1: holding that an original obligor is personally liable if there is no unconditional acceptance of the assuming party as the sole principal obligor by the holder of the indebtedness nor was there any agreement to release the original obligors 2: recognizing that a claim is an assertion of a right and if there is no assertion of a right there is no claim to deduct 3: holding there was no error in refusing to charge accessory after the fact because there is no exclusionary situation which eliminates one defendant or the other from having participated in the murder as a principal 4: holding that where the parties fail to reach an agreement as to the character nature or type of release to be used an essential element of the agreement is not established


Input: possible solutions while the other side simply awaits the arrival of an offer to its liking”). Further, the accommodation was reasonable. See id. at 595-96. 5 “In an action for wrongful interference with contract the plaintiff must prove that the plaintiff had a contract with a third party, the defendant knowingly induced the third party to break that contract, the defendant’s interference was improper in motive or means, and the plaintiff was harmed by the interference.” Abramian, 432 Mass at 122. 6 See also Comey v. Hill 387 Mass. 11, 19-20 (1982) (action based on age discrimination supported jury verdict for plaintiff on intentional interference claim); Draghetti v. Chimielewski, 416 Mass. 808, 817 (1994); Martins v. University of Mass. Medical Sch., 75 Mass.App.Ct. 623, 634 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Steranko v. Irforex, Inc., 5 Mass.App.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference 1: holding that a breach of settlement claim should have been brought in the court of federal claims pursuant to the tucker act 2: holding that interference claim against supervisors should have been submitted to jury in conjunction with discrimination claims 3: holding that wifes tort claims should have been presented in conjunction with the divorce action to lay at rest all their legal differences in one proceeding and avoid the prolongation and fractionalization of litigation 4: holding that the fraud claims against the defendant should not have been dismissed as the complaint provided him with fair notice of the claims made against her


Input: courts have exonerated individuals post-conviction have been single assailant DNA cases). 6 . Cherrix’s confession does not preclude a person's actual innocence of a crime. See Bruce M. Lyons, New Committee Looks at DNA and the Death Penalty, Crim.Jusx, Spring 2000, at 1 (reporting that, among May 16, 2000) (affirming its order for release of the habeas petitioner after DNA evidence showed he was actually of the murder); People v. Dabbs, 154 Misc.2d 671, 675-76, 587 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1991) (ordering post-conviction DNA testing and vacating conviction based on DNA evidence test results in a rape case). 10 . The need to prevent a miscarriage of miscarriage will be explored more fully below. See infra section IV. 11 . See also Commonwealth v. Reese, 444 Pa.Super. 38, 663 A.2d 206, 207 (1995) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hicks, 195 Wis.2d 620, 536 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a new trial was warranted and stating that the defendant was entitled to have dna testing done on vaginal swabs taken from the victim 1: holding that dna test results warranted a new trial of a postconviction petitioner who was convicted of rape and kidnaping 2: recognizing that enhancement for results obtained may be warranted 3: recognizing that in prior decisions the court had used the term inconclusive to mean that dna evidence did not exclude an individual but clarifying that in the future the term inconclusive would be used only when a dna sample does not contain enough dna to draw a conclusion dna is degraded or for other reasons a dna test yields no results or the examiner draws no conclusion 4: holding that there is no postconviction due process right to biological evidence for purposes of dna testing


Input: 471, 476 (6th Cir.2008). In other words, the government must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would have at least attempted to seriously harm or kill the driver if that action had been necessary to complete the taking of the car.” Id. at 477 (quoting Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 11-12, 119 S.Ct. 966, 143 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999)). In order to satisfy this requirement, the government sought to use the assault of Marshall to show that Clay had the specific intent to cause serious bodily harm or death to White. As a threshold matter, we have approved of the admission of other acts evidence to show specific intent in certain circumstances. See United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186,1192 (6th Cir.1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S.Ct. 910, 130 L.Ed.2d 792 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Most frequently, we admit this evidence in Holdings: 0: holding there was no rule 404b violation where the evidence was admitted to show knowledge and knowledge was an element of the crime charged 1: holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime 2: holding that where there is thrust upon the government either by virtue of the defense raised by the defendant or by virtue of the elements of the crime charged the affirmative duty to prove that the underlying prohibited act was done with a specific criminal intent other acts evidence may be introduced under rule 404b 3: holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of felonymurder the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony 4: holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial


Input: very helpful in establishing personal jurisdiction. See Kato-pothis v. Windsor-Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-380, 211 F.Supp.3d 1, 23, 2016 WL 5374081,. at *16 (D.D.C. Sept. 26,. 2016) ("[Ejmail and telephone communications sent into the District of Columbia are not sufficient to [confer personal jurisdiction] in themselves, even if they are made pursuant to an underlying contract between a resident [plaintiff] and a nonresident [defendant .... After all, such communications are incidental to nearly every business relationship; they are not indicative of any desire to do business in D.C. and do not suffice to show purposeful availment or minimum contacts.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Dove v. United States, No. 86-0065, 1987 WL 18739, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 1987) (<HOLDING>). 12 . ■ Furthermore, the court in Johnson Holdings: 0: holding that the mere delivery of documents  does not confer jurisdiction 1: holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 2: holding that mere reference to a collective bargaining agreement does not confer federal question jurisdiction under section 301a 3: holding that the flsa does not confer jurisdiction over ambulance services 4: holding that a choice of law provision is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant


Input: the trial court granted Bauer a new trial, found that the City had no title in the parkland, and vacated the prior judgment. The trial court then retained jurisdiction “for the purpose of making a final determination of relief consistent with the request of [Bauer’s] petition, the applicable law and evidence to be submitted upon further hearing.” The defendants have appealed the trial court’s vacation of the final judgment in favor of the defendants and the trial court’s granting of Bauer’s motion for a new trial. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315.03 (Reissue 1989) provides in part that “[a]n order entering judgment, as provided in section 25-1315.02, or granting or denying a new trial, is an appealable order.” See, also, Morford v. Lipsey Meat Co., Inc., 179 Neb. 420, 138 N.W.2d 653 (1965) (<HOLDING>). Hence, the district court’s order of March Holdings: 0: holding that mandamus is appropriate remedy because temporary order granting visitation is not appealable 1: holding that superior court erred in reversing trial courts order granting new trial and remanding for a new trial limited to apportionment of damages 2: holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action 3: holding that an order granting a new trial in a civil action is appealable 4: holding that an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial


Input: to carry out the agent’s express powers.” (citation omitted)). The authority to sell Philadelphia insurance, subject to Philadelphia’s ultimate approval, would not also impliedly include the ability of Wortham to accept notice of a claim on Philadelphia’s policy several years after Wortham had completed the brokering transaction. The claims process is distinct from policy brokering, and even though Wortham may have had authority to broker policies, this authority did not impliedly include authority to accept notice of claims. See Landry v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 428 F.Supp.2d 531, 534 (E.D.La.2006) (“The distinction between handling and procurement is well-supported by case law....”); see also Elkins v. Am. Int’l Special Lines Ins. Co., 611 F.Supp.2d 752, 766-67 (S.D.Ohio 2009) (<HOLDING>)- Thus, implied authority did not exist for Holdings: 0: holding that legal injury occurred for purposes of negligence action against insurance agent when insurance company rejected the claim 1: holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer 2: holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims 3: holding that insurance broker is generally agent of insured 4: holding that a broker may be a statutory agent for an insurance company pursuant to section 626842 florida statutes 1989 or be clothed with actual or apparent authority so that the brokers acts may be binding on the insurance company


Input: rules of parliamentary procedure, and . . . that common law or parliamentary law regards a tie vote on an affirmative resolution or action as a rejection.”); Crossgates Inc. v. Board of Comm’rs, 145 Pa. Commw. 339, 603 A.2d 276, 278 (1992), aff’d, 635 A.2d 1040 (Pa. 1994); Young v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 144 Pa. Commw. 16, 600 A.2d 667, 669 (1991) (“Equally divided votes . .. have been deemed to constitute a denial of the action requested from the Board, rather than the absence of a decision.”), appeal denied, 609 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1992); Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1152, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223, 237 (1996) (tie vote does not sustain moving party’s burden), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1167 (1997); but see Cobb County v. Jones, 179 Ga. App. 240, 345 S.E.2d 917 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 9 84 Wn.2d 25, 523 P.2d 1181 (1974). 10 84 Holdings: 0: holding that there is no first amendment or common law right of access to documents which played no role in a judicial decision 1: holding that a board affirmance of an ro decision subsumes that decision 2: holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision 3: recognizing that the reeves decision modified the combs decision 4: holding that tie vote equals no decision


Input: until amended motion for new trial); Short v. State, 995 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd)(failure to raise in pari materia claim before trial waives the complaint for appellate review); Haywood v. State, 344 S.W.3d 454, 465 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, pet. ref'd)(same). M.L.M. would not have had any occasion to raise this issue before, or even during the adjudication hearing, as there was no suggestion that the State was asking for a finding under a lesser included offense. But the bifurcated nature of the juvenile proceedings provided M.L.M. the opportunity to object to the referee’s finding on the lesser included offense before or dur ing the disposition hearing held sixteen days later. See In re A.C., 48 S.W.3d 899, 905 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied)(<HOLDING>). By that time, it was clear the referee had Holdings: 0: holding that defendant waived ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsels failure to emphasize certain evidence where amended motion for new trial did not assert claim of ineffectiveness on that ground and no argument related to the asserted ground was made at the motion for new trial hearing 1: holding that claims raised by appellant for first time in motion for new trial were untimely and therefore waived 2: holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action 3: holding appellants issue was rendered moot because appellant was given the opportunity to make a record in support of his motion for new trial and appellate court considered that record in disposing of only issue raised in the motion for new trial 4: holding complaint made first in amended motion for new trial when juvenile had notice of the issue before trial and during both phases was untimely


Input: Bath, the court erred by rejecting the evidence. [150] This issue may have been rendered moot by our holding that unsuccessful claimants, including Mr. Bath, may establish the "reasonable time" factor by demonstrating due individual diligence to utilize reserved waters once project facilities were made available to their properties. Because it cannot be determined from the extant record whether Mr. Bath did exercise such individual diligence, we will consider the matter. [151] It is well established that " 'the burden of proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of any issue. Morrison v. Reilly, Wyo., 511 P.2d 970 (1978)" " Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 90 (quoting Osborn v. Manning, 685 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Wyo.1984)); see, e.g., Younglove v. Graham & Hill, 526 P.2d 689, 693 (Wyo.1974) (<HOLDING>); Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Apodaca, Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 1: holding burden of proof is on one asserting an affirmative defense 2: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 3: holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence 4: recognizing that federal preemption is affirmative defense as to which defendant has burden of proof


Input: Richard Sumpter, his co-defendant, go to trial immediately, and made reference to some “thing” in his past where he “fought for 18 months,” but a “guy” got caught with an ounce of pot and “screwed everything up.” Through Diana’s assistance, the government taped this conversation and offered the conversation as evidence at trial. Prior to trial, the district court denied Free’s motion in limine to strike the conversation, concluding the tape “[did not] say he got convicted,” and thus presented no Rule 404(b) issue. Assuming the taped conversation presents evidence of a prior criminal act, the evidence is nonetheless admissible under Rule 404 to demonstrate Free’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and not his prior misconduct. United States v. Ailstock, 546 F.2d 1285, 1289 (6th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>); Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). It is not clear whether Holdings: 0: holding 404b evidence admissible under intent exception but not motive exception where motive not contested 1: holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial 2: holding that evidence of prior criminal misconduct is admissible under rule 404b to prove motive opportunity intent preparation plan knowledge identity or absence of mistake or accident 3: holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal 4: holding other acts evidence that was permissible to demonstrate a plan to defraud was also admissible to establish intent knowledge and absence of mistake


Input: of those claims under a theory of equitable recoupment. See id. at 29. Finally, Pran-sky claims that since his challenge to the 1987 tax assessment necessarily involves the “offset” of the 1984 and 1985 overpay-ments and that challenge would not be defeated even if plaintiff failed to file refund claims for 1984 and 1985. See Appel-lee’s Sur-reply at 3. a. Right to Assert Time Barred Tax Claims as Counterclaim The Court is not persuaded by appellee’s argument that in the context of his bankruptcy, the debtor may raise otherwise time barred issues as a defense or counterclaim to the government’s proof of claim. It is clear that the statute of limitations created by specific provisions of the tax code are applicable to bankruptcy proceedings. See e.g. Custom Distribution, 224 F.3d at 244 (<HOLDING>); In re Constable Terminal Corp., 246 B.R. 181, Holdings: 0: holding that district court had discretion to decline to offset severance and unemployment payments from damages award 1: holding that court sitting in bankruptcy may allow a taxpayer to use overpayment of taxes as offset of debt to the irs but only if that offset request is timely 2: holding that pursuant to statute unemployment benefits must be offset against workers compensation payments 3: holding that a debt discharged in bankruptcy could not be used to offset a statutorily imposed penalty against a national bank for changing usurious interest 4: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or


Input: complaint has been filed and, as such, there is no civil action. Ms. Shepard cites to a number of cases in her brief which support the longstanding rule in North Carolina that the Clerk of Superior Court has original jurisdiction in an estate matter, while the Superior Court Judge has derivative jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Estate of Parrish, 143 N.C. App. 244, 251, 547 S.E.2d 74, 78 (noting that the estate proceeding at issue “was not a civil action, but a proceeding concerning an estate matter, which was exclusively within the purview of the Clerk’s jurisdiction, and over which the Superior Court retained appellate, not original, jurisdiction.”) (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 69, 553 S.E.2d 201 (2001); In re Green, 9 N.C. App. 326, 328, 176 S.E.2d 19, 20 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we find the phrase “all actions Holdings: 0: holding that the cause of action under fela vests in the personal representative of the estate not in the beneficiaries 1: holding that the amount of a commission to be awarded to the personal representative requires the exercise of judicial discretion and judgment by the clerk who has original jurisdiction in the matter 2: holding in part that the right of removal is given only to a defendant who has not submitted himself to that jurisdiction not to an original plaintiff in a state court who by resorting to that jurisdiction has become liable under the state laws to a crossaction 3: holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity 4: holding that the apparent denial of the husbands request for an order compelling the wife to deliver to him the personal property he had been awarded in their divorce judgment did not constitute a modification of the original divorce judgment


Input: arising out of the same criminal episode for traveling to meet a minor under section 847.0135(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), and unlawful use of a two-way com-njunications device under section 934.215, Florida Statutes (2013), violate double jeopardy. Holt v. State, No. 5D14-3269, 173 So.3d 1079, 2015 WL 4768997 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 14, 2015). Furthermore, our sister courts have recently determined that, when the charged conduct arises out of. the same criminal episode, a charge for unlawful use of a two-way communications device under section 934.215 is subsumed within a charge of solicitation under section 847.0135(3) and subsumed within a charge of travelling to meet a minor after solicitation under section 847.0135(4). Hamilton v. State, 163 So.3d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (<HOLDING>); Mizner v. State, 154 So.3d 391, 399 (Fla. 2d Holdings: 0: recognizing that an indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged fairly inform a defendant of the charge and enable the defendant to plead double jeopardy as a defense in a future prosecution for the same offense 1: holding that two offenses are separate for the purposes of  4a12a1 where all the elements of the first offense occurred before any activity forming the basis of the second offense 2: holding that when state charges defendant with both unlawfully using twoway communications device and traveling during same time period state charges single criminal episode regardless of whether evidence could support finding of separate criminal episodes and double jeopardy considerations require that  communications charge be subsumed within traveling charge 3: holding that the offense of unlawful use of a twoway communications device does not contain any elements that are distinct from the offense of traveling to meet a minor 4: holding that for conduct arising out of the same criminal episode the elements for the offense of unlawful use of a twoway communications device  are subsumed within the soliciting and traveling offenses


Input: A & M Gregos, Inc., 607 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Among the more important requirements of estoppel are that the party to be estopped has misrepresented or wrongfully concealed some material fact and that this party acted with the intention that the asserting party rely to his detriment on his misunderstanding.”) (citing cases). Blake argues that because Farrington commissioned the Harrigan map, that map constituted a representation by Farrington. However, commissioning another to create a map is not in itself a representation for equitable estoppel purposes. Rather, a commissioned map or document constitutes a representation in equitable estoppel where a party uses the document to induce another party to act. See, e.g., Slagle v. United States, 809 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Minn. 1992) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Tipton, 18 B.R. 803, 806-10 (Bankr. Holdings: 0: holding that the united states corps of engineers publication of maps of navigable waters did not constitute affirmative misconduct for equitable estoppel purposes 1: holding that it was unreasonable for a party to rely on maps drafted by the united states corps of engineers that bore the heading waters covered by section 10 of the 1899 rivers and harbors act under the jurisdiction of the st paul district corps of engineers  and the caption that all other waters and wetlands not shown on this map should be considered to be covered by section 404 of the 1972 act to determine whether bodies of water outside the scope of the map were considered navigable 2: holding that the evident breadth of congressional coneern for protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems supported the army corps of engineers interpretation of waters of the united states to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined 3: holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states 4: recognizing that the supreme court has indicated that affirmative misconduct is a prerequisite to a finding of estoppel against the united states


Input: agents to exercise unfettered discretion, in part by explicitly placing conditions on execution). Consistent with these purposes, the conditions governing the warrant’s execution should be “explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents.” Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04; accord Dennis, 115 F.3d at 528; Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12. The particularity with which the magistrate should specify the conditions, however, will vary based on the individual facts of each case. Although the conditions precedent ensure that an anticipatory warrant will not be executed prematurely, such conditions do not serve as a substitute for the magistrate’s probable cause determination. See United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 654-56 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). If an anticipatory warrant is based solely on Holdings: 0: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish at time warrant was issued the required nexus between the contraband to be seized which was mailed to defendants post office box and defendants home 1: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid when defendant was required to pick up suitcase containing contraband at airport and there was no assurance at time warrant was issued that defendant would take suitcase to his home 2: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because contraband was picked up by defendant rather than being delivered to his home and affidavit failed to provide facts establishing a nexus between contraband and defendants home 3: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid when defendant was required to pick up suitcase containing contraband at airport and there was no information indicating defendant would take suitcase home or otherwise linking defendants residence to illegal activity 4: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because affidavit provided no assurance that defendant would take package to his home after collecting it at the airport despite fact that warrant contained condition that it was not to be executed until package arrived at defendants house


Input: that Andrew breached his fiduciary duties. It rather, presents an issue for trial. IV. CONCLUSION The Arrearage Claim is a valid claim against the Estate. Otherwise, the competing motions for summary judgment are denied. This court will retain jurisdiction going forward. 1 . This decision refers to multiple members of the Farren family, so it uses their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended. 2 . See, e.g., Alexander Indus., Inc. v. Hill, 211 A.2d 917, 918-19 (Del.1965); Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del.1962); Phillips v. Schifino, 2009 WL 5174328, at *1 (Del.Ch. Dec. 18, 2009); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 1998 WL 731660, at *3 (Del.Ch. Oct. 9, 1998). 3 . See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 86, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89 L.Ed. 82 (1944) (<HOLDING>); Fid. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Holdings: 0: holding that a foreign judgment filed under the montana uefja may not be subjected to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening or vacating as a domestic judgment and remain consistent with full faith and credit  the only defenses that may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a final judgment are those defenses directed at the validity of the foreign judgment 1: holding that a federal court must enforce a state court judgment under the full faith and credit statute where diversity jurisdiction exists 2: holding that the full faith and credit clause does not require a state to apply another states law in violation of its own legitimate public policy 3: holding that for federal court to grant full faith and credit to state court judgment state proceedings must satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the fourteenth amendments due process clause 4: holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state


Input: tort claim against defendant notwithstanding the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Act. In other words, the Virginia Act would in no way foreclose the availability of a federal maritime tort claim to plaintiff until plaintiff himself elected to subject himself to the Virginia Act’s exclusivity provision by affirmatively availing himself of its benefits. Such a mode of analysis might not implicate federalism and Supremacy Clause concerns so much as questions of the limits of contract, release, and waiver: i.e., whether an injured worker may contract effectively to waive his right to bring a federal maritime tort claim in exchange for access to supplemental state disability benefits. But see, e.g., Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 131, 82 S.Ct. 1196, 8 L.Ed.2d 368 (1962) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, it is not necessarily Holdings: 0: holding that an injured workers initial election to seek state compensation does not implicate the exclusivity provision to preclude the worker from later seeking compensation under the longshore act 1: holding that acceptance of payments under the louisiana state compensation act does not constitute an election of the remedy under state law precluding recovery under the longshoremens act 2: holding that in the absence of an adequate state remedy one whose constitutional rights are violated has a direct claim against the state under the state constitution 3: holding that under illinois law silence can constitute acceptance under the terms of the restatement of contracts 4: holding the privacy act to constitute a special factor precluding a bivens remedy


Input: sentenced ..., does not constitute service of that sentence”). B. Motion for Reduction of Sentence Nancy Melody also appeals the district court’s decision to deny her request for probation in lieu of incarceration. In her motion for reduction of sentence, Nancy Melody admitted that “the time for modifying [her] sentence under Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [had] ... elapsed_” See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 826 F.2d 507, 507-08 (7th Cir.1987). Nevertheless, she asserted that the district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3651 to suspend her sentence and impose probation prior to execution of her sentence. She then argued that her sentence was more severe than that imposed upon her husband and that dramatic changes in her circumstances had o h Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). However, we need not decide this issue Holdings: 0: holding time limitation on statement of costs is not jurisdictional and late filing is within courts discretion 1: holding  1498 to be jurisdictional regardless of defendant type 2: holding that rule 35bs time limit is absolute regardless of whether the motion for reduction of sentence is framed under rule 35b or 18 usc  3651 3: holding that a court has authority to order probation under 18 usc  3651 at any time before the defendant is incarcerated regardless of rule 35bs 120day jurisdictional limitation 4: holding that the plra only applies to plaintiffs who are incarcerated at the time an action is commenced


Input: District Court Approval). No mention is made of conditional discharge or deferred sentencing in these forms, and no form indicates the possibility of being found not guilty or of having the charges dismissed for any one of the myriad other reasons that can result in dismissal. {12} Nonetheless, because of the ubiquitousness of the language that a defendant must be informed of the permissible range of sentences, see Boykin v. Ala., 395 U.S. 238, 245 n. 1, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), Petitioner claims that his plea was involuntary because the officer did not advise him that he could appear in court and request a deferral of the prosecution or a deferred sentence. As a result, Petitioner claims he has “an absolute constitutional right to withdraw his -56 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also People v. Krantz, 58 Ill.2d 187, 317 Holdings: 0: holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard 1: holding with respect to a general motion for directed verdict that it raised the question as to the sufficiency of the evidence on venue an essential part of the governments case internal quotation marks and citation omitted 2: holding that notice on ticket that required payment of fine or contacting traffic bureau but did not specifically set forth right to hearing did not violate due process because the elements required to be included in the notice are to be tailored to the circumstances of the case and depend upon an appropriate accommodation of the competing private and governmental interests involved internal quotation marks and citation omitted 3: holding a replevin action did not comply with the notice requirement under lgtca because it only communicated to the city that it sought return of the vehicles and lossofuse damages rather than putting the city on notice to start an investigation into  whether the officers acted with actual malice or the nature and extent of the actual injuries sustained the causal relationship of the injuries to the alleged misconduct the likelihood of an award of compensatory andor punitive damages and litigation strategy that would be later in issue in the second case internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case


Input: plaintiff with a private cause of action. However, the Kansas Act does not provide a private cause of action. For these reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. A. The Kentucky Act (Count Two) “ERISA comprehensively regulates, among es insurance” under the new legal standard announced by the Supreme Court in Miller. However, while Miller announced a new legal standard for determining whether a state law regulates insurance for purposes of ERISA’s savings clause, Miller involved an “any willing provider” statute, not a state judicial remedy for a claims processing cause of action. Thus, Miller did not modify the body of case law regarding so-called “conflict preemption” in which a state law adds to the judicial remedies available under ERISA. See Elliot, 337 F.3d at 1147 (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Nguyen v. Healthguard of Holdings: 0: holding the conflict preemption principle announced in pilot life and clarified in rush prudential remains in force 1: recognizing same principle 2: recognizing principle 3: recognizing the conflict 4: recognizing conflict


Input: in (1) “mak[ing] determinations about the nature and extent of its various educational and social services programs”; (2) “its revenue regardless of its source”; (3) “its appropriation prerogatives”; and (4) “its authority to fashion an appropriate remedy in law enforcement actions.” None of these qualifies as a special sovereignty interest in this case. The first two asserted .interests can be dismissed straightforwardly on the basis of our precedent. First, the state has no special sovereign interest in ordinary aspects of its social programs, because “most government policies do not affect core aspects of a state’s sovereignty.” Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 495 n. 6 (10th Cir.1998); cf. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 632 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). More to the point, a “state’s interest in Holdings: 0: holding that article 10 section 8 of the arizona constitution did not create greater restrictions than the enabling act on exchanges of trust lands because section 8 provided that every disposition of or contract concerning trust lands would be null and void if not made in substantial conformity with the provisions of the enabling act 1: holding that a state can require firebreaks around housing on trust property adjacent to forest lands 2: holding that the state has no special sovereign interest in managing lands held in trust 3: holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust 4: holding that a wife could claim a homestead exemption even though she only had a beneficiary interest in the property held in trust


Input: at the time they sought the warrants. Such a claim, however, is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Horton v. California. See 496 U.S. at 138-42, 110 S.Ct. at 2308-11 (upholding the seizure of weapons used in an armed robbery, notwithstanding that, although the officer expected to find the weapons, his warrant application only listed the proceeds); see also United States v. Hill, 19 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir.1994). 4 . See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375, 113 S.Ct. at 2137 (indicating that the ‘‘immediately apparent” requirement is satisfied if the police have "probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object”). 5 . See also Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 69, 113 S.Ct. 538, 547, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Brown, 460 U.S. at 733, 742-43, 103 S.Ct. at Holdings: 0: holding that police seizure of weapon in plain view was lawful search incident to arrest where appellant was handcuffed but sitting within a few feet from where the gun was located 1: holding that the fourth amendment permits seizure of property in plain view where 1 the officer has a lawful right to access the object itself and 2 the propertys incriminating character is immediately apparent 2: holding that a seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine where there was probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity 3: holding seizure of evidence in plain view reasonable under fourth amendment 4: holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution


Input: accounts to her. Therefore, the trial court’s decision to deny maintenance to Wife is reversed. The cause is remanded to the trial court to hear evidence regarding the factors listed in Hill. The trial court should then determine whether, based upon those factors, income from Wife’s interest in Husband’s retirement accounts should be imputed to her and, if so, in what amount. After making that determination, the court should consider whether Wife has sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs. If the court finds that Wife does not have sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs, the court should then consider, as required by section 452.335.1, whether Wife’s reasonable needs can be met through appropriate employment. The court should also consider a 88) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Wife's monthly income would be an Holdings: 0: holding that home purchased with separate funds and titled in one spouses name was transmuted into marital property because home was used as marital residence and the other spouse contributed to payments and repairs on home 1: holding that one spouse may be entitled to a portion of the equity in home purchased with nonmarital funds 2: holding that the lower court failed to account for payments made in connection with the marital home including mortgage payments 3: holding that home purchased with spouses separate funds prior to marriage was transmuted into marital property because mortgage payments made from joint account home was used as marital residence and both parties devoted resources and energy into home 4: holding that furniture and furnishings for marital residence purchased with separate funds were transmuted into marital property because they were acquired and treated as communal property


Input: Defendants Heiser and Spencer in both their official and individual capacities. He sued Defendant McClure only in his individual capacity. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The district court assumed, solely for the purpose of its decision, that Mr. Umbehr “would have been protected from termination in retaliation for his statements” had he been a government employee, that his “comments did motivate the votes in favor of terminating [Mr. Umbehr’s] contract with Wabaunsee County,” and that he suffered damages as a result of the termination. Umbehr v. McClure, 840 F.Supp. 837, 839 (D.Kan.1993). It then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that “the First Amendment does not prohibit defendants from considering p 843 F.Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D.Ill.1994) (<HOLDING>); Inner City Leasing and Trucking Co. v. City Holdings: 0: holding that independent contractor claiming removal from city towing rotation list because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment 1: holding that independent contractor claiming loss of and denial of contracts because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment 2: holding that independent contractor claiming denial of public contract because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment 3: holding that it was not clearly established that independent contractor claiming denial of public contract because of political affiliation was protected under first amendment 4: holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of political affiliation not protected by first amendment


Input: expect criminal defense lawyers to be seers, but we must demand that they at least apprise themselves of the applicable law and provide their clients with a reasonably accurate description of it. Id. at 355. This element of gross misinformation was also present in Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir.1979), where defense counsel provided, prior to his client’s guilty plea, notably inaccurate information regarding a parole eligibility date and, as was the case later in Ostrander, the defendant relied upon the advice in deciding to plead guilty. Consequently, the Court said, “When the erroneous advice induces the plea, permitting him to start over again is the imperative remedy for the constitutional deprivation.” 611 F.2d at 65. See also Richardson, 397 U.S. at 772, 90 S.Ct. 1441 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 465-66 Holdings: 0: holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari 1: holding that plea of guilty admits all facts well pleaded and sentence imposed and is not subject to collateral attack on ground that as factual matter accused was not guilty of the offense charged 2: holding that defendant was entitled to withdraw guilty plea upon habeas corpus proceedings where he pled guilty in exchange for an illegal sentence 3: holding that previous crimp 35 attacks on the voluntariness coercion and adequacy of advisement of defendants guilty plea precluded raising a similar attack alleging that defendant did not understand the nature of the charge 4: recognizing incompetent advice from attorney as proper ground for federal habeas attack on voluntariness of guilty plea in state court


Input: removal and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of asylum for substantial evidence and may reverse only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir.2000). We deny the petition. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that petitioner failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. Any mistreatment that petitioner received from his classmates at school who harassed him in a ‘joking way’ and pressured him to join the Shining Path did not rise to the level of past persecution or establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-82, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016-18 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political 1: holding that refusal to join guerrilla group is itself not affirmative expression of political opinion 2: holding that guerrilla groups attempt to recruit alien did not establish persecution based on political opinion 3: holding that attempted conscription by a guatemalan guerrilla group did not constitute persecution on account of a political opinion where petitioner failed to show that the group was motivated by his political opinion 4: holding that a guerrilla organizations attempt to coerce a person into performing military service does not necessarily constitute persecution on account of  political opinion


Input: any officer of the state, or of a country, or of a city or other municipality, could follow them only when he saw fit. If by estoppel such salutary provisions, enacted with wise foresight as checks upon extravagance and dishonesty, can be utterly abrogated at will by any officer, such provisions then subserve no purpose, and the public corporation has no earthly protection against either greed or graft .... Equitable estoppel is impotent to purge transactions of the fatal infirmity of being in violation of law. Id. (citations omitted); see also Stewart, 165 S.W.2d at 629 (“[T]he doctrine of es-toppel cannot be applied to a municipality where it has no power under any circumstance to make the contract in question.”); Sager v. State Highway Comm’n, 349 Mo. 341, 160 S.W.2d 757, 763 (1942) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted); Fleshner v, Kansas City, Holdings: 0: holding that agency is bound by its regulations 1: holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound 2: holding that the state even though receiving a benefit from performance cannot by estoppel become bound by the unauthorized contracts of its officers 3: holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts 4: holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous


Input: of CBS’s. As the district court recognized, one company’s minority ownership interest in another company is not sufficient by itself to make the owner a competitor, for purposes of the antitrust laws, of the subsidiary’s rivals. To be a competitor at the level of the subsidiary, the parent must have substantial control over the affairs and policies of the subsidiary. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d. Cir.1978) (finding no violation of § 8 of Clayton Act where interlocked parent corporations had competing subsidiaries, but reserving issue whether statute would cover “parent corporation that closely controls and dictates the policies of its subsidiary”); Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 658 F.Supp. 1061, 1084-85 (D.Del.1987) (<HOLDING>); J.E. Rhoads & Sons, Inc. v. Ammeraal, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper 1: holding that a close relationship between a parent corporation and a subsidiary may justify finding that the parent engages in business in the jurisdiction through the local activities of its subsidiary 2: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations 3: holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control 4: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary


Input: is a necessary element of a computer-based corresponding structure. See WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349. The '930 Patent describes what result the A/D Converter and Microprocessor 24 in combination with the switch 28 accomplish, which is increasing the current to a higher level from the low level initially applied to the data signaling pair. See '930 Patent, fig 1. The' '930 Patent also gives a generalized indication as to the way the control means performs the function, which is detecting a varying level voltage drop across resistors 26 and 30. Id. However, there is insufficient disclosure of the details of a particular algorithm, so that the scope of the control means limitation and where the boundary of infringement and non-infringemen .Supp.2d 512, 518 (E.D.Tex.2006) (Clark, J.) (<HOLDING>); Gobeli Research Ltd. v. Apple Computer, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite 1: holding that claim that included control means for automatically operating said valving limitation was indefinite as the specification merely disclosed a diagram with a box labeled control and a stated the invention may be controlled automatically by known differential pressure valving and control equipment 2: holding claim that included database editing means  for generating  and embedding  limitation was indefinite where the specification merely restated that software performed the recited function 3: holding claim indefinite as the specification did not disclose sufficient structure where disclosure stated one of ordinary skill in the art could program a computer with appropriate programming to perform a control means function 4: holding improper reading into claims a limitation appearing only in the specification


Input: CONST. art. I, § 15 (requiring the Legislature to maintain "purity and efficiency” of right to trial by jury); id. art. V, § 31 ("The Supreme Court is responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial branch .... ”). 14 . See id. art. VII, § 1; id. art. VII, §§ 17(h), 18(h) (allowing legislation "[t]o assure efficient use of construction funds and t p. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 519 (Tex.1995) ("Because the other plaintiffs, except for Fuller, bring the same facial challenges and seek the same declaratory relief as the Texas AFL-CIO, we need not address their individual standing and we express no opinion thereon.”); Robbins v. Limestone County, 114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915, 917 (1925) ("There being parties plaintiff who a 41 n. 5, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968) (<HOLDING>). 36 . 620 S.W.2d 104, 109 (Tex.1981). 37 . 755 Holdings: 0: holding school board members had standing to complain that statute required them to distribute books in violation of constitution 1: holding that members of the board of trustees of an elementary school had standing to challenge the actions of the county board of education because they suffered an actual injury when the county board nullified their unanimous vote to reject a candidate for principal of the elementary school 2: holding that plaintiff had standing to sue a board even though board was far from sole participant in the application of the challenged statute 3: holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal 4: recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board


Input: While these observations by Hines "express an opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of [a] disputed issue," the testimony does not eross the line drawn by rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Utah 1993). Hines's testimony was relevant in "help{ing] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," see Utah R. Evid. 702(a), by explaining what concerns may drive an investor's decision to purchase a security. Compare Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1861 (determining that an expert's opinion testimony "that some of the material that [the defendant] had omitted from the securities documents could have been important or significant to an investor" was admissible), with State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse Holdings: 0: holding that such information is not material under securities law 1: holding that omission of information about shares held in corporations was material even if the securities were worthless at the time 2: holding that under certain conditions a bank assumes a duty to disclose facts material to a transaction 3: holding that purely factual material may be withheld from disclosure under exemption 5 if that material would expose the deliberative process of an agency 4: holding inadmissible expert testimony that included statements that failure to disclose certain enumerated information would be a material omission under utah law that the material actually provided to investors did not meet disclosure requirements under the act and that the agreements at issue were securities under utah law


Input: for the sale. Generally speaking, “[a]n escrow agent owes a fiduciary duty to both parties to [an escrow] contract.” Trevino v. Brookhill Capital Resources, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (emphasis added). Likewise, “[t]he title insurance agent may not inten-tionaHy or recklessly deceive the parties to a real estate transaction.” Zimmerman v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1990, writ denied) (emphasis added). An escrow agent and closer like HTC does not owe a duty — and thus has no negligence HabiHty — to the non-party creditor of a party to the escrow agreement. Cf. Rove v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. 05-96-01783-CV, 1998 WL 696880, at *4 (Tex.App.-DaHas Oct.8, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for pubHcation) (<HOLDING>). Compare Zimmerman, 790 S.W.2d at 694-95 Holdings: 0: holding that if the trial court would have had no discretion to deny summary judgment on an alternative ground the appellate court can on that alternative ground sustain the order granting summary judgment 1: holding that summary judgment against escrow agent to closing was properly granted when fraud was alleged basis of conspiracy and when nothing in the noevidence summary judgment record supports the borrowers claim that american title was a party to a plan to defraud them 2: holding that escrow agent owed duty only to parties to escrow agreement not to party to tangential contract further holding that trial court correctly rendered summary judgment on neghgence claim against escrow agent on this ground 3: holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment on ground not presented by movant in writing 4: holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion


Input: this constituted fraud and inequitable conduct on the PTO. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Warner Chilcott knew that the ’394 patent was not valid, as it was “anticipated and obvious in light of the prior art” before listing the patent in the Orange Book. (Id. ¶ 94.) Plaintiffs allege that “Warner Chilcott’s listing of the ’394 [p]atent was objectively and subjectively baseless because Warner Chilcott did not believe and could not reasonably have believed that the ’394 [pjatent could be asserted against manufacturers of generic versions of Loestrin 24.” (Id. ¶ 97.) It was listed to create an obstacle to generic competition. (Id.) Defendants argue that this claim only survives if Plaintiffs’ Walker Process fraud or sham litigation claims survive. See Solodyn, 2015 WL 5458570, *12 (<HOLDING>). Because the underlying conduct has survived' Holdings: 0: holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing 1: holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation 2: holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim 3: holding that listing presumptively valid patents in the orange book and enforcing them against infringers are not bases for an antitrust claim quoting in re lipitor antitrust litig no 312cv2389 pgs 2013 wl 4780496 at 21 dnj sept 5 2013 4: holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit


Input: bears the burden of establishing that the claims are patent-ineligible, and the Court will construe the patent claims in a manner most favorable to Plaintiff. See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed.Cir.2014). Previously, the Federal Circuit and courts in this district have presumed that issued patents are valid, and have required defendants to prove patent-ineligibility by clear and convincing evidence. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 2242, 180 L.Ed.2d 131 (2011); see also Ultramercial, Inc, v, Hulu, LLC, (“Ultramercial I”) 722 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2013), vacated and remanded on other grounds by WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2870, 189 L.Ed.2d 828 (2014) (<HOLDING>); CMG Fin, Servs., Inc, v. Pac. Trust Bank, Holdings: 0: holding that a bad faith claim must be met through the clear and convincing evidence standard 1: holding that where the new york times clear and convincing evidence requirement applies the summary judgment inquiry will be whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either plaintiff or defendant 2: holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied 3: holding that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies to section 101 challenges 4: holding that the presumption of validity  and its concomitant clear and convincing evidence standard  does not apply to section 101 claims the court reasoned because no evidence outside the pleadings is considered in deciding a motion to dismiss  it makes little sense to apply a clear and convincing standard  a burden of proof  to such motions citation omitted