Input: second accident. [21] Having concluded that the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit State Farm to question Woodgett regarding the second accident, we must now address whether this error was inconsistent with substantial justice. We conclude that it was. This exclusion went to the heart of the matter that the jury was asked to decide—the extent to which Woodgett’s accident with Storms caused the headaches experienced by Woodgett and, in particular, the severe migraine headaches. Conclusion [22] The court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence of a second automobile accident involving Woodgett, which was inconsistent with substantial justice. We reverse the court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Armstrong, 871 N.E.2d at 296 (<HOLDING>). [23] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Holdings: 0: holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury 1: holding that the commission reasonably interpreted the statute as requiring it to assess the condition of the industry as a whole 2: holding that a logical nexus between the injury sued upon and an unre lated prior condition satisfied the rondinelli test requiring only the possibility that the plaintiffs claimed damages in whole or in part resulted from a condition or event unrelated to the defendants negligence 3: holding that when the evidence shows that the railroad customarily does not enforce a safety rule the jury is entitled to consider whether that custom constituted negligence and whether it caused in whole or in part the plaintiffs injury 4: holding that when a possessor knows that a dangerous condition frequently reoccurs plaintiffs had a right to go to the jury on the issue of defendants negligence even where plaintiffs could not show how long the condition remained on the stairs


Input: See id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2047-48. A hypothetical illustrates the efficacy of a unitary standard of review. If a district court were to depart upward based upon physical injury pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.2, p.s., we might conclude that it had abused its discretion if the underlying offense were obstruction of justice, because the guideline applicable to that offense, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1), provides for an eight-level enhancement “[i]f the offense involved caus[es] ... physical injury to a person.” Our review in such a situation would amount to a de novo review of the applicable guideline to determine whether, as a matter of law, it takes physical injury into account. See United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that when the determinat (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 956, 136 Holdings: 0: holding that downward departure based on defendants restitution was improper because restitution is taken into consideration in assessing whether acceptance of responsibility adjustment should apply and district court abused its discretion in finding defendants restitution was extraordinary 1: holding apprendi inapplicable to restitution orders because restitution for harm done is a classic civil remedy 2: holding that district court may not depart downward to preserve defendants ability to make restitution 3: holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing 4: holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not


Input: given that a search of the digital data contained in a smartphone could reveal private information such as emails, text messages, notes, photographs, recordings, voice mail messages, passwords, financial records, tracking information, web site preferences, calendars, associations and contacts, and other private information. The search of the memory of a smartphone potentially reveals even more information than the search of a home computer. For instance, a smartphone has the ability to track and record the phone’s movements through GPS or geolo-cation technology and me 9-10 (7th Cir.2012) (upholding search incident to arrest of cell phone for its phone number but questioning whether more invasive search would be permissible); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 Fed.Appx. 216, 225 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>) (citing United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, Holdings: 0: holding that the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest includes the contents of a cell phone found on the arrestees person 1: holding a warrantless search of cell phone contents did not exceed permissible scope of search incident to arrest 2: holding that finley authorizes a police officer to search the electronic contents of a cell phone recovered from the area within an arrestees immediate control 3: holding seizure of arrestees cell phone lawful but finding the fourth amendment requires a warrant to perform a forensic search of the lawfully seized cell phone 4: holding that while law enforcement officers properly separated and assumed possession of a cell phone from arrestees person during the search incident to arrest a warrant was required before the information data and content of the cell phone could be accessed and searched by law enforcement


Input: F.2d at 729. The Eighth Circuit is not alone in finding that although inmates do not have a constitutional entitlement to and/or due process interest in accessing a grievance procedure, they have a First Amendment right to be free from retaliation when they do file. Compare Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding no liberty interest in grievance procedure), with Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing First Amendment retaliation right); compare Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding inmates have “no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure”), with Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing First Amendment retaliation right); compare Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1177 (11th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>), with Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1112 Holdings: 0: recognizing a parents right to rear his or her children without state interference as a constitutionallyprotected fundamental liberty interest 1: holding that inmates have a property interest in their money 2: holding that there is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure 3: holding that because plaintiffs were reasonable in interpreting defendants grievance procedure to apply only to active employees plaintiffs did not act in bad faith when they alleged that no applicable grievance procedure existed 4: holding that inmates have no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in access to grievance procedure


Input: because it was not a manufacturer or seller of a product. The court disagrees. First, a finder of fact may determine that for all intents and purposes Deer Valley manufactured a ski equipment system for Ghionis consisting of skis, bindings and boots. To the extent the system was defective, exposing Ghionis to an unreasonable risk of danger, a strict liability claim , may exist. Second, while no technical “sale” of equipment to Ghionis took place, the court is persuaded that the Utah courts will extend its rulings on strict product liability to apply to lessors of products such as Deer Valley. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-312 et seq. (implied warranties exist in leased goods); Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 et seq. (Consumer protection to leases); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) (<HOLDING>). Deer Valley’s reliance upon Conger v. Tel Holdings: 0: recognizing trend in the law to protect consumers including lessees 1: holding that purpose of statute is to protect unwary consumers 2: recognizing drug traffickers will commonly possess firearms to protect their product to protect their drugs to protect their cash to protect their life and even to protect their turf alteration in original internal quotation marks omit ted 3: recognizing the ability of corporations to protect property rights in federal court 4: holding that a prosecutor has an obligation to protect not only the public interest but the innocent and to safeguard the rights guaranteed to all persons including those who may be guilty


Input: have changed the result of the original criminal case”). The State contends and the trial court apparently believed that the nexus test mirrors the requirements for a substantive claim for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence. See Iowa Code § 822.2(4). To succeed on such a claim an applicant must establish, among other things, that the newly discovered evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching, and would probably have changed the outcome of the trial. See Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 274 (Iowa 1991). Although our prior cases have never equated the requirements for the ground-of-fact exception with a newly-diseovered-evidence claim for relief, the language used in our cases dealing with both concepts is similar. Compare Dible, 557 N.W.2d at 884 (<HOLDING>), with Jones, 479 N.W.2d at 274 (holding Holdings: 0: recognizing that an ohio court should apply local law unless a party meets the burden of showing that foreign law requires a different result 1: holding that conviction will not be reversed unless there is a reasonable likelihood that but for attorneys errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 2: holding section 8223 requires likelihood that result would be different 3: holding claim requires showing that additional evidence would have been produced that might have led to a different decision 4: holding state law governs property interests in bankruptcy proceedings unless some federal interest requires a different result


Input: "person" is defined in AS 23.30.045 and 055. 13 . AS 01.10.040(b). 14 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 34 (Apr. 14, 2004) (statement of Sen. Scott Ogan). 15 . Id. at 35 (testimony of Jack Miller). 16 . Id. 17 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 20 (Apr. 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins); Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S$.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 9-10 (Apr. 16, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins). 18 . Cf. Seward Marine Servs., Inc. v. Anderson, 643 P.2d 493, 496-97 n. 8 (Alaska 1982) (noting committee testimony must have been "endorsed by the legislature or relied on" to be persuasive evidence of legislative intent). 19 . See Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824, 833-34 (Alaska App.1994) (<HOLDING>). 20 . Mech. Contractors of Alaska, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 1: holding state university is not a person under  1983 2: holding that this statute was the most analogous state statute for purposes of erisa action filed in utah 3: holding kansas public employees retirement system is not as a state agency considered a person for purposes of  1983 liability 4: holding state is person for purposes of judicial recusal statute


Input: that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Officers Adams and Baxter acted with malice in initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt. Officers Adams and Baxter argue that they are protected from liability for malicious prosecution because they acted in reliance upon the advice of counsel— namely, the prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. “Proof that a person who institutes a criminal proceeding placed the facts fully and fairly before counsel and acted upon his advice is a good defense to the charge of want of probable cause.” Jarett v. Walker, 201 A.2d 523, 526 (D.C.1964). The burden of proof is on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to an affirmative defense. Cf. District of Columbia v. Sterling, 578 A.2d 1163, 1165 (D.C.1990) (<HOLDING>). Here, defendants have not met their burden of Holdings: 0: holding employer has burden of proving employee misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence when disputing a claim for unemployment compensation 1: holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence 2: holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner 3: holding that the party challenging the dischargeability of a debt bears the burden of proving the debt nondischargeable by a preponderance of the evidence 4: holding that plaintiffs bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants have failed to adhere to the requirements of nepa


Input: so as to prevent ruling on a motion for summary judgment until six months have passed, if the case is otherwise ripe for summary judgment.” Thurmond v. Richmond County Bd. of Ed., 207 Ga. App. 437, 439 (1) (428 SE2d 392) (1993). See also Gray v. Whisenaut, 258 Ga. 242 (368 SE2d 115) (1988) (noting that although USCR Rule 5 establishes a maximum six-month discovery period, the court may change the time allowed “in its discretion”). 6 OCGA § 9-11-56 (a). 7 OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). 8 Summers v. Deutsche Seereederei Rostok Grnbh, 220 Ga. App. 125, 126-127 (2) (469 SE2d 289) (1996). 9 There is no transcript of the oral argument in the appellate record, and thus Govindasamy has failed to preserve the issue on appeal. Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores, 203 Ga. App. 770, 773 (4) (417 SE2d 688) (1992) (<HOLDING>). 10 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in ruling on appellees motion for summary judgment before appellees complied with appellants discovery request when the record reflected that appellant filed a motion to compel three days before the hearing and the record did not reveal any effort on the part of appellant to secure a ruling from the trial court on its motion to compel or object at the trial court hearing the motion for summary judgment prior to ruling on the motion to compel 1: holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion 2: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 3: holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment 4: holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing


Input: REDOIL utilized the administrative appeal process, the sixty-day deadline did not begin to run on February 15, 2007. NSB and REDOIL filed an optional appeal of the agency’s decision with the IBLA on April 13, 2007, pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 290.2. This optional appeal was filed within the sixty-day timeline established by 30 C.F.R. § 290.3. On May 4, 2007, the IBLA declined to exercise its jurisdiction and stayed further proceedings pending the outcome of AWL’s petition, already filed in this court. The statute of limitations was tolled during the administrative appeal process, and the sixty-day period to file a petition for review began to run after the IBLA issued its decision on May 4. See ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 284-85, 107 S.Ct. 2360, 96 L.Ed.2d 222 (1987) (<HOLDING>). By filing on May 15 and May 22, the Holdings: 0: holding that a timely petition for administrative review stops the running of the statute of limitations 1: holding neither a lack of prejudice to the defendant nor the running of the statute of limitations constitutes good cause 2: holding that the concealment of ones identity does not toll the running of the statute of limitations 3: holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations 4: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense


Input: action under Title [9].” N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.D., 207 N.J. 88, 112, 23 A.3d 352 (2011) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.P., 408 N.J.Super. 252, 259, 974 A.2d 466 (App.Div.2009), certif. denied, 201 N.J. 153, 988 A.2d 1176 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.M., 136 N.J. 546, 556, 643 A.2d 987 (1994) (“[Termination proceedings, which are brought pursuant to N.J.S.A 30:4C-15, do not require a prior determination of abuse or neglect.”). Additionally, when DYFS has properly assumed “care or custody” of a child, it may initiate termination proceedings, even if a Title 9 action is pending and no determination of abuse or neglect has been made. A.P., supra, 408 N.J.Super. at 261, 974 A.2d 466 (<HOLDING>). On January 7, 2008, the family court granted Holdings: 0: holding that dyfs was not required to try the title 9 action to conclusion before filing a title 30 action for the termination of parental rights 1: recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights 2: holding that election of remedies did not apply because filing a trespass to try title action by the mortgageetrusteedeed grantee was not inconsistent with its successful settlement of claim against the title insurer 3: recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights 4: holding that trespass to try title is the method for determining title to  real property


Input: which authorizes use of force to "defend the national security of the United States ... and ... enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions,” 116 Stat. at 1501, excludes any action that is not called for by a Security Council resolution. They support their reading by reference to the October Resolution’s preamble and to legislative history. 6 .While the Supreme Court has not considered a modern war powers case, lower courts have, and they have reached differing conclusions about the applicability of the political question doctrine. Compare, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 37-41 (D.C.Cir.2000) (Tatel, J., concurring) (arguing that challenge to air campaign in Yugoslavia would not pose a political question); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>); Dellums, 752 F.Supp. at 1150 (rejecting Holdings: 0: holding that party waived public policy challenge by failing to raise it during arbitration 1: holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court 2: holding that challenge to vietnam war did not necessarily raise political question and remanding 3: holding that similar argument did not raise a colorable question of law for purposes of jurisdiction 4: holding that the plaintiffs claims against volkswagen and others did not necessarily raise a federal question since they were also based on the assertion that the plaintiffs vehicle did not comply with state law


Input: to insure that the defendant will not flee the jurisdiction. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4, 72 S.Ct. 1, 3, 96 L.Ed. 1 (1951) (“The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.”). Further, the statutory presumption that pretrial detention is appropriate in Medina’s case does not violate his constitutional rights. The pre sumption, as applied in Medina’s ease, arose following a determination by the magistrate that probable cause existed to believe Medina committed the crimes with which he was charged. Such a probable cause determination may be alone sufficient to justify detention pending trial. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 863, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Schall v. Martin, 104 S.Ct. at 2415-16 Holdings: 0: holding under the fourth amendment that a judicial determination of probable cause is a prerequisite to any extended restraint on the liberty of an adult accused of crime 1: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 2: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same 3: holding that the fourth amendment requires a finding of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty 4: holding that determination of probable cause by detached judicial officer that complies with fourth amendment constitutes all of the process due in order to constitutionally detain an accused pending trial


Input: of the statute of limitations in and of itself cannot operate to 'extinguish’ a tortfeasor’s liability"-because "it is subject to certain counter-assertions, such as waiver, tolling, and estoppel.”); cf. Zando, 182 W.Va. at 603, 390 S.E.2d at 802 (“The touchstone of the right of inchoate contribution is this inquiry: Did the party against whom contribution is sought breach a duty to the plaintiff which caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s damages?"). 8 . Moreover, none of the disqualifying factors for the contribution claim in Parke-Davis are pres t.App.1991) ("for such a right of contribution to exist, a nonsettling joint tortfeasor must also have been released from all liability to the injured party for the tort.”); Gump v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93 Hawaii 417, 5 P.3d 407 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Brockman Mobile Home Sales v. Lee, 98 Idaho Holdings: 0: recognizing necessity of release of joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought 1: holding that a joint tortfeasor may assert a claim for contribution against the plaintiffs uninsured motorist carrier for the torts of an unknown driver 2: recognizing ability of one or more joint tortfeasors to settle on behalf of themselves and another joint tortfeasor and then pursue that joint tortfeasor for its share of the settlement payment 3: recognizing right of contribution against joint tortfeasor where release is obtained on his behalf 4: holding that contribution will lie where no statute precludes recovery from the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought


Input: these services. We conclude that section 574.037 applied to the trial court’s order for extended outpatient mental health services. The trial court did not comply with this section in designating Evans as the person responsible for the ordered services. Therefore, the trial court lacked authority to order the Bexar County Parties to provide the court-ordered outpatient services. Accordingly, we sustain their second issue, reverse the trial court’s June 30, 2003 order, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. C. Should this court conditionally grant Evans’s petition for writ of mandamus? After finding that Evans was willfully disobeying the June 80, 2008 order, the trial court held Evans in contempt and ordered him p.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that Evans is Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant cannot be punished by contempt proceedings for disregarding a void order 1: holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter 2: holding that mothers failure to appeal prior contempt order precluded her challenge to prior order in appeal from later order entered based upon prior contempt order 3: holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality 4: holding that circuit court that had no jurisdiction to modify georgia custody determination could not enter valid contempt judgment against husband for violating void modification judgment


Input: wrongful discharge is administrative). Under Van Baale, it is plausible to assert that to the extent a taxpayer has a dispute with the IDOR or the director with respect to taxes paid to the department, Iowa Code section 423.47 (2013) provides an exclusive remedy to resolve the issues. No one can seriously contest that the regulatory framework is a dense, comprehensive scheme. See Iowa Code §§ 422.67-.75; Iowa Admin. Code ch. 701 (2013); cf. Walthart v. Bd. of Dirs., 667 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Iowa 2003); Van Baale, 550 N.W.2d at 156 (“Where the legislature has provided a comprehensive scheme for dealing with a specified kind of dispute, the statutory remedy provided is generally exclusive.” (quoting 1A C.J.S. Actions § 14 n. 55 (1985))); In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2004) (<HOLDING>). Ordinarily, however, a remedy .cannot be Holdings: 0: holding a pervasive regulatory scheme shows that the legislature intended the administrative remedy to be exclusive 1: holding the flsa does not provide the exclusive remedy for violations of its mandates 2: holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature 3: recognizing that the regulatory scheme created by the ina is so pervasive as to be consistent with the exclusive federal power over immigration 4: holding that the legislature granted exclusive authority over ratemaking to the public service commission


Input: remedy, of equitable tolling,” an evidentiary hearing would have provided- him the opportunity to present his claims. To qualify for equitable tolling, a petitioner must first demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances caused his failure to timely file his petition. See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562; LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir.2005). Alicia allegedly suffered symptoms from a rota-tor cuff tear from March 1, 2007 to August 17, 2007. He contends he experienced persistent pain from his injury so that daily activities, such as feeding himself, were -painful. But his injury did not necessarily preclude opportunities to file, since prison officials or others could have assisted him in completing the forms. C.f. Arbas v. Nicholson, 403 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). In fact, Alicia filed his habeas petition two Holdings: 0: holding that a petitioners mental incompetency can constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling if it interferes with his ability to communicate with his attorney 1: recognizing that the court has the power to grant leave upon certain conditions 2: recognizing the undesirability of prison conditions litigation 3: holding that the failure to articulate  orally that conditions  5d13d2 and 3 apply to a defendants sentence of supervised release does not create a conflict with the judgment imposing these conditions 4: holding physical conditions justify tolling when those conditions impair cognitive function or the ability to communicate


Input: not developed at trial.’ ” United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.1988)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1172, 116 S.Ct. 1263, 134 L.Ed.2d 212 (1996); see United States v. Rodriguez, 367 F.3d 1019, 1029 (8th Cir.2004) (“the presumption of prejudice does not apply unless the extrinsic contact relates to factual evidence not developed at trial”); United States v. Hall, 85 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that the presumption of prejudice is inapplicable where the contact does not relate to factual evidence not developed at trial, or where the contact pertains to purely legal issues), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1027, 120 S.Ct. 1437, 146 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000); United States v. Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278, 281 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the trial judge informed the Holdings: 0: holding petitioners reliance on remmer misplaced as statement from restaurant cashier to juror expressing cashiers hope that the juror find the defendant not guilty did not refer to the factual evidence not developed at trial 1: holding that the district courts dismissal of a juror after five weeks of deliberations violated the defendants right to a unanimous jury because the record evidence suggested the juror found the evidence insufficient for a conviction 2: holding that though judge did not question juror individually note from juror to judge requesting private meeting to ask legal question did not suggest juror would not base verdict on evidence 3: holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when the trial judge questioned the juror extensively enough to satisfy itself that the juror was not biased emphasis added


Input: age discrimination, a plaintiff would be required to demonstrate that: (1) he was a member of the protected class [i.e, age-40-and-over]; (2) he was discharged; (3) he was qualified for the position; (4) he was replaced by a younger person. Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66 (6th Cir.1982) (citing Marshall v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir.1977)). We have stated that the McDonnell Douglas test is not to be applied mechanically, instead opting for a case-by-case approach that focuses on whether age was in fact a determining factor in the employment decision. See Merkel v. Sco-vill, Inc., 787 F.2d 174, 177 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 990, 107 S.Ct. 585, 93 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1179 (6th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Ackerman, 670 F.2d at 70; Sahadi, 636 F.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff who could not demonstrate every element of the mcdonnell douglas test could nonetheless demonstrate a prima facie case 1: holding that the district court fundamentally misapplied the mcdonnell douglas test when it considered defendantemployers nondiscriminatory reason in assessing whether plaintiffemployee showed that she was qualified for her position under the third element of a prima facie ease 2: holding that whether the case could proceed under a mixedmotive instruction was not relevant because the case could proceed under the more taxing mcdonnell douglas standard 3: holding that a title vii plaintiff need not plead the elements of a mcdonnell douglas prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss 4: holding that federal government employee successfully established prima facie case of retaliation under mcdonnell douglas but failed to prove employers proffered reason was pretextual


Input: “public safety and welfare,” or to “effectuate public policy,” then the exception applies. On the other hand, if the purpose of the law relates “to the protection of the government’s pecuniary interest in the debtor’s property,” or to “adjudicate private rights,” then the exception is inapplicable, (citations omitted) The Court finds AmeriDebt’s arguments unpersuasive. The obvious purpose of the present action, indeed of the FTC Act itself, is protection of the public welfare and the effectuation of public policy respecting the credit counseling industry. Regardless of whether private rights of consumers may be adjudicated in some fashion, in this proceeding the FTC is operating on behalf of the public interest, not as a creditor seeking to assert its own pecuniary interest. See id. (<HOLDING>) Assuming the liability of Defendants is Holdings: 0: holding that courts must distinguish between situations in which the state acts pursuant to its police power and situations in which the state acts merely to protect its status as a creditor 1: holding that the missouri constitution reserves the power of referendum only to acts of the state legislative assembly and not to acts of a municipality 2: holding that courts must accommodate the contracts clause with the inherent police power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of its people 3: holding that a public corporation in that case a commission created to provide information about the tva is an entity separate from the state and its acts are not acts of the state  within the meaning of the state constitutions prohibition against the state creating new debts 4: holding as to the admissibility of prior bad acts that allegedly took place fourteen and twelve years before the acts alleged in that case that the lapse of time between the defendants sexual acts    goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility


Input: report constitutes an admission of a party-opponent, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. Snizaski counters that she offered the police accident report solely to establish the approximate time of the accident and, therefore, was not an admission of the truth of the substantive statements contained in the report. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 802 provides that hearsay is not admissible unless some exception applies. “A police report prepared by an officer who is not a witness to the accident is inadmissible hearsay evidence and should not be admitted into evidence. Nor should a party be able to get such a report into evidence in an indirect manner.” Holland v. Zelnick, 329 Pa.Super. 469, 478 A.2d 885, 888 (1984); See Johnson v. Peoples Cab Company, 386 Pa. 513, 126 A.2d 720 (1956) (<HOLDING>); accord Harvey v. Doliner, 399 Pa. 356, 160 Holdings: 0: holding that a statement implying that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial was inadmissible hearsay 1: holding that a report of a police officer who arrived at an accident scene minutes after a collision which contained a statement that one of the vehicles traveled through a stop sign was inadmissible hearsay evidence 2: holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible 3: holding that the defendant was guilty of leaving the scene because the injured party and a police officer were present at the scene within a reasonable time after the accident 4: holding that hearsay within a police report was inadmissible


Input: would be presented in a formal motion for a continuance or a change of venue. Cf. Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 335-37 (D.C.Cir.1989) ("Petitioner's argument for his absence is intertwined with his argument for a change of venue”); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir.1986) (concluding that the petitioner did not establish reasonable cause for his absence and that the denial of his motion for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion). In an emergency situation such as existed here, however, at least a phone call explaining the circumstances was required to preserve a potential challenge to the IJ's authority to enter an in absentia order. We express no view regarding the existence vel non of reasonable cause under the facts of this case. 7 . Cf. Sharma, 89 F.3d at 547 (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. INS, 976 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Holdings: 0: holding that the mechanical failure of the petitioners car on the way to the hearing did not constitute exceptional circumstances where petitioners returned home instead of finding transportation to the hearing and made only a cursory effort to contact the court 1: holding that confusion as to a hearing time does not amount to exceptional circumstances 2: holding that the petitioners traffic difficulties did not constitute exceptional circumstances 3: holding that the exceptional circumstances test does not apply to declaratory judgment actions 4: holding that petitioners divorce was a purely personal change in circumstances that does not constitute changed conditions or circumstances in jordan


Input: to be credible, id. at 140, and we cannot say that finding was clearly erroneous. The fact that the sponsors may receive an incidental benefit from the Happy Holidays sign — in the form of publicity and good will — does not refute Mr. Hall’s testimony as to the sign’s purpose. Indeed, any benefit that accrues to the sponsors ultimately serves the City’s interests by providing current and putative sponsors with an incentive to contribute to the Keep the Lights Foundation in the future. In this sense, the sign is comparable to the enhanced underwriter acknowledgments in Knights of the KKK. See 203 F.3d at 1088, 1093-94 & nn. 10-11. Second, it is uncontroverted that the City built, paid for, and erected the sign. Aplt.App. at 86-87; see also Knights of the KKK, 203 F.3d at 1094 n. 9 (<HOLDING>). Significantly, there is no indication that Holdings: 0: holding that the validity of a collateral waiver is a threshold issue 1: recognizing this rule 2: recognizing the narrow exception created by almendareztorres but noting that it was not directly at issue in alleyne 3: recognizing that the announcements at issue served primarily to identify sponsors but noting that conveyance of this collateral information remains a communicative act of the government 4: recognizing a split of authority on this issue


Input: which are not clearly erroneous.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1398, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991). To the extent that Diana Buchanan is attempting to contest the district court’s implicit decision not to depart from the guidelines, we have previously held that the district court’s decision not to depart is unreviewable on appeal. United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir.1995). Diana Buchanan, along with John Buchanan, also urges that the vast disparity between the sentencing ranges for crack and powder cocaine, mandated by the guidelines, violates equal protection principles contained in the Fifth Amendment. We have repeatedly rejected this argument and do so again. See United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cherry, 50 F.3d 338, 344 Holdings: 0: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 1: holding that stiffer penalties for cocaine base transactions are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense and therefore do not violate eighth amendment 2: holding that the guidelines stiffer penalties for cocaine base do not violate equal protection 3: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 4: holding that the cap does not violate equal protection


Input: As we explained in Part II, supra, it is the role of the trial court — not the jury— to determine whether a statement made by a defendant is voluntary and therefore admissible. See id.; Coates v. State, 534 N.E.2d 1087, 1093 (Ind.1989). Trial counsel was under no obligation to tender an instruction regarding the voluntariness of Defendant’s statements, and the trial court would not have been obligated to present such an instruction to the jury. See Abbott v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (Ind.1989) (upholding the trial court’s refusal to give an instruction on the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession which specifically instructed the jury to consider the defendant’s intoxication at the time an alleged admission was made); Gibson v. State, 694 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds, 702 N.E.2d 707 Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence 1: holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendants tendered instruction regarding the voluntariness of his confession 2: holding that trial court did not err 3: holding the determination of the voluntariness of a confession is a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession 4: holding that the district court did not err in refusing to give the defendants requested instruction concerning his mistaken belief about united states citizenship because the court had given an instruction covering the elements of the crime including the mens rea element


Input: ‘in custody’ for the purposes of the habeas petition. Critical to the disposition of this issue is the principle held in Nakaranurack v. United States, 68 F.3d 290 (9th Cir.1995). There, the Ninth Circuit stated: We have broadly construed “in custody” to apply to situations in which an alien is not suffering any actual physical detention; i.e., so long as he is subject to a final order of deportation, an alien is deemed to be “in custody” for purposes of the INA, and therefore may petition a district court for habeas review. Numerous cases have cited the above principle with approval — and while the context of those cases may vary; the principle remains the same — even in spite of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of Congress. See, Simmonds v. INS, 326 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Ramos-Birueta v. INS, 2000 WL 1359593 at *1 Holdings: 0: holding that a final order of removal is sufficient by itself to establish the requisite custody 1: holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct 2: holding that the farr act is expressly limited to claims arising out of a final order of removal and does not confer any legal rights outside of the removal setting 3: holding that the lower court should have entered a final order on custody 4: holding that term order of removal does not include aliens ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning attorneys actions taken after order of removal becomes final


Input: ”) (alteration in original). Quite simply, Code requirements that nurses treat others with “respect and compassion” and avoid “any and all forms of prejudicial actions” or “disregard for the effect of one’s actions on others” could easily be used to restrict protected speech. See, e.g., McCauley, 618 F.3d at 247-52 (concluding that provisions of university’s Code of Conduct that prohibited “conduct which causes emotional distress” and “offensive signs” were unconstitutionally overbroad); DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 317-20 (3d Cir. 2008) (public university’s policy that sought to forbid “gender-motivated” conduct that had the purpose of “creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment” held unconstitutional); Papish, 410 U.S. at 667-70 & n.2, 93 S.Ct. 1197 (<HOLDING>). In addition, when a college applies a Holdings: 0: holding proper remedy when a christian student newspaper was denied student activities funds was to make funds available to the religious paper not to deny funds to nonreligious student groups 1: holding that under fraser there is no first amendment protection for lewd vulgar indecent and plainly offensive speech in school 2: holding that university violated first amendment by expelling student for printing indecent newspaper despite student code prohibiting indecent conduct or speech 3: recognizing obscene and indecent have different meanings and indecent speech may be regulated under some circumstances without transgressing the first amendment 4: holding that free speech clause precludes state university that pays student publications printing costs from denying funding based on publications religious viewpoint


Input: Kormanik v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 5:01CV2122 (N.D.Ohio Oct. 19, 2001), a Scott-Pontzer case with facts substantially similar to those in the instant case. In the wake of Kormanik, a number of other courts in the Northern District, including this one, have adopted similar reasoning when remanding Scott-Pontzer cases. See Butler v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 184 F.Supp.2d 695 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Katz, J.); Stubbins v. Nationwide Agribusiness, 181 F.Supp.2d 805 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Carr, J.) (collecting cases); Comella v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 177 F.Supp.2d 704, (N.D.Ohio 2001) (O’Malley, J.); Kohus v. Hartford Ins. Co., No. 1:01CV01179 (N.D.Ohio Nov. 19, 2001) (Matia, C.J.); but see Redmon v. Sumitomo Marine Mgmt. (USA), Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 787 (N.D.Ohio 2001) (Aldrich, J.) (<HOLDING>); Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that shareholders had standing to bring derivative suit against the government but not direct suit due to lack of privity 1: holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit 2: holding that scottrpontzer suit was not a direct action 3: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 4: holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action


Input: submitted to a jury. Hale, like the cases before it, recognized that courts can rule on whether a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. Even if the Montana Constitution did establish a rule that defamation plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial in state court, that rule would not bind a federal court exercising its diversity jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-71, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) (“The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule [of Civil Procedure].”); see also Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94-95, 51 S.Ct. 383, 75 L.Ed. 857 (1931) (<HOLDING>). And as every trial lawyer knows, federal Holdings: 0: holding that a state law requiring the jury to decide the issue of contributory negligence cannot interfere with authority of a federal court to direct a verdict where there are no facts in dispute 1: holding that in a fela case where the jury found negligence per se the defendant railroad could not challenge the validity of the verdict through postverdict discussions indicating that the jury believed the total award would be reduced by the plaintiffs contributory negligence 2: holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury 4: holding that a federal court must decide an issue regarding the interpretation of a state law according to its anticipation of how the highest state court would hold


Input: fear of cancer were not authorized. See. id. 674 A.2d at 239-40. There are two ways to analyze the phenomenon of exposure-only causes of action. First is the monolithic view — i.e., that there is only a single cause of action based on exposure to asbestos, for which there are multiple remedies (some of which may not be available). Second is the "polylithic” view (for lack of a better word), that there are multiple causes of action for exposure to asbestos (some of which may not be available) — i.e., there is one cause of action for increased risk of cancer, one cause of action for medical monitoring costs, etc. It is large (1989); DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604, 744 P.2d 705, 707-11 (Ct.App.1987) (same); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del.1984) (<HOLDING>); Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the installation of asbestoscontaining materials caused immediate physical injury to the building because asbestos is ultrahazardous 1: holding dollar amount is not an essential element 2: holding that injury does not occur upon exposure to asbestos but rather upon development of disease 3: holding that present physical injury caused by exposure to asbestos is essential element of claims for mental anguish and medical monitoring costs 4: holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim


Input: so requires” and that the amendment is subject to dis-allowance on the trial court’s o t if allowing it would result in actual prejudice to the opposing party or for reasons of “undue delay.” GRE Ins. Group, 822 So.2d at 390. Undue delay can have two different meanings in a case. First, the trial court has discretion to deny an amendment to a pleading if allowing the amendment would unduly delay the trial. Horton v. Shelby Med. Ctr., 562 So.2d 127, 130 (Ala.1989). Second, an unexplained undue delay in filing an amendment when the party has had sufficient opportunity to discover the facts necessary to file the amendment earlier is also sufficient grounds upon which to deny the amendment. Stallings, 388 So.2d at 947; see also Rector v. Better Houses, Inc., 820 So.2d 75, 78 (Ala.2001)(<HOLDING>); Burkett, 607 So.2d at 141 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action 1: holding that since defendant failed to timely remove the original complaint which was removable based on federal question jurisdiction defendant thereby waived its right to file a subsequent removal even though the complaint was amended to add a new federal claim where the amendment to the complaint did not change the nature of the action so as to constitute a substantially new suit since the new allegations and claims were not substantially different from those in the original complaint 2: holding that pleadings could not be amended where no evidence offered during trial was outside the issues in the original complaint 3: holding that a demand for jury trial should be denied if the issues in the original complaint and the amended complaint turn on the same matrix of facts 4: holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in striking the amended complaint where the plaintiffs had learned of the facts underlying the new allegations six months before they attempted to amend


Input: a “catchall exception” that allows hearsay to be admitted in cases in which the declarant testifies if certain conditions are satisfied, the key one being that there are circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those surrounding statements fitting within the 23 specific exceptions created by Rule 803. Rule 803(24) is identical to Rule 804(b)(5), which is the corresponding “catchall exception” to be used when the declarant is unavailable. See State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Minn.1981). We have considered either Rule 803(24) or 804(b)(5) in a number of cases, including: State v. Langley, 354 N.W.2d 389 (Minn.1984) (admission of hearsay accounts of prior assaults upon homicide victim by defendant under Rule 804(b)(5)); State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96 (Minn.1981) (<HOLDING>); State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638 (Minn.1981) Holdings: 0: holding inconsistent out of court statements otherwise admissible not admissible against government in criminal prosecution 1: holding in a criminal case that a statement by an unavailable declarant was not admissible as a declaration against his penal interest and was not admissible under rule 804b5 either 2: holding that testimonial evidence is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant 3: holding that only selfinculpatory aspects of hearsay statement but not other parts of statement are admissible under exception for statements against penal interest 4: holding that statement that declarant saw defendant outside was admissible under rule 8081 because the statement explained an event or condition


Input: of law provision in a security agreement or contract is generally enforced. In re Mastercraft Metals, Inc., 114 B.R. 183 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1990); Consolidated Financial Investments, Inc. v. Manion, 948 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Mo.App. E.D.1997); Tri-County Retreading, Inc. v. Bandag Inc., 851 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo.App. E.D.1993). Therefore, we will employ Missouri law in determining whether JODA’s hen was perfected. Skytech’s Lien With the choice of law question decided, we turn to the dispositive question of priority. In order to determine which lien had priority, we must first determine whether each hen was properly perfected. As discussed above, Skytech’s hen must be evaluated according to Texas law. Section 70.301 of the Texas Property Code grants an Aircraft Repair and Maintenance Lien (<HOLDING>). It is uncontested that Skytech relinquished Holdings: 0: holding that a somewhat different indiana state statute imputes liability to absent owner of an aircraft 1: holding that where both vessels had the same owner it was not an abuse of discretion to give 75 of the salvage award to the owner 2: holding that a plea of title was not interposed where the person in possession answered that the party suing for possession was not the established owner of the premises 3: holding that 49 usc  44112 did not preempt state law imposing vicarious liability on an owner of an aircraft 4: holding that once possession of an aircraft was delivered to the owner a repairman had no right to repossess the plane


Input: fees are charged is an unearned fee and violates this section.” 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14(c). Plaintiffs specifically aver that they hired Dolphin, a mortgage brokerage company, and Datro, one of Dolphin’s agents, to find the most favorable financing agreement to fund the improvements to the DeLeon’s house (cplt., ¶ 28), that these defendants did not seek such terms (id., ¶ 32), and defendants charged $3,520, or 8% of the mortgage loan taken by plaintiffs, for rendering this sham service (id., ¶ 42). As we observed in our previous opinion, these allegations are more than sufficient to state a claim that defendants levied a charge for services that were not in fact rendered under § 2607(b). See DeLeon, 998 F.Supp. at 864; United States v. Gannon, 684 F.2d 433, 437-438 (7th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 940, 102 S.Ct. 475, 70 Holdings: 0: holding that the term reverse payment is not limited to a cash payment 1: holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service 2: holding some evidence existed that physician incurred fees because services had been performed on the physicians behalf 3: holding that a successful plaintiff in a legal malpractice action may recover initial fees a plaintiff pays or agrees to pay an attorney for legal services that were negligently performed and corrective fees incurred by the plaintiff for work performed to correct the problem caused by the negligent lawyer but not litigation fees which are legal fees paid by the plaintiff to prosecute the malpractice action against the offending lawyer 4: holding that  2607b prevents payment of fees to individuals who performed no service


Input: whether the risk of a conflict colored the defendant’s representation, but only when the potential conflict is brought to the court’s attention. Bare allegations of a conflict are not enough. See People v. Williams, 139 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1990). “In the absence of an evidentiary record of conflict, one should not be created based on mere speculation.” Banks, 121 Ill. 2d at 46-47 (Clark, C.J., specially concurring, joined by Ward, Ryan, and Miller, JJ.). The appellate court here held that “a trial court’s duty to investigate arises only if, at an early stage in the proceedings, a defendant presents facts suggesting a conflict that goes beyond the problem of one public defender having to attack another.” 353 Ill. App. 3d at 527; accord People v. Jones, 210 Ill. App. 3d 375, 378 (1991) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the appellate court, but Holdings: 0: recognizing the conflict 1: holding counsel must only provide relevant facts of the crime 2: recognizing conflict 3: holding that the defendant must provide facts to establish what the conflict was 4: holding that the public disclosure must reveal both the true state of facts and that the defendant represented the facts to be something other than what they were


Input: MMH was “a substantial motivating factor” in defendants’ decision not to renew his hospital privileges. Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 321 (2d Cir.2004). “To do so, [he] must aver some ‘tangible proof demonstrating that [his] protected speech animated [defendants’] decision ...” not to renew his privileges. Id. (citation omitted). Franzon “may not rely on conclusory assertions of retaliatory motive.” Id. Finally, a plaintiff may establish the required causal nexus by showing a close temporal proximity between his protected statements and the adverse employment action. See Morey v. Somers Centr. Sch. Dist., 06-CV-1877, 2007 WL 867203, at *11-12, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20265, at *38-39 (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 2007) (citing Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension, 252 Holdings: 0: holding that although evidence that the alleged adverse action occurred shortly after the employer became aware of the protected activity is sufficient to make a prima facie causation case the opposite is equally true  a lengthy time lapse between the employer becoming aware of the protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action  negates any inference that a causal connection exists between the two 1: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 2: holding that a time lapse of nine months between the filing of a formal grievance and the adverse employment action undercuts any inference of causation 3: holding that a twoweek lapse between the plaintiffs initial complaint to his supervisor and the adverse employment action was sufficient 4: holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection


Input: subject to court approval are binding before court approval. See In re Frye, 216 B.R. 166, 173-74 (Bankr. E.D.Va.1997). The Frye court explained that those courts that view such agreements as binding reason that contract formation and court approval require different analyses (the court adopted that view). Id. at 173; see also In re United Shipping Co., 1989 WL 12728, at *5 (Bankr.D.Minn. Feb.17, 1989) (“The considerations a court looks at in approving a settlement are entirely different than whether or not there was an agreement at all.”). On the other hand, other courts look to the Code and reason that if “judicial approval [is] necessary to go forward, an agreement could not be binding absent the required approval.” Id.; see also In re Sparks, 190 B.R. 842, 843 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996) (<HOLDING>). But this split only addresses the parties’ Holdings: 0: holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added 1: holding that the creditor did not satisfy the foregoing requirement because it was trying to exercise the avoidance power for itself as a sole creditor not for the benefit of the debtors estate or the creditors as a whole 2: holding creditors lacked standing to file an adversary action asserting the interests of the estate in seeking to prevent a former principal of the debtor from interfering with the chapter 11 reorganization given the lack of showing of the debtors consent and any determination by the bankruptcy court that the suit would be beneficial to the estate and necessary to a fair and efficient resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings 3: recognizing that a court may reverse the pelrbs actions where those actions are arbitrary capricious or an abuse of discretion    not supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole or otherwise not in accordance with law 4: holding that contracts are not binding before court approval because the debtorinpossession operates as a fiduciary any actions taken by the debtor are to be in the best interests of the creditor body as a whole for that reason  the debtors actions are subject to  review by the creditors of the estate and the bankruptcy court


Input: Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982) (interpreting the Commodity Exchange Act in light of preenactment case law). In 2002, the prevailing case law in the lower federal courts interpreted the language of § 9(e) to mean that the limitations period could be commenced upon some form of inquiry notice. By choosing language nearly identical to the language of § 9(e), Congress implicitly approved of that case law. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-99, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (interpreting Title IX to provide a private cause of action because Congress used language identical to that found in Title VI, which had already been interpreted by the courts to provide a private cause of action); Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner 1: holding that the burden of proving that the employee did not make reasonable efforts is on the defendant 2: holding that the silence of the class action fairness act regarding the burden of proving removal jurisdiction indicated congressional intent to leave intact the common law rule placing the burden on the defendant 3: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 4: holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury


Input: mortgagor without adhering to the due on sale clause is not permitted to cure the mortgage defaults through the Chapter 13 plan over the objection of the mortgage holder.” In re Tewell, 355 B.R. at 682. Here, the Debtor seeks to do exactly that under the Plan. Wells Fargo has objected to the Plan and argues that it impermissi-bly modifies Wells Fargo’s rights in violation of § 1322(b)(2). This Court agrees. The Plan allows the Debtor to keep the Property and also keeps the automatic stay in place to prevent Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the Property; meanwhile, the Debtor is supposed to make payments to the Morgans pursuant to the terms of the Second Lien Note, and the Morgans would presumably then turn around and remit payment to Wells Fargo under the First Lien Note. Under th 1) (<HOLDING>); In re Mendoza, 2010 WL 1610120, 2010 Holdings: 0: holding that a debtor may cure a default after acceleration but expressing no limit on the right 1: holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default 2: holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court 3: holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank 4: holding debtor could cure default partly because the bank held a recourse loan and therefore could recover against the original borrower personally


Input: rights), and anything less than conduct intentionally directed at the familjal relationship was not clearly established as unlawful within the Second Circuit at the time of Stephens’ behavior in 1990. The Court therefore holds that Stephens is entitled to qualified immunity on McGarr’s familial association claim. See Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 107. n. 10 (noting, in context of abuse investigation, that there is a difference between evaluating the appropriateness of a case worker’s actions, which “depends on the facts and events of a particular case,” and “evaluating whether it was objectively reasonable for a case worker to believe” that his or her actions were lawful, which “depends on the clarity of existing law at the time of those events”); see also Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 585 (<HOLDING>). H. Putnam County Defendant’s only argument Holdings: 0: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 1: recognizing the fourteenth amendment to the united state constitution embodies a right to familial integrity but stating the parameters of the right have never been clearly established and the right is not absolute or unqualified 2: holding that expert report that sufficiently addressed certain claims against doctor employed by professional association was sufficient as to claims against professional association based on doctors negligence because the doctors negligence is imputed to the association under the professional association act 3: holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for actions taken in 1983 as any right to familial association was not sufficiently clear such that the defendants reasonably could have understood they were violating it because njeither the supreme court nor this court has clearly held wrongful prosecution and incarceration of a family member violates a right to familial association 4: holding that defendants claiming qualified immunity to  1983 action were entitled to summary judgment where factual disputes were not material


Input: decision on appeal. Instead, the Court correctly remands Mrs. Reliford’s claim for accrued benefits to be processed in accordance with section 5121(a). 5 . Additionally, the Board, on remand in this case, should not be confused by the Court’s parenthetical reference to a remand "for [a] determination of whether [a] claim was reasonably raised, when there was an evidentiary factual bases therefore.’’ Ante at 305. The Court is remanding this matter "for adjudication of Mrs. Reliford’s claim based on the file as it existed at the time of her husband’s death.” Id. at 304. The Court is not remand ing — and indeed cannot remand — this matter for a determination of whether a claim was reasonably raised. See Jarrell, 20 Vet.App. at 331; see also DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56 (2006) Holdings: 0: holding that the proper procedure for a claimant to pursue a claim believed to be unadjudicated and for which there is no final decision that arguably failed to consider the claim is to pursue a resolution of the original claim eg seek issuance of a final ro decision with proper notification of appellate rights and initiate a notice of disagreement 1: holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision 2: holding that a claim before an ro remains pending until a final decision is rendered 3: holding issuance of administrative complaint to initiate proceedings not final agency action 4: holding that once a regional office decision is final a claimant may only attempt to overcome the finality of that decision in one of two ways a request for revision of the decision based on clear and unmistakable error or a claim to reopen based upon new and material evidence


Input: accumulated from the knowledge of various individuals, but the proscribed intent (willfulness) depended on the wrongful intent of specific employees.” Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 670 n.6 (D.C.Cir.1996) (finding that “[ijndividual acts of negligence on the part of employees — without 34 more — cannot ... be combined to create a wrongful corporate intent.”) ; see also United States v. LBS Bank-NewYork, Inc., 757 F.Supp. 496, 501 n. 7 (E.D.Pa.1990) (“although knowledge possessed by employees is aggregated so that a corporate defendant is considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of its employees, specific intent cannot be aggregated similarly”) (citations omitted); First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp., 690 F.Supp. 256, 259-260 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (<HOLDING>). At the same time, the courts, including our Holdings: 0: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation 1: holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law 2: holding that individuals assumption of the role of president of the corporation and her authority to sign documents on behalf of the corporation demonstrate that she had the requisite control over the corporation for purposes of finding individual liability under section 5a 3: holding that corporation cannot be deemed to have the requisite intent by mere inconsistences in knowledge of various employees 4: recognizing as a matter of federal law that an action to redress injuries to a corporation cannot be maintained by a shareholder in his own name but must be brought in the name of the corporation


Input: the Bedard residence because they submitted when the defendants, through a show of authority, placed a restraint on their freedom. In response, defendants assert that the request to evacuate was not a seizure, but that in any event, they are entitled to qualified immunity. As a threshold matter, we note that Estate member Laurie does not allege to have been inside the Bedard residence at any point during the day at issue. As a result, Laurie could not have been ordered to leave the Bedard residence by the defendants, and her Fourth Amendment claim premised on these actions fails. With regard to Isabel’s and Arlene’s claims, an order to evacuate through a show of authority may be regarded as a “seizure.” See Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 259 (1st Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). It is irrelevant that Arlene and Isabel were Holdings: 0: recognizing that an officers forcible rape of a woman violates her substantive due process rights 1: holding that the vessel owner had a responsibility to correct the positioning of the gangway 2: holding that the discretionary function exception applied where the coast guard had implied statutory authority to order the evacuation of a sinking ship 3: holding forcible extraction of the contents of defendants stomach shocks the conscience and violates due process 4: holding that the coast guards forcible evacuation of a sinking sea vessel constituted a seizure of the persons therein


Input: with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23(8). Costs in this Court are taxed to the appellee, EMC Mortgage Corporation. 1 . "The Supreme Court may, at its discretion, answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, a District Court of the United States in Tennessee, or a United States Bankruptcy Court in Tennessee. This rule may be invoked when the certifying court determines that, in a proceeding before it, there are questions of law of this state which will be determinative of the cause and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.” Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 23, § 1. 2 . See Manis v. Farmers Bank, 170 Tenn. 656, 98 S.W.2d 313 (1936) (<HOLDING>); See also In re Medlin, 201 B.R. 188, 192 Holdings: 0: holding that the state has the right to elect in which county the offense may be prosecuted where the jurisdiction is concurrent under the statutes and until the final judgment which operates as a bar to further prosecution in either county the states right of selection of the forum continues 1: holding that a notarys error in designating the county in which the instrument was executed did not render the instrument invalid as the acknowledgment and the instrument may be read together to cure the flaw in the acknowledgment 2: recognizing that the acceptance by the grantee of a deed poll signed and sealed by the grantor containing covenants to be performed by the grantee binds the latter to the performance of these covenants as effectually as if he had executed the instrument quotations and citation omitted 3: holding that the grant county prosecutor had a statutory duty to be legal advisor to the county clerk even though she was not embroiled in litigation in which the county was the real party in interest 4: holding that case involving evidence such as eyewitness testimony placing the defendant at the scene acknowledgment by the defendant of a dispute with the victim and theft of the victims purse and dna evidence suggesting that the defendant had engaged in sexual relations with the victim could not be deemed entirely circumstantial


Input: for any potential ... overpayments.” Def.’s Reply at 5. In light of the absence of any “meaningful standard by which a court could review the exercise of [the agency’s] discretion,” Def.’s Mot. at 10, and Congress’s choice of precatory statutory language (“may compromise”), the court, supposedly, cannot review the defendant’s decision without intruding upon administrative prerogative. A court may not review an agency action where “(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). The APA’s ban on judicial review of such actions is jurisdictional. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 252 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Patent Office Prof'l Ass’n v. Fed. Labor Holdings: 0: holding that ban on unauthorized practice of law did not implicate the first amendment 1: holding that the faas action in this case was  analogous to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion  and noting that when prosecutorial discretion is at issue the matter is presumptively committed to agency discretion by law 2: holding that judicial actions based upon a misapprehension of law constitute an abuse of discretion 3: holding that the ban on judicial review of actions committed to agency discretion by law is jurisdictional 4: recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction


Input: 523(a)(2)(A) claim, the creditor must prove the following [five] elements: ....”), abrogated cm other grounds by Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991); see also In re Maurice, 21 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir.1994) (“Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), [the creditor] was required to prove (a) the debtor obtained [money] through representations either knowingly false or made with such reckless disregard for the truth as to constitute willful misrepresentation; (2) the debtor possessed an actual intent to defraud; and (3) [the creditor] actually and reasonably relied on the false representation.”). 19 .In fact, the RTC did not even allege the basic elements of nondisehargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) in its “Complaint to Determine F.2d 605, 607 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Halpern v. First Ga. Bank (In re Halpern), Holdings: 0: holding that statecourt consent judgment containing findings of fraud precluded relitigation of same issue in dischargeability proceeding 1: holding that statecourt breach of fiduciary duty judgment precluded relitigation of same issue in dischargeability proceeding 2: holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan 3: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba 4: holding that resolution of issue underlying statecourt fraud judgment precluded relitigation of same issue in nondischargeability proceeding


Input: 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1988). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept well-pleaded facts as true. Columbia Natural Resources Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir.1995). Thus, a court may not grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based upon its disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations. Id. A court, however, need not accept as true conclusions of law or unwarranted factual inferences. Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides that, “[i]n all averments of fraud ..., the circumstances constituting fraud ... shall. be stated with particularity.” See generally Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, Nat. Ass’n, 214 F.3d 776 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) Holdings: 0: holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed 1: holding that pro se pleadings will be liberally construed 2: holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed 3: holding that under edenfield the act should be liberally construed 4: holding to ensure substantial justice to the parties the pleadings must be liberally construed


Input: 3. Indeed, this letter explicitly referred to Ms. Nicastro as the former president of A & B, further ratifying her signing the CBA by suggesting that she was president at one time. The Union and the Funds, therefore, reasonably believed that the CBA signed by Ms. Nicastro was a valid and enforceable agreement, while A & B’s failure to repudiate Ms. Nicastro’s signing the CBA and A & B’s actions in accordance with the terms of the CBA ratified Ms. Nicastro’s authority. No reasonable finder of fact could find otherwise. Thus, having failed to meet its burden of establishing that a material issue of fact exists, see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, Defendant’s opposition to partial summary Pension Fund v. Gerber Truck Service, Inc., 854 F.2d 1074, 1079-80 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); In re Baldanza Bakery, Inc., 149 B.R. 370, Holdings: 0: holding that the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of the persons primarily responsible for plaintiffs termination when coupled with the timing of plaintiffs termination and the conflicting reasons given by defendants agents for the termination might well persuade a jury that defendant fired the plaintiff in retaliation for  the letter sent by her attorney to defendants general counsel 1: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable 2: holding that a termination of benefits must go handinhand with a termination of the liability of an employer 3: holding that oral termination was invalid where cba called for written termination and that termination was effected only when written notice was given to the funds and the union according to the specific date requirements of the cba 4: holding requirement in contract to provide notice for termination but not limiting reasons for termination constitutes atwill employment relationship


Input: 508 (1993). See also United States v. Story, 503 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 379 (6th Cir.2005) (“a sentencing error affects substantial rights where it causes the defendant to receive a more severe sentence” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). In the instant case, Defendant claims that she was unaware of the maximum sentence before the plea hearing, and nothing in the record indicates that the defendant independently knew or was advised of the correct maximum sentence prior to the plea colloquy. Furthermore, the district court’s error may have caused Defendant to go to prison for longer than she thought possible for the crime she committed. Thus, the court’s error affects Defendant’s substantial rights. See, e.g., Syal, 963 F.2d at 906 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Walsh, 733 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release 1: holding that the failure to notify the defendant of the term of supervised release and its possible effect on his sentence was not harmless error where njothing in the record suggests that the defendant understood that his sentence would include supervised release andthere was no written plea agreement by which he might have been warned 2: holding that invitederror doctrine precludes defendant from challenging sentence of supervised release where defendant requested sentence of supervised release 3: holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses 4: holding that courts failure to tell defendant in rule 11 plea hearing that he faced a mandatory period of supervised release was harmless error because the defendant was on notice of the supervised release requirement set out in the plea agreement and the defendant did not claim he was unaware of the requirement only that court technically had failed to comply with requirements of rule


Input: hand, if the district court concludes, following an evi-dentiary hearing, that Krause forfeited his right to appointed counsel, a new trial is not necessary. c. Because we conclude that the district court denied Krause his due process rights, we do not decide whether the district court erred in its ruling. Instead, we remand the matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing with the due process protections outlined above to determine whether Krause engaged in “extremely serious misconduct” warranting forfeiture of his right to counsel. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 5 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant’s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); People v. Sloan, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d Holdings: 0: holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct 1: holding that defendant waived his confrontation rights by threatening witness not to testify 2: holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys 3: holding that a habeas petitioner was not entitled to relief from a state courts determination that he had forfeited his right to counsel by physically assaulting his attorney and threatening to put a contract on his attorneys life 4: holding that a defendant must demonstrate that the governments intrusion upon his relationship with his attorney created a possibility of either injury to his defense or benefit to the government in order to establish a violation of the right to counsel


Input: in Homer as an agent of its member institutions merely because it lacks statutory authority for its activities. The NCAA is a voluntary organization created by and comprised of the educational institutions which essentially acts as their surrogate with respect to athletic rules. In its construction of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which contains language identical to that of Title IX in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) regarding receipt of federal assistance, the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress, as in Title IX, did not distinguish between direct and indirect financial assistance. See United States Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597, 606-07, 106 S.Ct. 2705, 2711-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 494 (1986) (citing Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 564, 104 S.Ct. at 1216 (<HOLDING>)). The Court, however, drew a distinction Holdings: 0: holding that an order to disgorge funds was final even though the order did not distribute the funds 1: holding that kentucky high school athletic association was an indirect recipient of federal funds because it was created by state law its functions were determined by the kentucky board of education and it received dues from member schools who received federal funds 2: holding that ncaa was not an indirect recipient of federal funds even though it received dues from schools that received federal funds 3: holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college 4: holding that kentucky high school athletic associa tion qualified as agent of the state and as recipient of federal funds so as to be subject to title ix when association received dues from member schools which received federal funds


Input: A and Candidate B. If a resident of the district strongly favors the election of Candidate A — and strongly disfavors the election of Candidate B — the resident may choose to spend his personal funds to advocate the defeat of Candidate B. Under the independent expenditure provision, however, if the amount of the resident’s expenditure of personal funds — when combined with the amount of Candidate A’s own expenditures- — surpasses Candidate B’s expenditure limit, the state will provide additional funding to Candidate B to make up for the supposed inequality. In this way, the independent expenditure provision clearly acts as a “penalty” on the resident’s choice “to spend personal funds for campaign speech.” Id. at 2771; see also Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1359-62 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). As the resident spends more and more money Holdings: 0: holding that a similar motion to strike under california state law applies in federal court 1: holding mere deviation unconstitutional 2: holding that similar argument did not raise a colorable question of law for purposes of jurisdiction 3: recognizing similar duties 4: holding unconstitutional a similar law penalizing independent expenditures


Input: continue to litigate (and drive up defendant’s costs) once it knew it could not produce an expert and thus could not prove its case. On this basis, plaintiff should have folded its tent no later than the end of 2009 when it was foreclosed from using its expert because she had not provided a timely report ... [T]he EEOC failed to adequately manage the prosecution of this case from the beginning. Notwithstanding that the EEOC knew from the time of its administrative investigation that it would need expert testimony to make its disparate impact case, ... it did not hire its expert until September 2009 ... Thereafter, having already received several continuances, the EEOC sought a further continuance of over one-third of a year to provide the exper 2011 WL 3359622 (E.D.Mich. Aug. 4, 2011) (<HOLDING>). [A]s the magistrate judge aptly noted, Holdings: 0: holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling 1: holding failure to timely identify aggrieved parties and reasonably investigate such claims warranted attorney fee award against the eeoc  2: holding eeoc lacked foundation to proceed based on failure to reasonably investigate  3: holding that retaliation arising out of first eeoc filing was reasonably related to that filing obviating the need for a second eeoc charge 4: recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award


Input: 377 S.E.2d at 597. The defendant agreed that he could renew the motion if, as a result of jury voir dire, there was a problem. Id. Because the defendant never renewed the motion, we refused to consider his contention on appeal that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to grant a change of venue. Id. Although Green did not agree to continue his change of venue motion as did the defendant in Hoke, Green, however, did not object to the circuit court’s decision to take the motion under advisement pending the outcome of voir dire. Consequently, it was incumbent upon Green to renew the motion before the jury was empanelled and sworn, or at least remind the court that it was still pending and that he wanted the court to rule on it. Cf. Lenz, 78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (<HOLDING>). After voir dire was completed but before the Holdings: 0: holding appellant did not waive right to article 3823 instruction in failing to object to introduction of evidence when he raised a fact issue regarding the legality of the seizure of the cocaine 1: holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue 2: holding that the trial court need not hold a voluntariness hearing where the defendant did not object and no evidence presented raised the issue 3: holding that the defendant could not appeal a jury instruction where he did not object to the challenged instruction but in fact requested it and stated he was satisfied with it 4: holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence


Input: either that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of her working environment.” Cruz, 202 F.3d at 570 (citations omitted). Faced with facts very similar to those in the instant case, the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s holding that “essentially three incidents of racial animosity by a co-worker spanning over 25 months, with each incident separated by a full year, during which time no racial slurs were made” did not raise a triable issue of hostile work environment harassment. Arroyo v. Westlb Admin., Inc., 2000 WL 562425, *2, No. 99-7942, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 9528, at *6 (2d Cir. May 9, 2000) ; see also Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d. Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 Holdings: 0: holding that to meet his burden the plaintiff must show more than a few isolated incidents and that evidence solely of sporadic discrimination does not suffice 1: holding that to establish a hostile work environment plaintiff must prove more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity and cjasual comments or accidental or sporadic conversation will not trigger equitable relief pursuant to the statute 2: holding that the plaintiff failed to state an agebased hostile work environment claim where the plaintiffs proffered evidence was nothing more than a collection of unrelated and infrequent incidents of conduct by the defendants that the plaintiff subjectively construe as acts motived by agerelated animus and which was devoid of the agerelated comments or ridicule that are hallmarks of hostile work environment claims 3: holding that a plaintiff does not make a sufficient showing of a pervasively hostile work environment with a few isolated incidents but must show a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments 4: holding that supervisors routine vulgar references to plaintiff could not support a hostile work environment claim because plaintiff was unaware of the comments and to show that he or she perceived the environment as hostile a title vii plaintiff must at least have been aware of those comments


Input: notices. And the only places that the word “credit” appears are in the notification that Plaintiff could stop receiving prescreened offers of credit by calling a toll-free number, and in the last sentence of the “PreScreen & Opt Out Notice” on the reverse side of the letter, telling Plaintiff that if she “did not wish to receive any further promotional offers, please call (888) 567-8688, to opt out of the credit bureau mailing list.” Although Congress chose a broad definition of a “firm offer of credit,” and courts have been lender-friendly in finding less-than-complete offers to constitute a firm offer of credit, the Court concludes that here, Defendant has not met the minimum requirements of the Act. Cf, e.g., Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union, 520 F.3d 70, 71, 76 (1st Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the Court does not believe that the Holdings: 0: holding that a mailing which stated because of your excellent credit you have been preapproved for a home loan up to 100 of the value of your home  was a firm offer of credit 1: holding that the fcras provision that a lender may only use and obtain consumer credit information for the purpose of making a firm offer of credit requires that the lender offer something of value as an extension of credit alone 2: recognizing statutory credit 3: holding victims with poor credit histories were particularly susceptible to schemes involving offers of preapproved credit cards 4: holding that because the fcra does not require the disclosure in a firm offer of credit of amount of credit and interest rates courts should not imply such additional disclosure requirements explaining that the import of cole was that a firm offer of credit must have economic value rather than which terms must be included


Input: savings fund is his separate property. This court has long held that as a general rule, all property accumulated and acquired by either spouse during the marriage is part of the marital estate. See, generally, Davidson v. Davidson, 254 Neb. 656, 578 N.W.2d 848 (1998). Terry argues that because he brought the savings fund into the marriage, the savings fund was solely in his name, and he made the deposits to the savings fund, the entirety of the savings fund belongs to him. We disagree. Terry’s argument ignores the fact that during the parties’ marriage, the savings fund grew as a result of income Terry earned during the parties’ marriage. Terry’s income which accumulated during the parties’ marriage was a marital asset. Compare, Meints v. Meints, 258 Neb. 1017, 608 N.W.2d 564 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Parde v. Parde, 258 Neb. 101, 602 N.W.2d 657 Holdings: 0: holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital 1: holding income tax liability incurred during marriage is one of accepted costs of producing marital income and should be treated as marital debt for purposes of determining equitable distribution of marital estate 2: holding that in determining whether a substantial change of circumstances has occurred trial court must consider income available to parents new marital community 3: holding trial court had no authority to award portion of the marital property to wifes children from another marriage even though money they received by way of social security benefits were commingled with the marital estate and used in part for the aequisition of marital property 4: holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property


Input: that J.C. told her mother the details of the charged offenses. Further, the State informed the trial court at the article 38.072 hearing that J.C.’s mother was under indictment for failing to report appellant’s abuse of J.C., was unavailable to talk to the prosecutor, refused to cooperate with the police, and refused to admit that J.C. made an outcry statement to her. Appellant did not dispute the State’s assertions. See Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (“This Court accepts as true factual assertions made by counsel which are not disputed by opposing counsel.”). Urban was the first adult to whom an outcry statement was made who could remember J.C.’s statement and relate it at trial. See Foreman v. State, 995 S.W.2d 854, 858-59 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). 2. Reliability of the outcry Holdings: 0: holding that article 38072 allows the first adult who can remember and relate at trial the childs statement to be the outcry witness 1: holding that the trial court did not err in allowing a witness to testify regarding the child victims hearsay statements prior to the child testifying because ocga  24316 allows testimony about a childs outofcourt statements even in cases when the child does not appear as a witness as long as the child is available at the trial to testify 2: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 3: holding that admission of a witness prior identification statement where the witness could not remember the basis for the identification did not violate the confrontation clause or fedrevid 802 4: holding tape recorded statement given to police shortly after criminal incident was inadmissible under section 908035 when witness did not remember its contents and did not testify that it correctly reflected her knowledge or that she tried to be truthful at the time she made the statement


Input: of Appellant at 14. The VA’s point is well taken; we remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and Remanded. ORDER On April 3, 1992, our decision in United States v. Davis, No. 91-1678, slip op. (7th Cir. April 3, 1992) was published, see page 603, which reversed an injunction entered against the Veteran’s Administration (VA) prohibiting the VA from exercising its federal indemnity right to seek reimbursement for guaranties paid on behalf of veterans participating in its VA home loan program. Additionally, we remand the case for further proceedings, including a determination of whether part of the appellee class may be relieved of liability to the VA on the authority of United States v. Church, 736 F.Supp. 1494, 1497-98 (N.D.Ind.1990) (<HOLDING>). Unbeknownst to this panel until April 6, Holdings: 0: holding a cancellation clause that releases both parties from their obligations does not render contract void for lack of mutuality of obligation 1: recognizing that a divorce decree obligation to hold an exspouse harmless from a debt creates an obligation between the debtor and the exspouse separate from any obligation the debtor may owe to the creditor 2: recognizing that reasonable efforts by the va to obtain records regarding medical history from other federal departments or agencies are an important part of the vas affirmative duties under former section 3007a and 38 usc  5107a 3: holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation 4: holding that under 38 cfr  364324f a lenders noncompliance with the vas instructions releases the va from its guaranty obligation to the lender and in turn also releases the veteran from his obligation to the va