Input: probation. A special condition of the probation was jail time equal to the amount of time he had already served in this case. This meant, in effect, that his sentence was complete upon the court’s acceptance of the plea and entry of the judgment and sentence. Because Petitioner had already completed the incarceration which was a special condition of his probation, the trial court “terminated” Petitioner’s probation following acceptance of the plea. The court then discharged the $5000 bond Petitioner had previously posted. The court’s plea offer was made over the objection of the State. The sentence departed below the sentencing guidelines, and the trial court did not provide written reasons for the departure. See Fla.R.Crim. P. 3.701(d)(11) and Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). At the time of the plea, the State indicated Holdings: 0: recognizing that postoffense rehabilitative efforts while normally not grounds for departure may support departure in extraordinary circumstances and noting that the totality of the circumstances may justify a departure where a single circumstance is not alone sufficient 1: holding district court correctly reversed a departure sentence where the trial court failed to provide written reasons for the departure 2: holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure 3: holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure 4: holding same rule applied and required resentencing within the guidelines when trial judge failed to supply written reasons for downward departure


Input: of statements is unnecessary when the fraud allegations arise from misstatements or omissions in group-published documents, such as Annual Reports, prospectuses, registration statements, press releases, or other ‘group published information’ that presumably constitute the collective actions of those individuals involved in the day-to-day affairs of the corporation. Although the Third Circuit has not ruled on whether the group pleading doctrine has survived the enactment of the PSLRA, the district courts in this Circuit favor the conclusion that it has not. See In re American Bus. Fin. Serv., Inc. Sec. Litig., at *13; see also Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 2004 WL 2203709, at *6; But see In re U.S. Interactive, Inc. Class Action Sec. Litig., 2002 WL 1971252, *5 (E.D.Pa. Aug.23, 2002)(<HOLDING>). Lead Plaintiff claims that it does not rely Holdings: 0: holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown 1: holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy 2: holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint 3: holding that failure to identify the defendant in the information is an omission of an essential element because the primary purpose of the charging document is to inform the defendant of the nature of the accusations brought against him 4: holding that the group pleading doctrine is valid when applied to officers where it is almost certain that given the highlevel position of the officer within the company and the nature of the published writing that he would have been involved directly with writing the document or approving its content and that the officer was privy to information concerning the accuracy of the statements within the document


Input: a gun in defendant's back pocket). 30 . Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979) (Fourth Amendment violated by sweeping search of "adult” bookstore; officers viewed films “without the payment a member of the public would be required to make,” and viewed magazines and books "not ... as a customer would ordinarily see them” by removing cellophane wrappers). 31 . 1 LaFave, supra note 20 § 2.4(b) at 630. Courts have held that searches of private offices, airline baggage rooms, employee break rooms, employee locker rooms, private dressing rooms of entertainers, etc. are not sustainable on the theory of "store premises open to the public.” Id. (collecting cases). 32 . Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (<HOLDING>); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, Holdings: 0: holding that a canine sniff of an automobile need not be justified by reasonable articulable suspicion of drug activity 1: holding that an officer does not need reasonable articulable suspicion of drugrelated criminal activity prior to subjecting defendants car to a dog sniff subsequent to a lawful traffic stop 2: holding a canine sniff on a legitimately detained automobile is not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment 3: holding that a canine sniff is a search for purposes of the fourth amendment 4: holding that canine sniff not a search under the fourth amendment


Input: in isolation from each other does not take into account the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ as our cases have understood that phrase. The court appeared to believe that each observation by [the arresting officer] that was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation was entitled to ‘no weight.’ See [United States v. Arvizu,] 232 F.3d [1241] at 1249-1251 [ (9th Cir.2000) ]. Terry, however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis. The officer in Terry observed the petitioner and his companions repeatedly walk back and forth, look into a store window, and confer with one another. Although each of the series of acts was ‘perhaps innocent in itself,’ we held that, taken together, they ‘warranted further investigation.’ 392 U.S., at 22. See also Sokolow, supra, at 9 (<HOLDING>).” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, Holdings: 0: holding that while each separate item standing alone did not provide reasonable suspicion a combination of factors clearly satisfied the reasonable suspicion requirement 1: holding that factors that ordinarily constitute innocent behavior may provide a composite picture sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion 2: holding that contradictory or implausible travel plans can contribute to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity 3: holding innocent facts when considered together can give rise to reasonable suspicion 4: holding that factors which by themselves were quite consistent with innocent travel collectively amounted to reasonable suspicion


Input: Class may lack standing to bring this claim. See infra § VI(C). 12 . Because the court is dismissing the Transferee Class’s claim on other grounds, it need not decide a question that the Fifth Circuit has not yet resolved: whether "the scope of § 510 is limited to acts that affect the employer-employee relationship; in other words, [whether] plan amendments by themselves cannot be actionable under § 510.” Hines v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 207, 210 n. 5 (5th Cir.1995). The court also need not reach whether § 510 claims are limited to interference with the attainment of a right, as opposed to interference with an existing, vested right. See generally Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 516-17, 117 S.Ct. 1513, 137 L.Ed.2d 763 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (making it unlawful Holdings: 0: recognizing issue but reserving decision because not properly presented 1: holding that we cannot properly receive and consider evidence that was not presented to and considered by the trial court 2: holding that issues not properly presented to the bankruptcy court  cannot be raised  for the first time on appeal 3: holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal 4: recognizing the validity of the doctrine but holding no equitable tolling on the facts presented


Input: Administrative Code states: Sale of tangible personal property to real property contractors ... is generally subject to tax. Further: [Sjales of materials and supplies to contractors and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final consumers. Utah AdmimCode R865-19-58S (1990). A final consumer is one who “converts the personal property into real property ... since he is the last one to own it as personal property.” Id. The contractor is taxed as the ultimate consumer because real property sales are not taxable and thus the sale of raw materials would escape taxation upon being converted into real property if the ultimate consumer were not taxed. See Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 858 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah App.1993), cert. den. 870 P.2d 957 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, in Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that forfeiture of real property may be adjudicated before the seizure occurs because real property cannot abscond 1: holding contractor ultimate consumer because real property sale not taxed thus contractor taxed to avoid stream of products incorporated into real property from escaping sales tax altogether 2: holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner 3: holding utpa does not apply to real property sales 4: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property


Input: to 161 months of imprisonment. Nicholson timely appeals. Counsel has raised two issues: (1) whether Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether his sentence was unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The Government first asks us to dismiss the appeal, based on Nicholson’s waiver of his appellate rights in his plea agreement. We decline to enforce the waiver, however, as this provision of the plea agreement was not reviewed at Nicholson’s plea hearing. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, we find that Nicholson’s claims fail on the merits. First, the record reveals that Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, because Nicholson did not move in Holdings: 0: holding that when the courts oral statements in the plea colloquy conflict with the written agreement the courts oral statements control 1: holding sworn statements made during a codefendants plea colloquy were properly received as substantive evidence pursuant to fedrevid 801d1a 2: holding that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary a defendant is bound by statements made under oath during his plea colloquy 3: holding that a defendant is bound by representations made during a guilty plea absent a valid reason for controverting those statements 4: holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied


Input: (1974); see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (allowing jurisdiction for suits seeking prospective injunctive relief or to protect against continuing violations of federal rights). Moreover, the defendants were properly dismissed from Hogg’s’ suit because New Jersey, its Department of Labor and that Department’s Division of Workers’ Compensation are not recognized as “persons” under § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who ... causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Foreman v. State of Holdings: 0: holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under  1983 1: holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacity are not persons under  1983 2: holding that neither a state agency nor its officials acting in their official capacities may be sued under section 1983 3: holding that state and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages are not persons suable under  1983 4: holding that the eleventh amendment protects both states and state officials acting in their official capacity from suits brought pursuant to 42 usc  1983


Input: F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)), and we affirm. The district court properly dismissed Moore’s action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Holdings: 0: holding that meaningful postdeprivation hearing is sufficient to remedy unauthorized intentional deprivations of inmates property 1: holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies 2: holding that theft by prison guards does not violate due process when postdeprivation remedy exists 3: holding that due process is not violated when a state employee intentionally deprives an individual of property or liberty so long as the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy such as an article 78 proceeding 4: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional


Input: plaintiffs [are] competitors.” C&W counters that CBS alleges no facts even hinting that C&W might itself be a competitor of CBS except for C&W’s 27% investment in CCC, and that as a matter of law such an investment alone cannot vicariously make C&W a compet 8 WL 32012 (Del.Super.1988) (citing cases holding day-today control required before court will pierce corporate veil or find parent liable); Outokumpu Engineering Enterprises, Inc. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 729 n. 21 (Del.Super.1996) (noting test for parent’s liability for act of subsidiary is whether parent had “exclusive domination and control to the point that the subsidiary no longer has legal or independent significance of its own”); cf. Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 560 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Phone Directories Co. v. Contel Corp., 786 Holdings: 0: holding that a close relationship between a parent corporation and a subsidiary may justify finding that the parent engages in business in the jurisdiction through the local activities of its subsidiary 1: holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper 2: holding that in order to prevent parent from carrying out anticompetitive activity through subsidiary test for venue is whether parents control over subsidiary caused parent to transact business in state within venue provision of clayton act 3: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations 4: holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control


Input: may be taken into account at sentencing, as long as the government proves the acquitted conduct, and the sentencing court finds the same, by a preponderance of the evidence, and as long as the sentence falls within the prescribed statutory maximum. Because the sentenc ing judge in the instant case did find by a preponderance of the evidence that Poyato did in fact possess a firearm in connection with the offense, the district judge erred in concluding that he was precluded from denying the safety valve; the district court’s finding rendered Poyato ineligible for the safety valve. Accordingly, Poyato’s sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. VACATED AND REMANDED. 1 . See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2420, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The jury verdict in the instant case Holdings: 0: holding it permissible to increase a mandatory minimum sentence based solely on facts found by the sentencing judge 1: holding that the analysis in meritor sav bank fsb v vinson 477 us 57 64 106 sct 2399 2404 91 led2d 49 1986 applies to claims of sexual harassment under title ix 2: holding that an increase in the mandatory minimum sentence based on judicial factfinding does not evade the requirements of the fifth and sixth amendments and reaffirming mcmillan v pennsylvania 477 us 79 106 sct 2411 91 led2d 67 1986 3: holding that batson v kentucky 476 us 79 106 sct 1712 90 led2d 69 1986 does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review 4: holding on the authority of celotex v catrett 477 us 317 106 sct 2548 91 led2d 265 1986 that hearsay evidence produced in an affidavit opposing summary judgment may be considered if the outofcourt declarant could later present that evidence through direct testimony ie in a form that would be admissible at trial


Input: (emphasis added). The GTLA declares as well that “[w]hen immunity is removed by this chapter [the GTLA] any claim for damages must be brought in strict compliance with the terms of this chapter [the GTLA].” Id. § 29-20-201(c) (2012) (emphasis added). Both the history and the text of the GTLA demonstrate that, as to tort actions against local governmental entities, the Legislature intended it to be a comprehensive statutory scheme. Cruse, 922 S.W.2d at 496. However, the GTLA does not control every single action against a governmental entity. See id.; Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tenn.1987), abrogated on other grounds by Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 81-83; J.S. Haren Co. v. City of Cleveland, No. E2002-01327-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21276662, at *5 (Tenn.Ct. App. May 30, 2003) (<HOLDING>). Only those claims which are “brought under” Holdings: 0: holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs 1: holding that the remedy provided by a statute independent of the gtla was not subject to the gtla 2: holding that the phrase provided by law means prescribed or provided by statute 3: holding that georgia refund statute signifies state waiver of immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of the statute 4: holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute


Input: consolidation should not defeat the mutuality defense preserved here. III. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgments of the Bankruptcy Court and District Court. 1 . On the date of confirmation, Ferguson's claim for damages against Garden Ridge Management, Inc., and his loan with Garden Ridge, L.P., were at issue between the parties. AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This case turns on the meaning of substantive consolidation, a topic we addressed in In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir.2005). Unlike Owens Coming, here we are not confronted with a dispute over whether such a strong equitable remedy for a reorganization is appropriate, as neither side wants to undo the deemed consolidation contained in the debtors’ Plan of Reorganization. See id. at 211 (<HOLDING>). The only question is whether Ferguson is Holdings: 0: recognizing that there is no litmuspaper test for distinguishing a consensual encounter from a  seizure 1: recognizing that deemed consolidation is consensual 2: holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed 3: holding that a statute violated the federal constitutional right of privacy when applied to heterosexual nonviolent consensual activity between adults in private and pointing out that twentytwo states have decriminalized private consensual sodomy between adults 4: recognizing that consensual policecitizen encounters do not implicate constitutional protections


Input: not under Rule 21 but Rule 42(b) and effects merely a “separation of claims in an action in which multiple parties have been joined.”) (emphasis omitted). The confusion that can arise from loose talk of “severance” where in fact only a separation of claims has occurred, together with the impact the distinction can have on appellate jurisdiction, occasionally has provoked judicial frustration. See Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Pfizer, 498 F.2d 358, 359 (2 d Cir.1974) (speaking of the “tangle of Rules 21, 42(b) [and] 54(b)”). In the context of removal to federal court in diversity jurisdiction, the mere fact that an order of a state court purports to have “severed” claims generally is insufficient to make a case removable. See Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. Unijax, Inc., 625 F.2d 54, 56 Holdings: 0: holding that diversitydefeating parties were not severed from a case so as to permit removal to federal court where article 1038 of the louisiana code of civil procedure pursuant to which the severance was made authorizes separate trials rather than a true severance 1: holding the lumpsum payment of a severance benefit to be evidence of lack of an administrative scheme 2: holding that a plan providing severance pay for reduction in work force simply did not contemplate the effect of a sale of a business on the availability of severance pay 3: holding that severance pay policy was part of employment contract 4: holding that death qualification of jury is not of itself grounds for severance of a noncapital defendant


Input: Report of CS in October 2013 by TFO Travis Chavez regarding Erik Parra and Greg Cotinola Request 2: Copy of Handwritten and/or Audio Notes Regarding Debriefing of the CS in October 2013 by TFO Travis Chavez regarding Erik Parra and Greg Cotinola The Defendant has failed to show why he is entitled to either of these items. To begin, the “Debriefing Report” and the “Handwritten and/or Audio Notes” fall within the exceptions articulated in Rule 16(a)(2). These “handwritten notes regarding the CS debriefing” and any report produced therefrom [Doc. 64 at 4] plainly are encompassed within the ambit of “reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by a government attorney or agent in connection with investigating or prosecuting the case.” Lujan, 530 F.Supp.2d at 1265 (<HOLDING>). See also United States v. Weaver, 992 Holdings: 0: holding that an fbi agents rough notes of an interview of the defendant were not brady material because there was no independent showing that they contained evidence that was material to the defendants guilt or innocence 1: holding that the governments late disclosure of a statement by a government witness did not require reversal under the jencks act where the defendants were allowed a second chance to crossexamine the witness 2: holding that agents rough notes were not statements under the jencks act where notes were scattered and all the information contained in them was available to the defendant in other forms 3: holding that while brady and the jencks act might demand disclosure of rough interview notes in certain instances rule 16 did not 4: holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of records protected by tennessee rule of criminal procedure 16


Input: parts of a larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification.” See id. The Forest Service contends that Phase 1 and Phase 2 are not connected, but rather are complementary actions with “independent utility.” See Def. Reply at 19. The Court agrees. While Phase 1 and Phase 2 are both part of the “overall strategy to protect communities from wildfires and extended exposure to smoke and to restore affected watersheds,” (see AR 258), the record demonstrates that Phase 1 and Phase 2 apply to different parts of the forest and could each be implemented independently. See (Woltering Decl. ¶8; AR 258.) The Court concludes, therefore, that the Phase 1 and Phase 2 project are not connected actions. See Western Radio v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). b. Cumulative Actions Plaintiffs assert that Holdings: 0: holding road was still a public highway although fifty years had passed since the road was used by the public 1: holding that a road not open to the public at all times was not a highway 2: holding tower and access road for tower not connected actions where tower could function independently of road 3: holding that a bia road was a tribal road by considering the nature of the rightofway at issue and finding that although the tribe had relinquished certain gatekeeping rights by allowing public use of the road and collaborating with the bia in maintaining it the tribe had maintained other significant gatekeeping rights because the rightofway was not granted to the state and the road did not form any part of the states highway system 4: holding that mere use of a road will not make a road a public road even though such use is with the knowledge and consent of the landowner unless the use is accompanied by  recognition by public authority or by its maintainance sic


Input: is required”). Conduct is actionable if it is either “sufficiently severe or pervasive.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently noted that an isolated incident can amount to a “discriminatory changef] in the 'terms and conditions of employment’ ” when the incident is “extremely serious.” Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 121 S.Ct. at 1510, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (citation omitted). Other circuits have come to a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that “even a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim’s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability”); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1009 Holdings: 0: holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive 1: holding that a single incident where supervisor picked up plaintiff and forced her face against his crotch impliedly considered to create hostile environment 2: holding in a 42 usc  1981 and 1983 context that although a single incident ordinarily will not give rise to a cognizable claim for hostile work environment  where the plaintiff was subjected to a physical assault in which he was punched in the ribs and  temporarily blinded by having mace sprayed in his eyes we cannot say that as a matter of law such an incident is not sufficiently severe in all the circumstances to create a hostile work environment 3: holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment 4: holding that plaintiffs allegation of one incident where supervisor wrapped his arms around her and made sexually explicit statements was not sufficient to establish a claim of a hostile working environment absent the most stringent circumstances courts have refused to hold that one incident in itself was so severe as to create a hostile work environment


Input: into the bathroom. Thus, Jackson remembered the details of the events before and after the murder, suggesting he had control of his mental faculties, had coherent decision-making ability, and was not in a state of intoxication such that his judgment was impaired. Jackson asserts the OCCA’s dissent correctly decided this case. The dissent criticized the majority for (1) failing to find sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of intoxication; (2) weighing the evidence; and (3) using an incorrect test by reciting that Jackson had not proved his defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 964 P.2d at 902-03 (Lane, J., dissenting). The first criticism is addressed by the prior discussion. Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the majority did not weigh the evidence. See id. at 892 (<HOLDING>). Nor did the majority require Jackson to prove Holdings: 0: recognizing trial court should not weigh evidence 1: holding that on a motion for summary judgment it is settled that a trial court is not permitted to weigh material conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses 2: holding that it is function of trial court to judge witnesses credibility and to weigh conflicting evidence 3: holding that in resolving sufficiency of evidence appeals court does not weigh evidence or review credibility of witnesses 4: holding that it is trial courts function to evaluate witness credibility and weigh conflicting evidence


Input: In district court, a codefendant had objected to the instructions but the defendant declined to challenge them, telling the district court "I don’t have any objections to the charge.” We then held that the defendant had not preserved the issue for appeal and thus only examined the instruction for plain error. If the defendant states that he will not object to something and then, on appeal, reverses course and raises such an objection, this court should generally apply a plain error standard. Id. at 1472. There may be times, however, as recognized by this court in Love and White where the failure to join a codefendant's objection may nevertheless preserve the issue for appeal. 3 . When the district court declares a mistrial and one of the parties files a certain kind of Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 829, 114 S.Ct. 97, 126 Holdings: 0: holding that informal methods of granting continuances are inconsistent with the requirements of the iad 1: holding that the ijs or bias credibility determinations are not questioned if they are substantially reasonable 2: holding that if the statutory terms are unambiguous a courts review ends and the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its words 3: holding that openended continuances to serve the ends of justice are not prohibited if they are reasonable in length 4: holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined


Input: in 1990. 9 . One of Hartman's daughters suffers from sickle-cell anemia and her mother testified that "she can barely care for” her without Hartman's assistance. Pet. at Ex. C. Further, according to Hartman’s mother, Hartman would face discrimination in Guyana because "his father was born in the United States.” Id. In addition, the IJ noted “the hardship and stress that [his deportation] would cause his mother who has already suffered two heart attacks.” Id. 10 . The Court notes that it does not have habe-as jurisdiction to review the IJ's discretionary decision to award Hartman § 212(c) relief. See Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 132-133 (3d Cir.2001) (limiting habeas review of removal orders to statutory or constitutional challenges); Sol v. INS, 274 F.3d 648, 651 (2d Cir.2001) Holdings: 0: holding that the ij and bia lack authority to review discretionary decisions regarding when and whether to initiate removal proceedings 1: holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction 2: holding that federal jurisdiction over  2241 petitions does not extend to review of discretionary determinations by the ij and the bia 3: holding that apprendi does not retroactively apply to  2241 petitions 4: holding that the real id act does not restore jurisdiction over discretionary determinations


Input: error. Finally counsel points out that the court failed explicitly to tell Hanson that he was waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1)(F) (formerly Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(4)). The court misspoke and asked Hanson if he understood that he would be entitled to a jury trial if he had continued to plead guilty, rather than not guilty. This misstatement could not be plain error, however, because it is clear from the rest of the plea colloquy that Hanson understood that he was waiving his right to a trial by pleading guilty. See Maeder, 326 F.3d at 893. For these reasons we agree with counsel that the contemplated challenges to Hanson’s plea under Rule 11 would be frivolous. Counsel next addresses whether Hanson could make a nonfrivolous challenge t Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Franklin, 302 F.3d 722 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that escape is categorically a violent felony under the acca 1: holding that thirddegree burglary is a violent felony 2: holding that escape from secure custody is a violent felony 3: holding that burglary is violent felony 4: holding that coerced sex is violent felony


Input: incorporating Stevo’s marks — conduct at the heart of initial interest confusion on the internet. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1065 (9th Cir.1999) (discussing how use of metadata can create initial interest confusion); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417 (9th Cir.2004) (discussing how the purchase of trademarked keywords can create initial interest confusion). In short, Plaintiffs have alleged nothing to show that SBR created the type of confusion needed to defeat application of the first native fair use — “did not intend [it] to constitute an affirmative defense.” 6 McCarthy, supra, § 31:156.50; see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Instead, “nominative fair use” names a use of Holdings: 0: holding that nominative fair use is an affirmative defense to a prima facie case of likelihood of confusion similar to the fair use defense 1: recognizing nominative fair use as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement 2: holding that an assertion of nominative use gives rise to a modified likelihood of confusion analysis 3: holding that the nominative fair use factors replace the traditional sleekcraft factors for likelihood of confusion where nominative fair use is at issue 4: recognizing the underlying principles of nominative fair use


Input: Baty further stated that Booth’s representation to Baty was the reason that a warranty and representation to that effect was expressly included in the sale agreements. Howard & Howard communicated its representations via telephone calls and emails. Although the two paragraphs cobble together a few details, they fail to give even one date on which an alleged misrepresentation occurred. That alone dooms ABI’s ability to allege fraud with particularity. See Heinrich, 668 F.3d at 393 (finding that a plaintiff failed to allege fraud with sufficient particularity because she “d[id] not include [in her affidavit] the date she received the allegedly fraudulent email from the defendants.”); see also United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Hirt v. Walgreen Co., Holdings: 0: holding that the pleading standard set forth in twombly applies to all civil actions 1: holding that defendants failed to carry burden of proof to show that plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages when among other things they offered no evidence contradicting the plaintiffs evidence 2: holding that pleading was insufficient where the plaintiff failed to among other things set forth the dates of any fraudulent statements 3: holding that plaintiff had no jurisdiction in federal court because she failed to allege a state law claim but declining to discuss pleading requirement to set forth charge of discrimination 4: holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract


Input: of law. Thus we review the district court’s determination de novo. See Arkla Energy Resources v. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc., 9 F.3d 855, 865 (10th Cir.1993); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir.1986). In our judgment, Driver was the “prevailing party” within the meaning of § 3629(B). Although CUIC’s interpretations of § 3629(B) have some appeal, the language of that statute counsels a different construction. Section 3629(B) expressly requires a “written” offer of settlement. It twice refers to the type of offer in question and twice qualifies it as “written.” And it expressly requires that a covered offer be “submit[ted]” to the insured, which provision seems to us to contemplate that a qualifying offer be in writing. See Grosvenor v. Brienen, 801 F.2d 944 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to CUIC’s claim, the decision of the Holdings: 0: holding that while rule 68 does not explicitly require that an offer of settlement under that rule be made in writing its requirement that the offer be served upon the adverse party implies as much 1: recognizing further that the offer of proof allows the aggrieved party to present a proper record for review on appeal and in the absence of such an offer error may not be preserved 2: holding an unaccepted rule 68 offer does not moot a claim 3: holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell 4: holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added


Input: of Mr. Boggess, Detective Burke did nothing more than identify the person depicted in the photographs, the car shown in the photographs, and the place where the photographs were taken. Further, Mr. Boggess testified that the photographs showed him partially undressing after being baptized. We simply cannot find any prejudicial impact from the manner in which the photographs were introduced, nor the substantive content of what the photographs depicted. Consequently, the erroneous admission of the photographs has been shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. IV. CONCLUSION In view of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Mr. Flippo’s motion for a new trial. Affirmed. 1 . See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The medication and clothing were Holdings: 0: recognizing that any witness has the right to refuse to be interviewed if he so desires and is not under or subject to legal process 1: holding that if a suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning 2: holding that prior to engaging in custodial interrogation police must warn a suspect that he has a right to remain silent that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed 3: holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent 4: holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires


Input: Inc., Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc., Fujitsu Computer Systems Corporation, Hewlett Packard Company, International Business Machines Corporation and Leno-va (United States)). In light of the fact that four of the defendants (Fujitsu, Hewlett Packard, IBM and Lenova) have been dismissed with prejudice at various times and the stipulations incorporating the dismissals stated explicitly that the parties to the stipulations were to pay their own fees and costs, dkt. ## 68, 69, 94 and 95, I assume that counsel’s reference to “all defendants” includes only the four listed in the caption above. Defendants’ motion was filed within 14 days of the entry of judgment in this case and is therefore timely. See IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Defendants contend that the court can find by Holdings: 0: holding a summary judgment to be final although motion to assess attorney fees remained pending because award of attorney fees is collateral to judgment 1: holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment 2: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case 3: holding that correct way to perfect claim for attorney fees under  285 is through compliance with fedrcivp 54d2b which requires motions for attorney fees to be filed no later than 14 days after entry of judgment 4: recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees


Input: 456 F.Supp. 355, 358 (N.D.Ga.1978) (O’Kelley, J.) When the initial pleading provides at least a clue as to the plaintiffs citizenship, the burden is on the defendant to file the petition for removal within thirty days of receipt of the initial pleading. Kanter & Eisenberg v. Madison Assocs., 602 F.Supp. 798, 801 (N.D.Ill.1985); Richman v. Zimmer, Inc., 644 F.Supp. 540, 541 (S.D.Fla.1986); Kaneshiro v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 496 F.Supp. 452, 462 (D.Haw.1980). An overwhelming majority of the courts that have considered this matter have concluded that the plaintiffs failure to allege a party’s citizenship in the initial pleading does not prevent the thirty day removal period from commencing. See e.g., Stokes v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 577 F.Supp. 9, 11 (E.D.Pa.1983) (<HOLDING>) and cases cited therein. Moreover, several Holdings: 0: holding that failure to allege plaintiffs citizenship in notice of removal amounted to defect in removal procedure under former version of 28 usc  1447c 1: holding that the failure to join all the defendants in a removal petition is not a jurisdictional defect 2: holding that plaintiffs failure to allege citizenship of first defendant did not constitute good cause for second defendants failure to timely join in removal petition 3: holding that a party fraudulently joined to defeat removal need not join in a removal petition and is disregarded in determining diversity of citizenship 4: holding that the failure of all defendant to join in the petition for removal mandated remand to state court


Input: Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that the Texas Supreme Court would allow the filing of an Anders brief derived from this right in the parental-rights termination context. Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has extended Anders to juvenile-delinquency proceedings based, in part, on the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings. See In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex.1998). Although it has not yet considered application of Anders procedures to parental-rights termination appeals, it has recognized that the state’s interest in protecting the best interests of children through judicial economy, certainty, and finality are not outweighed by a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 354 (Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Dossey v. Tex. Dep’t of Holdings: 0: recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights 1: holding that there is no due process right to appellate review 2: holding that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding may not file a counterclaim 3: holding that the due process clause of the alaska constitution guarantees the right to effective counsel in proceedings for the termination of parental rights 4: holding due process does not mandate that appellate courts review unpreserved complaints of charge error in parental rights termination


Input: Co., 618 So.2d 874, 879 (La.1993) (concluding that damages may include cost of restoration of the property to its original condition or, if that is economically wasteful, the difference in value of the property before and after the harm). Orion asserts that Syracuse’s claim for damages resulting from the removal of the tags must be denied because Syracuse failed to mitigate those damages. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2002 (a contracting party “must make reasonable efforts to mitigate” damages caused by another’s breach of contract). See also Elliott v. Normand, 976 So.2d 738, 745 (La.Ct.App.2008) (denying storage charges for boat where party failed to mitigate its damages by not acting promptly to get boat repaired). Cf. Rogers v. Nelson Dodge, Inc., 407 So.2d 443, 447 (La.Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>). After Syracuse complained to Orion about the Holdings: 0: holding lien claimant could not recover for trackiron furnished for use in repairing mine but not actually used 1: holding that it is not 2: holding that party did not fail to mitigate his damages by not repairing motor home because evidence proved it could not be repaired 3: holding that the challenged evidence the government introduced in rebuttal was substantive evidence and not  relevant for impeachment purposes because it was not offered to show that the witness was not a credible person but to show that she was not at the defendants home during the relevant time making her testimony that she did not see any drugrelated activity while at the defendants home irrelevant 4: holding that it may not


Input: relevant post-judgment period from $12,000 to $14,000 per month. We find no merit in this contention, as the trial court did indeed make such a determination as expressly set forth in the final judgment—a determination which Futer-nick and Beber did not contest in their first appeal. 2 . On appeal, Trushina contends that Futer-nick and Beber are not legally entitled to any post-judgment interest. While such a contention may indeed be valid and supported by the Richardson analysis, Tmshina took the position in the trial court that Futemick and Beber were entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate of 1.49%. The trial court agreed with Tmshina, and therefore Trushina could not properly cross-appeal that portion of the trial court’s order. Pope v. State, 441 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.1983) (<HOLDING>) (citing Behar v. Southeast Banks Trust Co., Holdings: 0: holding that defendant may not complain of error he invited and further holding that reversal cannot be based on such error 1: holding that invited error does not entitle the defendant to any relief and of which he will not be heard to complain on appeal 2: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error 3: holding a party may not invite error and then be heard to complain of that error on appeal 4: holding that a party failing to make a timely objection to evidence at trial cannot as a matter of law be heard to complain on appeal that its admission is error constituting an irregularity in the proceeding


Input: law. For example, in Pace v. Insurance Company of North America, 838 F.2d 572, 578-79 (1st Cir.1988), we held that maritime law did not preempt a Rhode Island cause of action allowing recovery of damages and attorney’s fees for an insurer’s bad faith refusal to pay or settle claims; the refusal to settle [insurance] claims is normally left untouched by maritime law. Id. at 41 (emphasis added). Thus, the cases relied upon by Kenealy do not support the Kenealy court’s proposition that they reached the same conclusion as Inger-soll. In addition, Underwriters does not provide any reason, nor have we found one, to require a unitary and uniform federal rule respecting attorney’s fees in maritime in surance litigation. See INA, 800 F.2d at 1381; see also Coastal Fuels, 207 F.3d at 1251 (<HOLDING>). In conclusion, we hold that a district court Holdings: 0: holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award 1: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees 2: holding that appellate court should reverse and remand issue of attorneys fees where damages are reduced on appeal in a manner that could affect the determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees 3: holding that a party may recover attorneys fees under section 38001 only if the party prevails on a cause of action for which attorneys fees are available and recovers damages 4: holding that no reason existed to create a uniform national rule in admiralty where the case concerned attorneys fees and whether the contractual provision which provided for attorneys fees should allow a party to recover attorneys fees where it succeeded on all but one minor issue


Input: at 57 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (1994)). Describing the statute as “breathtakingly broad,” the Court faulted the law, not only for its nearly unlimited scope, but for its failure to accord any preference to the historical presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Id. at 68-69, 120 S.Ct. at 2061-62, 147 L.Ed.2d at 58-59. It found the Washington statute exceeded the bounds interest at stake in Troxel this way: In an ideal world, parents might always seek to cultivate the bonds between grandparents and their grandchildren. Needless to say, however, our world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in the first i .Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). Turning to the Iowa statute before us, we Holdings: 0: holding troxel not controlling where states supreme court previously held rational basis review sufficient based on minimal intrusion of grandparent visitation and other parental protections afforded by visitation statute 1: holding visitation statute unconstitutional because it disregards presumption favoring parental decisionmaking forcing parents to prove visitation not in childs best interest 2: holding that grandparent has no protected liberty interest in the visitation of a child of whom she once had custody 3: holding that uncertainty regarding amount of visitation ordered is fatal to the validity of a trial courts visitation  award 4: holding conclusory statements in visitation dispute were not adequate to support awarding visitation rights


Input: case. Reilly’s defense depends, in part, on Riggs’ performance under the agreement. Indeed, Riggs’ execution of the terms of the Trust Agreement has already been placed in issue by the parties. TRST has claimed Riggs expressly or implicitly waived Article X, Section 10.02 of the Trust Agreement. Thus, in deciding this case, the Court could determine Riggs breached the Trust Agreement or was negligent in signing or performing the contract and absolve Reilly of liability. Such a finding could be unfairly detrimental to Riggs. Although there is no danger of issue preclusion in the case pending in Washington, D.C., a negative precedent could impair Riggs in that litigation; that is, assuming this case is decided first. See Pulitzer-Polster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). In addition, if the D.C. Court acknowledged Holdings: 0: holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice 1: holding that a finding of no plain error on direct appeal precludes a finding of prejudice under strickland 2: holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause 3: holding nonagency defendants were properly joined as indispensable parties under rule 19 but recognizing no apa cause of action could stand against them 4: holding that a negative precedent can cause enough prejudice to an absentee for a finding of indispensability under rule 19


Input: however, between the public interest asserted here and the public interest present in Dep’t of Navy. In Dep’t of Navy, this court held that collective bargaining was in the public interest, and the union, as the chosen bargaining representative, was the party specifically designated by Congress to further that public interest. In this case, by contrast, Congress has authorized the contracting federal agency and the Department of Labor to safeguard the public interest embodied in the Davis-Bacon Act by giving them the power to enforce the statute. Although we do not decide the issue, it is likely that the Union has no private cause of action against the employer for Davis-Bacon Act violations. Cf. Weber v. Heat Control Co., 579 F.Supp. 346 (D.N.J.1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). But the mere fact that federal agencies are Holdings: 0: holding that the employees of government contractors do not have a cause of action for back pay against employers who violate the davisbacon act 1: holding in fca suit regarding contractors classification of employees for purposes of the davisbacon act that deferral to the department of labor was proper only with respect to the resolution of how particular types of work should be classified but not with respect to whether the contractors misclassified their employees 2: holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court 3: holding that court would not imply a statutory cause of action for employers interference in employees assertion of claim for compensation 4: recognizing the cause of action


Input: (quoting Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d at 1372). To the extent plaintiff alleges that a violation of due pr Federal Claims has never been granted general authority to issue declaratory judgments, and to hold that the Court of Federal Claims may issue a declaratory judgme Act that did not involve a pre-award protest, once the Court of Federal Claims determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear a plaintiffs claims for money damages, it necessarily followed that the court did not have authority to hear that plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief. See Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641, 645 (Fed.Cir.1994); see also Taylor v. United S tates, 88 Fed.Cl. 759, 762. appeal dismissed, 375 Fed.Appx. 4 (Fed.Cir.2009); Hufford v. United States, 87 Fed.Cl. 696, 702 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Matthews v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 274, Holdings: 0: holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims 1: holding that because it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the united states court of international trade the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over a matter that was protested or protestable 2: holding that the federal district courts dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims arising from the same incident 3: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 4: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort including fraud


Input: must provide it with clear notice that it is subject to suit here. AMAF, 428 A.2d at 851-852; see also Trerotola v. Cotter, 601 A.2d 60, 64 (D.C.1991); Ross v. Product Development Corp., 736 F.Supp. 285, 290 (D.D.C.1989). Appellant relies on D.C.Code § 13-334(a) as a basis for her claim that the trial court had general jurisdiction over IDE-SA. As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether the defendant was properly served under § 13-334(a), i.e., whether IDESA was personally served in the District of Columbia. In this case, that did not happen; by her own admission, appellant served IDESA in Mexico. As a consequence, appellant has “failed to comply with the statute’s mandate, and [is] thus foreclosed from benefiting from its jurisdictional protection.” Everett, 628 A.2d at 108 (<HOLDING>). We therefore have no occasion to consider or Holdings: 0: holding that by serving defendant in california appellant did not comply with section 13334a 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules 2: holding plaintiffs failure to comply with section 2622 requires dismissal in federal court 3: holding failure to comply with  851b was harmless error in part because defendant did not comply with  851c procedures for challenging prior convictions 4: holding that plan did not comply


Input: the right to appear personally at sentencing and testify. Section 557.041.2 states: At the time of sentencing of any person who has pled guilty or been found guilty of a felony offense, the victim of such offense may appear before the court personally or by counsel for the purpose of making a statement or may submit a written statement. The statement shall relate solely to the facts of the case and any personal injuries or financial loss incurred by the victim. A member of the immediate family of the victim may appear personally or by counsel to make a statement if the victim has died or is otherwise unable W.D.1993)(fmding no error in allowing representative of Mothers Against Drunk Driving to testify at the sentencing hearing); Edwards v. State, 794 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Mo.App. W.D.1990)(<HOLDING>). The statute does not restrict or modify the Holdings: 0: holding that a prosecutors questions eliciting testimony from a victim as to issue of virginity prior to the assault did not violate colorados rape shield statute because that statute does not specifically prohibit a victim from testifying as to a lack of prior sexual activity id at 1020 1: holding admissible testimony of the victims daughter regarding a telephone call from the defendant to the victim hours before the victims death and the victims emotions following the telephone call where defendant claimed accident 2: holding that a victim impact aggravator was not unconstitutionally vague because it directed the jury to consider inter alia the effect of the crime on the victims family 3: holding statute does not preclude victims family from testifying as to the difficulties encountered by victim following accident 4: holding that before a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of the victims character for violence there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was the first aggressor and that once the defendant testified that he was attacked and cut by the victim without provocation before using the victims utility tool to stab the victim the defendant was clearly entitled to question the victim about past acts of violence reflected in court documents from the state of oregon


Input: Minnesota Power contends that it was improper, as a matter of law, for the Commission to consider the factors that it did because those factors are not cost based. The dissent's contention is therefore not at issue in this case. 8 . The dissent nevertheless contends that the Commission's adoption of an interim rate at 60 percent of Minnesota Power's final rate request should be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. The Commission explained that its decision to set the rate at 60 percent, "an amount slightly in excess of any final revenue requirement found in previous Company rate cases in the last 22 years,” was based on its "balanc[ing] the potential burdens faced by the Company and its ratepayers in light of [the] exigent diyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 836 (Minn.2006) (<HOLDING>); Wajda v. City of Minneapolis, 310 Minn. 339, Holdings: 0: holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision 1: holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable 2: holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable 3: holding that the citys decision was arbitrary and capricious when it was contrary to the evidence and based solely on speculation arising from prior unrelated acts 4: holding that when the agencys decision was based on an erroneous and completely unsupported assumption the decision was arbitrary and capricious


Input: evidence or different reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury.’” (quoting Sims, 898 So.2d at 1005)); Smith v. Telophase Nat’l Cremation Soc’y, Inc., 471 So.2d 163, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (affirming denial of crematorium’s motion for directed verdict in case where jury found that crematorium committed tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when it gave deceased’s widow another person’s ashes and scattered deceased’s ashes at sea against his wishes; “it [is] within the province of the jury to find that the facts, and the proper inferences from the facts, establish that [crematorium’s] conduct was extreme and outrageous”); see also Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So.2d 683, 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). D. Punitive damages The Hospital argues that Holdings: 0: holding unreasonable an extraordinary variance based on factors such as the defendants lack of criminal history his health conditions and the lack of improper interactive behavior with children 1: holding that 21 years of crimefree violencefree behavior twelve years of good behavior in prison and other meaningful productive activities were not sufficient to outweigh the states evidence in support of the death penalty 2: holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized 3: holding that the good behavior requirement of a suspended sentence defined the period of suspension 4: recognizing that our society  shows a particular solicitude for the emotional vulnerability of survivors regarding improper behavior toward their dead loved one and that in such cases behavior which in other circumstances might be merely insulting frivolous or careless becomes indecent outrageous and intolerable


Input: for out of state medical treatment is as follows: 4. Prior authorization must be obtained from the payer for referral to out-of-state providers. The documentation must include the following: a. Name and location of out-of-state provider b. Justification for out-of-state provider, including qualifications of the provider and description of services being requested. ¶ 30. Henderson, by his own admission, neither attempted to obtain prior approval from Fleming or from the Commission nor did he provide the required documentation before receiving medical services and supplies from Dr. Whitecloud, an out of state provider. Henderson, admittedly without any notice to Fleming or the Commission sought and received medical treatment from Dr. Whitecloud. Henderson argue o.2d 320 (Miss.1969) (<HOLDING>); Roberts v. Junior Food Mart, 308 So.2d 232 Holdings: 0: holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation 1: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits 2: holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness 3: holding that employee who resigned left voluntarily where employer accepted resignation told employee not to come to work anymore and paid employee through end of notice period 4: holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury


Input: Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). Moreover, the plaintiffs' "obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of their entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action.” Id. at 527. "To state a valid claim, a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Id. 5 . A party may recover damages in equity if there exists a contract implied in law, see Paschall's, 407 S.W.2d at 153; however, equitable relief is not available if there exists a contract implied in fact. See Ridgelake v. Harpeth Valley Utilities Dist. of Davidson and Williamson Counties, 2005 WL 831594, at *8 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also, Daugherty v. Sony Elecs., Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims 1: holding that ajctions brought upon theories of unjust enrichment quasi contract contracts implied in law and quantum meruit are essentially the same courts frequently employ the various terminology interchangeably to describe that class of implied obligations where on the basis of justice and equity the law will impose a contractual relationship between parties regardless of their assent thereto 2: holding implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in some commercial contracts does not extend to atwill employment contracts 3: holding  he who seeks equity must do equity  4: holding only contracts implied in law are creatures of equity


Input: administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009) (“The substantial evidence standard of review applies, and we uphold the IJ’s factual findings if they are supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Although we generally afford particular deference to an IJ’s assessment of an applicant’s demeanor, Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir.2005), we have never held that a demeanor finding alone is substantial evidence sufficient to support an adverse credibility determination, see Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that this court can be more confident in its review of observations about an applicants demeanor where  they are supported by specific examples of inconsistent testimony 1: holding that the agency may rely on a lack of corroborative evidence where an applicants testimony is not otherwise credible 2: holding that an ij may not use general information contained in a state department report to discredit specific testimony regarding an applicants personal experience 3: holding that conviction can be supported solely by circumstantial evidence 4: holding that an adverse credibility determination cannot be based on trial testimony that is more detailed than the applicants initial statements at the airport


Input: case as well over the plaintiffs claim under section 1132(a). In its reply brief, Farm Bureau slipped in an additional jurisdictional argument: that because the plaintiff admitted that its recovery in her uninsured motorist state court case is “potential,” the present declaratory judgment action is not ripe. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not favored. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 773 (6th Cir.2012) (“Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before this court” (quoting United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1191 (6th Cir.1993))). Nonetheless, ripeness is an essential feature of Article III jurisdiction, so the Court will address it. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Article III of the Constitution permits Holdings: 0: holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention 1: holding that federal courts may not consider other issues before resolving standing an article iii jurisdictional matter 2: holding that article iii courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists 3: holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction 4: holding that the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to adjudicate common law claims violated article iii without deciding the claims


Input: to use the private roads in St. Lucie West were designed to control access to the dedicated utility easements. Accordingly, White’s allowing FP & L and Southern Bell access to St. Lucie West's private roads while prohibiting Centel access to those roads is a private agreement in violation of the Cable Act. B. Constitutionality of the Cable Act White also argues that the Cable Act, as interpreted by the Admiral’s Cove Court, violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. White argues that under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982), Congress’s providing cable companies with a right of action to install cables in White’s “private” easements is a per se violation of the Takings Clause. See id. at 426, 102 S.Ct. at 3171 (<HOLDING>). Admiral’s Cove, however, rejected this Holdings: 0: holding takings clause protections did not apply to an innocent owners interest in a car seized under a state forfeiture statute 1: holding the takings clause inapplicable to the states of its own force 2: holding state statute forcing landlords to allow installation of cable television cables for nominal charge violates the takings clause 3: holding that temporary deprivations of use are compensable under the takings clause 4: holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause


Input: to counsel. Of course, it could be said that Clark can hardly complain about the district court’s grant of his own motion. But, because the court’s discretion to deny a request for self-representation requires the court to consider the defendant’s interest, I would conclude that a defendant who makes such a motion, against the advice of or without the support of his appointed counsel ke a searching inquiry of Clark’s reasons for wanting to dismiss his present counsel. , On their face, Clark’s claims that counsel had not visited him in jail, had not discussed the case with him, would not seek out suggested witnesses, and would not have the gun checked for fingerprints, raised serious questions that required inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Morrissey, 461 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir. 1972) (<HOLDING>). The majority suggests that Clark’s claims do Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel on the strength of gonzalezs sworn responses at the pleataking that no one was threatening him or forcing him to plead where the defendant alleged that his attorney forced him to plead guilty  and threatened him if he did not take the plea 1: holding even when a request for an attorney is ambiguous it is incumbent upon law enforcement to seek clarification of the ambiguity before denying the statutory right to counsel 2: holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance 3: holding that an ambiguous mention of an attorney is not a request for counsel 4: holding that a defendants claim that his attorney did not meet with him or seek out witnesses required a searching inquiry before denying the request for new counsel


Input: alleges COLT’s liability arises solely from “designating routes and loading and unloading zones” for the bus. The McKinney car would have inflicted the same unfortunate injuries upon minor [appellant] had it pushed her into any static object — a lamppost, a brick wall or a fire hydrant. The car happened to thrust minor [appellant] into a large metal object mounted on tires, called a bus. [Appellant] has not alleged a.Super. 362, 621 A.2d 158 (1993), allocatur denied, 536 Pa. 624, 637 A.2d 285 (1993) (minor was “occupant” of friend’s truck while minor was unloading hunting rifle in front of truck in preparation to enter truck and was struck by oncoming vehicle); McGilley v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 369 Pa.Super. 547, 535 A.2d 1070 (1987), allocatur denied, 520 Pa. 601, 553 A.2d 964 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In reversing, we find it unnecessary to Holdings: 0: holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his fourth amendment rights by requiring him to get back in his car before questioning him 1: holding motorist struck by drunk driver had the crime of dui  committed against him regardless of defendants intent 2: holding that a passenger in a stopped vehicle was seized when she was escorted from the car to the front of two police cars that had their overhead lights turned on separated from the driver by two officers and separated from her purse which remained in the car 3: holding location of car off highway position of driver slumped over steering wheel and keys in ignition provided reasonable grounds to require breathalyzer test 4: holding taxi cab driver was not occupying his cab when cab driver had parked at cab stand behind several cabs in front of warwick hotel turned off ignition as well as cabs dome light took keys exited cab and walked to cab in front of him to bum a cigarette when he was struck by septa bus


Input: (“[T]he officer’s suspicions need not be inconsistent with a hypothesis of innocence. Rather, they need to be based only on rational inferences, from articulable facts, which reasonably suggest criminal activity.”). Florida courts have emphasized that no single factor is dispositive to establish that an officer’s suspicion leading to a Terry-stop is reasonable. Instead, the circumstances, as they are known to the officer at the time of the investigative stop, are viewed in their totality. Hernandez, 784 So.2d at 1128. Additionally, the officer’s training and experience is taken into consideration to determine whether anything incongruous or unusual reasonably triggered the officer’s suspicion to conduct a stop. Id. at 1126; see also May v. State, 77 So.3d 831, 835 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (<HOLDING>); Jenkins v. State, 524 So.2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that officers may consistent with the fourth amendment conduct a brief investigatory stop when they have a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot 1: recognizing that officers are entitled to rely on training and experience in forming belief that drug transaction has occurred 2: holding that notwithstanding the officers testimony that he had no suspicion of criminality the officer was aware of facts that would give rise to reasonable suspicion in the mind of a reasonable officer 3: holding that while some conduct consistent with drug activity may not arouse suspicion in an average citizen an officers training and experience of how drug crimes are committed may provide the officer with a different perspective and should factor into the rubric when determining the reasonableness of the officers suspicion 4: holding the location of an investigative stop is a factor that contributes to an officers reasonable suspicion


Input: forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute who does not receive such notice may file a motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture with respect to that person’s interest in the property.,. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (emphasis added). This “exclusive remedy” is only extended to property owners who are “entitled to written notice,” but “do[] not receive such notice.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1), (5). Matthews and Owens, to the contrary, actually received notice within weeks of the adoption. The DEA sent three letters to Matthews and four letters to Owens via registered mail (signed and certified return receipts are in the record), and the DEA posted notice of the forfeiture online for 30 days. See, e.g., In re $20,000 in U.S. Currency, 523 Fed.Appx. 322, 323 (6th Cir.2013) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. King, 442 Fed.Appx. 212, 213 Holdings: 0: holding that because the property owner argued only a theory of taking that was no longer a valid theory property owner did not demonstrate his entitlement to relief 1: holding that because the state failed to properly file the complaint the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial 2: holding that property owner was not entitled to relief under cafra because he was given sufficient notice of the administrative forfeiture proceeding through certified mail 3: holding that property owner was not entitled to relief under cafra because he received notice and failed to properly file a claim 4: holding that the biological father was not entitled to notice of adoption proceeding where he failed to properly legitimate his child


Input: wearing apparel comports with the statute’s goal of allowing the debtor to “sustain a minimum standard of living” and of providing an “opportunity for the rehabilitation of the debtor” while also “preventing] a creditor from levying on property which has little or no resale value.” There is no evidence that the watch was purchased for “investment purposes,” and it appears to be “actually worn” by the debtor on a daily basis. Finally, any potential for mischief — by attempting to claim a “luxury” watch as exempt — is limited by the $1,000 ceiling set by statute. See In re Miller, 101 B.R. 713, 717 (Bankr.E.D.Okl.1989) (stating that any danger of abuse was curtailed by the legislature limiting the value of items that may be exempted as “wearing apparel” to $4,000); Leva, 96 B.R. at 731 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court will allow the Holdings: 0: recognizing the same rule in texas courts 1: holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas 2: recognizing this texas rule 3: recognizing the ceiling present in the analogous texas statute 4: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied


Input: intimidate[ ], or interfere[ ] ... with any person,” (3) “because that person [the victim] is ... obtaining or providing reproductive health services.” Act, § 3(a). The government’s first defense is that the Act does not implicate the First Amendment at all; rather, it regulates conduct that is outside the First Amendment. According to the government, the Act leaves plaintiffs free to engage in any form of protected speech they choose. In many respects the government is correct. The Access Act does not prohibit protestors from prayin S.Ct. 2538, 2546-47, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Finally, certain physical obstructions, such as a blockade of pedestrian traffic, are not protected by the First Amendment. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1339, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Act does target unprotected Holdings: 0: holding that under  521 the coercive force applied against a plaintiff must result in an interference with a separate constitutional or statutory right and it is not sufficient that the right interfered with is the right to be free of the force or threat of force that was applied 1: holding that the plaintiffs right to political speech is fully in accord with the publics interest in free speech and association 2: holding that shortterm and sporadic interference with free exercise rights does not violate the first amendment 3: holding that to the extent compliance with the flsa interferes with the state budgetary process that interference is caused by state law not federal law 4: holding that a statute which prohibited unreasonable interference with access to a courthouse was a valid law  and the fact that free speech is intermingled with such conduct does not bring with it constitutional protection


Input: thereto.”); Jordan v. SEI Corp., No. Civ.A.96-1616, 1996 WL 296540, at *6 (E.D.Pa. June 4, 1996) (“Forum selection clauses bind nonsignatories that are closely related to the contractual relationship or that should have foreseen governance by the clause.”). “Third parties that ‘should have foreseen governance by the clause’ may also be bound by it.” University Painters, 2012 WL 1150131, at *3 (quoting Donachy v. Intrawest U.S. Holdings, Inc., No. Civ.A. 10-4038, 2011 WL 2973543, at *2 (D.N.J. July 21, 2011)). Courts have deemed a third party’s conduct to be “closely related” to a contractual relationship or dispute — and thus bound the third parties to forum selection clauses — in a wide variety of situations. See, e.g., Hugel v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 999 F.2d 206, 209-10 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); LaRoss Partners, LLC v. Contact 911, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that a forum selection clause was not enforceable against defendants that were not parties to the contract 1: holding that a forum selection clause should not be enforced where a consumer is told by a corporate agent to ignore boilerplate contract language containing a forum selection clause where there is a material difference in bargaining power and where the forum designated by the contract has little to do with the transaction and is gravely inconvenient for the parties and witnesses 2: holding that a permissive forum selection clause containing a waiver of any claims of forum non conveniens amounts to a mandatory forum selection clause at least where the plaintiff chose the designated forum 3: holding that corporations owned and controlled by the party signing the contract containing the forum selection clause may be bound by the clause 4: holding that when action arising under contract containing venue selection clause is filed in court other than that specified in clause case will be transferred to forum selected by contract unless venue selection clause is unreasonable and unjust or invalid due to fraud or overreaching


Input: mechanisms of the subpoena. Accordingly, we determine that appellants have not waived the opportunity to make an in camera proffer of allegedly privileged information to the bankruptcy court on remand. See Order Denying Motion to Quash (contemplating in camera examination). 4. Subpoenas Not Facially Invalid We next consider whether the challenged subpoenas are facially invalid because they reach too broadly, require disclosure of privileged information, or otherwise compel appellants to breach ethical obligations. As noted above, a determination of the existence of privileged material requires the development of a clear and concise record of questions posed and testimony and documents sought for the court’s review. See United States v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Because no such record exists, a Holdings: 0: recognizing privilege 1: holding that court must review  assertions of the privilege on a questionbyquestion basis 2: holding that production of documents without a claim of privilege waives the right to later claim that privilege 3: holding that to establish an attorneyclient privilege a corporate officer must make it clear that he is consulting the inhouse counsel on a personal basis and the counsel must accept the representation 4: holding that for purposes of certiorari review court of appeals must identify the basis for refusing to treat an issue


Input: Jessica Carolina Lopez-Castro, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review questions of law de novo, see, e.g., Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.2008), except to the extent that 9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>)). We also reject Lopez-Castro’s contention Holdings: 0: holding that former gang members do not comprise a particular social group 1: holding that persecution of a woman because of her government job or her husbands position as a police officer was not on account of a particular social group 2: holding that government material witnesses do not constitute a particular social group 3: holding that poor yemeni muslims are not a particular social group because group posseses broadlybased characteristics 4: holding that government informants are not members of a particular social group


Input: seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 2 . Lopez-Herrera raises no challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, and accordingly, he has waived any claim in this respect. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n. 8 (11th Cir.2003) Holdings: 0: holding that issues not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned 1: holding that issues raised but not supported by argument are deemed abandoned 2: holding that issues not argued in initial brief are deemed waived 3: holding that issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned 4: holding that issues not raised in an initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned


Input: but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11” and to "submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,” subject to de novo review. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c); In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 95. 41 . In re Querner, 7 F.3d at 1201. 42 . In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 93. 43 . 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 44 . Id. § 541(a)(6). 45 . Id. § 541(a)(7). 46 . In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. 628, 633 (8th Cir. BAP 2013). 47 . In re Swift, 129 F.3d 792, 795 & n. 12 (5th Cir.1997); In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. at 633. 48 . See In re IFS Fin. Corp., 669 F.3d 255, 262 (5th Cir.2012) (noting that, under Texas law, "control over funds in an account is the predominant factor in determining an account’s ownership”); see also In re Kemp, 52 F.3d 546, 551-53 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); In re Missionary Baptist Found. of Am., Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property 1: holding that a debtors interest in a tenancy by the entirety is property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 because of debtors undivided present interests in the use possession income and right of survivorship of the property 2: holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate 3: holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property 4: recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate


Input: an application of state sovereign immunity would in any event eviscerate § 1983 . as it applies to municipal and county officers. Second, the fact that plaintiffs did not join Cignature Hospitality as a defendant in this suit is irrelevant. Plaintiffs already engaged in several other lawsuits which, as noted above, already have settled. Cignature is not an indispensable party to this action. 17 . After the deadline for the filing of summary judgment motions passed, plaintiffs' counsel expr olding that official capacity claims “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”). The county is not entitled to assert qualified immunity. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-53, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (<HOLDING>). 19 .Government officials are accorded Holdings: 0: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 1: holding that officials in their individual capacities may  be able to assert personal immunity defenses including qualified immunity that are not available in officialcapacity suits 2: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 3: holding officials in their individual capacities may  be able to assert personal immunity defenses including qualified immunity that are not available in officialcapacity suits 4: holding that government entities may not assert qualified immunity


Input: 7 37 Ga. App. 299 (139 SE 828) (1927). 8 See id. at 300. 9 Id. 10 See id. 11 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Robinson, 268 Ga. at 744 (2) (a). 12 See Yasinac v. Colonial Oil Properties, 246 Ga. App. 484, 486 (2) (541 SE2d 109) (2000) (“the distraction doctrine does not apply where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the hazard before the alleged distraction occurred”); Means v. Marshalls of Ma., 243 Ga. App. 419, 420, 421 (2) (532 SE2d 740) (2000) (physical precedent only) (the plaintiff’s actual knowledge of the debris on the floor barred her recovery for her fall even though she claimed to have been distracted by attempting to prevent a dressing room door from hitting a child); McCoy v. West Bldg. Materials of Ga., 232 Ga. App. 620, 622 (502 SE2d559) (1998) (<HOLDING>). 13 For example, the type of distractions Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs claim of being startled by a child on a slide did not prevent summary judgment in her case because  t he simple fact wa s that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the hazard which caused her fall prior to encountering it 1: holding that to defeat summary judgment plaintiff was obliged to offer evidence indicating that persons who actually participated in her termination decision had  knowledge of her protected characteristics 2: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment 3: holding that opinion that fuel oil on her shoes caused her to fall is one which a normal person would form on the basis of observed facts 4: holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs admissions in her deposition undermined her claims


Input: the amount recovered begins only after entry of judgment.” Accordingly, the trial court App. 1981) (same); Joyce D. Palomar, 1 Title Ins. Law § 10:16 (2013-14 ed.); Christopher B. Frantze, Equity Income Partners LP v. Chicago Title Insurance Co. and Recovery Under a Lender’s Title Insurance Policy in a Falling Real Estate Market, 48 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L. J. 391, 396 (2013). 8 First Am. Bank, 759 F3d at 432 (III); see also Marble Bank, 914 FSupp. at 1254 (“In the court’s view, plaintiff did not suffer a loss until it foreclosed on the project. Since a lender suffers loss only if the note is not repaid, the discovery of an insured-against lien does not trigger recognition cker Constr., Inc., 285 Ga. App. 844,848-50 (2) (648 SE2d 170) (2007) (same). Cf. Hutsell, 164 Ga. App. at 446 (1) (<HOLDING>). 36 Hall v. Prosero, Inc., 333 Ga. App. 454, Holdings: 0: holding that party did not waive right to trial by jury by requesting directed verdict 1: holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict 2: holding that whether title policy covered damages of diminished value caused by survey defect was jury issue and thus trial court did not err in denying insurers motion for directed verdict 3: holding that some evidence was presented to support the jurys verdict that defendant breached contract and therefore trial court did not err in denying defendants motion for directed verdict or jnov 4: holding that trial court did not err


Input: medical and non-medical evidence. Such evidence includes: the use and effects of medications, the claimant’s ability to perform daily activities, the consistency of the claimant's allegations, and the extent to which the impairment can reasonably be expected to cause the pain the claimant alleges she suffers. SSR 96-7p. Where the ALJ makes a determination regarding a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ must adequately explain the reasons for the finding about the credibility of the individual's statements in the disability determination or decision. SSR 96-7p. If the ALJ points to substantial evidence in support of his decision and adequately explains the reasons for his finding on the claimant's credibility, the court must uphold the ALJ's determination. Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d at 176 Holdings: 0: holding that credibility determinations are for the jury 1: holding that court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency 2: holding that a court is not empowered to substitute its judgement for that of the agency 3: holding that a court may not reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo or substitute its judgment for that of the secretary 4: holding that the court is not to undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence make credibility determinations or substitute its judgment for that of the agency


Input: the relevant factors. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir.2007). As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, “[t]he fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. With respect to the procedural reasonableness of his sentences, Portney contends that the Guidelines relating to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 should be given little weight because they were developed based on Congressional mandate, not empirical data. We have already rejected a similar argument challenging § 2G2.2. See Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1201 n. 15. Thus, Portney’s argument is foreclosed by our precedent. See United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the substantive reasonable of Holdings: 0: holding that precedent set by our panels binds all subsequent panels 1: holding that decisions by prior panels are binding 2: holding that the panel is bound by decisions of prior panels 3: recognizing that a prior panels holding is binding on all subsequent panels 4: holding that where a statement is merely a prelude to another legal issue that commands the panels full attention it is not binding on later panels