Input: as to whether this error resulted in egregious harm under Almanza. See Trejo, 280 S.W.Bd at 261. The author of the concurring opinion in Teal expressly distinguished the situation in the case at hand from the situation in Teal. See Teal, 230 S.W.3d at 183-84. Therefore, the concurring opinion in Teal does not support the State’s argument that the charge error in this case did not result in egregious harm. We do not find any other information revealed by the record relevant to the egregious-harm analysis. Conclusion Having considered the factors set forth in Almanza, we hold appellant was egregiously harmed by the trial court’s submission of a charge authorizing the jury to convict appellant for an unindicted offense. See Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 222-23 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (<HOLDING>); Woodard, 300 S.W.3d at 410-12 (same as Holdings: 0: holding that error in omitting requisite mental state from application paragraph of charge did not result in egregious harm 1: holding that charge error that allowed jury to convict appellant for an unindicted offense caused egregious harm 2: holding jury charge error consisting of disjunctive submission of three separate sexual assault offenses without unanimity instruction caused egregious harm to defendant 3: holding egregious harm standard applied where appellant failed to object to lack of instruction on accomplice witness testimony 4: holding charge error which authorized jury to convict without finding every requisite element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt was egregious based on the entirety of the charge the contested evidence and the arguments of counsel


Input: its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one. Although a State’s general waiver of sovereign immunity may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment .... In the absence of an unequivocal waiver specifically applicable to federal-court jurisdiction, we decline to find that [a state] has waived its constitutional immunity.”); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halder-man, 465 U.S. 89, 99, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (Powell, J.) (“[A] State’s constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued.”) (emphasis in original); Serrano v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 12-CV-1592 (MAD) (CFH), 2013 WL 6816787 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. State Univ. of New York, No. Holdings: 0: holding that utah did not waive its eleventh amendment immunity with respect to a suit brought in federal court because state statute provided for exclusive original jurisdiction in its own courts 1: holding that new mexico did not waive eleventh amendment immunity by engaging in activities and entering contracts subject to federal regulation 2: holding that the nyshrl does not waive the new yorks eleventh amendment immunity to suit in federal court 3: holding that state did not waive eleventh amendment immunity by removing case to federal court 4: holding that state defendant waived eleventh amendment immunity to a federal claim by removing to federal court


Input: ERISA plan. Id. at 1292-93. As the Fifth Circuit later explained, Cefalu “rejected the contention that preemption was avoided because the former employee was not seeking recovery from the plan itself or its assets, but only from his former employer.” Lee v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 894 F.2d 755, 757 (5th Cir.1990); see also Memorial Hosp. System v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 245 (5th Cir.1990) (“We have [ ] held in this circuit that ERISA preempts state law claims, based on breach of contract, fraud, or negligent misrepresentation, that have the effect of orally modifying the express terms of an ERISA plan and increasing plan benefits for participants or beneficiaries who claim to have been misled.”); Olson v. Gen. Dynamics Carp., 960 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., Holdings: 0: holding that fraudulent oral misrepresentation of the level of benefits does not provide the basis for a nonpreempted claim even though erisa may also provide no remedy 1: holding the flsa does not provide the exclusive remedy for violations of its mandates 2: holding that 42 usc  1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations 3: holding that title vii did not provide exclusive remedy for sex discrimination in public employment claim could also be brought under equal protection clause 4: holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law


Input: cannot serve as an excuse for a violation of Fed. R. Civ. 45(b)(1). For these reasons, we find that the district court had a reasonable basis to conclude that Butler violated MRPC 8.4(g). C Allegation of Bias Butler also argues that the “court was not even handed” with him by “ignoring the conduct of Kansas counsel” in finding him in violation of Canon 9 and MRPC 8.4(g). For the reasons detailed above, we find that there is a reasonable basis to support the district court’s finding that Butler committed ethical violations. As such, we find no indication of bias by the judge in the record. IV Conclusion We find no basis for Butler’s argument that the district court clearly erred in assessing the evidence, or otherwise abused its discretion. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447 (<HOLDING>). On the contrary, our review discloses a Holdings: 0: holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard 1: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits 2: holding that a court would abuse its discretion by relying on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence 3: holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence 4: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion


Input: refusal was not triggered.” Id. at 408. The same is true of the transfer of the Share from the Partnership to the LLC. There was no meaningful change in control of the property. There was no desire to sell, no bona fide offer or purchase, nor were there any terms of sale of any kind. Simply put, the transfer did not invoke the right of first refusal provision. This conclusion is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Creque v. Texaco Antilles Ltd., 409 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir.2005) (“A right of first refusal to purchase real property is not triggered by the mere conveyance of that property. Only when the conveyance is marked by arms’ length dealing and a change in control of the property may that right be exercised.”); McGuire v. Lowery, 2 P.3d 527, 532 (Wyo.2000) (<HOLDING>); Wallasey Tenants Ass’n v. Varner, 892 A.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing enforceability of right of first refusal when burdened property is part of integrated transaction with sale of unburdened property 1: recognizing step transaction doctrine whereby courts must consider all steps of transaction in light of entire transaction so that substance of transaction will control over form of each step 2: holding that when determining the proper amount for a burdened property that was purchased in a package only two methods suggest themselves as arguably appropriate 1 a determination of the fair market value of the  property burdened by the right of first refusal or 2 a determination of the portion of the  purchase price which based on the percentage of the fair market value of the entire package represented by the  property burdened by the right of first refusal should be allocated to the  property burdened by the right of first refusal 3: holding that transfer of property from an individual to a corporation wholly owned by the same individual was not a sale triggering a right of first refusal 4: holding that for a transaction to constitute a sale and trigger a first right of refusal it must involve an armslength transaction resulting in an actual change in control of the burdened property rather than simply moving it from the individual owners to an entity controlled by them


Input: point. Neither Dickinson nor Cooper established that a claimant may recover damages for a taking of property that occurred prior to his ownership. In fact, in Dickinson, the Supreme Court observed that if the taking began long before purchase, plaintiffs “claim would be barred because he acquired the land after that date.” Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 747, 67 S.Ct. at 1384. Ownership of a property interest is an essential element in a takings claim. A property interest is grounded in a legally enforceable right, not an expectancy. See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380 n. 9, 66 S.Ct. 596, 600 n. 9, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (finding no property right in expectation that lease would be renewed); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 476, 491, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017, 102 S.Ct. 1712, Holdings: 0: holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict 1: holding that the mere application for other benefits is not fault 2: holding that mere expectancy is not property 3: holding that mere ownership of property in north carolina is not sufficient to establish the necessary minimum contacts for purposes of general jurisdiction 4: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property


Input: over other attorneys, settled tort cases only pursuant to directives he received from an internal management committee, and never participated in any forum wherein departmental policy was discussed and/or established. The defendants’ reliance on a string of cases holding that municipal attorneys in positions similar to Selkirk’s were not protected by Elrod and Branti, is irrelevant and misplaced. The very essence of the following cases required an examination of the duties of each plaintiff to ascertain whether his position entailed “policymak-ing” responsibility or required political fealty to effectively perform. The Court need not undertake such an analysis here because the Defendants have already done so and concluded to the contrary. See Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Mummau v. Ranck, 687 F.2d 9 (3rd Cir. 1982) Holdings: 0: holding that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages under  1988 in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the states case including deciding which evidence to present 1: holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a  1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony 2: holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for withholding exculpatory evidence from grand jury 3: holding that nasd disciplinary officers are entitled to absolute immunity from further prosecution for civil liability for them actions taken within the outer scope of them official duties 4: holding in dicta that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute loyalty from his assistants and could terminate them for political reasons


Input: that are objectively justifiable, moreover, regardless of an officer’s subjective intent. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). The impoundment/inventory decision in the case at bar was objectively justifiable, and the trial court’s application of the inevitable discovery doctrine was entirely proper. B. Exclusion of Expert Testimony— General vs. Specific Intent. The district court’s decision not to receive the testimony of medical experts who would have suggested that the defendant lacked control over his actions stemmed in part from the court’s view that the crime defined in 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) is a general intent crime as to which diminished capacity is not a defense. See United States v. Gonyea, 140 F.3d 649, 651 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Kimes contends that evidence of his Holdings: 0: holding that diminished capacity is a defense only to specific intent crimes 1: holding that the prosecutor does not have general discovery rights because michigan law requires a defendant to disclose only a defense of insanity or diminished capacity citing mcl  76820a 2: holding intoxication is only a defense to specific intent crimes and not general intent crimes 3: holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity 4: holding that the government may not be permitted to introduce other crimes evidence in its case in chief to prove intent unless the defense disputes intent during opening statements


Input: on a public exchange”). But not every communication from'management to corporate shareholders amounts to solicitation under § 14(a). Sargent v. Genesco, 492 F.2d 750, 767 (5th Cir.1974); see also Brown v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 328 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir.1964); see generally 4 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 1952 (3d ed. 1990) (listing examples of communications not covered by § 14(a) rules). Rather, it is only when management seeks consent or authorization for actions “requiring such approval” that § 14(a) steps in to ensure that approval is given with full knowledge. Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 775 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145, 102 S.Ct. 1006, 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982); see also Ash v. GAF Corp., 723 F.2d 1090, 1094 (3d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); cf. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 Holdings: 0: holding that even though the plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered a meaningful injury he was nevertheless entitled to nominal damages for the defendants violation of his first amendment rights 1: holding that an infringement on the right to vote necessarily causes irreparable harm 2: holding that complainant must show that he suffered harm from the infringement of his corporate suffrage rights to state a claim under  14a 3: holding that the opposing party must show substantial harm 4: holding that for any utpcpl claim plaintiff must show that he 1 justifiably relied on a defendants wrongful conduct or representation and 2 suffered harm as a result of that reliance


Input: has exhibited dangerous behavior towards females, and the underlying murder involved stab wounds to the victim’s nipples and right labia. See McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir.1993). 13 . Johnson applied 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which imposes a one-year statute of limitations on motions by prisoners seeking to modify their federal sentences. Like section 2244, section 2255 states that the one-year period runs from the latest of four alternative dates, the last of which is “the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We see no reason to distinguish between “facts supporting the claim” in section 2255 and "factual predicate” in section 2244. See Burns, 134 F.3d at 111-12 (<HOLDING>). 14 . We are surprised and disappointed that Holdings: 0: holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar 1: holding that the aedpa oneyear statute of limitations applies to amendments to  2255 motions 2: holding that limitations periods are tolled regardless of why the district court denied certification 3: holding that oneyear limitations periods under sections 2244 and 2255 are virtually identical 4: holding that oneyear limitations period set forth in  2255 is not a jurisdictional bar and is thus subject to equitable tolling


Input: Bonner’s entry of a not guilty plea and his attack on MeDay’s credibility also enhances the probity of the prior offense evidence by placing his intent and state of mind at issue. See Henthorn, 815 F.2d at 308 (finding probative value of extrinsic offense evidence outweighed possible prejudice where defendant pleaded not guilty and attacked the credibility of witnesses). Although the danger of prejudice associated with prior conviction evidence is often great, the district court in this case substantially reduced the possibility of prejudice to Bonner by carefully instructing the jury on how they could consider the evidence. See id. at 304 (finding that careful jury instructions minimized possibility of prejudice); see also United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1174 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Based upon the foregoing considerations, we Holdings: 0: holding any error in admission of evidence cured when same evidence later admitted without objection 1: holding almost any improper argument may be cured by an instruction to disregard 2: recognizing that a limiting instruction has the potential to cure any prejudice from the erroneous admission of evidence 3: holding improper admission of extrinsic evidence may be cured by adequate limiting instruction 4: holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence is cured by the subsequent admission of the evidence


Input: in an increase in the sentencing range from 15-21 months to 27-33 months, did not present an “exceptional circumstance[ ]” as contemplated by McMillan. Watts, 519 U.S. at 156-57, 117 S.Ct. 633. Nor does the case before us today. See e.g., United States v. Fenner, 147 F.3d 360, 366 (4th Cir.1998) (rejecting argument that increases from 42 years imprisonment to 55 years imprisonment for one defendant and from 115 months imprisonment to 210 months imprisonment were “so profound that it is sufficient to implicate due process concerns or to give the impression of having been tailored to permit the application of [a] cross-reference to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 425-26 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, Holdings: 0: holding that detention of approximately eight months violated due process 1: holding that where a defendants guideline range is 121 to 151 months and his statutory minimum sentence is 240 months and the government moves for a downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the starting point for the departure is 240 months and the court is not limited to the low end of the guideline range in determining the extent of the departure 2: holding that a potential increase in a guideline range from 2127 months to 6378 months did not raise due process concerns 3: holding one and onehalf months establishes causation while three months is too long and does not 4: holding that dismissal was required where overall length of prosecution was 16 months state was responsible for 13 months of delay and six months of that delay was due to simple neglect


Input: of violence to the person (great weight), see § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003); (2) Reynolds committed the murder while engaged in or an accomplice in the commission of or an attempt to commit any burglary (great weight), see § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003); (3) Reynolds committed the murder for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest (great weight), see § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003); and (4) Reynolds committed the murder in this case in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel fashion (great weight), see § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2003). With respect to Christina Razor’s murder, the trial court also considered the additional aggravating circumstance that the victim was a person less than twelve years of age (great weight), see 921.141(5)(Z), Fla. Stat. 1) (<HOLDING>); Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 647 Holdings: 0: holding death sentence proportional in a case where the aggravators were murder committed during the course of enumerated felony prior violent felony and hac and the following nonstatutory mitigating factors were found remorse unstable childhood positive personality traits and acceptable conduct at trial 1: holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense 2: holding the death sentence proportional for the firstdegree murder conviction where the aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and hac 3: holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill 4: holding the death sentence proportional for the firstdegree murder conviction where only the hac aggravator was found


Input: But under either plain or clear error review, Phillips's arguments fail. 3 . Probable cause existed even without mention of computer paper because Williams and Smith observed child pornography images in the residence. Phillips argues that the statement about the images being on standard computer paper impermissibly expanded the warrant to include computer equipment. But the warrant would have included computer-related equipment for seizure because pornographic images typically are received via computers connected to the internet. See United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1290 (11th Cir.2006), reversed and remanded on other grounds by United States v. Williams, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008), superseded by United States v. Williams, 534 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir.2008) Holdings: 0: recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography 1: holding that trading of child pornography is distribution for purposes of  2g22b2 2: holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment 3: holding admission of videos containing child pornography was probative of intent to sexually assault a child 4: recognizing common use of computers and internet in child pornography offenses


Input: this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). As used in the PLRA, the modifier “available” requires “the possibility of some re lief for the action complained of’. Booth, 532 s grievance process, a prisoner must pursue a grievance through both steps for it to be exhausted. Johnson, 385 F.3d at 515 (citing Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir.2001)). This court has also provided that “[njothing in the [PLRA] ... prescribes appropriate grievance procedures or enables judges, by creative interpretation of the exhaustion doctrine, to prescribe or oversee prison grievance systems”. Wright, 260 F.3d at 358 (<HOLDING>). With these principles in mind, we turn to Holdings: 0: holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient 1: holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice 2: holding that the plra mandates that prisoners exhaust internal prison grievance procedures before filing suit emphasis added 3: holding that although the only remedy sought was money damages substantial compliance by filing a stepone grievance constituted failure to exhaust 4: holding that plaintiffs failure to exhaust available grievance procedures does not bar her title vii claims


Input: proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness. See Fed. R.Evid. 609(a)(2). Here, the prosecutor used Lester Jones’s prior conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana for impeachment. Lester Jones’s narcotic offense does not fall under Rule 609(a)(2)’s ambit because it did not involve an act of dishonesty or false statement. See United States v. Galati, 230 F.3d 254, 261 n. 5 (7th Cir.2000) (“A person’s past drug possession does not necessarily implicate dishonesty....”); United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1977) (finding that the history of Rule 609(a) indicated that Congress sought to exempt from its purview crimes such as misdemeanor narcotics convictions); see also United States v. McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the prosecutor’s questioning of Holdings: 0: holding prior use of one type of drug is not relevant to establish use of another type of drug on a different occasion 1: holding that evidence of prior drug sales was sufficiently similar to the crimes charged  to be probative of the fact that the defendant was not merely an innocent driver who was involved in the drug transaction by accident 2: holding the use of a drug that carries a higher sentence rather than another drug does not amount to sentencing factor manipulation 3: holding that drug use is not probative of character for truthfulness 4: holding a fiveyear old drug conviction is probative of a defendants state of mind in a drug conspiracy case


Input: detected. We thus hold that the probation officer’s decision to order Duff to undergo drug screening was not inconsistent with the trial court’s failure to require such testing. We now consider Duff’s claim that the drug testing was unreasonable and thus violated his fourth amendment rights. We assume but do not decide that the taking and testing of a urine sample constitutes a search under the fourth amendment. See Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Williams, 787 F.2d 1182, 1185 n. 5 (7th Cir.1986); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F.Supp. 1089, 1098 (D.N.J.1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 577, 93 L.Ed.2d 580 (1986); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (<HOLDING>). Although the fourth amendment’s requirement Holdings: 0: holding that blood alcohol content almost 30 over the limit together with testimony of intoxication at the time of driving was sufficient to convict contrasting a case in which the blood alcohol content was just barely over the limit which was insufficient to convict 1: holding a warrantless blood test reasonable due to bloods rapid loss of its alcohol content 2: holding that the fourth amendment is implicated by the withdrawal of blood to test its alcohol content 3: holding blood testing for alcohol content a search 4: holding that a defendants right to an independent blood alcohol test means the right to a test that is not subject to government manipulation


Input: Tree. 10 . Under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation may include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). 11 . While there appears to be some issue as to whether Susie's frequent absences prevent her from meeting the statutory requirement that she is a "qualified individual with a disability," 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), the parties have failed to adequately develop this issue in the summary judgment record before the court. The court does note, however, that federal courts have frequently held that "[a]n employee who cannot meet the attendance requirements of the job at issue cannot be considered a qualified individual protected by the ADEA.” Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d at 213. See also Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Law v. United States Postal Serv., 852 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim 1: holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact 2: holding that coming to work regularly is an essential function 3: holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function 4: holding it is not reasonable to require an employer to hire a helper to do overhead work for a miner who cannot perform this essential job function alone


Input: to join in litigation against the shopping mall and their secret financing and control of that litigation were not “modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . .,” Button, supra, 371 U.S. at 428-29, 83 S.Ct. at 335, for two reasons. First, Primus and Button are concerned only with the solicitation and financing of good faith claims. Here, the Plaza defendants are alleged to have solicited numerous baseless suits by the landowners. Second, the First Amendment does not shield such improper practices in the solicitation and representation of clients as occurred here. See Primus, supra, 436 U.S. at 426 and 439, 98 S.Ct. at 1901 and 1908; cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 449, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1915, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978) (<HOLDING>). In this regard, we note that it is relevant Holdings: 0: holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor 1: holding that under article i section 9 a person has no constitutionally protected privacy interest in abandoned property 2: holding a state constitutionally may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person    under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the state has a right to prevent 3: holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment 4: holding that the state police is a state agency


Input: granted. See RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384-385, 650 A.2d 153, 155 (1994) (“If a court determines, as a matter of law, that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant.”). B. Count Thirteen: Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) Clear Channel and Koplik move for summary judgment on the plaintiffs CUTPA claim on the ground that Goldsich does not fall within the class of persons that CUTPA is intended to protect. In order to prevail on a CUTPA claim, the plaintiff must establish that the conduct of the defendants resulted in a substantial injury to consumers, competitors, or other business persons. See Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 496, 656 A.2d 100 7, at *5 (D.Conn.1995) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the motion for summary judgment on the Holdings: 0: holding a limitation on damages arising out of bodily injury to one person involved in an accident applies to all claims arising from the death of that person 1: holding that a person involved in a motor vehicle accident with a customer of enterprise was not a consumer or competitor of enterprise or other business person affected by enterprises conduct 2: holding that the person charged with violating  1962c must be distinct from the rico enterprise 3: holding that predicate acts need not be in furtherance of the enterprise 4: holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle


Input: be an incorrect or negligent medical judgment, but that alone does not give rise to deliberate indifference. See White, 897 F.2d at 108-09 (“Mere medical malpractice cannot give rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”); Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (“It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute deliberate indifference.”). Nurse DeLorenzo did not refuse to provide required medical treatment without reason or prevent Mr. Thomas from receiving recommended medical treatment; instead she concluded — consistent with Prison medical policy — that no medical treatment was necessary or even available. This is not deliberate indifference. See Goodrich v. Clinton Cty. Prison, 214 Fed.Appx. 105, 112 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Chimenti v. Kimber, 133 Fed.Appx. 833, 836 Holdings: 0: holding that a difference of medical opinion was insufficient as a matter of law to establish deliberate indifference 1: holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment 2: holding that a medical professional clearly indicated an exercise of medical judgment rather than deliberate indifference where the medical professional engaged in a goodfaith clinical assessment of plaintiffs symptoms concluding on several visits that his condition did not warrant medication 3: holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs 4: holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation


Input: is that any person — may it be a parent, school system employee, or concerned citizen while on school premises or a school bus — who dares to speak critically to school officials at any time in the presence of minors must leave the premises when so ordered by a school official or face arrest and prosecution for a misdemeanor. Though the statute ostensibly only criminalizes the speech after the speaker refuses to leave school premises, the result is the same: the speaker is silenced, either through his or her absence on the school premises or school bus or through subsequent prosecution, based on the content of his or her speech, be it at a high school football game or a parent-teacher conference. Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781 (109 SCt 2746, 105 LE2d 661) (1989) (<HOLDING>). Decided October 31, 2016. Jason R. Clark; Holdings: 0: holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information 1: recognizing that time place and manner restrictions must be content neutral 2: holding that a quick look analysis was inappropriate for restrictions imposed by professional association of dentists on member advertising where the likelihood of noncompetitive effects of restrictions were not obvious and restrictions could plausibly be thought to have procompetitive effect on competition 3: holding restrictions embodied in content neutral statute must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest while leaving open sufficient alternative channels of communication 4: recognizing prudential concerns underlying antitrust standing restrictions


Input: right to private communication, i. e., communication free from telephone taps or interceptions. But the subject matter of the conversation at issue here is far removed from that in situations where the media publicizes truly private matters. See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 841-842 (CD Cal. 1998) (broadcast of videotape recording of sexual relations between famous actress and rock star not a matter of legitimate public concern); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts §117, p. 857 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that there is little expectation of privacy in mundane facts about a person’s life, but that ‘‘portrayal of... intimate private characteristics or conduct” is "quite a different matter”); Warren & Brandéis 214 (<HOLDING>). Cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U. S. 448, Holdings: 0: recognizing that in certain matters the community has no legitimate concern 1: recognizing that the court has the power to grant leave upon certain conditions 2: recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern 3: holding that issues of prison security public safety and official corruption are matters of public concern 4: holding that statements made only to supervisor and chief by police officer were matters of public concern


Input: that would arise if we were to affirm a removal order on a ground introduced only on appeal and not raised or litigated below, see Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332 F.3d 1245, 1252 (9th Cir.2003), the government’s argument fundamentally misunderstands the nature of our review. Whatever the grounds on which Al Mutarreb might have been found removable, only one was charged. We have no power to affirm the BIA on a ground never charged by the Service or found by the IJ. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (noting that a “court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate and proper basis” not relied on by the agency); see also Cardoso-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Nor do we accept the government’s contention Holdings: 0: holding that when an ij issues a decision granting an aliens application for withholding of removal without a grant of asylum the decision must include an explicit order of removal designating a country of removal 1: holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft 2: holding that term order of removal does not include aliens ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning attorneys actions taken after order of removal becomes final 3: holding that the defendants prior drug conviction for simple possession did not constitute a controlled substance offense because the plain language of  4b12b requires that the prior conviction involve possession with intent to distribute 4: holding that an aliens prior possession conviction cannot sustain the removal order because it was not alleged in the nta


Input: the “use” of any trademark belonging to plaintiffs, as that term is used in the Lanham Act, because WhenU does not use any of the plaintiffs’ trademarks to indicate anything about the source of the products and services it advertises. Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 877-78 (6th Cir.2002) (when a domain name is used to indicate an address on the Internet, and not to identify the source of goods and services, it is not functioning as a trademark); U-Haul, 279 F.Supp.2d at 727-28. The cases cited by plaintiffs (Plaintiffs’ Reply Mem. pp. 1-2) do not support their argument that the inclusion of URLs in the WhenU directory constitutes the use of a trademark under the Lanham Act. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir.200 2 F.Supp.2d 1029 (N.D.Ill.2001)(<HOLDING>); Bihari v. Gross, 119 F.Supp.2d 309, 322-23 Holdings: 0: holding that use of plaintiffs trade name as metatag in defendants website was a permissible fair use as metatag simply described defendants and the content of their website 1: holding that there is nothing improper about the use of a trademark to communicate that goods bearing that mark were actually sold on defendants website 2: holding that use of metatags constitutes use in commerce but finding no trademark violation because defendants only used mark in metatag to fairly identify the content of his websites and did so in good faith that is without the intention of capitalizing on the plaintiffs reputation and goodwill 3: holding that an unspecified number of complaints posted on the defendants website was insufficient to show that the defendant had knowledge of an alleged defect 4: holding that there is nothing improper with defendants purchase of sponsored links when defendants actually sell plaintiffs products  on their website


Input: privilege must be applied cautiously because it could become the exception that swallows up the rule favoring governmental openness and accountability. If governmental employees at any level could claim the privilege, Tennessee’s public records statutes and open meetings law would become little more than empty shells. Whether the “deliberative process privilege” may be invoked depends on the governmental official or officials involved. We have no doubt, for example, that the Governor may properly invoke this privilege, should he or she care to, in meetings with staff or cabinet members. We have also held that the Constitution of Tennessee embodies a version of the privilege for the General Assembly when it decides to invoke it. Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 772 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>). However, we decline to hold that the Holdings: 0: recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings 1: holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful and that the only public meetings held before remedial action were not meaningful because they did not discuss selection of remedy 2: holding that the public does not have a right of access to all legislative meetings because of tenn const art ii  21 and 22 3: holding that the total denial of all access to the law library for seven months violated the plaintiffs constitutional right of access to the courts 4: recognizing that intent of public records act is to provide all citizens with access to the records of all public governmental bodies


Input: that the California judgment was void because its court had no jurisdiction and that the Superior Court of New Jersey “has sole jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by modification” of the previous decree. The New Jersey court, after hearing argument on the return day, entered a final judgment for the plaintiff. It found the Superior Court of California had properly assumed jurisdiction to make a child custody determination and that the Superior Court of New Jersey did not have jurisdiction. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division. Finding that the California court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Division reversed. 187 N.J.Super. 133 (1982). We granted plaintiff’s petition for certification. 93 N.J. 15 (1982). The L.Ed. 1221 (1953) (<HOLDING>); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S.Ct. 963, Holdings: 0: holding evidence insufficient to terminate mothers parental rights under section c because mother made arrangements for adequate support of children evidence showed mother left children with father who maintained steady employment and adequately supported children mother knew that father would provide adequate support and mother left children pursuant to agreed divorce decree 1: holding that plaintiffs who had been served and received responses to interrogatories on personal jurisdiction had had such a fair opportunity 2: recognizing that the ohio longarm statute does not extend to the limits of due process and focusing the inquiry on whether defendant established sufficient business contacts with ohio 3: holding that a maryland court could not exercise jurisdiction over an ohio lawyer when a maryland client initiated five of seven contacts with the lawyer the parties created the attorneyclient relationship in ohio and the attorneyclient relationship involved only events in and the law of ohio 4: holding ohio need not give full faith and credit to wisconsin custody judgment because wisconsin did not have personal jurisdiction over mother who was in ohio with children at time process was served wisconsin had been matrimonial domicile and father had remained there


Input: Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 44-45; see also Peckham v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d at 856. We recognize that, when appropriate, litigation costs must be apportioned between business and personal claims, and that business litigation costs are nondeductible to the extent that they constitute capital expenditures. See, e.g., Kurkjian v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 862 (1976) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to personal matters); Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 640, 646-647 (1975) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to acquisition of intangible assets); Merians v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 187 (1973) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to personal matters); see also Boagni v. Commissioner, supra (<HOLDING>). This principle of allocation is inapposite to Holdings: 0: recognizing the not insignificant costs involved in both establishing and operating as an llc 1: holding that the costs of computerized research should be characterized not as taxable costs but as attorneys fees 2: holding defense applicable to both types of claims 3: holding that an ex post facto claim can only be successful if the law can be characterized as punishment in the constitutional sense 4: recognizing that litigation costs can be characterized as both deductible and nondeductible when the litigation is rooted in situations giving rise to both types of expenditures


Input: suffered from past persecution nor had a well-founded fear of future persecution because of his Indian ethnicity. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s and Immigration Judge’s findings of fact that Petitioner was not credible and that he failed to show either past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review and uphold the Board’s decision. A. Adverse Credibility Determination The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner refugee status primarily because she found that he was not credible. After reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that substantial evidence supports this adverse credibility determination. An adverse credibility finding must be based on issues that go to the heart of an applicant’s claim. Yu, 364 F.3d at 703 (<HOLDING>). Such a finding “cannot be based on an Holdings: 0: holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of an adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility 1: holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum 2: holding that where asylum officer testifies regarding accuracy of interviewing procedures inconsistencies between petitioners asylum interview testimony and merits hearing testimony form sufficient basis to uphold adverse credibility determination 3: holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination 4: holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility


Input: California state prisoner Thomas Hen-nagan, Jr. appeals pro se the magistrate judge’s order denying his motion for appointment of counsel in his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the challenged order is not immediately appealable. See Serine v. Peterson, 989 F.2d 371, 372-73 (9th Cir.1993) (order) (concluding magistrate judge’s order was not appealable because the order could not form the basis of a final judgment without subsequent intervention by the district court); Kuster v. Block, 773 F.2d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). All pending motions are denied as moot. Holdings: 0: holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order 1: holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable 2: holding that denial of counsel in section 1983 action is not immediately appealable 3: holding that the denial of a motion to disqualify counsel in a civil case is not appealable 4: holding if immunity is raised as a basis in the motion for summary adjudication a substantial right is affected and the denial is immediately appealable


Input: is successive. First, in ise F88-39846B, Petitioner filed several otions trying to vacate his plea based on Peart argument. See Peart v. State, 756 }.2d 42 (Fla.2000). His motions were mied and Petitioner filed a Writ of Habe- > Corpus on June 27, 2002. In this Writ, etitioner made some of the same argu-ents he is now bringing under this cur-snt Petition, inter alia, that he was denied fective assistance of counsel in the man-ir in which his plea was conveyed. The ourt denied Petitioner’s Habeas on July ., 2002. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim of effective assistance of counsel in the anner in which the plea was conveyed ould be successive. Second, in case F91-.41, Petitioner appealed the denial of his 850 motion to the Third District Court of ppeal on So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). But see Dickey v. State, Holdings: 0: holding that expressions of belief or opinion regarding the future of plaintiffs and defendants respective businesses and promissory statements of future intent do not violate the udtpa 1: holding that the alleged inconsistency between the awarding of future medical expenses and the failure to award damages for future pain and suffering could be readily resolved and did not require a new trial 2: holding that failure to predict future law or to anticipate arguments that blossomed after trial is not a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel claims 3: holding that defendants failure to anticipate future events did not constitute securities fraud 4: holding that even assuming that the defendants attorney had misadviced the client that his previous convictions could not be used to enhance future sentences njeither the court nor counsel is required to anticipate a defendants future recidivism


Input: process to convict a defendant when he is legally incompetent. United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir.1995). “Congress has safeguarded this [due process] right by providing that trial courts conduct competency hearings” under specified circumstances. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)). Of relevance here, when neither party to a criminal trial moves for a competency hearing, the district court shall order such a hearing on its own motion[ ] if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. § 4241(a); see also Mason, 52 F.3d at 1289 (<HOLDING>). Whether such reasonable cause exists, Holdings: 0: holding that the existence of probable cause in a  1983 case is a jury question 1: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 2: recognizing the cause of action 3: recognizing that the existence of reasonable cause requires the sua sponte ordering of a competency hearing 4: recognizing cause of action


Input: would “compl[y] with all required regulations and standards;” (3) that the development, unless deemed a public necessity, would “maintain or enhance the value of contiguous property;” and (4) that the development “conform[ed] with the general plans” for Town development. Piney Mountain, 63 N.C. App. at 248, 304 S.E.2d at 254. Likewise, ordinances at issue in Rauseo v. New Hanover County, 118 N.C. App. 286, 290, 454 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1995), Vulcan Materials Co. v. Guilford County Bd. of Comm’rs, 115 N.C. App. 319, 323, 444 S.E.2d 639, 642, disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 807, 449 S.E.2d 758 (1994), and Petersilie v. Town of Boone Bd. of Adjustment, 94 N requirements under Asheville’s City Code. Cf. Three Guys Real Estate v. Harnett County, 345 N.C. 468, 473, 480 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The City “may not create new requirements not Holdings: 0: holding plain language compelled that reading 1: holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning 2: holding that the plain language of the regulations requires a claimant to have an intent to file a claim for va benefits 3: holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute 4: holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language


Input: that Gorman was not a credible witness or that the Commission erred by considering Gorman’s testimony, that argument fails because this court does not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence. Darkenwald v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 182 Wn. App. 157, 172, 328 P.3d 977 (2014), aff’d, 183 Wn.2d 237, 350 P.3d 647 (2015). 32 It is reasonable that, because the various parties disagreed about the best approach, the parties would submit competing evidence and proposals. And because competing evidence was presented, the Commission would have used its discretion to make complex factual determinations and select a proposal. It is precisely in this sort of circumstance that we defer to the Commission’s discretion and authority. See US W. Commc’ns I, 134 Wn.2d at 56 (quoting Cole, 79 Wn.2d at 309 (<HOLDING>)); see also RCW 80.04.430 (providing the Holdings: 0: holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony 1: holding that the commission exercises substantial discretion in selecting the appropriate ratemaking methodology and this is especially true where as here the issues involve complex factual determinations peculiarly within the expertise of the commission 2: holding that the legislature granted exclusive authority over ratemaking to the public service commission 3: holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity 4: holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days


Input: may assess the tax only on assets that a donee actually receives through the bequest. The Constitution provides that “[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.” U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 9. This provision bars Congress from imposing a “direct” tax without apportioning it to the population. Congress need not, however, apportion “an excise upon ... the shifting from one to another of any power or privilege incidental to the ownership or enjoyment of property.” Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 352, 66 S.Ct. 178, 90 L.Ed. 116 (1945) The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected attempts to portray the estate tax as an unconstitutional direct tax. Fernandez, 326 U.S. at 352-58, 66 S.Ct. 178 (<HOLDING>); Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 502-04, Holdings: 0: holding that the tax was not direct even though the government imposed it on the estate rather than the recipient 1: holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property 2: holding that the tax was not direct even though it encompassed a spouses joint interest in the decedents property 3: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate 4: holding that the irs may reach half of a nonliable spouses sole management community property to satisfy a liable spouses tax debt


Input: 1999) (quoting Chitwood, 443 S.W.2d at 830-31) (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court entered separate orders of dismissal for the chancery court and circuit court cases. Only one order was appealed. Because consolidated lawsuits remain separate actions, “it logically fol lows that consolidation cannot cure defects in either lawsuit.” Givens v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. M2011-00186-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 5145741, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Oct. 28, 2011) (citing McMillin, 2009 WL 749214, at *3). The developers’ appeal of the order of dismissal in the circuit court case does not constitute an appeal of the chancery court case. Without an appeal, the chancery court order became a final judgment thirty days after it was entered. Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 377 (Tenn. 2009) (<HOLDING>). “The thirty-day time limit for filing a Holdings: 0: holding attorney may not wait more than thirty days from the entry of final judgment give notice of nonrepresentation and then seek to enforce a hen not noticed before the entry of the final judgment 1: holding that the requirement to serve a motion for attorney fees or costs within thirty days after filing of judgment applies even where the final judgment reserves jurisdiction to award same 2: holding that california supreme courts denial of habeas petition becomes final thirty days after filing 3: holding in part as a general rule a trial courts judgment becomes final thirty days after its entry unless a party files a timely notice of appeal or specified posttrial motion 4: holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review


Input: 2002) ("Because it is summary in nature, a Section 225 proceeding is limited to those issues that must necessarily be considered in order to resolve a disputed corporate election process.”); Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG v. Johnston, 1997 WL 589030, at *3 (Del.Ch. Sept. 17, 1997) (explaining that a Section 225 proceeding has the limited scope of determining "the validity of a corporate election or to determine the right of a person to hold a corporate office in the event that such office is claimed by more than one person.” (citation omitted)). 82 . Agranoff v. Miller, 1999 WL 219650, at *17 (Del.Ch. Apr. 12, 1999) (internal citation omitted), aff'd as modified, 737 A.2d 530 (Table), 1999 WL 636634 (Del.1999). 83 . Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Box, 697 A.2d at 398 (<HOLDING>). 84 . Arbitrium, 1997 WL 589030, at *4. 85 . Holdings: 0: holding that section 105 does not afford a private cause of action for  506bbased issues 1: holding that in a subsequent criminal action for driving under the influence collateral estoppel did not apply to issues decided at a prior administrative hearing held pursuant to implied consent statute 2: holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral proceedings not on direct appeal 3: holding that declaratory judgments should not be used as a restraint against criminal action 4: holding that a section 225 action should not be used for trying purely collateral issues


Input: Ability to Perform, Job With or Without Accommodation Gil claims that in spite of his impaired vision, “he was at all times during his employment with Vortex, able to perform the essential functions of his job.” Compl. ¶ 46. Vortex does not dispute this assertion, but argues that Gil’s discrimination claims must fail because he never requested an accommodation for his impairment. See Culhane v. Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc., 69 Mass.App.Ct. 1106, 2007 WL 1630093, at *7 (Mass.App.Ct. June 6, 2007) (affirming dismissal of a claim at the summary judgment stage where “[t]he accommodations the plaintiff asserts should have been provided were ... never requested or even suggested by the plaintiff’). See also Otolo v. Middlesex Sheriff's Office, 2007 WL 4248122, at *4 (Mass.Super. Nov. 14, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Gil responds “that there is no need for [him] Holdings: 0: holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation 1: holding that a person must request a reasonable accommodation before he has been terminated he cannot wait until he is terminated and then months later  request reinstatement and demand a reasonable accommodation 2: holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation 3: holding failure to immediately approve request for accommodation even for employee with known disability did not constitute denial of reasonable accommodation where employer was working on solution over several months 4: holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada


Input: instead, the dispute is whether the consent was voluntary. ANALYSIS The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that it is “[t]he right of the people to be secure in then-persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable seizures ... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment shall not be admissible at trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments .... ”); Sing v. Wainwright, 148 So.2d 19, 20 (Fla.1962) (“This lid and involuntary where the police falsely assert that they have a valid search warrant. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-50, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (<HOLDING>). In Royer, a case originating in Florida, the Holdings: 0: holding that consent was coerced when officers told defendants wife they came to search the premises and she allowed them to enter 1: holding that defendants consent was involuntary where defendant consented to search following a warrantless entry and officers explained that absent consent the officers would obtain a warrant 2: holding consent invalid when given under coercive circumstances in which police misrepresented that they had a warrant to search the home 3: holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises 4: holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search


Input: did not challenge the adequacy of [the] defendants' search for records in response to his FOIA requests in Counts II and III”). 6 . The plaintiff also asserts that the defendant failed to provide to him his 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice. However, the plaintiff only requested the 2014 Within Grade Increase Notice in his FOIA request. See Def.’s Mot., Def.’s Facts 1. Furthermore, the Court is baffled by the plaintiff’s assertion, given that he provided the Court with the requested 2013 Fiscal Year Acceptable Level of Competence Form, See Pl.’s Compel Mot, I at 23. Accordingly, because the production of any 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice falls outside of the scope of the defendant’s obligations under the FOIA, see Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable 1: holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint 2: holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents 3: holding an agency need not demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist 4: holding that a foia request should be read to seek all documents covered by a catchall


Input: ‘imprisonment,’ and a community confinement facility is a ‘penal or correction facility.’ ” Id. at 1025. In fact, it is § 3621(a) that arguably provides the closest thing to a definition of “imprisonment” as one can find in the United States Code: A person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment ... shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons until the expiration of the term imposed, or until earlier released for satisfactory behavior pursuant to the provisions of section 3624. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a) (emphasis added). The statute makes clear that it is not place, but custody, that defines imprisonment — a conceptual distinction that is consistent with long-accepted views on this subject. See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 63-65, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). The district court in Holdings: 0: recognizing that time spent in community confinement subject to bop custody entitles a prisoner to sentencing credit while community confinement on pretrial release does not because ujnlike defendants released on bail defendants who are detained or sentenced always remain subject to the control of the bureau  1: holding that due process clause does not require a federal prisoner to receive credit for time spent on supervised release if release is revoked 2: holding that credit cannot be awarded for time served on community control 3: holding that the purpose of the credit statute is to provide credit for confinement    where 1 bail has been set for the defendant and 2 the defendant was financially unable to post the bail 4: holding time spent on electronic monitoring while on bail release does not constitute custody within meaning of sentencing credit statute


Input: reasons, the Court has held that presumptively involuntary statements taken in violation of Miranda may be used by the prosecution for impeachment purposes on cross-examination. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). These holdings do not extend to cases of actually coerced confessions. Before Fulminante, the distinction between actually and presumptively coerced confessions was relevant with regard to harmless error as well. In deciding, as the Su preme Court did in Fulminante, that the improper introduction at trial of an actually coerced confession is subject to harmless error analysis, the Court overturned a well established line of precedent which held to the contrary. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029 (1945) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding introduction of actually coerced confession constitutes reversible error even where confession was cumulative in nature 1: holding failure of prosecution to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the accused is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 2: holding that states procedure providing for jury evaluation of voluntariness of a defendants confession violates fourteenth amendment due process 3: holding that introduction of an actually coerced confession deprives the defendant of his fourteenth amendment rights to due process even if ample evidence existed to otherwise support the conviction 4: holding that question of whether a confession was coerced was not to be resolved by considering the truth or falsity of the confession


Input: any manner or that Banco Popular bears any responsibility for the lengthy delay. Indeed, the “explanatory statement” prefacing the new Property Registry Facilitation Act indicates that registrar delay has been widespread in Puerto Rico for quite some time without the fault of applicants. See 2010 P.R. Laws No. 216. Moreover, the local statutes give no indication that mere passage of time caused by registrar delay somehow nullifies or expires the filing entry or its priority rank. Cf. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 30, § 2255 (entry of presentation expires where notified defect is not seasonably corrected). Like the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as the creditor in 229 Main Street, Banco Popular obtained a concrete, pre-petition debt owed to it by the property owner. See 229 Main St., 262 F.3d at 7 (<HOLDING>). Even more than Massachusetts, though, Banco Holdings: 0: holding that no distinction exists between investigatory costs and onsite cleanup costs for purposes of recovery 1: holding that the state was not liable as an operator for responding to a site to conduct cleanup activities 2: holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution 3: holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs 4: holding that the department of transportation was liable under the mtca but that it was not responsible for any of the cleanup costs


Input: (7)(f) or other discovery under N.D.R.Crim.P. 16, but the defendant is not under obligation to do so. The statute places the affirmative burden on the State to allege the prior offense upon which it relies for the imposition of the mandatory sentence. The State does not meet that burden by the penalty format it uses here. [¶ 13] In State v. Gielen, 54 N.D. 768, 210 N.W. 971, 975 (1926), the Court stated: It may be said that while the information in this case, under the circumstances presented by the ons which have reached what appears to be the opposite conclusion. But, we have not adopted a strict compliance standard. Rather, we have interpreted the statute as a notice requirement to which the harmless error analysis applies. Cf. State v. Anderson, 303 N.W.2d 98 (N.D.1981) (<HOLDING>). The analysis in the Federal decisions appears Holdings: 0: holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice 1: holding there was no evidence a reasonably prudent employee in similar circumstances would have believed facts reported by plaintiff were a violation of law 2: holding that due process does not require defendant to receive verbal notice of standard probation conditions because all persons have constructive notice of states criminal statutes 3: holding probationer who did not receive notice of specific offenses she was believed to have committed but had notice of probation terms states attorney believed were violated and of the facts constituting violation was not harmed 4: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner


Input: subject to the exclusions in the policy”). Accordingly, an additional insured not only reaps the benefits of the insured’s policy, but it also bears the burden of the exclusions. It is further our view that, if the insurer intended to exclude indemnification agreements within insured contracts from the substantial restriction on coverage that the On-Premises Endorsement constitutes, the policy would have expressly so stated. See Maroney v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 5 N.Y.3d 467, 805 N.Y.S.2d 533, 839 N.E.2d 886, 889 (2005) (stating that “[i]f the insurer intended to limit [an] exclusion * * * it could have done so explicitly, as it does in the very same policy’s * * * provisions”); see also Chimbay v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc., 742 F.Supp.2d 265, 283 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (<HOLDING>). The policy at issue in the instant case does Holdings: 0: holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled 1: holding that if an insurer intended to exclude insured contracts from the provision denying coverage for injuries to employees it could have expressly stated as such 2: holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage 3: holding that insured cannot demand reimbursement for defense insurer had no opportunity to control if insured does not promptly notify insurer of facts triggering coverage 4: recognizing that a conflict of interest may provide the source of prejudice upon which an insured may rely to estop an insurer from denying coverage


Input: clear error in this factual finding. The district court accordingly determined that Agent Woodruffs additional questioning of Chacon and Carrillo was not objectively reasonable because it did not conform to the justifying purpose of the stop—determining the citizenship status of persons traveling through the Sierra Blanca checkpoint. Id. at *5-*7. The district court applied this court’s decision in Portillo-Aguirre, a case involving the same checkpoint, the same Border Patrol agent and a similar factual scenario. In Portillo-Aguirre, this court held that where a border patrol agent has completed the immigration purpose of a stop, questioning that unduly prolongs the duration of the stop may be improper under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d at 657 (<HOLDING>). The district court’s legal determination, Holdings: 0: holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law 1: recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot 2: holding that if an agent does not develop reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before the justifying purpose of a checkpoint stop has been accomplished he may not prolong the stop 3: holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished 4: holding that an officer can stop an individual if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underfoot


Input: circumstances, the Court concludes that [defendant] was not “in custody” ... and that [the agents] were not required to Mirandize him. Id. at *27-28 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). One additional factor that arose in Kofsky was that during the search, the agents continued to question the defendant after he had asked to speak to counsel. Regarding this issue, Judge DuBois held that “[u]nder the circumstances, the Court concludes that [the defendant] was not ‘in custody’ ... and that [the agents] were not required to Mirandize him. Accordingly, the Court also rejects defendant’s argument that the agents [were required] to stop questioning him after he requested counsel. ” Id. at *28 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. McNaughton, 848 F.Supp. 1195, 1200 (E.D.Pa.1994) (<HOLDING>)). In the present case, as in Kofsky, the Court Holdings: 0: holding that where defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation agent did not violate the fifth amendment by contacting defendant for questioning after defendant refused to answer questions without a lawyer present 1: holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer 2: holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel 3: holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds silence during police custodial interrogation 4: holding that miranda does not apply to statements of the defendant which are voluntary and unsolicited and not the product of custodial interrogation


Input: Yeota Christie contends that she received demands for mortgage payments from several entities that did not have the authority to make such demands: The Bank of New York Mellon, N.A, as Trustee for the CWALT Pass-Through Certificates CWALT Series 2007-OA3 (the “CWALT Trust”); Bank of America, N.A.; BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP; and Re-conTrust Company, N.A. (collectively, “Ap-pellees”). Christie alleges that unauthorized and inauthentic assignments of her loan have rendered her Note (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Christie’s reliance on the California Holdings: 0: holding that when applying state law this court follows the decision of the highest state court or in the absence of such a decision and any indication that the highest court would rule differently the decisions of the states intermediate courts 1: holding federal courts are bound to follow intermediate state appellate court decisions unless there is persuasive evidence that the states highest court would rule otherwise 2: holding that federal courts must accept the decision of the states highest court even if it is an erroneous one 3: holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state 4: holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide


Input: Life Partners Inc., 650 F.3d at 1029; Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161). 5 . Id. (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)). 6 . Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir.2006). 7 . New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir.2013) (en banc) (citing Lampton v. Diaz, 639 F.3d 223, 227 n. 14 (5th Cir. 2011)). 8 . Lampton, 639 F.3d at 227 n. 14 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 9 . 29 U.S.C. § 794; see Dark v. Potter, 293 Fed.Appx. 254, 258 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (explaining that the Rehabilitation Act “constitutes the exclusive remedy for a federal employee alleging disability-based discrimination”); Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 304 (5th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See Tolbert v. United States, 916 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity 1: recognizing that the rehabilitation act as amended in 1978 provides individuals a private cause of action to obtain relief for handicap discrimination on the part of the federal government and its agencies 2: recognizing the cause of action 3: holding that the rehabilitation act does not create a private right of action against the secretary of transportation where the apa provides an adequate remedy 4: holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies


Input: request for an award of costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees. This case is hereby REMANDED to the 193rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas. SO ORDERED. 1 . 12 U.S.C. § 1819 was amended by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA”), with the effective date of amendment August 9, 1989. FIRREA's removal provisions became effective as of that date. Triland Holdings & Co. v. Sunbelt Svc. Corp., 884 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir.1989). 2 . The Court agrees with Plaintiff that it need not decide whether the FDIC must remove a case within thirty days of its appointment as receiver for a failed thrift where the thrift is already a party to litigation. See, e.g., FDIC v. Brooks, 652 F.Supp. 744, 745 (N.D.Tex.1985) ("Brooks I") (Woodward, J.) (<HOLDING>); compare Sunbelt Sav. Ass'n v. Browning, No. Holdings: 0: holding that the absence in the notice of removal of copies of the summonses served on the defendants uncorrected until after the thirty 30 day removal period had expired violates 28 usc  1446a and bars removal 1: holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer 2: holding that the thirty day removal period runs from the date of fdics plea in intervention and notice of substitution 3: recognizing that while defendants may freely amend their notice of removal within thirty days of service they may not add new grounds for removal after the thirty day period has expired 4: holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction


Input: stated in language from an earlier century. As we have stressed in its application, Article 4 is about access to the judicial branch to enforce the law. See Holton v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training, 2005 VT 42, ¶ 27, 178 Vt. 147, 878 A.2d 1051. We cannot believe that the drafters of Article 4 intended that judicial access be denied by legislative inaction in creating an enforcement mechanism. Indeed, denial of access to the courts is a violation of the substantive requirements of the Article. ¶ 51. The principles of due process have been developed and applied in thousands of decis (stating that “prohibitive clauses of the constitution such as the due process clause are self-executing and require no legislation for their enforcement”); Dorwart v. Caraway, 2002 MT 240, ¶20, 58 P.3d 128 (<HOLDING>). For example, in Spackman v. Board of Holdings: 0: holding that pretrial detainees can bring substantive due process claim 1: recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution 2: holding that a conflict of interest on the part of the prosecution violates the due process clause of the virginia constitution 3: recognizing exception under state constitution 4: recognizing that the due process guaranteed under the alabama constitution is coextensive with the due process guaranteed under the united states constitution


Input: in September 2009. 29 . The court measures this amount by considering the joint life expectancy of the child and the deceased parent. See BellSouth Tele., 863 So.2d at 292. 30 . While there is no disagreement between the parties on this point, the court notes that the proposition is well supported by case law. The Eleventh Circuit has plainly stated that the FTCA’s express provision that the government is liable to the same extent as a private party "applies to any limitation on damages.” Scheib v. Fla. Sanitarium & Benev. Ass’n, 759 F.2d 859, 864 (11th Cir.1985). See also Richards, 369 U.S. at 11-16, 82 S.Ct. 585 (in- cheating that the state’s whole law applies, including its choice of law rules and statutory damages caps); Cibula v. United States, 551 F.3d 316, 321 (4th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Carter v. United States, 333 F.3d 791, 794 Holdings: 0: holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor 1: holding that the government is liable under the ftca in the same respect as a private person under the law of the place where the act occurred 2: holding that a state statute that affects the governments ultimate liability is to be applied as substantive state law under the ftca 3: holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law 4: holding that the state police is a state agency


Input: see EEOC v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 1994 WL 68420, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1994) (EEOC conciliation efforts toll limitations period), Plaintiffs’ one-year period within which to apply for leave to file late notice of claim under § 3813 has nevertheless expired. Discussion, supra, at 573-74. If the one-year statute of limitations was first tolled, as Plaintiffs contend, on June 21, 2004 the date which Plaintiffs filed charges with the EEOC, through January 14, 2007, the date Plaintiffs are presumed to have received their Right to Sue Letters from the EEOC, Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1996) (“A presumption exists that an EEOC notice is received three days after its mailing.”); Allen v. Darbey, 2006 WL 2504446, at * 5 (W-D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Slootskin v. John Brown Eng’g and Constr. Holdings: 0: recognizing added presumption 1: recognizing a presumption against retroactive legislation 2: recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome 3: recognizing presumption 4: recognizing a presumption of reasonableness


Input: the trial court is properly presented to this Court. Because we find the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction with respect to the permanent injunction and the order was interlocutory with respect to the preliminary injunction, we vacate in part and remand in part for further proceedings. I. Permanent Injunction “A permanent injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy and may only properly issue after a full consideration of the merits of a case.” Shishko v. Whitley, 64 N.C. App. 668, 671, 308 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1983). “A judge conducting a hearing to determine whether a temporary restraining order should be continued as a preliminary injunction . . . has no jurisdiction to determine a controversy on its merits.” Everette v. Taylor, 77 N.C. App. 442, 444, 335 S.E.2d 212, 214 (1985) (<HOLDING>). “[Where] the judgment entered [is] beyond the Holdings: 0: holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction 1: holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction 2: holding that the standard for permanent injunction is the same as that for preliminary injunction with the one exception being that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than likelihood of success 3: holding preliminary injunction improper where it exceeded the relief sought and granted the same relief which would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction 4: holding that a hearing must be held to determine credibility in preliminary injunction cases


Input: records were lost or destroyed, or that the defendant has changed his position in anticipation that the opposing party has waived his claims. Fulton, supra at 131 (internal citations omitted). “In the absence of prejudice to the one asserting laches, the doctrine will not be applied.” Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391, 394, 172 A.2d 152, 154 (1961). In other words, “prejudice to the defendant must be shown as a prerequisite to the application of laches.” Miller v. Hawkins, 416 Pa. 180, 190, 205 A.2d 429, 434 (1964) (citing id.). Importantly, a single co-executor or co-administrator generally has authority to act unilaterally on behalf of an estate only if the act falls within the ordinary course of administering the estate. See Fesmyer v. Shannon, 143 Pa. 201, 208, 22 A. 898, 899 (1891) (<HOLDING>); Holmes v. Lankenau Hosp., 426 Pa.Super. 452, Holdings: 0: holding that a legal malpractice claim arising from errors by an attorney in rendering estateplanning services is properly brought by the personal representative of the estate when excess estate taxes are paid by the estate in contravention of the decedents intended estate plan 1: holding single coexecutors release of mortgage debt paid to estate was valid and binding on estate because acts of any coexecutor in respect to the administration of the effects of the estate are deemed to be the acts of all as where one releases a debt or settles an account of a person with the deceased or surrenders a term or sells the goods and chattels of the estate his act binds the others characterizing conversion of decedents personal property into cash as act in due course of administration of estate 2: holding directors and officers liability policy was not property of the estate because it did not increase or decrease the worth of the bankruptcy estate 3: holding that for estate tax purposes property is to be valued as it exists in the hands of the estate 4: holding estate was not bound by single coexecutors confession of judgment for claims regarding decedent debts even though acts done by one coexecutor which relate to the testators goods such as sale delivery possession  are considered as equivalent to the acts of all as they possess a joint authority


Input: The downzoning was the subject of the other case consolidated on appeal. The Court of Appeals initially opined: We think it plain ... that the WSSC was subject to valid criticism ... from the Council and the Planning Commission, each of whom had legitimate reason to be concerned .... That they voiced their concern ... and urged the WSSC to deny the permit ... is not the equivalent of wrongful governmental pressure brought to bear upon a sister agency. ... Nor does the mere fact that the future commercial development ... was under study ... justify an inf , 428, 571 A.2d 1270 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 323 Md. 504, 594 A.2d 95 (1991) (stating that application for permit does not create vested right); Miller v. Forty West Builders, Inc., 62 Md.App. 320, 330, 489 A.2d 76 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Prince George’s County v. Equitable Trust Holdings: 0: holding that vested rights were not acquired by obtaining approval of the subdivision plan 1: holding that a plan sponsor was an erisa fiduciary to the extent that it was vested with and exercised discretionary control 2: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant 3: holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary 4: holding that the right of approval is subject to standards of reasonableness implied by law


Input: v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148 (2d Cir.2006), to challenge the BIA’s consideration of the underlying adverse credibility determination is misplaced. In Paul, we held that the BIA abused its discretion by denying a motion to reopen based on changed country circumstances, where, despite an adverse credibility finding, the IJ had explicitly credited the movant’s assertion regarding his religious affiliation that would likely result in persecution. Id. at 152-55. Here, unlike in Paul, the IJ did not find any aspect of petitioner’s testimony credible, and the BIA reasonably relied on this general adverse credibility finding (along with other evidence) to find that petitioner did not adequately establish her religious affiliation. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-49 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Because petitioner’s assertion of ineffective Holdings: 0: holding that speculation and conjecture cannot support an adverse credibility finding 1: holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding 2: recognizing that omissions of details may be an insufficient basis for upholding an adverse credibility finding 3: holding a general adverse credibility finding may justify a decision to reject other claims 4: holding that history of dishonesty can support an adverse credibility finding


Input: or, although they could be discovered upon investigation, do not in due course of business come to [the] knowledge [of the debtor]”); Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 490, 108 S.Ct. 1340 (stating that "[n]or is everyone who may conceivably have a claim properly considered a creditor entitled to actual notice ... [as][i]t is reasonable to dispense with actual notice to those with mere 'conjectural' claims”). 8 .While the bankruptcy court's known creditor analysis is reviewed de novo, it is nonetheless appropriate to give substantial consideration to the bankruptcy court's conclusions in this regard given that court's significant experience and expertise in these matters, which routinely arise in the administration of bankruptcy estates. 9 . See In re Crystal Oil Co., 158 F.3d 291, 297 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Under Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Holdings: 0: holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs 1: holding that the debtor in possession was liable for civil contempt when he disobeyed the courts order to turn over the cash collateral and violated 11 usc  363 2: holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor 3: holding that the debtor in possession could utilize the strongarm powers of the trustee to avoid an unperfected security interest even though the debtor knew of the interest prior to bankruptcy because the two are distinct entities and the debtor in possessions responsibility is to preserve the estates assets for the benefit of the creditors 4: holding that in order for a claim to be reasonably ascertainable the debtor must have in his possession at the very least some specific information that reasonably suggests both the claim for which the debtor may be liable and the entity to whom he would be liable


Input: among the items mentioned, we conclude that the legislature intended trust assets to be included among the available resources of potential recipients. Id. at 45, 176 N.W.2d at 892. Although McNiff did not involve a minor settlement fund, its reasoning and holding nonetheless apply here. Minor settlements, like private trusts, are not among the enumerated assets that are not to be considered available resources. Minn.Stat. §§ 256B.06, subd. l(13)(a); 256B.07. Under Minn.Stat. § 645.19 (1986), “[exceptions expressed in a law shall be construed to exclude all others.” In the absence of any compelling authority to the contrary, the fact that minor settlement funds are not specifically excepted from consideration as available resources is dispositive. See also Brooks, 405 N.W.2d at 433-34 (<HOLDING>). II Hennepin County’s claim for reimbursement Holdings: 0: holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits 1: holding that a gift of 5000 was an available resource for the purpose of determining eligibility for afdc benefits 2: holding that a legal determination regarding an aliens eligibility for adjustment of status was not barred by the statute 3: holding that state agencys voluntary reinstatement of benefits after agency had previously announced that recipients no longer met the eligibility requirements for those benefits did not moot suit challenging the termination of the benefits when agency remained free to reassess the recipients needs and cancel their benefits at any time 4: holding that a denial of benefits will not be reviewed de novo where the language of an erisa plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan


Input: clauses discussing venue in terms' of ’a state are commonly interpreted as creating either a'geographic or sovereignty limitation on venue. [Fjorum selection clauses that use the term ‘in [a state]’ express the parties’ intent as a.matter of geography, permitting jurisdiction in both, the state-and federal courts, of the named state, whereas forum selection clauses that use the term ‘of [a state]’ connote sovereignty, limiting jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute to the state courts of the named state.. FindWhere Holdings, Inc. v. Sys.. Env’t Optimization, LLC, 626 F.3d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 2010) (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Dixon v. TSE Int'l Inc., 330 F.3d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Several of. our sister circuits have applied Holdings: 0: recognizing the same rule in texas courts 1: holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas 2: holding that a texas court had personal jurisdiction over a kansas resident who after objecting to the texas courts jurisdiction filed a motion for attorneys fees 3: holding that the contract language the courts of texas usa shall have jurisdiction precluded federal jurisdiction by explaining that flederal district courts may be in texas but they are not of texas emphasis in original 4: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied


Input: recusal. See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir.2000) (“We have repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.”). Hartman also complains about Judge Diamond’s “attitude,” asserts that he exhibits a “personal interest in the case,” and alleges that he has been “unduly distrustful and suspicious of Plaintiff.” These bare allegations are not sufficient to mandate recusal. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (“Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, image and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women ... sometimes display.”); see also In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we will deny the mandamus Holdings: 0: recognizing that tenuous assertions strung together by strands of speculation and surmise cannot defeat summary judgment 1: holding that recusal is not required on the basis of unsupported irrational or highly tenuous speculation 2: holding that under section 455 a judge should not recuse himself based upon conclusory unsupported or tenuous allegations 3: holding that recusal was required based on newspaper report of interview with trial judge 4: holding recusal not required


Input: Because Hobson failed to object to the question on redirect, he has waived any potential error on appeal. Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 853 (Miss.1995). ¶ 15. It is true that a party cannot open the door to admission of hearsay evidence. Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1293-94 (Miss.1984). However, in this case, the defendant elicited the hearsay himself. “It is axiomatic that a defendant cannot complain on appeal concerning evidence that he himself brought out at trial.... As the Court stated pithily in Reddix v. State, 381 So.2d 999, 1009 (Miss.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986, 101 S.Ct. 408, 66 L.Ed.2d 251 (1980): ‘If the defendant goes fishing in the state’s waters, he must take such fish as he catches.’ ” Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 289 (Miss. 1992) (internal citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). We find no error resulting from the admission Holdings: 0: holding that defendant waived error of admission of hearsay testimony when he elicited it himself 1: holding that we would not review a claim of error regarding the admission of evidence when the defendant stipulated to its admission at trial 2: holding improper admission of hearsay evidence is reversible error only when the admission causes prejudice 3: holding that defendant who introduced hearsay statement waived objection to admission of another part of same statement 4: holding that admission of hearsay constituted harmless error when there was more than sufficient other evidence in the record to support the verdict