Input: define the terms of an otherwise unambiguous contractual term. Sydlik’s interpretation is unimportant when we may construe the contract without that interpretation. Certainly, had she stated she did not believe she had released anyone from liability, appellees would not put such stock in her view. Holding to our traditional rules of interpretation for pre-injury releases, we turn now to determine what claims and parties were released within the four corners of the contract. b. Claims Released As we have explained already, to satisfy the express negligence prong, the release must mention all claims it purports to release. Sydlik relies on certain cases to argue that the language in the release is not specific enough. See Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex.1987) (<HOLDING>); Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 811 S.W.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that subcontractor was not obligated to indemnify general contractor for general contractors own negligence where indemnification clause did not expressly state that subcontractor would indemnify general contractor for such negligence 1: holding that if the party seeking indemnity is held liable in part because of its own negligence common law indemnification is unavailable and the only remedy is contribution 2: holding that illinois construction contract indemnification for negligence act invalidates indemnity provision in contract between general contractor and postal service 3: holding that indemnification provision did not expressly state the party was seeking indemnity for its own negligence so as to satisfy express negligence test 4: holding that indemnification  without regard to  the negligence of any party clearly and unequivocally provided bay drilling with indemnification for its own negligence


Input: Abraham-son insists they are distinct companies observing all corporate formalities. (6/29/10 Abrahamson Dec. ¶ 4, 6.) 3 .As discussed below, the Court concludes that transfer of this action is appropriate. Accordingly, the standards for evaluating the other portions of Defendants' Motion — concerning personal jurisdiction and improper venue — will not be recited herein. Notably, the Court may transfer this action regardless of whether venue is proper in this district or whether it enjoys personal jurisdiction over the moving Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (even if action is filed in improper venue, district court may transfer it to "any district or division in which it might have been brought”); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962) (<HOLDING>); Eggleton v. Plasser & Theurer Export Von Holdings: 0: holding district lacking personal jurisdiction over defendant not one in which suit might have been brought under section 1404a 1: holding that personal jurisdiction was lacking when the only contact by defendant with forum state was initiated by plaintiffs counsels paralegal for the sole purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction 2: holding that transfer most appropriate under 28 usc  1406a 3: holding that section 1406a grants district courts power to transfer cases even where personal jurisdiction is lacking 4: recognizing conflicting case law regarding whether waiver  under rule 12b3 extends to a request for a transfer under  1406a given that such a transfer is premised on venue being improper in this district


Input: Id. at 411. But the court squarely held that legislative enactments will not be permitted to "fetter the efficient operation of the courts or impair their ability to uphold their dignity and authority." Ibid. The issue in Continental Insurance was whether the maximum penalty specified in the contempt statute was binding on the courts if that maximum penalty was clearly inadequate to preserve the court's authority and efficacy. But courts in other states have held that this same principle-the principle that the contempt power is inherent in the judicial branch of government-forbids the legislature from restricting the judiciary's use of the contempt power, or limiting the instances in which this power may be employed. j See Walker v. Bentley, 660 So.2d 313, 317-321 (Fla.App.1995) (<HOLDING>); La-Grange v. State, 238 Ind. 689, 153 N.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding unconstitutional a statute which prohibited courts from using criminal contempt proceedings to enforce domestic violence restraining orders and which required that all such prosecutorial decisions be made by the executive branch 1: holding that a motion to enforce bankruptcy sale order is a core proceeding and citing 11 usc  105a as the section which gives the bankruptcy court the power and the jurisdiction to enforce its valid orders  2: recognizing that a court granted jurisdiction by statute to review the legality of administrative orders is also empowered to examine the constitutionality of the statute by virtue of which such orders were entered 3: holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions 4: holding that when the executive branch defaults a district court has the authority to appoint a prosecutor for contempt proceedings in order to preserve respect for the judicial system itself


Input: demonstrate that "the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk." Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970). It is not enough that an official "fail[s] to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The proposition that deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical needs can amount to a constitutional violation has been well-settled since Estelle in 1976. Moreover, numerous decisions have involved the withholding or delayed administration of medication. See, e.g., Canady v. Wilkinson, 90 Fed.Appx. 863 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Dozier v. Pauley, 24 Fed.Appx. 398 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that the preindictment delay was a due process violation because actual prejudice was shown and the state had shown absolutely no need for any investigative delay 1: holding that delay in prescription was not eighth amendment violation because delay was inadvertent and quickly rectified 2: holding that a twoday delay was insufficient to establish deliberate indifference and citing cases where no deliberate indifference was found after a sixteenday delay a sixday delay and a threemonth delay 3: holding that prescription delay was not violation because plaintiff could not establish detrimental effect of delay in treatment 4: holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable


Input: on Texas contract law, but whether its claim is allowable in bankruptcy “is a matter of federal law and the bankruptcy court’s exercise of equitable powers.” See First City Beaumont v. Durkay (In re Ford), 967 F.2d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir.1992). Section 502(b) provides nine grounds for disallowing a claim that has been objected to. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). One of these grounds is that the claim “is unenforceable against the debtor under ... applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1). Courts have uniformly interpreted this to mean that a claim may be disallowed if it is unenforceable under applicable state law. See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 127 S.Ct. 1199, 167 L.Ed.2d 178 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Under Texas law, a credit card issuer must Holdings: 0: holding that the bankruptcy courts as compared to state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine issues of dischargeability under the bankruptcy code 1: recognizing rule that state law governs the substance of claims in bankruptcy proceedings 2: recognizing that there are no formal procedures for determining the validity of rs 2477 claims 3: recognizing validity of state antidiscrimination provisions 4: recognizing that  502b1 requires bankruptcy courts to consult state law in determining the validity of most claims


Input: CURIAM. Iowa inmate Beau T. Berge appeals from the final judgment ent 991) (§ 1983 suit; holding officer who was aware affidavit was untruthful “should have known [it] would violate the accused’s constitutional rights”). As to Shatto, Milburn, and Lamack, however, Berge failed to specify in his complaint how any of them violated a protected right. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 1: holding that a plaintiff in a bivens action must allege that the individual defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation 2: holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action 3: holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under  1983 4: holding that to state  1983 claim against defendant plaintiff must allege that defendant was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for incidents that resulted in injury


Input: the warrant. Rather, according to the trial court, the express terms of the warrant "through inadvertence” did not permit as extensive a search as was actually conducted. Thus, it appears the actual basis for the trial court's ruling was that the search exceeded the scope of a valid warrant. 3 . We do not here address the question of whether an appellee may raise an argument in defense of the lower court’s judgment when that argument was not presented in the lower court. We do note, however, that our previous opinions on that question have been somewhat inconsistent. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988) (applying argument raised for first time on appeal to affirm lower court’s decision); American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984) (<HOLDING>); L & M Corp. v. Loader, 688 P.2d 448, 449-50 Holdings: 0: holding that   1252d1 bars the consideration of bases for relief that were not raised below and of general issues that were not raised below but not of specific subsidiary legal arguments or arguments by extension that were not made below 1: holding that arguments not raised below are waived for appeal 2: holding that petitioners had abandoned arguments not raised below 3: holding that argument offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not raised below 4: holding that an issue not properly preserved below in the district court is generally waived


Input: “Mere ‘knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute infringement’ is not sufficient.” Id. at 1368 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In establishing the predicated direct infringement, a patentee need not present direct evidence of infringement, because a finding that the accused device contains all the limitations of the asserted claims may be done with direct or circumstantial evidence. 02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 449 Fed.Appx. 923, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). For example, “use of instruction manuals [may Holdings: 0: holding that direct evidence of defendants dna found at the scene was direct evidence merely of a circumstance that suggested his participation in the burglary and theft but was not direct evidence of his participation in the burglary 1: holding circumstantial evidence has equivalent standing to direct evidence in criminal prosecution 2: holding that direct and circumstantial evidence are to be given the same weight when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 3: holding that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that a method step was carried out by the direct infringer even in the absence of direct evidence for direct infringer 4: recognizing the difficulty of determining a nonspeculative hypotheticallicense damages amount when the infringer is a direct competitor


Input: Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393-4, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). The “reasonable time” requirement has been applied considerably more flexibly— when it has been applied at all — in institutional reform cases. See, e.g., Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1164. There is good reason for this. Private parties can be expected to move in a timely fashion to modify or vacate orders whenever a change in circumstance arises. Municipal entities, such as the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, however, do not have perfect institutional memory, and where a consent decree has gone unenforced for many years, the individuals who administer those entities may not have any knowledge of its existence. See Shakman v. City of Chicago, 426 F.3d 925, 933-34 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, consent decrees, unlike other Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court should overturn a district courts denial of a motion to amend a complaint only if the district court has abused its discretion 1: holding that the district court had abused its discretion in failing to consider the public nature of the litigation in finding that the citys motion to amend did not meet rule 60bs timing requirement 2: holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend after a delay of eight months 3: holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend 4: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint


Input: the claimed design by stating, “the broken lines showing the door pull are for illustrative purposes only and form no part of the claimed design.” Similarly, the patentee could have shown the rear features in broken lines to comply with § 1.152 while excluding those features from the claimed design. Rather than doing so, the paten-tee included the rear features in the claimed design. In addition, the rear features are not generally concealed. After the door has been installed, the rear features may be temporarily hidden from view when the door is closed. The rear features are visible, however, before the door is installed and when the door is open during use. Accordingly, the rear features are not “hidden” and their appearance is a “matter of concern.” See KeyStone, 997 F.2d at 1451 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the rear features are not Holdings: 0: recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate 1: holding that if there is only one construction that will permit all parts of the deed to be given effect it should be followed 2: holding that actual posses sion requires some visible means which gives notice of exclusion from the property to the true owner or to the public and of the adverse claimants dominion over it 3: holding that there is no hidden portion of a patented block even though it ceases to be visible as a block when incorporated in a wall because as a block all parts of it are visible 4: holding that the use of visible shackles is prohibited unless that use is justified by an essential state interest  such as the interest in courtroom security  specific to the defendant on trial


Input: filed and it does not matter that all parties were not served within thirty days. AWSD bases its argument on a novel reading of our Supreme Court’s decision in Maples v. State, 110 N.M. 34, 791 P.2d 788 (1990). In Maples, the Supreme Court held that on procedural matters such as time limitations for appeals, rules adopted by the Supreme Court governing limitations period for appeal to the judiciary from workers’ compensation deci sions prevail over an inconsistent statute. Id. at 36, 791 P.2d at 790. AWSD argues that Section 72-7-1 is such an inconsistent statute and that AWSD was therefore required to comply only with the requirements set out in Rule 1-074 to perfect its appeal to the district court. But cf. In re Application of Metro. Invs., Inc., 110 N.M. at 440, 796 P.2d at 1136 (<HOLDING>). {7} AWSD admits that it did not make this Holdings: 0: holding time for filing notice of appeal under rule 8002 is jurisdictional 1: holding that successive new trial or jnov motions do not toll the time for serving the notice of appeal 2: holding that timeliness of filing of notice of appeal is a jurisdictional issue 3: holding that the time limits in the equal access to justice act are jurisdictional 4: holding that section 7271 statutory provisions specifically dealing with the time limits for serving notice of appeal from decisions of the state engineer were jurisdictional


Input: “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Zhang has not established any error in the BIA’s conclusion that there was no material change in country conditions here. First, Zhang’s apparent assistance to the United States government is a change in personal circumstances that does not excuse the time and number limitations. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005); Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006); see also Ali v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Young Dong Kim v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1181 (7th Holdings: 0: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 1: holding that the faas action in this case was  analogous to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion  and noting that when prosecutorial discretion is at issue the matter is presumptively committed to agency discretion by law 2: holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record 3: holding that exercise of prosecutorial discretion was not subject to judicial review absent a constitutional claim or question of law 4: recognizing that the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review


Input: of that State.” Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396, 68 S.Ct. 1156. The Supreme Court has long held that “the pursuit of a common calling is one of the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the Clause.” United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cnty. & Vicinity v. Mayor & Council of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219, 104 S.Ct. 1020, 79 L.Ed.2d 249 (1984). The practice of law has long been held to be a fundamental right within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause because the profession has both a commercial and noncommercial role in the United States. See Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 553, 109 S.Ct. 1294, 103 L.Ed.2d 559 (1989); Piper, 470 U.S. at 281, 105 S.Ct. 1272; cf. Parnell v. Supreme Court of Appeals of W.Va., 110 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). B. Discrimination on the Basis of Residency Holdings: 0: holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice 1: holding right to be fundamental 2: holding that sponsoring applicants for pro hac vice admission to practice law is not a core component of the fundamental right to practice law 3: holding that the unauthorized practice of law constitutes violation of code 4: holding that under the supremacy clause a state court could not enforce a prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law against an individual who was permitted to practice law under the rules of a federal court located in the states jurisdiction


Input: not end our inquiry. Our legislature established restitution as part of a defendant’s sentence. “A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a criminal charge ... against the offender if. the offender is' convicted.” Minn.Stat, § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2012). And Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd. 1(a)(5) (2012), provides that court-ordered restitution is a sentence that may be imposed upon conviction of a felony. Minnesota courts have consistently interpreted these statutes to mean that restitution is part of a criminal sentence. See Evans v. State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn.2016); see also State v, Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn.2011). Because the obligation to pay restitution is a part of a sentence, and the rules of evidence do not Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Robers v. Holdings: 0: holding hearsay admissible in revocation hearings 1: recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings 2: holding that because the rules of evidence including the rule against hearsay do not apply to sentencing hearings the district court did not err in relying on hearsay in ordering restitution 3: holding that because restitution hearings are a part of sentencing and have nothing to do with a defendants guilt or innocence the rules of evidence do not apply 4: holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence


Input: Act, standing alone, is not protected conduct under the SOX.... Id. Further, Plaintiffs deposition testimony makes clear that the bulk of her complaints related to purported ethical lapses of Stifel employees, which Plaintiff deemed contrary to Stifel’s internal ethical policies — i.e., engaging in office romances, using office equipment for personal reasons, asking an assistant to fix personal computers of the supervisor’s family and friends, spending too much time on out-of-office travel, showing lack of enthusiasm in being a branch manager, meeting “undesirables” in the parking lot, and the like. But complaints about alleged violations of internal company policies are not protected activities under SOX. Wiest v. Lynch, No. 10-3288, 2011 WL 2923860, at *9 (E.D.Pa. July 21, 2011) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Marshall v. Northrup Gruman Holdings: 0: holding that the fact that employer had knowledge of the employees protected activity was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation where the timing of the discharge was not proximate to the protected activity 1: holding that informal complaints to superiors about discrimination constitute protected activity 2: recognizing that complaint to supervisor could constitute protected activity where employer was made aware of such complaint 3: holding that a sixmonth gap between the protected activity and the employees termination was insufficient to infer that the protected activity was a contributing factor 4: holding that raising a complaint about a violation of an internal policy is not considered protected activity


Input: the litigation.” MBI Grp., Inc. v. Credit Fonder Du Cameroun, 616 F.3d 568, 571 (D.C.Cir.2010) (emphases added). “A court first determines whether there is an adequate alternative forum and, if so, then proceeds to balance both private interest factors and public interest factors in favor of the respective forums.” Jackson v. Am. Univ. in Cairo, 52 Fed.Appx. 518, 518 (D.C.Cir.2002). The Supreme Court has explained that, ordinarily, the requirement of an adequate alternative forum “will be satisfied when the defendant is ‘amenable to process’ in the other jurisdiction.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981). However, “where the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory,” for example “where the alternative foru D.N.Y.1996)(<HOLDING>); Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press, 574 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that extreme delay in the alternative forum can render that forum inadequate 1: holding an alternative remedy to be inadequate where it would have caused great delay in the vindication of the petitioners rights 2: holding that ghana was an inadequate alternative forum for a former ghanian trade counselor suing a ghanian security official for alleged torture because plaintiff would be put in grave danger if forced to litigate there 3: holding inadequate alternative forum because the court believed that plaintiffs would not obtain justice at the hands of the courts administered by iranian mullahs and would probably be shot if they returned to iran 4: holding that paraguay was an inadequate alternative forum because the paraguayan government was implicated in the alleged wrongdoing and individuals investigating the case had been murdered


Input: as follows: When a company sells or transfers its assets to another company, the successor company does not acquire the liabilities of the transferor’s assets, unless (1) The sale transaction is, in effect, a consolidation or merger. (2) The successor corporation is merely a continuation of the transferor corporation. (3) The transaction is fraudulently entered into in order to escape liability. Dawejko v. Jorgensen, 290 Pa.Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106, 107-108 (1981) ¶ 11 The agent’s statements to Mr. Scanlon that Vista was told to “change its name” to DCL because Vista was being “taken over” by DCL, considered with other evidence adduced at trial, provides the evidentiary foundation for the charges of these three exceptions. Lockhart v. List, 542 Pa. 141, 148, 665 A.2d 1176, 1179 (1995) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 12 For all of the foregoing reasons, I Holdings: 0: holding that unless an erroneous instruction was unlikely to have changed the result of the trial a reviewing court cannot say that giving the instruction was harmless error 1: holding that in reviewing a jury instruction this court must review the entire instruction and look at all the evidence on the record to determine whether there was error and whether that error prejudiced the complaining party 2: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given 3: holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present 4: holding that a court reviewing an informal adjudication must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment


Input: 985 (3d Cir. 1988). In this case, it is evident that Prive’s injury occurred in the context of Dr. Fabian’s business activities. Clearly if Prive had tripped while in Dr. Fabian’s office, see also Harad, supra at 985, had been exposed to disease because Dr. Fabian had improperly labeled laboratory samples, see Doe v. Doctors Bryan, Hatcher, Vick and Gastings, 623 So.2d 722 (Ct.App.La. 1993), or had injured herself moving a patient, see Duprey v. Shane, 249 P.2d 8, 13 (Ca. 1952), a medical malpractice action would not be warranted. As these cases recognize, the proper recourse for a physician’s negligence toward nonpatients is a common law claim for negligence rather than a claim for medical malpractice. See Doe, supra at 723; see also Roe v. Federal Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 43, 49-50 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the exclusion clause in the Holdings: 0: holding that a patients settlement of a prior action brought against him by doctors for payment of a bill did not bar medical malpractice action against doctors 1: holding that doctors conduct toward patient that does not come within penumbra of doctorpatient relationship cannot form basis for malpractice action 2: holding that doctors may limit the extent of their responsibility to patients by narrowing the scope of the doctorpatient relationship 3: holding that provision would not be enforced due to that fact that the doctorpatient relationship is special and entitled to unique protection 4: holding that an obligation imposed by statute cannot form the basis for a statutory employer relationship


Input: de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim. Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 679 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir.2012). Sefa’s claims against the Cabinet are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment “bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief, against the state and its departments.” Thiokol Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, State of Mich., Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir.1993). Because Kentucky has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and Congress has not abrogated state sovereign immunity under sections 1981 and 1983 or any other federal statute cited by Sefa, his claims against the Cabinet cannot proceed. See Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 193-94 Holdings: 0: holding california school district a state agency for purposes of the eleventh amendment 1: holding that the eleventh amendment applies in  1981 litigation 2: holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981 3: holding that the eleventh amendment bars blyshrl and nychrl claims against a state agency in federal court 4: recognizing that section 1981 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment


Input: AND ORDER DISPOSING OF ALL PENDING MOTIONS McMAHON, District Judge. The various pending motions are disposed of as follows: 1. TM’s motion for Leave to Rely on the Statement of Ethan Miller is granted, and IBM’s cross-motion to strike the statement is denied. 2. IBM’s motion for summary judgment relating to the ’342 patent is denied, on the ground that there are myriad disputed issues of material fact, almost all of them concerning the question of substantial equivalence under the Doctrine 985). See also, e.g., C-Thru Products, Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 262 F.Supp. 213 (E.D.N.Y.1966) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 397 F.2d 952 (2nd Cir.1968); Servaas & Holdings: 0: holding that motions for summary judgment in patent cases must be considered with unusual caution 1: holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment 2: holding that summary judgment was appropriate because no genuine issue of material fact existed and no expert testimony was required to explain the nature of the patented invention but observing that district courts should approach summary judgment motions in patent cases with great care 3: holding that the trial court grants or denies motions for summary judgment on the basis of what is contained in the motions for summary judgment and the responses thereto 4: recognizing that summary judgment must be approached with special caution in discrimination cases


Input: regarding the remedial investigation that occurred from March 1996 through February 1997. Second, it contends that the public was not given a “meaningful” opportunity to comment on Aviall’s remedy selection because the public meeting held at the end of 2002 was merely a “sham.” Concerning the first argument (regarding the remedial investigation), the parties are again silent on the question whether all foreseeably affected parties were given a meaningful opportunity to comment. The court will therefore afford the p blic meetings did not allow meaningful opportunity for comment on remedy selection, where first did not even discuss issue, and second was held after plaintiff had already begun an “early and essential step” in remediation process); Pierson Sand, 1996 WL 338624, at *3-*4 (<HOLDING>). Thus the court declines to hold, as a matter Holdings: 0: holding that notice of judgment was insufficient 1: holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful 2: holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice 3: holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful and that the only public meetings held before remedial action were not meaningful because they did not discuss selection of remedy 4: holding that public meetings were not adequate where first was held without sufficient notice and second was held after remedy was already selected by means of consent judgment


Input: trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to make a factual determination as to whether Richardson’s failure to appear at his sentencing was willful. At this hearing, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Richardson willfully failed to appear. See Peacock v. State, 77 So.3d 1285, 1288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing Ingmire, 9 So.3d at 1281). If the State fails to establish willfulness, then Richardson should be sentenced in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement previously accepted by the trial court. See Lowery v. State, 22 So.3d 745, 749 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). REVERSED and REMANDED. TORPY, PALMER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur. 1 . Richardson’s plea agreement is known as a "Quarterman” agreement. See Quarterman v. State, 527 So.2d 1380 (Fla.1988) Holdings: 0: holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that as a matter of common sense a defendant is already under a legal duty not to go out and commit more crimes in the future regardless of whether the penalty is ordinary or enhanced neither the court nor counsel is required to advise a defendant what penalty he can expect to receive for crimes not yet committed the defendant can avoid further sentencing consequences enhanced or otherwise by refraining from committing new crimes future sentence enhancement for a later crime is not a direct consequence of a plea at all but is instead contingent first on the defendants voluntary decision to commit another crime second on whether the new crime is one capable of having enhanced sentencing and third on the prosecutors discretionary decision whether to seek enhancement future sentence enhancement is plainly a collateral consequence not a direct consequence of the defendants plea in the earlier case 2: holding specific performance of plea agreement proper remedy where defendant testified against all of his coconspirators and where court later unilaterally breached original plea agreement by imposing a ninety day term of incarceration in addition to sentence of probation that had been earlier agreed to without first providing1 defendant with opportunity to withdraw plea on the record 3: holding that the district court erred when it used rule 36 to amend the defendants sentence to include an order of forfeiture that had been agreed to in the plea agreement but which the court failed to make a part of its judgment at sentencing 4: holding that where a furlough and an enhanced sentence for failure to appear in court at a later time are part of the plea agreement a court is justified in imposing the enhanced sentence after the defendant fails to appear in court without giving him an opportunity to withdrawhis plea


Input: with Samek in Samek’s individual capacity, and not with Samek’s group practice. The court awarded Gerson $400,-000.00 in damages for breach of contract plus $371,835.62 in prejudgment interest, which had been pled in the complaint. The record reflects that there was competent and substantial evidence presented at trial that fully supports the jury verdict. “Credibility of the witnesses was a jury question. There was sufficient testimony upon which the jury could fix and determine the amount of damages. The testimony as to damages was not so uncertain, speculative, remote, contingent and inconclusive that it could not support or justify the verdict rendered.” McCall v. Sherbill, 68 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla.1953). See also Helman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 349 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Fla.1977)(<HOLDING>); Espino v. Anez, 665 So.2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 3d Holdings: 0: holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict 1: holding that a motion for directed verdict should be granted if there is no evidence on which a jury could legally base a verdict for damages against the moving party 2: holding that a verdict must be sustained against a sufficiency of the evidence challenge if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that a jury verdict will be sustained on any reasonable theory based on the evidence 4: holding that a district court must compare and weigh the opposing evidence and it must set aside the verdict if it determines that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence


Input: available only if the violation of state law “raises federal constitutional problems.” Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1145 n.7 (11th Cir.1987). Thus, whether or not the state court erred under Alabama law in its rulings at Davis’ trial is “largely beside the point” in the court’s analysis. Jammed v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.1991). IV. DISCUSSION Davis seeks habeas corpus relief as to his sentence of death based upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Roper, supra, and the court addresses this claim first. Davis also has raised and briefed six constitutional guilt-phase claims attacking the validity of his judgment of conviction which the court will address in the order in which the claims are asserted by Davis. See Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). A. Davis’Sentence of Death This case no Holdings: 0: holding that district court must resolve all claims for relief premised on alleged constitutional violations which are raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus whether habeas relief is granted or denied 1: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus 2: holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus 3: holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law 4: holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted


Input: 6 (1998). According to Kansas case law the generally accepted meaning of an accident is “an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character, and often accompanied by a manifestation of force.” Harris v. Richards, 254 Kan. 549, 553, 867 P.2d 325 (1994). According to USF & G, the allegations of negligent misrepresentations and negligence in inspecting the minivan and reporting the history of the minivan do not fit the generally accepted meaning of an “accident.” The Kansas Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether negligent misrepresentation or negligence in discovering and reporting safety defects constitutes an “accident.” This court believes that, if faced with the issue, the . of New York, 32 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1258 (D.Kan. 1998) (<HOLDING>); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Mike Miller Holdings: 0: holding that negligently allowing a statute of limitations to run does not constitute an ethical violation 1: holding that negligent construction is not sudden unexpected or unanticipated and does not constitute an accident 2: holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim 3: holding that the insurer did not have a duty to defend because the pleadings alleged that the defendants had acted intentionally rather than negligently 4: holding that the claim that the defendants negligently provided investment advice did not constitute an accident


Input: When Asbill initially entered the hotel’s office, Cruel was the only employee present, which represented to third parties that she was in charge. Asbill testified that Patidar told him that he could leave the papers with Cruel or that he could come back. Patidar similarly testified that he told Asbill it was up to him whether to leave the papers. Under these facts, we find that Patidar knowingly permitted Cruel to exercise authority to accept service of process and further find that his manifestations to Asbill indicated that Cruel had such authority. For these reasons, we hold that evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that Cruel was authorized to accept service. Brown v. Carolina Emergency Physicians, P.A., 348 S.C. 569, 583, 560 S.E.2d 624, 631 (Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>). II. Rule 55(c) Appellants argue that the Holdings: 0: holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand 1: holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required 2: holding that lack of appellate jurisdiction is fundamental error 3: holding unchallenged findings of fact are binding on an appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or there is no evidence to support the finding 4: recognizing that the findings of the circuit court on factual issues arising on a motion to quash service of process for lack of jurisdiction are binding on the appellate court unless wholly unsupported by the evidence or controlled by error of law


Input: Id. at 493-94. This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 494. “Well established precedent ... holds that the judgment in an action in which a government agency or officer represents private individuals is binding on those individuals.” Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 Holdings: 0: holding that consent decree in action by united states and state of alaska against exxon which resolved governments claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded nonparty sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against exxon 1: holding that lear does not abrogate general principles of res judicata or the res judicata effect of a consent decree regarding patent validity 2: holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action 3: holding parent company bound in subsequent action by res judicata effect of judgment against subsidiary 4: holding that the united states and the state of alaska as public trustees under the cwa and cercla could recover all lost use damages caused by the spill and that private claims for lost recreational use were barred under res judicata


Input: credence to Ms. Thompson-Wright’s tip. The justification for detaining appellant was markedly enhanced when Officer Chih learned (before taking him to the show-up) that appellant had recently arrived at the apartment (making it more likely that he was out in the neighborhood at the time of the robbery). Assessing the totality of these circumstances, the trial court properly avoided the “sort of divide-and-conquer analysis” in which appellant engages. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. 744. It did not err in concluding that the police acted reasonably in commanding appellant not to make any sudden moves, in patting him down to check for weapons, and in detaining him until the show-up procedure was complete. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Womack v. United States, 673 A.2d 603, 608 Holdings: 0: holding that a limited search of the outer clothing of a suspect for weapons is reasonable where the officer has a reasonable articulable basis for believing that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous 1: holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger 2: holding that an officer making a reasonable investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect  and he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective purpose 3: holding that absent probable cause to arrest a police officer may approach an individual to conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal conduct is afoot 4: holding that long authorizes protective search of vehicle for weapons during terry stop even when suspect is outside vehicle and effectively under police control


Input: between investigative detentions and custody are legion. Thus, to discuss the issue here, it is necessary to use that investigative detention/custody framework. Nevertheless, the use of the term investigative detention when discussing the Fifth Amendment should be interpreted as a non-custodial encounter under Miranda rather than a Fourth Amendment stop under Terry. 27 . See United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 296 (6th Cir.1988) (Jones, J., concurring) (concluding "since a valid Terry seizure is, by definition, not a ‘full seizure’ — a term synonymous with ‘arrest’ — a person properly seized on reasonable and articulable suspicion for a brief investigatory detention could never be considered ‘in custody’ so long as the scope and duration of the Terry stop do not exceed h Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 29 . If custody and investigative detention Holdings: 0: holding defendant was in custody under miranda while being detained under terry 1: holding police officer knew that miranda rights are required to be given only to individuals who are in custody and although giving miranda warnings to a detainee may not automatically convert a terry stop into an arrest it is evidence that the nature of the detention has grown more serious 2: holding a defendant was not in custody for purposes of miranda after he consented to go to police headquarters 3: holding miranda inapplicable because defendant not in custody 4: holding that defendant was not in miranda custody during knock and talk interview at his residence


Input: $5 and costs, conviction reversed); Jones v. Opelika (1942) 316 U.S. 584 [86 L.Ed. 1691, 62 S.Ct. 1231, 141 A.L.R. 514] (selling books without license, reversed) (fine of unstated amount, see Cole v. City of Fort Smith (1941) 202 Ark. 614 [151 S.W.2d 1000]); Schneider v. Irvington (1939) 308 U.S. 147 [84 L.Ed. 155, 60 S.Ct. 146] (violation on ban on public distribution of leaflets, convictions reversed) (fines of $5, see Commonwealth v. Nichols (1938) 301 Mass. 584 [18 N.E.2d 166], and $25, see People v. Young (1938) 33 Cal.App.2d Supp. 747 [85 P.2d 231]); Lovell v. Griffin (1938) 303 U.S. 444 [82 L.Ed. 949, 58 S.Ct. 666] (distribution of literature without permission of city manager, $50 fine, conviction reversed); Davis v. Massachusetts (1897) 167 U.S. 43 [42 L.Ed. 71, 17 S.Ct. .731] (<HOLDING>). 3 Since Congressman Tunney’s appearance at Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for imposition of that fine 1: holding meeting without a permit fine of unstated amount conviction affirmed 2: holding meeting without permit fine of 25 plus costs conviction reversed 3: holding religious meeting in public park without license 20 fine conviction affirmed 4: holding meeting without permit 10 fine conviction reversed


Input: for dependency did not reference abandonment. The father’s position is unfounded because the petition for dependency alleged generally that the parents had abused and neglected the child, and the trial court stated on the record that the child was found dependent based upon the father’s neglect. The father also argues that this court erred when it dismissed his first appeal based upon a determination that the trial court’s order finding his daughter dependent but withholding an adjudication of dependency. was not a final, appealable order. Although both parties recognize that this issue is now moot, both request appellate review because of an apparent inconsistency in the manner in which our court has addressed this issue. See Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So.2d 964 (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>). We agree that appellate review is warranted Holdings: 0: recognizing the general principle that a party who fails to address an issue has conceded the issue 1: holding that an appellate court cannot address on appeal an issue never ruled upon by the trial court 2: holding that the court can properly address an issue which although moot is likely to recur 3: holding that the court properly refused to instruct on an issue for which no evidence was offered 4: holding that although an address in which the zip code is incorrect may be properly addressed an address in which both the zip code and the street address is incorrect is not properly addressed


Input: agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party. 5 U.S.C. § 702. The civil forfeiture in Plaintiffs’ case was achieved by a consent judgment in judicial proceedings; the civil forfeiture did not involve agency action. By its own terms, § 702 only applies where the party seeks judicial review of agency action. Because the instant forfeiture took place in the context of a civil judicial proceeding, there is no agency action for the district court or this Court to review. See Comm, of Blind Vendors of D.C. v. District of Columbia, 28 F.3d 130, 134 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The APA therefore cannot be the basis for a Holdings: 0: holding that under the apa exhaustion is a prerequisite to judicial review when expressly required by statute or when an agency rule requires appeal before review so long as the administrative action is made inoperative pending that review 1: holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record 2: holding apa 5 usc  702 inapplicable because no agency proceeding took place for the court to review 3: holding that the apa does not afford an implied grant of subjectmatter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action 4: holding a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands


Input: Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. Alternatively, Markwell claims that his alleged action is immunized based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See Def. Mot. to Dismiss (d/e 14) at 15. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides that “parties may petition the government for official action favorable to their interests without fear of suit, even if the results of the petition, if granted, might harm the interests of others.” See Tarpley v. Keistler, 188 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir.1999). The doctrine protects “litigation, lobbying, and speech... as an application of the First Amendment’s speech and petitioning clauses.” New West, LP v. Joliet, 491 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir.2007). The Seventh Circuit has extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to government officials as well. See id. at 721-22 (7th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In doing so, the court recognized that public Holdings: 0: recognizing criticisms of public officials is at core of speech protected by first amendment 1: holding that ijnjuries caused by the condition of a public entitys property  clearly refers to ownership of a property interest which allows a public entity to control the property 2: holding that joliet public officials actions of filing litigation sending letters and making public statements regarding a property in an effort to persuade the department of housing and urban development to cut funding to the property were protected by the first amendment 3: holding that alleged misconduct by public officials particularly by law enforcement officials is matter of public concern 4: holding that a public entitys property refers to the public entity that owns the property where a dangerous condition exists


Input: v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144 (1986); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977)). The State contends that Smith is distinguishable from the present case, stating that, unlike in Smith, where the trial judge ruled that proof of a required element of the charged offense was lacking, here, the State was required to prove an additional element that the statute does not require. In short, the State argues that Carter was never “acquitted” for double-jeopardy purposes. We cannot agree. To begin with, the Supreme Court’s definition of “acquittal” in Smith, only requires a “resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Smith, 125 S.Ct at 1134 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the State has failed to cite a Holdings: 0: recognizing ruling on motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo on appeal 1: holding that an application is  pending from the time it is first filed  emphasis added 2: holding that competency is appropriately defined as the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed upon the convict emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added 4: holding that an acquittal may be based on a ruling by the court however mistaken that the evidence is insufficient to convict emphasis added


Input: bright line rule designed to exclude the use of state wrongful death statutes for deaths occurring within territorial waters. See, e.g., Moragne, supra, 398 U.S. at 401, n. 15, 90 S.Ct. at 1788 n. 15; Neal v. Barisich, Inc., supra at 866-867; Matter of S.S. Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 752 (5 Cir.1976). However, “it appears that [that] choice of law question is not relevant to disposition of [the now pending] summary judgment motion ... [because plaintiffs’ state claims] are not permitted [in any event] where they would be in conflict with the applicable substantive admiralty law”. Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F.Supp. 942, 949 (D.Conn.1989) (Cabranes, J.); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Complaint of DFDS Seaways (Bahamas) Ltd., 684 Holdings: 0: holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law 1: holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law 2: holding that reverseerie doctrine requires that substantive remedies afforded by state law conform to federal maritime standards 3: holding that general maritime law preempts state law 4: holding that jurisdiction must be resolved before applying the act of state doctrine because that doctrine is a substantive rule of law


Input: or the nature of the position for which the defendant was employed. Obviously, a janitor employed by the government that defies department rules and/or his supervisor’s orders could not be reasonably deemed to be entitled to official immunity when he decides not to post a “wet floor” sign after mopping. The janitor’s duty to post such a sign could not be deemed to require “the exercise of reason in the adaptation of means to an end and discretion in determining how or whether an act should be done or course pursued” regardless of whether such action is required by statute or state regulation. Indeed, Missouri cases have routinely denied official immunity in instances where no statute or state regulation was violated. See Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Mo.App. W.D.2010) (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. Brandt, 325 S.W.3d 481, 483 Holdings: 0: holding that mayor is a high public official 1: holding that it was a jury question whether a general warning to avoid excessive pressure was adequate to reveal the danger of an exploding safety ring at a high pressure setting 2: holding dismissal of petition was erroneous and that the defendant failed to demonstrate entitlement to official immunity where the plaintiff averred that the defendant a public employee negligently injured him while operating a high pressure hose 3: holding that stateagent immunity was not available to a county employee who sued the plaintiff and had him arrested for operating without a business license because the evidence showed that in so doing the defendant acted with malice willfullness or  so beyond his authority that sovereign immunity would not apply footnote omitted 4: holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that speech was public concern


Input: While not specifically enumerated in the terms of Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution, the opportunity to pursue employment is, nonetheless, necessary to enjoy the right to pursue life’s basic necessities.” Wadsworth v. Montana, 275 Mont. 287, 299, 911 P.2d 1165, 1172 (1996). In Wadsworth, the Montana Supreme Court held “that the opportunity to pursue employment, while not specifically enumerated as a fundamental constitutional right under Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution is, notwithstanding, necessarily encompassed within it and is itself a fundamental right because it is a right ‘without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311-13 (1986) (<HOLDING>)). Plaintiffs want to equate the opportunity to Holdings: 0: recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution 1: holding that montanas constitution does not create a right to welfare 2: holding that rcw 1040200 does not create a constitutional right to be advised of immigration consequences therefore failure to comply with statute does not create constitutional harm 3: holding that the employer intended to create a new employee welfare benefit plan 4: holding that the constitution does not encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information


Input: itself,” Lim, 224 F.3d at 936, here Salguero-Castro testified to threats “with more”—the threats were menacing and were combined with an (albeit unsuccessful) attempt by the military to shoot and kill Salguero-Castro. As the majority notes, in Gui v. INS, we found past persecution when an applicant was first threatened and then survived a staged car crash. 280 F.3d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir.2002). The reasoning in Gui supports a finding of past persecution here: “The fact that [Salguero-Castro] did not in fact die or suffer serious injury in [the shooting incident] should not mitigate the severity of the acts. Had he been maimed in the [shooting incident], persecution would be established easily.” Gui, 280 F.3d at 1229. See also Del Carmen Molina v. INS, 170 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir.1999)(<HOLDING>); Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs who had been served and received responses to interrogatories on personal jurisdiction had had such a fair opportunity 1: holding that substantial evidence did not support agencys finding fear speculative when petitioner had offered evidence that she had already had two children that she planned to have more that she had gone to great lengths to avoid being sterilized in china and that she had removed her iud after escaping to the united states 2: holding that defendant adequately indicated to officers that she sought assistance of counsel when she stated that she wanted to call her lawyer and officer testified that request was unambiguous 3: holding that alien who had received numerous death threats and whose colleagues were murdered by the military had not proven past persecution 4: holding that where petitioner testified that some of her cousins had been killed because they served in the military and that she had received two threatening notes she had demonstrated past persecution


Input: also moved to strike Asphalt as class representative arguing that Asphalt lacked the requisite typicality and commonality because Nextel had unique defenses applicable only to Asphalt. At the hearing, affidavits and depositions were introduced. Thereafter, the trial court granted the motion to strike Asphalt as class representative, but denied the motion for summary judgment. The parties filed motions for rehearing and/or reconsideration. Following a hearing, the trial court also granted final summary judgment against Asphalt. This appeal follows. First, contrary to H & J and Asphalt’s assertion, we find that the trial court acted within its discretion by striking them as class representatives. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a); Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>); Weinstein v. American Biomaterials Corp., 123 Holdings: 0: holding that a class action may continue even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot 1: holding that trial court may not consider whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail 2: holding that after a class is certified the controversy may exist  between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot 3: holding that trial court may consider honesty and trustworthiness of the named plaintiff to judge the adequacy of representation 4: recognizing the range of discretion of the trial judge


Input: and, given the absence of contrary law in the First Circuit, this Court concludes that the award of $8,000 of Wife’s pension to Husband did not create a dischargeable debt. It is both equitable and in conformance with the clear majority rule, that this Court affirms the Order of the Bankruptcy Court that Husband has a vested property interest in an amount of $8,000 in Wife’s pension fund and that such interest was not a prepetition debt of the Bankruptcy estate. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED and this appeal is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 1 . A vast majority of courts have followed the line of cases holding that an interest in a spouse’s pension awarded prepetition is not a dischargeable debt. Chandler v. Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>), Hall v. Hall, 51 B.R. 1002 (S.D.Ga.1985) Holdings: 0: holding former wifes cause of action accrued at the time of former husbands failure to pay her the portion of his retirement benefits to which she was entitled which was no earlier than the date of his actual retirement 1: holding that wife had standing to seek disinterment where death of husband occurred prior to entry of decree of divorce 2: holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce 3: recognizing that a divorce decree which obligated the divorcing husband to name the children of his first marriage as the irrevocable beneficiaries of an insurance policy precluded him from naming his new wife as a beneficiary entitled to a portion of the insurance benefits 4: holding debtor could not discharge that portion of his monthly army retirement benefits awarded to his wife pursuant to a divorce decree


Input: have moved for summary judgment does not permit the entry of a summary judgment if disputes remain as to material facts. However, cross motions for summary judgments do authorize the court to assume that there is no evidence which needs to be considered other than that which has been filed by the parties. Harrison W. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Co., 662 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir.1981) (citations omitted). See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Am. Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir.1976)(“[F]iling of cross-motions under Rule 56, F.R. Civ. P. raises the inference that there is no evidence other than the pleadings and supporting instruments to be considered, and so the trial court need only examine those materials in ascertaining whether an issue of material fact exists.” (8th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>). “The district court has discretion to go Holdings: 0: holding that the district court has no affirmative obligation to plumb the record to procure material facts 1: holding that a failure to advise even when the defendant has an affirmative obligation to do so is not the same as engaging in affirmative misconduct  2: holding state has affirmative duty to disclose favorable and material evidence to defense 3: holding that the court has an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority 4: holding that the court had no obligation to search large record extract


Input: execute their duties as police officers. Thus, this type of communication falls squarely within the scope of speech as a public employee under Garcetti. Moreover, the fact that plaintiff also copied the Memorandum to next level of supervision (i.e., the Village Board) does not alter the analysis in this case. The fact that plaintiff not only expressed the grievance to his immediate supervisor, but also to the entity ultimately responsible for the proper functioning of the police department is simply further evidence that this speech was not citizen speech; rather, the Memorandum — whether required or not— was clearly pursuant to his duties as a police officer. See, e.g., White v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., No. 8:06-CV-1626-T27MAP, 2008 WL 227990, at *5 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 25, 2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Knight v. Drye, 375 Fed.Appx. 280, Holdings: 0: holding that where approval of the board of directors was not formally requested a demand would have been futile for it could hardly be expected that if approval of the board of directors were sought defendant who controlled 50 of the board would have authorized the action against himself 1: holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties 2: holding that letter that was copied to the schools board of directors was written pursuant to her duties and was not protected speech 3: holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law 4: holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected


Input: the county claims statute could limit. Pross, 303 S.E.2d at 890. The United States Supreme Court has also employed a similar rule of statutory construction when interpreting whether the United States is included as a “person” within federal legislation: Since, in common usage, the term “person” does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it. But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 743-44, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941) (<HOLDING>). Employing the above standards, we are Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff may state a claim under the sherman act for a defendants enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the pto where the plaintiff alleges deliberate fraud and the other elements of a monopolization claim under section 2 of the sherman act 1: holding that the government is liable under the ftca in the same respect as a private person under the law of the place where the act occurred 2: holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act 3: holding that the use of the words any person was insufficient under the ordinary dignities of speech to authorize an action by the federal government for treble damages under the sherman act 4: holding treble damages under the civil theft statute are punitive


Input: of his excessive force grieva rrectional officer shut off water for five days because the prisoner used the prison grievance system was sufficient to state a retaliation claim); Burgess, 39 F.3d at 218 (threat made in retaliation for a prisoner’s use of the prison grievance system is sufficient to state a First Amendment retaliation claim). A reasonable jury could conclude that Blair’s placement of Santiago in a cell without his personal property, proper facilities, bedding, or clothing and Blair’s threat that things would get worse, issued after hearing Santiago complain that he was being retaliated against, are adverse actions sufficient to chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from engaging in the prison grievance process. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 398 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Santiago has also satisfied the causal Holdings: 0: holding that the prison physician lacked standing to raise the prisoners rights of access to the courts 1: holding that harassment physical threats and transfer to the area of the prison used to house mentally disturbed inmates especially combined with the conditions allegedly present there would likely deter a prisoner of ordinary firmness from exercising a right to access the courts 2: holding that the record contained insufficient evidence that increasing the prisoners work load would chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from using the prison grievance process 3: holding that although prison inmates have a first amendment right to access to the courts prison officials may regulate law library access including reasonable time place and manner of access taking into account the administrative needs of the institution 4: holding that threats to an inmates safety after his use of the prison grievance system supported a retaliation claim


Input: existing driveways and curb cuts in light of the statutory change that has affected the plaintiff’s ability to use his deeded easement. This conduct is the functional equivalent of the obstruction or impairment contemplated in Sakansky and Bean. The trial court also found that the deviation proposed by the plaintiff would not unduly burden the defendant. We uphold such findings if they are supported by the evidence and are not erroneous as a matter of law. See Batakis v. Town of Belmont, 135 N.H. 595, 597, 607 A.2d 956, 957 (1992). The record supports the trial court’s findings. Under these circumstances, the owner of the dominant estate may deviate from the deeded easement to the extent reasonably necessary to secure an egress to the highway. Cf. Haley v. Colcord, 59 N.H. 7, 9 (1879) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we uphold the trial court’s ruling Holdings: 0: holding that an easement is not a separate estate when dominant and servient tracts are under the same ownership 1: holding that the owner of the dominant tenement may extinguish an easement appurtenant by specifically excluding it from a conveyance of the dominant estate 2: holding that the burden on the servient estate cannot be increased without the consent of the owners of the servient estate and that the owner of the dominant estate to which the appurtenant easement is attached has no power to convey or expand use of that easement in connection with a tract of land owned by another 3: recognizing that the dominant easement owner not the servient estate owner bears responsibility for maintaining an easement 4: holding that dominant tenant may deviate from path of prescriptive easement to extent reasonably necessary to pass around obstruction created by servient tenant


Input: in employment discrimination cases,” citing Haglof v. Northwest Rehabilitation, Inc., 910 F.2d 492, 495 (8th Cir.1990); Hillebrand, 827 F.2d at 364). Summary judgment is appropriate in employment discrimination cases only in “those rare instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion.” Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244; see also Webb v. St. Louis Posh-Dispatch, 51 F.3d 147, 148 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244); Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244). To put it another way, “[b]e-cause discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant.” Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (<HOLDING>); accord Snow, 128 F.3d at 1205 (“Because Holdings: 0: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 1: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate 2: holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact 3: holding that unsupported allegations or denials are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment 4: holding that an eeoc reasonable cause determination letter did not constitute evidence precluding summary judgment when the other evidence was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact


Input: held that “[e]ach patent asserted raises an independent and distinct cause of action.” Id. at 1555-56. Plaintiffs argument appears to be a red herring. While the Court understands that, for purposes of res judi-cata, each patent is distinct, there is undoubtedly no question here as to whether the '505 and '418 patents are independent of the four patents involved in the 2006 Maryland action. Thus, the issue here is not one of res judicata; rather, it is whether StemCells subjected itself to the jurisdiction of this Court when it filed a prior suit against Neuralstem with respect to related patents, involving the same parties, and arising out of the same transaction or same nucleus of operative facts. See Gen. Contracting & Trading Co. v. Interpole, Inc., 940.F.2d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The Court is satisfied that there exists Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant that invokes the jurisdiction of a court as a plaintiff waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim for which it invoked the courts jurisdiction 1: holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property 2: holding that a defendant who elected to avail itself of the benefit of a state courts jurisdiction by filing a prior suit against the same party waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim and arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts for which it originally invoked the courts jurisdiction 3: holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction 4: holding that unlike subject matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction may be waived


Input: In Comdisco, the taxpayer submitted information to a taxing authority listing the value of its taxable property at “$13,000,000” instead of “$1,300,000.” 927 S.W.2d at 326. The court of appeals held that, under the provisions of section 25.25(c) of the Tax Code, the taxpayer’s alleged mistake was the result of a clerical error, and the court of appeals reversed the summary judgment that had been granted in favor of the taxing authority and remanded the case for a determination of the actual value of the property. Id. at 327-28. We note that, in Comdisco, the taxpayer’s alleged error resulted from the addition of an extra decimal place. Id. at 326; see also Handy Hardware Wholesale, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 985 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Here, Marubeni alleges that the errors in its Holdings: 0: holding that it was a clerical error readily correctable under frcrim p 36 where the judgment of conviction named a different subsection than that for which the defendant was charged and tried but where the penalties under those subsections were the same 1: holding sufficient evidence existed that the victim was not released in a safe place where the victim was left tied to a tree in a damp wooded area fortyfive feet off a dirt road and ninetythree feet down a path 2: holding that there was sufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where a bullet came within fifteen feet of a bystander 3: holding that the court made a clerical error or was just guilty of creating ambiguous verbiage where it sentenced the defendant to parole under counts four and five instead of one and three and concluding that the answer is for the order to be corrected not vacated 4: holding that taxing authoritys incorrect listing of warehouse as having 20125 square feet instead of 201250 square feet was correctable clerical error under section 2525c of the tax code


Input: credits. Stated another way, the ALC may not summarily decline to hear an inmate appeal solely on the ground that it involves the loss of the opportunity to earn-sentence related credits. Turning to the facts of the instant case, the ALC should not have summarily dismissed Appellant’s appeal as it involved more than a review of the loss of the opportunity to earn good-time credits and a reduction in earned-work credits. Appellant also challenged the SCDC’s enforcement of the policy forbidding one inmate from providing legal assistance to another inmate. Because Appellant’s claim constitutes an as-applied constitutional challenge to the policy, the ALC could have ruled on this claim. See Travelscape, LLC v. S.C. Dep’t of Rev., 391 S.C. 89, 108-09, 705 S.E.2d 28, 38-39 (2011) (<HOLDING>). However, for reasons that will be discussed, Holdings: 0: holding that the district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs asapplied challenge to the constitutionality of the tennessee collateral review statutes under rookerfeldman 1: holding that a state prisoner may not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under 42 usc  1983 2: holding that the alc may not rule upon a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a regulation or statute but may rule upon an asapplied challenge 3: holding that a facial challenge to regulation accrues when the agency publishes its rule in the federal register 4: recognizing that categorical constitutional challenge was fundamentally similar to asapplied constitutional challenge initially raised on appeal


Input: the date of the court’s October 1995 judgment) from the es-crowed sales proceeds. Sandra filed a motion to amend the judgment, arguing that the court should reverse its award of interest on the $6,693 it awarded to the IRS. Sandra also moved the court to award her interest, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2411, on the funds that the IRS would have to return to her. The court granted Sandra’s motion in part, deleting the interest awarded to the IRS, but denied her request for interest. The government filed a timely notice of appeal and Sandra filed a timely notice of cross-appeal in June 1999. In October 1999, the government petitioned this court for en banc review of the Craft I decision. The government argued that the Craft I decision — as well Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>), a prior decision upon which the Craft I court Holdings: 0: holding that when the united states held a senior tax lien it was an indispensable party under the controlling federal tax law 1: holding that the right to disclaim property under state law does not defeat a federal tax lien because the taxpayer exercised control over the disposition of the property 2: holding that under michigan law tenants in the entirety possess sufficient property interests for federal tax liens to attach 3: holding that no tax liens may attach to property after the fdic acquired title 4: holding that federal government may not under michigan law attach lien to entireties property to satisfy individual tax liability of one spouse


Input: public interest.” Administrative agencies are far better suited than áre courts to make determinations based on the broad policy question of what is in the “public interest.” Third, § 925(c) contains a restriction on the consideration of new evidence by the district courts, stating; “The court may in its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.” This constraint on the admission of evidence suggests that the initial adjudication of applications is limited to the Secretary of the Treasury. We therefore conclude that Congress in tended for district court review to be contingent on an initial consideration of an application by the Secretary. See Saccacio v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 211 F.3d 102, 104 (4th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Owen v. Magaw, 122 F.3d 1350, 1354 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that persons seeking restoration of federal firearms privileges need not exhaust administrative remedies to invoke the judicial review provision of section 925c 1: holding that congress clearly intended to suspend  925c relief by denial of funding for investigating and processing applications under the statute and denying writ of mandamus 2: holding that section 925c authorizes judicial review of only the denial of an application for relief 3: holding that the only role for the judiciary is judicial review of a denial of relief under  925c 4: holding that the standard of review is abuse of discretion and an appeal from denial of rule 60b relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review


Input: injury and intrude into a state-administered and judicially-ordered execution in the manner proposed by Arthur. X. TURNER FACTORS Lewis further explained that Bounds “must be read in pari materia” with Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), which held “that a prison regulation impinging on inmates’ constitutional rights ‘is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’ ” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361, 116 S.Ct. at 2185 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 88, 107 S.Ct. at 2262). The courts thus must “accord adequate deference to the judgment of the prison’ authorities,” especially with inmates in lockdown or other inmates “presenting special disciplinary and security concerns.” Id.; see also Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has laid out four factors Holdings: 0: holding that turner did not cast doubt on the courts previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons 1: holding that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for racial classifications even in the prison context 2: holding that strict scrutiny applies 3: recognizing in a  1983 case brought by a deathrow prisoner that the deferential turner standard differs from the strict standards of scrutiny applicable to the con stitutional rights of persons in free society 4: holding that judicial scrutiny of attorney performance must be highly deferential


Input: 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). In all “special needs” cases, the nature of the need addressed makes particularized suspicion impossible or otherwise renders the warrant requirement impractical. For example, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), the Court noted that requiring a warrant before a search of a probationer’s home would “interfere to an appreciable degree with the probation system,” and would “reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create.” Similarly, the Burger Court noted that “surprise is crucial if the regulatory scheme aimed at remedying this major social problem is to function at all.” 482 U.S. at 710, 107 S.Ct. 2636; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (<HOLDING>). If a special need renders the warrant Holdings: 0: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 1: holding that the need for flexibility within the probation system and the special relationship existing between a probationer and his probation officer justified departing from the usual warrant requirement 2: holding that imposing the traditional warrant and probablecause requirements would unduly interfere with the effective administration of the illinois probation system because the process of obtaining a warrant would delay the officers ability to respond to evidence of misconduct by the probationer and would facilitate the probationers evasion of probation conditions through concealment of misconduct 3: recognizing the searchincidenttoarrest exception to the warrant requirement 4: recognizing that the special need articulated must make the warrant and probablecause requirement impracticable before waiving those requirements


Input: motive for the Challenged Laws. Before reaching that question, however, the Court notes that Defendants contend once again, in the context of Plaintiffs’ free exercise claim, that housing is not eligible for free exercise protection because it is not a religious use. (See, e.g., Defs.’ Mem. 2.) However, at least in the context of RLUIPA, the Court has already found that “the building of rabbinical college,” of which student housing would be a part, “falls squarely within [the] definition of ‘religious exercise,’ ” and that “the multi-family dormitories that [Plaintiffs] seek to build are intended to facilitate religious exercise.” Tartikov, 915 F.Supp.2d at 629. The same analysis is applicable here. Because the definition of religious exercise is quite broad, see WDS I, 386 F.3d at 186 (<HOLDING>), accessory housing, and particularly accessory Holdings: 0: holding exempt under ors 307130 which relates to other charitable institutions a building that was used as an office for a religious official and religious court and a printing press for a religious publication 1: holding that the defendant countys two denials of variance permits under the circumstances had to a significantly great extent lessened the prospect of the religious institution being able to construct a temple in the future thus imposing a substantial burden on the religious institutions religious exercise 2: holding rluipa claim requires prisoner to show he wishes to engage in 1 a religious exercise 2 motivated by a sincerely held belief which exercise 3 is subject to a substantial burden imposed by the government 3: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise 4: recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion


Input: and are not likely to be working as blackjack dealers, bingo callers, or other employees of Indian casinos.” Def.’s Reply In Supp. of Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. at 8. This logic cannot be refuted. NIGC’s decision not to search these records was reasonable. See Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485-89 (D.C.Cir.1984). Even if the Enforcement Division’s individual investigatory files contained responsive records, NIGC asserts that those files are law enforcement documents which, in the absence of a waiver, are exempt under FOIA Exemption 7(C) because their disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C); see Melius v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 96-CV-2210 (TFH), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17537, at *14-15 (<HOLDING>). The Court agrees that NIGC’s investigations Holdings: 0: holding that nigcs individual background files are law enforcement records subject to exemption 7c and that in the absence of a waiver disclosure is not required by foia because individuals mentioned in law enforcement investigatory reports  have a presumptive privacy interest in keeping their names undisclosed 1: holding that names and address of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c  are exempt from disclosure 2: holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure 3: holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure   4: holding that names of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c are categorically exempt from disclosure unless disclosing such information is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity


Input: that refusal may be admissible in a subsequent prosecution; (2) if the person refuses to submit to the taking of the specimen, the person’s license to operate a motor vehicle will be automatically suspended, whether or not the person is subsequently prosecuted as a result of the arrest, for not less than 180 days;.... The statute was later amended to also require a warning that "if the person refuses to submit to the taking of a specimen, the officer may apply for a warrant authorizing a specimen to be taken from the person.” Act of May 23, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S. ch. 674 § 2011 Tex. Sess. Law serv. 1627 (West). 3 . The fact that Barker’s comments were in response to Appellant’s questions does not by itself render the trooper’s statements non-coercive. See, e.g., Hall, 649 S.W.2d 627 (<HOLDING>). It is, however, a factor to consider. Holdings: 0: holding that the issue of the voluntariness of a settlement agreement is waived on appeal if not raised before the board 1: holding that because of the factbound nature of the inquiry determination of voluntariness of consent to search is reviewed for clear error 2: recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law 3: holding that the evidence raised the issue of voluntariness of consent even though the officers comments were in response to an inquiry by the suspect 4: recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances


Input: CURIAM. Opal Coleman appeals from an order of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granting summary judgment in favor of the Arkansas Department of Correction, Varner Unit (ADC), in her Title VII action alleging discrimination and constructive discharge on the basis of her race (African-American). For reversal, Coleman argues that (1) the district court erroneously construed her complaint as simply raising claims of a hostile work environment and constructive discharge, rather than discrimination; (2) she produced sufficient evidence of d 6 (8th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Holdings: 0: holding that selfserving deposition testimony standing alone is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment 1: holding affidavits based on conclusory allegations insufficient at summary judgment 2: holding that party may not rely on conclusory statements or an argument that the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment are not credible 3: holding that affidavits that are conclusory and based on hearsay can not be used to oppose motion for summary judgment 4: holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony standing alone are insufficient to withstand a properlysupported motion for summary judgment


Input: mentioning Turner’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace. 5. The ALJ also did not err in accepting the vocational expert’s testimony that Turner could perform jobs with Level 2 reasoning. The RFC determination limiting Turner to “simple, repetitive tasks,” which adequately encompasses Turner’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, is compatible with jobs requiring Level 2 reasoning. See Dictionary of Occupational Titles, app. C, § III (4th ed. 1991) (defining jobs with Level 2 reasoning as requiring the employee to “carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions” and “[d]eal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations”); compare Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). 6. The ALJ erred by failing to set forth Holdings: 0: recognizing conflict 1: holding that there was a conflict between an rfc of simple routine or repetitive work and level 3 reasoning 2: recognizing conflict between circuits 3: recognizing the conflict 4: recognizing possible conflict between the cases


Input: simply did not bar the use of the residual exception. We note that Judge Wiss dissented from the Court’s decision on this issue and complained “that the majority has erred by shuffling past one of the three absolute prerequisites for admission of hearsay under” the residual exception by passing over the fact that the child/vietim in Morgan was available and did testify, albeit in a somewhat limited manner. 40 M.J. at 413 (Wiss, J., dissenting). (2). As to the second part of the appellant’s argument, that AK’s testimony should not have been admitted because better evidence (i.e., Mr. Mills’ tes ority for his contention except to quote our opinion in Martindale out of context. Martindale did not involve the exclusion or possible exclusion of other evidence because, as we pointed out 88) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that this aspect of Mil.R.Evid. Holdings: 0: holding also that only a childs first statement made is admissible under the exception 1: holding childvictims statement to babysitter admissible un der residual exception in addition to statement to physician under medical treatment exception 2: holding multiple statements by childvictim and childs mother admissible under residual exception 3: holding statement by childvictim to teachers aide admissible under residual exception in addition to statements to school nurse and pediatrician under medical treatment exception 4: holding ehildvictims testimony at pretrial investigation admissible under residual exception in addition to doctors testimony under medical treatment exception


Input: Proposal 2 interfered with the Air Force’s right to hire employees, the Authority found the Proposal negotiable under 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3) because it concerned “appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected” by the Air Force’s exercise of its hiring authority. Id. at 914. II In its petition, the Air Force contends, for the first time, that it had no duty to negotiate over Proposals 1 and 2 because they conflicted with federal statutes and regulations governing VRAs. It also argues the Authority erred when it determined that Proposals 1 and 2 did not improperly infringe on management authority. We find the first claim waived and the second insufficient to overcome our deferential standard of review. See Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. FLRA, 745 F.2d 705, 707-08 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). A The Air Force identifies two alleged Holdings: 0: holding that cis rejection of visa renewal application was not arbitrary capricious an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law 1: recognizing that a court may reverse the pelrbs actions where those actions are arbitrary capricious or an abuse of discretion    not supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole or otherwise not in accordance with law 2: holding that court may set aside lsc decisions that are arbitrary and capricious or are not based on substantial evidence 3: recognizing a nonstatutory basis for setting aside an arbitration award if it is arbitrary and capricious 4: holding an authority ruling may only be set aside if arbitrary capricious an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law