Input: Fact No. 1-5 made in the Referee’s first decision. Claimant argues that there is no substantial evidence that the “letters” and “calls” to Claimant made by Employer took place after July 11, 2011. Claimant is correct. The contacts took place in January of 2011, at a time when Claimant did not believe she could do any job. In sum, we agree with Claimant that Employer did not present any evidence that it ever offered her a job after July 11, 2011. The Board sidesteps the question of when Employer contacted Claimant about available jobs. It contends that when Claimant “released” herself to work at some kind of job, her absence from work immediately became unexcused. In support, the Board relies upon Oliver v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 69 Pa.Cmwlth. 98, 450 A.2d 287 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Here, there is no relevant work rule or Holdings: 0: holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim 1: holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy 2: holding that the claimant committed willful misconduct when she did not return to work at the end of her leave and did not comply with her employers notification policy 3: holding that employers policy which required employee to work without pay in violation of federal law was unreasonable and employees refusal to comply was not misconduct 4: holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave


Input: Jenney’s claim does not necessarily require proof through his conversations with his attorney, the sword and shield doctrine does not apply to waive his attorney-client privilege. Cf. Long v. Murphy, 663 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (rejecting application of the sword and shield doctrine to waive attorney-client privilege because the plaintiff could rely on his own testimony and cross-examination of the defendants to prove his case and thus had no need to use privileged communications with his attorneys to establish his claims). Moreover, attorney-client privilege is not waived simply because the credibility of Jenney’s statements concerning his intent could possibly be impeached by his communications with his former attorney. See Cuillo v. Cuillo, 621 So.2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>). Were this court to hold otherwise, it would Holdings: 0: holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts 1: holding that former wifes interest in her homestead was held in cotenancy with a mortgagee who succeeded to her former husbands 2617 fee simple interest 2: holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment 3: holding that the former husbands property from a noninterspousal gift may not be distributed under section 610751 although use of the former husbands separate property may be awarded to the former wife to satisfy the former husbands child support obligation 4: holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney


Input: for an exclusionary rule analysis, we will remand. A government search of a private home presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances or a valid warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). To be valid, the relevant portion of the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant “particularly describe] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const, amend. IV (emphases added). The particularity requirement — “the touchstone of [the] warrant,” Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 239 (3d Cir.2004) — is satisfied by expressly listing items to be seized or expressly incorporating by reference an affidavit that lists such items. See Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428-429 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The requirement that the warrant particularly Holdings: 0: holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable 1: holding that plan documents could be incorporated without converting the motion to one for summary judgment even though the complaint referred only to the plan and not the accompanying documents 2: holding that 1 the complaint is deemed to include any documents incorporated in it by reference and any document upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint and that the court may consider such documents on a motion to dismiss pursuant to fedrcivp 12b6 3: holding that if a warrants particularity depends upon incorporated documents those documents must physically accompany the warrant 4: holding that where original documents were illegally seized those documents as well as all copies had to be returned


Input: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly serves the purposes of pleading negligent misrepresentation as well as would rule 9(b). Indeed, the Twombly rule is better, because there is nothing served by creating a new exception to Twombly’s general rule for a negligence tort unless there is some compelling reason to do so. Not finding that compelling reason, the Court will decline to apply rule 9(b) to negligent misrepresentation claims, particularly those like New Mexico’s and Colorado’s, which are truly based on negligent conduct. LAW REGARDING GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY A foreign jurisdiction is not compelled to follow the governmental immunity laws that protect a state-governmental entity in its own state. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 123 S.Ct. 1683, 155 L.Ed.2d 702 (2003)(<HOLDING>); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424, 99 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that a forum is not required to extend sovereign immunity to other states sued in its courts but should extend immunity under the principle of comity unless doing so would violate the forums public policies 1: holding that rfras waiver of sovereign immunity did not extend to monetary damages the acts reference to appropriate relief was susceptible to more than one interpretation and thus was not an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity 2: holding that the full faith and credit clause does not require a forum to apply the sovereign immunity doctrine of another state if such an application would violate the forums legitimate public policies 3: holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine 4: holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law


Input: references to a group such as “the Kingston Polygamist Family” might reasonably be understood to refer to an individual surnamed Kingston. See Fenstermaker, 43 P. at 114 (allowing head of a family to maintain an action for defamation where defamatory statements were made about “a family named Fenstermaker”). But see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564A cmt. a, illus. 1 (1977) (giving hypothetical example where defamatory statements about a large family would not be actionable by individual family members). In fact, if the Pratts were widely known as members of “the Kingston Polygamist Family,” the Pratts might very well be able to maintain an action on such statements, even without referring to the Kingston Complaint. See Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 51-52 (Okla.1962) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 513, 84 S.Ct. 964, 11 Holdings: 0: holding that a single member of a large university football team could maintain a lawsuit for libel for general statements about the team since he was well known and identified in connection with the group and because he had sufficiently established his identity as one of those libeled by the publication 1: holding that the court could reasonably assume that no rational class member would have purchased the product had he known of the alleged misrepresentation 2: holding as a matter of law that the plaintiff could not recover for libel to his person  for the reason that the articles referred to no person who could possibly be identified as him 3: holding that a plaintiff would have to show that he was not promoted because of his race not that he was a member of a protected group and was not promoted 4: holding that the insured could not maintain a lawsuit for additional federal benefits because he had not submitted a sworn proof of loss


Input: The school’s pedagogical considerations are present, and are perhaps heightened, when a parent is the speaker because parents, much like teachers, are typically held in high regard and viewed as authoritative by young children. By inviting participation in curricular activities, educators do not cede control over the message and content of the subject matter presented in the classroom. Were teachers or school administrators required to do so, individual students or parents could use the classroom to promote any message in the guise of a pedagogically approved curricular activity. Educators should be free to seek appropriate ways to involve parents in the education of their children. See Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bds. Ass’n and Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 4 (<HOLDING>). Yet the value and frequency of these efforts Holdings: 0: recognizing that because parents have a constitutional right to direct their childrens education organization has standing to bring claim on behalf of parents 1: recognizing that without claim preclusion plaintiffs in small claims cases will not feel obligated to present all of their claims or all of their evidence  and they can simply file again  if need be 2: holding that evidence of the fathers conduct in stabbing the childrens mother alleged to endanger the childrens physical and emotional wellbeing is pertinent to and entwined in the issue of the childrens best interest 3: recognizing that to shift the patenteligibility inquiry entirely to  102 103 and 112 risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty while assuming that those sections can do work that they are not equipped to do 4: recognizing the need to avoid creating legal disincentives for schools to do all they can to engage parents in their childrens educations


Input: warnings. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). The court reasoned that the competency of an expert witness has never been limited to only those facts he or she has learned from personal demonstration. Instead, the court explained, "where a witness exhibits such a degree of knowledge, gained from experiments, observation, standard books, or other reliable source, as to make it appear that his opinion is of some value, he is entitled to testify." Id. Exide cites several cases as support for the proposition that "mere practical knowledge and frequent use of a product does not qualify the user as an expert on ... warnings." However, none of these cases support this proposition. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 981 F.2d 656 (2nd Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); Silva v. American Airlines, Inc., 960 F. Holdings: 0: holding that warnings given to a witness by the trial court and the prosecutor concerning the possibility that testifying could place the witness in jeopardy of revocation of his plea agreement and charges of perjury or false statement did not violate the defendants due process rights because the warnings merely corroborated in a straightforward and nonthreatening manner the information given by the witness attorney 1: holding witness was not qualified to opine on the adequacy of the warnings of a specialized glue because he lacked expertise in either the product  was not a chemical engineer toxicologist or an environmental engineer  or the design of warning labels 2: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony of mechanical engineer in products liability case involving automobile because expert did not have specific experience regarding subject matter of lawsuit 3: holding that the shape of a product was not an advertising idea because there was no allegation in the complaint that the design itself was a trademark or was intended to distinguish the product from others that might enter the market citation omitted 4: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for district court to allow a mechanical engineer to give expert testimony about a machine with which the engineer had no design experience


Input: and sentence. I. DISCUSSION A Unconstitutionality of 18 U.S.C, § 922(g) Seneeharles first contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional, both facially and as-applied to him, because his possession of the firearm did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Because Seneeharles did not object to the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute in the district court, we review for plain error. See United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1018-19 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating we review constitutional objections “not raised before the district court only for plain error”). Senecharles’s facial challenge is directly foreclosed by our precedent upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1273 (11th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Further, because the parties stipulated the Holdings: 0: holding that double jeopardy precludes dual convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and felon in possession of separate ammunition because section 790231 florida statutes prohibits possession of  any firearm ammunition or electric weapon or device emphasis in original 1: holding the jurisdictional element of the statute ie the requirement that the felon possess in or affecting commerce any firearm or ammunition immunizes  922g1 from a facial constitutional attack 2: holding that conviction for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 usc  922g is valid under the commerce clause as long as the ammunition had previously moved in interstate commerce even though the possession did not have a substantial affect on same 3: holding that a prior conviction ie one for which the civil right to possess a firearm has not been restored is an element of a 922g1 violation 4: holding that dual convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon violated double jeopardy


Input: this court to read § 7407(d)(3)(E)(iii) as requiring “permanent and enforceable reductions in emissions from sources in the nonattainrrient area.” Under this interpretation, EPA would need to determine that the Cincinnati area has achieved attainment status solely because sources within the confines of the nonattainment area have sufficiently reduced their emissions; improvements in Cincinnati air quality due to emissions reductions from anywhere else would be ignored. EPA and the Intervenors respond that the statutory text is silent on the location of the reductions and that k regional foc Cir.2008) (rejecting a “regionwide approach to CAIR” where § 7410(a)(2)(D)© required a focus on sources “within the State”); La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 382 F.3d 575, 585-87 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). But, unlike the .statutory sections in those Holdings: 0: holding that even if the calculation commenced on the date of the first indictment the defendants right to a speedy trial was not violated 1: holding that the fourth amendment does not mandate the payment of money by the united states 2: holding that where a defendant acquiesces in a continuance that time is excluded from the speedy trial calculation 3: holding that party who sought stay after mandate had issued first had to show that mandate ought to be recalled and then had to show that recalled mandate should be stayed 4: holding that epa violated the mandate of  7511ablb which requires calculation of baseline emissions  from all anthropogenic sources in the area


Input: whatever means necessary — including violence — to avoid being apprehended; and (2) individuals involved in narcotics trafficking — which is, by its very nature dangerous—could be present in the warehouse for the purpose of purchasing drug paraphernalia. When these two potential risks are coupled with the fact that the agents believed a fugitive was present in the warehouse, it is clear that the agents possessed the reasonable articulable suspicion required under Buie to conduct a protective security sweep. Further, the layout of the warehouse made a protective sweep particularly appropriate. Scartozzi saw immediately upon entering the warehouse, a building he had never entered before, that inside were long, high rows of stacks of boxes. Cf. Buie, 494 U.S. at 333, 110 S.C .Ed.2d 112 (<HOLDING>). The plain view exception only applies, Holdings: 0: holding seizure of evidence in plain view reasonable under fourth amendment 1: holding that the incriminating nature of an item was immediately apparent where the police officers had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of a crime 2: holding that the observation of evidence in plain view is not a search for purposes of the fourth amendment and does not require a warrant 3: holding that the fourth amendment permits seizure of property in plain view where 1 the officer has a lawful right to access the object itself and 2 the propertys incriminating character is immediately apparent 4: holding that a seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine where there was probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity


Input: way to the objective of the statute. Few statutes have been found so wanting in “rationality” as to fail to satisfy the “essentially arbitrary” test. Stated positively, the test is that courts must uphold a statutory classification where it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. The rational basis test reflects the judiciary’s awareness that it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide the wisdom and utility of legislation, [Wysocki, 248 Mich App at 354 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] With regard to SORA in general, this C 16 (2007) (upholding the trial court’s determination that the requirement of sex offender registration for “certain nonsexual abduction-related crimes” was constitutional); People v Johnson, 225 Ill 2d 573, 591-592; 870 NE2d 415 (2007) (<HOLDING>); State v Sakobie, 165 NC App 447, 453; 598 Holdings: 0: holding evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction for violation of sex offender registration requirement 1: holding that sex offender registration and notification do not constitute punishment 2: holding that the inclusion of aggravated kidnapping of a minor by a nonparent in the illinois sex offender registration act was not violative of due process regardless of whether the offenders conduct was sexually motivated 3: holding that classifying the defendant as a sexually oriented offender after he was convicted of kidnapping minors without a sexual purpose violated the defendants right to substantive due process where the statutory definition of sexual offender included one who had committed certain criminal offenses against a minor regardless of sexual intent 4: holding that the requirement of sex offender registration for the defendants conviction of false imprisonment of a minor was not cruel and unusual punishment and did not violate substantive or procedural due process


Input: and stating that the six tests in Baker v. Carr were “probably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty”). 171 . TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 172 . 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. 691 ("The non-justiciability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.”). 173 . West Orange-Cove I, 107 S.W.3d at 563. 174 . Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973). 175 . Nix 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (concluding that a challenge to Congress’ power to pass a statute with a one-House veto did not present a political question); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351-53, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (concluding that a political patronage case involving dismissal of employee by 71, 675 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1976, writ ref. n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). 182 . Ex parte James, 836 So.2d 813 Holdings: 0: holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution 1: holding that whether a hospital district included areas not benefitted by any services solely for purpose of raising revenue does not present a justiciable matter under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 2: holding that racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 3: holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court 4: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection


Input: “regardless of whether the respondent has been tried, acquitted, or convicted in a court for the alleged criminal offense.” This language makes it clear that a disciplinary violation premised on a violation of law is separate from the initiation or outcome of criminal proceedings based on the same conduct. Behm’s argument that he cannot be found to have violated the rules at issue without an express finding of intent is also without merit. While this Court has held that “in order to sustain a violation of rule 4-8.4(c), the Bar must prove intent,” this Court has also stated that the intent ele ment can be satisfied “merely by showing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing.” Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So.2d 76, 81 (Fla.2005); see also Fla. Bar v. Riggs, 944 So.2d 167, 171 (Fla.2006) (<HOLDING>); Fla. Bar v. Barley, 881 So.2d 163, 169 Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys engaging in conduct involving dishonesty amounts to conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law 1: holding intent as an element for disciplining an attorney for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation is proven by establishing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing 2: holding that an infamous crime under the arkansas constitution is a crime involving elements of deceit and dishonesty 3: holding that reliance is not an element to be proven under securities fraud in indiana 4: holding that in the context of federal immigration law the amount of loss to the victim of fraud or deceit does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit but rather refers to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed fraud or deceit


Input: rather, it shows that accidents were infrequent, with only a few other large objects falling from mezzanines over the previous decade and smaller objects falling more frequently, and that tens of thousands of bags had been moved up and down without incident. Although the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the Estate suggest an injury may have been likely to occur, the required showing is not made “by demonstrating an employer’s awareness that a dangerous condition exist[ed], or that an employer knew an accident was likely.” Johnson v. Detroit Edison Co., 288 Mich.App. 688, 795 N.W.2d 161, 168 (2010) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 285 F.3d 448, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). In addition, “[t]o be ‘known’ and ‘certain,’ Holdings: 0: holding that there was not complete preemption because the applicable federal statute did not provide a private right of action to redress the same kind of injury alleged in the plaintiffs statelaw claims 1: holding wdcas intentionaltort exception did not apply where plaintiffs suffered injury after being instructed to remove carpet under which there was asbestos because the plaintiffs had shown only that the defendants knew of the general dangers of as bestos and did not provide proper training or safety equipment 2: holding that the special relationship exception did not apply because the decedent was not in defendants custody 3: recognizing that georgia did not adopt  115 but even if it did finding that plaintiff did not consider removal of asbestos to be immediately necessary where there was an undisputed delay between plaintiffs discovery of the hazard and beginning of removal 4: recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception


Input: safety information they would choose to disclose in their initial, allegedly fraudulent, reports, would be the most severe adverse events. b. Motive For Fraud Plaintiff contends that its allegations regarding motive bolster its scienter pleadings. In support of this argument Plaintiff argues that it alleged a motive to commit fraud when it alleged that, at the time the allegedly fraudulent statements were made, Defendants were seeking a partner and were planning to raise capital in a stock offering. In addition, Plaintiff points to its allegations that individual defendants knew that they would receive higher salaries, bonuses, and stock options and that the value of their stock options would increase substantially if Rigel reported positive results from the clinical trial. Howev 001) (<HOLDING>). In fact, it supports the opposite inference. Holdings: 0: holding that where knowledgeable insiders did not sell stock at a time that would have taken advantage of allegedly fraudulent statements there was not a strong inference of scienter 1: holding that where a defendant sold no stock at all this suggested that there was no insider information from which to benefit and there was not a strong inference of scienter 2: holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter 3: holding that recounting of analysts opinions did not prove underlying factual support necessary to create a strong inference of scienter 4: holding that there was no inference of scienter based on defendants knowledge of facts or failure to monitor information because plaintiffs did not specifically identified any reports or statements that existed or would have come to light in a reasonable investigation that would have demonstrated the falsity of the allegedly misleading statements


Input: filed this action in federal district court. Allen named as defendants the Casino, the Tribe, Mattie Mayhew, and John Does 1 thru 300, against whom he asserted various employment, civil rights, and conspiracy claims. The magistrate judge recommended that the claims against the Tribe be dismissed on the ground of sovereign immunity. The magistrate judge assumed without analysis that the Tribe’s immunity extended to the Casino. The magistrate judge found that the only remaining claim was for false accusations against Mayhew. He recommended dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because this was a non-federal claim. The district court adopted these recommendations and dismissed all claims. On appeal, Allen, who is now represented by counse 4th 632, 642, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 65 (1999) (<HOLDING>). The question is not whether the activity may Holdings: 0: recognizing sovereign immunity of forprofit corporation formed by a tribe to operate the tribes casino 1: holding that a casino that functioned as an arm of the tribe enjoyed tribal immunity 2: holding that offreservation casino owned and operated by tribe was arm of the tribe and therefore was entitled to sovereign immunity 3: holding that by engaging in gaming tribe waives sovereign immunity for narrow purpose of determining tribes compliance with the igra 4: recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity extends to agencies and subdivisions of the tribe


Input: of justice extends to sentencing under section 3C1.1. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (“the defendant willfully obstructed ... or attempted to obstruct ... the administration of justice with respect to ... sentencing”). As the district court pointed out, Lewis was a crucial witness regarding drug quantity (which is the primary consideration in de ment is inapplicable because he did not send the threat directly to Lewis, but rather included it in a letter to Holmes — suffers the same fate. Cogswell cites United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir.1992), in which the Fourth Circuit required the threat to be made directly to the intended target or under circumstances in which there is some likelihood that the intended target will learn of the threat. Following this l (6th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); Searcy, 316 F.3d at 553 (“The Fourth Holdings: 0: holding that statements even when made to a third party which are appropriately determined to be threatening can constitute obstruction of justice 1: holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys 2: holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party 3: holding that plaintiffaffiant did not have personal knowledge of statements made to him by a third party 4: holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant


Input: of service contracts, which' are specifically excluded from Article 2 coverage. Id. at 138. Oklahoma courts have not addressed the issue of whether a software license would constitute a sale of goods; however, Massachusetts has considered the issue, at least indirectly. In VMark Software v. EMC Corp., 37 Mass. App.Ct. 610, 642 N.E.2d 587, 590, n. 1 (1994), the Massachusetts Court of Appeals assumed that Article 2 of the UCC applied to a software licensing agreement and held that the licensee met its burden of proof regarding allegations of misrepresentation by the licensor of a software program. This application is consistent with the holding in the majority of cases addressing the issue. See e.g., Colonial Life Ins. Co. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 817 F.Supp. 235 (D.N.H.1993) (<HOLDING>); Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article Holdings: 0: holding that a contract for the installation and implementation of a complex computer system did not constitute a consumer purchase covered by the njcfa and noting that the contract did not provide for simply the installation of a standardized computer software program but rather the design of a custommade program to satisfy the plaintiffs unique needs and the defendants active participation in implementation of this program 1: holding that the ucc applies to a computer software license with an additional obligation to provide incidental services where the predominant thrust of the contract was the sale and support of the software 2: holding that the statute of frauds of chapter 8 of kansass ucc applies to the sale of 50 of banks stock 3: holding the predominant purpose of a contract containing both sale and nonsale aspects was the sale of goods in part because the portion of the cost attributable to nonsale elements was less than onehalf of the total contract price 4: holding that a contract for the design construction and installation of a water tank was predominantly a contract for the sale of goods under the ucc


Input: Union made an unconditional agreement or an offer, as the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that an insurer is not estopped to dispute its defense obligations by reason of having sent letters to the insured in which the insurer initially agreed to defend the underlying suit. Ga. Farm, Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanhuss, 243 Ga.App. 26, 26, 532 S.E.2d 135, 136 (2000). In Vanhuss, the court held that where the insured did not claim that he relied to his detriment on the insurer’s initial decision to defend the suits and no such reliance appears, the insured is not estopped from later denying coverage. Id.; see also Mahens v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 1:10-cv-174, 2011 WL 1321578, at * 4 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 1, 2011) (citing Danforth v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 282 Ga.App. 421, 638 S.E.2d 852 (2007) (<HOLDING>)). Here, as in the Vanhuss case, there is Holdings: 0: holding that injured employee has right to settle with thirdparty tortfeasor claims not covered by minnesota workers compensation act 1: holding that insurers assurances that it would pay for repairs including its attempt to settle with a thirdparty did not waive right to deny coverage 2: holding that an insurer has no obligation to pay diminished value in addition to repairs 3: recognizing that an insurers obligation to pay for prenotification legal expenses is concomitant with its right to control the defense and that a contrary result would require the insurer to pay for those defense costs which it had no opportunity to control 4: holding insured relinquished right to sue general liability insurer for breach of contract relative to insurers allegedly improper handling and payment of thirdparty claim by purchasing policy which gave insurer right to settle


Input: Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045, 1054 (Ind.App.1990) (addressing the claims of a decedent who began smoking in 1940, and finding “[t]he state of knowledge attributable to the community of individuals consuming cigarettes has changed over time and will continue to do so.”). Accordingly, we must reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Mrs. Tompkin’s design defect and failure to warn claims. B. Mrs. Tompkin additionally contends that the district court erred in concluding that OPLA preempted her negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct claims. This court has applied OPLA to product Lability negligence claims and has therefore implicitly concluded that common law negligence claims have been preempted by OPLA. See Amendola, 1999 WL 1111515, at *2 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the Faugh court, using the Holdings: 0: recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress 1: holding that the plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are governed by opla 2: holding that a party claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot recover for emotional disturbance alone 3: holding that plaintiffs negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are not independent of the breach of contract claim and summary judgment is warranted on these claims 4: holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient


Input: interested adult. See Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 19-2-511; Ind.Code.Ann. § 31-32-5-1; Iowa Code Ann. § 232.11; Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-311; Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-331; N.H. Stat. Ann. § 169-B:12; N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-26; Okla. Stab. Ann. tit. 10 § 7003-3.7; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.09; W. Va.Code § 49-5-8(d). Those jurisdictions consistently have held that any statements made during custodial interrogation are inadmissible where a juvenile’s parents are absent. People v. J.D., 989 P.2d 762 (Colo.1999) (observing that statute requires notification of parents when juvenile is taken into custody and requires suppression of statements or admissions made by juvenile during custodial interrogation where interested adult is not present); In re L.B., 33 Colo.App. 1, 513 P.2d 1069, 1070 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 Holdings: 0: holding inadmissible statements of juvenile made where parent who was incarcerated for drunkenness was brought to juveniles interrogation although interested adult must be present mere physical presence of parent is insufficient 1: recognizing that a foster parent may attain the status of psychological parent when the relationship is not temporary in duration and exists with the consent and encouragement of a childs legal parent or guardian 2: holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles 3: holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights 4: holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper


Input: of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a). Section 1441 makes clear that removal of any civil action over which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction is allowed unless (1) expressly provided otherwise by (2) an act of Congress. Neither condition is met by the FLSA, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals so held in Cosme Nieves v. Deshler, 786 F.2d 445, 451 (1st Cir.1986). The ambiguity of Congress’s use of “maintain” is self-evident. That “maintain” can be interpreted to suggest congressional intent to bar removal falls short of the standard set in § 1441 that a bar on removal must be “expressly provided.” See, e.g., Cosme Nieves, 786 F.2d at 451 (<HOLDING>). There is also no “Act of Congress” which bars Holdings: 0: holding that congress would have used express terms not ambiguous ones like maintain if its intent were to prevent removal of cases under the fsla 1: holding contract with ambiguous terms should not be dismissed on pleadings 2: holding exclusion was not ambiguous 3: holding that parol evidence can be presented when the terms of the agreement are ambiguous 4: recognizing ambiguous terms of plea agreement are construed against government


Input: Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided in relevant part: "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as ... are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations....” 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (re pealed 1978). The commentary in Collier on Bankruptcy suggests that the addition of "actual fraud” simply clarifies the limited scope of the fraud exception: The addition of the words “or actual fraud” probably makes no change in the law as it existed prior to enactment of the [Bankruptcy Act of 1978] because false pretenses and representations were construed to mean acts involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong.... In any event, section 523(a)(2)(A) was intend (7th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 260, Holdings: 0: holding that jurys determination is not binding on courts ch 93a decision 1: holding that injunctive relief was unwarranted when the jurys award already included prospective relief 2: holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief 3: holding jurys finding of liability on partys claim does not bestow prevailing party status when party received no relief on that claim 4: holding that jurys finding was binding on court considering claim for equitable relief


Input: survey line by means of adverse possession and the doctrine of acquiescence. 6 . During the pendency of this appeal, defendants removed the boulders from plaintiff's property. Accordingly, the building is the only alleged encroachment onto plaintiff’s land that remains for this appeal. This Court granted defendants a stay of the injunction to remove the building from plaintiff's land while this appeal was pending, on the condition that defendants post a $50,000 bond. 7 . This Court notes that the row of trees was not specifically planted by either party in order to serve as a boundary marker nor is there any allegation that they consist of either arborvitae or a hedgerow that may be commonly understood to denote a boundary. Cf. Acampora v. Pearson, 899 A.2d 459, 461, 463 (R.I.2006) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The trial justice, after viewing the Holdings: 0: holding that determination of the oklahoma and texas common boundary in a prior suit was conclusive in future litigation 1: holding that the doctrine of acquiescence had established a boundary line between two adjoining lots where the plaintiff had planted a row of thirteen or fourteen arborvitae shrubs along the line which she claimed as the boundary 2: holding that members of congress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the line item veto act 3: holding that substantial evidence did not support agencys finding fear speculative when petitioner had offered evidence that she had already had two children that she planned to have more that she had gone to great lengths to avoid being sterilized in china and that she had removed her iud after escaping to the united states 4: holding that where petitioner testified that some of her cousins had been killed because they served in the military and that she had received two threatening notes she had demonstrated past persecution


Input: and Ek sold the vessel with the anchor, rope, and chain still on it. Even if Ek did misappropriate these items, Peterson does not have standing to assert the claim of a third party. Standing in this court is a rule of judicial self-restraint that asks whether the person raising a particular claim is a " 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue.' ” Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 23 n. 25 (Alaska 1976) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)). We cannot consider the purported transfer of the materials lien from Dockery to Peterson because it was not in the record before the superior court and was improperly included in Peterson's excerpt of record. Alaska R.App. P. 210. See also B.B. v. D.D., 18 P.3d 1210, 1214 (Alaska 2001) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, any payment that Peterson did Holdings: 0: holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal 1: holding that we cannot properly receive and consider evidence that was not presented to and considered by the trial court 2: holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court 3: holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial 4: holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal


Input: presented for payment was money mandating. We held that the regulation, at best, only conferred rights on presenting banks (a category that did not include the plaintiff, the bank that received the deposit). We concluded that "the regulations could [not] be construed as being money-mandating as to [the plaintiff bank], even if they were money-mandating as to [the presenting bank] ... since there is support its argument involve delay of the class certification until after a trial on the merits or the question of whether a court can consider the merits when ruling on class certification. The one case cited by Greenlee County that is on point is against the weight of authority, and we decline to follow it. See Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion Int'l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200, 1216 (11th Cir.2003) Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 1: holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing 2: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed 3: holding that court should have ruled on certification even after granting summary judgment for the defendant 4: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed


Input: to issue conservation orders "to conserve the property [of a non-domiciliary insurer] found in this state or any other state.” Tenn. Senate Bill 1080 § 4. The Chancery Court, however, rendered the Liquidation Order pursuant to Section 402, which governs liquidations and which was not amended in this manner. See Tenn.Code. Ann. § 56-9-402 (1999). Moreover, although the amendment purports to have retroactive effect, the retroactivity provision states that the amendment applies only "for the purpose of conducting the proceeding henceforth.” Tenn. Senate Bill 1080 § 5. Because our review takes place after the completion of the Tennessee proceedings, we conclude that the amendment does not have retroactive effect in this case. 5 . Accord Bryant v. United Shortline, 984 S.W.2d at 297-98 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court exceeded its authorized scope of review by invoking equitable jurisdiction 1: holding that a court may consider materials outside the pleadings to determine its jurisdiction 2: holding that tennessee court exceeded its statutory jurisdiction when it ordered liquidation of assets outside tennessee 3: holding that a challenge to liquidation instructions falls under  1581i jurisdiction 4: recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum


Input: be instructed that “surreptitious” interception meant “unauthorized, in other words unlawful” interception. Under this theory, lawful intercepts by law enforcement would not qualify as surreptitious. Kachi-kian’s defense was that if he manufactured the wiretapping devices believing that they would be used primarily for law enforcement-authorized purposes, he would not be breaking the law because he could not have “[had] reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for ... surreptitious interception” of wire communications. Id. The term “surreptitious” as used in the statute was aimed at the secret nature of the interception, not the illegality of it. That is the common understanding of the word. See United States v. Lande, 968 F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bast, 495 F.2d 138, 143 Holdings: 0: holding that the cost of capital equipment is not recoverable under the terms of the miller act 1: holding that experienced contractor familiar with business practices is merchant with respect to buying certain equipment despite lack of special knowledge of that equipment 2: holding description all personal property sufficient to cover equipment 3: holding that equipment manufactured to intercept and descramble satellite television programming met the surreptitious element because the producers of satellite programming were unable to detect the interception equipment 4: holding that a general contractors right to forbid the work from being performed in a dangerous manner and the fact that he would have stopped the work and required protective equipment had he seen the employee of the independent contractor not using such equipment merely showed the possibility of control not actual control


Input: court’s denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by a non-attorney representative of a Social Security claimant whose fee agreements had been repeatedly denied. 256 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir.2001). In that case, we found the petitioner had failed to prove that he had exhausted all other avenues of relief because he had not filed a fee petition pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1725. Id. Although the district court below did not address whether the reasons for the ALJ’s disapproval of the fee agreement were entitled to deference, this does not change Cordoba’s requirement that a representative seeking approval of a fee agreement must exhaust all available administrative remedies — including a fee petition — before the writ of mandamus may be granted. See also Power, 292 F.3d at 786 (<HOLDING>). In addition, Baker has not shown that the fee Holdings: 0: recognizing conflict between filing motion to dismiss and fee application and noting postponement of fee application resulted in no prejudice to any party 1: holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied 2: holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee  3: holding that petitioner had failed to exhaust alternative remedies for review of his fee agreement because the ssa notified petitioner he could obtain his fee by filing a fee petition 4: holding that the petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his claim involving a procedural error correctable by the bia


Input: forming his opinion as to the risk of infection, he assumed that Mr. Jones and Ms. Zhong had sex two to three times per week, contrary to Ms. Zhong’s record testimony that she and Mr. Jones had sex about once a week. Furthermore, the government presented its own expert witness, Harold Margolis, M.D., of the Centers for Disease Control, who disagreed with Dr. Gubbins’s assessment of the risk of infection. Dr. Margolis testified that Mr. Jones had only about a ten per cent, chance of infection over the course of a year. While the fact that the government would have presented an opposing expert is not by itself a' sufficient reason to exclude Dr. Gubbins’s testimony, it was a factor that the District Court properly considered in its assessment. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (<HOLDING>). The District Court’s analysis and findings as Holdings: 0: holding that jury must be instructed that value of identification testimony may depend upon the witnesss capacity and opportunity to observe the offender 1: recognizing under fre 702 that there is no clear line dividing testimony based on scientific knowledge from testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge holding that a single flexible test for reliability applies to all expert testimony 2: holding that a federal courts inquiry into the reliability of expert testimony is flexible and may depend upon a variety of considerations 3: holding that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in accepting  expert testimony  on the issue of reliability and rank order scoring that happened to include a component reliability estimate 4: holding that federal rules of evidence require trial courts to hold hearingsreferred to as daubert hearingsto determine reliability of scientific expert testimony before admission at trial


Input: have shown that he signed in at his housing unit before proceeding to the canteen; therefore, it would have rebutted the librarian’s statement that Mitchell was at the canteen instead of checking in at his assigned housing unit. Due process requires a DHO to produce and review evidence alleged by a prisoner to be supportive of his defense unless do ing so would be “unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 813-14 (10th Cir.2007). But assuming, without deciding, that the DHO in this case committed error by refusing to consider the work-crew log, the error was harmless to Mitchell and therefore cannot form the basis of a due process claim. See Howard, 487 F.3d at 814-15 & n. 5 (<HOLDING>); of. Grossman v. Bruce, 447 F.3d 801, 805 Holdings: 0: holding that error will not be presumed from a silent record and that without the relevant transcript there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error and the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged error in the record 1: recognizing that a dhos unjustified refusal to review a videotape alleged to be exculpatory might constitute harmless error and remanding to the district court to make a determination of harmlessness on a fuller factual record 2: holding that the district courts review of a partial and truncated record was error and remanding the case for review on the entire administrative record 3: holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court 4: holding that chapman harmless error review will be conducted when error is tested for harmlessness for the first time on habeas


Input: intended for the Workers' Compensation Act to "be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to employers, without the necessity of any litigation ...." § 8-40-102, C.R.S. (2007). Thus, a primary purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to compensate injured workers "regardless of fault." Colo. Springs Disposal v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 58 P.3d 1061, 1063 (Colo.App.2002). In a previous case, we noted that the Workers' Compensation Act "is intended to be remedial and beneficial in purpose, and should be liberally construed in order to accomplish these goals." Davison, 84 P.3d at 1029 (internal quotation marks omitted). The temporary total disability benefits 29-30 (Colo.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). The penalties and enforcement provision Holdings: 0: holding a claimant who refuses to provide financial information necessary to ascertain whether a claimant is working may have his indemnity benefits suspended until such information is provided 1: holding that a claimants benefits were rightly suspended under what is now section 8434048 when the claimant refused to cooperate with a vocational rehabilitation plan 2: holding that a claimant establishes a prima facie case for compensable medical treatment where a qualified physician indicates treatment was necessary for a workrelated condition 3: holding that a claimants benefits were rightly suspended under what is now section 8434043 when the claimant did not return to the authorized physician for treatment 4: holding the procedural right to request a onetime change of physician during the course of treatment does not attach until claimant actually begins treatment with the initially authorized physician


Input: law, for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. They concede that in this case, the only public policy at issue is the First Amendment, so we affirm the summary judgment on the state tort claim on the same basis as on the section 1983 claim as no violation of Hobler’s or Southwell’s First Amendment rights occurred. Conclusion Because plaintiffs were “confidential employees” in the Bmnti sense, the First Amendment did not protect them from dismissal because of their political loyalty to the defendant’s political adversary, so the summary judgment for defendant is AFFIRMED. 1 . 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). 2 . 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3 . 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). 4 . Id. at 357, 96 S.Ct. 2673. 5 134, 1139 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Tp. High Holdings: 0: holding that defendants status as police officer did not obviate the requirement of miranda 1: holding that an employees status as a policymaker under the branti exception does not obviate the pickering analysis 2: holding that access to confidential information didnt transform janitorial staff into confidential employees under branti 3: recognizing exception 4: holding that filing an answer  does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit


Input: it appears Union County has not asserted a standing argument at all, but rather has attempted to invoke parens patriae authority, which in Latin means “parent of his or her country,” and refers to “the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.” Parens patriae, Black’s Law Dictionary 1287 (10th ed. 2014), But it has long been settled that “a state may act as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens. However, a county has no sovereign powers and cannot act as parens patriae, asserting the claims of its residents.” Bd. of Comm’rs of Howard Cty. v. Kokomo City Plan Comm’n, 263 Ind. 282, 295, 330 N.E.2d 92, 101 (1975) (internal citations omitted)- (emphasis added); see also Shoemaker v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Grant Cty., 36 Ind. 175, 183-84 (1871) (<HOLDING>). Union County is thus disqualified from Holdings: 0: holding that it was not the taxpayers responsibility to pursue the different tax units to which the illegally levied county tax was proportioned as the taxpayer was entitled to recover the full amount of the tax from the county the collecting entity 1: holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county 2: holding that the county had no standing to sue the state to recover taxes illegally obtained from citizens unless the money belongs to the county 3: holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county 4: holding before the apa definition of person was amended to include county that the board of county commission ers of dolores county could not sue the state agency that had ordered reappraisals of real property in dolores county in connection with valuation for ad valorem taxation because the board of county commissioners was not a person under the apa and did not otherwise have authority to sue under statute or constitution


Input: §§ 300aa-l-300aa-34. 2 . The non-resident defendants were Abbott Laboratories Inc.; American Home Products Corp., doing business as Wyeth, Wyeth Laboratories, Wyeth-Ayerst, Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Wyeth Lederle, Wyeth Lederle Vaccines, and Lederle Laboratories; Aventis Pasteur, Inc., individually and as successor in interest to Connaught Laboratories, Inc.; Baxter International, Inc.; Eli Lilly and Company; GDL International, Inc; GlaxoSmithKline, individually and as successor in interest to SmithKline Beecham Corp; King Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Merck & Company, Inc.; Sigma-Aldrich, Inc.; Spectrum Chemical Manufacturing Corp.; and Medeva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 3 . See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441(b), 1446. 4 . 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-l-300aa-34. 5 . 385 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 992, 125 S.Ct. 1825, Holdings: 0: holding that there is no improper joinder when the allegation of improper joinder rests only on a showing that there is no reasonable basis for predicting that state law would allow recovery against the instate defendant and that showing is equally dispositive of all defendants 1: holding there was no claim and no basis for a claim of surprise concerning allegation of a former conviction 2: holding that a sentence is not excessive if it is within statutory limitations and there are no facts supporting an allegation of prejudice against the defendant 3: holding that no heightened showing is required 4: holding that there is no right of recovery against individual defendants under the ada


Input: preclude the formation of an installment contract because § 2-612’s definition of “contract” is quite expansive. It is defined to mean “the total legal obligation which results from the parties’ agreement as affected by this title and any other applicable rules of law.” § 1-201(11). The parties’ “agreement” is in turn defined to mean “the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance.” § 1-201(3). Nowhere in these definitions is there a requirement of a single document or negotiation. And other courts agree that § 2-612 does not impose such a severe restriction. See, e.g., Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc. v. Snydergeneral Corp., 944 F.2d 1131, 1146-47 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In addition, even limiting our focus to Holdings: 0: holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods 1: holding that black box labeled purchase orders was insufficient structure to perform the generate purchase orders function 2: holding that a suit for one installment payment does not preclude suit for a later installment 3: holding that a purchase money security in jewelry was not lost when the perfected purchase money security interest was consolidated with a subsequent retail installment contract 4: holding that twentythree purchase orders made up a single installment contract


Input: and ministerial acts in its application of the qualified public official immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 284, 653 A.2d 436, 442 (1995) (noting that “the Court has distinguished between the qualified and narrower immunity for discretionary acts generally accorded to public officials, and absolute judicial immunity, which ... applies [to judges] regardless of the nature of the tort” (emphasis added)); Mandel, 320 Md. at 110, 576 A.2d at 769 (recognizing that “ ‘the Maryland cases seem to indicate that discretionary action [of officials] will be protected only in the absence of malice’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351, 356, 196 A.2d 887, 890 (1964))); Robinson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 262 Md. 342, 346-47, 278 A.2d 71, 74 (1971) (<HOLDING>). In the context of public official immunity, Holdings: 0: holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added 1: holding that individuals acting in a legislative capacity at a regional level are entitled to absolute immunity 2: holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacity are not persons under  1983 3: holding that  in maryland governmental immunity is extended to all nonmalicious acts of public officials  when acting in a discretionary  capacity  emphasis added quoting duncan 260 md at 104 271 a2d at 550 4: holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine


Input: is common in adversary proceedings for expert witnesses to be present during the presentation of factual testimony so that they have a foundation on which to base their opinions. See, e.g., Federal Rule of Evidence 615. Although that Rule authorizes a district court to sequester witnesses to prevent them from hearing the testimony of other witnesses, it also provides several exceptions, including an exception for “a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party’s cause.” Fed.R.Evid. 615(3). The Advisory Committee notes specify that this exception contemplates “an expert needed to advise counsel in the management of the litigation.” Fed.R.Evid. 615(3) Advisory Committee notes. See United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1404-05 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Morvant v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 570 Holdings: 0: holding that a witness may testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue 1: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify 3: holding that the presence in the courtroom of an expert witness who does not testify to the facts of the case but rather gives his opinion based upon the testimony of others hardly seems suspect and will in most cases be beneficial for he will be more likely to base his expert opinion on a more accurate understanding of the testimony as it evolves before the jury 4: holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard


Input: when he had been sentenced two years prior to Portillo. Thus, the court omitted that portion of the judgment requiring payment “jointly and severally with Isidro Silva Rubio (Case No. 2:96-cr-33).” Second, the court discovered that it had erred by ordering restitution to be paid to the GBI rather than to the six illegal aliens listed in Rubio’s PSI. Thus, the court corrected the order to substitute the six aliens for the GBI as payees. Because we find that the errors corrected by the court in Portillo’s judgment and commitment order were merely clerical, we affirm. I. DISCUSSION We review the district court’s application of Fed.R.Crim.P. 36 to correct its judgment at sentencing as a matter of law de novo. See United States v. Pease, 331 F.3d 809, 812, 149, 151 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Werber, 51 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious 1: holding that the district court erred when it used rule 36 to amend the defendants sentence to include an order of forfeiture that had been agreed to in the plea agreement but which the court failed to make a part of its judgment at sentencing 2: holding that rule 36 may not be used by the district court to fundamentally alter the defendants sentence from three to five years imprisonment in an attempt to conform the sentence to the intention of the parties as reflected in the plea agreement which provided that the prisoner would serve exactly five years 3: holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony 4: holding that rule 36 was inapplicable when a court order fundamentally changed the sentence appellant had earlier received


Input: and claims do not resolve the reasonable debate as to the proper way to correct the obvious error in claim 8. Finally, while it is not entirely clear if it intends this argument to apply in the correction context, we note that Fargo argues that the prosecution history supports only one reasonable construction of claim 8. IRIS maintains, however, that under Novo Industries our inquiry is com píete if the proper way to correct the error is not apparent from the face of the patent, even if the proper correction is clear from the prosecution history. Fargo is correct in so far as it argues that the prosecution history is to be consulted to determine whether the error is subject to only one reasonable construction. See Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp., 405 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The error must be evident on the face of the Holdings: 0: holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised on direct appeal when the facts supporting the claim are presented on the face of the record 1: holding that when two patents issued from continuationinpart appliea tions derived from one original application the prosecution history of a claim limitation in the first patent to issue was properly applied to the same claim limitation in the second patent to issue 2: holding a technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention unless it is apparent from the patent and the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a different meaning 3: holding that a court can correct a patent claim for a grammatical error where the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims 4: holding that claim 22 which depends from nonexistent claim 38 could be corrected because the error in the dependency was evident based on the face of the patent and that the correct antecedent claim was apparent from the prosecution history


Input: membership dues were actually waived by the Local and that membership status was conferred without any payments. Furthermore, it is clear that the IBT and the Local did not consider or treat the nurses as members since they paid the striking nurses “Out-of-W0rk” benefits at the “non-member” rate. Plaintiffs argue that the president of Local 803 had at least apparent authority, if not actual authority as a union agent, to waive dues and confer membership status upon the plaintiffs, and that Local 803 and the IBT ratified his actions. Thus, they contend, the Local and the IBT should be estopped from disclaiming plaintiffs’ membership status now. Agency theory may well apply to some acts of union officials. See Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). See also Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Holdings: 0: holding that the breach occurs when the union acts against the interest of its members 1: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 2: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 3: holding that ratification by a union of disciplinary acts of the local leadership against members would occur if the union affirmed the discipline with full knowledge that it was part of an overall scheme to suppress dissent in violation of the lmrda 4: holding that the plaintiffs acted on behalf of all union members and reimbursing the attorneys fees from the union treasury such that all union members in effect equally contributed to the costs of litigation


Input: credibility in that the complaints presumably accuse the officers of lying about the legality of their conduct. See Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) (allowing, in the discretion of the court, inquiry on cross-examination into specific instances of conduct probative of truthfulness). The excluded testimony is thus relevant and admissible. The district court could have properly excluded it under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, however, concluding that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice due to the inherently unreliable nature of unsustained complaints and the danger of confusing the issues and wasting time with mini-trials regarding the events underlying different complaints. See Fed.R.Evid. 403; United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 715, 718 (4th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In order to show a Confrontation Clause Holdings: 0: holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime 1: recognizing that rule 608b prior bad acts evidence admissible as probative of truthfulness is subject to rule 403 balancing 2: recognizing rule 3: recognizing that under the proper application of rule 608b extrinsic evidence of specific instances of bad conduct is made inadmissible when offered to prove a witnesss character for untruthfulness 4: holding prior bad acts evidence is admissible where there is an articulation or identification of the consequential fact to which the proffered evidence of other acts is directed


Input: F.2d 460, 461 (6th Cir.1980). However, because of this statutory provision, creditors may continue to pursue their remedies against a dissolved corporation despite its formal nonexistence if the action is commenced within two years from the date of dissolution. Lottman v. Piper Indus., Inc., 726 F.Supp. 384 (N.D.N.Y.1989) (applying Tennessee law, dismissing claim pursuant to T.C.A. § 48-1-1013 which was filed more than two years after dissolution). Statutes similar to T.C.A. § 48-1-1013 have been described as survival statutes rather than statutes of limitation. 19 Am. Jur.2d Corporations § 2897 (1986) (discussing the provision found in the Model Business Corporations Act). The Supreme Court of South Dakota explained ., 448 F.Supp. 769 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff'd 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Several courts have nonetheless held that a Holdings: 0: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 1: holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment 2: holding allegation of fraudulent concealment did not affect the running of the survival statute 3: holding that engle established the conduct elements of a fraudulent concealment cause of action 4: holding that the concealment of ones identity does not toll the running of the statute of limitations


Input: 1,000 clients over the course of his practice.” Coppola’s experience in the practice of law, especially in the area which is the subject matter of this case, is definitely an aggravator. See Attorney Grievance v. Whitehead, 405 Md. 240, 263, 950 A.2d 798, 812 (2008) (“Respondent also had substantial experience in the practice of law having been admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on December 1, 1973, the Bar of the District of Columbia in 1991, and the Bar of the State of New York in 1997.”); Attorney Grievance v. Mininsohn, 380 Md. 536, 576, 846 A.2d 353, 376 (2004) (“With almost twenty-five years experience at the bar, Mininsohn also has ‘substantial experience in the practice of law.’ ”); Attorney Grievance v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 106, 797 A.2d 757, 769 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Attorney Grievance v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, Holdings: 0: holding evidence sufficient to support aggravating factor of old age 1: holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice 2: recognizing attorneys substantial experience in the practice of law as an aggravating factor 3: holding that the death of a victim may not be considered an aggravating factor in a homicide sentencing 4: holding a state has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state


Input: credit against his federal sentence because he would likely have served only half of his 15-month term if it were not for the extradition detainer. We agree with the district court that there was no meaningful evidence to support that argument. For the reasons stated above, the district court’s Order denying Efrosman’s habeas petition is hereby AFFIRMED. 1 . Efrosman’s petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, challenged the propriety of the BOP’s execution of his sentence, not the legality of the district court’s imposition of his sentence. Placing substance over form, see Cook v. New York State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 277-78 (2d Cir.2003), the petition is properly construed as brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, see Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474-75 (2d Cir.1997) Holdings: 0: recognizing our ability to construe a pretrial habeas petition filed under  2254 as being brought under  2241 1: holding that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of probation 2: holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction 3: holding that petition relating to calculation of credit for time served during federal detention was properly brought under  2241 4: holding that credit cannot be awarded for time served on community control


Input: testimony concerning his qualifications and his resume chronicling his extensive experience as a salvor, we alternatively hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Startz’s knowledge, skill, experience, and training concerning the documentation, evaluation, and liquidation of a variety of types of damaged goods qualified Startz to give an opinion that would be helpful to the finder of fact on that subject — his documentation, replacement valuation, and attempt to liquidate AHC’s inventory of smoke-damaged hats. We overrule the portion of Wise Electric’s second issue to the extent that it may be construed as complaining of Startz’s qualifications to offer replacement-value testimony. See, e.g., Helena Chem, Co. v. Wilkins, 47, S.W.3d 486, 500 (Tex.2001) (<HOLDING>). 29 . Wise -Electric states that “Startz’s Holdings: 0: holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony 1: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss on de minimis grounds where his expert witness testimony was inadmissible 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify 3: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sequestering a criminal defendants fingerprint expert 4: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify


Input: touch a minor constituted a violent act, the State could not demonstrate a prima facie case that defendant violated an “express” probation condition, and the VOP conviction cannot stand. See State v. Austin, 165 Vt. at 398, 685 A.2d at 1082. ¶ 17. Our probation condition precedent provides no direct analogy to the case at hand. In prior cases where this Court contemplated violations of the probation condition prohibiting “violent” and “threatening” behavior (here Condition N), we addressed the terms separately, as distinct types of action. The application and interpretation of this condition has generally been challenged in cases where the State alleges that the probationer engaged in threatening behavior that was primarily or exclusively speech. See, e.g., Johnstone, 2013 VT 57, ¶ 17 (<HOLDING>); Sanville, 2011 VT 34, ¶ 12 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that defendant had not violated probation condition prohibiting violent or threatening behavior when he was simply mouthing off to his girlfriend and did not intend to put his probation officer in fear of harm 1: holding that probation is not a sentence 2: holding that it is sufficient grounds to revoke a probation if only one condition of the probation is broken 3: holding that a defendant was not constitutionally entitled to counsel at a probation revocation hearing when he admitted to violating the terms of his probation and refused the district courts offer to appoint counsel 4: holding that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of probation


Input: Hospital, 911 F.Supp. 1213, 1221 (W.D.Mo.1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260, 269-70 (8th Cir.1995)(“[o]nee a relevant market has been established, the Court must next determine whether the proposed consolidation will have anti-competitive effects”). Plaintiffs have not shown any anticompetitive effects whatsoever that will result from the merger. Plaintiffs have simply made eonclu-sory allegations that the merged entity will have significant market power and that the merger will significantly limit competition without any evidence of the same. Also, there seem to be significant efficiencies realized from this merger that plaintiffs have failed to address. F.T.C. v. Butterworth Health Corporation, 946 F.Supp. 1285, 1300-02 (W.D.Mich.1996), aff'd., 121 F.3d 708, 1997 WL 420543 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Department of Justice and Federal Trade Holdings: 0: holding that court had no supplemental jurisdiction over claim by shareholder for breach of merger agreement that was the subject of the dispute between the merger partners over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction 1: recognizing exceptions to the continuous ownership requirement in certain merger cases 2: holding that the trial court did not err in its refusal to consider the borrowers defense of merger on appeal since the defense was outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court 3: recognizing the efficiencies defense in merger cases 4: recognizing defense in securities case


Input: copies to the United States Sentencing Commission and the United States Bureau of Prisons. 1 . The Tenth Circuit has not directly addressed the question of what constitutes "a single act of aberrant behavior.” In United States v. Peña, 930 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir.1991), the court upheld the district court’s decision to depart downward on the basis of "a single act of aberrant behavior.” The Tenth Circuit found that implicit in the district court’s findings was the conclusion that defendant's behavior was an aberration from her usual conduct, as reflected by her long-term employment, economic support for her family, and lack of either abuse or prior involvement in the distribution of controlled substances. Peña, 930 F.2d at 1495. Cf. United States v. Bauer, 995 F.2d 182 (10th Cir.1993) Holdings: 0: recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart 1: holding there was no jurisdiction to review district courts discretionary refusal to depart downward on the grounds that defendants conduct constituted a single act of aberrant behavior 2: holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart 3: recognizing that aberrant criminal behavior may justify downward variance 4: holding that district court may not depart downward to preserve defendants ability to make restitution


Input: Police Board held a hearing on the Internal Affairs complaint and sustained the complaint by a vote of 4-1. Although the results were forwarded to the then acting police chief, Barile has received no communication regarding his complaint. On July 17, 2004, Barile read a newspaper article indicating that the Honorable Ellen Bree Burns, U.S.D.J., had ruled on a consent decree that would result in the review and, hopefully, resolution of the backlog of complaints against the Hartford Police Department. Barile commenced this action by complaint dated July 20, 2004. III. Discussion Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is time-barred. The limitations period for filing a section 1983 action is three years. See Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Barile alleges that defendant Rodrigues used Holdings: 0: holding that in connecticut the general threeyear personal injury statute of limitations set forth in connecticut general statutes  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions asserted under 42 usc  1983 1: holding that civil rights claims at least those arising under 42 usc  1983 were subject to the applicable states personal injury statute of limitations 2: holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions 3: holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under  1983 4: holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims


Input: entire arbitration provision because the PAGA waiver expressly forbids severance. 2013 Agreement § 14.3(v)(c). In any event, even if Uber’s structural argument offered a plausible construction of the Agreement (and the Court has considerable doubts on that point) it must ultimately be rejected. At best, Uber’s argument suggests there is some ambiguity in the otherwise crystal clear language of the contract that provides that the PAGA waiver is not severable. Because the 2013 Agreement is a standardized contract written by Uber, however, to the extent the language is ambiguous any ambiguity, must be “resolved against the drafter.” Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal.App. 4th 779, 798, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 (1998); see also Slottow v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 10 F.3d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court would Holdings: 0: recognizing that california has a valid interest in protecting a california company from copyright infringement 1: recognizing a hypothetical situation where california law left a party free to sue on a claim in maryland even after the claim was precluded in california because the california statute of limitations had expired 2: recognizing rule 3: recognizing california law rule that ambiguities in a written instrument are resolved against the drafter 4: holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law


Input: applied in federal court appeals”) (footnote omitted); In re St. Mary Hospital, 120 B.R. 25, 28 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990) (“The district court may affirm the decision of the bankruptcy court on any basis that finds support in the record.”), aff'd, 931 F.2d 51 (3d Cir.1991) (unpublished disposition). Finally, Beal argues that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that the principles of waiver and estoppel precluded Beal from applying the default interest rate to the matured loans. Because, like the district court, we conclude that the plain language of the contract precluded the default interest rate from applying to the matured loans, we need not reach the issues of waiver and estoppel. AFFIRMED. 1 . See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 2 . See NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1089 Holdings: 0: holding state law governs property interests in bankruptcy proceedings unless some federal interest requires a different result   1: holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code 2: holding that in a bankruptcy proceeding state law governs the rights of the parties with regard to interests in property 3: holding that federal law governs the definition of property which embraces both fee and lien interests 4: recognizing rule that state law governs the substance of claims in bankruptcy proceedings


Input: a natural condition. ¶ 18 Thus, even assuming that the negligent actions of government employees or the defective condition of the reservoir or floating dock proximately caused Glaittli's injuries, his injuries arose out of, were in connection with, or resulted from a natural condition on publicly owned or controlled land. See id. § 68G-7-301(5)(k). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the natural condition exception to the waiver of immunity is applicable and bars Caittli's suit. CONCLUSION ¶ 19 Based on Glaittli's pleaded facts, the wind-caused waves on the Jordanelle Reservoir that caused his injuries were a natural condition. @Glaittlif's injuries arose out of, were suffered in connection with, or resulted from that natural condition. Thus, the 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 (1992) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Were we to overlook the effect of the Holdings: 0: holding on rehearing that exclusion for disabilities caused by a preexisting medical condition would not support denial of benefits caused by staph infection resulting from surgery for a preexisting condition 1: holding that a shorebreaking wave was a natural condition even if caused by manmade improvements to the beach 2: holding as a matter of law that natural condition present was open and obvious to all who would encounter it 3: holding that employer was entitled to discharge employee after he threatened life of his supervisor even if such misconduct was caused by employees disability 4: holding that the plaintiff had no riparian rights in a natural lake when the plaintiffs access to the lake was provided by a manmade channel and that the defendant was entitled to exclude the plaintiff from the lake by installing a fence


Input: the remedies previously available to insureds in certain scenarios involving bad-faith conduct by their insurers, inter alia, by authorizing punitive-damages awards. See generally Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos. Inc., 567 Pa. 386, 402, 787 A.2d 376, 386 (2001). Allstate removed the litigation to a federal district court. During pretrial proceedings, Wolfe filed an amended complaint and Allstate pursued summary relief, asserting that, as a third party to the Allstate/Zierle insurance policy, Wolfe lacked standing to pursue damages under Section 8371. This position was grounded on two main premises. First, Allstate explained, under Ash v. Continental Insurance Co., 593 Pa. 523, 932 A.2d 877 (2007), Section 8371 created a form of an unliquidated tort claim. See id. at 536, 932 A.2d at 885 (<HOLDING>). Second, per longstanding Pennsylvania law, Holdings: 0: holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations 1: holding the twoyear period for filing a particular tort action such as assault and battery controls over the more general threeyear statute of limitations for tort actions 2: holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under  1983 3: holding in determining the appropriate limitations period that an action under  8371 is a statutorilycreated tort action 4: holding that an employees action against her employer for negligent supervision lies not in tort but with an action for breach of contract


Input: by Plain Dealer. Moreover, subsection (c)(7) of those regulations permits, on its face, unbridled discretion and therefore an inherent threat of arbitrary decision making. Since Gannett did not involve a facial challenge to adopted licensing requirements, it is inapplicable to this instant case. B. Provision Granting the Architectural Board of Review With Standardless Discretion Is Unconstitutional The provision requiring the Board to approve the design of newsracks is unconstitutional under a time, place and manner analysis because the provision is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. See Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L s Board, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953 (1937) (<HOLDING>) as authority for the above proposition. Holdings: 0: holding that the national labor relations act does not unconstitutionally abridge the freedom of the press in that it does not interfere with the right to discharge any employee for any proper cause 1: holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act 2: holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board 3: holding that the nlrb was a creditor within the meaning of the code because it had been granted the power to enforce the national labor relations act even though a back pay award was made to individual workers not to the government 4: holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act


Input: J. This appeal raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in ordering judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $1.00 for nominal damages. We find there was no error. This complaint arises from an arson fire of a studio and its contents destroyed by the fire of property owned by the plaintiff, Dona M. Kerins. The fire was set by three juveniles, Christopher M. Rule, James Hannan, and Kevin Dmytryck. The defendants, Linda McConnell and Joseph Hannan, are the parents of the juvenile, James Hannan. The cases against the foster parents of Christopher M. Rule and the parent of Kevin Dmytryck have previously been resolved. See Kerins v. Lima, 425 Mass. 108, 680 N.E. 2d 32 (1997) (<HOLDING>); and Writ of Execution on Money Judgment as to Holdings: 0: recognizing that foster parents do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a continued relationship with their foster child 1: holding that natural parents could not lose parental rights to foster parents where the foster agreement contemplates a surrender of custody for only a temporary period of time 2: holding foster parents not liable for willful act of their foster child 3: holding the foster parent did not possess a liberty interest in her relationship with the foster child 4: recognizing emotional bond between foster parents and child although ultimately determining foster parents did not have rights of parents in dependency action under chapter 2644 rcw


Input: CURIAM. Affirmed. See Adams v. State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>); accord Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722 (Fla. 3d Holdings: 0: holding that section 89313 as amended by section 893101 florida statutes 2002 is constitutional 1: holding that the legislature amended section 8120142d florida statutes now renumbered as section 8120143c in 1992 to omit habitual offender penalties for the crime of felony petit theft 2: recognizing that the 1992 amendment to section 8930216 florida statutes changed the law 3: holding florida sexual predators act section 77521 florida statutes 2000 to be unconstitutional as violating procedural due process 4: holding that arbitration is not a civil action as that term is used in section 76873 florida statutes 1991


Input: the inference that there was a fraudulent intent,” and that this inference cannot be rebutted by “the mere assertion by a party that it did not intend to deceive.” Id. at 1352 (emphasis added). Contrary to Pequignot’s position, the Federal Circuit did not hold that this inference is irrebuttable. Indeed, Pequignot’s interpretation would eliminate any distinction between intent to deceive, which § 292 requires, and knowledge of falsity, a different state of mind. Moreover, to hold, as Pequignot suggests, that a party that knowingly made false patent markings is precluded from even offering evidence that it did not in tend to deceive would be inconsistent with the high bar that is set for proving deceptive intent. See Brose v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 455 F.2d 763, 768 (5th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>); Central Admixture Pharmacy Servs. v. Advanced Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review 1: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden to show that the defendant acted with intent to deceive 2: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 3: holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury 4: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden when relying on the discovery rule


Input: who commits any felony has the requisite mens rea to commit first-degree murder is a legal fiction we no longer can support. In felony murder cases where the felony is a first-degree felony such a presumption is appropriate, but not where the felony is of a lesser degree. This presumption is inappropriate today for lesser-degree felonies where moral, social, and penal considerations dictate that criminal liability should be imposed according to moral culpability. Thu 494 (1958) (stating that the mere violation of a traffic safety statute is an insufficient predicate for felonious slaying, that it requires “recklessness of probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision”); State v. Collins, 67 Ohio St.3d 115, 616 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ohio 1993) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Heck, 517 Pa. 192, 535 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop 1: holding that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop did not depend on the actual motivation of the officer involved as long as the officer articulated a lawful reason for the stop 2: holding that the forceable stop at issue was an investigatory stop rather than an arrest 3: holding that the misdemeanormanslaughter rule requires a showing of intent or the commission of an act in such a maimer as to make the killing of deceased a natural or probable result of such conduct 4: holding that a minormisdemeanor such as the failure to stop at a stop sign could not be a predicate offence for misdemeanormanslaughter because it did not show the necessary intent or recklessness