Input: it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 461 (10th Cir.2013) (citations omitted). If a movant properly supports a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in her complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Only admissible evidence Holdings: 0: holding that mere speculation does not satisfy the nonmoving partys burden of establishing a dispute of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment 1: holding that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact 2: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 3: holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact 4: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate


Input: any additional damages under state law that were not recoverable under CERCLA), because we have found that Durham’s state-law claims are barred by the statute of limitations, Durham may not recover attorneys’ fees under state law. 97. Accordingly, Durham’s request for attorneys’ fees is denied. VII. Conclusion 98. On Plaintiffs claims under § 113(f)(1) of CERCLA, the Court awards Plaintiff, The Durham Manufacturing Company, $116,075.65 against Defendant Merriam Manufacturing Company, and $19,345.94 against Defendant Allan E. Adams, plus post-judgment interest. 99. The Court further awards Plaintiff pre-judgment interest, accruing from the latter of the date on which Plaintiff made demand for payment on the Defendants or the date of the expenditure. See Goodrich Corp., 311 F.3d at 177 (<HOLDING>). The Plaintiff is directed to submit a Holdings: 0: holding that prejudgment interest may include compound interest 1: holding that award and rate of prejudgment interest are within trial courts discretion 2: holding that an award of prejudgment interest under  113f of cercla is mandatory 3: holding that the state circuit court did not have the authority to award prejudgment interest for matters occurring prior to arbitration award 4: holding summary rejection of request for interest was not an abuse of discretion under indcode  345147 which states the court may award prejudgment interest as part of a judgment


Input: the only major issue was the identity of the robbers.” Id. 21 .Similarly, if the defense indicates that it will present evidence during its case to impeach the testimony of a State witness (as in Milligan and Cobh), there is no concern that the State will not have the "predicate issue” to justify offering further evidence to refute the defense evidence during the State’s rebuttal case. 22 . The legislature has established entrapment as an affirmative defense with the concomitant burden of proof on the defendant rather than as an element of an offense to be negated in the State’s prima facie case. See 11 Del. C. § 432(a). 23 . Arguments by counsel during opening statements and summation are not evidence and thus cannot be said to raise an affirmative defense. Cf. Milligan 761 A.2d at 8 (<HOLDING>). 24 . Cf. United States v. Bailey, D.C.Cir., Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony 1: holding that evidence of a later sexual encounter that triggered the delayed report was admissible only after milligan had in fact introduced evidence of late reporting  to impeach the victims testimony 2: holding that remedial measures evidence was not admissible to impeach testimony that at the time of the event the measure was not believed to be as practical as the one employed 3: recognizing that if the government introduced evidence tending to show that the victims  did not expect to engage in prostitution  it will have put those victims sexual histories at issue and under those circumstances it is possible that  evidence rebutting the governments allegations might be admissible under the constitutional exception 4: holding that evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct with the victim is admissible to corroborate the victims testimony


Input: that these taxes were discharged in the Joyes’ bankruptcy case. 1. Section 1305 is entitled “Filing and allowance of post-petition claims.” Subsection (a) provides that “[a] proof of claim may be filed by any entity that holds a claim against a debtor ... (1) for taxes that become payable to a governmental unit while the case is pending.” 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1). The parties do not dispute that the Joyes’ bankruptcy case was pending from March 7, 2001 to March 4, 2004. Therefore, whether the Joyes’ outstanding taxes give rise to a post-petition claim pursuant to section 1305(a)(1) depends on when these taxes became “payable” for the purpose of that section. We have yet to construe the term “payable” as used in section 1305(a)(1). See In re Savaria, 317 B.R. 395, 401 (9th Cir. BAP 2004) (<HOLDING>). However, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Holdings: 0: recognizing a split of authority 1: recognizing a split of authority on this issue 2: recognizing split 3: recognizing split within the circuit on whether the rule is mandatory or discretionary but not resolving the conflict 4: recognizing without resolving the split in authority on the meaning of the word


Input: it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.’ ”). A fact is “material” for purposes of summary judgment when proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the claim or a defense advanced by either party. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). A patent enjoys a presumption of validity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 282. “Consequently, ‘a moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at summary judgment must submit such clear and convincing evidence of invalidity so that no reasonable jury could find otherwise.’ ” Chrimar Sys. v. Cisco Sys., 318 F.Supp.2d 476, 491 (E.D.Mich.2004) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir. 2001) ); see also Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 725 (Fed.Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). However, “[t]he burden of persuasion created Holdings: 0: holding in part that party seeking reformation of deed must show the original intent or agreement of parties by clear and convincing evidence 1: recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome 2: holding presumption overcome based on competent substantial record evidence which the judge could reasonably find to be clear and convincing 3: holding that a party seeking to establish particular claims as invalid must overcome the presumption of validity in 35 usc  282 by clear and convincing evidence 4: holding that the presumption of validity  and its concomitant clear and convincing evidence standard  does not apply to section 101 claims the court reasoned because no evidence outside the pleadings is considered in deciding a motion to dismiss  it makes little sense to apply a clear and convincing standard  a burden of proof  to such motions citation omitted


Input: properly resorted to construing the contract against the drafter, Ms. LeKander. Point II is also denied, and the trial court’s order granting her claim only as to the mortgage interest she had paid on the home after Mr. LeKander’s death is affirmed. BARNEY, P.J., and LYNCH, J„ Concurs. 1 . The probate commissioner heard this matter and entered a "judgment” denying Ms. LeKander's claim on July 8, 2010. Under section 472.160.1(1) and (13), an order denying a claim against an estate of more than one hundred dollars may be appealed. Under section 478.268, the judge of the probate division must reject or confirm the orders and judgments of the probate commissioner in the thirty-first judicial circuit. Cf. Clemans v. Mercantile Bank of St. Louis, N.A., 936 S.W.2d 889, 890 (Mo.App. E.D.1997) (<HOLDING>). Greene County is within the thirty-first Holdings: 0: holding that the notice of appeal filed after the district court entered judgment as to one defendant but before the court dismissed the claims against the other defendants would have become effective when those defendants were later dismissed 1: holding that the determination by the probate court in the summary proceeding provided for by section 211516 revised code that assets should be included in an estate makes the question of title res judicata as between all parties to the proceeding but the judgment of the probate court may be attacked in a subsequent action by other interested persons who were not parties to the proceeding in probate court 2: holding that the appeal should be dismissed as nothing in the record indicated that the probate court confirmed the commissioners order in construing a similar statute  section 478266  applicable in certain other circuits 3: holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well 4: holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal


Input: bad law, we conclude that the territorial restriction in Atlanta Speciality’s uninsured motorist policy does not violate Mississippi public policy as embodied in the UM Act. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and RENDER judgment for Atlanta Speciality. REVERSED AND RENDERED. 1 . The Mississippi Supreme Court has found various provisions of uninsured motorist policies ambiguous. See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So.2d 1002, 1006 (Miss.1984) (limitation of liability clause); Pearthree v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 373 So.2d 267, 270-71 (Miss.1979) (same); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Bridges, 350 So.2d 1379, 1381-82 (Miss. 1977) (same); compare Blansett v. American Employers Ins. Co., 652 F.2d 535, 536-37 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.1981) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). There is no dispute in this case that the Holdings: 0: holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous 1: holding that an identical or nearly identical limitation of liability clause was valid and enforceable under georgia law 2: holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law 3: holding that if easement language is clear and unambiguous and does not limit its duration then the court cannot impose such a limitation 4: holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant


Input: In addition, to the extent Olmstead has argued that the court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 60(b) motion because he was proceeding without counsel, a defendant’s pro se status in civil litigation generally will not excuse mistakes he makes regarding procedural mies. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (explaining that the Court “never [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel,” because “experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law”); see also Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, relief cannot be granted under Rule Holdings: 0: holding that a pro se litigants failure to comply with the filing deadlines for a notice of appeal set out in federal rule of bankruptcy procedure 8002 meant that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the litigants appeal 1: holding that although pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings pro se litigants must follow procedural rules 2: recognizing that although pro se litigants are not entitled to greater rights than represented litigants due process principles permit the imposition of a procedural bar only after consideration of the pro se litigants reasonable expectations about what had occurred 3: holding that rule 56f applies to pro se litigants 4: holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines


Input: filed a motion for a new trial on September 16, 2009, which the trial court denied on February 15,2013. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, which properly transferred the appeal to this Court on October 8,2013. The case was docketed here for the January 2014 term and submitted for decision on the briefs. 2 In addition, OCGA § 16-3-21 (d) (2), which was enacted in 1993, authorizes relevant expert testimony regarding the defendant’s condition of mind at the time of the offense, including relevant facts and circumstances relating to the family violence or child abuse that are the bases of the expert’s opinion, to support a justification defense in a prosecution for murder or manslaughter. See also Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619 (277 SE2d 678) (1981) (<HOLDING>). 3 We recognize that the descriptions of Holdings: 0: holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible 1: holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion 2: holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard 3: holding that expert testimony in support of a justification defense based on battered spouse syndrome would not he an improper opinion on an ultimate fact 4: holding that expert testimony should be excluded when jury is equally competent to form an opinion about ultimate fact issue or experts testimony is within jurys common knowledge


Input: that Rutherford was not prejudiced by the District’s lack of notice because he received all of the benefits he otherwise would have received had the leave been designated. Defi’s Mem. Supp. 31; Dunn Dep. 37 (Dunn stated that while Rutherford was not given FMLA forms, he “was given all the rights and benefits as if [he] had been.”) This argument misses the mark in addressing Rutherford’s real concern: that he was not returned to work once he had proven himself fit to do so. Pl.’s Mem. 32. Simply put, the District’s failure to follow the FMLA notice rules, and thereby prolonging Rutherford’s reinstatement process, prejudiced Rutherford because it kept him from returning to work despite the fact that he wanted to, was fit to do so, and was entitled to do so. Cf. Ridings, 537 F.3d at 762 (<HOLDING>). Even though Rutherford was not required to Holdings: 0: holding that an employer was justified in demoting plaintiff after she returned from maternity leave because plaintiff could not rebut the employers evidence that she was having performance problems before she went on leave and that additional performance problems were discovered while she was on leave 1: holding in the only seventh circuit case addressing prejudice in the context of failure to notice that an employee was not prejudiced because she benefitted from a reduced schedule of leave for more than a yeara schedule she wanted to keep 2: holding that defendants decision to change the office schedule without allowing plaintiff leave to alter his personal schedule did not constitute an adverse action although plaintiff alleged that because of the schedule revisions he was forced to come in two hours early for his shift a mere inconvenience is not sufficiently adverse to sustain a prima facie case 3: holding that a change in work schedule and request that an employee perform two additional tasks did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action 4: holding that defendant adequately indicated to officers that she sought assistance of counsel when she stated that she wanted to call her lawyer and officer testified that request was unambiguous


Input: by Tus-chner was reasonable in law. According to the district court, although our court ultimately disagreed with the conclusion that Tuschner controlled Zahareas, “the SEC’s legal position was at least a colorable, reasonable attempt at defining an otherwise undefined phrase.” (Id. at 12.) Third, relying on the undisputed communications and dealings between Tuschner and Za-hareas, the district court found that the SEC’s factual basis was reasonable. The fact that the district court and our court found for the SEC at various stages in the litigation does not automatically grant the government immunity from EAJA liability. See Herman v. Schwent, 177 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir.1999) (reversing district court and granting attorney’s fees); Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, 53 F.3d at 885 (<HOLDING>). Instead, we must fully analyze the facts and Holdings: 0: recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue 1: recognizing ajlthough presiding judge mccormicks opinion in davis  is labeled a concurring opinion it was joined by a majority of the court and may be regarded as an opinion for the court 2: holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion 3: holding a medical opinion to be not significantly probative where the opinion was contrary to other substantial record evidence 4: holding that the district court erred in denying fees by relying too heavily upon its original opinion and judge magills dissent from our decision reversing that opinion


Input: of the Government’s bargaining power and the fact that the defendant waives his constitutional rights. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236. When considering an alleged breach of a plea agreement, we first identify the terms of the agreement. We then determine whether there has been a breach. If so, we fashion a remedy. Id. at 235. In Miller’s case, the Government filed a written 5K1.1 motion, which requested a downward departure of “ ‘3 levels from the parties’ stipulated offense level of 26,’ to ‘offense level 23.’ ” Br. for Appellee 27 (quoting App. 360). Miller asserts that he reasonably understood this to be- a term of the plea agreement and, therefore, that the Government was bound to recommend offense level 23 at sentencing. Cf. United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). We will assume for the sake of argument that Holdings: 0: holding federal court is not bound by terms of plea agreement between defendant and state authorities 1: holding that the government is no longer bound by its obligations under a plea agreement when a defendant commits a material breach 2: holding that objecting to guidelines calculations as specifically reserved in the plea agreement is not a breach of the plea agreement even if the objection is overruled and thus government is not released from obligation under the agreement to move for acceptance of responsibility 3: holding that when a court accepts a fixed plea agreement it is bound by the agreements terms 4: holding that the government was bound by an agreement it treated as binding although it preceded the formal plea agreement


Input: they completely terminated their physician and patient relationship. Generally, the negligent conduct of a physician causes at least some immediate damage to the patient, but the statute of limitations, nonetheless, commences running at termination of the course of treatment, sometime after the initial damage occurs. See Schmit, 183 Minn, at 359, 236 N.W. at 625 (adopting the termination of treatment rule despite the general rule that a statute of limitations action in tort begins to run at the time of the negligent act which coincides with the injury). Zagaros claims the termination of treatment rule is inapplicable in her case because no immediate damage coincided with Erickson’s allegedly negligent misdiagnosis. See Peterson v. St. Cloud Hosp., 460 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). She argues she was not injured by any lack of Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal 1: holding that the occurrence of damages determines when a medical malpractice action accrues 2: recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner 3: holding that absent a contrary mandate from congress the discovery rule determines when a cause of action accrues in a federal question case 4: holding cause of action accrues when some compensable damage occurs


Input: It’s a rather unusual circumstance, but I’ve heard it before. Obviously, it’s not unusual for participants in a trial to watch the jury, but we want to be sure that the jury is not made uncomfortable. So if I’m correct that the regular attendees have been members of the family or friends of the defendants, I would appreciate counsel commenting to them when and as appropriate that we don’t want to make the jurors uncomfortable, and what’s actually a lot more interesting about a trial is what goes on in the well of the court and from the witness stand as opposed to the jury. So I share that with you just so you can convey the court’s mild concern that the jurors not be made uncomfortable. It’s nothing more than that. Okay? J.A. 915-16. There was no evidence that the judge had ir.1994) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793, Holdings: 0: holding that multiple sentences for offenses under 18 usc  924c are appropriate when multiple separate acts of firearm use have occurred even if they are related to the same underlying offense 1: holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts 2: holding that in relation to is an element of 18 usc  924c 3: holding that consecutive fixedterm sentences for juveniles who committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are not clearly unconstitutional under graham even when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole 4: holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution


Input: the confidentiality protections afforded by the Mediation Order. A. The Defendants Have Not Established a Special Need for Mediation Communications Under the first prong of the Teli-gent test, a movant seeking to modify a protective order must establish “improvidence in the grant of the order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need.” Teligent, 640 F.3d at 59 (quoting SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir.2001)); see Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 165 Fed.Appx. 878, 880 (2d Cir.2005) (affirming denial of motion to modify protective order on the” basis that movant “had not shown a compelling need or extraordinary circumstances necessary to modify the protective order”); Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); see also Dandong, 2012 WL 4793870, at *5 Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant has the right to an order permitting him to inspect his own written or recorded statements absent a basis for a protective order 1: holding that a protective order under rule 26c to stay discovery pending determination of a dispositive motion is an appropriate exercise of the courts discretion 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it modified a protective order after settlement to permit public access to pretrial materials in spite of a protective order to the contrary which it viewed as having had been initially justified 3: holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the tennessee rules of civil procedure 4: holding that a protective order granted pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 26c should not be modified absent a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need


Input: that the “catchall has to be understood within the context of the limitations” enumerated in the first eight factors). 9 . Although the Coalition's briefs appear to pose its specificity challenge as an attack on EPA's interpretation of RCRA, it might also have intended to argue that the asserted vagueness of § 270.10(Z) renders the regulation arbitrary and capricious. But such an argument would also fail because, as was true in Animal Legal Defense Fund, "[t]he explanation that renders the [agency’s] interpretation of the statute rea th respect to a jurisdictional provision analogous to RCRA, that agency action is reviewable if it "binds private parties or the agency itself with the 'force of law’ ”), with McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, our jurisdictional cases routinely Holdings: 0: holding that when the agency reopens a proceeding for any reason and after reconsideration issues a new and final order setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties that order  even if it merely reaffirms the rights and obligations set forth in the original order  is reviewable on its merits 1: holding that it is not 2: holding that an agency pronouncement is a policy statement exempt from apa notice and comment if it first does not have a presentday binding effect that is it does not impose any rights and obligations and second genuinely leaves the agency and its decisionmakers free to exercise discretion  quoting community nutrition inst v young 818 f2d 943 946  n 4 dccir1987 3: holding that the court reviews noncompliance with an agency pronouncement only if it actually has the force and effect of law 4: holding that ftc issuance of a complaint meets the apa definition of order and therefore is agency action even if not final agency action


Input: applicable here, and supports our conclusion that the language of the ballot title and summary do not constitute political or emotional rhetoric. Moreover, the common definition of the term “protect” is “to maintain the status or integrity of.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 938 (10th ed.1998). This common definition, when read in context and conjunction with the rest of the language contained in the ballot title and summary accurately portrays the chief purpose of the amendment — preserving the current concept of marriage in Florida as the legal union of one man and one woman. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ballot summary and title in the instant proposal are not impermissibly misleading, nor are they “clearly and conclusively defective.” Askew, 421 So.2d at 154 (<HOLDING>). REVIEW OF FINANCIAL IMPACT STATEMENT Article Holdings: 0: holding that language in a citizen initiative must be clearly and conclusively defective to justify removal of the measure from the ballot 1: holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective 2: holding that the plain language of the diversity jurisdiction statute permitted a workmens compensation claim to be filed as an original action in federal court even though congress clearly intended to prohibit the removal of such claims congress used language specifically barring removal of such cases from state to federal courts and at the same time left unchanged the old language which just as specifically permits civil suits to be filed in federal courts in cases where there are both diversity of citizenship and the prescribed jurisdictional amount in this situation we must take the intent of congress with regard to the filing of diversity cases in federal district courts to be that which its language clearly sets forth congress could very easily have used language to bar filing of workmens compensation suits by the insurer as well as removal of such suits and it could easily do so still 3: holding that notice of removal was defective on its face because it failed to contain a copy of the process as required by the removal statute 4: holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand


Input: Rather, as noted above, it is clear that the IDEA provides for reimbursement only if (1) the school district fails to provide a FAPE and (2) the parental placement is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Carter, 950 F.2d at 163 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369, 105 S.Ct. 1996. These two findings lie at the heart of the statute. In this regard, we note that the hearing officer and district court made findings that Lindamood-Bell had fallen short in several significant respects, namely in the failure to provide the life skills and vocational training and the group interaction needed by M.S. for his instruction. We accord great deference to such findings under our precedent. See MM ex rel. DM, 303 F.3d at 531 (<HOLDING>). Whether the identified shortcomings of Holdings: 0: holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings 1: holding that findings of fact from a bench trial are reviewed for clear error 2: holding that findings of fact made in administrative proceedings are considered to be prima facie correct and that where a district court has heard and considered additional evidence  we review its findings of fact for clear error 3: holding that findings of fact are reviewed for clear error 4: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case


Input: due process claim was proper because it was subsumed by his Fourth Amendment claim. See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). Summary judgment was proper on McKinney’s First Amendment claim because McKinney failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officers acted with intent to deny McKinney his first amendment rights. Cf. Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1469 (9th Cir.1994). Summary judgment on McKinney’s claim alleging the seized property was never returned to him was proper because McKinney admitted at deposition that he did not follow California state law procedures for recovering property pursuant to Cal.Penal Code § 1536. See City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241, 119 S.Ct. 678, 142 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Summary judgment on McKinney’s pendent state Holdings: 0: holding california postdeprivation recovery procedures satisfy due process despite lack of notice to claimant of recovery procedures 1: holding that the irs has notice of plaintiffs alternate ground of recovery because it had considered and evaluated the applicability of the code provision under which the plaintiff sought recovery 2: holding that its flexible approach to due process taking account of private interests the potential for reducing erroneous deprivations and the costs of procedures needed to reduce errors applies to evaluations of notice as well as the procedures at a hearing 3: holding that notice and postdeprivation grievance procedures are sufficient process to freeze an inmates prison trust account until the prisoner pays for medical expenses he has incurred 4: holding that the avoidance powers provide for recovery only if the recovery is for the benefit of the estate


Input: Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 257 (1st Cir.1996)). Under the circumstances at hand, where the case was originally filed in state court and subsequently removed to federal court, precedent dictates that the district court should have remanded the remaining claims to state court. See, e.g., Cook v. Sheriff of Monroe County, 402 F.3d 1092, 1123 (11th Cir.2005) (explaining “[bjeeause this case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1441, if the district court declines to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, [plaintiffs] remaining claim should be remanded to state court”); Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find that the district court Holdings: 0: holding that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related statelaw claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction 1: holding that district courts dismissal of state law claims was proper where the district court had properly dismissed all of the federal questions that gave it original jurisdiction 2: holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well 3: holding that when all federal claims have been dismissed the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims 4: holding that after all federal claims had been dismissed if the district court does decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction these state claims shall be remanded to state court rather than dismissed because this case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court


Input: in accordance with another provision of this code. See Act of May 10, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 290, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 548, 548-51 (repealed and recodified 2003) (current version at Tex. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 541.051-.061). 9 . See, e.g., Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex.1996); Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 491 n. 1 (Tex.1988); IN A of Tex. v. Bryant, 686 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.1985); Conte v. Ditta, No. 14-02-00482-CV, 2003 WL 21191296, at *4 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.) (presuming that trial court did not consider a late-filed affidavit where the record showed only that the trial court considered the response). But see Durbin v. Culberson County, 132 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Alaniz v. Hoyt, 105 S.W.3d 330, 339-40 Holdings: 0: holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government 1: holding that in ruling on a summaryjudgment motion record evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to nonmovant 2: holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing 3: holding that the sevenday limit before submission in which a nonmovant may submit summaryjudgment evidence does not apply to the movants reply 4: holding that title ii does not apply to the states


Input: to Deitz's complaint, Palaigos was acting as the husband's attorney throughout that litigation. 3 . The other defendants later joined in this motion. 4 . Although we reach the same result as the trial court, we do so taking a different route. "Ordinarily, an appellate court will not affirm a summary judgment by ruling on a ground not ruled upon by the trial court.” Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 113 Md.App. 440, 450, 688 A.2d 448 (1997); see also Gresser v. Anne Arundel County,-Md.-, -, -A.2d - (No. 20, Sept. Term, 1997, slip op. at 9, filed Jan. 28, 1998). "If the alternative ground is one as to which the trial court had no discretion, however, summary judgment may be affirmed.” Thomas, 113 Md.App. at 450, 688 A.2d 448; see also Maryland Cas. Co., 100 Md.App. at 357-58, 641 A.2d 924 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the trial judge would have had Holdings: 0: holding where an appellate court affirms trial courts grant of summary judgment on a particular ground the appellate court need not discuss the remaining grounds 1: holding that an appellate court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground appearing in the record even if the circuit court did not rely on it 2: holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion 3: holding that if the trial court would have had no discretion to deny summary judgment on an alternative ground the appellate court can on that alternative ground sustain the order granting summary judgment 4: holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment on ground not presented by movant in writing


Input: the Army argues that the two jobs are not identical and Nealon failed to present “comparable worth” evidence below. However, it is for the district court to determine on the merits whether the two jobs are sufficiently similar to find an EPA violation; Nealon. was never permitted to offer evidence on the merits because her suit was dismissed before trial, on the Army’s motion. B. Finally, Nealon argues that the fact that her favorable EEOC I decision was issued during the limitations period, in October 1987, warrants equitable tolling of the statute of limitations period. We agree. As a general matter, statutory time limits in suits against the government are subject to equitable tolling principles. See Irwin v. Veterans Administration, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Loe v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 409 (D.C.Cir.1985), Holdings: 0: holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling 1: holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration 2: holding as subject to equitable tolling title vii statute authorizing suit brought within 90 days of receipt of right to sue notice 3: holding title vii subject to equitable tolling 4: holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling


Input: (1st Cir.1985) (applying Mass. Law). Utah requires proof under its consumer fraud act of either intent to deceive or knowledge of the falsity of defendant’s affirmative misrepresentations, while South Dakota requires proof of both knowledge and intent under its consumer fraud statute. Utah Code Ann § 13-11-4(2); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952); Iadanza v. Mather, 820 F.Supp. 1371, 1381 (D.Utah 1993); S.D.Code Ann. § 37-24-6; Stene v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 N.W.2d 399, 404 (S.D.1998). California and Pennsylvania require proof under their consumer fraud acts of justifiable reliance by plaintiff on defendant’s deceptive acts. Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court of Orange County (Fahnestock), 18 Cal.3d 355, 134 Cal.Rptr. 388, 556 P.2d 750, 755 (1976); (<HOLDING>); Weinberg v. Sun Company, Inc., supra., 777 Holdings: 0: holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law 1: holding that plaintiff failed to prove reasonable reliance on a false statement 2: holding that each class member was not required to prove justifiable reliance when an inference of reliance arises if a materially false representation was made to persons whose acts thereafter were consistent with reliance upon the representations 3: holding in the context of a non  212c iirira retroactivity challenge that if reliance were required we would insist at most upon objectively reasonable reliance and not subjective reliance 4: holding that where material misrepresentations are made to class members an inference of reliance arises to the entire class


Input: 892, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)). Accordingly, a trial court has the authority to impose sanctions on a party that perpetrates a fraud on the court, which includes striking that party’s pleadings and entering a. default judgment against that party. See Faddis, 121 So.3d at 1135. However, and importantly for our purposes, the power of the court to impose sanctions under these circumstances “should be exercised with .great restraint” and should be used ‘“only upon the most blatant showing of fraud, pretense, collusion, or other similar wrongdoing.’ ” E.I. DuPont De Nemours &■ Co. v. Sidran, 140 So.3d 620, 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). See also Celebrity Cruises, Inc. v. Fernandes, 149 So.3d 744, 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (noting that “striking a party’s pleadings and entry of a default ... is 7) (<HOLDING>). We reverse and remand to the trial court for Holdings: 0: holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence 1: holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence 2: holding that district court acted prematurely by dismissing case on the pleadings 3: holding appeal from an order dismissing action without prejudice was properly before this court 4: holding court must have evidence to support dismissal before dismissing a case for fraud on the court


Input: claim is the Agreement, Plaintiffs have not identified any other contract to which these allegations could refer. Plaintiffs argue that their claims relate to disclosures on HighBeam’s website, not in the Agreement. However, as already mentioned, Plaintiffs admit that some disclosures were made in the Agreement. (Id. ¶ 46(f).) Even if this were not the case, the First Circuit’s decision in Huffington defeats Plaintiffs’ argument. In Huffington, the plaintiff argued that his tort and statutory fraudulent misrepresentation claims did not relate to his contract with the defendant because the misrepresentations “would be actionable regardless of whether the parties executed a contract.” 637 F.3d at 22. However, as the First Circu . A. 97-12283-RGS, 1998 WL 518187 (D.Mass. Aug. 5, 1998) (<HOLDING>). C. Unresolved Factual Disputes. There remain Holdings: 0: holding that the forum selection clause at issue encompassed both contract and tort claims 1: holding that a permissive forum selection clause containing a waiver of any claims of forum non conveniens amounts to a mandatory forum selection clause at least where the plaintiff chose the designated forum 2: holding that a forum selection clause was not enforceable against defendants that were not parties to the contract 3: holding that claims were not related to a license agreement which contained a forum selection clause in part because the bulk of the claims were against a defendant who was not a party to the agreement for breaches of employment contracts which did not contain forum selection clauses and for disclosure of trade secrets 4: holding enforceable forum selection clauses in arbitration agreements


Input: below the 50 percent mark, but such mathematical uncertainty is not fatal to the guideline’s validity, and we have previously concluded that criminal provisions featuring the “substantial” language survive facial challenge. See Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (ordinance requiring licensing of store selling “ ‘significant or substantial’ ” amount of sexually oriented merchandise was not void for vagueness); see also VIP of Berlin, LLC v. Town of Berlin, 593 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir.2010) (language of zoning ordinance defining sexually oriented business as establishment with “substantial or significant portion” of goods in adult merchandise not unconstitutionally vague); ILQ Invs., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413, 1418-19 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we cannot say the sentencing court Holdings: 0: holding that safety standards regarding the safe design and use of trampolines including astm standards were admissible on the issue of the defendants negligence even though the defendants were unaware of the standards 1: holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law 2: holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent 3: holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission 4: holding that substantial or significant  is not  devoid of meaningful legislative standards


Input: sex offenders, Bender, 566 F.3d at 752, whereas the district court here imposed the ban on pornography after a discussion of Demers’s background and characteristics, including his prior child pornography arrests and domestic battery offenses, citing “the need to curb any tendency you might have to further engage in child pornography efforts or abuses.” Moreover, even were we to find that the district court erred in not conducting a sufficiently individualized determination, that error likely would not “affect[ ] substantial rights,” Davis, 452 F.3d at 994, since Demers’s offense and history, including his prior conviction for sexual abuse, make it unlikely that he could carry his burden of showing that the condition would not have been imposed in any event. Cf. Curry, 627 F.3d at 315 (<HOLDING>). Demers also argues that special condition 7 Holdings: 0: holding that a condition banning pornography prejudiced the defendant because there was a reasonable probability that the condition would not have been imposed had the district court conducted a sufficiently individualized determination given that the defendants conviction was for a registration offense not a sexual exploitation offense 1: holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea 2: holding that that the trial court erred when it determined that firstdegree sexual offense was an aggravated offense 3: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense 4: recognizing that before a special condition of probation may be imposed there must be an oral pronouncement of the condition at sentencing


Input: was appropriate. 23 . Accord Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.1980); United States v. City of Miami, Fla., supra at note 19. 24 . See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2271 n. 8, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192, 93 S.Ct. 375, 378, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) (judgment entered by an equally divided court is not entitled to precedential weight); Berlin v. F.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.1964) (affirmance by an equally divided court is, between the parties, conclusive determination, but the principles of law involved, having not gained the assent of a majority of the court, prevents the case from being authority for other cases); But see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 25 . In Fullilove, the Court was faced with Holdings: 0: holding of fragmented court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds 1: recognizing that this court may affirm summary judgment on grounds other than those relied upon by the motion justice 2: holding where movant asserts several grounds in support of its summary judgment motion and the trial court does not specify the grounds on which judgment was granted the reviewing court can affirm the judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious 3: holding that when a fragmented court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taking by those members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds 4: holding of the court is the position taken by member who concurs in the judgment on the narrowest grounds


Input: had robbed six businesses that purchased supplies from other states, and/or had employees or customers from other states. 328 F.3d at 711-12. We underscored that “ ‘the cumulative result of many Hobbs Act violations is a substantial effect upon interstate commerce,’ and that substantial effect empowers Congress to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 711 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1215 (5th Cir.1997)). On this record, there was sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Jeanette was running a business that had the requisite nexus to interstate commerce. Although the speakeasy was not a licensed bar, it was selling alcohol and the people playing cards at the time of the robbery were its c (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). There was also evidence here from which a Holdings: 0: holding that the single transaction rule protects a purchaser of stolen goods who by definition must know the goods to be stolen from being made party to the original theft via conspiracy 1: holding that a buyer who purchases goods subject to an express warranty that the goods are free from all liens takes free of any unperfected security interest 2: holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods 3: holding that the hobbs act jurisdictional nexus was met by the robbery of a delicatessen that sold goods produced out of state without mentioning whether the goods were purchased from outofstate or instate suppliers 4: holding that a statement of conditional sale of goods can be filed with the state auditor before the delivery of goods where statute says the statement must be filed within ten days of delivery of goods


Input: trial, all of his pretrial motions had not yet been heard and the State had failed to provide him a complete list of witnesses. The motion for continuance was granted in part and denied in part. Wilson claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for continuance because his trial counsel’s scheduling conflict prevented counsel from adequately preparing Wilson’s case. Additionally, Wilson argues that the continuance should have been granted because the State designated new experts, shortly before trial, denying trial counsel the opportunity to investigate the experts. Furthermore, the State failed to provide a complete witness list and the trial court failed to rule on his motion filed in accordance with Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Wilson argues that the trial court should Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant not only has a right to be examined by an expert but also has the right to have an expert appointed to assist him in his defense 1: holding that an expert that had provided consulting services to the defendant relating to the litigation was not precluded from serving as an expert for the plaintiff 2: holding that prior to engaging in custodial interrogation police must warn a suspect that he has a right to remain silent that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify 4: holding that the defendant validly waived right to conflictfree representation where the defendant knew a conflict existed its effect on his defense and his right to have other counsel appointed


Input: protected under the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities”); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583-86, 15 S.Ct. 673, 39 L.Ed. 759 (1895), modified, 158 U.S. 601, 15 S.Ct. 912, 39 L.Ed. 1108 (1895), overruled in part by U.S. Const. amend. XVI, South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515-27, 108 S.Ct. 1355, 99 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988). 9 . From 1938 until the modern Code’s enactment, state authorization was required for plan confirmation. See Act of Aug. 16, 1937, Pub.L. No. 302, ch. 657, sec. 83(e)(6), 50 Stat. . 653, 658 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 403(e)(6) (1937) (conditioning confirmation of a plan on, inter alia, petitioner being "authorized by law to take all action necessary to be taken by it to carry out the plan”)); Bekins, 304 U.S. at 49, 58 S.Ct. 811 (<HOLDING>); accord 11 U.S.C. § 404 (1976). Puerto Rico's Holdings: 0: holding that law in  403e6 refers to state law 1: holding state law irrelevant 2: holding that even though  24 only refers to actions in state court it applies to state claims brought in federal court 3: holding that federal courts presiding over causes of action created by state law should apply state substantive law but federal procedural law 4: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law


Input: to reward appellant for his past commendable service, while at the same time, adding incentive for appellant to remain with the company in order to exercise such options. Yet, in the unfortunate circumstance of appellant’s death, the option period would have remained open to appellant’s estate for one year. Similarly, if appellant became disabled, such options would then vest. Notwithstanding the lack of value, such options that were gained prior to the filing of the dissolution petition do represent assets that were accumulated during the marriage and are, thhs, subject to equitable distribution. We also find support for our holding in the majority of other state courts that have addressed this issue. In Fisher v. Fisher, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing both .Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect 1: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husbands unvested stock options as marital property 2: holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property 3: holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust 4: holding that unvested stock options subject to the contingency of debtors future employment are property of the bankruptcy estate


Input: of self-defense, and a person is just as capable of defending himself with a marked firearm as with an unmarked firearm. With or without a serial number, a pistol is still a pistol. Furthermore, it cannot be the case that possession of a firearm in the home for self-defense is a protected form of possession under all circumstances. By this rationale, any type of firearm possessed in the home would be protected merely because it could be used for self-defense. Possession of machine guns or short-barreled shotguns — or any other dangerous and unusual weapon' — so long as they were kept in the home, would then fall within the Second Amendment. But the Supreme Court has made clear the Second Amendment does not protect those types of weapons. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178, 59 S.Ct. 816 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined 1: holding that shortbarreled shotguns are unprotected 2: holding that arguments which are not sufficiently developed are waived 3: holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived 4: holding that possession of a shortbarreled shotgun is a violent felony under the accas residual clause because sawedoff shotguns are inherently dangerous and lack usefulness except for violent and criminal purposes internal quotation marks omitted


Input: GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Road Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 310 (Tex.2006) (the duty to defend is created by the terms of the insurance policy); 2 Allan D. WlNDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: Representation of InsuRance Companies and InsuReds § 11:31 (5th ed.2007) (“The difference between a self-insured retention and a deductible is usually that, under polices containing a self-insured retention, the insured assumes the obligation of providing itself a defense until the retention is exhausted.”). If LTC itself had funded the defenses or settlements of the underlying claims, it would have no claim against U.S. Fire under the policy for amounts within the SIRs. See generally H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 150 F.3d 526 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, U.S. Fire’s refusal to defend or Holdings: 0: holding that when the district court disposed of the adea claims the pendent claims became subject to dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction 1: holding that a common question of causation was a predominate issue central to each of plaintiffs claims and subject to generalize proof notwithstanding need to review each plaintiffs individual account 2: holding that insureds settlements of two claims were each subject to the sir provisions of the policy 3: recognizing that a contract is to be construed to give reasonable effect to each of its provisions 4: holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa


Input: these prior holdings, Corus argues that fundamental structural changes to the U.S. Antidumping statute, as implemented in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”), render zeroing inherently unreasonable, citing recent WTO decisions for further support that zeroing is no longer reasonable. See supra note 1. The Federal Circuit, however, in addressing arguments similar to the ones Corus now presents before the court, (1) expressly affirmed the reasonableness of Commerce’s use of zeroing in an antidumping administrative review, and (2) accorded no deference to Corus’s cited WTO cases, again concluding that WTO decisions are not binding on the U.S. and cannot trump domestic legislation. See Corus Staal BV v. Dep’t of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1346 — 49 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“Corus Staal II”) (<HOLDING>). While it is highly debatable whether the Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts apa review of a sba size decision was not entitled to deference but that the agencys interpretation and application of its own regulations did merit deference 1: holding that 1 our decision in timken addressed commerces interpretation of section 167735 and 2 we give commerce substantial deference in its administration of the statute because of the foreign policy implications of a dumping determination 2: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 3: holding that 19 usc  167735 is ambiguous and that zeroing is a reasonable interpretation 4: holding that we review for clear error a district courts factual determination as to whether prior cases were consolidated for sentencing under ussg  4a12a2 and that we give the court due deference in its application of the guidelines to that determination


Input: States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.2009) (“Comstock I”). In 2007, a district court in this Circuit struck down the commitment scheme of § 4248 on two constitutional grounds: that (1) Congress lacked the authority to enact § 4248; and (2) § 4248’s clear and convincing burden of proof contravened the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Comstock, 507 F.Supp.2d 522 (E.D.N.C.2007). On appeal, we agreed with the district court that enactment of § 4248 exceeded congressional authority, without reaching the due process issue. See Comstock I, 551 F.3d at 276. In May 2010, the Supreme Court reversed our Comstock I decision, holding that Article I of the Constitution conferred sufficient authority for Congress to enact § 4248. See Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1954 (<HOLDING>). The Court remanded for an assessment of the Holdings: 0: recognizing that constitution grants authority for congress to enact  4248 as necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the constitution internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding that congress may impose its will on the states as long as it is acting within the powers granted by the constitution 2: recognizing that provisions of the colorado constitution should be construed in the context of the constitution as a whole 3: recognizing that conflict preemption precludes laws that under the circumstances of a particular case stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of congress omission alteration internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: recognizing that a tax enactment will not be invalidated unless it clearly palpably and plainly violates the constitution internal quotation marks and citation omitted


Input: citations omitted). “Considering whether ‘questions of law or fact common to class members predominate’ begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying cause of action.” Halliburton, 131 S.Ct. at 2184. In the 30-page M&R adopted by the district court, the magistrate judge correctly began the predominance and superiority analysis by laying out the elements of Appellants’ claims and what must be shown to prove antitrust liability in a class action context. The magistrate judge continued his Rule 23(b)(3) analysis by finding that Appellants failed to present class-wide proof of the various elements of their private antitrust claims. Ultimately, the magistrate judge concluded that individualized issues affecting each of the roughly one million c., 381 F.3d 717, 737 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Because Appellants brought this case as a Holdings: 0: holding that the relevant geographic market or appropriate section of the country is the area in which the acquired firm is an actual competitor 1: holding that a contract for an exclusive agency to market a product contains an implied promise to use all reasonable efforts to market the product 2: holding that economic analysis in antitrust context is virtually meaningless if it is entirely unmoored from at least a rough definition of a product and geographic market 3: holding that changes in the baseball card market between 1965 and 1980 foreclosed any argument that a definition of the relevant market by the federal trade commission could preclude relitigation of the market definition issue 4: holding district court erred by incorporating issue of anticompetitive market effect into its standing analysis confusing antitrust injury with an element of a claim under section 1 of the sherman act and stating district courts approach may have been result of the similar antitrust injury label applied to injury component of antitrust standing analysis and to marketplace harm element under section 1


Input: the arbitration clause, we further conclude that Ms. Chapman’s decision to accept arbitration bound Ms. Barron to arbitrate future disputes with Betty Dare. Unlike the parties in McMillan, DeArmond, and Lisanti, the record indicates that Ms. Chapman voluntarily and knowingly chose arbitration of future disputes. The Resolution of Legal Disputes form clearly stated that agreeing to arbitrate legal disputes indicated a waiver of a right to sue or go to trial in a court of law. To the extent that Plaintiff argues on appeal that Ms. Chapman did not fully understand the implications of the arbitration clause, we find this argument unavailing. Parties to an agreement are presumed to know and understand the terms of the agreement. See Ballard v. Chavez, 117 N.M. 1, 3, 868 P.2d 646, 648 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Plaintiff did not develop any Holdings: 0: holding a party to a contract who is himself in default cannot maintain a suit for its breach 1: holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it 2: holding that a party may not contract away the protection that a statute is intended to afford him nor may the other party to the contract exempt itself from its duty to comply with such statute 3: recognizing that a contract is to be construed to give reasonable effect to each of its provisions 4: recognizing that each party to a contract has a duty to read and familiarize himself with its contents  and generally is presumed to know the terms of the agreement


Input: injures, interferes with, or intimidates the provider or recipient of reproductive health care or speech that amounts to a threat of force that obstructs, injures, intimidates, or interferes with the provider or recipient of reproductive health care. The regulation of neither the former conduct, nor the latter speech, is violative of the First Amendment. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 2199, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993) (“[A] physical assault is not ... expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (noting that “threats of violence are outside the First Amendment”); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769-73, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361-63, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616-17, 88 Holdings: 0: holding new yorks disclosure law unconstitutionally overbroad 1: holding portions of the online solicitation of a minor statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment 2: holding the improper photography or visual recording statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment 3: holding that washingtons harassment statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it covered constitutionally protected speech 4: holding that a statute must burden a substantial amount of protected speech to be unconstitutionally overbroad


Input: the crime scene while he was a juror, [W.H.] answered yes. [W.H.] said he saw where the baby was .burned and that the trailer was ‘burned pretty bad.’ In cross-examination, however, [W.H.] indicated that he thought say the least, this Court cannot find that Dunaway has met his burden of proving this allegation of juror misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence as required by Rule 32.3, Ala. R.Crim. P. “Moreover, even assuming [W.H.] improperly visited the crime .2d 822, 826 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (finding that juror misconduct did not warrant a new trial because ‘[t]he jurors in the present case all stated that they were basing their decision on the officers’ testimony rather than any statements of allegations coming from the investigating juror’); Ex parte Dawson, 710 So.2d at 476 (<HOLDING>). ■ “Even if this Court were to And Duna-way Holdings: 0: holding bjecause dawson failed to show that the jurors viewing of the crime scene resulted in the introduction of facts that might have unlawfully influenced the jurys verdict a new trial is not warranted 1: holding that the unobjected to statements made by the prosecutor did not indicate an intent on the part of the prosecuting attorney to inflame the minds of the jurors or to arouse passion or prejudice against the defendant nor were they so inflammatory that the jurors might be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence and thus there was no misconduct 2: holding that bjecause the defendant in this case has failed to show that the experiment conducted by a juror resulted in the introduction of facts that might have unlawfully influenced the verdict rendered we find that the jurors action does not warrant a new trial 3: holding that a new trial was warranted where there is reasonable probability that the false testimony introduced by the government influenced the outcome of the trial 4: holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict


Input: so, the Court noted Congress’s recognition of this principle in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The earlier cases cited in Todd Shipyards included Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 S.Ct. 427, 41 L.Ed. 832 (1897), St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 43 S.Ct. 125, 67 L.Ed. 297 (1922), and Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 58 S.Ct. 436, 82 L.Ed. 673 (1938). 5 . Indeed, the Commissioner apparently has conceded that no Florida court would have personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ German affiliates in a case arising under the German insurance contracts now at issue. See Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing (document 38) at 56. 6 . See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 57 S.Ct. 129, 81 L.Ed. 106 (1936) (<HOLDING>), cited with approval in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Holdings: 0: holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer 1: holding change of beneficiary effective where city employee listed a new beneficiary for his group life insurance policy in an employee personal data form next to the words designated beneficiary even though this did not comply with the policy terms 2: holding a georgia law requiring a plaintiff in a direct action against an insurance company to attach a copy of the insurance policy to his complaint inapplicable because it conflicts with rule 8 3: holding that insureds widow as beneficiary of life insurance policy had standing as an injured person under the insurance code 4: holding that application of georgia law to dispute arising under life insurance policy issued by massachusetts insurer to new york resident violated due process clause where only georgia contact was that beneficiary moved there


Input: shall be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the same. A separate fund shall be established for each of the several objects for which the said grants are hereby made or confirmed, and whenever any moneys shall be in any manner derived from any of said land the same shall be deposited by the state treasurer in the fund coiresponding to the grant under which the particular land producing such moneys was by this Act conveyed or confirmed. No moneys shall ever be taken from one fund for deposit in any other, or for any object other than that for which the land producing the same was granted or confirmed. (Emphasis added.) Congress deleted the italicized portion in 1957. 71 Stat. 457-58. 8 . Cf. Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 163 Ariz. 587, 596, 790 P.2d 242, 251 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 9 . The Commissioner points out that the Holdings: 0: holding that article 10 section 8 of the arizona constitution did not create greater restrictions than the enabling act on exchanges of trust lands because section 8 provided that every disposition of or contract concerning trust lands would be null and void if not made in substantial conformity with the provisions of the enabling act 1: holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust 2: holding that a state can require firebreaks around housing on trust property adjacent to forest lands 3: holding that the state has no special sovereign interest in managing lands held in trust 4: holding that billboard was not structure within meaning of the zoning enabling act g l c 40  25


Input: well as “[s]uch other factors as are necessary to consider the equities for the parents and child.” Code § 20-108.1(B)(15). See also Code § 20-108.1(B) (“The court’s decision in any such proceeding shall be rendered upon the evidence relevant to each individual case.”). Further, although the trial court must consider each of the statutory factors for which evidence is presented, the weight, if any, to give any particular factor in the overall decision lies within the trial court’s sound discretion. Robbins, 48 Va.App. at 481, 632 S.E.2d at 622. Thus, we do not hold that the trial court must deviate from the presumptive guidelines because of the income imputed to father. Rather, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to first consider recent past earnings .2d 148, 152-53 (1996) (<HOLDING>). It is only when considering all the facts of Holdings: 0: holding that where husband had strong familial ties to richmond he was not voluntarily underemployed based on his refusal of a job opportunity requiring him to relocate to a different state 1: holding that a qualified or conditional consent is tantamount to a refusal except where a driver qualifies a refusal on his having an opportunity to contact an attorney 2: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 3: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated by refusal to allow him to contact counsel after he was given misleading information on consequences of refusal to take bloodalcohol test 4: holding that witness whose life had been threatened forcing him to relocate was not required to disclose true name address or telephone number


Input: for first degree murder and when the judgment has become final in the trial court, the defendant shall have the right of direct appeal from the trial court to the court of criminal appeals. The affirmance of the conviction and the sentence of death shall be automatically reviewed by the Tennessee supreme court.”). 7 . Application of this pre 1989 version of the (i)(5) aggravating circumstance is proper as the offense was committed in 1987. See State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Tenn.1994). 8 . The trial court correctly deleted "torture” from the instruction, as both parties concede that the evidence does not support a finding that the murder involved torture. See State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 478-79 (Tenn.1993) (citing State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 139-40 (Tenn.1981) (<HOLDING>)). 9 . In Houston v. Dutton, the whole Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence 1: recognizing trial court should not weigh evidence 2: holding that trial court may charge on involuntary manslaughter only where evidence exists to support such a verdict 3: holding that without transcript of trial proceedings appellate court cannot review underlying evidence so as to conclude that trial courts judgment is not supported by evidence 4: holding that a trial court should charge only those aspects of an aggravating circumstance supported by the evidence in a case


Input: that the acquisition of a new claim of homestead defeats and discharges a previously-filed claim of homestead. The court agreed with Citizens, holding that the plain language of § 2 meant that Garran’s § 1A declaration and corresponding homestead exemption was defeated and discharged by his wife’s subsequent § 1 declaration. We agree that this is the proper reading of the statutory language. Garran’s wife filed a declaration of homestead under § 1 on February 21, 2001. The declaration of homestead under § 1 is an acquisition of a homestead “for the benefit of [the] family.” Id. § 1. Therefore, by his wife’s filing of a § 1 declaration, Garran, as her spouse and member of her family, “acquired” a homestead on February 21, 2001. See In re Roberts, 280 B.R. 540, 547 (Bankr.D.Mass. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Section 2 states that “the acquisition of a Holdings: 0: recognizing that the eighth amendment protects individuals from a lingering death 1: holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default 2: holding that the fourth amendment protects people not places 3: recognizing that a declaration filed under subsection 1 protects even the nonfiling debtor 4: recognizing that no private right of action exists for subsection a violations


Input: The investigation request form prepared by Kathryn Siegel alerted Elmer to the fact that petitioner had stated that a man named Charles Mitchell had seen petitioner “totally loaded” and “running down the street,” and petitioner himself told Elmer both before and during trial that Charles Mitchell could corroborate his account of the events preceding his entry into the Gonzalez home. Once he was made aware that Charles Mitchell was a witness to these events, Elmer was obligated to follow up with him to determine what he would say and whether he could give credible testimony in support of the defense. See, e.g., Riley, 352 F.3d at 1319. Of course, the Sixth Amendment does not require counsel to interview every possible witness. See LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1274 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Judicial scrutiny “must be highly Holdings: 0: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 1: holding that ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for procedural default only if counsels performance was constitutionally ineffective 2: holding counsel will be held ineffective if he made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the sixth amendment and such performance prejudiced the defense 3: holding performance  not ineffective where trial counsel reviewed transcripts of interviews conducted by others 4: holding that reversal required where trial court did not attach portions of the transcripts to refute claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to improper closing argument


Input: Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss ("PI. Mem.'') at 18. 64 . See Complaint ¶¶ 34-35. 65 . See Commercial Union Ins. Co., 347 F.3d at 462 (citations omitted) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 15, 26) (finding that an agency relationship is established when there are facts sufficient to demonstrate both that the principal intended to grant authority to the agent and the agent assented). See also Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 483, 912 N.Y.S.2d 508, 938 N.E.2d 941 (2010) ("Whether apparent authority exists is a fact-based determination requiring inquiry into the conduct of the principal.”). 66 . See Complaint ¶ 36. 67 . See id. ¶ 20. 68 . See id. ¶ 33. 69 . See Contractual Obligation Prods., LLC, 2006 WL 6217754, at *19 (citing Weiss, 69 F.Supp.2d at 462) (<HOLDING>). 70 . See Complaint ¶¶ 22, 43; SPA at 30. 71 . Holdings: 0: holding that anonymous statement was admissible as a statement by a partys agent under rule 801d2d and noting that a district court should be presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who is alleged to have made the damaging statement is in fact a party or an agent of that party 1: holding that plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context 2: holding plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context 3: holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard 4: holding that under the rule 8 standard a short plain statement is sufficient


Input: that the insured consciously desires the result of his or her act and the term ‘expect’ requires that the insured knows with substantial certainty that l 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“An injury is expected if the insured was consciously aware that the injury was practically certain to occur.”); James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Ky. 1991) (“The ‘expected or intended’ exception is inapplicable unless the insured specifically and subjectively intends the injury giving rise to the claim.”); Great American Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. 1992) (noting that “[t]he subjective intent of the insured . . . will determine whether an act is intentional”); Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gervais, 1998 ME 197, ¶ 11, 715 A.2d 938 (<HOLDING>) (quotations omitted); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Holdings: 0: holding that the policy language expected or intended by an insured person is unambiguous and requires a subjective intent on behalf of the insured 1: holding that the exclusion is triggered when the insured subjectively expects or intends that bodily injury will occur 2: holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended 3: holding that the inclusion of the phrase by the insured indicates that its application is triggered when the insured subjectively expects or intends that bodily injury will occur and not merely when an ordinary reasonable person would be able to foresee injury occurring as a result of his acts 4: holding that the standard policy exclusion of injuries expected or intended by the insured refers only to bodily injury that the insured in fact subjectively wanted intended to be a result of his conduct or in fact subjectively foresaw as practically certain expected to be a result of his conduct


Input: Plaintiff does not allege any facts regarding whether the PSD adequately investigated that incident, the alleged facts concerning the Harper incident along with the broader allegations concerning routine failure to investigate excessive force claims permit a reasonable inference that the PSD failed to adequately investigate the Harper incident. Further, Plaintiff alleges that the PSD “in the period before and since this event, has unfounded other complaints of excessive force by law enforcement.” Compl. ¶ 72. Though that allegation is somewhat ambiguous, it further suggests, at least implicitly, that the PSD has failed to adequately investigate claims of the use of excessive force. Cf. Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 403 (4th Cir.2014) (published) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, through the factual allegations Holdings: 0: holding that the conduct complained of must be an unlawful employment practice under title vii 1: holding that evidence of specific uncharged drug trafficking offenses were not extrinsic to prosecution for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine where the events occurred within the time period of the alleged conspiracy and were demonstrative of the conspirators conduct 2: holding that allegations of reported and unreported cases from the period of time before and during the events complained of establishing that the defendant had a custom policy or practice of knowingly and repeatedly violating constitutional rights were nonconclusory 3: holding the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing inapplicable when a witness had been deported during the period of time the defendant had been a fugitive 4: holding that the plaintiff had the burden of establishing that he properly served an agent of the defendant


Input: 526 U.S. at 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1239. 2. Thus, whether venue was proper for the section 924(c) violation charged in Count Seven depends on whether an overt act occurred in Maryland. Babb and Moore argue that the conspiracy had been terminated by the arrests of Moore, Babb, and Bush at the time the weapons were seized. However, because there was no termination of the conspiracy and an overt act occurred in Maryland, venue was proper there. A conspiracy is not terminated merely because its participants are arrested. United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1240 (4th Cir.1989). Even if substantial time has passed between the formation of the conspiracy and the last overt act, the conspiracy has not necessarily ended. Joyner v. United States, 547 F.2d 1199, 1203 (4th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Instead, the defendant bears the burden to Holdings: 0: holding that the end of a conspiracy must be affirmatively shown 1: holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges 2: holding that prejudice cannot merely be alleged it must be affirmatively proved 3: holding that wrongful or improper purpose must be shown for jurisdictional purposes 4: holding that special damages must be shown to be reasonable and necessarily resulting from accident


Input: entirely within a single lane” (emphasis added). While I find that Crivello is credible that the rig op were justified, defendants argue that Crivello did not have a reasonable suspicion authorized borrower of the ear, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the RV itself, but only that he lacked such an expectation in the closet. I disagree because he was the driver of the car at the time of the stop, had possession of the keys to the car, had been living in the RV for the two days prior to the search, and planned to use the RV as a home for the duration of the cross-country trip. Courts have recognized standing by homeowners to challenge searches of containers found on their premises but owned by third parties. See United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209, 218 (1st Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant who had constructively possessed a shotgun that was owned by his brother and used solely for lawful sporting purposes was entitled to a reduction under ussg  2k21b2 1: holding that defendant had standing to challenge the seizure of a box regardless of who owned it because it was in a house owned and possessed by defendant 2: holding that owner of a chattel seized during an illegal search of a car owned by a third party has standing to object to the seizure but no standing to object to the search 3: holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance 4: holding defendant who was employee of and had key to his fathers business  premises searched  lacked standing to challenge search of building his father owned


Input: district courts should handle motions by the government to reconsider suppression orders. When the government seeks reconsideration of a suppression order based on a new legal argument or evidence, the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits require the government to justify its failure to present this legal argument or evidence in the earlier proceedings. See United States v. Villabona-Gamica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1055 (11th Cir. 1995) (“By failing to raise an issue at a suppression hearing without offering any justification therefor, the government waives its right to assert it in subsequent proceedings.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting, in parenthetical, United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir.1983))); McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, the Second, Fifth, Holdings: 0: holding that our court will not consider an issue of whether a defendant has standing to seek suppression of evidence if the issue was not raised in the lower court 1: holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal 2: holding that suppression issue not raised to the district court was waived under rule 12 3: holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   4: holding that the government was obligated to advance stronger justification for relitigating a suppression issue where the issue raised was clear and a considered ruling had been made


Input: by relying on the facts in the presentence report to satisfy the factual basis for his guilty plea. According to Oehler, the lack of a specific overt act during the conspiracy time frame rendered the factual basis insufficient. We affirm. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) requires that the district court satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea prior to entering judgment. However, because Oehler did not move in district court to withdraw his guilty plea, his challenge to the adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir.2002). A district court may find the factual basis for the plea “from anything that appears on the record,” and the court may defer its inquiry until sentencing. Id. at 531 (<HOLDING>). Here, Oehler stipulated that a factual basis Holdings: 0: holding that express adoption of factual findings in presentence report is sufficient 1: holding that court may satisfy factual basis requirement by examining presentence report 2: holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report 3: holding that the district court committed plain error in relying solely on the factual description in the presentence report 4: holding defendant waived alleged factual inaccuracies in presentence report by failing to raise them in district court


Input: one or more of the following: (i) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i). 14 . Appellee presumably concedes that the remaining subsections of Section 9543(a)(2)-are not applicable to his Batson claim. 15 . Moreover, this Court has examined Batson claims within the PCRA framework, albeit without challenges being raised as to the applicability of the PCRA eligibility requirements relied upon here by Appellee. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268 (2006) (finding Batson claim waived); Commonwealth v. Sneed, supra, (<HOLDING>);. Commonwealth v. Wharton, 571 Pa. 85, 811 Holdings: 0: holding claim is not cognizable 1: holding claim is cognizable 2: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 3: holding that while batson claim was waived derivative claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the batson claim is cognizable under the pcra 4: holding that claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase of capital case is cognizable under the pcra


Input: is necessarily correct, for probable cause may be founded upon hearsay and upon information received from informants, as well as upon information within the affiant’s own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily. But surely it is to be ‘truthful’ in the sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.’ Id. at 164-65. Franks clearly establishes, therefore, that an officer of the law may not make affirmative or reckless misrepresentations to the court in a warrant affidavit. The Eleventh Circuit has noted, since the O’Ferrells’ ease began, that Franks clearly established, for qualified immunity purposes, that an officer may not make an “affirmative misstatement” in ‘applying for a warrant. See Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d at 1555 (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit ’interpreted Franks to Holdings: 0: holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under  1346 1: holding the right to record police activity on public property was not clearly established 2: holding that franks had clearly established that a public official could not intentionally perjure himself in seeking warrant 3: holding that if official has violated clearly established law he is entitled to qualified immunity only if reasonable official could have believed conduct was lawful 4: holding police officer is a public official


Input: at 1428-29. It has been held that a disclosure sufficient to waive the work product protection does not have to be intentional; therefore inadvertent or unintentional disclosures of protected materials also might result in the waiver of the privilege. See, e.g., Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1451 (Fed.Cir.1990). However, such a disclosure does not automatically forfeit the attorney work product privilege. In determining whether a party has waived the privilege- through an inadvertent or involuntary disclosure, courts consider, among other factors,- the steps taken by a party to remedy the disclosure and any delay in doing so. See, e.g., United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., 885 F.Supp. 672, 676 (M.D.Pa.1994); cf. United States v. de la Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 749-50 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). But see Carter, 909 F.2d at 1451 (holding Holdings: 0: recognizing privilege 1: holding that a defendant waived his attorneyclient privilege with regards to a seized letter because he waited six months after the seizure to assert his privilege 2: holding that failure to timely assert attorneyclient privilege constitutes waiver 3: holding that governmental entities may assert attorneyclient privilege to prevent disclosure of information otherwise required by statute 4: holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege


Input: to Complete Discovery. 2 . PL’s Compl. 120. 3 . Officer Synder is a police officer with the Philadelphia Police Department who was a deputized Federal Officer with the FBI at the time of the events giving rise to this suit. 4 . Def.’s Mots. to Compel Ex. B at 3. 5 . Pl.’s Dep. at 117. 6 . Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. at 8. 7 . In her Response to the Motion, Robinson states: "Upon information and belief, it appears as if the government is maintaining the position that [Robinson] is permitted to testify to any and all matters relating to her conversations with the FBI." Pl.'s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. at 8. 8 . Def.’s Mots, to Compel Ex. B at 3. 9 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(a)(1)(C). 10 . Vt. Agency of Nat’l Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (<HOLDING>); see Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm'rs of Holdings: 0: holding that the provisions of the false claims act allowing suit imposing liability on any person who presented false claims to the federal government did not allow suits against state governments 1: holding that a state or agency is not a person subject to qui tam liability under the false claims act 2: holding that standing of a qui tam plaintiff under the false claims act requires an injury to the united states 3: holding that a state agency is not a person subject to suit under federal false claims act 4: holding that the fca effectively assigns the governments claims to qui tam plaintiffs  who then may sue based upon an injury to the federal treasury


Input: head. Further examination of the baby revealed eighteen unexplained rib, leg and arm fractures in various stages of healing, in addition to a skull fracture. The mother denied any knowledge of the injuries except for the skull fracture, which she explained was accidental. DCF was notified and initiated an investigation. DCF subsequently sought termination of both parents’ rights pursuant to sections 89.806(l)(f), (g) Florida Statutes (2010). The record shows that the evidence presented to the trial court did not rea undamental liberty interest, DCF must establish that termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child or children from serious harm. Id. at 571; see also J.C. v. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 937 So.2d 184, 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>); L.D. v. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., Holdings: 0: holding that although parents have a fundamental right to the care and custody of their children they have no fundamental right to allocate support to their children as they see fit 1: recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children 2: holding that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 3: recognizing in dictum parents right to care custody management and companionship of their children 4: holding care custody and control of children is a fundamental right


Input: for f ends on resolution of a substantial question of workmen’s compensation law Harper’s retaliation claim also does not arise under Michigan’s Worker’s Disability Compensation Act according to the second “arising under” definition because the claim does not necessarily depend on resolution of a substantial question under that statute. The retaliation claim does not implicate the administrative or remedial mechanisms of that statutory scheme, require courts to interpret the statute, or seek an award of compensation for personal injury that causes a diminished wage-earning capacity, which is the only type of compensation that the statute affords, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.301(1), (4). See Thornton v. Denny’s Inc., No. 92-1368, 1993 WL 137078, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr.29, 1993) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). As the Seventh Circuit explained regarding a Holdings: 0: holding that claim for retaliatory discharge premised on michigans workers compensation statute does not arise under that law because the statute provides neither the mechanisms nor the remedy for this type of suit 1: holding that an atwill employee who alleges retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers compensation claim has stated a cause of action under pennsylvania law 2: recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act 3: holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws 4: holding that a claim for retaliatory discharge premised on missouris workers compensation law arises under that law for purposes of  1445c because antiretaliation provision also authorized the filing of a civil action for damages the antiretaliation right established by the missouri workers compensation statute is an essential element of plaintiffs claim