Input: record accompanied by a presumption of correctness, “unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 654 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004). If some of the trial court’s factual findings are based on its determinations of the credibility of the witnesses, then this Court will afford great weight to those credibility determinations, and will not reverse such determinations absent clear evidence to the contrary. See McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 910 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn.1995). Whether the ultimate issues of dependency and neglect or severe child abuse have been established by clear and convincing evidence are questions of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 810 (Tenn.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 548 Holdings: 0: holding that the question of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of a permanency plan was a question of law reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness 1: holding in a termination of parental rights case that as a question of law the trial courts ruling that the facts of this case sufficiently support the termination ground of willful abandonment are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness 2: holding that trial courts determination of facts has a presumption of correctness but trial courts legal conclusions are subject to de novo review 3: holding that appellate review of hearsay issues is de novo with no presumption of correctness 4: recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights


Input: and times of the alleged incidents, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the records on relevance grounds. Victim’s OASIS Interview {37} Defendant asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s request to play a DVD of Victim’s OASIS interview at trial. However, the district court admitted the DVD itself into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit A. Although the OASIS interview was not played for the jury in open court, Defendant cross-examined Victim about the content of the OASIS interview and impressed upon the jury in closing argument the importance of reviewing the DVD. Presentation of evidence is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Rule 11 — 611(A)(1), (2) NMRA; see State v. Hovey, 106 N.M. 300, 303, 742 P.2d 512, 515 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Because Defendant has not shown that the Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse discretion in limiting the number of diary entries that could be read to the jury and explained by the defendant where there were hundreds of diary entries and all diaries were admitted into evidence and available for review by the jury 1: holding that where an officer of a corporation has possession of corporate records which disclose his crime there is no ground upon which it can be said that he will be forced to produce them if the entries were made by another but may withhold them if the entries were made by himself 2: holding that this court is required to assume that the jury followed the limiting instructions given by the district court 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants request for severance because the district court nullified any prejudicial error when it repeatedly admonished the jury throughout the trial to consider the evidence only against the defendant to whom it related and at the end of trial gave the jury instructions that admonished the jury to consider separately each offense and evidence in support of each offense 4: holding that testimony concerning the content of certified docket entries admitted into evidence only through an fbi agent who read the docket entries into the record in lieu of admission of the redacted docket was pursuant to the public records exception to the hearsay rule under the federal rules of evidence admissible to show the existence of prior misdemeanor convictions for certain purposes


Input: suppression motion for failure of the prosecution to go forward with an evidentiary showing. II. 18 We hold that the trial court erred in assigning the initial burden of going forward to the prosecution and reverse the suppression order. A. Standard of Review T9 We review a suppression order with deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact and will not overturn those findings if supported by competent evidence in the record. People v. Castaneda, 249 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Colo.2011). We review the trial court's legal determinations de novo. Id. B. Applicable Law $10 A motion to suppress under Crim. P. 4l(e) is a claim that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. People v. Jansen, 713 P.2d 907, 911 (Colo.1986); People v. Jorlantin, 196 P.3d 258, 259 (Colo.2008) (<HOLDING>). The motion should state with reasonable Holdings: 0: holding that the driver of a borrowed car had the requisite legitimate expectation of privacy to support standing for fourth amendment purposes 1: recognizing that standing for a motion to suppress invokes the movants fourth amendment right to privacy 2: holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy 3: holding that squatter had no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore no fourth amendment standing to challenge search of abandoned structure 4: recognizing an implied fourth amendment action for damages


Input: Influenced Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. (“RICO”) and also asserted an equitable claim for unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment for Delta on both claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm. A. RICO Claim To prevail on a civil RICO claim the plaintiffs must show, among other elements, a “pattern 1992) (same). Although the parties dispute whether the amounts charged in each debit memo are the actual measure of Delta’s damages, and, in some cases, whether the ticketing violation even occurred, these issues concern the interpretation of the ARC Agreement and amount to nothing more than a contract dispute. See, e.g., Union Nat’l Bank of Little Rock v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Association, 860 F.2d 847, 857 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Delta’s threat to terminate its Holdings: 0: holding that regardless of whether the defendant actually had a right to monies claimed defendants demands under the contract were not extortion because they were motivated by the defendants interpretation of the agreement 1: holding that apprendi was not triggered because the defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment that were within the maximum penalties for the rico offenses that they were found guilty of committing 2: holding that monies were not property of the estate once the irrevocable election had been made and thus were not subject to turnover 3: holding that the defendants had received sufficient notice where the original defendants and the newly added defendants shared an identity of interests and were represented by attorneys who were involved in the litigation from its inception 4: holding that defendants had no standing where they conceded that they did not own the automobile searched and were simply passengers the owner of the car had been the driver of the vehicle at the time of the search


Input: use, and (4) lost profits on gas that TGP was unable to sell because it had to be used for venting and to perform emergency shutdowns. Id. at 10-11. C. Analysis We conclude that some of the damages awarded to HP are permitted direct damages and some are impermissible consequential damages. 1. Costs Relating to Transformer B: Damage Elements (a), (b), (c) & (f) Damages that flow “naturally and necessarily” from a breach of the parties’ contract are those inherent in the nature of the breach of the obligation between the parties, as compared to those damages that flow “naturally but not necessarily” from the breach because they require the existence of some other fact (known or unknown) beyond the relationship between the parties. Cf. Tennessee Gas Pipeline, 2008 WL 3876141, at *9-10 (<HOLDING>); Hoppenstein Props., Inc. v. McLennan Cnty. Holdings: 0: holding that government claim seeking incidental and consequential damages for plaintiffs alleged breach of contract did not require certification 1: holding that cost for backup generator necessitated by power outage were consequential damages of defendants premature dismantling of old generator and costs for penalty under utility contract for delayed use of utilities were consequential damages from construction delay because the cost depended on terms of owners contract with third party utility company 2: holding that consequential damages are not to be considered 3: holding that provision barring recovery of consequential damages did not necessarily bar all loss of use damages but damages for loss of use of money were consequential 4: holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract


Input: own name. These facts supported the jury’s finding of alter ego. Therefore, the trial court correctly used the jury’s finding of alter ego to hold the Hubbards individually liable for the $17,-981 debt. See Tex.Bus.Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.21(A) (West Supp.1995) (allowing imposition of individual liability under alter ego theory where fraud and direct personal benefit have been shown). B Thrift contends next that the Hub-bards should not recover for interference with prospective business relations and that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the issue because the Hubbards failed to plead that cause of action. A court may instruct the jury on an issue only if the issue has been properly tried by the parties. Neubauer v. City of McAllen, 766 F.2d 1567, 1575 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). “The trial court has no duty to give the jury Holdings: 0: holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue 1: holding that failure to try issue made instruction on that issue reversible error 2: holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue 3: holding that failure to raise an issue in an opening brief waives that issue 4: holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error


Input: of a fire occurring” was “insufficient” for defendants to claim immunity. Geiger at 494. Similarly, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-82-5 requires that the alleged negligent act occur “at the scene” of a reported fire before a rural volunteer fire department can assert immunity. The fact that plaintiff’s wreck occurred where defendants had filled their fire trucks with water from a fire hydrant, one-half mile away from the reported fire, is insufficient for defendants to claim immunity. The words “at the scene” provide immunity for defendants for acts and omissions only in a specific place. A broader reading of the statute would be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words. See State ex rel. McDonald v. Whatcom Cty. Etc., 575 P.2d 1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) aff’d, 593 P.2d 546 (Wash. 1979) (<HOLDING>). II. Plaintiff further argues that defendants Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant was guilty of leaving the scene because the injured party and a police officer were present at the scene within a reasonable time after the accident 1: holding that convictions for both leaving the scene of an accident involving injury and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage only were inconsistent and therefore could not be sustained 2: holding that an offduty officers assertion to bystanders that he was on the job  at the scene of a car accident did not place him within the scope of employment 3: holding that the words at the scene   imply a specific place    and limit rather than expand the officers power to arrest and the scene is the place where the accident occurred 4: holding scene of accident was suspicious place


Input: or operators” of uninsured or un-derinsured motor vehicles). After liability is established, if the damages exceed the tortfeasor’s liability insurance limits, “the excess is payable by the [plaintiffs] under-insurance carrier to the extent of its coverage.” Dean v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 535 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Minn.1995). UIM coverage thus serves the same basic purpose as UM coverage: both coverages stand as a proxy for the coverage of the uninsured or underinsured motorist, and both unquestionably constitute forms of y not paid until after the tort action has been tried, UIM benefits are not a collateral source in the usual case. See Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 1 (defining “collateral sources” to include only payments made “up to the date of the verdict”); Smith, 586 N.W.2d at 786 (<HOLDING>). In the normal course, a UIM claimant is Holdings: 0: holding that the statute that provides for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill does not preclude a death sentence as the result of such a verdict 1: holding that failure to move for judgment after verdict entitled party only to a new trial not a judgment in its favor 2: holding that premium reduction was legal where the insured had given consideration for reduction 3: holding that the collateralsource statute requires a reduction of the judgment only for payments made prior to the verdict 4: holding that the lower court failed to account for payments made in connection with the marital home including mortgage payments


Input: of her appeal, and thereby “failed to exercise due diligence in pursuing her rights”). Here we agree with the BIA that even if Acquaah’s motions were found to be timely, he would still not be entitled to relief because, as explained below, he has not shown that he missed his hearing due to exceptional circumstances. Acquaah does not dispute that he had proper notice of the hearing date and does not allege that he was ill or in custody at the time of his hearing. Rather, he asserts that had Kloek promptly filed a motion to reopen — which Klock all 92) (affirming the denial of motion to reopen where an alien appeared ten minutes late at a hearing because he and his attorney had “crossed signals” about where to meet); but see Barseghian v. INS, 14 Fed.Appx. 806, 807 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding this general trend, the Holdings: 0: holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due 1: holding that where surety was given until date of forfeiture hearing to produce defendant and defendant was killed by police before that date bond would not be forfeited 2: holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act 3: holding that trial courts resetting of hearing date for motion for summary judgment made timely summaryjudgment evidence that had been untimely based on hearing date in effect when the evidence was filed and served 4: holding in a twopage unpublished opinion without supporting caselaw that exceptional circumstances existed where an alien misunderstood a court interpreter to say that his hearing date was a week later than the date of the actual hearing


Input: of the sudden emergency instruction, was appropriate considering the trial court’s finding that the situation lacked spontaneity. Id. In the case before us, a jury could find that a vehicle suddenly spinning out of control immediately ahead of defendant-driver created a spontaneous reaction not necessarily present when vehicles are stopped in the road ahead of a driver who is able to see the stopped vehicles before the collision. Based upon our de novo review, we conclude that the rear-end collision instruction amounted to harmless error and that the sudden emergency jury instruction was correctly given. Therefore, we are satisfied that the trial justice erred in granting the motion for new trial. See Lieberman v. Bliss-Doris Realty Associates, L.P., 819 A.2d 666, 673 (R.I.2003) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion We vacate the order of the Holdings: 0: holding that trial judge should have granted new trial rather than judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the judge could not know in what order the jury reached its inconsistent verdicts 1: holding that a motion to intervene filed after final judgment should have been granted 2: holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b 3: holding that where jury has been properly instructed counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to an instruction 4: holding new trial should not have been granted because jury was properly instructed


Input: trial testimony describing the soil from the stain on the sweatpants as “kind of soot,” reveals that defense counsel objected to the description and the trial court sustained the objection. Even if the trial court had overruled the objection, we would find no error in its doing so because the officer’s description — although it may contain a conclusion, opinion, or inference-accords with the ordinary experience of everyday life. “Witnesses are permitted to express conditions in terms understandable to the average person, even though the term utilized is a summary of a combination of sensory impressions or separate physical conditions.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Woods, 663 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Mo.App. S.D.1983), citing Whitney v. Cent. Paper Stock Co., 446 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Mo.App.St.L.D.1969) (<HOLDING>). As this court stated in Woods: The test for Holdings: 0: holding that testimony that wood was rotten should have been allowed 1: holding that psychologists testimony on the reliability of eyewitness testimony was both relevant and reliable and thus should have been admitted 2: holding that child support should have been made retroactive 3: holding that the prisoner should have been allowed to choose whether to leave his car parked in a public parking lot 4: holding that an arbitrators award should have been vacated


Input: and (2) judicial estoppel. Neither of these two grounds involve an attack on the legal or factual basis for the Claims. In analyzing the affirmative defense of election of remedies, this court does not inquire into these matters. See Gorman, 811 S.W.2d at 546; Bocanegra, 605 S.W.2d at 850-52; Heggy, 123 S.W.3d at 779. After reviewing Horizon’s allegations in this case, we conclude that the remedies, rights, and facts Horizon alleges in this case are not inconsistent with the remedies, rights, and facts Horizon alleged in the English suit. In addition, to the extent there is any inconsistency, it is not so unconscionable, dishonest, contrary to fair dealing, or so stultifying to the legal process or trifling with justice as to be manifestly unjust. See Musick, 531 S.W.2d at 588-89 (<HOLDING>); Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Holdings: 0: holding that dyfs was not required to try the title 9 action to conclusion before filing a title 30 action for the termination of parental rights 1: holding that trespass to try title is the method for determining title to  real property 2: holding that claimant could recover all of his attorneys fees because declaratoryjudgment claim in boundary dispute was based on the same facts as his claims for adverse possession trespass and trespass to try title 3: recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim 4: holding that election of remedies did not apply because filing a trespass to try title action by the mortgageetrusteedeed grantee was not inconsistent with its successful settlement of claim against the title insurer


Input: of Leistiko. State v. Jones, 353 Or 208, 297 P3d 480 (2013). On remand, we concluded that a trial court’s admission of prior bad acts evidence under OEC 404(3) to prove a defendant’s intent — in a case in which the defendant disputed committing the charged acts and the jury had not been instructed that it must first find that the defendant had committed the charged acts before it could consider the prior bad acts evidence to determine intent — was properly reviewable as plain error, in light of Leistiko, because “plain error” is determined by the law as it exists at the time the appeal is decided. Jones, 258 Or App at 5-6 (discussing Leistiko, 352 Or at 174; State v. Jury, 185 Or App 132, 136, 57 P3d 970 (2002)); see also State v. Hutton, 258 Or App 806, 816, 817-18, 311 P3d 909 (2013) (<HOLDING>). We now apply the foregoing principles to this Holdings: 0: holding that to admit evidence of prior bad acts under rule 404b ala r evid the state must demonstrate that the evidence was reasonably necessary to its case 1: holding admission of prior bad acts of child abuse was reversible error when the defendant did not have exclusive control over the children during the period when the prior bad acts occurred 2: holding prior bad acts evidence is admissible where there is an articulation or identification of the consequential fact to which the proffered evidence of other acts is directed 3: holding that it is error for a trial court to admit evidence of prior bad acts without properly conditioning the jurys use of that evidence 4: holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime


Input: the obviousness analysis, the problem examined is not the specific problem solved by the invention but the general problem that confronted the inventor before the invention was made.”). The problem is not properly framed as creating an internal regenerating dryer for a IMS detector device designed for field use that is capable of regenerating while the detector operates (i.e., is capable of continuous use), nor is it properly framed in reference to an IMS detector dryer that never needs to have its desiccant replaced. Such constructions would improperly rely on hindsight to define the problem, and in actuality, come closer to defining the problem as it existed for Smiths while it tried to play “catch-up” after Morpho’s Itemizer 3 product was commercialized. See Mintz, 679 F.3d at 1377 (<HOLDING>); cf. Nascom Video Depo. 46:3-46:17 (testimony Holdings: 0: holding that the district court committed legal error by using a survey to define the meaning of a phrase  and then insisting that verification meet the standards thus established 1: holding that district court error was not clear error because no prior ninth circuit authority prohibited the course taken by the district court 2: holding the district court committed reversible error by certifying a class with respect to fraud claim 3: holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error 4: holding that the district court committed error by using the invention to define the problem that the invention solves


Input: of 1996, the time of the enactment of the legislation. See supra. In any event, under this Court’s holding that attorney fee awards are payable to the attorney, not the plaintiff, the awards are the property of the attorney and therefore not subject to offset for the plaintiffs debts. See Marré, 117 F.3d at 304 (finding that “the government cannot set off [the plaintiffs] tax obligations against the attorneys’ fee award, as no mutuality of debt exists between the government and [the plaintiffs] attorneys”). Plaintiff’s Counsel Is Entitled to an Additional Fee Award This Court further finds that the plaintiffs attorney is entitled to an additional fee award under the EAJA for his time spent litigating this issue. See Commissioner, 496 U.S. 154 at 160-161, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (<HOLDING>). The Government recognizes that this Court has Holdings: 0: holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee  1: holding that eaja fees may be awarded for fee litigation without a separate finding that the government was not substantially justified in its position as to the fee litigation as the single finding that the governments position lacks substantial justification  operates as a onetime threshold for fee eligibility  and presumptively encompasses all aspects of the civil action 2: holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied 3: holding that awarded fees were reasonable and that proof that attorneys fees are necessary apart from testimony as to the reasonableness of the fee is not required 4: holding that the termination of the fee cap did not affect litigation in progress when the fee cap was in effect


Input: Action until' after the Bankruptcy Court granted him a discharge, he was fully aware of the Guarantors’ repudiation of the Consulting Agreement before he filed his bankruptcy petition, see R.67, Ex. O (Exs. C-E to Dist, Ct. Compl.), and the breach of contract claim is therefore property of his estate, see O’Dowd v. Trueger (In re O'Dowd), 233 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing a pre-petition cause of action is property of the estate). Insofar as the Consulting Agreement payments are recovered in the Contract Action, such payments will not be for any services actually performed by Segal but will be damages for his pre-petition breach of contract claim and will therefore be property of the estate. See Venn v. Sherman (In re Sherman), 322 B.R. 889, 892-93 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.2004) (<HOLDING>); cf. Stinnett, 465 F.3d at 313 (rejecting the Holdings: 0: holding that causes of action for age and sex discrimination that arose prepetition were property of the bankruptcy estate 1: holding lost future wages recovered pursuant to a prepetition cause of action are property of the estate 2: holding that a valid judgment hen is enforceable against the property of the estate recovered by the trustee 3: recognizing the cause of action 4: holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate


Input: in the child’s mother, Procanik; for a child’s cystic fibrosis on a doctor who failed to test a symptomatic sibling for that genetic disease, Sckroeder; or for a child’s Down’s Syndrome on a doctor who failed to warn a pregnant woman that her age put her at increased risk of delivering a child with that condition, Berman. It is quite another to impose liability for prescribing a drug that had no connection with a birth defect. In one ease, the condition is the foreseeable result of the doctor’s omission; in the other, it is not. The majority’s result is unprecedented in any jurisdiction. In every previous failure-to-warn case, the harm about which the doctors failed to warn was the harm that in fact occurred. See, e.g., Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., 824 F.Supp. 746 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 1309 Holdings: 0: holding that to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress based on fear of contracting aids plaintiff must allege actual exposure to hiv 1: holding plaintiffs administrative complaint alleging negligent exposure to radiation established subject matter jurisdiction for plaintiffs civil claim alleging failure to warn of radiation exposure 2: holding that where plaintiffs emotional distress was the direct result of documented physical injury and was reasonably foreseeable in light of the fact that the plaintiff may have been exposed to hiv he was not required to prove actual exposure to the disease in order to state a viable cause of action 3: holding that absent any proof that the plaintiff was in fact exposed to hiv he could not recover damages for his fear of contracting aids 4: holding medical providers who failed to warn mother about danger of exposure to hiv liable when baby born with hiv


Input: date for valuation, [the] fair market value of the property was $425,000 less the reasonable cost of remediation of then existing contamination of which the arbitrator finds to be $245,000 ... rendering the true market value to be $180,000 as of March 12, 1990. It is true that the arbitrator referred to the “exercise of the right” to repurchase, but we cannot construe that language to imply a determination that Avatar had the right to repurchase, because the arbitrator was merely setting the valuation date. Perhaps it would have been better for the arbitrator to have referred to the assertion of the right to repurchase, but we cannot read into the award a determination the arbitrator was not authorized to make. See Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So.2d 1327 (Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>). We also reject Avatar’s claim that it would Holdings: 0: holding that upon vacating an arbitration award the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator 1: holding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by addressing a question that was not submitted to arbitration and actually emerged six weeks after the original issue arose 2: holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator 3: holding that the arbitrator was without jurisdiction to consider an issue which was not included in the written notice of arbitration and was added on the first day of the arbitration hearing 4: holding that an arbitrator exceeds his or her power by going beyond the authority granted by the parties or the operative documents and decides an issue not pertinent to the resolution of the issue submitted to arbitration


Input: the body-cavity search, which was performed at approximately 2:15 a.m., officials placed Thompson in a room with seven other prisoners until 7:00 a.m. The room lacked toilet facilities, and at least one of the prisoners urinated on the floor. An official then led Thompson, in his bare feet, to a damp toilet stall, where he was directed to give a urine sample. No one cleaned the toi occurred, but whether the search was hygienic. Because of the strikingly unsanitary conditions under which the officials searched Thompson and performed the urinalysis, I believe that the prison officials in the instant case violated clearly established law. Nor could the prison officials reasonably have believed that their conduct was lawful. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The California Department of Corrections Holdings: 0: holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a constitutional right and the law to this effect was clearly established under thenexisting law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful 1: holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had 2: holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity 3: holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established 4: holding that if official has violated clearly established law he is entitled to qualified immunity only if reasonable official could have believed conduct was lawful


Input: to justify briefly stopping individuals to question them “about their citizenship and immigration status ... but any further detention ... must be based on ... probable cause.” Id. at 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574 (emphasis added) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868); see also id. at 884 (“[Tjhe Fourth Amendment ... forbids stopping or detaining persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens”). Guided by this Supreme Court prece-' dent, we have also required that immigration officers have reasonable suspicion to briefly stop individuals to question them regarding their immigration status and probable cause for any further arrest and detention. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez-de Jesus, 85 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 69 (1st Holdings: 0: holding that passenger who attempts to walk away from a legal traffic stop cannot be detained absent reasonable suspicion of dangerous or criminal activity 1: recognizing that brignoniponce stands for the principle that an individual may not be briefly detained for questioning about citizenship absent reasonable suspicion that the person is an illegal alien 2: holding that where an alien was ineligible for a visa as a matter of law his citizenship was illegally procured and subject to revocation 3: recognizing that an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person has been is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity to frisk an individual for weapons and must have probable cause to conduct a further seizure 4: holding that absent probable cause to arrest a police officer may approach an individual to conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal conduct is afoot


Input: undermines her arguments. (Defs-.’ Mem. 9-10.) However, the issue before the Court on this claim is not whether Plaintiff was guilty of disclosing official NYPD -information, but whether her termination was motivated, even in part, by her sex. The evidence that a similarly situated male lieutenant who engaged in comparable or worse conduct than Plaintiff received a much lighter pen alty, in combination with the evidence that Defendants departed from procedural regularity by providing Commissioner Weisel with an inaccurate and version of Plaintiffs disciplinary record than they provid: ed to Plaintiff, is legally sufficient for- a reasonable jury to find that Defendants terminated Plaintiff in part on the basis of her sex. See Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, summary judgment is Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs prima facie case plus evidence of pretext sufficed to permit reasonable juror to infer that retaliation was butfor cause of adverse action 1: holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action 2: holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct 3: holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation without evidence that the decisionmaker knew about plaintiffs protected activity when he made the decision that resulted in the adverse action 4: holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons


Input: by the DOJ, the DOJ has specifically stated that a public entity “is not accountable for discrimination in the employment or other practices of [a company licensed by the public entity], if those practices are not the result of requirements or policies established by the [public entity].” Department of Justice, Title II Technical Assistance Manual § II-3.7200, available at http://www.ada.gov/ taman2.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2015). Here, any failure of the driver education schools to comply with the ADA or Rehabilitation Act cannot be said to be “the result of. requirements or policies established by the” TEA. Instead, the named plaintiffs’ claim is at most that the 11, at *5-6 (E.D.La. Aug. 14, 2013) (same); Reeves v. Queen City Transp., Inc., 10 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1187 (D.Colo.1998) (<HOLDING>); Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 849 F.Supp. 1429, Holdings: 0: holding title company liable for bad faith 1: holding that city is not liable for inaccessible restaurants and liquor stores it licenses 2: holding that a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen 3: holding that public entity is not liable for inaccessible taxi companies it licenses and regulates 4: holding that public utility company is not liable for inaccessible bus company it licenses where there is no contract between them


Input: the “inextricably intertwined” exception, the trial court may conclude that segregation is required and that, without segregation, the court does not have sufficient information to determine the amount of reasonable and necessary fees. If the party seeking fees refuses to segregate, the trial court may be forced to deny recovery of fees, as the trial court did in this case. Based on both the judgment and the findings of fact, we conclude that the only basis for the trial c etermining segregation because it contradicts the legal standard articulated in Sterling as well as precedent from this court and the majority of cases on this issue from other courts of appeals. See Sterling, 822 S.W.2d at 11-12; Goebel v. Brandley, 76 S.W.3d 652, 657-58 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>), disapproved of on other grounds by Martin v. Holdings: 0: holding that because plaintiffs claims were presented as a single claim based on the same facts and based on the same alleged damages multiple awards would be duplicative 1: holding that trespass to try title is the method for determining title to  real property 2: holding claimant did not have to segregate fees between fraud and contract claims because both claims were based on the same set of facts and circumstances 3: holding that claimant could recover all of his attorneys fees because declaratoryjudgment claim in boundary dispute was based on the same facts as his claims for adverse possession trespass and trespass to try title 4: holding that election of remedies did not apply because filing a trespass to try title action by the mortgageetrusteedeed grantee was not inconsistent with its successful settlement of claim against the title insurer


Input: in Salinas was not necessary to the resolution of that case and therefore provides no binding authority. See, e.g„ Baumgart v. State, 512 S.W.3d 335, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (refusing to treat statement in previous, case as binding authority because it was not necessary to the resolution of the case). We review decisions of courts of appeals on discretionary review. Tex. Const. art. V, § 5(b) (“[T]he Court of Criminal Appeals may, on its own motion, review a decision of a Court of Appeals in a criminal case.”); Holland v. State, 802 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“In our discretionary review capacity we review ‘decisions’ of the court of appeals.”). In Salinas, the court of appeals never considered the issue of retroactivity because it declared the court costs at 2013) (<HOLDING>). That is why I would grant review in this case Holdings: 0: holding portions of the coercion of public servant or voter statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment and in violation of the separation of powers 1: holding new yorks disclosure law unconstitutionally overbroad 2: holding portions of the online solicitation of a minor statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment 3: holding the improper photography or visual recording statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment 4: holding that a statute must burden a substantial amount of protected speech to be unconstitutionally overbroad


Input: has standing to require compliance with that provision.”). Cf. Zenith Radio Corp., 437 U.S. at 457-58, 98 S.Ct. 2441 (noting the reliance interests of foreign producers on both the continuity of U.S. laws, and the adherence to international legal principles); Made in the USA Found., 242 F.3d at 1318. Because prudential standing is satisfied when the injury asserted by a plaintiff “ ‘arguably [falls] within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question,’ ” Akins, 524 U.S. at 20, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (quoting NCUA, 522 U.S. at 488, 118 S.Ct. 927), there are no prudential standing restraints to bar Plaintiffs’ claims here, accord United Food & Commer. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555-58, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996) (<HOLDING>). III. POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE Defendant Holdings: 0: holding that article iii constitutional standing must be addressed before considering lanham act prudential standing 1: holding that congress may dispense with prudential standing requirements 2: holding that constitutional requirements under article iii and prudential requirement that plaintiffs be the proper proponents of the particular legal rights on which they base their suits are distinct aspects of standing inquiry 3: recognizing prudential concerns underlying antitrust standing restrictions 4: holding that plaintiffs may not circumvent the requirements for prudential standing by relying on forms of relief that benefit the public at large


Input: & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.003 (West 2008) (emphasis added). Thus, if legally sufficient evidence does not exist of the negligence of a settling physician, his percentage of responsibility should not be submitted. See id. § 33.003(b) (expressly prohibiting submission to jury of any person’s percentage of responsibility absent legally sufficient evidence); Rehab. Facility at Austin, Inc. v. Cooper, 962 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (interpreting predecessor statute and holding that trial court properly refused to submit settling defendant’s negligence to jury); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 278 (authorizing trial court to submit to jury only questions raised by pleadings and evidence); Kroger Co. v. Betancourt, 996 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). That is, section 33.003, the comparative Holdings: 0: holding that to establish tort liability in a negligence action there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff 1: holding that defendant was not harmed by submission of invalid fraud claim 2: holding submission of question on comparative responsibility of settling defendant is required only if evidence exists supporting liability on part of settling defendant 3: holding when reasonable minds cannot differ the question of comparative negligence is a question of law appropriate for summary judgment 4: recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts


Input: manufacturers.”); id. ("Permitting GM in bankruptcy, to ignore state dealer laws upsets the competitive balance among GM and every other automotive manufacturer. ”). 127 . It also at least seemingly would not be a person aggrieved with standing to appeal, but that is an issue for the appellate courts. 128 . See discussion at 492-93, above. 129 . Adelphia Settlement-Bankruptcy, 327 B.R. at 166. 130 .Adelphia Settlement-District, 337 B.R. at 477. 131 . See In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 199-206 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2009); see also id. at 205-06 (“Where a state law unduly impede[s] the operation of federal bankruptcy policy, the state law [will] have to yield’ ”) (quoting In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.2009)). 132 . 406 B.R. at 205-06; see also Vallejo, 403 B.R. at 77 (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). 133 . 406 B.R. at Holdings: 0: recognizing that the supremacy clause does not of its own force create rights 1: holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government 2: holding that congress enacted section 365 to provide debtors the authority to reject executory contracts this authority preempts state law by virtue of the supremacy clause and the bankruptcy clause 3: recognizing that the supremacy clause is not a source of any federal rights 4: holding in a bankruptcy context that any state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the supremacy clause


Input: “purge himself of the charge of contempt before this court, before further participating in this trial.” On appeal, the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals reasoned that “[t]he proper thing to do is to excuse the jury and thereafter fine counsel.” Id. at 130, 225 P.2d at 819. Noting that such a mistake was not per se reversible error, id., the Court held that, nevertheless, the defendant in that case had not received a fair trial. Id. at 132, 225 P.2d at 820. Likewise, in Meek v. State, 112 Nev. 1288, 1295-97, 930 P.2d 1104, 1109 (1996), the Supreme Court of Nevada held, inter alia, that the defendant’s case had been prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling the defense counsel in contempt and fining him before the jury. See also United States v. Kelley, 314 F.2d 461, 463-64 (6th Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>); Neal v. State, 36 Ala.App. 156, 158, 54 So.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing that providing defendant with hobsons choice between incompetent lawyer or no lawyer violates right to counsel 1: recognizing that state agencies might require the lawyer to prove the truth of the fact stated by supplying copies of the court documents or material that led the lawyer to the fact 2: holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person 3: holding that trial judges act of threatening defense lawyer twice with contempt tended to belittle the lawyer in the eyes of the jury and operated to prevent the defendant from having a fair trial 4: holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive


Input: that the USAF letters did not qualify as requests FPRs under FAR 15.307(b). Id. at 263. The court finds that, like the USAF letters in Dubinsky, the July 8, 2011 letter failed sufficiently to convey that OPM “intend[ed] to make award without obtaining further revisions.” See FAR 15.307(b). The court does not find the request in the July 8, 2011 letter for a “formal proposal revision,” AR 342 (July 8, 2011 letter), to be evidence to the contrary. Nor does the court consider the request in the July 8, 2011 letter for responses to be submitted “no later than 3:00 PM on July 21, 2011,” id. (emphasis omitted), to be determinative of the matter. FAR 15.307(b) requires that requests for FPRs include, among other things, a “common cut-off date.” FAR 15.307(b); accord Cleveland, 43 F.3d at 658 (<HOLDING>). Given that none of the other offerors in the Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff need not have submitted requests for admissions by the august 15 discovery motion cutoff date or by the discovery cutoff date of september 15 because requests for admissions are distinct from other general discovery devices and are not subject to discovery cutoff dates 1: recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted 2: recognizing that language giving notice to all offerors of a common cutoff date for receipt of offers has the intent and effect of a request for bafos internal quotation maiks omitted 3: holding that beneficiary of general support trust has a legal right to compel distribution of funds internal quotation marks omitted 4: holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates


Input: has failed to assert a valid claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part: “No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law....” Thus, by its terms, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the States; it does not apply to the Federal Government or the District of Columbia. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543 n. 21, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987) (“The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a State. The claimed association in this case is between the [defendant] and the Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply.”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954) (<HOLDING>). Because Plaintiff has sued only the District Holdings: 0: holding that the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the district of columbia 1: holding that the plaintiff has a good faith basis to believe a putative defendant may be a district of columbia resident if a geolocation service places his her ip address within the district of columbia or within a city located within 30 miles of the district of columbia 2: holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government 3: holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim 4: holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action


Input: party-opponent of his having assaulted the victim. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 2. The district court did not err when it denied Jose’s motion to suppress statements made to Detective Rosales. Detective Rosales warned Jose that his statements could be used against him in court. She was not required to specifically warn Jose that his statements could be used against him in a federal prosecution. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008, 1022-23 (9th Cir.2002). 3. The district court’s imposition of fifty-one months’ imprisonment was substantively reasonable. Considering the totality of circumstances, the district court imposed a sentence within the applicable sentencing range and adequately explained its reasoning. See United States v. Bendtzen, 542 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. * This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding that when a court miscalculates the guideline range yet imposes a sentence that falls within a properly calculated guideline range the sentence enjoys a presumption of reasonableness 1: holding that a sentence within a properly calculated guideline range is usually reasonable 2: holding sentence within properly calculated advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 3: holding that a sentence within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 4: holding that imposition of a sentence within the properly calculated range is not reviewable


Input: Wright contends that the district court erred by sentencing him to consecutive sentences of imprisonment following the revocation of his supervised release because the original plea agreement and sentence provided that the terms of imprisonment be concurrent and co-terminous. The district court did not err because under Ninth Circuit precedent, a district court may impose consecutive sentences after the revocation of supervised release even when the original sentences were concurrent. See United States v. Jackson, 176 F.3d 1175, 1176 (9th Cir.1999). Wright also contends that the district court erred by imposing a term of supervised release following his re-imprisonment. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 694, 713, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not Holdings: 0: recognizing that probation officers are mandated to enforce a sentencing courts terms and conditions of supervised release 1: holding that defendant is not entitled to a jury trial to determine whether terms of supervised release have been violated 2: holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release 3: holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release 4: holding that district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release following reimprisonment


Input: State was of the view that a plea agreement with Langston was necessary because “the case against Langston was, at best, shaky, while the case against [Clabourne] was overwhelming, with much of the evidence coming from his own mouth.” Appellee’s Answering Briefi'Cross-Appellants Opening Brief at 51. c. Length of Time on Death Row ¶ 43 Clabourne has been sentenced to death for eighteen years. He claims this is mitigating because he has a mental illness and Langston and Carrico, who do not, have not had to face the prospect of execution for the same period. We find these facts altogether unrelated to Clabourne’s character or record and the circumstances of his offense and, therefore, reject this proffered mitigation. Cf. State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 259, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (1997) (<HOLDING>). c. Independent Reweighing ¶44 Upon Holdings: 0: holding the death penalty disproportionately cruel and unusual when imposed for the crime of rape 1: holding that the carrying out of an execution after the first execution attempt had failed did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment 2: holding that twentythree years served on death row is not cruel and unusual punishment 3: holding that the fact that defendant spent years on death row awaiting execution does not render the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment 4: holding that twentythree years on death row is not cruel and unusual punishment


Input: 1 A.3d 658, 671 (2010). In addressing this issue, the District Court looked to a 1998 district court opinion that predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not allow an affirmative cause of action for intentional spoliation, Larison v. City of Trenton, 180 F.R.D. 261, 266 (D.N.J.1998). The New Jersey Supreme Court has since authorized tort recovery for intentional spoliation. See Rosenblit, 766 A.2d at 758. Moreover, when it did so, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not adopt the strict causation and damages theories propounded by Larison. Compare Larison, 180 F.R.D. at 266 (predicting that a prima facie case could not be established unless and until the plaintiff shows that he failed to prove his original case because of the missing evidence), with Tartaglia, 961 A.2d at 1190 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, plaintiffs did not have to Holdings: 0: holding that where an express contract was in place between plaintiff and defendant that governed the compensation sought by plaintiff plaintiff may not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment 1: recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue 2: holding by new jersey supreme court that a plaintiff may recover from a spoliator even if the plaintiff prevails in the original suit 3: recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey 4: recognizing that pennsylvania had no interest in denying its residents the greater damages available under new jersey consumer fraud statutes for claims against a new jersey seller


Input: 994 A.2d at 878 n. 13. In ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 344 Md. 155, 192, 686 A.2d 250, 268 (1996), Judge Rodowsky, writing for the Court, refused, on a Motion for Reconsideration, testimony contained in depositions which were not contained in the five volume, 2,437 page, joint record extract, explaining The liberalizing provision ... in Rule 8-501(c) does not excuse the failure to furnish in the brief references to factual material in support of a party’s argument as required by Rule 8-504(a)(4). Nor does the liberalization in Rule 8-501(c) alter the fundamental rule of appellate practice under which the appellate court has no duty independently to search through the record for error. Id. (footnote deleted); see also State Roads Comm’n v. Halle, 228 Md. 24, 26-27, 178 A.2d 319, 320 (1962) (<HOLDING>); Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex, Inc., 174 Md.App. Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record with no guidance from the briefing party to determine if the record supports the partys argument 1: holding that recording is notice to one bound to search the record 2: holding that the court had no obligation to search large record extract 3: holding that the district court has no affirmative obligation to plumb the record to procure material facts 4: holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation


Input: While we agree that the definition of employer requires that the entity “employf] workers under the terms of the W orkers’ Compensation Act,” we disagree that the language requires that all counted workers actually be eligible for workers’ compensation insurance coverage. Section 52-1-15. {9} There are several instances in which a worker is counted to determine whether an employer is subject to the Act but is not ultimately covered under the Act’s provisions. See, e.g., Howie v. Stevens, 102 N.M. 300, 302, 694 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing that an illegally employed minor would presumably be counted to determine application of the Act to the employer but has the right to circumvent the Act’s coverage and pursue remedies in tort), Garcia, 111 N.M. at 211, 803 P.2d at 1116 (<HOLDING>). But the most important example is contained Holdings: 0: recognizing retaliatory discharge claim where employer prevented employees exercise of workers compensation rights because of employees intention to file claim 1: holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage 2: holding that probation department employees are not county employees 3: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 4: holding that past employees who were regularly employed are still to be counted to determine worker minimums even though those workers are now no longer employees and thus ineligible for coverage


Input: to hold those for either — they’re on file, he can bring them, if you choose to do that.” On December 13, 2001, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. The State Appellate Defender was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. II. ANALYSIS A. Posttrial Motions Defendant first contends that this cause must be remanded for further proceedings because the trial court failed to rule on his post-trial motion for recusal or his motion for a new trial. At the outset, we question whether defendant’s pro se posttrial motions were properly before the trial court. The motions were filed at a time during which he was represented by counsel. It is well established that a defendant may not simultaneously proceed pro se and by counsel. See People v. Handy, 278 Ill. App. 3d 829, 836-37 (1996) (<HOLDING>); People v. Taggart, 233 Ill. App. 3d 530, 557 Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance 1: holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial 2: holding that pro se pleadings from defendants who are represented by counsel in the pending criminal proceedings are unauthorized 3: holding that trial court erred in considering pro se motion for new trial filed when defendant was represented by counsel 4: holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se


Input: vacating the old Brightmoor Station Post Office, the USPS intended to remain in legal possession of the premises, and therefore Settlement Agreement I did not effect a surrender of the leasehold. See Third Am. Compl. IT 32; see also Reply PI. Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant “merely retains the keys to the premises,” the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant § 14.2, Reporter’s Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant. See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (<HOLDING>); see also Four “S” Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Holdings: 0: holding that where the issue of sanctions was not before the court of appeals when the appeal was filed the district court retained jurisdiction 1: holding where 1 the government provided the defendant with all the necessary drugmaking materials 2 the government provided instructions on how to make the drugs and 3 the defendant sought out the materials and help from the undercover government agents the case set the outer limits to which the government may go in the quest to ferret out and prosecute crimes but the governments conduct did not rise to the level of a due process violation 2: holding that when the defendant asserted in her answer that she was not a tenant and that she had an equitable interest in the property ejectment not eviction was the proper remedy and the matter should have been transferred to the circuit court 3: holding that even though the tenant retained the keys the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out 4: holding that the court retained cafa jurisdiction even though class certification was denied


Input: her testimony). 6 See Cromer v. Mulkey Enterprises, 254 Ga. App. 388, 392 (2) (562 SE2d 783) (2002); Hyde v. State, 189 Ga. App. 727, 728 (1) (377 SE2d 187) (1988). 7 See Richey v. State, 261 Ga. App. 720, 724-725 (3) (583 SE2d 539) (2003). 8 See Cannon v. Jeffries, 250 Ga. App. 371, 376 (2) (551 SE2d 777) (2001). 9 See Joiner v. Lane, 235 Ga. App. 121, 126 (4) (508 SE2d 203) (1998). 10 See id. at 125-126. 11 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 126. See also Doctors Hosp. of Augusta v. Bonner, 195 Ga. App. 152, 160 (3) (392 SE2d 897) (1990). 12 Doctors Hosp., supra at 159. 13 See Joiner, supra; Randall Mem. Mortuary v. O’Quinn, 202 Ga. App. 541, 543 (1) (414 SE2d 744) (1992) (physical precedent only). 14 OCGA § 16-5-24 (a). See also Miller v. State, 275 Ga. 730, 732 (1) (571 SE2d 788) (2002) (<HOLDING>). 15 It was unclear from the testimony at trial Holdings: 0: holding that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of manslaughter 1: holding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated battery when the bodily member that is lost or rendered useless in the battery is a tooth 2: holding that aggravated battery of peace officer encompasses both insulting or provoking contact and battery resulting in bodily harm 3: holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery 4: holding that when a battered victim has suffered a severe injury to his brain resulting in the loss of normal brain functioning he is said to have been deprived of his brain thus suffering an aggravated battery


Input: Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 961, the predecessor statute to TexLoc.Gov’t Code Ann. § 6.012, and holding that “two-thirds of the council” means two-thirds of the entire five member council); City of Alamo Heights v. Gerety, 264 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1954, -writ refd n.r.e.). The statutory requirements for obtaining type A status are to be strictly construed. Etheridge, 32 S.W.2d at 831; City of Centerville v. Adkisson, 291 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1956, no writ). However, where there has been colorable compliance with the statute, and the ordinance has been in place for a sufficient period of time, the municipality may become a de facto type A municipality. See Cook v. Town of Putnam, 283 S.W. 649, 650 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1926, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (<HOLDING>); Couch v. City of Fort Worth, 287 S.W.2d 255, Holdings: 0: holding that the grant county prosecutor had a statutory duty to be legal advisor to the county clerk even though she was not embroiled in litigation in which the county was the real party in interest 1: holding that de facto type a status was achieved where the only violation of the statute was the failure to file the ordinance with the county clerk 2: holding that the county attorney had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the county attorneys authority was first made on appeal 3: holding that a de facto parents rights do not infringe on the fundamental liberty interests of the other legal parent in a family unit because de facto status can be achieved only through the active encouragement of the biological or adoptive parent by affirmatively establishing a family unit with the de facto parent and child or children that accompany the family 4: holding county clerk sued in official capacity was entitled to the immunity the county enjoyed


Input: Likewise, whereas the qualifications to serve as a probate or juvenile judge of the city and county of Denver are set forth in Colorado Constitution article VI, sections 14 and 15, respectively, the term of office is set forth for both judges by reference to Colorado Constitution article VI, section 10(2). I agree that our decision in In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1197 n. 11 (Colo.1998), includes a footnote that suggests that a single initiative which sought to alter the manner in which judges are nominated, appointed and retained, judicial terms of office, and term limits would not violate the single-subject mandate of section 1(5.5), so long as the subject of the initiative was qualific .2d 1205, 1211 (Colo. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Because I do not read the term Holdings: 0: holding that the colorado constitution reserves no authority in the state legislature to change add to or diminish the qualifications for constitutionally created offices 1: holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature 2: holding that the requirement that the county seek recommendations for appointments to a civil office from a private corporation was not constitutionally repugnant because where the office was created by the legislature the legislature retains the control over that offices method of appointment 3: holding that state legislature may at pleasure create or abolish public offices 4: recognizing that provisions of the colorado constitution should be construed in the context of the constitution as a whole


Input: Martin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1981) (noting that “agreement to agree” is unenforceable). Nor does the complaint allege facts indicating that Shaw relied on Boccardi’s confidential information in making its subsequent public bid for Riviera. Boccardi claims to have advised Shaw that such a bid would cause the share price to increase, but even if Shaw relied upon this unextraordinary prediction, no factfinder could conclude that it constituted confidential information within the meaning of the Agreement, which expressly excluded from that definition “information ... generally available to the public.” Cf. Buhler v. Michael P. Maloney Consulting, Inc., 299 A.D.2d 190, 191, 749 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (1st Dep’t 2002) (<HOLDING>). Because we conclude that Boccardi fails to Holdings: 0: holding that a customer list may be protectable as a trade secret if it is secret and the court examines and determines if it is protectable based on three factors 1 what steps if any an employer has taken to maintain the confidentiality of a customer list 2 whether a departing employee acknowledges that the customer list is confidential and 3 whether the content of the list is readily ascertainable 1: holding that the plaintiffs customer list was not a trade secret in part because there was no evidence that by the nature of the plaintiffs business extraordinary effort was involved in compiling the customer list 2: holding that contact list based on inter alia information that was publicly available did not qualify as trade secret 3: holding contact information of potential computer network services clients was not a trade secret because all businesses are now potential customers of computer network services and their contact information is publicly available 4: recognizing that nondisclosure agreements did not have to list the secret information in order to put employees on notice


Input: 499 F.Supp.2d 501, 514 (S.D.N.Y.2007) for the proposition that the privilege does not reach "routine operating decisions.” PL’s Mem. for Mot. to Compel at 26, but it is the Mead Data opinion that has precedential value here. 7 . Even the cases the Committee cites indicate that the privilege covers agency deliberations about decisions, as well as the formulation of policy positions. In Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 677 (D.C.Cir.1981), the Court stated, "the privilege protects documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated ....” See also Paisley v. C.I.A., 712 F.2d 686, 698-99 (D.C.Cir.1983), vacated on other grounds, 724 F.2d 201 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 8 . In Waters v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 218 Holdings: 0: holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege 1: holding that in analyzing whether materials are protected from disclosure under exemption 5 of foia which protects materials covered by the deliberative process privilege  a court must first be able to pinpoint an agency decision or policy to which these documents contributed and stating that the decision whether to prosecute an individual is the type of decision protected by the privilege 2: holding that emails among prosecutors relating to decision not to prosecute were covered by the deliberative process privilege 3: holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege 4: holding that internal emails about how to present an agency decision to the public were covered by the deliberative process privilege


Input: Given her admissions, which are described above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs interests “ ‘are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the [TCPA] that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.’ ” Id. (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. 750). Indeed, it is unfathomable that Congress considered a consumer who files TCPA actions as a business when it enacted the TCPA as a result of its “outrage over the proliferation of prerecorded telemarketing calls to private residences, which consumers 'regarded as an intrusive invasion of privacy and a nuisance.” Leyse, 804 F.3d at 325 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Because Plaintiff does not have “the sort of interest in privacy, 17, 2011 WL 1812496, at *6-7 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the tcpa because they attempted to use the statute in a way not intended or contemplated by congress and because their damages are not of the vexatious and intrusive nuisance nature sought to be redressed by congress in enacting the tcpa 1: holding that the plaintiff did not have standing because it was not able to demonstrate how its economic interests fell within the zone of interests protected by the nhpa 2: holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment 3: holding that the plaintiff had prudential standing because her interests in avoiding harassment via the telephone line installed in her home are not so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that they fail to fall within the tcpas zone of interests 4: holding the defendant does not possess statutory standing to attack the subpoena  because he has not demonstrated that he was within the zone of interests intended to be protected by  876a


Input: not “serious” enough to require the protection of that a constitutional guaranty of jury trial does not apply to proceedings to punish for contempt of court whether in a court of law, a court of equity, a court having criminal jurisdiction, or other court.” Pass v. State, 181 Tenn. 613, 184 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1944) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ahern v. Ahern, 15 S.W.3d 73, 82 (Tenn.2000). Additionally, unlike criminal prosecutions, general contempt proceedings do not require an indictment and subsequent' prosecution by the State. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 42(b)(2); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 185-86, 78 S.Ct. 632, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958), overruled in part on other grounds by Bloom, 391 U.S. at 196 n. 1, 198, 88 S.Ct. 1477; State v. Wood, 91 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). Contempt proceedings are often initiated upon Holdings: 0: holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at the time of a  formal charge which we construe to be an arrest warrant or at the time of the preliminary hearing in those rare cases where a preliminary hearing is not preceded by an arrest warrant or by indictment or presentment when the charge is initiated by the grand jury quoting state v mitchell 593 sw2d 280 286 tenn 1980 1: recognizing that an indictment may be dismissed in part 2: holding a statement in the motion for new trial entitled certificate of presentment in which appellate counsel stated the motion was handdelivered to the trial court insufficient to establish presentment 3: recognizing that criminal contempt is not initiated by an indictment or presentment 4: holding that certificate of presentment and docket entry noting filing of motion were insufficient evidence of presentment


Input: for a sentence of fifteen years in prison with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. After Marckman entered his plea, the court granted him a one-week furlough. The court informed Marckman that it would sentence him to thirty years as an HFO if he got arrested on a new charge while out on the furlough or failed to appear for sentencing. Marckman agreed to this additional term, and trial counsel amended his change of plea form accordingly. Marckman failed to appear for sentencing and was subsequently arrested for failure to appear and for a new charge. The trial court sentenced Marckman to thirty years in prison as an HFO with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. In ground four of his postconviction motion, Marckman argued that the trial cour d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>); Butler v. State, 764 So.2d 794, 795 (Fla. 2d Holdings: 0: holding that an involuntary plea claim is cognizable in a rule 3850 motion 1: holding that claim that plea was involuntary because the court failed to comply with rule 3172c was cognizable in a rule 3850 motion 2: holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion 3: holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion 4: holding defendant was not barred from raising sentencing issue in rule 3850 motion by virtue of prior rule 3850 motion which did not raise any sentencing issues


Input: his position as an “ex-post facto attempt to add additional terms to the Forbearance Agreement.” Instead, Saverin asserts, he is alleging that Wendy’s bad-faith actions breached the existing terms of the Forbearance Agreement. Specifically, he posits that the very purpose of the Forbearance Agreement was frustrated when Wendy’s failed to prevent the occurrence of a condition — the appointment of a receiver — that permitted Wendy’s to prematurely terminate the Forbearance and Franchise Agreements. But this reasoning ignores the principle that the implied duty of good faith cannot be breached by acting as allowed by the specific terms of the contract. Ed Schory & Sons, 662 N.E.2d at 1083; see also Jim White Agency Co. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 126 F.3d 832, 834-35 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Simply put, Saverin admits that Wendy’s did Holdings: 0: holding that franchisor not only has valid interest in protecting good will it has developed but it also has an interest in being able to place a new franchisee at or near the same location where its goodwill has been created 1: holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurers failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party 2: holding that a lending institution does not violate a separate duty of good faith by adhering to its agreements with a borrower or enforcing its contractual rights as a creditor 3: holding that franchisor has an interest in the goodwill its franchise has created 4: holding in a case decided under ohio law that a franchisor cannot be found liable for failure to act in good faith where it has done no more than to insist on enforcing its contract rights to the detriment of its franchisee


Input: and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 446 (4th ed.1994). 6 Malingering is the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms motivated by external incentives, such as obtaining compensation or drugs, avoiding work or military duty, or evading criminal prosecution. American Psychiatric Association, supra, at 683. 7 The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 Holdings: 0: holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion 1: holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against experts wishes 2: holding that an insurer had conclusively established a reasonable basis for denying a claim when it relied on an experts opinion even though another expert had expressed a conflicting opinion 3: holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion 4: holding even though experts are permitted to give an opinion they may not offer an opinion regarding the credibility of others


Input: Rico that portion of his motion which sou der is appropriate. Accordingly, we will vacate and remand in part so that, consistent with the District Court’s order of December 13, 2010, that portion of Rodriguez’s motion which seeks return of property seized in Puerto Rico may be transferred to the District of Puerto Rico. As explained below, however, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Rodriguez’s Rule 41(g) motion in all other respects. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir.1999). Rodriguez argued that he did not receive sufficient notice of the forfeiture of items 3, 4, and 5. United States v. McGlo-ry, 202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). In these circumstances, due process requires Holdings: 0: holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review a legal claim not presented in administrative proceedings below 1: holding that district courts have jurisdiction to review a claim that a person received inadequate notice of completed administrative forfeiture proceedings 2: holding that inadequate notice did not trigger plans time bar for administrative review 3: holding that where notice was deficient in administrative forfeiture proceedings proper remedy was to grant claimant right to a hearing 4: holding that there is no right to habeas review of administrative evidentiary determinations before a district court where direct review of the administrative proceedings is available in the appellate courts


Input: memorandum asserting that Chase’s motion to dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff attaches four exhibits to her supplemental memorandum: (1) excerpts of the mortgage agreement; (2) a Standard Flood Hazard Determination; (3) a flood policy declaration from Prudential Financial; and (4) a flood insurance renewal invoice from Liberty Mutual. The Court finds that these documents are referred to in the complaint and are central to plaintiffs claims against Chase. The Court, therefore, grants plaintiffs motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum and will consider the attached documents without converting Chase’s motion into one for summary judgment. See Gen. Retail Servs. Inc. v. Wireless Toyz Franchise, LLC, 255 Fed.Appx. 775, 786 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Shamrock Associated Indus., L.L.C. v. Fid. Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff cannot introduce new allegations or new facts in opposition to a motion to dismiss 1: holding plaintiffs reference to and attachment of franchise agreement excerpts in opposition to defendants motion did not convert motion to dismiss to motion for summary judgment because plaintiff did not introduce support for arguments beyond the allegations in the complaint 2: holding that district court has discretion when deciding to convert a defendants motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment 3: holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion 4: holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived


Input: to the carrier or fund. Here, Libner does not allege that he directly notified the Association of the existence of the lien. He asserts that the Association should have been on notice as a result of his relationship with his client, his communications with the Association on behalf of that client, and the Association’s receipt of a copy of a letter Libner sent to his client indicating that he had a right to recover his fees. [¶ 11] Without deciding whether, and in what circumstance, an attorney may impose a lien against the fund of the opposing party or its carriers, we conclude that no lien may be imposed without direct and specific notice to the carrier or fund that a lien is asserted before the proceeds are disbursed. See Sowder v. Sowder, 127 N.M. 114, 977 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1999) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 12] Because Libner failed to provide any Holdings: 0: holding that no lien may be imposed without direct and specific notice to the fund of an opposing party or its carriers that a lien is asserted before the proceeds are disbursed 1: holding that the constitutional right to be present is satisfied so long as the defendant is given an opportunity to register his opinions with counsel after juror questioning and is present when the exercise of strikes is given formal effect even if the defendant is not present when his lawyer actually exercises the peremptory challenges 2: holding that if an attorney seeks to assert a lien but does so only after distribution of the proceeds of the judgment his notice even if given to all appropriate parties is too late and the hen is lost 3: holding that if no notice was given prior to the institution of an action a condition precedent to the right to bring the action does not exist and the buyerplaintiff has lost the right of his remedy 4: holding that if an attorney is discharged without cause he is entitled to a charging lien for the reasonable value of his services rendered prior to the date of the substitution of counsel where 1 his representation was entirely competent and successful up until his discharge 2 any potential conflict of interest was disclosed and the plaintiff chose to continue to be represented by the attorney and 3 the discharge of the attorney occurred solely because of a fee dispute


Input: emotional distress to Plaintiff. Notably, the object of Defendant Manley’s engagement in investigating and arresting Plaintiff was clearly not for the benefit of Plaintiff. Rather, Defendant Manley undertook this' obligation for a law enforcement purpose, to investigate the illegal sale of PCP and apprehend those involved, for the benefit of the community. While the investigation of Plaintiff as a suspect in criminal activity and his related arrest may be emotionally distressing to Plaintiff if conducted negligently, it does not form the type of relationship or undertaking between Defendant Manley and Plaintiff that would give rise to a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. See Aubin v. District of Columbia, No. 14-02133 (RJL), 2016 WL 509283, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff has not pled any additional facts Holdings: 0: holding neither a phone call by the police requesting an arrestee to come to the station for questioning nor the questioning of an arrestee at the station was a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment 1: holding that transportation of arrestee to police station is service of police under the ada 2: holding that police officer did not subject arrestee to excessive force by requiring him to stay outside in cold temperatures during an investigation that lasted more than an hour 3: holding a police officer did not have the requisite relationship with or undertook an obligation to an arrestee that implicated the arrestees emotional wellbeing 4: holding that a police officers rape of an arrestee was outside the scope of his employment


Input: (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir.2014) (same). Notwithstanding Dooley’s argument to the contrary, the temporal relationship between her sex-discrimination complaint and the denial of her internal appeal is not “evident,” as her amended complaint provides no date for either event. In fact, Dooley does not even allege that there was close temporal proximity between them. All we know is that both occurred after she was fired. Dooley’s claim therefore fails to satisfy the fourth prong, as it is impossible to determine whether “the temporal proximity [between the two events is] very close.” Clark, 532 U.S. at 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Holdings: 0: holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action 1: holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity 2: holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action 3: holding that a temporal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action may in some cases be sufficient to create an inference of retaliation 4: holding that the plaintiffs failure to set forth a time frame in which his protected activity and the adverse action took place precluded an inference of a causal relationship between them and warranted dismissal of his first amendment retaliation claim


Input: of a contractual obligation to share in operating costs.”); see also Union Pacific R.R. v. United States, 52 Fed.Cl. 730, 733 (2002) (dismissing indemnity claim, but permitting plaintiff to show damages for breach of contract if it could prove its loss was a “direct and foreseeable consequence of [the government’s] breach of some other contractual duty”); Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 12 Cl.Ct. 1, 19 (1987) (explaining that indemnity claims seek all losses within the scope of an indemnity clause, while breach claims generally seek expectation damages), subsequent ruling, 13 Cl.Ct. 72 (1987), vacated for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1500, 855 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Compare Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. United States, 129 F.3d 1226, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>), with Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United Holdings: 0: holding that the government was liable for partial breach of contract 1: holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract 2: holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract 3: holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation 4: holding government could be liable for breach of a contractual obligation to purchase insurance for plaintiff


Input: military, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts secret.”). In AHIF-Oregon’s view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (<HOLDING>); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of Holdings: 0: holding that neither the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 nor the illegal immigration reform act of 1996 repealed the district courts jurisdiction to review aliens habeas petitions 1: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act aedpa begins to run on the date a prisoner dismisses his direct appeal because his conviction is then final 2: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 is not jurisdictional 3: holding that in a designation of a foreign terrorist organization under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 aedpa the governments use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organizations due process rights 4: holding that in a military criminal trial the governments use of classified information without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information did not violate the defendants due process rights


Input: the LPT Schroeder was a managing director at Morgan Stanley and was among the top ranked property and casualty insurance industry analysts. Tr. 382-83. The team she led regularly advised institutional investors about AIG. Tr. 377, 409. 12 . At the time of the LPT Cohen was a senior equity analyst at Merrill Lynch focusing on property and casualty insurance companies, including AIG. Tr. 3544-45. His clients included institutional investors such as hedge funds, pension funds, and mutual funds. Tr. 3546. 13 . In reaching this conclusion, the Court also notes that a misstatement is material so long as investors would consider the misstated facts significant in making investment decisions, even if investors would consider other information to be more important. See Gemi-no, 228 F.3d at 162 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Reyes, No. 06-00556-1, 2007 Holdings: 0: holding that no remand is necessary  where no additional facts need be developed and any district court decision of the issue would be reviewed de novo 1: holding that to rebut presumption plaintiff need only allege specific facts not plead evidence 2: holding that nature and occasion of offenses are facts inherent in convictions and those facts need not be alleged in indictment or submitted to jury 3: holding appellate court need not address issues unnecessary to its decision 4: holding an investment decision need not hinge on misstated facts


Input: competing motion for summary judgment. We overrule Faucette and Schadler’s first issue. Damages for Breach of Option Contract In their second issue, Faucette and Schadler contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove damages for breach of contract. They argue that Grace was awarded what she would have received from the sale of the remaining shares of Sarco without any evidence of the value of the shares she should have surrendered in the transaction. According to Faucette and Schadler, proper proof of damages required not only evidence of the amount Grace would have received had the sale of the shares been performed, but also evidence of the value of the shares she would have surrendered in the transaction. See Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207, 215 (Tex.2002) (<HOLDING>); Holt Atherton Indus. Inc. v. Heine, 835 Holdings: 0: holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue 1: recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach 2: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach 3: holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach 4: holding damage award resulting from a breach of an agreement to purchase securities is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the asset at the time of the breach


Input: 223, 230 (Mo.1982)(en banc) (“Notice and an opportunity to be heard must be provided by the state in a meaningful manner prior to deprivation of a protected interest. This rule is not necessarily applied when there is a temporary taking, as is the case here. Due process is a flexible concept.”) (citations omitted); see also State v. Doe, 46 Conn.Supp. 598, 765 A.2d 518, 523-29 (2000) (concluding defendant had not been prejudiced by issuance of initial protective order without an attorney where he had the order modified with the aid of counsel). Notably, appellate courts from other jurisdictions have held that statutes similar to this state’s Protection from Domestic Abuse Act are not violative of due process. See, e.g., Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 803 So.2d 413, 417-19 (La.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Kampf v. Kampf, 237 Mich.App. 377, 603 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that there are two standards in review of orders on motions to vacate defaults simple abuse of discretion for orders denying relief and gross abuse of discretion for orders granting relief 1: holding that protective orders in the landlord and tenant branch are distinguishable from ordinary prejudgment security devices because protective orders are not statutory creations and because a tenant who fails to pay a protective order may suffer the irreparable consequence of losing possession of the property 2: holding that mere neglect for prisoners safety does not amount to a substantive due process violation implying that intent to do harm would be an abuse of government power and amount to a substantive due process violation 3: holding that in similar factual situation no due process violation occurred 4: holding no due process violation with respect to hearings for protective orders against domestic abuse


Input: requires tha ion the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.”). The same is true under federal law. See United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir.2002) (compiling cases); United States v. Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110, 1119 (3d Cir.1992) ("For parole and probation revocations, the Guidelines specify that the original sentence and the sentence imposed after probation is revoked are added and counted as if they were one sentence.”). 4 . In subsequent cases, we noted that this exception to mootness only applies where a “personal liberty interest is at stake.” Matter of Kulp Foundry, Inc., 691 F.2d 1125, 1129 (3d Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). There can be no question, however, that a Holdings: 0: recognizing that under puerto rico law res judicata may not apply if  public policy demands an exception but noting that this exception was successfully argued in only two cases and concluding that public policy does not demand an exception in this case 1: holding that the exception does not apply to osha inspection cases 2: holding that alleyne does not apply to cases on collateral review 3: recognizing exception 4: holding report to authorities for violating osha does not qualify as protected activity under title vii