Input: as an injunction is set forth in Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 85, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), and it requires a litigant requesting appeal to show: (1) that the order has the practical effect of an injunction; and (2) that the order might have “serious, perhaps irreparable eonsequence[s].” As demonstrated in our discussion of the third Cohen factor, supra, this is not a situation where Landise will suffer irreparable consequences. However, we need not reach the Carson test because this court has held that prejudgment security devices “generally have been expressly excluded from the definition of an injunction for appeal purposes and thus are subject to appeal only to the extent they fall within the Cohen collateral order doctrine.” McQueen, 547 A.2d at 177 (<HOLDING>). Cf. Cohen v. Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Holdings: 0: holding no due process violation with respect to hearings for protective orders against domestic abuse 1: holding that protective orders in the landlord and tenant branch are distinguishable from ordinary prejudgment security devices because protective orders are not statutory creations and because a tenant who fails to pay a protective order may suffer the irreparable consequence of losing possession of the property 2: holding expired child abuse protective order not moot because of possible effect on future custody determinations 3: holding that trial courts denial of defendants motion seeking a qualified protective order allowing defendants to question the patientplaintiffs health care providers about any and all medical care she received during a threemonth period was not an abuse of discretion because the qualified protective order was not sufficiently tailored to limit the defendants to discussing only the medical conditions at issue in the litigation when the plaintiffs complaint involved only the cause extent treatment and consequences of the patients wound 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it modified a protective order after settlement to permit public access to pretrial materials in spite of a protective order to the contrary which it viewed as having had been initially justified


Input: he is removed; his appointment is voidable, not void.”). CONCLUSION ¶ 21 For these reasons, we vacate the superior court’s order granting Progressive’s motion and dismissing the complaint. This matter is remanded for further proceedings. CONCURRING: PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Presiding Judge and PATRICIA A. OROZCO, Judge. 1 . The complaint names George Pop as the defendant. Duncan has not amended the complaint to substitute the Estate of George Pop for George Pop. Progressive, however, has not contested the propriety of the complaint and it has proceeded as though the Estate of Pop is a named defendant. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we assume that the complaint is sufficient as against Pop's estate. See Pargman v. Vickers, 208 Ariz. 573, 575, ¶4, 96 P.3d 571, 573 (App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 25(a) (allowing substitution Holdings: 0: holding that as a matter of law claim stated in amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint 1: holding that when a plaintiff mistakenly sues a decedent and not the decedents estate and seeks to recover only against insurance proceeds if the decedents insurer had notice of the action and knowledge of the plaintiffs mistake within the period specified by rule 15c an amended complaint will relate back to the date of the original complaint absent any prejudice to the insurer and the estate and assuming the other requirements of rule 15c are met 2: holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations 3: holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate 4: holding that plaintiffs amended complaint could not relate back because there was no evidence in the record that the defendant had notice of the suit within the 120 day period required by rule 4m


Input: 28 (2d Cir.1991). A. The Civil Rights Claims Legal Aid argues that plaintiffs allegations concerning the violation of his civil rights by Legal Aid should be dismissed on the ground that Legal Aid has not acted under color of state law, as required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff pleading a claim under § 1983 need allege only that “some person acting under color of state law deprived the claimant of a federal right.” Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1016 (2d Cir.1983) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980)). Legal Aid is correct, as far as it goes, that the Second Circuit expressly has ruled that Legal Aid is not a state actor. Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that although legal aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume it is a private institution in no manner under state or city supervision or control 1: holding that state action is present when the state exercises coercive power over is entwined in the management or control of or provides significant encouragement either overt or covert to a private actor 2: holding that new york city agencies cannot be sued 3: holding that there is no private right of action against a state governmental entity for violations of the texas constitution 4: recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state


Input: on this point, that portion of Hilson’s sentence is vacated and the case remanded to the district court only for its consideration as to whether Hilson should be resen-tenced to a lesser term of supervision. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (allowing sentencing judge to impose supervised release term of at least three years for possession crimes where defendant had less than 28 grams of cocaine base). 3. Apprendi Error Hilson argues that, insofar as the district court found him to have trafficked in more than 28 grams of crack, the amount necessary to trigger a mandatory minimum under the FSA, it violated his Sixth Amendment rights as construed in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. See Alleyne v. United States, — U.S.—, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (<HOLDING>). Because Hilson failed to raise any such Holdings: 0: holding that other than fact of prior conviction any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt 1: holding any fact other than prior conviction that increases statutory mandatory minimum is element of offense that must be submitted to jury and found beyond reasonable doubt 2: holding that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that any fact that increases mandatory minimum is element that must be proved beyond reasonable doubt 4: holding any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an element that must be submitted to the jury


Input: samples, an alteration in the RCD limit initially proposed of 1.0 mg/m3 limit to the 1.5 mg/m3 limit actually adopted, and the introduction of “excessive concentration values” or ECVs. There remains, no doubt, a difference of opinion between the industry and MSHA about the costs associated with making the adjustments necessary to remedy violations, especially those that require the repair or replacement of faulty equipment. But such differences of opinion are hardly fatal to the Rule. As long as MSHA considers, as it has, the concerns of the industry and has supplied a reasoned view as to why it prefers the view of its own experts, we cannot hold that its decision is arbitrary and capricious. See Fla. Manufactured Hous. Ass’n, Inc. v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1580 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Here, MSHA has reasoned that most such Holdings: 0: recognizing that a district courts review is limited to the agency record submitted and that no de novo evidentiary hearing is permitted 1: holding that an agency is entitled to rely on the cost estimates calculated by its own engineering staff rather than the figures submitted by the industrys trade association where our review of the record does not indicate that the agencys projections are either flawed or unreasonable 2: holding that evidence not submitted to the district court cannot be part of the record on appeal 3: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 4: holding that internal agency memoranda are presumptively part of the record on review subject to any privilege the agency might claim one of which is of course that which protects internal memoranda embodying the deliberative processes of the agency and its staff


Input: the government. Thus, impugning the integrity of the Prince is the same as impugning the integrity ons grounded in personal disputes because “without a firm footing in one of the five protected bases, asylum law offers no succor.” Marquez, 105 F.3d at 380-81 (concluding that a commercial dispute with a Philippine military officer was “apolitical”); see also Silva v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2005) (rejecting an asylum claim based on the applicant’s whistle-blowing against a corrupt employer as “essentially a personal dispute”); Marku v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 982, 986 (6th Cir.2004) (“Evidence must be presented which suggests that the applicant was persecuted on account of or because of the political opinion.” (emphasis in original)); Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Huaman-Cornelio v. BIA, 979 F.2d 995, 1000 Holdings: 0: holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes 1: holding that the employer was not the insurers agent 2: holding that a clerical employee was not an agent authorized to accept service of process for the corporation 3: holding that a dispute with a bulgarian secret service agent over employment was personal not political 4: holding that rule 45b does not require personal service


Input: should receive the death penalty, ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) further provides: “In determining the issue in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection, the court shall instruct the jury to answer the question ‘no’ if one or more of the jurors find there is any aspect of the defendant’s character or background, or any circumstance of the offense, that one or more of the jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.” The testimony offered by defendant in this case cannot be said to relate to the circumstances of the offense. Thus, in order to be relevant, the evidence must be relevant to “any aspect of the defendant’s character or background * * * that one or more * * * jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.” See State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 254, 906 P2d 272 (1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Stevens, 319 Or at 579 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding defense counsel was ineffective at sentencing when he failed to make a significant effort based on reasonable investigation and logical argument to ably present the defendants fate to the jury and to focus the attention of the jury on any mitigating factors 1: holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded 2: holding counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence 3: holding that focus of ors 1631501bd is on mitigating evidence 4: holding that counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a particular mitigating factor where despite a reasonable investigation by counsel counsel was not put on notice of any such mitigating evidence


Input: that the defendant was less culpable than most other participants in [his] relevant conduct. Id. The district court did not clearly err in denying Lopez-Moreno a role reduc tion because (1) he was only held accountable for the quantity of drugs related to his role in the offense, (2) the quantity of drugs involved supported the court’s finding that he was not a minor participant, and (3) he failed to produce any evidence in support of his mitigating role. See De Varon, 175 F.3d at 939, 941, 943. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue. IV. Booker Reasonableness (Arias only) We review sentences imposed under the post-Booker advisory Guideline scheme for reasonableness. United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir.2005); Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-63, 125 S.Ct. at 765-66 (<HOLDING>). Following the Booker decision, we have held Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court review sentences for unreasonableness in light of the  3553a factors 1: holding that the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors 2: recognizing that many of the  3553a factors are already incorporated into any guidelines determination and the  3553a factors can themselves overlap 3: holding that sentence is reasonable when the district court properly addresses sentencing factors of  3553a 4: holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors


Input: 153, 156 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.], writ denied); Terra Int'l Inc., 829 S.W.2d at 273; Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686-87 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 28 . 852 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied). 29 . Id. at 256. 30 . Id. at 254. 31 . To the extent that the Dallas Court’s analysis of "property damage” does relate to the misrepresentation claims, we disagree with it. Also, while we do not address the issue, we note that the Ninth Circuit has held that an insured's policy provides no coverage even if tort claims are alleged, as long as the claims, as here, are based on a contract. Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir.1991). 32 . See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Brewer, 914 F.Supp. 140, 142-43 (S.D.Miss.1996) (<HOLDING>); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 806 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations 1: holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage 2: holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did 3: holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed 4: holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee


Input: In contrast to the previous category, the Court’s conclusion follows not from Weintraub ’s holding, but rather from its rationale. Many of the complaints in this category were explicitly lodged by plaintiffs (sometimes with others) as committee members. Moreover, all of the complaints contended that McDuffie was undermining the committee process. These facts demonstrate that plaintiffs’ complaints were “undertaken in the course of performing” their responsibilities as committee members; that is, they were “part-and-parcel” of plaintiffs’ concerns about their ability to properly execute their duties as faculty members elected to, and serving on, various committee. Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 203; accord Ezuma v. City Univ. of N.Y., 665 F.Supp.2d 116, 129-30 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (Co gan, J.) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 367 Fed.Appx. 178, 2010 WL 605732 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that restatement  2191 is inapplicable to alleged sexual harassment by a supervisor was sexual harassment within the scope of antonis employment of course not 1: holding that harassment of women working alongside plaintiff was relevant to question of creation of environment viola tive of title vii  although vinson was a sexual harassment case the principles underlying a hostile environment theory are equally applicable in sexual harassment and racial harassment cases 2: holding that an employer must remedy situation of sexual harassment 3: holding that professors reports of sexual harassment were wholly referable to the performance of his official functions as department chair 4: holding that sexual harassment is a personal injury tort


Input: the right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974) (classifying contempt to determine whether the contemnor enjoyed the right to a jury trial). In such cases, the Supreme Court has noted that “the severity of the penalty actually imposed is the best indication of the seriousness of a particular offense.” Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). The Court notes that the actual sentence imposed and the final guideline range are not the same; however, in this unusual context, the final guideline range is a closer benchmark to the sentence imposed than the offense guideline without the applicable adjustments. Cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (<HOLDING>). If the Court adopts the latter approach of Holdings: 0: holding that a court of appeals may afford a presumption of reasonableness to a withinguidelines sentence 1: holding a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the sentencing guidelines 2: holding that district court may not presume reasonableness of guidelines sentencing range in particular case 3: holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range 4: holding that a court of appeals may presume reasonable a district courts proper application of the sentencing guidelines


Input: memorandum, at 4-5 n. 5 (Pa.Super. filed October 17, 2007) (“Reed II”). This Court has explained that “[w]here a decision rests on two or more grounds equally valid, none may be relegated to the inferior status of obiter dictum.” Commonwealth v. Swing, 409 Pa. 241, 245, 186 A.2d 24, 26 (1962). In the instant case, while the Superior Court in Reed I determined that Reed’s claims were waived, it also determined that even if the claims had not been waived, they were without merit, and the court explained the basis for its conclusions. Thus, the Superior Court’s holding in Reed I that Reed’s claim regarding the admission of prior bad acts testimony was meritless was a valid holding that constitutes the law of the case, see Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 578, 664 A.2d 1326, 1333 (1995) (<HOLDING>), constraining the Court in Reed II. However, Holdings: 0: holding law of case doctrine is not absolute rule that must be inexorably followed in every case 1: holding that the law of the case doctrine is not a fixed rule that prevents a federal court from determining the question of its own subject matter jurisdiction in a given case 2: holding law of case doctrine is procedural and does not go to jurisdiction of court 3: holding that the coordinate jurisdiction rule and all its attendant meanings and limitations expressed in previous case law would be assumed into law of the case doctrine 4: holding that application of the doctrine of law of the case is discretionary and that a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine only if 1 the first decision was clearly erroneous 2 an intervening change in the law occurred 3 the evidence on remand was substantially different 4 other changed circumstances exist or 5 a manifest injustice would otherwise result


Input: matter of state law. And because “the highest state court is the final authority on state law,” Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940), and further because “no federal court interpreting California law could change the California Supreme Court’s [ruling on an issue],” this Court cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly contradicting California Supreme Court authority. Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 546 (C.D.Cal.2012); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (noting that the United States Supreme Court “repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Sen’s., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). In Ahmed, the plaintiff was hired to work as Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts are bound by state interpretations of state law 1: holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law 2: holding that our courts are bound by the united states supreme courts interpretation of the federal constitution 3: recognizing that federal courts are bound by pronouncements of the california supreme court on applicable state law 4: holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law


Input: affirmed by the district court and by this Court with specific reference to the fact that the settlement would not be permitted to extinguish Aetna’s rights. Under the circumstances, we understand the acceptance of the settlement to constitute the requisite “full payment” of the DOL claims within the meaning of § 509(c). D. The Government’s Argument on Appeal In its brief to this Court, the government—essentially agreeing with our finding that a common law right of setoff exists— “concluded that the basis upon which the district court reached its decision in this case ... was incorrect.” Nonetheless, the government urges us to affirm the decision of the district court on an alternative basis. See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 343 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citation Holdings: 0: holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports 1: holding that an appellate court may affirm the result reached by a district court on alternative grounds 2: holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds 3: holding that despite a trial courts failure to make specific factual findings an appellate court is free to affirm on any grounds for which there is sufficient record to permit conclusions of law 4: holding that an appellate court can affirm a district courts order on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law including grounds upon which the district court did not rely


Input: inherent power “to curb abuses and promote a fair process.” Richardson, 76 Hawai'i at 507, 880 P.2d at 182. Accordingly, we reverse the ICA’s ruling that the trial court abused its discretion in giving the instruction. B. Ford’s Supplemental Document Productions Ford also challenges the ICA’s reversal of the trial court’s partial denial of plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Ford’s supplemental production of documents. Preliminarily, plaintiffs styled their request as a “motion in limine,” but based it on the rules of discovery. We thus construe the motion as a request for discovery sanctions, the denial of which we review under an abuse of discretion standard. See Kawamata Farms, 86 Hawai'i at 241, 948 P.2d at 1082. See also Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 244 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). In their motion, plaintiffs cited HRCP Rule Holdings: 0: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard 1: holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard 2: holding that the less deferential skidmore standard was a more appropriate standard to be applied to an agencys unpublished opinion 3: recognizing that the interaction of general constitutional rules governing pretrial identification procedures and the deferential standard of habeas review affords significant discretion to the state court 4: recognizing the rock solid basis for such a deferential standard of review


Input: process, they had “at most, a generalized grievance shared by all Michigan residents alike,” and thus lacked the s tute, the Supreme. Court has held that a plaintiff satisfies the injury requirement of standing by alleging “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and [that] there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2342, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (<HOLDING>). The mere possibility of prosecution, however Holdings: 0: holding that law firm who was plaintiffs adversary in foreclosure proceeding owed no duty to plaintiffs as law firm could not have expected that plaintiffs would rely on law firms representations about payoff amounts 1: holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance 2: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 3: holding that when plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to a law it must be established that there are no set of circumstances under which the law would be valid 4: holding that one of the plaintiffs had standing to challenge a discriminatory zoning law where an injunction against the law would have produced at least a substantial probability warth 422 us at 504 95 sct 2197 that the plaintiffs desired housing project would materialize


Input: attempt to avoid the effect of a judgment offered as a link in the chain of title in a suit to try the title to property. See In re A.L.H.C., 49 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Tex.App.Dallas 2001, pet. denied). SOS Alliance argues that its attempt to set aside the 2004 judgment can be considered a collateral attack on the judgment. We disagree. This proceeding was instituted for the sole purpose of declaring the 2004 judgment void, and in the same district court in which exas Supreme Court’s holding with respect to what constitutes a collateral attack. See Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 345-46 (defining collateral attack as made in “a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment”); see also Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Tex.1985) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). In accordance with supreme court precedent, Holdings: 0: holding that bill of review is exclusive remedy on direct attack where court had jurisdictional power even if judgment void 1: holding that the meritorious defense requirement in a bill of review proceeding violates due process where the bill of review plaintiff has no notice of the proceeding in which the default judgment was rendered 2: holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions 3: recognizing collateral attack on void order 4: holding that bill of review brought in wrong court constitutes collateral attack


Input: As the only entity with power to enforce the remedy, the Panel concluded that the SEC had standing as a creditor in the bankruptcy case to request a dischargeability determination because that agency was the only entity that could enforce the right to payment. Cross, 218 B.R. at 79. Based upon the Court’s research, it seems fair to observe that “[m]ost courts that have addressed the issue ... [conclude] that any time a governmental entity has a right of action against a debtor, the governmental entity is a creditor as defined under the Bankruptcy Code.” AARP v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 269 B.R. 428, 435 (C.D.Cal.2001) (citing additional authority). See also Nathanson v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 344 U.S. 25, 27, 73 S.Ct. 80, 97 L.Ed. 23 (1952) (<HOLDING>). This Court concurs in this approach. If, in Holdings: 0: holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act 1: holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board 2: holding that unemployment compensation should not be deducted from a back pay award under the national labor relations act because failing to deduct unemployment payments does not make the employee more than whole 3: holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act 4: holding that the nlrb was a creditor within the meaning of the code because it had been granted the power to enforce the national labor relations act even though a back pay award was made to individual workers not to the government


Input: plaintiffs did not know definitively whether MidAtlantic would actually operate as a division of U.S. Airways when the December 2002 agreement was executed, they did know or reasonably should have known that the terms of employment provided therein were negotiated irrespective of MidAtlantic’s corporate form. In other words, the agreement provided plaintiffs actual notice that defendants had rendered a significant bargaining point as to the corporate form as irrelevant and that AFA had taken a negotiating position adverse to their interests. See Palancia v. Roosevelt Raceway, Inc., 551 F.Supp. 549, 553 (E.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd mem., 742 F.2d 1432 (2d Cir.1983) (“[U]nion members are charged with knowledge of the contents of their collective bargaining agreement.”); Ramey, 378 F.3d at 278 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs essentially ask the court to toll Holdings: 0: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 1: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 2: holding that the plaintiffs acted on behalf of all union members and reimbursing the attorneys fees from the union treasury such that all union members in effect equally contributed to the costs of litigation 3: holding that the breach occurs when the union acts against the interest of its members 4: recognizing union members vital concern in preserving jobs for union members


Input: serving for the April 1986 conviction. Little’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See United States v. Wingate, 854 F.2d 1318, 1988 WL 83334 (4th Cir. Aug.4, 1988) (unpublished). Since then, Little has filed numerous motions seeking post-conviction relief. Although an extensive review of Little’s endeavors is unnecessary, it suffices to note that the district court found the Rule 35(a) motion giving rise to this appeal, filed on June 17, 2002, was Little’s seventh attempt at post-conviction relief. Little’s Rule 35(a) motion alleged (1) that his convictions and sentences for both Count One and Count Forty in 1987 were “illegal” within the meaning of Rule 35(a) in light of Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 307, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996) (<HOLDING>); and (2) that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Holdings: 0: holding conviction for cce murder 21 usc  848e1 is a separate offense from a cce 21 usc  848c 1: holding that conspiracy is lesserincluded offense of cce 2: holding that convictions for the crimes of conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise violate double jeopardy 3: holding that double jeopardy precluded conviction for both conspiracy and engaging in a cce when the conspiracy was used to prove the cce 4: holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges


Input: in Mem’l Hosp.-West Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corp., 729 So. 2d 373, 379 (Fla. 1999), the Florida Supreme Court held that a lessee running a hospital on behalf of a public authority responsible for public services was a public agency under Florida law. The court agreed with the Florida district court of appeal that the totality of factors test mandated by Schwab indicated that when the government transferred the responsibilities of a public health authority to a private entity, the state’s sunshine requirements should continue to apply to that entity and that, therefore, open government mandates dictated that reporters must be allowed to attend hospital meetings. Id. at 379-82; see B & S Utils., Inc. v. Baskerville-Donovan, Inc., 988 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Dade Aviation Consultants v. Knight Ridder, Holdings: 0: holding that the fact that the city had delegated its municipal engineering functions to a private entity was dispositive in establishing that documents generated by the private entity were public records 1: holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception 2: holding that the crucial distinction that rendered the public entity liable for a private actors inaccessibility was that the public entity had contracted with the private actor for it to provide aid benefits or services to beneficiaries of the public entitys redevelopment program 3: holding that land dedicated for a public street may not be leased to a private entity for private use 4: holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver


Input: precise issue has held likewise. The Eighth Circuit, in In re Kline, 65 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir.1995), specifically considered whether holdings under the prior Act remained vital under the Code. The Kline court held that “the statute continues to except from discharge attorney fees, even if payable to an attorney rather than to a former spouse, if su 3), the Fifth Circuit considered the dischargeability of a child’s guardian ad litem fees and an ex-spouse’s attorney’s fees in a custody proceeding following a divorce. Noting that the hearing for which the fees were incurred was “clearly for [the child]’s benefit and support,” the court held that a court-ordered obligation to pay the fees was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(5). Id.; see also In re Hudson, 107 F.3d 355, 357 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit, the first to consider Holdings: 0: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case 1: holding that in a chapter 7 case postpetition interest on a nondischargeable tax claim is also nondischargeable 2: holding that  4314123 specifically allows for attorney fees in paternity and child support cases 3: holding that a debt for attorney fees incurred by an exspouse in a postjudgment divorce contempt proceeding was nondischargeable 4: holding nondischargeable attor neys fees owed directly to an attorney from a paternity suit


Input: State v. Welke, 298 Minn. 402, 216 N.W.2d 641 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462, 323 A.2d 489 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. Bryant, 285 N.C. 27, 203 S.E. 2d 27, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974, 95 S.Ct. 238, 42 L.Ed.2d 188 (1974); State v. Watkins, 262 S.C. 178, 203 S.E.2d 429 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 911, 94 S.Ct. 3204, 41 L.Ed.2d 1157 (1974); West v. State, 514 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949, 94 S.Ct. 3217, 41 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1974) (semble) (may have been applying pre-Miller construction); State ex rel. Chobot v. Circuit Court, 61 Wis.2d 354, 212 N.W.2d 690 (1973). 16 . Commonwealth v. Winkleman, 230 Pa.Super. 265, 326 A.2d 496 (1974) (<HOLDING>). The statute held unconstitutional in Holdings: 0: holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect 1: holding that although probation statute was repealed by sentencing reform act old provision continued to apply to offenses which occurred before effective date of act nov 1 1987 2: holding that 1972 amendments had no effect on persons not covered by the act 3: holding that section 211a of the act commonly known as the parole act act of august 6 1941 added by section 5 of the act of august 24 1951 pl 1401 as amended formerly 61 ps  33121aa repealed by the act of august 11 2009 pl 147 providing that a convicted parole violator forfeits all the time spent at liberty on parole similar language can be found at section 6138 of the prisons and parole code 61 pa cs 6138a2 was not subject to the rule of lenity because that section did not define elements of a crime but defines the ramifications when an individual who was on parole from a prior crime is convicted of committing a new crime 4: holding unconstitutional act of june 24 1939 pl 872  528 as amended formerly codified as 18 ps  4528 repealed by act of december 6 1972 pl 1605 no 334  5


Input: from trying to steal a march on each other, In re Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir.1982), and the automatic stay is essential to accomplishing this purpose. There is, in contrast, no policy of preventing persons whom the bankrupt has sued from protecting their legal rights. True, the bankrupt’s cause of action is an asset of the estate; but as the defendant in the bankrupt’s suit is not by opposing that suit, seeking to take possession of it, subsection (a)(3) is no more applicable that (a)(1) is. Martin-Trigona v. Champion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1989). Accord, United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467, 1473 (D.C.Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1048, 112 S.Ct. 913, 116 L.Ed.2d 813 (1992); Merchants & Farmers Bank of 10, 522-523 (Bankr.D.S.C.2014) (<HOLDING>). The Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss Holdings: 0: holding that a state is immune by virtue of 11 usc  106c from money damages for violating the automatic stay provision of 11 usc  362a 1: holding that the plaintiffs  5629 action against the defendant for alleged fraudulent transfers was subject to the automatic stay provision 11 usc  362a 2: holding that the protections of the automatic stay apply only to actions against the debtor 3: holding that debtor did not prove that defendant creditors violated automatic stay under 11 usc  362a with respect to their actions in a state court lawsuit because the creditors actions involved a counterclaim that debtor asserted and were in response to that counterclaim 4: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc  1367a


Input: S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984), the Court considered a cell search challenged by a pretrial detainee. While Hudson does not mention Bell’s Fourth Amendment assumption, Block specifically affirms it with regard to pretrial detainee cell searches. Block, 468 U.S. at 586, 104 5.Ct. 8227 (upholding Bell’s conclusion that prison cell searches do not violate pretrial detainees’ presumed Fourth Amendment rights). The majority of circuit courts that have considered the relationship between Hudson and Bell have limited Hudson to cell searches and have held, either explicitly or implicitly, that Hudson did not disturb Bell’s Fourth Amendment approach to analyzing the constitutionality of strip searches conducted in custodial settings. See Elliott v. Lynn, 38 F.3d 188, 191 n. 3 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Watsy v. Ames, No. 87-1660, 1988 WL 24978, at Holdings: 0: holding sbm is not a violation of the defendants fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 1: holding that a reasonable suspicion requirement for searches and seizures on the high seas survives fourth amendment scrutiny 2: holding that inmates fourth amendment protection from unreasonable strip searches survives hudson 3: holding strip searches conducted in the station house without reasonable suspicion that minor offenders had possession of contraband are unreasonable and violate the fourth amendment 4: holding that policy requiring strip searches of prisoners prior to transfer did not violate fourth amendment


Input: who are alleged to be vicariously liable. The plaintiffs point out, if the first sentence of the exclusion is interpreted to be all-inclusive, the second sentence is superfluous. In light of the insurer’s duty to define “exclusionary clauses in clear and explicit terms,” Homick, 511 N.W.2d at 374, we doubt that the clarifying language of the second sentence could properly be considered superfluous. In any event, notwithstanding our desire to interpret a policy so as not to render any part superfluous, “we will not do so when that [interpretation] is inconsistent with the structure and format of the [provision] and' when that [interpretation] is otherwise unreasonable.” Kibbee, 525 N.W.2d at 869. In the named driver exclusion, the fi ion does not create an ambiguity. See id. at 1234 (<HOLDING>). To the contrary, the second sentence confirms Holdings: 0: holding exclusion was not ambiguous 1: holding exclusion was harmless error 2: holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous exclusion applied to all coverage afforded by the policy including the um coverage 3: holding similar regulatory exclusion is not ambiguous and rejecting secondary suit construction 4: holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion


Input: Rossi’s affidavit would be admissible at trial and whether Mr. Rossi would be competent to testify about it. For all the Court knows from Mr. Rossi’s affidavit, the information contained in it is based upon rank speculation and fourth-hand hearsay. While Mr. Rossi’s counsel contended at oral argument that in opposing summary judgment, Mr. Rossi had no burden to show that the information contained in his affidavit would be admissible at trial, Mr. Rossi’s counsel is plainly wrong. See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 219 (“Rule 56(e)’s requirement ... means that an affidavit’s hearsay assertion that would not be admis sible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.”); Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.Bd 155, 160 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). See also Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that hearsay statement did not constitute competent evidence and thus could not be considered in opposition to motion for summary judgment 1: holding that a signed but unsworn letter which is not otherwise authenticated is hearsay and should not be considered as evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 2: recognizing motion to strike as proper vehicle for evaluating objectionable hearsay evidence in opposition papers to summary judgment motion 3: holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived 4: holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment


Input: to treat Kyler as a boy precisely because of his gender non-conformance. In fact, the Complaint alleges that one RCHSD employee told him, “Honey, I would call you ‘he,’ but you’re such a pretty girl.” (Compl. ¶ 44.) Accord ingly, Ms. Prescott’s claim on behalf of Kyler survives under the ACA . it Standing RCHSD argues that Ms. Prescott lacks standing to assert a section 1557 claim on her own behalf because she is not an aggrieved party. However, as Ms. Prescott has noted, she is not bringing the claim on her behalf, but instead on behalf of Kyler. While Ms. Prescott is unable to bring a claim as an individual, she certainly can bring the claim on behalf of Kyler within her representative capacity. See Lopez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 5 F.Supp.3d 1106, 1114-1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (<HOLDING>). Hi. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under Holdings: 0: holding that while parents may not bring a title ix claim as individuals they may bring such claim on behalf of a deceased child 1: recognizing that because parents have a constitutional right to direct their childrens education organization has standing to bring claim on behalf of parents 2: holding that plaintiff had standing to bring a rico conspiracy claim despite his inability to bring a substantive rico claim 3: holding that a claim for damages exists in an action to enforce title ix 4: holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under title ix


Input: disclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Speech involves a public concern when the speaker intends to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust by a public official or to disclose any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance within a governmental entity.” Eisenhour v. Weber Cty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Den-ton’s motive was to regain his job—not to expose some wrongdoing or malfeasance. Because Denton’s arbitration testimony did not concern a matter of public interest, summary judgment in favor of defendants was appropriate. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (<HOLDING>). Association Claim The gravamen of this claim Holdings: 0: holding if an employee does not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern the employee has no first amendment cause of action based on his or her employers reaction to the speech 1: holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern 2: holding that an employee engages in protected activity under the first amendment when he threatens to file a lawsuit on a matter of public concern 3: holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation 4: holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern


Input: to render an informed decision on the claim”); see also Cullens, 14 Vet.App. at 237 (noting burden on Secretary to prove substantial justification in administrative and litigation positions); Evans v. West, 12 Vet.App. 22, 31 (1998) (Court will give no consideration to a “vague assertion” or an “unsupported contention”). Moreover, as noted by Mrs. Padgett, the Secretary failed to take any position on the Court’s “cleai'ly erroneous” standard of review at the administrative stage of the proceedings, but rather the Secretary only took such a position on the issue after the Board rendered its decision and Mr. Pad-gett had filed his initial appeal to the Court. See generally Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 146, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 113 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Based on the totality of the circumstances, Holdings: 0: holding that agency litigating positions are not entitled to judicial deference when they are merely posthoc rationalizations for agency action and are advanced for the first time on appeal 1: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 2: holding that a longstanding agency interpretation was no longer entitled to chevron deference given that the agency had changed its position on the issue 3: holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law 4: holding that deference to an agency interpretation is not appropriate where a statute is administered by more than one agency


Input: parents. See Carol Amadio & Stuart L. Deutsch, Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted Children to “Stay in Touch” with Blood Relatives, 22 J.Fam.L. 59, 60 (1983-84); see also B. Lee Phillips, Note, Open Adoption: A New Look at Adoption Practice and Policy in Texas, 43 Baylor L.Rev. 407, 409 (noting that open-adoption policy of Texas is not “legally sanctioned process”). See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Postadoption Visitation by Natural Parents, 78 A.L.R. 4th 219 (1990 & Supp.1993) (reviewing post-adoption visitation cases). A few New Jersey courts have considered post-adoption visitation in adoption agreements between a biological parent and another biological parent, step-parent, or grandparent. See, e.g., Kattermann v. DiPiazza, 151 N.J.Super. 209, 376 A.2d 955 (App. Div.1977) (<HOLDING>); F., supra, 170 N.J.Super. at 425, 406 A.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing that postadoption visitation limited to when adoptive parents are grandparents siblings or foster parents 1: holding that postadoption visitation of child who was adopted by grandparents on basis of biological parents unconditional consent was required to promote childs best interests 2: holding that biological grandparents were statutory strangers to children following their adoption by stepfather statute authorizing grandparent visitation violated parents constitutional right to privacy 3: holding that publicagency adoption termination of mentallyill biological parents rights that mandated visitation between biological parent and child inappropriate because applicable termination statutes spoke in absolute terms noting however that continued contact between biological parent and child possible on voluntary basis without court order 4: holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parents choice except where the choice is plainly contrary to a childs best interests


Input: intervene. See Hawaii-Pacific Venture Capital Corp. v. Rothbard, 564 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir.1977). If the appellants’ only interest in the present case was to ensure that the MTCA would have sufficient resources to satisfy any judgment they may be able to obtain in the territorial court action, the district court’s reasoning and conclusion would be sound. The district court’s holding, however, does not recognize that the appellants claim an interest in a specific fund being held in the district court’s registry. While a mere economic interest may be insufficient to support the right to intervene, an intervenor’s interest in a specific fund is sufficient to entitle intervention in a case affecting that fund. See, e.g., Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52, 53-54 (5th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>); Hardy-Latham v. Wellons, 415 F.2d 674 (4th Holdings: 0: holding contingency fee cases commenced prior to dissolution are assets of the firm 1: holding that insurance defense law firm did not have nearpermanent relationship with its clients 2: holding that law firm was liable for restitution of contingency fee but not of other noncontingent fees following vacatur of judgment 3: holding that workers compensation insurer was required to intervene in injured employees tort action to protect and enforce its subrogation lien and could not file a separate action 4: holding that a law firm could intervene in a former clients action to protect its interest in its contingency fee


Input: 229 S.W.3d 415, 434 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). To prevail in a forc ible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. However, where the right to immediate possession necessarily requires resolution of a title dispute, a justice court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment. Id. Accordingly, a justice court is not deprived of jurisdiction merely by the existence of a title dispute; it is deprived of jurisdiction only if resolution of a title dispute is a prerequisite to determination of the right to immediate possession. See id.', cf. Dass, Inc. v. Smith, 206 S.W.3d 197, 200-01 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). It has been long settled in Texas Holdings: 0: holding that some special relationship between the parties is required to recover under the theory of negligent misrepresentation 1: holding that a duty of care may arise out of a contractual relationship between two parties 2: holding that where relationship between parties was one of buyerseller rather than lessorlessee determination of right to immediate possession of property necessarily required resolution of title dispute and jurisdiction lay in district court 3: holding where the commonwealth is not in possession of property in question petition for return of property is moot 4: holding that immediate right to appeal lies from denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction


Input: reach retirement age and payments to survivors upon the death of the insured. This was the original name for the retirement and death benefits established by the Social Security Act of 1935. As the scope of these benefits expanded, the name changed to Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), and then to Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance (OASDHI). Today, the system is most often referred to as Social Security. Black’s Law Dictionary 1260 (10th ed.2014). Moreover, since its enactment, we have consistently construed the offset provision to refer to federal social security benefits. In Telle v. Northfield Iron Co., we allowed an offset for federal social security retirement benefits, but not disability benefits. 278 Minn. 129, 132, 158 N.W.2d 270, 272 (1967) (<HOLDING>). Since Telle, apart from increasing the Holdings: 0: holding that credit for social security old age and survivor benefits does not also include credit for federal disability benefits 1: holding that offset for social security retirement benefits does not include federal disability benefits and stating that there was no legislative intent to embody the entire subchapter of the social security act dealing with both disability benefits and old age benefits 2: holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits 3: holding parent entitled to credit for any social security disability benefits paid to child as a result of parents disability 4: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of social security disability benefits


Input: trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Machete’s suit without specifying the jurisdictional ground on which it relied. Machete then perfected this appeal. DISCUSSION In its first issue, Machete advancés three arguments to support its assertion that sovereign immunity did not bar its suit. First, Machete asserts that it alleged valid ultra vires claims against Page and Abbott and, as a consequence, sovereign immunity did not apply to those claims. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372-80 (Tex.2009) (explaining ultra vires exception to sovereign immuhity). Next, Machete contends that it asserted valid constitutional claims under the UDJA that are not barred by sovereign immunity. See Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>); Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Holdings: 0: recognizing that udja waives sovereign immunity in suit challenging validity of statute 1: holding that when state voluntarily submits a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding the state waives its sovereign immunity 2: recognizing that section 252061 waives immunity 3: holding that  390uu waives sovereign immunity from contract claims for injunctive relief and specific performance 4: holding that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available in the absence of a statute providing immunity to a municipal corporation in a negligence action


Input: an unrecorded mortgage using the Bankruptcy Code’s “strong arm” powers. In this case, Cerrato has not claimed that BAC’s lien on the Property was unrecorded or improperly recorded, nor would it matter since BAC’s lien had already been reduced to judgment before the filing of Cerrato’s bankruptcy. B. The Unpaid Transfer Tax New York imposes a transfer tax on the sale of real estate. See N.Y. Tax §§ 1400-1421. The transfer tax applies to a sale pursuant to a judgment of foreclosure. See N.Y. Tax § 1405 (listing exemptions to the real estate transfer tax, which do not include foreclosure sales). The obligation to pay the real estate transfer tax falls on the grantor. See N.Y. Tax § 1404. Where the grantor fails to pay the tax, the duty to pay s , 274, 654 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (<HOLDING>); Katzeff v. Cohn, 139 Misc.2d 1076, 529 Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff lacked standing after foreclosure sale to set aside the sale arid reinstate her right to redeem property based upon arguments that events surrounding the closing of the sale were improper 1: holding that plaintiffmortgagor lacked standing to enforce the terms of a foreclosure sale since there was no statutory authority allowing a mortgagor to enforce the provisions of a sale agreement when a foreclosure purchaser is in default 2: holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale 3: holding that a properly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale quiets title in the purchaser 4: holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final


Input: of this case and the record do not support a stay of adjudication. First, it is clear the district court’s decision to stay adjudication is within the court’s “inherent judicial power” when the decision is supported by “special circumstances.” Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 254-55. A clear-abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of stays of adjudication. Angotti, 633 N.W.2d at 556. Here, the district court stayed adjudication based on the fact that respondent would lose his job as a slots manager if a felony conviction were entered. We can understand the district court’s motive, but it is not at all clear that the potential loss of employment is sufficient, by itself, to support a stay of adjudication on a felony. See State v. Twiss, 570 N.W.2d 487, 487 (Minn.1997) (<HOLDING>). Importantly, the record indicates that Holdings: 0: holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits 1: holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction 2: holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss 3: holding that possibility of loss of employment due to gross misdemeanor conviction was not a special circumstance supporting stay of adjudication 4: holding that loss of an arm includes loss of the hand


Input: future flow of capital gains taxes. Whether the record supports other estimates of the value of Johnco stock is unclear. Because the Tax Court clearly erred in its approach to the discount of capital gains taxes on the Timber Property, this issue must be remanded for further consideration. B. The Family Settlement Agreement. The Estate argues that the Tax Court clearly erred in disregarding the share value set forth in Andrew and Dinah’s Family Settlement Agreement. It notes that even the Tax Court recognized that the two negotiated at arm’s length. The Estate asserts that Estate of Warren v. Comm’r, 981 F.2d 776 (5th Cir.1993), controls. “In general, comparable sales constitute the best evidence of market value.” United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 798 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). The more comparable a sale is in Holdings: 0: holding that courts should liberally construe the requirements of rule 3 1: holding that courts should liberally admit evidence of comparable sales and allow the factfinder to evaluate them 2: holding that election laws should be liberally interpreted so as to allow the candidate to stand for election 3: holding that coas should be construed liberally 4: holding that courts should employ the same analysis to evaluate claims under the ada and the wlad


Input: we need not address whether the district court could have applied a lower standard of proof in this context. 13 . See United States v. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir.2002) ("It is also a basic principle of criminal law that foreseeable negligent acts of a third party do not sever the chain of causation.”); 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12, at 408-09 (1986) (same); see also United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 749 (2d Cir.1976) ("Where such intervening events [as negligent medical treatment] are foreseeable and naturally result from a perpetrator's criminal conduct, the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken and holds the perpetrator criminally responsible for the resulting harm.”). 14 . Cf. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d at 952 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Purchess, 107 F.3d 1261, Holdings: 0: holding  841b1c which covers drug offenses is an exception to 18 usc  3583b 1: holding that drug quantity is an element of an offense under 21 usc  841 2: holding conviction for cce murder 21 usc  848e1 is a separate offense from a cce 21 usc  848c 3: holding that a failure to obtain prompt medical treatment for overdosing heroin user did not break the chain of legal causation under 21 usc  841b1c 4: holding that a defendant convicted of distributing heroin failed to satisfy  3553f5 when he refused to provide complete information regarding the immediate chain of distribution


Input: of the number of officers present. Huether also has prior experience with law enforcement — he was arrested after being questioned by law enforcement in Montana. At a minimum, these factors sh cord here supports the district court’s decision declining to suppress the evidence. Moreover, the record shows Huether, without hesitation, answered the questions relating to the materials in his computer. B. Confrontation Clause Huether contends the district court erred in admitting testimony from Agent Erickson, which repeated the conclusions of a report prepared by those at NCMEC, and testimony from Agent Helderop concerning the hard drives’ and compact discs’ origin. Huether did not raise this issue in the district court; accordingly, we re , 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2532, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) (<HOLDING>). According to Huether, Agents Erickson’s and Holdings: 0: holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment 1: holding forensic laboratory experts statement that substance was cocaine is testimonial for sixth amendment confrontation clause purposes 2: holding that the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay 3: holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements 4: holding that bureau of criminal apprehension bca laboratory report identifying a substance as cocaine was testimonial and implicated defendants right to confrontation


Input: regarding the plaintiffs ability to meet even the very general exertional requirements for sedentary work. Id. Moreover, Social Security Ruling 96-8p provides that, “[t]he RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g. laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *7, (S.S.A.). In the instant case, the ALJ failed to provide any explanation or narrative discussion as to how she determined the plaintiff retains the RFC for sedentary work. Such a finding, absent any analysis, makes it impossible for this Court to apply the substantial evidence test. Arnold v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 567 F.2d 258, 259 (4th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). The ALJ provides a detailed summary of the Holdings: 0: holding that if no evidence was presented to support the prevailing party there is no evidence upon which to apply the substantial evidence test and therefore the capricious disregard standard applies 1: holding the record must demonstrate that the alj considered all of the evidence and the alj must discuss  the evidence supporting his decision  the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon and significantly probative evidence he rejects 2: holding it is impossible to apply the substantial evidence test where the alj has failed to sufficiently explain his decision 3: holding the alj does not have to specifically refer to every piece of evidence so long as the decision is not a broad rejection that is insufficient to permit a court to conclude that the alj considered the claimants medical condition as a whole 4: holding that the substantial compliance doctrine did not apply when a fiduciary failed to issue a timely decision on claimants appeal


Input: Although we do not view each contact in isolation, occasional travel to Texas is insufficient by itself to establish general jurisdiction. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Ruiz, 355 S.W.3d 387, 410 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1874, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). Even before, the applicable- standard was clarified by the Goodyear Dunlop and Daimler cases, numerous trips to the forum state were considered inadequate to establish general jurisdiction when the trips did'not enhance the nature of the defendant’s contacts with' the-state. Helicopteros,* 466 U.S. at 418, 104 S.Ct. at 1874; accord DENSO Corp. v. Hall, 396 S.W.3d 681, 693 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2013, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The appellants did not make any allegation Holdings: 0: holding that thirteen business trips of short duration over eighteen months was not continuous and systematic solicitation of business in the state to justify general jurisdiction 1: holding there was no general jurisdiction when there was no evidence that defendants advertised or promoted their goods or services in texas solicited business in texas sold their goods or services to a texas entity established a general business office or general business presence in texas or targeted texas markets 2: holding that isolated trips to texas more than 1500000 in purchases from texas vendors and two contracts with texas entities were not substantial enough to support general jurisdiction 3: holding sending two employees to work in texas and using an office in texas for limited purposes did not support finding of general jurisdiction 4: holding that 155 trips to texas by foreign corporation personnel over a tenyear period did not support general jurisdiction because evidence did not establish a general business presence


Input: received from the account. b. If the applicant is not able to provide the amount of taxes that are due, the value shall be determined by deducting 20% from the gross value of the account. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, § 8.110.51(C); Aple. Supp. App. at 33. 3 . Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their § 1983 claim. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) ("plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court”); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(<HOLDING>). 4 . The amended complaint asserted nine Holdings: 0: holding that  1396aa8 is enforceable by medicaid recipients under  1983 1: holding the medicaid act permits enforcement under  1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures 2: holding no exhaustion requirement in  1983 suit alleging violations of the medicaid act 3: holding that there is an exhaustion requirement in  1983 suits asserting violations of the medicaid act 4: holding that patient could sue state agency under  1983 for breaching its obligation under the balance billing provision of the medicaid statute


Input: consequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated. Id. at 158. In other words, while the Constitution does grant a privilege of confronting ones accusers, that privilege is lost if the accuser causes the witness's unavailability at trial. ¶ 40. Since the Reynolds decision, the Court has continued to acknowledge the concept that a defendant can forfeit through misconduct his or her confrontation rights. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 451-53 (1912) (<HOLDING>); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 Holdings: 0: holding that a hearsay statement can itself be considered in first determining if a conspiracy existed when the statement was made 1: holding that defendant who introduced hearsay statement waived objection to admission of another part of same statement 2: holding that a defendant waives right to object to a hearsay statement on confrontation grounds when he or she offers the statement 3: holding that a statement implying that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial was inadmissible hearsay 4: holding prior statement subject to crossexamination when made does not violate confrontation clause


Input: after learning that leave was needed for a serious health condition. In determining whether an employee provided sufficient notice to his employer, the Sixth Circuit has held that the “critical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee’s request to take time off for a serious health condition.” Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998). Courts have held that an employee merely notifying his employer that he is sick, without more, is not sufficient notice to invoke the FMLA. Rather, the employee must notify the employer that he is suffering from a serious health condition that prevents him from performing his normal job. Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) Although “[t]he employee need not assert his Holdings: 0: holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work 1: holding that an employee requesting unforeseeable medical leave is not required to even mention the fmla when requesting leave for a serious health condition 2: holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration 3: holding that an employee gives his employer sufficient notice that he is requesting leave for an fmlaqualifying condition when he gives the employer enough information for the employer to reasonably conclude that an event described in 29 usc  2612a1 has occurred 4: holding that an employer may deny restoration when it can show that it would have discharged the employee in any event regardless of the leave


Input: and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. Id. at 1669 (citation omitted). To determine whether Plaintiffs have displaced the presumption against extraterritoriality, we first consider the threshold inquiry of whether the presumption is “self-evidently dispositive” or whether “its application requires further analysis.” Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010); see also Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 182. That is, when a complaint alleges no contact “between the injuries alleged and the territory of the United States,” the presumption against extraterritoriality is not displaced and the inquiry, in all likelihood, ends there. Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 182-83; Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>). The Kiobel complaint, which contained no Holdings: 0: holding defendant failed to rebut statutory presumption where evidence was not particular to the facts and circumstances of the case 1: holding plaintiffs claims did not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality set forth in kiobel ii because the plaintiffs have failed to allege that any relevant conduct occurred in the united states emphasis added 2: holding that to rebut presumption plaintiff need only allege specific facts not plead evidence 3: holding that because a judgment was awarded the plaintiffs against the united states no judgment will be announced against the government employee 4: holding that despite plaintiffs allegations of a conspiracy they did not suggest that any of the acts committed by individual defendants occurred in the united states


Input: the alleged offense was against person or property.” Id. § 54.02(f)(1). Here, the alleged offense was the murder of Adriana Terry, a first-degree felony. At the crime scene, prior to any questions asked by the officer, Rodriguez told Officer Martin, “I did it.” Officer Martin explained that he understood Rodriguez to be saying he caused Terry’s injuries. We note Rodriguez volunteered this information prior to being identified as a suspect and while staring at .the front door of Terry’s home in the midst of the crime scene investigation. After Rodriguez was magistrated, Rodriguez requested to speak to Officer Bow en and Rodriguez again made the statement, “I did it.” Officer Bowen confirmed Rodriguez was confessing to the injuries suffered by Terry. See Gonzales, 467 S.W.3d at 600 (<HOLDING>); see also Bleys v. State, 319 S.W.3d 857, 860 Holdings: 0: holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed 1: holding defendants confession to murder met factor 5402f1 2: holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  3: holding that later declarations during defendants confession leading officers to evidence of the crime constituted part of one continuous confession that began at the police station 4: holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given


Input: manslaughter conviction where teenager died in an automobile accident after leaving an underage drinking party that the defendant knowingly permitted her minor daughter to host); Commonwealth v. Keysock, 236 Pa.Super. 474, 345 A.2d 767, 773-74 (1975) (upholding involuntary manslaughter conviction for driver after vehicle on which he put bald tires killed another driver after a traffic accident). It was reasonable for the jury to infer that, had Appellant properly performed his duties, the accident would not have occurred. The cases relied upon by Appellant in support of his sufficiency challenge are inapposite, as they involve factual circumstances where the defendant’s conduct was more remote and attenuated. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moyer, 436 Pa.Super. 442, 648 A.2d 42, 46 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Colvin, 340 Pa.Super. 278, Holdings: 0: holding commonwealth did not establish a prima facie case of involuntary manslaughter after a jet ski crashed into defendants boat because there was no evidence that the defendant could have avoided the accident 1: holding that the plaintiff made a prima facie case even though there was no evidence of causal connection other than the fact that the plaintiff was fired after bringing a lawsuit 2: holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position 3: holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct 4: holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1


Input: provisions are mandatory, exclusive, and require compliance in all respects, otherwise the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Dubai Petroleum Company v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75-77 (Tex.2000). Though the Kazi court indicated a general preference by the high court to follow the modern trend of minimizing the number of defects that deprive courts of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Kazi court did not state or even suggest that no failure to follow a statutory prerequisite would henceforth be a jurisdictional defect. See Kazi, 12 S.W.3d at 74—77. Indeed, on various occasions since it decided Kazi, the high court has held that a failure to follow a statutory prerequisite is a jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442-43 (Tex.2013) (<HOLDING>); In re John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Holdings: 0: holding that the signature requirement was an indispensable condition precedent and the failure to comply with it deprived the town of jurisdiction to annex 1: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction 2: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case 3: holding that failure to comply with statutory prerequisite deprived the courts of subjectmatter jurisdiction 4: holding appealable district courts order dismissing for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction due to determination of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction


Input: adjudication of the controversy.” Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3)). When making the determination of predominance and superiority, a court must consider, among other things: “(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). In this case, plaintiff fails both the predominance and superiority requirements. 1. “The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficien Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Such an inquiry would involve different Holdings: 0: holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the adea 1: holding that in title vii disparate impact case an employer may rebut prima facie case of disparate impact by demonstrating that the employment policy at issue is related to the employees job performance and justified by business necessity 2: recognizing cause of action under section 504 based on claims of disparate impact 3: holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea 4: holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions


Input: counsel is Respondent’s attempt to “explain away” the evidence of probable cause against him. Evidence that tends to establish an alibi is evidence “that the [accused] was not present at the time or at the place where the [accused] is alleged to have committed the offense charged.... ” United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 135, 137 (5th Cir.1995); see Black’s Law Dictionary 84 (9th ed. 2009) (an alibi is a “defense based on the physical impossibility of a defendant’s guilt by placing the defendant in a location other than the scene of the crime at the relevant time”). Definitive evidence of an alibi conclusively placing Respondent in a location other than Las Botellas bar at the time the crime occurred could be sufficient to obliterate probable cause. See Gonzalez, 52 F.Supp.2d at 738^1 (<HOLDING>). Here, however, the evidence merely shows what Holdings: 0: holding that respondents had presented credible and persuasive alibi evidence that they were elsewhere on the date of the robbery and could not have perpetrated this crime and that such evidence is admissible when it negates the existence of probable cause 1: holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendants credibility and not for determining guilt 2: holding that defendants prior possession of the physical means of committing the crime is some evidence of the probability of his guilt and is therefore admissible 3: holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision 4: holding that the date of the offense was material to the defense where defendant could not have anticipated from the date specified in the indictment that the state would present evidence that the crime occurred nearly two months later


Input: policy commenced South Norwalk had not yet been found liable, nor had the amount of damages been established. South Norwalk was thus aware of potential likely losses, but not actual losses. This distinction is significant, particularly as South Norwalk was one of three defendants named in Peck’s suit with potential liability and Peck’s injury was of an ongoing, recurring nature.”). Thus, absent an undisputed, discrete loss occurring before insurance incepts, the application of the known loss doctrine will depend on when an ongoing loss occurred such that it was an “actual” loss and the extent of the insured’s knowledge of that loss. Compare Peck, 363 F.Supp.2d 137, with Travelers Property Cas. v. H.A.R.T., Inc., No. CV980485730S, 2001 WL 649616, at *6-7 (Conn.Super.Ct. May 18, 2001) (<HOLDING>). In this case, it is uncertain from the record Holdings: 0: holding that an automobile dealers liability insurer was not liable for any damage allegedly caused by the negligence of the dealer and sustained in an accident involving an automobile purchased from the dealer or to defend the dealer in the negligence action where the injury occurred outside of the policy period and occurrence was defined in the policy as an accident including injurious exposure to conditions which results during the policy period in bodily injury or property damages   1: holding that where an insured made misrepresentations and concealed the existence of a fatal automobile accident in an attempt to reinstate a cancelled policy the loss was uninsurable as a known loss 2: holding that loss of an arm includes loss of the hand 3: holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss 4: holding where the defendant knows as well as anyone the value of the assets he concealed the intended loss calculation may properly be based upon the value of the assets concealed


Input: we hold that Appellants had adequate notice of the acts required of them should they decide to continue operating prior to a final trial on the merits of the underlying lawsuit. Appellants also argue that the temporary injunction is void because it refers to the NRA Range Manual. As we noted above, the temporary injunction may not describe the activities to be enjoined merely by referencing the complaint or other documents. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 683. So long as the injunction reasonably describes the activities to be enjoined, it may refer to such items as laws or ordinances. See Maloy v. City of Lewisville, Tex., 848 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ), disapproved of on other grounds, Schleuter v. City of Fort Worth, 947 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). As we have explained, the order here states Holdings: 0: holding that the prosecutors indirect reference to a defendants prior conviction was improper 1: holding that if property description is to be supplied by writing to which reference is made in deed reference must be adequate to identify writing 2: holding that a single implicit reference to the email in which the complaint makes no explicit reference to nor does it quote at all from is insufficient to establish that the email was incorporated by reference into the complaint 3: holding that reference to ordinance is not improper reference to an external document because injunction sufficiently describes the act sought to be enjoined and reference to the ordinance as stated in the injunction is merely to give further notice as to the enjoined conduct but the reference was unnecessary to give the appellants sufficient notice of that conduct 4: holding that whether error is apparent is determined by reference to the law as of the time the appeal is decided


Input: between the two concepts. See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). That the court Holdings: 0: recognizing doctrine 1: holding the totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy like the abstention doctrine  or the prudential standing doctrine represents the sort of threshold question we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction 2: holding that jurisdiction must be resolved before applying the act of state doctrine because that doctrine is a substantive rule of law 3: recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine 4: holding that the law of the case doctrine is not a fixed rule that prevents a federal court from determining the question of its own subject matter jurisdiction in a given case


Input: Docket No. 137 at 20. ■ Defendants further argue that the patent specifications similarly fail to identify any corresponding structure for these terms. Id. at 21. “Processing device” is readily recognized by those skilled in the art as a processor, thereby evidencing corresponding structure. Accordingly, “processing device” is not a means-plus-function term, and because it is easily understood by a jury, needs no further construction. However, “module” is not as readily recognized in the art. While “module” has sometimes avoided means-plus-function construction in specific contexts, module has also been considered a nonce word and subject to § 112, ¶ 6. Compare, e.g., Beneficial Innovations, Inc. v. Blockdot, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-263, 2010 WL 1441779, at *16 (E.D.Tex. Apr. 12, 2010) (<HOLDING>); PalmTop Productions, Inc. v. Lo-Q PLC, 450 Holdings: 0: holding that  112  6 did not apply when construing a term including module in the context of a software system 1: holding that claim limitation using the term means for and not reciting any structure presumptively falls within the scope of  112  6 2: holding that person as defined in njsa 112 does not include the state based on the fact that 1 the definition of person indicates that such term includes the state when it is used to designate the owner of property which may be the subject of an offense and 2 state and municipality are separately defined in njsa 112 3: recognizing that the term including is somewhat ambiguous 4: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance


Input: met to define the transaction as a security." In response to the State's question as to whether promissory notes, in general, can be securities, Hines explained that "notes that are issued for investment purposes and are not collateralized are" recognized in the industry as securities while "[nlotes that are issued in which there is collateral attached ... [are] less likely a security." Hines explained in broad terms how those in the industry may characterize a transaction that is not clearly enumerated in the Securities Act as a security. Hines did not tell the jury that the transaction at issue was a security, couch his opinion specifically in terms of what is required under Utah law, or otherwise tell the jury what conclusion to reach. Compare, e.g., Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1861 & n. 10 (<HOLDING>), with Davis, 2007 UT App 18, ¶17, 155 P.3d 909 Holdings: 0: holding that an expert that had provided consulting services to the defendant relating to the litigation was not precluded from serving as an expert for the plaintiff 1: holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify 3: holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law 4: holding that an expert is not competent to testify as to statutory interpretation


Input: juvenile probation. Based upon this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the punishment and programming available in the juvenile justice system is adequate to overcome the presumption of certification. While the testimony of the evaluators focused upon the rehabilitation of appellant through juvenile programming in EJJ, none of the evaluators were able to address the issue of public safety should such programming fail and such failure becomes evident after appellant is released from probation at age 21. Yet, all agreed that if appellant continues with his long-time association with the gang upon his discharge from probation, he would be extremely dangerous. See P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d at 686 (<HOLDING>). In upholding the district court’s Holdings: 0: holding that where failure at rehabilitation will create an extreme risk to public safety the heavier weight given by the statute to the first and third factors evidences our legislatures recognition that the risk is too great to justify an attempt to modify this offenders behavior in the juvenile system 1: holding that the risk of convicting an innocent accused is too great when the evidence is entirely based on hearsay 2: holding that an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a genuine substantial risk that he could be injured or could injure others and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk 3: holding that a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived for failure to present the issue first to the trial court 4: holding that regardless of the risk of discriminatory enforcement a court may not hold that this risk invalidates the statute in a preenforcement facial attack


Input: (N. D.Cal.2000) (citing Argument in Favor of Proposition 4 by Earl Warren, District Attorney of Alameda County, 1934 General Election Ballot Pamphlet). 5 . The Tenth Circuit has also addressed the authority of the states to execute search warrants and to arrest individuals on reservations. In United States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir.1990), state authorities executed a search warrant on a tribal reservation. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the search warrant was invalid, and therefore the evidence should have been suppressed, because the state had no jurisdiction over the reservation to enforce its laws — including the execution of a search warrant — unless Congress consented to the state's jurisdiction. Id. at 1147. See also Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1354-55 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Our conclusion that the Tribe may bring a Holdings: 0: holding that the state did not have jurisdiction over crime committed on land held by the bureau of indian affairs for the use and benefit of a discrete indian community 1: holding that the arrest of an indian on indian land was illegal because the state had no jurisdiction over the reservation to enforce its laws  including the execution of a search warrant  unless congress consented to the states jurisdiction 2: holding that oklahoma police officer was without jurisdiction to arrest indian inside indian reservation when the state has neither received by express grant nor acted pursuant to congressional authorization to assume criminal jurisdiction over indian country 3: holding that state has no jurisdiction over civil suit by nonindian against indian where cause of action arises on indian reservation 4: holding that the state has no jurisdiction to pursue an indian onto an indian reservation for criminal offenses committed off the reservation


Input: the federal officer removal statute. When the Second Circuit held that removal was improper under section 1442, it necessarily held that this Court lacked jurisdiction because there is no independent statute that gives original subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts over cases involving federal officers. "Federal jurisdiction rests on a ‘federal interest in the matter,’ the very basic interest in the enforcement of federal law through federal officials.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969) (quoting Poss v. Lieberman, 299 F.2d 358, 359 (2d Cir.1962)). 24 . PL Mem. at 5. 25 . 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (emphasis added). 26 . 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) & (b). 27 . See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fullington v. Parkway Hosp., Inc., 351 B.R. 280 (E.D.N.Y2006) (<HOLDING>). 28 . 11 U.S.C. § 101(27). The statute states Holdings: 0: recognizing the indicia of authority from a governmental unit to the authorized person to pursue some endeavor as common in the enumerated items 1: holding that while qui tam actions by private parties could be on behalf of or for a governmental unit they are not actions by a governmental unit as required by the bankruptcy code 2: holding that recovery against an individual employee is barred and may be sought against the governmental unit only  when suit is filed against both the governmental unit and its employee id  101106e 3: holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary 4: recognizing utswmc as a governmental unit under the act


Input: possession. It is. As part of the conspiracy to advertise child pornography, all defendants are accountable for the images depicting child pornography on the KOFD board. United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir.1999) (defendant “pled guilty to participating in a conspiracy[,] and the reasonably foreseeable actions taken by his coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy” were properly attributed to him). B. Total amount of the victim’s los 7 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 12, 2014). The disaggregation of costs is not necessarily a brightline however, and the continued harm and abuse arising out of the viewing of child pornography images may be part of a continuing, concerted harm. Compare United States v. Sanders, 52 F.Supp.3d, 1329, 1338-39, 2014 WL 5033280, at *8 (N.DiGa. Oct. 9, 2014) (<HOLDING>) with United States v. Galan, 2014 WL 3474901, Holdings: 0: holding that the psychological injuries related to the initial abuse were not sufficiently disaggregated from those arising from the viewing of the images because the counselors report did not show the victim suffered any harm from the continued viewing andor spread of the images 1: holding that a release of such claims or other matters arising from the beginning of time to the date of execution of this agreement did not protect the defendant from liability arising from unconstitutional conduct that occurred after the agreements execution 2: holding that pornographic videos and images were properly authenticated where the government presented detailed evidence as to the chain of custody specifically how the images were retrieved from the defendants computers 3: holding that general losses must be sufficiently disaggregated from losses caused by the initial abuser when determining those losses caused by the continuing traffic of the images 4: holding that government must introduce relevant evidence in addition to the alleged pornographic images to prove that images depict real child