Input: writ denied). However, “[t]he phrase ‘Approved as to Form and Substance’, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a consent judgment.” Id.; Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1997, no pet.). In the absence of some indication in the record the case was settled or something in the body of the judgment indicating it was rendered by consent, that phrase above a signature on the form of judgment “is too indefinite to justify declaring as a matter of law that the judgment was a consent judgment” and that the right of appeal has been voluntarily relinquished. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Adams, 829 S.W.2d 356, 364 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied); see Andrew Shebay & Co. v. Bishop, 429 S.W.3d 644, 647-48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Here, the trial court’s order was signed Holdings: 0: holding that partys consent to the trial courts entry of judgment waives any error except for jurisdiction error contained in the judgment   1: holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion 2: holding where record plainly indicated party disagreed with verdict and record contained no evidence of actual agreement between parties partys submission of proposed judgment conforming to trial courts intended judgment and containing notation that party approved it as to both form and substance did not create consent judgment 3: holding the intent of parties can be inferred from sufficient details contained within the consent judgment indicating the parties understood the consent judgment operated as a final adjudication of the factual issues 4: holding that failure to move for judgment after verdict entitled party only to a new trial not a judgment in its favor


Input: was intended to prevent creditors from obtaining the Business interest. Thus, the fourth element is met in this case. Finally, the Court readily finds that the omission was material in this case. “The subject matter of a false oath is ‘material,’ and thus sufficient to bar discharge, if it bears a relationship to the bankrupt’s business transactions or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence and disposition of his property.” Chalik, 748 F.2d at 617, citing In re Steiker, 380 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir.1967). Even the omission of assets of little value can be material. See, e.g., Olson, 916 F.2d at 484 (concluding that omission of dinner theater which had “questionable value” was material for purposes of section 727(a)(4)(A)); Chalik, 748 F.2d at 619 (<HOLDING>). In this case there is substantial evidence Holdings: 0: holding that failure by corporation president to list asset on corporations bankruptcy petition was omission of material information supporting a  152 conviction 1: holding that such information is not material under securities law 2: holding that omission of information about shares held in corporations was material even if the securities were worthless at the time 3: holding inadmissible expert testimony that included statements that failure to disclose certain enumerated information would be a material omission under utah law that the material actually provided to investors did not meet disclosure requirements under the act and that the agreements at issue were securities under utah law 4: holding that a plaintiff alleging securities fraud must show that a defendant 1 made a material misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he or she had a duty to speak 2 with scienter 3 in connection with the purchase or sale of securities


Input: course of the hearings, Has-kell asserted that the document entitled “Statement of Resident Rights” was meant to establish the applicable standard of care for his expert report. He further asserted that the documents established how being dismissed affected his health and that he was a resident at the Center. It is undisputed by the parties that nothing in the report addresses any breach by either defendant as to any standard of care. Defendants in this matter urge us to determine that the report served by Has-kell was so deficient as to not constitute a report. If we hold that Haskel report must be sufficient as to each defendant individually. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(a); see also Rivenes v. Holden, 257 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we will review the sufficiency Holdings: 0: recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff 1: holding that the trial court should have granted a motion for relief from judgment when it was the trial courts failure to serve the defendant with notice of the final judgment as required by rule 1080h1 that prevented the defendant from timely appealing 2: holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case 3: holding that the defendants failure to timely serve a notice of appeal and docketing statement did not prejudice the plaintiff and therefore would not serve as a basis to dismiss the appeal 4: holding if plaintiff does not serve report as to particular defendant trial court must dismiss that defendant from suit


Input: Letter are final orders relating to “aviation duties and powers,” § 46110 preempts the district court from considering these claims. But if they are not final, then the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) bars the district court from hearing the case for lack of jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. The finality requirement comes from two sections in the APA. An “order” is defined as “ ‘the whole or a part of a final disposition ... of an agency in a matter other than rule making.’ ” Air Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 654 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir.1981) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)). The APA only allows judicial review of “final agency actions.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Thus, if an FAA order is not final, neither we nor the district court have jurisdiction over the case. See Air Cal, 654 F.2d at 622 (<HOLDING>). As a result of the finality conundrum, the Holdings: 0: holding district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the document before the district court in this instance is not a vehicle for any recognized legal remedy under the rules 1: holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court 2: holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review state disciplinary proceedings against attorney 3: holding that this court lacked jurisdiction under  46110 for lack of finality and that the district court also lacked jurisdiction because the orders were not final and thus not ripe for review 4: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because the case was not ripe for adjudication


Input: address was defendant’s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father’s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant’s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant’s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996). 5 . Although we do not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee’s behalf, we note that Indiana Trial Rule 4.15(F) provides, "No summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him.” "In evaluating pp.2000) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. If service of process is not Holdings: 0: holding that the court cannot conclude that failure of service resulted from defendants rejection of delivery where letters sent to defendant were returned stating unclaimed and not at this address 1: holding that rule 415f worked to cure deficiencies in service of process in action to enforce a judgment lien on real estate where service was provided at debtors last residential address known to lienholder because address was used during underlying lawsuit lienholders attorney checked county record to verify address information debtor did receive summons and residential address was on the former situs of debtors business 2: holding that trial rule 415f will not cure defective service of process where no person authorized by the rules was actually served 3: holding that service to defendants business address resulted in total failure to serve process rather than mere technical defect and thus could not be cured by rule 415f 4: holding while there may be some case law to support plaintiffs argument the majority approach is that the failure to attach process defect is merely procedural and that this particular procedural defect may be cured


Input: or issues remanded.” United States v. Moore, 131 F.3d 595, 597-98 (6th Cir.1997) (internal citations omitted). “[A]bsent explicit limitations in the appellate court’s mandate, an order vacating a sentence and remanding the case for re-sentencing directs the sentencing court to begin anew, so that fully de novo resentencing is entirely appropriate^]” United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1422 (6th Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added). Accordingly, when no express lim t court violated § 3553(c) when it failed to explain the reasons underlying his sentence “in open court.” Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that upon resentencing, the reasons supporting the sentence must be pronounced by the district court from the bench. See DeMott, 513 F.3d at 58 (<HOLDING>). We agree and hold that upon general remand, Holdings: 0: holding that states procedure providing for jury evaluation of voluntariness of a defendants confession violates fourteenth amendment due process 1: recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language 2: holding that upon resentencing providing only a written opinion violates the open court requirement of  3553c 3: holding that school policy prohibiting written material of a religious nature violates the fust amendment 4: holding that  172545hs written notice requirement is mandatory


Input: this Circuit routinely reject Exemption 4 arguments that are grounded in generalizations. See Ctr. for Public Integrity v. Dep’t of Energy, 191 F.Supp.2d 187, 194-95 (D.D.C.2002) (“The Courts of this Circuit have viewed [Exemption 4] arguments with skepticism, generally requiring agencies to disclose information under Exemption 4’s competitive harm prong unless they are able to demonstrate that release of the information would be of substantial assistance to competitors in estimating and undercutting a bidder’s future bids.”); Brownstein Zeidman & Schomer v. Dep’t of Air Force, 781 F.Supp. 31, 33 (D.D.C.1991) (rejecting application of Exemption 4 because the harm that would allegedly result from disclosure of pricing information was “speculative”). Cf. Gilda Indus., 457 F.Supp.2d at 11 (<HOLDING>). Because the D.C. Circuit has cautioned that Holdings: 0: holding that competitive harm would result where the agency identified 212 competitors and explained how the requested information could be used in combination with publicly available information to disrupt supply product lines supply chains and customers 1: recognizing that there is an important privacy interest in corporate financial documents the court agrees that the information can be protected therefore the court  required that the information be disclosed pursuant to a confidentiality order only to be used in connection with this litigation 2: holding contact information of potential computer network services clients was not a trade secret because all businesses are now potential customers of computer network services and their contact information is publicly available 3: holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish unconscionability based upon the alleged excessive cost of arbitration because they failed to supply information as to the actual costs that might be incurred 4: holding that contact list based on inter alia information that was publicly available did not qualify as trade secret


Input: Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1157. And standing must remain “extant at all stages.of review.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975)). “Standing cannot be ‘inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings,’ ” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (quoting Grace v. American Central Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 284, 3 S.Ct. 207, 27 L.Ed. 932 (1883)), or even from the government’s concession of standing, “but rather ‘must affirmatively appear in the record.’ ” FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 231-36, 110 S.Ct. 596 (quoting Mansfield C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 392, 4 S.Ct. 510, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884)) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has “always insisted on Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance 1: holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law 2: holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff 3: holding that a courts order invalidating part of a city billboard ordinance did not moot a claim for damages arising from that invalidated portion of the ordinance 4: holding certain plaintiffs did not have standing to attack ordinance governing sexually oriented businesses where the record did not reveal that any one of these plaintiffs was subject to the ordinance even though the city attorney conceded at oral argument before the supreme court that one or two of them had had their licenses denied under the ordinance


Input: and in Gregory requires a comparable holding in this case. Mr. Cervine misreads our decision in Gregory. For purposes of establishing reasonable suspicion, we only consider vehicle and weather conditions when the underlying state statute so directs. We considered these conditions in Gregory because the underlying Utah statute contained an-as-nearly-as-practical requirement. The relevant statute in Gregory, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61(1), requires that “[a] vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane.... ” Id. (emphasis added). Given the difficult weather, vehicle, and road conditions, it was not “practical” for the driver in Gregory to avoid the emergency lane at all times. See Gregory, 79 F.3d at 978; State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in Gregory, we recognized nothing more Holdings: 0: holding that one isolated incident of partially weaving into emergency lane does not constitute a traffic violation in tennessee 1: holding that one in stance of weaving does not constitute a violation of utah code ann  416611 2: holding in part that the utah state probation agreement does not create such an option 3: holding that the unauthorized practice of law constitutes violation of code 4: holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se


Input: of fact in a Terry stop). Where, as here, police officers themselves are responsible for the mistake (as opposed to police functionaries), the application of the rule is more efficacious still. But ignoring these deficiencies, and assuming without finding that Swierk and Mitchell simply misheard Antone say “come on” (when he really said “hold on”), the Court finds that an objectively reasonable police officer would not have believed that Antone consented to the entry of his home. As previously discussed, Det. Swierk asked Antone whether he would come to the police station, and Antone said that he would. To a reasonable person, Antone’s unsolicited statement, “come on,” would have been a puzzling follow up to Det. Swierk’s introduction and question. Cf. Marshall, 348 F.3d at 286-88 (<HOLDING>). The statement that the detectives thought Holdings: 0: holding that acquiescence to a strip and body cavity search did not extend the scope of defendants consent to search his person because of the highly intrusive nature of the search 1: holding that when reasonable suspicion exists a school search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search 2: holding that the government must prove the defendant knew of the features of the firearm that brought it within the scope of the act 3: holding that the challenged item was within the scope of the search because it reasonably fell within the expressed object of the search even though it turned out to be the defendants personal property 4: holding that where defendant consented to search of his car and stood by as agent conducted a thorough and systematic search which included removal of vehicles back seat and raising of cars rear quarter panel defendants failure to object to search indicated search was within scope of consent


Input: litigation. See Allen, 94 F.3d at 928 (“Those contractual provisions ... specify that ‘any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature arising out of or relating to’ [an entity’s] participation in Lloyd’s be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the British courts .... ” (quoting underlying -contract)); Rice, 240 F.Supp.2d at 528 (“The form contract used ... contained a choice of forum clause, stating that ‘any litigation arising hereunder shall be filed only in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia or the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, and you hereby consent to the jurisdiction of such courts.’ ” (quoting underlying contract)); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587-89, 595, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that a forum selection clause encompassing any case or controversy arising under or in connection with this agreement included all causes of action arising directly or indirectly from the business relationship evidenced by the contract 1: holding that forum selection clause providing that any appropriate state or federal district court located in the borough of manhattan new york city new york shall have exclusive jurisdiction was not dispositive but merely one factor to consider in transfer analysis quoting underlying contract 2: holding that plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claim was subject to mandatory forum selection clause requiring litigation in florida of any claims or disputes arising from employment agreement 3: holding that contract promise to litigate any dispute arising from the contract in the english courts was prima facie valid quoting underlying contract 4: holding valid forum selection clause providing that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under in connection with or incident to this contract shall be litigated if at all in and before a court located in the state of florida quoting underlying contract


Input: ] [of] the defense attorney” and continuing by emphasizing that there was no evidence presented to support such a claim, the prosecutor was properly answering an argument of opposing counsel. See Felder, 848 S.W.2d at 94-95. Case law supports this conclusion. For example, in Coble the prosecutor argued that the defense attorney’s lawyer was arguing “something ridiculous.” 871 S.W.2d at 205. The court of criminal appeals noted that such a statement was not directed at defense counsel, but at defense counsel’s argument. Id. This stands in stark contrast to the cases cited by Davis and other cases in which the appellate court has determined that a prosecutor’s comment did strike at the defendant over defense counsel’s shoulders. See Gomez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (<HOLDING>); Lopez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 844, 846 Holdings: 0: holding prosecutors argument that defense counsels goal was to keep evidence from the jury was improper 1: holding prosecutors argument that defense counsel was manufacturing evidence and thus suborning perjury was improper 2: holding the prosecutors argument if it was there they can bring it to you was not an improper jury argument 3: holding prosecutors statement that defendant and defense counsel were lying when they pleaded not guilty was improper 4: holding prosecutors isolated argument referencing punishment was not improper because it was responsive to evidence in the record and was not intended to inflame the jury


Input: 139 L.Ed.2d 300 (1997).’ “Samra v. State, 771 So.2d 1108, 1112 (Ala.Crim.App.1999). “No doubt that with additional time and money Brunson and McKinnon could have done soniething more or different. The same could be said after any trial where a capital defendant was found guilty and sentenced to death, but ‘perfection is not the standard of effective assistance.’ Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1514 (11th Cir.1995). Mr. Brunson and Mr. McKinnon faced a daunting task defending Dunaway and both testified they spent far more hours preparing for Dunaway’s case than they were given compensation. The cap on personal compensation did not lessen Brunson’s and McKinnon’s vigor or zeal in their preparation arid presentation at Dunaway’s trial. See Bui v. State, 717 So.2d 6, 15 (Ala.Crim,App.1997) (<HOLDING>). “Based on this Court’s review of the record Holdings: 0: holding we reject the notion that alabamas statutory scheme for compensating attorneys in capital cases in and of itself denies a defendant effective representation 1: holding that alabamas capital sentencing scheme which utilizes a factfinding jury remains constitutional under hurst 2: holding that under section 27702 each defendant under sentence of death is entitled as a statutory right to effective legal representation by the capital collateral representative in all collateral relief proceedings 3: holding teague applies to capital cases 4: holding that even capital prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel in habeas cases


Input: as an “agent” of WMATA, is an “employer” hable under section 2000e-2(a)(l) for discriminating against her on the basis of her sex. While a construction of the statute to impose individual liability on an agent is facially plausible, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that “[t]he obvious purpose of this agent provision was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the statute.” Miller v. Maxwell’s Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.1993) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, while a supervisory employee may be joined as a party defendant in a Title VII action, that employee must be viewed as being sued in his capacity as the agent of the employer, who is alone hable for a violation of Title VII. See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Considering the evidence in the hght most Holdings: 0: holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii 1: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 2: holding that there is no individual liability under title vii 3: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 4: holding individual employees may be liable under title vii


Input: The appeals system had been set up specifically to deal with a dispute over an individual’s entitlement to disability benefits. See id. at 424-26. Not all of Appellant’s allegations serving as a basis for his Bivens claim involve individual action leading to final agency decisions reviewable pursuant to the APA. For example, Appellant’s allegations that some Defendants denied him certain rights pursuant to his management plan is properly challenged in an administrative proceeding. Therefore, a Bivens claim for that particular allegation is precluded. However, several of Appellant’s allegations of Defendants’ intentional misconduct are unrelated to any final agency action and are therefore properly within the scope of a Bivens claim. See, e.g., Zephyr Aviation, 247 F.3d at 572-573 (<HOLDING>); Western Center for Journalism, v. Cederquist, Holdings: 0: holding that a bivens cause of action cannot be maintained against a federal agency 1: holding that social security regulations and procedures precluded a bivens action 2: holding that court would not imply a bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private prison facility 3: recognizing potential of bivens action for extraprocedural and unconstitutional actions by faa inspectors while acknowledging that a bivens action would be unavailable to challenge the faas attachment of condition notice to companys airplane 4: holding that a bivens claim cannot be brought against a federal agency


Input: Finally, the relief the Laws seek is beyond just preserving the status quo pending a trial on the merits. The status quo to be preserved is “the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status that preceded the pending controversy.” Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d at 528. The Laws contend the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status was Dr. Bass’s decision to overturn the two semester suspension. We disagree. The Laws appealed that decision to Dr. Gillis. Instead, the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status is Dr. Gillis’ decision to uphold Dr. Bass’s decision after the second disciplinary hearing, i.e., the failing grade in organic chemistry and the two semester suspension. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Paiz, 856 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in vacating the temporary Holdings: 0: holding status quo was school districts decision to prohibit student who had not passed taas test from participating in graduation ceremonies 1: recognizing districts obligation to maintain special needs student at specific private school where hearing officer had directed district to place and fund student pending development of iep 2: recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts 3: holding that a school had no duty to protect pedestrian from student 4: holding school districts had standing to bring claims against the state asserting that school financing system had become unconstitutional


Input: under the anti-stacking statute. The majority does not analyze the statute and resolve this critical issue, although it admits that Andrea, as the “injured insured,” would have been limited to only one UM policy had she lived. The very reason she would be limited is because she, not her parents, is the “insured” under the anti-stacking statute. The observation that a wrongful death action is a “separate and independent” cause of action from Andrea’s personal injury action, although true, is immaterial. Op. p. 744. The Boullts are not attempting to “stack” their policies covering Andrea’s wrongful death on top of policies covering Andrea for personal injury damages. They are attempting to “stack” two UM policies providing evelopment, 94-0735 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 1242 (<HOLDING>). 2 . The "insured” for purposes of uninsured Holdings: 0: holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended 1: holding that the married parents of their deceased son could not stack two separate um policies under which they and their son were each insureds because the antistacking statute reference to the insured contemplates the person who suffers the bodily injury or bodily injury resulting in death 2: holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury 3: holding that a divorced parent of a deceased child may chose to recover wrongful death damages under either her um policy or her exhusbands um policy which ever is more favorable but is prohibited by the antistacking statute from recovering under both policies 4: holding that divorced parent could not stack their separate um policies for the wrongful death of their son because the insured referred to in the antistacking statute is the person who suffers bodily injury or bodily injury which results in death


Input: companies appellees allege, he owns. Therefore, the analysis is whether the $20,000 in contributions the campaign retained in 2014 creates an appearance of impropriety for a case that will be before the court in 2017. Few cases in Arkansas address whether campaign-related matters require recusal by a judge. See Massongill v. Scott, 337 Ark. 281, 991 S.W.2d 105 (1999) (denying a challenge that the judge should have re-cused when one attorney was former campaign treasurer); Eason v. Erwin, 300 Ark. 384, 781 S.W.2d 1 (1989) (stating a judge did not necessarily havé to recuse off case of prominent local lawyer, campaign contributor, and alleged close friend | ¿but that the judge should rule objectively); Committee for Utility Trimming, Inc. v. Hamilton, 290 Ark. 283, 718 S.W.2d 933 (1986) (<HOLDING>). So the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct Holdings: 0: holding that recusal is not required on the basis of unsupported irrational or highly tenuous speculation 1: holding that recusal was required based on evidence of judges statements of bias against a particular ethnic group 2: holding recusal not required 3: holding that recusal was required based on newspaper report of interview with trial judge 4: holding that recusal is not required when judge has minimal alumni contacts with a defendant university


Input: 957 F.2d at 621. Allison argues that Wellmark’s interpretation of the Plan’s subrogation provision conflicts with Congress’s declaration of policy concerning employee benefit plans and directs the court’s attention to Section 2 of ERISA: § 1001. Congressional findings and declaration of policy (a) The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational scope and economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; that the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans; that they are affected with a national public interest; that they have become an important factor affecting the stability 299 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The court finds that Wellmark’s Holdings: 0: holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself 1: holding that erisa preempts state law claims of fraud and misrepresentation that are based upon the failure of a covered plan to pay benefits 2: holding that erisa employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan 3: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant 4: holding that summary plan description and not individual notification is all that erisa requires of plans insurer


Input: was sufficiently included in the requested property division, Kelly does not contend that a request for property division is sufficient to provide notice that she sought payment of spousal maintenance following the property division. Outside the default-judgment context, some courts have held that absent special exceptions, a prayer for general relief will support an award of any relief raised by the evidence. See, e.g., Khalaf v. Williams, 814 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). The relief must also be consistent with the allegations in the petition, however. Id.; Hardin v. Hardin, 161 S.W.3d 14, 24 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see Alan Reuber Chevrolet, Inc. v. Grady Chevrolet, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Bufkin v. Bufkin, 259 S.W.3d 343, 358 Holdings: 0: holding prayer for general relief does not support award of attorneys fees 1: holding that a preliminary injunction reversed on appeal does not support an award of attorneys fees 2: holding prayer for general relief does not support award of commonlaw prejudgment interest as element of damages 3: holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees 4: holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees


Input: to move for the exclusion of time, it argues that this failure did not contribute to the delay. Instead, the government contends that Koerber caused the delay in January 2011 by requesting (and receiving) an indefinite pretrial-motion-cutoff date. In evaluating the government’s position, we note that we later address how Koerber’s role in the trial delays might affect the STA analysis. But first we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering this 42-day period as part of the government’s “pattern of neglect” leading to the STA violation. The January 27, 2011 continuance for pretrial motions did not trigger an excludable delay in the STA clock. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1); Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 204, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 176 L.Ed.2d 54 (2010) (<HOLDING>). In addition, “defense responsibility for Holdings: 0: holding an excludable period under  2912074a commences on the day immediately after the filing of a defendants pretrial motion 1: holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act 2: holding that time granted for preparing pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under  3161h1 but is excludable only after the district court enters appropriate findings under  3161h7a 3: holding that time excluded from a speedy trial clock for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excluded under  3161h1 but may only be excluded when a court makes appropriate reasonableness findings under  3161h7 4: holding that the time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under  3161h1 but may be excluded only when a court grants a continuance based on appropriate findings under  3161h7


Input: of such an evaluation. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-582(e). The court then considers both reports as well as any other evidence, including witness testimony, provided by the parties. Section 17a-582 further provides that a person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect may contest a court’s order regarding confinement or conditional release. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a-582(g) (“An order of the court pursuant to subsection (e) of this section may be appealed by the acquittee or the state’s attorney to the Appellate Court. The court shall so notify the acquittee.”) Kalman has appealed his confinement. Furthermore, following entry of the court order committing him to the PSRB’s custody, the PSRB, pursuant to section .Ed.2d 67 (1987); Seibel v. Kemble, 63 Haw. 516, 631 P.2d 173 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the defendants are entitled to Holdings: 0: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 1: holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts 2: holding that regardless of whether the deferred adjudication was part of a plea bargain recommended by the prosecution imposed by the trial court without objection by the appellant or granted under other circumstances once the trial court proceeds to adjudication it is restricted in the sentence it imposes only by the relevant statutory limits 3: holding that psychiatrists who upon appointment by a court recommended the release of a man acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect enjoyed judicial immunity from suit for damages by relatives of a woman later killed by the man released 4: holding that in the absence of a statute providing immunity the defense of sovereign immunity is not available to a municipal corporation in an action for damages alleged to be caused by the tortious conduct of the municipality


Input: which he likens to the more familiar terms “for just cause” or “for cause,” which remove employment from the at-will category. The School District does not dispute that § 20.7(3) is applicable to Lockhart, but does contend that Lockhart is nonetheless an at-will employee. Quite surprisingly, no reported Iowa decision has directly addressed the issue of whether § 20.7(3) negates the presumption of at-will employment for the public employees and employers covered under this provision of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act. The few cases that have specifically addressed § 20.7(3) deal with its interaction with other statutory provisions involving discharge of public teachers. See, e.g., Northeast Community Educ. Ass’n v. Northeast Community Sch. Dist., 402 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Iowa 1987) (<HOLDING>); McFarland v. Board of Educ., 277 N.W.2d 901, Holdings: 0: holding that a collective bargaining agreement between school board and teachers union established a teachers legitimate claim of entitlement to their positions at elementary school 1: holding that  2073 was not inconsistent with the provision regarding the discharge of a teacher employed by public schools iowa code  27927 2: recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts 3: holding that  2073 expressly grants school districts the power to suspend teachers for proper cause for disciplinary reasons provided an iowa code  27927 discharge proceeding has been initiated 4: holding that the district was not liable under respondeat superior for a teachers sexual assault of a student even though it occurred on school grounds and during school hours because the criminal misconduct was not within the scope of the teachers employment


Input: a decision of this Court holding that the repeal had eliminated the right to jury in chancery court, the Legislature re-enacted verbatim the text of the repealed stat ute, and that legislation is now codified as section 21-1-103. Id. Just two years after restoring the statutory right to a trial by jury in chancery court, the Legislature enacted the THRA, and at that time, vested exclusive jurisdiction of THRA claims in chancery court. Not only is the Legislature presumed to have been aware of the statutory right to trial by jury in chancery court, given its very recent focus on that precise issue, the Legislature that enacted the THRA was almost certainly actually aware that the civil action in chancery it was authorizing included the right to trial by jury. Cf Doyle, 49 S.W.3d at 858 (<HOLDING>). Eighteen years after its enactment, the THRA Holdings: 0: holding that where state rules of civil procedure apply to courts of the state they do not apply to adjudicatory proceedings before state agencies 1: holding that tennessee rule of civil procedure 24 is not applicable to proceedings in juvenile court 2: holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the tennessee rules of civil procedure 3: recognizing that where the juvenile code sets forth specific procedures governing termination actions those procedures apply to the exclusion of the rules of civil procedure 4: holding that by vesting jurisdiction of gtla actions in circuit court where the tennessee rules of civil procedure applied the legislature intended to allow the tennessee rules of civil procedure to apply to gtla actions


Input: of leniency in exchange for testimony is a recognized and established activity of federal prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution of criminal activity. “No practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system than the practice of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to the crime for which the defendant is charged and having that witness testify under a plea bargain that promises him a reduced sentence.” United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026, 108 S.Ct. 749, 98 L.Ed.2d 762 (1988). This traditional prosecutorial granting of leniency has, throughout history, been sanctioned by the courts as well. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594, 604, 25 L.Ed. 399 (1878) (The Whiskey cases) (<HOLDING>). The case law is replete with instances of Holdings: 0: holding that a public prosecutor is permitted to induce a witness to fully and fairly testify to the guilt of his associates in exchange for the prosecutors recommendation for executive clemency 1: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 2: holding that the witness had accepted immunity in exchange for no prosecution 3: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case 4: holding that the jury could have reasonably inferred the requisite intent to induce the witness to lie or testify falsely from the defendants statements to the witness


Input: and deprived each of unbiased, independent assessments of the available and outstanding claims.” Again, we agree. See In re Prince, 40 F.3d at 361 (finding a conflict of interest where counsel “was in the unfortunate position of having to serve too many masters”); id. at 360 n. 1 (“[I]nability to independently evaluate claims for its client ... is the actual prejudice to the Debt- or ....”). Having made these determinations, the bankruptcy court was well within its discretion to (1) conclude that “[Q&B]’s initial and continuing violation of the disclosure rules coupled with its non-disinterestedness warrants its disqualification in all of these related cases,” (2) deny Q&B all compensation, and (3) order the firm to disgorge any pre-petition retainer. See In re Prince, 40 F.3d at 361 (<HOLDING>). In short, we affirm based on the bankruptcy Holdings: 0: holding that where a conflict of interests exists counsel should be denied compensation it is no answer to say that fraud or unfairness were sic not shown to have resulted alteration in original quoting woods v city natl bank  tr co 312 us 262 268 61 sct 493 85 led 820 1941 1: holding that no ada violation was shown because the disabled were not denied benefits that were otherwise available 2: holding that the question of whether it might have been error for the court to have denied leave to amend is not before us because plaintiffs never requested it 3: recognizing the conflict 4: recognizing conflict


Input: Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906, 108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 237 (1988) (applying both Illinois and Indiana law). The Sixth and Eighth Circuits, however, disagree. Both courts denied the corporation in bankruptcy the right to bring alter ego claims on behalf of its creditors. See Spartan Tube and Steel, Inc. v. Himmelspach (In re RCS Engineered Prods. Co.), 102 F.3d 223 (6th Cir.1996) (applying Michigan law); Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.), 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.) (applying Arkansas law), cert. denied sub. nom., Jacoway v. Anderson, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct. 147, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987). 18 . To ascertain the property ownership of a foreign bankruptcy estate, the law of the jurisdiction where the section 304 proceeding is p (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1028, 116 S.Ct. 673, Holdings: 0: holding appellate courts cannot reverse judgment  on grounds not raised on appeal 1: holding that we will not reverse in the absence of prejudice 2: recognizing that appellate court may reverse trial courts judgment when it is based on an erroneous conclusion of law 3: recognizing reverse piercing ordinarily in oneman corporations 4: recognizing appellate court may not reverse a summary judgment on a basis not raised by the appellant on appeal


Input: as well as his motion to stay the proceedings prior to denying his claims on remand. It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient record to substantiate his or her claims on appeal. State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873, 702 P.2d 910, 911 (Ct.App.1985). In the absence of an adequate record on appeal to support the appellant’s claims, we will not presume error. State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105, 803 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct.App.1991). Here, while Hyde attached to his brief copies of both motions and the Department’s objection to his motion to disqualify, these documents were not made part of the clerk’s record on appeal. Simply attaching documents to one’s brief does not include them in the record. See Ohman v. Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 820 P.2d 695 (1991) (<HOLDING>). We will not presume error where we have no Holdings: 0: holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error 1: holding appeal of termination is limited to information that is part of the record 2: holding that evidence not submitted to the district court cannot be part of the record on appeal 3: holding that jury instructions attached to an appeal brief were not part of the record 4: holding an appellate brief may serve as a notice of appeal


Input: period normally was limited to the current fiscal year or legislative session, rarely reaching back more than a year. Though the time period of retroactivity is particularly long here, such a concern is in part offset by the failure of the Plaintiffs to articulate a vested right with which the New Law interferes, as well as by the specific context of trade duties. In examining the nature and circumstances of the New Law, the court notes that customs duties are to an extent unique from other government assessments in that there is no right to import, and where unfair trade remedies apply, those with goods that may be imported rarely can predict with accuracy what the duty will be. See Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 318, 53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796 (1933) (<HOLDING>). For example, when goods become the subject of Holdings: 0: holding that the petitioner can claim no rate as a legal right  other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the agency commission 1: recognizing that as with tax rates no one has a legal right to the maintenance of an existing rate or duty 2: holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate 3: holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate 4: holding that a utility can claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the commission


Input: v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 455, 458-59 (3d Cir. 1981) (clear ánd unmistakable waiver of right to strike over administration of pension fund held unnecessary where general contract term extended scope of no-strike clause beyond scope of arbitration clause). We believe it consistent with the Act that the arbitrator’s decision in the present case clearly and unmistakably recognized the existence of the special duties of union officials. To go further and require that the Board rather than the arbitrator must be the one to declare the meaning of the parties’ agreement would be to give to the Board a power that Congress has denied it. See discussion of NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., infra. 22 . The court cited New Orleans Steamship Ass’n v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455, 468 (5th Cir. 1980) (<HOLDING>), cert, granted sub nom. Jacksonville Bulk Holdings: 0: holding that the court may issue an injunction prohibiting a defendant from repeating statements determined at trial to be defamatory 1: holding that district court erred in ruling that a particular item of evidence must be admitted in the arbitral proceeding 2: holding that district court erred in issuing injunction against future work stoppages based on arbitral award prohibiting one such stoppage 3: holding that trial court erred by entering an injunction sua sponte as an injunction cannot be entered unless a pleading requests one 4: holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence


Input: Carlson v. State, 798 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Alaska 1990) (“[License fees which discriminate against nonresidents sere-prima facie a violation of [the Privileges and Immunities Clause].”). Further, an unbroken line of authority characterizes commercial fishing as a “common calling” that is protected by.the Privileges and Immunities. Clause. See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417-19, 72 S.Ct. 428, 96 L.Ed. 458 (1952) (striking down Alaska’s differentials for commercial fishing licenses as violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Toomer, 334 U.S. at 403, 68 S.Ct. 1156 (“[Commercial shrimping in the marginal sea, like other common callings, is within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause.”); Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>); Tangier Sound Waterman’s Ass’n v. Pruitt, 4 Holdings: 0: holding an arbitration tribunal fell within the purview of section 1782 1: holding that commercial lobstering falls within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause 2: holding that the flsa is not within the purview of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 3: holding issues within scope of administrative hearing are within the reviewing courts purview 4: holding that licensing fee for nonresident commercial fishermen constituted discriminatory tax in violation of privileges and immunities clause


Input: but even if he is correct, AT & T would still be able to terminate his employment based on a mistaken application of the internal policy, if AT & T is correct that his employment was unconditionally at-will. See Smith v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 620 A.2d 265, 269-70 (D.C.1993) (affirming summary judgment to defendant employer where the plaintiff claims that she was terminated for violating a policy she in fact followed because the discharge violated no employment contract and was not contrary to public policy); Alibalogun v. First Coast Sec. Sols., Inc., 67 F.Supp.3d 211, 218 (D.D.C.2014) (complaint "merely” alleging termination due to "a false reason,” without more, is inadequate to support a claim of wrongful termination); cf. Pope v. Romac Intern., 829 A.2d 945, 947 (D.C.2003) (<HOLDING>). 3 . AT & T has also moved for sanctions, Holdings: 0: holding that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of age discrimination the employer must show that the discharge was based on reasonable factors other than age  and if the employer meets that burden the plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in the discharge 1: holding that where the immediate cause or motivating factor of a discharge is the employees assertion of statutory rights the discharge is discriminatory under section 215a3 whether or not grounds for other discharge exist 2: holding the pro se plaintiff has no breach of contract or wrongful discharge claim against defendant employer where the employer wrongfully characterized her discharge as for cause but remanding to trial court to consider whether the pro se plaintiff suffered some other compensable injury if the employer as alleged intentionally mischaracterized the plaintiffs discharge in order to reduce its unemployment contributions 3: holding that an employee has no right of action against an employer for wrongful discharge where no clear mandate of public policy is violated thereby 4: recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge


Input: and “demeaning” and testified that, in response to her supervisor’s remarks and conduct, she felt “intimidated,” “embarrassed,” and “stressed.” Fuchs also presented evidence that coworkers enlisted to assist Fuchs given her disability felt intimidated and threatened by the Employer’s comments. Plainly, Fuchs has alleged conduct by the Employer that subjectively caused her “intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Palesch, 233 F.3d at 566. As it was bound to do in ruling the Employer’s summary judgment motion, the trial court treated Fuchs’s factual assertions about the Employer’s conduct and her subjective reaction to same as true. However, harassing conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive both as viewed subjectively by the plaintiff and as vie 88, 503 (Mo.App.E.D.1990) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Geiger, 212 S.W. 384, 388 Holdings: 0: holding that while the question of whether a reasonable person would believe his person was seized was normally a question of law that the district court was still entitled to deference because its determination in this case is inextricably intertwined with the credibility of the witnesses 1: holding it is a question of fact 2: holding that whether or not claimant would have returned to work at all was a question of fact 3: holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question 4: holding that whether appearing in a television report about in vitro fertilization would bring shame or humiliation to a reasonable person was a question of fact for the jury


Input: 8.) 4 . Defendants filed a Suggestion of Mootness [Doc. # 77] on June 6, 2000. Attached is the Affidavit of David C. Lanier. Mr. Lanier is the registrar at UNC, and he testifies that Ms. Jennings has graduated from UNC. (Lanier Aff. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs have not responded. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), courts can look beyond the pleadings to determine a matter on standing. Smith v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 290 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir.2002). Only Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) converts to a summary judgment when additional evidence is examined. Id. 5 . If preemption is found, Plaintiffs will be precluded from suing officials in their individual capacities under Title IX. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The Supreme Court recognizes that Federal Holdings: 0: holding title ix does not support an action against official in an individual capacity 1: holding that in a bivens action service upon employee in his official capacity does not amount to service in his individual capacity 2: holding that a claim for damages exists in an action to enforce title ix 3: holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under title ix 4: holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability


Input: and allocation that Beverly contends are material. Beverly argues that the handwritten agreement was not intended to be final because it lacked the waiver-and-release language that the typewritten proposal describes as “an essential and material term of this Agreement and that, without this provision, no agreement would have been reached by the' parties.” But the handwritten agreement states' that Beverly demanded $210,000 and mediation costs “to resolve this matter.” Though' perhaps inartful, this phrase adequately conveys Beverly’s offer to abandon her claims against Abbott; the use of formal terms such as “waiver,” “release,” and “covenant not to sue” was unnecessary—at least regarding the claims Beverly alleged in her complaint. See Wilson v. Wilson, 46 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The other purportedly material term that Holdings: 0: holding that voting agreement that did not comply with certain notice requirements of the act was enforceable because all of the shareholders knew of the agreement and participated in the transaction in question 1: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt 2: holding that agreement as to form and content did not constitute agreed judgment 3: holding that a settlement agreement in which the plaintiff agreed to drop all claims against the defendants in exchange for a specific sum of money was enforceable despite the fact that the agreement did not specify whether the plaintiffs promise would take the legal form of a release or a covenant not to sue 4: holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement


Input: States, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 607, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932) (noting the presumption that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning”). We have not previously decided whether, under this prior version of section 1332(c), a corporation incorporated in the United States also takes the citizenship of its foreign principal place of business. But three out of four of our sister Circuits and two district courts in this Circuit that have confronted this issue have concluded that a domestic corporation with a principal place of business abroad should be treated, for diversity purposes, as a citizen of only the State in which it is incorporated. See MAS Capital, Inc. v. Biodelivery Sciences Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 831, 832-33 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, Holdings: 0: holding that the location of a corporations principal place of business for diversity purposes is the state where the corporation has its headquarters or nerve center 1: holding  1332c does not apply to a domestically incorporated corporation with its principal place of business abroad 2: holding that if a domestic corporations principal place of business is abroad the foreign principal place of business cannot be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes 3: holding that a corporation is fairly regarded at home and so amenable to personal jurisdiction for suits relating to all of its activities including those outside the forum in its principal place of business and place of incorporation 4: holding that for a domestic corporation the foreign principal place of business does not count


Input: defendants also say that the prosecution presented false evidence to the grand jury in order to secure an indictment. We have reviewed the evidence and conclude that there is no evidence to indicate that the government’s testimony and evidence before the grand jury was false. The majority of the arguments presented by the defendants go to the weight and interpretations of the evidence, instead of demonstrating actual false statements made by the government. In addition, many of the arguably false statements appear to be about information that is not material to the case. The Ninth Circuit appears to focus on the materiality of statements when analyzing whether there has been government misconduct that warrants sanctions. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>) Post-Indictment The second argument focus on Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose 1: holding that tribal courts are not subject to the fifth amendments requirement of indictment by grand jury 2: holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury 3: recognizing that a constructive amendment to an indictment occurs when either the government the court or both broadens the possible bases for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury 4: holding that in the situation of a possible dismissal of an indictment because of possible grand jury tampering  only where knowing perjury relating to a material matter has been presented to the grand jury should the trial judge dismiss an otherwise valid indictment


Input: containers], which could be utilized in the event that both generators should fail for some reason.” 11 . TransAtlantic’s vice president filed a declaration stating that costs of supplying the clip-on generators required by the solicitation and the fuel to power them is approximately $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year for each container. We have no other evidence on this issue. Defendant responded only that this estimate "could be wrong.” The vice president also asserted that owning the barge and operating it with the company's own employees cost more than $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year. 12 . At least one court has ruled that a finding of likely success on the merits creates a presumption of irreparable harm. See CW Gov't Travel, Inc. v. United States, 61 Fed.Cl. 559, 577 (2004) (<HOLDING>)(quoting Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding candidates for judicial office were entitled to preliminary injunction of expenditure limit given likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm and lack of public interest in enforcing a law that curtailed political speech 1: holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest 2: holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm 3: holding that a movant that clearly establishes likelihood of success on the merits receives the benefit of a presumption of irreparable harm 4: holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction


Input: argued that “given the criteria for major reports at the CCUSO unit,” section 229A.8A(2)(e) constituted “an unconstitutional imposition of a limitation on a less restrictive placement.” While we generally oppose the “elevat[ion of] form over substance” in conducting error preservation analysis, we note Taft did not cite a specific constitutional principle or provision in support of his challenge to section 229A.8A(2)(e). Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 465 N.W.2d 280, 283-84 (Iowa 1991) (noting that error was preserved on a due process argument where the party cited the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Due Process Clause in support of its constitutional challenge); see also City of Muscatine v. Northbrook P’ship Co., 619 N.W.2d 362, 368 n. 2 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>). A party cannot preserve error for appeal by Holdings: 0: holding that patients constitutional due process rights were violated when his trial counsel was not allowed to present a closing argument prior to involuntary commitment 1: holding that when neither the petitioners state court briefs nor the state courts decision made any reference to any federal constitutional claim or cited any federal constitutional cases the lack of fundamental error found by the state court was a lack of fundamental error under arizonas state constitution 2: holding a party failed to preserve error on its constitutional due process argument concerning notice when they did not cite any state or federal constitutional provision to the trial court or otherwise explain how lack of notice violated their constitutional rights 3: holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice 4: recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify


Input: specified different criminal penalties for violations of the Trafficking Act, which include restitution for a defendant’s ill-gotten gains. 18 U.S.C. § 1593(b)(3). If the government wanted to seek penalties under the Trafficking Act, it was required to prosecute Defendants under the Trafficking Act. Having chosen to prosecute Defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 241, it may seek only the penalties authorized by law for violations of that crime. The government has cited no authority — and we know of none — for the proposition that the district court may exceed its statutory authority simply because of the government’s assertion that “defendants engaged in the same sort of behavior” as a crime of which Defendants were not convicted. Because the district court rejected the correct r.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1057 Holdings: 0: holding district courts adoption of the presentence report constitutes sufficient findings 1: holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error 2: holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error 3: holding that a district courts failure to make the necessary findings related to a restitution order constitutes plain error 4: holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error


Input: requirements of the Uniformity Clause and the federal Equal Protection Clause. Appellants forcefully argue that, in a series of decisions, the intermediate court has misconstrued our analysis and holding in Downingtown. Thus, it is helpful to first review the relevant facets of that opinion and clarify their significance. The Downingtown Court recited the foundational and longstanding principle that “a taxpayer is entitled to relief under the Uniformity Clause where his property is assessed at a higher percentage of'fair market value than other properties throughout the taxing district.” Downingtown, 590 Pa. at 466, 913 A.2d at 199 (citing In re Harleigh Realty Co., 299 Pa. 385, 388, 149 A. 653, 654 (1930)); see Appeal of F.W. Woolworth Co., 426 Pa. 583, 587, 235 A.2d 793, 795 (1967) (<HOLDING>), quoted in Downingtown, 590 Pa. at 468, 913 Holdings: 0: recognizing that uniformity has at its heart the equalization of the ratio among all properties in the district 1: recognizing that using false documents that go to the heart of an asylum claim can indicate lack of credibility 2: holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding 3: recognizing implicit waiver of the attorney client privilege where the plaintiff has placed in issue a communication which goes to the heart of the claim in controversy 4: holding that omissions in petitioners asylum application which go to the heart of the claim support adverse credibility finding


Input: she had just “glanced at it” but that no one had prevented her from reading it. Moreover, she testified, she was represented by counsel when she signed that document. "See Burroughs v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 618 So.2d 1329, 1332 (Ala.1993) (“When the plaintiff ... [consults an expert in a field] ... [t]he knowledge and understanding of [that] expert are attributed to the plaintiff.”). She also testified that she had no personal knowledge whatever of any wrongdoing by Merrill Lynch. Furthermore, Ms. Kirton and Merrill Lynch made no exceptions to their agreement that would have specifically excluded certain types of claims from arbitration. See Ex parte Dyess, 709 So.2d 447 (Ala.1997); Jones v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 604 So.2d 332 (Ala.1991); H.L. Fulle 995) (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Dickinson, 711 So.2d 984 (Ala.1998) Holdings: 0: holding that claims of breach of fiduciary duty negligence and fraud were subject to arbitration in light of broad arbitration clause which called for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of or relating to this agreement breach thereof or any aecounts   1: holding that under federal law the party seeking to obviate the forum selection clause must prove that the inclusion of the clause was the result of fraud or coercion  fraud in the inducement as to the entire contract is not enough 2: holding that a clause requiring arbitration of any controversy or claim that shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof was sufficiently broad to cover a 1934 securities act claim involving fraudulent misrepresentation 3: holding that the language of the arbitration clause   any controversy or claim arising out of     was broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract 4: holding that a clause covering any controversy or claim  related directly or indirectly to this agreement was a broad arbitration clause


Input: arise: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. See LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 539 (1997). As plaintiffs do not allege the existence of a fiduciary relationship or that Ford made any representations about its ignition locks, only the second and third of the above-referenced circumstances are implicated here, and, as set forth above, both require a finding of “materiality.” See, e.g., Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F.Supp.2d 964, 970-71 (N.D.Cal.2008), (<HOLDING>), aff'd Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 322 Holdings: 0: holding that a constitutional challenge to a statute is not properly preserved for appellate review if as here it is not presented to the trial court and is raised for the first time on appeal 1: holding that section 636b1c does not require any review at all by the district court of an issue that is not objected to 2: recognizing the preliminary issue in a first amendment challenge is whether the speech at issue is protected or unprotected 3: holding that section 636b1c  does not require any review at all  of any issue that is not the subject of an objection 4: holding the first condition is not at issue here  all of the other situations require materiality


Input: authority to determine whether we 'have jurisdiction over deportation orders‘concerning alleged aggravated felons as described in Tapia Garcia, supra, “the plain language of § 1252(a)(2)(C) fairly explicitly strips the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to hear their claims on petitions for direct review.” Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 351, 121 S.Ct. 2268, 150 L.Ed.2d 392 (2001). Because Mr. Latu does not contest his status as an aggravated felon subject to removal, thereby admitting the jurisdip-tional fact that strips the court of jurisdiction to review his final order-of removal, he has not. failed to seek an available judicial remedy, and he is not procedurally barred from habeas review in the district court. See Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Ramtulla v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 202, 203 & n. Holdings: 0: recognizing appellate court jurisdiction over questions of law when objections were not presented below 1: recognizing that failure by state to provide the required certification deprives appeals court of jurisdiction over appeal 2: holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction 3: holding that review of questions not raised to the bia is barred 4: holding that  1252a2c deprives court of appeals of jurisdiction over constitutional questions as well as other questions presented in petition for review by removable alien who has committed qualifying aggravated felony


Input: that FHLMC is a United States agency fo onsequential] damages are in the nature of expectancy damages: they place [plaintiff] in the position it claims it would have been had the promises been kept. Such damages are not recoverable through promissory estop-pel.”). 18 . Wells v. Hico Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d 243, 251 n. 9 (5th Cir.1984). 19 . Brown v. Slenker, 220 F.3d 411, 421 n. 9 (5th Cir.2000). 20 . Gomez v. St. Jude Med. Daig Div. Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 927 (5th Cir.2006). 21 . Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1986). 22 . Washington v. Dep't of Transp., 8 F.3d 296, 299 (5th Cir.1993). 23 . See Young v. Repine (In re Repine), 536 F.3d 512, 518 n. 5 (5th Cir.2008). 24 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g)(2). 25 . See Coco v. United States, 569 F.2d 367, 372 (5th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). 26 . See Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(3) ("A matter is Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply laches where the only prejudice shown by the government was attributable to its own delay rather than to that of the movant 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a rule 56f motion for a continuance where the movant had ample time in which to pursue the discovery that it now claims is essential 4: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form


Input: class certification elements. C. The Prudential Life Insurance Sales Practices Class Action Satisfies Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) 1. The Estimated Eight Million Policyholders Satisfy the Numerosity Requirement 40. The proposed j class must be comprised of members that are so numerous that “joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1); see In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F.Supp. 1449, 1464 (D.N.J.1987). To meet the numerosity requirement, class representatives must demonstrate only that “common sense” suggests that it would be difficult or inconvenient to join all class members. Lerch v. Citizens First Bancorp, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 247, 250 (D.N.J.1992). The Court may consider the geographical dispersion of class members. Eisenberg, 766 F.2d at 785-86 (<HOLDING>). “To be sure, when the class is very large — Holdings: 0: holding that a potential class of 256 members did not satisfy numerosity 1: holding joinder not practicable where 100 to 150 class members were geographically dispersed 2: holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification 3: holding numerosity requirement to be satisfied where putative securities fraud class consisted of more than 90 geographically dispersed plaintiffs 4: holding that securities fraud plaintiffs do not have to prove loss causation to obtain class certification


Input: trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorneys on the counts premised on the alleged breach of the Disciplinary Rules. In affirming the summary judgment, this Court stated: “The Alabama courts, state and federal, have never addressed the issue of whether a breach of a Disciplinary Rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the basis for a private cause of action. However, courts in other jurisdictions which have confronted this issue have expressly held that a violation of a Disciplinary Rule does not create a private cause of action. Tew v. Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver, & Harris, P.A., 655 F.Supp. 1573 (S.D.Fla.1987); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.Supp. 1376 (N.D.Iowa 1978), aff'd mem., 590 F.2d 341 (8th So.2d 363, 367 (Ala.1996) (<HOLDING>); Baker v. Baker, 862 So.2d 659, 663 Holdings: 0: holding that a breach of the rules of professional conduct would not justify setting aside a divorce judgment and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 1: holding that the disciplinary rules of the code of professional responsibility are not laws of the state of texas for purposes of statute which excludes the admission of evidence obtained in violation of law 2: holding that the rules of professional conduct are selfimposed internal regulations and do not play a role in determining the admissi bility of evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 3: holding violation of the rules of professional conduct does not create a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor constitute negligence per se although it may be used as some evidence of negligence 4: holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability


Input: not of limitation) rev’d on different grounds 474 U.S. 9, 106 S.Ct. 289, 88 L.Ed.2d 9 (1985). Accordingly, this court concludes that the plain meaning of “discharge” does not restrict the definition to point sources or non-point sources with conveyances. Defendants next argue that their interpretation of § 401(a) should receive deference from this court. Defendants assert that the court should defer to the Forest Service’s long-standing practice of not requiring state certification for cattle grazing. The Supreme Court addressed the standards for determining the amount of deferenc the one it is entrusted to administer is entitled to no deference. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S., 29 Fed.Cl. 197, 223 (1993); Wachtel v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d 581, 585 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, a post hoc rationalization by Holdings: 0: holding deference to agency methodology appropriate unless agency failed to address an essential factor 1: holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 2: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 3: holding that deference to an agency interpretation is not appropriate where a statute is administered by more than one agency 4: holding that under a due weight deference standard a more reasonable interpretation overcomes an agency interpretation


Input: plate. 308 Or at 93. But, when the officer approached the defendant’s car, he saw a temporary registration sticker in the window. At that point, the officer’s reason for the stop evaporated. Id. Nevertheless, the officer proceeded to ask the defendant for his driver’s license and proof of registration. The defendant’s responses to those requests led to the discovery of evidence that the defendant’s license was suspended and he was driving uninsured. The Supreme Court held that, once the reason for the stop evaporated, the officer did not have authority to ask the defendant for his license and registration, and the court affirmed the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence resulting from those requests. Id. at 94; see also State v. Bentz, 211 Or App 129, 134, 158 P3d 1081 (2007) (<HOLDING>). As Starr and Farley show, an illegal stop Holdings: 0: holding that defendants voluntary consent to search his car dissipated taint of officers illegal entry 1: holding that officers request for defendants name during an illegal entry constituted exploitation of the illegal entry under hall 2: recognizing difference in elements between offense of actual entry and attempted entry 3: holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry 4: holding that a confession obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest is not admissible


Input: get Morganti paid for unilateral modifications prior to the execution of bilateral modifications with respect to CPC 53 and CPC 58. Ms. Moore testified that she believed Mor-ganti was entitled to some money for these CPC’s, even though she disagreed with the total amount Morganti was requesting in each of the CPC’s. Thus, Ms. Moore released $2 million that was being retained for lack of progress until she and Morganti could defini-tize bilateral modifications based on CPC 53 and CPC 58. In sum, the court finds that neither Ms. McBride nor Ms. Moore did anything to intentionally undermine Morganti’s performance. Importantly, Morganti presented no evidence that the FBOP’s conduct interfered with its ability to perform. D.W. Sandau Dredging, 96-1 BCA ¶ 28,064, at 140,160, 1995 WL 739023 (<HOLDING>) (citing Northern Helex, 197 Ct.Cl. at 124-25, Holdings: 0: holding plaintiff not required to perform its residual contract obligations after defendants material breach 1: holding only a material breach discharges contractors duty to perform 2: holding that whether failure to make progress or other payments is material depends upon the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the contractors ability to perform 3: holding that a district court is entitled to give more weight to the seriousness of the offense than to other factors 4: holding that the right of action accrued upon failure to perform contract


Input: agreement” that “achieved [plaintiffs] objective of obtaining injunctive relief to make [defendant’s hotel] accessible”). This is because a “prevailing plaintiff ... should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134 (9th Cir.2002). The Ninth Circuit has held that an ADA plaintiff is a prevailing party if she: (1) “achieve[s] a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties”; and (2) that alteration is “judicially sanctioned.” Jankey v. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2008). The second requirement can be met in many ways, including when a party enters into a legally enforceable agreement with the defendant. Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff was not the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys fees even where the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement because there was insufficient judicial sanctioning of the alteration of the parties legal relationship 1: holding that the district court abused its discretion by telling the jury about the right of a prevailing plaintiff to attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 2: holding that plaintiff was prevailing party under 42 usc  12205 because he could enforce a settlement against the defendant 3: holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action 4: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees


Input: not present during the above-referenced proceedings. The speakers are identified based upon representations made by others.” But regardless of the authenticity of this transcript, the Estate submits it for the first time on appeal, and we will not consider evidence that was not presented to the trial court. See Givens v. Ichauway, Inc., 268 Ga. 710, 712 (1) (493 SE2d 148) (1997) (“[A]ppellate courts will review only evidence presented to the trial court before its ruling on the motion. Additional evidence will not be admitted on appeal.” (punctuation omitted)); Meade v. Heimanson, 239 Ga. 177, 180 (236 SE2d 357) (1977) (same); RC Cola Bottling Co. v. Vann, 220 Ga. App. 479, 480(1) (469 SE2d 523) (1996) (same); see also Jones v. O’Day, 303 Ga. App. 159, 162-63 n.4 (692 SE2d 774) (2010) (<HOLDING>); Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shook, 215 Holdings: 0: holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal 1: holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal 2: holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court 3: holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court 4: holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal


Input: did have a prepetition legal interest in that case. At the time of bankruptcy, § 172 of the Internal Revenue Code gave the debtor a claim for a tax refund if certain conditions were met. It was the combination of the law and the conditions made legally relevant by the law that conferred on the debtor a prepetition legal interest: the claim for a refund. In that way, the Segal debtors’ claim for a refund is similar to the prepetition accrual of a cause of action that results in a post-petition judgment in the debtor’s favor. In such eases, the debtor’s cause of action is a prepetition legal interest — ■§ 541(a)(1) property- — -that brings the postpetition judgment into the estate as proceeds under § 541(a)(6). See, e.g., Wieburg v. GTE Southwest Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, by contrast, Burgess suffered the crop Holdings: 0: holding that claims harming the debtor corporation that arose from prepetition conduct become property of the estate under 11 usc  541a1 1: holding that causes of action for age and sex discrimination that arose prepetition were property of the bankruptcy estate 2: holding that to make out the fourth element of a prima facie case of sex discrimination plaintiff must prove that males remained in similar positions and similarly for age discrimination that she was otherwise discharged because of her age 3: holding lost future wages recovered pursuant to a prepetition cause of action are property of the estate 4: holding age discrimination claim barred


Input: not necessary. And in its “Technical Support Document,” the EPA explained why it believed the revised MVEB was adequate for conformity purposes. Although the explanations may not have been as detailed as the Petitioner would have liked, we nonetheless conclude that through these documents the EPA adequately addressed the somewhat general comments of the Petitioner and sufficiently explained the basis and purpose of its actions. See Reytblatt v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722-23 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (“Although the NRC did not directly respond to Dr. Reytblatt’s suggested alternatives ..., its explanation was adequate in light of the general nature of Dr. Reyt-blatt’s comments.... ”); National Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Browner, 984 F.2d 1243, 1252 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). VI. To summarize, we conclude that nothing in Holdings: 0: holding that a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 1: holding the rule of lenity inapplicable where the defendants interpretation failed to give meaning to each statutory provision 2: holding epas interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision unreasonable where it was inconsistent with the clean air acts purpose 3: holding that the epas explanation in five different documents of its interpretation of a specific statutory provision satisfied the apas basisandpurpose requirement 4: holding that to the extent the petition challenges the application of epas regulatory interpretation to petitioners plants the challenge is unripe


Input: WL 625006, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 9, 1997); Rodriguez v. Margotta, 71 F.Supp.2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (McMahon, J.); Schultz v. Inc. Vill. of Bellport, No. 08CV0930, 2010 WL 3924751, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (Bianco, J.)). Here, the Individual Defendants did not deny Plaintiff all opportunities to practice in her chosen profession. It is undeniable that Defendants’ actions made it more difficult for Plaintiff to attain her goal as she now has a failing grade on her resume, lost her scholarship, and was only offered to repeat a course for which she allegedly should have been awarded credit. However, the ultimate resolution of Plaintiffs grade appeal was an opportunity to retake the student teaching seminar. See Sacco v. Pataki, 114 F.Supp.2d 264, 273 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (Cedarbaum, J.) (<HOLDING>); Empire Transit Mix, Inc. v. Giuliani, 37 Holdings: 0: holding convicted sex offender had not been deprived of liberty interest for purposes of procedural due process challenge to sorp 1: holding plaintiffs are not deprived of a liberty interest because they cannot have the best job in their field 2: holding that although the parking citation that the plaintiff received did not indicate where and how to contest the allegation the plaintiff was not deprived of procedural due process because he received a summons to appear in court via first class mail before he was deprived of any liberty interest 3: holding that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 4: holding that a prisoner cannot be deprived of a protected liberty interest in goodtime credits without procedural due process


Input: 2. Local Law Claims Lastly, Defendants request that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims if the federal law claims are dismissed. Plaintiff asserts several causes of action under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Specifically, she alleges claims under Puerto Rico Laws 17, 69,100 and 80. With the dismissal of federal claims against Defendant, there are no pending claims giving rise to federal jurisdiction. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A). As such, dismissal of pending state law claims is proper because an independent jurisdictional basis is lacking. Exercising jurisdiction over pendent state law claims once the federal law claims are no longer present in the lawsuit is discretionary. See Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, the court chooses not to Holdings: 0: holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit 1: holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit  and the district court has considerable authority whether or not to exercise this power in light of such considerations as judicial economy convenience fairness to litigants and eomity  2: holding if the legislature had the power to confer upon the county commissioners jurisdiction to hear and determine the question as to whether or not a town was of undue extent and to deprive it of a part of its territory then the proceeding being statutory before a body of limited powers the record must show affirmatively that such a case was brought before them as they were authorized to hear and determine and that all the jurisdictional facts were found to exist where the jurisdiction and power to hear and determine depends upon the existence of a fact that fact must appear or the proceedings are coram non judice and void 3: holding that in the interest of judicial economy we exercise our discretionary power to suspend the rules pertaining to interlocutory appeals and address the remainder of the defendants appeal 4: recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power


Input: with Turnage that the postconviction court’s formulation of the second Larrison prong was erroneous insofar as it seemed to focus its inquiry on whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Turnage even without Quantez’s testimony. Under the second Larrison prong, the court is to ask whether the petitioner has demonstrated “that without the [recanting witness’s] testimony, the jury might have reached a different conclusion.” Williams, 692 N.W.2d at 896; see also Hooper, 680 N.W.2d at 96 (affirming the postconviction court’s holding that second prong not met because “even without [the recanting witness’s] testimony, the strength of the other evidence presented at trial was such that the jury would not likely have reached a different conclusion”); cf. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 424 (<HOLDING>). As these cases make clear, the second Holdings: 0: holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses 1: holding that second prong was met because of the seven witnesses who testified for the state in a largely circumstantial case the testimony of five of them was either formally recanted or otherwise called into doubt in postconviction proceedings 2: holding any error in admitting testimony of expert witness was harmless because it was cumulative of same testimony given by six other expert witnesses who testified at trial 3: holding that second state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as an abuse of the writ was properly filed 4: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial


Input: sentencing range. Because the district court abused its discretion when it imposed this substantively unreasonable sentence, I respectfully dissent. 1 . On a prior appeal of Edwards’s sentence to this Court, Judge Kleinfeld dissented from the majority's decision to remand Edwards’s sentence to the district court for possible resen-tencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Edwards, 158 Fed.Appx. at 932 (Kle-infeld, J., dissenting). Judge Kleinfeld would have vacated the sentence as substantively unreasonable and remanded for resentencing. Id. 2 . Section 3553(a)(2) lists factors a district court must consider when it decides whether to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range. Section 3553(a)(2) require 7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Even outside the context of white collar Holdings: 0: holding that a sentence of twelve months imprisonment was unreasonably lenient where the defendant engaged in wire fraud and caused 90000 in losses and the guidelines range was sixtythree to seventyeight months imprisonment 1: holding that the district courts imposition of a 15month sentence when the guidelines range was 37 to 46 months imprisonment a 60 downward variance was unreasonable 2: holding that a sentence of seven days imprisonment was substantively unreasonable where the defendant participated in a securities fraud conspiracy that caused more than 1 billion in losses 3: holding a sentence is not based on the guidelines unless the plea agreement itself expressly uses a guidelines sentencing range to establish the term of imprisonment 4: holding that a sentence of five years probation was unreasonably lenient where the defendant played a key role in an accounting fraud scheme that caused over 1 billion in losses to a companys shareholders and the guidelines range was seventyeight to ninetyseven months imprisonment


Input: could not state that proposition. Alabama law is not permitted by the FAA to treat arbitratio his case. That fact is uncontested. In addition, it is uncontested that the contract to which Stiles assented may be changed by AGFC. A contract incorporating such a clause is valid under the laws of both Utah and Alabama. See discussion below. Stiles has, therefore, assented to an arbitration clause, even absent his signature. Cf. Clayton v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society, 981 F.Supp. 1447 (M.D.Ala.1997) (compelling arbitration where arbitration clause was included in constitution of fraternal benefit society, which was incorporated by reference into insurance contract); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. den., — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 47, 139 L.Ed.2d 13 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The provision is not invalid because not Holdings: 0: holding corporation vicariously liable for assault on customer by assistant manager as customer was engaged in trying to settle a controversy concerning a portion of defendants business 1: holding former employee could properly use recollection of customer information where he did not otherwise misappropriate an actual customer list 2: holding that arbitration clause which was included with product mailed to customer and with proviso that customer could return product within 30 days was binding on customer who did not return computer 3: holding that a bank customer was not bound to arbitrate where the signature card that was signed referenced a collateral document which contained an arbitration clause but the bank never sent the customer a copy of the collateral document 4: holding that murder committed by customer was not foreseeable result of excessive sale of alcohol to customer


Input: in federal court, “[t]he state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Congress codified this holding in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which provides that when district courts have original jurisdiction, “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same ease or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” Once a district court decides the state claims derive from the same operative facts, it possesses discretion to determine whether to deny exercising supplemental jurisdiction. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (<HOLDING>); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding a district courts application of supplemental jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion not of plaintiffs right 1: holding that a district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs statelaw claims after dismissing the plaintiffs federal claims and did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand the case to state court 2: holding that jurisdiction must be resolved before applying the act of state doctrine because that doctrine is a substantive rule of law 3: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 4: holding law of case doctrine is procedural and does not go to jurisdiction of court