Input: at any time after an action for equitable distribution has been filed and prior to the final judgment of equitable distribution, enter orders declaring what is separate property and dividing part of the marital property between the parties. The partial distribution may provide for a distributive award. Any such orders entered shall be taken into consideration at trial and proper credit given. Interim equitable distribution orders are by nature preliminary to entry of a final equitable distribution judgment and thus are interlocutory. See Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 57 S.E.2d 377, reh’g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950) (explaining that an interlocutory ruling is one that does not finally determine the issues presented but instead leaves the matter 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, permitting an immediate appeal from Holdings: 0: holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders 1: holding forced medication orders are immediately appealable 2: holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291 3: holding that orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable as collateral orders 4: holding that pendente lite orders and awards are not immediately appealable


Input: are no plaintiffs and defendants in a will contest, and it is not instituted by the filing of a complaint. This was the case in the Civil Code, which applied to probate courts only in civil actions and had separate provisions governing will contests. See Civil Code ss 24, 806, s 513. While those provisions governing will contests have been superseded by the Probate Code of 1949, the nature of the proceedings has not. Coleman, 257 Ark. at 408, 520 S.W.2d at 242. Here, the will was not probated, and the Estate did not seek to contest the will under the probate statutes. Rather, the Estate’s state court complaint asserted a claim pursuant to Arkansas’s declaratory judgment act. That act provides, in pertinent part: “Any person interes , 485, 41 Ill.Dec. 633, 407 N.E.2d 1131, 1134 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Assuming, without deciding, that an action to Holdings: 0: holding that an action challenging the validity of a will may not be brought under ohios declaratory judgment act 1: holding that a plaintiffs declaratory judgment petition with a copy of the third codicil attached was sufficient to initiate a will contest in a probate proceeding 2: holding that the trial courts determination that the invalidity of an unprobated will under texass declaratory judgment act was not error where the action was joined with a probate action and multiple wills were before the court 3: holding that an action under the illinois declaratory judgment act to void a will must be construed as a will contest that is governed by the laws controlling such contests in probate proceedings 4: holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment


Input: have uniform application within the class of those subject to its provisions. This attribute alone disqualifies WCTF’s claim under § 65(8) from classification as a tax. B. The Principle of Equal Distribution. There is another reason, however, for treating claims under § 65(8) as non-tax claims. As noted above, Feiring teaches that the policies of the Bankruptcy Code establish the criteria upon which priority status of a claim is to be determined. 313 U.S. at 285, 61 S.Ct. 1028. Giving tax priority to WCTF’s reimbursement claim here would enervate the Bankruptcy Code’s central policy of equal distribution among similar creditors. See Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1067-68; New Neighborhoods, 886 F.2d at 718-19 (noting the need to limit priority claims in bankruptcy); Suburban II, 36 F.3d at 487 (<HOLDING>) (citing Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 Holdings: 0: holding that courts should give due consideration to the premise that equality of distribution among creditors is a central policy of the bankruptcy code 1: holding that section 105a facilitates compliance with the bankruptcy code and the bankruptcy courts orders and compliance is one of the central goals of civil contempt sanctions 2: holding reimbursement claims were excise taxes under the lorber test without addressing the bankruptcy codes central policy of equal distribution 3: holding that creditors rights are subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the bankruptcy code 4: holding that the bankruptcy courts as compared to state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine issues of dischargeability under the bankruptcy code


Input: failed to pay Wall’s commissions or did so in bad faith in order to receive treble damages. We disagree and find that the trial court’s interpretation was not an abuse of discretion. South Carolina case law does not support Fruehaufs position. Fruehauf cites to a number of cases which discuss puni tive damages in general, but not treble damages under § 41-10-80(0). See, e.g., Carter v. R.C. Jordan Oil Co., 301 S.C. 84, 390 S.E.2d 367, 368 (S.C.Ct.App.1990). Although South Carolina law requires that there be no good faith dispute concerning the wages due in order for treble damages to be awarded under § 41-10-80(0, the decision is in the complete discretion of the trial court and no specific finding of bad faith or willfulness is required. Rice, 318 S.C. 95, 456 S.E.2d 381 (S.C.1995) (<HOLDING>); Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Holdings: 0: holding that the tcpas treble damages provision is remedial 1: holding that when a trial court determines that the amount of damages awarded by a jury is excessive the court may either suggest remittitur or grant a new trial on the issue of damages 2: holding that threequarter guarantee payments were not wages under arizona wage payment laws permitting treble damages for nonpayment under rationale that wages are restricted to compensation due an employee in return for work performed 3: holding that the treble damages provision is not mandatory and will not apply if the trial court determines that a good faith dispute over the wages allegedly due exists 4: holding that the award of treble damages while a matter of discretion for the trial court is inappropriate in circumstances where there is a bona fide wage dispute


Input: indicia of fraud to create inquiry notice as a matter of law in Betz, UL was engaged in endorsing products for reasonably safe consumer use, and its listing of the Cadet heaters as safe, in combination with the 1999 recall, was sufficient to give Platt notice that UL’s prior assurances of the heaters’ safety were potentially false. It is irrelevant what else Platt might have learned through further diligent investigation after 1999 about UL’s misrepresentations or intent to deceive Platt and others regarding the Cadet heaters’ safety, because in 1999 Platt already knew that UL’s prior representations about the heaters’ safety were false, and that knowledge was sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations for fraud under California law. See Hamilton Materials, 494 F.3d at 1206-07 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). These cases demonstrate Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice 1: holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale 2: holding in a civil rico case based upon predicate acts of mail and wire fraud that the plaintiff must plead a material misrepresentation of fact that was calculated or intended to deceive persons of reasonable prudence and comprehension and that the plaintiff relied upon that material misrepresentation to establish the fraud statutes requisite scheme to defraud 3: holding that a plaintiff need not have notice of the defendants specific intention to deceive before the fraud action accrued all that is relevant is that a reasonable person  would have been on notice of a potential misrepresentation 4: holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city


Input: the codefen-dants’ testimony that Green had firearms at his home and that they went to Green’s house specifically to obtain firearms to use in the burglary. Green argued that even if the evidence of these firearms had some relevance, which Green did not concede, any relevance was significantly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court overruled Green’s objections and admitted the firearms into evidence. As to the two firearms found in Green’s roommate’s bedroom, the trial court erred by admitting any evidence of these guns because they were completely irrelevant. Relevant evidence is evidence that tends to prove or disprove a material fact. See § 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2007); see also Zabner v. Howard Johnson’s Inc. of Fla., 227 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) (<HOLDING>). Here, not only were these two firearms not Holdings: 0: holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury 1: holding relevance of evidence is established by any showing however slight that the evidence makes it more or less likely that the defendant committed the crime in question 2: holding that relevant evidence has a tendency to establish a fact in controversy or to render a proposition in issue more or less probable 3: holding that speculative theory of possible injury insufficient to establish injury in fact under article ills case or controversy requirement 4: recognizing that the case or controversy requirement for standing is no less strict in a declaratory judgment proceeding than in any suit where other relief is sought


Input: counsel? RYAN, Judge, with whom STUCKY, Judge, joins (dissenting): This Court granted review of the decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals on one issue raised by Appellant: ‘Whether [detailed counsel’s] failure to disclose his conflict of interest resulted in an uninformed and invalid election of counsel.” Rather than answer this question, which is directly controlled by Supreme Court precedent and not an open issue, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (“[T]o demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.”), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>), the majority remands the case for additional Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant was deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel where appointed counsels representation presented a conflict of interest 1: holding defendant must demonstrate an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance 2: holding that to demonstrate that a conflict of interest violated his sixth amendment rights a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance 3: holding that defense counsels performance was adversely affected by an actual conflict of interest if a specific and seemingly valid or genuine alternative strategy or tactic was available to defense counsel but it was inherently in conflict with his duties to others  4: holding that defendant must demonstrate both that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance to establish a sixth amendment violation


Input: award, do not justify overturning that award. Instead, only “utterly irrational” legal conclusions will be cognizable; “[i]n these circumstances the appropriate standard of review is whether the construction of the contract presents such an egregious mistake that it amounts to an arbitrary remaking of the contract between the parties.” 277 Cal.Rptr. at 714. Other jurisdictions have applied stricter standards for upsetting an award than that adopted by the plurality. E.g., Department of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 294 Ark. 255, 743 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (1988) (reviewing Uniform Arbitration Act and holding mistakes of law insufficient to overturn an award absent fraud or corruption); Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Auth., 242 Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122, 127 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Runewicz v. Keystone Ins. Co., 476 Pa. 456, Holdings: 0: holding that an award of arbitration cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law or the facts if the award is within the scope of the submission and the arbitrators are not guilty  of the acts of misconduct set forth in the statute the award operates as a final and conclusive judgment and  however disappointing it may be  the parties must abide by it 1: holding that manifest disregard of the law is one of the very unusual circumstances in which a federal court can set aside an arbitration award 2: holding that errors of law without accompanying fraud or misconduct not enough to set aside arbitration award 3: holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment 4: recognizing that a trial court can set aside verdict


Input: unrecorded bench conference with the foreperson, the trial court informed the foreperson that it needed to give him “one other instruction” and instructed him that “[t]he issues about which we had talked in this courtroom, both here at the bench and also openly on the record, are issues you that are not to share with the other jurors.” While the record sufficiently reveals that the trial court violated the unanimity requirement by instructing only the foreperson, the record is inadequate to meet the demanding task of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the State to meet its burden, the record must reveal the substance of the conversations at issue or the conversations must be adequately reconstructed. See, e.g., Boyd, 332 N.C. at 106, 418 S.E.2d at 474 (<HOLDING>); State v. Smith, 326 N.C. 792, 794-95, 392 Holdings: 0: holding that the state could not meet its burden of proving harmless error where the record did not reveal the substance of the trial courts unrecorded conversations with prospective jurors 1: holding that in appellate proceedings where no transcript is provided a trial courts decision has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error 2: holding that the trial courts definition of normal use was harmless error 3: holding that without transcript of trial proceedings appellate court cannot review underlying evidence so as to conclude that trial courts judgment is not supported by evidence 4: holding that the state cannot demonstrate harmless error where the substance of the trial courts conversation with an excused juror was not revealed by the transcript or reconstructed at trial


Input: Cir.2000). Patria potestas is codified in Peruvian law under the term “parental authority,” which is defined as the right and duty of the parents, to take care of the person and properly of their minor children. Civil Code of Peru § 418. In addition to providing rights and duties relating to the development, education, and assets of a child, parental authority gives parents the right to “[k]eep the children with them and appeal to the proper authority in order to recover them,” which necessarily implies rights relating to the child’s residence. Code of Children and Adolescents of Peru art. 74(e). Such patria potestas rights, which Correa received when the Children were born, are recognized as “rights of custody” within the meaning of the Hague Convention. See Whallon, 230 F.3d at 459 (<HOLDING>). Cf. Bader v. Kramer, 445 F.3d 346, 350 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that patria potestas rights under mexican law are custody rights under the hague convention 1: holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the montreal convention 2: holding that because hague convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction lacks specific remedy for rights of access to children matters relating to access are best left to the state courts which are more experienced in resolving these issues 3: holding that state rights are equivalent to federal rights in this area 4: holding that rights under vienna convention are not the equivalent of fundamental rights such as the right to counsel


Input: cause existed. Id. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317. The totality of the circumstances, as set forth in Deputy Beuer’s affidavit, supported a finding of probable cause. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); see also United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 958 (9th Cir.2009) (affirming probable cause finding based in part on buzzing noise and odor of growing marijuana); United States v. Kerr, 876 F.2d 1440, 1444-45 (9th Cir.1989) (affirming denial of motion to suppress where officer smelled growing marijuana); United States v. Roberts, 747 F.2d 537, 544 (9th Cir.1984) (affirming probable cause finding in part due to frost-free garage roof and covered windows suggesting marijuana grow operation). The existence of the Compass r.3d 80, 146 P.3d 531 (Cal.2006) (<HOLDING>). The district court properly denied a hearing Holdings: 0: holding that an affirmative defense is ordinarily lost if not timely raised 1: holding that laches is an affirmative defense 2: holding cua is an affirmative defense to be raised at trial 3: holding mmpa is an affirmative defense to be raised at trial 4: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense


Input: further action by the trial court). An interlocutory decree is immediately appealable only if permitted by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277 (1996), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (1990), or N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(d) (1995). The only possible basis on which the present order could be immediately appealable under any of these statutes is on the ground it affects a substantial right. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ l-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(l). To be immediately appealable on that basis, plaintiff has the burden of showing that: (1) the order affects a right that is substantial; and (2) the deprivation of that substantial right will potentially work injury to plaintiff if not corrected before appeal from final judgment. Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 392 S.E.2d 735 (1990). Fur 5 (1982) (<HOLDING>); and Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. Holdings: 0: holding order awarding father temporary partial custody prior to custody hearing was not final and appealable under rule 341 1: holding that a temporary order granting emergency relief and temporary child custody under the domestic violence act is not immediately appealable 2: holding that mandamus is appropriate remedy because temporary order granting visitation is not appealable 3: holding that the uccja applied to a california child custody order granting temporary custody of two children to their father 4: holding that mandamus was appropriate remedy because temporary order granting visitation is not appealable


Input: with leaving his property unprotected by a properly applied chemical treatment barrier.” But as plaintiff readily acknowledges, he filed this suit a mere eight days after purchasing Terminate, despite the fact that the Terminate label specifically advised, under the heading, “IMPORTANT USAGE NOTES”: Results depend upon the species involved, weather, moisture, time of year, and may take 1-4 months or longer. Time required for effectiveness depends upon how quickly the terminates enter the stake and feed upon the bait. While for reasons undisclosed -by plaintiff in his complaint or otherwise, plaintiff may have suspected, within a- mere week of his purchase of the Terminate, that the product ultimately would not perform as represented and that his property 66 Cal.Rptr. 106 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Zamora v. Shell Oil Co., 55 Cal.App.4th 204, Holdings: 0: holding the mda did not preempt plaintiffs state common law claims for defective design defective manufacture and failure to warn 1: holding that plaintiffs failure to prove that the subject air valve had not been altered in some way invalidated their design defect claim 2: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 3: holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control 4: holding plaintiff with inherently defective heart valve failed to state a claim unless the valve malfunctioned


Input: relies, Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), involved a status-offense statute. The defendant in Lewis was charged with the federal offense of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony by a state court. He attempted to defend on the ground that he had been unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel in connection with the predicate felony conviction. The United States Supreme Court rejected Lewis’s challenge, concluding that Congress had manifested no intent to permit collateral attacks upon prior state convictions in federal criminal proceedings. Id. at .60. The Court distinguished the status-offense statute in Lewis from cases that involved penalty-enhancement statutes where the sentence was overturned. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115-16 (1967) Holdings: 0: holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury 1: holding an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is valid because no prison term was imposed and the conviction may be used to enhance a sentence for a subsequent offense 2: holding that felony conviction for which imposition of sentence was stayed could be counted as prior felony conviction under sentencing guidelines 3: holding uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may be sentence enhancer 4: holding that uncounseled conviction could not be considered by court in sentencing defendant after subsequent conviction


Input: that conclusion in Leimkuehler, rejecting arguments that Plan servicers met the requirements of subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition by selecting which mutual fund share classes to include on the investment menu offered to a 401(k) plan; by exercising authority or control over the management and disposition of plan assets in the separate accounts because that task had nothing to do with the alleged breach of fiduciary duty; and by reserving the right to substitute or delete funds made available to the Plan participants for the same reason. 713 F.3d at 911-12. It is worth noting that in Leimkuehler, the Seventh Circuit only addressed the fund-substitution theory under subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition, and attributed th , 270 (W.D.N.Y.2010) (<HOLDING>). Some courts have held that in some Holdings: 0: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan 1: holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions 2: holding that insurer was a fiduciary to a 401k plan because the insurer had the ability to substitute investment options and the plan had no meaningful opportunity to reject substitutions because of the penalty charges associated with doing so 3: holding that service provider which offered a big menu of investment options from which 401k the plan trustee selected a smaller plan menu was not a fiduciary because provider did not have ultimate authority over which investments were included in the plans 4: holding that plan servicer which provided 401k plan a menu of investment options was not a fiduciary because parties contract required servicer to give the plan notice of and opportunity to reject any changes to the menu


Input: disorder, bipolar affective disorder, and recurrent major depressive disorder does not automatically entitle him to a competency hearing especially since his most recent evaluations attest to his competency. Given our evaluation of the weight due to the various psychiatrists’ reports, we find that the Court has sufficient evidence to make a determination regarding the defendant’s competence without further proceedings. The stipulations filed by the government and defense counsel regarding defendant’s competence provide a complete picture of the defendant’s mental state and demeanor. Here, both parties were given a chance to provide what evidence they deemed appropriate to determine the defendant’s competence. See United States v. O’Neal, 969 F.2d 512, 514 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). This Court holds that a competency hearing is Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court need not hold a voluntariness hearing where the defendant did not object and no evidence presented raised the issue 1: holding that the district court did in effect hold a hearing when it gave the defense a chance to supplement a psychiatric report with further evidence 2: holding after remand that where the opposing party thus raises a material dispute as to the admissibility of expert scientific evidence the district court must hold an in limine hearing a socalled daubert hearing to consider the conflicting evidence   3: holding that the lower court was not required to hold a hearing on a motion to transfer 4: holding that court did not have to hold a hearing to determine attorneys fees where detailed affidavit was provided


Input: involve whether a particular sale qualified as a taxable “retail sal 7 Shetakis Dist. v. State, Dept. Taxation, 108 Nev. 901, 907, 839 P.2d 1315, 1319 (1992); Sierra Pac. Power v. Department Taxation, 96 Nev. 295, 297, 607 P.2d 1147, 1148 (1980). 8 Dawley, Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 605 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (Ind. T.C. 1992). 9 NRS 372.105. 10 NRS 372.050. 11 NRS 372.185; see also NRS 372.190 (explaining that the user of purchased property is generally liable for the use tax). 12 State, Dep’t Taxation v. Kelly-Ryan, Inc., 110 Nev. 276, 280, 871 P.2d 331, 334 (1994); see also NRS 372.345 (noting that use tax does not apply to property if sales tax was already collected with respect to that property’s sale). 13 Nev. Const. art. 10, § 3(A)(2)(a) and (b). 14 See also NRS 372.265 (<HOLDING>). 15 Although the Tax Department has argued Holdings: 0: holding that executive branch prosecution of disciplinary charges against a judge violated the separation of powers provision in the nevada constitution a provision identical to article v section 1 of the utah constitution 1: holding that definition of seizure under state constitution differs from that under us constitution 2: recognizing exception under state constitution 3: holding that under the federal constitution the states retained unlimited authority in matters of taxation except where trumped by for instance the commerce clause 4: recognizing that items prohibited from taxation under the nevada constitution are not taxable under nrs chapter 372


Input: with the approval of the Governor and in accordance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, ends its current impasse and adopts its own redistricting plan. 5 . The Supreme Court has also held that courts must utilize single-member districts "[ujnless the ... [c]ourt can articulate ... a singular combination of unique factors” that justifies a different result. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 21, 95 S.Ct. 751, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). The South Carolina General Assembly is already organized exclusively into single-member districts. 6 . For simplicity's sake, we refer to the Leath-erman plaintiffs simply as "Leatherman” and the Marcharía plaintiffs as the "ACLU.” 7 . See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Smith, 946 F.Supp. at 1206 (noting that Holdings: 0: recognizing frequent use of respect for municipal boundaries as criteria in evaluating redistricting plan 1: recognizing the obviously important government interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political activities  contained in the hatch act 2: holding that redistricting plan violated state constitutional mandate and thus affirming trial courts findings that 1 3: recognizing that a redistricting plan can be driven at least to some extent by partisan interests 4: holding redistricting plan would violate equal protection clause if it reflected a naked desire to increase partisan strength


Input: § 2518(l)(e) when it is not required for a violation of § 2518(l)(b)(iv). Disclosure of prior applications naming those individuals who are targets of a new investigation necessarily depends on the naming of the targets in the new application. If failure to name target Smith in a wiretap application would not require suppression, the failure to disclose prior applications which Smith was a named interceptee should not require suppression. Sullivan, 586 F.Supp. at 1323; Gambale, 610 F.Supp. at 1536-37 (quoting Sullivan). Accordingly, at least where, as here, a violation of subsection (l)(e) is inadvertent, suppression is not justified. Van Horn, 789 F.2d at 1500; Abramson, 553 F.2d at 1170; Gambale, 610 F.Supp. at 1537; Sullivan, 586 F.Supp. at 1323; but see Massino, 657 F.Supp. at 107 (<HOLDING>). In this ease, after initially deciding that a Holdings: 0: holding that a prior application might affect the issuing judges finding of necessity 1: holding that failure to follow state law requiring issuing judge to record testimony did not affect validity of warrant 2: holding that procedural violations merely affect the weight of the evidence 3: holding that resigntorun requirement in delaware judges code of judicial conduct did not violate first amendment interests of judges 4: holding that issuing judge may draw reasonable inferences from the material presented in the warrant application


Input: with less than ideal clarity; occasionally, legislation is opaque in instructing which federal tribunal is the proper — or a proper — forum for the first court airing of, or an appeal in, a particular kind of federal case. Compare Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 239-41 (D.C. Cir.1985), with id. at 944-946 (dissenting opinion) (divided views on “plain meaning” of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (1982)). When administrative' action is in question, as in the instant case, the governing statute may fail to say with precision whether judicial review should initially occur in a district court, or directly in a court of appeals. The matter at hand pointedly illustrates these difficulties, as did our previous encounter with these appellants, Lorion v. NRC, 712 F.2d 1472 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>), rev’d sub nom. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Holdings: 0: holding that there must first be a denial by atf for the district court to review 1: holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case 2: holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record 3: holding in land use situations courts have concluded in order for a regulatory takings claim to be ripe there must be a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue 4: holding that judicial review of nuclear regulatory commission decision at issue must first occur in district court


Input: As noted above, the act requires a shipyard that has agreed with a ship purchaser on a ship price to “submit [to Mar-Ad] backup cost details and evidence that the negotiated price is fair and reasonable.” 46 App. U.S.C. § 1152(a)(ii). The words “fair” and “reasonable” indicate that the Secretary should use an objective standard when determining whether the negotiated ship price is acceptable, since to do otherwise would relegate each inquiry under the statute to a web of subjectivity and destroy the continuity and predictability of administration and enforcement. Similarly, these words also indicate that the cost estimates that a shipyard submits to MarAd must also be objectively reasonable. See generally United States v. Davis, 666 F.Supp. 641, 643 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (Weinfeld, J. ) (<HOLDING>). In the legislative history of the 1970 Holdings: 0: holding that the transaction must be fair and equitable and in good faith 1: holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable 2: holding that marad subsidy contracts must be consistent with the enabling statute which authorizes their execution and that therefore cost estimates that shipyards provide to marad must be fair and reasonable 3: holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary 4: holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith


Input: We need not resolve this question. Regardless whether a presumption of correctness attached to the boards’ of equalization valuations in this case, the presumption was “ ‘.one of fact and [was] rebuttable and only served the place of evidence until [Ameren] ... came .forward with the evidence hereinbefore set out.’” State ex rel. Kahler, 393 S.W.2d at 465 (quoting Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686, 693-94 (Mo. 1959)). Once Ameren came forward with evidence to establish that which 'the assessors in fact admitted—that the valuation methodology the assessors used, though correct, was unlawfully and unfairly applied due to the failure to consider depreciation—the' presumption of correctness, if any, attached to the boards’ of equalization valuations was defeated. Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). Ameren’s fourth point on appeal is denied as Holdings: 0: holding that agency decisions enjoy a presumption of correctness 1: holding that a trial court has discretion to qualify experts and rely on various methods in making a valuation determination 2: recognizing that the mcdonnell douglas framework is less useful in the context of an alleged discriminatory disciplinary decision than in the context of an alleged discriminatory hiring decision 3: holding that presumption of correctness defeated when taxpayer alleged assessors valuation was discriminatory and presented evidence of discriminatory valuation methods 4: holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness


Input: findings of fact were based on Rapoport’s own admissions. A litigant’s right to due process is not forfeited, however, because the most damaging evidence comes from his own confession or admissions. The right ) ("An attorney must be accorded due process in ... disciplinary proceedings, and the requirements of due process are met when the attorney is served with charges or specifications reasonably informing him of the charges against him and the attorney is thereafter accorded a hearing with an opportunity to defend.”). 7 . The majority opinion seems to suggest that Rapoport, who was proceeding pro se at the time, should have spelled out the disputed issues of fact in his request for a continuance. 1 find this reasoning disingenuous for if Rapo-p So.2d 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) Holdings: 0: holding that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is filed is entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 1: holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 2: recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard 3: holding the completely fully fairly element is met if the party against whom preclusion is sought had adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue 4: holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner


Input: address entitlement to benefits or level of benefits for employees who have lost employment due to fault, and leaves open the question of whether any consequence should attach to termination from post-injury employment for fault. Therefore, the statute is ambiguous, and we attempt to discern the Legislature’s intent. [¶ 9] Prior to 1992, Maine’s Workers’ Compensation Act did not include a provision analogous to section 214(1)(D) and (E). See 39 M.R.S.A. § 55-A (Pamph. 1987); 39 M.R.S.A. § 55-B (Supp. 1989). In several decisions construing pre-1992 versions of the statute, we determined that an employer could not terminate or reduce benefits when the employee was fired from post-injury employment for fault. See Bernard v. Mead Publ’g Paper Div., 2001 ME 15, ¶ 9, 765 A.2d 576, 579 (<HOLDING>); Cote v. Great N. Paper Co., 611 A.2d 58, 59 Holdings: 0: holding pursuant to former title 39 that termination for fault did not constitute grounds for discontinuing benefits 1: holding that the mere application for other benefits is not fault 2: holding that a termination of benefits must go handinhand with a termination of the liability of an employer 3: holding there were no grounds for challenging in a termination proceeding the alleged failure to comply with the ada in the provision of services because services are not required by the termination statute 4: holding failure of reemployment drug test did not constitute grounds for reducing employees benefits


Input: determining whether the state court magistrate, who did not know about the information the Cl provided to Dunn on October 16, 1997, properly found that probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. This 'Court has long held that only the information presented under oath and affirmation to the judicial officer who issued the warrant may factor into the calculus of whether probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. See e.g., Tabasko v. Barton, 472 F.2d 871, 874-75 (6th Cir. 1972) (refusing to consider proof to support probable cause where statement at issue was not in affidavit and state court record failed to show that affiant made the statement under oath in state court before the issuing magistrate); see also United States v. Harris, 255 F.3d 288, 292-93 & n. 1 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). There is no indication that the state magis Holdings: 0: holding informants testimony corroborated by evidence consisting of defendants presence at scene coupled with cash found in his pocket carrying serial numbers matching those provided to informant for controlled buy and videotape of transaction included conversation of defendant regarding prior drug sale 1: holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where the officers corroboration of events that occurred during the controlled buy as set forth in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause 2: holding that affidavit officer submitted to state court judge coupled with officers sworn testimony before that judge regarding informants controlled drug purchases at defendants residence sufficed to establish probable cause 3: holding that a controlled buy at a particular home provided probable cause for the search of that residence 4: holding that a known informants statement can support probable cause even though the affidavit fails to provide any additional basis for the known informants credibility


Input: claim concerning the admission of evidence related to his three prior felony convictions was raised as a state law claim, and not as a federal due process constitutional claim. Petitioner’s brief on direct appeal did not mention any due process analysis regarding this claim. Petitioner did cite to one federal case in his brief, Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). In Old Chief, the Court considered whether the State could introduce evidence regarding the nature of a prior offense to prove possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. However, the Old Chief decision was based on Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and not on any constitutional analysis. See also Sims v. Larson, 2002 WL 1497922 at *4 & n. 7 (N.D.Cal. Jul.2, 2002) (<HOLDING>). That Old Chief was being cited to analogize Holdings: 0: holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence 1: recognizing that old chief was based entirely on the federal rules of evidence rather than the constitution 2: holding that a change between old and new rules was fundamental to a degree that impacts our jurisdiction over the plaintiffs challenges to the old rules 3: recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings 4: recognizing privilege under federal rules


Input: Camacho Every citizen has a Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during lawful arrests. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776-78 (3d Cir.2004). “Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control” over the plaintiff. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). An excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment requires that the police act “through means intentionally applied” to secure physical control of the plaintiff. Id. at 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378. The acquiring of physical control, or seizure, need not occur in the manner originally intended by the police, but it must result from volitional police activity performed for the purpose of seizing the plaintiff. Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378 (<HOLDING>); In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 711, Holdings: 0: holding that the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is subject to a harmlesserror analysis 1: holding that no seizure occurred where the defendant initially stopped in compliance with a police officers order but then drove off quickly before the police officer could reach the suspects car 2: holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible 3: holding that a seizure results whenever an individual is stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result 4: holding that probable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place


Input: The participant may also be subject to an early withdrawal penalty. But, the plan administrator has no right to payment under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 . See Black’s Law Dictionary 331 (7th ed. (abridged) 2000). 12 . Under the USAF’s system, repayment of 75 percent of the allowance was a condition precedent to receiving retirement checks. Mullen, 696 F.2d at 471. 13 . See, e.g., McVay v. Otero, 371 B.R. 190, No. EP-06-CV-436-PRM (W.D. Tex. April 26, 2007); In re Jones, 335 B.R. 203, 210 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2005); In re Esquivel, 239 B.R. 146, 151 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1999); Inre Fulton, 211 B.R. 247, 264 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1997); In re Scott, 142 B.R. 126, 131-32 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1992); In re Jones, 138 B.R. 536, 537-38 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1991). But see In re Buchferer, 216 B.R. 332 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1997) (<HOLDING>). 14 . The bankruptcy court has also pointed Holdings: 0: holding that a debtors obligation to repay a pension plan loan is a debt because the plans right to offset the obligation against future benefits constitutes a method of enforcement sufficient to create a right to payment 1: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan 2: holding that benefits in excess of the support obligation could not be credited against future support 3: holding that obligation to pay pension benefits gave rise to a constructive trust relationship and obligation was not discharged in bankruptcy 4: holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation


Input: one exception, these pleadings fail because of defendant’s status as a notary or because they are claims for legal malpractice barred by N.C. Gen. Stat. § l-15(c). See, e.g., Sharp, 113 N.C. App. at 592, 439 S.E.2d at 794 (noting “claims ‘arising out of the performance of or failure to perform professional services’ based on negligence or breach of contract are in the nature of ‘malpractice’ claims, [and] are governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § l-15(c)”). Similarly, any claim based on defendant’s breach of a fiduciary duty is time barred. See Heath v. Craighill, Rendleman, Ingle & Blythe, 97 N.C. App. 236, 244, 388 S.E.2d 178, 183 (1990) (“Breach of fiduciary duty is a species of negligence or professional malpractice.”); Childers v. Hayes, 77 N.C. App. 792, 795, 336 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1985) (<HOLDING>). The exception is plaintiff’s only remaining Holdings: 0: holding breach of fiduciary duty claim is essentially a negligence or professional malpractice claim 1: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on claim of breach of fiduciary duty where underlying claim was a common law negligence action 2: recognizing contributory negligence as a defense to professional malpractice claims 3: holding professional malpractice claim not contractual 4: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba


Input: mandatory sentence prescribed ' in subsection (b). Any other reading of HRS § 712-1200(4) would produce an absurd result, Franks, 74 Haw. at 341, 843 P.2d at 674, and contradict the obvious meaning of the statute. State v. Paaluhi, 70 Haw. 237, 240, 768 P.2d 235, 237 (1989). Id. at 395-96, 885 P.2d at 1135-36 (emphasis in original). Because we were satisfied that an absurd result could only be avoided by employing the “plain meaning” approach to the construction of the term “subsequent of fense,” we noted in Ramela that resort to the legislative history was “not necessary to our analysis,” although we observed, in a footnote, that the legislative history supported our construction. Id. at 396 n. 3, 885 P.2d at 1136 n. 3. See also State v. Simpson, 9 Haw.App. 165, 827 P.2d 1156 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, because the plain meaning of the Holdings: 0: holding that a second offense was subsequent for purposes of hrs  71212004 inasmuch as it was  subsequent in terms of both commission and ascertainment of guilt notwithstanding that the two convictions had occurred simultaneously in the course of the same proceeding 1: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense 2: holding that the greater offense is  by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it 3: holding that notwithstanding code  182231s application to successive trials conviction of both the completed substantive offense and the underlying conspiracy are permitted in virginia provided the convictions occurred as here in a single trial 4: holding that two offenses are separate for the purposes of  4a12a1 where all the elements of the first offense occurred before any activity forming the basis of the second offense


Input: the September 19, 1996 order. The district court did not explain the procedural grounds upon which it proceeded to award relief restricting Ford’s policy, after denying the only motion contesting that policy. While it is unclear whether the district court intended the order as a sanction for what it perceived as an “end run around the clear intention of’ the March order, slip op. at 1-2, or as an entry of judgment on Liberty’s allegation that Ford’s newly adopted policy violated the NJFPA, we conclude that we cannot sustain the order on either basis. We cannot sustain the September order as a sanction for noncompliance with the court’s March order because the policy which the court restricted in the September order did not violate any clear mandate set fort F.2d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, Holdings: 0: holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion 1: holding deathpenalty sanctions inappropriate where party inadvertently failed to comply with courts order and nothing in the record  even approaches the flagrant bad faith or abuse necessary for the imposition of such sanctions 2: holding that where party had reasonable grounds to believe conduct was in compliance with the district courts order imposition of sanctions was not warranted and constituted an abuse of discretion 3: holding sanctions order not final where the amount of sanctions had not yet been determined 4: holding district courts dismissal following explicit and reasonable warning was not an abuse of discretion


Input: ■ after the LHWCA’s enactment, ■ however, courts struggled to define when an injured worker was entitled • to relief. Initially, the LHWCA provided coverage on the basis of a “situs test” alone, allowing recovery for a work-related injury as long as,the injury occurred on “navigable waters” and the employer had at least one employee (but not necessarily the injured employee) who was engaged in maritime employment'. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977) (citing Pa. R.R. Co. v. O’Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 340-42, 73 S.Ct. 302, 97 L.Ed. 367 (1953)). Thus construed, however, the situs test often produced arbitrarily restrictive outcomes. See, e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 224-25, 90 S.Ct. 347, 24 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969) (<HOLDING>). To address this problem, Congress in 1972 Holdings: 0: holding evidence insufficient for conviction for possession of controlled dangerous substances when the drugs were not found on the person of or in the same room as the defendant but were only found on other persons on the premises 1: holding that the elements of a claim under  3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added 2: holding that longshoremen killed or injured on a pier while loading or unloading a ship were not covered under the act but would be if they had been thrown into the water or were on the deck of the ship when the accident happened 3: holding that where the claimants were servicemen injured or killed while on active duty due to the negligence of others in the armed forces they could not seek recovery under the ftca for injuries sustained that arose out of or were incident to their military service 4: holding for the purposes of the california public records act that a city disclosed all documents in a reasonably timely manner when records that had not been in the citys possession or could not be found were promptly disclosed when they were found or became available


Input: Nations with ample notice of its intent to charge her as a habitual offender, and she had a fair opportunity to present any defense to that charge. ¶15. Moreover, at the March 23, 2014 hearing on the State’s motion to amend the indictment to charge her as a habitual offender, Nations’s attorney specifically stated: ‘Tour honor, we don’t have any opposition [to the State’s motion]. It’s either — she’s habitual or she’s not. I think that we had already talked and she is in that status.” After Nations’s attorney’s statement, the trial judge granted the State’s motion. It is difficult to imagine a clearer waiver of the issue. Thus, Nations’s claim of unfair surprise is not only without merit but also procedurally barred. Newberry v. State, 85 So.3d 884, 888 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial Holdings: 0: holding that a noticebased objection to a motion to amend an indictment to charge the defendant as a habitual offender is waived if the defendant fails to make a specific and contemporaneous objection 1: holding that an objection was adequate when the judge cut short the objection and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to explain his objection fully 2: holding a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review 3: holding that a party fails to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal not only by failing to make a specific objection but also by making the wrong specific objection 4: holding that defendant waived his objection to the prosecutors use of her peremptory challenges by failing to make a contemporaneous objection during jury selection


Input: needed to have probable cause when he first observed the items he seized, it noted that “[a] plausible limitation would require Hyde to form probable cause during this search in this house, but the more specific limitation urged by [defendant] does not seem prudent.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808 (4th Cir.1996), one of several agents executing a search warrant for the defendant’s apartment found a loaded firearm in plain view. The warrant did not authorize a search for weapons, and the agent who came upon the gun did not have a basis to believe its possession to be criminal. The agent nevertheless reported his discovery to a fellow agent in the apartment who was supervising the search. The supervising agent was aware that the defendant r.1985) (<HOLDING>). The government has cited no cases holding Holdings: 0: holding that agents were allowed to seize and question occupants of business while executing search warrant for illegal aliens 1: holding that defendant was not in custody during search of his residence 2: holding that when agents executing a search warrant for narcotics came upon a firearm in plain view they properly detained the firearm for security reasons and that when the same agents at a later point in their search came upon documents indicating the resident had a felony record the firearm could lawfully be seized 3: holding that even personal papers of a defendant discovered during a permissive search of his parents home were protected by the privilege 4: holding that subsequent discovery during same search of papers indicating defendant was on parole permitted agents to return to and seize a firearm they had previously observed in plain view


Input: vapors from reaching the surface and harming nearby homeowners. The Court finds that both cases are inapposite to the case sub judice. In Lueke and Baker, the basis of the plaintiffs’ interference with use claims were the health risks posed by contamination, and such interference was' actually remediated by filtration. In contrast, in this case, while the GAC remedi-ates the harm C8 poses to human health, it does not undo the other harms C8 poses to the Plaintiff, which are outlined supra and include interference with expansion projects, with revenues from water sales, etc. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that under Banford, it can recover for annoyance damages without having to show physical discomfort, since it has shown interference with use. 126 Ohio St.3d at 215, 932 N.E.2d 313 (<HOLDING>). This Court finds that Plaintiff misinterprets Holdings: 0: holding that claimants may be entitled to damages for loss of use and enjoyment in addition to returned rents and profits 1: holding award that included damages for loss of enjoyment of life not excessive 2: holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent 3: holding that loss of quiet enjoyment is not a sufficient plus 4: holding plaintiff may recover for annoyance and discomfort for a nuisance including fear and other emotions without a physical component if the annoyance or discomfort are connected to the persons loss of use or enjoyment


Input: this study, Ashley Creek knows what its own costs would be only within a margin of plus or minus 25%. Ashley Creek does not know the cost to ship its concentrate from the end of the pipeline to its potential customers. Ashley Creek does not know whether there are any customers who would buy concentrate at the price Ashley Créek would have to charge even if the Pipeline tariff were zero. While Ashley Creek claims that the tariff is too high, it does not know whether it could profitably ship at the actual tariff rates or indeed at any tariff rate. Merely knowing that there are phosphate deposits on its leases is not sufficient to demonstrate that Ashley Creek is prepared to enter the market. See Practice Perfect Inc. v. Hamilton County Pharm. Ass’n, 732 F.Supp. 798, 803 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (<HOLDING>); Gas Utilities Co. of Ala., Inc. v. Southern Holdings: 0: holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established 1: holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim 2: holding that proof of relevant market is essential under  2 3: holding plaintiffs principals failed to identify a sufficient market for their services which was an essential element for the success of their proposed business 4: holding dismissal proper where complaint fails to allege an essential element of plaintiffs claim


Input: coverage of an existing one. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)). Faced with a dearth of federal precedent, blindly resorting to only the forum state’s privilege law is inappropriate. Appellant has not shown that California law is in accord with most states, or that it is likely that the federal common law would be advanced by the injection of California’s broadened view of the client-representative extension of attorney-client privilege. Fed.R.Evid. 501 (stating that federal courts should recognize evidentiary privileges according to the principles of the common law in the light of reason and experience); see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. 906 (<HOLDING>); Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the burden rests upon the party seeking benefits to prove the injury sustained was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and the rule of liberal construction is not a substitute for the claimants burden of establishing his claim by a preponderance of the evidence 1: holding that the party asserting work product protection has the burden of establishing that the doctrine applies 2: holding that a party seeking a new privilege must overcome a significant burden of establishing that excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth 3: holding that a party seeking a writ bears the burden of proving that it has no other means of attaining the relief such as by appeal 4: holding that the party seeking to vacate the award has the burden of providing the court with the evidence to support its arguments


Input: Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.003 (West 2014). We also agree with Munson that the term “residence” “generally requires both physical presence and an intention to remain.” Munson, 948 S.W.2d at 816. Thus, “[i]f a person comes to a place temporarily, without any intention of making that place his or her home, that place is not considered the person’s residence.” Id. at 817. Instead, those persons are using a home for transient purposes. Id. And, as in Munson, we draw a distinction between “residential” purposes and “transient” purposes. See id. at 816-17. One leasing his home to be used for transient purposes is not complying with the restrictive covenant that it be used solely for residential purposes. See also Benard v. Humble, 990 S.W.2d 929, 931-32 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Here, the record is clear that Tarr, through Holdings: 0: holding that babysitter living in home connected via ramp to defendants home had no authority to consent to search of defendants home 1: holding that homeowners short term rental of home violated deed restriction that home could be used only for singlefamily residence purposes 2: holding that home purchased with separate funds and titled in one spouses name was transmuted into marital property because home was used as marital residence and the other spouse contributed to payments and repairs on home 3: holding that a covenant stating that all lots shall be used exclusively for singlefamily dwellings was both a structural and a use restriction that prohibited the building of roads not used in connection with a residence 4: holding that homeowners did not control the premises to the extent a duly  arose for injury during a home show when homeowners had moved only a few items in and had surrendered possession for the home show


Input: WL 3487723, at *4-*6 (W.D.Tex. Nov. 3, 2005) (rejecting policy argument). For example, Albany Insurance Co. v. Bengal Marine, Inc. involved a policy requiring the insured to pay a certain deductible before the insurer became liable; the Fifth Circuit, applying Louisiana law, held that, in light of Louisiana’s direct action statute, the insurer was liable for claims above the deductible up to the policy limit when the insured could not pay the deductible due to insolvency. 857 F.2d 250, 255-56 (5th Cir.1988). Other courts have reached a similar result by holding that enforcing retained limit or deductible provisions in this situation would defeat state bankruptcy provision laws. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Hooper, 294 Ill. App.3d 626, 229 Ill.Dec. 129, 691 N.E.2d 65, 70 (1998) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 178 Ill.2d 576, 232 Ill.Dec. Holdings: 0: holding that illinois public policy did not require the application of illinois law to an illinois accident involving only indiana residents insured in indiana 1: holding that defendants testimony that he did not see a provision in the agreement because the plaintiffcounterparty failed to direct him to the provision was insufficient as a matter of law to establish fraud and defendant was therefore bound to the terms of the provision 2: holding that an insurers reliance on a retained limit provision referred to as a selfinsured retention limit  to avoid payment when the insured became insolvent was directly contrary to the public policy as declared by the legislative enactment of illinois bankruptcy provision law 3: holding contribution claim against attorney not contrary to illinois public policy 4: holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth


Input: States v. Eide, 297 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 2002), the defendant was convict ed of attempting to manufacture five grams or more of methamphetamine. 297 F.3d at 702. On appeal, he argued the government’s evidence was not sufficient as to quantity, and thus “he should be resentenced on the included offense of simple attempted manufacturing.” 297 F.3d at 704. As in Cain’s case, the government in Eide did not find any methamphetamine in the defendant’s residence, but it did find pseu-doephedrine and equipment commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine. 297 F.3d at 702-03. Therefore, the government relied on expert testimony to establish the quantity of methamphetamine the defendant attempted to manufacture. 297 F.3d at 703-04. The government’s expert was Patricia Krahn, a chemist from t (<HOLDING>). In Eide, after rejecting the government’s Holdings: 0: holding testimony must be accurately tailored to the specific manufacturing conditions ingredients and skill of the accused 1: holding that if the reason the victim cannot testify at trial is that the accused murdered her then the accused should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation right even though the act with which the accused is charged is the same as the one by which he allegedly rendered the witness unavailable 2: holding that an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved 3: holding that defense counsel had duty to communicate formal offer from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused 4: holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection


Input: Tischendorf v. Tischendorf 321 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn.1982). Although appellant did not raise his equal protection argument in the district court, we believe the conditions described in Tis-chendorf have been met here, and elect to review the issue. “The granting of jail credit is not discretionary with the trial court.” State v. Cameron, 603 N.W.2 Guidelines III.C.3 (credit for confinement as a condition of stayed sentence “is limit ed to time spent in jails, workhouses, and regional correctional facilities”); Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. Ill .C.04 (“Credit should not be extended for time spent in residential treatment facilities or on electric home monitoring as a condition of a stay of imposition or stay of execution.”); see also State v. Bonafide, 457 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Minn.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). Although treatment may be available both as Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant who does not receive concurrent sentences on multiple charges  is not entitled to have his jail time credit pyramided by being given credit on each sentence for the full time he spends in jail awaiting disposition he is only entitled to jail credit on the first of the consecutive sentences quoting daniels v state 491 so2d 543 545 fla1986 1: holding that the statutory entitlement to presentence jail credit starts with the initial arrest for a criminal offense 2: holding that a defendant must be granted credit for time served in any institution serving as the functional equivalent of a county jail 3: holding defendant who received treatment in a state hospital was not entitled to jail credit for that time 4: holding that jail credit may be granted for presentence custodial period spent under a civil commitment order at state security hospital and observing that denying credit for time relating to probationary conditions is not inconsistent with that holding


Input: Further, as the court stated in its July 27, 2011 Order Adopting in Part and Modifying in Part Magistrate Judge Azrack’s Monsanto Hearing Report and Recommendation, “[b]y setting up an accounting system in which all of the [GDC] subsidiaries contributed to and received funds from a single [account], which was also funded with loan proceeds, USW entangled itself with the allegedly fraudulent loan proceeds.” (July 27th Order at 22.) The court further noted that “the group of related subsidiaries, including USW, all shared in the [same account] 'and benefited from transfer hecks, as opposed to security interests, petitioners are unable to assert rights to a particular asset or specific funds) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 339 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Schwimmer, 968 F.2d 1570, Holdings: 0: holding that employers have standing to sue 1: holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures 2: holding that representatives of the news media have the standing to contest a court order restricting public access to legal proceedings 3: holding that 20 of creditors knowing of consignment relationship does not satisfy general knowledge requirement notwithstanding that such creditors represented 63 of claims against debtor 4: holding that a contest to a claim of exemption was ineffective when that contest was not by affidavit and did not properly state that the claim of exemption was invalid or excessive


Input: the product as promised minus the value of the product delivered.”). Thus, the proper question is not how much the erroneous sticker may have reduced the vehicle’s perceived value for any individual purchaser or lessee. Rather, damages should reflect the difference between the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with perfect safety ratings for three standardized categories and the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with no safety ratings. Unlike the calculation of an individual consumer’s direct pecuniary loss, which would limit the plaintiff to the difference of what she paid and the actual value received, the FDUTPA “benefit of the bargain” model provides a standardized class-wide damages figure because the plaintiffs out-of-pocket payment is immaterial. See Coghlan, 240 F.3d at 453 (<HOLDING>); 13 A.L.R.3d 875, §§ 3(a) and 4(a) Holdings: 0: holding that in cases of a false conflict of law a court may apply the law of the forum state 1: recognizing that fdutpa cases apply a benefit of the bargain damages formula 2: recognizing that berry altered the apportionment and valuation portions of the taggart formula 3: holding that banks damages were benefit of the bargain type damages that fail to constitute a substantial and independent injury sufficient to remove borrowers claim from the operation of the statute of frauds 4: holding that competitor could seek only injunction under fdutpa not damages


Input: of Fourth Amendment protection as is the interior of a residence.” Rodriguez v. State, 106 S.W.3d 224, 228 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1189, 124 S.Ct. 1432, 158 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004). Nothing in the record indicates that Romo displayed any "no trespassing” signs or other evidence indicating that he wished to keep people off his property, and as previously articulated, the back driveway of the home was not enclosed, was open to the alleyway at the rear of the house, and gas meters were located on the driveway. 6 . The Rodriguez court states, "There is no legitimate expectation or interest in ‘privately’ possessing an illegal narcotic.” 106 S.W.3d at 229; see Wilson v. State, 98 S.W.3d 265, 272-73 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.l 2002, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that a hotel guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his room during the period of time for which the room is rented 1: holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest 2: holding that canine sniff not a search under the fourth amendment 3: holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest 4: holding a dog sniff outside the defendants front door was not a fourth amendment search


Input: to that in Katz, none of those cases specifically addresses standing. And in each case, while the officers did not need a warrant to view areas from the air, the information observed, without more, was not enough to justify a warrantless search or seizure of the property. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-52, 109 S.Ct. 698, 102 L.Ed.2d 885 (1989) (plurality op.) (reversing the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress contesting the search of a greenhouse in a residential backyard conducted pursuant to a warrant, which was obtained based upon observations gained from helicopter surveillance, because the helicopter surveillance did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment); Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) (<HOLDING>); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215, 106 Holdings: 0: holding only that the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the fourth amendment 1: holding that canine sniff not a search under the fourth amendment 2: holding that mere insertion of key was not a search or at least not an unreasonable search protected by the fourth amendment 3: holding that the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rules are not implicated by a private search 4: holding that a canine sniff is a search for purposes of the fourth amendment


Input: Media of Ill., L.L.C. v. City of Des Plaines, Ill., 391 F.Supp.2d 682, 687 (N.D.Ill.2005) (quoting United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir.2003)). Parties challenging a statute on First Amendment grounds may represent the interests of third parties “whose protected expression is prohibited or substantially burdened by the regulation.” Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 848 (7th Cir.2000). Additionally, businesses may represent their customers’ constitutional rights. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (beer vendors may challenge an alcohol regulation on equal protection grounds on behalf of their customers); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (<HOLDING>); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 696 Holdings: 0: holding that courts may rely solely on affidavits in granting preliminary injunctions 1: holding that a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of a third party 2: holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students 3: holding that school officials may not limit the first amendment rights of students and teachers to freedom of speech and expression 4: holding that a school may assert the rights of its students parents and gathering cases granting injunctions to businesses on behalf of customers


Input: which he cannot in good conscience retain or withhold from another who is beneficially entitled to it as where money has been paid by accident, mistake of fact, or fraud, or has been acquired through a breach of trust or the violation of a fiduciary duty.’ ” (quoting SSI Med. Servs. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 500, 392 S.E.2d 789, 793-94 (1990))); see All v. Prillaman, 200 S.C. 279, 308, 20 S.E.2d 741, 753 (1942) (“ ‘The law will not permit a party to deliberately put his property out of his control for a fraudulent purpose, and then, through intervention of a court of equity, regain the same after his fraudulent purpose has been accom plished.’ ” (quoting Jolly v. Graham, 222 Ill. 550, 78 N.E. 919, 920 (1906))). As to Issue III: Bowen v. Bowen, 352 S.C. 494, 499, 575 S.E.2d 553, 556 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Hayne Fed. Credit Union v. Bailey, 327 S.C. Holdings: 0: recognizing that the child custody act required that the natural parent presumption must be seriously considered and heavily weighted in favor of the parent but that the presumption is rebutted if the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the third party 1: holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child 2: holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the presumption is that the purchase was a gift to the child and thus no resulting trust arises 3: holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 4: holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the parent has the burden of proving a gift was not intended


Input: hearing is only necessary if “the movant makes a sufficient threshold showing that material facts are in doubt or dispute, and that such facts cannot reliably be resolved on a paper record.” U.S. v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 603 (1st Cir.1996). There is no such showing made here, the basic facts are undisputed. 3 . The undisputed facts relevant to the instant motion are drawn entirely from the Affidavit of Special Agent Jeffrey Commander ("the affidavit”) filed along with the complaint (Docket Entry # 1, Exhibit 1), incorporated by reference within claimant’s memorandum (Docket Entry # 15) as "anticipated facts” and within the government's opposition (Docket Entry # 18). 4 . The court distinguishes this case from those cited by claimant, namely, U.S. v. Freeman, 209 F.3d 464 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), and U.S. v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10th Holdings: 0: holding failure to promote was an isolated incident of discrimination which is insufficient to prove a continuing violation 1: holding that an isolated incident of a vehicle crossing into the emergency lane of a roadway does not violate state statutes requirement that vehicles remain entirely in a single lane as nearly as practical 2: holding that one in stance of weaving does not constitute a violation of utah code ann  416611 3: holding that one isolated incident of partially weaving into emergency lane does not constitute a traffic violation in tennessee 4: holding that a uhaul trucks similar one time entry into the emergency lane failed to constitute a violation of a statute nearly identical to the statute at issue


Input: of the defects. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d); see United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, an alien is barred from collaterally attacking the validity of an underlying deportation order “if he validly waived the right to appeal that order” during the deportation proceedings. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d at 1182 (citation omitted). Such a waiver must be “considered and intelligent.” Id. A waiver is not considered and intelligent when the record contains an inference that the petitioner is eligible for relief from deportation, but the IJ fails to advise the alien of this possibility and give him the opportunity to develop the issue. United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that iirira and aedpa are not applicable to criminal alien who entered a guilty plea at a time when alien was eligible for  212c relief 1: holding that failure to advise an alien of possible forms of relief may violate due process 2: holding that the ijs failure to inform alien that he is eligible for relief from deportation constitutes due process violation where alien establishes prejudice 3: recognizing burden is on alien when alien is removable 4: holding that there is no due process violation where the ijs finding was not arbitrary and the alien was not denied a full and fair opportunity to present his claims


Input: must have an ownership right in the property sought and must come into the transaction with “clean hands.” Howell, 425 F.3d at 973-75. “The court must receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion.” • Fed. R.Crim.P. 41(g); see also United States v. Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir.2001) (concluding the district judge incorrectly denied a criminal defendant’s Rule 41(e) motion based on the government’s unsupported allegation that the property at issue had been destroyed). Herrera-Contreras has cited no binding precedent in support of his argument the district judge was required to hold a hearing, where the judge received evidence showing the government did not possess the $2.1 million at issue. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 41(g); Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d at 1314 (<HOLDING>). The district judge received a declaration Holdings: 0: holding where record fails to establish whether and how appellant presented motion for new trial to the trial court it was not timely presented 1: holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted 2: recognizing the government must submit some evidence of property destruction but it is within the district judges discretion to determine how evidence should be presented 3: holding that a defendant owed no duty to a plaintiff with regard to the safekeeping of evidence because there was no promise by the defendant or its employees to inspect or safeguard the evidence for the plaintiffs benefit and destruction of physical evidence was not criminal because destruction was innocent and designed to ensure the safety of the defendants employees 4: recognizing that evidence of government knowledge of the defendants conduct could be part of a defendants argument that it did not knowingly submit false claims


Input: but also must give the de fendant credit for the full elapsed period of the administrative suspension, see id. § 1311-A(5)(C). This interleaving, the petitioner suggests, signifies that the civil sanction must itself be punitive. We do not accept this syllogism. A remedial sanction is not transmogrified into a punishment simply because a similar sanction sometimes may be imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631, 636, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 1429, 1431-32, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988) (explaining that the characterization of a sanction as remedial or punitive depends on the nature of the sanction itself, not the proceeding in which it is imposed); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2101-02, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (<HOLDING>). In all events, the credit provision, fairly Holdings: 0: holding that civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punishment and imposition of a restitution order is a form of punishment and part of a criminal sentence 1: holding that the use of the written form is mandatory and that failure to use the written form as mandated is reversible error 2: holding that police officers charge to protect the public differentiated them from the public 3: holding that although imprisonment is generally thought to be the paradigmatic form of punishment pretrial detention to protect the public is not regarded as punitive 4: holding that the good faith requirement of the whistleblower statute was not met where the purpose of the employee at the time of the making of reports was not to protect the public but to protect the jobs of himself and his coworkers


Input: were actually taken by Trooper Chad Chandler and that Sgt. Alexander is merely the case agent assigned to investigate the incident. 2 . Sgt. Alexander has been sued in his official capacity only. Therefore, he is entitled to the same sovereign immunity (and subject to the same exceptions) as the Department of Public Safety. 3 . Similarly, the doctrine of sovereign immunity might not apply to the $115,000 Gore seeks to recover if he were attempting to replevy the seized cash instead of seeking damages for conversion. However, such an action would also have been due to be dismissed because 21 U.S.C. § 881(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1355(a) give the federal district courts original jurisdiction in all federal forfeiture actions. See Edney v. City of Montgomery, 960 F.Supp. 270 (M.D.Ala.1997) (<HOLDING>). 4 . In Lightfoot, the police also claimed Holdings: 0: holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states 1: holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states 2: holding that the commandant of the united states disciplinary barracks and the united states are identical parties 3: holding that the united states adoption of a states seizure of currency has the same effect as if the united states had originally seized the currency 4: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states


Input: Hospital Damas. See id. (“[A] fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent’ action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242, 45 S.Ct. 66, 69 L.Ed. 262 (1924))). f. L.C.V. also argues that, as a matter of public policy, issue preclusion should not be applied to this case, which, according to her, involves Fundación’s perpetration of a “fraud” “to evade responsibility and eventually justice.” We are unpersuaded by L.C.V.’s public-policy argument. For starters, the‘cases on which L.C.V. relies apply Puerto Rico law of preclusion. See Barreto-Rosa v. Varona-Mendez, 470 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>); Medina v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 737 Holdings: 0: holding that the court of appeals correctly stated the public policy exception but erroneously concluded that the exception did not apply 1: recognizing that under puerto rico law res judicata may not apply if  public policy demands an exception but noting that this exception was successfully argued in only two cases and concluding that public policy does not demand an exception in this case 2: recognizing exception 3: recognizing the public interest exception 4: recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine


Input: must be granted for the same reasons. First, - if plaintiffs proposed amendment were allowed, the Amended Complaint would nonetheless be subject to dismissal as unexhausted. It is well established that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (requiring complete exhaustion of correctional facility administrative remedies). The exhaustion requirement for prison condition claims is mandatory. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In interpreting the exhaustion requirement of Holdings: 0: holding that dismissal under 42 usc  1997ea was required even though case had gone to trial as inmate had failed to exhaust administrative remedies 1: holding that inmate plaintiff satisfied  1997ea where he attempted to exhaust all available administrative remedies but was prevented from doing so by prison personnel 2: holding exhaustion is required regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures 3: holding that 42 usc  1997ea requires prisoners to exhaust a process and not a remedy 4: holding that congress has provided in  1997ea that an inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues


Input: history, and other appropriate matters that throw light on the subject. Id. Additionally, it is fundamental that a general statute does not apply and must yield when there is a specific statute addressing a particular subject matter. Id. Appellant’s argument is that § 5-64-403 is unconstitutionally vague because it authorizes different penalties for the same conduct: possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. However, the legislature may authorize different maximum penalties for the same conduct if the law clearly defines the conduct prohibited. Further, the punishment authorized is not unconstitutional merely because a statute contains overlapping provisions authorizing different maximum penalties. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Arkansas General Assembly has Holdings: 0: holding the statutory scheme of two federal laws was not void for vagueness and did not violate equal protection or due process even though the defendants conduct violated both laws 1: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 2: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 3: holding transfer eligibility rule did not deny the student equal protection of the laws or procedural or substantive due process under the fourteenth amendment 4: holding that segregation in public education is a denial of equal protection of the laws


Input: are inapplicable because they relate to athlete registration requirements, not eligibi nt arbitration decision by the FIFA Players’ Status Committee regarding this controversy, which finds that (1) FIFA’s statutes give USSF authority to sanction professional soccer matches in the United States; (2) Under this authority, USSF has the right to charge sanctioning fees and require the posting of a bond securing those fees; and (3) USSF has the right to notify FIFA in the event that a FIFA-licensed match agent refuses to pay a sane tioning fee or post a performance bond. The exercise of the above-named rights would arguably constitute unreasonable restraints of trade under the Sherman Act. See, Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 359-60, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 10 L.Ed.2d 389 (1963) (<HOLDING>), which is why USSF claims the antitrust Holdings: 0: holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation 1: recognizing infrequency of state law antitrust actions under chapter 133 wisconsin courts follow federal interpretation of corresponding federal antitrust laws 2: holding that the fcc was not given the power to decide antitrust issues and that its actions do not prevent enforcement of the antitrust laws in federal courts 3: holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing 4: holding antitrust laws serve to protect freedom to compete unhindered by group actions of others


Input: of retaliation into a broader hostile work environment claim. The reason is simple: hostile work environments are by definition different because their very nature involves repeated conduct. 811 F.Supp.2d at 177-78 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration marks committed). 9 . In fact, this allegation does not even support her theory of the case. Following the Jeffers/Perry email episode, the Agency in fact responded to complaints about insulting emails in the workplace and took corrective measures — it sent around an office-wide memorandum about inappropriate emails and hired the Littler Mendelson firm to investigate the matter. However, plaintiff complains nonetheless because she disagrees with the way in which it remediated the problem. 10 . See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (<HOLDING>); Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374 ("As a general rule, Holdings: 0: holding that two acts were not sufficiently similar when one consisted of verbal threats and other resulted in physical violence 1: holding that when two penetrations were separated by a short period of time two independent assaults occurred 2: holding delay of two years and four months lengthy enough to warrant review of other factors 3: holding that a dozen racial incidents over a two and one half year period were too few to constitute a custom with the force of law 4: holding that employees four verbal altercations with supervisor two impositions of leave restrictions two proposals of suspension and other clashes over twoyear period were too sporadic


Input: Act is to make compensation the exclusive remedy of the employee where he is injured by the employer or any of its employees during the course of his employment.”). 11 .See Ala Code § 25-5-11. See also Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 1180, 1181 (5th Cir.1985) (setting out the conflict between Mississippi and Alabama workers compensation laws). 12 . Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Found. Health Servs., 524 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). 13 . See Davis v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 743 F.2d 1132, 1134 (5th Cir.1984). 14 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2). 15 . Id. § 6(2). 16 . McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303, 310 (Miss.1989). 17 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (emphasis added). See also Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509, 510 (Miss.1968) (<HOLDING>); In re Estate of Blanton, 824 So.2d 558, 562 Holdings: 0: holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect 1: holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision 2: holding that in cases of a false conflict of law a court may apply the law of the forum state 3: holding that courts apply the procedural law of the forum and the substantive law of the jurisdiction originating the claim 4: holding that the site of the injury does not invariably determine choice of law when the most substantial relationships of the parties and the dominant interest of the forum require application of another states law


Input: of property-tax payers obligated to pay through their taxes for bonds issued for public construction projects pursuant to voter approval in a bond election. Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 34; Black, 246 S.W. at 80; Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75; Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 676. Each of these cases involved a suit brought by property taxpayers who had voted to issue bonds to be paid for from general tax revenues, in- eluding from their property taxes. See Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 82-33 (treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners’ court and “electorate entitled to vote at said election” and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road); Black, 246 S.W. at 80 (<HOLDING>); Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75 (in action by Holdings: 0: holding that county commissioners court that had adopted order designating roads to be improved if bond issue carried could not designate other roads to be improved with proceeds of bonds after election contrary to the will of those having to bear the bond burden 1: recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest 2: holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county 3: holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed 4: holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute


Input: No. 95-0641, 1996 WL 633382, *12 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1996). Plaintiffs allege that there is no legitimate public purpose to reduce the State contribution rate, a substantial impairment of their contractual rights, or that the same was necessary and reasonable to accomplish said purpose. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 95-99, 124-125. On a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept these allegations as true. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts suggesting that Defendants’ actions were not reasonable and necessary. While Defendants rely upon the economic emergency, a resolution of the issues surrounding Defendants’ fiscal crisis and economic situation will involve questions not appropriately resolved on a motion to dismiss. See Nat'l Educ. Ass’n-Rhode, 890 F.Supp. at 1164 (<HOLDING>). Courts have held that “Resolution of ... Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants motion for discharge was premature and thus properly denied by the trial court 1: holding that the defendants challenge to the evidence through a pretrial motion to dismiss was premature because such a challenge can only be made after the state has had an opportunity to present its evidence to the trier of fact 2: holding that a determination of the reasonableness of the defendants actions based upon the economic crisis involving the retirement system was premature on a motion to dismiss 3: holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss 4: holding that the district court properly denied defendants motion to dismiss based upon a lack of jurisdiction when defendant challenged the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act


Input: in this case. See Ronald Lature McCray v. State, No. 02C01-9412-CC-00277, 1995 WL 568388 (Tenn.Crim.App., at Jackson, September 27, 1995); George Cheairs v. State, No. 02C01-9304-CC-00070, 1994 WL 583331 (Tenn.Crim.App., at Jackson, October 26, 1994). In George Cheairs v. State, this court made the following observation: If the parties can agree that a defendant be sentenced to a term of years exceeding the maximum for his range, then logically by agreement he could be sentenced to a term less than the minimum. The release eligibility date would then be determined by agreement rather than the Range. Thus, the statutory ranges and the corresponding release eligibility percentages would be virtually meaningless, with sentencing structure governed by contract rather than by statute. At *2 (<HOLDING>). Although we cannot distinguish Cheairs and Holdings: 0: holding that an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is rendered moot when a defendant receives an illegal sentence 1: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that the failure of defense counsel to object to erroneous punishment charge authorizing an illegal sentence is ineffective assistance of counsel 3: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record 4: holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel