Input: litigation because, for example, relevant business documents pertaining to the antitrust conspiracy may not exist and covert behavior may have to be proven through less direct means.”); Callahan v. AEV, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 175, 179 (W.D.Pa.1996) ("Discovery in an antitrust case is necessarily broad because allegations involve improper business conduct.... Such conduct is generally covert and must be gleaned from records, conduct, and business relationships.”). 13 . In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. MDL-1426, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29160, at *8 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 29, 2004). 14 . Id. at *16. 15 . Id., at *12. 16 . Id. 17 . No. 99-197TFH, 2001 WL 1049433, at *11 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001). 18 . Id. 19 . Id. 20 . See, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 2275531, at *2 (<HOLDING>); In re Plastics Additives Antitrust Litig., Holdings: 0: holding that market participant socal edison is in privity with the california power exchange corporation not with other market participants 1: holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach 2: holding that the market price is understood to mean the current market price being paid for gas at the well where it is produced 3: holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue 4: holding that information and documents that relate to among other things the nonu s manufacture sale and distribution of aspartame may prove relevant to establishing the existence of a global conspiracy to allocate the market for aspartame the ability of market participants to engage in domestic price fixing and the mechanisms employed by market participants in price fixing


Input: characterize the ruling of the trial court. The trial court actually concluded that “the evidence before the Court is as strongly supportive of Paul Donald Cappo having voluntarily disappeared.” Thus, the trial court ruled that the evidence that Paul Cappo voluntarily disappeared was as strong as the evidence that he was murdered. The court did not conclude that Paul Cappo had voluntarily disappeared, but rather that appellant had failed to meet her burden of proving not only that he did not voluntarily disappear, but that he died from accidental bodily injury. Appellant attempted to rely on the legal presumption of Paul Cappo’s death created by his absence of at least five years. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 490.260 (1986); Sanderson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 194 S.W.2d 221, 227 (Mo.App.1946) (<HOLDING>). This presumption was not conclusive, however. Holdings: 0: holding that the common law presumption of incapacity of a minor between the ages of seven and fourteen years to commit a crime no longer applies 1: holding that federal common law is the law that would govern in the absence of the warsaw convention 2: recognizing presumption 3: holding that a common law presumption of death is triggered after an absence of seven years 4: holding that the presumption is weaker if triggered at all where there is not a tradition of state legislation


Input: Se lack of record evidence demonstrating a cognizable link between his injuries and either his shipmate’s drunkenness or the M/V Bennett’s alcohol policy. A defendant “may not be held liable” for its employee’s misconduct “unless the particular act performed negligently was also in the scope of employment of the negligent employee.” Trost v. Am. Hawaiian S.S. Co., 324 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir.1963); see also Gallose v. Long Island R.R., 878 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir.1989) (applying Trost’s rule in context of FELA claim); Higgins v. Metro-North R.R., 318 F.3d 422, 426 (2d Cir.2003) (following Gallóse ). Like the district court, we easily conclude that drinking alcohol was not within the scope of the shipmate’s employment. Cf. Robinson v. Ne. S.S. Corp., 228 F.2d 679, 681 (2d Cir.1956) (<HOLDING>). Nor could Reynolds demonstrate that the M/V Holdings: 0: holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action 1: holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury 2: holding that in the absence of superiors directive or authorization negligence of marineremployee who assisted drunken shipmate was not attributable to shipowner 3: holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe coumadin and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence 4: holding that the absence of privity does not constitute a policy reason for not imposing liability where negligence is a substantial factor in causing the harm alleged


Input: suits constituted extortion under the Hobbs Act. However, Aspex’s mere fear of economic loss in the face of VSP’s warnings does not give rise to a claim under the Hobbs Act. “[Ejxtortion requires more than fear____[t]he use of the fear must be ‘wrongful.’ ” Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir.2006). The Hobbs Act does not make actionable VSP’s threats of altering Aspex’s network status, at least to the extent that the basis for those threats “do not rise to the level of a sham,” id. at 939-40, of which there is no evidence on this record. Accordingly, VSP was entitled to use some economic pressure falling within the scope of its legal rights in order to bring Aspex to the negotiating table. See Rothman v. Vedder Park Management, 912 F.2d 315, 318 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Aspex also alleges that VSP’s conduct is Holdings: 0: holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution 1: holding that tenants interest in a sublease terminated upon the landlords termination of the lease and affirming order that landlord entitled to receive 12 months of rent deposited by subtenant with court subsequent to termination of lease and prior to denial of petition for relief from forfeiture 2: holding that trespasser did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay rent and had been asked to leave 3: holding lessor entitled to full months rent when rent due on first of month and lease rejected on second 4: holding that a landlords alleged threats that tenants who did not sign a lease would have to pay their own utility bills and be subject to future rent increases did not constitute a wrongful use of force or fear


Input: other equitable relief, costs, and attorneys fees (Doc. 115) is granted in part and denied in part as follows: plaintiff shall recover from defendant back pay in the amount of $8,063, with prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $1,363; plaintiffs costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; compensatory damages as found by the jury in the amount of $1,000; pecuniary damages as found by the jury in the amount of $12,000; and punitive damages as found by the jury in the amount of $20,000. 1 . 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. 2 . See Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir.1983) ("title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) leaves to the discretion of the trial court the amount of back pay to be awarded a successful plaintiff in an employment discriminatio 61 F.Supp.2d 1219 (D.Kan.2001) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 416. Holdings: 0: holding that an award of back pay under title vii remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion 1: holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court 2: holding that an arbitral award of back pay that continued beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement was perfectly appropriate because the agreement contained no provision restricting back pay to the term of the agreement 3: holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment 4: recognizing equitable nature of back pay award under age discrimination in employment act


Input: A substantial threat is one that is reasonably likely to induce a belief that it will be carried out and one that threatens significant confinement, restraint, injury, or damage. A threat meets the latter criterion if it threatens an act that would cause an average person to experience significant apprehension upon contemplation of the occurrence of the threatened act. See Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1488, 1442 (9th Cir.1983) (invalidating on First Amendment overbreadth grounds a Montana intimidation statute that punished threats to “commit any criminal offense” in part because it applied “so broadly to threats of minor infractions” and “to threats not reasonably likely to induce a belief that they will be carried out”); U.S. ex rel. Holder v. Cir. Ct., 624 F.Supp. 68, 71 (N.D.Ill.1985) (<HOLDING>). D. I would therefore construe the Colorado Holdings: 0: holding a substantially similar probation condition overbroad 1: holding that an illinois intimidation statute was substantially overbroad because it made it an offense to threaten to commit any crime no matter how minor or insubstantial 2: holding the language of the statute applicable to floating buffer zones was substantially overbroad and burdened substantially more speech than necessary to serve the states interest 3: holding that because statutory variants of an underlying crime are not elements of an attempt to commit the underlying crime jurors are not required to unanimously find which specific statutory variant the defendant intended to commit it is sufficient that they unanimously conclude that the defendant intended to commit any of the applicable statutory variants 4: holding there was no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor of equipment lease although payments were made to illinois bank the guaranty was accepted in illinois and it provided that it would be gov erned by illinois law


Input: in relevant part: The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor, except those specified in section 365(b)(2), arising from and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (emphasis added). The purpose of § 365(d)(3) is to protect landlords by requiring debtors to timely perform their obligations arising under the lease. With regard to rent, courts generally agree that § 365(d)(3) requires debtors to pay rent obligations in full and without proration as they come due in the pre-rejection period. See Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Morse Road Co. (In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc.), 203 F.3d 986 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Towers v. Chickering & Gregory (In re Holdings: 0: holding lessor entitled to full months rent when rent due on first of month and lease rejected on second 1: recognizing and applying rule that lessee who breaches a lease is entitled to a rent credit for any proceeds gained by the landlord from reletting during the period of the original lease term 2: holding that where the rent payments during the original and extended terms were the same the lessees payment of rent and continued occupation of the leased premises standing along was insufficient  to establish that they had exercised their option to renew the lease for an additional term 3: holding that tenants interest in a sublease terminated upon the landlords termination of the lease and affirming order that landlord entitled to receive 12 months of rent deposited by subtenant with court subsequent to termination of lease and prior to denial of petition for relief from forfeiture 4: recognizing two lines of eases regarding calculation of administrative claims for rent  one based on reasonable value of portion of demised premises actually used and occupied and one on the reasonable value without regard to amount of space used holding that landlords were entitled to full rental payments not warehouse value of premises until lease assumed or rejected


Input: was granted — that the submission date had been re-set to March 18 made it impossible for plaintiffs to file controverting evidence.” Thus, the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18 is contradicted by the Insureds themselves. In addition, the Insureds’ assertion in their motion for rehearing that they had insufficient notice of the trial court’s resetting of the submission date is not a basis for granting rehearing because it is well-established that, if the trial court did not give sufficient notice in this regard, the Insureds had to raise this complaint in the trial court. See Okonkwo v. Washington Mut. Bank, No. 14-05-00925-CV, 2007 WL 763821, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 15, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (<HOLDING>); Babajide v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., Holdings: 0: holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal 1: holding that parties waived any choice of law objection by not raising an objection 2: holding appellant waived his complaint that trial court gave him no notice of submission date for summaryjudgment motion by not raising the objection in the trial court 3: holding that once a trial court has set a date for a summaryjudgment hearing the court must allow the nonmoving party an opportunity to be heard 4: holding that if appellant preserves legal sufficiency complaint in motion for new trial new trial is all the relief appellate court can give because that is all the relief appellant requested in trial court


Input: MURGUIA, District Judge. Pending before this Court is Defendant United States of America’s Motion in Limine (Dkt.# 27) to permit it to contact (<HOLDING>), aff'd 982 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir.1993). Plaintiff Holdings: 0: holding that arkansas privilege law and public policy considerations prohibit ex parte interviews 1: holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction 2: holding that federal common law allows ex parte interviews as discovery tool and controls even when state law supplies the rule of decision 3: holding that minnesota law prohibiting ex parte interviews was not integral to its privilege law but was merely procedural rule and therefore not controlling in diversity action and the federal rules allow ex parte interviews as method of informal discovery 4: holding that preservation of the integrity of maine privilege law limits defendant to formal mechanisms of discovery provided by federal rules which do not allow ex parte interviews absent consent


Input: waives this privilege if he “voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter.” At trial, Ross testified extensively about what he said to his wife on the night of the shooting. This was clearly a voluntary disclosure of a “significant part of the privileged matter” under Rule 504. We therefore agree with the State that Ross’s testimony constituted a waiver of the Rule 504 privilege in this case. Furthermore, Ross could not use the trial court’s initial ruling to exclude the marital communications as a means to commit perjury by way of a defense. The State was certainly entitled to cross-examine Ross as to his version of what he disclosed to his wife on the night of the shooting. See Rooks v. State, 250 Ark. 561, 466 S.W.2d 478 (1971) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm on this point. As for Holdings: 0: recognizing the importance of crossexamination in casting doubt on credibility 1: holding due process required an opportunity for crossexamination when the decision depended on the credibility of individual witness testimony 2: holding that it was permissible for the state to test the credibility of appellants trial testimony by crossexamination 3: holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error 4: holding counsel was not deficient in not objecting to testimony that was permissible within state rules of evidence


Input: v. LeChambord Rest., 246 A.D.2d 514, 667 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y.App.Div.1998), (relying on Trincere, which held that a one-half inch elevation of a cement slab in the plaza area of a municipal building was not actionable as a matter of law). To determine whether a defect is too trivial to be negligent, the court should consider the “time, place, and circumstances” of the injury, in addition to dimensions and appearance of the defect. Trincere, 665 N.Y.S.2d 615, 688 N.E.2d at 490. In some instances, however, “the trivial nature of the defect may loom larger than another element” and therefore “[n]ot every injury allegedly caused by an elevated brick or slab need be submitted to a jury.” Id.; see Nathan v. City of New Rochelle, 282 A.D.2d 585, 723 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (<HOLDING>); but see Sanna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 271 Holdings: 0: holding that a postconviction claim that is refuted by the record is without merit 1: holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally waived absent exceptional circumstances 2: holding that a oneinch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable and that plaintiffs assertions that triable issues of fact were raised by the time place and circumstances of the accident are without merit 3: holding that the plaintiffs claims for assault and battery were patently without merit since the officers actions under the circumstances were justified 4: holding that exhaustion of issues is waived if not raised by the government


Input: of emotional distress claim beyond those asserted above, namely BANA’s failure to provide her with proper notice of the foreclosure. The trial court did not err in concluding that she “failed to allege any acts by [BANA] that were extreme and outrageous or that her emotional distress was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Thompson-El v. Bank of America, 327 Ga. App. at 313 (3). Consequently, the grant of judgment on the pleadings as to this claim was proper. See id. (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon bank’s foreclosure, allegedly without her knowledge, and subsequent attempts to remove her from the property); Racette v. Bank of America, 318 Ga. App. 171, 179 (3) (733 SE2d 457) (2012) (<HOLDING>) (punctuation omitted). Compare DeGolyer v. Holdings: 0: holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale 1: holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final 2: holding that in contrast to foreclosure of a mortgage secured by personal property foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need hot be at a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable 3: holding that debtors allegation that mortgage holder failed to provide him with the statutorily required notice of foreclosure was sufficient to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure 4: holding that appellants allegation that creditor conducted foreclosure sale despite knowing of inaccuracies in the published foreclosure advertisements cannot be described as extreme outrageous atrocious intolerable or beyond the bounds of decency


Input: legitimate interests and concern. The contrary evidence cited by the court falls far short of “clearly precluding]” the FLRA’s interpretation of the record. Universal Camera, supra, 340 U.S. at 490, 71 S.Ct. at 465. The court points primarily to the fact that after union representative Foust left the area where Reed was being interviewed, Deputy Chief Patrol Agent Barnette opined to Foust that OPR lacked authority to grant administrative immunity. It is undisputed that Agent Reed did not even hear Barnette’s ill-founded statement, if at all, until after the interview. Because the focus of § 7114(a)(2)(B) is on the risk of discipline reasonably perceived by the employee at the time o/the investigatory interview, the court’s reliance on Barnette’s statement is quite misguided. See at 729 (<HOLDING>). Even if Deputy Barnette’s odd statement were Holdings: 0: holding that deference to legislative fact finding does not foreclose the courts independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law 1: holding that an issue not raised on direct appeal of sentence is barred by the law of the case from presentation in a subsequent appeal 2: recognizing a split of authority on this issue 3: recognizing this rule 4: recognizing that events subsequent to inss interview of reed have no bearing on issue of whether  7114a2b was violated in this case


Input: evidence and must uphold the decision unless the evidence compels a contrary result. Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s denial of asylum based on an adverse credibility finding. Singh testified that he drove a taxi from 1998 to 2000 as his full-time job and was arrested a third time after driving militants in his taxi. In his application for redetermination of custody status, however, he stated that he was a farm worker during this period. When questioned about the inconsistency, Singh was evasive and nonresponsive. Because Singh provided inconsistent statements regarding the circumstances of his third arrest, the IJ’s adverse credibility finding is supported. See Kohli v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Because Singh failed to establish eligibility Holdings: 0: holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding 1: holding that minor discrepancies that do not involve the heart of the asylum claim are not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding 2: holding that ijs adverse credibility was not supported by substantial evidence where there were significant communication and translation problems  during the asylum hearing and the discrepancies at issue were not crucial to petitioners claim 3: holding that minor discrepancies in the date of an aliens graduation from high school as compared to the date of a beating did not justify an adverse credibility finding 4: holding adverse credibility finding was supported based on discrepancies between aliens testimony and statements regarding a police detention


Input: 704, 714-15 (9th Cir.1996), reasoned that the defendant had not made a prima facie case of racial discrimination where the prosecutor challenged two African-Americans in the jury pool but where three others remained on the panel. I would hold that the judge did not abuse his discretion in failing to sustain defense counsel’s Batson objection. Even following our more stringent decision in United States v. Moore, 28 MJ 366,1 am convinced that the prosecutor adequately set forth the basis for her peremptory challenge. The judge concluded that the prosecutor had been forthright in the past and that there was no evidence of a discriminatory intent. 1 . Some examples include the following: Right to counsel. Compare Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994)(<HOLDING>) with United States v. Kelly, 45 MJ 259 Holdings: 0: holding an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is valid because no prison term was imposed and the conviction may be used to enhance a sentence for a subsequent offense 1: holding that uncounseled conviction could not be considered by court in sentencing defendant after subsequent conviction 2: holding uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may be sentence enhancer 3: recognizing that felony and misdemeanor dwi are separate offenses because a prior conviction is an essential element of felony driving while intoxicated but it is not an element of the misdemeanor offense 4: holding misdemeanor conviction for petty larceny triggered disenfranchisement


Input: 2. The Hatch Letter Select portions of two paragraphs of the August 9, 1984 letter from Robert A. McConnell to Senator Orin G. Hatch have been redacted pursuant to Exemption 5, because defendant claims that they contain information protected by the deliberative process and attorney work-product privileges. Second Ferrel Decl. ¶ 5 and Exhibit 1 thereto. Plaintiff claims that this letter is not covered by Exemption 5 because it was prepared after the Moon case had concluded. However, the fact that the final decision to prosecute was made and the litigation was concluded prior to the date of the Hatch letter does not remove this information from Exemption 5 and the attorney work-product privilege. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Grolier, 462 U.S. 19, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In fact, the Supreme Court has held that Holdings: 0: holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia 1: holding attorney workproduct was exempt from disclosure under foia exemption 5 even after the case was dismissed and litigation terminated by the ftc 2: holding that memoranda prepared by various levels of staff lawyers within the department of justice tax division and by an assistant united states attorney were exempt from disclosure under foia exemption 5 3: holding that unauthorized disclosure of documents does not constitute a waiver of the applicable foia exemption 4: holding that the work product doctrine applied to a document prepared in anticipation of litigation and was therefore protected from disclosure under foia exemption 5


Input: that probable cause did not exist. Qualified immunity protects those officers who make a reasonable error in determining whether there is probable cause to arrest an individual. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir.2007). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test for qualified immunity: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (<HOLDING>)). Although qualified immunity is an Holdings: 0: holding that citys policy need not be unconstitutional per se but need only cause a constitutional violation 1: holding that a defendant need not be advised of the right to terminate questioning at any time 2: holding that the saucier procedure need not be followed in any particular sequence 3: holding that courts are not bound to decide any particular jurisdictional question before any other 4: holding that a claim on an algorithm for converting binarycoded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers was not patent eligible because the claims were not limited to any particular art or technology to any particular apparatus or machinery or to any particular end use


Input: to be read his Miranda rights before the school police questioned him and, given their failure to do so, we find that Appellant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination was violated. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. Former Chief Justice FLAHERTY did not participate in the decision of this case. CAPPY, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. CASTILLE, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. NEWMAN, Justice, files a concurring opinion. SAYLOR, Justice, files a concurring opinion. EAKIN, Justice, did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Although Justice Castille’s dissent goes Holdings: 0: holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously 1: holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer 2: holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease 3: holding that prior to engaging in custodial interrogation police must warn a suspect that he has a right to remain silent that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed 4: holding that constitutional precedent does not require that a convicted defendant be warned of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent prior to submitting to a routine authorized presentence interview


Input: ¶ 18 The dictionary defines a “structure” as “[sjomething constructed.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the E luding that the Restrictions at issue did not preclude the construction of the proposed roadway. As demonstrated above, a roadway is a “structure” within its ordinary meaning and wi .2001); Chase v. Joslin Mgmt. Corp., 128 N.H. 336, 512 A.2d 434, 436 (1986) (affirming the trial court’s ruling that an access road violated a restrictive covenant that only permitted the construction of single-family homes); L. W., Inc. v. Trice, 416 So.2d 736, 738 (Ala.1982) (“[A] roadway is a structure and ... a lot limited for residential use is limited to residential use within the subdivision of which it is a part.”); Beyt v. Woodvale Place Apartments, 297 So.2d 448, 450 (La.Ct.App.1974) (<HOLDING>); Duklauer v. Weiss, 18 Misc.2d 747, 182 Holdings: 0: holding that a roadway is a structure and its construction would violate the restrictive covenant limiting the land to residential purposes 1: holding that a restrictive covenant with worldwide restrictions on competition is not reasonable 2: holding that a restrictive covenant with a tenyear term was unenforceable 3: holding that a restrictive covenant will be upheld where a franchisor has a protectable interest in the sale of his franchise 4: holding that a roadway benefitting land outside the subdivision was not a residential purpose and was therefore a violation of the restrictive covenant


Input: Stat. 1107, 1567 (1988), was enacted in part because of the inadequacy of a '337 action. In particular, Congress recognized the limited remedies available to a patent owner in a '337 action for the use of a process patent outside the Unites States. See S.Rep. No. 100-83, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 30 (1987); H.R.Rep. No. 100-60, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1987). 12 . Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571-72 (Fed.Cir.1996), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1183, 117 S.Ct. 1466, 137 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) ("The government's unlicensed use of a patented invention is properly viewed as a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment through the government's exercise of its power of eminent domain .... ”); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 336 (Fed.Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); Trojan, Inc., 885 F.2d at 857 (Newman, J., Holdings: 0: recognizing  1498 is based on principles related to the taking of property namely a patent license 1: holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent 2: recognizing that the theory behind united statess use of a patent is a taking 3: holding that a professionals license is a protected property interest 4: holding motorist entitled to hearing before taking his license under statute that required loss of license if uninsured driver involved in an accident


Input: claims are defaulted, but Louisiana prisoners can benefit from the Martinez/Trevino exception to the procedural-default, rule if they can show that they have a substantial IATC claim and received IAC from state habeas counsel. As an appellate court, we cannot adequately evaluate, in the first instance, Coleman’s factual allegations against his trial and state habeas lawyers. Therefore, the judgment dismissing the petition is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED. The distinct court should determine whether Coleman has satisfied the remaining two requirements to show cause for procedural default under Martinez and Trevino and should conduct proceedings as needed. We express no view on what decisions the court should make on remand. 1 . State v. Ratcliff, 416 So.2d 528, 530 (La. 1982) (<HOLDING>); State v. Woodard, 9 So.3d 112, 118 (La. 2009) Holdings: 0: holding court unable to rule on issue when the record fails to include copies of the evidence needed to decide issue on appeal 1: holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived 2: holding issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal 3: holding that if the record discloses evidence needed to decide the issue of iac and that issue was raised by assignment of error on appeal it can be decided on appeal in the interest of judicial economy 4: holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it


Input: 106 S.Ct. at 1724 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). The prosecutor having offered a race-neutral reason for the challenge, the trial court must evaluate the credibility of the parties in order to determine whether the reason articulated by the prosecutor is, indeed, legitimate and non-discriminatory, or if it is, in fact, pretextual. Based on the Supreme Court’s observation that the defendant in Batson had made a timely objection to the peremptory challenge, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that in order to preserve the Batson issue for subsequent review, a defendant must make an objection at the l exceptions to the procedural default are not applicable in a Batson claim. Wiley, 969 F.2d at 101 (<HOLDING>). The eases in this line of precedent address Holdings: 0: holding that the cause and prejudice standard applied to defendants failure to object to his career offender classification at sentencing 1: holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice 2: holding that failure to comply with state contemporaneous objection rule bars federal review absent a showing of cause and prejudice 3: holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error 4: holding that a showing of cause and prejudice fails to overcome a defendants initial failure to object


Input: with regard to the modification of previously granted spousal support awards. The divorce court has no express or implied authority to modify retroactively a spousal support award that was merely erroneous and not entered as a result of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties or as a result of fraud upon the court. In such cases, until prospectively modified or terminated by the divorce court, the obligated spouse is required to make his or her spousal support payments in accordance with the terms of the court’s decree. See generally Richardson v. Moore, 217 Va. 422, 229 S.E.2d 864 (1976); Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 140 S.E.2d 663 (1965); Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 118 S.E.2d 656 (1961); accord Martin v. Bales, 7 Va. App. 141, 147, 371 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1988) (<HOLDING>). When an erroneous spousal support award is Holdings: 0: holding that a court is without authority to modify its spousal support decree retroactively and relieve a party of the obligation to pay past due installments 1: holding that the trial court was without authority to modify a spousal support obligation when the modification proceeding was initiated ten years after the obligation to pay spousal support under the dissolution judgment had been terminated by order 2: holding that the trial court lacked authority to renew spousal support payments pursuant to a motion that was filed after the expiration of time during which spousal support was required to be paid under the original judgment 3: holding that where payments are made on past due support they must first be applied to  current child support installments due then to accrued and outstanding interest on  delinquent child support obligations and finally to the principal amount due on unpaid child support 4: holding that a trial court has broad discretion to modify a spousal maintenance award


Input: JJ., concur. 1 . On appeal, Amquip argues the trial court also erred in denying: its motion for summary judgment, the admission into evidence of depositions, and its motion for a continuance. 2 . Amquip contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying its request to admit deposition transcripts into evidence and in denying its motion for continuance when it was unable to get the deposition transcripts into evidence. As mentioned previously, those issues are moot because this case is reversed on the denial of the right to a trial by jury. 3 . Although Vercon contends Amquip waived its right to a jury trial by participating in a nonjury trial, this argument relates to whether Amquip preserved the issue for appeal. See Crespo v. Crespo, 28 So.3d 125, 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) Holdings: 0: holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered 1: holding defendant failed to preserve for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence that was the subject of the motion in limine where defendant failed to object to evidence when offered at trial 2: holding that a claim was not preserved for review where the defense failed to object on the specific grounds advanced on appeal 3: holding that the defendant waived the issue on appeal when he failed to contemporaneously object to the admission of such evidence at trial 4: holding exwifes claim regarding admission of parol evidence was not preserved for appeal because she failed to object to the evidence or to having an evidentiary hearing


Input: Judge. John Wesley Felton pled nolo contende-re to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and to carrying a concealed weapon, reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress a ,22-ealiber rifle. We disagree with the trial court’s determination that the facts were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Felton was engaged in criminal activity and, accordingly, reverse. See Phuagnong v. State, 714 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(<HOLDING>). In reviewing the trial court’s assessment of Holdings: 0: holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo 1: holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo 2: holding that trial courts determination of facts has a presumption of correctness but trial courts legal conclusions are subject to de novo review 3: holding appellate court reviews legal conclusions de novo 4: holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo


Input: or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan. (b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor. (c) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, the property vesting in the debtor under subsection (b) of this section is free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan. [11 U.S.C section 1327 (1982).] Nothing in 11 U.S.C. section 1327, or elsewhere in chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code, suggests that confirmation of the chapter 13 plan results in the case being closed or dismissed or a discharge being granted or denied. See also In re Herbert, 61 B.R. 44 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (<HOLDING>) Therefore, there is no termination of the Holdings: 0: holding that refusal to provide chapter 7 debtor transcript because of default on student loan was a violation of the automatic stay based on the plain language of 11 usc  362 1: holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor  counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay 2: holding that the automatic stay provisions of section 362 remain in full force and effect during chapter 13 proceedings in order to prevent harassment of debtor while he attempts to rehabiliate himself and pay off some outstanding debts 3: holding that relief from the codebtor stay is mandated to the extent that the chapter 13 plan does not propose to pay the claim in full 4: recognizing that in enacting  362 in 1978 congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay


Input: lose “merit pay, extra class assignments normally to be expected such as summer school, promotion and increased pay, publishing opportunities, paid speaking opportunities, paid sabbaticals, research grants, and the like.” Neither the Wisconsin Administrative Code nor the UW-Whitewater University Handbook creates an entitlement to a certain earning capacity level for UW faculty members. Furthermore, where a censured employee retains his job and does not suffer any loss of pay or rank, any alleged harm to his stature or earnings prospects is purely speculative. See Lowe, 841 F.2d at 858. Powell “cannot complain that he has been made unemployable; he remains employed, and in a job that has considerable tenure rights attached to it.” Hershinow v. Bonamarte, 735 F.2d 264, 266 (7th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). The cases that Powell cites in support of Holdings: 0: holding that a school principals suspension with pay did not implicate a constitutionally protected property interest 1: holding that a threeday suspension without pay did not infringe police officers liberty interest 2: holding that suspension with pay was not adverse employment action 3: holding that a suspension with pay does not invade any recognized property interest 4: holding that a suspension with pay does not violate any recognized property interest


Input: States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A.1982). 7 . See Specifications 1 and 2 of the Charge. These specifications allege violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1470 and 2422(b) respectively. 8 . Specifications 3 through 7 allege violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. 9 . The Benchbook does not list such a requirement either. See Military Judges’ Benchbook, Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-9 at ¶ 3-60-2B (1 Jan 2010). 10 . United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F.2002). 11 . In evaluating harmlessness for nonconstitutional error, we apply the standard of whether the error "had a substantial influence on the member’ verdict in the context of the entire case.” United States v. Yammine, 69 M.J. 70, 78 (C.A.A.F.2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 12 . See Mil. R. Evid. 201A(a) (<HOLDING>); Moore, 55 M.J. at 781. 13 . Although not Holdings: 0: recognizing that mil r evid 201a authorizes judicial notice of domestic law even a of consequence to the action 1: holding procedural requirements of mil r evid 201g do not apply where military judge takes judicial notice of domestic law that is a fact of consequence to the determination of the action 2: holding that the notice requirements of section 101101 do not apply to employees because they are not governmental units 3: holding that courts apply the procedural law of the forum and the substantive law of the jurisdiction originating the claim 4: holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes


Input: 3553(e)[,] asserting the defendant’s substantial assistance to the Government; or (2) the defendant meets the “safety valve” criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).’ Otherwise, post-Booker sentencing courts lack discretion to depart below relevant statutory mínimums.” In this case, the gov 606, 2008 WL 946065 (5th Cir.2008) (noting that alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis). 4 . Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 189, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). 5 . Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 6 . Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 7 . Id. at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 8 . Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 9 . See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (<HOLDING>). 10 . U.S. Const. amend. VI. 11 . Crawford, Holdings: 0: holding that lesser sentence imposed on codefendant did not constitute abuse of discretion where defendant was sentenced within the statutory and guideline range and where codefendant received reduction for acceptance of responsibility and for being a minimal participant 1: holding that a defendants sixth amendment confrontation clause rights are violated when a court admits into evidence an incriminating statement given by a nontestifying codefendant 2: holding that admission of a postal inspectors testimony about an oral confession by a defendants codefendant violated the defendants sixth amendment right to crossexamine his codefendant who was unavailable because the codefendant asserted his right not to testify 3: holding that the defendants allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendants behalf because he had been coerced by the state were sufficient to state a prima facie claim of newly discovered evidence 4: holding that the admission of a pretrial confession of a nontestifying codefendant that incriminates the defendant violates that defendants right to confront witnesses even if a limiting instruction is given


Input: failure to argue harmless error, the majority concludes that the constructive-possession instructional error was harmless, primarily by relying on Mr. Little’s supposed exclusive control of the well house. However, the majority’s harmless-error analysis does not alter my view that the resolution of the harmlessness question is at least debatable and far from certain or readily apparent. As the majority candidly acknowledges, the cases on which it relies only hold that constructive possession may be inferred from a defendant’s exclusive control of the premises in which the firearms are found; the cases do not indicate that a defendant’s exclusive control of the premises necessitates an inference of constructive possession. See United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 571 (10th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants dominion control and knowledge may be inferred if he had exclusive possession of the premises on which the object was found emphasis added 1: holding that if the site where the contraband is found is in joint rather than exclusive possession a defendants knowledge of the contrabands presence and his ability to control it cannot be inferred merely from the defendants proximity to the contraband 2: holding that circumstance that contraband was found in a box bearing defendants name was sufficient to support an inference of knowledge and dominion and control 3: holding that where drugs are found in the presence and plain view of the owner or resident occupant of a home dominion and control maybe inferred 4: holding when drugs are found on premises exclusive control provides significant proof of constructive possession


Input: conceivable means, proving it to be in fact ineffective. A good-faith effort is all that should be required. See Emery Realty, 863 F.2d at 1265; Husky Oil, N.P.R. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 643, 645 (10th Cir.1982). 11 . The only available strip of public property, the edge of the grassy apron, abuts the Berlin Turnpike, a four-lane highway with a speed limit of 50 m.p.h. The area is commercial in character and there are indications in the record that traffic is more than minimal. There is no traffic signal or stop sign at the entrance from the turnpike into the Plaza. 12 . Accessibility, in this context, is dichotomous. One aspect implicates the geography of the workplace. Cf., e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 799, 65 S.Ct. 982, 986, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945) (<HOLDING>); Husky Oil, N.P.R. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, Holdings: 0: holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled 1: recognizing need for access to remote mining or lumber camp where the employees pass their rest as well as their work time 2: holding that a contractors employees were not within the scope and course of their employment when they deviated from their work to shoot at squirrels 3: recognizing the need for judicial economy in family issues as well as  the need to avoid fundamental unfairness 4: holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline


Input: any “person engaged in commerce ... [or] any agent of such person.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), § 630(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, § 2000e(b); see Legal Services Corp. of P.R., 932 F.Supp. at 50. Although all three statutes provide that a supervisor is an employer, a number of courts have held that Congress included the phrase “any agent” to make sure that respondeat superior liability was imposed on the employers for the acts committed by their agents, not upon the agents personally. Id. at 50-51. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ADA claims against the Individual Defendants are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. B. TITLE VII CLAIMS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS The First Circuit has held that there is no individual employee liability under Title VII. Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22 (1st Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). “ ’The statutory scheme of Title VII itself Holdings: 0: holding that the definition of employer for title vii purposes does not encompass individu al supervisors even if such individuals are acting as agents of the employer 1: holding that only employers not individuals acting in their individual capacity who do not otherwise meet the definition of employers can be held liable under title vii 2: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 3: holding that title vii does not provide for a damages claim against supervisors or fellow employees 4: holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii


Input: that a tennis court was a use of land, not a structure. Id. at 191. This interpretation focused on the specific zoning provisions regulating buildings and structures, as opposed to uses. We were unwilling to extend the term “structure” to a use of land. Williams, supra at 190-191. These opinions demonstrate that we have been sensitive to the purposes for which the term “structure” has been used in the particular statute or regulation in issue. To the extent that our cases interpreting the term “structure” in other statutes and by-laws are relevant, as the newspapers contend, there are numerous other cases that take a broad interpretation and reach the opposite conclusion from Galligon and Williams. See, e.g., Scott v. Board of Appeal of Wellesley, 356 Mass. 159, 161-162 & n.2 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Selectmen of Lancaster v. DeFelice, 352 Mass. Holdings: 0: holding that argument offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not raised below 1: holding black box labeled sel was sufficient structure because it was a well known electronic structure and performs a common electronic function 2: holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum 3: holding that swimming pool was structure for zoning bylaw purposes although it was mostly below ground level 4: holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum


Input: plaintiffs limitation of liability claim pending); Bergeron v. Elliot, 466 F.2d 514, 516 n. 3 (5th Cir.1972) (allowing appeal of grant of summary judgment as to one of several defendants). Cf. Jamaica Commodity Trading Co. v. Barge Hercules, 992 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (finding no jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of grant of summary judgment on one defendant’s cross-claim against another for indemnification because plaintiffs claims for liability as to any defendant had not been determined). As the District Court did neither of these and did not otherwise determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, McLaughlin’s appeal is not yet ripe for review and cannot be heard by this court. Accord Francis v. Forest Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 147, 149-50 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Upper Miss. Towing Corp. v. West, 338 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a pretrial order that the 500 cogsa limitation applied was not appealable under 28 usc 1292a3 1: holding order setting aside summary judgment for procedural irregularity was not immediately appealable 2: holding that where an adversary proceeding continues the order  is no more a final decision than an order denying summary judgment or denying a request for additional discovery the litigation proceeds and the issue will be reviewed if it turns out to make a difference to an order that is independently appealable 3: holding that an order denying summary judgment is not appealable under  1292a3 even though it may have had important procedural consequences 4: holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable


Input: Therefore, it was an allegation based on speculation and conjecture. The trial court conducted a hearing, at which Walker could have pursued this legal theory, objected to the State’s alleged lack of evidence of probable cause to arrest, presented evidence to support his allegation, and argued that the lack of evidence required that his statement be suppressed. Walker, however, remained silent; he did not pursue this issue in the trial court; and he did not allow the trial court the opportunity to prevent the alleged injustice. See Adams v. State, 585 So.2d 161, 164 (Ala.l991)(“Matters not objected to at trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal, since review on appeal applies only to rulings by the trial court.”)- Cf. Coulliette v. State, 857 So.2d 793, 795 (Ala.2003)(<HOLDING>). Walker’s silence and abandonment of this Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court considers the entire record on appeal not just the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in affirming the denial of a motion to suppress 1: holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal 2: holding issues not raised in appellate brief are waived 3: holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal 4: holding that because a specific argument raised on appeal was not presented at suppression hearing  the motion to suppress did not give the trial court notice of the specific issues the defendant  raised in his appellate brief therefore the trial court did not have the opportunity to rectify these alleged errors the defendants motion was not sufficient to preserve the issues presented by him in his brief  quoting aeree v state 673 so2d 855 856 alacrimapp1995


Input: to the very heart and substance of the contract. It was material; indeed, it is difficult to imagine anything more material, given nearly three years of delays, three contract extensions, and two federal lawsuits involving the sale of this very property. The Sellers displayed the patience of Job by waiting nearly 3/é years to accomplish the sale of farmland that was originally intended to be transferred within six months. Paragraph 15 of the settlement agreement clearly called for closing or termination “[i]f closing has not occurred on or before January 25, 2001, for any reason,” and the closing failed to occur in a timely fashion. Based on the facts before us, we do not perceive any clear error with the district court’s findings. See O’Malley, 86 Ill.App.2d at 451, 229 N.E.2d 878 (<HOLDING>); Schneider, 767 F.2d at 1014 (“The parties Holdings: 0: holding that explicit deadline coupled with forfeiture provision was sufficient evidence of materiality 1: holding that when a plea agreement or consent order does not explicitly prohibit seeking the forfeiture of substitute assets via civil forfeiture under  981 the statutory scheme controls and requires the forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to  2461c and 853p 2: holding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a criminal forfeiture action where a state court in a related state court forfeiture proceeding had in personam jurisdiction over the same currency subject to forfeiture 3: holding evidence legally sufficient 4: holding a forfeiture provision to be a civil action despite its codification in the states criminal code


Input: the sale and he was not arrested until seven months later. He had also testified that although his mother lived near the location where the buy had occurred, he could not remember if he had visited her that night or where he had been at that time. Then-Justice Castille concurred, noting that under the facts — "namely the lengthy time period between the alleged transaction and the arrest” — the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Payne, 656 A.2d at 80. However, Justice Castille disagreed with much of the majority's explanation of the test to be applied, in particular disputing the emphasis the majority placed on the availability of testimony from "a more disinterested source” than a police officer. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 427 Pa. 261, 234 A.2d 423 (1967) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Washington, 463 Pa. 206, 344 Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of prior drug sales was sufficiently similar to the crimes charged  to be probative of the fact that the defendant was not merely an innocent driver who was involved in the drug transaction by accident 1: holding that the defendant was entitled to a new trial where the only witnesses to a drug transaction other than the defendant were an fbi agent and a cl 2: holding that defendant was not entitled to specific performance of alleged cooperation agreement entered into with fbi agent who allegedly promised defendant he would not be prosecuted if he cooperated in making a statement where there was no evidence establishing that agent was authorized to make promises to obtain defendants cooperation 3: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial 4: holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant


Input: applying the legal “tax” definition utilized by courts under the Act. In arriving at this conclusion, the court determined that the assessment involved an “involuntary pecuniary burden,” because the marketing order involved statutory, rather than contractual, obligations. Id. at 387. Also, the assessment was found to be for a public purpose, since the funds were utilized “to defray the necessary expenses incurred by the director in the formulation, issuance, administration and enforcement of each marketing order.” Id. at 388. However, contrary to the Farmers Frozen Food decision, courts under the Code have not hesitated to determine certain assessments to be “fees,” despite the fact that they stemmed from statutory obligations. In re Jenny Lynn Mining, 780 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); In re Shooters Emporium, Inc., 135 B.R. 701, Holdings: 0: holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment 1: holding that background check assessments required by statute are not taxes under the code 2: holding that permit fee assessments required by statute are not taxes under the code 3: holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes 4: holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable


Input: remedies available to him. Nevertheless, Jacquez-Perez’s petition must fail. In expanding the definition of “aggravated felony,” Congress explicitly stated that the expanded definition “applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before ... the date of enactment [September 30, 1996],” IIRIRA § 321(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)), and that the new definition “shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred,” id. § 321(c). See also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 318-19 & n. 43, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (using these sections as an example of Congress’s unambiguous intent to apply the expanded definition retroactively); Tran v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Here, the relevant “action taken” is ICE Holdings: 0: recognizing that 1996 amendment to definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively 1: holding that the expanded definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively in actions taken on or after september 30 1996 2: recognizing that 1996 amendment specifically applies regardless of date of prior conviction constituting aggravated felony 3: holding that  212c applies to all applications for relief filed after november 29 1990 regardless of when conviction occurred for offenses within the original definition of aggravated felony 4: holding that an ij or bia decision that occurs after september 30 1996 is an action taken that triggers iiriras aggravated felony rules


Input: of influencing the grand jury as to any proper matter pertaining to its inquiry or which might have influenced the grand jury or impeded its inquiry.” United States v. Doherty, 906 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1990); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). To be material, the statement “need not directly concern an element of the crime” being investigated, “nor need it actually influence the jury.” Doherty, 906 F.2d at 44. Because materiality is a mixed question of fact and law for the jury, Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512-15, 115 S.Ct. 2310, a court may only decide the issue, as a matter of law, when no reasonable juror could find materiality on the evidence presented, cf. In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 209 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). On appeal, Silveira contends that the Holdings: 0: holding that a district court may find acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence 1: recognizing only that the guidelines must be advisory not that judges may find no facts 2: holding that to find negligence jury need not find violation of federal motorcarrier regulation 3: holding in a securities fraud action that a court may only find the lack of materiality where a jury could not reasonably find materiality 4: holding in securities law context that in cases involving nondisclosure of material facts  materiality rather than reliance  becomes the decisive element of causation


Input: those state laws that specifically “regulate insurance.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A). The Supreme Court has recently set forth a new two-part test for determining whether a state law “regulates insurance” and is, therefore, saved from ERISA’s preemptive effect. This two-part test requires the state law to: (1) “be specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance”; and (2) “substantially affect the risk pooling arrangements between the insurer and the insured.” Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, _ U.S. _, 123 S.Ct. 1471, 1479, 155 L.Ed.2d 468 (2003). If this two-part inquiry reveals that the state' law regulates insurance, then the state law is saved from preemption. “This does not, however, end [the] preemption analysis.” Cono Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1147-48 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Holdings: 0: holding claims under the montana unfair trade practices statute were conflictpreempted because the montana law provided nonerisa damages for essentially claim processing causes of action 1: holding that an action which seeks nonerisa damages for what are essentially claim processing causes of actionf clearly falls under the  1132 preemption exemplified by pilot life 2: holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted 3: holding that a complaint that seeks nonerisa damages for what are essentially claim processing causes of action clearly fall within the ambit of  1132 preemption exemplified by pilot life 4: holding that state common law causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan are removable to federal court


Input: of unsuccessful appeals through the state court system. Thus, to the extent the arbitrator evaluated a slim record, it was a record starved by Kalyanaram, not by any inadequacy of the arbitration process. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 1 . Kalyanaram’s suit claimed that NYIT submitted fraudulent information to federal and state agencies so that the school’s students would be eligible for subsidized student loans. His claims were brought under the federal False Claims Act and its New York state equivalent. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729, N.Y. State Fin. Law § 189. 2 . Even if the arbitration award had not yet been confirmed by state courts, it could still have preclusive effect. See Jacobson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 261, 267-68 (2d Cir.1997) Holdings: 0: holding that collateral estoppel and res judicata apply to quasijudicial agency decisions 1: holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to issues resolved by arbitration where there has been a final determination on the merits notwithstanding a lack of confirmation of the award citations omitted 2: holding that a summary judgment is a determination on the merits for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes 3: recognizing exception to application of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles to decisions of administrative proceedings where there has been manifest error in the record 4: holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration award


Input: in Berry, 670 F.2d at 597, did say that ‘The more intrusive on an individual's freedom complying with a request would be, the greater should be the skepticism with which a court treats assertions that an individual consented to a request”; but this does not determine when consent was given, however, or suggest less validity to an acquiescence voluntarily and intelligently extended. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555-56, 100 S.Ct. at 1877-78; Gonzales, 842 F.2d at 754-55. 17 . Zukas, 843 F.2d at 183 ("The suspicion did not rise to the level of probable cause [for arrest], though, until after Zukas and the passenger had consented to a search that resulted . in the discovery of cocaine.”). 18 . Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435 n. 22, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3148 n. 22, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310, 87 Holdings: 0: holding that traffic stops do not ordinarily place a motorist in custody the court rejected the position that custody arises as soon as the level of suspicion amounts to probable cause to arrest 1: holding that traffic stops based on probable cause are valid even if the officer stopping the vehicle suspects that the occupant is engaged in other illegal activity 2: recognizing that district courts finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances is ordinarily accorded deference 3: holding that arrest took place inside home even though officers did not physically enter residence to place suspect in custody 4: holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops


Input: public policy and case law surrounding Commonwealth contract claims,” and did not alter or diminish the Board of Claims’ jurisdiction, except as explicitly enumerated in “two minor areas (i.e. by eliminating Board jurisdiction over medical assistance claims and allowing for nonmonetary relief, excluding specific performance, on state contract claims before the Commonwealth Court).” Id. at 1 (citing 62 Pa.C.S. § 1724(c), (d)). In terms of its main request, the Board of Claims centers a substantial portion of its presentation on the question of whether the amendments to the Procurement Code reconstituting the tribunal narrowed its jurisdiction only to claims for breaches of procurement contracts. See generally Hanover Ins. Co. v. SWIF, 35 A.3d 849, 856 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2012) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The Board of Claims also places particular Holdings: 0: holding that a nonfrivolous allegation of board jurisdiction is one which if true would establish a prima facie case that the board has jurisdiction over the matter at issue 1: holding that the courts jurisdiction is limited to the appeal of final board decisions that are adverse to the claimant 2: holding consistent with the board of claims position that the provisions of the procurement code have not altered or limited the exclusive jurisdiction of the independent administrative board over a particular nonprocurement matter 3: holding that the denial of enforcement on the basis that the board lacked a proper quorum did not deprive the board of jurisdiction to consider the case anew 4: holding that taxpayer could not have presented substantive due process claim to the board of assessment review because of the limited jurisdiction of that board


Input: that Mexican gangs attempted to extort money from his family by threatening to kidnap his sister. The IJ reasonably found that the callers targe 3 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that general civil strife does not establish a well-founded fear of persecution). The IJ also reasonably found that Vargas did not establish a likelihood that he would be tortured by Mexican gangs because, despite the high level of gang violence, Vargas testified that none of his family living in Mexico had been harmed and he did not provide evidence that the Mexican government permits gang violence. See Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir.2004) (requiring applicant for CAT relief to show that torture would be perpetrated with the government’s consent or acquiescence); Melgar de Torres, 191 F.3d at 313 (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for Holdings: 0: holding members of two distinct pension plans were not similarly situated for equal protection analysis 1: holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim 2: holding that where similarly situated family members continued to live in aliens native country claim of future harm was diminished 3: holding that wellfounded fear was established where all of petitioners similarly situated family members were persecuted 4: holding that potential class members are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs if they are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions


Input: motions are rendered moot by the dismissal of the appeal. While the request for posteonviction relief filed by Barnes was timely filed in accordance with Rule 37.2(c), which requires that, when a petitioner entered a plea of guilty, a petition under the Rule must be filed in the trial court within ninety days of the date of entry of judgment, the request for postconviction relief filed by Barnes was not properly verified. For that reason, it was subject to dismissal by the trial court. Keck v. State, 2013 Ark. 139, at 5, 2013 WL 1385240 (per curiam). Barnes could not circumvent the requirement that a [.¡petition for postconviction relief be verified by labeling his petition as a motion to retract his guilty plea. See Lambert v. State, 2012 Ark. 310, at 2, 2012 WL 3373199 (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); see also Livingston v. State, 2014 Ark. 364, Holdings: 0: holding that because the petitioner had already filed a rule 371 petition he was barred from submitting a subsequent petition under that rule and his petition was subject to dismissal on that basis regardless of the label he placed on it 1: holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition 2: holding that a petition to correct sentence was properly considered as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 371 because it challenged a judgment entered on a plea of guilty on grounds cognizable under the rule 3: holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raise in the rule 32 petition 4: holding that petition was properly filed even though the state court denied it as procedurally barred because the petition was delivered to and accepted by the state court


Input: to be free from liability for one’s own negligence is to use the word ‘negligence,’ is erroneous.”). Here, the release provided that it applied to “all claims, demands, expenses, attorneys’ fees, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature, resulting from or claimed to have resulted from the sale, use or administration of ProHeart 6 INJ.” (Emph 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (same); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 782 So.2d 445, 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (same). However, in this case, the release was completely typewritten. The reference in the release to “all other persons, firms, corporations and entities” clearly applies to appellees for claims resulting from “the sale, use or administration of ProHeart 6.” See Hester v. Gatlin, 332 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (<HOLDING>). However, we conclude that in entering a Holdings: 0: holding that release must specifically name or otherwise specifically identify the persons to be discharged 1: holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release 2: holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release 3: holding that release which specifically referenced certain parties but went on to discharge any and all other persons andor corporations was sufficient to release unnamed third party 4: holding that release discharges only those tortfeasors specifically named in the release agreement


Input: § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (issues not raised in an opening brief are waived). To the extent that Verdu-Degregorio contends that he did not knowingly waive his right to appeal his removal order and request withholding of removal, his due process claim fails because he does not explain how his due process rights were violated in his signing of the waiver, nor did he establish any resulting prejudice. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim). To the extent that Verdu-Degregorio is collaterally attacking his underlying state criminal conviction, we lack jurisdiction to consider this claim. See Ramirez-Villalpando v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED Holdings: 0: holding that petitioner could not collaterally attack his state court conviction on a petition for review of an agency decision 1: holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review 2: holding that a habeas petitioner must be in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed 3: holding that a habeas petitioner cannot collaterally attack the conviction serving as a predicate for a removal order 4: holding that a defendant cannot collaterally attack a prior state conviction during a federal sentencing proceeding in a different case


Input: 150-51. As just stated, Harry’s directive to transfer King to another Level II institution in order to give the staff a break was facially legitimate. King produced no evidence that Chaffee knew or should have known that he was not actually instigating other prisoners to defiance. Indeed, King’s trial counsel elicited from Chaffee on direct examination that he did not have any first hand knowledge whether King was instigating other prisoners. Trial Trans. (Vol.1) at 139. Thus, King failed to show that Chaffee knew or should have known that the reasons Harry gave him for the transfer were false or given for retaliatory reasons. Therefore, King failed to prove that in facilitating his transfer, Chaffee acted with retaliatory intent. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 393 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Chaffee cannot have known of any Holdings: 0: holding a subordinate will be liable under  1983 for following a superiors orders if he knew or should have known his acts were violating plaintiffs constitutional rights 1: recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action 2: holding that a constitutional violation by a subordinate is a predicate for supervisory liability under  1983 3: holding that a request is sufficiently clear if the administrator knew or should have known that plan information was requested 4: holding that defendant who sets in motion series of events that he knew or should have known would cause others to deprive plaintiff of rights may be liable under  1983


Input: v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (declining to find a due process right to appointed counsel on appeal from state collateral review even when under state law, ineffectiveness claims relating to trial or direct appeal could only be brought in a state collateral review proceeding). To the extent Petitioner premises her asserted entitlement to collateral review on the constitutional nature of her ineffectiveness claims, we have already held that, in the context of the jurisdictional timeliness restrictions on the right to bring a PCRA petition, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b), the constitutional nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 Holdings: 0: holding that where the appellant had the opportunity to bring his petition within the parameters of the jurisdictional requirements of the pcra yet did not do so he cannot complain of a lack of due process 1: holding no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely pcra petition 2: holding that because an untimely pcra petition was premised on claims that were cognizable under the pcra the statutory writ of habeas corpus was unavailable 3: holding that the constitutional nature of the violations alleged in a pcra petition has no effect on the application of the pcra jurisdictional time bar 4: holding that a pcra petitioner may not raise new claims by merely supplementing a pending pcra petition without court authorization because to do so would wrongly subvert the time limitation and serial petition restrictions of the pcra


Input: The Posts clearly could have litigated the insurance claim in their prior foreclosure action. A foreclosure judgment determines with finality the rights of the parties to the contract. See Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis. 2d 164, 172, 325 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1982). The effect of strict foreclosure is to bar and foreclose the purchaser's equitable interest in the property and terminate the purchaser's rights under the contract. Kallenbach v. Lake Publications, Inc., 30 Wis. 2d 647, 653, 142 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1966). Foreclosure also "is effective to fully liquidate and discharge the contract . . . [and] bars any other rights of the vendor under the contract." Id. (quoting 3 American Law of Property sec. 11.75 at 187 (1952)); see also Kunz v. Whitney, 167 Wis. 446, 449-50, 167 N.W. 747, 748 (1918) (<HOLDING>). This, we conclude, "conforms to the parties' Holdings: 0: holding that the land contract vendors were entitled to insurance benefits when before the fire that damaged the subject property the vendors obtained a judgment of forfeiture based on the vendees default on the land contract 1: holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties 2: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 3: holding that when the holder of a land contract repurchases the land in foreclosure the contract between the parties is effectively canceled and the purchaser is relieved of any unperformed obligations of the contract 4: holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute


Input: FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). Under rational basis review, a classification is permissible “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.” Id. (quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096). Plaintiffs contend that the EO discriminates on the basis of religion and was designed to exclude Muslims from the United States. They further allege that it singles out citizens of seven different countries. At oral argument, plaintiffs relied on “astonishing evidence of intent” from President Trump which, in their view, demonstrates that EO was “substantially motivated by improper animus.” See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Defendants responded that the cases examining Holdings: 0: holding that the state law violated equal protection principles 1: holding that where racial bias motivated its original enactment a facially neutral felon disenfranchisement law violated the equal protection clause 2: holding that a provision in the alabama constitution violated equal protection even through it was facially neutral because it was motivated by animus 3: holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial 4: holding that an illinois countys facially neutral twotiered ballot ordering system did not violate the equal protection clause


Input: Edward C. Tadefa appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habe-as corpus. We dismiss. Tadefa contends that the special mental health aftercare requirement imposed as a condition of his release violates his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Because this issue is not yet ripe for review, we dismiss. See United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 931-32 (9th Cir.2009); Cf. United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir.2005). Tadefa’s motion to supplement the record is denied. See Fed. R.App. P. 10(e); see also Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 351 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Tadefa’s motion for appointment of counsel is Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court will not normally address issue raised for the first time on appeal 1: holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal 2: recognizing that this court construes rule 10e narrowly and has held that normally the reviewing court will not supplement the record on appeal with material not considered by the trial court 3: holding that an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by this court 4: holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal


Input: federal court, but we agree it is not necessarily improper. 2011 WL 477175, at *1. Tex. Lab.Code § 410.251 allows judicial review after exhaustion of administrative remedies for parties aggrieved by a final decision of an appeals panel of the DWC. The Texas Legislature, when attempting to limit jurisdiction, makes this intent clear in the statute. See, e.g., Chapman v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 814 F.Supp.2d 716, 721 (N.D.Tex.2011) (finding the Texas Legislature not using the term “exclusive jurisdiction” in the Texas Title Insurance Act “was not just mere oversight because the Texas Legislature has demonstrated that it knows how to confer such jurisdiction when it desires by carefully selecting the wording of the statute.”); In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Tex.2004) (<HOLDING>). While Chapman and Entergy Corp. each Holdings: 0: holding that the utilities commission has the discretion to use a hypothetical capital structure in setting customer rates particularly where the utility is a whollyowned subsidiary of a holding company 1: holding that the commission may only exercise jurisdiction over utilities expressly included in the scope of the pua 2: holding that the texas legislature limited jurisdiction to the public utilities commission for disputes about rates operations and services of an electric utility by stating that the commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over these issues citing tex utilcode  32001 west 2007 3: holding commission created and given full power to investigate hear and determine disputes between utility and general public primarily for the interest of the consumer 4: holding that the legislature granted exclusive authority over ratemaking to the public service commission


Input: with complete waiver as the penalty imposed for any untimely filed claims. Rule 24.035(b), (g); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012) (“By failing to timely file, the movant has completely waived his right to proceed on his post-conviction relief claims.”). Finally, Rule 24.035 restricts the authorized scope o.f appellate review “to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous.” Rule 24.035(k); see also Dobbins v. State, 187 S.W.3d 865, 866 (Mo. banc 2006). These Rules combine to prohibit appellate review of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is not timely raised in a Rule 24.035 motion. State v. Kelley, 953 S.W.2d 73, 92 (Mo.App.S.D.1997) (cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151, 118 S.Ct. 1173, 140 L.Ed.2d 182) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 48, 50 Holdings: 0: holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived 1: holding that a claim is proeedurally barred where it was not raised in the defendants motion for postconviction relief 2: holding that claims not raised in a timely postconviction motion are waived 3: holding that a ground for relief not pled in a motion for postconviction relief is waived and cannot be raised on appeal 4: holding an issue not preserved when one ground is raised to the trial court and another ground is raised on appeal


Input: are “persons” under 26 U.S.C. § 6672. Plaintiffs argue that they are not “persons” because: 1) they did not make the decision to stop paying tax funds or to prefer some creditors over the IRS; and 2) Manley had enough funds free and clear of any control by the bank to have paid the payroll taxes withheld to the United States. The United States argues that under the line of credit loan and security agreement, the bank has the power to control Manley in the event of default, plaintiffs are “persons.” “Person” is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 6671(b), as follows: “[t]he term ‘person’, as used in this subehapter, includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under it, Inc., 956 F.2d 703 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). When a lender does not exercise control over Holdings: 0: holding the lender hable when after borrower defaulted the lender took control of borrowers finances determined which creditors were paid and loaned the borrower money for the purpose of paying employees on condition that none of the money be used to pay withholding taxes 1: holding that it was not improper for a lender to halt the proposed settlement and discounted payment of plaintiffs loan when the lender believed the loan would otherwise be paid in full 2: holding that where lender financed collected and retained one years premium on credit life insurance for borrower it assumed a contractual obligation to obtain credit life insurance for such borrower and to apply the amounts so received to credit life insurance and  it stood in a fiduciary capacity towards the borrower to see that the amount so charged collected and withheld were actually applied to obtaining and purchasing such insurance 3: holding that the lender was subject to the dtpa because the borrowers purpose in obtaining the loan was the purchase of a house 4: holding lender might be held responsible for buyers alleged damages where facts indicated lenders active participation in the sale of the residence or the existence of a special relationship between the lender and the borrower


Input: is agreeing to the imposition of a criminal sentence for the crime charged.” State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001). The plea only differs from the traditional guilty plea "in that when a defendant enters an Alford plea, he or she does not admit participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id. at n. 1. 2 . We acknowledge our decision today is the third within a year that recognizes collateral consequences based on the court’s acceptance of the plea notwithstanding the defendant’s deferred judgment. See Daughenbaugh v. State, 805 N.W.2d 591, 592, 598 (Iowa 2011) (defendant lost federal pharmacy license as result of a plea to three felonies for taking prescription pills notwithstanding the deferred judgment); State v. Deng Kon Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The parties stipulate Van Haaften Holdings: 0: holding a deferred judgment is not a final judgment of sentence from which a defendant may appeal under iowa code section 8146 1: holding that petitioners prior guilty plea and deferred adjudication for forgery did not amount to a conviction within the meaning of the immigration reform and control act 8 usc  1255a 2: holding that a guilty plea for which the defendant received a deferred adjudication counted as a conviction under federal law for purposes of ussg  4b11 3: holding a guilty plea pursuant to a deferred judgment is a conviction for purposes of the feloninpossessionofafirearm statute iowa code section 72426 4: holding that determining what care is reasonable under iowa code section 8527 is a question of fact


Input: abuse of discretion. Celis-Castellano v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir.2002). We deny the petition for review in part, and dismiss it in part. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez’s motion to reopen because Perez did not demonstrate that his prior attorney’s failure to apply for adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility caused Perez any prejudice. See Iturribavria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir.2003) (petitioner must show prejudice in order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel). We lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s discretionary determination that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 212(h), Perez is prima facie ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility because Perez failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship. Cf. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1152 (<HOLDING>). Perez’s remaining contentions also lack Holdings: 0: recognizing that the iirira strips the court of jurisdiction over the attorney generals discretionary extreme hardship determination but retaining jurisdiction over constitutional due process claims 1: holding that the court of appeals has jurisdiction to decide its jurisdiction under the transitional rules of the iirira 2: holding that the transitional rules preclude direct judicial review of the bias discretionary determination of extreme hardship in suspension of deportation cases 3: holding under the predecessor to  1229bb that denials of suspension based on the  element of extreme hardship are discretionary decisions 4: holding that judicial review is available over the determination of whether extreme hardship exists though no jurisdiction exists to review the ultimate decision of whether to grant a waiver under  1186ac4a


Input: the disciplinary process has violated his rights under the First Amendment; however, his discussion of this issue is perfunctory at best, and certainly insufficient to form a cognizable claim for us to address. See Manchester v. Pereira, 926 A.2d 1005, 1015 n. 8 (R.I.2007) (repeating well-established rule that this Court will not substantively address an issue that is not adequately briefed). 13 . This statute is now codified at G.L.1956 § 8-1-2. 14 . This Court went on to explain the historical roots of this institutional structure in common law England. See Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service Association, 55 R.I. 122, 132-33, 179 A. 139, 143-44 (1935). 15 .See also G.L.1956 § 8-6-2 (judicial authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure); G.L.1956 § 11-27-18 (<HOLDING>); G.L.1956 § 7-5.1-2(2) (identifying the Holdings: 0: recognizing this rule 1: recognizing this presumption 2: holding that the authority of the supreme court to discipline judges and members of the bar is plenary 3: recognizing right of this court to regulate and discipline members of the bar 4: holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state


Input: special education and daycare at different sites, children who receive both daycare and special education services at the same site are not entitled to transportation under the IDEA as incorporated by Minn.Stat. §§ 123B.88,125A.03(a). This court retains the authority to review de novo questions of law, which arise when an agency decision is based upon the meaning of words in a statute. St. Otto’s Home v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d 35, 39-40 (Minn.1989). A reviewing court is not bound by an agency’s interpretation of a statute. Id. When interpreting Minnesota statutes, “words and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (2004). If a statute, construed according 773, 785 (1st Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 Holdings: 0: holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law 1: holding that when state educational benefits exceed minimum federal standards the state standards are enforceable through the idea 2: holding that congress did not authorize the states to enforce federal law where it gave states regulatory control through enforcement of their own laws 3: holding that states may enforce their own laws for disabled children and are not limited to the minimum standards of the federal law 4: holding that the rights and duties of the united states on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal law and that in the absence of an applicable act of congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards


Input: Judge. Jonathan Outing appeals from the sentence imposed upon him following the revocation of his probation. He correctly argues, and the State concedes, that the State failed to present sufficient nonhearsay evidence that Outing violated the terms of his probation by changing his approved residence. See McCrary v. State, 464 So.2d 670 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we reverse the order of Holdings: 0: holding that probation cannot be revoked solely for violation of conditions requiring payment without evidence that probationer is able to pay 1: holding defendants fifth amendment rights had been violated when his probation was revoked based on his failure to complete a sexual treatment program that required incriminating admissions 2: holding that probation and suspension of sentence may not be revoked based solely on a violation or criminal offense that was committed before the offender was actually placed on probation 3: holding that where defendant admitted to two violations of probation and was sentenced therefor court could not enter second order of revocation and resentence defendant on third charge of violation of probation which was pending at time defendants probation was first revoked 4: holding that a defendants probation cannot be revoked solely on the basis of hearsay


Input: This is not fee simple. When all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party, there is a disputed issue of fact as to when and how MassMutual determines its compensation for each SIA involving a single mutual fund. The caselaw is clear that a service provider’s retention of discretion to set compensation can create fiduciary duties under ERISA with respect to its compensation. Generally speaking, a service provider “does not act as a fiduciary with respect to the terms in the service agreement if it does not control the named fiduciary’s negotiation and approval of those terms.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 583 (7th Cir.2009) (citing cases); Santomenno v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 2:10-ev-01655, 2013 WL 3864395, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2013) (<HOLDING>). However, “after a person has entered into an Holdings: 0: holding that service provider was not a fiduciary with respect to revenue sharing because the total expenses associated with each investment option were fully disclosed 1: holding that the phrases in connection with and associated with are synonymous with the terms with respect to with reference to and relating to which mean connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation 2: holding the same with respect to an apartment 3: holding that when attorneys were acting as members of the firm with respect to the case in question section 504b1 applies to allow  fee sharing with any member whether that membership is regular or sporadic 4: holding that defendant was not a fiduciary with respect to a fixed fee that was set by an agreement negotiated at arms length