Input: was dismissed for Sotak’s want of prosecution. Even worse, Sotak did not appeal the dismissal and did not inform his clients their case had been dismissed. In the Wheeler matter, Sotak failed to file the report of first injury within the required timeframe. In the American Built and Ellsworth matters he failed to serve opposing parties within the ninety day parameter set forth in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302(5). These cases illustrate Sotak’s consistent failure to perform his assumed obligations. B. Misrepresentation In the Wheeler, American Built, and Ellsworth matters he also made misrepresentations to hide the neglect. Misrepresentation of neglect warrants a more severe sanction. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Walters, 646 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Iowa 2002) (<HOLDING>). The practice of law simply cannot have people Holdings: 0: holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client 1: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client 2: holding that suspension for fortyfive days with requirement of paying restitution of 47950 to client plus costs was appropriate disciplinary sanction for attorneys conduct relating to representation of client in divorce action in failing to act with diligence failing to keep client informed failing to adequately explain matters to client and failing to return unearned advancefee upon termination of representation and for attorneys conduct in failing to respond to two letters from office of bar counsel seeking explanation of inconsistencies in attorneys response to bar complaint 3: holding multiple instances of neglecting client matters engaging in misrepresentation failing to notify a client of his suspension from the practice of law and failing to respond to inquiries from the iowa supreme court board of professional ethics and conduct warranted eighteenmonth suspension 4: holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case


Input: in question has authority to set policy in that particular area of municipal business. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir.2006). This normally involves looking at the specific statutory delegation of authority to the particular official position. See, e.g., McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 368-69 (3d Cir.2005). Second, a court must determine “whether the official’s authority to make policy in that area is final and unreviewable.” 455 F.3d at 245 (3d Cir.2006) (emphasis in original) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988)). This second inquiry frequently involves looking to see whether any other official has supervisory authority over the specific action of the official in question. See, e.g., id. at 246 (<HOLDING>). b. Analysis Whether Catania issued an Holdings: 0: recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts 1: holding that while town counsel had final supervisory authority over the hiring and firing of employees in plaintiffs position it did not have supervisory authority over the mayors constructive discharge of plaintiff 2: holding that defendants supervisory position enabled her to embezzle funds while avoiding detection over a long period of time 3: holding over 4: holding that agent part of title viis definition of employer includes someone who serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over  hiring firing or conditions of employment


Input: and the prosecutor failed to offer any such explanation. Further, the record shows that the prosecutor did not strike Juror 015, a white juror who possessed the same objective characteristics as Juror 016: both were single, employed females with no children who responded to the court’s questions in the same manner, thereby revealing the pretextual nature of this justification. See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (“Peremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.”); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (“[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.”); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (<HOLDING>); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at Holdings: 0: holding that defendants pretext argument failed because the state offered another legitimate reason for striking the prospective juror 1: holding that where a nonblack juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual 2: holding that the statement contained in a juror pamphlet that a reasonable doubt is one for which should he be called upon a juror can give a reason was obviously erroneous under our law 3: holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated 4: holding that age is an acceptable raceneutral reason for striking a prospective juror


Input: if it allows plan participants "to obtain remedies ... that Congress rejected in ERISA," Pilot Life, supra, at 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 377, 122 S.Ct. 2151 (alteration in original). 16 . We pause to note that claimants such as Bal-dado who have relied upon HRS § 432E-6 in pursuing claims for medical coverage have six years from an HMO's denial of coverage in which to file an ERISA claim. See HRS § 657-1 (1993) (providing a six-year limitations period for ”[a]ctions for the recovery of any debt founded upon any contract, obligation, or liability” and for "[p]ersonal actions of any nature whatsoever not specifically covered by the laws of the State”); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Shofer v. Hack Co., 970 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that absent an applicable federal statute of limitations state statutes of limitations should be applied in  301 cases if they are not in conflict with federal policy 1: holding that private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by congress courts may not create a cause of action absent statutory intent 2: recognizing cause of action 3: recognizing the cause of action 4: holding that where congress does not establish a statute of limitations applicable to a federal cause of action a void which is commonplace in federal statutory law  this court has repeatedly borrowed the state law of limitations governing an analogous cause of action


Input: changes in Decoteau’s medical condition, defendant or the government may move at any time to amend this order. If Decoteau is restored to competence, a report shall be filed with the Court discussing the results of the treatment, whether and how the medications will affect Decoteau at trial, and how to monitor for effects of the treatment throughout trial. If, on the other hand, it is determined that the treatment has failed, the government shall file a report so advising the Court and assessing defendant’s current mental and physical condition. Finally, leave is granted to file an interlocutory appeal within 14 days of the entry of this order, which, except for the order that Decoteau remain at FMC Butner, is stayed pending possible appeal. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176, 123 S.Ct. 2174 (<HOLDING>). Unless the order is further stayed, the Holdings: 0: holding that orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable as collateral orders 1: holding forced medication orders are immediately appealable 2: holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders 3: holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291 4: holding that pendente lite orders and awards are not immediately appealable


Input: Court’s holding in Montana was the notion that “[b]eeause such a [third party] has had the ‘opportunity to present proofs and argument,’ he has already ‘had his day in court’ even though he was not a formal party to the litigation.” Taylor, 128 S.Ct. at 2173(quoting Restatement 2d of Judgments § 39, Comment a, p. 302). The facts alleged by Bhatia in support of his privity argument come nowhere close to establishing privity between the government and Inderra. To be sure, the FBI was involved in a parallel criminal investigation of Bhatia while the civil suit was ongoing, but nothing in the record supports the claim that the government controlled or influenced the civil litigation, or took the “laboring oar.” See Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Inderra’s objective was understandably Holdings: 0: holding the failure to establish identity alone is sufficient grounds to deny asylumrelated relief 1: holding that numbers alone are not sufficient to establish or negate a prima facie ease 2: holding that defamation standing alone is not sufficient to establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest citations omitted 3: holding that parallel legal interests alone identical or otherwise are not sufficient to establish privity 4: holding that the accrual of attorneys fees alone is sufficient to establish cause


Input: did not represent [the doctor] in any way other than as the ship’s doctor ... [the] brochure did not constitute a true ‘holding out’ or manifestation that an agency existed.” Id. Thus, the court found that it was unreasonable for the plaintiffs in that case to believe that the cruise line had control over the manner in which the doctor treated his patients. In the instant case, however, Plaintiffs assert that in addition to being recognized as the ship’s doctor, Dr. Coiner “wore a Carnival uniform,” “ate with the ship’s crew,” “[was] held out to the passengers as an officer of the ship” and “was addressed by the ship’s crew as an officer of the ship.” (D.E. No. 14, AimComplA 29). According to the Complaint, Dr. Coiner was listed in “literature provided by Defen 346 (S.D.Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>). There is an exception to this rule if the Holdings: 0: holding the implied warranty is implied in all residential leases in california 1: holding plaintiff had to commence his breach of implied warranty action under the dtpa within two years because tjhis special statute of limitations denies plaintiffs alternative proposal of entitlement to recover for breach of the common law implied warranty 2: holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract 3: holding that breach of implied warranty action exists solely as a contract remedy which of necessity requires a privity of contract showing as an essential element of the action 4: holding that passenger cannot maintain action for breach of implied warranty to provide safe passage


Input: the substance of the testimony of several witnesses. None of these witnesses live in New York or Tennessee. On balance, the convenience of the witnesses weighs in favor of transfer. Approximately half of the witnesses identified by,the parties reside in Tennessee, while none reside in New York. If the case is transferred, Chase and Godsey will be relieved of traveling entirely. By contrast, if the case is not transferred, the witnesses identified by the plaintiff, Hozid, Lodge, Jones, and Boyce, will still be required to travel. In the Court’s view, it is only slightly less convenient to travel from the United Kingdom to New York than it is to travel from the United Kingdom to Tennessee. See Bionx Implants, Inc. v. Biomet, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 740, 1999 WL 342306, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (<HOLDING>); accord Cento Group, S.p.A. v. OroAmerica, Holdings: 0: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york 1: holding that to grant a new trial the error must be more than harmless 2: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership 3: holding that witnesses traveling from finland were no more inconvenienced by having to travel to indiana than they would be traveling to new york 4: holding that the construction of a median in a roadway that causes traffic traveling to and from an abutting property to travel a cireuitous route does not constitute a compensable taking under indiana eminent domain law


Input: depend on adequate levels of cyclic and preventative maintenance and repair, which are also essential to protect the extensive capital investment [of NPS] in the physical facility constituted by park roads, parkways and bridges. Consequently, park roads shall be maintained to the standards to which they have been constructed or reconstructed, and in a condition that promotes safety and protects capital investment. (Id. at 43) (emphasis added). Thus, the NPS is required by the Park Road Standards to maintain its “roads”- — defined to include “the entire area within the right-of-way” — in a specific manner: in accordance with “the standards to which they have been constructed or reconstructed.” (Id. at 43, 48). Cf. ARA Leisure Sens. v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). As set forth above, Plaintiffs’ theory of Holdings: 0: holding that the amount of a commission to be awarded to the personal representative requires the exercise of judicial discretion and judgment by the clerk who has original jurisdiction in the matter 1: holding that a policy requiring that park roads conform to the original grades and alignments and that graded roads be firm and of uniform cross section  was a sufficiently specific standard to which to hold the nps alteration in original 2: holding that park services decision not to repave a particular section of road was within discretionary function exception because this section was thirtythird on a maintenance priority list of eighty sections of park road and determining the appropriate course of action would require balancing factors such as beach drives overall purpose the allocation of funds among significant project demands the safety of drivers and other park visitors and the inconvenience of repairs as compared to the risk of safety hazards 3: holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial 4: holding that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the presence of a cross in a city park even though the cross was neither erected nor financially maintained by the government


Input: Bill of review plaintiffs must ordinarily plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action, (2) which the plaintiffs were prevented from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party or official mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on their own part. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96 (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406-08). Bill of review plaintiffs claiming non-service, however, are relieved of two elements ordinarily required to be proved in a bill of review proceeding. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96. First, if a plaintiff was not served, constitutional due process relieves the plaintiff from the need to show a meritorious defense. Id. (citing Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86-87, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Second, the plaintiff is relieved from Holdings: 0: holding thata bill of review was unavailable where the petitioner had actual notice of a default judgment between twentyone and ninety days of the judgment but failed to utilize rule 306a 1: holding that bill of review brought in wrong court constitutes collateral attack 2: holding that standard for obtaining equitable bill of review did not apply to statutory bill of review in guardianship proceeding citing jones v parker 67 tex 76 3 sw 222 224 1886 3: holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights 4: holding that the meritorious defense requirement in a bill of review proceeding violates due process where the bill of review plaintiff has no notice of the proceeding in which the default judgment was rendered


Input: to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. How and when a stay is imposed is left to the court’s discretion; in exercising that discretion, a court must “‘weigh the competing interests and maintain an even balance,”’ giving due consideration to the interests of the litigants, the court, and the public. Tak Fat Trading Co. v. United States, 24 CIT 1376, 1377, 2000 WL 1825396 at **1 (CIT 2000) (quoting Landis, supra). A stay that fails to properly balance the relevant interests, e.g., a stay “of indefinite duration in the absence of a pressing need,” is likely to be deemed an abuse of discretion. Id. See Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). In this matter, the need for the stay (or, Holdings: 0: holding that it was an abuse of discretion to deny stay while matter was pending in neighboring state 1: recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous 2: holding that trial courts stay was an abuse of discretion because pending actions may take years to complete and because proceedings on liability could not be justifiably stayed merely because a precise determination of damages is not possible at this moment   3: holding that it is an abuse of discretion  to dismiss a complaint merely because of the presence of superfluous matter 4: holding that it was an abuse of discretion for a district court not to stay an exhausted petition pending exhaustion of a newly discovered claim


Input: court, finding that the Director of the Division of Building and Construction had testified that substantial completion of the entire project had occurred “around June of 1975.” Id. at 41, 453 A.2d 559. The court stated that it was not aware mages? lost profits can be assessed up to the date of substantial completion. For example, in D.A. Davis Construction v. Palmetto Properties, Inc., 281 S.C. 415, 315 S.E.2d 370 (1984), the court awarded three months’ lost rental income to the owner for the builder’s failure to substantially complete the project on the date specified in the contract. Id. at 372. The owner presented evidence that the property was to have been rented to a beer distributor upon substantial completion. See also Hemenway Co. v. Bartex, Inc., 373 So.2d 1356 (La.Ct.App.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 1272 (La.1979); Holdings: 0: holding that in the context of a rule 10b5 claim when the merger was approved and the exchange of securities occurred the owner of stock had in effect purchased a new security and paid for it by turning in his old one 1: holding that sjince the consumer cannot obtain the right to occupy the room without paying the retail room rate charged by the otc that retail rate is the taxable amount or rent  where rent means the consideration received for occupancy valued in money 2: holding that the owner of retail store should receive the interest it had paid on interim financing and the rent paid on the old building for the period of delay until substantial completion 3: holding that no interest is paid on benefits awarded based on a finding of cue 4: holding that the portion of the retirementplan annuity paid for by the employer but not the portion paid for by the employee  is includable in the marital estate


Input: federal statutory scheme evidences an implicit or explicit intent to exclude Ex Parte Young actions, id. at 647, 122 S.Ct. 1753, and we may also question whether the suit and the remedy it seeks “implicate[] special sovereignty interests” such that an Ex Parte Young action will not lie. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997). Here, we conclude that the Federal Power Act (“the Act”) unmistakably evidences an intent to exclude licensees such as AmerenUE from maintaining an Ex Parte Young action seeking to prevent a State from recovering damages to its property resulting from the licensee’s negligence in the operation of the licensed power project. Cf. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44, 74, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In relevant part, the Act provides: Each Holdings: 0: holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action 1: holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action 2: holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction 3: holding that ex parte young permits jurisdiction over officials who have authority to control the assessments of railroad taxes that are in violation of federal law 4: holding that the medicaid act provision allowing reduction of funds to noncompliant states is not a detailed remedial scheme sufficient to show congresss intent to preempt an action under ex parte young


Input: Valley, in which the request was for a “single category of documents that, by definition, [were] available for immediate production,” we held that the statute required MCSO to produce the documents “at once.” Id. We also observed, however, that whether a government agency’s response to a wide variety of document requests was sufficiently prompt “will ultimately be dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each request.” Id. n. 8. ¶ 15 While we thus consider the facts and circumstances of each of the New Times’ nine requests, we do so pursuant to the requirements of Arizona law. Arizona law places on MCSO the burden of establishing that its responses to the New Times’ re quests were prompt given the circumstances surrounding each request. See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (<HOLDING>); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. Holdings: 0: recognizing a strong presumption favoring arbitrability 1: holding that if a document falls within the scope of the public records statute then the presumption favoring disclosure applies 2: recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome 3: holding that it is the appellants burden to present a record to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial courts findings 4: holding that the burden fell squarely upon the maricopa county attorney as a public official to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure


Input: little mitigating weight in tijis case. ¶ 47 Appellant further contends the trial court erred when it failed to regard the giving of a felony murder instruction at trial as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance. We disagree. This court has held that a felony murder instruction “may be mitigating where there is some doubt as to a defendant’s specific intent to' kill.” State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 552, 944 P.2d 57, 67 (1997). Appellant’s actions in savagely beating and strangling the victim to death, however, undermine any argument that he did not intend to kill the victim. Moreover, the jurors unanimously found Appellant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder as well as felony murder, indicating that they found" intent to kill. See Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 648-49, 832 P.2d at 665-66 (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that the giving of a Holdings: 0: holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant 1: holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense 2: holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill 3: holding that the eighth amendment requires finding that a felony murder defendant killed or attempted to kill 4: holding that the giving of a felony murder instruction is not a relevant mitigating circumstance when the defendant acted alone to kill the victim


Input: so strict liability should be imposed. Again, defendants’ argument is more persuasive. Massachusetts has not clearly recognized strict liability for the pumping of subterranean water, even if it results in damage to a plaintiffs land in its natural state. See Gamer, 346 Mass, at 620-21, 195 N.E.2d 65 (negligence); New York Cent. R. Co. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 337 Mass. 469, 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (1958) (negligence). The strict liability-cases on which plaintiff relies have to do with the removal of lateral support by excavation, not by pumping. See Marinucci Bros., 337 Mass, at 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (restating rule on strict liability for excavating and holding that excavator who withdraws mixture of silt and water can be held liable for negligence); Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 (<HOLDING>). As for the pumping of subsurface water, the Holdings: 0: holding that landowner who digs in such a way as to disturb natural state of neighboring land is strictly liable 1: holding that permanent easement on land containing natural gas pipeline reduced value of directly encumbered land by 75 2: holding that city may by ordinance require abutting landowner to repair sidewalk but that the abutting landowner is not liable in an action in tort for injuries 3: holding unconstitutional a zoning law that purported to give landowners who were not bound by any official duty but wejre free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and could subject a neighboring landowner to their will or caprice authority to prevent a particular use on a neighbors land 4: holding in case where railroad grant was an easement and not a right of way that title vested in abutting landowner once railroad abandoned land


Input: the treaty’s requirement, this and other circuits have held in recent years that an exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional violations, not for statutory or treaty violations. See United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.1999) (“The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.”). See also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir.1983) (rejecting suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the exclusionary rule “was not fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not ‘authorized’ by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of individuals.”); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 n. Holdings: 0: holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation 1: holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required 2: holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule absent an underlying constitutional violation or right 3: holding that because code  19260 a procedural statute did not expressly provide a right of suppression of evidence a violation of that provision did not require application of the exclusionary rule in the absence of a constitutional violation 4: holding that a violation of  6103 does not require the application of the exclusionary rule


Input: original complaint. Id. at 468, 470. Following Nicrosi, the Court determined that the circumstances were such as to give Hughes notice that she was being sued and held that the amendment did not change the nature of the action or add any parties to the action. Id. at 470. The Court stated, “there was no question as to the identity of the defendant, because Hughes Realty was merely a name under which Hughes did business.” Id. at 470. The Court further stated: “[W]e affirmatively hold that a judgment entered against a trade name is a judgment against the individual doing business under that trade name, at least so long as the individual was personally served with the complaint.” Id. at 471. See also, Box v. Boilermaker Nat’l Health & Welfare Fund, 47 Ala.App. 266, 253 So.2d 326 (1971) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the original complaint Holdings: 0: holding appeal not moot where bankruptcy proceedings involved third parties but unlike robehs farms and rochman v northeast utils serv group in re pub serv co 963 f2d 469 1st cir1992 the reorganization plan is not a complex billiondollar affair that has affected innumerable third parties 1: holding that hearing officers noting the parties agreement did not constitute a change in the parties legal relationship 2: holding that insured had not substantially complied with the policys change of beneficiary provisions when the hospitalized insured was physically unable to leave her bed and was unable to retrieve the policy from her lock box at the bank to return to the company for endorsement as required by the terms of the policy 3: holding error where re cording which was later deemed inadmissible was played during opening statement 4: holding that an amendment from re box steel erection company to re box individually and dba re box construction and equipment co did not add or change the parties but merely sought to accurately describe the named defendant


Input: the authority to represent him in all things concerning the custody, care, and well-being of J.D.S.; and (2) that, in his letter, Sessums stated he wanted to be present in order to provide input on where J.D.S. would be placed “for the time being.” (Emphasis added.) Even if the Department is correct that Sessums wrote his letter in anticipation of the February 1, 2002, hearing, the letter also contained a request to be physically present at “any and all proceedings” (emphasis added) involving J.D.S. We interpret this as a valid request to be present at his termination hearing. The parent-child relationship is recognized and protected by law to such a degree that it is of federal constitutional dimensions. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (<HOLDING>). The termination of parental rights is final Holdings: 0: holding that consortium is not a part of the parentchild relationship 1: holding that the parentchild relationship is far more precious than any property rights 2: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 3: holding that de facto parentchild relationship does not support a finding of qualifyingrelative status 4: holding that destruction of the parentchild relationship includes grief and mental anguish


Input: claims. This immunity applies to the section 1983 claims. Individual immunity is not necessary for the RLUIPA claims. RLUIPA provides a cause of action against “governments” and does not appear to allow causes of action against individuals. (A section 1983 claim' against an individual could be based upon a denial of such a statutory right (see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980)), but such a claim would be a section 1983 claim, not an individual RLUIPA claim.) In any event, to the extent Plaintiffs assert or can assert a claim against individual defendants in their personal capacities specifically under RLUIPA, the Court would find the same immunity and such claims are dismissed. See Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, Holdings: 0: holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine 1: holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity 2: holding trial court improperly granted dismissal on ground of immunity because the defendant had qualified statutory immunity rather than absolute immunity 3: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 4: recognizing that absolute immunity is immunity from charges of either constitutional or statutory violations


Input: 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8). Citing Foti, Zortman argues that because JCC’s message indicated it was “important” that constitutes communicating information regarding a debt. Foti, 424 F.Supp.2d at 656 (noting that the message stated it that the “matter required immediate attention” in concluding that the voicemail was a communication). JCC, for its part in the supplemental briefing, argued that its messages did not violate § 1692c(b) because they did not disclose that a particular consumer actually owed a debt. JCC points the Court to several cases, though not precisely on point, that indicate that a mere statement identifying a caller as a debt collector may not be sufficient to convey information regarding a debt. See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 668 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Zamos II v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 423 Holdings: 0: holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt 1: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or 2: holding that information was not fatally defective because while defendants name did not appear in the charging part of the information it did clearly appear in the caption and in the verification of the charge by the district attorney 3: holding that the name under which a debt collector is licensed to do business is the debt collectors true name for purposes of the fdcpa 4: holding that a fax requesting employment information and verification did not convey information regarding a debt but also noting that the senders name and logo did not make explicit that the request was from a debt collector


Input: when considered in the context of the whole trial. See Alexander, 163 F.3d at 429-30; United States v. Reed, 2 F.3d 1441, 1450 (7th Cir.1993). To guide us in this deci but harmless the prosecutor’s comment that a federal agent would risk his career by committing perjury). Lassar’s comment did not serve to bolster anyone’s credibility and so did not invade the province of the jury to assess credibility or determine facts. Essentially, the prosecution appealed to the jury’s supposed belief that the government only prosecutes strong eases and this was, in Lassar’s opinion, one of the strongest. Although improper, this generalized comment cannot be considered nearly as damaging as introducing a fact that bolsters a particular witness’s credibility. Cf. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d at 1304 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the prosecution made the comment Holdings: 0: holding that while not reversible error a prosecutors vouching for a witness was improper and should be avoided on retrial 1: holding that the prosecutors indirect reference to a defendants prior conviction was improper 2: holding that prosecutors remark vouching for credibility of government agent was certainly improper 3: holding that a prosecutors argument about the special agents disincentive to lie was impermissible vouching 4: holding that the prosecutors question to the defendant about a prior unrelated offense was improper


Input: the adjudication and sentence, a statement of the reasons for such sentence, and a statement of credits received____ A copy of the judgment shall be forwarded to all parties and their counsel by the clerk forthwith upon entry. As we pointed out in State v. Moore, 178 N.J.Super. 417, 427, 429 A.2d 397 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 87 N.J. 406, 434 A.2d 1083 (1981), “under R. 3:21-5, a judgment of conviction occurs when the judge signs the sentencing order and it is entered by the clerk.” See State v. Womack, 206 N. J.Super. 564, 570, 503 A.2d 352 (App.Div. 1985), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 482, 511 A.2d 658 (1986) (stating that “the judgment is prepared by the clerk and signed by the judge and provides ‘finality’ ”); State v. Robinson, 198 N.J.Super. 602, 603, 487 A.2d 1304 (Law Div.1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. L.R., 167 N.J.Super. 364, 367-368, Holdings: 0: holding that a notice of appeal is timely when filed before final judgment is entered by the district court 1: holding that the judgment is entered following sentencing forthwith by the clerk 2: holding that a second judgment controls over an earlier judgment entered in the same case 3: holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief 4: holding part of the sentencing phase of trial the restitution amount is determined following conviction and is a matter resting within the sole province of the sentencing judge


Input: dismissal of claim under misappropriation and copying branches of New York state unfair competition laws as federally preempted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820, 108 S.Ct. 79, 98 L.Ed.2d 42 (1987). Plaintiff alleges that “[a]ll of defendant’s state law claims are based upon the premise that the Pro motional. Previews furnished to Video Pipeline belong to Defendant and were misappropriated by Video Pipeline.” Pl.’s Br. at 16. Misappropriation, or “reverse passing off,” is grounded in the alleged unauthorized copying and use of another’s copyrighted expression, and thus fails the extra element, test. See Fundamental Too, Ltd. v. Universal Music Group, Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-1595, 1997 WL 381608, at *4 (E.D.Pa. July 9, 1997); see also Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656, 666 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1112, 114 S.Ct. 1056, Holdings: 0: holding misappropriation claim grounded solely in the copying of a plaintiffs protected expression was preempted by  301 of copyright act 1: holding misappropriation claim by real estate information service provider against website using services photographs was preempted by copyright act because claim had no extra element 2: holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 3: holding copyright act preempted photographers misappropriation claim when claim did not have extra element such as breach of fiduciary duty 4: holding that even if utah law recognized tort of misappropriation such a claim would be preempted by copyright act


Input: note, except for appurtenant rights, water interests are separate from real estate surface interest. See Hydro Res. Corp., 2007-NMSC-061, ¶ 17. We see no reason why this concept does not apply to the inchoate interest the parties were dealing in here. {28} The most relevant argument the Christophers make is that Owens could not reserve an interest because of the speculative nature of his intent to divert water. The cases cited by the Christophers simply do not apply here. The facts in those cases involve situations in which someone attempts to divert more water from a common source than they can actually use with the intent or purpose of then essentially extorting other potential users of water from the same source. See Millheiser v. Long, 1900-NMSC-012, ¶¶ 30-32, 10 N.M. 99, 61 P. 111 (<HOLDING>); see also New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, Holdings: 0: holding that a water right is a property right created by a person appropriating unappropriated water and applying it to a beneficial use 1: holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use 2: holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district 3: holding that the legislative assembly intended the water right certificate not the permit even when followed by a beneficial use to mark the point at which a water right becomes vested 4: holding that permits only give the applicant an inchoate or contingent right to put the water to a beneficial use


Input: was not harmless. 4 . The City also argues that it was effectively denied its right under the Agreement and the AAA Rules to participate in the selection of the arbitrator in a meaningful manner because it might not have agreed to the selection of this arbitrator had it known that an out-of-class pay issue was involved. As the FOP notes, however, the City does not assert that it would have made some other selection. Further, once this arbitrator decided on the first day of the hearings to consider the possibility of out-of-class payments, it was incumbent upon the City to raise an objection at that time if the City truly objected to having this arbitrator in particular decide that issue. The City raised and preserved an objection to ns Board, 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 544, 621 A.2d 1184 (1993) Holdings: 0: holding that the statute is mandatory 1: holding that a transfer of work was a mandatory subject of bargaining because the motivation for the shift was to cut labor costs 2: holding that a fiveminute change in employee starting time is a mandatory subject of bargaining 3: holding that the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean is a mandatory subject of bargaining 4: holding that giving the work of a bargainingunit sergeant to civilians in the revamping of communications center was a mandatory subject of bargaining


Input: declaration thereof has been filed by making and filing with the officer holding the process an affidavit that, in his belief, either the claim is invalid entirely or it is invalid in part or is excessive, specifying wherein such invalidity or excess consists, and if excessive, also specifying the property alleged to be in excess, to be, in all cases, the last named in the claim.” (Emphasis added.) In this case, Bartholomew attempted to contest Gutzmore’s claim of exemption by filing an unsworn objection. This does not meet the requirements of § 6-10-25, which provides that any contest to a claim of exemption must be made by affidavit. Accordingly, Bartholomew did not properly contest Gutzmore’s claim of exemption. See Griffin v. Bank Street Fin., 587 So.2d 349, 350 (Ala.Civ.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Young v. Strong, 694 So.2d 27, 28 Holdings: 0: holding that a search warrant is invalid if not based on an affidavit 1: holding that the argument that an additional limitation be read into claims 1 3 and 4 was only correct with respect to claim 1 and thus only claim 1 was invalid 2: holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures 3: holding the defendants claim that he was denied the right to testify was appropriate for direct review when the record was adequately developed to permit full consideration of the defendants claim the pertinent facts were undisputed a pcr hearing was not necessary to resolve a factual dispute and would not aid in the application of the law and the defendants claim was presented not as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim but rather as an error committed by the trial court in excluding the defendants testimony which was not an appropriate basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 4: holding that a contest to a claim of exemption was ineffective when that contest was not by affidavit and did not properly state that the claim of exemption was invalid or excessive


Input: admissions are binding only against “the party making the admission.” Requests for admission are a tool, not a trapdoor. Goudeau’s attorneys knew perfectly well that defendant USF & G was denying underinsured coverage. Accordingly, they are not entitled to use a response against it when they sent it to the law firm representing it in a different capacity. IV. The Evidentiary Objection Goudeau also objected to the summary judgment on the ground that USF & G’s evidence was not authenticated. The trial court overruled the objection, and the court of appeals did not reach the issue. Contrary to Goudeau’s objection, the un-derinsured policy (which showed the policy language) wa . 117, 931 A.2d 1180, 1182-83 (2007); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 779, 750 P.2d 1105, 1106 (N.M.1988) (<HOLDING>). 17 . See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Fisher, Holdings: 0: holding claimant was simply not engaged in a transaction oriented to the use of the covered auto at the time of the accident 1: holding that the delivery of an eeoc decision to the former attorney of a claimant did not constitute notice to the claimant 2: holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over the question of whether truck was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident emphasis added 3: holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony 4: holding that the plaintiffs location on the supply barge at the time of the accident did not alter his status


Input: appropriation to fund a statutory right, not involving constitutional rights or judicial functions, is normally beyond our powers to order. Hillis v. Dept. of Ecology, 131 Wash.2d 373, 932 P.2d 139, 148 (1997) (internal citation omitted); accord Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 763, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“[AJppropriating funds is a peculiarly legislative function, and one expressly committed to Congress by Art. I, § 9.”); Cal. Ass’n. of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal.App.4th 792, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 224, 246 (2003) (finding legislature’s policy decisions when appropriating funds and setting spending priorities from its tobacco tax revenue did not violate state constitution); State ex rel. Harrell v. Cone, 130 Fla. 158, 177 So. 854, 873 (1938) (<HOLDING>); Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Auth., 125 Ill.2d Holdings: 0: holding legislatures allocation of road funds did not vio late state constitution because the wisdom economy and policy of statutes are for legislative decision 1: holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night 2: recognizing exception under state constitution 3: holding that park services decision not to repave a particular section of road was within discretionary function exception because this section was thirtythird on a maintenance priority list of eighty sections of park road and determining the appropriate course of action would require balancing factors such as beach drives overall purpose the allocation of funds among significant project demands the safety of drivers and other park visitors and the inconvenience of repairs as compared to the risk of safety hazards 4: holding that a bia road was a tribal road by considering the nature of the rightofway at issue and finding that although the tribe had relinquished certain gatekeeping rights by allowing public use of the road and collaborating with the bia in maintaining it the tribe had maintained other significant gatekeeping rights because the rightofway was not granted to the state and the road did not form any part of the states highway system


Input: carried on; and (f) the extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977); Leatherwood, 121 S.W.3d at 699-700 (citing Restatement factors). The application of strict liability for ul-trahazardous activities appears to be rather limited in Tennessee, as it is in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ergon, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 966 F.Supp. 577, 583 (W.D.Tenn.1997) (noting that Tennessee courts reject the application of strict liability to gas suppliers for escaping gas, even though gas is poisonous, dangerous, and highly explosive, and holding that defendants with escaping petroleum products also should not merit strict liability). But see Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F.Supp. 303, 315-16 (W.D.Tenn.1986) (<HOLDING>), rev’d in part on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1188 Holdings: 0: holding that under facts presented defendants creation location operation and closure of toxic chemical dump was abnormally dangerous and ultrahazardous activity 1: holding in a case involving denial of coverage under an insurance contract that the location of documentary evidence related to insurance coverage mattered less than the location of the underlying tort suits 2: holding other than location of the drugs state presented evidence establishing direct connection between drugs and accused thereby creating inference of control 3: holding that an anonymous tip that described a suspects appearance and location and alleged that he was carrying a concealed weapon was insufficiently corroborated by the officers observation of the appellant who matched the description hanging out at the indicated location 4: holding that an officer must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous


Input: Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or 543, 569, 652 P2d 318 (1982) (child’s distress caused by negligently inflicted harm to parent insufficient to state negligence claim). Rather, a plaintiff must suffer harm “to an interest of a kind that the law protects against negligent invasion.” Solberg v. Johnson, 306 Or 484, 490, 760 P2d 867 (1988). Oregon law has long recognized that the fact that a defendant’s negligence poses a threat of future physical harm is not sufficient, standing alone, to constitute an actionable injury. As this court has explained, “the threat of future harm, by itself, is insufficient as an allegation of damage in the context of a negligence claim.” Zehr, 318 Or at 656; see also Bollam v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 302 Or 343, 347, 730 P2d 542 (1986) (<HOLDING>) (quoting W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Holdings: 0: holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate 1: holding that  the threat of future harm not yet realized is not enough  2: holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence 3: holding declaratory relief is inappropriate where the constitutional injury has already occurred and there is no threat of future harm 4: holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm


Input: Found, v. Goodfarb, 176 Ariz. 497, 502, 862 P.2d 870, 875 (1993). In assessing whether a city attorney’s communication with city officers or employees will be protected by the city’s attorney-client privilege, Arizona has adopted a “functional approach”. This functional approach focuses “on the relationship between the communicator and the need for legal services.” Id. at 505, 862 P.2d at 878. Thus, if the communication “concerns the employee’s own conduct within the scope of his or her employment and is made to assist the lawyer in assessing or responding to the legal consequences of that conduct,” then the communication falls within the city’s privilege. Id. at 507, 862 P.2d at 880; see also Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. O’Neil, 183 Ariz. 196, 198, 901 P.2d 1226, 1228 (App.1995) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, as the court in Samaritan Holdings: 0: holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known 1: holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege 2: holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts 3: holding that failure to timely assert attorneyclient privilege constitutes waiver 4: holding that governmental entities may assert attorneyclient privilege to prevent disclosure of information otherwise required by statute


Input: “the trial court’s discretion is not unbounded,” Grimes v. Walton Cnty., 591 So.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Trial courts are required to consider whether the prospective inter-venor has an interest in the proceedings. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992). “In order for a party to intervene, its interest must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.” Omni Nat’l Bank v. Georgia Banking Co., 951 So.2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (internal quotation omitted). Importantly, a party’s asserted interest must already be at issue in the proceedings when the party seeks to intervene. Carlisle, 593 So.2d at 507 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234, 78 Holdings: 0: holding that where litigation involves more than one claim the origin of the claim test must be applied separately to each part 1: holding that documents that are created in the ordinary course of business or would have been created irrespective of litigation are not protected by the work product doctrine 2: holding with respect to another part of the plra that the court must determine the prisoners status on the date the suit or appeal is brought rather than at some other time 3: holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit 4: holding that the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof  which is the subject of litigation


Input: cannot be adjudicated as counterclaims in a § 3213 proceeding. Noting that Wireless could, if it chose, press its allegations in a separate action, the court then granted summary judgment for Com/Tech. Wireless appealed. “Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). Classifying a rule as substantive or procedural is sometimes a subtle undertaking. See id. But where the matter in question is one covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “it is settled that ... the Federal Rule applies re gardless of contrary state law.” Id. at 427 n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 2211. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3213 d F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Fed.R.Civ.P. 13 governs counterclaims in the Holdings: 0: holding that a party in an action pending in a federal court was subject to the counterclaim rule and thus violated  65440 by commencing another action in a state court 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc  1367a 2: holding that lessees fraud in the inducement claim should have been pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim where lessors original claim was for breach of the lease 3: holding that a waiver of counterclaims potentially valid in state court was inoperative in federal court when its application would have prevented the assertion of a counterclaim that under fedrcivp 13a was compulsory 4: holding that the prosecution in a subsequent action of claims that had been compulsory counterclaims in a previously filed declaratoryjudgment action violated  65440


Input: a broad interpretation of the meaning of the word “disability,” and imposes a “non-onerous” burden on a plaintiff at the prima facie stage. Haley v. Cmty. Mercy Health Partners, 2013 WL 322493 (S.D.Ohio Jan. 28, 2013). Even if an impairment lasts less than six months, it can be considered substantially limiting under the ADAAA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix). If a plaintiff has a condition that is connected to an underlying disability, this is referred to as a “characteristic manifestation” of the qualifying impairment. Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 780 (6th Cir.1998). The Sixth Circuit has held that a “characteristic manifestation of [the] physical impairment [is] ... part of the underlying impairment.” Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Thus, to determine if Plaintiff meets the Holdings: 0: holding without applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel that the plaintiff who made sworn statements of total disability in a social security disability application and then testified at her deposition that she was not totally disabled failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ada 1: holding that a plaintiffs bladder infections were connected with her disability of interstitial cystitis 2: recognizing that employer has notice of limitation when disability manifests itself to the extent that it would be reasonable to infer that her employer actually knew of the disability 3: holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada 4: holding disability discrimination claim barred


Input: and State’s Exhibit 10 as cocaine in rock form. When the State offered the exhibits, appellant’s trial counsel stated, “[W]e have no objection, Your Honor.” The court then admitted these exhibits. In general, when a court overrules a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, the defendant need not object to the same evidence in order to preserve the error on appeal. Brown v. State, 183 S.W.3d 728, 741 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. reff) (citing Moraguez v. State, 701 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)). However, when a defendant affirmatively states that he has “no objection” to the admission of the complained of evidence, the defendant waives any error in the admission of the evidence. Brown, 183 S.W.3d at 741; see also Hams v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). Here, the record reflects that appellant Holdings: 0: holding that an objection raised in a motion to suppress evidence preserves the issue for appeal despite the lack of further objection at trial 1: holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection 2: holding a trial court erred in determining that a motion to suppress was waived by a speedy trial demand 3: holding that overruling an objection to evidence will not result in reversal when other such evidence is received without objection 4: holding that appellants complaint that trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence obtained as result of illegal seizures was rendered moot when state offered complained of evidence and defense counsel affirmatively stated no objection


Input: of this state. 2. A police officer in “hot pursuit” may continue beyond the one and one-half mile [2.⅛1 kilometers] limit to make an arrest, in obedience to a warrant or without a warrant under the conditions of section 29-06-15, whenever obtaining the aid of peace officers having jurisdiction beyond that limit would cause a delay permitting escape. As used in this subsection, “hot pursuit” means the immediate pursuit of a person who is endeavoring to avoid arrest. (Emphasis added.) [¶ 10] This Court has also recognized that city police officers have jurisdiction to stop vehicles and arrest individuals outside of their geographical jurisdiction when responding to requests from another law enforcement agency for aid and assistance. See State v. Graven, 530 N.W.2d 328, 330 (N.D.1995) (<HOLDING>). See also N.D.C.C. § 44-08-20(3) (stating, Holdings: 0: holding a stop was effected where officers vehicle blocked defendants vehicle from proceeding 1: holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop 2: holding that the stop of defendants vehicle was unlawful where officers stopped the vehicle to check the license and registration but had observed no suspicious activity 3: holding that although officers observation and stop of the defendants vehicle occurred outside of the officers geographical jurisdiction the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspects vehicle 4: holding that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to stop the defendant for obstructing traffic because there was no evidence of intent to impede or hinder traffic where the vehicle was only briefly stopped in the roadway and the officer approaching the vehicle from behind did not have to stop or drive around the defendants vehicle


Input: Salvador de Jesus Trujillo-Teo, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ summary affirmance of an immigration judge’s denial of his application for asylum and withholding of deportation. Because the transitional rules apply, Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.1997), we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). We deny the petition for review. We conclude that a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to find that Trujillo-Teo established past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his actual or imputed political opinion. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-82, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Molinar-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, Holdings: 0: holding that attempted conscription by a guatemalan guerrilla group did not constitute persecution on account of a political opinion where petitioner failed to show that the group was motivated by his political opinion 1: holding that forced recruitment does not amount to persecution without a showing that it was on account of petitioners political opinion 2: holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political 3: holding that a petitioners unwillingness to return must be based upon persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race religion nationality membership in a particular social group or political opinion   4: holding that retaliation for opposition to government corruption can constitute persecution on account of a political opinion


Input: because of the fear that their results would become public knowledge. § 381.004(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). The specific safeguards provided by the statute to prevent disclosure lend weight to the argument that public dissemination of the test results would cause emotional distress, and thus Continental should have known that by sending the results in an unsecured fax, it was risking causing great emotional distress to the Abrils if an unauthorized party saw the test results. Because the only reasonable damages arising from a breach of section 381.004(3)(f) are emotional distress, and because this emotional damage would be akin to that suffered by victims of defamation or invasion of privacy, we conclude they should not be barred by the impact rule. See Gracey, 837 So.2d at 356-57 (<HOLDING>). Thus, based on our recent precedent in Gracey Holdings: 0: holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized 1: holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere  conclusory statements  rather they must  sufficiently articulate  true demonstrable emotional distress  including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any 2: holding that the impact rule should not bar recovery because the emotional distress that plaintiffs allege they have suffered is at least equal to that typically suffered by the victim of a defamation or an invasion of privacy and that ijmposition of the impact rule in this context would render the legislative intent and its statutory implementation meaningless and without substance 3: holding emotional distress suffered must be severe and not trivial 4: holding that employee could not state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under fela without a showing of physical impact


Input: involving the drugs that were stored in a residence without resultant exposure to children residing therein. The district court did not give unreasonable weight to this factor. 3. Provision of medical, educational, and correctional treatment Adams also argues the district court afforded too much weight to the time needed to provide him with medical, educational, and corrections treatment. Adams asserts that this factor does not warrant a higher sentence because the drug program in which he will enroll lasts only eighteen months, a time period that does not exceed a within-Guidelines sentence. But Adams does not suggest that the district court’s variance was imposed solely to enable Adams to receive substance-abuse treatment. Cf United States v. Yopp, 453 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Instead, Adams argues that the “sentence Holdings: 0: holding that where the sole purpose of sentence was to provide mental health and substanceabuse treatment it was substantively unreasonable to sentence defendant to twentyfour months because the 500hour drug treatment program could be finished in nine months 1: holding that dismissal was required where overall length of prosecution was 16 months state was responsible for 13 months of delay and six months of that delay was due to simple neglect 2: holding that period of three years and nine months of prospective employment was not unreasonable 3: holding that a district courts treatment of the guidelines as mandatory renders a sentence procedurally unreasonable 4: holding that when the district court imposed drug testing in connection with a special condition of substance abuse program participation  it was  not required to specify the number of drug tests a defendant must undergo as a part of the treatment program


Input: 818, 102 S.Ct 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). 133 . See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991); and Sanchez v. Swyden, 131 F.3d 1144, 1147 (5th Cir.1998). 134 . Sanchez, 131 F.3d at 1147-48. 135 . Docket no. 49, Andrade's Declaration, at ¶¶ ir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 854, 110 S.Ct. 156, 107 L.Ed.2d 114 (1989); Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir.1987); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n. 3 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 3476, 87 L.Ed.2d 612 (1985): "Isolated violations are not the persistent, often repeated constant violations that constitute custom and policy.”; Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 227 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215, 104 S.Ct. 2656, 81 L.Ed.2d 363 (1984), (<HOLDING>); and Berry v. McLemore, 670 F.2d 30, 33 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that a section 1983 plaintiff asserting police misconduct must allege a pattern of similar incidents in which citizens were injured or endangered by policyconsistent misconduct or that serious incompetence or misbehavior was general or widespread throughout the police force 1: holding the alleged misconduct taken together did not constitute a pattern of harassment or aggravating conditions 2: holding that to state  1983 claim against defendant plaintiff must allege that defendant was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for incidents that resulted in injury 3: holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct 4: holding that the prosecution must establish a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means that the leads making the discovery inevitable were possessed by the police prior to the misconduct and that the police were actively pursuing the alternate line of investigation prior to the misconduct


Input: factor is to ensure that a prisoner’s rights are infringed upon to the least possible degree, without compromising the asserted goal of restricting him. See id. at 90-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254. Were less restrictive alternatives available in this case, the district court would have applied them. Felipe’s example of such an alternative — allowing correspondence to be exchanged after it is reviewed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office— ignores the fact that Felipe could easily slip a secret message past those in charge of monitoring his mail. He did it successfully before. Moreover, even the Supreme Court has acknowledged what a difficult task it would be for prison officials to monitor inmate correspondence, and has dismissed this kind of option as a viable alternative. See id. at 93, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (<HOLDING>). . As Judge Martin said in placing the Holdings: 0: recognizing first amendment and fourteenth amendment interests in inmate correspondence 1: holding that because pretrial detainees fourteenth amendment rights are comparable to prisoners eighth amendment rights the same standards apply 2: holding that prison administration may infringe upon prisoners first amendment rights as long as the infringement is reasonably related to legitimate penological interest 3: holding that routine monitoring and recording of the calls of convicted prisoners does not violate the prisoners fourth amendment rights 4: holding that the prohibition of inmatetoinmate correspondence was not an unconstitutional infringement of prisoners first amendment rights


Input: his statement to the authorities. The litany of crimes discussed in cross-examination indicated that Hicks was not a trustworthy individual, and the evidence that he received a benefit for his testimony only would have been consistent with that well-supported notion. Further, as Hicks had already been convicted of perjury once (before the same judge) and had admitted to his use of a variety of false identities, the jury was already under the impression that Hicks was prone to lie at any point. On that basis, even if Gentry had an opportunity to impeach Hicks as to his false testimony regarding the denial of any benefit for testifying, that opportunity would have been cumulative of other impeachment evidence and thus immaterial. See Heishman v. Ayers, 621 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Hicks’s testimony was not the Holdings: 0: holding that undisclosed napue evidence is cumulative and thus immaterial where the witness is already sufficiently impeached 1: holding that witness could not be impeached with prior statement because his silence did not constitute testimony  2: holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative 3: holding impeachment evidence was not merely cumulative where the withheld evidence was of a different character than evidence already known to the defense 4: holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence


Input: only if [the Supreme Court] has held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) (construing identical language in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)). Put differently, “[t]he only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, lay out and construct a rule’s retroactive effect, or cause that effect to exist, occur, or appear, is through a holding.” Id. at 663, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Robinson does not allege that the Supreme Court announced that its decision in Alleyne would apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Def. Mot. at 18 (noting that “this Court is authorized to find that [Mr. Robinson’s] claim is retroactive” (emphasis added)); id. at 20 (<HOLDING>). Mr. Robinson therefore fails to establish the Holdings: 0: holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review  that was previously unavailable 1: holding johnson announced a new substantive rule and prior supreme court holdings make it retroactive 2: recognizing that several circuits  have recently announced alleyne does announce a new rule of constitutional law not made retroactive by the supreme court emphasis added 3: holding the constitutional rule announced in apprendi does not prohibit a district court from finding by a preponderance of the evidence facts relevant to the application of the guidelines 4: holding that cage has not been made retroactive by the supreme court


Input: was void. Because the Johnstons moved for a summary judgment on this issue, they must prove that they are entitled to prevail as a matter of law. See Johnson, 891 S.W.2d at 644. The record indicates that the IRS gave notice beginning on March 21, 1995 that a sealed bid sale was scheduled for April 11, 1995 in Houston, Texas. The sale was then postponed on April 11. Appellants received a second notice of sale on November 22, 1995. The property was sold to the Bennetts at the sealed bid sale on December 12, 1995 in Houston, and the Bennetts received a certificate of sale. After the 180-day redemption period had expired, a quitclaim deed was issued to Mary Bennett on June 11, 1996, which deed she recorded the next day. The procedures for seizure of land mandated by section 6 r.1973) (<HOLDING>); Koby v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 99, 105 Holdings: 0: holding that a decedents tax settlement with the irs did not establish the value of his estates claim against the irs as a matter of law 1: holding that although irs failed to comply with procedures of section 6335 tax sale was valid due to ratification by taxpayer 2: holding that failure of irs agent to follow irs electronic surveillance regulations before recording conversations between taxpayer and agent did not require suppression of tape recordings in prosecution of taxpayer accused of bribing irs agent since irs was not required by constitution to adopt its regulations governing electronic surveillance violation of agency regulations did not raise constitutional questions 3: holding that a notice of tax deficiency sent to a taxpayer by the irs need not be signed in order to be valid 4: holding that irss failure to comply with seizure and sale provisions of section 6335 renders tax sales voidable at taxpayers option rather than void as matter of law


Input: 1762, supra at 847, quoting Sanders v. Youthcraft Coats & Suits, Inc., 700 F.2d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir.1983); see also, Baird v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe R.R. Co., 169 F.Supp.2d 1019, 1025 (D.Minn.2001), aff'd, 24 Fed.Appx. 629 (8th Cir.2001). “A union owes a duty to all members of the bargaining unit, therefore ‘the union has the affirmative duty not to press grievances which the union believes, in good faith, do not warrant such action.’ ” Id., quoting Sanders v. Youthcraft Coats & Suits, Inc., supra at 1229. 2) Legal Analysis. The IFO asserts that the Plaintiffs duty of fair representation claim is time-barred, because all of the alleged acts were committed prior to the ninety (90) day statute of limitations. See, Allen v. Hennepin County, 680 N.W.2d 560, 563-5 (Minn.App.2004) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied (Minn. August 17, 2004). We Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims 1: recognizing a ninety 90 day statute of limitations for claims brought under the pelra 2: holding that georgias statute of limitations for personal injury actions should be applied to discrimination claims brought under the rehabilitation act and title ii of the ada 3: recognizing a sixyear statute of limitations on claims filed under the coal act 4: holding that the virginia disabilities act constitutes the most analogous state statute of limitations for claims brought under the ada


Input: N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 691(4). Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action on March 26, 2001, alleging that defendants: (a) sold them franchises without having an offering prospectus registered with the State, in violation of section 683(1) (the prospectus claim); and (b) committed fraud in connection with the sale of franchises, in violation of section 687(2), because they induced plaintiffs to enter franchises with a false promise to pay 60% commissions for deliveries (the fraud claim). For both claims, therefore, the “act or transaction constituting the violation” occurred when the franchises were purchased. See United Magazine Co. v. Murdoch Magazines Distribution, Inc., 146 F.Supp.2d 385, 407 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“United Magazine ”), aff'd, 279 Fed.Appx. 14, 19 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Leung v. Lotus Ride, Inc., 198 A.D.2d 155, Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered 1: holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made 2: holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach 3: holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court 4: holding that the limitations period begins to run at the time that the parties first enter into the franchise agreement


Input: that she had known McCray for approximately only one to two years. Moreover, the officers' testimony is equally, if not more, contradictory. Thus, the court will not discredit Wallace’s testimony. 8 .If the officers had observed some sort of exchange among the parties that might be an objective factor which would give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the parties were engaged in criminal activity. See United States v. Ruiz, No.Crim. A. 98-120, 1998 WL 622405, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 15, 1998) (finding officer had reasonable suspicion after observing money exchange hands in a high drug area). See also United States v. Williams, 139 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir.1998) (finding reasonable suspicion where officer observed exchange of drugs and money); United States v. Garrett, 1007 (DC Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Although Washington v. Gilmore is a civil Holdings: 0: holding that an officers observation of a man holding his hand out with a group of other men looking down at his open palm in an high drug trafficking area late at night constituted reasonable suspicion 1: holding officers articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellants contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellants prior arrests for drug offenses appellants lie about his prior criminal history and appellants possession of small jewelers bags used in cocaine trafficking 2: holding that officers observation of a known drug dealer approaching the defendants car gave rise to reasonable suspicion 3: holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on his presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking and his flight upon seeing police officers 4: holding that an officers observation of exchange of small object and money in a known drug trafficking area constituted reasonable suspicion


Input: actions, “the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction ... over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule ... 24 ..; or over claims by persons ... seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 ... when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.”). But in federal-question cases, the identity of the parties is irrelevant and the district court’s jurisdiction is grounded in the federal question(s) raised by the plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The jurisdictional requirement, therefore, prevents the enlargement of federal jurisdiction in such cases only where a proposed intervenor seeks to bring new state-law claims. See, e.g., Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 473 (<HOLDING>); Blake, 554 F.2d at 956-57. Where the proposed Holdings: 0: holding that an independent jurisdictional basis is not required in this case because intervenors do not seek to litigate a claim on the merits 1: holding that considering an amendment is not the time to address the merits of a case 2: holding that a dismissal based on a jurisdictional statute of limitations does not constitute a judgmerit on the merits because a judgment on the merits can only be rendered after a court has jurisdiction 3: holding that the disqualification order is an issue completely independent of the merits of the action 4: holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional


Input: with Rule 32.6(b)’s pleading requirements. Ala. R.Crim. P. 32.7(d). While the Court of Criminal Appeals refers to all three of these rules in its peitinent order, we focus our analysis on Rule 32.6(b), as Frazier’s failure to provide "full disclosure of the factual basis” of the relevant claim was the sine qua non of the Court of Criminal Appeals’s dismissal. 7 . It is uncontroversial that "[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir.2001); see also Owen v. Sec’y for Dep't of Corr., 568 F.3d 894, 908 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Because we find no procedural default, we Holdings: 0: holding that a petitioner may overcome a procedural default by demonstrating either 1 an adequate cause for and actual prejudice arising from the default or 2 that a miscarriage of justice caused by a substantial denial of constitutional rights will occur if the petitioners federal claims are not considered quoting lynd v terry 470 f3d 1308 131314 11th cir2006 1: holding that in the case of state procedural default a federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate among other things that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice 2: holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact 3: holding that a federal court may excuse a state habeas petitioners procedural default if the petitioner can show cause for the failure to raise the claim and prejudice resulting from such failure 4: holding that the novelty of a petitioners claim can constitute cause for a procedural default


Input: the Sentencing Commission’s failure to provide for completed distributions, in the application notes. He maintains further that -if we agree that this is a clarifying amendment, we should remand for resentencing so as to give the sentencing court the opportunity to consider the additional clarifying language. Marmolejos’s argument is based on the established principle that a post-sentencing amendment to a sentencing guideline or its comments should be given effect if it “clarifies” the guideline or comment in place at the time of sentencing. If, however, the amendment effects a substantive change in the law, the defendant does not reap the benefit of the new provision. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11(b)(2) (1998); Isabel v. United States, 980 F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ofchinick, 877 F.2d 251, 257 Holdings: 0: recognizing this as the general rule 1: holding that the bia rule is unreasonable in this context 2: recognizing this texas rule 3: recognizing this rule 4: holding that this is the rule in virtually all circuits


Input: that the term means “source of secondary power; the secondary power source need not be physically separate from the main power source,” while Defendants contend that it means “a source of power connected to provide power between the data node and the access device using the data signaling pair. The secondary power source is physically separate from the main power source.” The parties disagree whether or not the term “secondary power source” requires the secondary power source to be physically separate from the main power source. Network-1 asserts that since the D— Link case, Federal Circuit cases have demonstrated that the “secondary power source” need not be physically separate from the “main power source.” See, e.g., Linear Tech. Corp. v. ITC, 566 F.3d 1049, 1055 (Fed.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1275 Holdings: 0: holding that claim that the circuit courts order was deficient because it did not include specific findings of fact regarding each is sue was not preserved for review where it was not raised in the circuit court 1: recognizing circuit split 2: holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case 3: holding that the terms second circuit and third circuit do not require entirely separate and distinct circuits with each requiring a specific structural requirement 4: holding that the conclusion that the wiretap was necessary in each situation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and bringing the tenth circuit into accordance with the authority of a majority of other circuits


Input: Signal Corp., 68 F.3d 1488, 1492 (2d Cir.1995) (same); Flanigan v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, 942 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.1991) (same); Ghartey v. St. John’s Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir.1989) (same). Applying this standard to this case, we coneludé that the cause of action did not accrue prior to January 28, 1999, and therefore this action was timely filed. IAM initially suggests that the cause of action accrued in 1993 when it announced its position that plaintiffs would not be credited with their Eastern seniority. This argument borders on the absurd because, although we have held that the harm that results from the union’s breach need not be beyond all doubt for a cause of action to accrue, see, e.g., Buttry, 68 F.3d at 1492-93 (<HOLDING>), we cannot accept IAM’s contention that the Holdings: 0: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 1: holding that the breach occurs when the union acts against the interest of its members 2: holding that cause of action accrued when union manifestly abandoned the interests of its members 3: recognizing union members vital concern in preserving jobs for union members 4: holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale


Input: has experience with gangs would be helpful to the jury. That, however, is not the precise issue. Rather, the issue is whether it is helpful to the jury, in making the determination as to whether a particular group constitutes a criminal gang, to hear from an expert concerning the primary activities of that particular group or association. Neither the Minnesota Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals has had cause to visit this precise question. Those jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, however, have held that, upon establishing proper foundation and meeting the helpfulness requirement, a police officer may offer an expert opinion as to whether a group or association constitutes a criminal gang. See People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal.4th 605, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713, 722 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Lewis, 514 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa 1994) Holdings: 0: holding that murder committed by minor gang members was not foreseeable result of sale of alcohol to gang members 1: holding that experts testimony as to aspects of gang culture relevant to the case including requirements of members obedience silence and staunch defense of other gang members and the punishment meted out to a gang member who violates these requirements went to factual matters outside the experience of the average juror 2: holding that expert testimony by police officer based on conversations with defendants family crip members personal investigations of crimes committed by gang members and information from colleagues and law enforcement organizations was admissible and gave jury sufficient grounds to find that group constituted a criminal street gang defined as 1 an ongoing organization of three or more persons 2 that shares a common name or identifying symbol 3 and has as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more enumerated crimes 3: holding that evidence of violent crimes and other illegal activities of defendants gang was not unduly prejudicial because defendant was not directly implicated and the evidence was probative of elements of the crimes that the defendant was charged with 4: holding that active participation in a criminal street gang means that there is a relationship between the defendant and the gang that is more than nominal passive inactive or purely technical and that defendant must devote all or a substantial part of his time and efforts to the gang


Input: The photograph of Smith’s car is also relevant, as it provides context for the photos of the drugs found inside. The probative value of this evidence in proving Smith’s knowledge and lack of mistake or accident in the possession of the contraband seized from his house was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In addition, the district court’s instructions to the jury properly limited the scope of their consideration of the evidence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. Likewise, the district court committed no plain error in admitting the actual bags of methamphetamine. IV Finally, Smith argued that the district court erred in imposing a 60-month mandatory minimum sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), to run d 348 (2010) Holdings: 0: holding that the statute is mandatory 1: holding that dismissed drug counts are not more serious if their effect on the total sentence is less than the  924c fiveyear mandatory consecutive sentence 2: holding that a sentence was based on a mandatory statutory minimum sentence even though it was lowered under another statute 3: holding that a defendant is subject to a mandatory consecutive sentence for a  924c conviction and is not spared from that sentence by virtue of receiving a higher mandatory minimum on a different count of conviction 4: holding a mandatory sentence is still subject to constitutional scrutiny


Input: are not applied strictly. Flexible applications of procedural statutes of limitations may be based on equitable principles, such as the discovery rule, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973), or estoppel, e.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).” In short, under varying circumstances we have recognized that tolling of the statute of limitations is the fair and responsible result, because the “[ujnswerving ‘mechanistic’ application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing [the] legislative purposes.” Galligan v. Westfield Ctr. Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 192, 412 A.2d 122, 124 (1980). See also Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 514, 521, 267 A.2d 498, 501 (1970) (<HOLDING>). III. The undisputed facts here support an Holdings: 0: holding fanresolution of statutory incongruity is to toll period of limitation from time insured gives notice until liability is formally declined by insurer 1: recognizing that equitable tolling doctrines may toll the time period for filing 2: holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach 3: holding that a defect in notice by the faa does no more than toll the statutory time limit 4: holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous


Input: v. Cuffley, 112 F.3d 1332, 1337 (8th Cir.1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’ ” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985)). We conclude the NYPSC’s challenge to the FCC’s order is not ripe for review. The order only suggests the FCC, if faced with the precise issue, would preempt fixed VoIP services. Nonetheless, the order does not purport to actually do so and until that day comes it is only a mere prediction. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 594 (D.C.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, as we noted, the FCC has since Holdings: 0: holding that epa regions policy statement does not constitute final agency action because it does not compel action 1: holding fda seizure action did not constitute final agency action 2: holding that ftc issuance of a complaint meets the apa definition of order and therefore is agency action even if not final agency action 3: holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action 4: holding a general prediction set forth in order does not constitute final agency action


Input: Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex.2004) (Schneider, J. dissenting). I. Background, The record demonstrates that the trial court ordered Bazan’s counsel to submit an order after it heard evidence of damages and pronounced judgment in default. Over nine years later, and ten days after the trial court dismissed the case for want of prosecution, Bazan wrote a letter to the trial court requesting it to “sign final orders so this action can become final.” In the same letter he notified the trial court that he had terminated his counsel’s representation and was proceeding pro se. He further apprised the trial court that he had requested the reporter’s record so that Bazan could prepare the final orders, and, if the trial court had final orders before it, Bazan r 2d 121, 124 (Tex.1988) (<HOLDING>); Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, Holdings: 0: recognizing the federal courts ability to impose inherent power sanctions on parties 1: recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants 2: recognizing the inherent power of courts to ensure an adversarial proceeding 3: recognizing courts inherent power to issue subpoenas 4: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals


Input: by Ford Elliot, J.), citing Senate Legislative Journal, No. 13, 172nd General Assembly, Volume I, at 1780, 1784, and 1786 (February 23, 1988). See also House Legislative Journal, No. 16, 172nd General Assembly, Volume I, at 357, 363, 373 and 374 (March 16, 1988) (for similar comments). Further, the legislature imposed more severe penalties on those individuals who were found to possess and/or deliver greater quantities of drugs.... [T]he legislature’s scheme of imposing harsher penalties and longer periods of confinement on convicted drug dealers is rationally related to the laudable goal of attempting to put an end to the pernicious effects which drugs and the illicit drug trade have inflicted upon our society. Commonwealth v. Eicher, 413 Pa.Super. 235, 605 A.2d 337, 352 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the statute is not applied Holdings: 0: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 1: holding that the cap does not violate equal protection 2: holding the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions under 18 pacsa  7508 do not violate the equal protection clause 3: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause 4: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection


Input: or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A). It is undisputed that Ibrahim was convicted of federal crimes of terrorism, and the evidence presented at trial showed that Ibra-him was involved in or intended to promote these crimes, which were intended to influence by means of intimidation and to retaliate against the government of the United States of America. To assess an enhancement for obstruction of justice based on false testimony, “a sentencing court must find that the defendant 1) willfully 2) and materially 3) committed perjury, which is (a) the intentional (b) giving of false testimony (c) as to a material matter.” United States v. Salim, 549 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The distri 72, 80 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The relevant statute here provides for Holdings: 0: holding that sentencing under the mandatory guidelines regime creates a presumption of prejudice that the government must rebut with clear and specific evidence that the district court would not have  sentenced the defendant to a lower sentence if it had treated the guidelines as advisory 1: holding guidelines to be only advisory 2: recognizing that under the booker remedial regime  the guidelines are no longer mandatory but are only advisory 3: holding that even in the absence of a sixth amendment violation the imposition of a sentence under the former mandatory guidelines regime rather than under the advisory regime outlined in booker is plain error 4: holding that judicial factfinding at sentencing is permissible  indeed required  under an advisory guidelines regime