Input: Morris intriguingly argues that he could not have been guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because Mississippi does not permit an instruction defining the limits of reasonable doubt. Morris argues that by not requiring the court to define the limits of reasonable doubt, Mississippi is in effect trampling upon the requirement that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Mississippi however has a longstanding policy of relying upon jurors to determine whether their doubt is reasonable, and prohibits any instruction that would presume to define the nature of reasonable doubt. Isaacks v. State, 337 So.2d 928, 930 (Miss.1976). ¶ 9. We find no error in the refusal of the requested instruction. III. IS THE VERDICT CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVID 03, 806 (1957) (<HOLDING>). This Court cannot substitute its judgment Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony 1: holding that a district court was entitled to accept or reject testimony on the basis of the witnesses demeanor and candor or lack thereof and contradictions in the witnesses testimony 2: holding that strength of testimony is not the result of a calculus of witnesses 3: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial 4: holding that selfinterested witnesses can be reliable when they provide detailed testimony that is corroborated by other witnesses or facts


Input: Interest cannot be used to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, see § 1332(a), so this claim comes in well under the jurisdictional limit. Mr. Amari argues that I have supplemental jurisdiction over the claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, but because I decline to exercise my jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment claim, I dismiss the pendent state claim as well. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Miller Aviation v. Milwaukee County Bd. of Supervisors, 273 F.3d 722, 731 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[A] district court’s decision to ‘relinquish pendent jurisdiction before the federal claims have been tried is ... the norm, not the exception.’ ”). Mr. Amari may bring this claim as a counterclaim in the substantive action. See Channell v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 386 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Radio Spirits’ motion to dismiss is Holdings: 0: holding that where counterclaim arises out of same transaction alleged in plaintiffs complaint is not barred by a running of the statute of limitations thereafter rather statute of limitations is suspended until counterclaim is filed 1: holding that the time limits in the equal access to justice act are jurisdictional 2: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc  1367a 3: holding that time limits in title vii are not jurisdictional but are instead like statutes of limitations 4: holding that counterclaim is within jurisdictional limits of  1367a


Input: conviction for reasons unrelated to the merits of the underlying criminal proceedings, the respondent remains ‘convicted’ for immigration purposes.” 23 I. & N. Dec. at 624; see also Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 306 (1st Cir.2000) (“[A] subsequent dismissal of charges, based solely on rehabilitative goals and not on the merits of the charge or on a defect in the underlying criminal proceedings, does not vitiate that original admission [of guilt].”). Nothing in Pickering precludes a stipulated vacatur from invalidating a conviction as a ground for removal or for other immigration purposes, provided that the vacatur is still based on a defect in the underlying conviction rather than rehabilitative or otherwise proscribed grounds. See Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193 (3rd Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d at 1131 Holdings: 0: holding that a prior conviction obtained in violation of a defendants constitutional rights cannot be used as the underlying conviction in a prosecution under colorados felon with a gun statute 1: holding the petitioners challenge of his conviction is not rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence because collateral consequences flowing from the conviction give the petitioner a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him 2: holding that the petitioners vacatur obtained by settlement rather than adjudication meets the pickering standard because the petitioner claimed a defect in his underlying conviction 3: holding that standard of review is a matter of procedural rather than substantive law 4: holding that it is the conduct required to obtain a conviction rather than the consequences resulting from the crime that is relevant


Input: 624 F.Supp.2d 933 (N.D.Ill.2009). 17 . Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 319 (D.C.1989). 18 . Sennett argues that there was no probable cause to believe that she was guilty of conspiracy or aiding and abetting because the record does not contain evidence satisfying all the elements of those offenses. This argument fails because "evidence sufficient to find an individual guilty of an offense is not required to establish probable cause.” Gantt v. Whitaker, 57 Fed.Appx. 141, 148 (4th Cir.2003); see also Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir.1998) (“Probable cause requires more than ‘bare suspicion’ but requires less than evidence necessary to convict.”). And, based on the totality of the facts an 455 (9th Cir.1975)); Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 Holdings: 0: holding police are not required to explore and eliminate every potentially plausible claim of innocence as part of their prearrest investigation 1: holding that where arrest was unlawful police officer committed a battery when he touched plaintiff during arrest 2: holding that police officer is not required to explore and eliminate all theoretically plausible claims of innocence 3: holding that petitioners challenge to jury instructions in light of some new cases did not demonstrate his actual innocence because petitioner only asserts legal innocence not actual innocence 4: holding that police officer was not required to eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before effectuating arrest for animal cruelty


Input: the Eighth Circuit held that the state law claims were indeed preempted by ERISA, reasoning that the plaintiffs’ claims all relied on Mr. Kuhl’s status as a beneficiary under the employer’s health benefits plan and arose from the administration of benefits under the plan. Id. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that [ajrtful pleading by characterizing Lincoln National’s actions in refusing to pay for the surgery as “cancellation” or by characterizing the same administrative decisions as “malpractice” does not change the fact that plaintiffs’ claims are based on the contention that Lincoln National improperly processed [Mr.] Kuhl’s claim for medical benefits. Id. at 303; see also Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc., 868 F.Supp. 110, 114 (D.Md.1994) (<HOLDING>). 4. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims Initially, we Holdings: 0: recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 1: holding that employees claims for medical malpractice negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress against an hmo arising out of refusal to pay for surgery were integrally and inextricably related to their employee benefit plan and therefore preempted 2: recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 3: recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress 4: holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it arose out of the same conduct as a preempted contract claim


Input: that the prosecutor lied to the jury about Abdur’Rahman’s culpability by arguing that the defense’s theory that the SEGM orchestrated the killing was “bunk.” The district court rejected the claim on the merits. Id. at *6-9. Seventh, Abdur’Rah-man charged that the prosecutor showed the jury an indictment against Abdur’Rah-man for robbery in violation of a trial court order. The district court also addressed the merits of this claim. Id. at *18. Martinez 'does not apply to claims that were fully adjudicated on the merits in state court because those claims are, by definition, not procedurally defaulted. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.2013) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2662, 189 L.Ed.2d 230 (2014); see also Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 840 (8th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 297, 193 Holdings: 0: holding that martinez did not apply to ineffective assistance of counsel subclaims that were not defaulted by postconviction counsel 1: holding that the defendants ineffective assistance of counsel claims which were raised in a motion for a new trial and challenged on direct appeal were not barred in postconviction by the doctrine of res judicata because the defendants conviction and sentence were affirmed without a written opinion expressly addressing the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that martinez did not apply to case where ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were reviewed on the merits in a  2254 proceeding 3: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 4: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel


Input: government agreed to ensure that Berkeley would not face charges in Maryland. Plea Agreement ¶ 5. Berkeley “does not affirmatively allege, much less establish to a reasonable probability, that he would have chosen to go to trial” despite the risks, United States v. Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. 781, 782 (D.C.Cir.2003), if only he had known that the advice the court found Wood gave him — -that he “could be placed in a Bureau of Prison[s] drug treatment program which, if completed successfully, could allow him to be released from prison” up to a year early— was incorrect. Berkeley, 515 F.Supp.2d at 165 (emphases added). Accordingly, Berkeley “cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. at 782; see United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 835-36 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Curry, 494 F.3d at 1131; In re Holdings: 0: holding that a  mere allegation that the petitioner would have insisted on trial but for his counsels errors  is ultimately insufficient to justify relief 1: holding that where defendant seeks to withdraw his plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel the prejudice prong of the strickland test is satisfied by demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial alteration in original quoting hill v lockhart 474 us 52 58 106 sct 366 88 led2d 203 1985 2: holding that the defendant could not prove prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance because he has never claimed that but for counsels errors he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted upon going to trial 3: holding in the context of a plea that the strickland prejudice prong requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial 4: holding that to establish prejudice sufficient to warrant finding of ineffective assistance the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different


Input: Chasmer was very different from the current language. At the time, § 5G1.3 provided for consecutive sentences when defendant was serving an unexpired sentence "unless one or more of the instant offense(s) arose out of the same transactions or occurrences as the unexpired sentences.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 (1988). The commentary stated that the presumption that sentences imposed at different times run consecutively "does not apply when the new counts arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as a prior conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, commentary (1988). The focus, thus, was on "prior conviction,” not on what offenses the imprisonment "resulted” from. However, as we note, we do not need to rule on this question here. 3 . Compare United States v. Goldman, 228 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1175, 121 S.Ct. 1149, Holdings: 0: holding that applica tion note 6s language is mandatory 1: holding that the statute is mandatory 2: holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language 3: holding that the language of the iad is mandatory and absolute 4: holding that application note 6 is not mandatory


Input: that indirectly delight and "passive" uses that do so directly. 156 The majority next opines that the Club's proposed aesthetic, recreational, and piscatorial uses cannot be "beneficial" because they have no "objective limits, beyond which it becomes unreasonable, inappropriate, inefficient, or wasteful." Maj. op. 1122-23. Yet these types of uses can be- and are statutorily required to be-limited to amounts "reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made." § 37-92-103(4). Water courts are well equipped to determine what amount of water is reasonable for recreational uses. See Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 602-08 (Colo.2005) (<HOLDING>). As with RICDs, expert testimony can establish Holdings: 0: holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially 1: holding that the recreational inchannel diversion ricd statute requires water courts to determine the amount of water necessary for a reasonable recreation experience 2: holding that mandamus was appropriate to require the director to deliver the full decreed water rights of a water right holder 3: holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district 4: holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted


Input: & N. Dec. 912, 917-18 & n. 4 (BIA 2006); see also Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 123-24 (2d Cir.2008). Joseph claims that the BIA failed to consider unrebutted evidence of past torture and existing country conditions that are “relevant to the possibility of future torture,” under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). He notes, in particular, that there is no indication in the BIA’s opinion that the Board considered Concannon’s expert testimony, as well as evidence from various sources (including the State Department Country Report for Haiti, issued in March 2008) that chronicled human rights abuses in Haiti from 2004 through 2008, perpetrated in part by the Haitian National Police and armed anti-Lavalas groups. Joseph relies primarily on Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 477, 479 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). (Pet. Br. at 22 (Awolesi v. Ashcroft, 341 Holdings: 0: holding that the bia erred under 8 cfr  20816c3 when it provided only a minimal analysis of zubedas claim and cavalierly dismissed the substantial documentation of conditions in the drc democratic republic of congo 1: holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte 2: holding that the bia rule is reasonable 3: holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte 4: holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider a claim not raised before the bia even when the bia sua sponte considers the claim


Input: Both of Appellant’s arguments are without merit and we affirm. I. Appellant argues that attempted second-degree kidnapping as defined by Oregon law is not a crime of violence as that term is defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(l)(ii). Section 4B1.2(1) defines the term “crime of violence” • as any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that: (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1). Appellant was convicted under Oregon Revised Statute section 163.225(l)(a) which provides that: [a Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Application Note 2 to section 4B1.2 Holdings: 0: holding that kidnapping is a crime of violence which necessarily involves the threatened use of physical force under 18 usc  924 1: holding that kidnapping is a crime of violence which involves a serious potential risk of injury under 18 usc  924 2: holding that the potential for violence against the victim is an inherent aspect of the crime of kidnapping under 18 usc  924 3: holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc  2113a is a crime of violence 4: holding that kidnapping is a violent crime which inherently involves the threat of violence under ussg  4b121ii


Input: v. Sec’y of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1384-85 (2d Cir.1977). In this case, however, the court does not find it necessary to review extraneous material because Krichbaum has not shown that any of his proposed additions to the record are necessary to the court’s effective review of the agency’s decision. None of Krichbaum’s exhibits provide needed background information, raise questions that the agency failed to consider, or present evidence of bad faith. Instead, they merely criticize the Forest Service’s methodology and decision to proceed with the sale. Supplementation of the administrative record “to determine the correctness or wisdom of the agency’s decision” is specifically prohibit ed. Asarco, 616 F.2d at 1160; see also Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410 n. 21, 96 S.Ct. at 2730 n. 21 (<HOLDING>). Because the materials submitted by Krichbaum Holdings: 0: holding that court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency 1: holding that a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 2: holding that the court is not to undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence make credibility determinations or substitute its judgment for that of the agency 3: holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board 4: recognizing a subsequent agency action as a valid ratification and indicating that the court will not substitute our judgment for that of the agency


Input: Cir.1981). The defendants also argue that the statement was inadmissible because Whitaker did not write it or review it, but “when a statement is the party opponent’s own statement, there is no requirement that the party opponent ‘adopt’ the statement.” Bondie, 947 F.2d at 1534. The defense did not question the authenticity of Whitaker’s statement. The transcript was admissible under the business records exception because a Cincinnati Insurance representative testified that the document was “made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,” the document was “kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity,” and “it was the regular practice of that business activity to make” the record. Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) ; Bondie, 947 F.2d at 1534 (<HOLDING>). See also Essex Ins. Co. v. Fid. Guar. Ins. Holdings: 0: holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses 1: holding social workers report about plaintiffs statements was admissible through the combined effect of rules 801d2a and 8036 2: holding that a plenary hearing was necessary based upon mothers certification and school social workers report of childs behavioral problems 3: holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible 4: holding inconsistent out of court statements otherwise admissible not admissible against government in criminal prosecution


Input: view that surprise in litigation is something to be avoided. Such a rule also gives an undeserved windfall to the complainant as a reward for not acknowledging that reversible error has been made. I believe that the majority has erred by affirming the relief granted by the court of appeals but refusing to address the merits of the State’s claim. Today, we have either abdicated our responsibility to answer an important but unsettled question of state law or we have created a legal fiction by granting relief on the basis that Appellant preserved a claim that our case law tells us need not be preserved. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s resolution of this case. 1 . See Lee, 115 S.W. at 322 (citing City of Dallas v. Peacock, 89 Tex. 58, 60-63, 33 S.W. 220, 220-22 (1895) (<HOLDING>)). 2 . My research has revealed no historical Holdings: 0: holding that a federal court may refuse to exercise continuing jurisdiction even though the parties have agreed to it parties cannot confer jurisdiction by stipulation or consent 1: holding that parties may consent to jurisdiction on noncore matters 2: recognizing the right to waive a jury trial 3: holding that parties to a suit cannot waive a judges disqualification but not equating inability to consent to a loss of jurisdiction 4: holding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent


Input: the office during normal business hours. Rev. Breen Deck ¶¶ 22-24. This creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 726 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that employer’s allowance of medical -leave to other employees created genuine issue of fact as to whether grant of leave to plaintiff would have constituted reasonable accommodation); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C.Cir.1999) (observing that an employer “ ‘may not obtain summary judgment by declaring it has a policy when [the employee] may have evidence that [the employer] follows the policy ... selectively ” (quoting Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir.1998)) (brackets in original)); Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1346 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Carr v. Reno, cited by the defendant, is not Holdings: 0: holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation 1: holding in a similar factual situation that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because it had no actual or constructive possession of the letters of credit involved 2: holding that because the employee had engaged in similar religious conduct on prior occasions employer had notice of the conflict 3: holding that the employer must offer a medical leave of absence in order to satisfy the requirement of providing a reasonable accommodation 4: holding that plaintiff demonstrated factual dispute by providing evidence that employer had granted another employee the requested accommodation in a similar situation


Input: of article I, section 24 of the Washington Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. DISCUSSION ¶44 We must recognize what the statute at issue does. RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(iv) categorically prevents any person from possessing firearms while pending trial for a series of statutorily enumerated serious crimes. The judge must find only probable cause that the accused committed the crime— there is no opportunity for an individualized hearing of dangerousness (indeed, the facts of this case demonstrate that judicial discretion will be overruled by the statute). The accused is deprived of the fundamental right to possess firearms and faces additional criminal prosecution upon exercising that right. See State v. Sieyes, 168 Wn.2d 276, 287, 225 P.3d 995 (2010) (<HOLDING>). ¶45 Though the right to bear arms is not Holdings: 0: recognizing that the right to bear arms is fundamental 1: holding right to be fundamental 2: holding that us supreme court cases do not define the fundamental right to bear arms to include activity barred by the auuw statute 3: holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right 4: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental


Input: Fed.Reg. 68,722 at 68,724-25 (“Although water quality problems also can occur from agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture, this area of concern is statutorily exempted from regulation as a point source under the Clean Water Act.”). Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that the Clean Water Act’s exemptions for irrigated agriculture are inapplicable to defendant’s operations because defendant’s possible over-application of fruit processing wastewater to its crops is more akin to industrial, non-agricultural activities. The only case to support this position was decided seven years before Congress added the exemption for agricultural runoff to the Clean Water Act. United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc., 487 F.Supp. 852, 854 (E.D.Pa.1980) (<HOLDING>); see Pub.L. 100-4, Title V, §§ 502(a), 503 Holdings: 0: holding that a period of paid leave does not qualify as a suspension 1: holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence 2: holding that the spraying of an overabundance of wastewater onto irrigation fields may qualify as a point source 3: holding negligence on the part of the attorney does not qualify for such relief 4: holding that the department of transportation may be enjoined from diverting water flow onto a landowners property


Input: Ann. § 99-39-3 et seq. (Supp.1992). Section 99-39-3 provides that a “[djireet appeal shall be the principal means of reviewing all criminal convictions and sentences, and the purpose of this chapter is to provide prisoners with a procedure, limited in nature, to review those objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues or errors which in practical reality could not be or should not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.” If any effect is to be given to such legislative intent, the right of a prisoner to challenge his conviction based on subsequent changes in the law must be limited. However, our PCR Act has its own provisions regarding intervening decisions. See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 99-39-5(2) and 99-39-27(9) (Supp.1993). Accordingl .Ct. 1712, 1722, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Nixon failed to object to the jury Holdings: 0: holding that where defendant failed to object to facts in psi relating to prior conviction the failure to object constituted an admission 1: holding that a defendant may object to the exclusion of members of the defendants own race 2: recognizing that we are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant 3: holding that exclusion of potentially qualified members below the grade of e7 was improper 4: holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion


Input: by the provisions of a contract to which it was not a party. Nor do they cite a similar provision from the 2003 BAA, and it does not appear that any such provisions exist. This argument is of no moment. Plaintiffs also attempt to place the onus on BancorpSouth to object if the “course of dealing” was inconsistent with the BAA. See, e.g., id. at 4 (“The Bank never objected to either the Lender, whether Roy Al or Edwards, or CHFS as to the course of dealing for the blocked accounts.”). But under the BAA, it was allegedly the lender’s right to have Ban-corpSouth prohibit wrongful transfers. If the Edwards Entities wanted to continue enjoying that right, they were required, under Mississippi law, to insist on it in the face of a known breach. See Upchurch Plumbing, Inc., 964 So.2d at 1112 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs failed to do so here. So based on Holdings: 0: holding that the party seeking contractual attorneys fees is entitled to a decision on the merits 1: holding that the court should look to the actions of the relevant party and determine whether that party fails to insist on its contractual rights or acts inconsistently with such rights 2: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees 3: holding that the substitution of a party acts as a modification discharging the replaced party and substituting the new party with the same rights and liabilities 4: holding when a party fails to provide arguments or supporting authority for his assertion the party is deemed to have abandoned the issue


Input: 125 (2d Cir.2006), no reasonable fact-finder would have been compelled to credit the explanation he offered, see Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). These inconsistencies went to the heart of Petitioner’s claim as they related to the medical care he received for his alleged beatings. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir.2008). Since the only evidence that Petitioner was likely to be persecuted or tortured depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility determination precludes success on his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005); cf. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 184-85 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). We decline to consider Petitioner’s challenge Holdings: 0: holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of an adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility 1: holding that defeat of asylum claim on credibility grounds does not necessarily preclude relief on a cat claim 2: holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum 3: holding it improper to deny cat relief based on adverse credibility finding where objective documentary evidence establishes likelihood of torture 4: holding that a negative credibility finding for the purposes of an asylum claim does not preclude relief under cat where documented country conditions corroborate a claim of torture


Input: of “disposal” is “clear,” 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs., 915 F.2d at 1362, whether the definition includes passive soil migration is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Other circuit courts have taken a variety of approaches. Those opinions cannot be shoehorned into the dichotomy of a classic circuit split. Rather, a careful reading of their holdings suggests a more nuanced range of views, depending in large part on the factual circumstances of the case. Compare United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir.2000) (concluding that absent “any evidence that there was human activity involved in whatever movement of hazardous substances occurred on the property,” there is no “disposal”), ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 359 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that prior owners are not liable for the gradual spread of contamination underground 1: holding past owners liable for the disposal of hazardous wastes that leaked from an underground storage tank 2: holding that all property owners affected by a residential use permit are necessary parties 3: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 4: holding that subsequent property owners were bound by prior owners agreement to restrict building density and preserve certain portions of land as a condition of the original zoning approval


Input: is defined as “a security that satisfies the standards for a covered security specified in paragraph (1) or .(2) of section 77r(b) of this title, at the time during which it is alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative or deceptive conduct occurred.... ” 15 U.S.C. § 77p©(3). Section 77r(b)(2) provides that a “security is a & Thompson, supra, at 35-36 (stating that the SEC regulates variable universal life insurance policies). Second, the plaintiff invested his premiums in a sub-account which is registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See Araujo v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 01-6622, Notice of Removal ¶ 4. As such, the plaintiffs variable universal life insurance policy is a “covered security” under SLUSA. See Lander, 251 F.3d at 109 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, courts have regularly concluded Holdings: 0: holding that variable annuities are covered securities under slusa because they are securities and the subaccounts are registered with the sec under the investment company act 1: holding that slusa precludes statelaw class action claims against these banks because the claims are predicated on the banks involvement with the fraudulent securities transactions of bernard l madoff investment securities madoff securities 2: holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 are arbitrable 3: holding that claims under the securities act of 1934 and the rico statutes are arbitrable 4: holding that variable insurance policies are covered securities under slusa


Input: of the precluded evidence” on Oatts’s Sixth Amendment rights and the “state’s interests in excluding the evidence at issue.” Tague, 3 F.3d at 1137-1138. We first address the state’s interest in excluding the evidence by noting the policy of Indiana’s Rape Shield Rule. The Rule reflects a policy first embodied in Indiana’s Rape Shield Act, Indiana Code § 35-37-4^1, that inquiry into a victim’s prior sexual activity is sufficiently problematic that it should not be permitted to become a focus of the defense. Rule 412 is intended to prevent the victim from being put on trial, to protect the victim against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasion of privacy, and, importantly, to remove obstacles to reporting sex crimes. Williams, 681 N.E.2d at 200. See also Baughman, 528 N.E.2d at 79 (<HOLDING>); Tagne, 3 F.3d at 1139 (recognizing the Holdings: 0: holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded 1: holding that evidence of prior molestation by a different person was the type which the legislature deemed should be excluded 2: holding that the legislature intends different meanings when it uses different terms in a statute 3: recognizing that the legislature would not generally use a different meaning for the same word in a legislative provision unless a different purpose was intended 4: holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded


Input: complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seek relief properly characterized as prospective.” Id. Although this inquiry does not include an inquiry into the merits of the claim, it may include an inquiry as to whether the suit and the remedy it seeks implicate special sovereignty interests such as those found in Coeur d’Alene. Union Electric Co. v. Missouri Dep’t of Conservation, 366 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir.2004) (citing Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 647, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) and Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997)). The Plaintiffs’ complaint unquestionably alleges an-ongoing violation of federal law and seeks prospective relief. Each of the five 0th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The Eighth Circuit has addressed the “special Holdings: 0: holding the governors emergency powers to take private property for the public benefit was a special sovereignty interest but the relief requested was not so much of a divestiture of the states sovereignty to render the suit as one against the state itself 1: holding that a states interest in the integrity of its property tax system lies at the core of the states sovereignty it is impossible to imagine that a state government could continue to exist without the power to tax 2: holding that interest received by a foreign corporation on a tax refund from the united states was interest on an interestbearing obligation of a resident of the united states within income tax statute 3: holding that tribal sovereignty is dependent on and subordinate to only the federal government not the states 4: holding states property interest in right to profits from a recreational land lease did not rise to the level of a special sovereignty interest


Input: receiver, manager of property, or debtor in possession be appointed by a court of the United States. Based on review of virtually all, if not all, reported opinions of federal courts dealing with the 1887 and 1911 versions, this Court has located no opinion where a court utilized it as applicable to any receiver or property manager other than one appointed by a federal court. See, e.g., Investment Registry v. Chicago & M. Elec. Ry. Co., 204 F. 500, 507 (E.D.Wis.1913); In re Kalb & Berger Mfg. Co., 165 F. 895, 896 (2d Cir.1908). With only one exception, this remained true after the statute was revised in 1948. See, e.g., SEC v. Lincoln Thrift Ass’n, 557 F.2d 1274, 1277 n. 1 (9th Cir.1977); Republic Bank of Chicago v. Lighthouse Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 829 F.Supp.2d 766, 772 (D.Minn.2010) (<HOLDING>). This requirement arises not only from the Holdings: 0: holding that section 959a applies to receivers appointed by federal courts not state courts 1: holding that a federal courts dismissal of state claims without prejudice is not res judicata as to adjudication in either state or federal courts 2: holding that state courts in construing and interpreting state law are not bound by the decisions of federal courts 3: recognizing that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts 4: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts


Input: MOTION FOR REHEARING AND WRITTEN OPINION PER CURIAM. We deny Appellant’s motion for rehearing, but withdraw our previous per curiam opinion dated June 14, 2011, and substitute the following opinion in its place. AFFIRMED. See Santiago v. State, 65 So.3d 575 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); see also Hernandez v. State, 61 So.3d 1144, 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>); accord Barrios-Cruz v. State, 63 So.3d 868 Holdings: 0: holding that batson v kentucky 476 us 79 106 sct 1712 90 led2d 69 1986 does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review 1: holding that batson v kentucky does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review 2: holding that courts must begin the process by following the commissions instructions in ussg  1b110  to determine the prisoners eligibility for a sentence modification quoting dillon v united states 560 us 817 827 130 sct 2683 177 led2d 271 2010 3: holding inter alia that the decision in padilla v kentucky  us  130 sct 1473 176 led2d 284 2010 should not be applied retroactively while certifying the question as one of great public importance 4: holding that the rule announced in padilla v kentucky 559 us 356 130 sct 1473 176 led2d 284 2010 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review


Input: of the terms “discipline or discharge” in the context of section 31-51q, the Connecticut Superior Court held that “the language of § 31-51q, which ... is restrictive even by Connecticut standards, simply cannot compare with the expansive texts of these asserted federal counterparts.” Bombalicki v. Pastore, 2000 WL 726839, at *5 (Conn.Super.Ct. May 10, 2000). Rather, under section 31-51q, the term “discipline” contemplates “an affirmative act of deprivation that diminishes the status or happiness of the recipient rather than a failure to enhance that status or happiness.” See Burdick v. Clouet, 2011 WL 2739557, at * 7 (Conn.Sup.Ct. June 14, 2011) (citing Bombalicki, 2000 WL 726839, at *3). Examples of discipline include a change in an employee’s salary or fringe benefits. See id. (<HOLDING>). A transfer will generally not be considered Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to condition a transfer on death or remarriage of the wife was a factor showing that the transfer was not in the nature of alimony 1: holding that transfer was not discipline because transfer neither altered salary nor fringe benefits 2: holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court 3: holding transfer restriction granted right of first refusal in event of voluntary or involuntary transfer of stock 4: holding that a denial of transfer was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff asserted only that the transfer would allow him to work closer to home


Input: of commercial sports facilities the same as we treat other commercial property owners. Therefore, I would apply the business invitee rule, under which the stadium owner and operator would owe a duty “to conduct a reasonable inspection to discover latent dangerous conditions,” and the stadium owner and operator would have a duty to “guard against any dangerous conditions ... that the owner either knows about or should have discovered.” Parks v. Rogers, 176 N.J. 491, 497-98 n. 3, 825 A.2d 1128 (2003)(quoting Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 434, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993)). Moreover, under certain conditions the landowner has a duty to protect business visitors from foreseeable criminal acts. Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496, 516-17, 694 A.2d 1017 (1997) (<HOLDING>). There is nothing about the game of Holdings: 0: holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons 1: holding that a residential landlord has no duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts 2: holding landowner had duty to provide security in parking lot to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties 3: holding that a store owner has a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts 4: holding a business owner must protect invitees against injury caused by third persons


Input: uncovered authority that expressly undermines this Court’s decision to employ a presumption of prejudice where an extensive preindictment delay is involved. See Hey, 269 S.E.2d at 394, syl. pt. 2. Our holding in Hey is called into question by the Fourth Circuit’s recognition that “[t]he Due Process Clause has never been interpreted so as to impose a presumption of prejudice in the event of a lengthy preindictment delay----” Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 906 (4th Cir.1996); accord U.S. v. Lucien, 61 F.3d 366, 370 (5th Cir.1995) (rejecting contention that delay was presumptively prejudicial, holding that “a defendant must show actual prejudice to establish a claim of preindictment delay under the due process clause”); State v. Collins, 118 Ohio App.3d 73, 691 N.E.2d 1109, 1111 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Firmly rejecting an argument to extend the Holdings: 0: holding that unquestionable lack of actual prejudice weighs against a finding of a speedy trial violation 1: holding the military judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing charges with prejudice for violation of speedy trial courtmartial rule and recognizing that the military judge assessed the prejudice that would result from remedies short of dismissal 2: holding that the government may appeal trial courts dismissal of count in indictment because of prejudice caused by preindictment delay without violating double jeopardy principles 3: recognizing speedy trial analysis is genesis of presumptive prejudice rulings and holding that notion of presumptive prejudice  has no application to preindictment delays 4: holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice


Input: to this action. The original complaint against Yashinsky by Consolidated Rail brought professional malpractice, negligence, and breach of contract claims, all state law claims. It stated that “jurisdiction is vested in this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 [federal question] and 1332 [diversity] pursuant to diversity of citizenship between the parties.” Whether the complaint was based on diversity or federal question jurisdiction, Michigan’s statute of limitations would apply to this action. If the case is a diversity jurisdiction case, Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945), requires the federal court to apply the Michigan statute of limitations under the Erie doctrine. See also Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 372 F.2d 762, 764 (6th Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>). In any event, if the complaint housed some Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases 1: holding that a federal court with diversity jurisdiction must apply the choiceoflaw rules of the state in which the federal court sits 2: holding that a federal court in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law 3: holding that in diversity eases the law of the state in which a federal court sits must be followed with respect to the statute of limitations citing guaranty trust 4: holding that in a diversity action a federal court must apply the law of the forum state


Input: and whether PGM was a party to a fraudulent transfer. ¶ 15 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge. 1 . PGM also argues that Westchester failed to show that the alter ego and fraudulent transfer issues were fully and fairly litigated because Westchester did not supply the trial court with the full record from the Paria litigation. Cf. Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996). However, this court has held that, when the moving party produces documents that make a facial showing that a particular issue was litigated, the burden falls to the nonmoving party to show that the record before the court did not establish that the issue was in fact litigated. See Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Images & Attitude, 941 P.2d 636, 640-41 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case 1: holding that burden was on nonmoving party to show issue was not litigated where moving party presented arbitrators order showing issue had been litigated 2: holding that once the moving party meets its burden the nonmoving party is obliged to produce evidence in response 3: holding that all matters litigated or which could have been litigated in al foreclosure action are forever at rest  4: holding that trial by consent requires that the parties actually recognize the issue to have been litigated


Input: log indicated the notice of appeal was accepted by the mail room on Monday, November 3, 2003, Singletary deposited the mail in the legal mail box no earlier than Friday, October 31, 2003, two days after the excusable neglect period expired. Thus, the magistrate judge apparently concluded that the appeal period could not be extended. See Hensley v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 651 F.2d 226, 228 (4th Cir.1981) (finding that expiration of time limits in Rule 4 deprives court of jurisdiction over case). The record was then returned to us for further review. It appears from our review of the record that the magistrate judge’s order may be a dispositive ruling as it potentially ends Singletary’s ability to pursue his appeal. See Vitols v. Citizens Banking Co., 984 F.2d 168, 169-70 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the magistrate judge only is authorized Holdings: 0: holding that it is unconstitutional for a us magistrate judge to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc  636c over a  2255 motion 1: holding that a motion to certify a district court order for interlocutory appeal is dispositive 2: holding that under 28 usc  1292b the appellate courts may review only matters in the order not all issues in the case 3: holding that a magistrate judge acting pursuant to   636b1  has no authority to issue a dispositive ruling on a motion to certify a district court order for interlocutory appeal under 28 usc  1292b  2000  4: holding the failure to file objections to a magistrates report issued pursuant to 28 usc  636b1 waives the right to appeal all issues both factual and legal


Input: class actions because of the concept’s novelty. Aseertainability, as defined by defendant, is particularly misguided when applied to a case where any difficulties encountered in identifying class members are a consequence of a defendant’s own acts or omissions. Had defendant obtained the identities of consumers when giving out $25 gift cards, the problems it now offers as grounds for upending certification would not exist. Allowing a defendant to escape responsibility for its alleged wrongdoing by dint of its particular recordkeeping policies — an outcome admittedly un-troubling to some federal courts — is not in harmony with the principles governing class actions. See Byrd, supra, 784 F.3d at 176, 2015 WL 1727613, at *14, 2015 U.S.App. LEXIS 6190, at *50 (Rendell, J., concurring) (<HOLDING>). In the final analysis, “aseertainability” Holdings: 0: holding that advertising and selling expenses incurred by a manufacturer clearly fall within the class of charges which congress intended to be included in the tax base as they enter into the composition of the wholesale selling price 1: recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice 2: recognizing that wjithout the class action mechanism corporations selling smallvalue items for which it is unlikely that consumers would keep receipts are free to engage in false advertising overcharging and a variety of other wrongs without consequence 3: holding that facilitating small claims is the policy at the very core of the class action mechanism 4: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members


Input: pr e-Miranda silence, we cannot say that LaCourse is controlling. ¶ 13. Nor is there controlling federal precedent. The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236 n.2, 238 (1980) (concluding that the prosecution may use a defendant’s pre-arrest, pr e-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes but explicitly withholding judgment on the issue of whether such silence may be used in the prosecution’s case in chief where the App. 2008) (“[W]e hold that a proper invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination is protected [by the Fifth Amendment] from prosecutorial comment or substantive use, no matter whether such invocation occurs before or after a defendant’s arrest.”); State v. Leach, 2004-Ohio-2147, ¶¶ 1, 9, 807 N.E.2d 335 (<HOLDING>); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 349-50 (Utah Holdings: 0: holding that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate fifth or fourteenth amendments 1: holding that substantive use of prearrest silence is contrary to fifth amendment 2: holding that federal constitution does not permit state to use prearrest silence to imply guilt and characterizing the states argument to the contrary as nothing short of incredible 3: holding that state constitution prohibits substantive use of prearrest silence 4: holding that the government can use prearrest silence for impeachment purposes against a defendant because no government action induced the silence


Input: noneconomic damage awards. A defendant is liable to a claimant only for the percentage of the damages found by the trier of fact equal to that defendant’s percentage of responsibility unless the percentage of responsibility attributed to the defendant is greater than 50% or the defendant engaged in particular conduct listed in the penal code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.013(a), (b) (West 2008). Here, the jury found LMS 30% responsible and found Hospital 60% responsible. Based on our above holding that legally insufficient evidence exists to support the jury’s joint enterprise finding and the fact that the jury assessed only 30% responsibility against LMS, LMS cannot be jointly and severally liable with Hospital for the entire judgment. See id.; Able, 35 S.W.3d at 616 (<HOLDING>); Shoemaker, 513 S.W.2d at 14 (same). Holdings: 0: recognizing as viable actions in tort negligent hiring and negligent retention 1: recognizing that each party in a joint enterprise is responsible for the negligent act of the other 2: holding that the jones act did not operate to make negligent crew members liable to their employers for damages paid to other seamen under the jones act because crew members cannot sue each other for negligence 3: holding that a clause providing that the insurer has a right to recover damages from a responsible third party referred to a tortfeasor because the use of damages in bodily injury cases means pecuniary compensation resulting from an unlawful or negligent act by a wrongdoer 4: holding that for a plaintiff to recover on claim of negligent hiring the negligent hiring of the employee must have been the proximate cause of the injury at issue


Input: of a new or different offense to a petition if the motion to amend is made before the adjudicatory hearing begins.” Rule 10-103 committee commentary (emphasis added). Thus, the rule contains no authority to amend the charging document in a delinquency case after commencement of the adjudicatory hearing. {8} The State, however, attempts to rely on the provision in Rule 10-103(F) that permits amendments in order to correct mistakes in the pleadings. This ment. Roman, 1998-NMCA-132, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 688, 964 P.2d 852. Only amendments that are made to conform to the evidence in support of the charge on which defendant was tried are permissible. Marquez, 1998-NMCA-010, ¶¶ 20-21, 124 N.M. 409, 951 P.2d 1070; but see State v. Lucero, 1998-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 23-25, 126 N.M. 552, 972 P.2d 1143 (<HOLDING>). {10} Any addition of new criminal charges not Holdings: 0: holding that indictment for murder in the first degree charges murder by whatever means it may have been committed regardless of the theory of murder presented to the grand jury 1: holding that whether amendment to capital felonymurder information to add the charge of premeditated and deliberate murder was improper turned on whether there was prejudice or surprise 2: holding that conspiracy to commit murder is not lesserincluded offense of firstdegree murder 3: holding different rule applicable for conviction of second degree murder 4: holding that states pretrial amendment of the original indictment charging defendant with willful and deliberate first degree murder to add an alternative murder theory of depraved mind murder did not add a different offense and therefore did not prejudice the defendant


Input: of cool reflection.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(a)(1); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211. Sudden passion must arise at the time of the offense and cannot result solely from former provocation. Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 213. Neither ordinary anger nor fear alone raises an issue on sudden passion arising from adequate cause. See id. at 213-14; see also Naasz v. State, 974 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. ref'd) (stating defendant’s testimony of being upset and angry over culmination of events did not rise to level of adequate cause). Similarly, a defendant may not rely on a cause of his own making to support an argument for sudden passion. See Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211 (<HOLDING>); Trevino v. State, 157 S.W.3d 818, 822 n. 4 Holdings: 0: holding evidence legally sufficient under sections d and e 1: holding evidence legally insufficient 2: holding evidence legally sufficient 3: holding that ordinary anger or causes of defendants own making are not legally adequate causes 4: holding district court may properly on its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have not moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants or where claims against such defendants are integrally related


Input: Procedure § 26.3c, at 1219-25 (4th ed. 1998). 12 . In Dale, we added that "[cjircuit precedent suggests that habeas prejudice may require a greater showing, namely, 'by a preponderance of the evidence, that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the errors in question.’” 140 F.3d at 1056 n. 3 (quoting United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C.Cir.1994)) (emphasis in Dale); cf. Frady, 456 U.S. at 174, 102 S.Ct. 1584 (rejecting as insufficient to support a colla (stating that the omission of an element from a jury instruction would not be deemed harmless on direct review if "the defendant contested the omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding”); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-39, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt 1: holding that nonconstitutional error is harmless if it did not have substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jurys verdict 2: holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt 3: holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt 4: holding on habeas review that a constitutional trial error did not substantially  influence the jurys verdict and hence was harmless where the states evidence of guilt was if not overwhelming certainly weighty


Input: if needed. on v. Varney, 586 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), “[t]he payment of wages is the least important factor” in determining an employment relationship. Id. at 464. Because neither the law nor the record on appeal supports the trial court’s ruling, the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary judgment based on lack of an employment re B-2-00-3 (2001) (concluding that an employee injured while crossing a street to eat lunch at a restaurant also located on campus sustained a compensable injury, because “as a matter of law, the grounds of an entire college campus constitute its ‘premises,’ rather than simply the building or buildings in which an employee happens to regularly work”). See generally In the Matter of Anneliese Ross and Dep’t of the Army, 42 E.C.A.B. 371 (1991) (<HOLDING>); In the Matter of Gordon R. Woodruff and Dep’t Holdings: 0: holding that civilian distributing leaflets on military base could not constitutionally be convicted of unlawfully entering the base where the military had abandoned any right to exclude civilian vehicular and pedestrian traffic from the avenue greer 424 us at 835 96 sct at 1216 1: holding the employee was clearly within the zone of her employment even though not at her work station because she was on the universitys premises the campus 2: holding that when an employee is injured by his employers tortious conduct his employer owes him damages and compensation under the act 3: holding that whether the tortious act was committed during the time the employee was on duty and whether the tortious act was committed while the employee was on the employers premises were both factors weighing in favor of finding the activity within the scope of employment 4: holding that a civilian employee injured when her automobile was hit by a military vehicle while she was driving on a road on the employers premises the military base to report to work sustained a compensable injury under the federal employees compensation act


Input: that Fleming’s denial of any further medical services or supplies in July 1993 justified his non-compliance with the applicable fee schedule. ¶ 31. We cannot say that Fleming’s denial of further medical services and treatment in July 1993 justified Henderson’s disdain for the Commission’s procedures as set forth in the fee schedule. Henderson has cited several cases in his brief to this Court where the Mississippi Supreme Court has upheld a claimant’s right to secure medical services on his own elsewhere after the employer/earrier refused to provide medical services and supplies to the injured employee and that the employer/earrier should be held liable for the medical services selected by the injured employee. Thornbrough Well Servicing Co. v. Brown, 223 Miss. 322, 78 So.2d 159 (1955) (<HOLDING>); Central Elec. & Machinery Co. v. Shelton, 220 Holdings: 0: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits 1: holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness 2: holding that notwithstanding fact that employer brought suit in its own name pursuant to ocga  349111 c only for the liquidated amount that had been paid to the employee in workers compensation benefits after employee failed to file his own tort action within one year of injury employee was not precluded from bringing his own separate action to recover for personal injuries and loss of consortium but noting that employee received notice of employers suit only after filing his own action suggesting that court in which employers action was pending had wrongly denied the employees motion to intervene to which motion employer had objected noting that if employee had not moved to intervene in other action employees separate action would have been barred by laches and holding that thirdparty tortfeasor could move for mandatory joinder of the employer in the employees action 3: holding that employee was consumer of medical insurance purchased by employer for employees benefit 4: holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury


Input: decision that one party’s version of the events is more credible than the other party’s is, without more, insufficient to justify an award of attorneys’ fees_” Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1986) (discussing fee awards under the Copyright Act); see also Blue, 914 F.2d at 544 (noting that “not every instance in which a district court credits one side’s witnesses over another’s is an occasion for sanctions”). Here, the district court merely stated that the Sprafkins’ testimony, “[i]n light of all the evidence in this case, ... simply was not credible.” It set forth no explanation for this conclusion. We think that a district court cannot predicate the use of its inherent powers on a mere conelusory statement that the witnesses were not credible. Cf. Blue, 914 F.2d at 544 (<HOLDING>). Because the district court neither explained Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts specific meticulously detailed finding of bad faith was supportable on appeal 1: holding proper basis for award of fees 2: holding a district court may in its discretion award attorneys fees upon a finding that plaintiffs action was frivolous unreasonable or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad faith 3: holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial courts exercise of discretion to award fees 4: holding that although the fee award was assessed against plaintiffs in a complex civil rights suit it was proper because the district courts order imposing fees meticulously describes each instance of perjury and bad faith


Input: prejudice by his counsel’s failure to submit jury instructions as he did not demonstrate that there was an instructional error or that there was a reasonable probability of a different result had his counsel submitted jury instructions. Moreover, in light of the aggravating circumstances in this ease - the emotional harm to the victim, that the molestation occurred over a long period of time, the exploitation of children other than the victim, Liska’s pri- or felony convictions for child molestation and motorcycle theft, and Liska’s long history of taking pornographic pictures of nude boys - it is unlikely that Liska’s attorney’s failure to present additional mitigating evidence, if indeed there was any, was prejudicial. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 836 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Pizzuto, 280 F.3d at 968-69 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that apprendi does not apply to state capital sentencing schemes where judges are required to find certain aggravating circumstances before imposing a death sentence 1: holding that the cause and prejudice standard applied to defendants failure to object to his career offender classification at sentencing 2: holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt 3: holding that where the aggravating circumstances are overwhelming it is particularly difficult to show prejudice at sentencing due to the alleged failure to present mitigation evidence 4: recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard


Input: College, 54 W.Va. 32, 46 S.E. 253, 255 (1903): The acceptance of the bid and the making of a memorandum thereof by the trustee being a complete contract of sale, binding the purchaser to accept the bid and pay the purchase money, must he, in seeking the enforcement of that contract, show that the trustee has proceeded regularly in making the sale? The contract does not confer title upon him. He obtains that by the deed. It confers only the right to call for the legal title, to enforce a specific performance of the contract of sale. Accordingly, legal title to real property does not pass until a conveyance is made by deed; equitable title to the real property, however, passes to the purchaser at the time of sale. See, e.g., Annon v. Lucas, 155 W.Va. 368, 185 S.E.2d 343, 351 (1971) (<HOLDING>). In the absence of a true trustee-beneficiary Holdings: 0: holding that trespass to try title is the method for determining title to  real property 1: holding that a constructive trust is imposed in order to prevent injustice and that such a trust may be imposed when the circumstances show that it would be inequitable for the holder of legal title to retain the property 2: holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence 3: holding that the legal title holders to real property held it in constructive trust for the equitable title holder who was entitled to the real property based on an earlier contract 4: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property


Input: Report Ex. 15. Despite Strougo’s contentions and as demonstrated by the SLC’s Final Report, the SLC pursued its investigation in a thorough and diligent manner. From June through December 1998, the SLC interviewed 11 witnesses and conducted a comprehensive review of approximately 36,000 pages of documents. The SLC requested documents from Defendants throughout the course of its investigation and prepared memoranda of its interviews and meetings. The SLC’s Report and the five volumes of exhibits thereto outline the SLC’s reconstruction of the history of the events surrounding Strougo’s allegations, and the SLC’s findings and conclusions based on its efforts. This is a reasonable investigation and thus, the SLC has demonstrated its good faith. See Rosengarten, 613 F.Supp. at 1501 (<HOLDING>); Grossman, 89 F.R.D. at 664 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that benefiting fiduciary must show he acted in good faith and that transactions were fair and equitable 1: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision 2: holding that the transaction must be fair and equitable and in good faith 3: holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims 4: holding that special litigation committee acted in good faith based upon a 33page report several exhibits interview summaries meeting minutes and a chart of the movement and volume of the corporations stock during the relevant time period


Input: Francisco public housing, such as the “right” to an entry door fitted with a solid door, would not necessarily exist for residents of Marin County public housing, just across the Golden Gate bridge. While federal courts often apply different state laws to federal claims, for example, the statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim differs depending on the state in which the claim arose, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the Court is un intiff stated a section 1983 claim against a supervisor at a state facility who placed plaintiff in danger by assigning her to work with an inmate sex offender who had a history of violent as saults against women; he subsequently-raped and kidnapped her); Wood v. Os-trander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs do not allege any affirmative Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 1: holding that workers compensation statute barred suit of medical technologist who was allegedly raped and robbed in dormitory room which she rented from the hospital at which she was employed 2: holding that plaintiff stated a section 1983 claim against police officers who after examining plaintiff and finding him in medical need canceled a 911 call to the paramedics dragged plaintiff from his porch where he was in public view into an empty house then locked the door and left him there alone 3: holding that plaintiff stated a section 1983 claim against a state police officer who caused a woman to be stranded in a highcrime area at night where she was subsequently raped 4: holding woman who alleged she was terminated for having an abortion stated a prima facie case for discrimination


Input: composition of Innovative AFC’s board of directors. Although Rene Harris’s affidavit was not greatly detailed, it did constitute admissible evidence that David Edwards, George Williamson, Brenda Lester, Priscilla Murrell, Hazel Bartlett, Michelle Johnson, and Julian Watkins had been elected as directors of the corporation sometime in 1999. Specifically, Rene Harris averred that the four original incorporators had met sometime in 1999 and had “unanimously agreed” to elect the individuals listed on Exhibit A to the board of directors of Innovative AFC. Contrary to the ruling of the circuit court, this affidavit did contain sufficient detail to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Bennett v Detroit Police Chief, 274 Mich App 307, 318-319; 732 NW2d 164 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the affidavit that our Supreme Court Holdings: 0: holding that the original pto declarations create a genuine issue of material fact 1: holding that subsequent affidavit contradicting prior sworn testimony does not create genuine issue of fact 2: holding that the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a dispute of fact that is genuine 3: holding that a speculative affidavit which contained mere conjecture was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial 4: holding that unsupported allegations or denials are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment


Input: 712 F.2d at 135. Thus, the criminal defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights weigh heavily in favor of a stay to avoid prejudice to the other civil parties, especially The Hartford. See Holden Roofing, Inc., 2007 WL 1173634, at *1 (finding that if depositions were permitted in a civil case related to a pending criminal ease, a significant portion of questions posed to the defendants would likely result in the defendants asserting their Fifth Amendment rights, which weighed heavily in favor of a stay). The civil action should also be stayed because Hoeffner, a criminal defendant, seeks discovery as a civil plaintiff. As a matter of equity and public policy, a criminal defendant may not institute a civil action to obtain discovery relating to the criminal case. See Campbell, 307 F.2d at 487 (<HOLDING>); see also Agran v. City of New York, 95 Civ. Holdings: 0: holding that liberal civil discovery procedures are not a back door to information otherwise beyond reach under the criminal discovery rules 1: recognizing that while summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery it is the nonmovants responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery by filing an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f of the federal rules of civil procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery 2: holding discovery rules apply to civil forfeiture proceedings 3: holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted 4: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law


Input: damages and increased it by $10,000. He also maintains that those “adjustments” produced an aggregate award of $15,000 less than the total quotient in jury note 1. Given such large deviations, the trial court reasonably could have decided that the verdict materially varied from the quotient. Although Alabama cases recognize that a quotient verdict may still be presumed despite a minor deviation between the quotient and the verdict, see Harris, 288 Ala. at 378, 261 So.2d at 46, no Alabama case has ever considered discrepancies as large as $10,000 and $25,000 to indicate mere mathematical adjustments, or “rounding off,” to an agreed-upon quotient, even in relation to a $200,000 verdict. Compare Burgreen Contracting Co. v. Goodman, 55 Ala.App. 209, 222, 314 So.2d 284, 295 (Civ.App.1975) (<HOLDING>). “[A] material variance between the quotient Holdings: 0: holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict 1: holding that the statute that provides for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill does not preclude a death sentence as the result of such a verdict 2: holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial 3: holding that notwithstanding defendants consent the verdict was a nullity where the trial court proceeded to verdict with a jury of eleven 4: holding that discrepancy of only 225 between a quotient of 3275 and a verdict of 3500 was so great as to completely negate the conclusion that the quotient process had been followed in arriving at the verdict


Input: N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000). In many ways, plaintiffs seek to base jurisdiction for their claims against these defendants on the in-forum contacts of plaintiffs own subsidiary, C & F. By this logic, defendants would be subject to jurisdiction in any forum in which plaintiff had a subsidiary. Imposing jurisdiction on such “random” and “fortuitous” grounds would undermine the due process considerations on which the minimum contacts analysis is based. See Waste Mgmt., supra, 138 N.J. at 121, 649 A.2d 379; see also Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 93-94, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1698, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 142 (1978). Indeed, such an exercise of personal jurisdiction is precluded by well-established due process principles. Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at 15, 134 S.Ct. at 1122, 188 L.Ed.2d at 21 (<HOLDING>). 4. Summary There being no grounds for the Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights 1: holding that defendant has initial burden to establish link between fourth amendment violation and challenged evidence 2: holding that an intervening act of misconduct by the plaintiff can break the causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action 3: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties 4: holding that plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum


Input: of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, that “the question of the sufficiency of the evidence needed to go to the jury in a diversity case is a matter of federal law”); Bank of Cali, N.A. v. Opie, 663 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir.1981) (“[Fjederal law alone governs whether evidence is sufficient to raise a question for the trier-of-fact.”). Applying that standard to the case before it, this court in Foster held that, at summary judgment, the plaintiff “must set forth evidence of a clear and convincing nature that, if believed by the ultimate factfinder, would establish that plaintiff was more likely than not the victim of illegal retaliation by her employer.” Foster, 293 F.3d at 1195. See also Conrad v. Bd. of Johnson County Comm’rs, 237 F.Supp.2d 1204, 1266-67 (D.Kan.2002) (<HOLDING>). Thus, although the state law dictated that a Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts sitting in diversity shall apply state substantive law 1: holding that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state law that determines the outcome of the case 2: holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied 3: holding that a federal court sitting in diversity is bound to follow the law of the forum state 4: holding that for state law retaliatory discharge claims the clear and convincing standard is applied at the summary judgment stage  at least when the claim is brought in a federal court sitting in diversity


Input: U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005), and we grant the petition for review. The BIA denied Hanna’s motion to reopen on the ground that Hanna did not demonstrate he will likely be singled out for persecution and did not address Hanna’s claim that the documentary evidence establishes a pattern or practice of persecution of Coptic Christians in Egypt. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A) (proof of particularized persecution to establish a well-founded fear not required where the applicant proves a pattern or practice of persecution of a protected group to which the applicant belongs); see also Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). We grant the petition for review and remand Holdings: 0: holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals 1: holding bia erred in requiring petitioners who were hungarian gypies to prove they were singled out for persecution where there was evidence other gypsies were being persecuted 2: holding that where issues were not considered by the bia remand is appropriate 3: holding that tort claims were arbitrable because they arose out of and were related to contract 4: holding that district court erred by requiring plaintiffs to show that they were better qualified than employees who were promoted in order to make a prima facie case


Input: M.R. Evid. 403, see State v. Allen, 2006 ME 21, ¶9 n. 3, 892 A.2d 456, 458-59 (admission of a photograph over a Rule 403 objection); or (3) denying Keene’s oral motion for a change of venue, see State v. Saucier, 2001 ME 107, ¶ 14, 776 A.2d 621, 626 (denial of a motion for a change of venue). Furthermore, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Keene’s convictions. See State v. Smen, 2006 ME 40, ¶ 7, 895 A.2d 319, 321 (review for sufficiency of the evidence). Finally, although Keene argues that the court was barred under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(3)(B) from imposing consecutive sentences for crimes committed during a single criminal episode, section 1256(3)(B) did not apply because manslaughter is not a specific intent crime. See State v. Horr, 2003 ME 110, ¶ 11, 831 A.2d 407, 411 (<HOLDING>). 3 .Keene’s account of the events in the alley Holdings: 0: holding that unintentional crimes which lack criminal purpose and a specific intent element are excluded from the limitation set out in section 12563b 1: holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes 2: holding intoxication is only a defense to specific intent crimes and not general intent crimes 3: holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law 4: holding that diminished capacity is a defense only to specific intent crimes


Input: must show that the class of plaintiffs is so large that joinder of all members would be “impracticable.” In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir.1982). Plaintiffs allege Defendants engaged in a national scheme to illegally fix the wholesale price of Potash. The class Plaintiffs seek to represent contains thousands of farm co-ops, agricultural distributors and farmers who purchased potash between April 1987 and July 8, 1994. (Pis.’ Mem. in Supp. of Class Cert, at 5.) Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ showing of the numerosity requirement, and based upon the geographical dispersion and number of putative class members, the Court finds that such a challenge would be unavailing. Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that joinder of all putative membe (D.Minn.1990) (<HOLDING>); see generally 4 Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Holdings: 0: holding that alleged pricefixing conspiracy involved common questions relating to the existence and proof of illegal agreement 1: recognizing that the government carved out a portion of a larger conspiracy and alleged it as a separate conspiracy 2: holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges 3: recognizing that ajntitrust pricefixing conspiracy cases by their nature deal with common legal and factual questions about the existence scope and effect of the alleged conspiracy 4: holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman


Input: 11, the Eleventh Circuit held in Massengale v. Ray that attorney’s fees cannot be awarded to a pro se attorney litigant. 267 F.3d 1298, 1301-03 (11th Cir.2001). “Because a party proceeding pro se cannot have incurred attorney’s fees as an expense, a district court cannot order a violating party to pay a pro se litigant a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of a sanction.” The court relied, in part, on the fact that “the word ‘attorney’ generally assumes some kind of agency (that is, attorney/client) relationship” and that when a lawyer proceeds pro se, “legal fees are not truly a ‘cost’ of litigation — no independent lawyer has been hired (or must be paid) to pursue the ... complaint.” Id. at 1301 (quoting Ray v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 87 F.3d 1250, 1251 n. 2 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>)). Other courts have reached the same Holdings: 0: holding that new jersey rule patterned on fed r civ p 11 precludes a pro se attorney litigant from receiving attorneys fees because such fees are not actually incurred 1: holding a pro per litigant to the same standard as an attorney 2: holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under  1988 3: holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond 4: holding attorneys fees not available to pro se attorney litigant in a federal freedom of information act action


Input: encompasses not just consistency but also plausibility and sufficient detail. See, e.g., In re M-D-, 1998 WL 127881, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1180, 1182 (BIA 1998). The B We decide instead to join the Second and Third Circuits in expressly approving the BIA’s corroboration rule. See Guam, Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Diallo, 232 F.3d at 285); Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554); see also Capric, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting the rule and the Ninth Circuit’s disapproval of it but neither accepting nor rejecting it). Indeed, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of corroborating evidence. See, e.g., Micakovic v. Ashcroft, 85 Fed.Appx. 424, 426 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that the BIA Holdings: 0: holding that due process required a hearing so the putative father would have an opportunity to present evidence to show as a factual matter that he could not reasonably have complied with utahs statutory requirements or deadlines because he could not reasonably have expected his baby to be born in utah 1: recognizing refund claim could be barred if there was any valid local limitations law in force when the claim was filed 2: holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force 3: holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave 4: holding that even if he was credible the applicant could be reasonably expected to corroborate his claim that government officials in kosovo attempted to force him into military service


Input: the jury to find that the negative employment action was based on a mix of lawful and unlawful reasons, but which also would have provided Xerox a defense to the effect that it would have taken the same action against Hylind even if the discriminatory factors had not been present). In Gross, the Supreme Court determined that a mixed-motive instruction is not appropriate in an Age Discrimi nation in Employment Act (“ADEA”) case. Id. at 2350. But, since this is a Title VII case, not an ADEA case, the Court finds that Gross in no way affects the Court’s decision to give a pretext instruction in this case. In Title VII cases, a plaintiff may proceed under either a pretext theory or a mixed-motive theory. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 317-18 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Watson v. Se. Penn. Trans. Auth., 207 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotive theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination 1: holding that the contention that all employment discrimination cases should be analyzed as mixedmotive cases is meritless 2: holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotives theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination 3: holding  95114c generally applicable to employment discrimination cases 4: holding that the mixedmotive framework does not apply to retaliation cases under title vii


Input: prong of the Collins [v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)] test, the panel opinion did not apply the first prong — establishing an underlying constitutional violation.”). Indeed, some courts have actively cabined Fagan to its facts and held that, generally, plaintiffs may not pursue a municipal .liability claim without any concomitant individual liability. See, e.g., DeNinno v. Municipality of Penn Hills, 269 Fed.Appx. 153, 158 (3d Cir.2008) (“Even more fundamentally, there can be no municipal liability here because we have determined that none of the individual defendants violated the Constitution.”) (citing Grazier, 328 F.3d at 124 n. 5); Cole ex rel. Cole v. Big Beaver Falls Area Sch. Dist, 2009 WL 3807185, at *8 (W.D.Pa. Nov. 12, 2009) (<HOLDING>) (citing Grazier, 328 F.3d at 124 n. 5); Leddy Holdings: 0: recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim 1: holding that if the actions of the officer did not reach the level of a constitutional tort the township through its police department cannot be liable because of an inadequate policy or ineffective training program and noting marks criticism of fagan 2: holding that plaintiffs reliance on fagan is misplaced because fagan merely carved out an exception to the general rule of law that a municipality cannot be held accountable pursuant to  1983 when no individual officer violated the constitution  subsequent to fagan the united states court of appeals for the third circuit has clearly stated that it carefully confined fagan to its facts a substantive due process claim resulting from a police pursuit  3: holding that a municipality cannot be held liable for an official policy or custom if it has been determined that the individual defendants did not violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights 4: holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution


Input: re Roso), 76 F.3d 179, 181 (8th Cir.1996). We review de novo the district court’s conclusions of law, which include the application of collateral estoppel. See Tudor Oaks Ltd. Partnership v. Cochrane (In re Cochrane), 124 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 1044, 140 L.Ed.2d 109 (1998). Section 523(a)(6) provides that certain debts are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, namely those that are “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity.” Willful and malicious are two distinct requirements that Fischer, as the party seeking to avoid the discharge of the debt, must prove by the preponderance of the evidence before the § 523(a)(6) exception to discharge applies. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. Miera (In re Miera), 926 F.2d 741, Holdings: 0: holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence 1: holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applied to all of the  523 dischargeability exceptions including the fraud discharge exception 2: holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to  523 claims 3: holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence 4: holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard


Input: Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The evidence, all facts, and any reasonable inferences from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). III. On appeal, WCI challenges the district court’s determination that the assumption and indemnification clauses in the Purchase Agreement place the liability for the cleanup of the Edison Facility on WCI. WCI does not contest the district court’s grant of summary judgment on its claims under CERCLA, the Spill Act, or negligence, and thus has waived its right to appellate review of these claims. See Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Hence, the primary legal question confronting Holdings: 0: holding that generally arguments not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned or waived 1: holding that arguments not briefed are abandoned 2: holding that arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived 3: holding arguments not raised on appeal waived 4: recognizing that arguments not briefed on appeal are waived


Input: S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). The right at issue in habeas cases, in other words, is not the same right as that at issue in § 1983 cases. In § 1983 cases, it is the constitutional right itself that forms the basis of the claim. In habeas cases, in contrast, it is the right not to be held in custody in violation of the Constitution that lies at the core of the suit. This is no mere difference in semantics. Where a petitioner asserts the violation of a constitutional right — indeed, even one so fundamental as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures — but the violation did not contribute to the custody of the petitioner, the Court has held that such a claim is not cognizable on habeas. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (<HOLDING>). When the custody itself is unlawful, however, Holdings: 0: holding that the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment applies to civil forfeiture proceedings 1: recognizing good faith exception to fourth amendment exclusionary rule 2: holding that fourth amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas review because the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not relate to the accuracy of the factfinding process 3: holding that the fourth amendment does not mandate payment and therefore such claims are not within the jurisdiction of the court 4: holding that the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rules are not implicated by a private search


Input: I succeeded in their defenses that the guarantee had expired or that the guarantee was fraudulently induced. We again agree with Tucker. The concept of privity requires an alignment of interests and not an exact identity of parties. In Nash County Board of Education v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 494 (4th Cir.1981), this Court applied the definition of privity employed by Judge Goodrich in his concurrence in Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir.1950): “Privity states no reason for including or excluding one from the estoppel of a judgment. It is merely a word used to say that the relationship between the one who is a party on the record and another is close enough to include that ot Cont’l Sav. Ass’n v. Collins, 814 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1991) (<HOLDING>). We do not hold, however, that privity exists Holdings: 0: holding that under florida law for the purposes of collateral estoppel an attorney is in privity with his or her client in a previous suit when the opposing party in that action brings a subsequent suit against the attorney based in the same facts 1: holding that under texas law the mere representation of a party in a lawsuit does not establish privity between an attorney and his or her client 2: holding that when an attorney represents multiple clients and a dispute between the attorney and one client later occurs there is a waiver of the privilege but only by the client asserting the liability 3: holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client 4: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client