Input: presented at trial does not support the finding that he was armed with a weapon when he broke into the Gillespie home. We find no merit in this argument. The state bears the burden of proving the existence of aggravating factors. State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 249, 337 S.E. 2d 497 (1985). The existence of such factors must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). At trial the state’s evidence tended to show defendant removed Coggins’ service revolver from the trooper’s holster, shot him once in the head and took the revolver from the patrol car. The state also introduced William Bray’s sworn testimony from his own sentencing hearing to this effect: Q. Mrs. Gillespie was gone and you did go into the house did you not? A. Yes, I did. ... Q. 1986) (<HOLDING>); State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 301 S.E. 2d Holdings: 0: holding evidence sufficient to support aggravating factors of old age and infirmity 1: recognizing attorneys substantial experience in the practice of law as an aggravating factor 2: holding that the trial court did not err in using the particularized factual circumstances of the case namely the victims age  as an aggravating factor 3: holding evidence sufficient to support aggravating factor of old age 4: holding that the death of a victim may not be considered an aggravating factor in a homicide sentencing


Input: loss in profits, the normal increase in the business which might have been expected in the light of past developments and existing conditions may be considered”); Sw. Battery Corp., 181 Tex. at 427, 115 S.W.2d at 1099 (same); see also Fleming Mfg. Co. v. Capitol Brick, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ,ref'd n.r.e.) (including analysis of sales projections derived from past sales in lost-profits analysis). Moreover, no controverting evidence exists in the record showing any other growth rate should be applied or undermining the data utilized or the computations performed by Shipp to arrive at the growth rates he utilized. Additionally, the western-hat market is neither new nor uncertain, and cowboy hats are not untested products. Compare White, 651 S.W.2d at 262 (<HOLDING>), with Tex. Instruments, Inc., 877 S.W.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that in pennsylvania there is a rule that proof of the ownership of a business vehicle involved in an accident raises a presumption that the operation of the automobile was for the owners business purposes 1: holding that evidence showed hewlettwhite florist shop had been an established business for thirtythree years and that the sale of flowers was not an uncertain or speculative business so as to preclude lostprofits award 2: holding that stateagent immunity was not available to a county employee who sued the plaintiff and had him arrested for operating without a business license because the evidence showed that in so doing the defendant acted with malice willfullness or  so beyond his authority that sovereign immunity would not apply footnote omitted 3: holding that evidence that appellee received complaints intended for appellant showed actual injury to business reputation 4: holding that an employee qualified as a business visitor which the janis court subsequently defined as a business invitee


Input: may have paid more or less than others, although relevant in assessing damages, does not affect whether the conspiracy, if proven, would have had an impact common to the class. See In re Workers' Compensation, 130 F.R.D. at 110 (in considering whether insurers conspired to fix insurance rates, the Court explained that "the multiple factors which affect rates” relates to damages, not whether there was common proof of impact); In re Wirebound Boxes Antitrust Litig., 128 F.R.D. at 271-272 (explaining that “common proof of impact is possible even though prices” are "individually negotiated,” and that defendants' reliance on "localized and unique” markets and pricing procedures related to damages, not common fact of injury); In re Domestic Air Transp., 137 F.R.D. 677, 689 (N.D.Ga.1991) (<HOLDING>); In re Screws Antitrust Litig., 91 F.R.D. 52, Holdings: 0: recognizing that ajntitrust pricefixing conspiracy cases by their nature deal with common legal and factual questions about the existence scope and effect of the alleged conspiracy 1: holding that alleged pricefixing conspiracy involved common questions relating to the existence and proof of illegal agreement 2: holding that the proximate cause requirement was satisfied  because the defendants actions resulted in identifiable losses as outlined in the expert reports and vickys victim impact statements footnote and citation omitted 3: holding that arithmetical error that resulted in an increase to a defendants base offense level pursuant to the sentencing guidelines affected his substantial rights even though the resulting sentence was within the range for the correct offense level 4: holding common impact satisfied because alleged pricefixing resulted in an artificial base price even though actual fares were discounted or negotiated


Input: for — the peremptory challenge. MJ: Captain [K] [trial counsel]’s been very forthright with the Court in the past. I assume, Captain [K] that you’re, likewise, being forthright this time; that you have no other reason for substituting — or for excusing this member? TC: No, sir, we do not. MJ: And it’s particularly not race — although I do note that [of 11 members] there are several other minority members on the panel, including the sergeant major who was just in, as well as one female member— TC: Sir, Sergeant First Class [B] and Sergeant First Class [KA]. ATC: And, for the record, sir, Lieutenant Colonel [B] is also a minority member, based on his worksheet. MJ: Okay. Well, I’m satisfied that the Government has exercised its peremptory challenge on a non-discriminato D.Texas 1994) (<HOLDING>). DISCUSSION The Fifth Amendment guarantees due Holdings: 0: holding lack of factual basis for preemptory challenge renders avowed reason for challenge a pretext 1: holding raceneutral basis for preemptory challenge was pretext where stated reasons for challenge not supported by venirepersons statements 2: holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea 3: holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason 4: holding that if a race or genderneutral reason for a peremptory challenge is apparent from the record the trial court may deny an objection to the challenge without requiring the party exercising the challenge to articulate a race or genderneutral reason


Input: grown by independent farmers were processed by the employer prevented it from receiving the “secondary agriculture” exemption); Skipper v. Superior Dairies, Inc., 512 F.2d 409, 411-12 (5th Cir.1975) (employees who delivered and disposed of dairy products did not fit within the primary or secondary meaning of agriculture); Brennan v. Sugar Cane Groivers Co-op. of Fla., 486 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir.1973) (camp cooks for sugar cane workers fell within the secondary meaning of agriculture); Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.1971) (clerical work performed for a contractor primarily engaged in leveling agricultural land was not within the secondary meaning of agriculture, as most of that clerical work took place off the farm); NLRB v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 681 F.2d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>); Valmac Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 246, Holdings: 0: holding that farm workers who voluntarily choose to ride employers bus to and from field were engaged in noncompensable travel 1: holding that employees who transported live poultry from an independent growers farm to their employers processing plant were not agricultural laborers 2: holding that the antiretaliation provision must protect employees who complain about violations to their employers 3: holding that employers are not liable for conduct of ordinary employees because an ordinary employees conduct will normally be so unrelated to the employers business that it cannot be deemed in furtherance thereof 4: holding that atwill employees have no contractual relationship with their employers to support a cause of action under section 1981


Input: converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment. This argument marries with Marrero’s contention that factual issues existed on the merits of her section 1983 claim. Marrero, consumed by her belief that such factual issues existed, concludes that the district judge must have converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment in order to dismiss the case. There is, however, no support that such a conversion occurred. The record shows that the district court properly considered the matter as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Defendants did not attach any documents or exhibits outside their pleadings, and the district court never allowed the parties to supplement the record. See Collier, 158 F.3d at 603 (<HOLDING>). Of course, the implication of this holding is Holdings: 0: holding that a court may consider materials outside the pleadings to determine its jurisdiction 1: holding that in ruling on a rule 12b1 motion the court may consider exhibits outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes regarding jurisdiction 2: holding that on a rule 12b1 motion challenging subjectmatter jurisdiction the court has authority to consider matters outside the pleadings 3: holding that a trial court entered judgment on the pleadings where the decision did not depend on any document outside the pleadings 4: holding that such a conversion is proper in order to consider materials outside the pleadings


Input: v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1132 n. 8 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that, once an employee notifies an employer of a disability and requests reassignment, both parties should “interact in good faith to determine how to reasonably accommodate the employee”). We begin by recognizing that a request for reassignment may constitute protected activity under the ADA. We have treated requests for reasonable accommodation as protected activity under the ADA. See Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1265 (10th Cir.2001); Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 752 (10th Cir.1999). And a request for reassignment to a vacant position is a request for a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see also Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir.1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Hence, if Mr. Jones had a reasonable, good Holdings: 0: holding that when an employer takes steps to accommodate an employees restrictions it is not thereby conceding that the employee is disabled under the ada or that it regards the employee as disabled 1: holding that employers must when appropriate accommodate a disabled employee by reassignment to a vacant position if employee cannot be accommodated in existing job 2: holding that an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as disabled simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job 3: holding that the employers willingness to accommodate the employee undercut the employees claim of constructive discharge 4: holding that an employee whose disability is related to his ability to perform the duties of his position is not disabled under the act and therefore an employer has no duty to accommodate


Input: in a separate and clear finding,” id. at 95, 113 S.Ct. at 1117, the court may nevertheless make the upward adjustment whenever it finds all three elements of perjury. Here, the district court found that Queen’s testimony was “false” and that Queen gave this false testimony, “knowing it to be false and material.” That, we conclude, is sufficient. Accordingly, we affirm Queen’s conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have found over 60 published opinions since 1990 addressing the rule. 2 . Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provi efendant's previous sexual advances towards women admissible to show motive in fraudulent scheme to use company funds for personal relationships); United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 496, 136 L.Ed.2d 388 (1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hayden, 85 F.3d 153, 159 Holdings: 0: holding that evidence that defendants had participated in several prior drug transactions was properly admitted to establish defendants intent to distribute narcotics 1: holding that a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is admissible under rule 609 2: holding that prior drug trafficking conviction was admissible to prove intent to distribute 3: holding prior arrest in connection with an undercover drug buy admissible to show intent to distribute narcotics 4: holding that evidence of a 10yearold drug conviction was properly admitted to show intent in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute


Input: we review de novo.” See Franks Inv. Co. LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 593 F.3d 404, 407 (5th Cir.2010) (en banc) (citation omitted). That standard, however, is only the beginning of the analytical rules we must apply. The nature of the Appellees’ lawsuit — a facial, prospective challenge — and the character of the Ordinance — a housing regulation that falls within the City’s police power — necessarily affect our analysis. A. Salerno Principle Regarding Facial Challenges That the Appellees waged a facial, prospective challenge to the Ordinance invokes standards of judicial restraint designed to further the interests of federalism and deference to duly passed legislation. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1191, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to United States v. Salerno, the Holdings: 0: holding that there were at least four amendments submitted to the people in a single proposition and for that reason the amendments were not submitted in accordance with  the constitution and notwithstanding the action of the legislature in inserting them in the constitution are null and void and form no part of said constitution 1: holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states 2: recognizing that fees of 2030 are generally awarded in this circuit 3: recognizing that facial challenges are generally disfavored because they threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the constitution 4: holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution


Input: support this conclusion, and nothing points the other way. First, RICO’s statutory scheme resembles the EPCA more than the RCRA. Both RICO and the EPCA stand alone in grappling with a broad social issue, whereas the RCRA had a closely related statute on which the Court in Meghrig relied heavily. Second, as in both Porter and Mitchell, the government brought the suit rather than a private party like the Meghrig plaintiff, and Porter makes clear that district courts may have “even broader and more flexible” equitable powers where the public interest is involved, 328 U.S. at 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086. This point has particular traction if the government is the only party that may seek equitable relief under RICO. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1083-89 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). But see Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the fdcpa 1: holding that private plaintiffs can seek equitable relief under rico 2: holding that damages are not relief that is available under the idea 3: holding that equitable relief under rico is available only to the government 4: holding that claims for equitable relief under  502a3 are only available when a plaintiff has no other relief under erisa


Input: who are part of the public.” Summary judgment was therefore appropriately granted to the Town. Given that conclusion, there is no need to address VSC’s argument that the court erred in evaluating a different portion of the “public use” test set forth in American Museum of Fly Fishing. Affirmed. 1 It is true, as the dissent posits, that the meaning of the term “public use” has been fleshed out through our case law, and there is little statutory language to be construed. Nonetheless, the Court is bound to construe tax exemptions strictly against the taxpayer lest all taxpayers be burdened with the costs of conferring a benefit to select individuals rather than to the public at large. See, e.g., Delta Psi Fraternity v. City of Burlington, 2008 VT 129, ¶ 14, 185 Vt. 129, 969 A.2d 54 (<HOLDING>). 2 We are not persuaded, as the dissent is, Holdings: 0: holding one who claims tax exemption has burden of showing entitlement to exemption 1: holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes 2: holding that when interpreting tax exemption statutes we strictly construe the statute in favor of taxation and against exemption 3: recognizing that the right to hold land without being subject to taxation may constitute a substantial detriment to the affected locality and a significant advantage to the landowner and that land use ought not to result in exemption from taxation absent the conferral of a substantial public benefit such as the tax exemption law was designed to foster quotation omitted 4: holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3


Input: or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1992)). When a defendant submits a factual attack on the complaint, he must provide support with “affidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials.” Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.1981). Given the burden of proof on the party asserting jurisdiction, the plaintiff must submit evidence to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court does have jurisdiction based on the complaints and evidence. Id. Courts are to hold pro se litigants to less stringent pleading standards than other parties. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (<HOLDING>); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, Holdings: 0: holding that while pro se complaints are liberally construed issues not raised in the district court are deemed waived 1: holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed 2: holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them 3: recognizing courts special duty to construe liberally a pro se plaintiffs pleadings 4: holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed


Input: asserts, without citation, that “when the patent discloses method and apparatus claims, if only method claims are asserted in the lawsuit and only method claims are found to be infringed, then the marking limitation does not apply.” Halliburton’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 152), p. 4. Where a patent contains both method and apparatus claims, and there is a tangible item by which notice of the asserted method can be given, the patentee must mark the tangible item to comply with the Marking statute, 35 U.S.C. § 287. American Medical Systems, Inc. v. Medical Engineering Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538-39 (Fed.Cir.1993); Honeywell International Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 2001 WL 66345, *4 (D.Del.2001); Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. Micron Technology, Inc., 2000 WL 1728351 (D.Del.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Federal Circuit set forth this principle Holdings: 0: holding that after reading the patent a person of skill in the art would not understand the patentee to have invented a generic method where the patent only disclosed one embodiment of it 1: holding that missouris good samaritan rule which incorporates section 323 comes into play only where the plaintiff is the intended beneficiary of the defendants action 2: holding that the only time that the notice provisions of the federal statute do not come into play is when the patent is directed to only a method or process 3: holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement 4: holding that  1338a jurisdiction inures when a complaint establishes that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the wellpleaded claims


Input: plaintiff filed the motion to remand presently before the court. Plaintiff contends that this suit “arises under” Alabama’s workers’ compensation laws and, as a result, its removal to federal court is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). DISCUSSION Under 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), “[a] civil action in any State court arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the United States.” The issue before the court is whether a claim for retaliation for the exercise of rights under Alabama’s workers’ compensation laws “arises under” those laws, precluding its removal to federal court. A number of courts have considered this question and the decisions go both ways. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1246 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 16 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that  255111 claim does not arise under alabamas workers compensation laws 1: holding that retaliation claim did not arise under states workers compensation laws 2: holding that missouris cause of action for retaliation does arise under its workers compensation laws 3: holding action did not arise under the patent laws 4: holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws


Input: buy. Agent Snedeker and Pope discussed in detail the location of the drug buy, the price, the quantity, and the availability of drugs for future purchase. Considering these factors, the statements made by Pope to Agent Snedeker were not testimonial in nature. Therefore, it is immaterial whether the declarant was unavailable or whether the defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross examine the declarant. Furthermore, the statements made by Pope to Agent Snedeker fall outside the long- rt intended to overrule its precedent regarding the admissibility of co-conspirator statements. Any ambiguity regarding the admissibility of co-conspirator statements in the wake of Crawford has been firmly resolved by the Fourth Circuit. See United States v. Sullivan, 455 F.3d 248, 258 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Canady, 139 Holdings: 0: holding statements by coconspirator nontestimonial and thus admissible 1: holding testimony admissible as showing context of relationship with coconspirator prior to conspiracy 2: holding that bruton does not apply to nontestimonial codefendant statements 3: holding that voluntary statements to police initiated by witness are not interrogation and therefore are nontestimonial 4: holding that driving records were nontestimonial


Input: able [to] control.” Later, the petitioners note that the BIA’s rejection of their “particular social group” definition “was challenged ... in [the] Motion to Reconsider ... which stressed [that] ... young women in general are a particular group that has characteristics which are indisputable and not subject to change.” Finally, the petitioners assert that the BIA’s description of Kuci’s definition as “simply too broad” is “obviously erroneous, especially when you consider the fact that women in Albania are being kidnapped and threatened to be sold as prostitutes to this day, no matter their age.” But the petitioners have failed to elaborate on these statements, none of which explains how the BIA erred in its legal analysis. See Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The government recognizes that this court has Holdings: 0: holding that vague conclusory statements are insufficient 1: holding a onesentence conclusory objection to an issue in the magistrates recommendation insufficient to preserve that issue for appeal 2: holding that scattered statements in the appellants briefs are not enough to preserve an issue for appeal 3: holding defendant failed to preserve burden of proof issue for appeal 4: recognizing that conclusory statements do not preserve an issue for appeal


Input: by Eleventh Circuit case law. As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit has found that a statute may refer to a class of persons or entities and require the government to take action relative to those persons or entities, but still not contain rights-creating language. See Arrington, 438 F.3d at 1345 (“[E]ven though [the statute] contain[s] language requiring the state to take certain actions relative to individual foster children (e.g., the State shall file a petition [to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents], we determined [the statute] do[es] not have the kind of foeused-on-the-individual, rights-creating language required by Gon-zaga.”) (quoting 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir.2003)). See also Coutu, 450 U.S. at 771-73, 101 S.Ct. 1451 (<HOLDING>). Next, the present case is distinguishable Holdings: 0: holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine 1: recognizing  1 of the davisbacon act is a minimum wage law designed for the benefit of construction workers but finding the act does not contain rightscreating language 2: holding that  301 of the labor management relations act of 1947 29 usc  185 does not preempt claims brought under washingtons minimum wage act chapter 4946 rcw 3: holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective 4: holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury


Input: that this court must find that it is without subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs First Amendment claim. Because Title VII is the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of employment discrimination based on national origin, plaintiffs First Amendment claim is preempted. Cf. Thorne v. Cavazos, 744 F.Supp. 348, 352 (D.D.C.1990) (finding that the remedial provisions of ADEA [or in this case Title VII] provides plaintiff with sole remedy for constitutional claims). Therefore, plaintiffs First Amendment claim should be dismissed. B. Civil Service Reform Act Preemption. Even if plaintiffs First Amendment claim is considered separate and apart from his Title VII claim, it is still preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat (N.D.Ohio 1988) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, even if plaintiffs claim is Holdings: 0: holding that federal employee could not sue supervisors for discharge alleged to have violated her first amendment rights 1: holding plaintiff may sue federal agents for money damages for violation of his constitutional rights 2: holding that search of middle school student violated her fourth amendment rights 3: holding that due to the csra a federal employee has no independent right of action for damages against a supervisor who improperly disciplined the employee for exercising his first amendment rights 4: holding that employers have standing to sue


Input: ” id. at 1281 (quoting Compact art. VII(d)(l)), to hold that the EIS must include “at a minimum, a ‘reasonably complete’ discussion of mitigation measures including ‘analytical data’ regarding whether the available measures would achieve the required result,” id. Two caveats must accompany the League court’s articulation of what constitutes an adequate discussion of mitigation measures under the Compact. First, while NEPA caselaw may provide persuasive authority for interpreting the Compact, it is not controlling. Under NEPA, the duty to study possible mitigation measures stems from the statute’s requirement that the unavoidable adverse effects of a project be studied. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351-52, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Under the Compact, an EIS needs to include Holdings: 0: holding that an eis must consider the extent to which adverse effects can be avoided by discussing possible mitigation measures 1: recognizing that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense a party must plead and prove 2: holding that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded 3: holding that an adverse credibility determination must be supported by a true inconsistency 4: holding that perfunctory description of mitigation measures was inadequate


Input: serving a sentence. Id. at 793. Thus, it held loss of an opportunity for an earlier supervised release “does not constitute a substantial penalty for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. The court, however, specifically listed revocation of probation as a substantial penalty “that cannot be imposed * * * because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege not to give incriminating testimony against himself.” Id. (quoting United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 658 (3d Cir.1991)). This is supported by the United States Supreme Court’s statements in Murphy. In explaining under what circumstances the Fifth Amendment privilege becomes self-executing, the Court stated: A State may require a probationer to appear and discuss matters that affect his probationar 13-15 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Cate, 165 Vt. 404, 683 A.2d 1010, Holdings: 0: holding that defendant could be required to reimburse state for buy money in drug case as a condition of probation 1: recognizing that probation condition required probationer to enter into and successfully complete a sex offender treatment program but finding that no condition of probation was imposed that required him to admit to a counselor the sexual acts charged 2: holding defendant was placed in classic penalty situation when he was required as condition of probation to participate in treatment program that required participants to disclose their offense history 3: holding defendants fifth amendment rights had been violated when his probation was revoked based on his failure to complete a sexual treatment program that required incriminating admissions 4: holding that when the district court imposed drug testing in connection with a special condition of substance abuse program participation  it was  not required to specify the number of drug tests a defendant must undergo as a part of the treatment program


Input: further notes that the jury was given extensive instructions on evaluating inconsistent statements and evaluating the credibility of witnesses generally, which, collectively, sufficiently addressed the conflicts in the cooperator testimony. Id. at 138. The Court has assessed the testimony summarized by Demerieux and concludes that the conflicts in testimony do not rise to the level of a due process violation. Demerieux correctly states that, under Napue, a “conviction obtained through the use of false evidence ... must fall under [the Due Process Clause],” and that “it is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness’ credibility rather than directly upon defendant’s guilt.” See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-70, 79 S.Ct. 1173; see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (<HOLDING>). But as a threshold matter, Demerieux must Holdings: 0: holding that false arrest and false imprisonment claim were not duplicative 1: holding that a conviction obtained through the knowing reckless or negligent use of false testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury 2: holding that false arrest is one means of committing false imprisonment 3: holding that prosecutor cannot obtain conviction with the aid of false testimony where the prosecutor knows such testimony is false 4: holding that the knowing use of false testimony to obtain a conviction violates due process


Input: the defendant knows to be otherwise illegal, while in the case of entrapment by estoppel, because of the statements of an official, the defendant believes that his conduct constitutes no offense. See 53 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 249 Proof of Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel § 20 (1999). Neither defense implicates the defendant’s mens rea, except in the rare case in which mistake of law negates the required mental state of the offense. In such case the defense of entrapment by estoppel also could constitute a failure of proof "defense” because the government agent's misstatement of the law would lead the defendant to believe that there was nothing criminal about his conduct under any circumstances. See generally Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (<HOLDING>); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-39, 79 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 1: holding that the state police is a state agency 2: holding that appellants fourteenth amendment due process claim did not require reversal where they failed to show that they were prejudiced 3: holding that it would offend due process to permit the state to sanction individuals from demonstrating in an area where police told them they could hold their demonstration 4: holding that the denial of the motions for summary judgment precludes a sanction on the ground that the claims against them were legally insufficient and that a sanction is generally improper where a successful motion could have avoided any additional legal expenses by defendants emphasis in original


Input: at 659 (citing 10 C.F.R. at § 211.61 (1975)). The government also promulgated mandatory petroleum price regulations that applied to “each sale, lease or purchase of a covered product in the United States.” Id. (citing 10 C.F.R. § 212.2). “Oil from stripper well leases, which represented ‘probably a majority’ of the production at the Osage Reservation, was exempt from price controls under § 4(e)(2) of the EPAA.” Id. (internal citation omitted). For the three Tranche One trial months that fell within the time period when price controls were in effect — January 1976, May 1979 and November 1980 — the court found that, in addition to the “offered price” breach, the Osage Agency had misapplied price controls to its calculation of royalties owed to the Tribe. Osage II, 72 Fed.Cl. at 661 (<HOLDING>). The court rejected the United States’ Holdings: 0: holding that state did not have jurisdiction over tribe where tribe paid into workers compensation program but had not waived sovereign immunity 1: holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented  to the district court 2: holding that conversion theory of recovery does not extend to money owed on a debt or to general damages 3: holding that price controls did not extend to the calculation of royalty owed to the osage tribe under the 1974 regulations 4: holding that waiver in a sue and be sued clause is limited to actions involving the corporate activities of the tribe and does not extend to actions of the tribe in its capacity as a political governing body


Input: in a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.” Id.; see, e.g., United States v. O’Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 898-99 (7th Cir.1986) (allowing FBI agent to testify regarding witness’s prior identification of defendant after witness recanted at trial). The better course, obviously, is to provide the photo array or other evidence of the prior identification immediately, while the declarant is still on the witness stand. But events at trial sometimes make the better course impractical. In such circumstances, a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine a declarant regarding his prior identification is enough to satisfy the requirements of Rule 801, even if the defendant chooses not to use the opportunity. See United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The district court provided Foster such a Holdings: 0: holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment 1: holding that fbi agents testimony regarding witnesss pri or identification was admissible where nothing in the record suggested that the declarant was unavailable for reexamination after the agents testimony 2: holding that agents testimony as to witnesss identification was not hearsay 3: holding that an absent witnesss statements are admissible under the confrontation clause only where the declarant is unavailable and only where the defendant   had a prior opportunity to crossexamine 4: holding that the victims prior videotaped testimony from a preliminary hearing was admissible as testimony at trial where the victim was unavailable to testify


Input: the most succinctly: “First, there must be either a show of authority or a use of force; and second, the show of authority or use of force must have caused the fleeing individual to stop attempting to escape.” United States v. Bradley, 196 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir.1999). With respect to when a seizure occurs by physical force, the Supreme Court has clarified that a seizure only occurs “when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Br (9th Cir.1994) (finding no seizure where an officer drew his gun at a suspect who subsequently fled, and explaining that “a seizure does not occur if an officer applies physical force in an attempt to detain a suspect but such force is ineffective”); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In the cases in which no physical force is Holdings: 0: holding that no seizure occurred where officer approached the suspect at the bus stop mentioned that he was investigating a bank robbery asked the suspect what he was doing in the area and for his identification and otherwise gave no indication that the suspect was not free to leave or to refuse to respond to questioning 1: holding that where the police roadblock was intended to stop brower by physical impact and did so a seizure occurred 2: holding no seizure occurred when after defendant began to walk away officer directed him to stop 3: holding a seizure occurs when a passenger of a car is hit by a bullet that is meant to stop him 4: holding that no seizure occurred where shots were fired at a truck but did not hit the suspect because they failed to produce a stop


Input: to the employment contracts of seamen. As adopted by Congress, the Convention is part of Title 9 of the United States Code, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (“Title 9”). According to 9 U.S.C. § 1, the general provisions of Title 9 do not apply to seamen’s employment contracts. However, there is no indication that the Convention excludes seamen’s employment contracts from its purview. Instead, the Convention states that “an arbitration agreement... arising out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial.. .falls under the Convention.” 9 U.S.C. § 202. Numerous courts have held in accordance with this inclusive language that the Convention applies to the employment contracts of seamen E.g., Francisco v. STOLT ACHIEVEMENT MT, 293 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Bautista, et al. v. Star Cruises and Holdings: 0: holding that this boilerplate language conflicts with the regulations and rulings 1: holding that first and most importantly the language of the claim defines the scope of the protected invention 2: holding that a rule that conflicts with a subsequent adopted statutory amendment may not be enforced 3: holding that the most significant relationship test as espoused in the restatement of conflicts governs conflicts cases sounding in tort in case where automobile collision occurred in mexico 4: holding that 9 usc  1 conflicts with the inclusive language of the convention and thus may not restrict its scope


Input: 83 . Staggs v. State, 804 P.2d 456, 458 (Okl.Cr.1991). See also Shelton v. State, 793 P.2d 866, 870 (Okl.Cr.1990) (concluding that “[t]his Court does not encourage the use of photographs taken of victims before their demise and we caution prosecutors to first seek other forms of proof which are less prejudicial.”); Rawlings v. State, 740 P.2d 153, 161-62 (Okl.Cr.1987) (finding that "[ajlthough this Court does not favor admissions of photographs showing the victim alive, we are of the opinion that the photograph was relevant as to its existence and the location of its discovery.”); Boutwell v. State, 659 P.2d 322, 326 (Okl.Cr.1983) (concluding photos showing victim while alive were not relevant because victim's identity was not at issue). 84 . See Rawlings v. State, 740 P.2d at 160 (<HOLDING>). 85 . See Hayes v. State, 738 P.2d 533, 538-39 Holdings: 0: holding that evidence should be excluded where the likelihood that it would confuse the jury and protract the proceedings outweighs its probative value 1: holding probative value of evidence must be balanced against any prejudicial effect 2: holding that prior conviction shall be admissible evidence for impeachment purposes unless danger of undue prejudice substantially outweighs probative value 3: holding that trial court has discretion to determine whether probative value of photo outweighs prejudicial effect 4: holding that inextricably intertwined evidence is intrinsic evidence that is admissible if its probative value outweighs the danger of prejudice


Input: 10 . Plaintiff avers incorrectly that the LOGO provision becomes inoperative upon receipt of full funding under the contract. Rather, because this is a fixed-price contract, the LOGO clause remains operative with regard to work under the original scope of the contract or any subsequently executed bilateral modification. 11 . Defendant argued that the LOGO and FP limitations on liability would preclude plaintiff from recovery even in the event of breach. Defendant's argument is curious. The court will not interpret these clauses to reach an unjust or impractical result. It is axiomatic that either party would be entitled to some recovery in the event of a breach of the contract. See Raymond Constructors of Africa, Ltd. v. United States, 188 Ct.Cl. 147, 166, 411 F.2d 1227, 1237 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Solar Turbines, 26 Cl.Ct. at 1276 (finding Holdings: 0: holding confrontation clause inapplicable at sentencing 1: holding that bankruptcy court could not enter judgment for 7402564 under  107a for incurred costs when such costs had not been incurred 2: recognizing that the contractor may recover costs when loss of productivity results from the governments actions 3: holding limitation clause inapplicable where contractor incurred additional costs as a result of governments failure to perform 4: holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate


Input: Evaluation was then forwarded to the FWS, which issued a re-concurrence stating “[w]e have reviewed your November 1 biological evaluation and concur with your determination that hazing operations conducted under the Management Plan may affect, but are not likely 'to adversely affect grizzly bears.” In conducting a second consultation and Biological Evaluation on the impact of the Management Plan on Yellowstone grizzly bears, and obtaining a second concurrence from the FWS, the federal defendants completed the reinitiation of consultation required by the ESA. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(b). Reinitiation of consultation is the precise relief sought by Alliance. Accordingly, Alliance’s Section 7 claim is moot. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Bergland, 576 F.2d 1377, 1378-79 (9th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). IV. The ESA Claims A. The 60-Day Notice Holdings: 0: holding the case to be moot where construction of the pro ject had been entirely completed 1: holding that a challenge to a mining plan was moot where the action sought to be enjoined hadbeen completed 2: holding substantive reasonableness sentencing challenge to be moot when defendant had completed prison sentence but addressing challenge to supervised release conditions 3: holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot 4: holding that injunctive claim was rendered meaningless since the state action sought to be enjoined has irretrievably occurred


Input: DHHS focused only on Sarah. 2 DHHS’s assumption is faulty, in light of the current state of Arkansas law as to the collateral-estoppel effect of a guilty plea in a subsequent civil proceeding. In Zinger v. Terrell, 336 Ark. 423, 985 S.W.2d 737 (1999), the supreme court overruled prior case law and held that the criminal conviction of a life-insurance beneficiary of first-degree murder of the insured following a trial collaterally estopped the retrial of certain issues in a later civil trial concerning the disposition of the proceeds of the insurance policy. The court cautioned that it did not address the issue of collateral estoppel for criminal convictions other than murder and that it did not overrule Washington National Insurance Co. v. Clement, 192 Ark. 371, 91 S.W.2d 265 (1936) (<HOLDING>). 3 In its statement of the case, DHHS states: Holdings: 0: holding the same for malicious prosecution 1: holding that states nonproseeution agreement did not bar subsequent federal prosecution 2: holding that a judgment in a criminal prosecution for dwi did not bar a subsequent civil proceeding founded on the same facts 3: holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct 4: holding that foreign states prosecution did not bar subsequent florida prosecution for same conduct


Input: find, as we did in DiCicco, that Respondent’s conduct frustrated the purpose of MRPC 1.15(a) and in so doing violated the rule. Similarly, in using his Attorney Trust Account to pay personal and business debts, Respondent violated Md. Rule 16-607, requiring that “[t]he portion [... of funds] belonging to the attorney [...] shall be withdrawn promptly when the attorney [...] becomes entitled to the funds ...,” and Rule 16-609 prohibiting an attorney from “pledging] any funds required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust account....” In the present case, Respondent withdrew client funds from his Attorney Trust Account, to which he was in no way entitled, in violation of Maryland Rule 16-607 and 16-609. See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Herman, 380 Md. 378, 844 A.2d 1181 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Clarke had a child support obligation, Holdings: 0: holding that there was no presumption of a gift where the wifes money was used to make the purchase but title was placed in the name of the husband and finding the facts sufficient to establish a purchase money resulting trust in favor of the wife 1: holding in case where stock was purchased but held in suspense account pending repayment of loan from seller that the fact that the money to purchase the now worthless stock was borrowed does not mean that money was not lost 2: holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan 3: holding the general rule is that money paid to another under a mistake of fact may be recovered because the money belongs in equity and good conscience to the person who paid it 4: holding that it was a violation of maryland rules 16607 and 16609 for an attorney to borrow money in the form of a home equity loan and to then deposit the borrowed money into his trust account in order to pay the amount owed to his client


Input: challenge, we consider and weigh all the evidence, both supporting and contradicting the finding. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex.1998). We set aside the fact finding only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986). Initially, we note that the jury was asked to determine Grace’s damages for the breach of contract the court had found. The question was worded as follows: What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, w pp.Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (measuring sufficiency of damages evidence against commonly understood meaning of undefined term used in charge); see also Equistar Chems., L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 240 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2007) (<HOLDING>); Tribble & Stephens Co. v. Consolidated Holdings: 0: holding on habeas review that counsels failure to object to improper argument at trial did not prejudice petitioner where other evidence supported a guilty verdict and the jury was told closing argument was not evidence 1: holding argument not waived for failure to object where party previously raised argument and district court considered and rejected it 2: holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial 3: holding that a defendant waived a sentencing issue by failing to object in district court 4: holding argument that charge submitted improper measure of damages was waived by failure to object in trial court


Input: imputed to employer); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 99 F.3d 695, 703 (5th Cir.1996) (“Where the legal claims asserted by the plaintiffs are not independent and mutually exclusive, but rather related to and dependent upon excluded conduct, the claims are not covered, even if asserted against an insured who did not himself engage in the prohibited conduct.”); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc., Inc., 786 F.Supp. 629, 632 (N.D.Tex.1992), aff'd on other grounds, 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir.1993) (finding no duty to defend insured against claim of negligent hiring when the claim of negligent hiring arises out of agent’s intentional sexual harassment); Columbia, Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 987 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Huey T. Littleton Claims, Inc. v. Employers Holdings: 0: holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate 1: holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself 2: holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective 3: recognizing in context of general liability policy if petition contains allegations which when fairly and reasonably construed state cause of action potentially covered by policy insurer has duty to defend insured in underlying suit 4: holding that under texas law where liability of insured and liability of its agent were related and interdependent court must look to whether agents fraud was covered by policy


Input: with other free individuals — was unknown through much of history and is unknown even today in many parts of the world. Like other aspects of personal autonomy, it is too easily smothered by government officials eager to tell us what’s best for us. The recent tendency of judges to insinuate tort causes of action into relationships traditionally governed by contract is just such overreaching. It must be viewed with no less suspicion because the government officials in question happen to wear robes. Ill Fortunately, the tide seems to be turning. The California Supreme Court is once again leading the way. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1988), has taken a bite out of Seaman’s by holding that tort remedies are 805, 195 Cal.Rptr. 421 (1983) (<HOLDING>). At long last, however, we seem to be moving Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim was predicated on tort and that it was therefore subject to the statute of limitations for tort actions 1: holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract 2: holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship 3: recognizing that there can be compelling circumstances in which a trial court can determine that neither party prevailed in a contract case 4: holding that a party can be liable in tort for actions authorized by the contract


Input: these circumstances, and after extensive consideration, Defendants elected to force the sale of all remaining Employer Stock in the 401(k) Plan. Yet in most cases involving similar claims and similar financial uncertainty, fiduciaries reached the opposite decision. In other words, despite their knowledge that a company was in financial trouble, thereby potentially leading to a decline in value of the company st 995) (remanding case for further proceedings where, in the context of Employee Stock Ownership Plans ("ESOPs’’), court found that a fiduciary’s continuing investment in company stock despite substantial financial difficulties could be sufficient to overcome the presumption of prudence that applies to ESOPs); DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 397 F.Supp.2d 758, 773-74 (E.D.Va.2005) (<HOLDING>). While this contrast of facts does not Holdings: 0: holding that a trial courts refusal to allow the defendant to attend the jury view was not prejudicial 1: holding defendants were fiduciaries because they had discretion to determine the extent of the companys annual contribution to the plan and whether the contribution would be made in  stock or cash 2: holding that factors such as the possibility of us airways bankruptcy throughout the class period the companys known cash flow problems and its unresolved longterm financial problems following an unsuccessful merger were sufficient to allow a jury to question the prudence of the decision to continue to allow the plan to invest in us airways parent companys stock 3: holding that the trial court should conduct a hearing to allow the parties to be heard including the defendant in person and to allow presentation of additional evidence before sentencing 4: holding that to preserve an issue a party must object with sufficient specificity to allow the trial court to address it


Input: relevant to the qualified immunity defense are seriously disputed, a court may not reach the ultimate legal question of whether a reasonable police officer should have known that he acted unlawfully. Lennon, 66 F.3d at 421 (citing Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir.1990), and Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 649 (2d Cir.1994)). C. The Plaintiffs Section 1983 Excessive Force Claim Brown and Etherton argue that Brown’s use of deadly force in response to the perceived threat posed by Rasanen was objectively reasonable and that they are therefore entitled to qualified immunity. Here, there is no question that the Plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly-established constitutional right in contending that Brown used excessive force in shooting Rasanen. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 143 (<HOLDING>). The question for the Court on summary Holdings: 0: recognizing that the fourth amendment protects against the use of excessive force by police officers in carrying out an arrest 1: holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause 2: holding fourth amendment protects against use of force while in arresting officers custody until arraignment or formal charge 3: holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment 4: recognizing that police officers may use reasonable force to make a lawful arrest


Input: witness list (contrary to his assertion at trial that the presiding officer “didn’t say anything”) this was not an arraignment. Rather, this was a preliminary and informal meet ing to establish what would be required for the SCM trial proceeding. We find this to be no different than a military judge requiring counsel to submit a docketing request that includes anticipated pleas and forum, and proposed trial dates. See Army Reg. 27-10, Legal Services, Military Justice, para. 5-21 (16 Nov. 2005). As indicated by the lack of a recorder and the informality of the meeting, the purpose of the initial meeting was not to formally call upon appellant to enter pleas, but to properly prepare the presiding officer for what he would need in order to conduct the SCM. See Jackson, 41 C.M.R. at 681 (<HOLDING>). See also, R.C.M. 904 discussion (“The accused Holdings: 0: holding that a discussion concerning pleas at an offtherecord rcm802 session did not constitute an arraignment 1: holding that an additional remedy does not constitute an additional requirement 2: holding that the claim that the defendants negligently provided investment advice did not constitute an accident 3: holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim 4: holding that district courts discussion of an alternative ground for its decision did not undermine its ruling that appellants claim was untimely raised


Input: Cir.2000) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). Murphy argues that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law when it dismissed the lone holdout juror during deliberations after the trial judge concluded that the juror refused to deliberate. Murphy, however, cites no Supreme Court case which holds that the dismissal of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. Indeed, there are no Supreme Court holdings addressing the issue of whether a trial court’s discharge of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates the Sixth Amendment. We therefore reject Murphy’s challenge under § 2254(d)(1). See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 654, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Ill AEDPA also provides that the court may Holdings: 0: holding that a state court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under  2254d1 when there are no holdings from the supreme court addressing the issue raised by the petitioner 1: holding state court could not have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law given the lack of holdings from the supreme court regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators courtroom conduct 2: holding that where the supreme court has expressly left an open question circuit precedent is immaterial and there is no clearly established law for the state court to have unreasonably applied 3: holding that state court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if no clear supreme court precedent existed 4: holding that the language of  2254d1 expressly restricts the source of clearly established law to the supreme courts jurisprudence


Input: resulting IEP against a substantive standard.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. 8034. Like that under the APA or the CRIPA, the IDEA’S exhaustion scheme was carefully designed to balance the individual complainant’s interest in retaining prompt access to a judicial forum and the countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion. See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303 (discussing policies served by the IDEA’S exhaustion requirement); cf. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145-149, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (describing the balance of interests applicable in exhaustion determinations). Courts therefore may not, consistent with the intent of Congress, impose exhaustion requirements that “merely add additional steps not contemplated in the scheme of the Act.” Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 641 (2nd Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Diamond v. McKenzie, 602 F.Supp. 632, 639 Holdings: 0: holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case 1: holding that district court may order hearing as remedy for termination of public employee without due process 2: holding that state could not conduct sua sponte review of unappealed due process hearing order 3: recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process 4: holding that there is no due process right to appellate review


Input: States. The court held that if an alien’s 1-212 application is granted, he is no longer subject to the reinstatement pro vision, because he is no longer an illegal entrant. Id. at 789. Here, Lino did not apply for a 1-212 application. Consequently, her reliance on Perez-Gonzalez is misplaced. In any event, courts have questioned the Perez-Gonzalez outcome. See, e.g., Lattab, 384 F.3d at 17 (“[W]e have grave doubts about the correctness of the Perez-Gonzalez court’s conclusion.”). Although we recognize the unfortunate circumstances of this case, we have consistently held that “immigration policy ... is traditionally [within] the province of the political branches.” Gomez-Chavez v. Perryman, 308 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir.2002); see also Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 228 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that the flsa is not within the purview of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 1: recognizing that immigration policy is the clear purview of the legislative branch 2: recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear 3: recognizing that citizens who exercise their rights under the initiative provisions act as and become in fact the legislative branch of the municipal government  4: holding that in the absence of a legislative invasion of constitutionallyprotected rights the judicial branch of government must respect and defer to the legislatures exclusive policy decisions


Input: of all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor, in closing argument, may not try to interpret the meaning of a defendant’s not guilty plea by saying that defendant’s not guilty plea constitutes a “challenge” to the state to prove him guilty. State v. Miles, 255 N.W.2d 48, 49 (Minn.1977). It is just as improper for defense counsel to try to interpret the defendant’s not guilty plea for the jury. In this case, defense counsel arguably was trying to use defendant’s not guilty plea as an equivalent of or substitute for defend ant’s testifying. The trial court so concluded and, by these instructions, was trying to neutralize this. Cf People v. Finney, 88 Ill.App.2d 204, 232 N.E.2d 247 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936, 88 S.Ct. 2304, 20 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Since the trial court should be given some Holdings: 0: holding that defense counsel opened the door to the states rebuttal remarks when defense counsel raised the issue in his closing argument 1: holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify 2: holding that defense counsel opened the door to the prosecutions questioning of the defendant about prior convictions when defense counsel asked a prosecution witness whether he was aware that the defendant was  a convicted felon 3: holding it was improper for prosecutor to inject personal opinion in statements to the jury in closing argument 4: holding that defense counsel opened the door to response by prosecutor when he tried to turn defendants failure to testify to his advantage in closing argument


Input: That case, National Advertising Co. v. City of Miami, Case No. 02-20556-CIV-KING ("National II"), was filed on February 21, 2002 in response to the City’s rejection of seven permit applications to construct billboards. National I and National II were consolidated in the district court below. However, we ordered the cases to be argued separately before this court. In this case we asked the parties to focus solely on the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance itself. In the companion case, National II, the parties were asked to discuss the issues related to the permitting process in its entirety. 2 . Although National's amended complaint added the County as a party, the record makes no mention of appearances by the County and they did n 09 S.Ct. 2633, 2637-38, 105 L.Ed.2d 493 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 103, Holdings: 0: holding that a commerce clausebased challenge to florida banking statutes was rendered moot by amendments to the law 1: holding that universitys amendment of regulation made moot a challenge to regulations 2: holding admission of videos containing child pornography was probative of intent to sexually assault a child 3: holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment 4: holding that an overbreadth challenge to a child pornography law was rendered moot by amendment to the statute


Input: case represents the unusual situation in which a parent owning a building must include imputed rent as part of his income. See Ogard, 808 P.2d at 819 (such rental value may be imputed to owner of apartment upon showing of special circumstances pursuant to Civil Rule 90.3(c)(1)(A)). The free apartment is a benefit tó Joe provided by his business interest in renting out the triplex. This imputed rent is to be included with the cash rents received. (Emphasis added.) 2 . Eagley v. Eagley, 849 P.2d 777, 780 n. 3 (Alaska 1993) (quoting Turner v. Turner, 586 A.2d 1182, 1187 (Del.1991)). See also Ogard v. Ogard, 808 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1991) ("Depreciation is a means of reflecting on an annual basis the costs of capital equipment.”). 3 . See Nass v. Seaton, 904 P.2d 412, 416-17 (Alaska 1995) (<HOLDING>); Eagley, 849 P.2d at 781 (allowing a deduction Holdings: 0: holding that the superior court erred in determining obligors adjusted income by disallowing straightline depreciation for that portion of the residence that obligor used in his machinery business 1: holding plaintiff entitled to depreciation after repairs in determining the vehicles value at the time of the theft allowance must be made for depreciation then accrued 2: holding that depreciation in land value caused by a material change in a highway grade which made access to the property difficult is compensable 3: holding that under the facts of that case the action primarily involved a custody dispute and therefore that the trial court erred in determining the case by applying the dependency statute 4: holding that court erred in admitting letters written in anticipation of litigation as business records


Input: Ana Pozos appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Cory Birnberg APC, in Birnberg’s action to enforce an order awarding attorney fees pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 928(c) in a Long-shore and Harbor Workers Compensation case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Feiler v. United States, 62 F.3d 315, 316 (9th Cir.1995), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Birnberg’s attorney fee order was enforceable and the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Pozos’ challenges to the ALJ’s underlying decision. See Thompson v. Potashnick Constr. Co, 812 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. *** This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding that a district court only has jurisdiction to order compliance with compensation orders entered by an administrative law judge alj and reviewed by the benefits review board and to screen for procedural defects but may not otherwise affirm modify suspend or set aside a compensation order based on the substantive merits of the aljs decision 1: holding that a presumptive partial disability exists by virtue of the order to suspend compensation the employer can eliminate liability only by offering suitable work 2: holding that an order in a criminal matter drafted by the prosecutor and signed by the circuit judge was in compliance with requirements of the law 3: holding that an appellate court may not exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal district court order where the merits of the nonfinal order are not inextricably intertwined with the properly appealed collateral order or where review of the former is not necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter 4: holding that this court could not affirm the aljs finding of gross misconduct because the alj failed to make findings on every material contested issue of fact


Input: claim, even in Jack’s absence. A review of the complaint indicates that Solomon has sufficiently pled the existence and deprivation of a liberty interest, satisfying the first prong to state a due process claim. As to the second prong, Solomon must allege that the deprivation did not comport with constitutionally due process. Here, his claim fails. It is true that regardless of the state’s practices and procedures, “[w]hat process is due” is a question of constitutional law, not state law. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). When a state seeks to deprive a child of the liberty interest in being nurtured by their parent, it must provide procedures that are fundamentally fair. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (<HOLDING>). Yet, the complaint fails to satisfy the Holdings: 0: holding that state could be liable under ada for inaccessibility of company it contracted with to provide state inmates with jobs 1: holding that state law must give way to treasury department regulations governing survivorship rights in us bonds 2: holding that while the state must provide a defendant access to procedures for making a competency evaluation it need not shoulder the burden of proof in convincing the trier of fact that the defendant is competent 3: holding that when the state moves to destroy  familial bonds it must provide parents with fundamentally fair procedures 4: holding that the extradition procedures are a matter of state law


Input: helicopter was manufactured and delivered to the first purchaser on or before July 31, 1971, and that it has not modified the helicopter since delivery. Further, it is undisputed that Bell did not design, manufacture, sell, or install the engine or main fuel control unit that was in the helicopter at the time of the accident. Because the accident occurred on June 1, 2000, more than twenty-eight years had passed since delivery of the helicopter to the first purchaser. Thus, GARA precludes Plaintiffs from recovering against Bell under Texas state law for the following claims: (1) strict liability for defective design, manufacture, and marketing; (2) negligent design, testing, manufacture, and marketing; and (3) negligent failure to warn. See Alter, 944 F.Supp. at 536-41 (S.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Altseimer v. Bell Helicopter Holdings: 0: holding that convictions for both leaving the scene of an accident involving injury and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage only were inconsistent and therefore could not be sustained 1: holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident 2: holding a limitation on damages arising out of bodily injury to one person involved in an accident applies to all claims arising from the death of that person 3: holding the plaintiffs could not establish a valid claim in a lawsuit involving a helicopter accident because gara prohibits texas state law claims arising from design or manufacturing defects in an aircraft delivered more than eighteen years before the accident 4: holding texass substantive law should apply rather than the law of the state where the accident occurred because texas has a particularly strong interest when the defective product in question was manufactured and placed in the stream of commerce in texas


Input: the burden of proof to the parents, but for a different reason. According to these circuits, because the statute relies on the expertise of education professionals in local school systems, their decisions about the substantive terms of an IEP are owed deference; as a result, the parents bear the burden of proving why an IEP is deficient. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1158 (5th Cir.1986); Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir.1990). On the other side the Third Circuit assigns the burden of proof to school systems when their IEPs are challenged by parents in administrative proceedings. Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 533 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>)). Three other circuits, the Second, Eighth, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself and that one who asserts a claim has the burden of proof that normally comes with it 1: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 2: holding that a rebuttable presumption in favor of the action of an administrative agency and the burden of proof is upon one challenging its action 3: holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged 4: holding that when an administrative decision upholding an iep is challenged in district court the school district has the burden of proof because of its expertise and access to information and witnesses


Input: “I don’t recall the incident like that, but I do recall him putting it in the report like that,” Id. at p. 36, lines 14-18. 3 The “sufficient notice” element of the standard requires the court to examine the situation from the objective perspective of “a reasonable person who has been subjected to the conduct which forms the basis for the plaintiffs complaint.” Doe v. Creighton, 439 Mass. at 284 (quoting Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 245 (1991)). 4 In his opposition to summary judgment, Martin submitted an affidavit stating that he did not read the evaluation report until 2005. This affidavit squarely contradicts his deposition testimony as referenced in Footnote 2, and is therefore not taken into consideration. See O'Brien v. Analog Devices, Inc., 34 Mass.App.Ct. 905, 906 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 5 The further appellate review in Doe v. Holdings: 0: holding that subsequent affidavit contradicting prior sworn testimony does not create genuine issue of fact 1: holding that inconsistencies in the summary judgment evidence of a single witness create a fact issue 2: holding that it is well settled that a plaintiff may not create a factual issue for the purpose of defeating a motion for summary judgment by filing an affidavit contradicting a statement the plaintiff made in a prior deposition 3: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 4: holding that a plaintiff cannot create an issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment through an affidavit that contradicts prior testimony


Input: was not provided a pre-termination hearing. The United States Supreme Court has held that a public employee dismissible only for cause has a property interest in continued employment and that the due process clause prohibits such an employee from being terminated without a pre-termination hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546-547, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Here, Plaintiff was called into a meeting with BPW management, advised of the reasons he was to be terminated, and afforded an opportunity to respond. Plaintiff offers no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, because there are no issues of material fact in dispute, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs due process rights were not violated. See Boals v.. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 690 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). As such, summary judgment will be granted as Holdings: 0: holding that the absolutecertainty standard is similar to a finding that no violation had occurred at all rather than that any error was harmless 1: holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances 2: holding that there is no due process right to appellate review 3: holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim 4: holding that in similar factual situation no due process violation occurred


Input: id. at ¶ 19, and that she “was not afforded the opportunity to transfer to another Georgia-Pacific office as were at least two other similarly situated male employees on prior occasions,” id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that Georgia-Pacific discharged her “because of her gender.” Id. at ¶ 21. In Count IV of her complaint, plaintiff seeks relief under section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (Nov. 21, 1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a) (“1991 Act”), which provides, inter alia, for compensatory damages and punitive damages in employment discrimination cases and for the right to a jury trial if the plaintiff seeks either compensatory or pun as not addressed this issue. Compare, e.g., Bonilla v. Liquilux Gas Corp., 812 F.Supp. 286 (D.P.R.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citing, inter alia, Aledo-Garcia v. Puerto Holdings: 0: holding section 102 of the cra creating the power to recover damages and providing for jury trial did not apply to case pending on appeal on the date of enactment 1: holding no remedy available under amended provisions of title vii for violations occurring prior to date of amendment november 21 1991 where discriminatory acts did not continue into the postamendment period 2: holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time 3: holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background 4: holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment


Input: a false statement in this bankruptcy case. Jurisdiction This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to Judiciary Code Sections 157(b)(1) and 1334(b), and the Standing Order of Reference dated August 28,1986, as amended by the Order dated December 5, 2012, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. In addition, this Court may adjudicate these claims to final judgment to the extent that they are core proceedings pursuant to Judiciary Code Section 157(b), and to the extent that they are not core proceedings, pursuant to Judiciary Code Section 157(c) because the parties have stated their consent to this Court entering a final judgment. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1940, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (<HOLDING>). Background Mr. Cedillo’s Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Holdings: 0: holding that after stem bankruptcy judges have the authority to enter interlocutory orders in noncore proceedings and in core proceedings as to which the bankruptcy court may not enter final orders or judgment consistent with article iii absent consent 1: holding that in a bankruptcy proceeding state law governs the rights of the parties with regard to interests in property 2: holding that bankruptcy court possessed jurisdiction to enter money judgment in noncore proceeding against third party 3: holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding 4: holding that in a noncore proceeding a bankruptcy court may enter final orders with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding


Input: preliminary activating domain of NF-éB are, in fact, separable or spatially distinct.” Considering that the inventors of the '516 patent discovered NF-éB, if they did not know whether the two domains are distinct, one of ordinary skill in the art was at best equally ignorant. Perhaps one of ordinary skill could discover this information, but this does not alter our conclusion that the description of the dominantly interfering molecules “just represents a wish, or arguably a plan” for future research. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171; see Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567 (rendering obvious is insufficient for written description). Nor is it sufficient, as Ariad argues, that “skilled workers actually practiced this teaching soon after the 1989 application was filed.” See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563-64 (<HOLDING>). Decoy molecules are “designed to mimic a Holdings: 0: holding that where accessible literature sources clearly provided a description of the teachings at issue the written description requirement does not require their incorporation by reference 1: holding that section 10b violation occurs on date of alleged misrepresentation not the date of the sale or purchase of securities 2: holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint 3: holding that the creditors claim on the petition date for purposes of a  547b5 analysis was the unpaid balance of the store loans as of the filing date plus the total amount of the alleged preferential payments 4: holding thata written description analysis occurs as of the filing date sought


Input: means is consistent with its goals. The purpose of the Civil Service Act is “to secure efficient fire and police departments composed of capable personnel who are free from political influence and who have permanent employment tenure as public servants.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.001(a). Courts have interpreted the Civil Service Act in a manner consistent with a legislative intent to protect the rights of persons serving as officers and employees of police departments and shield them from harassment. See Bichsel v. Carver, 159 Tex. 393, 321 S.W.2d 284, 286 (1959) (recognizing legislative intent to shield “police and similar employees from harassment” and interpreting Civil Service Act accordingly); Carrollton v. Popescu, 806 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (<HOLDING>); see also Crawford v. City of Houston, 487 Holdings: 0: holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission 1: holding that lands held by a municipality in its governmental capacity may not be lost by adverse possession 2: holding that action of city legislative body may be judicially examined in light of its surrounding circumstances prior and subsequent actions of such legislative body and public policy in order to determine good faith of questioned action 3: holding that statements and charges by municipality may not be amended in light of legislative purpose of shielding police and similar employees from harassment 4: holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under  1983


Input: would serve a significant public interest only where “there is compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity,” and that the information sought “is necessary in order to confirm or refute that evidence.” Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282. The plaintiff demonstrates no such public interest with respect to the third parties described above, including those of investigative interest or those merely mentioned in responsive records. The FBI’s and the EOUSA’s decisions to withhold the names of and identifying information about third parties of investigative interest and about individuals who merely are mentioned in these law enforcement records are fully supported by the case law. See, e.g., Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Rugiero v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 257 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure 1: holding that names and address of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c  are exempt from disclosure 2: holding the governments prior disclosure of requested information could not waive individuals privacy interests under exemption 6 and collecting cases involving exemption 7c 3: holding that nigcs individual background files are law enforcement records subject to exemption 7c and that in the absence of a waiver disclosure is not required by foia because individuals mentioned in law enforcement investigatory reports  have a presumptive privacy interest in keeping their names undisclosed 4: holding that in light of the stigma potentially associated with law enforcement investigations exemption 7c affords broad privacy rights to suspects witnesses and investigators


Input: forum, there can be no-“parallel” state court litigation on the basis of which a federal court could exercise Colorado River abstention). B. The federal and state proceedings at issue here clearly are not “parallel” under Colorado River. As a general matter, a § 1983 action may be brought in either a state or federal forum. Thus, conceivably, concurrent state and federal jurisdiction could exist over the Marcuses’ damages claim. In the present case, however, the state action is criminal in nature and was initiated by the State of Pennsylvania in its criminal court. Pennsylvania law makes no provision by which the Marcuses could raise their § 1983 claim in a state criminal forum. See Hutchins v. Commonwealth, Pa. State Police Harrisburg, 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 635, 604 A.2d 1130, 1131 (1992) (<HOLDING>). As a consequence, the Pennsylvania criminal Holdings: 0: holding a party cannot be joined to prevent removal where no cause of action can be brought against that party 1: holding that a criminal statute does not provide a corresponding civil cause of action 2: holding that a municipal corporation cannot form the requisite criminal intent and cannot be held liable under civil rico laws 3: holding civil action cannot be joined to a criminal appeal 4: holding a forfeiture provision to be a civil action despite its codification in the states criminal code


Input: This order followed a noticed hearing on appellee’s motion to hold appellant in contempt for allegedly disobeying the court’s order on visitation. No pleadings were filed requesting a change of custody nor was there any notice that any such change of custody would be heard or considered by the court. The trial court cannot modify a support order or other adjudicated right unless the court’s subject matter jurisdiction has been properly invoked by appropriate pleadings, and that invoked jurisdiction has been perfected by the proper service of process and due process notice and an opportunity to be heard on that issue has been had. This succinctly states the requirements of due process in cases such as the instant case. See also, Fisher v. Whiteside, 541 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)(<HOLDING>); Brady v. Jones, 491 So.2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 2d Holdings: 0: holding that court lacked jurisdiction to modify visitation where it dismissed the modification petition 1: holding that denial of petition for modification of maintenance was proper when the parties agreement prohibited modification of maintenance 2: holding conclusory statements in visitation dispute were not adequate to support awarding visitation rights 3: holding that uncertainty regarding amount of visitation ordered is fatal to the validity of a trial courts visitation  award 4: holding that court in habeas petition has no authority to condition visitation right of parent upon payment for support and maintenance


Input: we perceive it appropriate in this instance to recognize, any increased protection as being afforded by our state constitution. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 4; Hinshaw. We next turn to the statutes relied upon by Saldana, Wyo.Stat. §§ 7-3-601 to -611 (1987), to determine whether legislative discretion may have been invoked to expand the constitutional protection. Sal-dana claims that, under this Wyoming “wire-tapping” statute, the admission into evidence of his telephone records is prohibited. We rely upon the statute in the form that it had been adopted at the time of Saldana’s conduct instead of at the later, and somewhat more expansive, version relied upon by Saldana. See Wyo.Stat. §§ 7-3-601 to -610 (Supp.1990). Cf. Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 (Wyo.1992) (<HOLDING>); Wyoming Refining Co. v. Bottjen, 695 P.2d 647 Holdings: 0: holding statutes are not applied retroactively absent clear legislative intent 1: holding legislatures intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power 2: holding that absent clear legislative intent court will not apply statute retroactively even when it creates new remedy 3: holding that a change of an element of an offense could not be applied retroactively to a crime committed prior to the statutes enactment 4: holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent


Input: to Council members in violation of Department and City policy, diminishing the level of protection his speech might otherwise enjoy. Belcher’s interest in speaking privately to the Council members must be weighed against the contrary interests of the City and the Department in maintaining harmony among Department employees. “When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.” Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1452 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 151—52, 103 S.Ct. 1684). Because such close relationships are necessary in a fire department, there is a “heightened governmental interest in maintaining harmony” among fire department employees. Id. at 1452 n. 22 (<HOLDING>). Firefighters place their lives in each Holdings: 0: holding routine exclusion of members of fire and police departments did not violate the faircrosssection requirement because it is good for the community that these workers not be interrupted in their work 1: holding that fire departments are analogous to police departments in this respect 2: holding that a police departments refusal to permit police affin ity group to march in parades was not a form of government speech 3: holding that an expert established a national standard of care for police officer training by testifying that police departments throughout the country commonly trained officers to deal with mentally distuibed persons and by naming several departments that offered such training 4: holding the evidence supported the police officers failure to follow the directives in the montgomery county police departments field operations manual


Input: more or better evidence.” (internal quotations omitted)); Jones v. United States, 466 F.2d 131, 136 (10th Cir.1972) (“Evidence of this type is not the result of a different factual situation or changed circumstances. It is, instead, historical in nature and could have been admitted at the first trial if properly submitted. If the taxpayers’ case was not effectively presented at the first trial it wa -04 (2d Cir.1999) (noting that the virtues of issue preclusion do not come without a price: “Just as occasionally ‘the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong ... but time and chance hap-peneth to them all,’ Ecclesiastes 9:11 (King James ed.), so too the results of an earlier resolution of an issue may simply be wrong.”); Johnson v. Watkins, 101 F.3d 792, 795 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., Holdings: 0: recognizing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel represents an informed choice that the occasional permanent encapsulation of a wrong result is a price worth paying to promote the worthy goals of ending disputes and avoiding repetitive litigation 1: recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time 2: recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings 3: holding collateral estoppel elements met considering changed circumstances in the context of an exception to the general rule of collateral estoppel 4: holding that the debtor has the burden of showing that collateral estoppel applies


Input: of the victim’s conduct. See § 90.405, Fla. Stat. (2009). There are, however, important distinctions and evi-dentiary requirements between reputation evidence and evidence of specific acts admitted under section 90.404(l)(b). Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. The purpose of introducing the reputation evidence in a self-defense case is to show that the victim was the initial aggressor. Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. Reputation evidence is offered to show that the victim acted in conformity with a known character trait. Because reputation evidence relates to the conduct of the victim, the defendant is not required to have had prior knowledge of the victim’s reputation in the community. See Dwyer v. State, 743 So.2d 46, 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Melvin v. State, 592 Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of assault on victim that was subsequent to the arson for which defendant was tried was admissible to show defendants bent of mind toward violence directed at the victim 1: holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment 2: holding that a defendant who alleges selfdefense can show through the testimony of another witness that the alleged victim had a propensity for violence thereby inferring that the alleged victim was the aggressor a defendants prior knowledge of the victims reputation for violence is irrelevant because the evidence is offered to show the conduct of the victim rather than the defendants state of mind 3: holding that before a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of the victims character for violence there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was the first aggressor and that once the defendant testified that he was attacked and cut by the victim without provocation before using the victims utility tool to stab the victim the defendant was clearly entitled to question the victim about past acts of violence reflected in court documents from the state of oregon 4: holding that corroborative evidence of prior specific acts of violence by victim may be admissible in selfdefense case where the defendant knew of the act


Input: tools or equipment necessary to provide chicken catching services. Required tools or equipment, such as tracks, cages, and forklifts, were provided by the processors, and the Catchers supplied themselves with hats, gloves, or boots, if they desired such items. See CE Credits OnLine, 946 A.2d at 1168; Beacon Flag Car, 910 A.2d at 105. Fourth, the Joint Venture did not provide training or instruction on how to catch chickens. See CE Credits OnLine, 946 A.2d at 1168; Beacon Flag Car, 910 A.2d at 105. Fifth, although the Joint Venture accepted jobs from processors, the time, place and location of each job was determined by the processors, not by the Joint Venture or the Catchers, and, therefore, the Joint Venture did not dictate those terms of the job. See Beacon Flag Car, 910 A.2d at 108 (<HOLDING>). Sixth, the Joint Venture did not supervise Holdings: 0: holding that failure to attach the aaa arbitration rules weighed in favor of a finding of procedural unconscionability 1: holding that fact that client not employer controlled time manner and location of services to be performed weighed in favor of independent contractor status 2: holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed 3: holding that texas law does not recognize an implied warranty that services incidental to helicopter maintenance will be performed in a good and workmanlike manner 4: holding that ambiguous agreement between attorney and client must be construed in the clients favor


Input: another department and had previously received ratings of "3” and "4 ". Bob Laird, who was also already a supervisor when he was transferred to be special services department supervisor had consistently received “4” ratings. Chris Scafidi, a Caucasian male who has held the position since August 1994 had received only "3” and "4" ratings and had two years experience working at the special services desk. (Home Depot’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts at pp. 7-9; Teixeira Aff. at ¶¶ 20-25). 9 . Courts have commonly applied the same standard of liability for employment discrimination cases alleging Title VII and Section 1981 violations because the elements of each are the same. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 583, 99 S.Ct. 1355, 1364-65, 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928 Holdings: 0: holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee 1: holding that section 1981 afford no greater substantive protection than title vii 2: holding that plaintiffs claims under 42 usc  1981 are also governed by the special venue provision of title vii 3: holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii 4: holding that there is no individual liability under title vii