Input: added to the underlying works is protected by copyright.”). The term original means that a writing must have been “independently created by the author ... [and] possess at least some minimal level of creativity.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282. However, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.” Id.; see also Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 512-13 (2d Cir.1991) (“Simply stated, original means not copied, and exhibiting a minimal amount of creativity.”). While a finding of originality is generally a question a of fact for the jury, under these circumstances it may be treated as a matter of law. See CMM Cable Rep Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1517 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Spilman has registered his Red Book as well Holdings: 0: recognizing a claim for injunctive relief is disposed of when expressly tied to claims dismissed on summary judgment 1: holding that affidavit in support of summary judgment may not be based upon factual conclusion or conclusions of law 2: holding that summary judgment may be reversed when it is based on an error of law 3: holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial 4: holding that where there is insufficient evidence to permit a reasonable factual finding of originality the question may be disposed of as an issue of law at summary judgment


Input: guilty” was reasonable, and thus, trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating). 36 See OCGA § 17-9-40 (“A verdict may be amended in mere matter of form after the jury have dispersed; but, after it has been received, recorded, and the jury dispersed, it may not be amended in matter of substance, either by what the jurors say they intended to find or otherwise.”); Groves, 162 Ga. at 166 (“There must be the unanimous assent of the entire twelve jurors before there is a legal verdict. When it develops that such is not the fact, there is no verdict. If the jury has not dispersed, they should be sent to the jury-room, with the direction to consider the case for the purpose of reaching an agreement on a verdict.”); Handley v. McKee, 8 Ga. App. 570, 573 (3) (70 SE 94) (1911) (<HOLDING>); see also Ballard v. Turner, 147 Ga. App. 584, Holdings: 0: holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict 1: holding that verdict returned by jury should have been received and recorded and that trial court erred by granting a continuance after jury returned its verdict applying the principle announced in merchantsbank of macon 7 ga at 200 4 that a verdict shall be considered as published eo instanti in which it is handed to the plaintiffs counsel or other person directed by the court to receive it emphasis omitted 2: holding that trial court erred in granting plea in bar as to murder when prior to receipt and publication of fact that jury could not reach a verdict on murder count jury had indicated in notes to the trial court that it had acquitted defendant of murder and holding that there was no verdict until it was received and published in open court 3: holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial 4: holding that when determining prejudice under the objective test relevant considerations include 1 whether the extrinsic evidence was received by the jury and the manner in which it was received 2 whether it was available to the jury for a lengthy period of time 3 whether it was discussed and considered extensively by the jury 4 whether it was introduced before a jury verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations and 5 whether it was reasonably likely to affect the verdict considering the strength of the governments case and whether the governments case outweighed any possible prejudice caused by the extrinsic evidence


Input: that ground was inappropriate. 5 . Walter Energy potentially could have asserted a claim against the Audley defendants based on similar federal securities-regulation statutes; however, it has elected not to do so, stating in its complaint that "the claims asserted herein are based entirely on Alabama law, and no claims are asserted under any federal law.” 6 . Our holding on this issue obviates the need to review the trial court’s alternate basis for dismissing Walter Energy’s Alabama Securities Act claim, specifically, that Walter Energy lacks standing to pursue such a claim because it has not alleged that it purchased any shares of Walter Energy stock following the Audley defendants’ alleged scheme to manipulate the share price. See, e.g., Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Walter Energy does not explain in its Holdings: 0: holding that stepgrandfather who was neither a biological nor an adoptive grandparent lacked standing to seek access to stepgrandchildren 1: holding that a party that was neither a purchaser nor a seller of the securities involved lacked standing to seek injunctive relief under the federal counterpart to  8617 2: holding because the district court refused to grant plaintiff reinstatement or any other injunctive relief the damage award was neither incidental to nor intertwined with any other relief 3: holding that neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the fdcpa 4: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because they failed to demonstrate any likelihood that they would end up back in jail where alleged constitutional violations occurred


Input: Board of Education v. White, 439 U. S. 82, 43 (1978), where we held that a Board of Education rule requiring employees to take unpaid leaves of absence while campaigning for elective political office was a barrier to candidacy “as formidable as the filing date changes at issue in” Hadnott and Allen. In other contexts, we have interpreted § 5 broadly to require preclearanee of changes in residence requirements for candidates, City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 160-161 (1980); alterations of municipal boundaries, Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358 (1975); reapportionment and redistricting plans, Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526 (1973); and the location of polling places, Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971). 23 See Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U. S. 305 (1977) (<HOLDING>). 24 Only one black candidate filed for Holdings: 0: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 1: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 2: recognizing in union democracy context potential adverse impact of requiring candidates to qualify long before election 3: recognizing that the involvement of supervisory union members in union affairs conflicts with the need to assure the complete devotion of union negotiating teams to employee interests 4: recognizing impact of child support guidelines


Input: transcript of jury request to review witness testimony (D.Mass. Dec. 7, 1995); United States v. DeBartolomeo, 95-CR-10239-WGY, trial transcript of jury request to review witness testimony (D.Mass. Jan. 22, 1996). 2 . Against this background, the current proposals to authorize "real time” court reporters to provide "unscoped” transcripts for a fee seem odd indeed. They wholly misconceive real time court reporting as some sort of “product,” rather than the vital, justice-enhancing “service” it is in fact. More importantly, unscoped transcripts can in no sense be said to be accurate "records” of the judicial proceedings. There is only one such record — the record certified by the court's official reporter. See e.g., United States v. Abrams, 95-10272-WGY (transcript) (D.Mass. Feb. 2, 1996) Holdings: 0: recognizing that the only record of grand jury testimony is the court reporters certified transcript not her tape recording of the proceeding 1: holding the trial court erred in ordering the transcription of grand jury proceedings so that it could intervene in the operations of the grand jury 2: holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose 3: holding where tape corroborated by independent testimony of two police officers and where defendant did not challenge accuracy of recording court did not err in admitting tape despite prosecutions failure to authenticate it 4: holding that the defendants offer of proof which consisted only of a tape recording and a private investigators affidavit did not satisfy the defendants preliminary burden under franks without the offering of other sworn testimony or reliable evidence


Input: or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Tex.R. Evid. 702. In these cases, the jury was required to determine the appropriate sentence for each of appellant’s offenses. In making that determination, the jury was entitled to consider “any matter the court deem[ed] relevant to sentencing.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp.2000) (noting that, during punishment, State and defendant may introduce any evidence court deems relevant to sentencing). One such matter is the accused’s “personal responsibility” and “moral culpability” for the crime charged. See Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 896 Holdings: 0: holding evidence admissible in punishment phase of trial because evidence had bearing on appellants personal responsibility and moral guilt 1: holding that capital punishment must be tailored to the defendants personal responsibility and moral guilt 2: holding defendant waived right to contest lawfulness of search on appeal after he had admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial 3: holding that a codefendants sentence is not relevant to an appellants guilt innocence or punishment 4: holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial


Input: The percentage interest appurtenant to a unit represents the unit owner’s percentage interest in the common expense and common profits of the Condominium, and his undivided share in the common elements of the Condominium. The percentage interest shall have a permanent character and, except as specifically provided in Title 11, may not be changed without the written consent of all the unit owners and their mortgagees. We note that the above language mirrors that of RP § 11-107, entitled "Percentage interests.” For an example of out-of-state cases that directly consider whether certain provisions are properly characterized as "use restrictions,” or whether they alter unit owners’ property rights in the common areas, see Makeever v. Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384, 609 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Ct.App.1980) (<HOLDING>); Kaplan v. Boudreaux, 410 Mass. 435, 573 Holdings: 0: holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest or failed to file a claim with the state within a twenty year period 1: holding that property owner could not argue it had no notice of deed restrictions simply because guidelines were unclear when owner acknowledged having copy of such restrictions 2: holding that a tenured teacher who can be dismissed only for good cause has a legitimate claim of entitlement to his or her position and may not be deprived of it without due process of law 3: holding that contrary to restrictions regarding use a unit owner may not be deprived of his interest in a substantial portion of the general common elements without his consent 4: holding that use of guns to effectuate arrest and handcuffing of defendant did not render his consent to search his home involuntary


Input: it fails prong one. Cases that qualify under prong one present controversies of inherently limited duration. In one of these cases, it is not “reasonably foreseeable” that plaintiffs can obtain full review before their case becomes moot. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). For example, “[pjregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (quotation marks omitted). Cases challenging a prior restraint on free speech also typically fit into this exception. See, e.g., Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-79, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Cases that only present live controversies in Holdings: 0: holding that universitys amendment of regulation made moot a challenge to regulations 1: holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot 2: holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order 3: holding that challenge to oneyear order for protection was not moot even though it had expired 4: holding that a challenge to a mining plan was moot where the action sought to be enjoined hadbeen completed


Input: ("To read the Wal-Mart plan literally would allow the plan to free ride on the efforts of the plan participant's attorney, contrary to the equitable concept of common fund.”). 18 . Van Gemert, 444 U.S. at 478, 100 S.Ct. 745 (citations omitted). 19 . Id. (citations omitted). 20 . Harris v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 208 F.3d 274, 277-78 (1st Cir.2000) ("Typically, these courts have read the reimbursement clauses’ silence on the issue of attorney fees as an ambiguity, then based their holdings on the prevailing state-law principle that ambiguities in insurance policies must be construed in the insured's favor.”) (citing York Ins. Group of Maine v. Van Hall, 704 A.2d 366, 368 n. 3 (Me.1997)). But see Bishop v. Burgard, 198 Ill.2d 495, 261 Ill.Dec. 733, 764 N.E.2d 24 (2002) (<HOLDING>). 21 . E.g. Wells, 213 F.3d at 402; Blackburn Holdings: 0: holding florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause 1: holding that the federal common fund doctrine may not be applied in contravention of a plans terms 2: holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans 3: holding that motion to adjudicate lien was not preempted by erisa and illinois common fund doctrine overrode plan language and would reduce plans reimbursement of expenses paid for insured 4: holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language


Input: financial interest in AeroMed. First, the order does not in any form prohibit the offering of evidence; it prohibits certain claims. Second, the language clearly permits claims of medical malpractice and lack of informed consent, which are the issues in the instant case. Next, the order only prohibits the assertion of claims that have as an essential element a financial relationship between the physician and AeroMed. However, this case is a medical malpractice and lack of informed consent action that does not require proof of a financial interest as an essential element. See Rauch v. Mike-Mayer, 783 A.2d 815, 824 (Pa.Super.2001) (stating the essential elements required to prove medical malpractice); and see Bey v. Sacks, 789 A.2d 232, 2001 WL 1602971 (Pa.Super. December 14, 2001) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 23 As stated above, questions referring to Holdings: 0: holding that a patient who endures an operation without his consent may base his action on a tortious battery 1: holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery 2: holding that an operation without the patients consent sounds in battery 3: holding that battery is clearly a factual determination readily resolved by the application of a legal standard defining battery to the facts in question 4: holding that in pennsylvania lack of informed consent claims utilize a battery standard that is a physician commits battery where the patient does not consent to the procedure on his person thus constituting a harmful or offensive contact


Input: to lay any foundation at all for the documents and, thus, the trial court did not err in excluding them from evidence. We also agree that, when evidence is excluded, counsel generally may make an effective offer of proof by summarizing the excluded evidence. Benchmark Properties v. Hipolito, 161 Or App 598, 605, 984 P2d 927 (1999). However, that rule does not mean that an offer of proof is sufficient if counsel represents that a document has a certain identity but in addition (1) fails to represent that he or she is prepared to lay a foundation establishing its authenticity and, if the court excludes the document from evidence, (2) fails to request that the document be identified and placed in the record as an offer of proof. See State v. Busby, 315 Or 292, 298, 844 P2d 897 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The state could have requested a continuance Holdings: 0: holding timely and sufficiently specific objection is required to preserve error 1: holding defendant failed to preserve burden of proof issue for appeal 2: holding that an offer of proof is not necessary to preserve an issue for appeal when the asserted error does not relate primarily to the admissibility of particular evidence but involves an underlying legal ruling that results in the exclusion of evidence as a consequence 3: holding that an adequate offer of proof is normally required to preserve error when a trial court excludes evidence 4: holding that to properly preserve an objection to the trial courts imposing a time limit for the presentation of evidence the objecting party must make a specific and definite offer of proof informing the trial court of the evidence that is being excluded by the limitation


Input: 1342 (10th Cir.1981). While it is probably true that the police officer exerted some subtle psychological pressure on Nadworny (whether intentional or not), this Court, after a thorough and independent review of the written record, finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the police officer did not pressure Nadworny to the point that his will was overborne and his statements were involuntary. As both Nadworny and the Commonwealth agree, Nadworny was not in custody. In fact, because Nadworny called the police officer, the officer had no idea where petitioner was during their conversation. This was not a situation in which the police officer, knowing Nadworny’s location, had only to go there to arrest him. Cf Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 531-33, 159 N.E.2d 856 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, there is nothing in the police Holdings: 0: holding that defendant had the right to refuse to answer questions put to him by police officer who had called him 1: holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station 2: holding that defendant in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a thirddegree assault charge 3: holding that a defendant who sought to receive the death penalty had the right to refuse to present mitigation evidence 4: holding that defendant was arrested  when the police officer took physical custody of him by grabbing his arm and returned him to the hotel for detention there


Input: at *3-5 (D.D.C. February 16, 2006) (entering judgment in favor of the defendant where a plaintiff failed to file an EEO complaint regarding her claims of retaliation, and explicitly rejecting the argument that “a claimant need not exhaust her administrative remedies for a claim based on retaliation when that retaliation claim arises after an administrative complaint has already been filed”). A more recent view is that acts of alleged retaliation occurring after an EEO charge is filed need not be separately exhausted where they necessarily would have come within the “scope of any investigation that reasonably could have been expected to result from [the] initial [EEO] charge[.]” Hazel, 2006 WL 3623693, at *8 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Lewis, 535 F.Supp.2d at 7 (<HOLDING>); Pierce v. Mansfield, 530 F.Supp.2d 146, 154 Holdings: 0: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 1: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 2: holding that a court cannot entertain claims arising from incidents omitted from an eeo complaint unless those incidents were within the scope of the investigation that would have followed the initial eeo charge 3: holding plaintiffs claims could not succeed without proof that the city had knowledge of prior incidents 4: holding that 8 incidents of assault theft robbery or burglary on the premises and 80 similar incidents within a 2bloek area within the prior 3 years did not constitute special circumstances giving rise to a duty to protect


Input: advice and an immigration judge ordered him removed to Jamaica, where he has resided ever since—separated from much of his family, including his parents and his daughter, and from the country he had called home for most of his life. Then, in 2010, the Supreme Court offered Newman a ray of hope. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), it held that defense attorneys provide inadequate representation when they fail to advise their clients about the likely deportation consequences of pleading guilty. Armed with that decision, Newman filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis, which provides a means of collaterally attacking a conviction when the person is no longer in custody. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954) (<HOLDING>). Newman argued that a writ was appropriate Holdings: 0: recognizing that under the common law applications for writs of error coram nobis were civil in character 1: holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider claims under the all writs act 2: recognizing the all writs act gives federal courts authority to issue writs of coram nobis to correct fundamental errors in criminal proceedings where the person is no longer in custody 3: holding that this court has authority in appropriate circumstances to issue writs under all writs act 28 usc  1651a 4: holding that removal to federal court was proper for claims asserted under all writs act


Input: the constitutionality of a statute, the court must presume a statute enacted by the legislature is constitutional. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex.1996); Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex.1985). The party seeking to invalidate the statute as unconstitutional bears the burden of demonstrating the statute fails to satisfy constitutional requirements. Enron Corp. v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 922 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex.1996). Where the trial court issues findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a sufficiency of the evidence review to the factual findings and review its conclusions of law de novo. Black v. City of Killeen, 78 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. deni 17, 222 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The State contends, and the trial court Holdings: 0: holding that purpose of stop was complete upon the issuance of the citation 1: holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation 2: holding that conspiracy requires an agreement to accomplish either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means 3: holding before the advent of the federal rules of evidence that the use of a tax return for the purpose of impeachment was proper 4: holding complete prohibition on use of crime or accident reports for purpose of soliciting clients too broad a means of effectuating the intended purpose of the law


Input: undertook the defendant’s retroactivity claim under plain error review standards because the defendant had failed to preserve the issue by objecting. The Supreme Court described its review under the plain error rule as discretionary, not mandatory. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 117 S. Ct. at 1549. Further, the Supreme Court ultimately denied relief to Johnson because, even though the new rule was retroactive, under plain error there was ‘ho basis for concluding that the error ‘seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470, 117 S. Ct. at 1550. ¶46 These principles are not limited to federal jurisprudence, but are broadly recognized in different states and federal circuits: Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 265, (Ind. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11, 15 (Alaska Holdings: 0: holding that although the defendant had preserved his objection to the constitutionality of a mental state requirement he had not preserved another constitutional objection 1: recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively 2: holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review 3: holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery 4: holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases


Input: which rejected the Plan. The Bankruptcy Code does not provide a standard for determining when “unfair discrimination” exists. See 203 N. LaSalle, 190 B.R. at 585 (noting “the lack of any clear standard for determining the fairness of a discrimination in the treatment of classes under a chapter 11 plan” and that “the limits of fairness in this context have not been established”). Rather, courts may examine the facts and circumstances of the particular case to determine whether unfair discrimination exists. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 636 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1986) (“The language and legislative history of the statute provides little guidance in applying the ‘unfair discrimination’ standard.”); see, e.g., In re Freymiller Trucking, Inc., 190 B.R. 913, 916 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 589 Holdings: 0: holding that a determination of unfair discrimination requires a court to consider all aspects of the case and the totality of all the circumstances 1: holding that an adverse credibility determination under the real id act must take into account the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors 2: holding the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances 3: holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances 4: holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession


Input: ‘either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that [he or she] had a claim.’ ” 2013 WL 717755, at *6 (quoting Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Kimbell, 558 F.3d 751, 759 (8th Cir.2009)). However, as discussed herein, Congress manifested a different intent for the applicable statute of limitations period for 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that by amending subsection (b), and not subsection (a), “Congress was silent on the discovery or injury-occurrence rule.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs. at 28 n. 3 [Doc. No. 13].) In fact, in TRW Inc., the Supreme Court stated that a directive from Congress need not be explicit — it may also be implied from the text or structure of a particular statute. TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 27-28, 122 S.Ct. 441 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff also misapplies the Supreme Court’s Holdings: 0: holding that while as a general matter discovery should be freely permitted  j jurisdictional discovery is justified only if the plaintiff reasonably demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations through discovery 1: recognizing without explicitly affirming the general rule 2: holding that the more transformative the new work the more likely the use of the old work is a fair one 3: holding that the text and structure of the fair credit reporting act fcra demonstrates that congress implicitly excluded a general discovery rule by explicitly including a more limited one 4: recognizing general rule


Input: Id. at 105. 20 . Mims v. Fidelity Funding, Inc. (In re Auto International Refrigeration), 275 B.R. 789, 810 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2002). 21 . Id. at 811. 22 . Id. at 812. 23 . 11 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4). 24 . 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) and (b) 25 . Auto Interna'l Refrigeration, 275 B.R. at 812 (citing In re Metro Square, 1988 WL 86679 (Bankr.D.Minn.1988); In re PCH Associates, 122 B.R. 181, 198 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1990); In re Texaco, 73 B.R. 960, 967 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1987)). 26 . 73 B.R. at 967. 27 . Id. 28 . Id. at 968. 29 . Id. 30 . 29 B.R. 787 (D.Md.1983). 31 . Id. at 791. 32 . 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). 33 . United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). 34 . See, e.g., Bank of Honolulu v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 69 B.R. 105, 108 (9th Cir. BAP 1986) (<HOLDING>); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Holdings: 0: holding that an oversecured creditor is entitled to postpetition interest if the creditor is oversecured or if the estate proves to be solvent 1: holding that nonconsensual oversecured creditor shall receive the statutory rate of interest unless it can be characterized as a penalty 2: holding that nonconsensual oversecured tax claim is entitled to the statutory rate of interest unless the statutory rate constitutes a penalty 3: holding that when a creditor is oversecured solvency is not required for the creditor to be entitled to postpetition interest and fees and granting contractual default interest to the oversecured creditor of approximately 24 4: holding that when an oversecured creditor seeks interest on its claim courts apply the interest rate provided for in the contract


Input: its own jurisdiction and to rectify any errors it may have made. Exhaustion of tribal court remedies, moreover, will encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review. Therefore, the propriety and legality of the exercise of the civil contempt authority of the tribal court must first be determined in the Ute Tribal Court system. Even if the contempt is considered criminal contempt, see Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988)(as to the distinction between civil and criminal contempt), after the Supreme Court’s decision in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990) (<HOLDING>), Congress enacted an amendment to the Indian Holdings: 0: holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization 1: recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes  to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians 2: holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation 3: holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians 4: holding that state of south dakota does not have criminal jurisdiction over indians in indian country


Input: in judicial speculation.” Gustafson, 290 F.3d at 909. The court is to examine the record for evidence of potential or actual disruption, but not engage in excessive Monday morning quarterbacking of a police official’s determination that potential disruption was present. See id. at 909-12; Kokkinis, 185 F.3d at 845-46. Here, the record demonstrates that Chief Wood and Lt. Snooks perceived potential disruption from McGreal’s conduct. In light of the need for structure, loyalty, and harmony in a police department, that potential disruption is sufficient to tip the Pickering scale in favor of Chief Wood and Lt. Snooks. Having found that Chief Wood and Lt. Snooks have carried their burden under the Pickering test, they are entitled to qualified immunity. See e.g. Gragg, 289 F.3d at 965-66 (<HOLDING>). Typically, this would end the analysis, but Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that speech was public concern 1: holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern 2: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 3: holding that defendants claiming qualified immunity to  1983 action were entitled to summary judgment where factual disputes were not material 4: holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right


Input: of ORS 183.310(9), a rule is: “any agency directive, standard, regulation or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the procedure or practice requirements of any agency. The term * * * does not include: “(a) * * * internal management directives * * * which do not substantially affect the interests of the public: «:{: * * ‡ * “(B) Within an agency, between its officers or between employees [.]” The parties agree that the health policy constitutes a “directive, standard, regulation or statement.” Further, the health policy has general applicability, as it applies to all inmates who receive or may need to receive medical care while incarcerated. See Smith v. Board of Parole, 250 Or App 345, 350-51, 284 P3d 1150 (2012) (<HOLDING>). The parties disagree about whether the health Holdings: 0: recognizing that cjlearly buie requires more than ignorance or a constant assumption that more than one person is present in a residence 1: holding that a noticeofrights form that plainly affects more than one person and encompasses more than an immediate set of facts and is applicable  to all inmates in a particular category is a rule 2: holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim 3: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 4: holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured


Input: a “final adjudication on the merits” of the issue now precluded from re-litigation. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 585 Pa. 477, 889 A.2d 47, 50-51 (2005). Because there was no final adjudication of Edison Learning’s negligence, the School District’s claim fails. At no point in the Viruet litigation did the court determine that Edison Learning was negligent. Even conceding the School District’s arg 2, 326, 75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955) (concluding there was “no question of collateral estoppel ... because the ease was never tried” and instead settled (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if considered final, settlement of a claim is not an automatic admission of liability. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Rue, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 187, 393 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Parties settle for many reasons, including to Holdings: 0: holding that because the settlement agreement here specifically did not contain any admission of liability the plaintiff must therefore prove some liability on the part of defendant 1: holding that to establish tort liability in a negligence action there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff 2: holding that where there has been no settlement or judgment of liability regarding the underlying claim any imposition of liability is not so immediate as to warrant declaratory relief on the issue of indemnification 3: holding that a binding settlement on a tax liability must follow the requirements of the tax code which include the execution of a closing agreement 4: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt


Input: and Fenner had not misrepresented his condition as he was merely asked his opinion about his physical abilities: “Do you have any injuries, you know, that would prevent you from doing this type of work.” Fenner answered in the negative. Whether this ruling was correct must remain unexamined. Trimac’s appeal on this issue was deemed untimely by this Court, and consequently, we are constrained to review only Fenner’s post-employment conduct. 11 . Some of the cases the majority offers to support its argument are inapplicable, as well, because they rely on a lower standard than that required in South Dakota. See, e.g., Appleby, 22 Ark.App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (considering whether an employee's actions aggravating a pri- or injury were merely reasonable); Amoco Chemical Corp., 318 A.2d 614 (<HOLDING>); Johnnie’s Produce Co., 120 So.2d 12 (noting a Holdings: 0: holding exclusion h does not apply where employees were merely negligent 1: holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury 2: holding that written warnings that impacted the probability an employee would be terminated are adverse employment actions 3: holding an employees actions in disregarding his doctors warnings were negligent 4: recognizing as viable actions in tort negligent hiring and negligent retention


Input: LEXIS 1468, at *9 n. 4 (D.S.C. Jan 31, 2000) (Plaintiffs' allegations that defendant “presented materially false information to the public in order to ensure the completion of a public offering that would provide him huge profits from the sale of his personally-held stock” was sufficient to plead scienter); In re American Bank Note Holographics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 93 F.Supp.2d 424, 444-45 (S.D.N.Y.2000) ("[Defendant company] had the most to win by inflating the price of the IPO, and was thus motivated to make statements or omit facts that would result in a higher price.”). 56 . San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 814 (2d Cir.1996) (quotations omitted); see, e.g., In re Crystal Brands Sec. Litig., 862 F.Supp. 745, 749 (D.Conn.1994) (<HOLDING>). 57 . The allegations in the Complaint, Holdings: 0: holding that alleged motives of directors and officers to maintain good relations with suppliers retailers and lenders and to protect their positions are insufficient because they pertain to virtually any company that manufactures goods 1: holding that allegations of a motive to maintain good relations with suppliers retailers and lenders  pertain to virtually any company that manufactures and distributes goods and are therefore inadequate 2: holding trial court improperly instructed jury in trial for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute that evidence of defendants similar acts of possession was admissible to show motive where motive was not element of crime charged and defendant did not contest motive 3: holding that the hobbs act jurisdictional nexus was met by the robbery of a delicatessen that sold goods produced out of state without mentioning whether the goods were purchased from outofstate or instate suppliers 4: holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter


Input: Cir.1988), and International Union UAW Local 91 v. Park-Ohio Ind., Inc., Nos. 88 Civ. 3145, 88 Civ. 3147, 1989 WL 63871 (6th Cir. June 15, 1989). In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit held that a beneficiary could not recover for extraeontractual damages against a fiduciary under Section 1132(a)(3) for improper processing of benefit claims. 857 F.2d at 518. In International Union, the Sixth Circuit held that neither Section 1132(a)(1)(B) nor Section 1132(a)(3) provide for extraeontractual compensatory damages. 1989 WL 63871, at *7. 24 . The Court notes that the Second Circuit does not adhere to the Seventh Circuit's presumption of awarding prejudgment interest in ERISA cases. See Mendez v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Assoc. and College Retirement Equities Fund, 982 F.2d 783, 790 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>) 25 . In order to submit a claim for benefits Holdings: 0: holding that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases except in peculiar or exceptional circumstances 1: holding that award and rate of prejudgment interest are within trial courts discretion 2: holding that prejudgment interest should be awarded when the claimant has been denied the use of money which was legally due 3: holding that a court may in its discretion award prejudgment interest in erisa cases where appropriate but it is not axiomatic that such interest should be awarded simply because  the prevailing party has demonstrated entitlement to the funds 4: recognizing general rule that prejudgment interest may be awarded in claims for liquidated amounts


Input: firms or corporations liable” is unambiguous and discharges all potential tortfeasors from liability. See, e.g., Battle v. Clanton, 27 N.C.App. 616, 220 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 613, 223 S.E.2d 391 (1976); Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764, 765 (1961). The parties t ic evidence of intent must be considered); Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 432, 433-34 (Fla.1980) (adopting intent rule and holding that release containing handwritten and preprinted terms was inherently ambiguous); Cram v. Toum of Northbridge, 410 Mass. 800, 575 N.E.2d 747, 749 (1991) (reversing summary judgment because accident victim filed an affidavit in which she stated she intended to discharge only the driver who injured her); Wells, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 521, 526 N.E.2d at 12 (<HOLDING>); Krauss, 852 P.2d at 1019-20 (same). A Holdings: 0: holding that extrinsic evidence of the parties course of conduct may be considered where the contract language is ambiguous 1: holding that a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether a contract is ambiguous 2: holding that court must determine intent of parties by reference to language of release turning to extrinsic evidence only when it determines as a matter of law that terms are ambiguous 3: holding that court may not use extrinsic evidence unless contract language is ambiguous 4: holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties


Input: it be argued that the timeliness of appellants' bad faith claim depended upon our Supreme Court’s ruling that Miller was a permissive user of Madalyn Gower’s vehicle, which ruling required appellee to pay the policy limits. A bad faith action under section 8371 is neither related to nor dependent on the underlying contract claim against the insurer. See March v. Paradise Mutual Insurance Co., 435 Pa.Super. 597, 646 A.2d 1254 (1994) (“a claim brought under section 8371 is a cause of action which is separate and distinct from the underlying contract claim.”). As a result, Miller (and, by extension, appellants) were not required to wait until the merits of the contract claim were decided to file suit for bad faith. See Boring v. Erie Insurance Group, 434 Pa.Super. 40, 641 A.2d 1189 (1984) (<HOLDING>); and Margolies v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Holdings: 0: holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order 1: holding arbitration decision disallowing insurers coverage defense binding in subsequent personal injury action where the issue was actually litigated and decided in prior action 2: holding that although the issue of coverage had not yet been decided appellants action under 8371 was a separate claim and the dismissal of that claim was instantly appealable 3: holding voluntary dismissal permissible because trial court had not yet reached a decision on the merits 4: holding that plaintiffs dismissal of personal injury action and subsequent dismissal of declaratory judgment action concerning extent of tortfeasors insurance coverage did not trigger double dismissal rule


Input: under California’s “three strikes” law for perjury on a Department of Motor Vehicles driver’s license application. Reyes had filled out a license application and attempted to take the written portion of the exam under the name of his cousin Miguel Soto. At trial, Reyes testified that he tried to take the exam for Soto because Soto was illiterate and had failed to pass. Because the perjury conviction was Reyes’s third strike, he was sentenced to 26 years to life. Reyes is married and has two children who were one and three years old at the time of sentencing. Reyes contends that his 26 years to life sentence is grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This argument is foreclosed by Lockyer v. An-drade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1172-75, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (<HOLDING>), and Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,123 Holdings: 0: holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imposed for felony grand theft under californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment 1: holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states 2: holding that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to decisions to impose consecutive sentences 3: holding that a california state courts affirmance of two consecutive 25 years to life sentences for petty theft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law 4: holding that 25 years to life sentence under the california three strikes law did not violate the eighth amendments prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment


Input: decision is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. While it may generally be possible to permit a party to call a witness without disclosing the fact of his or her prior engagement by the opposing party, there may be little reason to require this effort if other expert witnesses are readily available. See Rubel, 160 F.R.D. at 461. 5 . One such situation may be if on cross examination, the party who had originally retained the witness seeks to attack the expert's qualifications. In such a situation, a court may well decide that the opposing party should be permitted to attempt to rehabilitate the witness by eliciting testimony from the witness that the party had thought highly enough of the witness to consult him or her originally. See Granger, 656 P.2d at 1242, & n. 4 (<HOLDING>). 6 .On direct examination, appeEees’ counsel Holdings: 0: recognizing split within the circuit on whether the rule is mandatory or discretionary but not resolving the conflict 1: recognizing the open question 2: recognizing but not resolving this question 3: recognizing this rule 4: recognizing without resolving the split in authority on the meaning of the word


Input: The consensual overhear applications and orders for eavesdropping devices worn on the person are not included in the appellate record as required by Supreme Court Rule 608(a)(6). See 210 Ill. 2d R. 608(a)(6) (the record on appeal must contain, among other things, eavesdropping orders and other similar documents). 4 Following oral argument, this court granted Stroud’s motion to cite additional authority regarding the proper standard of review for eavesdropping necessity. Stroud argued that there was a split in the federal circuit courts regarding the proper standard of review. Our research reveals that the majority of circuits, including the Seventh Circuit, use an abuse of discretion standard of review. See United States v. Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d 1219, 1222 n.l (10th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>), citing United States v. Phillips, 959 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the admission of evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion 1: holding that the conclusion that the wiretap was necessary in each situation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and bringing the tenth circuit into accordance with the authority of a majority of other circuits 2: holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion 3: holding under third circuit law that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion 4: holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion


Input: against a concrete sidewalk); State v. Jacobs, 34 Or.App. 755, 579 P.2d 881, 882 (1978) (conviction upheld where defendant placed four-year-old child in scalding hot water). Third, Begay made clear that the residual clause applies to offenses involving “the deliberate kind of behavior associated with violent criminal use of firearms.” Begay, 553 U.S. at 147, 128 S.Ct. 1581. In noting that the enumerated offenses all “typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct,” the Begay Court explained that the conduct involved in those offenses “ ) of Oregon’s second-degree assault statute, Or.Rev.Stat. § 163.175(1)(b), presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another and “typically involve[s] purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct,” Begay, 9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Begay focused on a nearly identical Holdings: 0: holding that assault with a deadly weapon was not a crime involving moral turpitude 1: holding that washington seconddegree assault with a deadly weapon statute was a crime of violence under guidelines section 4b12a1 without considering whether it was a per se crime of violence under the application notes 2: holding that a prior conviction for abusive sexual contact under 18 usc  2244a3 was a per se crime of violence within the meaning of the application notes and declining to consider application of the residual clause 3: holding that theft from the person is not a crime of violence 4: holding that burglary of commercial building is crime of violence under guidelines


Input: requested an attorney and interrogation had ceased. The Supreme Court of Arizona upheld the conviction, holding that the defendant’s confession was voluntarily given. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding “waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id. at 483, 101 S.Ct. 1880. To invoke a Fifth Amendment right to counsel, one must give “some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991); see also State v. Kennedy, 333 S.C. 426, 430, 510 S.E.2d 714, 715 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, this Court has held that [а] Holdings: 0: holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights 1: holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease 2: recognizing two aspects to assertion of fifth amendment rights 1 a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand request was made for an attorney and 2 the request was for assistance with a custodial interrogation not for subsequent hearings or proceedings 3: holding a juveniles request to speak to a probation officer is not a per se invocation of fifth amendment rights 4: holding that an unequivocal invocation of the fifth amendment right to counsel must be presented in a manner that a reasonable police officer under similar circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for the presence of an attorney


Input: Supreme Court concluded in Bell that strip searches were not per se unreasonable and could be performed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment on less than probable cause in some instances. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559-560, 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85. In order to determine the reasonableness of the search and the instances requiring less than probable cause, the Supreme Court set out the following test: The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope L.Ed.2d 479 (1985); Tinetti v. Wittke, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir.1980), aff'g, 479 F.Supp. 486 (E.D.Wis.1979) (<HOLDING>). Courts considering the strip search issue Holdings: 0: holding that mandatory visual strip search policy in county jail was unconstitutional 1: holding that arrestees for minor offenses may be subjected to a strip search only if jail officials have probable cause to believe that arrestees are concealing weapons or contraband 2: holding unconstitutional blanket jail policy of subjecting all arrestees to strip and visual body cavity searches 3: holding that police may search containers whether open or closed located within arrestees reach 4: holding that mandatory routine visual strip search policy for all arrestees who were to be introduced into general jail population was constitutional


Input: criminal laws.” Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3164, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). Thus, based on our analysis of Williams’ sentence pursuant to the Solem objective criteria, we hold that 11 DelC. § 4214(b), as applied to Williams, does not impose an unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Conclusion The judgments of the Superior Court, which resulted in Williams’ convictions and his sentencing as an habitual criminal, are AFFIRMED. 1 . Some time after the police left, Thornton saw a person wearing the clothes he had described sitting in the back seat of a police vehicle on 17th Street. 2 . State’s Answering Brief at 7, Williams v. State, Del.Supr., No. 411, 1986 (citing Dalton v. State, Del.Supr., 252 A.2d 104, 105 (1969)) (<HOLDING>)). See also Tasco v. State, 223 Md. 503, 165 Holdings: 0: holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient 1: holding jury cannot return any verdict except acquittal when evidence is insufficient to corroborate accomplice witness 2: holding that mere presence at the crime scene without more is insufficient to prove accomplice liability 3: holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict 4: holding that failure to follow gaap without more is insufficient to establish scienter


Input: (2d Cir. 1982)). The Court will not construe unfair competition/misappropriation claims to apply to the two musical compositions at issue, however, because federal copyright law preempts them. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (preempting state law claims "equivalent” to exclusive rights under the federal copyright laws for, inter alia, unpublished works created prior to 1978), with § 301(c) (excluding sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972 from preemption until 2067). 19 .”[T]he existence of a valid copyright” is the first essential element for a claim of copyright infringement, under both New York law and federal law. Lime Grp., 784 F.Supp.2d at 436; see also Capitol Records, LLC v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., No. 12 Civ. 6646 (AJN), 2015 WL 1402049, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2015) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, a claim of unfair competition by Holdings: 0: holding that a fraud claim premised on thirdparty reliance raises a cognizable claim under new york law 1: holding that the most analogous claim for relief under new york law is a claim for employment discrimination 2: holding that dalessio did not justify removal where the gravamen of plaintiffs complaint was that defendants made materially false statements to them in a manner prohibited by new york law and in violation of duties created by new york law and no construction or interpretation of federal law was required 3: holding that new york law applies to this matter 4: holding that elements of a common law copyrightinfringement claim under new york law mirror those of a federal copyrightinfringement claim


Input: no matter how quickly and ably given, could salvage a fair trial for the defendant.”). Moreover, apparently the only reason the State sought to introduce the prior inconsistent statement was its belief that the jury would be swayed by the statement when determining guilt, or innocence. See United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir.1984) (“[I]t would be an abuse of the [impeachment] rule, in a criminal case, for the prosecution to call a witness that it knew would not give it useful evidence, just” so it could introduce hearsay evidence against the defendant in the hope that the jury would miss the subtle distinction between impeachment and substantive evidence — or, if it didn’t miss it, would ignore it.” (emphasis added)). See also Nance, 331 Md. at 566, 629 A.2d at 642 (<HOLDING>); State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. 343, 378 S.E.2d 754, Holdings: 0: recognizing that questions of intent and credibility make it difficult to grant summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of proof 1: holding that absence of epidemiological evidence not fatal but makes his task to show general causation more difficult 2: recognizing the jurys role in evaluating credibility 3: recognizing inherently difficult task of proving a negative 4: recognizing the jurys difficult task of separating substantive proof from impeachment evidence bearing solely on a wit nesss credibility


Input: 1 . The amendments made by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub.L.No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 ("IIRIRA”), are not applicable to the instant case. As such, references herein are made to the Immigration and Nationality Act as it existed prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA. The IIRIRA repealed the section under consideration in this case, but provided transitional rules that apply to cases, such as the instant case, where the deportation proceedings commenced prior to April 1,, 1996. The transitional rules provided that the INA applies as codified prior to the passage of the IIRIRA. See IIRIRA §§ 306(c)(1), 309(a). 2 . In early 1996, Scorteanu had married Doi-na Zieminska and retained attorney Mosabi Hamed to file an 1 1999) (<HOLDING>). See also Damon W. Taaffe, Comment: Tolling Holdings: 0: holding that  242bc3as time bar is not jurisdictional and thus subject to equitable tolling 1: holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling 2: holding title vii subject to equitable tolling 3: holding that oneyear limitations period set forth in  2255 is not a jurisdictional bar and is thus subject to equitable tolling 4: holding that the ninetyday filing requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite and is subject to equitable tolling


Input: representation that the investment program was “backed” or otherwise sponsored by Jackson Hewitt. D. No Reliance by the Kamans The Kamans were also unable to prove the reliance element necessary to establish an apparent agency. Indeed, the undisputed facts demonstrated that they did not rely on a purported agency relationship between Jackson Hewitt and JHIS when they decided to invest with Prewett. First, Dr. Kaman conceded that he knew the Jackson Hewitt Tax Service office in Sarasota was a franchise operation before investing with Prewett. It follows that he could not have reasonably believed that JHIS was owned, controlled, or operated by the franchisor, Jackson Hewitt. See Mann v. Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc., No. 90 C 5518, 1990 WL 205286, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 10, 1990) (<HOLDING>); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Lesch, 319 Md. 25, Holdings: 0: holding that employees retaliatory discharge based on employees election to public office did not violate public policy 1: holding unconscionable an arbitration agreement requiring employees to arbitrate claims against the employer but not requiring the employer to arbitrate claims against the employees 2: holding that tort claims act contemplates waiver of immunity when negligence of public employees causes unsafe dangerous or defective condition on property owned and operated by the government 3: holding that probation department employees are not county employees 4: holding that the employees of a local real estate franchisee could not maintain claims against the franchisor based on apparent agency when the employees knew that the franchisee was independently owned and operated


Input: Landvest Corp., Civ. A. No. 04-2025-CM, 2006 WL 897612, *7-8 (D.Kan. Mar. 31, 2006) (three years prior to plaintiff's termination was a reasonable scope in light of the three-year statute of limitations). 17 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). 18 . Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 611, 615 (D.Kan.2005); Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 690 (D.Kan.2001). 19 . Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 646 (D.Kan.2004) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1)). 20 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 615-16; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637, 640 (D.Kan.2003). 21 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 616; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Steil, 197 F.R.D. at 445. 22 . See United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>); Sprint, 236 F.R.D. at 529 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that assertions of privilege must normally be raised as to each record sought and each question asked so that  the court can rule with specificity 1: holding that products dissimilar in price can have similar features so as to compete with each other 2: holding that the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors 3: holding that each provision of a statute must be afforded meaning when possible 4: holding that each element required under the act must be included in the written notice and each element must be sufficiently clear and accurate


Input: affidavit did not allege any facts suggesting that any relationship existed between the two after that employment was terminated. See Bixler v. State, 471 N.E.2d 1093, 1100-01 (Ind.1984) (defendant not entitled to change of judge where trial judge went to same church as victim’s family and had drawn up will some years earlier for step-father of victim’s mother). Furthermore, the fact that Judge Gifford imposed a sentence in excess of the minimum does not, as McKinney contends, “reflect bias against McKinney and sympathy for the victim’s family.” Id. at 9. As discussed further in Section VI of this opinion, McKinney’s sentence is justified by the heinous nature of his crime and the existence of only one mitigating circumstance. See Johnson v. State, 472 N.E.2d 892, 911 (Ind.1985) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied. Judge Gif-ford’s denial of Holdings: 0: holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts 1: holding that imposition of lengthy sentences did not show prejudice where sentences were warranted by facts shown in the evidence 2: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to modify hfo sentences where sentences were not illegal and sixty days had transpired since imposition of the sentence 3: holding that the law allows the government to offer reduced sentences in exchange for assistance even if it results in sentences of such disparity as would strike many as unfair 4: holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt


Input: the last sentence of the statute. The statute sets forth the duty a vehicle operator has to pedestrians. The last sentence of section 41-6-80 states that the seetion sets aside any conflicting provision of the traffic rules and regulations found in chapter 6 of the annotated Utah Code or of a local ordinance. The plain language of the section clearly states that if either a local ordinance or a state statute under chapter 6 creates a duty for a vehicle operator that is any more or less than that stated in this section (which, inter alia, is to exercise the appropriate pre caution upon observing any child), that ordinance or statute is set aside. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-80. 150 The jury was given several instructions on the various duties of a driver and also on those of a pe .1992) (<HOLDING>); Shpigel v. White, 357 Md. 117, 741 A2d 1205, Holdings: 0: holding that jury should decide whether plaintiffs testimony proved reasonable and necessary medical expenses 1: holding that debtors have the burden of proving that other necessary expenses on form b22c are actual reasonable and necessary expenses and that these expenses should be considered in light of schedule j and other relevant evidence 2: holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary 3: holding that reliance must be proven by some evidence 4: holding that a statutory entitlement to payment for reasonable and necessary medical treatment cannot give rise to a property interest until the payments in question have been proven to be reasonable and necessary


Input: evidence of these matters is not required to sustain a conviction. Indeed, the “affirmative links” analysis is a way “to explain why the circumstantial evidence in a particular case [is] sufficient for conviction.” Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747. In addition, the trial court, as trier of fact, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and could have disbelieved the defense witnesses’ testimony that others had used Wiley’s car. See Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740. In such a case, there would be no basis for considering Wiley’s possession of the car to be shared with others. Wiley also relies on Miller v. State, 627 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1981, pet. ref'd), for the proposition that evidence that the defendant possessed keys to pp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); Lassaint v. State, 79 S.W.3d 736, 741-46 Holdings: 0: holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had knowledge of firearm in close proximity to him when he was driving the car for the cars owner who was a passenger 1: holding evidence that showed only that defendant drove car in which cocaine was found was insufficient to connect him to it especially in light of his attempts to dissociate himself from passenger who was high and in possession of pop at time of arrest 2: holding evidence did not connect defendant to narcotics found in individual bags inside a larger bag in a car following the defendants car when the only connection was his fingerprints on outer bag and when the driver and passenger of the car in which the drugs were found exhibited nervousness and other factors indicating consciousness of guilt 3: holding that defendant who was a passenger in a car had joint constructive possession of drugs found next to the defendants luggage in truck of car even where she disclaimed ownership of the drugs 4: holding that evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession where the defendant was in jail at the time the drugs were seized from his residence


Input: ORDER OF THE COURT. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is d r citing Graham, which the trial court granted. The court resentenced Roman to forty years in prison for count one and a consecutive fifteen-year prison term for count two followed by twenty-five years of sexual offender probation. The court imposed a concurrent fifteen-year term in prison for count three. We affirm Roman’s fifty-five-year aggregate prison sentence on the basis of Williams v. State, 197 So.3d 569, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (<HOLDING>). We certify conflict with Peterson v. State, Holdings: 0: holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham 1: holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence 2: recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences 3: holding that probation is not a sentence 4: holding that an effective life sentence of fortyfive years for seconddegree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment


Input: Id. at 262-63, 102 S.Ct. 2421 (quoting Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, 84 S.Ct. 1734, 12 L.Ed.2d 766 (1964)). Coe says that because Tennessee’s waiver practice has not been consistent in cases with similar circumstances, it cannot serve as the basis for a procedural bar. The state responds by citing numerous eases that establish waiver, and it has the better of the argument. Coe’s eases are mostly either adverse, or too old to constitute current “strict and regular” practice. The few that remain are isolated and unpublished, and so are also insufficient to defeat an otherwise “strict and regular” practice. See Delbridge v. State, 742 S.W.2d 266 (Tenn.1987) (not mentioning waiver); Moore v. State, No. 03C01-9212-CR-00445, 1994 WL 17864, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 25, 1994) (<HOLDING>); Sneed v. State, No. 03C01-9201-CR-00027,1992 Holdings: 0: recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver 1: recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary 2: holding that trial court has no duty to establish waiver on record 3: holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver 4: holding that record did not establish knowing waiver


Input: and later search at station); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 & n. 7 (5th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1353, 127 S.Ct. 2065, 167 L.Ed.2d 790 (2007) (approving the retrieval of call records and text messages from the defendant’s cell phone incident to his arrest, and finding that the “incident to arrest” basis for this ruling was unaffected by the fact that the police transported the defendant a short distance before conducting this search); United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir.2012) (upholding a search of a cell phone incident to an arrest for the limited purpose of obtaining the cell phone number, which in turn was used to subpoena call history records from the telephone company); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 Fed.Appx. 216, 225 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Fuentes, 368 Fed.Appx. 95, Holdings: 0: holding that while law enforcement officers properly separated and assumed possession of a cell phone from arrestees person during the search incident to arrest a warrant was required before the information data and content of the cell phone could be accessed and searched by law enforcement 1: holding a warrantless search of cell phone contents did not exceed permissible scope of search incident to arrest 2: holding that the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest includes the contents of a cell phone found on the arrestees person 3: holding seizure of arrestees cell phone lawful but finding the fourth amendment requires a warrant to perform a forensic search of the lawfully seized cell phone 4: holding that finley authorizes a police officer to search the electronic contents of a cell phone recovered from the area within an arrestees immediate control


Input: A.2d 300, 304 (App.Div.) (finding requisite level of intent if insured were guilty of child molestation and concluding, “[i]t is simply against public policy to indemnify a person for a loss incurred as a result of his own willful wrongdoing”), cert. denied, 122 N.J. 147, 584 A2d 218 (1990). Teti disagrees, contending that New Jersey law applies and that New Jersey has “not adopted the strict [Pennsylvania] test of the ‘inferred intent doctrine.’ ” Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, doc. no. 8, at 4. Instead, Teti argues, under New Jersey law, the intent to injure may be presumed only “when the [insured’s] actions are particularly reprehensible” in the underlying case. Voorhees v. Preferred Mwt. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165, 607 A.2d 1255, 1265 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Teti submits that this case does not rise to Holdings: 0: holding that accident does not include intentional act if insured acted with intent to harm and noting that intentional acts exclusion applies if insured acted with specific intent to harm 1: recognizing strong presumption in favor of parents right to custody absent misconduct or neglect which renders the parent unfit 2: recognizing duty of parent to control conduct of child 3: holding that  statements of insured parent at public meeting questioning competency of teacher albeit unquestionably intentional could not trigger presumption of intent to injure because parents conduct was not particularly reprehensible 4: holding that trial court abused its discretion in admitting alcoholism experts opinion that the insureds mental capacity was so impaired at the time of the shooting that he could not form intent to injure opinion lacked an adequate foundation when there was no scientific basis regarding the effects of intoxication on mental capacity to form intent to injure


Input: rate that is added to the total amount of commissions earned. As such, NHC’s nonrecoverable draw functions much more like a salary than a true draw on commissions. Regardless of whether the Level I plan constitutes a salary plus commission, a quota bonus plan, or a hybrid of both, the pre-determined compensation referred to by the Defendant as a “non-recoverable draw” does not represent commissions. To the contrary, in light of the way that compensation actually functions, it represents a salary. Therefore, this portion of the account executives’ compensation cannot be taken into account when determining whether more than fifty percent of the Plaintiffs’ earnings represent commission, as is required to qualify for the retail-service exemption. See Donovan, 1986 WL 11266, at *4 (<HOLDING>). Rather, the Court must examine only the true Holdings: 0: holding over 1: holding that the commission exercises substantial discretion in selecting the appropriate ratemaking methodology and this is especially true where as here the issues involve complex factual determinations peculiarly within the expertise of the commission 2: recognizing that the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true on a threshold motion to dismiss 3: recognizing that the only true commission portion of the salaries appears to be those amounts over the threshold level 4: holding that the commission may only exercise jurisdiction over utilities expressly included in the scope of the pua


Input: characterize a claim of procedural error as one of jurisdictional dimension. The fact that a trial court may have erred along the course of adjudicating a dispute does not mean it lacked jurisdiction. Thus, while we might casually say, “Judge Flywheel assumed jurisdiction,” or “the court had jurisdiction to impose a ten-year sentence,” such statements do not have anything to do with the law of jurisdiction, either personal or subject matter. Real jurisdictional problems would be, say, a juvenile delinquency adjudication entered in a small claims court, or a judgment rendered without any service of process. Thus characterizing other sorts of procedural defects as “jurisdictional” misapprehends the concepts. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 541-42 (Ind.2006) (emphasis in original) (<HOLDING>). In Packard v. Shoopman, our supreme court Holdings: 0: holding that the alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the unsafe building act was a procedural rather than jurisdictional error and was thus waived when it was not raised in a timely fashion 1: holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional 2: holding that petitioner could not collaterally attack his state court conviction on a petition for review of an agency decision 3: holding that the juvenile courts alleged failure to approve by written order the filing of a delinquency petition was a procedural error and not a jurisdictional one and thus could not be attacked collaterally 4: holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional


Input: for providing compensated lawyers where the defendant cannot afford to compensate counsel himself eliminates the opportunity for such extraneous influences on criminal proceedings. Nor was the district court entitled to rely on Rivera-Corona’s statement during his plea colloquy that he was satisfied with Marchi’s representation. According to Rivera-Corona, Marchi demanded money that his client presumably did not have as a condition of going to trial, and was prepared to “prosecute” — presumably sue— Rivera-Corona’s family if he didn’t pay it. If true, these facts could support a motion to set aside his plea, as Rivera-Corona’s statement of satisfaction with Marchi at the colloquy could be explained by the same facts. See United States v. Gonzalez, 113 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The implication of Rivera-Corona’s remarks Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs evidence that his back injury precluded him from performing at least 50 of the jobs previously available to him was enough to classify him as disabled under the ada 1: holding no coercion where counsel told movant his conviction was likely because movant stated he understood full range of punishment and no one threatened him to plead guilty 2: holding that the movant failed to establish that plea counsel coerced him to plead guilty to avoid taking the case to trial 3: holding the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendants motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the defendant did not admit to facts demonstrating the required mental state 4: holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel on the strength of gonzalezs sworn responses at the pleataking that no one was threatening him or forcing him to plead where the defendant alleged that his attorney forced him to plead guilty  and threatened him if he did not take the plea


Input: for the sale of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void, unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and signed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized in writing ... .[ ] The easement granted by Hoover over his property, lot 2, for the benefit of Zaher and his property, lot 3, was reduced to a written document. Under the statute of frauds, however, to transfer an interest in property, all parties possessing an interest in the subject property must sign the document. Forge, 458 Mich at 206 (“[a]ll owners of jointly held property must sign a contract conveying an interest in the property,” e.g., an easement in Forge); Slater Mgt Corp v Nash, 212 Mich App 30, 32; 536 NW2d 843 (1995) (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed that Hoover’s wife, Linda, Holdings: 0: holding that the equal rights amendment requires that wife as well as husband be permitted to recover for loss of consortium 1: holding that the statute of frauds applies to a sellers wife holding only a dower interest in the property so the wife must sign the purchase agreement as well as the seller husband 2: holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted 3: holding that a reservation clause gave a life estate to a spouse pursuant to a deed reserving use of the property to both husband and wife for life even though the husband had no interest in the property 4: holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees


Input: this suit was not a deficiency judgment because it was an action on a separate note for a different debt “and for which a conveyance of other property was made as security.” Id. 143 Ga.App. at 77, 237 S.E.2d at 626. Likewise, in Baker v. NEI Corp., 144 Ga.App. 165, 241 S.E.2d 4 (1977), two notes were secured by two deeds that covered two different properties. Each deed con tained an open-end provision. The lender foreclosed on both deeds, but only obtained confirmation of the sale under the second deed. The lender then sued for the itional property and had obtained confirmation of that sale, it would still need to obtain confirmation of the sale of the Tift County tracts in order to seek a deficiency judgment. See Surety Managers, Inc. v. Stanford, 633 F.2d 709, 712 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 121, 70 Holdings: 0: holding that suit on a note secured by two properties was barred when lender failed to obtain confirmation of the foreclosure on one of the properties 1: holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met 2: holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder 3: holding impairment of secured creditors foreclosure remedy permissible 4: holding that federal express fee required by lender was a transaction imposed by the lender as incident to the extension of credit and needed to be disclosed within the finance charge


Input: 23 S.W.3d at 485. A landowner with an easement of access is entitled to compensation through an inverse condemnation claim whenever the access is “materially and substantially impaired.” Heal, 917 S. t in the public alley.” TXDOT asserts that GAR does not possess an easement of access and that the “driveway” was not a “public road or alley.” TXDOT further asserts that “there was no dedication of the State’s property as a public road” and that GAR’s “temporary permissive use of the property” did not “result in a dedication.” “[A]butting property owners have private rights in existing streets and alleys in addition to their rights in common with the general public.” City of San Antonio v. Olivares, 505 S.W.2d 526, 530 (Tex.1974); see also State v. Meyer, 403 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex.1966) (<HOLDING>). “This right is in effect a private right of Holdings: 0: holding that waters in utah are of two classes private and public and title to public waters is in the public all are equal owners that is have coequal rights therein 1: recognizing that abutting property owners have certain private rights in existing streets and highways in addition to their right in common with the general public to use them 2: holding that it is well settled that while one tenant in common may acquire homestead rights in the common property the rights so acquired are not superior to the rights and remedies of the other joint owners he can acquire no such rights as will prejudice or in anywise interfere with the rights of the other tenants in common 3: recognizing private right of action 4: recognizing that unit owners own the common elements in fee as tenants in common


Input: abuse occurrence.” In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned is mindful that Florida has adopted the “cause” theory to assess whether one or more “occurrences” have taken place as the term “occurrence” might appear or be defined in many comprehensive general liability policies. The theory has been utilized by the courts where, unlike in this case, the “occurrence” policy either failed to define “occurrence” or defined “occurrence” as being in the nature of an accident “including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful conditions.” See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. RLI Ins. Co., 807 So.2d 171, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (reasoning that “[t]he act which causes the damage constitutes the occurrence”); See also Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So.2d 263 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). In such cases, courts inquire whether “there Holdings: 0: holding each act of shooting from a vehicle constituted a separate and distinct crime explaining where completed offense has occurred a separate charge may be brought for a repetition of the same conduct 1: holding the payment of benefits at the occurrence of a single event an indicium of lack of an administrative scheme 2: holding a judgment that reserved the issue of child support indefinitely and not pending the occurrence of a specific event to be final 3: holding that each separate pull of a trigger during the same shooting spree is an event sufficiently in time and space to constitute an independent occurrence 4: holding that the liability creating event constitutes an occurrence


Input: and, thus, the order fell easily within the ambit of Rule 2 (a)(6). But even more to the point, National Enterprises has taken inconsistent positions with respect to the chancery court’s 1994 order. In its first notice of appeal in 1994, National Enterprises referred to the 1994 order as a “final Order” and stated that it was appealing issues relating to the deeds, easements, and the License Agreement and specifically mentioned ingress and egress and parking. Because National Enterprises failed to perfect its appeal in a timely fashion by tendering the record too late, it failed to appeal the 1994 order. Because the order was not appealed, it became a final order and became binding on all the parties. See, e.g., Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fauria, 279 Ark. 291, 651 S.W.2d 80 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In addition to its notice of appeal, on May Holdings: 0: recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment 1: holding that poliey language stating that insurer will pay all interest accruing on judgment against its insured requires an insurer to pay interest on the entire judgment amount 2: holding that court of appeals was without jurisdiction to modify judgment against insurer because judgment against insurer became final when it failed to appeal 3: holding that in a dispute between insurer and insured in which the insurer admitted liability hut disputed the amount of damages it was only after entry of a judgment upon that verdict that the claim became liquidated 4: holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment


Input: ALJ did not accurately describe the treatment received by Ms. Grier for fibromyalgia and the ALJ also failed to credit Ms. Grier’s longitudinal history of back pain. The Regulations state that relevant factors for an ALJ to consider when evaluating a claimant’s pain symptoms include, “the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication” taken by the claimant, as well as any “[treatment, other than medication, [claimant] receives or ha[s] received for relief of [claimant’s] pain or other symptoms[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v). A claimant’s statements “may be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints[.]” SSR 96 — 7p; see also Farley v. Astrue, No. 2:08-CV-2219-VEH, (Doc. 11 at 9-12) (N.D.Ala. Dec. 2, 2009) (<HOLDING>). However, the ALJ must not draw any inferences Holdings: 0: holding that exaggeration of pain versus treatment sought was substantial evidence for the aljs credibility determination 1: holding the alj was permitted to consider fact claimant had not sought treatment for her alleged back pain 2: holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence 3: holding that ves unchallenged testimony was substantial evidence supporting aljs decision 4: holding that court reviews aljs decision for substantial evidence on the record as a whole including the new evidence submitted after the determination was made


Input: counsel filed a motion asserting that the court did not follow the proper procedures for a jury trial waiver. The motion was denied and the defendant was sentenced. This appeal followed. Both the Federal and New Hampshire Constitutions guarantee a right to trial by jury. U.S. CONST, amends. VI, XIV; N.H. CONST, pt. I, art. 15. We consider the defendant’s argument under the State Constitution first. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231 (1983). Because the Federal Constitution offers no greater protection than our State Constitution with regard to the rights asserted by the defendant, we need not undertake a separate federal analysis and cite federal law only to aid our analysis. See State v. Bousquet, 133 N.H. 485, 488 (1990); see also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (<HOLDING>). It is well established that “[w]hen waiving a Holdings: 0: holding that decisions on whether to plead guilty or waive the right to a jury trial reside solely with the defendant 1: recognizing the right to waive a jury trial 2: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel 3: holding that party did not waive right to trial by jury by requesting directed verdict 4: holding that written jury waivers alone cannot validly waive a defendants right to a jury trial


Input: 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966), the United States Supreme Court also expressed the view that a witness’ motive to lie does not render his or her testimony inadmissible: “The petitioner is quite correct in the contention that [the informant], perhaps even more than most informers, may have had motives to lie. But it does not follow that his testimony was untrue, nor does it follow that his testimony was constitutionally inadmissible. The established safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of his testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury.” Id. at 311, 87 S.Ct. at 418. Other cases in accord with Cervantes-Pacheco include: United States v. Valle-Ferrer, 739 F.2d 545, 547 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Edwards, 549 F.2d 362, 365 Holdings: 0: holding that claim that counsel was ineffective for allowing defendant to proceed while incompetent was facially insufficient where defendant did not allege he actually was incompetent to proceed to trial or insane at the time of his offense 1: holding that the due process clause prohibits the trial of a person who is incompetent 2: holding that a contractors experience in his profession qualifies him to testify as an expert to reasonable rates 3: holding that right to testify not denied where inter alia defendant made no objection to his attorneys statements that defendant would not testify and made no request to testify 4: holding that an informants anticipated receipt of 1000 if his testimony resulted in a conviction did not render him incompetent to testify


Input: that "gender" connotes cultural or attitudinal characteristics distinctive to the sexes, as opposed to their physical characteristics. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender Prom Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1 (1995) ("gender [is] to sex what masculine and feminine are to male and female”). See also JEB v. Alabama, - U.S. -, -n. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1436 n. 1, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). While it may be useful to disaggregate the definition of "gender” from "sex” for some purposes, in this opinion we make no such effort, using the terms interchangeably to refer to whether an employee is a man or a woman. 2 . Compare, e.g., Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (<HOLDING>) and Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 Holdings: 0: holding that samcscx sexual harassment claims are actionable under title vii 1: holding that samesex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under title vii 2: holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii 3: holding that noneconomic injury resulting from a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment is actionable under title vii 4: holding that title vii does not protect employees from harassment based on sexual orientation


Input: commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 3. Plaintiffs rely heavily on statements made by the United States Supreme Court and our Court of Appeals to support their position that filing a complaint alone is sufficient for statute of limitations purposes. Pis’. Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal; see, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 657 n. 2, 116 S.Ct. 1638, 134 L.Ed.2d 880 (1996) (“In a suit on a right created by federal law, filing a complaint suffices to satisfy the statute of limitations.”); Pis.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal. While it is true that federal and District of Columbia law do not require service to be effected within the statute of limitations period, see Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1257 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, 424 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that it is proper to consider prelimitations period conduct in determining whether conduct within the limitations period violated the antitrust laws 1: holding that the property appraiser was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations where the failure to bring the action within the limitations period was the direct result of the property appraisers failure to timely perform a related duty owed to plaintiff 2: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period 3: holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included 4: holding that the plaintiff filed suit within the statute of limitations even though he could not prove the time at which he mailed his petition


Input: to agree are subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the CBA.” In the more common case in which Boys Markets injunctions have been issued, the strike is occurring at the time of suit or is imminent. See 1 John E. Higgins, Jr., The Developing Labor Law 1461 (5th ed. 2006). Boys Markets itself concerned an ongoing violation of a no-strike clause. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 239-40, 90 S.Ct. 1583. In theory, questions may arise as to the application of Boys Markets to job actions short of actual strikes. But we have held that activities short of an actual strike may also violate no-strike clauses, including work slowdowns and concerted refusals to work overtime. Natl Elevator Indus., 776 F.2d 374; see also Avco Corp. v. Local Union # 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 974 (3d Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). The fact that there is no present ongoing Holdings: 0: holding that injunctive relief was unwarranted when the jurys award already included prospective relief 1: holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer 2: holding that concerted refusals to work overtime fell within the proscriptions of a cba nostrike clause and were subject to injunctive relief under boys markets 3: holding that lack of subject matter jurisdiction precluded court from awarding injunctive relief as well as damages 4: holding that injunctive relief is a form of equity which is generally subject to the courts discretion