Input: weapon was not recovered, Martin confirmed during the interview that the toolbox police found in Jacey’s vehicle was his, and that he threw the hammer he used to kill Jacey into a river. Thereafter, Martin hid Jacey’s body in the bushes and proceeded to use her vehicle and other belongings until he was apprehended by law enforcement nine days later. Moreover, the trial court found two other aggravators in addition to CCP: (1) commission by a convicted felon and one who is under a sentence of felony probation; and (2) committed during the course of a robbery. This Court has affirmed the imposition of death as a proportionate penalty when a finding of CCP was coupled with other aggravators in addition to multiple mitigating factors. See Mosley v. State, 46 So.3d 510, 527-29 (Fla.2009) (<HOLDING>); Zakrzewski v. State, 717 So.2d 488, 494 Holdings: 0: holding death sentence proportionate where defendant murdered wife and children and trial court found three aggravators previous capital felony ccp and hac and two statutory mitigators extreme disturbance and no prior criminal history 1: holding death penalty proportionate where the trial court found ccp and three other aggravators and twentynine nonstatutory mitigators 2: holding imposition of the death penalty proportionate where the trial court found two aggravating circumstances ccp and contemporaneous murder two statutory mitigating factors and a number of nonstatutory mitigating factors 3: holding death penalty proportionate where there were two aggravating factorsthe murder was committed for pecuniary gain and defendant had been convicted of a prior violent felonyand where there were two statutory and three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances 4: holding death penalty proportionate where there were two aggravating factors  avoiding arrest and commission during course of a burglary  with some nonstatutory mitigation


Input: at all. Lanier has- shown no error relating to the EpicEdge question. D. Attorney Disqualification Challenges Generally, the existence of a conflict of interest is a legal question subject to de novo review. See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 2005) (conflict between defendant and own counsel). With respect to criminal matters, the Supreme Court “establish[ed] a categorical rule against the appointment of an interested prosecutor, adherence to which requires no subtle calculations of judgment,” Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 2141, 95 L.Ed,2d 740 (1987). Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo with respect to the legal question of conflict, and reversal is automatic if conflict is found. See id. (<HOLDING>). Prior to trial, the district court rejected Holdings: 0: recognizing that harmlesserror analysis applies to britt violations 1: holding that harmless error analysis is inappropriate in a powers case 2: holding that harmlesserror analysis applies to coerced confessions 3: holding that the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is subject to a harmlesserror analysis 4: holding that harmlesserror analysis is inappropriate in reviewing the appointment of an interested prosecutor


Input: annuities, see D.C.Code § 5-716 (2012 Repl.). The linkage between "performance of duty” in D.C.Code § 1-612.030 and the Disability Act is further supported by the apparent application of the procedural provision in D.C.Code § 5-708.01 (addressing "processing of claims of injuries allegedly sustained within the performance of duty”) to claims for nonchargeable sick leave under D.C.Code § 1-612.03(j). See, e.g., Smallwood, 956 A.2d at 707-08; Franchak, 932 A.2d at 1089. 15 . By contrast, we held in Smallwood that an off-duty officer who was injured in the course of a shootout with a would-be robber did not suffer injuries in the performance of duty. See 956 A.2d at 709. 16 . See also Beckman v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters’ Ret. & Relief Bd., 810 A.2d 377, 386 (D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>). 17 . See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 Holdings: 0: holding that absence of competitive injury was not a defense to prima facie violation of  2e 1: holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation without evidence that the decisionmaker knew about plaintiffs protected activity when he made the decision that resulted in the adverse action 2: holding that a secret service agent who alleged that onthejob stress resulted in a psychological injury had made out a prima facie case that he had incurred a performance of duty injury 3: holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 4: holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review


Input: Court argued that the constitutional question was “not particularly meaningful” on a motion to dismiss, as an order denying the motion would not enter “final judgment” and an order granting the motion would be subject to the same de novo standard of review on a bankruptcy appeal as a report and recommendation in a “non-core” proceeding. See In re Refco Inc. (Memphis Holdings), 461 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2011). This reasoning is flawed. It confuses the power to enter final judgment with the right to appeal. If there is no appeal, the grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a final judgment dismissing the claim and is given res judicata and collateral estoppel effect. See Tel-tronics Servs. v. L M Ericsson Tele-comms., Inc., 642 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Corbett v. MacDonald Moving Servs., Inc., 124 Holdings: 0: holding parent company bound in subsequent action by res judicata effect of judgment against subsidiary 1: holding judgment under fed rcivp 12b6 is entitled to res judicata effect 2: holding that dismissal on res judicata grounds is proper under rule 12b6 unless a disputed issue of material fact exists 3: holding that lear does not abrogate general principles of res judicata or the res judicata effect of a consent decree regarding patent validity 4: holding that dismissal of case on statute of limitations grounds is final judgment and barring appeal has res judicata effect


Input: boat. All six (Martinez-Rios, Ramirez-Fajardo, Castaneda-Marin, Sanchez-Martinez, Ortiz-Cotoa and Carmargo-Silvera) were charged with conspiracy to possess and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1903(a) and 1903(j), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Carmargo-Silv-era pled guilty and testified on behalf of the government. The remaining five went to trial and were convicted. Discussion Defendants claim the district court erred by deciding, as a matter of law, that the MS was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as required by 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). Defendants claim that jurisdiction is an element of the offense and should have been submitted for determination by the jury. See U.S. v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Defendants claim they objected to the Holdings: 0: holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury 1: holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact 2: recognizing that under district of columbia law  what the parties deem to be the material elements of their agreement  either set forth in or absent from those documents is largely a question of fact for the jury  and concluding in that case that whether an enforceable oral contract was created and was subsequently breached is a question of fact for the jury to decide not this court 3: holding it is a question of fact 4: holding under predecessor to 46 usc app  1903a that jurisdictional element of crime is question of fact for jury to decide


Input: very matter on which he proposes to give an opinion.” Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex.1998). Paragraph six of Dr. Katz’s affidavit states, in pertinent part, that, when an anesthesiologist renders anesthesia services, whether on call or during the regular workday, “it is our practice to charge for those services.” The testimony in paragraph nine states that Dr. Riddle became responsible for S.D. when he assumed the care of Mrs. Chau. As such, he was entitled to compensation for intubat-ing S.D. after birth. While Dr. Katz purported to have personal knowledge of the facts recited in his affidavit, his statement regarding Dr. Riddle’s entitlement to compensation is a legal conclusion with no supporting facts or rationale. See McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 749 (<HOLDING>). Dr. Katz’s affidavit makes no claims that, Holdings: 0: holding there was no general jurisdiction when there was no evidence that defendants advertised or promoted their goods or services in texas solicited business in texas sold their goods or services to a texas entity established a general business office or general business presence in texas or targeted texas markets 1: holding that where patients expert witness did not testify to what degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed by doctors in good standing in little rock or similar locales was patient failed to establish applicable standard of care thereby warranting directed verdict in favor of appellant doctor 2: holding expert testimony is ordinarily required in legal malpractice cases to establish the standard of care 3: holding that maryland doctor not qualified to testify about whats ordinarily billed or what the law ordinarily allows people to recover for their medical services in the state of texas 4: holding that plaintiffs are ordinarily entitled to instructions consonant with their theory of the case where evidentiary support for the theory exists


Input: Feirson on an unrelated matter, he denies the existence of an ongoing patient-physician relationship with Sgt. Feirson. See Thorne Reply at 2; see also Browne v. Brooke, 236 F.2d 686, 688 (D.C.Cir.1956) (in finding no patient-physician relationship the court considered statements by doctor that he did not consider his one examination of plaintiff as creating a patient-physician relationship). Dr. Thorne was employed by PFC and assigned to perform examinations of police officers who suffered work related injuries or illness. See PL Opp., Ex. 6. But courts have recognized that the patient-physician relationship does not attach in circumstances where a physician is hired by an employer to conduct examinations of employees. See Betesh v. United States, 400 F.Supp. 238, 246-47 (D.D.C.1974) (<HOLDING>); Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 F.Supp. 86 Holdings: 0: holding that screening requirement applied to inmate who paid filing fee to commence action 1: holding that an obligation imposed by statute cannot form the basis for a statutory employer relationship 2: holding that a creamery was not statutory employer of a contractor hired to build a new structure 3: recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action 4: recognizing no patientphysician relationship for doctor hired by employer to conduct screening examinations of employees


Input: 177-78, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted): DHS’s policy of considering deterrence has profound and immediate consequences for Central American asylum seekers detained as a result. Relatedly, Defendants emphasize that Plaintiffs have failed to cite any statute, regulation, policy memoranda, or any other document memorializing the policy they challenge. See Def. Opp. & Mot. at 22. Agency action, however, need not be in writing to be final and judicially reviewable. See Venetian Casino Resort LLC v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 929 (D.C.Cir.2008) (concluding that “the record” as a whole “leaves no doubt” that a policy exists, even though “the details ... are still unclear”); Grand Canyon Trust v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 283 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1252 (D.N.M.2003) (<HOLDING>). A contrary rule “would allow an agency to Holdings: 0: holding that pure issue of law is preserved by motion for summary judgment and is reviewable after final judgment 1: holding that a reviewable final order is necessary for subjectmatter jurisdiction 2: holding that both law and logic dictate that an unwritten agency policy is reviewable 3: holding an agency could not use a policy found in a departments employee manual as the rule of law to determine a contested issue because the agency never adopted a rule containing such a policy 4: holding that an arbitration award based on the conclusion that unappended waiver forms are unenforceable pursuant to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because as stated in schultz it is not based on an allegation that a specific provision in an insurance policy contravenes public policy


Input: sentences, each of which would not have exceeded 20 years. The Apprendi rule, therefore, would not be implicated. It follows as night the day that any failure of the indictment in this case to allege quantity in the possession counts was immaterial. See Price, 265 F.3d at 1108. C. FAIRNESS, INTEGRITY, AND PUBLIC REPUTATION Finally, even were we to assume that the error here did affect substantial rights, we would affirm nonetheless because, given the evidence and the record we have referred to, the error did not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544. But see United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 403-04 (4th Cir.2001), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 803, 151 L.Ed.2d 689 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Our holding in this regard follows our Holdings: 0: holding that failure to charge drug quantity in the indictment and submit it to the jury seriously affects the fairness integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings so that the court should exerciseits discretion to recognize the error 1: holding that the closure of a courtroom during jury selection a structural error did not seriously affect the fairness integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings 2: holding that a plain error did not seriously affect the fairness integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings even though the error was assumed to have affected substantial rights 3: recognizing that plain error analysis requires 1 error 2 that is plain 3 that affects defendants substantial rights and 4 that seriously affects fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings 4: holding that plain error exists when 1 an error was committed 2 that was plain 3 that affected the defendants substantial rights and 4 the error seriously affects the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings


Input: medicine), could not eliminate any of the other potential causes either. All he could do was assess the likelihood it was one cause or another, and he found that the tetanus was least likely to have originated with the wound on May 13th. In fact, Avery said it was less than a hundredth of one percent that Lerma would get tetanus that many days later. Dr. Avery’s conclusion was based on (1) evidence that the tetanus fully developed outside the twenty-one day limitation, and (2) the fact that the caused tetanus versus diabetes or dental problems or any other source is just an inference of causation amounting to no more than conjecture or speculation. See Schaefer, 612 S.W.2d at 204-5. Therefore, we hold his testimo ny presents no evidence as to causation of Lerma’s death. See id. (<HOLDING>). Conclusion In light of the Robinson factors Holdings: 0: holding expert testimony provided no evidence as to causation since testimony was not based upon reasonable medical probability 1: holding that experts medical opinion constituted no evidence because it was based upon speculation and surmise rather than reasonable medical probability 2: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive 3: holding that though the government may have failed to disclose exculpatory testimony in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendants involvement in narcotics sales there was no reasonable probability that a defense based upon that testimony would have been successful 4: holding expert testimony was based on reasonable medical probability where there were multiple possible causes and expert testified that one cause was more probable than the others


Input: which was believed to be a mitigating factor. The court again asked defendant whether he wished to persist in his plea of guilty or whether he wanted to interpose a defense. Defendant repeatedly answered that he did not want to withdraw his plea, nor was he trying to plead self-defense. At one point during the extended colloquy the defendant made the statement, “I’ve already waived the right for counsel, so I just plead guilty.” The court eventually accepted the plea of guilty and found that it had a factual basis. Defendant subsequently appeared for sentencing on October 21, 1975, indicated h App. 3d 1005; People v. McCaffrey (2d Dist. 1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 1088, overruling People v. Hinkle (2d Dist. 1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 202; and People v. Bobo (3d Dist. 1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 274 (<HOLDING>). In Hessenauer this court considered whether Holdings: 0: holding that defendants waiver of counsel when pleading guilty was an implied waiver as to any subsequent proceedings including sentencing four days later 1: holding that in order for a waiver of counsel to be valid the trial court must ensure that the defendants waiver of his right to counsel is done knowingly and intelligently so that the record establishes that the defendants choice is made with eyes open 2: holding that a waiver of counsel once made and not retracted is operative throughout the proceedings 3: holding that defendants statements not admissible once he had invoked right to counsel without proof of waiver 4: holding that once the defendant raises the issue of intelligent and voluntary waiver with respect to prior guilty pleas the burden is on the state to establish a valid waiver


Input: error, Mandlbauer argues the trial court erred by not submitting an instruction on sole cause in the jury charge. Sole cause is an inferential rebuttal defense, which may be submitted to the jury only as an instruction. Reid v. Best Waste Systems, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 644, 646 (TexApp. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).... It is the duty of the trial judge to determine whether the doctrine of sole cause has been raised by the evidence. If the evidence supports an instruction, and the instruction has been raised properly by the pleadings, the trial judge has a duty to submit the instruction. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 658 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ); See also Cook v. Caterpillar, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1993, writ denied) (<HOLDING>) National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Holdings: 0: holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to consider cumulative error in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that trial court did not commit reversible error when it submitted admissibility of evidence question to jury because the trial court had independently decided the question 2: holding it is reversible error for a trial court to exclude a definition on new and independent cause an inferential rebuttal defense when supported by the evidence 3: holding that if these preservation requirements are met any error in the denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error 4: holding wrongful granting of states challenge for cause reversible error


Input: to Stephanie's college expenses, at the very least, he should receive a credit against the arrearage for the time Stephanie was away at school. We begin by noting that upon dissolution of marriage, parties are free to draft their own settlement agreements. Niccum v. Niccum, 734 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). Such agreements are contractual in nature and become binding upon the parties onee the trial court merges and incorporates such into the divorcee decree. In re Marriage of Loeb, 614 N.E.2d 954, 957 (Ind.Ct.App.19983). This court will enforce an agreement concerning the custody and support of children even though the divorcee court would otherwise not have the authority to do as the parties agreed. Id.; see also Schueneman v. Schueneman, 591 N.E.2d 608 (Ind.Ct. App.1992) (<HOLDING>). When interpreting such agreements, we apply Holdings: 0: recognizing that at common law a parents liability to support his child terminated at the parents death the terms of the support order could not be enforced against his estate unless provisions allowing for such enforcement were included in the order 1: holding that although a parents general duty to support his or her child ends when the child reaches twentyone years of age parents are free to enter into binding agreements to do so 2: holding that child cannot consent to search of parents bedroom 3: holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child 4: holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation


Input: corroborated” by police. Id. at 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416. Accord Pinkney v. State, 666 So.2d 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)(anonymous tip requires “detailed and specific information corroborated by police investigation” since the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are unknown). In this case, it mous” was that, even considering only the facts known to Officer Hall himself, her identity was readily ascertainable. Officer Hall knew that the informant was a McDonald’s employee, and they acknowledged each other when he arrived at the scene, with Ms. Steele pointing to Defendant’s vehicle. The cases support the proposition that an informant’s actual name need not be known so long as her identity is readily discoverable. See Lachs v. State, 366 So.2d 1223 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)(<HOLDING>). A “citizen-informant” Not only was Ms. Steele Holdings: 0: holding that the law in effect at the time a contract is made is as much a part of the contract as if incorporated therein 1: holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination 2: holding as much 3: recognizing that a stay is as much a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal 4: holding that a tipster fully identified by occupation and address was entitled to as much credibility as  a paid informer or the victims themselves


Input: in the case of an automobile accident that appears partially attributable to the presence of foliage obscuring a stop sign, the settling parties could release the persons responsible for the foliage by including terminology like “and the owners, occupiers, and any other persons responsible for the upkeep or maintenance of the premises on which the shrubs that obscured Releasee’s view of the stop sign were growing.” We recognize that general release clauses without specific identifying terminology have been used extensively and have been relied on as full and final settlement of all claims. Our ruling today shall, therefore, apply only prospectively, except that we will also apply it to this case and to all other cases in which the issue is preserved. Cf. Alsup, 461 N.E.2d at 364-65 (<HOLDING>). Conclusion. Because of the circumstantially Holdings: 0: holding that terms identifying persons in a manner that the parties to the release would know who was to be benefitted sufficient under specific identity rule 1: recognizing this as the general rule 2: holding that because of widespread use of and reliance on general language specific identity rule would apply prospectively only 3: holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls 4: recognizing general rule


Input: proposed amendment is untimely. It was filed ten months after Plaintiffs original Complaint was filed in this Court, two months after the close of discovery, and one month after Defendant moved for summary judgment. The Plaintiff has presented no explanation as to why the Court should overlook this delay. Though not binding oh this Court, the Court notes that the Seventh Circuit has held that a district court judge has discretion to deny such an amendment: “when an amendment to a complaint is proposed after the defendant has moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff must show that the amendment is supported by ‘substantial and convincing evidence’.” Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 944 (7th Cir.1995). See also Parish v. Frazier, 195 F.3d 761, 764 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Amended Complaint does not allege a new Holdings: 0: holding that failure to accurately calculate the thirtyday appeal period is not excusable neglect 1: holding plaintiff bears the burden of showing that delay was due to oversight inadvertence or excusable neglect 2: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought 3: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden when relying on the discovery rule 4: holding that the states failure to object to a late petition for appeal of a termination order granted by the trial court on the basis of excusable neglect constituted a waiver of the states right to contest excusable neglect on appeal to the court of appeals


Input: profitability of the funds portfolios” such that “[t]o the extent that mispricings improperly inflated the reported value of the portfolios, James River benefitted from and had a direct motive to commit the alleged fraud.” (Appaloosa and Tepper’s Opp. at 10, hereinafter “Opp.”, citing TPC ¶¶ 16, 17, 43). However, the Second Circuit has held that “the existence, without more, of executive compensation dependent upon stock value does not give rise to a strong inference of scienter.” Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir.1995). Here, Appaloosa and Tepper’s suggestion that the James River Defendants had a motive to commit the fraud because the better the funds’ perfor 101, 1107 (D.Conn.1991); Duncan v. Pencer, No. 94 Civ. 0321, 1996 WL 19043, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1996) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the Second Circuit has made clear Holdings: 0: holding that financial gain from compensation for professional services is not a sufficient motive for purposes of pleading scienter 1: holding the pslra standard for pleading scienter is more stringent than the second circuits standard prior to the act and that motive and opportunity is not an independent basis to show defendants had scienter 2: holding that access to financial information was reasonably related to a defendants narcotics convictions because financial gain motivated the underlying crimes 3: holding that in pleading scienter arguing that the motive for defrauding investors was to increase the companys profits or to increase officer compensation is not sufficient 4: holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter


Input: City of Jackson v. Southard, 869 S.W.2d 280, 281-82 (Mo.App.1994); Evans, 779 S.W.2d at 255. As further support for the rule that we lay down here, that no trial de novo lies in a municipal case from a SIS, we would point to the fact that this was the rule when trials de novo to the circuit court were statutorily authorized for misdemeanor convictions before associate circuit judges. Evans, 779 S.W.2d at 255. In the instant case, although there is a multitude of court documents at war with each other as to the actual disposition of the relator’s cases on August 13,1996, the record ultimately reflects that no sentences were imposed on that date by the municipal division that resulted in a judgment of conviction from which a trial de novo could be taken. See Yale, 846 S.W.2d at 195 (<HOLDING>). The question then becomes whether, pursuant Holdings: 0: recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public 1: holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable 2: holding that no sentence is imposed in the case of a sis 3: holding that forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following conviction 4: recognizing constitutional right to be present when sentence is imposed


Input: of resistance by the victim and the use of physical force by the perpetrator.” Id. at 932 (citing the BIA’s decision). Accordingly, we held that sexual battery is categorically a crime of violence under § 16(b). In Lisbey, we noted approvingly cases from other circuits which- establish that sexual acts, without the victim’s consent, constitute crimes of violence under § 16(b). See id. at 933 (citing approvingly Zaidi v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (lewd or lascivious touching of an adult without his or her consent); Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 176 (2d Cir.2000) (indecent assault and battery on a person over the age of fourteen which requires the victim’s actual non-consent as an element); United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>)). These cases, taken together, establish that Holdings: 0: holding that attempted sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen is a crime of viqlenee 1: holding that attempted sexual abuse is a specific intent crime 2: recognizing the two distinct generic definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and holding that a statute contains the element of abuse under the medinavilla definition if it applies to sexual conduct with children younger than fourteen years 3: holding that the florida offense of attempted lewd assault on a child under the age of sixteen is a crime of violence even though the offense might be accomplished without use of physical force 4: holding that a conviction under utah code ann  7654041 for sexual abuse of a child was a crime of violence under  16b based upon a common sense view of the sexual abuse statute in combination with the legal determination that children are incapable of consent which suggests that when an older person attempts to sexually touch a child under the age of fourteen there is always a substantial risk that physical force will be used to ensure the childs compliance


Input: raised the issue of the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. § 278.03 (2010), which provides for a waiver of the payment of taxes during the pendency of a tax appeal petition upon a showing of hardship in its motion for summary judgment, the parties stipulated on October 28, 2009, to transfer the case to the district court for immediate referral back to the tax court pursuant to Eñe Mining Company v. Commissioner of Revenue, 343 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. 1984). The district court immediately transferred the case back to the tax court, and the tax court did not rule on the constitutional issue. The Minnesota Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the portion of an appeal that challenges the constitutiona see also Ritchie v. City of Green Bay, 215 Wis. 433, 254 N.W. 113, 115 (1934) (<HOLDING>). But see, e.g., People ex rel. Thompson v. St. Holdings: 0: holding that in action by property owner to recover land taken by eminent domain current titleholder to land might be necessary party if district court were to restore land to plaintiff 1: holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages 2: holding that the deed and not the historical description of the land determines what land constitutes the forfeitable property 3: holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute 4: holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93a action against a prior owner of the land who was not the seller because there was no business connection between the two parties


Input: (ruling that a city’s fireworks ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution because the statute was a reasonable means for attaining the legitimate end of preventing the proliferation of fireworks outlets that, if allowed, would impose unacceptable burdens on the police department in regulating such businesses and protecting the public welfare); South Dakota Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Melgaard v. Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786, 790 (S.D.1983) (noting that the power of the government to regulate and restrain the use of fireworks does not represent an invalid exercise of the state’s police power and does not amount to a taking of property without just compensation); B & B Distrib. Co. v. Metropolitan Nashville, 667 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Akron v. Budiani, 52 Ohio Holdings: 0: holding that purchase of search terms is a use in commerce 1: holding because legislature knew how to include terms within statutory definition and did not do so statutory definition did not include terms in light of the terms contemporaneous inclusion of the same terms in a separate provision 2: holding unconstitutionally broad a statute prohibiting the use of opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty 3: holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional 4: holding the exclusivity element is satisfied by showing that others do not jointly possess or use the land


Input: of Section 1915(g) if an inmate was allowed to exploit [the procedure of referring prisoner complaints to magistrate judges for initial screening] by filing a meritless action and waiting until after it was reviewed to move for dismissal”). CONCLUSION A district court is not required to give a pro se plaintiff repeated opportunities to amend his complaint or explain the basis of his pleadings. Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 98 n. 5 (5th Cir.1994). Because Plaintiff has been given ample opportunity to amend his pleadings and comply with Rule 8(a) but has failed to do so, his complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. Rodriguez v. United States, 66 F.3d at 97-98. See Michaelis v. Nebraska State Bar Ass’n, 717 F.2d 437, 438-39 (8th Cir.1983) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). Further, because Plaintiff will be barred by Holdings: 0: holding that a district court is justified in dismissing a complaint with prejudice if the plaintiff persists in violating rule 8 1: holding that an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is a final appealable order only if no amendment to the complaint could cure the defects in the  case internal quotation marks omitted 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court 3: holding that court erred in dismissing minors claims with prejudice absent a hearing 4: holding that the district court erred in summarily dismissing a  1983 complaint that should have been brought as a habeas petition


Input: learned intermediary defense. If there is no basis in the record for the instruction given, such error may raise a “substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations,” and reversal may be required. McElroy v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 894 F.2d 1504, 1509 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting National Independent Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Charter Financial Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1396, 1402-03 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1056, 105 S.Ct. 2120, 85 L.Ed.2d 484 (1985)). Given the complete lack of evidence in the record to support the inclusion of the reasonable evidence standard in the instruction, we hold that the district court erred by inaccurately charging the jury on Armour’s affirmative defense. Cf. Bank South Leasing, 778 F.2d at 706 (<HOLDING>). In some instances, even an inaccurate Holdings: 0: holding the trial court erred in not charging the jury that a defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense of comparative negligence 1: holding that the trial court plainly erred in failing to provide a specific unanimity instruction to the jury 2: holding that the district court erred in failing to properly charge the jury on defendants affirmative defenses 3: holding that trial court erred in rendering takenothing judgment notwithstanding jurys verdict in favor of plaintiff based on defendants properly preserved charge error and concluding that proper remedy was for trial  court to grant new trial based on the charge error 4: holding that district court erred in failing to consider evidence of secondary considerations


Input: medical records — was that the wear and tear on his discs was the result of his work activities. The dissent dismisses Anderson’s testimony because it was in response to “questions posed to Anderson ... phrased by Anderson’s employer using a disjunctive clause” — that is, whether Anderson’s work for Frontier Communications was “causing” or “aggravating” Anderson’s back problems. According to the dissent, “the fact that [Anderson] acknowledged that work may have aggravated his back pain does not mean that he also acknowledged that work caused his back injury.” But Anderson’s injuries were compensable, whether caused in the first instance by his work or whether his work merely aggravated a preexisting condition. See Gillette v. Harold Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 317, 101 N.W.2d 200, 204 (1960) (<HOLDING>). The WCCA further concluded that the Holdings: 0: recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury 1: holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute 2: holding that the employees thirdparty tort claim stemming from the employees occupational disease does not accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the occupational disease begins to manifest itself 3: recognizing that a preexisting disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim arising out of employment if the employment aggravated accelerated or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce disability for which compensation is sought 4: recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment


Input: that, as of the condemnation date, the parcel contained fifteen acres of wetlands that could legally be drained. Specifically, the Department argues that even if the parcel is not subject to regulation under the CWA, it is subject to state regulation by the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) as an isolated wetland. We find no reversible error here. In his order, the master held that the issue of “DHEC’s alleged jurisdiction” over the wetlands was no longer before the court because it had previously been decided by Judge Harwell in his October 2004 order. The Department has not challenged the master’s ruling. Therefore, it is the law of the case, regardless of its correctness. See Buckner v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 159, 160-61, 177 S.E.2d 544, 544 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, because OCRM is a part of DHEC, Holdings: 0: holding that an unappealed order is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes 1: holding that an exhaustion of appellate remedies is required to make a trial courts ruling the law of the case 2: holding an unappealed ruling is the law of the case and cannot be later challenged 3: holding a trial judges unappealed procedural rulings become the law of the case 4: holding that an unappealed ruling right or wrong is the law of the case


Input: The Jerrels proposed tattooing and a plastic tagging method. After seriously considering these alternatives, the hearing officer ultimately rejected them as not sufficiently permanent or visible. The fact that DNR gave the Jerrels two years to come up with an alternative solution — from 1990 to 1992 — does not excuse the Jerrels’ complete failure to provide evidence that their horses had been branded. Even after the branding requirement was clarified, the Jerrels were given two more years to comply before the leases were finally terminated in 1994. The court’s opinion notes that DNR believed that the Jerrels worked with it in good faith until 1990. But by failing to consider the Jer-rels’ subsequent four years of promises, delays, and total non-compliance before DNR term (Alaska 1988) (<HOLDING>). 29 . See Op. at 144-145. 30 . See id. 31 Holdings: 0: holding that the circuit court was not authorized to overturn state agencys decision where the sanction was lawful authorized and within the discretion of the agency and it was not shown to be arbitrary or capricious 1: holding that agencys practical method for accomplishing its goal of safe disposal systems was reasonable and not arbitrary 2: holding that when the agencys decision was based on an erroneous and completely unsupported assumption the decision was arbitrary and capricious 3: holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable 4: holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable


Input: have objected to this statement by the prosecutor and to the use of the word “or” in the jury charge on the ground that appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was violated because the information alleged one offense, but the State proved another. It is proper for the jury to be charged in the disjunctive even though the indictment (or information) may allege the differing methods of committing the offense in the conjunctive. Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In this connection, alternative theories of committing the same offense are properly submitted to the jury in the disjunctive if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the theories submitted. Id; see also Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). This comports with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Holdings: 0: holding when a statute defines manner or means of committing an offense indictment need not allege matters beyond the language of the statute 1: holding although indictment may allege manner and means of committing offense in the conjunctive jury may be charged in the disjunctive and a conviction on any method alleged will be upheld if the evidence supports it 2: holding that when an indictment charges several acts in the conjunctive  the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged 3: holdingthat an error in instructing the jury that an offense could be committed by a statutory method not charged in the indictment is cured where  the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt  citation omitted 4: holding that for purposes of 18 usc  924c1 the law is well established that where an indictment charges in the conjunctive several means of violating a statute a conviction may be obtained on proof of only one of the means


Input: of Canady I Litigation To begin, we reject appellants’ argument that Missouri law, not the federal law of res judicata, should apply in this case because the Saunders cases were originally filed in Missouri state court. We have determined already that the relevant prior judgment was issued in federal court in Canady I, and therefore we apply federal res judicata law because “ ‘it is fundamental that the res judicata effect of the first forum’s judgment is governed by the first forum’s law, not by the law of the second forum.’ ” Hillary v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 123 F.3d 1041, 1043 (8th Cir.1997) (Hillary) (citing Semler v. Psychiatric Inst. of Wash., D.C., Inc., 575 F.2d 922, 930 (D.C.Cir.1978)); see also NAACP v. Metropolitan Council, 125 F.3d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir.1997) (NAACP I) (<HOLDING>) (citing Poe v. John Deere Co., 695 F.2d 1103, Holdings: 0: holding that federal law governs res judicata effect of an earlier federal judgment based on federal law 1: holding that to determine collateral estoppel effect of a federal civil rights action fjederal law governs the preclusive effect of a claim arising under federal law 2: holding in a res judicata case that fjederal law determines the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment 3: holding that a federal courts dismissal of state claims without prejudice is not res judicata as to adjudication in either state or federal courts 4: holding that federal rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel determine preclusive effect of prior federal ftca judgments even though liability is based on state law


Input: v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.1982). Plaintiffs here have adduced evidence of a discussion of a continuing investigation, but no evidence that tends to show the authorization, approval, or knowing acquiescence of the supervisory Defendants to any constitutional violations allegedly visited upon Plaintiffs. Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs had established that Defendants Marshall, Freeman, May, Rucker, Reitz, Brink, Gibson and Vander Wissel were aware of the alleged constitutional violations — which in itself would be quite a stretch for the Court to find, given the state of the record — and did nothing to stop them, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the supervisory Defendants still would not survive summary judgment. See Poe v. Haydon, 863 F.2d 418, 429 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence Holdings: 0: holding that liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under  1983 where at best the plaintiff has merely claimed that the appellants were aware of alleged violation but did not take appropriate action 1: holding that supervisory liability under  1983 requires a showing that the supervisory official at least implicitly authorized or approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate 2: holding supervisory personnel liable for  1983 violations only where evidence establishes that they authorized or approved the unconstitutional conduct 3: holding that a constitutional violation by a subordinate is a predicate for supervisory liability under  1983 4: holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation


Input: that the 2013 arbitration provision is “permeated with unconscionability,” taken together such a conclusion is required. As the California Supreme Court has held, multiple substantively unconscionable terms in or related to an arbitration agreement “indicate a systemic effort to impose arbitration on an employee not simply as an alternative to litigation, but as an inferior forum that works to the employer’s advantage.” Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 124, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745. At bottom, a trial court does not “abuse its discretion in concluding that [an] arbitration agreement is permeated by an unlawful purpose” where the arbitration agreement contains “multiple unlawful provisions.” Id.; see also Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1005-06 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that the presence of these Holdings: 0: holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a mere inspection instruction in a firearm possession case 1: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a motion to sever separate charges of rape committed against the appellants two nieces 2: holding that a 30day limitations provision is substantively unconscionable 3: holding district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever numerous substantively unconscionable terms from arbitration agreement 4: holding that the 9circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a motion to sever separate charges of rape committed against the appellants two nieces


Input: the custody arrangement in this matter, and we affirm that order. In addition, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found Colleen in contempt and ordered her to pay attorney fees. 1 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585 (1978). 2 Rust v. Clark Cty. School District, 103 Nev. 686, 688, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987); see also Smith v. Emery, 109 Nev. 737, 740, 856 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1993); Huneycutt, 94 Nev. at 80, 575 P.2d at 585. 3 Rust, 103 Nev. at 688-89, 747 P.2d at 1382. 4 Kantor v. Kantor, 116 Nev. 886, 895, 8 P.3d 825, 830 (2000) (citing Bongiovi v. Bongiovi, 94 Nev. 321, 579 P.2d 1246 (1978)). 5 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585. Other courts have reached similar conclusions in child custody matters. See, e.g., Daniel v. Daniel, 42 P.3d 863, 867 n.6 (Okla. 2001) (<HOLDING>); Decker v. Decker, 440 S.E.2d 411, 412 (Va. Holdings: 0: holding that temporary order amounted to order modifying custody of children because language changed custody for an indefinite period 1: holding that the lower court should have entered a final order on custody 2: recognizing that an appeal does not divest the lower court from making a provisional or temporary custody order during the appeals pendency 3: holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition 4: holding that since district court of appeal properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3850 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal the district court of appeal should have vacated the order rather than affirming on the merits


Input: regarding the granting of relief under section ... 1229b ... of this title.”); Martinez v. Mukasey, 508 F.8d 255, 257-58 (5th Cir.2007) (“Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)®, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary decisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.”). We therefore lack jurisdiction over the petition to the extent Khan challenges the dispositive finding that his removal will not result in an exceptional hardship to his children, see Sung v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir.2007), and dismiss the petition for review to the extent it challenges his removal order. However, we “retain[] jurisdiction over purely legal and nondiscretionary questions.” Wilmore v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir.2006); Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) “[Wjhether an alien satisfies the continuous Holdings: 0: holding that statutes restricting judicial review of discretionary decisions do not preclude review of challenges to the constitutionality of ins regulations but holding that petitioners failure to receive discretionary relief does not rise to a constitutionally protected interest 1: holding that the term final and conclusive precludes judicial review of army claims decisions 2: holding that sjeetion 1252a2bii clearly precludes judicial review of decisions under section 1186ac4 because the statute specifies that those decisions are purely discretionary 3: holding that  1252a2bii precludes  review of discretionary decisions  in only the specific circumstances specified in the statute itself 4: holding that  1252a2bs ban on review of judgments regarding the granting of relief precludes review of only discretionary decisions


Input: Defendants — making it a likelier reference to the other Defendants who were on trial. The Government notes that the Court in Gray suggested “[m]e and a few other guys [beat the victim]” as an alternative to the improper redaction in the phrase “[m]e, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys [beat the victim].” 523 U.S. at 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151. But the language “a few other guys” is less specific than “others” as stated at trial, especially when coupled with Alexander’s identification of “the other individuals” as the four other Defendants just a few minutes earlier in Hodous’s testimony. Another issue implicates the Confrontation Clause. The analyses in Richardson, Gray, and Vasilakos assume the presence of a limiting instruction. See, e.g., Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (<HOLDING>). Here, no limiting instruction was given to Holdings: 0: holding that where a defendants name is replaced with a neutral pronoun as long as identification of the defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other than the redacted confession and a limiting instruction is given to the jury there is no bruton violation 1: holding that when all references to the defendant in a eodefendants statement are replaced with indefinite pronouns or other general terms the confrontation clause is not violated by the redacted statements admission if when viewed together with other evidence the statement does not create an inevitable association with the defendant and a proper limiting instruction is given 2: holding that the clause was not violated by a redacted confession with a proper limiting instruction 3: holding that when all references to the defendant in a codefendants statement are replaced with indefinite pronouns or other general terms the confrontation clause is not violated by the redacted statements admission if when viewed together with other evidence the statement does not create an inevitable association with the defendant and a proper limiting instruction is given 4: holding that the confession did not violate the confrontation clause because it was redacted to eliminate not only the defendants name but any reference to his or her existence


Input: had a valid interest in ensuring that the appellant complied with income-reporting requirements after his release from custody. The special condition allows the court, through the probation department, to monitor the appellant’s earnings and identify any potential disparity between his income and his lifestyle. Relatedly, it serves to deter the appellant from engaging in schemes similar to the crimes of conviction once he is released from prison by forcing him to account for his income. We need go no further. The most that can be said for the appellant’s position is that the relatedness of the special condition of supervised release is somewhat attenuated. But the condition is, at the very least, arguably reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Behler, 187 F.3d 772, 780 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Because the error — if there is one — is Holdings: 0: holding that financial gain from compensation for professional services is not a sufficient motive for purposes of pleading scienter 1: holding that access to financial information was reasonably related to a defendants narcotics convictions because financial gain motivated the underlying crimes 2: holding that evidence of a defendants financial condition is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages 3: holding that representation as to financial solvency of partnership was statement of financial condition because it reflected overall economic condition of partnership 4: holding debt dischargeable since lender did not reasonably rely upon allegedly false financial statement where lender did nothing to verify incomplete financial statement four to six months old


Input: this test, the relevant inquiry “is not simply whether a private group is serving a 'public function’, [but] whether the function performed has been 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.' ” Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842, 102 S.Ct. 2764. Examples of "traditional exclusive governmental functions” include holding elections and exercising powers of eminent domain. The Supreme Court has rarely found the "exclusivity” aspect of this test to be met. See Mark, 51 F.3d at 1142. Furthermore, courts have held that the provision of hospital services is not a traditional public function exclusively reserved to the state. See, e.g., Shannon v. Shannon, 965 F.2d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1992); Cardio-Medical Assocs., Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 536 F.Supp. 1065, 1090-91 (E.D.Pa.1982) (<HOLDING>); Holton v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 419 Holdings: 0: holding that ccmcs activities did not amount to a traditional exclusive public function 1: holding the function of a public utility is controlling not how the term is defined 2: holding that records in the possession of a party with whom an agency has contracted to perform a governmental function on behalf of the agency are presumptively public records subject to public access so long as the record a directly relates to the governmental function and b is not exempt under the rtkl 3: recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver 4: holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact


Input: the fault of the person injured. 3 . Morgan also urges us to find that the Marquises’ filing with the trial court of a tendered M.R. Civ. P. 68 offer of judgment- — once while their motion for summary judgment was pending and again after she rejected the offer — was an improper attempt to influence the court. Although we agree with Morgan that such an offer should not be filed with a court unless accepted, there is no indication in the record that the court in this case was influenced in any way by the filings, and Morgan acknowledges that the error is not sufficient standing alone to warrant vacating the summary judgment. 4 . See also Murphy v. Buonato, 42 Conn.App. 239, 679 A.2d 411, 417-18 (1996); Docherty v. Sadler, 293 Ill.App.3d 892, 228 Ill.Dec. 460, 689 N.E.2d 332, 335 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Wilcoxen v. Paige, 174 Ill.App.3d 541, 124 Holdings: 0: holding that strict compliance is not required 1: holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective 2: holding that notice not required because cercla is a strict liability statute 3: recognizing strict product liability actions 4: holding that a tenyearold boy injured by a dog while caring for it was not protected by states strict liability statute


Input: was in part motivated by her pregnancy. “Direct evidence is that which demonstrates ‘a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged [employment] decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated [the employer’s] decision’ to take adverse employment action.” Deneen at 436 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997)). In finding direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination in Deneen, the Eighth Circuit noted that remarks about the plaintiffs pregnancy “were made contemporaneously and directly in connection with the adverse employment decision.” Deneen at 436. See also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding good faith jury instruction is not necessary when the court has given an adequate specific intent instruction 1: holding supervisors reference to plaintiff as that white boy was sufficient direct evidence of discriminatory intent for mixedmotives jury instruction 2: holding that circumstantial evidence alone may establish discriminatory intent 3: recognizing that whether an employee uses the mcdonnell douglas approach or relies on direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent the employee must counter the employers legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action in such a manner as to create a genuine issue as to discriminatory intent 4: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given


Input: See Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 325-26 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). We also infer all implied findings of fact that are necessary to support the trial court’s ruling. See Chadwick v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex.Crim.App.2010). Appellant testified by affidavit that she had not been advised of her right to an attorney, and that she would have requested an attorney had she been so advised. The trial court was free to disbelieve this testimony, and in its findings of fact, it expressly determined that appellant’s account was not credible. The court did not make a similar finding with respect to the affidavit testimony of appellant’s mother and immigration attorney, but we can infer that this testimony was implicitly rejected. Cf. Olconkwo v. State, 398 S.W.3d 689, 694 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (<HOLDING>). Deferring, as we must, to the trial court’s Holdings: 0: holding warrant not undermined and affiant did not act in bad faith where affiant relied upon erroneous statements made by third party 1: holding that it was not erroneous for committing court to refuse to admit an affidavit from a private investigator that provided evidence of a witnesss lack of credibility when the affidavit would not have explained away the witnesss testimony but only challenged its credibility 2: holding that a trial court had implicitly found that an affiant lacked credibility even where the affidavit testimony was uncontroverted 3: holding that a statement that the affiant is senior vicepresident and secretary of a corporation asserting a special appearance is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the corporations contacts with texas 4: holding that a statement that the affiant is president of the company asserting a claim on an account is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the account


Input: Winnebago premises, neither did his parents. Appellant’s attorney has argued the existence of a fictitious household which, applying appellant’s own “residency requirement,” would have no members. Id. at 575. Even if we were to assume that the Moultonborough property is a vacation home and that a person can have more than one residence for insurance purposes when one of the residences is a vacation home, the policy here, like that in Damore, requires that the additional insured be a resident relative of “your [the named insured’s] household.” To satisfy this requirement of sharing the same household, Matthews also would have to be a resident of his mother’s primary residence in Florida. See id.; see also Still v. Fox, No. C-940954, 1995 WL 596062, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1995) (<HOLDING>). As noted previously, the petitioners do not Holdings: 0: holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live 1: holding that a defendant who had maintained his fathers gun collection at his home deserved a reduction under ussg  2k21b2 2: holding that adult child who maintained his own residence separate from his fathers household but regularly vacationed and kept gear at his fathers vacation home was not a resident of his fathers household and therefore not an insured under his fathers insurance policy covering the vacation home 3: recognizing that fathers parental rights were terminated based upon his incarceration and his behavior while in prison his history of substance abuse and the fact that his child support payments are in arrears 4: holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body


Input: States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578 (4th Cir.1993). See Opinion 2 ("The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that 'residential searches have been upheld only where some information links the criminal activity to the defendant’s residence.' ” (quoting Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1583)). In Lalor, we concluded that a search warrant for the defendant’s residence was not supported by probable cause. See 996 F.2d at 1583. In so doing, however, we distinguished Lalor’s case from prior ones, including Suarez and Williams, wherein the nexus between criminal activity and the targeted premises was based on evidence of the suspect’s drug traf ficking activities combined with the reasonable inference that drug-related evidence would be found in the suspect’s home. See id. at 1582-83 (<HOLDING>); id. at 1583 (observing that, in Williams, Holdings: 0: holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence 1: holding that there was sufficient probable cause to search a defendants residence after evidence of drug dealing was found in his car during a traffic stop that was conducted when the defendant was coming from his residence and noting that under such circumstances a practical commonsense conclusion could be made that the drugs and money had been at the defendants residence a short time before the stop 2: holding that the affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location rendering the officers belief in probable cause based solely on the affidavit objectively unreasonable  3: recognizing that in suarez residential search upheld based on officers reasoned belief that evidence of drug activity would be found at residence 4: holding that a warrant authorizing the search of a residence vehicles at the residence and all persons found in the residence was not overly broad given that search was limited to places were drugs or weapons might be found


Input: resulted from a good-faith, but erroneous, interpretation of section 6103. Therefore, the United States can have no liability to Plaintiffs. 26 U.S.C. § 7431(b). As to the second issue, I find and conclude that the United States has returned to Plaintiffs all the property seized. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), I now issue the findings of fact and conclusions of law that have informed my decision. I. A. Procedural History This case has a complex procedural history. A brief description of that history will provide a meaningful context for the discussion to come. When this case was assigned to United States District Judge Warren K. Urbom, he granted a motion to dismiss by private individuals named as defendants and dismissed Counts IV and VI. See Filing 22 (<HOLDING>). Among other things, the result of Judge Holdings: 0: holding that wrongfuldisclosure allegations of count iv did not state a claim against private individuals and further holding that conspiracy allegations of count vi did not state a claim 1: holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim 2: holding that because the allegations purportedly suppressed by the government were not material an evidentiary hearing further exploring the  allegations themselves and the governments knowledge of the allegations is unnecessary 3: holding district court dismissal of plaintiffs present action did not constitute prior action  and thus did not count as third strike 4: holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim


Input: only after a responsible agency official assesses whether “the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in disclosure”—was met. See Pac. Gas, 70 Fed.Cl. at 144 (quoting Marriott, 437 F.3d at 1307). Next, Kansas contends that the government has not sufficiently “identified or described” the documents by stating with particularity what information is subject to the privilege. Having reviewed the government’s privilege logs (both initial and supplemental), the Court concludes that the government’s descriptions were sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether the privilege was applicable, and that, in any event, the Court has now conducted an in camera review of the documents withheld. See Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 91 Fed.Cl. 496, 503 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Holdings: 0: holding that documents reflecting the department of educations review of a universitys compliance with title iv were covered by the privilege and rejecting the argument that a specific policy judgment is necessary for the privilege to apply because the privilege servesto protect the processes by which governmental decisions as well as policies are formulated 1: holding that defendants privilege login combination with the in camera review requested by plaintiffsis adequate to determine whether the elements of the privilege have been established 2: recognizing privilege 3: holding that production of documents without a claim of privilege waives the right to later claim that privilege 4: holding that a complete prohibition against an opponents use of in camera review to establish the applicability of the crimefraud exception to the attorneyclient privilege is inconsistent with the policies underlying the privilege


Input: 10, 2008 temporary orders inappropriately modify the 1996 Oklahoma custody order. We further conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Bradshaw to pay the amicus attorney for any work performed pertaining to the habeas corpus matter. We also hold that Judge Rynd did not abuse his discretion by denying Bradshaw’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and request for attorney fees related to prosecution of the petition. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Brad ates: Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, the court may render an appropriate temporary order if there is a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.374. 4 . See Brown v. Dixon, 776 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1989, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>); Lundell v. Clawson, 697 S.W.2d 836, 840 Holdings: 0: holding that court could permit grandparent or other person having substantial past contact with child to intervene in pending sapcr even though original suit requesting possessory conservatorship could not be filed by grandparent or other person and further holding that stepgrandmother had standing to intervene to seek managing conservatorship of child under section 102004b and section 1020039 where natural mother abandoned child after birth parents were divorced natural father remarried father had custody of child after father died child lived first with stepmother then with stepgrandmother and mother first sought custody when child was eleven years old 1: holding subjective belief of maternal grandparents and their witnesses that child was better off with them and would be emotionally upset if made to go with father did not raise existence of unexpected crises or dire emergency demanding immediate action to protect child 2: holding that maternal grandmother had standing to intervene in pending sapcr to seek managing conservatorship of child pursuant to former section 102004b and section 102004a where she had substantial past contact with child there was evidence of abuse and neglect of child by mother and mother had been arrested and had subsequently engaged in bizarre and dangerous behavior towards child had attacked grandmother with frying pan and hedge clippers and had been involuntarily committed to psychiatric center all of which established serious and immediate concern for welfare of child 3: holding that a child was not barred by a former statute of limitations applicable to actions to establish the existence of a father and child relationship when the current action was to establish the nonexistence of a father and child relationship and the presumed father no longer persisted in maintaining paternity 4: holding child is entitled to know and be supported financially and emotionally by his or her biological father


Input: of the Lease, if the options were not exercised. Crossland’s right to the payments now at issue thus was contingent upon exercise of the options, exactly as was the case in Plumbing Industry. 8 . In some of the cases, the tenant had an option to extend the lease. In others, there was no such option. But this affected the courts’ analysis not at all. As the decisions made clear, under Florida law, renewal and extension mean the same thing. And this is so whether there is or is not an express option to renew or extend the lease. See, e.g., Strano, 534 So.2d at 1215 n. 2 (addressing lease not containing option); Woodard Tire, 596 So.2d at 1116 & n. 2 (applying same analysis to lease containing option). 9 . See also Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. v. Williams, 551 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See also supra note 5. 11 . Crossland is Holdings: 0: recognizing that the burden is on the landlord in a lease dispute to establish that the lease contract had been breached and that such breach entitled the landlord to the possession of the property in question 1: holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to present testimony that they were induced to enter an automobile lease by promises that they could disregard terms of the lease 2: holding that former employees of a brokerage firm who had a contractual right to a share of any commission received by the firm upon extension of a lease were not entitled to a share of the commission received when the landlord and tenant entered an amendment to the lease which extended the duration but also added new terms this was a new lease not an extension of the prior lease 3: holding that jury should have received evidence from parties lease negotiations to determine intended meaning of term bookstore in the lease 4: holding that the damage for tenancy at sufferance during the holdover period was the monthly rent under the lease versus the apartments fair market value because the lease contained a provision requiring lease payments beyond the lease term


Input: in the definition of "felony violation” under § 1028A). 10 . In this regard, Count Two charges defendant with knowingly possessing] and us[ing], without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person, to wit, a passport bearing the name, birth date, and alien registration receipt number of Sandy Garcia, a native of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, during and in relation to a violation of Title 8, United States Code, Section 1326(a), to wit, unlawful reentry after deportation. 11 . The Montejo decision is currently on appeal to the Fourth Circuit, with oral argument recently heard on October 28, 2005. See United States v. Montejo, No. 05-4143 (4th Cir.2005). 12 . See United States v. Simmons, 247 F.3d 118, 122 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Horton, 321 F.3d 476, 479 Holdings: 0: recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous 1: recognizing that when interpreting a statute a courts inquiry begins with the text 2: recognizing that the absurdity of the result is a factor to consider when interpreting a statute 3: holding courts must adhere to legislative intent when interpreting a statute 4: holding that courts must give effect to every word when interpreting a statute


Input: held that Prostok’s claims do not collaterally attack the confirmation order because they are based on conduct extrinsic to the confirmation order. 112 S.W.3d 876, 905. This Court has held that when a party does not seek to set aside a prior judgment, but instead brings suit based on extrinsic fraud, the action is not a collateral attack. State v. Durham, 860 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Tex.1993) (recognizing, in a suit brought by the state for fraud in obtaining court approval for an oil and gas lease, that the State had not sought to set aside the judgment but had “alleged fraud extrinsic to the judgment, and invoke[d] the equity powers of the court to impose a constructive trust”); cf. Spera v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C., 25 S.W.3d 863, 871 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th DistJ 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, the underlying issues resolved Holdings: 0: holding that debtors have no right to jury trial on malpractice claims against their attorneys 1: holding that extrinsic conduct that formed the basis of claims for attorney malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty were not a collateral attack on trial courts order apportioning attorneys fees 2: holding breach of fiduciary duty claim is essentially a negligence or professional malpractice claim 3: holding that there would be no exception to american rule on attorney fees for legal malpractice claims 4: holding that attorneys fees and costs expended as a result of an attorneys alleged malpractice constitute legallycognizable damages for purposes of stating a claim for such malpractice


Input: to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged); GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1546^17 (observing that where no heightened pleading standard is required, a plaintiff need not plead fraudulent intent with particularity). Under these requirements, Allstate has adequately alleged a violation of §§ 25400 and 25500. According to Allstate, Stern willfully participated in the conveyance of misleading information to investors through its involvement in investigating, drafting, and reviewing the data set forth in the Official Statements. Given that role, Stern had a duty to disclose any known information necessary to prevent the Official Statements from being false or misleading. See Howard, 228 F.3d at 1061 (<HOLDING>). Allstate has further alleged that Stern Holdings: 0: holding a defendant may be convicted of mail fraud if he knowingly and willfully participates in a fraudulent scheme created and set in motion by others 1: holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable 2: holding that a person violates the bank fraud statute when he knowingly executes a scheme to obtain money from a financial institution by means of false or fraudulent representations if a defendant knowingly provided materially false information in order to induce the loan the crime is complete and it is irrelevant whether or not he intended to repay or was capable of repaying it 3: holding that a defendant can be held liable when it knowingly participates in the creation of a false or misleading statement 4: holding that the elements of a claim under  3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added


Input: (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 67 Chapman v. State, 273 Ga. 348, 349-50 (2) (541 SE2d 634) (2001); see Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687 (III); Ashmid v. State, 316 Ga. App. 550, 556 (3) (730 SE2d 37) (2012). 68 Chapman, 273 Ga. at 350 (2);see Cammer v. Walker, 290 Ga. 251, 255 (1) (719 SE2d 437) (2011) (“A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is judged by whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance, not by a standard of errorless counsel or by hindsight.” (punctuation omitted)). 69 Sowell v. State, 327 Ga. App. 532, 539 (4) (759 SE2d 602) (2014). 70 Maurer v. State, 320 Ga. App. 585, 595 (6) (g) (740 SE2d 318) (2013) (punctuation omitted). 71 State v. Mobley, 296 Ga. 876, 881 (770 SE2d 1) (2015). 72 Maurer, 320 Ga. App. at 595 (6) (g); see Mobley, 296 Ga. at 881 (<HOLDING>); State v. Reynolds, 332 Ga. App. 818, 822-23 Holdings: 0: holding that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by positing mutual combat defense as an alternative in murder case even if doing so might have impaired principal defense of justification 1: holding that the appropriate vehicle for claims alleging that defense counsel violated a defendants right to testify is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that the erroneous omission of a justification defense was harmless where counsel did not invoke the defense during either voir dire or opening statements and where the defense did not appear to be the primary focus of the defensive theory at trial 3: recognizing an innocent possession defense though the defense in that case is more properly considered a justification defense as life and limb were arguably at stake 4: holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity


Input: (2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to... (F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;” 28 U.S.C. § 157. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York stated that an avoidance proceeding to recover assets of a debtor is within the bankruptcy courts' core jurisdiction. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. Transpacific Corp., Ltd. (In re Commodore Int’l, Ltd.), 242 B.R. 243, 261 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1999). See also, Braunstein v. Branch Group, Inc. (In re Mass. Gas & Elec. Light Supply Co., Inc.), 200 B.R. 471, 472 (Bankr.D.Mass.1996) (finding that an action under Section 549(a) for avoidance of a set-off as an unauthorized post-petition transfer to be core); N. Parent, Inc. v. Cotter & Co. (In re N. Parent, Inc.), 221 B.R. 609, 628 (<HOLDING>). 15 . The United States Court of Appeals for Holdings: 0: holding an action for postpetition breach of an agreement to purchase property to be a core proceeding 1: holding that a proceeding under section 547 is a core proceeding 2: holding that an adversary proceeding is a core proceeding under 28 usc  157b2 even though the laundry list of core proceedings under  157b2 does not specifically name this particular circumstance 3: holding that a lawsuit by a third party creditor against the estate is a core proceeding 4: holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding


Input: itself. We find equally unfounded the argument that any agreements Jones may have had in his Superior Court cases “don’t have anything to do with this case.” Def.App., Tab E at 42. Defendant’s whole point was that Jones may have planted the gun in this case in order to “work off’ obligations that arose in those Superior Court cases. Hence, agreements in the other cases have everything to do with this case. Nor does it matter that agreements in other cases may have involved other prosecutors. The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia prosecutes cases in both the federal District Court and the local Superior Court, and the prosecutor is responsible (at a minimum) for all Brady information in the possession of that office. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763 (<HOLDING>). For a similar reason, we reject as irrelevant Holdings: 0: holding that a promise to make a loan is not covered by  1823e because a promise is not an asset 1: holding there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant did not intend to perform when the promise was made 2: holding a duty to act is created by reliance not by the person to whom the aid is to be rendered but by another who as a result of the promise refrains from acting on that persons behalf 3: holding that ignorance by one prosecutor of promise made by another is irrelevant since the prosecutors office is an entity and  a promise made by one attorney must be attributed for these purposes to the government 4: recognizing that a unilateral contract can be formed when only one promise is illusory because the nonillusory promise can serve as an offer which the promisor who made the illusory promise can accept by performance


Input: with disapproval by the Fifth Circuit.” See Wilson v. Hibu Inc., No. 3:13-CV-2012-L, 2013 WL 5803816, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2013) (similarly denying remand where plaintiff pleaded monetary relief below jurisdictional threshold but faile Mktg., Inc., No. EP-12-CV-00340-DCG, 2012 WL 5287043, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2012) (similarly holding that the statements in the plaintiff’s petition and binding stipulation/sworn affidavit attached to her petition asserting that the amount in controversy was less than or equal to $74,999.00 and that the plaintiff would not accept damages greater than $74,999.00 was sufficient to bind her and defeat diversity jurisdiction); Wright v. Normandy Terrace Healthcare and Rehabilitation Ctr., No. SA-12-CA-0622-XR, 2012 WL 2979040, at *2 (W.D.Tex. 2012) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Plaintiffs argue that "Rule 47, when all Holdings: 0: holding that the stipulation included in the plaintiffs petitionthat the maximum amount of damages sought or that would be accepted wpuld not exceed 75000 exclusive of costs and interest bound the plaintiff and was sufficient to defeat diversity jurisdiction 1: holding that where plaintiff has set forth in the complaint a specific request for damages and attorneys fees that on its face is an amount less than the jurisdictional minimum the defendant must prove to a legal certainty that plaintiffs claim must exceed 75000 2: holding that the district court erred in not determining whether the amount in controversy necessary to create diversity jurisdiction was met at the time of removal 3: holding that defendants claim that the cost of injunctive relief would exceed 75000 was too speculative 4: recognizing that powerex abrogated rogers but ultimately denied remand since the plaintiffs failed to rebut defendants claim that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeded 75000 and also refused to stipulate to a lesser amount of damages


Input: gained by looking beyond the allegations of the complaint. See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., No. 88-1503, — F.2d - (10th Cir. March 21, 1991) (Westlaw 35967) (concluding, based on “extensive findings of fact in [an underlying case] indicating that the pollution at issue ... was intended by defendants,” that the pollution was not “accidental” and granting insurer’s motion for summary judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (“Under New Hampshire law, the complaint and the policy alone may be sufficient for a determination of no coverage. Independent evidence, of course, may be needed if the compl 72, 240 N.W.2d 310 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or.App. Holdings: 0: holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend 1: holding that under new york law for an insurer to have no duty to defend the court must find as a matter of law that based on the pleadings there was no possible factual or legal basis on which the insurer might eventually be held obligated to indemnify the insured 2: holding based on deposition which revealed that defective materials were used and construction was contrary to workmanship standards that insurer had no duty to defend because damages should have been expected by the insured 3: holding that a cgl policy such as the one at issue here does not insure against claims for defective or negligent workmanship or construction because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident and therefore claims for defective or negligent workmanship do not constitute an occurrence under the policy 4: holding that an insurer had a duty to defend the insured until it could establish that those claims were not supported by the facts


Input: United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir.2000) (”[A]n individual’s domestic violence conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun might well be the subject of regulation.... Although an individual’s right to bear arms is constitutionally protected, the possession of a gun, especially by anyone who has been convicted of a violent crime, is nevertheless a highly regulated activity, and everyone knows it.”) (citation 'otnitted); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 (1st Cir.1999) ("[A] person who is subject to [an anti-harassment or anti-stalking restraining] order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a firearm[.]”). 65 . See, e.g,, United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 91-93 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 468 Holdings: 0: holding that even though the defendant had not been given actual notice of his registration obligations under sorna his prosecution under that statute did not violate his due process rights under lambert where he was on notice that state law required sex offenders to register 1: holding failure to give putative father notice of adoption proceedings did not violate due process where he had never established a substantial relationship with his child 2: holding that a creditor who had received actual notice of a bankruptcy proceeding through his counsel did not suffer a due process violation because he had notice in time to file a complaint or at least to file a timely motion for an extension of time 3: holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice 4: holding that even though defendant stated he did not read and discuss psr with his counsel he could not show any error that affected his substantial rights


Input: years to life for a first conviction and a penalty of 20 years to life for a second or subsequent conviction”; subsection (b) sets forth what “could properly [be] characterized as an ‘aggravated’ continuing criminal enterprise,” carrying a mandatory life term, and requiring additional “elements” to be proven. Montalvo argues that his “illegal mandatory life sentence must be corrected to a term authorized by the facts reflected in the basic verdict for a continuing criminal enterprise.” It appears that Montalvo argues that he was convicted of a “basic” continuing criminal enterprise pursuant to section 848(a), but sentenced for an “aggravated” continuing criminal enterprise pursuant to section 848(b). So construed, this argument is cognizable under Rule 35(a). Fowler, 794 F.2d at 1449 (<HOLDING>). However, Montalvo’s challenge fails on the Holdings: 0: holding that rule 35a can be used to challenge sentences that are not authorized by the judgment of conviction 1: holding that a juvenile adjudication may be used as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes 2: holding that affidavits that are conclusory and based on hearsay can not be used to oppose motion for summary judgment 3: recognizing that the phrases can be used interchangeably 4: holding the petitioners challenge of his conviction is not rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence because collateral consequences flowing from the conviction give the petitioner a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him


Input: those responses as such, as indicated in his 1999 letter to the president of the University. The fact that he held out hope that the president would intercede on his behalf does not change the accrual date for the statute of limitations because that date is measured by the standard of when a person, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of his injury. See Stewart, 2006 WL 626921, at *4 (statute of limitations under the ADA accrues “when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for his claim.”); see also Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir.2007) (“Under federal law, the limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury that forms the basis of his claim.”); Soignier, 92 F.3d at 551 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff contends Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered 1: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run under federal law when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims 2: holding that under the ada discovery of the original act of discrimination not future confirmation of the injury or determination that the injury is unlawful is when the statute of limitations begins to run 3: holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court 4: holding that georgias statute of limitations for personal injury actions should be applied to discrimination claims brought under the rehabilitation act and title ii of the ada


Input: implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”). Policymakers may act with an awareness of race — unaccompanied by a facial racial classification or a discriminatory purpose — without thereby subjecting the resultant policies to the rigors of strict constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has specified that “race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper fashion .... [M]ere awareness of race in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor [to foster diversity and combat racial isolation] at the outset.” Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmties. Project, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2525, 192 L.Ed.2d 514 (2015); see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789, 127 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant 1: holding that a violation of  1981 requires purposeful race discrimination 2: holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case 3: recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination 4: holding race and gender discrimination claim barred


Input: that? (Tr. at 152.) Carter argues the quote is a misstatement of the law, and improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case. The State indicates the prosecutor was "verifying that the jurors could go outside what might be called the typical paradigm of a robbery ease." (Appellee's Br. at 11.) As we find the statement extremely difficult to understand, we cannot say it could have improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case or otherwise prejudiced the jury against Carter. Even if the statement could be understood to misstate the law, it did not make a fair trial impossible, as the jury was instructed multiple times thereafter regarding the elements of the charges against Carter. See Benefield v. State, 904 N.E.2d 239, 247 n. 4 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. There was no prose-cutorial Holdings: 0: holding almost any improper argument may be cured by an instruction to disregard 1: holding improper admission of extrinsic evidence may be cured by adequate limiting instruction 2: holding an error re garding the element of a crime may be cured through further instruction to the jury 3: holding that a jury instruction directing the verdict on one element deprived defendant of the right to a jury determination on every element of the charged offense and thus constituted structural error 4: holding omission in the jury instruction of element of offense requires a new trial


Input: by using the policy’s cash value or “paid up” provisions. The court’s opinion makes no reference to a 31-day grace period as an “extended coverage” for purposes of section 234(1) and we reject plaintiffs assertions that such a conclusion may be inferred from the opinion’s language. Moreover, as defendant notes, the court’s interpretation of section 234(1) was dicta, as the insured in First National Bank died long after the six-month period ended. First National Bank, 122 Ill. 2d at 118, 121-22. For these reasons, First National Bank does not govern the facts before us. Indeed, our research has uncovered no case holding that a 31-day grace period operates as an extension of coverage. See generally Estate of Blakely v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 100, 110 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Hall v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Holdings: 0: holding that because a disclaimer relates back to the decedents death the status of parties in the chain of succession are established as of the time of death regardless of when the disclaimer is made 1: holding that decedents overpayment of premiums during the policys first year extended coverage so that the policy would not have lapsed at the time of his death 2: holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage 3: holding that if there are multiple causes of action and one would potentially constitute a claim within the scope of the policys coverage the insurer would have a duty to defend until it could confine the claim to a recovery excluded from the policy internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: holding that policy coverage is triggered in each year that the plaintiff inhaled asbestos