Input: 108. 61 . We believe the instant case is one of these cases. 62 . See Wallace, 106 S.W.3d at 108. 63 . See McIntire, 698 S.W.2d at 658. 64 . Bahm, 219 S.W.3d at 396 ("While the court of appeals used the words 'reasonable grounds,’ its emphasis on proof in its analysis appears to conflict with its earlier statement that an appellant does not need to establish a prima facie case to obtain a hearing on his motion for new trail.”). 65 . If an appellate court made such a determination in favor of an appellant and thus remanded the case to the trial court, what determinations would remain for the trial court to make at the hearing? 66 . Wallace, 106 S.W.3d at 108 (emphasis added). 67 . McIntire, 698 S.W.2d at 660; see McMillan v. State, 769 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, pet. ref’d) (<HOLDING>). 68 . See id. 69 . The instant case was Holdings: 0: holding that if the defendant fails to file a motion in the trial court to withdraw his plea he cannot attack it for the first time on appeal 1: holding that trial court did not err in ruling on appellees motion for summary judgment before appellees complied with appellants discovery request when the record reflected that appellant filed a motion to compel three days before the hearing and the record did not reveal any effort on the part of appellant to secure a ruling from the trial court on its motion to compel or object at the trial court hearing the motion for summary judgment prior to ruling on the motion to compel 2: recognizing that the defendant whose trial counsel represented him on motion for new trial had no opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim prior to appeal and remanding the case for a hearing solely on this issue 3: holding that the trial court should have granted a motion for relief from judgment when it was the trial courts failure to serve the defendant with notice of the final judgment as required by rule 1080h1 that prevented the defendant from timely appealing 4: holding that by denying the defendant a hearing on his motion for new trial the trial court abdicated its fact finding function and effectively prevented the defendant from making a record sufficient to challenge on appeal the policy about which he complains


Input: where a negotiated compact is in effect between the state and the tribe. 25 U.S.C.S. § 2710(d)(1)(C). To this end, the language of the IGRA provides that “Any State ... may enter into a Tribal-State compact governing gaming activities on the Indian lands of the Indian Tribe.” Id. § 2710(d)(3)(B). The only reasonable interpretation of this language is that it authorizes state officials, acting pursuant to their authority held under state law, to enter into gaming compacts on behalf of the state. It follows that because the Governor lacked authority under New Mexico law to enter into the compact with Pojoaque Pueblo, the State of New Mexico has not yet entered into any gaming compact that the Governor may implement. Cf. Marburg v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-79, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION Under federal law as expressed in Holdings: 0: holding that a void decree has no legal effect 1: holding to the same effect 2: holding that an evicted plaintiff has no legal interest in property and therefore has no standing to bring a cercla claim 3: holding a party has no standing to appeal unless he or she is an aggrieved party an individual who is not a parent in the eyes of the law has no legal interest in the child and therefore has no standing to appeal 4: holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect


Input: to the Petitioning Creditor. Despite this acknowledgement, this Court finds the Instant Memo to be insufficient to prove the existence of an enforceable contract because it makes no reference to the essential terms of whatever loan agreement that may exist between the parties. Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa.Super.2009) (recognizing that when a party seeks to enforce an oral agreement, the party must establish the essential terms and conditions of the alleged agreement); CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa.Super.1999) (stating that a party must establish the essential terms of a contract in order to state a claim for breach of contract); Estate of Rodgers v. Morris Chapel Missionary Baptist Church, No. 04-1577, 2005 WL 3602536 (Pa.Ct.Com.Pl. Dec. 14, 2005) (<HOLDING>). For example, the Instant Memo makes no Holdings: 0: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 1: holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract 2: holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract 3: holding summary dismissal of breach of implied employment contract claim inappropriate where factual issue over existence of oral policy 4: holding failure to establish terms of an oral loan agreement precluded the existence of a breach of contract claim


Input: validly claim anxiety and concern over the pending charges. But that is not enough to find a constitutional speedy trial violation. Rather, if there is no actual prejudice, the presumed prejudice flowing from a long delay is “insufficient to carry a speedy trial claim absent a strong showing on the other Barker factors.” Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 600. This case does not present even a weak showing on the other Barker factors: Ashburn was as much, if not more, responsible for the pretrial delay; while Ashburn asserted his speedy trial rights, he also continued to request continuances; and the delay did not cause any pretrial incarceration and did not impair his defense. Under these circumstances, Ashburn was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. See Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 601 (<HOLDING>); Loera v. United States, 714 F.3d 1025, 1032 Holdings: 0: holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial 1: holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial 2: holding that aggressiveness with which defendant asserted his speedy trial right was lacking because he merely filed one demand for speedy trial and opposed his original counsels withdrawal 3: holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant 4: holding that whether a pretrial motion actually caused or is expected to cause delay of trial is irrelevant to the speedy trial act


Input: judgment on a take-nothing jury verdict against plaintiffs. Appellant challenges three of the district court’s evidentiary rulings, which excluded evidence relating to crashworthiness and unreasonable dangerousness. We affirm. I. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.1993). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61, we may not set aside a verdict based on an error in the exclusion of evidence, “unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. To vacate a judgment based on such an error, we “must find that the substantial rights of the parties were affected.” Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. (2d Cir.1981)(<HOLDING>); cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Holdings: 0: holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute 1: holding that when congress has implicitly delegated legislative authority to an agency a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 2: holding that although the court has the authority to review facts not before the plan administrator the court should use that authority sparingly 3: holding that an interim recommendation by a transit authority staff member to the transit authority administrator was not a factual finding of an agency within the meaning of rule 8038c 4: recognizing a trial courts common law authority to enter an interim rather than permanent parenting plan at the time of entry of a dissolution decree even in the absence of express statutory authority


Input: 2d, Business Relationships § 1401, at 352; see Partnership Law § 10 [1].) Finally, that the complainant’s attorney referred to the 1987 agreement as a partnership in 1992, five years after the 1987 agreement was drafted, does not prove, in and of itself, that the defendants and complainants were partners. (Brodsky v Stadlen, 138 AD2d 662, 663 [2d Dept 1988].) For similar reasons, the defendants’ argument that the 1987 agreement created a joint venture, the establishment of which is based on the same rules in which the existence of a partnership is determined (see Scholastic, Inc. v Harris, 259 F3d 73, 84 [2d Cir 2001]), is also without merit. 17 . See 3 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 19.4 (c) n 42 (2d ed). 18 . See State v Durant, 122 Or App 380, 383-384, 857 P2d 891, 893 (1993) Holdings: 0: holding under oregons larceny statute which is based on new yorks larceny statute that a partner cannot be charged with the theft of partnership property because oregon adheres to the commonlaw rule that partners cannot steal partnership property 1: holding that a transaction did not satisfy the requirements of  1031a when a partnership sold property and individual partners acquired the exchange property 2: holding that the property owners testimony alone placed the value of the stolen property above the amount necessary to constitute grand larceny 3: holding larceny conviction was a violation of bar against double jeopardy where defendant was acquitted of larceny at first trial but at retrial was convicted of larceny and burglary 4: recognizing that partnership property is a type of ownership


Input: (“Omegle Policy”), Ex. E to Opp. Mem. at 1. 22 . Id. In fact, users’ IP addresses are recorded with the explicit “inten[tion] [of] be[ing] used for the purpose of law enforcement.” Id. 23 . Id. 24 . Id. 36 . United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 665 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)). 37 . 534 U.S. 112, 120, 122 S.Ct 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). 38 . Id. at 120 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 587. 39 . Id. 40 . Newton, 369 F.3d at 665 (citing United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 461 (2d Cir.2002)). 41 . United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 182 (2d Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted). 42 . Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). 43 . Rakas v. Illinois, t. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (<HOLDING>). 48 . Garcia, 56 F.3d at 422. 49 . Florida v. Holdings: 0: holding that the evidence obtained as part of an illegal stop should have been suppressed even where the defendants consented to the search 1: holding that delay caused by or consented to by a defendant is not unreasonable 2: holding that a detained defendants consent to search his car was voluntary even though the police did not tell him he was free to leave 3: holding that a search can be consented to even if a defendant does not subjectively feel free to leave 4: holding inter alia that a search can be consented to even if a defendant to be advised that he is free to go


Input: application [ ] when in fact th[e] Attorney General has given the required preliminary approval to submit the application ... does not warrant the suppression of evidence gathered pursuant to a court order resting upon the application.” 416 U.S. at 571, 94 S.Ct. 1849. In other words, when the executive official who actually authorized a wiretap application had the power to do so, a law enforcement officer’s failure to correctly identify the official in the wiretap application does not require suppression. These are the circumstances of this case. Indeed, the officers’ reference to an outdated AG Order was merely a technical defect which did not subvert the primary purposes of the wiretap statute’s authorization requirement. See United States v. Jones, 600 F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court correctly Holdings: 0: holding that amended order which made more than clerical corrections was a nullity when it was entered after notice of appeal 1: holding statute which required consideration rather than a finding of amenability was constitutional 2: holding that deas reference to ag order 27582005 rather than 28872007 was a clerical error which did not subvert the reviewing functions required by congress 3: holding that reviewing court may consider trial evidence in reviewing denial of motion to suppress 4: holding that appellate courts analyze plain error by reference to the law as of the time the appeal is decided rather than the extant law at the time of the disputed trial court ruling


Input: in the equipment; (4) Segundo did not assist Monson in retrieving the equipment from law enforcement; and (5) Segundo did not adequately protect its collateral. But these excuses do not make Monson’s own conduct any less willful or malicious. The collapse of the business did not relieve Monson of the contractual obligations which he entered into or give him carte blanche to make off with equipment he bought with someone else’s money. Demonstrably, Monson knew his actions were wrongful and without just cause. Further, Monson’s behavior falls outside of the sort of reckless or unfortunate but non-malicious acts that this Court have previously held do not rise to the standard of a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). See In re Walker, 48 F.3d 1161, 1163-65 (11th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Ikner, 883 F.2d at 987-91 (affirming the Holdings: 0: holding that there must be proof of both a willful act and malicious injury to establish nondischargeability under section 523a6 1: holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury 2: holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence 3: holding that an employer who commits an intentional tort against his employee cannot claim that the act was accidental so that workers compensation is the employees exclusive remedy 4: holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act


Input: (emphases added). Thus, contrary to Vester’s contention on appeal, the United States Supreme Court has made a clear distinction between “uncounseled” convictions, and those that were secured with “ineffective” counsel. Accordingly, Yester’s claim that his “ineffective counsel” amounted to “no counsel,” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and collateral attack on his prior convictions, must fail. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court explicitly held in Custis that the right to collaterally attack a prior criminal conviction in a subsequent proceeding for enhancement purposes is limited to the actual denial of counsel. Id.; see also Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 378, 121 S.Ct. 1578, 1581, 149 L.Ed.2d 590 (2001); United States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1381 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Although the Custis decision concerned the Holdings: 0: recognizing collateral attack on void order 1: holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack 2: holding that where a defendants claim did not amount to a complete denial of counsel it could not form the basis of a collateral attack 3: holding that when the law of the circuit was so firmly against him petitioner did not have to raise an issue to preserve it as a basis for collateral attack later on 4: holding that the complete denial of counsel on direct appeal requires a finding of prejudice


Input: burden to establish prejudice “despite the fact that a delay occurred.” Id. at 188. We concluded employer’s delay of nearly seven months in moving to dismiss after employee’s suit did not prejudice employee. Id. Our holding in Mueller is consistent with prior authority finding delay in seeking to compel arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice. See generally Freeman, 924 F.2d at 158-59 (moving party’s use of judicial process and discovery before demanding arbitration not prejudicial to opponent as no issues litigated and limited discovery unusable in arbitration); Nettleton v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 904 S.W.2d 409, 410-12 (Mo.App.1995) (limited discovery and legal expenses incurred by party opposing arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice); Berhorst, 764 S.W.2d at 662-64 (<HOLDING>). Prejudice, however, may result from delay and Holdings: 0: holding party did not waive right to arbitrate despite moving to dismiss and moving for summary judgment on opponents claim 1: holding that the moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial 2: recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case 3: holding that the party moving for summary judgment waived its argument that the opposing partys affidavit should not be considered because the moving party never objected to the timeliness of the affidavit to the trial court 4: holding that summary judgment should be denied where the moving party does not show that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact with respect to each essential element of the claim


Input: but data-gathering that preceded it. See Seamon, supra, at 735-36 (quoting Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286). In the latter case, a court need not second-guess the decision's wisdom; it need only examine the decisionmaking process to determine whether the negligently produced data affected it. See id. 16 . The Court here used the term in its common-law sense, which distinguishes "discretionary” from "ministerial” acts, and not in its distinct but related FTCA sense. 17 . The Court has limited Mitchell, allowing immediate appeal only of denials of immunity turning on questions of law, not sufficiency of evidence. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), lim’d in turn by Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 18 . As illustrated by the opinion Holdings: 0: recognizing that ruling of one trial judge does not preclude another trial judge reconsidering interlocutory ruling 1: holding that genuine factual dispute does not preclude appeal of discrete ruling on pure legal issue 2: recognizing that order denying confirmation of a plan does not resolve a discrete issue 3: holding that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact 4: holding that the protection of the double jeopardy clause does not preclude a defendant from being charged under a statute  defining as the criminal offense a discrete act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a distinguishable discrete act that is a separate violation of the statute


Input: regarding the exclusivity provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 24 are determined by the judge, justiciable by motion. Anzalone v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority, 403 Mass. 119, 125, 526 N.E.2d 246, 249 (1988); Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 548, 413 N.E.2d 711, 713 (1980); Catalano v. First Essex Sav. Bank, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 377, 381, 639 N.E.2d 1113, 1116 (1994). It is reasonable to infer that the Verdict and Judgment followed the State Court judge’s consideration and denial of motions to invoke the exclusivity clause under the Act, M.G.L. c. 152, § 24. In Massachusetts, that level of adjudication is sufficient to provide preclu-sive effect for the issue underlying the motion in a subsequent forum. Jarosz v. Palmer, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 834, 836, 733 N.E.2d 164, 167 (2000) (<HOLDING>) aff'd 436 Mass. 526, 531, 766 N.E.2d 482, 488 Holdings: 0: holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   1: holding that an evidentiary hearing is necessary only if the party requesting the hearing raises a significant disputed factual issue 2: holding that an evidentiary hearing or jury trial is not necessary for an issue to have preclusive effect if it was properly raised in the prior proceeding was submitted for determination and was actually determined citing restatement second of judgments  27 cmt d 3: holding that the disputed issue with respect to the state law bar was properly submitted to the jury 4: holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars readjudication of issues when 1 the prior suit resulted in judgment on the merits 2 identical issues are involved 3 the issue was actually litigated 4 the issue was actually determined and 5 the determination was necessary to the resulting judgment


Input: “ByLine” products, are-invalid and, therefore, in advertising these products as being available “exclusively” at its retail stores, the Plaintiff has merely exercised its right to market the exclusive availability of these specific products, for which it holds the legal entitlement to sell as so trademarked. As a result, the attestations, which are contained in the Condon Affidavit, merely evince a consumer’s reaction to a lawful marketing practice, and not some reaction to illegal and misleading advertising. Moreover, we agree with the Plaintiff that its representations concerning the “exclusive” availability of these products are, at their worst, exaggerated and overgeneralized puffery. See, e.g., Gordon & Breach Science Publishers S.A. v. American Institute of Physics, supra at 182 (<HOLDING>); Data Cash Systems Inc. v. Js & a Group, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that statements proclaiming the most costeffective prices and subscription prices as low as possible were puffery 1: holding that statements made in the course of negotiation were not contracts and such statements were merged into the final written agreement 2: holding statements of product superiority and that product was industry approved were puffery 3: holding statement that product was americas favorite pasta was puffery 4: holding that statements that 1992 will produce excellent results for adage and adage is on target toward achieving the most profitable year in its history were predictions as to future events not statements as to present facts let alone guarantees and were therefore immaterial as a matter of law


Input: (1) Employment in the institution. (2) Iowa state industries. (3) An employment program established by the director. (4) A treatment program established by the director. (5) An inmate educational program approved by the director. Iowa Code § 903A.2 (Supp.1997) (emphasis added). Propp had a category “A” sentence. 3 .The practice of the DOC is to allow an inmate required to participate in a sex offender treatment program to earn credits while awaiting placement in the program rather than being deemed ineligible until completion of the program. This interpretation of the statute is not challenged in this case. 4 . Propp does not claim that requiring him to participate in the SOTP is itself a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Cf. Schreiber v. State, 666 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Iowa 2003) (<HOLDING>). Nor does he claim he could not be disciplined Holdings: 0: holding that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them 1: holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause 2: holding that work release and security classification regulations were not ex post facto laws 3: holding imposition of discipline for refusal to supply blood specimen did not violate ex post facto clause 4: holding statute requiring inmates to submit blood specimens for dna profiling did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws


Input: trial court to have granted a 30-day grace period, in light of the fact that Schorp’s attorney failed to file an expert report in compliance with the statute’s requirements, would have undermined the statute’s intent. For that reason, appellant’s fourth issue cannot be sustained. Therefore, we overrule appellant's fourth issue. 4 . Bell and Baptist assert relevant questions which a jury would have to consider and would necessitate an expert's opinion: for example, (1) whether the decision to use an arterial line was within the appropriate standard of care; (2)what are the appropriate procedures for an arterial line insertion; (3) what other possible medical causes could exist; (4) what should have been the appropriate medical treatment or intervention? See Haddock, 793 S.W.2d at 953 (<HOLDING>); Odak, 934 S.W.2d at 873 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that affidavit of merit is not required in common knowledge cases 1: recognizing common knowledge exception 2: recognizing a common knowledge exception 3: holding that administering of a hypodermic needle for the purpose of anesthesia was not within laymans common knowledge 4: holding that a reason to combine may come from the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art the nature of the problem to be solved or common knowledge and common sense


Input: competent, ... a person rendering necessaries or professional services is entitled to recover from such person under the conditions stated in this Section, although the person expresses an unwillingness to accept the things or services. (Emphasis added.) In addition to the principles set forth in the Restatement of Restitution discussed above, cases from other jurisdictions have concluded that a patient is liable for the reasonable value of medical services rendered by a hospital based on an implied in law contract theory. See Nursing Care Servs., 380 So.2d at 518 (concluding that provider of nursing care services was entitled to value of services provided to patient based on emergency aid quasi-contract theory); Galloway v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 658 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>); Heartland Health Sys. v. Chamberlin, 871 Holdings: 0: recognizing that at least for certain purposes a hospital room is fully under the control of the medical staff yet for other purposes it is the patients room  because patient understands that nurses doctors food handlers and others enter and exit hospital room in accordance with medical need and hospital routine 1: holding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering chiropractor to disclose the identity of all patients that had any type of connection to the plaintiffs attorneys and to produce all billing records for services rendered to attorneys or patients 2: holding that wife made an unambiguous unqualified promise to pay for the hospital services rendered to her husband when she signed a document that was separate from the patients registration form which she did not sign and which listed her husband as the person responsible for this account and when the separate document was entitled guarantee of account and provided i will pay any unpaid balance on dismissal and i agree to be responsible for hospital services rendered to this patient 3: holding that equity demanded that patients pay for medical services rendered by hospital in birth of child to prevent unjust enrichment 4: holding that claim against hospital regarding patients fall caused by defective footboard on hospital bed constituted health care liability claim


Input: of the items” does not permit the conclusion that the court gave little or no consideration to the erroneously admitted evidence of the perjury conviction in determining what weight to give the testimony of LeBray. The court could have attributed greater credibility to LeBray’s testimony and drawn more extensive inferences from it precisely because it rejected Pierce’s denial of possession to police based on the court’s admission of evidence of Pierce’s prior perjury conviction. Applying harmless error terminology, neither the “cumulative” evidence nor the “overwhelming” evidence formulation of harmless error analysis supports the conclusion that the admission of the challenged evidence was harmless. See, e.g., Brecht, 507 U.S. at 639, 113 S.Ct. at 1722, 123 L.Ed.2d at 373-74 (<HOLDING>); Lane, 474 U.S. at 450, 106 S.Ct. at 732, 88 Holdings: 0: holding improperly admitted evidence may be harmless if cumulative 1: holding improperly admitted testimony was cumulative to the other properly admitted evidence and was therefore harmless 2: holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt 3: holding improperly admitted evidence may be harmless if other evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the error is insignificant by comparison 4: holding that when evidence was erroneously admitted such error was harmless when the evidence was insignificant and cumulative


Input: that I can let you continue on with this case, so I’m going to dismiss you from the case with my thanks for your service up to this point. And I’m going to release you at this time. Defendant then filed a motion for mistrial pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1061 on the basis that the jury had heard extraneous informa tion in violation of defendant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. After the trial court denied defendant’s motion for mistrial, it inquired of the prosecutors and defense counsel as to their wishes regarding the jury in the capital sentencing proceeding. The prosecutor expressed a willingness to replace juror eleven with an alternate juror for the capital sentencing proceeding. However, defense counsel argued that the trial court had err 9, 192 (1971) (<HOLDING>). In State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 256, 485 Holdings: 0: holding a directed verdict motion stating specific grounds is a prerequisite for a subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 1: holding that notwithstanding defendants consent the verdict was a nullity where the trial court proceeded to verdict with a jury of eleven 2: holding defendants failure to file motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict did not prevent district court from granting motion for directed verdict for which court reserved decision 3: holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury 4: holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial


Input: of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. As in Po-ohina, the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the charges was not based on a decision on the merits of the case or a decision as to the guilt of Clemente. Instead, the District Court dismissed the charges as a sanction against the State because the District Court mistakenly believed that the State’s witness, Officer Tallion, would not be appearing as ordered. Because the District Court’s dismissal of the charges did not constitute an acquittal, the District Court had the authority to reconsider and overturn its dismissal ruling without violating the protection against double jeopardy. See Poohina, 97 Hawai'i at 509-10, 40 P.3d at 911-12; Commonwealth v. Adams, 349 Pa.Super. 200, 502 A.2d 1345, 1347-52 (1986) (<HOLDING>); State v. Calhoun, 18 Ohio St.3d 373, 481 Holdings: 0: recognizing the specific need for an appropriate double jeopardy review when an appeal is taken by the state from a lower courts dismissal of the criminal charges 1: holding that defendant waived double jeopardy claim by obtaining severance of charges at first trial 2: holding that a sua sponte dismissal of the charges during trial was not an acquittal that barred retrial based on double jeopardy 3: holding that the trial courts dismissal of the charges after jeopardy had attached based on the prosecution witnesses failure to appear was not an acquittal and therefore double jeopardy did not prevent the court from reconsidering its decision and reinstating the charges 4: holding that the dismissal of criminal charges for evidentiary insufficiency is an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause


Input: only improves on the questions of fact. ¶17 The employer also argues that neither Mayor Johnson nor the article revealed that Mr. White had epilepsy; only that he had seizures for which he had regularly been taking medicine to control. This could be a distinction without a difference, or at least it presents a genuine issue of material fact. In other words, a jury could find that the mayor’s statement and the article that reported it undoubtedly referred to epilepsy. ¶18 The employer argues that the information disclosed was not highly offensive. Cases from other jurisdictions involving publication of the intimate details of an employee’s medical health have met the “highly offensive” requirement. See Blackwell v. Harris Chem. N. Am., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1310 (D. Kan. 1998) (<HOLDING>); Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 241 F. Supp. 2d Holdings: 0: recognizing that information disclosed in private is not a public disclosure under the fca 1: holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy 2: holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts 3: holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant 4: holding alleged disclosure of personal medical information to other employees sufficiently met elements of private facts tort


Input: 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (emphasizing the inherent power of federal courts to “manage their own affairs” and stating that “Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence.”). Furthermore, the mandates of Rule 11 are not absolute. and contempt sanctions, the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits. Rather, it requires determining a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process and, if so, the appropriate sanction. Lefley v. United States, No. 259-89, 1997 WL 718468, at *11-12, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 309, at *34-35 (Ct.Cl. July 31, 1997); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131,137-38, 112 S.Ct. 1076,117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (<HOLDING>). In Cooter & Gell, the Supreme Court set forth Holdings: 0: holding that a district court had jurisdiction to impose rule 11 sanctions regardless of the existence of subjectmatter jurisdiction 1: holding that an award of sanctions under rule 11 survives despite a later determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 2: holding that a district court could constitutionally impose rule 11 sanctions in a case in which was later determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 3: holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case 4: holding that a district court may impose sanctions for abuse of judicial process pursuant to rule 11 even after it is determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims


Input: asylum application, but we find it doubtful that the DHS would deny asylum to the victim of a politically motivated, two-week detention filled with deliberate, vicious beatings but grant it to a similar applicant with additional nonlethal electrical shocks; pain is pain, whether inflicted with or without technological sophistication. Giday, 434 F.3d at 552. The discrepancies regarding Captain Azote’s assassination, with the exception of those dealing with the motivation for the killing, are similarly unimportant. If Azote was killed for his association with Adekpe, it suggests that the government would likely kill Adekpe too, if given the chance, regardless of whether Azote was killed on a Monday or Saturday, walking or jogging. Kllokoqi v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 336, 341-42 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the IJ found it unreasonable that Holdings: 0: holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act 1: holding that minor discrepancies that do not involve the heart of the asylum claim are not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding 2: holding that minor discrepancies in the date of an aliens graduation from high school as compared to the date of a beating did not justify an adverse credibility finding 3: holding adverse credibility finding was supported based on discrepancies between aliens testimony and statements regarding a police detention 4: holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding


Input: only the quantity of prior convictions, but also the qualitative relationship between the prior convictions and the present homicide conviction. 498 A.2d at 852. Justice Hutchinson suggests that prior felony convictions must be factually similar to the conviction at issue in order to support the aggravating circumstance. Id. This interpretation of the aggravating circumstance by Justice Hutchinson, accepted by only one other Justice, is not binding precedent upon this court. See CRY, Inc. v. Mill Service, Inc., 536 Pa. 462, 640 A.2d 372, 376 n. 3 (1994). Additionally, we specifically rejected reliance upon Holcomb for the argument raised by Appellant in Commonwealth v. Young, 536 Pa. 57, 637 A.2d 1313, 1320-1321 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1012, 114 S.Ct. 1389, 128 L.Ed.2d 63 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The evidence of Appellant’s two prior Holdings: 0: holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction 1: holding that section 9711d9 does not require that prior felony convictions be factually similar to the crime at issue 2: holding our habitual offender act does not limit enhancement to prior felony convictions within a certain time 3: holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded 4: holding that section 636b1c does not require any review at all by the district court of an issue that is not objected to


Input: While McIntyre appears to have applied strict scrutiny, this Court does not find that the result differs under the exacting scrutiny standard. Simply stated, the inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity to inform the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, at least in the context of referenda. The Defendants argue that the McIntyre holding is a very “fact-specific” and should yield to the more recent and relevant stream of Supreme Court cases. (Defs.’ Br. Opp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 4-5.) However, the Defendants do not fully develop this argument, and this Court has no obligation to formulate arguments for a party. See Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int’l— Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir.2000); See also, United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). As highlighted in Swaffer, the only notable Holdings: 0: holding that the seventh circuit has made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority are waived even where those arguments raise constitutional issues 1: holding that arguments not raised in district court are waived 2: holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence 3: holding that claims must put parties on sufficient notice of underlying arguments or arguments are deemed waived 4: holding that appellate courts will not review undeveloped and unsupported arguments


Input: only if “the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines. ...” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1) (emphasis added). The central dispute in this appeal is the meaning of “applicable to” and “applicable guidelines.” The government contends that, in this case, the applicable guidelines are the Career Offender guidelines because Pleasant qualified as a Career Offender, even though he was not sentenced under those guidelines. Pleasant argues that, under Freeman, the applicable guideline is § 2D1.1 because the plea agreement called for sentencing to be imposed under that provision. The commentary to § 1B1.10 addresses this very question. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, Application Note 1(A) clarifies Holdings: 0: holding that commentary is not authoritative if it is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of the guideline it interprets or explains 1: holding that commentary to the guidelines is treated as an agencys interpretation of its own legislative rule 2: holding that guidelines and commentary have force of law that may not be disregarded by sentencing judge 3: holding that commentary accompanying guidelines is binding 4: holding that guidelines commentary is generally authoritative


Input: would have a realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice, albeit by a small margin. Furthermore, it is appropriate for a district court to consider the substantial increase in turnout of black voters that usually follows the creation of an opportunity district in its effectiveness analysis. See United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F.Supp.2d 740, 765 (N.D. Ohio 2009) ("[I]t is unreasonable to assume that minority turnout will not increase under a system in which that turnout is made meaningful, relative to a system in which that turnout was entirely ineffective.”) With the boost in turnout of black voters the district becomes substantially more effective. 188 . Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). 189 . Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406-07 (<HOLDING>): Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d 1414, 1425 (11th Holdings: 0: holding that miller and its progeny did not work a change in the first gingles inquiry and rejecting the argument that a proposed district that violates miller does not satisfy the first gingles factor per se 1: holding that the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendants argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it 2: holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor 3: holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court 4: holding that an argument not raised before the bankruptcy court will not be considered for the first time on appeal


Input: adverse discrimination at all. The whole purpose of Title VII, as stated clearly by its text and controlling case law, is preventing harmful discrimination, not the lamentable-but-benign discrimination that the jury found Litton experienced. I respectfully dissent. 1 . See, e.g., Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir.2004); Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir.2000); Riser v. Target Corp., 458 F.3d 817, 820-21 (8th Cir.2006). 2 . See, e.g., Fuhr, 364 F.3d at 757; Suggs v. ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72 F.3d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing that the "ultimate question” is "whether the plaintiff carried her burden of proof of discriminatory discharge." (emphasis added)); Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding the employees complaints must give adequate notice to the employer that the employee is complaining of conduct prohibited by title vii 1: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 2: holding that to determine whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee the court examines if there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the employers stated reason for the firing is pretext 3: holding that the one central question at a title vii trial is whether the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that  the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race color religion sex or national origin emphasis added 4: holding that whether an employee decides to assist the charging party or refuses to assist the  employer the employer may not retaliate against the employee because this decision of the employee constitutes participation in an investigation or proceeding under title vii


Input: member, etc.), there was no evidence of the ultimately fatal situation that existed inside Ms. Patterson’s home when Finley knocked on the door. Any conclusion that Ms. Patterson had, or did not have, a reasonably safe opportunity to warn Finley would be mere speculation. “Evidence ... which affords nothing more than mere speculation, conjecture, or guess is insufficient to warrant the submission of a ease to the jury.” Sprayberry v. First Nat’l Bank, 465 So.2d 1111, 1114 (Ala.1984). Thus, the evidence did not indicate sufficient special circumstances to impose a duty on Ms. Patterson to warn Finley. The trial court properly directed a verdict mative-conduct theory because he does not allege that Ms. Patterson took any affirmative action. Cf. Orr v. Turney, 535 So.2d 150 (Ala. 1988) (<HOLDING>). 2 . We note that it would be peculiar to Holdings: 0: holding that a business owner has a duty to use reasonable care to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition for patrons 1: holding that premises owner owed higher duty of reasonable care to visitor instead of lower duty to licensee where owners affirmative conduct of running with a pan of hot grease created a risk to a visiting child 2: recognizing the general rule that a premises owner owes a licensee not only a duty to abstain from willfully or wantonly injuring the licensee but also a duty to avoid negligently injuring the licensee after the premises owner discovers that the licensee is in danger 3: holding that ship owners have a duty of exercising reasonable care to protect passengers regardless of status as invitee or licensee 4: holding that premises owner had duty to use degree of care in performing activities that owner of ordinary prudence would use under same or similar circumstances


Input: written objection). Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). It is therefore within this Court’s power and discretion to refuse to consider the materials submitted by LVNV on August 5, 2008, in support of claim 11, 12, 13, 14, and 18, which were filed without the Court’s leave or the Debtors’ consent after the Debtors lodged their claim objections. 2. The Court’s Equitable Power to Allow or Disallow Amendments to Contested Proofs of Claim Filed Without Leave of Court Even if Bankruptcy Rule 7015 is reserved solely for adversarial proceedings, a number of courts have determined that proof of claim amendments are subject to the court’s equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). See United States v. Johnston, 267 B.R. 717, 721 (N.D.Tex. 2001); see also In re Eden, 141 B.R. 121, 123-24 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>). The Seventh Circuit explained that Holdings: 0: recognizing that a bankruptcys equitable powers provided by  105 do not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law or constitute a roving commission to do equity 1: recognizing that many bankruptcy courts  for equitable reasons  do permit amendments to proofs of claim even past the bar date 2: recognizing heightened importance of bankruptcy forum after passage of bankruptcy amendments and federal judgeship act of 1984 3: holding that it was within the bankruptcy courts equitable powers to award damages in an action for fraud on the court 4: holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief


Input: goes to the validity of the 292 month sentence, in that he argues that he should have been resentenced to time served, or for some period less than 292 months.” Brown appealed. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is plenary over a district court’s legal conclusions. See Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir.2000). We may affirm the District Court on any basis supported by the record. See Fairview Twp. v. EPA, 773 F.2d 517, 525 n. 15 (3d Cir.1985). Because Brown alleged that the BOP “has failed to execute” the Minnesota District Court’s July 22, 2008, order, his challenge was properly brought under § 2241. See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142,146 (3d Cir.2009); see also United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Generally, federal prisoners must exhaust Holdings: 0: holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court 1: holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law 2: holding that the authority to calculate a federal prisoners period of incarceration for the federal sentence imposed is delegated to the attorney general who acts through the bop 3: holding that employees of county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to contract with the federal government were not federal employees even though county jail had to comply with federal rules and regulations 4: holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority


Input: physical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a), or uses inappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action that is likely to result in physical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a)(4). “Corporal discipline may be considered excessive or abusive when it results in” specified or similar injuries such as sprains, fractures, brain damage, asphyxiation, burns, cuts, disfigurement, or significant bruises or welts. Id. Here, the evidence showed merely that the mother threw an empty plastic jug at the oldest child on one occasion and physically disciplined her on another occasion. There was no suggestion that the child required medical attention or that her physical, mental, or emotional health was significantly impaired. See In re W.P., 534 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>); see also J.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Holdings: 0: holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses 1: holding that physical abuse to support dependency adjudication was not shown by evidence that mother pulled childs hair and father slapped childs face leaving a mark that did not require medical attention 2: holding that trial court improperly awarded custody of child to the childs stepmother and grandparents where no pleading in the case was directed at such relief and the childs mother had no notice that the issue would be considered 3: recognizing policy and ruling that person who failed to file counterclaim when childs paternity was being determined in earlier litigation should not be allowed to bring later suit to establish that he was childs natural father as this would not be in the childs best interests 4: holding evidence legally and factually sufficient under sections d and e to terminate mothers parental rights based in part on evidence that mother endangered childs physical and emotional wellbeing by leaving child alone overnight with known cocaine abusers


Input: possessing the authority to bind Defendant. State Sec. Ins., 145 Ill.2d at 431-32, 583 N.E.2d at 551, 164 Ill.Dec. at 635. During his deposition, Markwell acknowledged that he, through Kinsella, McNeeley, Ryan, and Markwell, Inc., represented approximately 20 insurance companies and that he was an independent contractor having limited authority to deal on behalf of a given insurance company. In addition, Markwell admitted that he did not have the authority to bind, nor did he have the authority to settle liability claims for Defendant. If Markwell was merely a broker rather an agent, Mark-well’s knowledge of Plaintiffs occurrence may not be imputed to Defendant. Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bassett, 170 Ill.A Ill.App.3d 1040, 1043, 506 N.E.2d 627, 629, 106 Ill.Dec. 827, 829 (1987) (<HOLDING>); see also Equity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Patis, 119 Holdings: 0: holding that a five month delay was unreasonable 1: holding that a five month delay is unreasonable 2: holding that a 13 month delay was unreasonable 3: holding that a six month delay was unreasonable 4: holding that a 14 month delay was unreasonable


Input: Bankruptcy Procedure 4004. Id. at 456-57, 124 S.Ct. 906. Rule 9006 allows extension of the Rule 4004 time limit only to the extent permitted by Rule 4004. When the creditor in Kontrick did raise an objection, the debtor responded by addressing the merits of the objection, and did not raise the timeliness issue until later. Id. at 449, 451, 124 S.Ct. 906. The Court held that the rule limiting the time for filing an objection was a claim-processing rule that did not implicate subject matter jurisdiction and that the debtor’s failure to timely assert it resulted in a forfeiture under the rule. Id. at 456-59, 124 S.Ct. 906. Rule 59 is as much a claim-processing rule as the rule at issue in Kontrick. See also Eberhart v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 403, 407,163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng’g, Holdings: 0: holding that the time limit to move for a new trial under federal rule of criminal pro cedure 33b2 is claimprocessing rule forfeited by governments failure to timely raise it 1: holding that a defendant who fails to raise rule 11 error at trial has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule 2: recognizing rule 3: holding that rule 33 of the federal rules of criminal procedure is an inflexible claimprocessing rule that may be waived if not raised 4: holding that kontrick and eberhart require the conclusion that rule 59e is a claimprocessing rule


Input: contract, because the cause of action did not “arise under the agreement but [was] merely related to it.” Id. 3 . Language in section 301(a) of the LMRA strongly suggests that its requirements are necessary to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts: The action "may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (reasoning that similar language in the Clean Water Act made the Act's requirements jurisdictional). This reading is consistent with our precedent. See Majestic Housing, 743 F.2d at 1345 (<HOLDING>). Thus, a failure to state a claim under Holdings: 0: holding dispute under collective bargaining agreement not arbitrable as delegation of nondelegable authority without reference to whether provision was consented to by parties 1: holding that a complaint for interference with a collective bargaining agreement against a nonparty to that agreement is not actionable under  301a of the lmra 2: holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement 3: holding that mere reference to a collective bargaining agreement does not confer federal question jurisdiction under section 301a 4: holding that the mere delivery of documents  does not confer jurisdiction


Input: the employer need not persuade the court that the proffered reason was the actual reason for its decision.” Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 36 (2d Cir.2000). Finally, after the employer justifies its action, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. See Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 469; see also Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38. Pretext can be shown by either presenting additional evidence showing that the employer’s justification is “unworthy of credence” or relying solely on the “evidence comprising the prima facie case.” See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089). There is no categorical rule that the plaintiff must offer, in addition to his prima fa 90 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Because the PPR downgrade may lead to Holdings: 0: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 1: holding that downgrade of evaluation among other factors raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to adverse employment action 2: holding that an adverse party must state specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of fact for trial 3: holding that plaintiff failed to show genuine issue of material fact on equitable estoppel claim 4: holding nonmoving partys affidavit created genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an employment relationship


Input: or indirectly” language had been combined with a reasonable geographic and time-period restriction, the court would have nevertheless struck down the covenant. The Court finds more troubling Knob-loch and WES’s central argument in this objection — the restriction on contacting customers. The covenant’s restriction on solicitation of all customers and potential customers, which surely covers clients with whom Knobloch had no contact. Texas courts have struck down such covenants as unenforceable. TransPerfect Translations, Inc. v. Leslie, 594 F.Supp.2d 742, 754 (S.D.Tex.2009) (“Texas courts note that non-compete covenants that ... prevent contact with clients with whom the employee had no contact are unenforceable.”); Peat Marwick Main v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 386-87 (Tex.1991) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, however, courts have also Holdings: 0: holding that the employer had a protectible interest in its good will where the employee had direct contact with its customers and much of the employers business was repeat business 1: holding that an accountant owed a duty of care not only to his own client but to a limited and foreseeable class of third parties for whose benefit and guidance the accountant knows the information is intended 2: holding that an accounting firms protectable interest was its client base and that the nonsolicitation provision which inhibited departing partners from engaging accounting services for clients who were acquired after the employee left or with whom the accountant had no contact while at the firm was overbroad and unreasonable 3: holding that a firm could be disqualified from bringing an antitrust action against a former client for which the firm had worked on various corporate and tax matters during the relevant period in question 4: holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan


Input: of the rights of litigants.” Esty v. Beal Bank S.S.B., 298 S.W.3d 280, 297 (Tex.App.-Dal las 2009, no pet.). Interrogatories and requests for admission are not pleas, pleadings, or motions. See Exito, 142 5.W.3d at 305 n. 11 (noting that the “pleadings” in a suit are the petition and answer, and a “motion” is an “ ‘application requesting a court to make a specified rule or order’ ”) (citing Tex.R. Civ. P. 45 and quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1031 (7th ed.1999)). Further, Horowitz did not waive her special appearance by filing a motion to compel discovery. By its express terms, the motion was made subject to Horowitz’s special appearance and her motion to dismiss for forum, non conveniens. See Puri v. Mansukhani, 973 S.W.2d 701, 707 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The motion to compel was not heard or decided Holdings: 0: holding that filing of rule 11 agreement and hearing of jurisdictionrelated discovery dispute did not waive special appearance 1: holding that defendant did not waive his special appearance by filing a motion for new trial subject to the special appearance 2: holding that party waived special appearance 3: holding that the defendant did not waive his special appearanee by filing a motion for sanctions that was made subject to and in the alternative to his special appearance and where the motion for sanctions was not heard or ruled upon 4: holding that defendant does not waive special appearance by engaging in discovery regarding merits of plaintiffs claims


Input: is sufficient” (citation and punctuation omitted)). From her testimony, we know that Ms. Wright and Martin were on the floor in the den when they “started to have sex.” Under ordinary circumstances, the phrase, “started to have sex,” can imply foreplay in anticipation of penetration. However, under the extreme circumstances described by Ms. Wright, who wa pite the evidence of rape described above, the jury was unauthorized to find that a rape had occurred because Ms. Wright did not report the rape early in her interactions with investigators. We find this argument unpersuasive for four reasons. First, a rape conviction is not unauthorized under the law simply because the victim chooses not to report the rape immediately. See Watson v. State, 235 Ga. 461, 463 (2) (219 SE2d 763) (1975) (<HOLDING>). Second, the jury might well have considered Holdings: 0: holding that a letter written by a thirteenyearold victim two years after her alleged rape was admissible reasoning that the issue of the twoyear delay was one of credibility not admissibility 1: holding that a delay in reporting an alleged rape goes to the victims credibility which is solely a jury question 2: holding proximate cause almost always a question solely for the jury 3: holding that the thirteenyearold victims twomonth delay in reporting her rape is explained by and completely consistent with the all too common circumstances surrounding sexual assault on minors  fear of disbelief by others and threat of further harm from the assailant 4: holding issues of fact in dispute are solely for the jury


Input: go to the arbitrator”); Overstreet v. Contigroup Cos., 462 F.3d 409, 411 n. 1 (5th Cir.2006) (declining to address whether a contract as a whole was unconscionable because “federal courts are limited to reviewing the arbitration clause itself’). Thus, we will decide only whether the arbitration clauses are unconscionable. To determine what state’s law applies to the question of unconscionability, we use Delaware law, pursuant to the choice of law provisions in the CMAs. See Overstreet, 462 F.3d at 411-12 (applying a choice of law provision to determine the law governing the unconscionability of an arbitration clause in a case where both the arbitration clause and the agreement as a whole were attacked as unconscionable); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>). Under Delaware law, a contract is Holdings: 0: holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect 1: holding that under texas choice of law principles contractual choice of law provisions are generally upheld 2: holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision 3: holding that party waived an objection to choice of law 4: holding that parties implicitly stipulated to choice of law


Input: it does not necessarily follow that the threat-of-death enhancement would be grafted onto all crimes covered by § 2B3.1. Furthermore, a reading of the statute under which Jennings was indicted and convicted x-eveals that the threat-of-death enhancement would not be applied in “every conceivable circumstance” under the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) covers not only individuals who take property from a bank “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” as did Jennings, but also those who obtain property from a bank by extortion and those who enter a bank with the intent to commit a felony therein. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Jennings’s contention also does not recognize the fact that one can commit a robbery with force or intimidation without threatening Uves. See Jennette, 295 F.3d at 292 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bingham, 628 F.2d 548, 549 Holdings: 0: holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction 1: holding that because it is not strictly necessary under the statute for a victim to fear death the guideline enhancement is not coterminous with the basic offense conduct 2: holding that application of  2a31 is appropriate even when the victim is fictional as an enhancement for a fictitious victim is consistent with the utilitarian purpose of the enhancement 3: holding that it is not 4: holding that the district court erred in imposing an enhancement under the  5k20 departure provision where an enhancement under the separate guidelines provision for restraining a victim during the course of an offense would have been appropriate


Input: payment. Indeed, payments to the plaintiff do not “suggest! ] ... affirmative misconduct,” which is “a prerequisite to a finding of estoppel against the United States.” Conax, 824 F.2d at 1131 (rejecting the plaintiffs assertion that the government was estopped from challenging a contract on which it had completed payment). Because payments alone are insufficient to establish affirmative misconduct, the defendant’s partial payments of attorneys’ fees, likewise, are insufficient. Furthermore, failing to raise arguments in an administrative due process hearing does not constitute affirmative misconduct absent a showing, by the plaintiff, that the omission was anything more than “ordinary negligence.” See Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (<HOLDING>); see also American Sav. v. Bell, 562 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 1: holding that defendant does not waive an affirmative defense if defendant raises it at a pragmatically sufficient time such as summary judgment and the defendants failure raise the affirmative defense in its answer did not cause the plaintiff prejudice 2: holding that the court has an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority 3: holding that a failure to advise even when the defendant has an affirmative obligation to do so is not the same as engaging in affirmative misconduct  4: recognizing that federal preemption is affirmative defense as to which defendant has burden of proof


Input: result from improper performance of the employee’s duties.” Martin, 381 F.3d at 583. Plaintiffs contend that underwriters do not exercise discretion and independent judgment concerning matters of significance because the underwriters do not bear any responsibility for financial loss and do not determine the financial risk that Huntington will take for any given loan. However, while underwriters do not determine Huntington’s overall risk guidelines, they still make decisions that signifi cantly impact the business and do determine the risk Huntington will accept for any particular loan. Underwriters can approve loans between $250,000 and $1,000,000. Their approval of a loan binds Huntington to that risk, and their denial of an application prevents a customer from acquiring credit. Cf (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Huntington’s underwriters satisfy Holdings: 0: holding that the analogous predecessor regulation to 29 cfr  541202a did not encompass an employee who made no decisions that affect even the small segment of the companys operations in which his work is performed 1: holding that the fact that the insurance agents perform functions that are an essential part of the companys normal operations is a decisive factor 2: holding that an employer is accountable to a discharged employee for unpaid compensation if the employee was terminated in bad faith and the compensation is clearly connected to work already performed 3: holding futa after which florida molded its unemployment law is phrased entirely in terms of the nature of the employer and not in terms of the work performed or the place at which the employee works 4: holding that your work exclusion is triggered only where the damage at issue is to work performed by you and is caused by work performed by you  and does not apply to damage caused to original construction of a house during later repair work


Input: but one, which showed that he was. And, importantly, although Jacob was only seen and taped on thirteen occasions, he was able to elicit testimony that Amtrak was billed $101,253.70 for 1,578 man hours of surveillance. Turning to the third criterion, granting Amtrak’s request to play the tapes did extend the trial, but not for long. And, finally, the District Court found that defense counsel did not act in bad faith in failing to list the tapes or the investigators who made them in the final pretrial order. In sum, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment to the final pretrial order. The third issue raised by Jacob is whether the District Court erred in not granting his motion for judgment as a matter of law. At the close of all 2, 364 (3d Cir.1999)(<HOLDING>). Even assuming that Jacob has not waived his Holdings: 0: holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial 1: holding that appellate courts determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction based on a review of all of the evidence admitted at trial 2: recognizing that to preserve a claim of insufficiency of the evidence a defendant must move for judgment of acquittal when the government rests or at the close of all the evidence 3: holding that a party who fails to comply with rule 50 by moving for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence wholly waives the right to mount any posttrial attack on the sufficiency of the evidence 4: holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence


Input: United States or of the state ... may commence a proceeding to secure relief by filing a petition in the district court in the county in which the conviction was had to vacate and set aside the judgment.... Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2008). The term “crime” was, and still is, defined as “conduct which is prohibited by statute and for which the actor may be sentenced to imprisonment, with or without a fine.” Minn.Stat. § 609.02, subd. 1 (2008). A misdemeanor is “a crime for which a sentence of not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both, may be imposed.” Minn.Stat. § 609.02, subd. 3. We have rejected indefensible divisions between felonies, gross misdemeanor, and misdemeanor cases in the past. See State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 396-97, 154 N.W.2d 888, 893 (1967) (<HOLDING>). Labeling the offense a felony or misdemeanor Holdings: 0: holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance 1: holding pursuant to courts inherent supervisory power over courts that counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend indigent persons 2: holding in situation of appointed counsel that if nonfrivolous issues may exist new counsel must be appointed 3: recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts 4: holding based on our supervisory power over the administration of justice that indigent defendants including those charged with misdemeanors were entitled to appointed counsel at trial if they faced incarceration for their crimes


Input: Toolasprashad’s alleged deprivations also meet this standard. The Bureau offers several counter-arguments, none of which is convincing. For example, it notes that Toolasprashad’s “ability to exercise his First Amendment rights has not been impaired by his transfer.” Appellees’ Br. at 24. This fact, though undisputed, is immaterial. The relevant question is not whether a transfer actually interferes with a particular prisoner’s ability to exercise his rights but whether the threat of a transfer would, in the first instance, inhibit an ordinary person from speaking. See Crawford-El, 93 F.3d at 826. Equally irrelevant is the Bureau’s long-recognized discretion to decide where to house prisoners. See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1745, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (<HOLDING>). “[A]n ordinarily permissible” exercise of Holdings: 0: holding inmates have no constitutional right to receive a particular or requested course of treatment and prison doctors remain free to exercise their independent medical judgment 1: holding that a prisoner has no constitutionallybased liberty interest in a particular prison classification  because an inmate is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison 2: holding that inmates have no constitutionally protected interest in the wages earned while in prison 3: holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells 4: holding that inmates have no justifiable expectation of being incarcerated in any particular prison


Input: the informant received cash awards and please state the total amounts received by the informant from you in relation to the events at issue in this Complaint!]” may allow Plaintiff to piece together the person who made a purchase of heroin from him, which could put the informant’s life and/or well-being in jeopardy. You cited to criminal defense cases as the basis for your argument that you are entitled to this information, however, this case does not' involve an “individual’s right to prepare his defense.” This case involves a civil complaint filed against Defendant Lopez, inter alia. You have not set forth a basis for the need to disclose the identity or even the identifying information of the informant. See McGee v. Hayes, 43 Fed.Appx. 214, 217 (10’h [10th] Cir.2002) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>) Although you argue in your letter that Holdings: 0: holding that failure to develop a legal argument supporting a claim results in waiver of the claim 1: holding that a plaintiff is not required to state the statutory or constitutional basis for his claim only the facts underlying it 2: holding that the court is in no position to decide  whether there is a genuine dispute  because the district court did not permit  any discovery before issuing its ruling 3: holding that a district court is not required to permit plaintiff to engage in a fishing expedition in the hope of supporting his claim 4: holding that a plaintiff is required to identify specific acts of individual defendants  for his claim to survive


Input: contrary to the public interest. A preliminary injunction in the instant case would not be contrary to the public interest because the courts should strive to enforce contractual agreements. To begin, the Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2336-37, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) noted that the Arbitration Act established a federal policy supporting arbitration which obligates the courts to enforce arbitration agreements rigorously. Recognizing this important policy, this Court stated in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (M.D.Fla.1991) that parties should not be allowed to circumvent the terms of arbitration agreements by utilizing the AMEX Window. See also Merrill Lynch v. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, as stated before, customer Holdings: 0: holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision 1: holding that should is a preferential rather than mandatory word and that contract provision stating that parties should settle disputes in a particular forum was not a mandatory selection clause 2: holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement 3: holding that under ordinary contract principles the parties should be bound by an arbitration provision requiring that disputes be arbitrated only before particular fora 4: holding that where a contract containing an arbitration clause is challenged as unconscionable those disputes should first be resolved by an arbitrator


Input: This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders of the Board. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2006); see Eggers v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 11 F.3d 35, 38 (4th Cir.1993) (“The finality requirement contained in § 921 encompasses the same concepts as finality in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 [(2006)].”). Because the Board did not determine the amount of the attorney’s fees and remanded the case for further proceedings, the Board’s order is not a final order. See John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1390 (7th Cir.1990) (“An award of attorneys’ fees which does not fix the amount of the award or specify a formula allowing the amount to be computed is not a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 853 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Holdings: 0: holding that denial of counsel in section 1983 action is not immediately appealable 1: holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order 2: holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable 3: holding that order remanding  to an alj for further findings is not in general immediately appealable under 33 usc  921c 4: holding that the issue of whether the attorney general was entitled to qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine


Input: trial, facts may be proved by circumstantial evidence, “even if the jury might draw other reasonable inferences from the circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Henry, 920 F.2d 875, 877 (11th Cir.1991) (quotation omitted). In this case, the government presented sufficient evidence to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Cruz was the one who robbed the Bank of America. Cruz’s co-worker, Diaz, identified Cruz as the robber on two surveillance photos taken inside the Bank of America. Although the photographs did not depict the robber’s face with perfect clarity, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Diaz, who saw Cruz on a daily basis over several years, was capable of recognizing him from those pictures. Cf. United States v. Pierce, 136 F.3d 770, 773-75 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, there were at least two Holdings: 0: holding that lay opinion based on physical appearance is not enough to identify crackcocaine 1: holding that lay opinion testimony is not admissible when the jury can readily draw the necessary inferences and conclusions without the aid of the opinion 2: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial 3: holding that a district court was entitled to accept or reject testimony on the basis of the witnesses demeanor and candor or lack thereof and contradictions in the witnesses testimony 4: holding that lay opinion testimony of witnesses was helpful and admissible to identify the defendant as the bank robber depicted in a surveillance photo as the witnesses were more familiar with the defendants appearance than the jury


Input: See, e.g., Goldberg v. Miller, 371 Md. 591, 603, 810 A.2d 947, 954 (2002) (“This Court has long recognized the parents’ obligation to support their minor children. This obligation imposes a duty on the parent to provide support and confers a right on children to receive it.”) (internal citations omitted). This duty is confirmed in the common law, see id., and in our statutes. See Md.Code Ann., Fam. Law (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol. & Supp.2009) § 5-203 (Parents are “jointly and severally responsible for the child’s support, care, nurture, welfare, and education.... ”). The duty is so important that a parent may not “bargain away” or waive his/her minor child’s right to receive support. See Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Admin., 323 Md. 106, 111-12, 591 A.2d 501, 503-504 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the Citizens of Maryland and the Holdings: 0: holding that an agreement between a mother and father to waive payment of child support and arrearages in exchange for fathers consent to the adoption of the minor children by the mothers husband was invalid because it violated public policy 1: holding that the trial court had erred in imposing an obligation to pay child support when clear and convincing evidence established that the husband was not the father of the child 2: holding evidence insufficient to terminate mothers parental rights under section c because mother made arrangements for adequate support of children evidence showed mother left children with father who maintained steady employment and adequately supported children mother knew that father would provide adequate support and mother left children pursuant to agreed divorce decree 3: holding that termination of fathers parental rights should be reversed since it was done to facilitate childs adoption and would prejudice rights of child and mother to receive support from father 4: holding that the court erred in failing to credit fathers child support account for the entire amount that he paid for the mothers mortgage


Input: presented for our consideration concern attorney’s fees and costs and whether the trial court erred in failing to reserve jurisdiction over the charging lien filed by the Former Wife’s counsel. We affirm the amended final judgment with the following exception. The Former Wife raises several arguments regarding the propriety of the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction her challenge to the award because, not only is the amended final judgment ambiguous regarding entitlement, the trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees to be awarded. Because the amount has not been determined, that portion of the amended final judgment is nonfinal and nonappealable. See McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So.2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Zuberer v. Zuberer, 28 So.3d 993, Holdings: 0: holding dismissal without prejudice to refile a facially sufficient motion is a nonappealable nonfinal order 1: holding that an order granting a motion or application to compel arbitration is nonappealable because it is not listed in the uaa arbitration provision and because it is not a final order 2: holding that although the trial courts failure to determine amount of fees does not render underlying order nonfinal the fee award itself is not reviewable until the amount is determined 3: holding that an order that determines only the right to attorneys fees without setting the amount is a nonappealable nonfinal order 4: holding that the dismissal of a complaint ordinarily is a nonfinal nonappealable order since amendment generally is available while dismissal of the entire action ordinarily is final


Input: an ordinary household item is not only present in virtually every American household—it was also readily available within the Home Depot outlet where the device was installed. Indeed, Sheehan’s own expert acknowledged that there was tape around the device that could have been used to attach one of the wires from the pipe to the .top of the battery. The language in Posnjak on which.Sheehan relies makes sense when read to require that a “combination of parts” cannot be considered a destructive device based on the hypothetical possibility that the parts could be “readily” made into a bomb only if the defendant could obtain some crucial component that he did not possess and could not acquire without. a “shopping trip.” See, e.g., United States v. Malone, 546 F.2d 1182, 1184 (5th Cir. 1977) (<HOLDING>). Posn-jak cannot sensibly be read to require Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant could not be convicted for possessing a combination of parts that could be readily assembled into a bomb where the defendant did not possess any explosive material a key element required for the creation of a bomb 1: holding the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement where guns were found on the same premises from which the defendant trafficked drugs and were readily accessible to the defendant 2: holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense 3: holding that a reasonable jury could find the device to be readily convertible into an explosive bomb where wires could be quickly stripped and recrimped to a pager that was part of the detonating mechanism 4: holding that evidence of a defendants prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt


Input: do so.”). Further, it is well-settled that “[a] party is bound by, and a court is powerless to rewrite, the clear and unambiguous terms of a voluntary contract.” Brooks v. Green, 993 So.2d 58, 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). This principle applies even where the terms of the contract are “harsh” or “out of the ordinary.” Id. at 61. (citations omitted). In addition, to give proper meaning to a specific contract provision, a court must consider it in the context of the entire contract. Hand, 983 So.2d at 687. When an employment agreement contains a noncompete covenant, the restriction survives the termination of the agreement if the agreement contains express language demonstrating that the parties intended its survival. Brenner v. Barco Chems. Div., Inc., 209 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (<HOLDING>). Where the parties expressly provide that the Holdings: 0: holding a contract was divisible in its nature  if the intention is expressly stated in the contract 1: holding new york law may prohibit noncompete forfeiture provisions but erisa statutes allow forfeiture of all deferred compensation benefits under noncompete forfeiture provisions in a top hat plan 2: holding that noncompete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where 1 the contract expressly provided that the provisions would continue to apply if the employee continued working and 2 the noncompete clause expressly stated it would continue to be in effect after the expiration or termination of employment 3: holding even though idaho law does not permit the enforcement of noncompete clauses in employment contracts erisa statutes allow forfeiture of pension benefits in excess of erisas minimum vesting requirements in noncompete clauses 4: holding that under arkansas law maximum duration of noncompete clause incident to employment agreement is three years


Input: Washington crimes. Weiand, at 31. If a comparable Washington "offense definition” exists, the court must next determine how that definition is classified under Washington law. Weiand, at 32. This inquiry'requires the court to determine whether the definition is classified as a felony, and if so, whether it is an A, B, or C felony. Weiand, at 32. Because the record is devoid of the underlying facts upon which Roche’s California robbery conviction was based, it is impossible to determine how it would be classified in Washington. Therefore, the conviction must be removed from the calculation of Roche’s criminal history unless, on remand, the State can establish that it would constitute a class A felony under Washington law. See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, Holdings: 0: holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the washington classification of an outofstate conviction the state must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendants criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence 1: holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence 2: holding that the party challenging the dischargeability of a debt bears the burden of proving the debt nondischargeable by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence 4: holding at trial a criminal defendant has the burden to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence


Input: the information that she was possibly wanting to commit suicide;” (7) both his partner, Officer Lilly, and Mother were on the scene; (8) he immediately opened the purse and looked in it for “[a]ny type of weapon to harm herself or me;” and (9) the incident took place in the early afternoon. ¶ 11 There is no evidence in the record that the 9-1-1 call mentioned that Appellant had or was threatening anyone with a weapon. There was no sign of a weapon when the officers arrived on the scene, and upon their arrival, they saw no domestic violence or suicide attempt taking place. Officer Stewart testified, however, that the seizure of the purse was justified because when Mother called 9-1-1 she indicated Appellant was suicidal and vedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1 .1981) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 15 As Flippin explained, the relevant Holdings: 0: holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept 1: holding that a search was justified when the police responded to a complaint that a woman at a school bus stop might have a gun in her purse the womans responses to police inquiries were unhelpful and she resisted the purse being taken from her 2: holding that the opening of a makeup bag was justified when a woman had grabbed the bag when the officer turned away had resisted it being taken from her the bag felt heavy her companion had been armed the previous day and the officer and individual were alone 3: holding that car passenger who left her purse in her boyfriends car had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse indeed a purse is a type of container in which a person possesses the highest expectations of privacy 4: holding that search of defendants purse which he carried was authorized by a warrant to search his person


Input: is not sufficient to bar a retrial. Lewis has received one of the remedies that Brady envisions, a new trial. The prosecution’s alleged Brady violations in this case simply do not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause or otherwise bar his retrial. The district court thus did not err in rejecting Lewis’s double jeopardy claim. CONCLUSION We DISMISS Lewis’s fair warning claim for lack of jurisdiction. Although we have jurisdiction over his double jeopardy claim because it raises a colorable claim, the substance of that double jeopardy claim lacks merit. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Lewis’s motion to dismiss with respect to the double jeopardy claim. DISMISSED, in part, and AFFIRMED, in part. 1 . Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Lanier involved a defendant, state judge Holdings: 0: holding that the prosecutions suppression of evidence material to guilt or punishment violates due process regardless of the prosecutions good or bad faith 1: holding prosecutions suppression of favorable material evidence violates due process 2: holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused  violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 3: holding that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 4: holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution


Input: where the rights of employees may be vindicated to the fullest extent possible under our workers’ compensation statutory scheme. For example, in Pro-Football, Inc. v. McCants, a player on the roster of the Washington NFL football team brought in Maryland a workers’ compensation claim for game injuries sustained in various forums—some in Maryland, and some out of state. 428 Md. 270, 275-76, 51 A.3d 586, 589-90 (2012). McCants’ employment contract contained a forum-selection clause choosing Virginia law, but we allowed McCants nonetheless to maintain a claim in Maryland for the injuries sustained here and out-of-state. McCants, 428 Md. at 288, 51 A.3d at 596-97; see Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 197 Md.App. 463, 471, 474, 14 A.3d 678, 682, 684 (2011), aff'd, 428 Md. 198, 51 A.3d 544 (2012) (<HOLDING>). Although significant differences exist Holdings: 0: holding that employee must prove that the sole reason for their discharge was their filing of a workers compensation claim to prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge under marylands workers compensation act 1: holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act 2: holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim 3: holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act 4: holding that a player on the roster of the washington nfl football team was a covered employee under  9203a of the workers compensation statute despite working intermittently in maryland playing games at fedex field and primarily in virginia practicing