Input: of this breach of contract claim. See Edwards, 178 F.3d at 241 n. 6. Next, the Joneses dispute the district court’s dismissal of their third claim, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), as adopted by Virginia, which they based on Defendant’s alleged breaches of contract discussed supra. The Joneses’ claim fails as a matter of law for two reasons. First, the UCC does not apply to transfers of real property. Greenwood Assocs., Inc. v. Crestar Bank, 248 Va. 265, 448 S.E.2d 399, 402 (1994). Second, even if the deed of trust falls under the UCC as the Joneses argue, their claim fails because it was pled as a separate tort claim. See Charles E. Brauer Co. v. NationsBank of Va. N.A., 251 Va. 28, 466 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the Joneses contend that the Holdings: 0: holding that where the conduct forming the basis of the plaintiffs breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim is the same conduct forming the basis for the breach of contract claim the claims merge and there is no separate cause of action for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing 1: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach 2: holding that the failure to act in good faith  does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract 3: recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach 4: holding that breach of good faith and fair dealing claim requires showing of breach of contract


Input: Amendment, the City has not destroyed “a major portion” of the license’s value. Moore v. City of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d at 262. Plaintiff has two other wireless communication towers within the City (AR, Ex. 1 at 23), Plaintiff has rejected a site because it would be too “complex” to build upon (AR, Ex. 1 at 22), and Plaintiffs own witnesses have not testified that other sites would be entirely unavailable (See, e.g., AR at 21-22, 27-28). In other words, Plaintiffs FCC license is being used within the City through the two existing towers, and may well be used more if Plaintiff applies at additional sites. Plaintiff has not proven to the satisfaction of this Court that the value of its FCC license has decreased. See United States v. 129.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the Court grants the Holdings: 0: holding that landowner was entitled to compensation because the condemnation destroyed all reasonable access to remainder property 1: holding that the party asserting work product protection has the burden of establishing that the doctrine applies 2: holding the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over condemnation proceedings 3: holding that in condemnation proceedings the landowner has the burden of establishing the value of the property 4: recognizing no right to damages if landowner retains reasonable access to property after a condemnation


Input: clearly states that the precise location of an easement need not be designated for the easement to be valid. See McConnell v. Golden, 104 R.I. 657, 663, 247 A.2d 909, 912 (1968). Instead, the holders of the dominant estate are entitled to a convenient, suitable, and accessible easement of way. Id. Therefore, despite the lack of specificity in the original writing that created the easement, plaintiffs are entitled to the use of “a rear roadway, at least ten feet in width,” to be “kept open so that vehicles can reach the rear of the building [once] known as First National Store Since this language was referenced in defendant’s deed, and because it has not been modified by subsequent instrument, it remains in effect. See Crawford Realty Co. v. Ostrow, 89 R.I. 12, 19, 150 A.2d 5, 9 (1959) (<HOLDING>). There is no question that defendant caused a Holdings: 0: holding that an express easement ran with the dominant estate 1: holding that increase in vehicular traffic arising out of the subdivision of the dominant estate was reasonably foreseeable and so did not restrict the rights of the dominant owner 2: recognizing that the dominant easement owner not the servient estate owner bears responsibility for maintaining an easement 3: holding that the dominant tenement a power company rather than the servient tenement had affirmative duties of inspection and repair related to its easement 4: holding that the owner of the dominant tenement may extinguish an easement appurtenant by specifically excluding it from a conveyance of the dominant estate


Input: court made individualized determinations for each defendant, this argument overlooks the fact that the court neglected to identify the particular evidence presented at trial and at the sentencing hearing that led it to find Orlando accountable for $449,000. See United States v. Corvado, 227 F.3d 528, 540-41 (6th Cir.2000) (remanding the case for re-sentencing because the district court “either summarily adopted the findings of the [PSR] or simply declared that the enhancement in question was supported by a preponderance of the evidence,” thereby failing to comply with the requirement of Rule 32(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that it make specific factual findings for each sentencing matter controverted); United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 396-97 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, Holdings: 0: holding that the district court failed to comply with rule 32c1 because its oral finding regarding the value of loss resulting from monuss offense was stated in general terms and did not explain how it calculated the amount of loss or respond to the defendants specific factual objections to the methods of calculation included in the psr 1: holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding 2: holding that the district court determines the amount of loss under the preponderance of the evidence standard 3: holding that where the real value of an anchoring system design is in the idea not in the physical plans that memorialize it any loss in value of the design represents a loss in the value of the idea which is not a loss of use of tangible property 4: holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented  to the district court


Input: of the claims of fraud against BMC because it allegedly committed the fraud as BMC’s agent. If Plaintiffs are unable to show fraud on the part of BMC or First Boston, as BMC’s agent, BMC will have no claim for contribution or indemnity against First Boston. If Plaintiffs are able to show fraud on the part of First Boston, it might be held liable for all or part of the claim against BMC, even though it would not be liable for the particular relief sought. The power to implead First Boston based on its fraud as an agent of BMC should not be limited by the form of the remedy requested in the Plaintiff’s Complaint, especially when, as here, the relief sought is a lump sum of $30,000,000 minus the value of the Notes. Cf. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Concast, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 566 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>). Although no authority is presented for the Holdings: 0: holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment 1: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action 2: holding thirdparty complaint proper in action for declaratory judgment even though the defendant would have no pecuniary liability to plaintiffs 3: holding that if a declaratory judgment will not end the controversy it is not proper 4: holding that filing of infringement action twelve days after complaint for declaratory judgment obviated the need for a declaratory judgment in this case


Input: a substantial question of federal law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the District Court correctly held, the ease before us does not depend on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Petitioner argues that because his petition for vacatur alleged that arbiters had disregarded federal law by holding that a settlement agreement bound the parties, there is federal-question jurisdiction. But whether a settlement agreement is binding is generally a question of state contract law. Of course, federal common law does sometimes govern settlements, as when state law over settlements might otherwise conflict with federal policy or frustrate objectives of federal legislation. See, e.g., Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. 160, 161, 81 S.Ct. 561, 5 L.Ed.2d 486 (1961) (<HOLDING>). But in the case before us, the underlying Holdings: 0: holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court 1: holding that state court with jurisdiction over  301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law 2: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 3: holding that the validity of releases under the federal employers liability act was a question to be determined by federal rather than state law 4: holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court


Input: muscle tenderness on repeated examinations ...; or, [a]ny other medical signs that are consistent with medically accepted clinical practice and are consistent with the other evidence in the ease record.” Id. at 3. Further, CFS may be established by: (1) laboratory findings including neurally mediated hypotension or an abnormal exercise stress test; and (2) mental findings, including problems with short-term memory, information processing, visual-spatial issues, comprehension, concentration, speech, word-finding, calculation, and anxiety or depression. Id. Citing Ruling 99-2p, we have recognized that “there are no specific laboratory findings that are” widely accepted as indicative of CFS and no test for CFS. Vega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1219-20 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). B. Medical Opinions Generally, the opinions Holdings: 0: holding that the alj failed to analyze the effect of cfs on a claimants ability to do work meaningfully when he rejected cfs as a diagnosis for want of a definite test or specific laboratory findings to support the diagnosis 1: holding that individual has privacy interest in medical information including diagnosis 2: holding that a treating physicians diagnosis could be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record 3: holding that the alj erred in determining that the claimant was disabled when a retrospective diagnosis along with all other medical evidence supported a finding of disability 4: holding that the alj erred in failing to give the findings and assessments of the treating physicians any weight when the medical evidence and claimants testimony supported a diagnosis of cfs


Input: as to correct an inadvertent omission concerning a hiring freeze. See Gassaway Decl. ¶¶ 8-13; [D.E. 35-7]; [D.E. 35-8]. Moreover, ECSU reposted the position two additional times after .Gray and Cherry applied in order to increase the applicant pool, and such reposting ■ obviously did not favor Gray who already had applied. See Gassa-way Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; Branch - Decl. ¶ 7; [D.E. 35-9]; [D.E. 35-12]; [D.E. 35-13]; [D.E. 35-14];, [D.E. 35-15]. Furthermore,, a job posting for a senior law-enforcement management position that references a preference for law-enforcement management experience is not evidence that an employer intentionally sought to exclude African-Americans in general, or to exclude Cherry in this case. Cf. Feldman v. Law Enf't Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 350 (4th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted); Jiminez v. Mary Holdings: 0: holding that a federal court does not sit as a superpersonnel department to review the prudence of employment decisions 1: holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims because the court may review neither criminal matters nor the decisions of district courts 2: holding that because the department of revenue is subordinate to the board of tax review in the decision making process the department is not an adversely affected or aggrieved party having standing to petition for judicial review of the boards order reversing a decision of the department 3: holding that the court does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with citations to cases not pending review in this court 4: holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions


Input: . Id. 42 . Id. at ¶15. 43 . Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff was recommended to Defendant by Judith Hunter, a master representative. Id. at ¶ 15. Based on this recommendation, Stewart pushed for Plaintiff's hiring despite his lack of manager verification. 44 . Pl's. Am. Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J„ 16. 45 . Attachment 6 to Docket Entry 81 is an excerpt of Judith Hunter's deposition testimony. Hunter’s deposition, however, does not mention verifiable relevant experience. Instead, the portion attached seems to focus on the confidential documents Plaintiff allegedly took from Custer’s office. 46 . Custer's summary was noted on an Authorization Form. See Attachment A to Plaintiff’s Response to Summary Judgment at (DE #41). 47 . E.E.O.C. v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir.1988)(<HOLDING>). 48 . Balmer, 423 F.3d at 612. 49 . Id. 50 . Holdings: 0: holding that the legitimate business reason standard is the appropriate benchmark against which to measure the factor other than sex defense 1: holding that the  fair and just reason standard is simply more generous than the standard for determining whether a plea is invalid 2: holding that an employee may establish that the legitimate reason for an employment decision offered by an employer is pretextual by showing by a preponderance of the evidence either that the discrim inatory reason was the true reason motivating the employers conduct or that the profferred legitimate reason was false 3: holding that majority shareholders had legitimate business reasons for terminating a shareholder which included the reason that the shareholder was not working well with other employees 4: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion


Input: we explained: Equitable tolling would be appropriate, for example, when a prisoner is actually innocent, when an adversary’s conduct— or other uncontrollable circumstances— prevents a prisoner from timely filing, or when a prisoner actively pursues judicial remedies but files a defective pleading during the statutory period. Simple excusable neglect is not sufficient. Moreover, a petitioner must diligently pursue his federal habeas claims; a claim of insufficient access to relevant law, such as AEDPA, is not enough to support equitable tolling. Id. (internal citations omitted). Mr. Bisner has not shown that any of the three circumstances discussed in Gibson, or any similar circumstances, exist. And the reasons Mr. Bisner offers for equitable tolling are simply inadequate. See id. (<HOLDING>); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that aedpas statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling only when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control 1: holding that the general equitable tolling doctrine is read into every statute of limitations 2: holding petitioners alleged ignorance of aedpas statute of limitations is insufficient to warrant equitable tolling 3: holding statute of limitations period defined in 28 usc  2244d is subject to equitable tolling 4: holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations


Input: isolated investigation reveals relatively little about the conduct of the Air Force as an agency. Given this, and given Major Bux-ton’s strong privacy interests in her personnel files, it is clear that even under the more exacting standard of § 552(b)(6), disclosure of the requested documents would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. Thus, the requested documents are properly exempt from disclosure under FOIA. III. Because the requested documents are exempt from disclosure under either § 552(b)(6) or § 552(b)(7)(C), and consequently, also under the Privacy Act, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment must be denied and the Air Force’s motion for summary judgment must be granted. An appropriate order will enter. 1 . See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C.Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Although the language of § 552(b)(7)(C) Holdings: 0: holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia 1: holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege 2: holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant 3: holding that unauthorized disclosure of documents does not constitute a waiver of the applicable foia exemption 4: holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents


Input: sentence.” (Emphasis added.)); Keven Bennardo, Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause, 77 La. L. Rev. 21, 21 (2016) (“Restitution is an important component of a criminal offender’s sentence.” (Emphasis added.)); Cortney E. Lollar, What is Criminal Restitution?, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 93, 94 (Iowa 2014) (“Restitution imposed as part of a criminal sentence has become a core component of criminal punishment.” (Emphasis added.)). If the legislature intended the statute to apply narrowly, it could have used narrow language. It did not. As succinctly noted by an appellate court, the term “sentence” is not synonymous with the term “jail.” State v. Josephson, 124 Idaho 286, 858 P.2d 825, 826 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Smarr v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 748 A.2d 799, 801 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (<HOLDING>), disapproved of on other grounds by Martin v. Holdings: 0: holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs 1: holding that the law is clear that when a defen dant is sentenced to a split sentence consisting of incarceration and probation  the combined sanction cannot exceed the maximum period of incarceration provided by law 2: holding that work release qualified as incarceration 3: holding a sentence is not limited to period of incarceration 4: holding a sentence of imprisonment is considered punitive and therefore criminal contempt if it is limited to a definite period


Input: a situation where Christopher-son was alone with him and able to have sexual contact. Id. [¶ 15.] In Perkins, 444 N.W.2d at 36, the defendant was charged with three counts of second-degree rape stemming from three incidents of sexual contact with a female minor, D.J.K. All three incidents occurred when D.J.K. was babysitting or visiting in Perkins’ home. The circuit court admitted testimony of two other girls indicating that Perkins had initiated sexual contact with them when they were babysitting his children or otherwise visiting his home. We concluded that “[t]he challenged testimony demonstrat[ed] a consistent pattern of molesting young girls with whom Perkins was long acquainted, when they were within his home.” Id. at 38. See also State v. Roden, 380 N.W.2d 669, 670-71 (S.D.1986) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 16.] Under these authorities, Big Crow’s Holdings: 0: holding that the striking similarity between the acts alleged in the indictment and the prior incidents rendered incidents that occurred fifteen years prior to the acts alleged in the indictment relevant and admissible under rule 404b 1: holding that a defendant must show that the victim had previously been exposed to a sexual act and that the prior sexual act was sufficiently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the experience and ability to contrive or imagine the molestation charge 2: holding that evidence was insufficient where the victim testified that she was awake and communicated her desire not to have sexual intercourse with the defendant 3: holding other acts testimony showed a common scheme where defendants stepdaughter testified to incidents of sexual contact which paralleled the complaint made by the present victim 4: holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment


Input: morale, comfort, and dignity, it is not our province to take such action, which rests with the State Department of Social Services, its Board of Social Welfare, and the Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Unlike Alabama’s “substitute father” regulation, which was struck down for inconsistency with the controlling federal statute in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), New York’s resources and income exemptions do not run contrary to the central purpose of the controlling federal statute. As New York’s regulations do not “plainly and palpably” infringe upon the policy of an Act of Congress, they must be allowed to stand. See Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 867-868 (S.D.N.Y.1968), affd., 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed. 2d 511 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Equal Protection Plaintiffs’ next contention Holdings: 0: holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined 1: holding that medicaid recipients do have enforceable rights under  1396aa23 2: holding that new yorks welfare laws and regulations requiring welfare recipients in certain instances to repay the cost of assistance benefits if they are discovered to have property recover for injuries in a lawsuit or are entitled to insurance proceeds are not inconsistent with social security provisions which grant aid to families with dependent children to enable recipients of assistance to attain or retain capability for    maximum selfsupport and personal independence 42 usc  601 3: holding ambiguous provisions are to be interpreted so as to provide maximum coverage to the insured 4: holding that assuming compliance with a standard form and the absence of conflict with statute the parties to a contract of insurance are free to incorporate such provisions and conditions as they desire


Input: as displaying a total lack of competence in the law.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 7. Further, in addition to charging that the judge has violated federal law “hundreds of times,” thus demonstrating his “heinous criminal nature,” plaintiffs state: “Of course, it don’t make no never mind to [the district judge, he] is so far above the law, [he] cain’t [sic] see the law, but then, [the judge] makes it up as he goes along anyway.” Aplt. Reply Br. to Aplee. Smith at 3. Referring to one of the defendants’ attorneys, plaintiffs wrote: “but hey— when you get to he like hell to gain advantage as [the attorney] has done — well go ahead and lie! Who cares?” Id. at 4. These statements come perilously close to forfeiting plaintiffs’ right to appellate review. See Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we have carefully reviewed the Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs scurrilous briefs that failed to address substance of claims forfeited appeal 1: holding that the supreme court will not address an argument on appeal if a party has failed to obtain a ruling below 2: holding that when an application letter included a statement referring to the appellate division briefs the claims in the briefs were fairly presented to highest state court because the fair import of this statement was that petitioner was requesting the new york court of appeals to review the same claims that were advanced in the appellate division 3: holding that an appellant abandons an issue for purposes of appeal where he fails to argue it in his briefs 4: holding that a habeas petitioner abandons the claims he does not address on appeal


Input: or to consult with an attorney or to have a parent present during questioning.” The Court applied the rule requiring all interrogation to cease when an adult defendant requests an attorney, to a juvenile who requests an attorney, parent, guardian, or custodian. See id. Once a juvenile defendant has requested the presence of a parent, or any one of the parties listed in the statute, defendant may not be interrogated further “until [counsel, parent, guardian, or custodian] has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631, 636 (1986) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also State v. Hunt, 64 N.C. App. 81, 86, 306 S.E.2d 846, 850 (<HOLDING>), disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 824, 310 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that juvenile defendants miranda rights were violated when the police continued to interrogate him after he requested his parents 1: holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles 2: holding that officers remarks to a sixteenyearold juvenile that a cooperative attitude would be to his benefit were far from threatening or coercive where he was thoroughly informed of his miranda rights and the officers questioning was restrained and free from the abuses that so concerned the court in miranda  3: holding that the trial court violated the defendants allocution rights when the court sentenced him without allowing him to offer mitigating remarks 4: holding police violated edwards when they continued questioning a defendant after his initial invocation of the right to counsel even though he responded to the subsequent questioning


Input: followed by three years supervised release. In accordance with § 1326(b) and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2000), Hernandez-Roman’s sentence was enhanced because of his prior conviction of an aggravated felony. Hernandez-Roman asserts that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the aggravated felony was an element of the offense that had to be charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held to the contrary in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219,140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), and the Apprendi Court did not overrule that holding. 530 U.S. at 489-90. See United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 931, 122 S.Ct. 2606, 153 L.Ed.2d 792 (2002) (<HOLDING>). We also reject Hernandez-Roman’s argument Holdings: 0: holding that almendareztorres remains the law after apprendi 1: holding both that almendareztorres was not overruled by apprendi and was not limited to facts in which the defendant does not contest prior convictions 2: holding that almendareztorres remains good law after apprendi 3: holding that almendareztorres was not overruled by apprendi 4: holding that apprendi carved out an exception for prior convictions that specifically preserved the holding of almendareztorres


Input: is encapsulated in the general negligence principles that apply to any other design professional. 17 . There was a jury finding that the property owner was negligent in hiring and supervising the contractor. McDaniel, 887 S.W.2d at 170. Such a claim is not covered by Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 795-96 (Tex.1962), which we discuss below. 18 . This Court has recently explained in another context that, when a party takes on multiple roles with respect to an event or transaction, the fact that one of those roles is one for which there is no liability (former premises owner) does not shield the party from liability arising out of the other roles (designer of a faulty acid addition system). See Strebel v. Wimberly, 371 S.W.3d 267, 279-81 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. filed) (<HOLDING>). 19 . According to Occidental, this portion of Holdings: 0: holding that role as limited partner with no duty did not insulate party from liability for other nonpassive role in partnership which did give rise to duty 1: holding the voluntary assumption of a duty will give rise to liability if the performance is not done with reasonable care 2: holding only a party to the partnership agreement can breach it and be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty relating to partnership obligations 3: holding that under texas law limited partner could not bring breach of fiduciary duty claims without the partnership because the partners claims would be indirect and duplicative of the partnerships claims 4: holding partner owes fiduciary duty in dealings effecting the winding up of the partnership and the proper preservation of partnership assets during that time


Input: Kamal Matian, a native and citizen of Iran, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s deportation order, which denied all relief except protection under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, Femandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir.2006), and we deny the petition for review. Matian’s sole contention, that he is eligible for relief under former § 212(c), is foreclosed by Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). See also Saravia-Paguada v. Gonzales, 488 Holdings: 0: holding that iirira and aedpa are not applicable to criminal alien who entered a guilty plea at a time when alien was eligible for  212c relief 1: holding that bars on 212c relief do not apply to aliens entering preaedpa nolo contendere or guilty pleas in reliance on 212c availability but that those bars do apply to aliens convicted through other means prior to the enactment of aedpa and whose proceedings commenced postaedpa 2: holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina  212c 3: holding that aliens who pleaded not guilty and elected a jury trial  are barred from seeking  212c relief 4: holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for  212c relief


Input: the trial court erred when it failed to invoke the equitable principle of “subrogation” and declare that, to the extent MECO pays Subcontractors, either voluntarily or involutarily, MECO should be entitled to the security held by Subcontractors, mainly, the Subcontractors’ mechanics’ liens. Stated otherwise, MECO charges the trial court erred when it failed to “award MECO a right of subrogation against the Subs mechanic’s lien against the property.” In developing this point, MECO argues that § 429.270, RSMo 1994, and case law interpretations thereof make it clear that mechanics’ lien cases are proceedings in equity in every sense of the word and for every purpose, including application of the equitable doctrine of subrogation. See, e.g., Huggins v. Hill, 236 S.W. 1051 (Mo. banc 1921) (<HOLDING>). MECO then cites Cole v. Morris, 409 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing that the determination is an equitable one 1: recognizing equitable subrogation 2: holding that equitable relief under rico is available only to the government 3: holding mechanics lien action is equitable not only because the statute so denominates it but is equitable in substance 4: holding the beginning of a creditors action to subject an equitable estate to the payment of a judgment gives a specific lien upon the property which it is sought to reach and this lien continues while the cause is pending


Input: on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof’) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with affidavits, depositions, interrogatories or other sworn evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmoving party may not satisfy this burden simply by “show[ing] that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348; see also Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 188 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), quoting Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 Holdings: 0: holding a finding of fact by the commission may not be based upon surmise conjecture or speculation but must be founded on evidence of sufficient substance to afford a reasonable basis for it 1: holding that a nonmoving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by relying on conclusory statements 2: holding that a court may not engage in conjecture or surmise in determining the offense for which a defendant was convicted 3: holding that a nonmovant cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely  on the basis of conjecture or surmise 4: recognizing the general rule that when one party files a motion for summary judgment the nonmovant cannot merely rely on matters pleaded in the complaint but must by factual affidavit or the like respond to the motion


Input: the employee was invited to an employer-sponsored dinner meeting. After attending the meeting, while on her way home, the employee was severely injured in an automobile accident. After accepting the Commission’s finding that the employee had been required to attend the dinner, the court held the em ployee’s journey was covered under the special mission exception: Here, claimant was attending an off-premises dinner meeting, after normal working hours, under at least the implied direction of her employer, and travel to and from the meeting was a necessity. These special circumstances justify the Commission’s determination that claimant’s injuries while returning from the meeting were compensable. Id. at 916. See also Brown v. City of Wheeling, 212 W.Va. 121, 569 S.E.2d 197, 203 (2002) (<HOLDING>); State of Utah (Tax Commission) v. Industrial Holdings: 0: holding the employee was clearly within the zone of her employment even though not at her work station because she was on the universitys premises the campus 1: holding that it was appellants burden to prove that her husbands death occurred in the scope of employment and that she was eligible for widows benefits 2: holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment 3: holding that the employers party was a social event thus the employee was not acting within the scope of her employment when drinking at a party or when she was driving home afterwards 4: holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy


Input: 1124, 1136 (9th Cir.2006); see Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). Under the plain error standard, relief is not warranted unless there has been: (1) “error,” (2) that was “plain,” (3) that affected “substantial rights,” and (4) that “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Redo, 371 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir.2004). 1. Moreland first asserts that his due process rights were violated when the prosecution compelled him to testify regarding whether two government witnesses lied during their testimony. It is improper for a prosecutor to question a defendant regarding the veracity of a government witness. United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 572 (9th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 545, 548 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the prosecutor twice asked Holdings: 0: holding that testimony regarding witness credibility is prohibited unless it is admissible as character evidence 1: holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony 2: holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error 3: holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness 4: holding coconspirators guilty plea is admissible as an aid to the jurys assessment of witness credibility but not as substantive evidence of a defendants guilt


Input: to recover the benefits that she claimed. Ms. Wilson did not initiate this action until July 28, 2011, approximately 34 months after the three year contractual time limit for a lawsuit expired. The record does not support Ms. Wilson’s request for equitable tolling of that limitation period. Doc. 19 at 22-23 (third alteration in original). We agree. A plaintiff is not reasonably diligent when she fails to investigate basic issues that are relevant to her claim or to proceed with it in a reasonably prompt fashion. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457-58, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (explaining that equitable tolling generally cannot be invoked if “the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights”); Motta, 717 F.3d at 846-47 (<HOLDING>). Wilson could have requested a copy of the Holdings: 0: holding that a prisoners claim under the ftca based on being imprisoned for an extra ten days did not call into question the conviction or sentence and was not barred by heck 1: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment 2: holding that the plaintiffs claim against the united states for negligence was not a tort claim within the ftca where it was founded upon an alleged failure to perform explicit or implicit contractual obligations 3: holding that plaintiff established a prima facie claim of retaliation because the defendants failure to transfer her out of her abusive working environment could be viewed as an adverse personnel action and there was a causal link between the filing of plaintiffs complaint and the defendants failure to transfer her 4: holding that equitable tolling could not apply to the plaintiffs ftca claim because she was not diligent and her lack of diligence was evidenced by her failure to call the ftca helpline search a website that included a relevant link or ask for an address before the limitations period ran


Input: taxpayers should be allowed to conduct their own midcycle revaluations of their property whenever they believe that their property values have declined since the last time the county revalued their property according to the legislatively sanctioned program. But if ASiMI is correct, counties would have to conduct out-of-cycle revaluations every time a taxpayer alleged a declination in property value during a midcycle year, unless they simply acquiesced to every allegation. Such a system is unsupported by statute and would render meaningless the uniformity goals of cyclical revaluation programs. Not only are ASiMI’s arguments unsupported by the language of RCW 84.36.005 and RCW 84.40.020, they are also unreasonable in light of chapter 84.41 RCW. See Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 11-12 (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION ¶18 ASiMI has cited to no Holdings: 0: holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts 1: holding that the plain meaning of a statute is ascertained by looking at all related statutes 2: holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous 3: holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language 4: holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning


Input: specifically to Arteaga’s counsel’s argument that the jury “[had] to make a decision whether or not when my client looked at [the photographs] he was viewing them as lewd.” The trial court’s instruction was not improper. Arteaga was allowed to argue and present evidence that others, including appellant, might not view the photographs as lewd. Specifically, Arteaga testified, without objection, that he did not consider the photographs to be child pornography. The argument the jury was instructed to disregard went a step further—informing the jury that the jury’s consideration of lewdness was limited to whether appellant viewed the photographs as lewd. The trial court correctly instructed that it was within the jury’s province to decide whether the photographs were lewd. See id. at 792 (<HOLDING>). We also note the jury charge tracked the Holdings: 0: holding that a conviction for a lascivious act with a child in violation of iowa code  7098 was a crime of violence 1: recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography 2: holding a defendant found in possession of three or more copies of the same article of child pornography during a single episode may only be prosecuted for a single count of possession with intent to promote 3: holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment 4: holding an appeal from conviction for possession and promotion of child pornography that the defendant was not entitled to instruction that whether the content of a photograph constitutes a lewd or lascivious exhibition of a childs genitals depends on the intent of the photographer


Input: dictionary/seek (last visited March 27, 2017). Thus the Secretary’s only clear duty under section 7071(c) is to try to get the IMF to implement best practices for getting whistleblower retaliation claimants access to independent adjudicative bodies. That limited duty 'forecloses this Court from issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to “require the IMF to implement whistleblower protections, including the convening of an independent adjudication of [Mr. Nyambal’s] ' complaints.” See SAC, ECF No. 5 at 15 (em phasis added). Accordingly, because this Court lacks the authority to grant a portion of the relief that Mr. Nyambal has requested, he fails to satisfy the redressa-bility prong of the standing inquiry. See Lozansky v. Obama, 841 F.Supp.2d 124, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2012) (<HOLDING>). Second, the Court does not doubt its Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs  lack standing because the court cannot issue the requested writ of mandamus and thus cannot redress the alleged injury 1: holding that a writ of mandamus will not issue under  1361 unless the defendant is under a clear nondiscretionary duty to perform the act requested 2: holding standing cannot be waived and may thus be raised at any time 3: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances 4: holding public standing doctrine permitted action for emergency writ of mandamus


Input: that she provided to Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs multiple revision surgeries. By its motion in limine, Defendant seeks to interview Dr. Carman, an employee of the United States’ government, ex parte, in advance of her deposition. Plaintiff objects to this ex parte contact with her treating physician, and proposes that the parties interview Dr. Carman concurrently, before her deposition. II. Standard of Review There is no physician-patient privilege under federal statutes, rules or common law. See Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hospital Foundation, Inc., 5 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 1993). Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, state law dictates federal liability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “in civil actions and proceedings, with .1991) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff objects to this ex parte contact Holdings: 0: holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action 1: holding that federal common law allows ex parte interviews as discovery tool and controls even when state law supplies the rule of decision 2: holding that ex parte young exception to states sovereign immunity applies only where violation of federal law is ongoing not where federal law was violated only in the past 3: holding that minnesota law prohibiting ex parte interviews was not integral to its privilege law but was merely procedural rule and therefore not controlling in diversity action and the federal rules allow ex parte interviews as method of informal discovery 4: holding that preservation of the integrity of maine privilege law limits defendant to formal mechanisms of discovery provided by federal rules which do not allow ex parte interviews absent consent


Input: at 6) (citing Rybarczyk, 235 F.3d at 986; EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Emps. Relief Ass’n, 727 F.2d 566, 579 (6th Cir.1984); Lorenzen v. Emps. Ret. Plan of Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 236-37 (7th Cir.1990)); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir.1984). COOK, Circuit Judge, joined by MOORE, Circuit Judge. Though we concur with Judge Gwin’s conclusions with respect to the statute-of-limitations, ICCTA-retroactivity, and prejudgment-interest issues, we write separately on the issue of damages. Courts speak through judgments, and the judgment appealed here represents Comerica’s first adverse judgment as opposed to “calculation” or “finding” as referenced by the dissent on damages. See California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311, 107 S.Ct. 2852, 97 L.Ed.2d 258 (1987) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Further, the district court incorrectly held Holdings: 0: recognizing that our courts will normally not enforce foreign tax judgments 1: holding that judgments rendered by courts not having authority to enter such are not subject to collateral attack because judges entering those judgments were de facto officers 2: holding that the discovery rule does not apply to  bill of review claims to set aside probate judgments 3: recognizing that judgments of arizona courts on foreign judgments will not be conclusive in the jurisdiction of origin 4: holding that courts review judgments not statements in opinions


Input: (1984); providing “ample room for mistaken judgments,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 343, 106 S.Ct. 1092; shielding officers from liability when the law did not clearly proscribe the ac tions they took, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); and protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092. The common theme of protecting reasonable judgment calls by officers, such as this one, exists throughout qualified immunity law. It is not inconsistent for an officer to have violated constitutional rights, as the jury found here, but still be entitled to immunity on the various prongs (described below) of the immunity test. See Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 871-72, 879-80 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 636-37 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that transit authority director was entitled to immunity despite jury verdict for plaintiffs because law was not clearly established at the time that plaintiffs activities were constitutionally protected from employer retaliation 1: holding that plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for a constitutional deprivation but that the contours of the right at issue were not clearly established and that official was therefore entitled to qualified immunity 2: holding that officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless at the time of the dismissal it was clearly established that employees in the particular positions at issue in light of the responsibilities inherent in those positions were constitutionally protected from patronage dismissal  3: holding that prison clerks were entitled to immunity despite jury verdict against them because it was not clearly established at the time that mail from the courts was protected legal mail 4: holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right


Input: are intended to protect consumers against misrepresentations of material fact; statements of opinion alone are generally insufficient to rise to the level of actionable misrepresentations under the DTPA. See Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex.1980) (noting that misrepresentations of material fact are actionable under sections 17.46(b)(5) and (7) so long as they are not merely “puffing” or opinion); cf. Latham v. Castillo, 972 S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Tex.1998) (allowing claim for mental anguish damages against attorney under uneonscio-nability section of pre-1995 version of DTPA). Gertrude identified no particular statements by DKW about the settlement agreement’s “characteristics” or “benefits,” or about any “rights, remedie 52 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); see also Humble Nat’l Bank v. DCV, Inc., 933 Holdings: 0: holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue 1: holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient 2: holding insurer not liable for misrepresentation based solely on general statement that policy was adequate or sufficient 3: holding that insurer was liable for amount in excess of policy limits because it breached its duty to defend 4: holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim


Input: (2012). The Alleyne Decision In Alleyne v. United States, the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases a mandatory minimum is an element that must be decided by the jury. Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 2163-64, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). By newly recognizing this constitutional right, the Supreme Court’s decision satisfies part of § 2255(f)(3). See In re Payne, 733 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir.2013). But Mr. Hoon must also satisfy the remaining requirement in § 2255(f)(3): the existence of a past holding that the newly recognized constitutional right is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. No court has treated Alleyne as retroactive to cases on collateral review. See United States v. Reyes, 755 F.3d 210 (3d Cir.2014) (to be published) (<HOLDING>); In re Mazzio, 756 F.3d 487, 489-92, 2014 WL Holdings: 0: holding that batson v kentucky does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review 1: holding that alleyne does not apply to cases on collateral review 2: holding that batson does apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review 3: holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review 4: holding booker is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review


Input: necessarily constitute bad faith, particularly when the valuation of the injuries and damages of a claim is difficult. Here, in light of the uncertainties regarding [the plaintiffs] future earning power and the inherently subjective nature of much of the plaintiffs’ damages, a reasonable jury could not find [the defendant’s] lower valuation of the claim to be clear and convincing evidence of bad faith. Williams v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 83 F.Supp.2d 567, 576 (E.D.Pa.2000); see also Kosierowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 51 F.Supp.2d 583, 592 (E.D.Pa.1999) (“Even cases such as Klinger that acknowledge that a refusal to settle may constitute bad faith so hold only when the amount in question is clearly known by the insurer.” (citing Klinger, 115 F.3d at 233)); Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 688-89 (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s valuation of Plaintiffs injuries Holdings: 0: holding that an insurer acted in bad faith by failing to keep the insured informed of settlement negotiations 1: holding a settlement privilege exists as to thirdparty discovery of settlement negotiations 2: holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an identifiable fund and thus a proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim 3: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt 4: holding that defendants low settlement offers were not evidence of bad faith because many factors including medical ambiguities injury severity ear damage and liabilities of each driver were used to determine settlement values and were thus reasonably based


Input: the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The judge is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists only when there is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. B. Brentwood has not waived its 2 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972) (<HOLDING>); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, Holdings: 0: holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights 1: holding that there is no due process right to appellate review 2: holding that a cognovit clause which provided for judgment without notice or hearing was not unconstitutional per se because due process rights are subject to waiver 3: holding that where there is no unequal bargaining power or overreaching debtors can voluntarily intelligently and knowingly waive due process rights by signing a cognovit note which is an agreement by which a debtor consents in advance to a holders obtaining a judgment without notice or hearing 4: holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right


Input: a spouse or parent who is a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident; (2) has been continuously physically present in the United States for at least three years; (3) has been a person of good moral character during such period; (4) is not inadmissible due to the commission of specified crimes; and (5) establishes that removal would result in extreme hardship to the alien, his child, or to his parent. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2006); Stepanovic v. Filip, 554 F.3d 673, 677 n. 4 (7th Cir.2009). In an appeal of an administrative decision to grant or deny cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), this court has jurisdiction only over constitutional claims and questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D) (2006); see Jean v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 475, 479-80 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Obioha v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 400, 405 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that the rules of evidence do not apply when a court is deciding upon preliminary questions dealing with the admissibility of evidence under rule 104 except for questions of privilege 1: holding that juvenile court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims 2: holding that court of claims has jurisdiction over actions for breach of standard contract 3: holding that under  1252a2bi d court has no jurisdiction over any aspects of denial of relief under  1229b except constitutional claims or questions of law 4: holding that the claims court has no jurisdiction under the tucker act over claims to social security benefits


Input: courts routinely dismiss appeals from Rule 736 foreclosure orders for lack of jurisdiction, citing Rule 736.8(c). See, e.g., Wood v. 21st Century Mortg. Corp., No. 05-14-01467-CV, 2015 WL 3866634, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jun. 23, 2015, no pet.); Moir v. JP Morgan Chase NA, No. 05-14-00899-CV, 2014 WL 6808668, at *1 (Tex. App.— Dallas Dec. 4, 2014, no pet.); Thweatt v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 01-14-00261-CV, 2014 WL 2538691, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jun. 5, 2014, no pet.). The Burciagas’ “Motion to Vacate” was an impermissible challenge to the Rule 736 Foreclosure Order. Although Rule 736.8(c) does not include “motions to vacate” in its list of specific forbidden challenges to foreclosure orders, this absence is not disposi-tive. See Casterline, 476 S.W.3d at 44-45 (<HOLDING>). Rule 736.8(c) makes clear that “[a]ny Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to reconsider and reopen was in substance a motion for rehearing or new trial which is prohibited by rule 7368c 1: holding that unauthorized motion for rehearing to set aside default heard by trial court will be considered as motion for reconsideration 2: holding that rule 59e applies to a motion to reconsider 3: holding that there is no authority for a motion for rehearing of an order disposing of a rule 3800 motion to correct illegal sentence and therefore the motion for rehearing did not postpone rendition of the order so as to make the notice of appeal timely 4: holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing


Input: (3) the hypothetical presented to the vocational expert was legally deficient because it did not include all of plaintiffs restrictions, and the ALJ erred in ignoring the vocational expert’s opinion that plaintiff would be unable to work if all her testimony was taken as true; and (4) the ALJ erred in not considering plaintiffs excessive absenteeism rt by a claimant’s physician, he must set forth “specific, legitimate reasons” for his decision. Miller v. Chater, 99 F.3d 972, 976 (10th Cir.1996) (quoting Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir.1987)) (further quotations omitted). Where, as here, an ALJ does not identify which medical exhibits were rejected and the reason for their rejection, we cannot meaningfully review the ALJ’s determination. See, e.g., Clifton, 79 F.3d at 1009 (<HOLDING>); Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that we must uphold any of the aljs factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence and we owe substantial deference to inferences drawn from these facts 1: holding aljs listing of factors he considered was inadequate when court was left to speculate what specific evidence led the alj to his conclusion 2: holding an aljs failure to adequately explain the weight given to treating sources opinions not harmless because the aljs reasoning was not sufficiently specific to make clear that the alj recognized and evaluated the treating relationships 3: holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion and thus the aljs unexplained conclusion was beyond meaningful review 4: holding that the alj is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion


Input: trial judge was correct in his analysis. 5 . We note the inconsistency of the phrases “prima facie case” and “preponderance of the evidence” appearing in the same burden of proof. However, this is the United States Supreme Court's language. Interestingly, it is only used by the federal courts in discussing summary judgment; i.e., presumptions that arise from establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. Even the federal courts that have attempted to instruct a jury on the McDonnell Douglas analysis do not instruct on prima facie case. 6 . In Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that it was error to instruct the jury on the technical elements of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting ana .3d 207, 221-222 (3rd Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1147, 121 S.Ct. 1086, Holdings: 0: holding that although a jury instruction that included the phrase prima facie case and referred to defendants burden of production created a distinct risk of confusing the jury in certain instances it would be appropriate to instruct the jury on the elements of a prima facie case 1: holding that although it is proper to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown it is error to instruct the jury on the mcdonnell douglas burden shifting scheme 2: holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error 3: holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant 4: holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial


Input: promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public. (2) Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction or relationship include the following: (b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with his employer or other principal; .... 13 . Similarly, Florida courts recognize that an employer’s relationship with its employees constitutes a legitimate business interest. Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). 14 . To the extent MacMillan contends that Holdings: 0: holding that sales made to contractor who builds roads for the state are not sales to the state and therefore are not exempt 1: holding that the fact that defendants sales in forum were less than 5 percent of its total sales volume was irrelevant so long as its sales were part of a regular course of dealing and were not isolated or exceptional events 2: holding that agreement prohibiting sales manager from soliciting or influencing other employees to leave automobile dealership for two years following his resignation was presumptively reasonable and necessary to protect substantial investment dealership made in specialized training of its sales staff and furthered legitimate business interests of promoting productivity and maintaining competent and specialized sale team and thus was enforceable 3: holding that exercising general jurisdiction over defendant was improper where its actual sales in florida were a small percentage of the total sales and therefore these sales were de minimis  4: holding that defendants conduct amounted to substantial and nonisolated activity within florida for purposes of general jurisdiction where its advertising strategy was designed to generate product sales in florida and its dollar volume of sales was substantial


Input: numbers of named plaintiffs and putative class members. In Flores, the court issued a protective order preventing defendant’s discovery of the plaintiffs immigration documents, social security numbers, and passports in a suit seeking unpaid wages under the FLSA. 233 F.Supp.2d at 462, 465. The court concluded that the information was irrele vant and its minimal probative value outweighed by its potential for prejudice. Id. at 464-65. See also Zeng Liu, 207 F.Supp.2d at 193 (denying defendant’s request to discover information relating to plaintiffs immigration status because such information is both irrelevant and the need for its disclosure outweighed by the risk of injury to the plaintiffs, even if the parties were to enter into a confidentiality agreement); Cabrera, 695 N.W.2d at 81 (<HOLDING>). In Galaviz-Zamora, the court denied discovery Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs social security numbers are not relevant to determining liability for unpaid wages in a suit under the flsa and state law 1: holding under flsa 2: holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendants collection and publication of highly sensitive personal information including credit card numbers social security numbers financial account numbers and information regarding plaintiffs personal issues including sexuality mental illness alcoholism incest rape and domestic violence 3: holding that social security benefits should not be set off from adea lost wages award 4: holding that the flsa does not preempt a state law contractual claim that seeks to recover wages for time that is compensable under the contract but not under the flsa


Input: to Bucheit and Knop, however, his claim suffers an additional problem. Neither defendant was involved personally in the decision to fire him. To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff claiming a violation of § 1983 must produce evidence that the defendant knew of a deprivation and “ ‘approved it, turned a blind eye to it, failed to remedy it, or in some way personally participated.’ ” Johnson v. equired him to report allegations of this nature to his superiors and that he always initiates an investigation when he receives a report of sexual harassment. Furthermore, even if Warden Cowan’s action had been discretionary, Bucheit and Knop were not “involved” in that action by virtue of their presence. See Hildebrandt v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1040 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). After the meeting at which Knop had informed Holdings: 0: holding that inconsistencies in the summary judgment evidence of a single witness create a fact issue 1: holding that the nonmoving party must come forward with significant probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact 2: holding that evidence of defendants attendance and active participation in meeting where  1983 violation allegedly occurred did not create triable issue of fact as to personal involvement 3: holding no triable issue of fact existed where employee had not asked for accommodation 4: holding that acts of infringement occurring earlier than three years prior to suit are barred by section 507b but that triable issue of fact exists as to whether acts of copying and distribution occurred thereafter


Input: of "harboring” was insufficient to conclude that Congress intended to occupy the field of non-citizen employment and therefore "to pre-empt all state regulation” in that area. 424 U.S. at 360 & n. 9, 96 S.Ct. 933. While providing shelter can, by contrast, constitute harboring under § 1324, see United States v. Cantu, 557 F.2d 1173, 1180 (5th Cir.1977), we conclude that the Ordinance is conflict preempted, without reaching field preemption. The Court in De-Canas explicitly based its decision on field preemption grounds and remanded the question of conflict preemption. See id. at 360 n. 9, 96 S.Ct. 933 (noting that § 1324 and other "cited statutory provisions” would be . -, 131 S.Ct. 2958, 180 L.Ed.2d 243 (2011); United States v. South Carolina, 906 F.Supp.2d 463, 467-68 (D.S.C.2012) (<HOLDING>); Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. 10-1061, 2012 Holdings: 0: holding that  1324 preempted south carolina law creating state crimes for harboring both relating to harborers and aliens themselves 1: holding that  1324 preempted a local ordinance prohibiting renting housing to illegal aliens 2: holding the state law claims were not preempted 3: holding that in south carolina sheriffs and deputies are state officials 4: holding that  1324 preempted georgia law criminalizing harboring of aliens


Input: favor because the issue was never raised by either party. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 862, the trial court “shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general and equitable relief.” However, Louisiana jurisprudence has held that “[njothing in Article 862 of the Code of Civil Procedure is intended to confer jurisdiction on a court to decide controversies 110which the parties haye not regularly brought before it.” Patrick v. Patrick, 227 So.2d 162, 164 (La. App. 2nd Cir.1969); Cannatella v. City of New Orleans, 612 So.2d 923, 924 (La.App, 4th Cir,1993); Glover v. Med. Ctr. of Baton Rouge, 97-1710 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 713 So.2d 1261, 1262 (<HOLDING>). The petition filed by the Hymans does not Holdings: 0: holding that trial court erred as a matter of law by enforcing contract for purchase of real property that had terminated by its own terms 1: holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine 2: holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim 3: holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial 4: holding the trial court erred as a matter of law in adjudicating a claim for relief that was not demanded by the parties


Input: to the District Council, the Prince George’s County Planning Board, and the County's Department of Environmental Services/Resources as "County” interchangeably. 3 . The record extract is unclear as to when the sectional map was transmitted. The printed face sheet has a caption which reads: "July 1991.” We assume that the sectional map is printed or prepared before it is transmitted. Thus, that date, "July 1991,” was prior to transmittal. At oral argument, counsel for appellee was unable to furnish the actual date of transmittal. [4] 4. Neither party has directed us in their briefs to any provision of the zoning ordinance which would allow appellant’s project to qualify for a special exception or variance permitting the commercial use 94-95, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Prior to Mahon, only direct Holdings: 0: holding that the exercise of police power was valid where an owner was prohibited from operating a liveiy stable business that was not a nuisance per se 1: holding that an ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavating was a valid exercise of police power wherein it prevented the defendant from further excavation below the water table 2: holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 3: recognizing a connection between surface and groundwater even where the water table falls below the stream bed 4: holding that an ordinance passed for the health and comfort of the community that prohibited brickmaking in a designated area was a valid exercise of police power


Input: the District Court applied the correct version of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Bertoli 40 F.3d 1384, 1403 (3d Cir.1994). The ex post facto clause is violated when a court applies a change in the law which is adverse to the interests of a defendant where that change occurred after the commission of the crime. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Accordingly, when the court in a criminal case is confronted with post-offense amendments which call for a more severe sentence than th ncealment of assets listed in Count One of the indictment was determined by either the evidence produced at trial, or the date the concealment was detected, both of which he claims point to an end date prior to November 2000. See United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 739 (4th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Stein, 233 F.3d 6, 18-19 Holdings: 0: holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment 1: holding that court should not use ending date of indictment as determination of when continuing violation ended but should look at the evidence introduced at trial 2: recognizing trial court should not weigh evidence 3: holding that an offer to reimburse plaintiff for costs is not a precondition but an important factor for trial court to look at in determining whether it should grant a new trial 4: holding that valuation should occur on the date of the trial at which property issues are determined


Input: the size of Plaintiff's Exhibit, the Exhibit was designated a “bulky exhibit” by the Clerk's Office such that it is available for public viewing and copying in the Clerk’s Office but is not available electronically on ECF. See Docket Entry [33], Attachment 2. 5 . The Court notes that both Plaintiff and Defendants have submitted the unsealed transcript of the proceedings in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Samuel L. Alexander (Civil Case No. 622-04) before Judge Gary S. Gasparovic in the District Court for Charles County, Maryland, on April 21, 2004; Plaintiff's various filings in that case; and related orders issued by both the district and appellate courts in that case, all of which may be considered matters of public record. See In re Thomas H., 381 Md. 174, 187 n. 4, 848 A.2d 652 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. Warden of Maryland House of Corr., Holdings: 0: holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice 1: holding that it may be decided as a matter of law 2: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner 3: holding that a notice because it was docketed should be considered a matter of public record 4: holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record


Input: in the plaintiff’s favor, similar to the review of a traditional summary judgment) (citing Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997)). 44 . See Texas Logos, L.P. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 241 S.W.3d 105, 118-23 (Tex. App.Austin 2007, no pet.): accord Satterfield & Pontikes Constr., Inc. v. Texas S. Univ., 472 S.W.3d 426, 431-33 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) ("Texas courts have also ‘regarded these immunity principles as ... barring suits to cancel or nullify a contract made for the benefit of the state.'" (quoting Texas Logos, L.P., 241 S.W.3d at 120) (citing W.D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen, 158 Tex. 74, 308 S.W.2d 838, 840-41 (1958))); Mustang Special Util. Dist. v. Providence Vill., 392 S.W.3d 311, 315-19 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 45 . Texas Logos, L.P., 241 S.W.3d at 119-20. Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official 1: holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability 2: holding plaintiffs claim seeking to invalidate agreement with water supply district was barred by governmental immunity 3: recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit 4: holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary


Input: no evidence that the management agent or any of its employees filed the appropriate information with the Licensing Board as required by statute. Because no reasonable jury could find that Defendants met the requirements for exemption, the Court finds that Defendants violated the MCALA by failing to register with the Licensing Board prior to engaging in debt collection activities. Despite the' MCALA violation by the management agent and its employees, Plaintiffs claims under the MCALA (Counts XXII-XXIII) fail as pled and argued by Plaintiff because the MCALA does not give rise to a private right of action. See id. § 7-401; see also Bradshaw, 765 F.Supp.2d at 727-28. Violations of the MCALA may, however, support a cause of action under the FDCPA. See Bradshaw, 765 F.Supp.2d at 729, 732 (<HOLDING>). In Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 52, Holdings: 0: holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act 1: holding as a matter of first impression that a violation of the mcala may in some cases support a cause of action under the fdcpa 2: recognizing the cause of action 3: holding that the elements of a cause of action were not subject matter jurisdictional simply because the statute that created the cause of action provided that district courts shall have jurisdiction of such actions 4: recognizing cause of action


Input: Terses a Macias on April 15, 1996.” Id. at 963 (emphasis added). In support of its conclusion that the alleged constitutional deprivation was the death of Mrs. Macias, the district court cited the Supreme Court’s opinions in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989), the dissenting opinion of Justice O’Connor in City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 260, 107 S.Ct. 1114, 94 L.Ed.2d 293 (1987), and this court’s opinion in Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, (9th Cir.1981). In each of those cases, the Supreme Court and this court treated the deprivation of a constitutional right as the alleged “injury.” See Monell, 436 U.S. at 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (<HOLDING>); Harris, 489 U.S. at 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197 Holdings: 0: holding that  1983 plainly imposes liability on a government that under color of some official policy causes an employee to violate anothers constitutional rights 1: holding that although municipalities are persons within the meaning of 42 usc  1983 no municipal liability lies under that statute unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort 2: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom 3: holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability 4: holding that a defendant can only be sued in his official capacity under  1983 if he acted pursuant to an official policy or custom in causing the constitutional injury


Input: fee award, Defendants do not dispute the district court’s calculation of the lodestar— the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299-1302 (11th Cir.1988). Rather, Defendants contend that the district court was required to reduce the lodestar in proportion to the “partial and extremely limited” success achieved by Quainoo at trial. We disagree. Because Quainoo’s successful and unsuccessful claims were related, as they arose from a common core of facts, the district court was not required to reduce the lodestar. See Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1578-79 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). And, although the district court had the Holdings: 0: holding despite not finding undue hardship that it would be equitable to reduce the amount of nondischargeable liability by the amount of the accrued interest 1: holding that claims are related if they involve a common core of facts or they are based on related legal theories 2: holding that a liquidated damages amount set by contract is enforceable where the amount bears a reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained 3: holding that where claims  involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories  and the plaintiff obtained only partial or limited success the court may reduce the lodestar amount if it believes that amount is excessive in relation to the plaintiffs relief emphasis added 4: holding that the presumptive amount is rebuttable and that the court may deviate from the presumptive amount if such amount is determined to be unjust or inappropriate in consideration of any relevant evidence pertaining to the factors set forth in code  201072 and 201081


Input: Virginia Lee requests the setting aside of a final judgment stemming from its decision to settle with the plaintiffs. So as not to be futile, therefore, Virginia Lee cannot simply state a claim or defense to the original collection action filed by the Trustees. The fact of the settlement remains, and it is this legal event that the defendant has to surmount in order to meet its threshold showing. Construction and interpretation of the settlement agreement is not a matter contemplated by the applicable federal statute in this case. Rather, an analysis of the settlement agreement is simply a matter of contract law. Because there is no federal common law of contracts, state substantive law applies. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) (<HOLDING>). As to which state’s law applies here, the Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 1: holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law 2: recognizing that it is an open question whether drpa is a federal agency governed by the apa or a state agency governed by state administrative law 3: holding that ejxcept in matters governed by the federal constitution or by acts of congress the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state 4: holding a state workers compensation regime preempted by erisa to the extent state law applied to pension plans governed by federal law


Input: utilizing a governmental entity for either establishing or dissolving the status-based relationship. See, e.g., U.S. v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-445, 93 S.Ct. 631, 34 L.Ed.2d 626 (1973) (''The denial of access to the judicial forum in Boddie [Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971)] touched directly, as has been noted, on the marital relationship and on the associational interests that surround the establishment and dissolution of that relationship. On many occasions we have recognized the fundamental importance of these interests under our Constitution ... The Boddie appellants' inability to dissolve their marriages seriously impaired their freedom to pursue other protected associational activities."); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1080 (10th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). Of course, a state may possess interests that Holdings: 0: holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right 1: recognizing that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals 2: holding right to be fundamental 3: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental 4: recognizing a fundamental right to marry


Input: 464, 473, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). We do not believe, however, that this is such a case. Vasquez has alleged more than “a mere abstract objection” to Defendants’ removal of the cross from the county seal. See Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086. To the contrary, he has held himself out as a member of the community where the seal is located, as someone forced into frequent regular contact with the seal, and perhaps most importantly, as someone “directly affected” by his “unwelcome direct contact” with the seal. If we assume for the moment that the revised seal did, in fact, convey an anti-Christian message, then it is understandable that Vasquez would feel aggrieved by that message. He should, accordingly, be able to seek a legal remedy. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n. 9, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (<HOLDING>); Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1087 (“Plaintiffs who ‘are Holdings: 0: holding that parents who brought suit challenging certain religiouslyrelated practices in public schools were without standing to challenge religious practices at baccalaureate programs because their children who were enrolled in elementary schools were not adversely affected by the challenged practice 1: holding that the challenged practices were not consumeroriented under  349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents 2: holding that plaintiffs had established an injury in fact because the challenged activity directly affected their recreational aesthetic and economic interests 3: holding that regulations issued by commissioner of food and drugs were ripe for review because they were definitive immediately effective and directly and immediately affected petitioners daily business activities 4: holding that plaintiffs had standing because they were directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints were directed


Input: 593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980). 6 . The Supreme Court recently held that a break in the custodial interrogation of fourteen days is sufficient to end the Edwards presumption that any statements made by the individual after invoking his right to counsel must be suppressed. Maryland v. Shatzer, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1223,-L.Ed.2d -(2010). 7 . In State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Tenn.1992), in which the voluntariness of a confession was at issue, this Court observed that article I, section 9 of our state constitution may apply more broadly than its Fifth Amendment counterpart “based upon considerations other than, and in addition to, the difference in terminology.” 8 . See, e.g., State v. Ragland, No. W2008-02065-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 4825182, at *8 (Tenn.Crim.App. Dec. 15, 2009) (<HOLDING>); Nash, 2009 WL 2461178, at *4-5 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person 1: holding that a suspect made an acceptable request for counsel by stating i dont think i want to talk to you anymore without a lawyer 2: holding that statement i think i should call my lawyer was an unequivocal request for counsel 3: holding that request for counsel was not unequivocal when suspect wrote i need a lawyer on the blackboard among several of other statements while alone in the interview room then responded to officers clarifying questions that he did not want a lawyer 4: holding that the state courts conclusion that a suspect did not unambiguously request counsel was not unreasonable when during a postmiranda interview the suspect stated i think i would like to talk to a lawyer after which the police stopped questioning him left the room and did not resume questioning until the suspect explicitly said he did not want a lawyer and wanted to continue talking


Input: of proving a prima facie case, the proponent has the burden of production of a race-neutral explanation, and the opponent has the ultimate burden of proving pretext and discriminatory intent.” Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832. After Pendleton gave reasons for the objection, the district court should have determined whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination had been shown. See White, 684 N.W.2d at 505. Instead, the court allowed the state to respond and Pendleton to rebut that response. The court’s analysis was not in accordance with our Batson precedent or the Batson procedure set forth in Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 6a(3). But we have not reversed a district court’s Batson ruling solely because of its failure to follow the prescribed procedure. See Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832-34 (<HOLDING>); Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 202 (“Because the Holdings: 0: recognizing that factual findings were clearly erroneous where the record before the court was simply devoid of any basis for the district courts conclusion 1: holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record 2: holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record 3: holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review 4: holding that the district courts application of batson was clearly erroneous but then reviewing the record to make our own determination as to the validity of the objection


Input: service of summons, Omni 484 U.S. at 109, 108 S.Ct. 404, it would be inappropriate for a federal court to effectively extend the territorial reach of a federal statute by applying a national contacts test for personal jurisdiction where service is not effected pursuant to that federal statute. In fact, in the only case to directly address the issue, the Seventh Circuit explicitly held, without analysis, that because RICO contains no provision for worldwide service, a plaintiff who attempts to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign national served outside the United States “must rely on the long-arm statute of the state in which he files his suit.” Stauffacher v. Bennett, 969 F.2d 455, 460 (7th Cir.1992); see also Brink’s Mat Ltd. v. Diamond, 906 F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Biofeedtrac, Inc. v. Kolinor Optical Holdings: 0: holding that that foreign corporation that acted as agent for retail customers within the united kingdom had insufficient contacts with florida to permit the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the corporation 1: recognizing that personal jurisdiction of federal courts of course may be grounded in state longarm or other jurisdiction statutes in civil rico cases 2: holding that the court must look for continuous and systematic general business contacts  ie general jurisdiction  if the causes of action do not arise from or relate to the foreign defendants contacts with the forum state 3: holding that the foreign administrator of a deceased nonresident was subject to jurisdiction under the illinois state longarm statute because dece dent would have been subject to jurisdiction had he lived 4: holding rico plaintiff may resort to state longarm statute to serve foreign defendants abroad and assuming personal jurisdiction question would turn on foreign defendants contacts with middle district of florida


Input: ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent, only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Id. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The New Mexico Constitution also prohibits the state legislature from enacting ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, see N.M. Const., Art. 2 § 19, and analyzes ex post facto claims under the same framework, see State v. Druktenis, 135 N.M. 223, 233, 86 P.3d 1050 (N.M.Ct. App.2004). In Smith, the Supreme Court considered the ex post facto implications of an Alaskan sex registration statute that is similar in many ways to NMSORNA. See id. at 235, 86 P.3d 1050 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 103-04, 123 S.Ct. 1140) (<HOLDING>). Alaska’s law was designed to apply Holdings: 0: recognizing the applicability of the mcdonough standard to federal criminal proceedings 1: recognizing the presumptions applicability to federal statutes 2: recognizing the applicability of rule 9b under such circumstances 3: recognizing the applicability of the smith analysis to nmsorna 4: recognizing applicability of discovery rule


Input: Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 43 (2d Cir.2004). Reynolds’s first argument fails because it mischaracterizes the district court’s decision. The district court did not find that Reynolds’s intoxication caused his injuries. Instead, it found that although Reynolds was acting in the course of his employment, see 46 U.S.C. § 30104, his injuries could not be legally attributed to the defendants’ alleged negligence because the defendants did not own the bus that injured Reynolds and otherwise had no duty to provide a safe means of transportation between the M/V Bennett and Reynolds’s chosen venue for shore-leave amusement. We identify no error in that conclusion, which is consistent with the undisputed facts and the law. See Thurnau v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 229 F.2d 73, 74 (2d Cir.1956) (<HOLDING>). Reynolds’s second argument fails because of Holdings: 0: holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify 1: holding no duty and noting that foreseeability bears on the scope of a duty and not whether it exists in the first place 2: holding that employer has nondelegable duty to provide safe workplace 3: holding that shipowner is under no duty to provide a safe means of transportation between the ship and any place of amusement crew members desire to visit while on shore leave 4: recognizing a state law tort claim for negligence arising under a duty to provide a safe work environment


Input: Damon Skaggs pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to manufacture, distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A) and 846. Applying the then-mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court sentenced Mr. Skaggs to 188 months’ imprisonment — the bottom of the applicable guideline range (188 to 235 months)— and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, the Government conceded that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 764, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (<HOLDING>), the district court erred in imposing Mr. Holdings: 0: holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment 1: holding guidelines to be only advisory 2: holding that the mandatory nature of the united states sentencing guidelines resulted in violations of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial and rendering the guidelines advisory 3: holding unconstitutional the mandatory application of the federal sentencing guidelines 4: holding that the pennsylvania sentencing guidelines are purely advisory in nature


Input: easement, i.e., once permission is granted by the landowner there is no longer adverse use or use under a claim of right. Accordingly, we find the Court of Appeals correctly cited Williamson as supporting authority for its decision. Rooted in Williamson, the law is well-established that evidence of permissive use defeats the establishment of a prescriptive easement because use that is permissive cannot also be adverse or under a claim of right. See Paine, 400 S.C. at 586, 735 S.E.2d at 538 (quoting Williamson and recognizing that a claimant’s permissive use of landowner’s property cannot begin to ripen into a prescriptive easement until the claimant makes a distinct and positive assertion of right hostile to the landowner); Horry Cnty. v. Laychur, 315 S.C. 364, 434 S.E.2d 259 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Williamson, 107 S.C. at 401, 93 S.E. at 16 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a temporary use of property does not automatically create an expectation of privacy in that property 1: holding evidence which established that use of property was permissive showed use of property was not adverse 2: holding that the amendment was a use regulation which was in effect a condition on the use of property in the affected zone 3: holding that adverse inference rule is permissive 4: holding that allowing moderate use of the resources on the property was not inconsistent with exclusive use


Input: amendment that must be applied retroactively. Id. at 2-3. The district court denied Williams’s motion, concluding that Amendment 709 is not retroactive. Rl-66. II. DISCUSSION On appeal, Williams argues, pro se, that the district court abused its authority by denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion. He contends that the court erroneously assigned him a criminal history category of IV, and that his true criminal history category was II. Accordingly, his guideline range was calculated incorrectly, and his sentence is unjust. Williams’ pro se argument may be liberally construed as a contention that the district court erred in concluding that Amendment 709 did not entitle him to a § 3582(c)(2) reduction. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). We “review de novo a district court’s Holdings: 0: holding to ensure substantial justice to the parties the pleadings must be liberally construed 1: holding that pro se pleadings will be liberally construed 2: holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed 3: recognizing courts special duty to construe liberally a pro se plaintiffs pleadings 4: holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them