Input: previously, plaintiffs interests can and should be adequately protected in the state proceeding given the substantial similarity of the state proceeding to the federal one. Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of abstention. g. Vexatious and reactive nature of the federal claim The Supreme Court recognized that the “vexatious or reactive nature of either the federal or the state litigation may influence the decision whether to defer to a parallel state litigation under Colorado River. ” Cone, 460 U.S. at 17, 103 S.Ct. 927. Where courts find bad faith on the part of plaintiff, a stay or dismissal may be warranted “as a means to deter vexatious use of the courts.” Holland, 840 F.Supp. at 1101; see also Baseline Sports, Inc. v. Third Base Sports, 341 F.Supp.2d 605, 611-612 (E.D.Va.2004) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, Livingston and Winn Holdings: 0: holding that a developers claim for breach of fiduciary duty was actually a contract action properly brought in the court of claims 1: holding that district court has no jurisdiction when an action is brought before the first final denial occurs 2: holding that plaintiff brought its claim to district court for a vexatious purpose when the claim was a mirror image of the state court action 3: holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the purported state law claim for violation of the automatic stay and that any such claim could be brought only in bankruptcy court only 4: holding state immune from suit brought in state court


Input: districts in which they serve. Sullivan, 106 S.W.3d at 189. Texas law places control of probation departments in the hands of district judges, who are elected state officials. See PYCA Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d at 1417 n. 3. In Shore, the court explained that because the district judges are empowered to employ and dismiss individuals in the probation department, any actions by the director “would be as an agent for the Judges.” 414 F.Supp. at 385; see Sullivan, 106 S.W.3d at 189. The Shore court further explained that “any equitable relief granted must therefore be directed against the ‘Judges ....”’ 414 F.Supp. at 385; see Sullivan, 106 S.W.3d at 189 (citing Clark v. Tarrant County, 608 F.Supp. 209, 211 (N.D.Tex.1985), rev’d in part on other grounds, 798 F.2d at 739 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>)). Because ultimate control over JCCSCD staff Holdings: 0: holding that probation department employees are not county employees 1: holding that county and district attorneys are officers within the judicial department 2: holding that a county had no duty to bargain with a union of its employees 3: holding that the commissioner of the department of pensions and security had statutory authority to reassign state employees to the county level 4: holding that employees of county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to contract with the federal government were not federal employees even though county jail had to comply with federal rules and regulations


Input: sentence” may not “then appeal the merits of a sentence conforming to the agreement.” United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1993). The plea agreement stipulated that Blackwell “committed the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony-conviction for a crime of violence.” App’x at 10, That stipulation resulted in a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months under the terms of the plea agreement. Id. at 11. At sentencing, the district court decided to follow the plea agreement and sentenced Blackwell to 36 months imprisonment. Because Blackwell’s sentence conformed to his plea agreement, he received the benefit of that agreement and he has waived any challenge to his sentence on the basis of Johnson. See United States v. Morgan, 406 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, and finding no Holdings: 0: holding that defendants failure to appeal the voluntariness of a plea constitutes waiver of the issue on subsequent appeal 1: holding that a waiver of right to appeal contained in a plea agreement is enforceable 2: holding that the inability to foresee that subsequently decided cases would create new appeal issues does not supply a basis for failing to enforce an appeal waiver on the contrary the possibility of a favorable change in the law after a plea is simply one of the risks that accompanies pleas and plea agreements 3: holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver 4: holding that since the statute does not provide for appeal of issues related to a motion to dismiss after entry of a guilty plea the defendant who raised only that issue had no right to appeal


Input: York, 804 F.3d 277, 294 (3d Cir. 2015) (“To state an equal-protection claim, Plaintiffs must allege (and ultimately prove) ‘intentional discrimination.’” (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976))). Additionally, because Lee does not allege that she is a member of a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class, her claim would be subject to rational basis review. See id. at 298-99. Lee would not plausibly be entitled to relief under this standard because, as the District Court observed, the Palimony Law is “extremely rationally related to the end goal” (Oral Arg. Tr. at 23), of “providing greater clarity in the enforcement of palimony agreements” (App. 400). See F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Lee’s Amended Complaint fails to Holdings: 0: holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction 1: holding rational basis as standard for commerce clause inquiries 2: holding that the law challenged in that cases classification is invalid because it is wholly without any rational basis 3: holding that a law survives rational basis review so long as there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification 4: recognizing heightened rational basis scrutiny


Input: from enforcing its billboard ordinance, save wind load and electrical requirements, should Whiteco or its successors apply to rebuild in the same location, or to relocate in a new location, any of the forty-two billboards identified in the Agreement. Applying the settled principles above, the Agreement had “the effect of interfering [with the proper exercise of City’s police power], [and] must necessarily give way to an appropriate exercise of [City’s] police power.” State ex rel. Kansas City, 524 S.W.2d at 859. Because City had no authority to contract away future enforcement of its zoning ordinance against rebuilt or relocated billboards, the Agreement exceeded the scope of City’s powers in violation of section 432.070, and is void. North Kansas City Sch. Dist., 369 S.W.2d at 165 (<HOLDING>); Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., 3 Rathkopfs The Law Holdings: 0: holding it is critical to the trial courts power of control over its own docket and its ability to serve effectively all litigants that it maintain control over progress of cases before it including requests for extensions of time 1: holding that where a court possesses jurisdiction over a disputed matter it may exercise its equitable powers to ensure that substance will not give way to form and that technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done 2: holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract 3: holding that any attempt by way of contract to deprive a city of  control over exercise of it police powers is void 4: holding over


Input: to support denial, is nevertheless relevant.”) The single most important factor is whether prejudice would result to the nonmovant as a consequence of the amendment. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1053 (9th Cir.1981). In the Ninth Circuit, if a complaint does not include the necessary factual allegations to state a claim, it is not sufficient to allege such claims in a motion for summary judgment. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1080 (9th Cir.2008); see also Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir.2006) (“ ‘Simply put, summary judgment is not a procedural second chance to flesh out inadequate pleadings.’ ”); Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968-69 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The first amended complaint alleges a general Holdings: 0: holding that the complaint did not satisfy the notice pleading requirements of federal rule of civil procedure 8a because the complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment 1: holding despite collective allegations in complaint the complaint was not deficient under rule 8a because it stated with sufficient particularity facts establishing a causal connection between the defendants actions and the constitutional deprivation 2: holding that the plaintiffs complaint was valid because despite general allegations it provided notice 3: holding that a complaint does not meet the requirements of rule 9 when the complaint did not give notice to the defendant of false claims submitted by others for federal reimbursement of offlabel uses only of illegal practices in promotion of the drug 4: holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment


Input: whether [it] ha[d] some job that [Burns] might [have been] able to fill.” Dalton, 141 F.3d at 677 (noting that “reassignment is particularly important when the employee is unable to perform the essential functions of his or her current job, either with or without accommodation”); see also Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (stating that “[njumerous courts have assumed that the reassignment obligation means something more than treating a disabled employee like any other job applicant”). Because prior decisions of this court hold that an employee has the burden of identifying particular positions to which he could be reassigned based on his qualifications, we affirm 'the district court’s order granting summary judgment for KCC. See Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Dalton, 141 F.3d at 679 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that drugrelated misconduct is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination 1: holding that employees threats of violence against a coworker were legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for termination 2: holding that employers must when appropriate accommodate a disabled employee by reassignment to a vacant position if employee cannot be accommodated in existing job 3: holding that reassignment is not required where the disabled plaintiff sought to escape the employers legitimate nondiscriminatory policy requiring all employees seeking transfers from parttime to fulltime positions to take a written exam 4: recognizing that an employers decision to eliminate a position is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a position or employee


Input: the F.D. Rich decision, courts deciding the issue had held almost without exception that the provision was a venue requirement. United States ex rel. Capolino Sons, Inc. v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 364 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 924, 87 S.Ct. 239, 17 L.Ed.2d 148 (1966). It is well settled that venue provisions are subject to contractual waiver. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315, 84 S.Ct. 411, 414, 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964). Three circuits have addressed forum selection clauses that conflict with the Miller Act’s venue provisions. All three have held that as a mere venue requirement, § 270b(b) is subject to contractual waiver by a valid forum selection clause. See FGS Constructors, Inc. v. Carlow, 64 F.3d 1230, 1233 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); G & C Enterprises, 62 F.3d at 36; In re Holdings: 0: holding that a partys repeated representations that venue was proper in one forum waived its right to bring a subsequent motion under 28 usc  1406a challenging venue 1: holding the miller acts venue requirement could be waived by defendants 2: holding that where a defendant if given the opportunity to renew a motion for a change of venue immediately prior to trial but fails to do so the right to challenge venue is waived 3: holding that the failure of three defendants to object to venue did not waive a fourth defendants objection and therefore affirming the trial courts decision to transfer venue 4: holding that the defendant waived the issue of change of venue where the trial court denied the motion for a change of venue without prejudice stating that it was willing to reconsider the motion at any time during the jury selection process but the defendant never renewed the motion for a change of venue


Input: innocence by giving jurors an instruction that minimized the significance of their anonymity. Before jurors filled lowed its anonymity discussion by instructing jurors that the defendants enjoyed a presumption of innocence, and repeated that instruction both at the beginning and conclusion of the trial. See Preliminary Instruction at 3, reprinted in J.A. I 260; Trial Tr. (Sept. 18, 1989) at 46, reprinted in J.A. VIII; id. (Dec. 1, 1989) at 74, reprinted in J.A. XVII. This step further mitigated any prejudice from the anonymous jury procedure. See Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1133; see also Crockett, 979 F.2d at 1216 (finding repeated instructions on presumption of innocence to protect defendant from possibility of prejudice resulting from impan-elment of anonymous jury); Vario, 943 F.2d at 241 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, appellants find fault in the Holdings: 0: holding that trial court took adequate steps to safeguard defendants presumption of innocence where judge failed to instruct jurors as to reason for their anonymity but fully instructed them on presumption of innocence 1: holding that no amount of boiler plate instructions to the jury  not to draw any inferences as to the judges feelings about the facts from his asking questions or that they are free to disregard factual comment by the judge or as to the presumption of innocence  could be expected to erase from a jurys mind the part taken in this trial by the district judge 2: holding trial courts failure to recite a presumption of innocence instruction seriously jeopardized the defendants federal constitutional right to due process and a fair trial 3: holding that it was fundamental error for a sentencing court to consider a criminal defendants protestations of innocence because due process guarantees an individual the right to maintain innocence even when faced with evidence of overwhelming guilt 4: holding that a district court order denying anonymity to the parties is a collateral order


Input: dismiss Counts III-V pending adjudication of Count I. With regard to Count II, the court held that the power to revoke an objection is implied by the power to interpose one, and that the sixty-day period was intended only to limit the Attorney General’s authority to interpose objections. Id. at 211. Appellees urged that the claims set forth in the remaining counts were not subject to judicial review, because section 5 of the Voting Rights Act precludes judicial review of actions taken by the Attorney General under its provisions, and commits the decision to interpose objections wholly to agency discretion. However, the District Court deferred consideration of the review-ability of Counts III through V, and ruled on the basis of Harper v. Levi, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 520 F.2d 53 (1975) (<HOLDING>), that the “procedural” issue raised by Count I Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error 1: holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  2: holding that where defendant failed to object to facts in psi relating to prior conviction the failure to object constituted an admission 3: holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver 4: holding reviewable the attorney generals alleged failure to exercise his independent judgment before deciding not to object to a proposed voting change


Input: failed to establish that Kennedy’s stock sales were “unusual.” As discussed above, Kennedy disclosed all his holdings in the November announcement. The additional 30,000 shares that Kennedy sold in January represented less than 11% of his holdings; after the sale, Kennedy owned approximately 259,000 shares and/or options of IMCERA stock. Further, the complaint failed to allege that any other defendant sold any shares of IMCERA stock during this period. The fact that the other defendants did not sell their shares during the relevant class period undermines plaintiffs’ claim that defendants delayed notifying the public “so that they could sell their stock at a huge profit.” In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,060, at 94,-697, 1992 WL 394927 (N.D.Cal.1992) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, it appears that the 30,000 shares Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs claims that defendants artificially inflated the companys share price so that they could sell their stock at a huge profit was undermined by the fact that one of the four defendants did not sell his stock during the class period 1: holding that plaintiffs allegations of loss causation complied with dura because they asserted that defendants misrepresentations had caused the value of the shares of stock to become inflated after which the disclosure of the true state of affairs caused the plaintiffs to lose millions of dollars 2: holding that complaint stated a claim under erisa for breach of fiduciary duty of among other things prudence where defendants continued to offer a company stock fund as a pension plan alternative when they knew that the stock price was unlawfully and artificially inflated 3: holding that where knowledgeable insiders did not sell stock at a time that would have taken advantage of allegedly fraudulent statements there was not a strong inference of scienter 4: holding that plaintiffs failed to plead loss causation where their only allegation was the payment of artificially inflated prices for defendants securities and their complaint failed to provide defendants with notice of what plaintiffs relevant economic loss might be or of what the causal connection might be between that loss and the alleged misrepresentation at issue


Input: in understanding the case and in reaching a correct verdict.” State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 136, 184 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1971). It is recognized by this Court that “the preferred method of jury instruction is the use of the approved guidelines of the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions.” In re Will of Leonard, 71 N.C. App. 714, 717, 323 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1984). “In a criminal trial the judge has the duty to instruct the jury on the law arising from all the evidence presented.” State v. Moore, 75 N.C. App. 543, 546, 331 S.E.2d 251, 253, disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 188, 337 S.E.2d 862 (1985). This places a duty upon the presiding judge to instruct the jury as to the burden of proof upon each issue arising upon the pleadings. See State v. Redman, 217 N.C. 483, 8 S.E.2d 623 (1940) (<HOLDING>). “The rule as to the burden of proof is Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 1: holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant 2: holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial 3: holding that the failure to instruct on a definition or to amplify an element is not a failure to instruct on an essential element 4: holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error


Input: 109 Utah 213, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (1946)). This requires a system of coordination between the holder of the easement and the owner of the land through which it passes. The Court thus concluded that the BLM needed to make an “initial determination” regarding the reasonableness and necessity of any proposed improvements beyond mere maintenance of the previous condition of the road. Id. at 1084-85. This approach was elaborated and applied in district court cases after Hodel. In United States v. Garfield County, 122 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Utah 2000), the court held, with reference to the same road at issue in Hodel, that any road construction within the National Park, beyond “maintenance,” would require advance notification of the Park Service and mutual accommodation between the P Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that proposed improvements to an rs 2477 route in a national preserve is subject to regulation by the national park service 1: holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation 2: holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board 3: holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act 4: holding that a lessors interest can only be subject to liens arising from improvements performed on the leased property if the lease required the improvements or if under judicial interpretation the improvements were the pith of the lease


Input: 1 . See Tex. Lab.Code § 417.002. Goudeau raised no objection to USF & G's intervention in his pleadings or summary judgment response. 2 . 243 S.W.3d 1, 10. The portion of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming summary judgment against Goudeau's former wife Tasha, see id. at 5-6, has not been appealed. 3 . Fies Hawai’i 117, 883 P.2d 38, 53 (1994) (finding coverage as occupancy if insured vehicle "started the chain of events” that resulted in injury). 13 . See Torres v. Travelers Indem. Co., 171 N.J. 147, 793 A.2d 592, 593 (2002) ("[I]n order to obtain UM coverage where occupancy is in issue, a plaintiff is required to establish a substantial nexus between the insured vehicle and the injury sustained.”). 14 . See Genthner v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 681 A.2d 479, 482 (Me.1996) (<HOLDING>); Sayers v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 192 Mont. Holdings: 0: holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle 1: holding that the physical contact needed to support a direct claim against an uninsured motorist carrier pursuant to nc gen stat  2027921 existed where the physical contact arose between the hitandrun vehicle and plaintiffs vehicle through intermediate vehicles involved in an unbroken chain collision which involved the hitandrun vehicle 2: holding attempt to apprehend hitandrun driver was directly and reasonably related to the operation and use of the insured vehicle 3: holding that the term strike as used in a contractual definition of hitandrun coverage required physical contact between the hitandrun vehicle and the insured vehicle 4: holding that probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the police officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the accused had committed or was committing an offense in situations where the arresting officer has not observed the operation of the vehicle such facts and circumstances would necessarily have to include a relationship between the time there was evidence to show the influence of intoxicants and the time of operation of the vehicle internal citations omitted


Input: F.2d 711 (5th cir.1985) ], its intended purpose should be upheld so long as it otherwise offends no substantive rights. See In re Adams [734 F.2d 1094 (5th cir.1984) ]. We see no such result here. On the contrary, if bankruptcy court jurisdiction is not permitted over a class action of debtors, Rule 7023 is virtually read out of the rules. Id. at 754 (internal footnotes omitted). ... There is also disagreement about whether the bankruptcy court may exercise jurisdiction over a nationwide class of debtors or is limited to exercising jurisdiction over debtors whose petitions are filed within the same judicial district. Compare, e.g., In re Noletto, 244 B.R. 845, 849 (Bankr.S.D.Ala.2000) (permitting nationwide class) with Barrett v. Avco Fin. Servs. Mgmt. Co., 292 B.R. 1, 8 (D.Mass.2003) (<HOLDING>). The class at issue in this case was limited Holdings: 0: holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members 1: holding court lacks jurisdiction over putative class members whose bankruptcies were discharged outside of judicial district 2: holding that it is not necessary that all putative class members share identical claims 3: holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification 4: holding court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over the governments prosecutorial discretion decisions


Input: award was not an abuse of discretion. The district court based its award on a variety of factors: it cited the need for deterrence, and recognized that “the willful and pervasive nature of [Chertok]’s misrepresentations, and the time and effort they added to this litigation,” called for a “considerable sanction.” Joint Appx 290-91. It balanced those considerations against the fact that we vacated two out of the three Rule 11 violations it originally relied on, and the fact that StreetEasy devoted less than one third of its submissions to the affirmed Rule 11 violation. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the district court’s decision to award one-third of the original amount was not within the range of permissible decisions. See Eastway Constr. Corp., 821 F.2d at 128 (<HOLDING>); see also Caisse Nationale de Credit Holdings: 0: holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive 1: recognizing wide reach of jurisdiction under title 11 2: holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions 3: recognizing that appellate courts that have applied rule 16 have afforded wide discretion to district courts applications of that rule 4: recognizing district courts wide range of discretion in setting amount of rule 11 sanctions


Input: that the “fast-steering” language of the claim preamble is not a limitation of any of the claims. See STX LLC v. Brine Inc., 54 USPQ2d 1347, 1349 (Fed.Cir.2000) (“The fact that the first squeezes that formed the basis of the commercial offer to sell might not have exhibited the desired degree of ‘improved playing and handling’ characteristics ... is irrelevant, not least because the preamble to claim 1 is not a limitation.”). Nor should the court consider things like the alleged “operator friendly” characteristics of the ’220 trowel that do not appear in the claims. Finally, the court should appreciate that experimentation and modification of non-claimed features of the Red Rider will not necessarily preclude the finding of an on-sale bar. See Theis, 610 F.2d at 793, 204 USPQ at 194 (<HOLDING>). 4. Marking Bartell argues that the Holdings: 0: holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment 1: holding the same with respect to an apartment 2: holding that under privacy act federal government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actual damages but not with respect to damages for mental or emotional distress 3: holding that experimental use  does not apply to experiments performed with respect to nonclaimed features of an invention 4: holding to that effect with respect to rule 64


Input: v. Ford Motor Cre creditor owes to the debtor must be incurred for the specific purpose of achieving setoff rights.” In re Summit Fin. Servs., Inc., 240 B.R. 105, 120 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1999) (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Mfr. & Traders Trust Co. (In re The Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.), 146 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir.1998)). The debtor has the burden of proving that a creditor obtained a claim for the purpose of obtaining setoff rights. In re Energy Co-op., Inc., 100 B.R. 992, 995 (N.D.Ill.1989) (citing Record Club of Am. v. United Artists Records, 80 B.R. 271 (S.D.N.Y.1987)). “There must be facts to show an intent to manipulate the balance in order to create an issue of fact.” Energy Co-op., 100 B.R. at 995. See In re Dillard Ford, Inc., 940 F.2d 1507, 1513 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). But see In re Bohlen Enter., Ltd., 859 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a creditor could not set off a debt owed on a loan that he took out a month before the bankruptcy against the value he paid for investment certificates from the debtorbank a year earlier in order to improve his position as a creditor based on the timing of the loan 1: holding that when a creditor on multiple debts applies an undesignated partial payment by the debtor to a debt on which the statute of limitations has not yet run the payment tolls the statute of limitations on that debt 2: holding that for purpose of the means test debtor can deduct mortgage payment even though debtor will abandon property 3: holding that creditor did not have actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filing where the debtor informed creditor of the possibility that a bankruptcy case would be filed 4: holding that a creditor did not incur debt for the purpose of set off where it stopped payment to the debtor


Input: is not dependent on the alleged merits of an appellant’s underlying claim. Boone, 409 S.W.3d at 598. Rather, the relevant inquiry in determining whether to apply the escape: rule is deciding whether the defendant’s escape adversely affected the criminal justice system. Id.; McCartney, 297 S.W.3d at 926. Here, Appellant twice failed to appear for sentencing. The trial court was forced to issue a capias warrant, and law enforcement had to locate, and apprehend Appellant out of state and transport him back to Missouri. The trial court had to, schedule three sentencing hearings, resulting in a delay of nearly six months. Appellant’s actions in absconding from justice adversely impacted the criminal justice system, warranting application of the escape rule. See Wagner, 172 S.W.3d at 924 (<HOLDING>); McCartney, 297 S.W.3d at 926 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that willful failure to appear at sentencing supported obstruction of justice enhancement 1: holding a failure to appear for sentencing constitutes an escape under the rule 2: holding that failure to appear is also a continuing offense 3: holding that dismissal for failure to appear at a deposition is on the merits 4: holding that the defendants oral promise to appear was insufficient to amount to a required appearance within the meaning of the failure to appear statute


Input: must be a substantial one, a “well-founded, rule of domestic policy established to protect the morals, safety or welfare of our people.” Bevins, 195 S.W. at 155 (emphasis supplied). Where no Kentucky resident has been affected, rarely will that standard be met. It is not met here where the competing public policies — supposing a Kentucky policy against this UIM exclusion — concern only the balance to be struck between required insurance coverage and insurance affordability, a balance different states have assessed differently. Since here no Kentucky resident is affected, nothing requires a Kentucky court to interfere with the balance Pennsylvania has chosen for its citizens. Cf. United Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frye, 381 Ill.App.3d 960, 320 Ill.Dec. 639, 887 N.E.2d 783 (2008) (<HOLDING>); Cherokee Insurance Company, Inc. v. Sanches, Holdings: 0: holding there was no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor of equipment lease although payments were made to illinois bank the guaranty was accepted in illinois and it provided that it would be gov erned by illinois law 1: holding that illinois public policy did not require the application of illinois law to an illinois accident involving only indiana residents insured in indiana 2: holding that geographic limitation in illinois franchise law prevents its application to dispute with outofstate franchisor notwithstanding express illinois choiceoflaw clause 3: holding that a federal due process malicious prosecution claim against an indiana police officer could proceed because indiana law did not provide an adequate postdeprivation tort law remedy 4: holding that illinois wage law did not apply to nonresident employee who worked outside the state even though eim ployers primary place of business was in illinois


Input: be a little over 17 grams. He continued his argument by drawing the same distinction between simple manufacturing and trafficking. He stated, I think the evidence that has been presented is, at this point ... not sufficient for at least trafficking ... [b]ut it’s certainly the—it’s too speculative to present the trafficking. So, if we don’t have—if we have enough to present to the jury, I submit we have—it would be for manufacturing as opposed to trafficking. In denying the motion, the trial court specifically referred back to the previous discussion about “theoretical yield,” indicating the trial court understood the directed verdict motion to address the sufficiency of the State’s evidence on the element of quantity. See State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 353, 737 S.E.2d 490, 497 (2013) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hendricks, 408 S.C. 525, 531, 759 Holdings: 0: holding that because the appellant did not present to the administrative agency the argument it raised before this court the issue was not preserved and holding that even if preserved the argument failed 1: holding that although the defendant had preserved his objection to the constitutionality of a mental state requirement he had not preserved another constitutional objection 2: holding the issue was preserved when the trial court immediately appeared to understand the objection was a renewal of a previous argument 3: holding an issue was preserved in part because the trial court immediately understood the basis of the objection 4: holding that an issue was not preserved for appellate review because appellants trial objection does not comport with the issue he raised on appeal


Input: prosecutor’s failure to strike venire-member 33 for the same reason as Robertson was the result of a mistake in his notes and not evidence of his disparate treatment of Robertson based on race. Here, in response to the challenge by appellant’s trial counsel, the prosecutor represented to the trial court that he exercised a peremptory strike on all venire-members who he had marked in his notes as stating that they could not consider life imprisonment and that he did not strike veniremember 33 because she was not marked in his notes as having given this response. Appellant’s counsel did not cross examine the prosecutor on this statement or request the production of the prosecutor’s notes to assess the truth of the statement. See Pondexter v. State, 942 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>); Salazar v. State, 795 S.W.2d 187, 193 Holdings: 0: holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice 1: holding that appellant is entitled to prosecutors voir dire notes if they were actually used by prosecutor to refresh his memory 2: holding that an order requiring a prosecutor to disclose his notes from voir dire over a claim of workproduct privilege was immediately appealable under rule 313 3: holding that appellant failed to meet his burden of showing that the trial court violated his right to a public trial by sealing jury questionnaires used in open court during voir dire 4: holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire


Input: it is mandatory and therefore the exclusive remedy for the Leonards’ counterclaims. Failure to arbitrate, Shepler argues, barred suit on the Leonards’ claims and was not subject to waiver by Shepler. ¶15 Most contract terms will be viewed as mandatory in the sense that the parties agreed that they will be bound by them and expect that they will be enforced by the court. However, this does not mean that contract terms cannot be waived or modified. It is also well established that parties may contract for an exclusive remedy that limits their rights, duties, and obligations. Graoch Assocs. #5 Ltd. P’ship v. Titan Constr. Corp., 126 Wn. App. 856, 865, 109 P.3d 830 (2005). But, the contract must clearly indicate the parties’ intent to make the stipulated remedy exclusive. Id. at 865-66 (<HOLDING>); see also Torgerson v. One Lincoln Tower, LLC, Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs were not foreclosed from pursuing ucc remedies outside of written warranty because warranty notice provision did not specify that the remedies provided were exclusive of any other remedy 1: holding that a cgl policy such as the one at issue here does not insure against claims for defective or negligent workmanship or construction because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident and therefore claims for defective or negligent workmanship do not constitute an occurrence under the policy 2: holding the flsa does not provide the exclusive remedy for violations of its mandates 3: holding that warranty claim accrued at tender where 180 day warranty on computer not a warranty for future performance as it involved a remedy only 4: holding that one year warranty was not an exclusive remedy for defective construction where the contract did not so state


Input: to his own skill, which we interpret the law not to mean, as distinguished from the chance or unpredictability of the mechanism, which we construe the law to proscribe. Id. at 874-75. Additionally in State v. Broward Vending, Inc., 696 So.2d 851 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997), the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that where “the game is set to play-itself and to record a certain win/loss ratio[,] ... the element of chance is inherent in the game.” Id. at 852. These prior Florida cases clearly put Plaintiffs on notice of the meaning of the phrase “outcome is determined by factors unpredictable by the player or games in which the player may not control the outcome of the game through skill.” See Fla. Stat. § 849.161(l)(a); see also Martin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 136-37 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). As, the Fourth Circuit stated in Martin v. Holdings: 0: holding that a noticeofrights form that plainly affects more than one person and encompasses more than an immediate set of facts and is applicable  to all inmates in a particular category is a rule 1: holding that prior south carolina cases interpreting whether a device is a game of chance demonstrate  a plainly legitimate sweep and more than a conceivable application which is all that is required to survive a facial challenge to a criminal statute where constitutional rights are not implicated 2: holding that exhaustion of arbitration procedure is not necessary before the district court could consider a facial constitutional challenge 3: holding that in deciding on a facial constitutional challenge it is improper to consider only limited hypothetical applications 4: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required


Input: regardless of whether or not the June 20th Order triggered the filing requirements of Rules 50 and 59, it is not necessary to decide if the June 20th Order triggered the 10-day filing requirement of these Rules. Specifically, if the June 20th Order did trigger the 10-day filing requirement, Schering’s motion may be considered by this Court because they were timely filed. If, however, the June 20th Order is not a “judgment” under Rule 50 and 59, Schering’s motion may nonetheless be considered by this Court because the filing requirements embodied in those Rules are maximum filing requirements and do not prevent a party from filing such motions prior to the entry of “judgment.” Although parties typically do' not file post-trial motions until entry of final judgment resolving al Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017, 102 S.Ct. 1711, Holdings: 0: holding trial court retains jurisdiction to consider motion for attorneys fees despite filing of notice of appeal of final judgment 1: holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees 2: holding that a motion to reconsider filed after the entry of final judgment must be considered a motion to correct error 3: holding that the rule 12b6 ruling was not a final judgment and did not bind the district court at summary judgment 4: holding that district court improperly denied rule 50b motion filed after entry of final judgment because previous judgment which did not resolve issue of attorneys fees did not trigger rule 50b filing requirements


Input: The debtor is not directly obligated to her minor children for Mr. Sinton’s charges, but this fact is not determinative of discharge. In the case of Silansky v. Brodsky, Greenblatt & Renehan (In re Silansky), 897 F.2d 743 (C.A.4 1990), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the holding of the District Court that attorney’s fees ordered to be paid to attorneys for debtor’s former spouse were within the coverage of § 523(a)(5) and not dischargeable, following the holdings of such cases as Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661 F.2d 6 (C.A.2 1981), that classified fees allowed to a spouse’s attorneys in divorce proceedings as nondisehargeable debts in the category of alimony, maintenance, and support. See Brodsky, Greenblatt & Renehan, Chartered v. Daumit (In re Daumit), 25 B.R. 371 (Bankr.Md.1982) (<HOLDING>); Burns v. Burns (In re Burns), 186 B.R. 637, Holdings: 0: holding debtor could not discharge that portion of his monthly army retirement benefits awarded to his wife pursuant to a divorce decree 1: holding that attorneys fees incurred in a custody action were nondischargeable under  523a5 2: holding that counsel fees awarded to debtors wife in a divorce action were nondisehargeable under  523a5 3: holding the family court properly awarded a wife attorneys fees incurred as the result of her husbands contempt 4: holding that the apparent denial of the husbands request for an order compelling the wife to deliver to him the personal property he had been awarded in their divorce judgment did not constitute a modification of the original divorce judgment


Input: S.Ct. 471, 107 L.Ed.2d 462 (1989)). The Navy concedes that it is an agency with a mixed function. Therefore, it must demonstrate that it “had a law enforcement purpose based upon properly delegated enforcement authority” for compiling the ESQD arc maps. Church of Scientology, 611 F.2d at 748. The Navy does not meet this standard. Agencies with law enforcement powers have the ability to conduct investigations or adjudications to enforce laws or regulations. See, e.g., Church of Scientology Int’l v. I.R.S., 995 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir.1993) (finding that the Exempt Organization Division of the IRS performs a law enforcement function “by enforcing the provisions of the federal tax code that relate to qualification for tax exempt status”); Lewis v. I.R.S., 823 F.2d 375, 379 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Binion v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 695 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the irs has a law enforcement purpose in the context of a criminal tax investigation 1: holding that a decedents tax settlement with the irs did not establish the value of his estates claim against the irs as a matter of law 2: holding that the irss full participation in the bankruptcy proceeding in relation to an income tax debt did not bar it from collecting a gift tax debt that had also been listed in the debtors schedules where the irs did not file a proof of claim and the debtor did not force the irs into the proceeding on the gift tax debt 3: holding that the debtors belated filing was not a reasonable effort to satisfy the requirements of the tax law relying significantly on the debtors delinquency in failing to file his tax returns until after the irs assessment thus defeating the main purpose of the selfreporting requirement of our tax system 4: holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue


Input: result: An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to another for physical harm which results from an act done by the other or a third person in reliance upon the truth of the representation, if the actor (a) intends his statement to induce or should realize that it is likely to induce action by the other, or a third person, which involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the other, and (b) knows (i) that the statement is false, or (ii) that he has not the knowledge which he professes. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 310 (1965) (emphasis supplied). Though cited to in passing by the Court of Appeals in a small number of cases, § 310 has not been expressly adopted by Maryland courts. But see Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, at 791 n. 14, 955 A.2d 769 (2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Virginia Dare Stores v. Schuman, 175 Holdings: 0: holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position 1: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 2: holding that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish constructive notice because the plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that the oil was on the floor for any length of time 3: holding that a constitutional violation by the individual defendants is required in order to sustain a claim against the municipality 4: recognizing that although the plaintiff attempted to make a claim under section 310 the plaintiff failed to establish the element of duty required to sustain that claim


Input: judgment. It is inherently of such character that the voters, no matter how intelligent, cannot be expected to investigate and have access to all the information which we may assume the city council, with the aid of their attorney, acquire. Full information should be obtained and carefully considered before a conclusion is reached. Oakman v. City of Eveleth, 163 Minn. 100, 203 N.W. 514, 517 (1925). See also Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. of Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, 293 Minn. 227, 198 N.W.2d 531, 536-37 (1972) (stating a proposed city charter amendment that would have allowed citizens to refer actions such as the settlement of lawsuits could create a “chaotic situation” in city government); Peterman v. Village of Pataskala, 122 Ohio App.3d 758, 702 N.E.2d 965, 967 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The dissent’s self-generated contention to Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action 1: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom 2: holding that legislative immunity does not depend on motivation for legislative action even if the motive was to impinge on plaintiffs free speech rights 3: recognizing that citizens who exercise their rights under the initiative provisions act as and become in fact the legislative branch of the municipal government  4: recognizing a settlement prevented a municipal referendum as it was not a legislative action


Input: Judge. Kiefer Filppula entered a plea of nolo contendere to the following crimes: (1) possession of a prescription drug without a prescription in violation of section 499.03, Florida Statutes (2009); (2) possession of cannabis with intent to sell in violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2009); (3) possession of alprazolam in violation of section 893.13; and (4) possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of section 893.147. On appeal, Filppula argues that the court imposed illegal sentences on counts two and three. We agree and reverse. For count three, the possession of alprazolam, the court orally sentenced Filppula to five years’ probation with two 1991) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the order of probation states that Holdings: 0: holding that the law is clear that when a defen dant is sentenced to a split sentence consisting of incarceration and probation  the combined sanction cannot exceed the maximum period of incarceration provided by law 1: holding a sentence is not limited to period of incarceration 2: holding that probation is not a sentence 3: holding that work release qualified as incarceration 4: holding that a sentence structured with three years incarceration suspended and eight years of sex offender probation was a true split sentence


Input: jobs at the GS-12 grade level. See Luper Suppl. Decl. Ex. G, ECF No. 34-12 (labeling both jobs as "GS 12” positions on Mr. Willis’s resume). That Mr. Willis’s previous specialized experience was not credited to him is therefore insignificant in assessing Ms. Thompson and Mr. Willis’s comparative qualifications. 7 . Below, the Court addresses Ms. Thompson’s allegations of impermissible bias shown through factors other than her own qualifications. See infra Part IV.B.2. 8 . Other circuits, including the D.C. Circuit, corroborate this legal principle. See Hendricks v. Geithner, 568 F.3d 1008, 1014 (D.C.Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment when the plaintiff’s evidence "supports at most favoritism, not sex discrimination’’); Caldwell v. Washington, 278 Fed.Appx. 773, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Holdings: 0: holding that when a plaintiff proves the defendants stated reasons for hiring someone else were pretext for offering the position to a personal friend and not a pretext for racial discrimination she does not establish triable issues of fact 1: holding that a plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination 2: holding that the plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection 3: holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the defendants reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretext because the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence other than her own subjective testimony that she was more qualified for the job than the selectee 4: holding that inconsistency in employers reasons for the termination is an indication of pretext


Input: I. & N. Dec. at 124 (reasoning that it would be “inconsistent” to interpret Section 1226(c) in a manner that “permits the release of some criminal aliens, yet mandates the detention of others convicted of the same crimes, based on whether there is a delay between their release from criminal custody and their apprehension by [DHS]”). Finally,. the Court’s interpretation of Section 1226(c) is further reinforced by Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has held that “a provision that the Government ‘shall’ act within a specified time, without more, [is not] a jurisdictional limit precluding action later.” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 158, 123 S.Ct. 748, 154 L.Ed.2d 653 (2003); see United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Sylvain v. Attorney General of the Holdings: 0: recognizing that at a bond hearing there is no limit to the discretionary factors that may be considered  in determining whether to detain an alien pending a decision on  removal 1: holding that the government may detain criminal defendants leading up to trial even if they do not comply with the relevant statutes command that a judicial officer shall hold a bond hearing immediately upon the persons first appearance before the officer 2: holding that an officer  may detain a person in order to determine identity and circumstance when that officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot 3: holding that period of up to fortyeight hours between arrest and initial appearance before judicial officer is presumptively reasonable 4: holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger


Input: That alone is enough to demonstrate the regulation provided defendants with the fair notice required by the Due Process Clause. See Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975) (explaining that statutes which require interpretation using standard tools of legal analysis are not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 82-85 (1st Cir.2005) (rejecting a defendant’s fair notice challenges after interpreting a criminal statute in light of its legislative history). Looking beyond the language of Part 273.2(f)(3) and the legislative purpose of e is particularly fair because the record establishes they, as required by their business model, kept abreast of developments in hazardous waste regulation and had act .3d 722, 727 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). The government’s search of Executive’s Holdings: 0: holding for a unanimous court that sentencer in capital case must consider an extensive list of nonstatutory mitigating factors 1: holding that a customer list may be protectable as a trade secret if it is secret and the court examines and determines if it is protectable based on three factors 1 what steps if any an employer has taken to maintain the confidentiality of a customer list 2 whether a departing employee acknowledges that the customer list is confidential and 3 whether the content of the list is readily ascertainable 2: holding that a guidance document is not binding where it provided only a list of factors the agency would consider rather than a clear statement of policy 3: holding that courts should look at the notice afforded by a document rather than a litigants motivation in filing to determine whether a document constitutes a notice of appeal 4: holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint


Input: that the State satisfied its burden of proof. Therefore, counsel’s failure to object was not deficient. We also find that the prosecutor’s alleged improper vouching for Skalnik was a fair comment in response to defense counsel’s attack on Skalnik’s credibility during closing argument. Defense counsel referred to Skalnik as a “professional thief’ and a poor police officer. The State was entitled to rebut these comments. Accordingly, Dailey has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s failure to object constitutes deficient performance. With regard to the prosecutor’s alleged “blatant misstatement of fact” concerning Shaw’s testimony, this claim was never raised in Dailey’s postcon-viction motion. Therefore, it is not cognizable on appeal. See Gordon v. State, 863 So.2d 1215, 1219 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). Dailey also argues that the cumulative effect Holdings: 0: holding that a ground for relief not pled in a motion for postconviction relief is waived and cannot be raised on appeal 1: holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion 2: holding that the defendants habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have been or was raised in his postconviction motion 3: holding that a claim is proeedurally barred where it was not raised in the defendants motion for postconviction relief 4: holding that claims not raised in a timely postconviction motion are waived


Input: 664 A.2d 1370 (1995) (for purposes of appellate review, what is not of record does not exist). The uncontradicted evidence indicates that Forrest McDanel and his wife, Jacquelyn, are named as the sole owners of the truck. There is no evidence supporting appellant’s allegation that the truck was titled in the name of McDanel Painting, or any other indication in the record that the truck was a commercial vehicle. Because there is no evidence in the official record that the truck was a commercial vehicle, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the status of the vehicle. Consequently, appellant’s claim that the truck was a commercial vehicle, and, thus, she is entitled to the presumption that the operation of the truck was for the owner’s purposes must fail. See Waters, supra (<HOLDING>). 4 . Although Forrest McDanel and his wife, Holdings: 0: holding that in pennsylvania there is a rule that proof of the ownership of a business vehicle involved in an accident raises a presumption that the operation of the automobile was for the owners business purposes 1: holding that care of the grounds was part of the business of the hospital 2: holding that the operation of a plant cafeteria was part of the plant owners business 3: holding that there is no unitary business in part because there is no flow of international business 4: holding that ownership of vehicle later involved in accident passed to buyer even though assignment of title not completed


Input: she accordingly lacks the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” which is “an injury in fact that is ... actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Drutis, 499 F.3d at 611 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Majority correctly observes that “[o]ur decision in Horvath did not revolve around whether the plaintiff suffered a financial loss.” (Majority Op. at 416.) It did, however, turn on the question of whether the plaintiff had demonstrated an individual loss, i.e., an actual injury to that particular plaintiff. That showing is required when a plaintiff is seeking individual relief under ERISA. See In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 159 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Yet the Majority appears to conclude, as one Holdings: 0: holding that claims for equitable relief under  502a3 are only available when a plaintiff has no other relief under erisa 1: holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the fdcpa 2: holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan 3: holding that a civil rights plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under fmla against individual individual is not employer subject to liability under the act 4: holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 in contrast to  502a2 which allows relief on behalf of a plan is required to prove an individual loss


Input: 890, 893 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). Abuse of discretion occurs when a decision by the trial court is “so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.” Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Public records and reports, in any form, of public offices or agencies setting forth matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report are not hearsay, even if the declarant is available as a witness. Tex.R. Evid. 803(8)(B). An exception controls criminal cases, however, in which records and reports concerning matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel are inadmissible hearsay. See id.; Cole v. State, 839 S.W.2d 798, 804-07 & n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (op. on reh’g) (<HOLDING>); Bermen v. State, 798 S.W.2d 8, 12 Holdings: 0: holding that an objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve for appeal an exception to the hearsay rule that was not specifically raised 1: holding that fulltime forensic chemists employed by texas department of public safety were lawenforcement personnel whose reports were not admissible under either the publicrecord hearsay exception rule 8038b or the businessrecord hearsay exception rule 8036 2: holding that records referring to defendant as escaped prisoner and escape risk were not admissible because exception for public records rule 8038b specifically excluded them as records of law enforcement personnel further holding that specific exclusion controlled over businessrecord hearsay exception rule 8036 3: holding that victims statements were hearsay admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and constitutionally permissible under ohio v roberts citations omitted 4: holding that evidence of customer inquiries is admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule


Input: for federal protection, aid, and grants of land.” Id. at 218, 79 S.Ct. at 269. Were the State to expressly disclaim jurisdiction and the federal courts to give up their protective jurisdiction over Indian lands, including water rights, the Indians would seem deprived of the benefit of the original bargain that they were driven to make. Of course, by general statute, Congress later expressed its willingness to have any state assume jurisdiction over reservation Indians if the state legislature or the people voted affirmatively to accept such responsibility. Id. at 222, 79 S.Ct. at 271. To date, Montana does, not appear to have accepted such responsibility. In passing, we note that McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n., 411 U.S. 164, 179, 180, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 1266, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1972) (<HOLDING>), has expressly limited the application of the Holdings: 0: holding that arizona could not impose an income tax on reservation indians 1: holding a state cannot impose an income tax on indians whose income is solely from reservation sources 2: holding state may not impose tax on nonindian trader operating on the reservation 3: holding that assumption of jurisdiction by the state court would infringe upon the right of reservation indians to make their own laws and be governed by them 4: holding that state cannot impose vendor taxes on indian sellers who operate on the reservation


Input: Alvarez-Bernabe, 626 F.3d 1161, 1165-66 (10th Cir.2010); see also United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1180-83 (10th Cir.2006) (upholding a 41-month sentence for illegal reentry based in part on a 16-level enhancement for a prior conviction). Based on this precedent, the district court could reasonably rely on the 16-level enhancement to arrive at an appropriate sentence. Mr. Soto-Robledo relies not only on the alleged unfairness of the 16-level enhancement, but also on the alleged failure to adequately consider mitigating factors. According to Mr. Soto-Robledo, these factors deserved greater weight. But the district court has the discretion to balance mitigating factors, such as cultural assimilation. See United States v. Galarza-Payan, 441 F.3d 885, 889-90 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Alvarez-Bernabe, 626 F.3d at 1167 Holdings: 0: holding that a court of appeals may afford a presumption of reasonableness to a withinguidelines sentence 1: holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range 2: holding that sentence within guidelines range enjoys a presumption of reasonableness 3: holding that a 57month sentence for illegal reentry was substantively reasonable rejecting the defendants effort to rebut the presumption of reasonableness based on evidence of cultural assimilation 4: recognizing a presumption of reasonableness


Input: so disabled. The second certified question asks us to construe the legal disability statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106, to determine whether its provisions toll the statute of limitations for individuals of unsound mind when that person’s legal representative accepts responsibility for the injured person’s tort claims arising out of a single incident. As noted above, the statute of limitations for actions for injuries to the person is one year. TenmCode Ann. § 28-8 — 104(a)(1) (2000). However, Tennessee’s legal disability statute provides that: [i]f the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of eighteen (18) years, or of unsound mind, such person, or such person’s representatives and pri 590, 592 (Minn.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); Sacchi v. Blodig, 215 Neb. 817, 341 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that appointment of a conservator does not remove a mentally disabled persons legal disability so as to start the statute of limitations running 1: holding that the appointment of a conservator will not cease the tolling of the statute of limitations for those of unsound mind 2: holding that appointment of guardian over incompetent adult does not remove legal disability so as to halt tolling and commence running of statute of limitations 3: holding that the appointment of a guardian for a mentally incompetent or nonage person does not have the effect of commencing the running of the period of limitations tolled by virtue of the disability 4: holding that appointment of guardian does not operate to start statute of limitations running in cases where title to cause of action is in person belonging to class of disabled persons encompassed within tolling provision


Input: judge announces that she has denied a group of motions, and this group includes the Insureds’ motion to strike as untimely the Reply Evidence. The trial judge further states that she had set the Motion for submission on March 18, 2005, and that counsel knew about this setting. No party challenges this statement, states that the court did not re-set the submission date, expresses surprise that the trial court had set the Motion for submission on that date, or objects to any alleged lack of notice that the submission date had been re-set. The trial court also announces that it is granting the Motion. The Insureds’ counsel complains that the Reply Evidence had been on file for less than ten days before the submission date for the Motio S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, pet denied) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the timeliness of the Reply Evidence Holdings: 0: holding that trial courts resetting of hearing date for motion for summary judgment made timely summaryjudgment evidence that had been untimely based on hearing date in effect when the evidence was filed and served 1: holding that evidence filed less than 21 days before original summaryjudgment hearing was timely even though trial court never granted leave to file late evidence because the summaryjudgment hearing was reset to a date more than 21 days after the evidence was filed 2: holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing 3: holding that once a trial court has set a date for a summaryjudgment hearing the court must allow the nonmoving party an opportunity to be heard 4: holding same when nonsuit filed after summaryjudgment hearing but before rendition of summary judgment


Input: 5708, can justify a contrary result. We decline to accept Cooper’s invitation to place the burden on the defendant to request a nominal damages instruction. Cooper was the party seeking a finding of actual injury and, as such, bore the responsibility of requesting a nominal damages instruction if it wanted the jury to consider that option. Of course, Cooper may well have decided for tactical reasons that it did not want the jury to consider that option. But whether Cooper failed to request an instruction on nominal damages by choice or inadvertence, it should bear the consequences. Because Cooper did not request such an instruction, it cannot now contend that we should infer a finding of nominal damages. See Walker v. Anderson Electrical Connectors, 944 F.2d 841, 844-45 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 1043, 122 Holdings: 0: holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict 1: holding that when plaintiff has proven injury but has failed to prove the amount of damages the plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages 2: holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of nominal damages when she had failed to request them 3: holding that the plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages in a breach of contract regarding a fire appraisal 4: holding that plaintiff waived the right to nominal damages in an excessive force case because nominal damages were not requested until after the verdict


Input: statutory sodomy, and it does pot consist of an attempt to commit the latter offense. Thus, first-degree sexiial misconduct as defined by section 566.090 does not satisfy any of the subparts of section 566.046.1(2) and therefore is not a lesser included offense of first-degree statutory sodomy. Our holding is consistent with State v. Greenlee, 327 S.W.3d 602, 621 (Mo.App. E.D. 2010), in which this Court held that first-degree sexual misconduct, as defined by section 566.090 is not a.lesser included offense of first-degree statutory sodomy because the former requires proof of “lack of consent.” Id. Ward’s argument is based entirely on the principle that a person under the age of fourteen can never legally consent to any kind of sexual activity. State v. Stokely, 842 S.W.2 Mo.banc 1965) (<HOLDING>); State v. Baker, 276 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Mo. banc Holdings: 0: holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent 1: holding that mistake as to the age of the victim is no defense to statutory rape 2: holding that intent and motive play but little if any part in statutory rape 3: holding that very little  evidence is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an employers motive any indication of discriminatory motive  may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a factfinder 4: holding 404b evidence admissible under intent exception but not motive exception where motive not contested


Input: were offered or admitted in evidence. 3 . It is not clear from this record why the final hearing occurred two months after service on Ducatt. 4 . Jusseaume offered this testimony without objection. 5 . If one party’s cross-examination of the other could result in harassment, intimidation, or threats, the court may exercise its discretion to constrain that cross-examination. See M.R. Evid. 611(a)(3) (“The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence on direct and cross-examination so as to ... protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”). "[Tjrial judges retain wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on ... cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, p 5 (1997) (<HOLDING>). There is no allegation here, however, that Holdings: 0: holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation 1: holding that a court may take steps to minimize fear in a child witness if the court finds that the child would be substantially traumatized in a way that compels the limitation of confrontation rights 2: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child 3: holding that the trial court did not err in allowing a witness to testify regarding the child victims hearsay statements prior to the child testifying because ocga  24316 allows testimony about a childs outofcourt statements even in cases when the child does not appear as a witness as long as the child is available at the trial to testify 4: holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5


Input: in a case involving a yielding motorcyclist-rather than section 41-6a-904, which requires vehicles to yield to emergency vehicles and includes a subsection stating this does not eliminate the duty of emergency vehicle operators to others on the road-when considering an emergency vehicle operator's duty, further affirming this conclusion. Willden v. Duchesne Cnty., 2009 UT App 213, 193, 4, 6-15, 217 P.3d 1143. 16 . Urtag Cons § 41-6a-212(1)(b). 17 . See Richards, 2012 UT 14, ¶ 23, 274 P.3d 911. 18 . See, eg., Estate of Day v. Willis, 897 P.2d 78, 81 n. 7 (Alaska 1995) ("We do not interpret these sections as establishing a duty to protect fleeing offenders. Rather, these provisions focus on the safety of innocent third parties."); Bryant v. Beary, 766 So.2d 1157, 1160 (Fla.Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>); City of Winder v. McDougald, 276 Ga. 866, 583 Holdings: 0: holding that such a duty exists 1: holding that these statutes are not intended to create a duty where none exists but to preserve any that do exist 2: recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts 3: holding these two statutes are not criminal offenses and only affect sentencing 4: holding that claims under  1983 1985 and 1986 are barred for the further reason that these statutes create rights solely against persons and a state is not considered a person under these statutes


Input: injuries to children who may have fallen therein.... ” Neal v. Home Builders, 232 Ind. 160, 111 N.E.2d 280, 286 (1953) (quoting 38 AmJur. § 151), reh’g denied. Thus, the risk of falling from a height to the ground or of falling into an excavation, pit, or ditch is considered obvious and, therefore, generally precludes the application of the doctrine. See 62 Am. JuR.2d § 352. However, certain exceptions have been made in cases where a dangerous condition was concealed, where the structure from which the child fell was defective, where there existed a distracting influence which made it likely that the child would not appreciate the danger, or where the child was too young to appreciate any risk. See id. at § 353; see also Greene v. Di Fazio, 148 Conn. 419, 424, 171 A.2d 411, 414 (1961) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the parties dispute the Holdings: 0: holding that to find negligence jury need not find violation of federal motorcarrier regulation 1: holding in a securities fraud action that a court may only find the lack of materiality where a jury could not reasonably find materiality 2: holding that the jury could find that a nine year old boy did not realize the risk of falling fiom a plank over an open stairwell in a house under construction 3: holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury 4: holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff


Input: would still be John’s though ‘apples and oranges’ are listed before pears. The comma after ‘apples and oranges’ is not a period, it’s a comma. They are still ‘John’s ... pears.’ It is illogical to say otherwise. Also, the apples, oranges, kiwis, and pears are still John’s though ‘fruit’ appears in the middle of the statement and is a term that overlaps the others. Appellants’ Reply Brief at 7. To the extent that the Haires argue that “the entire list of categories is controlled by the possessive ‘its,’ ” we observe that the list includes “riders,” “motorcycle owners,” “mechanics and pit crew, and owners and lessees of premises,” Appellants’ Appendix at 47, and the plain language of the Release does not reveal whether these entities are or are not owned by or separate from Haspin 1267 (<HOLDING>). The Haires also argue that Donald was not in Holdings: 0: holding that parol evidence is admissible to determine intent of parties 1: holding that if summary judgment is reversed and remanded parties are not limited to theories asserted in original summary judgment at later trial on merits 2: holding that contradictory references clouded the intent of the document parol evidence may be utilized to determine the parties true intentions respecting the documents application and that the entry of summary judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a factual determination 3: holding that where trial court erred in applying established law to the facts of the case it must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to address the issue 4: holding that summary judgment may be reversed when it is based on an error of law


Input: 549 S.W.2d 698, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (reversing and remanding because trial court erroneously overruled motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence); see also Tex. R. App. P. 21.3 (setting out grounds for granting a new trial, many of which refer to newly discovered evidence). In addition, if trial counsel is aware of exculpatory evidence that is not effectively used at trial, the defendant can make an ineffective claim in his motion for new trial. Tex. R. App. P. 21.7 (the court “may receive evidence by affidavit or otherwise”). Finally, counsel can be deficient when he fails to object to erroneous language in a jury charge. Willis v. State, No. 06-02-00108-CR, 2003 WL 21524704 (Tex. App.-Texarkana July 8, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); McDade v. State, No. 06-01-00134-CR, 2002 WL Holdings: 0: holding that the failure of defense counsel to object to erroneous punishment charge authorizing an illegal sentence is ineffective assistance of counsel 1: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel 3: holding that an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is rendered moot when a defendant receives an illegal sentence 4: holding that the appropriate vehicle for claims alleging that defense counsel violated a defendants right to testify is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel


Input: As stated above, the Ninth Circuit generally takes a broader view, and often finds that expert testimony is appropriate regarding the objective substantial similarity of literary works. See Olson, 855 F.2d at 1449; Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.1977). Nonetheless, several Ninth Circuit cases have recognized the limitations of expert testimony in this area. See Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir.2003) (upholding the district court’s decision to disregard the parties’ expert reports where the court engaged in an extensive analysis of the alleged similarities in expressive elements of the works and "neither expert opinion [was] very relevant to the conclusions drawn by the court”); Olson, 855 F.2d at 1450-51 (<HOLDING>); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts decision to discount expert testimony was appropriate where the expert deemphasized dissimilarities between the works and compared scenes a faire 1: recognizing that the need for the expert was so great that the decision to preclude the expert effectively amounted to dismissal of case 2: holding the district courts decision not to allow an expert to rely on a note found in a hospital record was within the courts discretion because the court found that the note was too unreliable to be used as the basis for an expert opinion 3: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive 4: holding expert testimony on probative similarities between works is unnecessary where the works are not highly technical and the jury is capable of recognizing and understanding the similarities between the works without the help of an expert


Input: believe that an interlocutory appeal may be taken from a pretrial ruling in a criminal case that denies any relief sought on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause. We disagree. [A defendant] is not entitled to an interlocutory appeal to avoid whatever slight increment of strain, embarrassment, or expense might arise from having to defend against allegations made or evidence presented in connection with a court on which trial will in any event occur.”); United States v. Gulledge, 739 F.2d 582, 586 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Unlike the defendant in Abney, Gulledge will undergo a second trial regardless of our ruling .... Consequently, full protection of his fifth amendment right does not depend on appellate review at this time.”); United States v. Head, 697 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1982) (<HOLDING>). Significantly, in this case, Pickering did Holdings: 0: holding no jurisdiction under abney when appeal even if successful could only lessen and not wholly remove the possibility of conviction upon being again tried 1: holding that harmless error test is satisfied when there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction 2: holding that extraneous information which is unrelated to the case being tried is not prejudicial 3: holding that an error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction 4: holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction


Input: they ignored the obvious warning signs of the alleged mispricings by Smirloek of the funds portfolios.” The examples of such “obvious warning signs” provided by Appaloosa and Tepper are: “significant inconsistencies in markets in which Smirloek invested for the funds; significant discrepancies in securities valuations from different dealers for the funds’ portfolio securities; and the substitution of the prices of more valuable securities for those of less valuable securities in the funds’ portfolio valuations.” As further support for their allegation of conscious misbehavior or recklessness, Appaloosa and Tepper contend that the James River Defendants “failed to institute any meaningful systems of internal controls over Smirl 9 CIV. 8761, 2000 WL 977673, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that here, the facts alleged Holdings: 0: holding that scienter had not adequately been pled where the plaintiffs provided none of the required facts underlying the complaints allegations as to the information that was supposedly available to the individual defendants 1: holding scienter not adequately alleged where the complaint lacked sufficient specificity as to facts regarding how and when defendants received information which they allegedly recklessly ignored 2: holding that single paragraph asserting that plaintiffs based their information and belief on investigation of sec filings analysts reports press releases and discussions with consultants neither provided required facts underlying complaints allegations nor directed court to where facts could be found 3: holding that underlying complaints filed by several plaintiffs all contained express allegations of property damage and that because all complaints arose from the same set of circumstances the allegations in any single complaint can be inferred in the other complaints 4: holding that the plaintiffs failed to allege scienter because in part the amended complaint affords no basis for inferring that the individual defendants would have heard about these whistleblower complaints during the class period


Input: first year. DOT, meanwhile, continued to forward the balance of the commissions, minus a percentage for administrative costs, to the Commonwealth's Bureau of Blindness and Visual Services. (DOT’s brief at 4.) 12 . As noted previously, DOT terminated each of the five contracts effective January 14, 1990. Accordingly, the contracts for Site 55, Site 56, Site 62 and Site F were in the second renewal period at the time of termination; only the contract for Site 61 was still in the first renewal period. 13 . See also Central Transportation, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Cambria County, 490 Pa. 486, 417 A.2d 144 (1980); Citizen Care, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 118 Pa.Cmwlth. 397, 545 A.2d 455 (1988). But see Spatz v. Nascone, 368 F.Supp. 352 (W.D.Pa.1973) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Although it is true, as DOT argues in Holdings: 0: holding that where a contract results from joint efforts of attorneys for both sides contract should not be construed against either party 1: holding that prevailing party to contract dispute may recover attorneys fees either pursuant to contract or pursuant to statute 2: holding that construction that neutralizes any provision of a contract should not be adopted if the contract can be construed to give effect to all provisions 3: holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract 4: holding an ambiguous contract will be construed against the party drafting the same


Input: 783 A.2d 543, 557 n. 54 (Del.2001); Security First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d at 568; Mattes v. Checkers Drive-In Rests., Inc., 2001 WL 337865, at *5 (Del.Ch.); Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., 2001 WL 1334182, at *3; Sahagen Satellite Tech. Group, LLC v. Ellipso, Inc., 791 A.2d 794, 796 (Del.Ch. 2000). 42 . The "credible basis” standard is also settled law in those states that look to Delaware law for guidance on matters of corporation law. See, e.g., Arctic Fin. Corp. v. OTR Express, Inc., 272 Kan. 1326, 38 P.3d 701, 703-04 (2002) (looking to Security First and Thomas & Betts for guidance regarding a books and records inspection under Kansas law); Towle v. Robinson Springs Corp., 168 Vt. 226, 719 A.2d 880, 882 (1998) ( , 2001 WL 1334182, at *4 (Del.Ch.) (<HOLDING>); Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 2001 WL 818173, Holdings: 0: holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses 1: holding that trademark infringement must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the credible evidence 2: holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions 3: holding that the plaintiffshareholders demonstrated a credible basis for its  220 claim tjhrough the testimony of their two trial witnesses and the documents introduced as evidence regarding the actions of the corporations board of directors through evidence of suspicious expense figures 4: recognizing a cause of action against a corporations directors brought by a creditor for the fraudulent misrepresentation of the corporations financial condition


Input: disbursing the $65,000. Moreover, even if it were to be assumed that federal common law does not govern the perfection of MHFA’s security interest, see supra note 11, the same result would obtain under Massachusetts law. In Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Boston Harbor Marina Co., 159 B.R. 616 (D.Mass.1993), the district court held that a Massachusetts mortgagee which recorded its assignment of rents in the registry of deeds as an adjunct to its mortgage, “perfected” its lien in the rents so as to constitute the rents “cash collateral” under Bankruptcy Code § 363(a), and that there was no need for the creditor to take possession of the real property (e.g., as by foreclosure) or the rents (e.g., as by appointment of a receiver) prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id. at 620-22 (<HOLDING>); see also H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Holdings: 0: holding that 20 of creditors knowing of consignment relationship does not satisfy general knowledge requirement notwithstanding that such creditors represented 63 of claims against debtor 1: recognizing distinction between perfection which governs secured creditors rights against third parties and enforcement of liens which controls creditors rights against its debtor rejecting theory that such inchoate or unenforced security interests are voidable under bankruptcy code  544a 2: holding that creditors rights are subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the bankruptcy code 3: holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor 4: holding an unsecured creditors postconfirmation suit against a secured creditor for fraudulent misrepresentation at a creditors meeting constituted a collateral attack on the confirmation order


Input: District of California. Before turning to the relative merits of these venues, the court addresses two disputed legal issues between the parties: whether the venue provision of Title VII commands greater deference to a plaintiffs choice of forum and affects the section 1404(a) analysis, and whether the venue provision impl 3 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying section 1404(a) to a Title VII action); Harrison v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 807 F.Supp. 1513, 1516-17 (D.Or.1992) (same); Dean v. Handysoft Corp., 2005 WL titled to greater deference where a case arises under Title VII. Congress expanded the available fora to plaintiffs grieving civil rights violations, thereby expressing intent to broaden a Title VII plaintiffs choice of forum. See Passantino, 212 F.3d at 504 (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Where venue is governed Holdings: 0: holding that congress intended for idea to be interpreted consistent with fee provisions of statutes such as title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 1: recognizing right to petition for redress of grievances under established prison grievance system 2: holding that title viis broad venue provision was necessary to support the desire of congress to afford citizens full and easy redress of civil rights grievances 3: recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim 4: recognizing that it is important that the judicial remedy be full and complete and stating because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal counsel they are unable to present their cases to the courts


Input: recreational facilities ***.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 85, par. 3 — 106.) Section 3 — 106 applies to situations where a municipality fails to maintain property under its control intended for recreational use by allowing an unsafe condition to exist. Section 3 — 106, unlike section 3— 102, contemplates liability only if the governmental unit or employee acts in a willful and wanton manner. Pursuant to section 3— 106, there is no municipal liability for negligence resulting in injuries occurring on public property intended for recreational purposes, unless the local public entity is guilty of willful and wanton conduct. Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 501. Accord Jarvis v. Herrin City Park District (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 516, 285 N.E.2d 564 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff first argues that defendant has no Holdings: 0: holding that a right of action for personal injuries resulting from negligence cannot be assigned absent statutory law 1: holding that a forest preserve will be liable for injuries only in the case of willful and wanton negligence that proximately causes such injuries 2: holding that the plaintiff was not barred by hrs  3865 from seeking common law tort remedies against his insurer for injuries caused by the insurers  outrageous and intentional denial of medical benefits and disability payments  because such injuries were not  work injuries  within the scope of hrs chapter 386 3: holding that injuries covered by the act are not limited to external traumatic injuries 4: holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service


Input: plaintiff provides no evidence — other than her own bare allegations of futility — that requesting a second claim review would have been “clearly useless.” Such bare allegations of futility are simply insufficient to defeat defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See Rando, 1999 WL 317497, at *4 (granting summary judgment to an ERISA defendant when plaintiff responded to defendant’s summary judgment motion with unsupported allegations of futility). Moreover, the record indicates that the second claim review would have been conducted by different individuals than the first claim review, and that fact is also sufficient to preclude the court from finding that any further review would have been futile. See Getting v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 108 F.Supp.2d 1200, 1203 (D.Kan.2000) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 2001 WL 201966. For these reasons, the Holdings: 0: holding that the fact that different individuals could have conducted the subsequent review of denial of benefits was itself sufficient to preclude a finding futility 1: holding that claims were preempted where the factual basis of the complaint was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits 2: holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself 3: holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits 4: holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard


Input: 75 Fed.Reg. 8747-01 (Feb. 25, 2010). At the time the bankruptcy petition was filed in this case in December 2007, the relevant dollar amount was $136,875. 16 . “Dependent” is defined in § 522 to include a spouse. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(1). 17 . Id. § 522(p)(l)(D). 18 . H.R. Rep. 109-31, pt. 1, at 15-16 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 102, cited by In re Rogers, 513 F.3d at 227. 19 .11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(2)(B). 20 . Id. § 541(a)(2). 21 . 461 U.S. 677, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983). 22 . Id. at 680, 687, 103 S.Ct. 2132. 23 . Id. at 697, 103 S.Ct. 2132 (quoting U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1; U.S. Const, amend. XVI) 24 . See generally 11 U.S.C. § 363. 25 . Id. § 363(g). 26 . Id. § 363(h). 27 . See Laster v. First Huntsville Properties Co., 826 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tex.1991) (<HOLDING>); Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 161 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney 1: holding that the former husbands property from a noninterspousal gift may not be distributed under section 610751 although use of the former husbands separate property may be awarded to the former wife to satisfy the former husbands child support obligation 2: holding that a wifes minimal involvement in her husbands business coupled with the lack of evidence that she knew of or intended to further her husbands fraudulent schemes was insufficient evidence of conspiracy 3: holding that former wifes interest in her homestead was held in cotenancy with a mortgagee who succeeded to her former husbands 2617 fee simple interest 4: holding that plaintiffs had no vested interest in former interpretation of state law


Input: Jerry Crawford.” Complaint, ¶ VII. May further stated that “because the sexual harassment caused Plaintiff to leave her employment and because the said harassment interfered with her advancement within the company, the sexual harassment claimed in the Plaintiffs complaint did, in fact, result in a tangible job detriment.” Response Brief at 2. Here, the court agrees with Autozone that May has not suffered- any tangible employment action, as that term is defined above. When an employee quits, even when under stressful or undesirable conditions, it simply is not a company act. May was not fired, and has presented no evidence that she was passed over for a promotion, reassigned, or given any change in benefits. See Young v. R.R. Morrison & Son, Inc., 159 F.Supp.2d 921, 924 (N.D.Miss.2000) (<HOLDING>). The court is of the opihion, that with regard Holdings: 0: holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave 1: holding that a plaintiff in a sex discrimination suit did not suffer an adverse employment action where her employer withheld one days pay and it was not reinstated 2: holding that an initial denial of leave did not constitute materially adverse action because the plaintiff was ultimately allowed to take the leave without any other consequence to her 3: holding that because plaintiff chose to leave her employer she did not suffer any tangible employment action 4: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination