Input: that this is consistent with the legislative intent “to increase the grading of the offense when a Chapter 31 sexual offense comprised the act which corrupted or tended to corrupt the morals of a minor.” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 10. Appellant’s claim demands that we interpret the corruption of minors statute before we determine whether he committed an offense under subsection (a)(l)(ii). Because statutory interpretation is a matter of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. McClintic, 589 Pa. 465, 472, 909 A.2d 1241, 1245 (2006). Consequently, we are not bound by the lower court’s conclusions regarding the proper meaning of the applicable provisions of this statute. See Commonwealth v. Kyle, 582 Pa. 624, 632, 874 A.2d 12, 17 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Our review is further governed by the Holdings: 0: holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court 1: holding that our court owes no duty of deference to the legal conclusions of lower courts regarding an issue of statutory construction 2: holding that where the issue before the court is legal as opposed to factual an appellate court need not give deference to a trial courts decision 3: holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo 4: holding that a trial courts statutory interpretation is given no deference on review


Input: from the court to submit more than eighty statements of facts, the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Exceed the Page Limit also requested that it be permitted to exceed the number of facts allowed in the Statement of Material Facts, Local Rule 56.1(a)(3). (See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. 59) at 1.) 4 . The parties and witnesses refer to the time of events relating to Flight 2745 in "Zulu,” "GMT” (Greenwich Mean Time) and "UTC,” interchangeably, and also in EST. For the purposes of this opinion, the court will refer to time in EST and UTC. 5 . The court notes that under the FTCA's discretionary exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), the United States cannot be held liable for a discretionary policy judgment. Collins v. United States, 564 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). As will be discussed below, based on the Holdings: 0: holding that cocounsel who did not sign the answer could not be held liable under rule 11 for its contents 1: holding that a municipality may only be held liable under  1983 for a policy practice or custom 2: holding that a police officer cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution when he did not make the decision to prosecute the plaintiff 3: holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii 4: holding that under the discretionaryfunction exception the faa could not be held liable for negligence for its determination not to install automated radar at an airport because the decision was a discretionary policy judgment


Input: Wallace’s “way of making it look like he was just playing with me.” Id. at 78. Plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition that he may have been laughing after this incident" occurred, although he contends that any laughing was “mad and nervous laughter ... it wasn’t happy laughter.”' Def.’s Mot., Ex. A, Jones Dep. at 142. Furthermore, Mr. Newell, the third participant in this event, “was laughing because [he] thought it was funny.” Id. at 93. Given the circumstances in this case, the Court finds that a reasonable jury, at most, could conclude that while Mr. Wallace’s actions may have been in bad taste, and personally offensive, they were not severe enough to constitute a hostile working environment. See Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Plough Del Caribe Inc., 354 F.3d 34, 39, 45-46 (1st Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Tatum v. Hyatt Corp., 918 F.Supp. 5, 7 Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs allegations that coworker attempted to grab her breast and later touched and rubbed her thigh that customers made sexually threatening remarks and that supervisors did not respond to her complaints about these incidents did not support a hostile work environment claim 1: holding that testimony of plaintiff and her coworkers regarding cause of her injury was pure conjecture 2: holding that plaintiffs allegations that her supervisor was a lesbian and that she made improper remarks to her including telling the plaintiff to invite her to lunch and making comments about plaintiffs coworkers private lives and sexual preferences   and on one occasion approaching the plaintiff from behind hugging her and whispering in her ear a request for a cookie from another table did not suffice to establish a hostile working environment 3: holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where a supervisor allegedly touched plaintiffs hand and thigh lifted her dress hem repeatedly asked her to lunch told her that she was beautiful stared at her and called her home on numerous occasions at night and asked about personal matters 4: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment


Input: has been to take from the legislature and the courts, and place in district attorneys, the actual discretion to determine the severity of individual sentences in a substantial number of felony cases. The effect may be to empower a prosecutor to force upon a trial judge the imposition of a sentence so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense involved as to shock the conscience of the court. Such a sentence may be so excessive as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution. For a careful, thorough discussion supporting this position, see Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert, den., 415 U.S. 983, 94 S.Ct. 1577, 39 L.Ed.2d 881 (1974) (<HOLDING>). The practical effect of the habitual criminal Holdings: 0: holding  1130 to be unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff 1: holding west virginia recidivist statute unconstitutional as applied to require disproportionately severe sentence 2: holding minnesotas patterned sex offender senfence enhancement statute unconstitutional as applied to one defendant and noting our doubts as to whether the statute could ever be constitutionally applied 3: holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants 4: holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause


Input: See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that Six Feathers continually eluded the officers and took them on a lengthy and ' highly dangerous chase. Near the end of the pursuit, Six Feathers intentionally drove his car directly into Tarrell’s vehicle. Jarman testified that it was his belief that Six Feathers was an “immediate threat.” Dep. of Brett Jarman at 178. Jarman further testified that, after the collision, he believed Six Feathers, as he was backing up and turning his car in Jarman’s direction, intended to run him over. Id. at 179. Based on these undisputed facts, we hold that Jarman’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances as Jarman knew them to be at that time. See Cole, 993 F.2d at 1333 (<HOLDING>). In denying Jarman’s motion, the District Holdings: 0: holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others 1: holding that an officers use of deadly force to stop a dangerous car chase did not shock the conscience because an officers poor judgment in using unreasonable force does not automatically convert the officers acts into conscience shocking conduct 2: holding officers decision to use deadly force to stop truck driver was not objectively unreasonable because officer believed driver posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm to the officers in the pursuit as well as other innocent motorists 3: holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver 4: holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm


Input: in Owens’ deed to Sonora and applying the doctrine of merger. Sonora’s cross-claim was based on the district court’s ruling that Owens had nothing to convey to Sonora. Our ruling means that Owens did have something he could convey. Thus, the rationale for the cross-claim has evaporated. We reverse on that basis only. We venture no opinion on the law relied on by the district court for its ruling. CONCLUSION {32} We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. {33} IT IS SO ORDERED. MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge WE CONCUR: LINDA M. VANZI, Judge M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 1 We recognize that issues can arise with regard to the unintended conveyance of unsevered appurtenant water rights. See Turner v. Bassett, 2005-NMSC-009, ¶ 24, 137 N.M. 381, 111 P.3d 701 (<HOLDING>). No one here argues that there were any Holdings: 0: holding that failure to use irrigation water rights on conveyed property for more than ten years did not sever water rights from said property absent compliance with statutory requirements 1: recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest 2: recognizing a presumption that the issuance of a permit by the state engineer allowing recognized irrigation water rights to be shifted to other users works as severance of those water rights from the land 3: holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially 4: holding that the state engineer has discretion to refuse to accept for filing amended declarations of water rights pertaining to water rights that are not vested and that the state engineer may rely on information contained in his own records in exercising this discretion


Input: Young because it is the “necessary result of compliance with decrees which by their terms were prospective in nature.” Id. at 668, 94 S.Ct. 1347. Moreover, the injunction does not directly lead to the payment of state funds from the treasury because the Fund will still make the final decision determining whether Dairy Mart meets the numerous other filing requirements imposed by Kentucky law. Thus, whether reimbursement is ultimately appropriate, the injunctive relief sought in this case falls on the Ex parte Young side of the Eleventh Amendment, rather than on the Edelman side because “whether or not [the claimant] will receive retroactive benefits rests entirely with the State, ... not with the federal court.” Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 348, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Appellants dispute that the eventual payment Holdings: 0: holding that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available in the absence of a statute providing immunity to a municipal corporation in a negligence action 1: holding that state sovereign immunity bars state constitutional claims 2: holding that state could not assert sovereign immunity defense where the state had waived immunity in state court and agreed to remove suit to federal court 3: holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity 4: holding that sovereign immunity did not bar an order forcing the edelman defendants to send a notice to plaintiffs advising them that state administrative procedures were available by which they could obtain past welfare benefits


Input: the extrinsic and charged offenses.”). The rationale is that if “the defendant had unlawful intent in the extrinsic offense, it is less likely that he had lawful intent in the present offense.” Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911. But to understand whether two acts have the same intent, we must define the “intent” at issue. In Watson’s case, the United States tells us that it is the “intent to smuggle aliens.” See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(2) (punishing “[a]ny person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, brings to or attempts to bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever, such alien”), 1327; see also United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1068 (11th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Watson agrees on this point. Consequently, Holdings: 0: holding that the phrase resident alien means an alien lawfully residing in the united states 1: holding that the district court did not err in refusing to give the defendants requested instruction concerning his mistaken belief about united states citizenship because the court had given an instruction covering the elements of the crime including the mens rea element 2: holding that the crime of bringing aliens to the united states is complete when the initial transporter who brings the aliens to the united states ceases to transport them 3: holding that district courts acceptance of a defendants guilty plea to bringing an unlawful alien into the united states under 8 usc  1324alai was plain error in part because the defendant did not accompany or arrange to have a person accompany the alien across the border and we have found no case where a defendant has been convicted under clause i of this statute for bringing an alien into the united states except where the defendant accompanied or arranged to have the alien accompanied as in a smuggling operation across the border 4: holding that  1324a2 requires the mens rea of knowingly bringing an alien to the united states


Input: or distribute, a controlled substance ... for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). A “violent felony” is any crime punishable by an imprisonment term exceeding one year that: (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). Senecharles’s argument with regard to his Florida conviction under Fla, Stat. § 893.13(1) for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute is directly foreclosed by our precedent. See United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1266-68 (11th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>). Senecharles’s argument that Smith was wrongly Holdings: 0: holding that a conviction under fla stat  893131 is a serious drug offense 1: holding convictions under fla stat  893131 qualify as serious drug offenses pursuant to the acca despite the florida statutes lack of a mens rea element 2: holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea 3: holding that a conviction for a violating fla stat  84301 constitutes a violent felony under the acca 4: holding that an indictment that omitted the mens rea element was sufficient because it cited the applicable statutes which informed the defendant of the elements of the charged offenses


Input: and unrelated to authority stemming from the war power; there was no connection shown between Schlomann’s military duties and the offenses; the victims were not engaged in the performance of duties relating to the military; there was present and available a civilian court where the case might be prosecuted; there is no showing of flouting of military authority; there was no threat to a military post; there was no violation of military property shown; and the offenses were among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts. See Alaska Statutes Annotated, 1962, Title 11 §§ 11.15.010 (first degree murder, including felony murder) ; 11.-15.030 (second degree murder, including unpremeditated murder) ; 11.15.220 (assault with a dangerous weapon) ; 11.15.-240 (robbery) ; 11.0 L.Ed.2d 2 (<HOLDING>) ; Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 89 Holdings: 0: holding that testimony of witnesses absent from the jurisdiction shall not be used unless good faith effort has been made by the state to secure appearance of the witnesses as announced in barber v page 390 us 719 88 sct 1318 20 led2d 255 to be retroactive 1: holding that mempa v rhay 389 us 128 88 sct 254 19 led2d 336 1967 controlled with respect to texas revocation proceedings that suspended the imposition of sentence and accorded a constitutional right to counsel and further holding that gagnon v scarpelli was inapplicable 2: holding that counsel must be appointed to indigents for purposes of appeal as announced in douglas v california 372 us 353 83 sct 814 9 led2d 811 to be retroactive 3: holding that indigents have a right to a transcript on appeal as announced in griffin v illinois 351 us 12 76 sct 585 100 led 891 to be retroactive 4: holding the rule requiring that counsel be furnished in proceedings for probation or imposition of deferred sentence as announced in mempa v rhay 389 us 128 88 sct 254 19 led 2d 336 to be retroactive


Input: what additional factors are sufficient to create the requisite inference of participatory involvement. In Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 90-91, 100 S.Ct. at 341-42, officers had a warrant to search a bar and its bartender for heroin. They conducted a pat-down search of Ybarra, a bar patron, despite the fact he had made no gestures suggesting criminal conduct, no attempts to conceal contraband, and no suspicious statements. In declaring the search invalid, the Court noted that the officers “knew nothing more about Ybarra except that he was present, along with several other customers, in a public tavern at a time when the police had reason to believe that the bartender would have heroin for sale.” Id. at 91, 100 S.Ct. at 342. See also Swint v. City of Wadley, Alabama, 51 F.3d 988 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that while search incident to arrest could not justify search in that case probable cause plus exigency justified search 1: holding that the legitimate search and seizure of one suspect in a public place cannot be bootstrapped into probable cause for a broadbase search of the business establishment and its patrons 2: holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause 3: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same 4: holding that probable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place


Input: their children because no conflicting interests were implicated. See Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir.2001) ("[U]nless a conflict of interest exists between the representative and minor, a district court need not even consider the question whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed.”); Gonzalez-Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. United States, 231 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1196 (M.D.Fla.2002) aff'd sub nom. Gonzalez-Jiminez De Ruiz v. United States, 378 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that "[tjypically, the next friend who sues on behalf of the minor is that minor’s parent” and finding that the mother of the minor plaintiffs, as a party to the suit, was not required to bring the action as a "next friend”); see also Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). 17 . The court concluded that "the instant Holdings: 0: holding that claim belongs to child but allowing mother to assert it on childs behalf 1: holding a fathers duty to support his minor child did not include a duty to contribute to the cost of the minor childs college education 2: holding that the minor was otherwise represented because the childs legal guardian his mother brought the action on his behalf 3: holding in a paternity action that the selection and change of the childs surname from the name chosen by the mother must be based on the trial courts determination that renaming is in the childs best interests and the record must affirmatively show such a name change is required for the welfare of the minor child 4: holding in syllabus point 4 that when a childs mental health records are sought to be produced and the child is not directly represented in the proceeding the child should be joined as a party and a guardian ad litem must be appointed by the circuit court to protect the childs rights


Input: of Faber is satisfied because Plaintiffs claims fall within the ambit of the arbitration agreement. See Faber, 367 F.3d at 1052. The arbitration agreement also is valid under the first-prong of Faber. Missouri law, like federal law, supports the enforcement of arbitration agreements in the context of employment discrimination. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 435.350; see also Berkley v. Dillard’s Inc., 450 F.3d 775, 777 (8th Cir.2006). Claims based on the federal equivalent of Michigan’s Elliob-Larsen Civil Rights Act—the Age Discrimination in Employment Act—have been held subject to binding arbitration. Faber, 367 F.3d at 1052 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35, 111 S.Ct. 1647); see also Cosgrove v. Shearson Lehman Bros., No. 95-3432, 1997 WL 4783, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 6,1997); cf. Bailey, 346 F.3d at 824 (<HOLDING>); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 Holdings: 0: holding that discriminatory pay reduction under fair labor standards act does not constitute continuing violation 1: holding right to liquidated damages under fair labor standards act nonwaivable 2: holding that the otca limitations period applied to a claim alleging a breach of the fair labor standards act by the state 3: holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration 4: holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration


Input: defense suffice— “even if the parties concede that the defense is the only disputed issue in the case” and, in that sense, “necessary to the resolution” of the state law claim. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d at 138-40 & n. 5; See id. at 140 n. 4 (stating that jurisdiction is inappropriate under Grable where a federal issue is “not necessarily raised by [the plaintiffs] affirmative claims,” but rather “comes into the case as a defense”); see also, e.g., Gilmore v. Weatherford, 694 F.3d 1160, 1173 (10th Cir.2012) (“To determine whether an issue is ‘necessarily’ raised, the Supreme Court has focused on whether the issue is an ‘essential element’ of a plaintiffs claim.” (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 315, 125 S.Ct. 2363)); see generally Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (<HOLDING>). And finally, if a claim does not present “a Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action 1: recognizing the cause of action 2: holding veilpiercing claim does not state cause of action under erisa and cannot independently support federal subject matter jurisdiction 3: holding that federal issues interposed as a defense generally do not create a cause of action arising under federal law 4: holding that a federal defense to a state cause of action does not support federalquestion jurisdiction


Input: financing, and the procedure for receiving benefits.’ ” Peckham, 964 F.2d at 1047 (quoting Donovan, 688 F.2d at 1373). A plan also implicates the existence of benefits “whose provision by nature requires an ongoing administrative program to meet the employer’s obligation.” Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 2217, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). Because any simple insurance policy must logically include the statutory criteria, most determinations of the existence of a plan hinge on whether the plan requires the employer either to institute an ongoing administrative program that might be subject to conflicting (and therefore preempted) state regulations, or to administer funds that might be subject to abuse or misappropriation. See, e.g., Peckham, 964 F.2d 1043,1048 (<HOLDING>); Hansen v. Continental Insurance Co., 940 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a two to threeday time period between the employees complaint and his discharge was sufficient 1: holding administrative program shown by employers keeping records making regular payments and employing two liaisons between insurer and employees 2: holding that employers insurer who provided workers compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employees settlement with thirdparty tortfeasor may maintain an action for payments that become payable in the future 3: holding that an insurer can be estopped from denying coverage for failure to make payments where that insurer has established a course of conduct of accepting late payments 4: holding that bivens plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies where administrative remedy program provided only for injunctive relief


Input: the Tucker Act, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff contends that his filing an application with the DOT BCMR on November 3, 2006, renders his claim timely. Plaintiff reasons that this filing tolled the court’s general statute of limitations. Nevertheless, it is a canon of military-pay jurisprudence that seeking permissive administrative review does not toll the statute of limitations in the Tucker Act. See Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[I]t is well settled that the statute of limitations for Tucker Act claims is not tolled by the claimant’s exercise of his right to seek permissive administrative review of his claim.”); see also Brighton Village Assocs. v. United States, 52 F.3d 1056, 1060 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). The Administrative Record reveals some Holdings: 0: holding that the post conviction relief act extends to challenges arising from the penalty phase of trial including ineffectiveness claims 1: holding that a  1983 claim is an independent original action rather than a review proceeding even when it challenges an administrative action 2: holding that  1983 claims may be joined with an administrative review 3: holding that administrative challenges did not postpone accrual of  claims 4: holding premature a suit filed before final administrative determination of claimants administrative claim


Input: Inc. v. United States, 344 F.Supp.2d 257, 264 (D.Mass.2004); Ass’n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1228 (W.D.Wash.1999); Or. Laborers-Emp'rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 17 F.Supp.2d 1170, 1182-1183 (D.Or.1998); Felton v. Schaeffer, 229 Cal.App.3d 229, 237-38, 279 Cal.Rptr. 713 (1991); Rojas Concrete, Inc. v. Flood Testing Labs., Inc., 406 Ill.App.3d 477, 347 Ill.Dec. 71, 941 N.E.2d 940, 946-47 (2010); Theisen v. Covenant Med. Ctr., 636 N.W.2d 74, 82-83 (Iowa assisting its employees in obtaining group health insurance, an employer assumed an extra-contractual duty to make accurate representations to an employee about her insurance coverage); McDonald v. Title Ins. Co. of Oregon, 49 Or.App. 1055, 621 P.2d 654, 656-59 (1980) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Although Harmon was not in a contractual Holdings: 0: holding that if counsel retained by an insurer acts as an investigator and not as an attorney then the communications between the insured and insurer are not privileged 1: holding that the insureds ordinary burden to allocate a verdict between covered and noncovered claims does not shift to the insurer unless the insurer had an affirmative duty to defend the underlying claims 2: holding that under new york law for an insurer to have no duty to defend the court must find as a matter of law that based on the pleadings there was no possible factual or legal basis on which the insurer might eventually be held obligated to indemnify the insured 3: holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue 4: holding that an escrow agent and title insurer may have voluntarily assumed a duty to advise the buyers on their potential legal liability for  subcontractors liens on the property in addition to the defendants ordinary contractual and professional duties as an escrow agent and title insurer


Input: judicata because of the state decision. Id. The state claim was based on Missouri law, while the federal claim was based on federal law, so the state decision was not going to be “determinative of the similar issue” in the federal suit. Id. We therefore held that, because the stay would not put the plaintiff out of federal court, it was not a final judgment and not appealable. Id. at 516-17. In other cases, we have used similar factors to conclude stays were not appeal-able. In Marcus v. Township of Abington, the causes of action in two proceedings — a state criminal suit and a federal § 1983 suit — were different, and we held the stay was not a final, appealable order. 38 F.3d 1367, 1371-72 (3d Cir.1994). We also noted in Marcus that stays on Works), 525 F.2d 151, 155 (3d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Here the Wildermans have clearly conceded Holdings: 0: holding that such a stay is appropriate where in the absence of a stay the continuation of the proceedings in the trial court disrupts the arbitration proceedings and can render them ineffective 1: holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order 2: holding a stay appealable because the state suit was likely to continue beyond the expiration of the federal grand jurys term with the practical effect of a dismissal of the proceedings 3: holding that extension of a federal grand jurys term was within the discretionary powers of the district court 4: holding that right was available in grand jury proceedings


Input: 601, 604-05 (1981). We conclude that a general publication occurred in the manner in which MBA disseminated its PRIDE manuals and forms. See White v. Kimmell, supra, 193 F.2d at 747. Further, the limited publication exception arose in circumstances quite different from this case. If the author disseminated his work without a copyright notice and if it was held that a publication had occurred, the author’s protection was forfeited. National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951). Where finding a general publication would divest the author of the benefit of his work, courts have avoided a complete forfeiture by concluding that a limited publication occurred. Compare Pierce & Bushnell Manuf’g Co. v. Werckmeister, 72 F. 54 (1st Cir. 1896) (<HOLDING>) with Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Holdings: 0: holding that exhibition of a painting in a public art gallery was sufficient publication to entitle plaintiff to recover under the copyright act 1: holding that plaintiff could recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act because the profits awarded under the federal trademark statute constitute compensation rather than a penalty while statutory damages are awarded under the copyright act are designed to serve a variety of purposes other than compensation including deterrence and punishment 2: holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession 3: holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply 4: holding that a plaintiff may recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act provided the copyright damages serve a purpose other than compensation


Input: have a vested property interest in his contractual rights to severance because Freddie Mac operated in an environment of pervasive federal regulation. The government’s theory is that because Mr. Piszel voluntarily contracted with an entity that was subject to pervasive regulation, he assumed the risk of future regulation and thus cannot claim a vested interest in property that was likely to be subject to additional regulation. Because Mr. Piszel voluntarily entered into a highly regulated area, he lacked a right to exclude the government from his property. To be sure, if a regulation existed at the time of contract formation, the regulation would have inhered in the title. See A & D, 748 F.3d at 1152; Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 669 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>); Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift Holdings: 0: holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate 1: holding that the governments precluding plaintiff from building a mitigation bank on his property was not a taking because the governments authority predated plaintiffs property right 2: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort when the government seized and failed to return plaintiffs property or in the alternative that his property was lost as a result of the governments theft 3: holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for governments taking of option to renew a lease 4: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property


Input: waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial.”); see also People v. Duran, 757 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Colo.App.1988)(“Because defendant’s right to counsel in [a] Crim. P. 35 proceeding is statutory and not constitutional, its waiver must be voluntary but need not be knowing and intelligent.”). Indeed, it appears to us, based on the circumstances leading to Davis’s withdrawal, that C.S. knew very well what risk her conduct posed. See People in Interest of D.J.P., 785 P.2d 129, 131 (Colo.1990) (“The totality of the circumstances is relevant when determining whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by denying a continuance.”); see also People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87, 94 (Colo.1989)(<HOLDING>). 2. No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Holdings: 0: holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance 1: recognizing a defendants right to dismiss retained counsel in favor of appointed counsel 2: holding in situation of appointed counsel that if nonfrivolous issues may exist new counsel must be appointed 3: holding that once counsel was appointed defendant spoke to the court through counsel and thus the court was not required to respond to defendants request for a speedy trial 4: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel


Input: offenses not involving violence or harm to a victim. See § 42-4-1801.1(8), C.R.S. (2010) (an officer cannot physically require submission to a chemical test unless there is probable cause to believe that the person has committed criminally negligent homicide, vehicular homicide, assault in the third degree, or vehicular assault); § 42-4-18301(2)(d), C.R.S. (2010) (if a person refuses chemical testing and is subsequently tried for DUI or DWAI, the refusal is admissible at trial); cf., State v. Lovig, 675 NW.2d 557, 566 (Iowa 2004) ("[A] defendant is permitted to refuse a chemical test ... [and therefore] the claim of destruction of evidence in the context of blood aleohol content testing may be illusory."); Commonwealth v. DiGeronimo, 38 Mass.App.Ct. 714, 652 N.E.2d 148, 158 (1995) (<HOLDING>). With these characteristics in mind, we must Holdings: 0: holding that the state police is a state agency 1: holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry 2: holding that if a police officer inflicted no constitutional injury on a suspect it is inconceivable that the police commissioners could be liable to the suspect 3: holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry 4: holding that under state law police may not constitutionally compel a suspect to take a field sobriety breathalyzer or blood test and therefore police can have no reasonable expectation that a warrantless entry will enable them to obtain or preserve such evidence


Input: Serv. Co., 210 A.D.2d 207, 620 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256 (1994) (emphasis added). The purpose of this limitation is to ensure that the tort of conversion—a property tort—is applied only where a plaintiff alleges interference with money in which he has a property interest, as contrasted with a mere right to receive payment. See High View Fund, 27 F.Supp.2d at 429; Selinger Enters., Inc. v. Cassuto, 50 A.D.3d 766, 860 N.Y.S.2d 533, 536 (2008) (“The mere right to payment cannot be the basis for a cause of action alleging conversion; the essence of such a cause of action is the ‘unauthorized dominion over the thing in question.’ ” (quoting Fiorenti v. Cent. Emergency Physicians, 305 A.D.2d 453, 762 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (2003))); Horn v. Toback, 44 Misc.3d 42, 989 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782 (App. Term 2014) (<HOLDING>). That determination often turns on whether the Holdings: 0: holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an identifiable fund and thus a proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim 1: holding that contract debt  was not subject to an act in tort for conversion 2: holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent 3: holding that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on conversion claim because the claim seeks merely to recover an allegedly unpaid debt and does not seek to recover money from a discrete identifiable fund 4: holding that carrier was entitled to summary judgment on claim regarding false statements that claimants were not entitled to coverage because the claim was limited to complaints about delays claim handling and disputes regarding entitlement to benefits


Input: (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The ADA was not asking about the insanity defense as it related to the case against the appellant, and the ADA was not attempting to ask or direct restrictive questions of a particular juror to test the juror’s qualifications. See Tex.Code Crim.P. art. 35.20. Instead, the ADA initiated a general discussion when he asked, “Have you all ever heard of Jeffrey Dah-mer? Let me have a show of hands. Be hard not to .... ” The ADA’s references went beyond the point of questioning and assessing the relative desirability of the venire members. The ADA went so far as to inject his opinion of the Dahmer case when he said, “I beg to ask anybody if they ever heard of a sicker case than that.” This, too, was improper. See Johnson v. State, 698 S.W.2d 154, 167 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (<HOLDING>). Generally, the error in an improper statement Holdings: 0: holding that plainerror exception did not apply where prosecutor asked jury to assume the role of the victim in closing argument 1: holding that various expressions of personal belief by the prosecutor in closing argument were improper warrant ing admonishment by the trial court 2: holding it was improper for prosecutor to inject personal opinion in statements to the jury in closing argument 3: holding that a defendant bears the burden of objecting to an allegedly improper closing argument at the time the improper argument is made 4: holding that it was harmless error when the prosecutor focused on a single incident in closing argument


Input: from activities as an independent contractor); Carroll v. Morrison, 116 Ga. App. 575, 576 (3) (158 SE2d 480) (1967) (including as lost earnings waitress’s estimated loss of tips). 9 See, e.g., Gipson, 232 Ga. App. at 236 (noting that damages at issue could be characterized as either “lost profits” or “lost earnings,” and holding that “even if we were to find the evidence was insufficient to provi with respect to the types of evidence necessary to prove damages for “lost profits” and “lost earnings,” and that “[t]o recover for lost profits the damages must be proven definitely,” whereas “lost earnings may be recovered if the proof is reasonably certain and not mere speculation or guesswork”) (Beasley, J., dissenting); Douglas v. Rinker, 134 Ga. App. 949, 950 (216 SE2d 629) (1975) (<HOLDING>); Kroger Co., 105 Ga. App. at 686 (3) (“Loss of Holdings: 0: holding that lost earnings can be recovered if the proof is reasonably certain 1: holding that in certain circumstances fraud can be prosecuted under the statute 2: holding that in an action for breach of contract only nominal damages can be recovered if there is no evidence produced from which the facts necessary to determine damages under the proper rule can be determined 3: holding that attorneys fees under adea may not be recovered against a defendant who was not an employer of the plaintiff 4: holding that the content of emails recovered from other sources was probative of the contents of lost emails


Input: excluded pretrial release on bail, time spent on bail pending appeal, and time spent on parole or probation, if revoked, from the definition of “custody”). This interpretation is augmented by the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that a pretrial defendant who absconded from a halfway house to which he had been released on a personal recognizance bond could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) for escape because he was not legally in custody. United States v. Baxley, 982 F.2d 1265, 1268-70 (9th Cir.1992). Dawson was confined to the premises of the halfway house at night only. During the day, he was to work at a job or to seek employment. Such liberty is markedly different from custodial incarceration in a penitentiary. See United States v. Parker, 902 F.2d 221, 222 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we have joined other circuits that have Holdings: 0: recognizing that time spent in community confinement subject to bop custody entitles a prisoner to sentencing credit while community confinement on pretrial release does not because ujnlike defendants released on bail defendants who are detained or sentenced always remain subject to the control of the bureau  1: holding confinement to home and work through electronic supervision does not equate to custody 2: holding that state may not subject indigent defendants to period of imprisonment beyond statutory maximum 3: holding that confinement in community treatment center after parole revocation was part of original term of imprisonment 4: holding that confinement subject to a defendants being released to go to work cannot possibly be equated with an equivalent period of imprisonment


Input: or omissions and plaintiffs economic loss, including allegations of material misrepresentation or omission, followed by the leaking out of relevant or related truth about the fraud that caused a significant part of the depreciation of the stock and plaintiffs economic loss.” Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 258 (5th Cir.2009). The pleading standard is not difficult to satisfy: “Asking for plausible grounds for an element of a claim does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of that element.” Id. at 267, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Furthermore, they only need to plead causation, not prove it. Erica P. John Fund, 131 S.Ct. at 2183 (<HOLDING>). Houston American’s stock fell by 35.5% when Holdings: 0: holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case 1: holding two days is sufficient to prove causation 2: holding that securities fraud plaintiffs do not have to prove loss causation to obtain class certification 3: holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud 4: holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification


Input: con-clusory. We agree. Conclusory allegations without factual substantiation are.not sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel was effective. E.g., James v. State, 2013 Ark. 290, at 4, 2013 WL 3322333. Harris never presented any evidence at either the sentencing hearing or in his Rule 37 proceedings to support his allegations. Jurors are presumed to be unbiased, and the burden is on the appellant to show otherwise. E.g., McIntosh v. State, 340 Ark. 34, 38, 8 S.W.3d 506, 509 (2000). Because Harris failed to show any bias or misconduct, his trial counsel was not deficient for failing to file a meritless posttrial motion based on such an allegation. Boatright v. State, 2014 Ark. 66, at 6, 2014 WL 585976; see also Monts v. State, 312 Ark. 547, 549, 851 S.W.2d 432, 434 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court Holdings: 0: holding counsel was not deficient for declining to make a meritless argument 1: holding that counsel was not deficient for failing to make an objection that lacked merit 2: holding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue 3: holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument 4: holding that an attorney is not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection


Input: 16 (D.C.1980) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We need not decide whether the prosecution of an administrative proceeding (such as the Maryland Securities Commission investigation), which is conducted independently by the agency once a complaint is filed, can constitute a continuing tort on the part of the complainant, because we agree with appellants that the ongoing prosecution of a lawsuit (such as the Putty Hill litigation) can suffice. It seems to us that a lawsuit is a continuous, not an isolated event, because its effects persist from the initial filing to the final disposition of the case. It is repetitive in that it represents the assertion, every day, of the plaintiff’s claim. Cf. Neumann v. Vidal, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 64,933, at 72,770, 1981 WL 2218 (D.D.C.1981) (<HOLDING>). A defendant subject to a lawsuit is likely to Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered 1: holding that the statute of limitations on an abuse of process charge begins to run not when the defendant institutes the allegedly abusive claim but when he ceases to assert it 2: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run under federal law when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims 3: holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court 4: holding that the statute of limitations for a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations begins to run when the contract in question has been breached


Input: (5th Cir. 2004). 68 . In re Jasper, 559 Fed.Appx. 366, 372 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Osborne, 379 F.3d at 283). 69 . Tex Gov’t Code Ann. § 78.054(b) (West). 70 . Cf. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.071 § 2(e) (West) (providing time periods for when state habeas counsel must move to appoint federal habeas counsel after the court of criminal appeals denies relief). 71 . In re Paredes, 587 Fed.Appx. 805, 824-25 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 72 . Id. 73 . Diaz v. Stephens, 731 F.3d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 2013). 74 . 545 U.S. 524, 531-32, 125 S.Ct 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005). 75 . Id. at 532 n.5, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (citation omitted). 76 . Clark v. Thaler, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 179, 184 L.Ed.2d 90 (2012) (mem.). 77 . See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (<HOLDING>). 78 . Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that aedpas statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling only when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control 1: holding equitable tolling appropriate where a party is prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights 2: holding that  2244d is subject to equitable tolling if ae petitioner demonstrates  1 that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and 2 that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filling quoting pace v diguglielmo 544 us 408 418 125 sct 1807 161 led2d 669 2005 3: holding equitable tolling available if an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control 4: holding that equitable tolling is only available when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control


Input: having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). In this case, the IJ found Mrs. Demiraj’s proof of “consent or acquiescence [by] a public official” lacking. A state actor only “acquiesces” in torture if “the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, ha[s] awareness of such activity and thereafter breaches] his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7); see also Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151, 154-57, 2010 WL 5064379, at *4-6 (5th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). We have thus held that “relief under the Holdings: 0: holding that class actions may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied after a rigorous analysis that the prerequisites of rule 23a have been satisfied 1: holding that new evidence impeaching credibility of governments key witness was cumulative of other evidence of witness criminal activity 2: holding that appellant satisfied exception 3: holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing 4: holding that  acquiescence is satisfied by a governments willful blindness of torturous activity


Input: 522(g)(1)(A) and 551 of the Code preserve the recovered property for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. VI Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the bankruptcy court. 2 . The Honorable William A. Hill, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of North Dakota. 3 .210 B.R. 799 (Bankr.D.N.D.1997), aff'd, 162 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir.1998) (Table). 4 . Gourley v. Usery (In re Usery), 123 F.3d 1089, 1093 (8th Cir.1997); O’Neal v. Southwest Mo. Bank (In re Broadview Lumber Co., Inc.), 118 F.3d 1246, 1250 (8th Cir.1997) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Olathe, Kansas v. Pontow, 111 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir.1997)). Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8013. 5 . First Nat’l Bank of Olathe, Kansas v. Pontow, 111 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir.1997); Sholdan v. Dietz, 108 F.3d 886, 888 (8th Cir.1997). .N.D.Iowa Jan.3, 2000) (<HOLDING>); Schieffler v. Beshears (In re Beshears), 182 Holdings: 0: holding that if a debt or had voluntarily granted a security interest that was later avoided the debtor was not entitled to exempt the interest recovered 1: holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing 2: holding security interest in insurance premiums perfected by creation of security interest 3: holding that the trustee could not avoid a security interest under section 549 when that security interest was authorized by the bankruptcy court 4: holding that under virginia law a banks security interest which secured a loan made to refinance preexisting debt was a nonpossessory nonpurchasemoney security interest


Input: CURIAM: Miriam J. Jiggetts appeals the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice her complaint filed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and Virginia Human Rights Act for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Individuals cannot be held liable for employment discrimination under the ADEA. See Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the dismissal of the Holdings: 0: holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the adea 1: holding sixyear statute of limitations applies to adea actions involving federal employees 2: holding that individual employees are not proper defendants in adea lawsuits 3: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 4: holding no individual liability under the adea


Input: both the original judgment and the bill of review in one appeal. Id. at 246. The mere filing of a bill of review affects neither the finality nor the enforceability of the judgment it challenges. Schwartz, 520 S.W.2d at 889; Kantor v. Herald Publishing Co., 632 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1982, no writ) (super-sedeas bond filed in bill of review action does not suspend final judgment in original action). In order to protect the status quo in the original proceeding while a bill of review is pending, trial courts have stayed execution of the original judgment by granting a temporary injunction in the bill of review action. See, e.g., Petro-Chemical Transp., Inc., 514 S.W.2d at 242; American Fidelity Fire Im. Co. v. Pixley, 687 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Because the City is not subject to a writ of Holdings: 0: holding in part that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a temporary injunction in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at law 1: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction 2: holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time 3: holding that although doctrine of primary jurisdiction required trial court to abate claims over which agency had primary jurisdiction trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing temporary injunction to maintain the status quo 4: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits


Input: this court. Specifically, Haberland v. Bulkeley, 896 F.Supp.2d 410 (E.D.N.C.2012), which Defendants rely bn, allowed the court to "consider documents that are referenced in and central to the complaint, and the authenticity of , which neither party questions,” Haberland, 896 F.Supp.2d at 419. The Haberland court used this logic to allow consideration of documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and refer- ' enced specifically in the complaint. Here, the documents Defendants would like this court to consider were not referred to in the com- ’ plaint and are not public filings. Therefore, this court finds it improper to consider these documents, like the Davis service agreement, at this time. See also Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir.1999) Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court 1: holding court could consider a mortgage agreement not attached to the complaint in ruling on motion to dismiss because the complaint refers to the mortgage numerous times the mortgage is attached to this motion and is central to plaintiffs claims 2: holding that the court may consider an article not attached to the complaint in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because the article was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs did not challenge its authenticity 3: holding that although a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment 4: holding that documents integral to the complaint are properly considered on a motion to dismiss


Input: protect plaintiffs’ economic interests. Not every relationship gives rise to a duty “beyond the common law duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm.” See Onita, 315 Or at 159 (stating standard). Determining which relationships give rise to such a duty has not always proven easy, however. This court has observed that section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) provides a good starting point for the analysis when a party has been negligent in obtaining or communicating information. Id. (describing that rule as “close to the mark”). The court, however, has declined to adopt that section of the Restatement as a “black letter ‘rule,’ ” id. — a view that sometimes has divided the court. Compare Conway v. Pacific University, 324 Or 231, 244, 924 P2d 818 (1996) (<HOLDING>); with id. at 251 (Durham, J., dissenting) Holdings: 0: holding that the courts grant of summary judgment did not violate the plaintiffs seventh amendment right to a jury trial and describing the plaintiffs argument that it did as very misleading 1: holding the original notice and verified account did not substantiate plaintiffs claim and was insufficient for the court to enter a default judgment against the plaintiffs 2: holding that defendant did not have a special responsibility to exercise independent judgment in the plaintiffs behalf and to look after the plaintiffs interests 3: holding that plaintiffs failure to warn claim could not proceed independent of plaintiffs aemld claim 4: holding that the need to look to the cba to determine the plaintiffs rate of pay did not trigger preemption


Input: appointed under § 333(a)(1) must be a disinterested person, and must: (1) monitor the quality of patient care provided to patients of the debtor, to the extent necessary under the circumstances, including interviewing patients and physicians; (2) not later than 60 days after the date of appointment, and not less frequently than at 60-day intervals thereafter, report to the court after notice to the parties in interest, at a hearing or in writing, regarding the quality of patient care provided to patients of the debtor; and (3)if such ombudsman determines that the quality of patient care provided to patients of the debtor is declining significantly or is otherwise being materially compromised, file with the court a motion or a written report, with notice , 359 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2007) (<HOLDING>); In re 7-Hills Radiology, LLC, 350 B.R. 902, Holdings: 0: holding that a chapter 11 debtor which provided services to the public only ancillary to its primary function of administrative support to a physicians group was not a health care business within the scope of  10127a 1: holding that a chapter 11 debtor who was in the business of providing plastic and reconstructive surgery to the general public met the definition of a health care business under  10127a 2: holding claim that negligent supervision caused assault was health care liability claim because it was inseparable from the health care and nursing services provided 3: holding that an individual debtor not engaged in business is eligible for chapter 11 4: holding in a case where a chapter 11 trustee was appointed after a period during which the debt or had operated as debtor in possession that a chapter 11 trustee has two years from the date of his appointment not from the commencement of the chapter 11 case to bring avoidance actions


Input: “too old and incapable of adapting to the new technologies and techniques,” R. at 327, and that “[h]e want[ed] to get rid of he[r] because she [was] too old to keep [up] with the work load,” id. at 327. As supporting evidence, Howell again relies on the EEOC reports. But as discussed above, those reports are inadmissible, unreliable, and largely unhelpful to Howell. She also cites the unsigned document purportedly written by supervisor Robertson. But that document is not in the form of an affidavit or an unsworn declaration, see 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and “was not within the range of evidence that the district court could consider” on summary judgment. DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 920 F.2d 457, 471 (7th Cir.1990); see also Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Further, even if the Robertson document were Holdings: 0: holding that an acknowledgment was defective because it did not include the name of the person who appeared before a notary public 1: holding that district court properly excluded affidavits that lacked signatures and attestation before a notary public 2: holding that district court properly refused to rely on affidavits to the extent that they contained only legal conclusions 3: holding a new constitutional challenge not raised in district court was not properly before court of appeals 4: holding that when the trial court proceeded to consider affidavits submitted with motion to reconsider summary judgment the affidavits were properly before the appellate court for purposes of reviewing the propriety of the trial courts grant of summary judgment


Input: transparently frivolous to either defendant or the court. Accordingly, the court finds that defendant’s staffing and travel expenses were reasonable because defendant could not have been aware that Austin had misled the court. Defendant mitigated its damages to the extent possible, given the impossibility of knowing how much evidence Austin possessed to sustain his contentions. B. Minimum to Deter Although courts have not ruled consistently on the issue of whether a trial court is required to impose only the minimum amount of sanctions necessary to deter, this court is persuaded by the majority of cases that require such a ceiling. Dodd Ins. Servs., 935 F.2d at 1159-60 (vacating district court’s sanctions award where the “minimum to deter” was not considered); White, 908 F.2d at 684 (<HOLDING>); Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Holdings: 0: holding that the amount of sanctions is appropriate only when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior 1: holding that it is not 2: holding that injunctive relief does not meet the amount in controversy when the only reason the injunction is worth more than the jurisdictional minimum is that it would affect defendants future sales 3: holding inference appropriate when reliance is the only logical explanation to explain behavior 4: holding that the determination that an alien is an undesirable person is not a conviction of crime nor is the deportation a punishment it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want


Input: Id. at 1284 (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24-26,125 S.Ct. 1254,161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005)). The Government does not dispute Washington’s assault statute is ambiguous, but we need not tarry long on this issue because Defendant made a factual concession as part of his state court plea demonstrating his prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence. In the “Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty,” filed in Washington State court and later made part of the record before us, Defendant acknowledged the elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty were as follows: “[I]n Mason County, on 6/12/01, [Defendant] did intentionally assault Cecelia Howland, and inflicted substantial bodily harm.” See United States v. Torres-Ruiz, 387 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). These elements track most closely with Wash. Holdings: 0: holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure 1: holding intent to use or threaten to use force is required under  2l12bla 2: holding that  2241a1 requires actual use of force meaning use of such physical force as is sufficient to overcome restrain or injure a person 3: holding that the decision of a police officer to preserve public safety and order through use of commands backed by threat of force or actual use of physical force is a matter of discretion 4: holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the eighth amendment


Input: (a) Appealable Orders. (1) The following orders may be appealed from dependency-neglect proceedings: (A) adjudication order; (B) disposition, review, no reunification, and permanency planning order if the court directs entry of a final judgment as to one or more of the issues or parties based upon the express determination by the court supported by factual findings that there is no just reason for delay of an appeal, in accordance with Ark. R. Civ. P. Rule 54(b); (C) termination of parental rights; and (D) denial of right to appointed counsel pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-316(h). In Posey v. Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services, 370 Ark. 1, 256 S.W.3d 504 (2007) (per curiam), this court explained that Rule 6-9 was a new rule adopted b Ark. 206, 644 S.W.2d 594 (1983) (<HOLDING>). As such, a party is not required to wait Holdings: 0: holding that an appeal from a denial of a motion to intervene as a matter of right is allowed under rule 2a2 1: holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration 2: holding an order denying a nonpartys motion to intervene is appealable because it effectively concludes the proceedings for intervention and prevents the movant from becoming a party to the original action 3: holding that an order denying a motion to vacate a  1782 order and denying a motion to quash the subpoena was immediately appealable 4: holding that pursuant to rule 2a2 a party may appeal an order denying a motion for permissive intervention


Input: that is conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law.” The court must first look to the plain language of the statute, and absent ambiguity in the language, the court’s inquiry ends ther AP 1998) (finding that under Wyoming law, the debtors’ right to cure a mortgage arrearage in a Chapter 13 plan expired at the time of the foreclosure sale even though the state has a statutory redemption period); In re Watts, 273 B.R. 471, 476 (Bankr.D.S.C.2000) (granting the creditor’s motion for relief from stay to allow it to record the foreclosure sale deed for the foreclosure sale that occurred prior to filing because the debtor no longer retained any equitable interest in the property and no right to cure the mortgage arrearage); In re Crawford, 232 B.R. 92, 96 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, these courts employ a plain meaning Holdings: 0: holding that the debtors right to cure ended when the sheriff accepted the bid at the foreclosure auction even though the order confirming the sale had not been entered at the time of the bankruptcy filing 1: holding that the debtors could cure their arrearage until the expiration of the 10day upset bid period which would render the foreclosure sale complete under north carolina law 2: holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court 3: holding that  1322c1 is not ambiguous that the debtors cure right terminates on the date of the foreclosure sale regardless of the intricacies of the state foreclosure sale process and refusing to attach significance to the legislative record indicating that more extensive cure rights under state law persevere 4: holding that the debtor is entitled to cure the arrearage until entry of an order confirming the foreclosure sale completes the foreclosure process under oklahoma law


Input: and profits in the land.” Restüd Torts § 821E. As explained above, Plaintiffs only interest in the foreshore is that of an easement providing free ingress and egress to the abutting navigable waters. As I have already determined Plaintiffs interest in and enjoyment of this right was not disturbed by the presence of the barges, Plaintiff cannot maintain his nuisance claim based on this theory. G. Plaintiffs Failure To Mitigate Damages Even if Plaintiff had proven that Defendants trespassed on Plaintiffs land, Plaintiffs claim would fail, insofar as it relates to the two steel barges, because Plaintiff did not mitigate his damages. New York courts adhere to the universally accepted common law principle that a harmed plaintiff must mitigate damages. Air Et Chaleur, 757 F.2d at 494 (<HOLDING>); see also Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N.Y. 72, Holdings: 0: holding a party to a contract who is himself in default cannot maintain a suit for its breach 1: holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract 2: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 3: holding that the district court properly applied new yorks mitigation doctrine against plaintiff stockholders who brought suit for breach of contract 4: holding that because suit requested damages for breach of contract colorado river applied even though district court characterized suit as declaratory judgment action


Input: FEC’s interpretation of the term “political committee” is an unreasonable reading of the FECA, or that this interpretation is inconsistent with the unambiguous language of the statute. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The FEC argues that its determination of whether AO 2006-20 infringes the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights is entitled to Chevron deference. However, “the Commission’s advisory opinions are not entitled to Chevron deference [when] they are necessarily based upon the Commission’s interpretation of the Constitution as construed by the Supreme Court and our Court of Appeals.” Federal Election Comm’n v. GOPAC, 917 F.Supp. 851, 860 (D.D.C.1996); see also Chamber of Commerce, 69 F.3d at 604-605 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the question is whether the FEC’s Holdings: 0: holding that a longstanding agency interpretation was no longer entitled to chevron deference given that the agency had changed its position on the issue 1: holding regulations entitled to chevron deference 2: holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 3: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 4: holding that the fec was not entitled to chevron deference with regard to whether its interpretation of the feca infringed the plaintiffs first amendment right to communicate with its members


Input: & Smith, Inc., 137 A.D.2d 170, 529 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1st Dept.), aff'd, 72 N.Y.2d 945, 533 N.Y.S.2d 52, 529 N.E.2d 420 (1988)). However, both Talking Togs and Moshiko turned on the fact that the wholesale broker had merely relayed information to the insurer, which issued a policy that conformed in all respects to the broker’s requests. Neither of these cases stands for the proposition that a wholesale insurance broker cannot be held liable for the alleged failure to fully inform an insurer of all the information in its possession. Moreover, the Court believes that the issue whether Yerkes was acting as an agent for Knight or O’Leary is a question of fact that has not been conclusively resolved on the current record. Cf. Citibank, N.A. v. Nyland (CF8) Ltd., 878 F.2d 620, 624 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, because Yerkes has not demonstrated as Holdings: 0: holding owner of limited liability company may be personally liable to third party if owner acts as agent for company and fails to disclose existence and identity of principal 1: holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party 2: holding that apparent authority refers to a third partys reasonable belief that the principal has authorized the acts of its agent it arises from the principals indirect or direct manifestations to a third party 3: holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant 4: recognizing that a principal may limit the authority of its agent and such limitation will be binding on a third party who is aware of the limitation


Input: and dissenting in part). And third, the Majority’s reliance on this IRS notice goes over and above any canon of judicial deference to agency interpretation. In this respect, it’s important to ask: what authority was' the IRS interpreting to support its view that all double deductions should be disallowed? The IRS does not claim to be “implementing a statute,” so we know that it is not entitled to Chevron or Skidmore deference. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227-28, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). And since the IRS concedes that §§ 1.337(d) and 1.1502 did not disallow these deductions, its belief could not have been derived from those regulations — and therefore is not entitled to deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Rather, the Majority seems to claim that the Holdings: 0: holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation 1: holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law 2: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 3: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 4: holding that the district courts apa review of a sba size decision was not entitled to deference but that the agencys interpretation and application of its own regulations did merit deference


Input: requirement under the “adversely affected” standard. 647 S.W.2d at 252-53. Both producing cause and proximate cause contain the cause-in-fact element, which requires that the defendant’s act be “a substantial factor in bringing about the injury and without which the harm would not have occurred.” Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, 907 S.W.2d at 481; accord IHS Cedars v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 799 (Tex.2004) (discussing the cause-in-fact element); see also Ford v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32, 46 (Tex.2007) (defining “producing cause” n Parkins and Royal Globe, if not compelled by logic, is required by the 1979 amendments to the DTPA and is consistent with an established line of authority from other states. See, e.g., Johnson & Higgins of Alaska Inc. v. Blomfield, 907 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Alaska 1995) (<HOLDING>); Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pete’s Satire, Holdings: 0: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 1: holding employer satisfied its burden of production 2: recognizing the majority rule 3: recognizing burden 4: holding that plaintiffs satisfied a burden to show that coverage was commercially available for the loss sustained and noting that such a burden seems to be the majority rule citations omitted


Input: that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. Tex.R. Evid. 609(a); Morris, 67 S.W.3d at 263. However, if the date of conviction or the release of the witness from confinement is more than ten years from the moment of impeachment, impeachment is permissible only if the probative value of the conviction supported by the facts and circumstances “substantially outweighs” its prejudicial effects. Tex.R. Evid. 609(b); see Morris, 67 S.W.3d at 263. Although the ten year limitations period in Rule 609 usually militates against admissibility, Texas courts have held that subsequent felony or misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude can be tacked onto remote convictions to cause them to be evaluated under Rule 609(a) instead of Rule 609(b). See Morris, 67 S.W.3d at 263 (<HOLDING>); LaHood v. State, 171 S.W.3d 613, 620 Holdings: 0: holding two prior convictions more than ten years old admissible where disorderlypersons offenses bridged the gap 1: holding that when a defendant admits prior convictions at a habitual offender hearing he waives any complaints about the validity of the prior convictions 2: holding that evidence of two intervening felony convictions removed taint of remoteness from convictions more than 10 years prior permitting analysis under rule 609a 3: holding that prior felony drug convictions that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance the defendants sentence if the conspiracy continued after his earlier convictions were final 4: holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction


Input: Cir.1976) (criminal trial for transporting and selling stolen cars)). Guaglione, Welsh, Netterville, and Leslie are consistent with two more recent decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals. In Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc., 929 F.2d 901 (2d Cir.1991) (products liability complaint), the out-of-court declarant was available to testify in person, and in Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir.1991) (civil rights action for police brutality), the three witnesses who had made relevant out-of-court statements were also available to testify. In both eases, the respective Court of Appeals held that the out-of-court statements should not have been admitted under the residual exception. In the present case, however, the “other evidence” the appellant would have had the judge use to 6) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rudolph, 35 M.J. 622 Holdings: 0: holding childvictims statement to babysitter admissible un der residual exception in addition to statement to physician under medical treatment exception 1: holding childvictims statement to police investigator admissible under residual exception as well as identical corroborating statement to babysitter 2: holding heroin overdose victims statement to police identifying her source admissible under residual exception in addition to admission by accused that he had supplied victim 3: holding statement by childvictim to teachers aide admissible under residual exception in addition to statements to school nurse and pediatrician under medical treatment exception 4: holding ehildvictims testimony at pretrial investigation admissible under residual exception in addition to doctors testimony under medical treatment exception


Input: on this ground is rejected. Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed.Cir.1998); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Defendants then argue that since Claims 2-13 of the ’608 patent depend on Claim 1 of the ’608 patent, Claims 2-13 are invalid as being anticipated by the Combinations Hanger for the same reasons as Claim 1. (Defs. Mem. at 9.) This argument is rejected for the same reasons defendants’ first point was rejected: Defendants have offered insufficient support for their argument and genuine issues of material fact remain. Thirdly, defendants argue that the Petrou patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,997,114 (“Petrou patent”)) anticipated the structure added by Claim 13 of the ’608 patent. (Defs. Mem. at 10) (citing Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>).) Defendants have shown only that on October Holdings: 0: holding that a court can correct a patent claim for a grammatical error where the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims 1: holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it 2: holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation 3: holding that prosecution history will limit the interpretation of claim terms so as toexclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution 4: holding that the prosecution history may modify a claim terms scope if the patentee expressly disclaimed the prior arts subject matter


Input: pockets. After Vasquez gave appellant twenty dollars, appellant searched his pockets and took his wallet. When appellant found only “fake Mexican” money, Levy struck Vasquez again and shot him in the head. Appellant then left the scene with Levy and gave Vasquez’s wallet to Levy. Based on this evidence that appellant and his companions coordinated their movements throughout the offense, as well as appellant’s remark about what one of his companions “was supposed to do,” a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt a prior or contemporaneous plan to commit this robbery in which appellant pai'ticipated. There was no evidence that appellant ever argued with or refused to follow Levy’s directions. See Thompson v. State, 54 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2001, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Although appellant said he was afraid of Holdings: 0: holding criminal conspiracy is sustained where the commonwealth establishes the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy a coconspirator may commit the overt act and conspirators are liable for acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy 1: holding that evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction 2: holding that a joint conspiracy trial was proper based on the lack of complexity of the conspiracy the number of defendants and an appropriate jury instruction 3: holding evidence of conspiracy sufficient and noting lack of evidence that any member of the group did anything but cooperate with the terms of the plan to commit robbery 4: holding the fedrevid 801d2e requires proof of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence and allows consideration of the offered declaration as part of the proof of the conspiracy


Input: act — aimed a gun at Deputy Martin — and threatened bodily harm — threatened to kill. An analysis of these facts thus supports a finding that Deputy Martin was justified in using deadly force. Similar to the determination of comparative fault, the issue of the applicability of the affirmative defense of self-defense is a fact-intense, totality of the circumstances determination. Freeman v. Teague, 37,982, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So.2d 371, 374. As such, this determination is generally 1 Inappropriate for summary judgment. However, where reasonable minds cannot differ, the question of self-defense with a dangerous weapon is a question of law that may be resolved by summary judgment. Id.; Rance v. Harrison Co., 31,503, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/20/99), 737 So.2d 806, 810 (<HOLDING>). Mr. Brown acknowledges that his conviction Holdings: 0: holding that the question of whether the defendants recording device was an intercepting device was a question of law appropriate for summary judgment 1: holding where reasonable minds may differ questions of causation are for the jury 2: holding in a civil context when reasonable minds cannot differ on the issue of intervening cause the matter can be decided as one of law 3: holding when reasonable minds cannot differ the question of comparative negligence is a question of law appropriate for summary judgment 4: holding summary judgment was improper because the issue of whether a reasonably prudent person would have undertaken a more diligent investigation was a matter about which reasonable minds could differ


Input: has noted, “even if we were torn between two competing yet sensible interpretations of [state] law ... we should opt for the interpretation that limits liability, rather than expands it, until the [state’s] Supreme Court ... decides otherwise.” Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 680 (3d Cir.2002) (discussing Pennsylvania’s economic loss doctrine). Here, the logic used by the New Jersey courts suggests that the economic loss doctrine precludes recovery under the Hunters’ tort claims — the interpretation of New Jersey law that “limits liability, rather than expands it.” Id. Specifically, the economic loss doctrine precludes recovery under the Hunters’ claim for conversion and negligence. 'See Cargill Global Trading v. Applied Dev. Co., 706 F.Supp.2d 563, 577-79 (D.N.J.2010) (<HOLDING>); Gleason, 243 F.3d at 144 (holding that New Holdings: 0: holding that the economic loss rule does not preclude independent tort claims that fall outside the scope of a breach of contract 1: holding no right to recover for economic loss resulting from defendants injury to a third party with whom plaintiff has contractual business relationship 2: holding that subject to certain exceptions the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for economic damages arising out of matters governed by contract 3: holding that the economic loss doctrine may bar recovery if the defendants duties emanate from contractual relationships 4: holding that the economic loss doctrine will preclude conversion claims arising out of a contractual relationship


Input: pose complications that are not always easily resolved. Still, the question Murphy presents here regarding his own registration will not always require case-by-case evaluation. Once the application of Wisconsin’s sex offender registration law is correctly decided, future cases like Murphy’s will also be a matter of routine. Balancing the Mathews v. Eldridge factors shows that this is a case in which the post-registration remedies were adequate: the DOC provided its reasons for requiring Murphy to register, and the state provides a judicial remedy if informal resolution proves unsatisfactory. Protections such as these are adequate when the deprivations are moderate, like the ones Murphy faces. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 345-46, 96 S.Ct. 893 (“A Holdings: 0: holding that the parole commission is required to state reasons for its finding that an inmate continues to be a poor candidate for parole release 1: holding that the state courts decision to uphold the parole boards denial of parole was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 2: holding that revocation of parole does not create collateral consequences sufficient to extend standing beyond expiration of sentence and rejecting as moot a challenge to an allegedly erroneous parole revocation 3: holding that a right to confrontation exists in parole revocation proceedings 4: holding that an important part of due process in the context of parole revocation is a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole


Input: at 14; see Williams v. Social Sec. Admin., 586 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2009) (quoting Douglas, 5 MSPB at 332, 5 M.S.P.R. 280) (“One of the Douglas factors that agencies are required to consider in determining an appropriate penalty for employee misconduct is ‘(6) consistency of the penalty with those imposed upon other employees for the same or similar of-fences.’ ”). The arbitrator, however, found that participating in the annual office basketball pool was not similar to engaging in outside business during work hours or sending inappropriate emails. The arbitrator acted within his discretion in so finding, and in affirming the penalty of removal. See Kumferman v. Dep’t of Navy, 785 F.2d 286, 291-92 (Fed.Cir.1986) (quoting DeWitt v. Dep’t of Navy, 747 F.2d 1442, 1445 (Fed.Cir.1984)) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion Having considered Mr. Jones’s Holdings: 0: holding that the penalty is applicable 1: holding that the authority to determine the appropriate penalty is with the supervisor of liquor control and not the administrative hearing commission or the reviewing court 2: holding that if the imposition of the death penalty depends on the existence of aggravating factors a jury must find those factors beyond a reasonable doubt 3: recognizing the unique and irrevocable nature of the death penalty and    the consequently overarching need for reliability in the imposition of such a penalty 4: holding the boards affirmance of the penalty of removal was within the discretionary authority of the board because the record reflects a reasoned concern for the factors appropriate to evaluating a penalty


Input: must show that he took affirmative action to defeat or disavow the purpose of the conspiracy.”). As the D.C. Circuit recently noted, “withdrawal from the conspiracy is difficult, requiring an affirmative step.” Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 800 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Thus, withdrawal requires either coming clean to authorities of communicating abandonment to co-conspirators. See United Stales v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 2. Analysis Agustín acknowledges, as he must, that he bears the burden of establishing that he withdrew from the conspiracy upon his arrest, see Agustin’s MIL Preclude Posb-Arrest Intercepts at 3, a burden that must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, see Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 109, 133 S.Ct. 714, 184 L.Ed.2d 570 (2013) (<HOLDING>); Moore, 651 F.3d at 90 (holding that “the Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant bears the burden of proof and that such a disposition does not violate the due process clause 1: holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review 2: holding that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the action should be transferred 3: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof for all elements of section 523a15 4: holding that doctrine does not violate due process


Input: adequate equipment available. Moreover, a common carrier is not required to provide the types of services that United provided for General Mills in the present case, although it is plainly permitted to do so. Thus, whether or not a common carrier could provide the transportation services that United provided to General Mills is not the issue; the issue is whether, by requiring such service, the actual carriage was tailored to meet a shipper’s particular needs in the context of an on-going contractual relationship. See, e.g., International Detective Service, Inc. v. ICC, 198 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 613 F.2d 1067, 1074 (1979). The continuing nature of the contractual relationship is particularly important. See, e.g., ZoneSkip, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 8 I.C.C.2d 645, 654-55 (1992) (<HOLDING>), petition for review denied sub nom. ZoneSkip, Holdings: 0: holding that bill of lading not charterparty governed contract dispute between carrier and shipper 1: holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier 2: holding fact that the carrier provides substantially identical services to a certain largevolume common carriage shipper as it offers to its contract carriage customers does not threaten the character of its valid contract carriage service 3: holding that even though certain corporate formalities had not been complied with in the execution of the subject contract the corporation had knowledge of the existence of the contract and treated it as a valid and binding contract and thus ratified the contract by accepting the benefits thereunder 4: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract


Input: of evidence under Evid.Code, § 352 “designed for situations in which evidence of little evidentiary impact evokes an emotional bias”].) Based on the strong link between the gang-related evidence and the shooting of Terry and Witherow, the evidence was highly relevant to the issue of motive and thus, as the trial court concluded, more probative than prejudicial.” (Lodgment No. 4 at 6-8). 4. Findings and conclusion The Court concurs with the California Court of Appeal that the evidence in question was relevant to petitioner’s motive for shooting the victims. Accordingly, the admission of such evidence did not violate petitioner’s federal constitutional rights to due process and to a fair trial. See Estelle, supra; Jammal, supra; Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). The Court therefore finds and concludes that Holdings: 0: holding other crimes evidence admissible to show motive where motive was put in issue by defense at trial 1: holding that evidence of violent crimes and other illegal activities of defendants gang was not unduly prejudicial because defendant was not directly implicated and the evidence was probative of elements of the crimes that the defendant was charged with 2: holding appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to appeal district courts decision to admit evidence that defendant was a member of a gang because gang membership was relevant to show motive and intent 3: holding that evidence of gang involvement was properly admitted to prove motive for participating in the alleged crimes 4: holding the district court properly admitted expert testimony on defendants active gang membership


Input: to trial before an Art. Ill judge. The Government argues that, because Belle Chasse is a federal enclave, Hollingsworth does not have a right to trial before an Art. Ill judge. In Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973), the Supreme Court held that “Congress [is] not required to provide an Art. Ill court for the trial of criminal cases arising under its laws applicable only within the District of Columbia.” Id. at 410, 93 S.Ct. 1670. Hollingsworth was tried for the violation of a federal criminal statute that applies only “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5). Thus under Palmore, Hollingsworth has no constitutional right to trial before an Art. III court. See Jenkins, 734 F.2d at 1326 (<HOLDING>). Hollingsworth also argues that, even if Holdings: 0: holding no violation of federal establishment clause 1: recognizing the power of federal courts to decide cases is restricted by the cases and controversies clause of article iii 2: holding that federal courts may not consider other issues before resolving standing an article iii jurisdictional matter 3: holding that the requirements of article iii are consistent with the establishment by congress of nonarticle iii courts to enforce federal criminal laws in clause 17 federal enclaves 4: holding that the requirements of title iii apply and must be satisfied


Input: request for preliminary injunctive relief, but the court’s inherent equity power does provide jurisdiction to do so). This is instead a case where a statute divests the court of jurisdiction to do a particular act, regardless of what the jurisdictional basis of the act would otherwise have been. Once a court is made aware that the controversy before it “involv[es] or grow[s] out of a labor dispute,” it has no jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief except in conformity with the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus, although the “preservation of jurisdiction” rationale might support a stay imposed in order to permit the court to decide whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act is applicable, cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 289-93, 67 S.Ct. 677, 693-96, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947) (<HOLDING>), it cannot support a stay pending a Holdings: 0: holding that the united states was a statutory employer under kansas law 1: holding the takings clause inapplicable to the states of its own force 2: holding that the united states was a statutory employer under missouri law 3: holding that the united states was a statutory employer under puerto rico law 4: holding the act inapplicable to the united states in its role as employer


Input: are required by law to spend a substantial portion of their fives in classrooms, student expression may not be suppressed simply because it gives rise to some slight, easily overlooked disruption, including but not limited to ‘a showing of mild curiosity’ by other students, see Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748, ‘discussion and comment’ among students, Reineke v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 484 F.Supp. 1252, 1261 (N.D.Ga.1980), or even some ‘hostile remarks’ or ‘discussion outside of the classrooms’ by other students, Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 514, 89 S.Ct. at 737, 740. Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1271-72. Further, “[wjhere students’ expressive activity does not materially interfere with a school’s vital educational mission, and does not raise a realistic chance of doing so, it may not be prohibited simp (<HOLDING>). 2. Application The issues of homosexuality Holdings: 0: holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students 1: holding that school officials may not limit the first amendment rights of students and teachers to freedom of speech and expression 2: holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school 3: holding that public school violated homosexual students first amendment right to speech and expression when it banned him from bringing a samesex date to the prom notwithstanding that the student and another homosexual student had previously been assaulted by other students and that the school was forced to provide additional security and escorts 4: holding that student stated a claim for violation of his first amendment right to speech when he alleged that school officials prevented him from openly stating that he was homosexual and retaliated against him for doing so