Input: federal officials. Under Alabama forfeiture law, cash is considered fungible and may be replaced by a monetary instrument such as a cashier’s check. Section 15-5-63, Ala.Code 1975, a part of the Alabama Comprehensive Criminal Proceeds Forfeiture Act, § 15-5-60 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, provides, in part: “(5)a. In cases where the property to be forfeited is cash, monetary instruments in bearer form, funds deposited in an account in a financial institution, or other like fungible property, it shall not be necessary for the state to identify the specific property, other than as U.S. currency, cash, monetary instruments in bearer form, or as funds deposited in an account in a financial institution, involved in the of urrency and $20.00 in Canadian Currency, 103 F.3d 902, 905 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Although “[i]t behooves authorities to Holdings: 0: holding that the cashiers check was an appropriate fungible surrogate for the seized currency 1: holding that drawer of check is liable only for the amount originally stated by drawer on check even though the drawers negligence facilitated the wrongful alteration of the amount on the check and the payment of a larger amount to the payee 2: holding that investigation was insufficient prior to prosecution for forgery of check 3: holding that a payment made by certified check rather than the customary regular check was outside the ordinary course of dealings between the parties 4: holding that principal who caused debtor to issue cashiers check to satisfy personal obligation was not initial transferee


Input: Graves “had many chances.” R.N., T.N.’s father, testified that Graves’s behavior with Billy was “very peculiar,” such as “riding around the countryside when he should be in school. Putting him up in an apartment. And telling other people that that’s his son.” R.N. further testified that he was “not alleging” that Graves used Billy for “sexual reasons.” None of these statements constitutes evidence of an extraneous offense. Rather, each of the witnesses denied knowledge of any improper conduct with other boys. Accordingly, with respect to Graves’s relationships with other boys, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that the State must prove extraneous offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bluitt v. State, 137 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Prior Convictions During punishment, the Holdings: 0: holding that under the bail reform act for a defendant to have been convicted of two or more offenses constituting crimes of violence offenses must have been committed on different occasions 1: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given 2: holding that trial courts instruction implying that the jury had to be unanimous in imposing a sentence of life imprisonment violated defendants constitutional rights because this instruction could have been clearerand should have been 3: holding that such an instruction is a useless act if no unadjudicated offenses have been introduced 4: holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction


Input: any cases addressing the issue of whether section 574.037 is a provision pertinent to an article 46.03, section 4(d)(5) proceeding, and therefore applies to such a proceeding. Based on the unambiguous language of the Texas Mental Health Code and article 46.03, we conclude that section 574.037 is a provision of the Texas Mental Health Code pertinent and applicable to a proceeding under article 46.03, section 4(d)(5). Section 574.037 is contained in a sub-chapter entitled, “PROCEEDINGS FOR COURT-ORDERED . MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES.” See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 574.031-.037. Courts of appeals have determined that five of the seven sections in this subchapter apply to proceedings under article 46.03 regarding court-ordered mental health services. See id; Campbell, 118 S.W.3d at 801-03 (<HOLDING>); Campbell, 68 S.W.3d at 757 n. 3 (stating that Holdings: 0: holding that a single ballot question encompassing amendments to both article i section 9 and article v section 10c violated the separatevote requirement 1: recognizing that rights under article i section 11 are subject to reasonable limitations 2: holding that article 4603 section 4d5 hearing was required to be conducted pursuant to the texas mental health code 3: holding  574032 574035 and 574036 applied to one of campbells prior hearings under article 4603 section 4d5 4: holding that a party could not pursue an employment discrimination claim under one article of a labor agreement when the complaint was framed exclusively in terms of another article of the same agreement


Input: protections that Miranda affords. A. The holding in Edwards v. Arizona makes clear the unreasonableness of the state court decision. As required by that case, Sessoms “expressed his desire” for the assistance of counsel, and was therefore “not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel [had] been made available to him.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880. “Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel ‘requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.’ ” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991)); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (<HOLDING>). These decisions, which constitute clearly Holdings: 0: holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right 1: holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires 2: recognizing that subject matter jurisdiction can be questioned at any time and with respect to any claim 3: holding that if a suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning 4: holding that a defendant need not be advised of the right to terminate questioning at any time


Input: and is guaranteed by the constitution.” We further held: The provision of the constitution must be construed liberally in favor of free and unrestricted access to the records, and that access can be denied only when a law, specifically and unequivocally, provides otherwise. Whenever there is doubt as to whether the public has the right of access to certain records, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the public’s right to see. To allow otherwise would be an improper and arbitrary restriction on the public’s constitutional rights. Id. Since Title Research Corp., we have reaffirmed that “the public has a constitutional right of access to court records.” Copeland I, supra, 930 So.2d at 941 (citing Title Research Corp., supra); In re John Doe, 96-2222 (La.9/13/96), 679 So.2d 900, 901(<HOLDING>) However, the fact that a document is filed in Holdings: 0: holding that factual pleadings on this issue are weak but sufficient 1: recognizing this as the general rule 2: recognizing that pleadings in the underlying case are subject to judicial notice by an appellate court 3: holding that draft pleadings are not subject to public records disclosure 4: holding that as a general rule pleadings filed in this court are public records and are not subject to being sealed


Input: that order. 2. GM II Having resolved the question of whether this court had jurisdiction to issue the original writ of mandamus, we turn to the relatively more straightforward question of whether we have jurisdiction to issue the writ for which petitioners now pray. We conclude that we do. Our jurisdiction is premised, as it was in GM I, on the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Under that act, the courts of appeals have the authority to, inter alia, issue writs of mandamus to district courts to ensure compliance with earlier mandates. U.S. v. Cannon (In re U.S.), 807 F.2d 1528, 1529 (11th Cir.1987); Oswald v. McGarr, (In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation), 620 F.2d 1190, 1195-96 (7th Cir.1980). Cf. In re Allied-Signal, Inc., 915 F.2d 190, 192-93 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). GM premises its current request for a writ of Holdings: 0: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances 1: recognizing authority but declining to issue writ 2: recognizing that laches is a proper ground for refusing to issue a writ of mandamus 3: recognizing a split of authority on this issue 4: recognizing the two lines of child custody cases but declining to resolve conflict


Input: and upheld the Commission’s regulations. Id. at 1143. We observe that before 1989, courts that reviewed programs designed to test police officers for drug use differed about whether the officers fell within the highly regulated industry exception. Compare Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n of New Jersey, Local 318 v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d. 133, 136-41 (3d Cir.1988) (“PBA Local 318”) (finding that police are members of highly-regulated industry and upholding suspicionless drug testing of police officers), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 1637, 104 L. Ed.2d 153 (1989) with Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.Supp. 1507, 1518-19 (D.N.J.1986) (finding that fire fighters are not members of pervasively regulated industry), and FOP, supra, 216 N.J.Super. at 469, 524 A.2d 430. (<HOLDING>). This divergence in views depended on the Holdings: 0: recognizing serious harm results when members of the legal profession engage in criminal acts which give rise to a lack of confidence by members of the public in those who are officers of the court 1: holding that police officers are not members of highly regulated industry 2: holding that even if the plaintiff had asserted a cause of action under the virginia wrongful death act against the city police officers the police officers would be entitled to sovereign immunity 3: holding that extensively regulated public utilities are not state actors 4: holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records


Input: an agreement, it is not contained within the record. Instead, the bystander’s report simply indicates that the parties agreed that the trial court “would hear all three cases together.” Therefore, based upon my review of the record, it is apparent that the trial court conducted a single trial of all three cases. See People v. Lopez, 367 Ill. App. 3d 817, 819 (2006) (noting that appellant has burden of providing sufficiently complete record to support claims of error and that any doubts that may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against appellant). By agreeing to a single trial on all of the cases, defendant cannot now complain that the trial court heard evidence of defendant’s conduct in the other cases. See People v. Gresham, 104 Ill. App. 3d 81, 87 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Finally, I disagree with the majority’s Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute waives the issue on appeal 1: holding that defendants failure to file a motion to sever waives objection to single trial on multiple charges 2: holding failure to assert an objection based upon the confrontation clause at trial waives the issue for appeal 3: holding that failure to file a postjudgment motion on alleged error of law relating to ruling on exception to the statute of frauds that was committed for first time in the judgment waives any objection to that ruling and that in the absence of any other formal objection the issue is not preserved for appellate review 4: holding that defendants general objection to states specific questions regarding defendants failure to appear before grand jury was sufficient to put trial court on notice of objection based on defendants constitutional right to remain silent


Input: they expressly state or overwhelmingly imply that KSU waived Eleventh Amendment immunity. To resolve this dispute, we must evaluate whether a state may waive immunity by its affirmative conduct in the context of a federal. program or whether Edelman mandates that a state can waive only by express statements or overwhelming implication in its statutory or constitutional text. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238. n. 1 & 239-40, 105 S.Ct. 3142; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673, 94 S.Ct. 1347. Several Supreme Court decisions. provide that neither receipt of federal funds, participation in a federal program, nor an agreement to recognize and abide by federal laws, regulations, and guidelines is alone sufficient to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246-47, 105 S.Ct. 3142 (<HOLDING>); Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Holdings: 0: holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college because the language of the section does not distinguish between direct and indirect receipt of federal funds 1: holding the requisite connection was met with proof that the city received federal funds for housing and urban development programs and the corrupt payments at issue concerned real estate transactions also without specifying which federal grant provided the jurisdictional basis 2: holding that neither mere participation in a federal program nor provision requiring compliance with federal law is sufficient to establish that the state consented to be sued in federal court 3: holding that participation in federal programs and receipt of federal funds under such programs fall far short of manifesting a clear intent  to waive immunity 4: holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity


Input: Althen, 418 F.3d at 1278 (requiring that a petitioner show “a medical theory causally connecting the vaccination and the injury”); see also Pafford v. Health & Human Servs., 451 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed.Cir.2006) (asking, under the first Althen element, “can [the] vaccine(s) at issue cause the type of injury alleged?” (internal quotation omitted)). Even if Dr. Shoenfeld’s testimony satisfied the first prong of Althen, under the very deferential standard of review afforded the decision of the special master, it was not arbitrary and capricious for him to find Dr. Maclaren’s testimony more credible than that of Dr. Shoenfeld, and thereby give substantial weight to Dr. Maelaren’s rejection of a causal link between the MMR vaccine and Petitioner’s Type 1 diabetes. See Lampe, 219 F.3d at 1360 (<HOLDING>); see also Crutchfield, 2014 WL 1665227, at *10 Holdings: 0: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 1: holding that the united states court of federal claims may not reweigh the factual evidence quoting munn 970 f2d at 871 2: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort including fraud 3: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states 4: holding that plaintiffs negligence claims sounded in tort and thus could not be transferred to the united states court of federal claims


Input: Property (Mortgage ) § 5.1(a), an “assumption of liability” means “a promise by the transferee of mortgaged real estate, whether made to the transferor or to the mortgagee, to perform the obligation secured-by the mortgage.” (emphasis added); see also Burlington State Bank v. Tucker, 76 S.W.2d 811, 814 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1934, writ refused) (“Her father’s obligation would not under said statute become her personal obligation; but she could, for the protection of her inheritance, validly assume it ....”). Wells Fargo cites several cases stating that every party to a contract must agree to modify that contract. See, e.g., Powell v. Thompson, 130 Tex. 577, 112 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex.1938); Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 22 1, 193 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1938, writ dism’d) (<HOLDING>). Struble was not a necessary party to the Holdings: 0: holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder 1: holding that note marked in rem gave maker no liability at all beyond property itself and that creditor was unable to maintain any action against maker to reach any of makers other assets 2: holding that a bank is required to notify the maker of a promissory note by some affirmative act upon exercise of its option to accelerate the maturity date of the note 3: holding failure to pay a debt due under a promissory note is a breach of contract claim under florida law 4: holding that even after a debt has been assumed a creditor can look to the maker for the collection of its note and the enforcement of its lien upon the assuming partys failure to pay


Input: submitted in support of their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Federal Defendants and Nebraska argue that this extra-record evidence is impermissible under the APA’s limitation on “the scope of judicial review.. .to the administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time that he or she made the decisions.” Fed. Defs.’ Mot. at 5 (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. Costie, 657 F.2d 275, 285 (D.C.Cir.1981). While it is true that “[a]s a general rule, plaintiffs may not supplant or supplement the administrative record,” Fed. Defs.’ Mot. at 6 (citing Peterson Farms I v. Madigan, 1992 WL 118370 (D.D.C.1992)), this Circuit has recognized that courts may consider extra-record evidence in its review of agency actions under certain circumstances. See Costle, 657 F.2d at 286. (<HOLDING>). The D.C. Circuit has also recognized that Holdings: 0: holding that the proper inquiry for the categorical approach is whether the conduct covered by the crime presents the requisite risk of injury in the ordinary case 1: holding that a party seeking to seal a judicial record  bears the burden of overcoming  the compelling reasons standard 2: holding appeal of termination is limited to information that is part of the record 3: holding that in determining whether the defendant has a prior conviction for burglary under the armed career criminal act the federal court may look only to the terms of the charging document the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant or to some comparable judicial record of this information 4: recognizing a judicial venture outside the record for background information or to determine the presence of the requisite fullness of the reasons given


Input: lesser included offense. State v. Espinosa, 686 So.2d 1345 (Fla.1996). However, in State v. Von Deck, 607 So.2d 1388 (Fla.1992), our Supreme Court held that an instruction cannot be given on a permissive lesser included offense unless both the accusatory pleading and the evidence at trial support the commission of that lesser included offense. Here, the information filed against Donovan alleged the charge of kidnapping as follows: COUNT 1: In the County of BRE-VARD, State of Florida, on July 11, 1999, Michael Curtis Donovan, did forcibly, secretly or by threat, confine abduct or imprison another person [K.B.] ag conviction because it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on that permissive lesser included offense. See Torrence v. State, 440 So.2d 392 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)(<HOLDING>). Donovan also argues that he was entitled to Holdings: 0: holding that where evidence was sufficient for attempted murder it was necessarily sufficient for aggravated assault which is a lesser included offense 1: holding that aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense in prosecution for armed burglary attempted robbery and use of a firearm in the com mission of a felony because the allegation in the information that the accused carried a firearm was insufficient to charge the elements of aggravated assault 2: holding that in a prosecution for possession of an unregistered firearm evidence of an armed robbery committed with the firearm was admissible 3: holding that the 1020life sentence was improperly imposed stating the absence of any allegation in the information that appellant discharged a firearm during the aggravated assault deprived him of notice that he was subject to a mandatory minimum of twenty years the jurys finding that he discharged a firearm during the course of the aggravated assault did not cure the defect in the information 4: holding reclassification impermissible where underlying felony of attempted thirddegree murder with a firearm was aggravated assault and aggravated assault includes the use of a deadly weapon as a necessary element


Input: Michael Ray Rogers, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s judgment dismissing, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, his civil rights action alleging that the United States Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine by requiring prison staff to assess and collect prisoners’ district court filing fees in installments pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Cooper v. Pickett, 187 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir.1997), and we affirm. Because the PLRA’s filing fee requirement is a procedural rule that does not infringe on the authority of the courts, the district court did not err by dismissing Rogers’ action. Cf. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Rogers’ contention that this court erred by Holdings: 0: holding that the plras three strikes rule is a procedural rule that does not violate the separation of powers doctrine 1: recognizing a referendum on a court judgment would violate separation of powers 2: recognizing separation of powers doctrine 3: recognizing that the judicial rewriting of a statute would violate the separation of powers doctrine 4: holding that adam walsh act does not violate procedural due process require excessive bail or violate separation of powers


Input: not assert that she imported Pike is inconsistent with her interpretation of Shallal. No cases support Talhelm’s attempt to read the public-body requirement out of the statute. The relevant precedents are strictly to the contrary. See, e.g., Richards v. Metron Integrated Health Sys., No. 242502, 2004 WL 443991, at *2 (Mich. Ct.App. Mar.11, 2004) (unpublished opinion) (nursing home employee did not meet the “public body” element when he threatened to report patient abuse to higher-ups at the company); Roulston, 608 N.W.2d at 530-31 (denying employer’s motion for summary judgment against employee who had reported suspected resident abuse at a nursing home to state investigators); see also Allen v. Charter County of Wayne, 192 Fed.Appx. 347, 350-51 (6th Cir.2006) (unpublished opinion) (<HOLDING>). The Michigan Supreme Court has recently Holdings: 0: holding woman who alleged she was terminated for having an abortion stated a prima facie case for discrimination 1: holding that a juror who initially equivocated as to her impartiality could be found impartial after she affirmatively said she thought she could be fair 2: holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position 3: holding that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of age discrimination based upon a showing that she was a member of the protected group she was qualified and capable of doing her job she was discharged and that her manager called her old woman thus evincing agebased animus sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent 4: holding that employee who admitted that she had no intention of affirmatively seeking out the state auditors or giving them any information  unless she was specifically asked could not establish a prima facie case


Input: his claims during “both the period of time before the ineffective assistance of counsel was or should have been discovered and the period from that point until the motion to reopen is filed.”). In fact, although Zheng stated that he did not learn of the ineffective assistance of his former counsel until he hired an attorney to file his motion to reopen in 2010, he failed to assert that he took any action in his proceedings during the more than seven years between his order of removal and the filing of his motion to reopen. See id. Finally, Zheng does not challenge the BIA’s determination that he failed to establish his prima facie eligibility for relief based on his practice of Falun Gong in the United States. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for Holdings: 0: recognizing that bia may deny motion to reopen where movant has not established prima facie eligibility for relief sought 1: recognizing that failure to offer new previously unavailable evidence establishing a prima facie case for the underlying relief sought is a proper ground on which the bia may deny a motion to reopen 2: holding that the bia may deny a motion to reopen on the ground that the movant has not established prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought 3: recognizing that there are at least three independent grounds on which the bia may deny a motion to reopen 1 failure to establish a prima facie case 2 failure to introduce evidence that was material and previously unavailable and 3 a determination that despite the aliens statutory eligibility for relief he or she is not entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion 4: holding that a movants failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief is a proper ground for the bia to deny a motion to reopen


Input: claim that the State negligently placed the barrels. Id. at 251 (emphasis in original). The court explained that the maintenance crew was merely carrying out the policy of the State because the barrel and sign warning system chosen by the crew complied with the department of transportation’s Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Id. Thus, the court held that the decision to warn rather than repair was discretionary, and the decision to use barrels and signs, as opposed to another warning device, was discretionary. Id. In contrast, when a governmental unit fails to maintain public works, such as a storm drainage system, or street and storm sewers, those activities are not discretionary functions. See City of Fort Worth v. Gay, 977 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the State contends that the Holdings: 0: holding that a city could not be held vicariously liable for the act of a magistrate who was immune from liability 1: holding a city liable for personal injuries caused by a driver colliding with a girder in the center of a city street where the city did not give a warning 2: holding city not immune from liability where claims were based on the citys failure to maintain clean and inspect an area of the street 3: recognizing that a judge is not absolutely immune from criminal liability 4: holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city


Input: (“service effected on a registered agent within the scope of its agency is imputed to the litigant”). On that date, CT Corp. had the duty to receive or accept and forward the process or lawsuit to WCT. See Tex. Bus. Orgs.Code Aun. § 5.206(a)(1) (West 2012). WCT argues that CT Corp. had no obligation to forward the process to WCT because CT Corp. was the registered agent for a second entity that used the same common name. The dilemma faced by CT Corp. does not, however, alter the applicable law. By contracting to act as the registered agent of WCT, CT Corp. became WCT’s agent on whom Arnold was entitled to serve the lawsuit she filed against WCT in its assumed name. See Cummings v. HCA Health Servs, of Tex., Inc., 799 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>); see also Chilkewitz, 22 S.W.3d at 830 Holdings: 0: holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service 1: holding service on hospital corporation of america dba tidelands general hospital was service on the assumed name and constituted service on hca health services inc dba tidelands general hospital because ct corporation system was the registered agent for both 2: holding that claim against hospital regarding patients fall caused by defective footboard on hospital bed constituted health care liability claim 3: holding that because the contract between the hospital and the health insurance company had a hold harmless provision which stated the hospital would not bill or hold insurance subscribers liable for any hospital expenses covered by the subscribers insurance contract and all expenses from the patients treatment for the automobile accident were covered in such contract there was no debt upon which the hospital could assert a lien pursuant to the states hospital lien statute 4: holding service on registered agent jack h brown was service on jack h brown  company dba signgraphics even though jack h brown was also the registered agent for signgraphics inc


Input: Ann. § 21-3-201 to -203, -205 (Michie 1996), which prohibits age discrimination in public employment but does not manifest consent to be sued for such discrimination in federal court. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (“A state will be deemed to have waived its immunity only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.”) (internal quotations omitted); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 493 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm. 1 . The Honorable Holdings: 0: holding that tribes did not waive their immunity by intervening in  administrative proceedings because any waiver must be unequivocal and may not be implied 1: holding that the tribal defendants removal of the case amounted to a clear and unequivocal waiver of immunity in federal court 2: holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal 3: holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity 4: holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence


Input: 722, 724 (3d Cir.2009) ("If it is necessary to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence, the court may conduct a hearing." (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted in Rainey) (quoting Durant v. Husband, 28 F.3d 12, 15 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2)))). 9 ."Delay in realizing satisfaction on a claim rarely serves to establish the degree of prejudice sufficient to prevent the opening [of] a default judgment” in favor of a defendant who has appeared, Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., Ltd., 691 F.2d 653, 656-57 (3d Cir.1982) (emphasis added), but the standard must apply differently when the district court is evaluating whether to grant default judgment against an absent defendant. Cf. Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 164 (<HOLDING>). See also infra note 11. 10 . See Chamberlain, Holdings: 0: holding that default judgment was not warranted where the defendant answered late but answered 1: holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact 2: holding 1 that where a defendant who previously answered does not appear for trial a plaintiffs only remedy is to make a motion with the court to continue with that trial 2 that entry of default is not authorized and 3 that the hearing held under such circumstances is uncontested as distinguished from a default hearing 1 quoting warden v lamb 98 calapp 738 277 p 867 868 1929 3: holding that on appeal a nonmovant need not have answered or responded to the motion for summary judgment to contend that the movants summaiy judgment proof is insufficient as a matter of law to support summary judgment 4: holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment


Input: (Morgan), 156 Pa.Cmwlth.304, 627 A.2d 250 (1993), aff'd, 545 Pa. 70, 680 A.2d 823 (1994). It is clear that an employer must pay medical expenses after indemnity benefits have been suspended until the employer’s petition to review medicals is granted. Consolidated Freightways v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Jester), 145 Pa.Cmwlth.369, 603 A.2d 291 (1992). See also Deremer v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 61 Pa. Cmwlth. 415, 433 A.2d 926 (1981). However, an employer’s liability does not extend beyond the time when compensation benefits are terminated. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Randall), 545 Pa. 22, 679 A.2d 765 (1996); Consolidated Freightways. See also Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments Div., 526 Pa. 25, 32, 584 A.2d 301, 304 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Article III (Liability and Compensation), Holdings: 0: holding that default termination is government claim 1: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of social security disability benefits 2: holding that a termination of benefits must go handinhand with a termination of the liability of an employer 3: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable 4: holding that termination is an adverse employment action


Input: file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in tribal court. Mr. Valenzuela argues that the district court was incorrect. He asserts that he exhausted all tribal court remedies and that “[a]ny further attempts to exhaust tribal remedies would be futile and result in irreparable damage.” Aplt. Br. at 18. First, Mr. Valenzuela argues that he waived his right to appeal in his written plea agreement and therefore had no tribal court remedies to exhaust. We agree with the district court that Mr. Valenzuela’s appeal waiver does not excuse his failure to pursue habeas corpus relief in the tribal court. The appeal waiver did not expressly waive Mr. Valenzuela’s right to collaterally attack his conviction in tribal court. See United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1181-83 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). That step was necessary to exhaust Mr. Holdings: 0: holding that under oregon law an agreement must be supported by consideration to be legally enforceable 1: holding appellate waivers are enforceable if invoked by the government 2: holding that waivers of  2255 collateral attack rights must be expressly stated to be enforceable 3: holding federal regulations have the force of law and may create enforceable rights 4: holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy


Input: class, so it appears that they seek to include all fifty states. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 94-97.) Again, like the consumer protection issue, courts faced with the question of whether variations in the state law of unjust enrichment bar class certification have reached different outcomes. Compare, e.g., Overka v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 265 F.R.D, 14, 19-21 (D. Mass. 2010) (stating that “unjust enrichment claims in different states are substantially similar” and certifying a 34-state class) and In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 220 F.R.D. 672, 697 n.40 (S.D, Fla. 2004) (stating that the “standards for evaluating various states classes’ unjust enrichment claims are virtually identical”) with Casa Orlando Apartments, Ltd. v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 624 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Rapp v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 302 F.R.D. Holdings: 0: holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed 1: holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment 2: holding that unjust enrichment is brought about by unlawful or improper conduct as defined by law 3: holding that plaintiffs survey here fails to show that burden of proof standards do not vary or that differences in state unjust enrichment laws are insignificant 4: holding that walsh does not support plaintiffs assertion that they need not allege any actual injury to bring an unjust enrichment claim


Input: came too late.”). The district court acted within its discretion in dismissing Adams’s duplicative complaint with prejudice and preventing her from “fragment[ing] a single cause of action and [ ] litigating] piecemeal the issues which could have been resolved in one action.” Flynn v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 418 F.2d 668, 668 (9th Cir.1969) (per curiam). AFFIRMED. 1 . We note that we are affirming the district court’s dismissal on the basis that the second action was duplicative of the first, and not on the basis that the district court had the discretion to dismiss the second action as a sanction for failing to comply with the Rule 16 scheduling order issued in the first action. Cf. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 146 F.3d 1071, 1073-74 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the plaintiff in Atchison, Adams was Holdings: 0: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint 1: holding that a district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs statelaw claims after dismissing the plaintiffs federal claims and did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand the case to state court 2: holding that the district court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing all 26 grounds in a  2255 motion where only certain claims were vague and conclusory 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court 4: holding that district court abused its discretion in dismissing a secondfiled action with prejudice where plaintiffs claims against a thirdparty defendant were permissive not mandatory under federal rule of civil procedure 14


Input: be designed specifically to accommodate creditors like LVNV, who claim to be unable to produce documents. Given these provisions, it is difficult to understand how providing a summary of documents supporting a claim, or at least providing an explanation for why the proof of claim has nothing attached to it, unduly burdens creditors. The only explanation could be that certain creditors wish to continue their routine of executing and filing proofs of claim without objection and without any evidence — essentially, without having to do any work. This practice violates the Bankruptcy Rules and undermines the bedrock notion of the legal system that claimants bear the burden of proving their claims. See Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 21, 120 S.Ct. 1951, 147 L.Ed.2d 13 (2000) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons stated above, LVNVs original Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 1: recognizing burden 2: recognizing that the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself and that one who asserts a claim has the burden of proof that normally comes with it 3: holding burden of proof is on one asserting an affirmative defense 4: recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial


Input: the movant “ ‘presents claims subject to the requirements for successive applications as well as claims cognizable under Rule 60(b),’ ” such a motion is a mixed Rule 60(b)/§ 2255 motion. Id. at 400 (quoting United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 207 (4th Cir. 2003)). In his Rule 60(b) motion, Strom sought a remedy for a perceived flaw in his § 2255 proceeding — namely, the district court’s failure, in ruling on the § 2255 motion, to address Strom’s claims of actual innocence and that plea counsel induced Strom’s guilty plea by assuring Strom that he would receive a 10-year sentence — and raised a direct attack on his conviction and sentence. Accordingly, the motion was a mixed Rule 60(b)/§ 2255 motion. McRae, 793 F.3d at 397, 400; see Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n.4, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (<HOLDING>); Winestock, 340 F.3d at 207 (stating that “a Holdings: 0: recognizing the trial courts responsibility to inquire where matters are raised which might entitle the movant to relief under rule 60b  1: holding that appellate courts can review the denial of a rule 60b motion by appeal even if the appellant mistakenly files a petition for a writ of mandamus 2: holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc  3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp 3: holding that district court correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction to consider rule 60b motion after appellate decision because movant cited no material change of circumstances or new evidence 4: holding that a movant files a true rule 60b motion when he  asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in error


Input: the contempt. (d) A rule provided for under subsection (b) may not issue until the facts alleged to constitute the contempt have been: (1) brought to the knowledge of the court by an information; and (2) duly verified by the oath of affirmation of some officers of the court or other responsible person. (emphasis added). The initial motion for contempt filed by Co-Alliance was not verified as required by Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-5(d)(2). However, we have held that “not every technical requirement of the indirect contempt statute must be followed, so long as the contempt defendant’s due process rights are respected.” In re Contempt of Wabash Valley Hosp., Inc., 827 N.E.2d 50, 63 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); cf. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114, 118 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (<HOLDING>). Benson does not mention in his appellant’s Holdings: 0: holding that a state application for relief had not been properly filed because it was not accompanied by an oath as required by state law 1: holding that pleading captioned petition for rule to show cause implies that proceedings will be civil because a criminal defendant can never be compelled to show cause 2: holding that because the court could not consider police reports it could not rely on an attorneys argument based on the police report as the basis for determining the statutory basis for a conviction 3: holding that the hospital failed to show how it was harmed by failure to verify the rule to show cause 4: holding that because the petition lacked verification by oath it faded to meet the statutory requirements and could not serve as a basis for a rule to show cause


Input: to raise it in a subsequent application. See Silvesan v. State, 1999 ND 62, ¶ 12, 591 N.W.2d 131. He may not raise this issue now. See id. C [¶ 14] Finally, Murchison contends he was denied a fast .and speedy trial. [¶ 15] Section 29-32.1-12(1), N.D.C.C., allows a court to deny a post-conviction application on the grounds of res judicata if the same claims have been fully and finally determined in a previous proceeding. See Hughes, 2002 ND 28, ¶ 8, 639 N.W.2d 696. [¶ 16] Murchison raised the speedy trial argument in his first Application for Post-Conviction Hearing. When that application was denied by the trial court, Murchison did not appeal. Murchison has had this issue fully and finally determined in a previous proceeding. See Murchison, 1998 ND 96, ¶ 11, 578 N.W.2d 514 (<HOLDING>). The doctrine of res judicata cannot be Holdings: 0: holding that a ground for relief not pled in a motion for postconviction relief is waived and cannot be raised on appeal 1: holding that when no appeal was taken from an initial application for postconviction relief the claims were fully and finally determined in that previous proceeding 2: holding that issues were not waived on subsequent appeal when initial appeal was dismissed 3: holding that postconviction relief claims which either were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal were properly denied without an evidentiary hearing 4: holding that postconviction proceeding is a civil suit


Input: immunity. See Validity and Construction of Indian Reorganization Act, 28 A.L.R. Fed.2d 563 at § 27 (citing cases); but see id. at § 28 (citing cases holding that sue-and-be sued clause does not constitute express waiver). Here, however, CNI’s charter does not contain a broad sue-and-be-sued clause; instead, the ability to take legal action is limited to action approved by the board of directors. Thus, even if we were to conclude that a broad sue-and-be-sued clause waives tribal-sovereign immunity, this clause is insufficient to do the job. Cf. Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir.2000) (“[T]he enactment of such an ordinance ... does not waive a tribe’s sovereign immunity.... [The o uper. 357, 747 A.2d 837, 841-42, 844 (1999) (<HOLDING>); but see Rush Creek Solutions, Inc. v. Ute Holdings: 0: holding that an act of legislature may be required to waive sovereign immunity 1: holding that a senior vice presidents signature to an agreement with an express waiver of sovereign immunity provision did not waive sovereign immunity because that right was reserved exclusively to the tribal council 2: holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity 3: holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity 4: holding that a controllers signature on a contract containing a forum selection clause was insufficient to waive sovereign immunity in part because the right to waive immunity was reserved to the tribal council


Input: Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which, among other things, imposes federal criminal penalties on sex offenders who knowingly fail to register or update their registrations. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250; 42 U.S.C. § 16913. Congress enacted SORNA in 2006 but delegated to the Attorney General the authority to determine whether and when SORNA should apply retroactively to sex offenders convicted before SORNA’s effective date. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d); Reynolds v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 975, 181 L.Ed.2d 935 (2012). The Attorney General has exercised this authority and made SORNA retroactive, but the circuits have split over which action by the Attorney General was successful in making the statute retroactive. Compare United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that sorna is only unconstitutional when applied to those previouslyconvicted persons who traveled before the attorney generals rule 1: holding that the act is not retroactive 2: holding that the act is retroactive 3: holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term 4: holding that sorna was made retroactive by the attorney generals february 28 2007 interim rule


Input: on this aspect of his appeal. Similarly, Culver merely asserted, without more, that Deborah Culver’s physical possession of the property on the date she filed for bankruptcy is a sufficient interest in property under section 541 to trigger the automatic stay. (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Stay Pending Appeal at 6). Whether the debtor has an interest in property is determined by non-bankruptcy law. William L. Norton, Jr., Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 51:5 (2d ed.2002) (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979)). Culver has not identified any body of Maryland law recognizing that a mere possessory interest in property is sufficient to invoke the automatic stay. Cf. In re Ford, 3 B.R. 559, 565 (Bankr.Md.1980), aff'd, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Culver has not met his burden of Holdings: 0: holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property 1: holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property 2: holding that the debtors interest in a broadcasting license constitutes property of the estate 3: holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code 4: holding that a debtors interest in a tenancy by the entirety is property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 because of debtors undivided present interests in the use possession income and right of survivorship of the property


Input: [the victim] was dying, did she c tention that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by invoking the victim’s memory and referring to spiritual authority. As noted, the prosecutor stated in closing remarks, “[i]t is fitting and proper that I do this for [the victim’s] memory,” and “this closing speech [has] become, for me, sort of a benediction for all the evil that we have been confronted with in this case.” N.T., Oct. 28, 1994 at 3. The prosecutor further concluded his remarks by stating, “God bless you.” Id. at 18. The trial court held that such references did not amount to the type of religious inferences that warrant the grant of a new trial. PCRA Court Opinion, Oct. 13, 2010, at 24 (citing Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (1991) (<HOLDING>)). The PCRA court reiterated the trial court’s Holdings: 0: holding that a new trial was warranted where there is reasonable probability that the false testimony introduced by the government influenced the outcome of the trial 1: holding that a new trial was warranted where the prosecutor stated as the bible says and the murderer shall be put to death 2: holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the defendants timely motion for the substitution of the participating prosecutor in order to permit the defense to call the prosecutor as a witness 3: holding that a seven week suspension of the speedy trial clock was warranted under the ends of justice provision where the chief prosecutor was ill and new assistant prosecutors required time to prepare for trial 4: holding that where the courts instructions caused a jury to consider erroneous criterion of liability plaintiff was prejudiced and new trial was warranted


Input: F.3d 135, 143 (4th Cir.2010) (“Because we hold that an indictment need not set forth vicarious coconspirator liability, it was not error for the district court to instruct the jury on this theory.”). As members of the conspiracy, all of the defendants, including Phun, were legally responsible for the possession of firearms, which was a reasonably foreseeable act by their cocon-spirators in furtherance of that conspiracy. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180. 10 . The defendants do not contest, and we find, that Snyder’s testimony met Rule 701’s second requirement, as it was undoubtedly helpful to the jury's ability to understand the conversations. 11 . Even if we were to follow the Ninth Circuit's approach in United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), there is no indication that Snyder gave any Holdings: 0: holding that an experts testimony that a victims symptoms were consistent with administration of a date rape drug were admissible 1: holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible 2: holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment 3: holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible 4: holding inadmissible an agents testimony that certain activities were consistent with those of an experienced drug trafficker


Input: video disks (DVDs). According to the officers, Officer Molinaro discovered a gun in Williams’s waistband during a search of his person after the arrest. It was later determined that Williams had several prior felony convictions, and Williams was indicted under § 922(g)(1) in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Williams elected to go to trial. Prior to trial, he stipulated that he was a convicted felon so that the name and nature of his recent prior convictions — a 1991 conviction for possession with intent to distribute heroin, a 1995 conviction for possession with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine, and a 1995 handgun conviction— would not be introduced to the jury. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The prosecution called Officers Molinaro and Holdings: 0: holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction 1: holding that a defendants denial of a conviction may be contradicted by introducing public records which prove such a conviction 2: holding that fedrevid 403 prohibits the government from introducing the name or nature of a prior felony conviction in a  922g1 case when such information would tend to lure a juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning regarding a defendant who had stipulated to his felon status 3: holding that prior indiana felony was conviction for purposes of defendants  922g1 prosecution and noting that although state law determines whether there is a predicate statelaw conviction once the conviction is established federal law dictates that the convicted felon may not possess any firearm 4: holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded


Input: the MERS system supplies the thinnest possible veneer of formality and legality to the wholesale marketing of home mortgages to large institutional investors. But what of it? MERS’s certifying officers “purport[ ] to hold the position of ... vice president, ... secretary, ... [or] assistant to ... such office or position.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 54B. That they hold themselves out as officers of MERS, the “entity holding [the] mortgage,” is all that the statute requires with respect to a signer’s authority. Id. The corporate resolution, however auto-generated, does give them actual authority to act on MERS behalf. Indeed, this is immaterial. Even without it, their assignments would be “binding upon [MERS] ... [and] entitled to be recorded.” Id.; see Kiah, 2011 WL 841282, at *7 (<HOLDING>); In re Marrón, 2011 WL 3800040, at *3 (“Though Holdings: 0: holding assignment of a mortgage was not subject to article 9 1: holding that even if the individual who signed the mortgage assignment lacked the authority to do so the assignment would still be binding on mers because he purported to be authorized 2: holding that the putative noteholder lacked standing to foreclose because mers lacked authority to assign the note though it arguably had authority to assign the mortgage 3: holding plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the validity of an assignment from mers to bac because she was not a party to the assignment and the assignment did not affect her underlying obligation to make timely payments 4: holding article 9 inapplicable to an assignment of a mortgage on real estate


Input: limited arbitration provision are legal in nature,” we review the district court’s judgment de novo. Paul Revere Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Kirschhofer, 226 F.3d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir.2000). “The FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.” Dialysis Access Ctr., LLC v. RMS Lifeline, Inc., 638 F.3d 367, 376 (1st Cir.2011) (quoting Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2776, 177 L.Ed.2d 403 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Employers and employees may contractually agree to submit federal claims, including claims under the ADA, to arbitration. Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 149-51 (1st Cir.1998); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Holdings: 0: holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration 1: holding that title vii claim was subject to compulsory arbitration 2: holding age discrimination claim barred 3: holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration 4: holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists


Input: court rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of the Department. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the transfer of a lawsuit from a county of proper venue to another county of proper venue is not reversible error. II. The Department contends that the transfer of a civil lawsuit from a county that qualifies as a proper venue to another county that might originally have been considered a proper venue is not reversible error as a matter of law. We disagree. Venue selection presupposes that the parties to the lawsuit have choices and preferences about where their ease will be tried. See Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 15.001-15.040 (Vernon 1986 & Supp.1994); Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enterprise Prod. Co., 833 S.W.2d 736, 741 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Venue may be proper in many counties under Holdings: 0: recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue 1: holding that the state has the right to elect in which county the offense may be prosecuted where the jurisdiction is concurrent under the statutes and until the final judgment which operates as a bar to further prosecution in either county the states right of selection of the forum continues 2: holding that suit against county sheriff in his official capacity was suit against county 3: recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions  4: recognizing that the plaintiff has the right to file suit in any permissible county


Input: but deemed unsalable. Perfetti moved for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction against Defendants after learning that Defendants had diverted the candy to retail stores for sale rather than recycling it. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants Perfet-ti’s motion for a preliminary injunction. I. Facts This Court draws the facts from the Verified Complaint, the affidavits and sworn declarations filed by Perfetti, and the testimony and exhibits from the hearing on May 28, 2015. See Doe v. S. Iron R-l Sch. Dist., 498 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir.2007) (affirming a preliminary injunction based on a verified complaint and additional documents); Movie Sys., Inc. v. MAD Minneapolis Audio Distribs., 717 F.2d 427, 431-32 (8th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Perfetti is a global manufacturer of candy Holdings: 0: holding that party may not rely on conclusory statements or an argument that the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment are not credible 1: holding that courts may rely solely on affidavits in granting preliminary injunctions 2: holding that a court may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence including hearsay evidence at the preliminary injunction stage 3: holding that a school may assert the rights of its students parents and gathering cases granting injunctions to businesses on behalf of customers 4: holding that statements in affidavits based solely on hearsay are inadmissible as summary judgment evidence


Input: need for the expert’s testimony that it cannot obtain without “undue hardship, which is necessary to overcome a motion to quash by an unretained expert.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee’s note (An expert can “withhold their expertise” unless the subpoenaing party can “show[ ] a substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship; and ensures that the subpoenaed person will be reasonably compensated”); see also Chavez ex rel. v. Board of Educ. of Tularosa Mun. School, No. CIV-05-380JB/RLP, 2007 WL 1306734, at *6 (D.N.M. Feb. 16, 2007). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there are no other comparable witnesses that are unwilling to testify on its behalf regarding the subject patents-in-suit. Id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I find it unnecessary to Holdings: 0: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive 1: holding defendants could not be guilty as parties when the state failed to show they knew the criminality of the conduct they assisted 2: holding that the expert failed to explain how the defendants device operated in an equivalent manner to one of the patent claims 3: recognizing that it is the proponents burden to demonstrate the admissibility of expert scientific testimony 4: holding the subpoenaing parties failed to demonstrate they could not obtain substantial equivalent testimony to that of the unretained expert


Input: remains in full force and effect as to such other acts.” Id. (citing Sanchez v. Dickinson, 551 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ)). When the parties have agreed to rights and obligations that are “collateral to and independent of the conveyance, such as completion of construction or escrow agreements pending construction,” those rights “survive[ ] a deed that is silent in respect to the construction or escrow agreement.” Id. We thus held in Harris that the parties’ execution of an escrow agreement “contemporaneously with” their - execution of a deed that “pertained only to the conveyance” itself “plainly shows” that the parties “did not intend to merge the conditions of the agreement into the deed.” Id. S.W.2d 818, 823 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1962, writ refused n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). , Because Ms. Cosgrove’s promise to correct Holdings: 0: holding that deed was valid when the deed was conveyed to grantee corporation which formally incorporated after the conveyance 1: holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed 2: holding that sellers agreement to furnish title policy was a separate agreement not superseded by the deed and properly not included in the deed 3: holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed 4: recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title


Input: rights are never property rights or that the Government may always take them for their own benefit without compensation. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223-24, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (internal conditional grant of funds to California did not subject the federal government to liability for California’s actions. Second, California’s legislature cannot be considered to have acted under federal ore, cannot be construed as a grant of authority for California to pass legislation on behalf of the federal government. This is not even a case in which Congress first regulated a particular field and then delegated its authority to regulate that field to another sovereign entity. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975) (<HOLDING>). California had, at all times, the inherent Holdings: 0: holding indian tribes subject to gamblingrelated taxes from which states are exempt 1: holding in the context of an adea claim that an indian tribes sovereign immunity had not been abrogated by congress and subject matter jurisdiction did not exist 2: holding that federal legislation with respect to indian tribes  is not based upon impermissible racial classifications and noting that article i  8 of the constitution gives congress the power to regulate commerce  with the indian tribes 3: holding that congress which regulated the introduction of alcoholic beverages in indian country could validly delegate to indian tribes its authority to regulate that subject matter because indian tribes themselves possessed independent authority over the subject matter 4: holding the constitution vests the federal government with exclusive authority over relations with indian tribes


Input: Fee Statements covering May of 2010 contain two expense charges: $14.25 in FedEx delivery services and $2.44 in total postage costs. [Adv. Doc. No. 87-3, p. 16]. The Court concludes that both of these expenses—totaling $16.69— are reasonable and, therefore, recoverable as a portion of McKool Smith’s sanction award. In sum, the Court concludes that McKool Smith is entitled to $73,522.85 in fees and $655.15 in expenses, for a total amount of $74,178.00. This award represents both the amount of fees and expenses this Court determines were reasonably expended by McKool Smith in prosecuting the Original Motion for Sanctions, in addition to the amount this Court believes is appropriate to deter repetition of the Plaintiffs’ bad faith conduct. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (<HOLDING>); Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Holdings: 0: holding that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct or uncharged criminal conduct 1: holding that the court should limit the amount of sanctions to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated 2: holding that government breached agreement to not recommend incarceration by arguing to the court that the defendant lacked remorse and the court should use the case to deter others from committing tax evasion 3: holding article 1802 claims only survive where the conduct alleged of is based on tortious or negligent conduct different from the conduct covered by other specific labor laws involved 4: recognizing that the legislature may effectively limit the scope of the victims bill of rights by decriminalizing certain conduct or redefining the type of conduct that qualifies as a criminal offense


Input: the jury found that Moncivais did not commit the murder under the immediate influence of sudden passion and assessed punishment at 50 years’ confinement. Moncivais timely appealed. Sufficiency of the Evidence Moncivais contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he did not kill Erik under the immediate influence of sudden passion. A. Sudden Passion Proof of sudden passion can reduce an offense from a first degree felony to a second degree felony and the defendant must prove sudden passion by a preponderance of the evidence. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(d) (West 2003); see McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); see also Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 206, 211-12 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). “‘Sudden passion’ means passion directly Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant must prove an affirmative defense at sentencing stage by a preponderance of evidence 1: holding at trial a criminal defendant has the burden to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence 2: holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that defendant bears burden at punishment phase to prove issue of sudden passion by preponderance of evidence 4: holding that defendant bears burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that factors other than the condemned discrimination caused the decision of which claimant complains


Input: 6 . A plaintiff may prove discrimination through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Ramsey v. City & County of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (10th Cir.1990). Proof of "an existing policy which itself constitutes discrimination” would constitute direct evidence. Id. at 1008. But contrary to Mr. Jones’s argument, the record does not contain direct evidence of a discriminatory policy. In order to be "direct,” evidence must prove “the existence of a fact in issue without inference or presumption.” Hall v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 476 F.3d 847, 854 (10th Cir.2007) (quotation omitted). For example, an employer's express adoption of a discriminatory policy constitutes direct evidence. See Trans World. Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) (<HOLDING>). To prove the existence of a discriminatory Holdings: 0: holding that an employers policy requiring female employees to make larger pension fund contributions than male employees was discriminatory on its face in violation of title vii 1: holding that a complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face 2: recognizing that whether an employee uses the mcdonnell douglas approach or relies on direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent the employee must counter the employers legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action in such a manner as to create a genuine issue as to discriminatory intent 3: holding section 61137 unconstitutional on its face 4: holding employers admitted policy discriminatory on its face


Input: has been a "legislative delegation” of regulatory authority to an administrative agency, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, courts must defer to that agency’s interpretation of that statute, so long as that interpretation is "based on a permissible construction of the statute,” id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. The NLRB’s interpretation of the Act receives this "Chevron deference” unless its interpretation is unreasonable. See N.L.R.B. v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713, 121 S.Ct. 1861, 149 L.Ed.2d 939 (2001). 4 . The holding of N.L.R.B. v. C. & C. Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 87 S.Ct. 559, 17 L.Ed.2d 486 (1967), is not to the contrary. That case dealt with the jurisdiction of the Board to adjudicate matters turning on contractual interpretation. Id. at 428, 87 S.Ct. 559 (<HOLDING>); see also Bath Marine Draftsmen’s Ass’n v. Holdings: 0: holding that terms of 29 usc  156 authorizing the nlrb to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the act grant the nlrb broad rulemaking authority 1: holding that this court must remand to the bia to allow it to address in the first instance an issue that it has not yet considered 2: holding with respect to a certified claim that congress has determined that submission of a  claim to the contracting officer in the first instance is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a suit in the claims court 3: holding that appellate court erred by reaching question of changed country conditions where neither bia nor ij had been given a chance to address it in the first instance 4: holding that the nlrb has the authority to interpret cbas in the first instance where its interpretation is for the purpose of enforcing a statutory right which congress considered necessary to allow labor and management to get on with the process of reaching fair terms and conditions of employment


Input: vexation of conflicting claims. See Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 406-08, 59 S.Ct. 563, 567-69, 83 L.Ed. 817 (1939); John, supra, 141 F.R.D. at 33; see generally 7 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1704 at 501 (2d ed. 1986). As interpleader provides a method to compel adverse claimants to litigate their claims to property in a single proceeding, the burden is on the party seeking interpleader to demonstrate its entitlement to the remedy. Id. § 1714 at 583. The plaintiff demonstrably has failed to carry its burden in this case. In general, an existing and a prospective claim from separate parties are sufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirement of multiple liability. See Bell v. Nutmeg Airways Corp., 66 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.Conn.1975) (<HOLDING>); 3A Moore & Lucas, supra, ¶ 22.-08[2]. The Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant could not appeal a jury instruction where he did not object to the challenged instruction but in fact requested it and stated he was satisfied with it 1: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 2: holding that a defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses under  922g on the basis that he belonged to more than one prohibited class or that he simultaneously possessed more than one firearm 3: holding in the alternative that plaintiff failed to proffer sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that but for plaintiffs age he would not have been constructively discharged where plaintiff was asked on more than one occasion when he was going to retire emphasis in original 4: holding that adversity existed between plaintiff and defendantclaimants despite fact that plaintiff al leged he was nothing more than stakeholder as he requested court to enjoin future claims


Input: requirement applies to “for cause” drug testing as well as random drug testing. DOC chose not to apply these procedures in White’s case. DOC has never shown that its refusal to apply the established procedure in this case was anything other than arbitrary. The agency’s arbitrary abandonment of its published procedure encroached upon petitioner’s due process rights. See Wareham v. Singletary, 700 So.2d 427, 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court held that inmates facing disciplinary charges must be afforded certain minimal safeguards.”). By denying relief, the circuit court condoned the denial of due process. Certiorari is therefore appropriate. See Plymel v. Moore, 770 So.2d 242, 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we grant the petition for Holdings: 0: holding that a denial of due process warrants mandamus relief 1: holding that the denial of counsel to a father at a shelter hearing constituted a denial of due process renewable by certiorari 2: holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis 3: holding that to declare a denial of due process we must find a denial of fundamental fairness 4: holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc  1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action


Input: began running on October 16, 2003. Our resolution of this dispute depends upon our construction of the legal disability statute. Initially, we reiterate that [o]ur approach to statutory construction begins with the statute’s language, and if it can end there — with our finding of a clear meaning of the Legislature’s intent — then we must stop. “Our search for a statute’s purpose begins with the words of the statute itself. If the statute is unambiguous, we need only to enforce the statute as writtenf,]” with no recourse to the broader statutory scheme, legislative history, historical background, or other external sources of the Legislature’s purpose. Galaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509, 516 (Tenn.2005) (quoting In re Conservatorship of Clayton, 914 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tenn.Ct.Ap 14 (1975) (<HOLDING>); O’Brien v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 405 Mass. Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations for an attorney malpractice suit did not begin to run until the client had suffered some actual damage 1: holding the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the owning spouse reaches a pay status 2: holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury 3: holding that statute of limitations did not begin to run against a non compos mentis individual in spite of interested parties being available to bring suit 4: holding that the statute of limitations for attorney malpractice may begin to run before the plaintiff knows the full extent of his damages


Input: would have been permissible. In other words, our decision appears to have agreed with the premise that the government may use classified information without disclosure, if that information truly implicates national security. Here, the classified information implicates national security. 10 . We recognize that the utility of the methods described in text may be limited. For example, the information conveyed by an unclassified summary will be decidedly less helpful to the entity than the classified information itself. But limited utility is very different from no utility. An unclassified summary is analogous to privilege logs in the context of discovery disputes, yet their use is routine. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(5); see also MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Compare EO 13,224, § 1(a), (b) (blocking Holdings: 0: holding party seeking disqualification waives attorneyclient privilege as to the court so the court may assess the contents of allegedly confidential information and the party may present the information either in a hearing out of the presence of the party against whom confidentiality is to be protected or in camera inspection 1: holding that on a motion for attorney fees the requesting party must disclose its time sheets to the other party redacted as necessary where protected by the attorneyclient privilege 2: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees 3: holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege 4: holding that a party waives the attorneyclient privilege when it voluntarily consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the communication in issue


Input: is that drawing any inferences from a party’s failure to call a witness equally available to both sides is impermissible.”). Andrews contends that the prosecutor “effectively shifted the burden of proof in this prosecution to the defendant.” Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, Andrews’ argument that the burden of proof was shifted is not supported by the record, because the district court gave the following instructions to the jury: “[T]he defendant is presumed by the law to be innocent. The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or to produce any evidence at all. The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant.” See Iredia, 866 F.2d at 117-18 (<HOLDING>). Plain error is not shown. D Andrews contends Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 1: holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify 2: holding that prosecutors comment  if there was  evidence available to defense lawyers dont you think they would put it on  did not require reversal because district courts instruction  that burden was on the government  should have sufficiently erased any doubts as to which party had the burden of proof 3: holding the prosecutors argument if it was there they can bring it to you was not an improper jury argument 4: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff


Input: clearly erroneous findings of fact, carefully and correctly set out the law governing the issues raised, and clearly articulate the reasons underlying the decisions, issuance of a full written opinion by this court would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the opinions of the magistrate judge and the district court, we AFFIRM. We add only that, although we agree with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that because the trustee in Sharp’s bankruptcy abandoned any interest in this cause of action, Sharp has standing to bring this action and to represent the class, we would find that Sharp has standing principally on the ground that Sharp’s interest in this action was never the property of the bankruptcy estate. See In re Young, 66 F.3d 376, 378-79 (1st Cir.1995) Holdings: 0: holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code 1: holding that the texas proceeds rule is only applicable in a chapter 13 bankruptcy case and would not apply where the debtor sells homestead property postpetition in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case 2: holding that facts as they existed on the date of the original bankruptcy petition not on the date of conversion from chapter 13 to chapter 7 bankruptcy applied 3: holding that the 1994 amendment to  348 of the bankruptcy code should control in preamendment ongoing cases and that the debtors tort causes of action that accrued while the case was proceeding under chapter 13 did not become property of the estate or subject to the bankruptcy proceedings upon conversion of the case to chapter 7 proceedings 4: holding that funds held by chapter 13 trustee become property of the chapter 7 estate upon conversion not subject to exemption


Input: silent about a medical problem or tell a patient he has a clean bill of health when he does not. Pickup was justified on the same basis. SOCE therapy is analogous to prescribing a harmful drug. Liability could attach for providing SOCE therapy because the therapy had the chance to harm minors psychologically. As Pickup and Lowe recognized, however, even if quack medicine (or what the State deems to be quack medicine) can be prohibited without scrutiny, doctors cannot be prohibited from talking to their patients about quack medicine. See 472 U.S. at 231, 105 S.Ct. at 2584 (White, J„ concurring) (“I do not think [the State] could make it a crime ... privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of medical thought.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 740 F.3d at 1228 (<HOLDING>). I believe, apparently unlike the Majority, Holdings: 0: holding only that a doctor may not counsel a patient to rely on quack medicine but recognizing that a doctor may talk to patients about quack medicine such as soce emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding that disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak but they  do not prevent anyone from speaking citation and internal quotation marks omitted 2: holding that provisions in a contract established only the tribes willingness to face suit in tribal court and not an explicit waiver of tribal immunily like that in c  l enterprises emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding that competency is appropriately defined as the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed upon the convict emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted 4: recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted


Input: on evolving circumstances, they were not merely attempts to revive waived issues. For this reason, “application of the firm waiver rule here would be pointless,” and we will consider Hill’s arguments. Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 695 n. 5 (10th Cir.2004). We review a district court’s refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent prisoner in a civil case for an abuse of discretion. See Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir.1995). “The burden is on the applicant to convince the court that there is sufficient merit to his claim to warrant the appointment of counsel.” McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1985). “Only in those extreme cases where the lack of counsel results in fundamental unfairness will the district court’s decision be overturned.” Id. at 839 (<HOLDING>). We have previously directed district courts Holdings: 0: recognizing a defendants right to dismiss retained counsel in favor of appointed counsel 1: holding that the natural father who was incarcerated failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with his daughter and noting that he called his daughter once and that he did not attempt mail communication with her despite his awareness that the adoptive parents were represented by counsel and therefore he could have initiated contact through their counsel or the court to communicate with her 2: holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance 3: holding a prisoner with multiple sclerosis attending court in a wheelchair who had diminished eyesight hearing and ability to communicate and needed to present complex medical issues requiring expert opinion should have been appointed counsel 4: holding in situation of appointed counsel that if nonfrivolous issues may exist new counsel must be appointed


Input: 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980) is most instructive. In Anderson, the Supreme Court expressly held that Doyle does not apply in situations where “a defendant ... voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings [because he] has not been induced to remain silent.” Id. at 408. Here, as in Anderson, before the Defendant made his statement regarding who owned the drugs in Apartment 22, the Defendant had already answered a number of prior questions; thus, his affirmative statement (that “he did know [who the owner of the drugs was]; however, he would not inform [Agent Hayes] of that person’s name”) was not silence, but rather an admission that he knew the identity of the drug owner but refused to reveal the party’s name to Agent Hayes. See also Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 201 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Crowder, 719 F.2d 166, 168, Holdings: 0: holding that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to introduce defendants prior consistent statement statement was not admissible because it was made after defendant had been arrested clearly not a time when the effect of the statement could not have been foreseen 1: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 2: holding that the defendants statement in an application for citizenship that he had only been married once was false even if the second marriage had been a nullity because it was bigamous 3: holding that an agents testimony regarding defendants compound statement that he had been out fishing all night but he didnt wish to say any more was not a doyle violation 4: holding that fishing was not incidental to navigation


Input: plain meaning of a clear statutory text. We therefore hold that the clear text of § 2713 creates a mandatory condition precedent barring all OPA claims unless and until a claimant has presented her claims in compliance with § 2713(a) and either: (1) all responsible parties deny all liability; or (2) the claim is not settled by payment within 90 days after (A) the claim was presented, or (B) advertising was begun under section 2714(b) of the Act, whichever is later. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(c). C. Consequence of Dismissal All parties agree that the district court’s dismissal should not be treated as a dismissal with prejudice. Appellants remain free to refile this action, if and when they comply with OPA’s claims presentation procedure. See also Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31-33, 110 S.Ct. at 312 (<HOLDING>). Cf. United States v. Daniel Good Real Holdings: 0: holding that rcras notice provision is a condition precedent to all claims 1: holding agreed abatement to allow compliance with 60day notice requirement of section 74051a did not extend 120day deadline or constitute an agreement of the parties to extend 2: holding that after dismissal plaintiffs may refile suit after compliance with rcras 60day notice requirement 3: holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient 4: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered


Input: Ark. v. Hill, 122 B.R. 539, 541 (ED.Ark.1990).” In re Merrick, 175 B.R. at 336-337. To determine whether a “proceeding” is subject to the automatic stay under section 362(a)(1), many courts have followed the analysis employed in the Third Circuit which is the following: “Whether a specific judicial proceeding falls within the scope of the automatic stay must be determined by looking at the proceeding “at its inception.” “That determination should not change depending on the particular stage of the litigation at which the filing of the petition in bankruptcy occurs.” Thus, the dispositive question is whether a proceeding was “originally brought against the debtor.” Maritime Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1204-1205 (3d Cir.1992) (citations o , 491 n. 2 (8th Cir,1993) (<HOLDING>); Gecy v. Bank of Ozarks (In re Gecy), 510 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void 1: holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor  counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay 2: holding that the protections of the automatic stay apply only to actions against the debtor 3: holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay 4: holding that a thirdparty action instigated by two debtors against a third party was not subject to the automatic stay


Input: not a statute of limitations in the traditional sense, but a part of the state's insurance laws dictating what terms must be included in group health policies. As such, we question whether it could impact claims existing at the time of its passage (rather than merely claims brought under policies issued in 1985 or thereafter which included the terms required by the statute), and whether the Missouri legislature would have had reason to include any saving language in the statute. This dilemma raises the more general concern about whether provisions in state insurance codes, such as § 376.426(14), should even be considered "analogous” statutes of limitation for ERISA purposes. See Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Group Long Term Disability Ins. Program, 222 F.3d 643, 647-48 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). As stated above, however, we decline to Holdings: 0: holding that the states personal injury statutes of limitation should be applied for claims under section 1983 1: holding that statutes of limitation for bivens and  1983 actions are the same 2: holding that criminal statutes of limitation should be construed in favor of the accused 3: holding that statutes of limitations are considered substantive matters for purposes of the erie doctrine 4: holding such statutes are not analogous statutes of limitation for erisa purposes


Input: that was neither deep enough or long enough to require stitches, and a scraped elbow did not require prompt medical attention under the Eighth Amendment. See Davis v. Jones, 936 F.2d 971, 972-73 (7th Cir.1991). In sum, Pinkston’s split lip and swollen cheek do not qualify as injuries that are “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Wynn, 251 F.3d at 593. Furthermore, even if we were to assume, for purposes of argument only, that Pinkston has indeed somehow established an objectively serious medical need, he has certainly failed to demonstrate that Madry and Grisselle were deliberately indifferent to that hypothetical need. See Board, 394 F.3d at 478; see also Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407, 1420 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Woods, 233 F.3d 482, 484 Holdings: 0: holding that when findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses rule 52 demands even greater deference to the trial courts findings for only the trial judge is in a position to be aware of the variations in demeanor including but not limited to the actions mannerisms and facial expressions that bear so heavily on the listeners understanding of and belief in what is said 1: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 2: holding that a courts determination to discount the testimony of the defendants expert witnesses was a proper exercise of his discretion in weighing the demeanor credibility and persuasiveness of the evidence when ruling on a motion for a new trial 3: holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence 4: holding total deference is given to the trial courts determination of historical facts supported by the record especially when the trial courts findings turn on evaluating a witnesss credibility and demeanor


Input: error that had a “ ‘substantial and injurious [effect or influence’ ” on the outcome of the proceedings. McKenna, 65 F.3d at 1490 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). The state court’s factual findings are entitled to deference, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and the district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. McKenna, 65 F.3d at 1490. Also important to our analysis is the posture of this case, which comes to us on collateral review of Lopez’s conviction in state court, not on direct review of a conviction in federal district court. In this context, our inquiry is limited to whether Lopez was sentenced in violation of the United States Constitution. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Quoting from Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, Holdings: 0: holding that a federally issued writ of habeas corpus  reaches only convictions obtained in violation of some provision of the united states constitution 1: holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 2: holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence   3: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus 4: holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence


Input: when she applied for a supervisor’s position, Johnson was required to be fingerprinted. The fingerprints were submitted to a law enforcement agency for review and Johnson’s previous conviction for affray was disclosed. When asked to clarify or explain the criminal charge, Johnson admitted that in 1980 she had been charged with aggravated assault and affray. She stated the aggravated assault charge was dismissed and she entered a plea of nolo contendere to the affray charge and was fined. One could agree with Johnson that she might have been confused if the Board’s question was, “Have you ever been convicted of a crime?” because the term conviction is confusing to both the legal and lay communities. See Proffitt v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 658 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>). However, the Board asked not only whether Holdings: 0: holding that where a witness had been convicted seventeen years earlier but had been given probation and had not been confined the date of the conviction controlled 1: holding that because the term conviction is ambiguous to lawyers judges and laymen the claimant did not commit misconduct when she wrote she had not been convicted of felony where adjudication had been withheld 2: holding that where juror did not disclose that she had an interest in the conviction of the defendant probable prejudice is shown and the conviction must be reversed 3: holding that where possible juror misconduct is brought to the trial judges attention he or she has a duty to investigate and to determine whether there may have been a violation of the sixth amendment 4: holding that substantial evidence did not support agencys finding fear speculative when petitioner had offered evidence that she had already had two children that she planned to have more that she had gone to great lengths to avoid being sterilized in china and that she had removed her iud after escaping to the united states