Input: if they did not prevail at arbitration); Daugherty v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., No. 10-cv-02272-WJM-KLM, 2011 WL 2791338, at *11 (D. Colo. July 15, 2011) (“Plaintiffs’ affidavits make plain they have no financial ability to pay [defendant’s] attorneys’ fees were Defendant to prevail before the arbitrator.”). In contrast here, defendants have not conceded that the fees and costs associated with arbitration prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their rights, and plaintiffs have provided no evidence for the court to make that finding. Without this information, plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden to show that the fee-shifting provision renders the arbitration agreement prohibitively expensive. See Marzano v. Proficio Mortg. Ventures, LLC, 942 F.Supp.2d 781, 795 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (<HOLDING>); see also Perkins v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., No. Holdings: 0: holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs 1: holding that plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden to show that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because plaintiffs claims of prohibitive costs were too speculative 2: holding that plaintiff failed to carry his burden to show that arbitration was cost prohibitive because he has provided no evidence of the specific costs or arbitration fees or his financial inability to afford  them 3: holding that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to show that the arbitration agreement prevented them from vindicating their statutory rights because they did not file affidavits or assert in their briefs that the costs were prohibitively expensive instead plaintiffs provided only the barest assertions that the fees and costs clause  makes the arbitration provision unconscionable 4: holding that where the arbitration agreement was silent on feesplitting and the costs imposed upon the plaintiff by the aaa were not prohibitive the plaintiff had presented little evidence to indicate that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive and the fees and costs of arbitration did not render the arbitration scheme unconscionable


Input: defendant responded to an officer’s request to look in his bag with “[Yjou’ve got the badge, I guess you can” (alteration in original)), it has also found that assuming the pat-down position can be evidence of consent. United States v. Chambers, 646 Fed.Appx. 445, 448 (2016); see also Drayton, 536 U.S. at 199, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (silently lifting hands was considered consent to a pat-down); United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (raising one’s arms at a request to pat down demonstrated nonverbal consent), cited in United States v. Anderson, 983 F.2d 1069, 1993 WL 2302, at *7 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision). We have also found that consent can be given without speaking a word. See United States v. Ortiz, 455 Fed.Appx. 669, 671-72 (6th Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>). Because “the question of voluntariness Holdings: 0: holding that ojffer and acceptance exist when the parties mutually express assent 1: holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent 2: holding that stepping back gesturing and opening the door wider  unambiguously conveyed assent to officers request to enter 3: holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel 4: holding mutual assent in contract law is elementary and it must be expressed by the parties


Input: and actions after all foster involvement ended and legal adoption was final. Second, neither Romero, nor any other New Mexico case, can be read as interpreting Section 41-4-6 so broadly as to intend the building waiver to apply to a private home when an adoption is final. The circumstances of Romero are not similar to those in the present ease. Romero involved a waste transfer facility operated by Valencia County. 2003-NMCA-019, ¶ 1, 133 N.M. 214, 62 P.3d 305. This Court held that the facts alleged in the plaintiffs complaint stated a claim based on the Court’s interpretation of “operation or maintenance” in Section 41-4-6 as “inelud[ing] negligence in failing to correct a dangerous condition created when the property was constructed o Dep’t, 184 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1165 (D.N.M.2001) (<HOLDING>); M.D.R., 114 N.M. at 191, 836 P.2d at 110 Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in separating negligent entrustment and negligence claims for trial 1: holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims 2: holding that section 41  16 does not grant a waiver for claims of negligent supervision 3: holding that the plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are governed by opla 4: holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn


Input: unit of prosecution each individual injury that the defendant recklessly caused, even if the injuries were caused by only a single act.” We disagree. The plain language of the statute establishes that the legislature has criminalized the act of recklessly causing bodily injury — not each individual injury. Cf. State v. Greene, 137 N.H. 126, 128 (1993) (explaining that the elements of knowing simple assault are twofold: “the culpable mental state of knowingly and the proscribed conduct of unprivileged physical contact”). Nothing in the language of the statute suggests that the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments “for a single criminal act against a single victim, simply because the act results in multiple injuries.” Com. v. Traylor, 34 N.E.3d 276, 284, 284-86 (Mass. 2015) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the legislature Holdings: 0: holding that virginia domestic assault and battery statute did not qualify 1: holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery 2: holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two 3: holding that unit of prosecution for statute prohibiting assault and battery upon a child was not injuries resulting from proscribed conduct 4: holding on plainerror review an oklahoma statute for assault and battery was equivalent to the enumerated offense


Input: with the unsuccessful claim also aided the work done on the merits of the successful claim.” Schwarz, 73 F.3d at 903 (alterations omitted) (citing Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 883 F.2d 739, 747 (9th Cir.1989)). Once separated, any work performed on claims unrelated to winning claims is not compensable. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Under the two-step analysis set forth in Hensley, this fee reduction is not warranted. These services were related to the core claim on which Plaintiff prevailed. See Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1147 (“Claims are ‘unrelated’ if they are entirely ‘distinct and separate’ from the claims on which the plaintiff prevailed.”) (citing Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir.1995)); Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). It was reasonable for Plaintiff to seek a Holdings: 0: holding that certain police stops of limited duration that are reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation are legal 1: holding that  362k claims are core 2: holding that tort claims were arbitrable because they arose out of and were related to contract 3: holding that where claims  involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories  and the plaintiff obtained only partial or limited success the court may reduce the lodestar amount if it believes that amount is excessive in relation to the plaintiffs relief emphasis added 4: holding that claims are related if they involve a common core of facts or they are based on related legal theories


Input: officer has a particularized and objective basis for sus easonable suspicion to detain the mailed package. B “[E]ven if the initial seizure of a mailed package is based on reasonable suspicion, a prolonged detention is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Hernandez, 313 F.3d at 1212. The relevant time period is that between the initial detention and that at which probable cause is developed because “[p]robable cause is sufficient to support the subsequent detention of the package.” United States v. Hoang, 486 F.3d 1156, 1160 n. 1 (9th Cir.2007). We have upheld as reasonable a five-day delay arising because of the difficulty of travel for canines in Alaska. Aldaz, 921 F.2d at 231; see also United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252-53, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Hernandez, 313 F.3d at 1212 (holding Holdings: 0: holding reasonable twentynine hour delay 1: holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay 2: holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable 3: holding that a twoday delay was insufficient to establish deliberate indifference and citing cases where no deliberate indifference was found after a sixteenday delay a sixday delay and a threemonth delay 4: holding reasonable sixday delay


Input: of the privilege would result in “automatic entry of summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Pervis, 901 F.2d at 947). In this case, Mr. Martin asserted his Fifth Amendment right not to testify in his deposition in response to probative evidence offered against him. The court stresses that the criminal charges against Mr. Martin were dismissed, and therefore, he currently is not the subject of a criminal prosecution for alleged illicit drug activities. As a result, the court may draw an adverse inference against Mr. Martin concerning responses in which he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. See Two Parcels of Real Property, 868 F.Supp. at 311 (citing A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d at 629 n. 4); Premises Located at Route 13, 946 F.2d at 756; Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318-19, 96 S.Ct. at 1558 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the court infers that Mr. Martin’s Holdings: 0: recognizing that where witness has no constitutional or statutory right to refuse to testify jurors are entitled to draw negative inference from witness refusal to testify 1: holding that the fifth amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them 2: holding that the privilege against selfincrimination does not prohibit the trier of fact in a civil case from drawing adverse inferences from a witness refusal to testify 3: holding that the fifth amendments protection against selfincrimination is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment 4: holding that defendants exercise of right to testify in own behalf waives his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination


Input: to proceed pro se resulted in a challenging situation for the trial court. It is clear to this Court that the trial court had the duty to question the witnesses as it did-in order to extract/clarify information it needed to make a decision as to the best interests of the child. We see no evidence of bias. In any event, grandparents, as the complaining party, have not met their burden of establishing that the' judge’s questioning constituted “an abuse of discretion, resulting in discernible prejudice, capricious disbelief, or prejudgment.” See Mansour, at 446. ¶ 33 Grandparents’ arguments as to the court limiting their testimony and interrupting their closing arguments are utterly undeveloped and we will therefore not address them. See Shepp v. Shepp, 821 A.2d 635, 639 (Pa.Super.2003) (<HOLDING>). We simply note that we are able to discern no Holdings: 0: holding the appellant was deemed to have abandoned an issue for which he failed to provide any argument or supporting authority 1: holding that a failure to advance any argument or cite any supporting authority on a subject enables us to deem the issue waived 2: holding that an argument that fails to cite to supporting authority in support of claim presents nothing for review 3: holding that an appellant waived a claim where he failed to cite any legal authority in support of an argument in his appellate brief 4: holding an argument waived for failure to cite authority


Input: Court lacks jurisdiction to review this claim. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED. 1 . Toledo’s conviction was vacated approximately seven months after the BIA’s decision, and approximately four months after the expi ration of the period for filing a motion to reopen. 2 . In fact, the BIA has shown a willingness to sua sponte reopen cases where there is evidence that an immigrant’s conviction was vacated for substantive or procedural defects. In re Noel, 2007 WL 2197540, *1 (BIA Jun 29, 2007) (using its sua sponte power to reopen proceedings where the immigrant presented evidence indicating that his conviction was vacated, in part, due to an alleged defect in the proceedings related to his plea bargain.); In re Bworna, 2007 WL 1520877, *1 (BIA May 14, 2007) (<HOLDING>); In re Sorokin, 2007 WL 1520791, *1 (BIA May Holdings: 0: holding that an immigration judges failure to advise the respondent of the availability of free legal services and to ascertain that the respondent has received a list of such programs invalidates a subsequently entered removal order 1: holding that since the basis for the respondents order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening 2: holding that once a petitioners prior removal order has been reinstated he no longer qualifies for any relief under the ina regardless of whether his application was filed before or after the reinstatement decision was made 3: holding that the failure to attach a custody order was not reversible error because there was no showing of prejudice where the respondents were aware of the childs placement the petition noted that custody of the child was given by prior orders the respondent admitted that the child was in the legal custody of the buncombe county department of social services and the respondents were present at pretermination hearings in which custody was granted to petitioner and hearings in which visitation options were discussed and determined 4: holding that an interim decision of a court in the resident country was determinative  as to whether respondents action represented a wrongful removal because it granted respondent the right to remove the child from germany in the circumstances presented


Input: more thañ a patent upon the abstract idea itself. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that a transformation of an abstract idea to a patent-eligible application of the idea requires more than simply reciting the idea followed by “apply it.” Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294). In that regard, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that “[fjor the role of a computer in a computer-implemented invention to be deemed meaningful in the context of this analysis, it must involve more than the performance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’.” Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347-48 (quoting Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359) (alterations in original); see also Mortgage Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324-25 (<HOLDING>); Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1278 (“To salvage Holdings: 0: holding that constitutional claim must be fairly presented to state court in order to satisfy exhaustion requirement 1: recognizing that substantial numbers usually satisfy the numerosity requirement 2: holding that generic computer components such as an interface network and database  do not satisfy the inventive concept requirement 3: recognizing that churches satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of 844i 4: holding that petitioners allegation that it is the owner of adjoining property does not satisfy the pleading requirement


Input: the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a dismissal was warranted. Accordingly, for all the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 1 . As the parties are familiar with the procedural history of this case, we will only summarize those facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal. 2 . Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., E.D. Pa. 74-cv-01345. 3 . Although the partial grant of summary judgment was a non-final order, see Fed. R. Civil P. 54(b), a final judgment has since been entered and the Court now has jurisdiction over both appeals. 4 . Bullock’s assertion that these claims were merely an amendment to her first complaint does not save the claims from untimeliness. See Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Also, we decline to address Bullock’s Holdings: 0: holding that trial court erred by granting a directed verdict on statute of limitations defense and remanding for a new trial on the statute of limitations only 1: recognizing that statute of limitations questions may be resolved on a motion to dismiss 2: holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired 3: recognizing that statute of limitations is applied on claimbyclaim basis 4: holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional


Input: As noted, in the present action Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages. Although the IDEA allows courts to grant “such relief as the court determines is appropriate,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii), ordinarily monetary damages are not available under that statute. As this court noted in Mountain View-Los Altos Union High Sch. Dist. v. Sharron B. H., 709 F.2d 28 which is not “relief that is available under” the IDEA, and because all educational issues already have been resolved to the parties’ mutual satisfaction through the IEP process, Plaintiff is not “seeking relief that is also available” under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(0.’ That being so, under the plain words of the statute, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required. See W.B. v. Matulo, 67 F.3d 484, 495 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In arguing to the contrary, Defendants rely Holdings: 0: recognizing that idea is simply not an antidiscrimination statute so that pure discrimination claim was not barred by parents failure to exhaust remedies under idea 1: holding that damages are not relief that is available under the idea 2: holding that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not available in the administrative process 3: holding that by its terms the idea does not require exhaustion where the relief sought is unavailable in an administrative proceeding under the idea monetary damages are not available so exhaustion is not required 4: holding that exhaustion is not required for plaintiffs seeking money damages because damages are unavailable through the administrative process and because all other relief available to the plaintiffs under the idea had already been provided through a settlement agreement


Input: answer questions. Agent Overton, who read Rodriguez his rights, testified: “[Rodriguez] was coherent, sitting up facing me. He spoke and interacted. He seemed normal.” Rodriguez’s own witness, the physician assistant who examined him just after he spoke with the border agents, testified that his withdrawal could only have been “mild or moderate” and that the Rodriguez was “alert [and] oriented” at the time of the exam. Further, our case law supports the finding that individuals going through heroin withdrawal can voluntarily and intelligently waive their Miranda rights. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 208 F.3d 786, 791 (9th Cir.2000) (“Nor did Defendant’s symptoms of heroin withdrawal render his statements involuntary.”); United States v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). On this record, the district court’s Holdings: 0: holding that the evidence at trial showed hart was aware that what he was doing was wrong 1: holding that even though defendant began to display physical signs of withdrawal his waiver was voluntary because he remained coherent and responsive was aware of what was going on and told the  agents that he was able to continue with questioning 2: holding that trial court did not err in admitting statements made two hours after defendants blood alcohol level was 026 when trial court found that during questioning the defendant was coherent and that his answers  were extremely reasonable responsive and appropriate  3: holding that defendants prior arrests were insufficient to establish that defendant was aware of his right to appointed counsel even though he told dea officers that he understood his rights 4: holding that a defendants statement made outside of police custody was voluntary because he was awake and relatively coherent during the questioning despite painful injuries


Input: Shawn James Woodall appeals pro se from the district court’s order revoking supervised release. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See United States v. Palomba, 182 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that a defendant lacks standing to challenge a completed sentence); see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 14, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (<HOLDING>). The government’s motion to dismiss this Holdings: 0: holding that a right to confrontation exists in parole revocation proceedings 1: holding that there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation 2: holding drivers license revocation was not moot because collateral consequences of revocation may be substantial including higher insurance rates and adverse employment consequences 3: holding that revocation of parole does not create collateral consequences sufficient to extend standing beyond expiration of sentence and rejecting as moot a challenge to an allegedly erroneous parole revocation 4: holding that the collateral consequences of a parole revocation were insufficient to create a case or controversy after the petitioner was released


Input: Javier Ochoa-Gaytan appeals his 63-month sentence imposed on remand for resentencing after his jury trial conviction for being a deported alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Ochoa-Gaytan contends that the district court improperly enhanced his sentence on the basis of a prior aggravated felony conviction that was neither admitted or charged in the indictment, nor proven be yond a reasonable doubt. These arguments are foreclosed by United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 284 F.3d 411, 414-15 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 966, 121 S.Ct. 1503, Holdings: 0: holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 did not overrule almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 1: holding that blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531159 led2d 403 2004 did not overrule almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 2: holding that almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 in which supreme court held it unnecessary to prove prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt is narrow exception to apprendi 3: holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 was not violated where the sentence did not exceed the applicable statutory maximum 4: holding that almendareztorres remains binding despite apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000


Input: 347-48 (W.D.Tex.1997) (addressing 5 C.F.R. § 2635.805); Dean, 151 F.R.D. at 86-87 (same); In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on Aug. 16, 1987, 737 F.Supp. 399, 404-05 (E.D.Mich.1989) (addressing the Ethics in Government Act); United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 189 F.R.D. 512, 514 (S.D.Ohio 1999) (addressing Touhy regulations pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 301); Romero, 153 F.R.D. at 651 (addressing 32 C.F.R. § 516.42, the predecessor to 32 C.F.R. § 516.49); Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 66, 69-71 (D.D.C.1998) (addressing 5 U.S.C. § 301, and finding that “neither the federal Housekeeping Statute nor the Touhy decision authorizes a federal agency to withhold documents or testimony from a federal court”); McElya v. Sterling Med., Inc., 129 F.R.D. 510, 514-15 (W.D.Tenn.1990) (<HOLDING>). C. The Federal Regulations at Issue Do Not Holdings: 0: holding that subsequently enacted federal statutes trump the rules of civil procedure 1: holding that 5 usc  301 does not grant authority to assert an evidentiary privilege not recognized by the federal rules of civil procedure or the law of evidence 2: holding that the court had the discretion to grant the summary judgment motion based on the fact that it was unopposed by plaintiff during the time allowed by the rules of civil procedure 3: holding that in federal cases partys right to assert a privilege is dictated by federal law 4: recognizing privilege under federal rules


Input: sale. He was also required to tender a deposit at some point to prove his good faith bid on the property. However, we read no requirement that the purchaser was to tender this deposit immediately after the hammer falls closing the sale. This provision says nothing of the timing requirements for a sale. In fact, the exact timing of a judicial sale is not set by statute; rather, under the direction of a master or other appropriate court officer, the sale is conducted on the day of sale between “eleven and five o’clock.” S.C.Code Ann. § 15-39-690 (1977); Rule 71(b), SCRCP. However, the officer may prevent sales before they start by giving notice that the sales for that dáy have been closed. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-39-690 (1977); see also Pickett v. Pickett, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 470 (1836) (<HOLDING>). When, as in the case at hand, the foreclosing Holdings: 0: holding that the confirmation statute does not inhibit subsequent sale under power of property other than the property which at a former sale under power had failed to bring the amount of the debt  1: holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover 2: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 3: holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property 4: holding subsequent sale of property after sheriff announced he would sell no more property that day was void


Input: awarded the defendant its attorney’s fees based on the failure of the EEOC to conciliate a pattern and practice claim. Id. at 288. We vacated the award of attorney’s fees holding that the EEOC could have reasonably believed that its efforts to conciliate were sufficient. Although we clarified that we were not deciding whether the EEOC in fact conciliated the claim, we acknowledged case law that had held “in a class action suit, the EEOC is not required to provide documentation of individual attempts to conciliate on behalf of each potential claimant.” Id. at 289 (quoting EEOC v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 876 F.2d 16 (3d Cir.1989)) (alteration omitted). Our view is also consistent with the rulings of our sister circuits. See, e.g., Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 904 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 876 F.2d at 17 (per Holdings: 0: holding requirement nonjurisdictional and remanding for a possible eeoc waiver of that requirement 1: holding that eeoc satisfied its presuit requirement to attempt to conciliate class claims by providing notice to cintas that it was investigating classwide instances of discrimination 2: recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice 3: holding that rule 23a requirements must be satisfied as if class were to litigate its claims 4: holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc


Input: sufficient to refute the Washington Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Act is civil, and to require the release of all those confined under its authority.”). In Seling, the Supreme Court assumed the statute in question was civil, and expressed no opinion as to how allegations that conditions of confinement “are too restrictive, that the conditions are incompatible with treatment, and that the system is designed to result in indefinite confinement ... would bear on a court determining in the first instance whether [a state’s] confinement scheme is civil.” Seling, 531 U.S. at 262-63, 121 S.Ct. 727. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s holding in Seling was limit ed to an as-applied challenge to a civil commitment statute on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds. Id. at 263, 121 S.Ct. 727 (<HOLDING>). At the center of Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Holdings: 0: holding that state work release regulation was not an ex post facto law 1: holding that ch 980 is not a punitive statute and violates neither the ex post facto nor double jeopardy clauses of the wisconsin and united states constitutions 2: holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause 3: holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation 4: holding that respondent cannot obtain release through an asapplied challenge to the washington act on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds and finding an asapplied analysis to be unworkable in that context because sueh an analysis would never conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a final determination of the schemes validity under the double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses


Input: the conduct which led to his conviction or previous extensions of his SAMs, such conduct might justify any future decision to impose new SAMs restrictions on Plaintiff, which would have nothing to do with the present lawsuit. Moreover, given that Defendants have apparently determined that Plaintiff sufficiently mitigated the reasons for his SAMs [Docket No. 121-2], it seems clear that Defendants could not reverse that determination at a later date based on past conduct and use it as an excuse to reimpose the prior SAMs designation. While they could impose a new SAMs designation for other legitimate reasons, e.g., new threats through the mail, such a determination would be unrelated to the original imposition of his SAMs and the annual reviews thereafter. See Tandy, 380 F.3d at 1291 (<HOLDING>). Further, I find that Plaintiffs case does not Holdings: 0: recognizing that dismissal is warranted only in extreme cases citation omitted 1: holding that prejudice may result when the alien is prevented from  reasonably presenting his or her case  citation omitted emphasis added 2: holding that injunctive relief is not moot based on voluntary cessation unless the defendant shows that it is absolutely clear his wrongful activities cannot reasonably be expected to recur 3: recognizing mootness if it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur citation omitted 4: recognizing that a judge is not absolutely immune from criminal liability


Input: on the remaining counts based on a higher base offense level than used in the original sentence after concluding that there was an error in the original sentencing. Smith, 103 F.3d at 535. Several courts considering resentencing after § 924(c) vacatur have reopened the sentences on the remaining counts and required consideration of not only changes which would increase the remaining sentence, but of the prisoner’s new arguments for decreases in his sentence as well. See Easterling, 157 F.3d at 1225 (on resentencing, district court required to consider whether defendant should receive three-level downward departure for acceptance of responsibility available under current guidelines rather than two-level departure he originally received); United States v. Core, 125 F.3d 74 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Reyes v. United States, 944 F.Supp. 260 Holdings: 0: holding that the district court may consider evidence of a defendants postsentence rehabilitation and that such evidence may support a downward variance from the federal sentencing guidelines 1: holding that resentencing should consider all sentencing arguments and remanding for court to consider defendants argument for downward departure based on postconviction rehabilitation 2: holding that when a defendants sentence has been set aside on appeal a trial court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendants postsentencing rehabilitation 3: holding district courts may consider rehabilitation when deciding whether to impose a more lenient sentence at a defendants resentencing 4: holding that the district court had the discretion to grant a downward departure for postsentence rehabilitation


Input: court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee James Gressett, dismissing the Trustee’s Texas law claim against Gressett for conspiring with Bradley to fraudulently transfer assets out of Bradley’s estate. The district court held that the Trustee lacked standing to bring the civil conspiracy claim. Reviewing both the grant of summary judgment and the underlying legal issue of standing de novo, Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 495 (5th Cir.2007), we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment for the following reasons: 1. It is well established that a trustee has no standing to bring tort claims that belong exclusively to creditors of the bankruptcy estate. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 433-34, 92 S.Ct. 1678, 1688, 32 L.Ed.2d 195 (1972) (<HOLDING>); In re Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc., 522 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a trustee lacked standing to sue a third party for damages incurred by debenture holders of the corporate debtor 1: holding that a trustee does not have standing to sue a thirdparty on behalf of debenture holders 2: holding that employers have standing to sue 3: holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support 4: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue


Input: 11 . 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a), (f). 12 . These three exceptions deal with property exempted from levy by the Internal Revenue Code, property exempted under the Federal Debt Collection Act, and restrictions on the amount a judgment creditor may garnish under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(l)-(3). 13 . Mem. and Order at 12. 14 . Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989)) (internal quotations omitted). 15 . See United States v. DeCay, 620 F.3d 534, 540 (5th Cir.2010) 0‘[T]he 'notwithstanding any other Federal law’ clause signals a clear Congressional intent to override conflicting federal law”) (<HOLDING>). 16 . Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that section 13c agreements do not override conflicting provisions of state law 1: holding language sufficient to override antialienation provisions of internal revenue code with respect to pension fund 2: holding that a courts power to allocate tax exemptions between parents must be exercised in accord with the internal revenue code 3: holding in the context of a plaintiffs suit to recover income taxes that congress has preserved the immunity of the united states from declaratory  relief with respect to all tax controversies except those pertaining to the classification of organizations under  501c of the internal revenue code 4: holding that the segregation of funds was not a prerequisite to the establishment of a statutory trust under the internal revenue code


Input: in this State, when construing statutes, we must presume that public interests are favored over private interests. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.021(5); City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 396-97 (Tex.2009). It is in the public interest that the ad valorem tax be applied to property owners to compensate for a variety of benefits provided by local services such as fire and police protection, street lighting, roads and streets, and other incidents of a modern industrial infrastructure. Virginia Indonesia v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 910 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex.1995) (citing Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 289, 96 S.Ct. 535, 548, 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976)); see also Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Rev., 447 U.S. 207, 228, 100 S.Ct. 2109, 2122, 65 L.Ed.2d 66 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, as the Supreme Court has held, Holdings: 0: recognizing that generally services that benefit debtor are services that facilitate completion of a case 1: holding that the state police is a state agency 2: holding that constitutional claim must be fairly presented to state court in order to satisfy exhaustion requirement 3: holding that both federal and state tax statutes are revenue production laws and not enacted for plaintiffs benefit 4: holding tax must be fairly related to services provided by state including police and fire protection and benefit of trained work force


Input: 528 U.S. 62, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) and Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) require reconsideration of whether retaliation claims against state defendants are indeed barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Kimel and Garrett held that particular laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age and disability, respectively, exceeded Congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore did not abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91, 120 S.Ct. 631 (addressing Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374, 121 S.Ct. 955 (addressing Title I of Americans with Disabilities Act). But see Hason v. Medical Bd. of Cal., 279 F.3d 1167, 1170-1 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Following Kimel, Garrett, and other recent Holdings: 0: holding that despite garrett congress abrogated state sovereign immunity under title ii of americans with disabilities act 1: holding that congress had no power under article i to abrogate state sovereign immunity 2: holding the americans with disabilities act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and declaring congress abrogates tribal immunity only where the definitive language of the statute itself states an intent either to abolish indian tribes common law immunity or to subject tribes to suit under the act 3: holding in the context of an adea claim that an indian tribes sovereign immunity had not been abrogated by congress and subject matter jurisdiction did not exist 4: holding that unjustified segregation constitutes discrimination prohibited by the americans with disabilities act


Input: 444 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir.2006) (quoting Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 994 (7th Cir.1996)). Absent direct participation, there must at least be a showing that the defendants “acquiesced in some demonstrable way” in the alleged violation. Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir.2003). Mr. Oakley contends that Bucheit and Knop were present at the meeting where Warden Cowan decided to inform the Deputy Director of the allegations and that, therefore, they “acquiesced in the chain of events that led to Oakley’s termination.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. However, Knop was following established department policy when he passed the allegations along to Warden Cowan, and Bucheit just happened to be in the room at the time. Cf. Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 396-97 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Warden Cowan explained that department policy Holdings: 0: holding that defendant who sets in motion series of events that he knew or should have known would cause others to deprive plaintiff of rights may be liable under  1983 1: holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong 2: holding that the district court erred because it applied the enhancement without taking into account whether the defendant knew or should have known possession would be unlawful 3: holding a subordinate will be liable under  1983 for following a superiors orders if he knew or should have known his acts were violating plaintiffs constitutional rights 4: holding danger was so open and obvious to plaintiff that as a matter of law he knew or should have known of danger


Input: S.W.3d 687, 709 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied). 2 . GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Road Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 311-12 (Tex.2006). 3 . Doncaster v. Hernaiz, 161 S.W.3d 594, 606 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.). 4 . Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). 5 . Santa Fe Petroleum, L.L.C. v. Star Canyon Corp., 156 S.W.3d 630, 641 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2004, no pet.). 6 . Doncaster, 161 S.W.3d at 606. 7 . Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex.1997) (quoting Tex Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 1.04(b), reprinted in Tex Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A, State Bar Rules, art. X, § 9 (Vernon 2005 & Sup (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 12 . See Stover, 17 S.W.3d at 397-98. 13 . Holdings: 0: holding that court of appeals erred by rendering judgment for full amount of attorneys fees sought after reversing 0 fee award because jury awarded less in damages than amount sought and therefore uncontroverted attorney testimony on amount of attorneys fees did not establish amount of reasonable and necessary fees as a matter of law 1: holding that section 721312 florida statutes provides for an award of appellate attorneys fees where the issue was the reasonableness of the fee awarded by the trial court 2: holding that awarded fees were reasonable and that proof that attorneys fees are necessary apart from testimony as to the reasonableness of the fee is not required 3: holding that appellate court should reverse and remand issue of attorneys fees where damages are reduced on appeal in a manner that could affect the determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees 4: holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees


Input: after it leased the Railroad parcel. Thus, the district court’s assumption of constant contamination over the entire period not only provides a reasonable basis to apportion liability, but, if anything, overestimates the contamination attributable to the Railroad parcel. Further, the district court’s reliance on period of ownership finds support from the Restatement hypothetical discussed above. Just as it is reasonable to assume that each of the cattle caused an equal amount of harm even though some of the cattle may have done no harm to the land, it is also reasonable to assume that each year of ownership caused an equal amount of contamination, even though the contamination may have been worse in some years than in others. See also Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d at 903-04 (<HOLDING>); Hercules, 247 F.3d at 718 (noting Holdings: 0: holding that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant when the site of a copyright owners alleged injury is the location of the copyright owner 1: holding that leases between private renters of ci1yowned property were public records even though they were in the hands of one of the private partys attorneys 2: holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception 3: holding apportionment is possible among the sequential owners of a chromeplating site even though the records of the chromeplating activities were incomplete 4: holding that records relating to a student court were not education records


Input: retaliated against Plaintiff by failing to take him as a trainer. 2. Calling Out Protected Activity at Roll Call Plaintiff argues that Defendants retaliated against him for filing an EEOC complaint in September 2010 by “calling him out” in front of others. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that, in October 2010, Lt. DeBoard told Plaintiff during roll call to “Stop whining about his post assignments” and to “Stop snitching.” Of course, Plaintiffs filing of the EEOC complaint constitutes protected activity. Further, the Court assumes that Plaintiffs filing of the EEOC complaint induced Lt. DeBoard to make said remarks. Still, a reasonable juror could not conclude that Lt. DeBoard’s action was materially adverse. See, e.g., Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 434 (4th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Cepada v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cnty., 814 Holdings: 0: holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment 1: holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment 2: holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim 3: holding that a oneday time period between the employees complaint and her supervisors recommendation to fire her was sufficient 4: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment


Input: the relevant statutes. A. Doctrine of Necessary Implication To begin, we note that “narrow construction is the rule in determining the scope of the condemnation power delegated pursuant to legislative enactment.” Coquina Oil Corp. v. Harry Kourlis Ranch, 643 P.2d 519, 522 (Colo.1982) (finding that a federal oil and gas lessee could not condemn private property for private use as a right-of-way based on a condemnation statute which was silent as to whether federal oil and gas lessees could exercise the power granted therein). Because we construe the statute against the entity asserting the authority, we will not find an implied grant of the condemnation authority through “vague or doubtful language.” Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora, 126 Colo. 267, 272, 248 P.2d 732, 735 (1952) (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Mack v. Town of Craig, 68 Holdings: 0: holding that the statute is mandatory 1: holding that the oklahoma statute like the california statute did not qualify as an enumerated offense because it lacked the elements of substantial interference with the victims liberty and risk of bodily injury 2: holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute 3: holding that a municipality could not condemn private property under a statute granting certain enumerated parties the authority to condemn such lands where the statute did not include municipalities 4: holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute


Input: certain or capable of being ascertained from the contract itself,” Howell v. Allen & Co., 8 N.C. App. 287, 289, 174 S.E.2d 55, 56 (1970), “[w]here the parties have attempted to put in writing an agreement fixing the rights and duties owing to each other, courts will not deny relief because of vagueness and uncertainty in the language used, if the intent of the parties can be ascertained.” Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374, 379, 126 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962). For that reason, since “[t]he law . . . does not favor the destruction of contracts on account of uncertainty,” “courts should attempt to determine the intent of the parties from the language used, construed with reference to the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract.” Welsh v. Northern Telecom, S.E.2d 6, 8 (1992) (<HOLDING>), the parties did actually reach a complete Holdings: 0: holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court 1: recognizing that determination of appropriate sentence to be imposed should ordinarily be determined by the trial court on remand rather than at the appellate level 2: holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law 3: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion 4: holding that a parents agreement to assist his children in obtaining a college education was unenforceable given the absence of any standard by which an appropriate level of assistance could be determined


Input: way into immigration cases, and it is in this sense that we use the term in this opinion. 4 .Although INA § 242B(c)(3)(A), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)(A) (1994), has been repealed, Congress replaced the provision with one that is in all respects identical except that what formerly was called "deportation” is now referred to as "removal.” See INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(i), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(5)(C)®. 5 . Former INA § 242B(f)(2), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(f)(2), provided: "The term 'exceptional circumstances’ refers to exceptional circumstances (such as serious illness of the alien or death of an immediate relative of the alien, but not including less compelling circumstances) beyond the control of the alien.” 6 . Compare Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) with Lopez v. INS, 184 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 1: holding that ina  242bc3a sets forth a mandatory and jurisdictional time bar 2: recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 3: holding that ina  242bc3as time bar is not jurisdictional and thus subject to equitable tolling 4: holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional


Input: of the average layper son.” Dominguez, 183 Cal.App.4th at 396, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 739. Applying this standard, courts find limiting language to not be plain and clear where the provision is ambiguous, the provision uses complicated words not within the knowledge of average lay persons, or where the language is “confusing.” Haynes, 32 Cal.4th at 1211, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 68, 89 P.3d 381 (finding exclusion not plain and clear because the exclusion used ambiguous terms that were not obvious on their face, involved cross-references between multiple definitions and documents not in the insured’s possession, and used “confusing language surrounding and introducing the actual text of the” exclusion); see also Ponder v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 145 Cal.App.3d 709, 723, 193 Cal.Rptr. 632 (1983) (<HOLDING>). However, if the limiting language “clearly Holdings: 0: holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts 1: holding that clause excluding coverage for temporomandibular joint syndrome without a definition for that disease was not plain and clear because it is a technical medical term 2: holding that it is not 3: holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious 4: holding that where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation


Input: specifically, “[t]he focus of the ‘wrongfulness’ inquiry” — as least in this Circuit — “is whether, in hindsight in light of the ultimate decision on the merits after a full hearing, the injunction should not have issued in the first instance.” Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1054 (emphasis added); see also Guzman v. Local 32B-32J, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 72 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir.1995) (stating that liability on the injunction bond turns on “the ultimate issue of whether the enjoined party had the legal right to act as it wished”). But see Global NAPs, 489 F.3d at 22 n. 6 (“Dissolution of an injunction is itself a final determination which permits a party to seek security posted with respect to the injunction.”); Qualcomm, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 580, 583-84 (S.D.Cal.1998) (<HOLDING>). In fact, the Blumenthal Court explained, a Holdings: 0: holding that the dissolution of a tro constitutes a final judgment on the merits allowing recovery against the tro bond 1: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence 2: holding that dissolution of a tro after the plaintiff failed to carry its burden at the preliminary injunction hearing constituted a final decisions on the merits for purposes of the bond 3: holding that where defendant received temporary restraining order and had actual knowledge of hearing technical failure to include summons with tro did not deprive trial court of personal jurisdiction 4: holding that an appellate court may not consider an issue not presented to the trial judge on appeal from final judgment on the merits


Input: another pre-1963 version of the statute. In State v. Gordineer, 229 Or 105, 109-10, 366 P2d 161 (1961), the court held that, where the statute provided that, “[n]o person other than a parent, guardian, or other responsible relative, shall give any alcoholic liquor to any person under the age of 21 years,” the “giv[ing]” of alcohol to a minor could be accomplished in one of two ways: (1) “by the giving of alcoholic liquor for immediate consumption by the minor such as a single or several drinks from the alcoholic liquor in the possession of another”; or (2) “by the giving of a quantity of liquor to the minor with intent that the possession of the liquor pass to the minor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 6 But see Fisher et al. v. City of Astoria, 126 Or 268, 282, 269 P 853 (1928) (<HOLDING>). 7 Similarly, in State v. Irving, 74 Or App Holdings: 0: holding the rule of ejusdem generis inapplicable to interpret the nonspecific term otherwise improve where the legislature had expressly defined the word improve 1: holding that for exception to apply procedure must not only improve accuracy but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding 2: recognizing the congressional policy in providing for a term of supervised release after incarceration is to improve the odds of a successful transition from the prison to liberty 3: holding that the term include but need not be limited to does not preclude the application of the ejusdem generis principle 4: holding that although term was not limited by the specification it was expressly defined in a narrow manner in the prosecution history


Input: were disclosed. For example, records at Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino for 1999 indicated Clark and Hunter recorded winnings of over $75,000 each. While both individuals had significant losses as well, their winnings apparently exceeded their wagers by several thousands of dollars. 2 . Although Hunter originally did not appeal the federal district court decision against her, after the state district court ruled a notice to cure was required, Hunter made several motions in federal court requesting relief from the federal district court’s decision against her. These attempts, and their appeals, ultimately proved unsuccessful. See Hunter v. Underwood, 362 F.3d 468 (8th Cir.2004). 3 . The district court rejected Hunter's claim that the prior FED decisions by the district court (<HOLDING>) were binding on the parties in this action Holdings: 0: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 1: holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city 2: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner 3: recognizing the language of  1322c1 as a minimum floor in cutting off the debtors right to cure and permitting the debtor to cure until the deed was delivered to the successful bidder which would complete the sale under new jersey law 4: holding the law required the dmmha to give a notice to cure


Input: the form of conducting presentations in the state to'obtain business and to report’ their business activities were neither unilateral activities of.Hoagland or AFFT nor random and fortuitous. See id. at 153. Appellees agreed to attend the Texas meetings. See id. Hoagland presented evidence that appellees made representations during those meetings with regard to their qualifications that form the basis of. Hoagland’s claims, i.e., that because of those representations, Hoagland entered into a business relationship with appellees, entered into the Operating Agreement and agreed to modify it, and agreed to take part-.in infomercials and other inedia events promoting the FairTax Campaign. See Max Protetch, Inc. v. Herrin, 340 S.W.3d 878, 886-87 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, appellees!, contacts were Holdings: 0: holding minimum contacts were necessary for personal jurisdiction over defendant 1: holding that when determining whether a nonresident defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with texas sufficient to support general jurisdiction courts examine the defendants contacts and forumrelated activities only up to the time that suit was filed 2: holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas 3: holding facetoface meeting in texas during which defendant made representations to plaintiff were purposeful contacts that formed a substantial portion of the core of the litigation 4: holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during and were unrelated to the judicial proceeding


Input: that Greenheart purchased the property as an investment. Greenheart claims that the evidence fails to demonstrate that Greenheart intended to use the property for any commercial venture. Finally, Greenheart argues that the district court’s reliance on how the Browns used their water rights in the past was erroneous because such uses did not bear on the actual land transaction between the Browns and Greenheart. The thrust of Greenheart’s arguments invite this Court to revisit and re-decide factual determinations already made by the district court. This we will not do. We conclude the district court did not err when it found that Greenheart and the Browns entered into their agreement as a commercial transaction. The district court’s finding that the Brown’s sa .2d 201, 214 (Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). This Court’s decisions are clear that Holdings: 0: holding that a previous decision assuming a malpractice action was a commercial transaction for the purpose of awarding attorney fees was not binding because the court in that case was not asked  to decide whether a malpractice action involving a commercial transaction falls within the parameters of the statute 1: holding that injury to business or property was not limited to commercial interests 2: holding sale of property was commercial transaction where the land was for both a family retreat and for logging 3: holding that the property held by the revocable trust in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence was a constitutionally protected homestead property 4: holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property


Input: one of his trial counsel as a witness, so the record is altogether silent about what the other trial counsel knew and did not know. And even as to the trial counsel who did testify at the hearing, Appellee never asked him what he knew, and what he did not know, about the testimony that family members might give. That trial counsel was unable to recall some details of his discussions with the family is unsurprising, considering that the hearing was held more than a decade after the trial, and it is unavailing to Appellee in any event. As noted earlier, a silent or ambiguous record is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of reasonable performance, and it is Appellee’s burden to make a complete and clear record. See Whatley v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 566 (V) (A) (668 SE2d 651) (2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Chandler, 218 F3d at 1314, n. 15. Holdings: 0: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that even the demise of trial counsel does not relieve a claimant of his burden to prove an ineffective assistance claim 2: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 3: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record 4: holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate


Input: is insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating changed circumstances that affect Billy’s welfare. In part, he contends it would be “against public policy” to permit his deployment to “negatively affect [his] custody” rights because our military personnel would be “discouraged” from service as a result. He further contends that without “expert or evaluator opinion on the matter,” the judge properly denied defendant’s request. The issue, however, is two-fold and sequential. Defendant must first make “a prima facie showing ... that a genuine issue of fact exists bearing upon a critical question such as the best interests of the child[ ] ....” Pfeiffer v. Ilson, 318 N.J.Super. 13, 14, 722 A.2d 966 (App.Div.1999). Once a prima facie showing is made, defenda 9 A.2d 178 (App.Div.1998) (<HOLDING>). We agree that but for plaintiffs impending Holdings: 0: holding that accident report was necessary to presentation of case and exclusion was in error 1: holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses 2: holding that a plenary hearing was necessary based upon mothers certification and school social workers report of childs behavioral problems 3: holding that a single father who relocated to care for an elevenyearold son with emotional and behavioral problems had a necessitous and compelling reason for leaving his employment 4: holding social workers report about plaintiffs statements was admissible through the combined effect of rules 801d2a and 8036


Input: 1141, 1145 (5th Cir.1990). To the extent that a ruling was a reconsideration of a question of law, however, the standard of review is de novo. Tyler v. Union Oil Co., 304 F.3d 379, 405 (5th Cir.2002); Fletcher, 210 F.3d at 512. This Court reviews a district court’s refusal to hold a party in civil contempt under the abuse of discretion standard. Piggly Wiggly Clarksville, Inc. v. Mrs. Baird’s Bakeries, 177 F.3d 380, 382 (5th Cir.1999). III. The Union first disputes the district court’s limitation of the arbitration awards to the period before the Union was decertified. When the NLRB decertified the Union on September 18, 2000, the CBA automatically terminated by operation of law. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n. Local 206 v. West Coast Sheet Metal Co., 954 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Arbitration awards ordering reinstatement and Holdings: 0: holding that cba became void prospectively as of the decertification of the union 1: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 2: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 3: holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union 4: holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity


Input: are, however, a number of exceptions to this presumption of immunity. See Butler v. Sukhoi Co., 579 F.3d 1307, 1312-13 (11th Cir.2009). One such exception is the “commercial activity” exception of Section 1610(a)(2), which provides an exception to the immunity of a foreign state’s property from attachment or execution: The property in the United States of a foreign state ... used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State ... if ... the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). To execute judgment on a sovereign’s property pursuant to the Section 1610( 32-33 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Before a court grants limited jurisdictional Holdings: 0: holding district courts order permitting general asset discovery prior to ruling on alleged exception to the fsia infringed on sovereign immunity 1: recognizing exception 2: recognizing the role of limited jurisdictional discovery to verify allegations of specific facts crucial to an immunity determination 3: recognizing the need for limited jurisdictional discovery to establish exception to the fsia 4: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law


Input: In support of this argument, it relies on the statement by the Court of Appeals that “where the landlord changes the lock, or padlocks the door, there is an actual eviction.” Barash, 26 N.Y.2d at 83, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 653, 256 N.E.2d at 710. After careful review of New York ease law in this area, the court rejects defendant’s statement of the law and finds that in order for any action, including the changing of locks on a premise, to constitute an eviction there must be intent on the part of the landlord to keep the tenant out by reason of that action. The notion that merely changing the locks constitutes an eviction has been expressly rejected by the New York courts. Equitable Tower Assoc. v. El Paso Natural Gas, 134 Misc.2d 23, 24, 511 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (App. Term 1st Dept.1986) (<HOLDING>); Breezy Point Cooperative v. Rockaway Point Holdings: 0: holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant despite retaining keys because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property 1: recognizing the general rule that the landlord is not liable for dangerous conditions existing once the tenant takes possession of the premises 2: holding the landlord did not trespass when his agent entered the premises for the purpose of showing them to a potential tenant 3: holding that changing of locks did not constitute an eviction when tenant had moved out of the premises and landlord changed locks in order to conform the locks to a master key 4: holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant


Input: ‘any individual,’ courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.”); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to “restrict[ ] the Act’s protection to only former, present, and potential employees”); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical “any individual” language in the ADEA to provide coverage “solely in favor of a person who is an employee”); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (“any individual” not limited to “employees”); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). This limitation is necessary to further Holdings: 0: recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action 1: holding that the ada does not require an employer to hire an assistant to help a disabled employee fulfill his work responsibilities 2: recognizing that a corporation is properly aligned as a defendant in a shareholder derivative suit when the corporation is in antagonistic hands 3: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 4: recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer


Input: reflected in the non-economic damages “cap” was not so strong as to override lex loci delicti. Erie Insurance Exchange, 399 Md. at 628, 925 A.2d at 653. Because the Maryland General Assembly had not addressed specifically the issue of the applicability of the non-economic damages “cap” to claims for uninsured/underinsured motorist damages, and had not given “an unequivocal directive to the Maryland judiciary to apply the cap in these cases,” we determined that lex loci delicti applied and that Maryland’s public policy as reflected in the statutory “cap” was not “sufficiently strong to warrant overriding the rule of lex loci delicti.” Erie Insurance Exchange, 399 Md. at 633-34, 925 A.2d at 657; see Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 92 Md.App. 27, 43, 606 A.2d 295, 302-03 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Anti-waiver provisions and explicit Holdings: 0: holding that the termination of the fee cap did not affect litigation in progress when the fee cap was in effect 1: holding that noneconomic damages cap mandated by orrevstat  317101 is unconstitutional as applied to commonlaw negligence claims 2: holding that the existence of a cap on noneconomic damages was not of sufficient importance to override the principle of lex loci delicti 3: holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages 4: recognizing principle


Input: through a practice of discrimination. See Amended Complaint, Docket No. 54. “Although the court welcomes what it will term ‘imaginative’ lawyering from time to time, novel arguments must still be based on a firm theoretical framework and be supported by non-conclusory factual allegations suggestive of a plausible claim to relief to survive early dismissal.” Febus-Cruz v. Sauri-Santiago, 652 F.Supp.2d 140, 152 (D.P.R.2009). Moreover, “so long as [a plaintiffs] allegations of political discrimination fit within the contours of the First Amendment, they are, a fortiori, insufficient to ground a claim that the politically-inspired misconduct violated equal protection guarantees.” Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d at 37 (citing Ruiz-Casillas v. Camacho-Morales, 415 F.3d 127, 134 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>)). In the case at hand, although the amended Holdings: 0: holding that an equal protection claim was no more than a first amendment claim dressed in equal protection clothing and was thus subsumed by and coextensive with the first amendment claim 1: holding that because plaintiff failed to allege invidious discrimination based upon his membership in a protected class his equal protection claim failed at its inception 2: holding that an appellants equal protection claim which was premised on allegations of political discrimination flounders as it is a mere restatement of her failed first amendment claim 3: holding it appropriate to grant a motion to dismiss a discrimination claim where claim is not supported by factual allegations 4: holding that regarded as claim was reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability


Input: percentage of fault. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2957(1). The current version of § 600.2925d, which shields a settling defendant from claims for contribution, does not provide for pro tanto claim reduction because, as Michigan courts have held, the rationale for set-offs no longer applies under a system of several liability: “There would be no need for a setoff because the tortfeasor-defendant not involved in the settlement would necessarily be responsible for an amount of damages distinct from the settling defendant on the basis of allocation of fault.” Markley v. Oak Health Care Investors of Coldwater, Inc., 255 Mich.App. 245, 255, 660 N.W.2d 344 (2003). See also Wrobbel v. Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, No. 07-10110, 2010 WL 940279, at *5 (E.D.Mich. March 12, 2010) (<HOLDING>). The Court concludes that the Papas and Holdings: 0: recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself 1: holding that under michigans reformed tortliability scheme the defendant union was not entitled to a setoff for a settlement received by plaintiff and holding that michigans allocation of fault scheme would permit the trier of fact to allocate fault regardless of whether all tortfeasors were parties to the proceeding 2: holding that  3240219b2 merely limits the liability of shortterm lessors the statute reduces responsibility for damages arising from the fault of others but preserves full liability for compensatory damages caused by ones own fault the statute merely caps the amount of damages for the vicarious liability of the lessor 3: holding plaintiff not at fault in accepting a lump sum social security benefit a second time observing that the agencys fault finding might be appropriate if plaintiff were an accountant 4: holding that the mere application for other benefits is not fault


Input: premises liability law is establishing what duty a premises possessor owes to those who come onto his land.” Hoffner, 492 Mich at 460. “With regard to invitees,[ ] a landowner owes a duty to use reasonable care to protect invitees from unreasonable risks of harm posed by dangerous conditions on the owner’s land.” Id. In the context of ice and snow, a premises owner has a duty to exercise reasonable care to diminish the hazards of ice and snow accumulation, requiring that reasonable measures be taken within a reasonable time after an accumulation of ice and snow to diminish the hazard of injury to the invitee. [Id. at 464 (quotation marks and citation omitted).] However, a landowner’s duty does not generally encompass defects that are “open and ob 466 Mich 11, 16; 643 NW2d 212 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Cole v Henry Ford Health Sys, 497 Mich 881 Holdings: 0: holding that petitioners reliance on a case which concluded that a defendants right to a fair trial was violated was insufficient to place court on notice that petitioner was advancing a constitutional due process claim because the decision was based on state law 1: holding that frost and ice on a roof was an openandobvious hazard 2: holding that when an appellant fails to offer an argument on an issue that issue is abandoned 3: holding that admission contained in an answer was binding despite the fact that it was made on information and belief 4: holding that the court bars a party from raising an issue on remand that  was not raised on appeal


Input: him to plead guilty in order that we not be prosecuted.” The district court denied this motion on two grounds. First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to criminal eases. Second, if construed as a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the same issues had been raised in the previous motion, which was then on appeal. The appeal from this order is before us as case number 92-50160. II. ANALYSIS A. The Second Appeal Andrade-Larrios’s statement of issues and arguments does not address the district court’s order denying his second motion, the one made while his appeal from the first order was pending. Accordingly, appellant waived his appeal of all the issues from the second order. See Fed.RApp.P. 28(a)(5); Wilks v. Reyes, 5 F.3d 412, 416-17 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). B. Judge’s Participation in Plea Bargaining Holdings: 0: holding that claims not raised in an appellants initial brief to our court are waived 1: holding that appellants brief satisfied rule 28a5 2: holding that issues not raised in an appellants initial brief are deemed abandoned 3: holding that issue first raised in appellees brief and then answered in appellants reply brief was properly raised for review 4: holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief


Input: the arrest was lawful, we stated: Read together, Payton and Oliver require that police obtain a warrant before entering either the home or its curtilage to make an arrest absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. Under Payton and Oliver, therefore, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, [the defendant]'s warrantless arrest, although not occurring in his home, was unlawful if his fenced-in backyard falls within the curtilage of his home. Id. at 183. We went on to conclude that the fenced-in backyard constituted curtilage of the home, thereby warranting the Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless entry for arrest. Id. at 184. Other states and federal courts are in accord with this approach, holding that an arrest occurring outside of 81 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (<HOLDING>); State v. Mierz, 866 P.2d 65, 70-71 (Wash. Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that where arrest was unlawful police officer committed a battery when he touched plaintiff during arrest 1: holding that arrest immediately out side of defendants house violated fourth amendment 2: holding that arrest by the back door of defendants house was unlawful 3: holding that defendants constitutionally protected privacy interest began at the door to his room not at the door to the rooming house 4: holding that the protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest in front of his house on suspicion of murder was not justified because the evidence that an accomplice was involved in the murder did not equate to evidence that someone would be hiding out in the defendants house a month after the crime occurred and at the time of the arrest the officers were not chasing the defendant from a crime scene


Input: unconstitutional behavior.” Id. In this case, the Loys assert that Sexton exhibited active unconstitutional behavior by (1) ratifying Elliott’s conduct, (2) inadequately training his deputies, and (3) establishing flawed policies. We disagree. First, the Loys contend that Sexton ratified Elliott’s unconstituti re we held that a sheriff, sued in his official capacity, had “a duty to both know and act,” Sexton is being sued here in his individual capacity. See Walker, 917 F.2d at 1457 (finding Márchese legahy in-apposite because defendants were only subject to liability in their individual capacities). Indeed, the Loys could not sue Sexton in his official capacity for money damages. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45, 58 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Loys’ claim against Sexton Holdings: 0: holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacity are not persons under  1983 1: holding that state employees acting in their official capacities are insulated from liability for money damages 2: holding that neither a state agency nor its officials acting in their official capacities may be sued under section 1983 3: holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under  1983 4: holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to liability under  1983


Input: in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagree ment.” Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786-87, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court’s denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 Holdings: 0: holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment 1: holding that plaintiff was not entitled to rely on a defendants jurydemand where the defendant had neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to make such a demand 2: holding that neither zafiro nor lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states 3: holding that neither the ada nor the rehabilitation act applies to prison employment 4: holding that we will not consider an argument of plain error where the defendant has neither mentioned the plainerror standard nor made any attempt to show how he can satisfy that standard


Input: And most recently, in Cunningham, the United States Supreme Court again flatly rejected attempts to base the jury trial right on a sentencing code’s structure, the historical discretion of courts in determining facts that underlie higher sentences, or the reliability of evidence to support increased penalties. 549 U.S. at 283-86, 290. These discredited rationales are the sole bases on which Thorne relies. After Cunningham, it is clear that the defendant’s right to a jury trial rests on a “bright-line rule” that is not subject to policy concerns such as what the legislature intended or whether the evidence that the fact finder is to evaluate is particularly reliable. 549 U.S. at 283-86, 290; see also Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 220, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 165 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2006) (<HOLDING>). ¶87 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, and its progeny Holdings: 0: holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements 1: holding there is no meaningful distinction between due course and due process 2: holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction 3: holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing 4: recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel


Input: de Ruiz v. U.S., 231 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1201-02 (M.D.Fla.2002) (concluding that aggravation of pre-exist-ing conditions, such as diabetes and asthma, is insufficient to satisfy impact rule), aff'd, 378 F.3d 1229, 1231 (11th Cir.2004). Here, the ailments complained of are headaches, diabetes, sleep apnea, stress, insomnia, anxiety, loss of appetite, hair loss, and bowel trouble, which are not the sort of the discernable physical injuries discussed in Champion and Zell. In addition, medical testimony discussing Mary Ann’s injuries was equivocal, and no evidence was introduced linking Douglas’s ailments to Appellant’s acts. Cf. Zell, 665 So.2d at 1050 (noting plaintiff introduced medical testimony linking medical conditions to emotional distress), with Champion, 478 So.2d at 20 (<HOLDING>). We also conclude that Appellees failed to Holdings: 0: holding plaintiff established entitlement to relief without addressing whether plaintiffs death was medically attributable to emotional shock 1: holding plaintiff established entitlement to jury trial of legal claims brought under the phra 2: holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief 3: holding emotional distress is a distinct claim from wrongful death 4: holding that the plaintiff had established an entitlement to relief on the merits of the claim  and was therefore entitled to fees even though it was remanded to the agency for further action


Input: and related Clausell’s improbable story to police officers, the officers likely had sufficient probable cause to search the apartment. And yet, Clausell continued to provide further inconsistent statements to the police officers thereby bolstering a finding of probable cause to search the apartment. During their investigation, the police officers found a .22 caliber pistol with one spent round in the chamber wrapped in a towel inside a bucket located immediately outside Clausell’s apartment. The police officers properly searched the area outside of Clausell’s apartment as he possessed no reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of his apartment, particularly given that the bucket was apparently in plain view. See State v. Hubbell (1997), 286 Mont. 200, 210, 951 P.2d 971, 977 (<HOLDING>). ¶23 Under these circumstances, the fact that Holdings: 0: holding that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to property leading up to and including the threshold of a residence therefore police officers were well within their authority to proceed on the open walkway to the front door where they saw evidence in plain view 1: holding based on steelman and johnson that evidence of the smell of marijuana emanating from a home a car with an open door and the keys in the ignition in front of the home and pry marks on the homes front door was not sufficient to justify a warrantless entry 2: holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records 3: holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence 4: holding that a drug sniff outside the front door of the defendants residence was not a fourth amendment search because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy at the entrance to property that is open to the public including the front porch


Input: been a basis for the preliminary injunction. C In sum, due to the jurisdictional and merits-based considerations discussed in detail above, the Association has failed to demonstrate even a fair chance of success on the likelihood of success prong as to any of the four claims. IV Turning briefly to the remaining prongs of the preliminary injunction test, even assuming that each of these prongs weighs in the Association’s favor, it was an abuse of discretion for the preliminary injunction to be granted. Regardless whether the fair chance standard or a more demanding standard applies to the likelihood of success prong, the Association did not establish even a fair chance of success on the merits and, therefore, a preliminary injunction was not warranted. See Mikohn Gaming, 165 F.3d at 895 (<HOLDING>). We note, however, our disagreement with the Holdings: 0: holding that the standard for permanent injunction is the same as that for preliminary injunction with the one exception being that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than likelihood of success 1: holding that under the sliding scale approach a petitioner had made a sufficiently strong showing of likely success on the merits where he presented a case which raises serious legal questions or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of success 2: holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest 3: holding that a movant that clearly establishes likelihood of success on the merits receives the benefit of a presumption of irreparable harm 4: holding that regardless of other factors as to harms a movants likelihood of success must carry at least a fair chance of success on the merits in order to warrant interim relief internal quotation omitted


Input: of a crime need not be objected to or preserved for appeal in order to merit treatment by the appellate court, and may be ground for reversal. See Rule 12-216. {47} “In determining what is or is not an essential element of an offense, we begin with the language of the statute itself[.]” Osborne, 111 N.M. at 657, 808 P.2d at 627. The murder statute, NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1 (1963) does not deal with the issue of more than one person contributing to the cause of death, and there is not the slightest suggestion that if there are multiple individuals responsible for the death that any of them is less guilty of the crime of murder. The additional, omitted instruction is therefore merely elaborative of the primary instruction. See State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 458, 462, 601 P.2d 428, 432 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, it expands, rather than contracts, Holdings: 0: holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established 1: holding that the failure to instruct on a definition or to amplify an element is not a failure to instruct on an essential element 2: recognizing that trial courts failure to instruct jury on element of offense is harmless when existence of element is uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence 3: holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial 4: holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim


Input: of imprisonment imposed under this section shall run consecutive to any former sentence imposed upon any prisoner. Florida law provides that a person convicted of a “felony of the second degree” is punishable to "a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years.” Fla. Stat. § 775.082(3)(c). 32 . Fla. Stat. § 945.091(4) provides: The willful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended limits of his or her confinement or to return within the time prescribed to the place of confinement designated by the department shall be deemed as an escape from the custody of the department and shall be punishable as prescribed by law. 33 . In so holding, we are mindful of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. --■, 129 S.Ct. 687, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) (<HOLDING>). We nonetheless find that decision inapposite. Holdings: 0: holding that failure to stop for a blue light is a violent felony under armed career criminal statute because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another 1: holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 2: holding that possession of sawedoff shotgun is violent felony as defined by armed career criminal act 3: holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act 4: holding that the illinois crime of failure to report for imprisonment is not a violent felony for purposes of the armed career criminal act


Input: construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series."). 125 Furthermore, the statute at issue defines ."sexual contact," not simply "contact." It would be incongruous to say that such contact could occur without having a "sexual element." In addition, the definition appears in a section under the broad heading "Unlawful Sexual Behavior," for Part 4 of the statute. © . 126 For all these reasons, we conclude that "sexual" modifies "abuse" in the definition of "sexual contact" contained in section 18-3-401(4). See United States v. De La Cruz-Garcia, 590 F.3d 1157, 1160 (10th Cir.2010) (noting that section 18-3-401(4) is limited to sexual acts); State v. Riolo, 50 Kan.App.2d 351, 330 P.3d 1120, 1124 (2014) (<HOLDING>). { 27 Having determined that there must be a Holdings: 0: holding that the fouching for the purposes of abuse language in section 1834014 means touching for the purposes of sexual abuse not abuse in general 1: holding evidence of outofstate instances of abuse admissible in child sexual abuse case to show intent opportunity and relationship between defendant and victim 2: holding that an abuse or molestation exclusion unambiguously covered claim of sexual touching even though terms abuse and molestation were not defined 3: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse 4: holding that although there were six occurrences under the general liability policy there was only one sexual abuse occurrence where sexual abuse occurrence was defined as a single act or multiple continuous sporadic or related acts of sexual molestation or abuse caused by one perpetrator


Input: that Althen could be bypassed in this case, the Court of Federal Claims correctly determined the error was harmless. See Trial Court Decision, 100 Fed.Cl. at 451. The special master’s finding that Petitioner had multiple sclerosis before receiving the vaccine means that Petitioner did not establish a “logical sequence of cause and effect showing that the vaccination was the reason for [his] injury” as required by prong two of Althen. 418 F.3d at 1278. If a petitioner has a disorder before being vaccinated, the vaccine logically cannot have caused the disorder. Additionally, prong three of Althen requires a “medically-aceeptable temporal relationship” between vaccination and onset of symptoms. Id. at 1281; de Bazan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 539 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Petitioner’s first episode of Holdings: 0: holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the bia to fail to consider the merits of a petitioners claim 1: holding a petitioners causation claim may fail because disease onset occurs too early to be attributable to the vaccine 2: holding that the petitioners offer of proof was too tenuous to justify the desired inquiry 3: holding that five alleged incidents in four years were too few too separate in time and too mild  to create an abusive working environment 4: holding that attorneys admission to an element of the offense in the petitioners presence at a deportation hearing was binding on the petitioners


Input: as a matter of law. To secure summary judgment, City was required to establish both that there was no genuine issue in dispute to support its affirmative defense that the Agreement was void ab initio, and that there was no genuine issue in dispute to negate Lamar’s affirmative avoidance of equitable estoppel. See id, at 381. As we explain, City sustained that burden. It is a long settled principle in Missouri that “[cjities cannot be made liable, either on the theory of estoppel or implied contract, by reason of the accepting and using [of] the benefits derived from void contracts.” Donovan, 175 S.W.2d at 881 (quoting Likes v. Rolla, 184 Mo. App. 296, 167 S.W. 645, 647 (1914)). Vain; and futile would Constitution and statutes and charter be, i 8 Mo. 978, 156 S.W.2d 706, 707 (1941) (<HOLDING>); St. Charles Cty., 184 S.W.3d at 167 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 1: holding notice of the defect actual or constructive and a failure to act on the part of the municipality to remedy the situation are prerequisites to recovery in an action involving a municipality 2: holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff 3: holding that under the implied covenant of good faith neither party to a contract shall do anything which has the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract 4: holding that where a city enters contract in excess of its statutory power the mere fact that the municipality has received the benefits of the contract which has been performed by the other party does not make the municipality liable either on the theory of ratification estoppel or implied contract in order to do justice to the other party by paying the reasonable value of the property or services


Input: 49) acquired for the personal use of the debtor.... 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). The hanging paragraph protects creditors possessing a “purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim” from § 506(a) bifurcation and cramdown. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). The parties agree the collateral in this case is a motor vehicle acquired for the personal use of the debtors and the motor vehicle was acquired within 910 days of the bankruptcy filing. The only issue in dispute is the extent to which Ford Motor Credit has a “purchas o.2008) (same), and In re Padgett, 389 B.R. 203, 211-12 (Bankr.D.Kan.2008) (same), rev’d sub nom., AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Padgett (In re Padgett) 408 B.R. 374, 381-82 (10th Cir. BAP 2009), with In re Ford, 387 B.R. 827, 833 (Bankr.D.Kan.2008) (<HOLDING>), and In re Austin, 381 B.R. 892, 897 Holdings: 0: holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing 1: holding bifurcation and cramdown are unavailable because negative equity is part of purchase money security interest 2: holding that a pledge is a sale and purchase of a security under  10b 3: holding that in georgia pursuant to  9107 of the ucc refinancing of a promissory note transforms the obligation thereby destroying purchase money nature of the security interest therefore the creditor lost its purchase money security interest pmsi in a television set when the loans were consolidated and lien was avoidable id 89 br 264 18 bcd 58 4: holding that a purchase money security in jewelry was not lost when the perfected purchase money security interest was consolidated with a subsequent retail installment contract