Input: as possible, because, yes, I was in fear for my safety at that time. Examining the encounter in context, however, in light of the testimony of Stratton, I find that the second movement was witnessed as the officers approached, before McKoy was asked to leave the car, and that promptly upon being asked, McKoy left his vehicle. 3 . Of course, the police did not actually stop the car in this case. At the point when they asked McKoy to leave the car, however, they had seized him for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The police officers in this case were justified in stopping the defendant and effecting this initial seizure because they had probable cause to believe he had committed two separate traffic violations. See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 819, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (<HOLDING>). The officers in this case were also permitted Holdings: 0: holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred 1: holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment 2: holding that the subjective intent of the officer is no longer determinative wjhen applying the objective test generally the only determination to be made is whether probable cause existed for the stop in question and that per whren a violation of traffic law provided sufficient probable cause to make the subsequent search and seizure reasonable 3: holding that probable cause to believe the traffic code had been violated rendered the stop reasonable under the fourth amendment regardless of officers subjective intent 4: holding a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the fourth amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed


Input: against unconsenting states or state officials when the state is the real, substantial party in interest, regardless of the remedy sought, including 'pendent state law claims.’ ”), citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120-21, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Rakow v. North Dakota ex rel. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 2000 WL 227850 at *1 (8th Cir., February 24, 2000) (The plaintiff's claims were "barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits federal courts from hearing suits against states and state officers in their official capacities when, as in this case, the suit alleges a violation of state law and regardless of whether money damages or injunctive relief is sought.”) [Table Decision]; see also, Bisciglia v. Lee, 370 F.Supp.2d 874, 878 (D.Minn.2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we recommend that the Holdings: 0: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state itself and not cognizable under  1983 1: holding state of north carolina and state official sued in their official capacity are immune from  1983 and  1985 actions in federal court 2: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state official sued in his or her official capacity 3: holding that a state officer sued in his individual capacity may be held personally liable for damages under 42 usc  1983 based upon actions taken in his official capacity 4: recognizing that when a state employee is sued in his official capacity the state is the real party in interest and as a result the eleventh amendment is implicated


Input: We disagree. The first and the third of these factors apply to any multiunit rental facility. The second is irrelevant: Hoosiers who live in rural areas are entitled to no less protection against invasion of their homes. The fourth, assuming it applied to the third home, is in and of itself innocuous. Probable cause clearly existed with respect to the first two homes, and the totality of the circumstances established some suspicion or possibility of a joint drug-dealing enterprise at the Farm. But this is not enough. The affidavit did not allege any facts linking the third home to the surrounding criminal activity. The lack of any nexus is a critical point in assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s reliance on the warrant. Cf. Stabenow v. State, 495 N.E.2d 197 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Objective good faith “requires officers to Holdings: 0: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search 1: holding that a warrant lacking a description of items to be seized was not facially invalid and finding in the alternative that even if the warrant were found to be deficient the seized evidence was admissible under the good faith exception 2: holding that there was probable cause for arrest where officers knew defendants had recently been with suspected drug dealer officers saw defendants car being maneuvered so as to indicate that surveillance had been detected and when officers approached car defendant attempted to place package under car and then pulled the package back inside the car and closed and locked the car door 3: holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car 4: holding that cocaine seized pursuant to search of defendants car was not admissible under good faith exception because affidavit did not establish connection between car and criminal activity


Input: in that opinion, however, that the Seventh Circuit would permit an indemnification or contribution claim to be brought by the employer against the supervisor. Likewise, the legislative history of the FLSA cited by Defendants does not support such a claim. See Herman, 172 F.3d at 144 (noting that the text of the FLSA makes no provision for contribution or indemnification and the Act’s legislative history is silent on a right to contribution or indemnification). Other cases cited by Defendants demonstrate the federal courts’ refusal to recognize a federal common law right to indemnity or contribution except in limited circumstances. (Defs.’ Resp. at 7, citing, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981) (<HOLDING>), and Tumer/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding employer had no right of contribution under equal pay act title vii or federal common law against unions that allegedly bore at least partial responsibility for statutory violations 1: holding that same standard applies to equal pay act and title vii wage discrimination claims 2: recognizing a right to contribution 3: holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii 4: holding that  final responsibility for enforcement of title vii is vested with federal courts


Input: and conspired uage and gestures of a custodial office[r] do not, even if true, amount to constitutional violations.” Robertson v. Plano City of Texas, 70 F.3d 21, 24 (5th Cir.1995). Likewise, claims of verbal abuse and harassment are not actionable under § 1983. Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d 271, 274 n. 4 (5th Cir.1993). Thus, Plaintiffs complaints of verbal abuse, harassment, and threats should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous. To the extent that Plaintiff complains that certain Defendants failed to answer his jail grievances or denied his grievances and the appeals, he has not demonstrated that he had a constitutionally protected interest in the Taylor County Jail grievance procedures. See Piper v. Alford, No. 3:02-CV-2640-P, 2003 WL 21350215, at *2 (N.D.Tex., June 4, 2003) (<HOLDING>). See also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Holdings: 0: holding that a jail inmate does not have a constitutional entitlement to an adequate grievance procedure and the ineffectiveness or even absence of a grievance procedure does not give rise to a constitutional claim 1: holding that there is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure 2: holding that an ineffective grievance procedure bars employers defense based on that procedure 3: holding that because plaintiffs were reasonable in interpreting defendants grievance procedure to apply only to active employees plaintiffs did not act in bad faith when they alleged that no applicable grievance procedure existed 4: holding that a prison grievance procedure is not a substantive right and does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment


Input: § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphases added). Section (B)(ii) does not lend itself to the interpretation advocated by the Government. Nowhere is it “specified” that the bond determination is a “discretionary” decision of the Attorney General. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (2004) (providing that the Attorney General “may require the positing of bond in an amount determined by the [Attorney General] to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal,” but failing to “specify” that that determination is “discretionary”), with 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(c) (noting that the Attorney General “may, in his or her discretion, grant employment authorization ....”) (emphasis added). Accord Spencer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 689-90 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Simply, it is not “specified” that the bond Holdings: 0: holding that the jurisdictional bar in section bii applies only to acts over which a statute gives the attorney general pure discretion unguided by legal standards or statutory guidelines 1: holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute not of challenge to statute itself 2: recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern 3: holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar 4: holding that the jurisdictional bar applies to the denial of deferral of removal under the cat


Input: 135 N.M. 192, 86 P.3d 617, 619 (Ct.App.2004). A contract is ambiguous if it is “reasonably and fairly susceptible of different constructions.” Id. "[I]n determining whether a term or expression to which the parties have agreed is unclear, a court may hear evidence of the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract and of any relevant usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance.” C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 112 N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238, 242-43 (1991) (footnote omitted). "Further, the language of the entire agreement should be construed together.” Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 127 N.M. 1, 976 P.2d 1, 12 (1999). 12 . See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1152-53 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). But see Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d Holdings: 0: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims 1: recognizing that analysis of whether certain expenses qualify as deducti ing royalty contracts 2: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 3: holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs 4: holding that the enactment of firrea breached certain government contracts


Input: 1136, 1140-41 (App.1996); Deuel v. Ariz. State Sch. for the Deaf and Blind, 165 Ariz. 524, 526-27, 799 P.2d 865, 867-68 (App. 1990) (setting forth due process rights of covered public employees); accord 5 U.S.C. § 2301 (1996) (setting forth federal merit system principles); see generally Daryl Man-hart, Commment, Property and Liberty Limitations on the Dismissal of Arizona Public Employees, 1977 Ariz. St. L.J. 835, 853-54 [hereinafter “Manhart”] (discussing law enforcement merit systems). ¶ 15 The right to treatment based on merit and a hearing by a neutral board before discipline becomes final are therefore central merit system principles of public employment for purposes of A.R.S. § 38-1003. See Evans v. State ex rel. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 131 Ariz. 569, 572, 643 P.2d 14, 17 (App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Bishop v. Law Enforcement Merit Sys. Council, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the focus must be on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial 1: holding no violation of substantial rights occurred during voir dire where record did not show that defendant was denied fair and impartial trial 2: recognizing requirement that state personnel board be a fair and impartial tribunal 3: recognizing absolute immunity for board members and the director of the mississippi state board of nursing 4: holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict


Input: on the grounds that the non-diverse employees of a diverse defendant had not been negligent). In this case, any finding of fraudulent joinder as to Pierce & Associates is necessarily dispositive, in part or, more likely, in whole, of the liability of U.S. Bank, because Plaintiffs allege the law firm acted at all times as the agent of Firstar, U.S. Bank’s predecessor in inter est. See Complaint ¶ 22. See also United States v. 7108 West Grand Ave., Chicago, Ill, 15 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir.1994) (“[A]n attorney’s errors and misconduct are attributed to his clients. The clients are principals, the attorney is an agent, and under the law of agency the principal is bound by his chosen agent’s deeds.”); Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 212 Ill.2d 1, 287 Ill.Dec. 510, 816 N.E.2d 272, 279 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Given that the alleged misconduct of Pierce & Holdings: 0: holding that a client is vicariously liable for an attorneys allegedly intentional tortious conduct if the attorney acted as the clients agent 1: holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client 2: holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case 3: holding that licensed agent is in privity with principal for purpose of establishing identity of parties record establishes classic employeremployee relationship in which corporation is vicariously liable for conduct of agent 4: holding that when an attorney represents multiple clients and a dispute between the attorney and one client later occurs there is a waiver of the privilege but only by the client asserting the liability


Input: of section 121. Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, no protection was afforded to patent applications filed as a result of a restriction requirement — referred to at the time as a “requirement for division” — and such applications were often rejected or held invalid on double patenting grounds. See Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. N. Petrochemical Co., 784 F.2d 351, 358 (Fed.Cir.1986) (“SGK”) (Newman, J., concurring); In re Eisler, 40 C.C.P.A. 913, 203 F.2d 726 (1953). Thus, although a requirement for division embodied a determination by the PTO that the patent application contained more than one patentably distinct invention, such a determination did not protect the divisional application from rejection on grounds of double patenting. In re Isherwood, 46 App.D.C. 507, 512 (D.C.Cir.1917) (<HOLDING>). The PTO and the courts were therefore not Holdings: 0: holding that there is no constitutional or statutory requirement that a defendants trial take place in a specific courtroom or division within a federal district and that the jury pool need not include anyone from the division in which the crime occurred 1: holding that the attorney generals decision not to provide representation to an employee is reviewable by the appellate division not by the law division where the actions against the employee are pending 2: holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division 3: holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order 4: holding that an examiner is not estopped from rejecting a divisional application because of an earlier requirement for division


Input: 2. 19 . Dr. Strong’s Report at 2 (emphasis added). 20 . Dr. Strong’s Report at 2. 21 . Dr. Strong’s Report at 2. 22 . Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 46], 23 .28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 24 . Estate of Northrop v. Hutto, 9 So.3d 381, 384 (Miss.2009). This element, like all elements of a medical malpractice case, must be satisfied by expert testimony. Coleman v. Rice, 706 So.2d 696, 698 (Miss. 1997). 25 . Patterson v. Tibbs, 60 So.3d 742, 753 (Miss.2011). 26 . Drummond v. Buckley, 627 So.2d 264, 268 (Miss.1993). 27 . Dr. Strong’s Report at 1. 28 . Government's Brief at 4. 29 . Government’s Brief at 4. 30 . Conn's Brief at 2. 31 . Dr. Strong’s Report at 1. 32 . See Patterson, supra at n. 31. 33 . Dr. Strong’s Report at 2. 34 . Estate of Northrop v. Hutto, 9 So.3d 381, 387 (Miss.2009) (<HOLDING>). The expert "must articulate an objective Holdings: 0: holding experts testimony was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the testimony at most showed the defendant deviated from the experts personal standard of care rather than the generally recognized and accepted standard of care 1: holding experts testimony was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the testimony at most showed the defendant deviated from the experts personal standard of care rather than the generally accepted standard of care 2: holding that standard of care need not be listed separately in report when same standard applies to each health care provider 3: holding that a manufacturers insert in and of itself may not establish the relevant standard of care in a medical negligence action but may be considered by the fact finder along with expert testimony to define the standard of care 4: holding that an experts personal preference does not establish a national standard of care


Input: which led the DOE to believe that “money may be due back to the DOE.” The e-mail further stated that, “[u]ntil the DOE is confident that no money is owed to it for prior false invoices from [RESG], the account will remain frozen and money withheld in order to protect the City’s interests and tax payer dollars.” Before the District Court, and now on appeal, UCF has argued that the objection in the February 3 e-mail was insufficiently specific inasmuch as it did not directly address each of the 3,913 invoices in the allegedly stated account. We are aware of no authority under New York law that requires such extreme specificity. On the contrary, numerous New des the plaintiffs statement of an account. See Navimex S.A. De C.V. v. S/S “Northern Ice”, 617 F.Supp. 103, 106 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (<HOLDING>). Upon a thorough review of the record, and in Holdings: 0: holding that a statement that the affiant is president of the company asserting a claim on an account is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the account 1: holding that a supplementary statement of account dated february 1978 did not constitute an account stated because there was an underlying dispute between the parties as evidenced by defendants objection in january 1978 to plaintiffs august 1977 statement of account thereby precluding a finding of consent by the defendants to the february 1978 statement 2: holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection  and admonished the jury to disregard the statement 3: holding that it was error for the court to rule that the statement of mortgage debt was incorrect prior to submission of the auditors statement of account 4: holding that language in a merrill lynch customer account agreement that the plaintiff signed upon opening the first account  providing for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of its business  applied to the disputed second account even though the plaintiff did not sign a separate customer account agreement for the second account


Input: Loschiavo for the proposition that § 1983 could be used to enforce regulations “which have the force of law”). The current Sixth Circuit precedent treats regulations as “laws” under § 1983 and looks to determine whether the regulation at issue creates rights. In essence, regulations are treated in the same manner as statutes for purposes of determining whether they create new enforceable rights under § 1983. A such, district courts in the Sixth Circuit must determine, just as with federal statutes, whether federal regulations presented by § 1983 plaintiffs create enforceable rights. This court questions whether the Sixth Circuit’s rule can be correct in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Alexander v. Sandoval and Gonzaga University v. Doe. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937 (<HOLDING>). These two decisions, when read together, Holdings: 0: holding that as the court has made clear in several recent decisions a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue 1: holding federal regulations have the force of law and may create enforceable rights 2: holding that regulations do not create enforceable rights when they are too far removed from congressional intent 3: recognizing that these two recent supreme court decisions resolve the issue of whether federal regulations alone can create enforceable rights under  1983 4: holding that because federal regulations have the force of law they may create enforceable rights under  1983


Input: informal refund claim based on written protests prior to payment); Night Hawk Leasing Co. v. United States, 84 Ct.Cl. 596, 603-04, 18 F.Supp. 938 (1937) (concluding that the taxpayer made an informal refund claim by writing an objection on the back of a check submitted as payment of the tax). Contrary to the assertions in plaintiffs complaint, Mr. Evans’ March 29, 2012 memorandum does not satisfy either of the requirements for informal claims. First, although the memorandum states that Mr. Evans verbally “conceded” that Mr. Ishler “has an open informal claim due to the documented discussions with IRS officials,” Compl. Ex. A at 1, it does not reference any written component of that alleged claim. See, e.g., Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (Ct.Cl.1981) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Second, the memorandum Holdings: 0: holding that oral assertions by the taxpayer during an audit were insufficient as a matter of law to constitute an informal refund claim 1: holding that an oral challenge to the venire is insufficient 2: holding that while the contract did not establish a formal fiduciary relationship the pleadings were sufficient to raise an issue as to the existence of an informal one 3: holding that a negative performance evaluation on its own is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action as a matter of law 4: holding that a motion to liftthe bankruptcy stay in order to pursue a claim is an informal proof of claim


Input: the Convention, finding that Li had not established a well-founded fear of persecution. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. We hold that the evidence in the record is insufficient to compel a finding that Li established a well-founded fear of persecution. The single threat to handcuff Li does not constitute past persecution. Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir.2000) (defining persecution as an “extreme concept” that includes the “infliction of suffering or harm” (citations omitted)). Nor does the combination of the threat, the experience of his father’s friend, and the State Department Profile establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Arrest alone, even on account of a protected category, does not constitute persecution. Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). While the State Department Profile does Holdings: 0: holding that beatings vandalism threats and humiliation in the aggregate  rise to the level of persecution as contemplated by the act 1: holding that imputed political opinion is a protected ground 2: holding that forced recruitment does not amount to persecution without a showing that it was on account of petitioners political opinion 3: holding that the record did not compel a finding of persecution where an alien was detained for five or six days 4: holding that detention of five or six days on account of imputed political opinion without beatings tortures or threats did not rise to the level of persecution


Input: of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of [the procedural rule governing class actions] are met.” (quoting Miller v. Mackey Int’l, 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir.1971))). 12 .See Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex.1993) ("An opinion issued in a case brought by a party without standing is advisory because rather than remedying an actual or imminent harm, the judgment addresses only a hypothetical injury.”). 13 . See id. 14 . E.g. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 443-445 (Tex.1989). 15 . 135 S.W.3d 657, 679 (Tex.2004) (footnote omitted). Cf. Collins v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 894 So.2d 988 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). 16 . See, e.g., Martinez v. Second Injury Holdings: 0: holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act 1: holding that the plaintiffs stated a claim for conspiracy because they alleged an actionable tort 2: holding that an insurers violation of covenant of good faith and fair dealing was actionable under the consumer protection act 3: holding that plaintiffs complaint that the value of her car was less because it was equipped with gen3 seatbelt buckles is actionable under the state consumer protection law even though the alleged defect has never manifest itself in an emergency or caused damages 4: holding on habeas review that defendant was not in custody for miranda purposes and reciting among other facts that defendant was transported to a police station for questioning in an unmarked police car which was not equipped with a shield inside the car


Input: received title— subject to Cox’s repurchase option—to a tract that had been valued three months earlier at nearly $2.5 million. Christopher assumed the outstanding AgSouth mortgage, which had an unpaid principal balance of around $700,000, and paid Banks $500,000 for Banks’s share of the property’s equity. Christopher did not make any payment to Cox for his share of that equity. In other words, Christopher received title to the Cox tract in exchange for consideration equal to about half the property’s value: $1.2 versus $2.5 million. A gross disparity between the sale price and the actual value of the land is evidence of the parties’ intent to create a security interest—a mortgage—rather than a sale. See Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139, 147-48, 13 L.Ed. 927 (1851) (<HOLDING>); Conway’s Ex’rs and Devisees, 11 U.S. at 241 Holdings: 0: holding that extraneous evidence is admissible to inform courts of all material facts surrounding the delivery of the deed and concluding that it is of great importance to inquire whether the consideration was adequate to induce a sale 1: holding that the delivery of the deed following a foreclosure sale was a ministerial act that was not prohibited by the automatic stay 2: holding that once the defendant is before the court the court will not inquire into the circumstances surrounding his presence there 3: holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed 4: holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession


Input: and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 1 . We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2 . Highway 80 runs northeast from the border town of Douglas, Arizona, through the sparsely populated “bootheel'' section of southwestern New Mexico before intersecting Interstate 10. 3 .It is unclear from the record whether the present stop was one of the two or in addition to the others. 4 . Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 5 . At oral argument, Montes-Ramos' counsel advised the Court that Montes-Ramos is no longer in custody. Because he is challenging the underlying conviction, not the sentence, Montes-Ramos' appeal is not moot. See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222, 67 S.Ct. 224, 91 L.Ed. 196 (1946) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The Fifth Circuit went on to conclude the Holdings: 0: holding that where a conviction survives an apprendi challenge under plain error review a sentence appropriate for that conviction also survives 1: holding that forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following conviction 2: holding that  once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual in custody for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it 3: holding that when the consequences of the conviction are not severe and imminent an appeal is moot when the judgment is voluntarily satisfied 4: holding the petitioners challenge of his conviction is not rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence because collateral consequences flowing from the conviction give the petitioner a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him


Input: is true. Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc., 891 S.W.2d at 644; Marchal, 859 S.W.2d at 412. For. a defendant to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the defendant must conclusively negate at least one of the essential elements of each of the plaintiffs causes of action or conclusively establish each essential element of an affirmative defense. Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex.1995). In his first point of error, Perrotta contends the trial court erred by rendering summary judgment for Farmers on both his contractual and extra-contractual claims. We will first consider the judgment rendered on the contractual claims. A. Breach of Contract In its motion for summary judgment, Farmers claimed that Perrotta breached several conditions .2d 948, 949 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1989, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Insurance policies are governed by ordinary Holdings: 0: holding policy provision requiring an insured to submit to an examination under oath is a condition precedent to suit rather than a cooperation clause 1: holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit 2: holding the failure of the insureds to submit to an euo a condition precedent to sustaining a suit on the insurance policy required abatement of the suit 3: holding insureds failure to comply with terms of policy requiring him to sign and return an euo was a material breach 4: holding that defendant insurance company could not be held liable in negligence to a plaintiff for failure to disclose the insureds medical condition where defendant insurance company had not assumed a professional and expert position with respect to the insureds physical condition


Input: made in open court, unless the defendant has, prior to that time, sought affirmative relief.” Id. at 325 (quoting Greenberg v. Brookshire, 640 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex.1982)). When nonsuit is filed after an unfavorable partial summary judgment has been entered against the claimant, the nonsuit is with prejudice as to those claims of which the judgment has disposed. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 892 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Tex.1995); see also Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 868 n. 7. This concept promotes judicial efficiency, protects parties from multiple lawsuits, and prevents inconsistent judgments through the preclusion of matters that have already been decided or which could have been litigated in a prior suit. See In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Tex.2008); see also Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>); Yazdchi v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 177 S.W.3d Holdings: 0: recognizing that dilution of disfavored partys electoral power constitutes adverse effect cognizable under the first amendment 1: recognizing need for coordinating rulings on discovery disputes 2: holding that rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate when a motion is filed in part for a legitimate purpose even when the motion includes certain evidence which is assertedly presented for an improper purpose 3: recognizing that nonsuit filed for the purpose of circumventing unfavorable legal restrictions or rulings are disfavored 4: holding that a quick look analysis was inappropriate for restrictions imposed by professional association of dentists on member advertising where the likelihood of noncompetitive effects of restrictions were not obvious and restrictions could plausibly be thought to have procompetitive effect on competition


Input: 349 (1979) [“Pedlar, Community Property”]. The article suggests the possibility that “the Devil himself could effectively receive a discharge in bankruptcy if he were married to Snow White.” Id. at 382. To this I would add: if he does not treat her better than his creditors, she will, by divorcing him, deny his discharge^ ] The cases are uniform in recognizing this effect of Section 524(a)(3). See, e.g., Soderling, 998 F.2d at 733 (“[a]ll claims against a marital community are discharged,” except for nondischargeable community claims); In re Homan, 112 B.R. 356, 360 (9th Cir. BAP 1989) (stating in dicta that after-acquired community property is immune from collection efforts, even if creditor’s claim is only against non-debtor spouse); In re Hull, 251 B.R. 726, 732 (9th Cir. BAP 2000) (<HOLDING>); In re Rollinson, 322 B.R. 879, 883 Holdings: 0: holding that section 4a12 is a broadly applicable section of the guidelines 1: holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect 2: recognizing effect of section 524a3 3: holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect 4: holding to the same effect


Input: only if the circumstances alleged to be in aggravation ... are found to be true by the trial judge ... and factual findings and reasons in support of such findings are set forth on the record at the time of sentencing.”). In effect, the State suggests that even though the fact-finder did not validly find any aggravating factor that exposed a defendant to an aggravated sentence, a sentence should be upheld if an appellate court could find in the record some aggravating factor that could expose the defendant to a greater sentence and thus allow the sentencing judge to consider other facts not found by the jury in imposing a sentence within the higher range. ¶ 18 The State misapprehends the role of a reviewing court in non-capital criminal sentencing. When a trial court im (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The State also assumes that an unenumerated Holdings: 0: holding that juvenile adjudications are prior convictions for purposes of the apprendi exception and indicating that the main concern in apprendi was whether the prior convictions procedural safeguards ensured a reliable result not that there had to be a right to a jury trial 1: holding that a juvenile adjudication may be used as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes 2: holding that the prior conviction exception should not extend to nonjury juvenile adjudications 3: holding that a juvenile adjudication should not be counted as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes 4: holding that a nonjury juvenile adjudication that  afforded all constitutionallyrequired procedural safeguards can properly be characterized as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes


Input: of males from the team and the goal of redressing past discrimination and providing equal opportunities for women.” Id. It is beyond question that redressing the disparate athletic opportunities available to males and females is an important governmental interest. See Mularadelis, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 464; see also Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F.Supp. 164, 170 (D.Colo.1977) (noting that because the athletic opportunity for females has historically been limited, “the encouragement of female involvement in sports is a legitimate objective”). Excluding males from female teams is substantially related to achieving that objective. See Clark, 695 F.2d at 1131; Hoover, 430 F.Supp. at 170. But see Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 378 Mass. 342, 393 N.E.2d 284 (1979) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, plaintiffs have not Holdings: 0: holding that discrimination based on religion is subjected to strict scrutiny whether a claim arises under the establishment clause the free exercise clause of equal protection clause 1: holding that section 922k passes muster under intermediate scrutiny and would also pass muster under a strict scrutiny analysis 2: holding that nearly identical kansas statute did not violate equal protection clause when subjected to strict scrutiny 3: holding that such a classification could not pass muster under the strict scrutiny required by the massachusetts equal rights amendment 4: holding statutory classification of victim and a defendant involved in issuance of a protective order did not violate defendants equal protection rights


Input: See Ackerson v. Bean Dredging, LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 209 (5th Cir.2009). Federal Rule of Civil Pro cedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” This rule must, however, be interpreted in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim for relief in federal court. Rule 8(a) calls for “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-82, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-51, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (applying Rule 8(a) and plausibility standard to Rule 12(b)(6) motion raising qualified-immunity defense); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 122 5. Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (<HOLDING>). As a result, “[a] motion to dismiss for Holdings: 0: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 1: holding that the pleading standard set forth in twombly applies to all civil actions 2: holding rule 8as simplified pleading standard applies to most civil actions 3: recognizing the liberal notice and simplified pleading principles underlying the federal rules of civil procedure 4: holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983


Input: compared to Sieg’s multiplier of 73%. Assuming an adjusted book value of $78.34 per share (book value adjusted by partially restating inventory to a FIFO basis per Ma-roney’s testimony), Sieg’s per-share value would have been $57.19 compared to the court’s value of $62.67, a difference of only $5.48 per share. Even if the marketability discount taken by Sieg is not allowed in Iowa, an issue we do not decide, the impact this error had on Sieg’s valuation of the stock was slight and would certainly support the trial court’s exercise of discretion to deny the substantial attorney fees sought by the dissenters, particularly in view of the fact the use of a marketability discount was not done in bad faith. See Waters v. Double L, Inc., 114 Idaho 256, 755 P.2d 1294, 1305 (Idaho Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>), modified, 115 Idaho 705, 769 P.2d 582 (1989); Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant was only permitted to recover attorney fees as an item of special damages with respect to the underlying action in which the defendant was sued and was not permitted to recover attorney fees incurred in the malpractice portion of the case as damages 1: holding a summary judgment to be final although motion to assess attorney fees remained pending because award of attorney fees is collateral to judgment 2: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case 3: holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment 4: recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees


Input: reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint (Dkt. No. 5) and DISMISSES Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . Plaintiff did not attach a copy of the Note or the Mortgage to his Complaint. Indeed, Plaintiff did not even disclose the principal amount of the loan or the interest rate terms about which he complains. Defendant at taches copies of the Note and Mortgage to its Motion. The Court considers these documents in this motion to dismiss, although they are not formally attached to the Complaint, because they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to Plaintiff's claims. See Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir.1999). See also Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). 2 . A civil conspiracy, by itself, is not a Holdings: 0: holding that if the plaintiff fails to attach the written instrument upon which he relies the defendant may introduce the pertinent exhibit which becomes a part of the pleadings 1: holding that trial court erred by not allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence of prior dealings with the defendant 2: holding that for the purpose of deciding a motion to dismiss the complaint includes any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference 3: holding that a ruling of the trial court to which no error has been assigned becomes the law of the case and is not subject to review by the court of appeals 4: holding that final judgment on the merits in one action bars any further claim based on the same nucleus of facts for it is the facts surrounding the transaction or occurrence which operate to constitute the cause of action not the legal theory upon which a litigant relies


Input: Terny from receiving advancements. The “right to advaneement does not go away simply because the entity from which advancement is sought is alleging that the [defendant] has committed perfidious acts against it.” DeLucca, 2006 WL 224058, at *11. However, Confederate argues that Terny is not entitled to any advances since he has not been sued as a director, but rather in his capacity as a shareholder or consultant. (PI. Opp. at 3). While this argument may limit the scope of work for which Terny is entitled to advancement, it does not eliminate the right to advancements in their entirety- Terny is only entitled to seek advancement of those fees incurred in connection with proceedings which are “by reason of the fact” that he was a director of Confederate. See Homestore, 888 A.2d at 214 (<HOLDING>). In addition, “all contracts providing for the Holdings: 0: holding that a nexus between the corporate officers or directors official activity and the matter for which indemnification is sought must be shown though no more than a nexus whether a nexus exists is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court considering all the circumstances surrounding the proposed indemnification 1: holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation 2: holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury 3: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office 4: recognizing the need for a nexus or causal connection between the claim against the officer and onces official corporate capacity


Input: production of otherwise discoverable information. b. Applying the Standard ¶ 32 We now turn to the application of this standard to the facts in this case. Applying the first factor, the strength of the relationship between the confidential information and the issue in dispute, we note that the discovery sought is strongly related to the core issue in the litigation: whether the disabilities at issue were caused by Defendants’ malpractice or by other sources. Christopher Cunniff, a medical doctor, submitted an affidavit stating that, “to a reasonable degree of medical probability,” Patrick’s “family history” was a “contributing factor to his alleged disabilities” and that “the characteristics exhibited in Patrick [ ] appear to be familial characteristi N.Y.S.2d 817 (N.Y.App.Div.1991) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 33 The second and third factors deal with Holdings: 0: holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury 1: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 2: holding academic records of siblings admissible based on expert affidavit stating that a possible connection existed between the neurological problems of the plaintiff and those of her siblings which would support a defense that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff have a genetic cause 3: holding that the fair and adequate representation requirement was not satisfied because of litigation between plaintiff and defendant the antagonism between the parties and the lack of support plaintiff garnered in its claim 4: recognizing the relationships between a decedent and his or her parents and siblings


Input: at 584. ¶ 9 In Lam v. Peyton, 268 F.Supp. 253, 254 (W.D.Va.1967), the court relied on that language in Kercheval in rejecting the defendant’s claim that the state had been required to provide independent evidence of the corpus delicti through a witness in a guilty plea proceeding. The court concluded that “corpus delicti must be established in order to admit an extra-judicial confession” and refused to apply that rule to “a formal plea of guilty.” Id.; see also Waley v. United States, 233 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir.1956) (corpus delicti rule inapplicable to plea of guilty made at trial); State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 439 S.E.2d 547, 568 (1994) (finding corpus delicti rule inapplicable at jury trial for sentencing of defendant who had pled guilty to first-degree murder); Mullen, supra, at 408 (<HOLDING>); but see Commonwealth v. Fears, 575 Pa. 281, Holdings: 0: recognizing first two exceptions 1: recognizing exceptions to immunity 2: recognizing the permissible use of hearsay without corroboration 3: recognizing two exceptions to eleventh amendment bar 4: recognizing infrajudicial statements among exceptions to corpus delicti rule defendant may plead guilty without independent proof of a crime and a defendants incourt confession requires no corroboration


Input: the notes in the financial statement that over $4,000,000 of that loss was due to a onetime, nonrecurring compensation expense to Nexity’s founders. Review of Blackmon’s deposition testimony reveals that he understood from the Nexity officers that the company was progressing according to its general strategic plan. Nexity officers apparently stated only in general terms that Nexity was doing well. The following is an excerpt from Blackmon’s deposition transcript: “A: ... I had conversations with Ken [Vassey] about how Nexity was doing, and he assured me that Nexity was doing fíne, that all they needed tating that a person cannot blindly rely on an agent’s oral representations that are contrary to written disclosures); and Wamser v. J.E. Liss, Inc., 838 F.Supp. 393, 399 (E.D.Wis.1993)(<HOLDING>). Therefore, the alleged oral Holdings: 0: holding that written judgment controlled over oral pronouncement 1: holding that oral pronouncement prevailed over the written order 2: holding that when the courts oral statements in the plea colloquy conflict with the written agreement the courts oral statements control 3: holding that written information cures oral misstatements and omissions 4: holding written judgment must conform to oral pronouncement


Input: to mean power devices that have control circuits. In addition to unrefuted admissions by professionals in the semiconductor industry that “smart power” is generic, ST also prepared a 150-page chronology from 1982 through the present that digested the pervasive uses of “smart power” to identify devices that utilize a certain type of technology, particularly integrated circuits that combine both power and logic. This chro nology provided evidence from a variety of sources including trade journals, newspapers and other publications, and advertisements. In addition, the chronology also set forth evidence from patent, trademark and copyright registrations indicating that ding that “software news” probably generic); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025, 98 S.Ct. 751, 54 Holdings: 0: holding that liquid controls is generic 1: holding that light beer is generic 2: holding that a database is a generic computer element 3: holding that crab house is a generic term referring to a class of restaurants that serve crabs 4: recognizing how generic and lightly invoked is the need for uniformity


Input: Hector Roderico Garcia, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions pro se for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We dismiss the petition for review. Garcia does not challenge the BIA’s dismissal of his appeal for failure to file a brief. He did not exhaust the claims presented to this court, and we must therefore dismiss his contentions. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED. ** This Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 1: holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional 2: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 3: recognizing that issue exhaustion is a mandatory although not jurisdictional requirement 4: holding that issue exhaustion is mandatory even if not a statutory jurisdictional requirement


Input: to consider Harris’s invitation to presume malice under these circumstances, Harris has not established another key element of Ohio’s malicious-prosecution claim — the lack of probable cause — for any of the three counts with which he was charged. First, a reasonable factfinder could fairly conclude that the officers had probable cause to charge Harris with criminal assault under Ohio Revised Code § 2903.13(a), which proscribes “knowingly causfing] or attempt[ing] to cause physical harm to another.” Ohio Rev.Code § 2903.13(a); see also Ohio Rev.Code § 2901.22(b). State prosecutors brought the assault charge against Harris in state court only after obtaining an indictment, which establishes “prima facie evidence of probable cause,” Carlton, 662 N.E.2d at 1121, t th Cir. Apr. 4, 1994) (<HOLDING>). In attempting to escape the reach of these Holdings: 0: holding in a nonohiolaw case that probable cause existed where plaintiff shoved police officer in the chest 1: holding that a determination of probable cause does not bar a state law malicious prosecution claim where the claim is based on the police officers supplying false information to establish probable cause 2: holding that the existence of probable cause in a  1983 case is a jury question 3: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law 4: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law


Input: homesteads under the TT government could be given a specific parcel of land, but that it could not be more than five hectares in area. Richard G. Emerick, Land Tenure in the Marianas, in 1 Office of the Staff Anthropologist, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Land Tenure Patterns, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 233-34 (1958). 45 See Pelisamen, 3 CR at 794-95; see also Cruz v. Johnston, 6 TTR 354, 357-58 (Trial Div. 1973) (noting that homesteaders who received certificates of compliance were entitled to deeds of conveyance, and holding that the issuance of such deeds may be compelled). 46 Reply Brief for Appellant MPLC at 5. 47 Conclusions of Law, supra note 16, ¶ 5. 48 Brief for Appellant MPLC at 8-9. 49 Cf. McCullen v. Sproles, 28 So. 2d 218, 220 (Miss. 1946) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 50 See 67 TTC § 208 (1970 Ed.) ("Deeds of Holdings: 0: holding that in action by property owner to recover land taken by eminent domain current titleholder to land might be necessary party if district court were to restore land to plaintiff 1: holding that recitals in land patent were affirmative evidence that patentee paid requisite price for land 2: holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land 3: holding that animal husbandry operations were included in the definition of farm even if the animals do not touch the ground graze on the land or feed from crops grown on the land and holding that land used to support buildings used in the production of agricultural products is a productive use of the land 4: holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute


Input: — the standard we must apply here — than for a statutory claim under Title VII. We believe the fact that verbal harassment is gender-specific gives it no greater claim as a constitutional violation than verbal harassment generally. Thus, we must look at this claim as one for psychological abuse. B We next consider whether plaintiffs allegation of psychological abuse states an actionable claim. Defendant argues that psychological abuse absent physical contact or a threat to bodily integrity is not a deprivation of constitutional rights. No published authority addresses this particular issue in a school context. In other contexts, however, even extreme verbal abuse typically is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation. Cf. Collins v. Gundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). We have decided one substantive due process Holdings: 0: holding that title 42 usc  1997ee requires proof of a physical injury before a prisoner can recover for emotional or mental distress and that verbal abuse is not actionable under section 1983 1: holding that verbal abuse where sheriff laughed at prisoner and threatened to hang him did not state constitutional deprivation actionable under  1983 2: holding that title 42 usc  1997ee requires proof of a physical injury before a prisoner can recover for emotional or mental distress holding that verbal abuse is not actionable under section 1983 and also recognizing a de minimus standard for 8th amendment excessive force claims 3: holding that under  1983 violations of constitutional rights are actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury 4: holding state is not a proper defendant under  1983


Input: Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 454 N.E.2d 522, 525, 467 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. 1983), most appellate courts to consider the question have held that — even in the absence of explicit statutory authorization permitting delegation of a particular function — an attorney general or similar official may delegate prosecutorial duties to assistants authorized to practice law, given the impossibility of personal performance of every statutory duty. See United States v. Kleve, 465 F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1972) (“Defendants’ contention that the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the prosecution cannot be delegated authority by the United States Attorney to file the certificate lacks merit.”) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3731); see also United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 1176, 1184 (11th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hawthorne, 235 F.3d 400, 404 Holdings: 0: holding that prosecution of defendant in the united states for hostage taking based on acts committed outside the united states did not violate due process 1: holding that assistant united states attorney may file information requesting sentence enhancement based on prior conviction even though statute says that information must be filed by the united states attorney 2: holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states 3: holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states 4: holding that it would be improper for a united states district attorney to prosecute a defendant using information the prosecutor had obtained while acting as the accuseds private attorney


Input: refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation was motivated by racial animus, the claim is not dependent upon proof of racial bias. The reasonable accommodation claim necessarily fails, however, because Philip failed to prove he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Second and distinct from his ADA claim, however, Philip contends Ford’s refusal to place him in the permanent position was racially motivated. Philip points to two similarly situated white employees who were grandfathered into the position de spite their lack of seniority, and argues Ford’s refusal to grant him a similar exception was due to race. Id. This latter claim is in no way dependent upon Philip proving he is covered under the ADA. See Austin v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 198 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) was a member of a protected group, 2) was Holdings: 0: holding that the employers discharge of the plaintiff four months after the plaintiff filed a discrimination claim is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge 1: holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 2: holding that plaintiff could not establish prima facie case of discrimination where plaintiff failed to meet minimum qualifications for job 3: holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position 4: holding that a plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of race discrimination because she failed to show valid comparators and presented no other circumstantial evidence of discrimination


Input: See Petitioner Sprint’s Br. at 28 (citing Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 13,198-99). Sprint claims that these historical observations are somehow preclusive, in that they may influence the district court’s judgment on the contract claim or be cited by other IXCs who refuse to pay Sprint’s access charges. It is clear that the passages from the Declaratory Ruling cited by Sprint are merely descriptive statements by the agency, not legal conclusions. The statements have no force of law, so they cannot conclusively cause the adverse collateral consequences suggested by Sprint. In short, Sprint is quibbling over FCC observations that have no binding effect whatsoever. This is never a basis for review in this court. Cf. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 198 F.3d 266 (D.C.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Sprint further argues that the FCC Holdings: 0: holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law 1: holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions 2: holding that a decision is final when it leaves nothing more for the court to do 3: holding that there is nothing for a court to review when an agency has never issued a final and binding judgment that has the force of law 4: holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review


Input: National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86. Retail Property Trust, 768 F.3d at 947-48, n.5. 21 . ECF No. 16 at 6. 22 . 49 U.S.C. § 40103. 23 . United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969). 24 . 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-46507. 25 . 49 U.S.C. § 41713. 26 . 49 U.S.C. § 42121. 27 . ECF No. 16 at 6. 28 . Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007). 29 . Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Exp. Hldgs., Inc., 555 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2009). 30 . Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 747 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 2014). 31 . Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 468 (affirming dismissal of passenger's failure-to-warn claims); Martin, 555 F.3d at 812 (reversing dismissal of airline's indemnity claim); Ventress, 747 F.3d at 723 (affirming judgment on the pleadings). 32 . Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 468 (<HOLDING>); Martin, 555 F.3d at 811-812 (holding that FAA Holdings: 0: holding state failuretowarn claims were preempted because any warning label linking said drugs to suicide would have been false and misleading 1: holding that failuretowarn claims based on theory that faarequired warnings are insufficient are preempted 2: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 3: holding the state law claims were not preempted 4: holding that a failuretowarn claim against a pharmaceutical company was not impliedly preempted


Input: attention of the court. If the court finds that the petitioner is indigent, it shall allow petitioner to proceed in forma pauperis. If the court finds the indigent petitioner is incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction, and has requested representation, it shall order a copy of the petition sent to the Public Defender’s office. P-C.R. 1, § 2. Although Barclay was in prison and attached an affidavit of indigence to his petition, the court did not forward his petition to the Public Defender’s office as required by P-C.R. 1, § 2. The State recognizes that the court erred in this omission but asserts that it is harmless error. We disagree. There are two reasons behind the rule requiring Barclay’s petition for post-conviction relief to be for .1994), reh’g denied, trans. denied (<HOLDING>). Barclay properly filed with his petition an Holdings: 0: holding that a prior conviction in a georgia state court was appropriately used to qualify the defendant as a career offender because he failed to prove he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel 1: holding petitioner cannot claim he was denied right to assistance of counsel when he knowingly and voluntarily decided to represent himself 2: holding that defendant waived his right to selfrepresentation where he told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself and the public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of trial without objection 3: holding that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent constitutional right of selfrepresentation and that he may proceed to represent himself without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so 4: holding that when the defendant voluntarily and knowingly pleaded guilty he waived any claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the defendants inculpatory statements


Input: Under § 15-18-8, Austin must serve a minimum of 3 years, but no more than 5 years, in confinement. The circuit court, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to order that Austin serve only 26 months in confinement. Accordingly, we must again remand this case for the circuit court to conduct another sentencing hearing and to again reconsider the execution of Austin’s 20-year sentence. As we stated in our original opinion: “Because the 20-year sentence was valid, the circuit court may not change it. See Wood[ v. State, 602 So.2d 1195 (Ala.Crim.App.1992)]. However, the court may either split the sentence in compliance with § 15-18-8, i.e., with no more than 5 years in confinement [and no less than 3 years in confinement], see, e.g., Soles v. State, 820 So.2d 163, 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2001)(<HOLDING>), or, if it determines that splitting the Holdings: 0: holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the sixth amendments guarantee of the right to trial by jury 1: holding that the newly amended  15188 allows a trial judge to suspend a sentence imposed upon application of the schoolhousing enhancements despite the prohibition against probation in  13a12250 and 13a12270 2: holding that probation is not a sentence 3: holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation 4: holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum


Input: the verdict only if the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1192 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1002 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1200, 116 S.Ct. 1701, 134 L.Ed.2d 800 (1996); United States v. Moralez, 964 F.2d 677, 679 (7th Cir.1992). The jury found Granados guilty of conspiracy to commit extortion and attempt to commit extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Extortion is the wrongful use of force or fear, including fear of economic harm, to obtain money or property from another person. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (defining extortion); United States v. Sturman, 49 F.3d 1275, 1281 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lisinski, 728 F.2d 887, 890 Holdings: 0: holding that the village could regulate doortodoor solicitation based on a fear of an anticipated harm without proof of actual harm 1: recognizing  1951 includes fear of economic harm 2: holding that expenses includes costs 3: recognizing the economic realities test 4: holding that an asylum applicant must show at least a deliberate imposition of a substantial economic disadvantage in order for the harm to constitute economic persecution


Input: tort cases without express focus on choice of law issues. See, e.g., Carmichael v. KBR, 572 F.3d 1271, 1288 n. 13 (11th Cir.2009) (providing that the court’s analysis “would remain the same regardless of which state’s law applied”); see also Taylor v. KBR, 658 F.3d 402 (4th Cir.2011) (dismissing on political question grounds -without discussing choice of law); Lane v. Halliburton, supra. The evidence of sensitive military decisions persuaded these courts that such cases are not “typical negligence action[s]” where the fact-finder can “draw upon common sense and everyday experience” in determining whether a military contractor acted reasonably. Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1289. But cf. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1359-62 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Differences among the tort regimes of the Holdings: 0: holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error 1: holding that a contractor failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error 2: holding that submissions qualified as cda claims when the contractor asserted in writing and with sufficient specificity a right to additional compensation and the contractor communicated his desire for a contracting officer decision 3: holding that private contractor failed to demonstrate that claims against it required reexamination of a military decision 4: holding that a contractor lacked standing because it failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error


Input: not have authority over Plaintiffs teaching or writing, they could not give him orders that he had to obey, and they did not have ultimate authority over whether or not he would be retained by University.” Id. at 629. Similarly, the Journalism Department faculty were responsible for reviewing Ku-bik’s progress and for making a recommendation, but did not have authority to reappoint Kubik. In fact, the Department’s first recommendation that Kubik not be reappointed was rejected by Dean Gha-nem. Kubik attempts to distinguish Sam Han by arguing that the Sixth Circuit was applying an Ohio statute, but the statutory language is substantially identical. See Ohio. Rev. Code § 4112.02. See also Masi v. DTE Coke Operations, LLC, No. 06-11592, 2007 WL 2827845, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Kubik cites Dutt v. Delaware State College Holdings: 0: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 1: holding that the individual defendant does not have to be in privity of contract with the plaintiff to be held liable under  1981 2: holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii 3: holding that individual defendants were not liable under the elcra because they did not have the authority to rehire the plaintiff 4: holding that the defendants were not liable for failing to perform the thorough professional investigation the plaintiff would have preferred


Input: on March 6, 2008. Among the forms was an arbitration agreement. When the Estate filed this action, the defendants timely requested arbitration. The Estate argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and otherwise unenforceable. In an order that did not explain its reasoning, the trial court denied arbitration. There is no evidence that the signing of these documents involved procedural un-conscionability, and the trial court did not find that any procedural unconscionability occurred in this case. From the transcript of the hearing, it appears the trial court held that the agreement was unenforceable because it was substantively unconscionable. We conclude that the trial court erred in this ruling. See FL-Carrollwood Care, LLC v. Gordon, 72 So.3d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). In addition to providing for arbitration as a Holdings: 0: holding that arbitration agreement was not unconscionable where agree ment did not limit punitive damages and limitation of liability provision was severable if unenforceable 1: holding that an arbitration provision that waived class actions and thus required the consumer to pay a 125 fee to vindicate a 150 claim was substantively unconscionable but also holding that the waiver provision was severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision which would be enforced 2: holding that limitation of liability provisions in arbitration agreement included in nursing homes admissions documents violated public policy and were not severable because they constituted financial heart of arbitration agreement 3: holding that an arbitration clause is valid despite an accompanying limitation on liability because the latter is severable in the event it is found unconscionable 4: holding that under a severability clause arbitration provision was not rendered unenforceable because it contained an invalid limitation on punitive damages


Input: in the instant case. The Department has acknowledged the finality of its decisions in its formal written reports submitted to Congress. Likewise, the Department’s Operational Plan states that “sampling for non-response will be used to complete the census enumeration.” As read in the Appropriations Act of 1998 § 209(c)(2), the Census 2000 Operational Plan “shall be deemed to constitute final agency action regarding the use of statistical methods in the 2000 decennial census,” thus making the question of use ripe for adjudication. Appropriations Act of 1998 § 209(c)(2) (emphasis added). Defendant’s suggests that the case is not ripe because “Congress has not reached its ultimate legislative conclusion regarding a s al Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Holdings: 0: holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred the claims in the case were still ripe for review 1: holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed 2: holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred 3: holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did 4: holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee


Input: he believed Reuland lied to him. Hynes’s counsel attempted to broaden this to simply “he had lied period,” but the court responded: “That is not what the evidence is____The whole issue whether he lied to him. This really isn’t ... a Pickering question, it’s a causation question. It is a way of focusing more precisely on your version of what caused the demotion.” Rather than persist in her Pickering argument, Hynes’s counsel replied, “I think that is right. I think what Your Honor has proposed will work.” Generally, we need not consider a claim on appeal where the party advancing it consented not to submit it to the jury below. See Coffey v. Dobbs Int’l Servs., Inc., 170 F.3d 323, 325 n. 2 (2d Cir.1999); Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103, 106-07 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). By failing to make clear to the district Holdings: 0: holding that defensive theory must be submitted to jury when theory is raised by evidence from any source 1: holding that theories of liability or defense pleaded and proved but not submitted are abandoned 2: holding that a theory of recovery pleaded but not submitted to the jury by explicit agreement need not be considered on appeal 3: holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory 4: holding that proof of an explicit agreement is not required


Input: the summary judgment motion, the district court recognized that Autrey could prevail on his claims of malicious prosecution and his Fourth Amendment claim of wrongful arrest only if the plaintiff could somehow establish that no probable cause for his prosecution had been established. Because a state-court judge had already determined that probable cause existed to bind Autrey over for trial, however, the district court determined that principles of collateral estoppel precluded the plaintiff from pursuing a second time an identical challenge to the quantum of evidence necessary to initiate a criminal prosecution. Additionally concluding that the plaintiff failed to make any showing “that Kennedy an 456 Mich. 365, 572 N.W.2d 603, 610 (1998) (Michigan tort of malicious prosecution) (<HOLDING>). When deciding what role the Michigan state Holdings: 0: holding that malicious prosecution plaintiff must show inter alia that criminal proceeding was initiated without probable cause 1: holding that a plaintiff in a retaliatory prosecution action must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for pressing the underlying criminal charge 2: holding that a malicious prosecution plaintiff must show inter alia that the criminal proceeding was initiated without probable cause 3: holding that the plaintiff must show that the person instituting or maintaining the prosecution lacked probable cause for bringing the action 4: holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution


Input: which you indicated was the last day that you worked, through April the 26th of 2001, did you speak to any member of management relative to any of the reasons why you were absent from work? A. No, I didn’t. (Id. at 76.) The Court finds that the notice given to the Defendant through the automated telephone system was simply inadequate to invoke the protection of the FMLA. Courts have consistently held that to give adequate notice to invoke the FMLA, an employee must inform his employer that he has a serious health condition. Ha/mmon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999); Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149, F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998); Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir.1995); see also Taylor v. Invacare Corp., 64 Fed. Appx. 516 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Simply selecting the “ill” option on an Holdings: 0: holding that both the cfra and the fmla require the employee to provide notice to the employer of the employees intent to take leave 1: holding that employer controlled the victims will at least in part by using his position as the victims employer 2: holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration 3: holding that employers knowledge of employees criminal conviction for intoxication did not put employer on notice that employee might be a thief 4: holding that an employee gives his employer sufficient notice that he is requesting leave for an fmlaqualifying condition when he gives the employer enough information for the employer to reasonably conclude that an event described in 29 usc  2612a1 has occurred


Input: Amtrak’s motion is GRANTED with respect to Counts II, IV and the age and perceived disability discrimination claims in Count V; and DENIED with respect to Counts I and III and the claims of race and gender discrimination in Count V. Green and Porter’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect to the § 1981 termination claim in Count I and the claims of race and gender discrimination in termination in Count V; and GRANTED with respect to the age and perceived disability discrimination in termination claims in Count V, and the failure to hire claims of Counts I and V. 1 . To the extent plaintiff also set forth claims against Green and Porter under Title VII, Title VII does not provide for liability against individual employees. See Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Martin v. Howard Univ., No. 99-1175, 1999 WL Holdings: 0: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 1: holding that an employer alone is liable for a violation of title vii by supervisory employees 2: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 3: holding that individual defendants with supervisory control over plaintiff cannot be held personally liable under title vii 4: holding individual employees may be liable under title vii


Input: 482 F.3d 860 (6th Cir.2007), the Sixth Circuit found that an administrator had acted arbitrarily and capriciously where he failed to “ ‘review ... the quality and quantity of the ... evidence and the opinions on both sides of the issues.’ ” Id. at 865 (quoting McDonald v. W.S. Life Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 161, 172 (6th Cir.2003)). The court held that the administrator’s denial of benefits failed under this standard. Contrary to the plaintiffs assertion, the existence of a conflict of interest that arises from a plan administrator deciding issues in which the company has a financial interest does not require a different standard, although the conflict “shapes” the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 984 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (citing Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Holdings: 0: holding that the heightened arbitrary and capricious standard applies where a plan administrator despite delegating its claim processing duties to a third party exercises the ultimate authority to determine for itself whether payments should be made out of its own assets 1: holding that a court is to factor an insurers dual role into its review under the arbitrary and capricious standard though the standard remains arbitrary and capri cious 2: holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable 3: holding that where a company pays plan beneficiaries from its own assets its perpetual conflict with its profitmaking role as a business must shape  the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard 4: holding that a company that generated revenue from the sale of its assets remained in business


Input: Second Circuit described it, the day “when [the petitioner] was denied leave to appeal,” Geraci 211 F.3d at 9 (emphasis added). Second, the court noted that “[t]he coram nobis petition was denied on February 17, 1998 and the time clock started to run again .... until February 24, 1998, the day the [habe-as] petition was filed, a total of seven days.” Geraci 211 F.3d at 9. This calculation of “seven days” indicates that the court necessarily included either the date the coram nobis petition was denied or the date the habeas petition was filed. Upon consideration, it must have been the latter, because in determining whether a habeas petition is timely filed, a court must include the petition filing date within the limitations period. See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Geraci’s primary holding — that a coram nobis Holdings: 0: holding that the habeas petition did not qualify for equitable tolling because the petitioner discovered that his attorney had lied about filing a petition in early 2008 and yet the petitioner did not file one himself until nearly two years later 1: holding that employer was estopped to assert a statute of limitations defense where the insurer had arranged to have the claimant examined by one of its physicians after the statute of limitations had run 2: holding that where the limitations period had run for 364 days petitioner had one day remaining  in which to file the  habeas petition 3: holding that the limitations period is not tolled while a federal habeas petition is pending 4: holding that dismissing a habeas petition as timebarred under the aedpa does not violate the suspension clause because petitioner had years to file the petition and gave no explanation why he failed to file on time


Input: procedures to obtain an untainted interview with L.B. were unsuccessful, because L.B.’s father spoke with her privately before she left for the shelter home. To determine what process is constitutionally due, we look to three somewhat flexible demands of procedural due process: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. 2493, 2503-04, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979) (<HOLDING>). As the district court noted, “[t]he bonds of Holdings: 0: holding that a person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment 1: holding that grandparent has no protected liberty interest in the visitation of a child of whom she once had custody 2: holding that a child has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment under the fourth amendment 3: recognizing the principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment 4: recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection


Input: Code § 288(a), does not qualify as a crime of violence. He contends that Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), overruled United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Medina-Maella, 351 F.3d 944 (9th Cir.2003). This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 511-16 (9th Cir.2009). Perez-Ramos also contends that Nijhawan v. Holder, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009), effectively overruled Medina-Villa. This contention fails. See Nijhawan, 129 S.Ct. at 2300. Finally, Perez-Ramos’s contention that we must call for en banc review based on a conflict between Estrada-E spinoza and Medinor-Villa is without merit. See Pelayo-Gareia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010, 1013-16 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not Holdings: 0: recognizing the two distinct generic definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and holding that a statute contains the element of abuse under the medinavilla definition if it applies to sexual conduct with children younger than fourteen years 1: holding that the new york misdemeanor offense of sexual abuse of a minor constitutes an aggravated felony under ina  101a43asexual abuse of a minor 2: holding that a conviction under  22039 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach 3: recognizing that estradaespinoza and medinavilla set out two different generic federal definitions of sexual abuse of a minor  and looking to both definitions to determine whether conviction under calpenal code  2615d qualifies as generic federal crime of sexual abuse of a minor under categorical approach 4: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse


Input: of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as it was under theories of Article I rejected by the Court in Seminole. As the Third Circuit stated in a related context: If a state’s conduct impacting on a business always implicated the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress would have almost unrestricted power to subject states to suit' through the exercise of its abrogation power. Congress could pass any law that tangentially affected the ability of businesses to operate and then create causes of action against the states in federal court if they infringed on those federally created rights. This result would be unacceptable and would conflict directly with the strict limits on Congress’s powers to abrogate a state’s El Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F.Supp. 400 (D.N.J.1996) (<HOLDING>), appeal pending, No. 97-1246 (Fed. Cir. argued Holdings: 0: holding that a patent is property for purposes of the fourteenth amendment and that remedial legislation abrogating state sovereign immunity under seminole is constitutional 1: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity 2: holding retroactive a pennsylvania case abrogating common law sovereign immunity 3: holding the fourteenth amendment partially abrogated eleventh amendment sovereign immunity 4: holding that state sovereign immunity bars state constitutional claims


Input: with Tang’s assertion that the omitted portion of his statement “specifically rebuffs] the defamatory charge that [the] article imputed to [Tang].” Rather, this is but one interpretation depending on the listener’s point of view. In the absence of evidence that it omitted Tang’s remarks to portray his statements falsely, the First Amendment protects the Houston Chinese Press’s editorial choice regarding what material it included in the article. See id. Tang offered no evidence to controvert Wang’s testimony regarding his interpretation of Tang’s remarks. Nor has Tang offered sufficient evidence to show that Wang’s interpretation was not a plausible or reasonable one in light of the tenor of the press conference and the provocative nature of Tang’s analogy. See Cantu, 168 S.W.3d at 855 (<HOLDING>). Given Wang’s understanding of Tang’s Holdings: 0: holding contract with ambiguous terms should not be dismissed on pleadings 1: holding that understandable misinterpretation of ambiguous facts does not show actual malice 2: holding that an ambiguous mention of an attorney is not a request for counsel 3: holding exclusion was not ambiguous 4: holding that mere surmise or suspicion of malice does not carry the probative force necessary to form the basis of a legal inference of malice


Input: t Den-ton’s argument that defendants decided to investigate the June 30, 2011, arrest, terminate his employment, and release the video to the Tulsa World in retaliation for the July 7, 2011, email he sent to his fellow union members. Denton also argues that because Owasso declined to impose any significant discipline against a group of police officers who engaged in similar conduct during the arrest of a suspect several years earlier, the harsher decisions made with regard to Denton must have been linked to his union activity when he sent the email. Although the Garcetti/Pickering analysis applies to an association based retaliation claim, a plaintiff need only satisfy the first, fourth, and fifth prongs of the test. See Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we examine whether the email was Holdings: 0: holding that the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement and that in appropriate circumstances present here the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the agreement 1: holding that a court should not require a showing of public concern or engage in judicial balancing of the employers interest against the employees interest when the public employee alleges retaliation for participation in a union with which his employer has signed a collective bargaining agreement 2: holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union 3: recognizing the public interest exception 4: holding that the scope of a government employees first amendment rights depends on the balance between the interests of the employee as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees


Input: against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. USSG § 4B1.2(a). In addition, relevant commentary to this section provides: “Crime of violence” includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling. Other offenses are included as “crimes of violence” if (A) that offense has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (B) the conduct set forth (ie., expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convict 261, 262, 264 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, we acknowledge that the Eighth Holdings: 0: recognizing that felony and misdemeanor dwi are separate offenses because a prior conviction is an essential element of felony driving while intoxicated but it is not an element of the misdemeanor offense 1: holding morevstat  569055 qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of ussg  4b12a 2: holding that assault conviction for driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and causing serious bodily injury to the person of another with the motor vehicle qualified as a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a 3: holding a felony conviction for driving while intoxicated dwi may be a crime of violence 4: holding that misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated constitutes a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a


Input: 374 U.S. at 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646); Red Star Towing, 552 F.Supp. at 371 (“[Fitzgerald] established that a litigant in admiralty is not entitled as a matter of right to a non-jury trial ....”) Furthermore, when non-jury admiralty claims are joined with legal claims carrying a jury right, the constitutional right to a jury should prevail. See Mayer v. Cornell Univ., 909 F.Supp. 81, 85 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (stating “general rule” that “when admiralty claims are joined with claims which carry the right to a jury, the right to a jury prevails”); In re Complaint of Berkley Curtis Bay Co., 569 F.Supp. 1491, 1494 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (“[W]here the nonjury’ admiralty tradition and a plaintiffs jury right conflict, the jury right must prevail.”); Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.Supp. 1275, 1276-77 (D.Conn.1976) (<HOLDING>); see also 8 Moore’s Federal Practice § 38.32 Holdings: 0: holding that a demand for a trial by jury is inconsistent with an intent to proceed in admiralty 1: holding in action involving single claim that if claim sounded only in admiralty there would be no right to a jury trial but if federal question was present as a separate and independent basis for federal jurisdiction then the jury demand must be honored 2: recognizing that parties had right to trial by jury in trespass action but holding that parties waived that right under cr 3804 by not filing a demand for a jury trial 3: holding district court could not declare jury advisory in action triable of right by a jury and even if no right to jury trial existed in case it would be abuse of discretion to declare jury advisory after both sides rested but before jury was instructed 4: holding that under rule 38e there is no right to a trial by jury if plaintiff chooses to identify his claim as admiralty or maritime as permitted by rule 9h


Input: or omission outside of this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state; or (e)having an interest in, using, or possessing a real or immovable property in this state. In addition, La. R.S. 13:3202 expressly limited La.R.S. 13:3201 to causes of action arising from acts or omissions enumerated therein. 3 . In 1984, the designations were also changed from letters to numerals such that Subsection (h) is now Subsection (8). 4 . This Court has noted the difference, in the context of personal jurisdiction in products liability cases, between a manufacturer and a distributor. McBead Drilling Co. v. Kremco, Ltd., 509 So.2d 429, 432 (La.1987) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Federal circuit courts are somewhat Holdings: 0: holding over 1: holding that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related statelaw claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction 2: holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state because there was no evidence the defendant knew where the product would be sold 3: holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident auto distributor whose only connection to the forum resulted from a customers decision to drive there failed to provide the defendant with clear notice that it would be subject to suit in the forum state and thus an opportunity to alleviate the risk of burden some litigation there 4: holding that in litigation arising from a product related injury in the forum state there are significant differences between the exercise of jurisdiction over a retailer who simply sold the product locally and the exercise of jurisdiction over a manufacturer whose products were sold over a large area


Input: a prepayment of royalties pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 1726(b) shall be distributed as follows: (1) a portion of the receipts, estimated by the taxation and revenue department to be equal to the amount that the state would have received as its share of royalties in the same fiscal year if the prepayment had not been made, shall be distributed to the public school fund; and (2) the remainder shall be distributed to the common school permanent fund. 2 . In addition to their claim for prospective relief, Plaintiffs originally claimed a right to payment of past royalties. The Eleventh Amendment, however, clearly bars any claim for the retroactive payment of royalties the State has received pursuant to the FMLA. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-671, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (<HOLDING>). 3 . In previously holding that FMLA Holdings: 0: recognizing that claims against a state under  1981 are barred by the eleventh amendment 1: holding that judgments for prospective relief that have an ancillary effect on the state treasury do not offend the eleventh amendment 2: holding the eleventh amendment barred the retroactive payment of state benefits wrongfully withheld 3: recognizing that section 1983 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment 4: holding the eleventh amendment barred that portion of a district court order directing retroactive payment of aid benefits from the illinois treasury