Input: colloquy. We have held: A competent election by the defendant to represent himself and to decline the assistance of counsel once made before the court carries forward through all further proceedings in that case unless appointment of counsel for subsequent proceedings is expressly requested by the defendant or there are circumstances which suggest that the waiver was limited to a particular stage of the proceedings. United States v. Springer, 51 F.3d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir.1995) (concluding that the defendant’s retrial was “obviously” a continuation of the criminal prosecution and previous waiver was intended to stand absent an attempt to withdraw it (quoting Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir.1969)); see also White v. United States, 354 F.2d 22, 23 (9th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>). Our jurisprudence on this point is harmonious Holdings: 0: holding that constitution protected right to counsel at sentencing even where it was waived at trial 1: holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence 2: holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage 3: holding that a valid waiver of counsel at an early stage of the proceeding does not continue in effect through a subsequent stage 4: holding that at resentencing the district court was entitled to assume that the waiver was still in effect and was not required to again advise defendant of his right to counsel where defendant had waived counsel at the plea stage


Input: after six years was constitutional. Lamb refrained from deciding however, “whether the legislature could constitutionally abolish all tort claims against builders and designers arising out of improvements they built or designed.” Id. at 443-444, 302 S.E.2d 868. In that case, the court found this was not an issue as “93% of all claims against architects are brought within six years of the substantial completion of the construction.” Id. at 444 n. 7, 302 S.E.2d 868. Similarly, Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., Inc., found § l-50(6)’s statute of repose constitutional in part because “over 97 percent of product-related accidents occur within six years of the time the product was purchased.” 314 N.C. 44, 54, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985). Here, the plaintiff is cla 0, 861 P.2d 625, 30 A.L.R.5th 729 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Berry By and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft Holdings: 0: holding first that injuries sustained during contact sports were foreseeable then deciding that public policy insulated the defendant from liability for those injuries 1: holding that the appropriate state statute of limitations to borrow for section 1983 actions is that for recovery of damages for personal injuries 2: holding that an action for breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the uniform commercial code is a product liability action within the meaning of the products liability act if as here the action is for injury to person or property resulting from a sale of a product 3: holding that the united states is immune from monetary damages for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service 4: holding that statute barring products liability actions for injuries occurring more than 12 years after product is first sold violated state constitutional prohibition against abrogation of right of action to recover damages for injuries


Input: the information but that they were nonetheless unable to comply with the scheduling order deadline. Nothing in the district court’s “good cause” analysis would have changed given that the court identified four specific reasons for concluding that the Appellants had demonstrated an overarching and persistent lack of diligence throughout the case. While the dissent theorizes on the district court’s “general frustration ... with various other delays” in the case, post at 829 n. 2, the district court’s reasoning is precisely the appropriate analysis to determine the existence of “good cause.” That is, in considering whether “good cause” excuses compliance with a scheduling order deadline, the district court must examine whether the movant had been dilig 1419 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). As noted, the Appellants alleged from the Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion where it determined that plaintiffs failed to show good cause to amend complaint after dispositive motion deadline 1: holding that good cause did not exist where counsel waited months after filing of the pleadings to propound written discovery and did not take oral depositions of known key individuals to their claims until after the deadline for amending the complaint 2: holding that good cause existed where the plaintiff did not establish a sufficient evidentiary basis to support new claims until after the deadline for amending his complaint and moved to amend immediately after the new evidence came to light 3: holding that good cause did not exist where movant was on notice of information that with some investigation would have led to timely discovery of the basis for the motion to amend 4: holding that the insurer was estopped from asserting coverage defenses when it waited to file a declaratory action until 10 months after it had notice of the claim and several months after it had notice of a potential settlement of the underlying litigation


Input: system expressly state that “[i]nmates may also pursue available remedies in State and Federal court.” 37 Pa.Code § 93.9(b). Even assuming, arguendo, that Paluch’s complaint includes federal claims, to which federal law would apply, Paluch’s “tolling while exhausting” argument is belied by his own evidence, which supports the conclusion that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Under Section 1997e(a), an inmate must exhaust the administrative remedies available at the state prison. Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir.2007). “ ‘[P]roper exhaustion’ [means] that the prisoner must comply with all the administrative requirements and not merely wait until there are no administrative remedies ‘available.’” Id. (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>)). The “administrative remedies available at Holdings: 0: holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted 1: holding that a plaintiff may not avoid exhausting the administrative remedies by requesting money damages 2: holding that the ftca bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies 3: holding that a procedural default in exhausting administrative remedies bars relief in federal court 4: holding that declaratory judgment was inappropriate where after exhausting administrative remedies a contractor would have to bring separate actions against the state and other parties in state court


Input: the appeal waiver, Garza has filed a notice of appeal. The government moved to enforce the appeal waiver under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (en banc). For the reasons explained below, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. In Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325, we held that a waiver of appellate rights will be enforced if (1) “the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) ... the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) ... enforcing the waiver would [not] result in a miscarriage of justice.” Garza concedes that his appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights. We therefore need not address that factor. See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We reject Garza’s argument that his waiver Holdings: 0: holding that a district court does not have to state on the record that it considered every  3553a factor 1: holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor 2: holding that an administrator need not address each piece of evidence 3: recognizing that court need not address each hahn factor if defendant does not raise issue relating to that factor 4: holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague


Input: misdemeanor theft, was referred on February 20, 1990, when Gilkey was 14. On August 27, 1990, a sentence of probation with restitution was imposed for each of these first two offenses. The probation for these first two adjudications, however, was revoked on July 29, 1992, and Gilkey was ordered into custody. On November 3, 1992, when Gilkey was 17, he was referred to the juvenile court for his third juvenile adjudication, for carrying a concealed weapon. A sentence of continued custody was imposed for this third adjudication. Gilkey remained in custody until April 8,1993. Gilkey concedes that his confinement constituted a “juvenile sentence to confinement” for purposes of § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A). See Appellant Br. at 11; see also United States v. Birch, 39 F.3d 1089, 1095 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). He claims, however, that only two points Holdings: 0: holding that although police initially took juvenile into custody juvenile arrested on drug charge did not have standing to challenge constitutionality of pretrial detention statute in relation to his drug case where juvenile was never detained for drug offense 1: holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles 2: holding defendants placement into kansas juvenile custody qualified as confinement within meaning of ussg  4a12d2a 3: holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii 4: holding that chapter 39 provides the juvenile judge the flexibility to factor a childs safety into a custody decision at all stages of a juvenile proceeding


Input: them. The same .result applies in this case. Section 679.4061(1)⅛ provision governing discharge upon assignment establishes a rule of contract performance: it determines how a party to a contract may discharge an obligation to make payment on an account created by virtue of that contract—i.e., how it can perform its contractual obligation to pay—after the party has been notified the account has been assigned. Cf. Bldg. Materials Corp., 972 So.2d at 1092 (applying section 679.4061(1) in the context-of a claim for'breach of contract). The 'Department all but concedes that this rule would govern in a contract dispute between private parties. For the reasons we have explained, the rule governs here as well. See also Mooney v. Univ. Sys. of Md., 178 Md.App. 637, 943 A.2d 108, 110-12 (2008) (<HOLDING>), reversed on other grounds, 407 Md. 390, 966 Holdings: 0: holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity 1: holding that sovereign immunity did not protect state agency from liability based on failure to pay assignee of contractual account receivable 2: holding that sovereign immunity does not protect the state from claims for statutory employment benefits that constitute a protected property interest 3: holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability 4: holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity


Input: governmental job, thus rendering HSS a state actor and Salon’s conduct in assessing Fridman’s employability state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court finds that, on the record before it, Fridman’s argument is too tenuous to prevail. Traditionally, a defendant must have exercised power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law for its conduct to constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). Accordingly, a private entity’s conduct may become so entwined with governmental policies, or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 755-57 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The existence of a contractual relationship, Holdings: 0: holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under  1983 1: holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states 2: holding that a private plaintiff may not being an action under the family educational rights and privacy act of 1974 because that statute does not create personal rights to enforce under 42 usc  1983 3: holding that to the extent that private hospital acted in furtherance of a child welfare statute and not medical considerations it may be held liable under 42 usc  1983 4: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983


Input: U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 3 . See also Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a First Amendment claim based on arrest fails if probable cause existed); Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The ‘constitutional tort[]‘ of false arrest ... require[s] a showing of no probable cause.”). 4 . See Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455, 456-57 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying doctrine where presentment to magistrate and grand jury occurred after arrest), overruled on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 949 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 5 . See Russell, 546 Fed.Appx. at 434, 436-37; see also Smith, 670 F.2d at 526 ("The constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested.”). 6 .See Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>); Arnott v. Mataya, 995 F.2d 121, 124 n.4 (8th Holdings: 0: holding that a grand jury indictment insulated police officers from damages accruing after but notbefore the indictment 1: holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury 2: holding that in the situation of a possible dismissal of an indictment because of possible grand jury tampering  only where knowing perjury relating to a material matter has been presented to the grand jury should the trial judge dismiss an otherwise valid indictment 3: holding that tribal courts are not subject to the fifth amendments requirement of indictment by grand jury 4: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense


Input: period prescribed in § 2953.21 or to the filing of an earlier petition, “the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner’s situation, and the petition asserts a claim based upon that right” and, in addition to meeting one of the foregoing conditions, “the petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of which the petitioner was convicted.” No matter how unlikely it seems that Godbolt’s petition will fall within the narrow exception contained in the statute, it is for the state courts to interpret and enforce their laws on such issues. See Israfil v. Russell, 276 F.3d 768, 771-72 (6th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Godbolt did not explain to the Holdings: 0: recognizing that an appellate court must defer to district courts findings denying defendants motion to suppress even when videotape of defendants encounter with state trooper is available 1: holding it is proper to defer to the family court even if conflicting evidence is presented on appeal as long as ample evidence in the record supports the family courts findings and conclusions 2: holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record 3: holding that it was proper for the district court to defer to the state courts findings as to whether a petitioners postconviction motion had been submitted according to ohios timeliness requirements 4: holding that circuit court should defer to supreme courts interpretation of the act


Input: information about their search precludes a finding of good faith on their part. And it is enough for us to make clear that Thomas in no way protects evidence obtained on the basis of a warrant which, like this one, was gotten not only illegally but in clear bad faith. CONCLUSION Because the district court’s findings, on the basis of which it correctly concluded that the search in this case constituted an illegal invasion of the defendant’s curtilage, were not clearly erroneous, and because the good faith exception, valuable though it is, does not apply on these facts, we affirm the decision of the district court. 1 . The government argues that in United States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d 93, 95 108 S.Ct. 128, 98 L.Ed.2d 85 (1987); United States v. Ceballos, 812 F.2d 42, 46-47 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with these cases, we hold that the Holdings: 0: holding that the issue of whether distress was so extreme that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it is a question of law 1: holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 2: holding that while the question of whether a reasonable person would believe his person was seized was normally a question of law that the district court was still entitled to deference because its determination in this case is inextricably intertwined with the credibility of the witnesses 3: holding that question of whether a state law tort claim was preempted by the lmra focused on whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract 4: recognizing that a person has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave


Input: argument, however, ignores two important limitations to the shield: (1) the shield is removed if the individual’s personal interests motivate his actions, see Rice, 38 F.3d at 912; and (2) the shield generally does not apply when the individual’s actions are discretionary. See Brujis v. Shaw, 876 F.Supp. 975, 978 (N.D.Ill.1995). As noted, the fiduciary shield denies personal jurisdiction if the individual’s actions were “solely on behalf of his employer.” Rice, 38 F.3d at 912. If the individual “was acting also on his own behalf—to serve his personal interests,” the shield does not apply. Id. (emphasis added). The personal interests need not be pecuniary—they may be dislike or malice towards the plaintiff. See id.; Roy v. Austin Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16254 at *6-7 (N.D.Ill.1994) (<HOLDING>). However, a defendant who dislikes or acts Holdings: 0: holding that injury to business or property was not limited to commercial interests 1: holding on a motion to dismiss that plaintiffs allegation that defendants actions were without justification based on the legitimate business interests of the employer and were performed maliciously was sufficient to prove actions taken to serve personal interests 2: holding that the defendants had received sufficient notice where the original defendants and the newly added defendants shared an identity of interests and were represented by attorneys who were involved in the litigation from its inception 3: holding that both inmates and pretrial detainees can be visually strip searched in the interests of significant and legitimate security interests 4: holding that a determination of the reasonableness of the defendants actions based upon the economic crisis involving the retirement system was premature on a motion to dismiss


Input: employer defaulted in that obligation. Cf. Bilotta v. Labor Pool of St. Paul, Inc., 321 N.W.2d 888 (Minn.1982). Having set forth the test for determining whether a special employer relationship exists, we must now analyze these factors as they apply to the facts of the instant ease to determine if Allied is Bowens’s special employer. Whether an individual is a special employee for workers’ compensation purposes is generally a question of fact. However, a court may find special employment status as a matter of law where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, together with affidavits establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact to the contrary. See Union Light & Power Co. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 796 A.2d 665, 669 (D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., Holdings: 0: holding no triable issue of fact existed where employee had not asked for accommodation 1: holding that the right to recover a particular measure of damages in a workers compensation case is fixed as of the date of injury 2: recognizing the issue may be decided as a question of law if the facts are undisputed and support only one inference 3: holding that temporary employee status for workers compensation purposes is determinable as a matter of law where the particular undisputed critical facts compel that conclusion and present no triable issue of fact 4: holding that workers compensation is the exclusive remedy as a matter of substantive law and hence whenever it appears from the plaintiffs pleadings bill of particulars or the facts that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant the obligation of alleging and proving noncoverage or applicability of workers compensation benefits falls on the plaintiff the court continued stating that waiver may be accomplished by ignoring the issue to the point of final disposition


Input: that have a determinate sentencing scheme.” Id. (quoting Foote, 808 P.2d at 735). Accordingly, we hold that a district court does not generally have the authority to order the Board of Pardons to credit an inmate’s sentence with time served as a condition of probation. However, because the establishment of an original parole date is inherently a sentencing function and the Board of Pardons therefore serves as a sentencing entity in our system, id., “the Board [of Pardons], like the courts, is governed by constitutional requirements addressing accuracy and fairness in the decision-making process.” Id. at 911. Thus, while the Board exercises unfettered discretion in determining the length of an inmate’s sentence, its actions must not violate the inmate’s constitutional rights. See id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we must examine whether the Holdings: 0: holding that any reliance by the parole board on inadmissible hearsay did not violate due process 1: recognizing in certain contexts  a postjudgment hearing may afford the requisite due process 2: holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate 3: holding that board of pardons must afford inmate due process in original parole hearing 4: holding that the parole commission is required to state reasons for its finding that an inmate continues to be a poor candidate for parole release


Input: of that statute, he must show “(1) that the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared unlawful by the [Tennessee Consumer Protection Act] and (2) that the defendant’s conduct caused an ‘ascertainable loss of money or property, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article, commodity, or „ thing of value wherever situated....’” Hanson v. J.C. Hobbs Co., Inc., No. W2001-02523-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5873582, at *9 (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 21, 2012) (quoting Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-18-109(a)(l)). To prevail, therefore, the Tennessee attorney general need not show that S & P violated CRARA or any other federal provision. That is, the right that he seeks to vindicate “is the right not to be lied to in a fashion that causes reliance and results in financial 195 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, if S & P had never invoked Holdings: 0: holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law 1: holding that dalessio did not justify removal where the gravamen of plaintiffs complaint was that defendants made materially false statements to them in a manner prohibited by new york law and in violation of duties created by new york law and no construction or interpretation of federal law was required 2: holding the same where the plaintiff alleged breach of a contract provision that incorporated federal law by reference and breach of a new york statute by failing to provide uniform rates allegedly required by federal law 3: holding under new york law in fact the failure to prove damages is  fatal to a plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action  4: holding that federal statutes and regulations can form the basis of a breach of contract claim if expressly incorporated into the contract


Input: by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion.” H o. 14, 15 (1918); Y.H. v. F.L.H., 784 So.2d 565, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)); 84 Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 656 So.2d 1297, 1299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (stat ing that “intervention under [rule 1.230] assumes an interest in pending litigation which shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding”) (internal quotation omitted). Additionally, a contingent interest in the proceedings, as opposed to a direct and immediate interest, will not justify a party’s intervention. Harbor Specialty Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, 932 So.2d 383, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Grimes, 591 So. 2d at 1094 (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, Infinity’s interest Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a motion to intervene where the intervenors would not stand to gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment in the action 1: holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion 2: holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss 3: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 4: holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion


Input: statement that he would “just as soon wait” until he had an attorney before talking to the police [Statement 1], followed immediately by his statement that he was willing to discuss the “circumstances” [Statement 2], was not an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel or a statement declaring an intention to remain silent. People v. McKinney, 794 N.W.2d at 614-15 (internal citation omitted). However, the crux of this case is whether Detective Hod-shire’s comment “Well that’s fine, but like I said” was interrogation. If Hodshire’s statement was interrogation, then the Michigan Supreme Court improperly used McKinney’s second statement in determining that he did not unequivocally request counsel. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision did not Holdings: 0: holding that after a suspect unambiguously requests counsel the suspects responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request 1: holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel 2: holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation 3: holding suspect must unambiguously request counsel before applying rule established in edwards that police questioning must cease once suspect requests counsel during interview 4: holding that interrogation must cease if the suspect unambiguously asserts his right to counsel


Input: permissible under the sufficient sureties clause of the Iowa Constitution so long as the accused is permitted access to a surety in some form ” Id. at 583. Thus, the Briggs court seemed to recognize that cash and surety are separate options. The court explained that the defendant had presented no evidence to show that she was absolutely precluded from accessing a surety of some form. Instead, her allegations appear to center on the denial of access to a commercial bail bond. . . . [T]here is no absolute right to such access. Briggs has made no claim that she could not otherwise find a sufficient surety. Under other circumstances, we would, perhaps, remand this issue to the district court to determine whether Briggs’ access to a surety was completely precluded. Id 125, 835 N.E.2d 5, 18 (<HOLDING>); Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 354 (holding that an Holdings: 0: holding an allcash bail violated ohios sufficient sureties clause 1: holding that retroactive application of ohios residency restriction statute violates the federal ex post facto clause 2: holding that stricti juris does not apply to compensated sureties but unambiguous contracts must not be extended by interpretation 3: holding allcash bail violates louisianas sufficient sureties clause 4: holding that an allcash bail violates vermonts sufficient sureties clause


Input: [the father] to [the mother] in the sum of $2,730.00.” The trial court further ordered the father to pay the attorney for the mother the sum of $2,789.08 within 180 days for the fees incurred in the action. The father filed a timely postjudgment motion, which the trial court granted in part and denied in part. The father timely appealed to this court. The father first argues that the trial court erred in awarding the mother “living expense assistance.” The father contends that Alabama law does not recognize such an award, except for periodic alimony, which, he says, the mother did not request and could not recover. The father further notes that the mother petitioned only for postminority support for their adult disabled daughter, see Ex parte Brewington, 445 So.2d 294, 297 (Ala.1983) (<HOLDING>), which, he says, can be awarded only in Holdings: 0: recognizing that third party may not recover contribution against parent where child has no cause of action against parent for negligent supervision 1: holding that court in habeas petition has no authority to condition visitation right of parent upon payment for support and maintenance 2: recognizing that a parent can petition for postminority support for a disabled child 3: holding that a superior court can adjudicate a child as a child in need of aid based on the acts of just one parent 4: recognizing duty of parent to control conduct of child


Input: the Michigan Court of Appeals decision that Petitioner consented to the mistrial was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. VI. Conclusion The Court concludes that Petitioner’s right to be free from double jeopardy was not violated. Therefore, it is ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 2 . The Double Jeopardy Clause is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). 3 . Implied consent to a mistrial does not implicate the line of Supreme Court cases holding that fundamental Constitutional rights may not be deemed waived on a silent record. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)(<HOLDING>). In Dinitz, the Supreme Court rejected the Holdings: 0: recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination 1: holding that the drug tax violated the privilege against selfincrimination 2: holding presumption of waiver from a silent record is impermissible 3: holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific 4: holding that waiver of the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination the right to a trial by jury and the right to confront ones accusers cannot be presumed from a silent record


Input: trial appears to have been directed toward whether or not Palmer Johnson performed more than the services ordered and not whether there were certain services ordered which it failed to perform. Wisconsin law and not federal principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel governs the effect of the state court judgment on this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978); Omernick v. LaRocque, 406 F.Supp. 1156 (W.D.Wis.1976); Allen v. McCurry, __U.S. __at__, 101 S.Ct. 411 at 415-16, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Thus, this Court must give to the Door County Circuit Court judgment at least the preclusive effect which the courts of the State of Wisconsin would give it. Allen v. McCurry, supra; Williams v. Ocean Transport Lines, Inc., 425 F.2d 1183, 1189 (3d Cir. 1970) (<HOLDING>). Casey argues that neither of the doctrines of Holdings: 0: holding that a federal court in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law 1: holding that after removal of diversity case to federal court the federal court may grant summary judgment notwithstanding earlier denial of summary judgment motion by state court 2: holding that a federal court acting under its federal as opposed to diversity jurisdiction may also give greater preclusive effect to a state court judgment than the state courts would give 3: holding that courts must look to the state that rendered the judgment to determine whether the courts of that state would afford the judgment preclusive effect 4: holding that state court judgment settling shareholders state and federal claims had preclusive effect in federal court even though shareholders could not have pressed their federal claims in state court


Input: maximum for an indeterminate quantity of drugs, then the type and quantity of drugs is an element of the § 841 offense that must be charged in the indictment and submitted to the jury. submitted to the jury, it was error for the District Court to sentence the Friedmans to life terms on the ITAR counts. We assume, arguendo, that Gary Friedman’s request to charge the jury with determining whether the plot involved a plan to commit a “crime of violence” was sufficient to preserve the issue of the failure to charge the jury with determining whether the deaths of Kovach and Gould were caused by the “crime of violence,” and, accordingly, review the claim for harmless error pursuant to Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(a). See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10-11, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Guevara, 298 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that knowledge element could not be deemed in favor of plaintiff where defendant objected to the omission of that element from the jury charge 1: holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis 2: holding that the harmlesserror rule of chapman v california  applies to the failure of a trial judge to submit an element of the offense to the jury 3: holding that the omission of an element from the jury charge is subject to harmlesserror review 4: holding omission in the jury instruction of element of offense requires a new trial


Input: thus providing no incentive to supervisory employees like plaintiffs, who have authority to give raises and set work hours, to avoid violating the FLSA. (Resp. at 3.) However the decisions discussed above explicitly considered — and rejected- — -the very policy arguments stressed by Defendants here. See, e.g., LeCompte, 780 F.2d at 1264. None of the authorities cited by Defendants as supporting their position addressed the issue of indemnity or contribution for FLSA violations. In Luder v. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2001), the court observed that a supervisor who uses his authority over employees to violate their rights under the FLSA may be liable to those employees (although, in that case, the claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment). There is no sugge (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>).) In light of the consistent holdings by the Holdings: 0: holding that an indemnitee must be proven to be free of negligence in order to receive indemnity either under a general indemnity agreement or under implied indemnity 1: holding that indemnification provision did not expressly state the party was seeking indemnity for its own negligence so as to satisfy express negligence test 2: holding that subcontractor was not obligated to indemnify general contractor for general contractors own negligence where indemnification clause did not expressly state that subcontractor would indemnify general contractor for such negligence 3: holding that illinois construction contract indemnification for negligence act invalidates indemnity provision in contract between general contractor and postal service 4: holding that the indemnification contract between an owner of train tracks and an owner and operator of a train clearly and unequivocally required indemnification for the track owners negligence given that the contract explicitly stated that the indemnification provisions shall apply regardless of considerations of fault or negligence


Input: rights “should be valued as an inherent part of his property interest”). We are persuaded that the first line of cases correctly interprets the statute. This interpretation gives meaning to both sentences of § 506(a), and enables bankruptcy courts to exercise the flexibility Congress intended. By retaining collateral, a Chapter 11 debtor is ensuring that the very event Winthrop proposes to use to value the property — a foreclosure sale — will not take place. At the same time, the debtor should not be heard to argue that, in valuing the collateral, the court should disregard the very event that, according to the debtor’s plan, will take place — namely, the debtor’s use of the collateral to generate an income stream. In ordinary circumstances the present value of the income strea 993) (<HOLDING>); In re Green, 151 B.R. 501 (Bankr.D.Minn.1993) Holdings: 0: holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debt or 1: holding parties negotiated price of vehicle was evidence of market value as represented 2: holding that truck to be retained by chapter 13 debtor must be valued at replacement cost to debtor because foreclosure value fails to account for debtors proposed use of collateral 3: holding that motor vehicle to be retained by chapter 13 debtor should be valued at the price the debtor could get for it in a free and open market ie its fair market value 4: holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debtor


Input: IX, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution provides: Neither the state nor any county, school district or municipality, except as otherwise provided in this constitution, shall directly or indirectly lend or pledge its credit or make any donation to or in aid of any person, association or public or private corporation or in aid of any private enterprise for the construction of any railroad except as provided. N.M. Const. Art. IX, § 14. “The Anti-Donation Clause ... prohibits the use of state or local governmental funds to benefit private organizations.” H. Stratton & P. Farley, Office of the Attorney General, State of New Mexico, History, Powers & Responsibilities, 1816-1990 at 125 (Univ. of N.M. Printing Servs.1990). In the context of New Mexico’s 8, 314 P.2d 714, 720 (1957)(<HOLDING>); Hutcheson v. Atherton, 44 N.M. 144, 99 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding an action for postpetition breach of an agreement to purchase property to be a core proceeding 1: holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court 2: holding that an appropriation to pay states share of emergency feed certificates issued to livestock owners for the purchase of hay was an unconstitutional subsidy of the livestock industry 3: holding that legislative diminishment of tax obligation constituted an unconstitutional subsidy to the liquor industry in violation of the antidonation clause 4: holding husbands early retirement subsidy was not marital property as a vested right but an option contingent upon his continued employment and eventual qualification for the subsidy in nine years based upon value of the pension frozen at the time of dissolution


Input: Property Mgmt. Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). When a plaintiff moves for summary judgment against a defendant’s counterclaim, the plaintiff must negate one or more of the essential elements of the defendant’s counterclaim. Martin v. McDonnold, 247 S.W.3d 224, 229 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2006, no pet.). Because the trial court’s order did not specify the ground(s) on which the summary judgment was granted, and because there were multiple grounds on which summary judgment may have been granted in the instant case, the State is required to negate all grounds on appeal. See Star-Telegram, Inc., v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tex.1995); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 381 (Tex.1993); Lewis v. Adams, 979 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Evans v. First Nat’l Bank of Bellville, 946 Holdings: 0: holding that to establish grounds for reversal an appellant must challenge all grounds on which the trial court ruled against it 1: holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal 2: holding that party may not appeal summary judgment in favor of opponent when grounds opposing summary judgment asserted on appeal were not raised before trial court 3: holding where movant asserts several grounds in support of its summary judgment motion and the trial court does not specify the grounds on which judgment was granted the reviewing court can affirm the judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious 4: holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal


Input: of Ms. Ward’s trust the plain language she used and replaces that language with words of the Court’s own choosing. It is neither this Court’s job nor its prerogative to rewrite the unambiguous language of trusts and wills, even if the terms of the trust or will might seem inequitable to one of the parties. Cf. In re Estate of Lucile B. Snyder, 2009 MT 291, 352 Mont. 264, 217 P.3d 1027. ¶28 As Jack correctly argues, 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of any attempt to recover or offset the debt he at one time owed to Joan. This means that judgment creditors-here, the trustee on behalf of Joan-are prohibited ‘from taking any action against debtors to collect the discharged debts.” In re Clowney, 19 B.R. 349, 353 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1982) (<HOLDING>). The granting of a discharge releases the Holdings: 0: holding that the code excepts from discharge debts resulting from agreements by the debtor to hold the debtors spouse harmless on joint debts to the extent those debts are in the nature of alimony maintenance or support 1: holding that plaintiffs amended complaint was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations where the amendment merely expanded on plaintiffs negligence theories and stating that in a tort action an amendment may vary the statement of the original complaint as to the manner in which the plaintiff was injured or as to the manner of the defendants breach of duty 2: holding that the plaintiffs liability to the defendant was absolved as a result of the bankruptcy order and the defendants were barred from collecting debts from property of the plaintiffs 3: holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code 4: holding that under the doctrine of direct estoppel a law firms failure to appeal the bankruptcy courts earlier order barred it from challenging the courts holding on its appeal from a subsequent order


Input: of that order. We consolidated the appeal and the petition for writ of certiorari for review. Fernwoods has now dismissed its appeals from the March 21 and March 29 orders; Octubre has also dismissed her cross-appeal from the March 10 order. This leaves pending for resolution only the Rodriguez’ cross-appeal of the March 29 order permitting Octubre to intervene and staying collection and their certiorari petition challenging the propriety of that same order. As the following eases establish, the March 29 order must be reversed: Goolsby v. State, 914 So.2d 494, 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (concluding that “any order entered simultaneously with an order of recusal ... [is] void and [has] no effect”); Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A. v. Tarr, 557 So.2d 595, 595-96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>); Economic Dev. Corp. of Dade County, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding recusal not required 1: holding that the oral rendition of an order in open court does not constitute entry of that order 2: holding that an order granted simultaneously with a recusal order is void unless the trial judges written order  was but a reduction of an earlier adverse oral ruling made prior to the recusal 3: holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order 4: holding that the judges recusal order effectively deprived that judge of authority to preside over the contempt proceedings


Input: amount of time. And, while Movants cite to their jury demand as a reason to withdraw the reference now, the Court may withdraw the reference if and when a trial is necessary, rather than at this early stage of deciding a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court directs that this adversary proceeding be now returned to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order. SO ORDERED. 1 . The Bankruptcy Court determined that the Trustee’s fraudulent conveyance claims were statutorily core, and that the unjust enrichment claims were non-core as pled, without prejudice to the Trustee to replead. See In re Refco Inc., Adv. Pro. No. 07-03060(RDD) (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2008); see also In re Refco Inc. (Memphis Holdings), 461 B.R. 181, 184 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2011) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, since neither party contends the Holdings: 0: holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment 1: holding that unjust enrichment claim could prevail contrary to the ucc priority system 2: holding that trustees unjust enrichment claim against memphis holdings defendants was statutorily core 3: holding that unjust enrichment claim alleging fraudulent inducement was based on tort theory 4: holding that a claim for unjust enrichment should not be dismissed because the court may find that the express contract was no longer in force


Input: support for exempting restitution orders from discharge” without the aid of federalism concerns because § 523(a)(7) “does not mention restitution, and it operates only if the penalty is ‘for the benefit of a governmental unit’ — a condition not easy to satis fy when the governmental body is collecting for private creditors.” Towers, 162 F.3d at 954; see also Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 419 n. 4, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990) (stating the goal of the VWPA is “compensating victims”). The Court held that the context in which the word “ ‘benefit’ appears — ‘payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit’ — implies that the ‘benefit’ in question is the benefit of the money that is ‘payable to’ the governmental unit.” Id. at 956. But see Vetter, 895 F.2d at 459 (<HOLDING>); Zajder v. Hills Dep’t Store, 154 B.R. 885 Holdings: 0: holding without comment that kelly applies to restitution paid to a victim bank 1: holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not 2: holding restitution paid to a local department store is not dischargeable pursuant to kelly 3: recognizing that the test adopted in kelly applies to rulings on evidence 4: holding that debtor not bank paid the propertytax redemption amount even though debtor paid this amount using proceeds of loan from the bank


Input: aff d in part, rev’d, vacated and remanded in part, 226 F.3d 1334 (2000); McCreary v. United States, 35 Fed.Cl. 533, 536 n. 1, 547 (1996) (distinguishing between a patent infringement action between private parties and the "so-called 'patent infringement’ by the United States, which is an uncompensated taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment”); Penda Corp. v. United States, 29 Fed.Cl. 533, 573 (1993) (reasonable and entire compensation is based upon a theory of eminent domain); Messerschmidt v. United States, 29 Fed.Cl. 1, 44 (1993) ("Therefore, for purposes of the instant claims of 'direct infringement,' or more properly for purposes of this compulsory, nonexclusive license analysis in eminent domain ...."); Ha-las v. United States, 28 Fed.Cl. 354, 360 n. 10 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Judin v. United States, 27 Fed.Cl. 759, 773 Holdings: 0: holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement 1: recognizing theory of constructive possession 2: recognizing  1498 is based on principles related to the taking of property namely a patent license 3: recognizing that the theory behind united statess use of a patent is a taking 4: holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent


Input: Fox in North Carolina; and, Ms. Gibson engaged in sexual intercourse with Mr. Fox in North Carolina. This is competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding that there is a direct link between Ms. Gibson’s contacts with North Carolina and the injuries alleged in Ms. Fox’s complaint. Replacements, Ltd., 133 N.C. App. at 140-41, 515 S.E.2d at 48. Since the trial court’s findings of fact, ignoring finding of fact twelve, support its conclusion of law that “[t]his action arises directly out of Defendant’s activities within and to the state of North Carolina[,]” we hold that section 1-75.4(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes confers personal jurisdiction in North Carolina. See Dillon, 291 N.C. at 675, 231 S.E.2d at 630; see also Cooper, 140 N.C. App. at 733, 537 S.E.2d at 857 (<HOLDING>). We must next examine whether the exercise of Holdings: 0: holding that a foreign subsidiary that is not registered to do business in north carolina has no place of business employees or bank accounts in north carolina does not design manufacture or advertise its products in north carolina and does not solicit business in north carolina cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction in north carolina even if some of the companys products do enter north carolina through the stream of commerce 1: holding that north carolina court lacked personal jurisdiction over illinois bank even though some of its customers resided in north carolina and loan proceeds were used in north carolina 2: holding that because north carolina has opted out of the exemptions provided under 11 usc  522d the exemptions available for bankruptcy debtors in north carolina depend upon the law of north carolina 3: holding that claims of alienation of affections and criminal conversation are claims within the purview of section 17543 of the north carolina general statutes 4: holding that the flsa is not within the purview of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment


Input: States, 23 CIT -, - n. 6, 41 F.Supp.2d 319, 323 n. 6 (1999) (noting that “[n]ot all rules of statutory construction rise to the level of a canon, however”) (citation omitted). If, after employing the first prong of Chevron, the Court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the Court becomes whether Commerce’s construction of the statute is permissible. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Essentially, this is an inquiry into the reasonableness of Commerce’s interpretation. See Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1038 (Fed.Cir.1996). Provided Commerce has acted rationally, the Court may not substitute its judgment for the agency’s. See Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also IPSCO, Inc. v. United States, 965 Holdings: 0: holding that when a court is asked to construe an ambiguous statute it must defer to the interpretation set out in a regulation promulgated by the agency charged with administering the statute so long as the agencys interpretation is reasonable 1: holding that a reviewing court must defer to an agencys interpretation of an operable statute as long as that interpretation is consistent with legislative intent and is supported by substantial competent evidence 2: holding that a court must defer to an agencys reasonable interpretation of a statute even if the court might have preferred another 3: holding that circuit court should defer to supreme courts interpretation of the act 4: holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation


Input: more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island, Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Apart from the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff can raise an inference of discrimination (i.e., create a prima facie case) with circumstantial or direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640. If the plaintiff attempts to do so and the employer provides evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiffs evidence must be such as to create a triable issue as to discriminatory intent. See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1123 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 Holdings: 0: recognizing that whether an employee uses the mcdonnell douglas approach or relies on direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent the employee must counter the employers legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action in such a manner as to create a genuine issue as to discriminatory intent 1: holding that circumstantial evidence alone may establish discriminatory intent 2: recognizing that whether the employee uses the mcdonnell douglas framework or other evidence to create a prima facie case when the employer offers a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its adverse action the question is whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that the employers action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons 3: recognizing that an employers decision to eliminate a position is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a position or employee 4: holding that if the plaintiff makes a prima facie case the defendant employer must then articulate some legitimate nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action and the employee must then have a fair opportunity to show pretext that is that a discriminatory intent motivated the employers action


Input: submitted a written curative instruction and asked the court to include it in the court’s final jury instructions: The Cincinnati Insurance Company was mentioned by Mr. Gratzianna. The Cincinnati Insurance Company does not insure Mr. Whitaker or Milford Towing or the Plaintiff. There is no evidence before you that the defendants or plaintiff have or do not have insurance. Whether such insurance exists has no bearing upon any issue in this case. You must not discuss or consider it for any purpose. The district court characterized Gratzi-anna’s comment as not “even a foul tip. It was just a loose comment that I think right now is better off left quiet without any further instruction to highlight ... the comment itself.” The court agreed to address the iss 1565-66, 1568-69 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). This Court held long ago that, when a trial Holdings: 0: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given 1: holding that failure to comply with state contemporaneous objection rule bars federal review absent a showing of cause and prejudice 2: holding that any misstatements of law during closing argument are presumed cured by final instruction 3: holding mistrial unwarranted where contemporaneous objection was made to single mention of insurance and court gave cautionary instruction 4: holding no prejudice occurred where party made contemporaneous objection to brief remark about insurance during closing argument and court gave cautionary instruction


Input: the bearer bonds had not yet been detected at that date, the further concealment of the $18 million in profits was either direct actual loss from the con tinuing offense or relevant uncharged conduct committed during the original offense. Therefore, those profits were properly considered in establishing the total loss. B. Whether the $18 Million Profits Were Properly Found by the Court Brennan argues that even if it is proper to consider the profits made as part of the bankruptcy fraud, the District Court did not make its own factual findings with respect to the profits, but merely adopted the facts in the presentence investigation report, in violation of former Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(c)(1) (2001) (now Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B)). See United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 253 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Cherry, 10 F.3d at 1013-14 (Fed. R.Crim.P. Holdings: 0: recognizing that factual findings were clearly erroneous where the record before the court was simply devoid of any basis for the district courts conclusion 1: holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record 2: holding that the trial courts putting its findings on the record at the conclusion of the states case was sufficient to satisfy  152538 because that section does not specifically limit the time within which the court must state the findings 3: holding that the district court must make findings on the record as to the basis for its conclusion about the amount of actual loss 4: holding that the district court determines the amount of loss under the preponderance of the evidence standard


Input: are not material to the court’s disposition of the case. 4 . Because of the timing of this filing — prior to any decision in the case, plaintiff's request for reconsideration is not ripe for judicial review. Reconsideration of an opinion or other action by a court presupposes an underlying prior action which the court may then reconsider. See Rule 59(b) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) (stating the requirement that "a motion for ... reconsideration of a judgment ... shall be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment” and therefore contemplating that the court will have rendered a decision or taken some other action in the case before the court may entertain a motion for reconsideration) (emphasis added); see also RCFC 59 rules committee note (2002) (<HOLDING>). Because the court, prior to this opinion, has Holdings: 0: recognizing that nonfinal orders may be revised at any time before a final judgment is entered 1: holding that motion for reconsideration renders deportation order nonfinal despite language of the 1990 amendments 2: recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal 3: recognizing that both final and nonfinal orders may be the subject of motions for reconsideration 4: holding that when reviewing a final judgment we generally also have jurisdiction to review all prior nonfinal orders and rulings which produced the judgment


Input: the court makes no determination that Waste Management — Washington has violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, by attempting to monopolize or monopolizing solid waste collection and disposal services at Fairchild AFB, only that Waste Management — Washington may not claim immunity under the “state action” doctrine in the event the court may need to reach that issue in related proceedings or if the Government does not comply with this final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). In that regard, the court notes that the modus operandi employed by Waste Management — Washington in this case apparently has been tried by an affiliated company in another court without success. See, e.g., Waste Management of North America, Inc. v. Weinberger, 862 F.2d 1393, 1397-98 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). If Waste Management — Washington and its Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs breach of contract claim was properly a statutory claim under the personnel management act 1: holding that because colorados hazardous waste program was authorized by rcra it became effective pursuant to rcra and the citizen suit provision of section 6972a1a applies 2: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction under the bid protest provisions of section 1491 to enjoin a contracting agencys termination of a contract 3: holding that the puc does not have the authority to regulate or control the management decisions of a utility absent a finding that the management decision would adversely affect the public 4: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate waste management of north americas claim that the el toro marine corps air base was required to award waste management of north america with a waste collection award since it was the only permittee in orange county because the case was not properly initiated as a citizen suit under rcra in addition the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit held that waste management of north america did not have standing under 31 usc  35512 since it did not file a proper bid protest nor submit a bid


Input: was lawful. The referral to secondary did not exceed the boundaries of permissible detention for continuing investigation, and did not become a de facto arrest. Cf. State v. Flores, 122 N.M. 84, 89, 920 P.2d 1038, 1043 (Ct.App.1996) (“When a detention exceeds the boundaries of a permissible investigatory stop, it becomes a de facto arrest requiring probable cause.”). {39} Whether the agent subjectively intended to continue his routine investigation or only to immediately ask for consent in secondary is not material to the outcome of this case. “[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the [officer’s] subjective intent.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). In the present case the Holdings: 0: holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop 1: holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation 2: holding that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop did not depend on the actual motivation of the officer involved as long as the officer articulated a lawful reason for the stop 3: holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver 4: holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense


Input: prepublication investigation to ensure it was adequate and complete. But Compuware squandered this opportunity, providing only a short, virtually fact-free, one-paragraph response to Moody’s inquiry. Compuware now attempts to use against Moody’s this cursory response, arguing that Moody’s should have investigated the issue further. But this sort of argument is not supported by precedent. The relevant legal inquiry focuses on the extent of the defendant’s efforts to avoid the truth, not the extent of the defendant’s investigation to discover the truth. See Perk, 931 F.2d at 411-12. Because Moody’s actively sought to learn about the relationship and litigation between Compuware and IBM, any alleged investigatory deficiencies are insufficient to establish actual malice. See id. at 412 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Moody’s investigatory efforts, Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants were not liable for failing to perform the thorough professional investigation the plaintiff would have preferred 1: holding that there is no constitutional duty to do a better investigation and that a decision not to conduct a more thorough investigation does not invade an accuseds rights 2: holding that individual defendants were not liable under the elcra because they did not have the authority to rehire the plaintiff 3: holding investigation was not deficient in part because counsel hired an experienced death penalty investigator who conducted a thorough investigation into defendants history 4: holding that under oklahoma law a bad faith claim  premised on inadequate investigation must be supported by a showing that material facts were overlooked or that a more thorough investigation would have produced relevant information


Input: are present at the commission of the crime, it matters not by whose immediate agency the crime is committed, all are guilty. The hand of one is the. hand of all. (J.A. at 656.) In other words, the State had to prove only that Howard and Weldon, working together and with malice aforethought, were jointly responsible for Le’s death. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-10 (Law Co-op.1985) (defining murder as “the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied”). Therefore, because South Carolina does not require that a defendant have specific intent to commit murder, nothing in Howard’s original confessions was exculpatory for Fifth Amendment purposes and in no way diminished Howard’s legal blameworthiness for the murder. See State v. Foust, 479 S.E.2d 50, 51 (S.C.1996) (<HOLDING>) (citing State v. Johnson, 291 S.C. 127, 352 Holdings: 0: holding that felony murder verdicts did not merge into a malice murder verdict but were instead vacated by operation of law 1: holding that possessing property of another for the purpose of security on a debt does not give rise to probable cause to arrest 2: holding defendant must act with specific intent to cause death of another in order to be convicted of attempted murder 3: holding that wrongful intent to injure another may give rise to finding of malice to support verdict of murder 4: holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action


Input: law claims against state officials, regardless of an otherwise-valid pendent jurisdiction claim. “[A] claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment .... this principle applies as well to state-law claims brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121, 104 S.Ct. 900. Nor does their request for declaratory relief save plaintiffs’ state law claims. “[I]t is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.” Id. at 106, 104 S.Ct. 900; see also Benning v. Bd. of Regents of Regency Universities, 928 F.2d 775, 778 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) Counts Four and Five of the Complaint are Holdings: 0: holding that a declaratory judgment by a federal court based on state law would constitute an endrun around pennhurst that is equally forbidden by the eleventh amendment 1: holding that state defendant waived eleventh amendment immunity to a federal claim by removing to federal court 2: holding that rookerfeldman doctrine bars federal jurisdiction when a plaintiffs suit in federal district court is at least in part a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court judgment and an  issue in that federal suit is inextricably intertwined with an issue resolved by the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto appeal is taken 3: holding that there is an exception to eleventh amendment immunity for actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials for alleged violations of federal law 4: holding that state did not waive eleventh amendment immunity by removing case to federal court


Input: make plan payments. The reverse can also occur: a debtor who has recently lost a high-paying job or who received unusual payments (such as severance or a year-end bonus) in the six-month period may show disposable income that is far beyond his or her actual ability to pay. Distortions can also occur with respect to the allowed deductions from current monthly income. For example, the means test envisions a hypothetical chapter 13 scenario in which secured debts are paid in fu 38 (Bankr.W.D.Va.2006) (projected disposable income for above-median income debtor would not include deduction for contractual payments on under-secured debt that debtors would not actually be required to pay because plan bifurcated claim or surrendered collateral); In re Minahan, 394 B.R. 116 (Bankr.W.D.Va.2008) (<HOLDING>); In re Watson, 366 B.R. 523 (Bankr.D.Md.2007) Holdings: 0: holding that for abovemedian income debtors projected disposable income calculated on form b22c is the starting point but not the ending point in determining debtors correct minimum obligation and both income and expenses must be determined as of date of confirmation 1: holding that projected disposable income for abovemedian income debt or is not fixed by means test calculation that includes expenses that would not actually be incurred under plan such as car payments for car to be surrendered 2: holding that the disposable income arrived at with form b22c is a beginning point for evaluating the debtors past and current financial status 3: holding that projected disposable income for abovemedian debtors is disposable income as defined by  1325b 4: holding that a debtors disposable income as calculated under 11 usc  1325b2 is not the same as a debtors projected disposable income but that it can be used as the presumptive projected disposable income


Input: possession of a gun or ammunition is admissible so long as it is sufficiently tied to the crime charged. For example, in Herman v. State, 896 So.2d 222, 229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), we considered the trial court’s decision to admit evidence that the defendant in a murder case — where the victim was killed with a shotgun — owned a shotgun. The defendant’s shot r ammunition and the crime is too tenuous, such evidence is generally not relevant. In Cooper v. State, the Third District held that evidence of ammunition found on a murder defendant nine months after the murder which could not be definitively matched to the ammunition used in the murder was too tenuous to the crime to be admissible. 778 So.2d 542, 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). See also Sosa v. State, 639 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). Here, there was an adequate nexus between the Holdings: 0: holding that when a defendant voluntarily approached the immigration officer at the airport it cannot be said that he was discovered in or found in the united states 1: holding that trial court erred in allowing police officer to testify to contents of telephone records that were not introduced into evidence 2: holding that court erred in allowing 380 caliber cartridges found in murder defendants vehicle into evidence when there was no evidence connecting them to the crime especially in light of the fact that the investigating officer testified the bullet holes he discovered were consistent with 22 caliber ammunition 3: holding that it was error to admit into evidence 880 cartridges found in defendants car where there was no link established between the cartridges and the crime charged 4: holding that the protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest in front of his house on suspicion of murder was not justified because the evidence that an accomplice was involved in the murder did not equate to evidence that someone would be hiding out in the defendants house a month after the crime occurred and at the time of the arrest the officers were not chasing the defendant from a crime scene


Input: (Tex.App.2000). As the court explained in Bohls v. Oakes, “[p]laintiffs establish their standing as consumers by their relationship to the transaction, not by a contractual relationship with the defendant.” Bohls v. Oakes, 75 S.W.3d 473, 479 (Tex.App.2002) (citing Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 892-93 (Tex.1985)). “A third party beneficiary may qualify as a consumer of goods or services, as long as the transaction was specifically required by or intended to benefit the third party and the good or service was rendered to benefit the third party.” Bohls, 75 S.W.3d at 479; see also Bynum v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 129 S.W.3d 781, 793 (Tex.App.2004) (acknowledging that third-party beneficiaries of a contract have standing to sue under the DTPA); Kennedy, 689 S.W.2d at 892-93 (<HOLDING>); Wellborn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 970 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding claims for negligent procurement of insurance accrued on date the insured purchased the insurance policies 1: holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury 2: holding that employee was consumer of medical insurance purchased by employer for employees benefit 3: holding that a plaintiff who purchased a crane for business use is a consumer 4: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits


Input: Cir.2005)[“[T]he District Court lack[s] subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA to provide injunctive and declaratory relief’]; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Therefore, Plaintiffs claims under the FTCA are without merit, and should be dismissed. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Defendant Berry and Paul’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs Bivens claim concerning his placement in the SHU on August 31, 2001 be denied. In all other respects, the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment should be granted. September 7, 2006. 1 . To the extent any of Plaintiffs claims relate to his transfer to FCI-Florence, or conditions of confinement at Florence, they are not properly before this court. See Ajaj v. Smith, 108 Fed.Appx. 743 (4th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The text of this order reads as follows: Holdings: 0: holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim 1: holding that ajaj did not have a protected liberty interest in remaining at fciedgefield and finding that this court was without jurisdiction over anyone with responsibility for  conditions at fciflorence in part because no one with responsibility over that facility was named in that action but noting that the decision was without prejudice to ajajs right to challenge the conditions of his fciflorence confinement in the district court in colorado 2: recognizing a liberty interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement 3: holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court 4: holding over


Input: to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. However, ‘[n]ot every order has the requisite element of finality that can trigger the operation of Rule 51(b).’ Goldome Credit Corp. v. Player, 869 So.2d 1146, 1147 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (emphasis added). A claim is not eligible for Rule 54(b) certification unless it has been completely resolved by the judgment. “.... ‘[T]he trial court cannot confer appellate jurisdiction upon this [Cjourt through directing entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) if the judgment is not otherwise “final.” ’ Robinson v. Computer Servicenters, Inc., 360 So.2d 299, 302 (Ala.1978).” Rather than appealing from the trial court’s interlocutory order, Deakle should have filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. See Ex parte Fort James Operating Co., 905 So.2d 836 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). However, for the reasons explained in Part I Holdings: 0: holding that a petition for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate mechanism for challenging a trial courts grant of leave to amend a complaint 1: holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court 2: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances 3: holding that denial of leave to amend was appropriate because the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint two years after filing his complaint  on the eve of trial when discovery was complete 4: holding that a trial judges denial of a recusal motion can be challenged on appeal or in a petition for a writ of mandamus


Input: times, requiring them to change schools. Id. at 750. However, all of the moves resulted in their residence being in southeast Missouri. Id. In 1993, the mother informed the father that she intended to move, with the children, to Fulton, Missouri, because of her upcoming remarriage. Id. The father filed a motion to modify custody, which the trial court sustained, finding a substantial and continuing change of circumstances based, inter alia, on the mother’s remarriage and move to Fulton. Id. at 752. The judgment was reversed on appeal, the appellate court finding that the mother’s move from southeast Missouri to central Missouri was not a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a change of custody. Id. at 752-53. See also Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 812 S.W.2d 250, 254 (Mo.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). The one change in the residence of the Holdings: 0: holding that evidence was sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding where mother allowed child to be in contact with individual who had physically abused her mother was not capable of caring for child on her own mother admitted at trial she had not found stable employment and child was doing well in her current placement 1: holding that no substantial and continuing change in circumstances had occurred where there was no evidence of an adverse effect on the child even though the mother has moved six times since her marriage was dissolved 2: holding that fundamental error occurred in the prosecution of a mother for aggravated manslaughter of her child when the prosecutor commented on the fact that the mother had contemplated having an abortion during the course of her pregnancy with the child 3: holding that a mother and her two children failed to establish a  1983 claim where there was no evidence that threats made to the mother were directly aimed at the relationship between parent and child 4: holding a mother on appeal must successfully challenge a trial courts finding that there was no substantial and continuing change of circumstances of the children or mother before she can succeed on her claim that the trial court erred in overruling her motion to modify custody


Input: 858 P.2d 380, 381 (1993)). In doing so, we are “bound to accept all the factual allegations in the complaint as true.” Marcoz v. Summa Corporation, 106 Nev. 737, 739, 801 P.2d 1346, 1347 (1990) (citing Edgar v. Wagner, 101 Nev. 226, 227-28, 699 P.2d 110, 111-12 (1985)). Kaldi contends that his exclusive agency arrangement with Farmers created an employer-employee relationship between himself and the companies. The plain language of the Agreement does not support Kaldi’s assertion. “It has long been the policy in Nevada that absent some countervailing reason, contracts will be construed from the written language and enforced as written.” Ellison v. C.S.A.A., 106 Nev. 601, 603, 797 P.2d 975, 977 (1990) (citing Southern Trust v. K & B Door Co., 104 Nev. 564, 568, 763 P.2d 353, 355 (1988) (<HOLDING>)). Here, provision “I” of the agreement Holdings: 0: holding that if a document is facially clear it will be construed according to its language 1: holding that when the language of a statute is clear courts should not substitute their judgment for that of congress and should enforce the statute according to its terms 2: holding that if the statutory terms are unambiguous a courts review ends and the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its words 3: holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts 4: holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning


Input: entitled to relief from the district court’s judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) because the court’s dismissal order violated his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. He appears to argue that the district court’s pretrial dismissal of his complaint under the “dogma” of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), usurped the jury’s fact-finding role. We cannot agree. Whether to grant a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is within the district court’s sound discretion. Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam). Yeyille has shown no exceptional circumstance that warrants relief. A plaintiffs right to a jury trial is not violated merely because his ease is dismissed before trial. See Garvie v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 366 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). There is no requirement to conduct a jury Holdings: 0: holding that dismissal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 56 did not violate the seventh amendment 1: holding that directed verdict does not violate seventh amendment 2: holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion 3: holding that seventh amendment right to jury trial not violated by courts dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 4: holding that the courts grant of summary judgment did not violate the plaintiffs seventh amendment right to a jury trial and describing the plaintiffs argument that it did as very misleading


Input: of the legislative history behind § 544(a)). The Bankruptcy Code does not authorize the Trustee to collect property or money except that which is owed to the estate. 2. The Trustee alternatively contends that the conspiracy claim belongs to the bankruptcy estate because, unlike in Caplin, the claim here seeks to remedy an injury to all of Bradley’s creditors and not merely a subset thereof. Even assuming that any or all of Bradley’s creditors could properly assert the claim, we disagree that this fact alone confers standing on the Trustee. This court recently clarified that, when determining whether a claim is property of the bankruptcy estate such that the trustee has standing to assert it under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), the distinction between claims that 52-53 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). But Texas law does not suggest that Bradley Holdings: 0: holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law 1: holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud 2: recognizing that pursuant to the traditional application of the alter ego doctrine corporate form may be disregarded when the corporation is the mere instrumentality or business conduit of another corporation or person 3: recognizing that the alter ego doctrine is an equitable doctrine which should be used to prevent inequitable results 4: holding that alter ego is shown from the total dealings of the corporation


Input: information to the government in 2007, Koerber did not file his protective-order motion until February 2010, nearly nine months after the grand jury’s indictment. In addition, Koerber did not file his motion to suppress statements from the February 2009 interviews until April 2012. Moreover, Koerber did not file a motion to dismiss for an STA violation until April 2014-nearly five years after the grand jury returned its initial indictment. At the same time, Koerber filed his motion before trial when it was clear that there was an STA violation in this case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (“Failure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial ... shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.”); United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 1001 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). And Koerber did not simply acquiesce to Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant waived any argument on the issue by failing to oppose a motion to dismiss 1: holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence 2: holding that the defendant waived the right to dismissal under  3162a2 when he did not file a motion to dismiss before trial 3: holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion 4: holding that party sought affirmative relief by filing motion to dismiss and violated dueorderofhearing requirement by having motion to dismiss and motion to reconsider dismissal heard before special appearance


Input: Circuits have held that footnote seven creates a general exception to Heck for § 1983 Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims. See, e.g., Beck, 195 F.3d at 559 n. 4 (noting that “use of illegally obtained evidence does not, for a variety of reasons, necessarily imply an unlawful conviction,” with the caveat, however, that the case before it was not one of those “rare situation[s] ... where all evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal arrest”); Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir.1998) (interpreting Heck’s footnote seven to “mean that Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful searches or arrests do not necessarily imply a conviction is invalid, so in all cases these claims can go forward”); Simmons v. O’Brien, 77 F.3d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252, 253 n. 1 (11th Holdings: 0: recognizing that harmless error analysis is appropriate even if presumptively coerced confession is improperly introduced 1: holding the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession is subject to a harmless error analysis when the defendants guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that  the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendants guilt or innocence  3: holding that beeause harmless error analysis is applicable to the admission at trial of coerced confessions judgment in favor of simmons on this  1983 action challenging his confession will not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction 4: holding admission of coerced confession to he a classic trial error similar in both degree and kind to the erroneous admission of other types of evidence and thus reviewable for harmlessness


Input: is not a pollutant. See, e.g., McFadden, 595 N.E.2d at 764 (finding that an insured could reasonably understand the pollution exclusion to “exclude coverage for injury caused by certain forms of industrial pollution, but not coverage for injury allegedly caused by the presence of leaded materials in a private residence.”). Accordingly, it is at least plausible that the pollution exclusion was not meant to and does not apply to lead exposure claims. There are several lower state court cases, cited by both plaintiff and defendant that interpret the pollution exclusion, as applied to lead poisoning and other injuries, in seemingly incongruous ways. The relevant Appellate Division cases are: American Heritage Realty Partnership v. La Voy, 209 A.D.2d 749, 618 N.Y.S.2d 125 (3d Dep’t 1994) (<HOLDING>); Miano v. Hehn, 206 A.D.2d 957, 614 N.Y.S.2d Holdings: 0: holding lead paint poisoning covered by the pollution exclusion 1: holding that the discharge of paint chips into soil was covered by the pollution exclusion because it polluted the environment but that the presence of lead paint in a household would not be so covered 2: holding that the release of carbon monoxide into an apartment is not the type of environmental pollution contemplated by the pollution exclusion clause 3: holding that removal of insulation that released asbestos  a thermal irritant  into an apartment was covered by the pollution exclusion 4: holding that pollution exclusion did not apply to claim arising from ingestion of lead paint because exclusion reasonably may be limited to environmental claims


Input: File is a routine background investigative file like the Government suggests, the file was not located in one of the FBI main files designated for such investi gations, such as the files for administrative matters, for special inquiries for the White House, or for the security clearance investigation program. Id. As the in camera review reveals, all of those features of the DeLoach Memorandum are reflective of the “highly unconventional” nature of the investigation at issue. By pointing out those features, and by presenting the Court with substantial external evidence of similar improper conduct by DeLoach and the Hoover FBI, Plaintiff has demonstrated that the allegation of improper conduct by the FBI is “more than a bare suspicion.” See Favish, 541 U.S. at 174, 124 S.Ct. 1570 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, despite the factual imbalance Holdings: 0: holding that the only relevant public interest in disclosure is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the foia which is contributing significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government  1: holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant 2: holding that when the public interest being asserted is to show that responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of their duties the requester must establish more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure 3: holding that the presumption is that the trial court acted reasonably in sentencing and that the defendant must show some unreasonable or unjustifiable basis in the record that amounts to an abuse of discretion 4: holding that a claim for abuse of process requires a plaintiff to show that the defendants acted with intent to do harm without excuse or justification  in order to obtain a collateral objective that is outside the legitimate ends of the process


Input: likewise conclude that Section 951.1, 25 Pa.C.S. § 2911.1, under which the Commonwealth Court ruled that Camejo cannot appear on the ballot as the candidate of a political body because of his membership in the (minor) Green Party, is inapplicable. I believe that the language of this provision, which includes “thirty (30) days before the primary----” as its reference point of disaffiliation, when read in context, clearly reveals that the General Assembly intended it to apply to major, not minor, political parties. This is so because in the Election Code, the legislature has determined that only major parties may gain ballot access through the primary process. See Heicklen v. Pennsylvania Board of Elections, 751 A.2d 260, 262 (Pa.Cmwlth.), aff'd per curiam, 561 Pa. 33, 747 A.2d 894 (2000)(<HOLDING>) Further, even if Camejo’s affidavit were Holdings: 0: holding that 25 pacs  28722 is capable of only one meaning that minor political parties must nominate candidates by nomination papers and are not entitled to participate at party primaries 1: holding that billboard was not structure within meaning of the zoning enabling act g l c 40  25 2: holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political 3: holding that it violated the first amendment to prohibit announcement of views on disputed legal and political issues by candidates for judicial election 4: holding that the achievements of minor political parties were accomplished without the help of public funds thus the limited participation or nonparticipation of nonmajor parties or candidates in public funding does not unconstitutionally disadvantage them


Input: to demonstrate a nexus because his fear of “ordinary crime” or “private violence” by “unknown persons” did not amount to evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground. We cannot say that the record compels a different conclusion. Garcia’s. evidence established at most that crime, including kidnapping for ransom, is widespread in Mexico and that people within both the expatriate and local communities, and at all socioeconomic levels, may be targeted by gangs and drug-trafficking organizations for kidnapping. As a matter of law, such evidence of high levels of general criminal activity within a country alone is insufficient to “constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground.” See Ruiz v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez, 735 F.3d at 1310-11 (explaining Holdings: 0: holding that petitioners who apply for withholding of removal must establish that a statutorily protected ground was a reason for their persecution 1: holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence 2: holding that persecution based on being a current member of the military national police force or us embassy guard does not qualify as persecution on a protected ground 3: holding that while widespread violence against a protected group by private individuals and public officials may constitute persecution widespread discrimination that may include persecution of some individuals does not compel such a finding 4: holding that evidence that  is consistent with acts of private violence  or that merely shows that a person has been the victim of criminal activity does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground


Input: to indemnify a public employee for defense costs arising out of willful or wanton misconduct,” regardless of the context in which those defense costs arise. We disagree. The statutes from which the city derives its broad public policy are part of the OTCA. By its terms, the OTCA establishes when the state and its subdivisions must expend public funds to address tort claims. Through the amendment of ORS 30.285 and ORS 30.287 in 1975, the legislature expanded the OTCA to require the state and its subdivisions to take financial responsibility for tort claims filed against their employees. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that ORS 30.287 is directed to “torts, [and] not to other claims.” City of Tualatin v. City-County Ins. Services Trust, 321 Or 164, 171, 894 P2d 1158 (1995) (<HOLDING>). That statute and ORS 30.285 were designed “to Holdings: 0: holding that proof that an employer fired an employee three months after the employee filed a charge of discrimination sufficed to state a prima facie case of causation 1: holding that ors 30287 does not oblige a municipality to defend an employee against an ethics charge 2: holding that the other party must have adequate notice of the claim in order to defend against it 3: holding that an insurers duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint against the insured 4: holding that rule 52040 prohibited the state from amending the indictment to include a different charge because defendant was prejudiced in that he had no ability to defend himself against the added charge