Input: claim against the bankruptcy estate alleging that Telegroup breached its agreement to use its best efforts to register its stock. Claimants sought damages on the theory that had Telegroup performed its obligation under the contract, they would have sold their shares as soon as Tele-group’s stock became freely tradeable, thereby avoiding the losses incurred when Telegroup’s stock subsequently declined in value. Telegroup filed objections to these claims, asking the Bankruptcy Court to subordinate the claims pursuant to § 510(b), which provides that any claim for damages “arising from the purchase or sale” of common stock shall have the same priority in the distribution of the estate’s assets a o. 97-1409, 2001 WL 1752566, at *7, 2001 Bankr.LEXIS 158 at *20 (Bankr.D.Del. Jan. 16, 2001) (<HOLDING>). Since the actionable conduct in this case Holdings: 0: holding that a pledge is a sale and purchase of a security under  10b 1: holding that an independent fiduciary duty arises from a brokers purchase and sale of securities 2: holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtors securities 3: holding that under  510b a claim does not arise from the purchase or sale of a security if it is predicated on conduct that occurred after the securitys issuance 4: holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument


Input: 74, 77 (Mo.1998), quoting James T. Hendrick and James P. Wiezel, The New Commercial General Liability Forms — An Introduction and Critique, Fedn. of Ins. & Corporate Counsel Quarterly 319, 322 (Summer 1986).] Courts generally conclude that the policies are intended to insure the risks of an insured causing damage to other persons and their property, but that the policies are not intended to insure the risks of an insured causing damage to the insured’s own work. [Id.} In other words, the policies do not insure an insured’s work itself; rather, the policies generally insure consequential risks that stem from the insured’s work. Heile v. Herrmann, 136 Ohio App.3d 351, 353, 736 N.E.2d 566 (1st Dist.1999). See also ACUITY v. Burd & Smith Constr., Inc., 2006 ND 187, 721 N.W.2d 33, ¶ 12 (<HOLDING>); Century Indemn. Co. v. Golden Hills Builders, Holdings: 0: holding that under missouri law the term property damage defined as physical injury to tangible property does not cover losses due to the insureds negligent performance of contract work where the defective work does not cause accidental injury to surrounding property 1: holding that under a cgl policy an insurer had no duty to defend its insured in an action resulting from faulty workmanship and that a cgl policy  is not intended to insure business risks ie risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which business management can and should control or manage rowland h long the law of liability insurance  10011 specifically the policies do not insure an insureds work itself but rather they generally insure consequential risks that stem from that work id 2: holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations 3: holding that a cgl policy such as the one at issue here does not insure against claims for defective or negligent workmanship or construction because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident and therefore claims for defective or negligent workmanship do not constitute an occurrence under the policy 4: holding that a claim of faulty workmanship that results in damage to property other than the work product is an accident and that a cgl policy is not intended to insure business risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which businesses can control and manage    a cgl policy does not insure the insureds work itself rather it insures consequential damages that stem from that work    as a result a cgl policy may provide coverage for claims arising out of tort breaches of contract and statutory liabilities as long as the requisite accidental occurrence and property damage are present


Input: subsequent purchasers is concerned, the only duty resting upon a mortgagee is the due registration of the mortgage in the office of the probate judge, which is conclusive notice to all the world of everything that appears from the face of the mortgage.” Christopher v. Shockley, 199 Ala. 681, 682, 75 So. 158, 158 (1917) (emphasis added). We conclude that the constructive notice provided by § 35-4-90 extends to those who, like subsequent purchasers, are under a duty to search the chain of title for claims against a parcel of property but that it does not extend to those who, like Geanie, have an antecedent claim to the property at issue and therefore have no reason to search for subsequently arising claims to the property. See, generally, Pierce v. Rwmmell, 535 So.2d 594, 597 (Ala.1988) (<HOLDING>). Although we conclude that the statute of Holdings: 0: holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument used is a firearm as defined by section 7900016 then that instrument is a deadly weapon as a matter of law  regardless of whether it is loaded or capable of being fired and holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument is not a firearm then courts are to apply an objective test and look to the nature and actual use of the instrument and not to the subjective fear of the victim or intent of the perpetrator in determining whether the instrument is a deadly weapon 1: holding that recording of an instrument provided constructive notice to subsequent purchasers not to those with an interest antecedent to the making of the instrument 2: holding that intent is a separate element and evidence relating to intent is irrelevant to determining whether an object is a criminal instrument 3: holding that recording is notice to one bound to search the record 4: holding if the language of a deed or other written instrument is clear and unambiguous the intention of the parties is gathered from the instrument it is what the grant or said and not what he intended to say


Input: the jurisdiction of this state.” Miss.Code Ann. § 75-9-102 (1972). The law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located therefore controls. First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Atlas Credit Corp., 417 F.2d 1081, 1082 (10th Cir. 1969). Because the airplane covered by the security interest is located in Kentucky, we shall apply the law of that state. The UCC defines security interest as “an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.” Ky.Rev.Stat. § 355.1-201(37) (1970). A security interest thus has no validity absent its underlying obligation; the satisfaction of that obligation extinguishes the security interest. See Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Custom Leasing, Inc., 402 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo, 1966, no writ) (<HOLDING>). In order to urge the continuing viability of Holdings: 0: holding that foreclosure of a prior mortgage extinguished a declaration of condominium and interests in a parking lot that were subject to the mortgage 1: holding that a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good or a service under the dtpa 2: holding that payment of debt extinguished accompanying chattel mortgage under precode law 3: holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage 4: holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee


Input: for a writ of habeas corpus, and not in a civil rights action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or durar tion of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” (emphases added)); see also Smith v. Mas-chner, 899 F.2d 940, 951 (10th Cir.1990) (“Insofar as [the appellant] seeks restoration of his good time credits, his complaint runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s holding in Preiser v. Rodriguez.” (citation omitted)); Rather, 1991 WL 50541, at *1; accord Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cnty. Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 462 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Whether or not Mr. Kailey is entitled to such Holdings: 0: holding that district court must resolve all claims for relief premised on alleged constitutional violations which are raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus whether habeas relief is granted or denied 1: holding that where plaintiff sought relief from custody his complaint sounded in habeas corpus not civil rights 2: holding sua sponte dismissal of civil rights complaint was error where complaint was treated as habeas corpus petition and dismissed on nonexhaustion grounds although nonexhaustion was waivable defense and not jurisdictional 3: holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law 4: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus


Input: of Guideline § 5 G 1.3(b), which mandates a concurrent sentence where the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offenses fully taken into account in computation of the new sentence. Although this provision is as inhibiting upon a sentencing court’s discretion as § 5G1.3(a), the issue was not raised in Oser that § 5G1.3(b) was in conflict with 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). 5 . We find it unnecessary to address the government’s alternative argument that, while § 5G1.3 may conflict with the language of § 3584(a), the guideline departure mechanism adequately preserves a court's discretion. A few circuits have resolved the apparent conflict in this fashion. See, e.g., United States v. Schaefer, 107 F.3d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir.1997), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jul. 3, 1997) (No. 97-5125) (<HOLDING>); see also Flowers, 995 F.2d at 317, United Holdings: 0: holding that while  5 g 13 a creates a presumption in favor of a consecutive sentence sentencing judges are free to depart from the guidelines and order a downward departure so long as they comply with the procedures required for downward departure in general outlined in 19 usc  3553c2 1: holding that defendants responsibilities to son and wife both of whom have medical problems are discouraged as a basis for downward departure 2: holding that while trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review 3: holding that absolute immunity protects  judges  so long as their acts are judicial  in nature internal quotation omitted 4: holding that later agency action cannot retroactively nullify the consequences of a petitioners failure to comply with a voluntary departure order


Input: Motivated Killing”, and (5)—“Se-lection of Victims” constitute an “ ‘end-run’ around the Eighth Amendment” because, by allegedly restating the offenses charged, they fail to distinguish the Defendant from other offenders. (Dkt. No. 291 at 26). To the contrary, the challenged aggra 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Two factors are not duplicative merely because they are supported by the same evidence.”). Here, even if some of the nonaggravat-ing factors may be supported by the same evidence, none are duplicative. Like a five-circle Venn diagram, there may be areas of overlap between the five aggravating factors. However, no two factors are identical, which means it aggravating factor may play some role in the weighing process. This is permissible under the FDPA. 18 U.S.C. § 1, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>) and United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 298 Holdings: 0: holding that if the imposition of the death penalty depends on the existence of aggravating factors a jury must find those factors beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that trial court must consider both statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors 2: holding that the grand jury need not find nonstatutory aggravating factors 3: holding that the fifth amendment does not require the government to charge nonstatutory aggravating factors in the indictment because the finding of a nonstatutory aggravated alone will not support imposition of the death penalty 4: holding that failure to charge nonstatutory aggravating factors in indictment is not constitutional error because under the fdpa only statutory factors expose a criminal defendant to the death penalty


Input: zones within 150 miles of the WAII tracts and that most of the Wyoming PRB is considered to be in “attainment” status for PM10 emissions. See J.A. 1388. Meanwhile, despite WildEarth Guardians’ assertion to the contrary, BLM did not “gloss over” PM10 modeling data for the PRB. WildEarth Pis.’ [89] Mem. at 12. In its final EIS, the agency expressly recognized. that modeling projected some ex-ceedances of the 24-hour PM10 standard, but discounted the data in part on the basis that modeling tends to over-predict 24-hour impacts of surface coal mining — a tendency that is directly reflected in an agreement between EPA and Wyoming environmental authorities that permits greater weight to be placed on PM10 monitoring data. See J.A. 1041, 1395-97; see also WildEarth Pis.’ [89] Mem. at 13 (<HOLDING>). As WildEarth Plaintiffs concede, “BLM has the Holdings: 0: holding that bloodtest results would be irrelevant in action challenging parentage where the results could not be compared to information relating to necessary parties 1: recognizing that enhancement for results obtained may be warranted 2: holding that in a statutory fee case the results obtained factor was already subsumed in the lodestar and that results multipliers should be awarded only in some cases of exceptional success 3: recognizing that blm discussed the modeling results and explained the basis for its decision to discount those results 4: holding that a plaintiff need only show that the results of a polygraph examination were a factor in the termination of employment and rejecting requirement that results be the sole factor for employees discharge


Input: Explaining its causes, even after the fact, is rife with uncertainty. Crime rates are affected by numerous factors, such as the local economy, population density, access to jobs, education, and housing, and public policies that directly and indirectly affect the crime rate. Even if it were possible to do so, Sheriff Arpaio does not explain how increased migration would interact with those and other factors affecting the crime rate. On this record, it is pure speculation whether an increase in unlawful immigration would result in an increase, rather than a decrease or no change, in the number of crimes committed in Maricopa County. Where predictions are so uncertain, we are prohibited from finding standing. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974) (<HOLDING>). We faced one example of the obstacles to Holdings: 0: holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint 1: holding iowa civil liberties union and lawyers lacked standing to maintain action to challenge a supervisory order of the court pertaining to the trial of criminal cases  only defendants in the criminal cases had standing 2: holding that a criminal defendant has standing to pursue a tenth amendment challenge to the statute under which he was charged as an unjustifiable expansion of federal law enforcement into a stateregulated domain 3: holding that a class of african americans and civil rights activists lacked standing to challenge an alleged pattern and practice of selective and discriminatory criminal law enforcement because attempting to anticipate whether and when these respondents will be charged with crime  takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture 4: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the hatch act because the nature of the political activities they intended to engage in was a matter of speculation


Input: S.W.2d 268, 272 (1973). An objection must be made by counsel in order to preserve for appellate review a claim that a defendant was absent during a critical stage of the proceedings. E.g., Clayton v. State, 321 Ark. 602, 608-09, 906 S.W.2d 290, 294-95 (1995); see also Durham v. State, 179 Ark. 507, 509-10, 16 S.W.2d 991, 991-92 (1929) (refusing to reverse in absence of objection by counsel, who was present, when jury was instructed without defendant’s presence). We will not address Clark’s second basis for reversal because it is not preserved for our review. Were we to entertain his argument, however, we would agree with the State that Clark has demonstrated no prejudice or loss of an advantage as a result of his absence. See Bell v. State, 296 Ark. 458, 465, 757 S.W.2d 937, 940 (1988) (<HOLDING>). We hold that Clark is not entitled to a new Holdings: 0: holding that the validity of an administrative order is properly before the court when it has been directly placed in issue 1: holding that an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future 2: holding that reversal is required when a significant step in a case is taken in an accuseds absence if it appears that he has lost an advantage or has been prejudiced 3: holding that a federal court must order arbitration once it is satisfied that an agreement for arbitration has been made and has not been honored 4: recognizing that dismissal is required if a plaintiff has had fair opportunity to make his case but has failed


Input: plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association.”). The Court does not believe that Mr. Chien can fairly and adequately represent the interests of Skystar’s shareholders for many reasons, chief among them that Mr. Chien is unrepresented and proceeding pro se; that he struggles with the English language; that he seems to lack even a basic understanding of the law; that he was previously sanctioned for bringing a frivolous lawsuit against these same Defendants; and that he has exhibited an animosity towards Defendants that is above and beyond what is generally expected during the normal course of litigation. See Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 413-15 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). In his First Amended Complaint, Mr. Chien Holdings: 0: holding that pro se litigant cannot act as representative in derivative suit and stating that we can find no reason or justification for permitting the corporation or the other shareholders to be subjected involuntarily to the risks of this plaintiffs transgressions distractions and deficiencies as their advocate 1: holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond 2: holding a pro per litigant to the same standard as an attorney 3: holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance 4: holding that corporation could not assign rights to pro se litigant to circumvent rule that corporation must be represented by licensed attorney


Input: CURIAM. Appellant, Elizabeth Harris Lowery, appeals her judgments and sentences and raises two issues, only one of which merits discussion. Appellant argues that the trial court committed fundamental error in failing to instruct the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence. Although the State concedes error, we conclude that no fundamental error occurred. Appellant’s testimony established that at the time any alleged resistance occurred, she was aware that the individuals were officers. As such, the knowledge element was not in dispute at trial. Cf. Lett v. State, 29 So.3d 455, 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>); Leonard v. State, 1 So.3d 1271, 1271 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that by including a knowledge element in two sections of a statute the legislature demonstrated that it knew how to express its intent to require a knowledge element rendering the absence of the element in another statute supportive of the inference that the legislature did not intend for there to be a knowledge element 1: holding that knowledge element could not be deemed in favor of plaintiff where defendant objected to the omission of that element from the jury charge 2: holding omission in the jury instruction of element of offense requires a new trial 3: holding that although the trial justice did not adopt the specific language that defendant requested be used in instructing the jury    the trial justice adequately and accurately instructed the jury as to that element of the charge 4: holding that the trial court committed fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence when that element was in dispute at trial


Input: before the court, where the dispute arises between two parents, the burden of proof is shared equally between the parties, as the court will not presume that custody should be awarded to a particular parent. Id. In making a determination, the court bases its findings on how the best interests of the child may be served. Arnold v. Arnold, 847 A.2d 674, 677 (Pa. Super. 2004). It is axiomatic that the paramount concern in a child custody case is the best interests of the child, and the court makes its determination based upon a consideration of all factors legitimately affecting the child’s physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well being. Id. Specific factors that a court must consider are set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5328(a); see also B.K.M. v. J.A.M., 50 A.3d 168 (Pa. Super. 2012) (<HOLDING>). The court will address each of these factors Holdings: 0: holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child 1: holding that best interests of the child analysis requires consideration of all section 5328a factors 2: holding that paramount consideration in terminationofparentalrights proceeding is best interests of the child 3: holding that the primary and overarching consideration in custody determination is the best interest of the child 4: holding that a childs preference regarding parental contact is not determinative of the best interest analysis and that a court must assess a childs best interest in light of all statutory factors


Input: in support of the other spouse after divorce do not constitute court-ordered alimony and therefore are not void in the State of Texas. Francis, 412 S.W.2d at 29. The fact that a court expressly approves such an agreement and incorporates it into the final divorce decree does not transform the contractual payments into prohibited court-ordered alimony. Id.; see also Klise v. Klise, 678 S.W.2d 545, (Tex.App l occasions, confirmed that under Texas law the legal force and meaning of marital property settlement agreements are governed by the law of contracts. See McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1984); see also McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.1979) (applying law of contracts to contractual alimony agreement); cf. Hutchings v. Bates, 406 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.1966) (<HOLDING>). Following Francis, courts of appeals have Holdings: 0: holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous 1: holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts 2: holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts and under contract principles payments survive obligors death absent agreement to contrary shown by provisions of contract or surrounding circumstances 3: holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation 4: recognizing that payments to secured creditors are only required in equal monthly amounts if property to be distributed  is in the form of periodic payments


Input: a hybrid of the quota bonus system and the salary plus commission system. Id. at *4. Like the court in Donovan, this Court finds that the Level I payment plan constitutes a hybrid of a quota bonus plan and a salary plus commission plan. Under a quota bonus plan, employees are paid commissions on sales over and above a predetermined sales quota. The Level I plan possesses characteristics similar to a quota bonus plan in that account executives’ commissions are added to the non-recoverable draw if they bring in money over and above a predetermined sales quota of $10,000. The Level I plan differs from a quota bonus plan, however, in that account executives are paid the full amount of the non-recoverable draw even if they do not bring in over $10,000. See Donovan, 1986 WL 11266, at *4 (<HOLDING>). The Level I plan also possesses qualities Holdings: 0: recognizing that the compensation plan at issue in that case possessed some qualities of a quota bonus system but that it was not strictly such a plan because a salary is paid to the managers  regardless of the number of gallons they pump 1: holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary 2: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan 3: holding that because the spd at issue stated that it is made part of the group policy its terms were sufficient to find that the plan conferred discretion on the plan administrator 4: holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions


Input: cannot be equated with the determination of disability under ERISA. Even if the Social Security administration required a showing of plaintiffs inability to work at any occupation, as does this Plan, the method by which that conclusion is reached in Social Security cases is substantially different than that used in ERISA cases. For example, and significant to this case, ERISA does not contain a treating physician rule, Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 832, 123 S.Ct. 1965, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003), while Social Security does. In an ERISA case, medical information offered by a Plan participant’s primary physician is to be considered, but it is not entitled to special deference. Id. at 832, 123 S.Ct. 1965. Meraou, 221 Fed.Appx. at 703; See Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1099 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Mr. Hildre’s reliance on the Holdings: 0: holding that a rational plan administrator could reject a treating physicians report of total disability due to diabetes when there was no accompanying clinical data to support the conclusion 1: holding that it was error for a plan administrator to require the claimant to submit clinical findings to support his diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome when the plan did not require such evidence 2: holding that where the alj had already  obtained and considered reports from treating physicians the alj had before him a complete medical history and the evidence received from the treating physicians was adequate for him to make a determination as to disability 3: holding that opinions of treating doctors are not conclusive in determining disability status and must be supported by medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic data 4: holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations


Input: product mix shift and lowered its earnings per share forecasts slightly. The report still gave Bailey an “Aggressive Buy” rating. After Bailey disclosed that its earnings for the third quarter of fiscal 1994 were only $0.16, Hancock lowered Bailey’s investment rating from buy to sell, based in part on the “serious credibility problem” of Bailey management. Hancock called Bailey’s third quarter earnings “a major negative surprise.” In support of their argument that Bailey should be held liable for alleged misstatements in these analysts’ reports, appellants cite cases in which courts have held that a defendant company may be held liable for any false or misleading statements contained in analysts’ reports. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); In re RasterOps Corp. Sec. Litig., No. Holdings: 0: holding that exclusiveremedy provision applied to both temporary staffing company and client company 1: holding that a company may sufficiently entangle itself with analysts forecasts to render the predictions attributable to the company but finding no such liability 2: holding owner of limited liability company may be personally liable to third party if owner acts as agent for company and fails to disclose existence and identity of principal 3: holding that plaintiffs failure to mention vice president of thirdparty company in initial disclosures was harmless because plaintiffs mentioned president of company and defendants conducted no discovery of company 4: holding that a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen


Input: only that a forfeiture proceeding be initiated within 25 days after a claim is made, the California controlled substances act requires that, once a person claiming an interest in seized property files a verified claim, "the [civil] forfeiture proceeding shall be set for hearing on a day not less than 30 days therefrom, and the proceeding shall have priority over other civil cases." Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11488.5(c)(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, the civil forfeiture provision of the Wisconsin controlled substances act states that "the action shall be set for hearing within 60 days of the service of the answer but may be continued for cause or upon stipulation of the parties.” Wis. Stat. § 961.555(2)(b); see also State v. Rosen, 72 Wis.2d 200, 240 N.W.2d 168, 171-72 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In South Carolina, when a motorist is Holdings: 0: holding that the statute is mandatory 1: holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days 2: holding that the 60day rule under the wisconsin controlled substances act is mandatory and that failure to set the hearing within that period deprived the trial court of jurisdiction 3: holding that the petitioners failure to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the bia deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear the issue 4: holding the 60day claim period applicable to a constitutional challenge of an assessment and of the statute authorizing the assessment


Input: that on the record in that particular ADEA action it was reversible error for the district court to fail to give a “business judgment” instruction. Likewise, our circuit has held that the intent of the ADEA is not to review the correctness of employer’s business decisions, Bell v. Gas Serv. Co., 778 F.2d 512, 515 (8th Cir.1985), and that “courts have no business telling Searle how to make personnel decisions, which may be objectively or subjectively based.” Neufeld v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 335, 340 (8th Cir.1989). See also Jorgensen v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 761 F.2d 502, 505 (8th Cir.1985) (observing that “[t]he ADEA is not intended to be used as a means of reviewing the propriety of a business decision ... ”; Smith v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 770 F.2d 719, 723 n. 3 (8th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050, 106 S.Ct. 1273, Holdings: 0: holding that this court may reconsider an erroneous ruling as long as the appeal is current 1: holding that that choices as to selection and arrangement are entitled to copyright protection only so long as they are made independently 2: recognizing that an employer may develop arbitrary ridiculous and even irrational policies as long as they are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner 3: holding that the court may not overturn the administrative law judges factual findings as long as they are supported by competent substantial evidence 4: recognizing in title vii context that employers may have hidden reasons for terminating employees or hiring someone less qualified  as long as the reasons are nondiscriminatory they are free to hire and fire as they choose


Input: trial court decided that putting her on the stand solely to allow her to state “I take the Fifth” in response to the State’s questions would wrongly inject the potentially improper element of inference into the jury’s deliberative process. So instead of calling her to the stand, the trial court allowed Ms. Day to sit in jail pursuant to a contempt ruling. While the State argues there was nothing more the trial court could have done to protect Appellant’s rights once Ms. Day refused to testify at the in camera proceeding, Appellant retorts that not until a witness actually takes the stand and is presented with questions by counsel does the court or counsel know for certain that the witness will refuse to testify. See Hoffman v. U.S., 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951) (<HOLDING>); see also In Re Anthony Ray Mc., 200 W.Va. Holdings: 0: holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness 1: recognizing that where witness has no constitutional or statutory right to refuse to testify jurors are entitled to draw negative inference from witness refusal to testify 2: recognizing that trial court has duty to determine whether witness silence is properly grounded in fifth amendment and to require witness to answer where refusal to testify is not warranted 3: holding that trial court has discretion to permit defendant to call accused witness to stand and permit witness to invoke fifth amendment privilege in front of jury where entire defense was centered on witness commission of crime 4: holding that sixth amendment only requires that witness be brought to court not that he be required to take witness stand after refusing to testify and observing that it is irrelevant whether the witnesss refusal is grounded in a valid fifth amendment privilege an invalid privilege or something else entirely


Input: 389, 432 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 974 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 1992)). The indictment here— even without the description of what Form B-21 requires — alleges every element of the offense. Accordingly, the additional factual description of Form B-21 is sur-plusage. “Surplusage ... may be disregarded provided it neither broadens the indictment nor misleads the accused.” United States v. Thompson, 990 F.2d 625, at *3 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished). The description of what Form B-21 requires does not broaden the indictment because the indictment required the Government to prove a knowingly made false statement to secure a conviction. The indictment alleges that “Grant falsely represented and stated that Grant only had one social security number XXX h Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the indictment was Holdings: 0: holding that the amendment made to the indictment in this case was not authorized by code  192231 because the amended indictment materially changed the nature of the offense originally charged 1: holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient 2: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the defendant knew before trial the theory of criminality on which the government would proceed 3: holding that the amendment of the indictment was permissible under the statutory predecessor to code  192231 because the amendment did not within the meaning of the statute change the nature of the offense charged in the original indictment 4: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense


Input: be what ERISA authorizes in a suit for benefits under § 1132(a). Id. at 379-80, 122 S.Ct. 2151 (footnote omitted). The Rush Prudential Court recognized that allowing the states to establish these types of procedures would somewhat undermine ERISA’s purpose in establishing a “uniform federal regime of ‘rights and obligations’ under ERISA.” Id. at 381, 122 S.Ct. 2151. However, the Court stated, “ *[s]uch disuniformities ... are the inevitable result of the congressional decision to ‘save’ local insurance regulation.’ ” Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985)) (alterations in original). The Court acknowledged its previous holding in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (<HOLDING>) and explained that a state statute might “so Holdings: 0: holding that congressional intent as clearly expressed in legislative history cannot trump the irrefutably plain statutory language that emerged when congress actually took pen to paper 1: holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan 2: holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans 3: holding that statutory language is conclusive in absence of clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary  4: holding that congress had clearly expressed through the structure and legislative history of  erisa an intention that the federal remedy  displace state causes of action


Input: to review his application. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. It held that § 925(c) “remain[s] in effect,” and that the ATF’s refusal to entertain the plaintiffs application constituted a “de facto denial” within the meaning of § 925(c). McHugh, 49 F.Supp.2d at 111. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge “to develop a record and make a recommendation regarding the relief sought.” Id. Pursuant to the defendants’ request, the district court certified its decision for immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and on October 5, 1999, this Court granted leave to appeal. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review This appeal turns solely on questions of law which we review de novo. See Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Connell v. Signoracci, 153 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that legal issues presented by rule 12b1 motion are reviewed de novo 1: holding that issues concerning the sufficiency of an indictment are reviewed de novo 2: holding that confrontation clause claims are reviewed de novo 3: holding that rule 12b6 disposition is reviewed de novo 4: holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo


Input: (applying Maryland law). A similar showing is required to establish agency by estoppel, a situation in which a party “who receives money, or anything of value in the assumed exercise of authority as agent for another, is estopped to deny such authority in criminal prosecutions, as well as in civil actions.” 2A C.J.S. Agency § 48. Like apparent authority, “an agency by estoppel can arise only where the principal, through words or conduct, represents that the agent has authority to act and the third party reasonably relies on those representations.” Johns Hopkins, 114 Md.App. at 96, 689 A.2d 91. The existence of an agency relationship is a factual matter. Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 460, 620 A.2d 327 (1993); see P. Flanigan & Sons v. Childs, 251 Md. 646, 653, 248 A.2d 473 (1968) (<HOLDING>); Levine v. Chambers, 141 Md. 336, 343, 118 A. Holdings: 0: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 1: holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact 2: holding it is a question of fact 3: holding that the existence of probable cause in a  1983 case is a jury question 4: recognizing that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact


Input: may recommend a particular sentence based upon the facts before the court. As part of a plea agreement, the Government is free to negotiate away any right it may have to recommend a sentence. However, the Government does not have a right to make an agreement to stand mute in the face of factual inaccuracies or to withhold relevant factual information from the court. Such an agreement not only violates a prosecutor’s duty to the court but would result in sentences based upon incomplete facts or factual inaccuracies, a notion that is simply abhorrent to our legal system. 660 F.2d 1086, 1090-92 (5th Cir.1981) (citations and footnotes omitted). The reasoning of Block has been adopted by the Fourth Circuit as well. E.g., United States v. Perrera, 842 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir.1988) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dail, 1991 WL 631 at *2, Holdings: 0: holding the government did not violate its plea agreement with a defendant because in addition to specifically retaining the right to comment at the sentencing hearing concerning defendants conduct and background the prosecuting attorney had a duty to bring all relevant information about defendant to the courts attention at the time of sentencing 1: holding that the district court erred when it used rule 36 to amend the defendants sentence to include an order of forfeiture that had been agreed to in the plea agreement but which the court failed to make a part of its judgment at sentencing 2: holding that we review for plain error whether the government breached its plea obligations when the defendant fails to object at sentencing 3: holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the act and to challenge the states evidence regarding the defendants eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender 4: holding the government was required by law to correct a defendants misrepresentations at a sentencing hearing and doing so did not violate the plea agreement


Input: CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See State v. Gonzalez, 121 So.3d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>). SAWAYA, ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., Holdings: 0: holding that attempted sexual abuse is a specific intent crime 1: holding prosecutor has discretion to charge defendant under general crime even though more specific crime exists 2: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins 3: holding kidnapping and underlying crime could be merged even when defendant has been acquitted of underlying charge 4: holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder


Input: Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 879, 113 S.Ct. 226, 121 L.Ed.2d 163 (1992), the court addressed a challenge that the defendant’s trial was untimely under the 180-day IAD requirement. The court stated that the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174, and the IAD speedy trial provision serve the same purposes. 953 F.2d at 1172. The court held that since the Speedy Trial Act excludes a delay attributable to a defendant’s pretrial motions under Section 3161(h)(1)(F), the IAD’s time requirements are also tolled. Id. The Second and Fourth Circuits have also concluded that time periods excluded under the Speedy Trial Act likewise should be excluded under the IAD. See United States v. Cephas, 937 F.2d 816 (2nd Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1037, 112 S.Ct. 884, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Hines, 717 F.2d 1481 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that the plain language of the rule broadens a courts discretion to extend time for service even if good cause has not been shown 1: holding that delay created by defendant in mistakenly agreeing to a waiver of his speedy trial rights is excludable 2: holding that review of good cause determination to avoid dismissal for speedy trial purposes is abuse of discretion 3: holding that the for good cause shown tolling provision encompasses the same circumstances as the rules for excludable time under the speedy trial act 4: holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act


Input: (“MTBE I”) (denying motion to dismiss nuisance claim against petroleum companies for contamination of wells, where plaintiffs alleged that defendants had “knowledge of the dangers MTBE poses to groundwater” and “failed to warn the downstream handlers, retailers, gasoline purchasers, government officials and well owners”). Second, the Employees based their claim on more than the mere manufacture and sale of PCBs. Their claim includes “releasing and dispersing” the PCBs into their work environment, the GE Plant. Even where the manufacture or sale of a hazardous material does not constitute an abnormally dangerous activity, the manner in which it is transported, stored, used, or disposed of may meet the standard. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The question for the Court, therefore, is Holdings: 0: holding that wind blowing particles of hazardous substances from a pile of waste was a cercla release 1: holding that mere possession of a dangerous weapon is insufficient to support a charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon 2: recognizing that failure to hold a hearing constitutes ah abuse of discretion only where there is evidence that the jury was subjected to influence by outside sources 3: holding that allowing corroding tanks to hold hundreds of thousands of gallons of hazardous waste constitutes abnormally dangerous activity 4: holding that the selection of the jury constitutes part of a public trial


Input: is a trustee for approximately 15 different family trusts. The trustee’s recollection of the specifics of the trust at issue and his dealings with Lesinski is somewhat vague. {¶ 15} Appellant argues that the inconsistencies between Lesinski’s and the trustee’s testimony regarding the trustee’s monitoring of Lesinski’s investment of trust assets create a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. We first establish that it is uncontested that the trustee received at least quarterly and annual statements concerning the trust, some of which were prepared by Merrill Lynch and some of which were prepared by the accountant the trustee retained to manage the family trusts. While Ohio law has defined and analyzed many duties of a trustee, the R.C. 1339.59( 7, 41 Cal.Rptr. 410 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 16} An example of the alleged Holdings: 0: holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious 1: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion 2: holding that it is obvious that the discretion given to a trustee is never unlimited or arbitrary such as might be exercised by an oriental prince out of the arabian nights sitting at the city gate and exercising his own uncontrolled whim as to what is appropriate and just 3: holding that while a court may direct that discretion be exercised it may not specify how that discretion is to be exercised nor require the performance of a particular discretionary act 4: holding that where the statute in question required that the measure of fair market value shall be as determined by the secretary  the court cannot substitute its own discretion for properly exercised administrative discretion


Input: Cal.Rptr. 219, 591 P.2d 509 (1979); Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohip St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950); Vaughn v. Deitz, 430 S.W.2d 487 (Texas 1968); Olseth v. Larson, 158 P.3d 532 (Utah 2007). 33 . 488 P.2d at 717: Appellant asserts that to permit the availability of a statutory agent for service of process to avoid the suspension of the statute of limitations is to impliedly amend the tolling statute by the addition of a limitation not expressed. Some of the cases adopting the minority viewpoint have so held. We cannot agree with their analysis. Id. (citations omitted). 34 . 486 U.S. 888, 108 S.Ct 2218, 100 LEd.2d 896 (1988). 35 . Id. at 894, 108 S.Ct. 2218. 36 . Id. at 891-92, 108 S.Ct. 2218. 37 . Id. at 891, 108 S.Ct. 2218. 38 . See, eg., Rademeyer v. Farris, 284 F.3d 833, 838-39 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 392 Holdings: 0: holding  922g is not unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who possessed a firearm only intrastate when the government demonstrated that the firearm moved in interstate commerce 1: holding that because dr medeiros a former california resident moved to texas to take a new job in 1998 thereby engaging in interstate commerce the tolling statute could not be applied under bendix 2: holding that a missouri tolling statute was unconstitutional under the commerce clause in the situation where a resident defendant moved out of state 3: holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause 4: holding that an ohio tolling statute violated the commerce clause because it gave nonresident corporations the choice between being subject to general jurisdiction in the state by appointing an instate agent for service of process or being subject to a tolling of the statute of limitations on claims against them


Input: imprisonment on the firearm charge. This appeal followed. II We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rojas, 520 F.3d 876, 884 (8th Cir.2008). In order to prevail on his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, Lee must demonstrate: “(1) the evidence was unknown or unavailable at the time of trial, (2) the defendant did not lack diligence in attempting to uncover it, (3) the newly found evidence is material, and (4) the evidence is likely to produce an acquittal if offered merely to impeach a government witnesses’s testimony, which is insufficient to warrant a new trial. See United States v. Baker, 479 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir.2007) (collecting cases); United States v. Johnson, 450 F.3d 366, 372-73 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Lee has failed to demonstrate the Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony 1: holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed 2: holding that district court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial because nonmovant presented sufficient evidence at trial for the district court to conclude that the outcome was not against the great weight of the evidence so as to constitute a miscarriage of justice 3: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for severance where the allegedly prejudicial evidence would have been admissible in separate trials 4: holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence


Input: Defendants’ failure to deposit ‘immediately upon demand, the sum demanded by the Surety as payment shall cause irreparable harm to the Surety for which the Surety has no adequate remedy at law ...[’] Therefore, the Court finds that absent enforcement of the Agreement, Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.”). However, courts have found such a provision to be at léast persuasive in determining irreparable injury in a trademark infringement context. See Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. KEV Enters., 634 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1336 (M.D.Fla. 2009) (in addition to presumption of irreparable harm, citing provision in agreement stating “FRANCHISEE further agrees that any unauthorized use of the Proprietary Marks during the term of or after exp cu Gas, Inc., 754 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir.l985)(<HOLDING>). “The most corrosive and irreparable harm Holdings: 0: holding that irreparable injury exists in a trademark case when the party seeking the injunction shows that it will lose control over the reputation of its trademark pending trial 1: holding that although the underlying action is one for trademark infringement the infringement occurred as a result of the underlying defendants use of the trademark in their advertising 2: holding that the lack of control over ones mark creates the potential for damage to  reputation which constitutes irreparable injury for the purpose of granting a preliminary injunction in a trademark case 3: holding that the defendants reference to the plaintiffs trademark in the metatags of the defendants web page was a violation of trademark law 4: holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract


Input: conversion rights were not terminated. See Aristocrat Leisure, 2005 WL 1950116, *3, *4, **6-7, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16788, at *8-9, 12, *20-22. Subsequently, by Opinion and Order dated May 30, 2006, this Court found that because the Bondholders presented evidence that they submitted conversion notices and tendered their interests in the bonds, demonstrating that they exercised their rights to convert under the Indenture, and because Aristocrat had not issued or delivered any shares to any Bondholders, Aristocrat is in breach of the Indenture with respect to each Bondholder who submitted evidence to the Court. See Aristocrat Leisure, 2006 WL 1493132, **6-7, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34709, at *22-23; see also Aristocrat Leisure, 2007 WL 404767, *2, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9521, at *6-7 (<HOLDING>); Aristocrat Leisure, 2006 WL 3103481, **3-4, Holdings: 0: holding that aristocrat is in breach with respect to qvt fund lp 1: holding to that effect with respect to rule 64 2: holding that under privacy act federal government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actual damages but not with respect to damages for mental or emotional distress 3: holding that aristocrat is in breach with respect to deutsche bank ag london branch 4: holding the same with respect to an apartment


Input: the facial applicability of § 2A3.1 but argues that the Sentencing Commission intended a different result for cases in which no actual minor was involved. However, this court has made clear that § 2A3.1 is appropriate for cases involving fictitious victims. In DeCarlo, this court considered DeCarlo’s argument that U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 is reserved for cases involving actual minors. As the DeCarlo court emphasized, “[t]he critical fact that renders the defendant’s conduct criminal in this case is not the act or the resulting harm, but the intent with which the act was done.... The plain language of the statute makes the age of the intended victim an element of the crime, and it punishes attempts the same as completed acts.” Id. at 457-58 (emphasis added); see also Hochschild, 442 at 978-79 (<HOLDING>). We therefore find that the district court did Holdings: 0: holding that the district court erred in imposing an enhancement under the  5k20 departure provision where an enhancement under the separate guidelines provision for restraining a victim during the course of an offense would have been appropriate 1: holding that because it is not strictly necessary under the statute for a victim to fear death the guideline enhancement is not coterminous with the basic offense conduct 2: holding a single vulnerable victim is sufficient to support application of the vulnerable victim enhancement 3: holding that application of  2a31 is appropriate even when the victim is fictional as an enhancement for a fictitious victim is consistent with the utilitarian purpose of the enhancement 4: holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction


Input: feature is one that is “essential to the use or purpose of the article,” “affects the cost or quality of the article,” or one that, if kept from competitors, would put them at a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33. By contrast, a feature is nonfunctional where it “is unrelated to the consumer demand . . . and serves merely to identify the source of the product” or business. Prufrock Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1986). Student feedback procedures, catamarans, teaching itineraries, and curriculum all affect the quality of Fair Wind’s business. They play a critical role in the consumer demand for Fair Wind’s services, rather than merely identifying Fair Wind as the source of the sailing instruction. Cf. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32 (<HOLDING>). Thus, Fair Wind’s alleged dress is plainly Holdings: 0: holding that the the statement of the purpose of the law in question in the committee report is not conclusive and reiterating that the question is whether the law is reasonably calculated to achieve a legitimate police power purpose 1: recognizing that one purpose of batson is to address the right of a juror not to be excluded from serving on a jury for racial reasons 2: holding that even when there is a legitimate government purpose the discrimination must bear at least some rational relationship to that purpose 3: holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation 4: holding that the dualspring design was not protectable because it had a purpose beyond serving the purpose of informing consumers that the sign stands are made by the plaintiff


Input: judgments. When a defendant has violated a court judgment or order, its subsequently coming into compliance before the hearing does not deprive the court of jurisdiction of the matter. Otherwise a defendant could violate a court order or judgment and then comply with it without the court having power to reach him.’ ” Id., 365. This court held that the trial court “properly stated the rule of law in Connecticut. [T]he trial court’s continuing jurisdiction is not separate from, but, rather, derives from, its equitable authority to vindicate judgments. Moreover, we [held] that such equitable authority does not derive from the trial court’s contempt power, but, rather, from its inherent powers. See Connecticut Pharmaceutical Assn., Inc. v. Milano, [191 Conn. 555, 563, 468 A.2d 1230 (1983)] (<HOLDING>); Papa v. New Haven Federation of Teachers, 186 Holdings: 0: recognizing the broad power of federal courts to fashion appropriate relief 1: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals 2: recognizing trial courts power to fashion a remedy appropriate to the vindication of a prior consent judgment 3: holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation 4: recognizing constructive trust as appropriate equitable remedy


Input: consistent both with the procedures of Rule 23 and with the proper function of the limitations statute.” Id. at 555, 94 S.Ct. 756. Moreover, the Court expressly rejected the contention that limitations is the sole prerogative of Congress, because it constitutes a “ ‘substantive’ element” of a claim. Id. at 556, 94 S.Ct. 756. To the contrary, it concluded that “the mere fact that a federal statute providing for substantive liability also sets a time limitation upon the institution of suit does not restrict the power of the federal courts to hold that the statute of limitations is tolled under certain circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative purpose.” Id. at 559, 94 S.Ct. 756. Accord Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 n. 13, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) (<HOLDING>). In Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, Holdings: 0: holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification 1: holding that a class action tolls the statute of limitations only for subsequent individual actions not for subsequent class actions 2: holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint 3: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members 4: recognizing that american pipe established that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the class


Input: plain statement”), 8(e) ("Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.”); Colle v. Brazos County, Tex., 981 F.2d 237, 243 (5th Cir.1993) (“A plaintiff’s complaint ordinarily need only be a short and plain statement that gives the defendant notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”); Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir.1991) (requiring plaintiffs to “identify the grounds upon which their claims are based ... even under the liberal notice pleading” (footnote omitted)); Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 650 n. 9 (3d Cir.1989) ("[A]s long as the issue is pled, a party does not have to state the exact theory of relief in order to obtain a remedy.”). 14 . See Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d 224, 226-27 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Lamborn v. Dittmer, 873 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory 1: holding that if basis described the parties were therefore aware of plaintiffs legal theory even where the theory was mischaracterized citation omitted 2: holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case 3: holding that the plaintiffs misconceived legal theory did not preclude it from obtaining relief under another theory 4: holding a complaint sufficiently raises a claim even if it points to no legal theory or even if it points to the wrong legal theory as a basis for that claim


Input: that Chen-Xu suffered any harm while in detention, and he failed to explain the economic impact of the fine. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006) (explaining that to constitute persecution the harm must rise above “mere harassment”); see also In re T-Z, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 169 (B.I.A.2007) (finding that economic harm may amount to persecution). Moreover, the record supports the agency’s determination that Chen-Xu failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. As the BIA noted, there was no evidence submitted showing that the authorities had any further interest in Chen-Xu after they released him from detention, including any interest in collecting the balance of the fine. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Further, the BIA appropriately noted that Holdings: 0: holding that absent solid support in the record a petitioners fear is speculative at best 1: holding that a fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable if it lacks solid support in the record and is merely speculative at best 2: holding that an applicants fear was not objectively reasonable because it lacked solid support in the record and was merely speculative at best 3: holding that absent solid support in the record that a fear is objectively reasonable a claim of future persecution is speculative at best 4: holding that in the absence of solid support in the record for an applicants assertion that he will be persecuted his fear is speculative at best


Input: the argument that the encounter at issue was not an investigatory stop, but rather an arrest requiring probable cause. Vargas claims that he was under arrest “from the very moment the police approached him.” In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court carved out an exception to the general rule requiring probable cause for a search, permitting an investigating officer to briefly detain an individual for questioning. An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, briefly detain an individual “if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.2001)(internal quotation marks omitted). During an investigatory stop, “[t]he inves S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)(<HOLDING>). In determining whether an investigatory stop Holdings: 0: holding that flight from police can help establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop 1: holding that a defendants unprovoked flight upon noticing the police in a highcrime area was suggestive of wrongdoing and therefore provided reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory detention 2: holding defendants unprovoked flight from area of heavy narcotic trafficking after noticing uniformed officers provided reasonable suspicion to detain and stating headlong flight wherever it occurs  is the consummate act of evasion it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such 3: holding that in a high crime area unprovoked headlong flight from police can form the basis for reasonable suspicion under terry 4: recognizing presence in a high crime area unprovoked flight and nervous evasive behavior as factors supporting a reasonable suspicion


Input: did not engage in a drug sale the evening of April 19. As the Investigating Officers claim to have observed him exchange money with the Cl on the porch of Defendant’s mother’s home that night, they must, therefore, be lying. The Government asserts that Defendant’s evidence is not sufficient to make a preliminary Franks showing because it does not constitute proof of a lack of veracity on the part of the affiant, Officer Gramlich, and that only Gramlich’s state of mind is relevant to the Franks inquiry. In order to make a preliminary showing with respect to the first prong of the Franks test, a defendant must challenge the affiant’s state of mind as well as the truth of the affidavit. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674; United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 676-78 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Defendant must, therefore, make a preliminary Holdings: 0: holding that because the information omitted from the affidavit was immaterial to the investigation there was no error in denying defendants motion for a franks hearing 1: holding that a challenge to the truth of the affidavit was not sufficient for a franks hearing where defendant offered no evidence that the affiant knowingly or recklessly gave false statements 2: holding that although affiantofficer filed affidavit in good faith the conduct of police officers who relayed the facts to the affiant was relevant to the franks showing 3: holding allegation that false affidavit was basis for arrest warrant is sufficient to state  1983 fourth amendment claim against affiant officer 4: holding that a statement that the affiant is president of the company asserting a claim on an account is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the account


Input: the parties have contracted directly, such a duty may arise if one party’s conduct “creates a new hazard” resulting from something more than nonperformance. See Fultz, 683 N.W.2d at 592-93; see also Hill, 822 N.W.2d at 202. Some older cases draw a distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance, finding only the latter to be actionable in tort, but this approach has largely been supplanted by the “separate and distinct” and “new hazard” standards. See Fultz, 683 N.W.2d at 592 (“[T]he former misfeasance/nonfeasance inquiry ... is defective because it improperly focuses on whether a duty was breached instead of whether a duty exists at all.”). Under Michigan law, ADT did not owe Ram a statutory or common-law duty to detect the burglary or dispatch police. See Spengler, 505 F.3d at 458 (<HOLDING>); see also Hill, 822 N.W.2d at 196 (no common Holdings: 0: holding that rule 415f worked to cure deficiencies in service of process in action to enforce a judgment lien on real estate where service was provided at debtors last residential address known to lienholder because address was used during underlying lawsuit lienholders attorney checked county record to verify address information debtor did receive summons and residential address was on the former situs of debtors business 1: holding that a correct address could have been determined by checking telephone directory 2: holding that considering an amendment is not the time to address the merits of a case 3: holding that adts failure to dispatch ems to correct address was not actionable in tort 4: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to require disclosure of witness address because personal safety exception applied noting that defendant knew victims prior address thereby limiting value of victims most current address


Input: turns On the damages sought. If the damages are for the insured’s own work, there is generally no coverage. If the damages are consequential and derive from the work the insured performed, coverage generally will lie. The underwriting intent is to exclude coverage for the contractor’s business risks, but provide coverage for unanticipated consequential damages.’ ” (Emphasis added.) [Indiana Ins. Co. v. Alloyd Insulation Co., 2d Dist. No. 18979, 2002-Ohio-3916, 2002 WL 1770491] ¶ 27-28, quoting Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims Under Commercial General Liability Policies (1994), 30 Tort and Ins. L.J. 785, 785-787. JTO, Inc. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 194 Ohio App.3d 319, 2011-Ohio-1452, 956 N Dist. No. CA2007-05-0666, 2008-Ohio-1351, 2008 WL 757533, at ¶ 25 (<HOLDING>); Westfield Ins. Co. v. Coastal Group, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that there was no coverage because there was no occurrence within the meaning of the policy because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident or an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy 1: holding that under a cgl policy an insurer had no duty to defend its insured in an action resulting from faulty workmanship and that a cgl policy  is not intended to insure business risks ie risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which business management can and should control or manage rowland h long the law of liability insurance  10011 specifically the policies do not insure an insureds work itself but rather they generally insure consequential risks that stem from that work id 2: holding based on deposition which revealed that defective materials were used and construction was contrary to workmanship standards that insurer had no duty to defend because damages should have been expected by the insured 3: holding that a cgl policy such as the one at issue here does not insure against claims for defective or negligent workmanship or construction because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident and therefore claims for defective or negligent workmanship do not constitute an occurrence under the policy 4: holding that a claim of faulty workmanship that results in damage to property other than the work product is an accident and that a cgl policy is not intended to insure business risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which businesses can control and manage    a cgl policy does not insure the insureds work itself rather it insures consequential damages that stem from that work    as a result a cgl policy may provide coverage for claims arising out of tort breaches of contract and statutory liabilities as long as the requisite accidental occurrence and property damage are present


Input: gravestone); Morro, 1999-NMCA-118, ¶ 1, 127 N.M. 763, 987 P.2d 420 (upholding multiple convictions for damaging gravestones even though all damage occurred in a single incident). {33} Further, that Defendant may have fulfilled some sort of overall plan or scheme to obtain funds from many victims by deceiving different victims at different times does not somehow mesh or coagulate his actions into but two offenses by labeling an activity to carry out the scheme a “course of conduct.” Thus, the double jeopardy proscription does not require the separate convictions to be merged into one for punishment purposes with respect to either Defendant’s unlicensed status or the unregistered security status relating to each transaction. See Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 20, 140 N.M. 644, 146 P.3d 289 (<HOLDING>); State v. Stone, 2008-NMCA-062, ¶¶ 19-25, 144 Holdings: 0: holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms 1: holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders 2: holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case 3: holding that two robberies of different people at the same time are two separate offenses calling for two judgments and two sentences when the defendants were convicted of taking a grandfathers wallet pistol and car and taking a grandsons fishing equipment 4: holding that under the former rules congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders


Input: with defendant’s eight-year sentence from another court. The district judge also clearly recognized that, despite the other comments made by the government with regard to the grand jury matter, the government was recommending a seven-year sentence, stating: “I have considered and given lots of thought to the Government’s recommendation of 7 years. After considering it I will not follow that recommendation.” (R.Vol. III, 23). Second, the court finds that the government attorney’s comments can, in the main, be viewed as informing the court about the grand jury incident. As stated above, informing the sentencing court of pertinent information cannot generally be considered a breach of a plea agreement. Williamsburg Check Cashing Corp., 905 F.2d at 28. Cf., Shorteeth, 887 F.2d at 256-57 (<HOLDING>). Third, although the government attorney Holdings: 0: holding a sentence is not based on the guidelines unless the plea agreement itself expressly uses a guidelines sentencing range to establish the term of imprisonment 1: holding that objecting to guidelines calculations as specifically reserved in the plea agreement is not a breach of the plea agreement even if the objection is overruled and thus government is not released from obligation under the agreement to move for acceptance of responsibility 2: holding that the united states breach of the plea agreement releases the defendant from the appeal waiver 3: holding that state liability only accrues as expressly authorized by law 4: holding that  1b18 of the guidelines expressly prohibits the use of selfincriminating information gained from a cooperating defendant unless authorized by the plea agreement


Input: HOLDS that Plaintiffs allegation of civil conspiracy is a “product liability action” within the meaning of § 29-28-102(6) and that the statute of repose from § 29-28-103 applies. Plaintiff presents two arguments against application of the statute of repose in this case, but both arguments are lacking in merit. First, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ fraudulent concealment of material facts preven rt would decline to create an equitable exception for fraudulent concealment to § 29-28-103. Plaintiffs second argument is that the statute of repose is a retroactive impairment of vested rights in contravention of the Tennessee Constitution. At least one Tennessee Court of Appeals has rejected this argument specifically. See Bowman v. A-Best Co., Inc., 960 S.W.2d 594, 595-96 (Tenn.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). The Bowman opinion is well reasoned and is Holdings: 0: holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation 1: holding that a private right of action does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been filed 2: holding that the right of action does not vest until the injury is discovered and thus  2928103 does not impair vested rights when latent injuries are involved 3: holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible 4: holding that for an act to be inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and thus constitute a waiver of that right it must repudiate the right of the party who does the act


Input: for the Tulsa Credit Union robbery, Herron testified that Deandre helped steal a car for the robbery, drove the coconspirators to the credit union, and acted as a getaway driver. We think that all three robberies have sufficient evidence to establish three conspiracies. 8 . We do not include the IBC Bank robbery because we concluded in Vernon’s appeal that there was insufficient evidence to establish a conspiracy to rob that bank. Hill, 604 Fed.Appx. 759, No. 13-5084. We also do not include the CVS Pharmacy robbery because that robbery was not even charged in the indictment. 9 . Deandre submits two cases from this court for the proposition that “mere gang membership, by itself, is not evidence of criminal activity.” He cites United States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>), and Robinson, 978 F.2d at 1563. Deandre’s Holdings: 0: holding that if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause the warrant was nevertheless valid 1: holding that the gang evidence was too stale to establish probable cause for a search warrant 2: holding that a visual body cavity search requires probable cause and a search warrant 3: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 4: holding that affidavit was stale and thus failed to establish probable cause to support wiretap


Input: not the businesses, and ordered Jeff to make an equalization payment, while providing mechanisms for Christina to enforce that judgment. Still, Jeff and the Crider Entities contend that the dissolution decree is erroneously worded in such a way as to automatically transfer one-half of Jeffs interests in the businesses to Christina in the event he did not pay the equalization judgment within 180 days. That date was December 28, 2013. We do agree that the decree contains overly-broad language with respect to Christina’s security interests, and that the trial court exceeded its authority to the extent it permitted an automatic foreclosure of Christina’s security interests in the event Jeff failed to pay the equalization judgment. See Moore v. Moore, 482 N.E.2d 1176, 1181 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>). Ownership interests in closely-held Holdings: 0: holding that both husband and wife are obligated to support each other based on relative ability to pay 1: holding stock transfer restriction in corporate bylaws did not prevent levy against and sale of stock by third party in order to pay judgment 2: holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees 3: holding trial court erred in ordering that in event wife failed to pay equalization judgment to husband court clerk could automatically enter judgment against wife and order sale of stock in closelyheld family business 4: holding trial court erred in finding purported wife unavailable to testify and admitting her sworn prior statements in lieu of her live testimony where record did not support courts ruling in light of its own finding that remarriage of wife and defendant was fraudulent and wife did not refuse to testify if claim of privilege was denied


Input: Murray, 194 Ariz. at 374-75 ¶¶ 4, 6, 982 P.2d at 1288-89. In holding that the statute violated separation of powers, we noted that parole eligibility on sentencing is a “substantive right” and the Legislature “ ‘may not disturb vested substantive rights by retroactively changing the law that applies to completed events.’ ” Id. at 375 ¶ 6, 982 P.2d at 1289 (quoting San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 193 Ariz. 195, 205 ¶ 15, 972 P.2d 179, 189 (1999)). ¶ 14 Senate Bill 1449’s operative provision, in contrast, does not disturb vested rights. The State does not argue, nor does the law suggest, that the government has a vested right to a conviction, at least when, as here, a case is pending trial or on direct appeal. Cf. State v. Morris, 55 Ohio St.2d 101, 378 N.E.2d 708, 715 (1978) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 15 The court of appeals in Fell held that a Holdings: 0: recognizing separation of powers doctrine 1: holding that statute that retroactively reduced penalties for drug offenses did not violate separation of powers 2: recognizing a referendum on a court judgment would violate separation of powers 3: holding legislatures retroactive amendment of statutory definition which rejected court interpretation did not violate separation of powers 4: recognizing that the judicial rewriting of a statute would violate the separation of powers doctrine


Input: the superi- or right to possession of the vehicle. The State’s legal theory lacks merit. A property owner’s gross negligence that facilitates the criminal misappropriation of the property does not result in forfeiture of the owner’s superior right to possess the property vis-a-vis the police department that investigated the crime or the district attorney’s office that prosecuted the crime. The trial court erred as a matter of law by accepting this theory. Universal is entitled to possession of its property. For these reasons, we sustain Universal’s second issue, reverse the trial court’s order, and render judgment that Universal is awarded possession of the vehicle, without conditions. SEYMORE, J., concurring without opinion. 1 . This was not a f 4 Tex. 207, 266 S.W. 393, 395 (1924) (<HOLDING>); Foust v. Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Holdings: 0: holding that drawer of check is liable only for the amount originally stated by drawer on check even though the drawers negligence facilitated the wrongful alteration of the amount on the check and the payment of a larger amount to the payee 1: holding that it was sufficiently foreseeable that the drawer of a check that was otherwise regular but had some unusual features would be harmed by a depositary banks acceptance of the check with a missing indorsement and permitting the drawer to sue the bank for negligence 2: holding that a payment made by certified check rather than the customary regular check was outside the ordinary course of dealings between the parties 3: holding that upon payment by check a transfer does not occur until the bank honors the check reasoning that until the moment of honor the debtor retains full control over disposition of the account and the account remains subject to a variety of actions by third parties 4: holding prejudgment interest is to be determined on the entire amount of compensatory damages and then reduced by the amount of interest which would have accrued at present value on the settlement amount determined before trial


Input: against AirTouch; it merely reached a different conclusion based on different factors. The City has demonstrated the absence of a material issue of fact on this point. 3. Does the City’s Decision Prohibit or Have the Effect of Prohibiting the Provision of Personal Wireless Services? Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) mandates that, in regulating personal wireless service facilities, the government’s decision may not “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of wireless services.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (Supp hat “local zoning policies and decisions have the effect of prohibiting wireless services if they result in ‘significant gaps’ in the availability of wireless services”). The City’s position was adopted by the Fourth Circuit. See Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 428 (<HOLDING>). The Court agrees with the weight of circuit Holdings: 0: holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional 1: holding that  332c7b iii does not apply only to general bans and stating that prohibiting only general bans would 1 require a court to wait for a series of denied applications and 2 lead to the untenable result that once personal wire services are available within the jurisdiction of a state or local government  the state or local government could deny any further applications with impunity 2: holding that cue review applies only to prior final decisions of agencies of original jurisdiction ros and not to prior decisions of the board 3: holding that  332c7biii applies only to blanket prohibitions and general bans or policies and not to individual zoning decisions 4: holding that teague applies only to procedural rules and not to decisions of the supreme court deciding the meaning of criminal statutes


Input: resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement.” On the other hand, Maharaj left Canada of his own volition to pursue what he perceived to be better opportunities in the United States, after invoking the process that Canada made available but without giving Canadian authorities a chance to confer, or not confer, some kind of permanent residence or resettlement status. Intuitively, this is a sensible reason to believe that asylum in the United States isn’t necessary to protect him fro he INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that[petitioner] had been ‘firmly resettled’ in Germany, [the petitioner] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled”); see also Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399 (<HOLDING>). Second, the threshold showing of an offer can Holdings: 0: holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances 1: holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury 2: holding that under the regulations the ins bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies and should the ins satisfy this threshold burden of production both the burden of production and the risk of nonpersuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country 3: holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply 4: holding that the party seeking to pierce the corporate veil bears the burden of proving that grounds for this action exist


Input: 336, 341 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617, 122 S.Ct. 1640). Others have read Lapides to "state a more general rule.” Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Phx. Int’l Software, Inc., 653 F.3d 448, 460-71 (7th Cir. 2011) (relying largely on Lapides to hold that the State plaintiff waived its immunity to counterclaims filed against it in federal court); see also Meyers ex rel. Benzing v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 2005) (discerning “no evident basis in law or judicial administration for severely limiting [Lapides’s] general principles ... to a small sub-set of federal cases[,] including only state-law claims in respect to which a state has waived immunity therefrom in state court”); Estes v. Wyo. Dep’t of Transp., 302 F.3d 1200, 1205 n.1, 1206 (10th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). Still others have held that, by removing a Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff waived an argument that the defendant voluntarily waived its eleventh amendment immunity by removing the case from state to federal court by failing to raise it before the district court even though an intervening supreme court decision clarified the law in the plaintiffs favor 1: holding that state waived its eleventh amendment immunity by filing proofs of claim in bankruptcy proceedings 2: holding the language of  5518e insufficient as a waiver of eleventh amendment immunity to federal claims in federal court 3: holding that states removal to federal court voluntarily invoked the federal courts jurisdiction waiving eleventh amendment immunity 4: holding that state defendant waived eleventh amendment immunity to a federal claim by removing to federal court


Input: that has long encouraged law enforcement officers to consider obtaining a warrant “whenever practicable.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. ' When You attempted to shut the door because he believed that he was going to be robbed or otherwise harmed, the agents forced it open and unlawfully entered his home without permission. The officers then identified themselves as federal agents and demanded to see everyone’s identification. Such actions plainly constitute a seizure of You because an objective person in You’s position would not feel at liberty “to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (quoting Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 569, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)). See also Glover, 957 F.2d at 1008 (<HOLDING>) (quotation marks, citations, and alterations Holdings: 0: holding that in determining whether a seizure has occurred a court must consider if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave 1: holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 2: recognizing that a person has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 3: holding that progressive intrusion into defendants privacy was of such a nature that a reasonable person would not believe that he or she was free to end the encounter 4: holding that an individuals liberty is restrained only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave


Input: and of all authority over its property and effects.” Hamzavi v. Bowen, 126 Md.App. 492, 730 A.2d 274, 276-77 (1999) (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, for all practical purposes, Plaintiff has no title to the Lease, no authority to perform the Lease, no power to modify the Lease, and no power to initiate any other action based upon the Lease. Gov’t Reply at 6-7. Accordingly, Plaintiff also has no standing to seek an interpretation of the Lease. Id. at 7. The fact that the Receivership Order reserved Plaintiffs right to prosecute this lawsuit is insufficient to confer standing. Id. The right to sue for a declaratory judgment cannot be segregated from the Lease, control of which resides in the Receiver. Propat Int’l Corp. v. RPost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1190-94 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In Propat, the appellate court explained Holdings: 0: holding that an exclusive license granting the licensor a reversionary interest in the patent in the event of the licensees bankruptcy was a grant of all substantial rights such that the licensee could sue for patent infringement 1: holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent 2: holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent 3: holding that where patent owner licensor retained substantial rights under license agreement licensee did not have an independent right to sue for infringement 4: holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement


Input: balance should be struck in favor of admissibility. Thus, in reviewing issues under Rule 403, [this court looks] at the evidence in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.” Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1344 n. 8 (quotations and citations omitted). Certain types of evidence of uncharged criminal activity are not considered “extrinsic” under Rule 404(b) and are admissible. Id. at 1344. This evidence falls outside of the scope of Rule 404(b) when it is: (1) an unchai'ged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or evidence under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). This evidence also satisfies the requirement Holdings: 0: holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal 1: holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper 2: holding that structural evidence showing the inception of the conspiracy prior to the charged activities was admissible under rule 404b 3: holding testimony admissible as showing context of relationship with coconspirator prior to conspiracy 4: holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy


Input: and an account for appellee and specifically provided that neither party had any right, control, or interest in the account of the other. The fact that appellee elected not to take her “single sum distribution” in 2007 or early 2008, which she admits she chose not to do because she disputed the amount, did not transform her segregated account from her sole and separate property into property for which appellant was responsible. The account belonged to her and any detriment due to her tardiness in exercising her legal right to it cannot be borne by appellant where the circuit court made no finding that appellant intentionally interfered with appellee’s property right. This is consistent with other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Hoffman, 841 So.2d 695 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>); Allen v. Allen, 118 N.C.App. 455, 455 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that  522f doesnot permit a debtor to avoid a lien granted to the debtors former spouse under a divorce decree that extinguishes all previous interests the parties had in the property and in no event secures more than the spouses former interest 1: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate 2: holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium 3: holding that a former spouse may not have an interest in the other spouses 12assets or earnings after the final judgment of dissolution 4: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence


Input: lacking a prosecutor, the judge himself must fill the role, leading to an unacceptable confusion of roles and a violation of the separation of powers. See Young, 481 U.S. at 815-25, 107 S.Ct. at 2141-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Although the question is not free from doubt, we believe that not all out-of-court contempt proceedings are fatally flawed by the failure to appoint a prosecutor. Where, as here, the judge is impartial and the evidence is so simple that the judge is not diverted from the role of impartial judge and factfinder, we are not convinced that a prosecutor must be appointed. See People v. Carlucci, 23 Cal.3d 249, 590 P.2d 15, 152 Cal.Rptr. 439 (1979) (prosecutor not required for traffic infractions). Cf. Figueroa Ruiz v. Delgado, 359 F.2d 718 (1st Cir.1966) (<HOLDING>). This is not the same situation as in Young, Holdings: 0: recognizing defendants right to due process includes the right to present a defense by crossexamining witnesses 1: holding that in light of defendants attack on credibility of states witnesses prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument when he implied states witnesses were credible 2: holding that the prosecutor is not required to provide the defense with the names of rebuttal witnesses because until the defense case has been presented the state cannot know of witnesses needed for rebuttal 3: holding unconstitutional procedure in the puerto rico local courts where no prosecutor was appointed and the judge acted regularly in place of any prosecutor calling and examining all prosecution witnesses and crossexamining defense witnesses 4: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial