Input: each interview that he was required to assist in obtaining travel documents and that he faced criminal prosecution for failing to cooperate, but Budha refused to fill out the application. Although Budha asked for an attorney at the December 16, 2010 meeting, he was not entitled to appointed counsel at that point, and the record does not show that Budha was told during any of the interviews after the removal order that he had a right to remain silent or to appointed counsel. A rational jury could find that Budha was subject to a final order of removal and that he was fully informed of his obligations to cooperate but willfully failed or refused to apply for the travel documents necessary for his removal. See § 1253(a)(1)(B); United States v. Jara-Favela, 686 F.3d 289, 301 (5th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Next, Budha argues that the Government Holdings: 0: holding that on a review of the sufficiency of the evidence the court determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that when an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction the relevant question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that a verdict must be sustained against a sufficiency of the evidence challenge if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that when conducting a legal sufficiency review the reviewing court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding that in evaluating sufficiency of the evidence in habeas corpus petitions we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt


Input: purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. at 1086. The court rejected Ventura’s argument that the savings clause in the Mineral Lands Leasing Act authorized the state ordinance. The court held that the proviso to the savings clause reserved to the states only rights which the states already possessed and a state does not possess the right tb “apply local regulations impermissibly conflicting with achievement of a congressionally approved use of federal lands.” Id. Relying on Kleppe, the court concluded, “ ‘[W]here those state laws conflict ... with other legislation passed pursuant to the Property Clause, the law is clear: The state laws must recede.’ ” Id. (quoting Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543, 96 S.Ct. at 2293-94). See also State ex rel. Andrus v. Click, 97 Idaho 791, 554 P.2d 969 (1976) (<HOLDING>). [II38] 4. Mining Act of 1872 Preempts Holdings: 0: holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority 1: holding that neither mere participation in a federal program nor provision requiring compliance with federal law is sufficient to establish that the state consented to be sued in federal court 2: holding that a federal regulation did not create privity of contract between the plaintiff and the government 3: holding that requiring a permit and the restoration of the land after the mining operations had concluded did not preempt federal law however the court did recognize that where a state regulation rendered it impossible to exercise a right granted through federal legislation that state regulation would be in conflict with the federal right 4: holding that a federal court litigant who is forced into state court under pullman may reserve a right to return to federal court in that the plaintiff can preserve the right to the federal forum for federal claims by informing the state court of his or her intention to return following litigation of the state claims in the state court


Input: vulnerable to attack because of, inter alia, her slight stature and her youth was not unconstitutionally vague because "the jury should have had no difficulty understanding that [the factor] was designed to ask it to consider whether the victim was especially vulnerable to petitioner’s attack”). 33 . United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 414 (5th Cir.1998) (upholding the factor against a challenge that it was both unconstitutionally overbroad and vague), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (peremptory challenges); Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (upholding the factor against a challenge that it was unconstitutionally vague). 34 . Webster, 162 F.3d at 354 n. 70. 35 . Cf. Jones, 527 U.S. at 401, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (<HOLDING>). 36 . See Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, Holdings: 0: holding although admission of victim impact testimony was error it was harmless in light of strong evidence against defendant 1: holding that use of a victim impact statement during sentencing violated the eighth amendment 2: holding autopsy photograph of victim was admissible even if defendant stipulated identity of victim 3: holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized 4: holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction


Input: 504-08, 115 S.Ct. 1597 (distinguishing Weaver) (shifting focus from whether the legislative change “produces some sort of ambiguous ‘disadvantage’ ” to whether the legislative change “alters [the] definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable”). In his report and recommendation, Judge Jarvey thoroughly discussed Davis, Bell and O’Neal. Although he acknowledged Davis represents contrary authority, Judge Jarvey noted a majority of courts “hold a conviction under a statute forbidding possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony does not violate the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lause even when the felony for which the defendant was convicted took place before the statute was enacted.” See United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447 (9th Holdings: 0: holding no violation of ex post facto clause because enhancement provision increases the punishment for being a felon in possession of a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce and it does not affect the punishment previously meted out to the defendant for the  crimes he committed prior to the effective date of the statute 1: holding that application of guidelines did not violate the ex post facto clause because rico offense was a straddle crime that continued before and after the effective date of the guidelines 2: holding 18 usc  922g9 penalizes the possession of a firearm after its effective date and therefore does not constitute a violation of the ex post facto clause 3: holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b 4: holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 usc  922g1 did not violate the ex post facto clause because the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm was not committed until after the effective date of the statute under which he was convicted


Input: by either an accused or a police officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship, will not generally "initiate” a conversation in the sense in which that word was used in Edwards. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830. However, the latter phrase from that sentence in Hutchins ("that may ... lead to further interrogation”) does not appear in this section of Bradshaw. 19 . We have been unable to find any Supreme Court case that references the Edwards rule and quotes the phrase "communication, exchanges, or conversations" without also linking that particular phrase to actions by the accused. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 407, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 104, 130 S.Ct. 1213 Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff has set forth a cognizable claim that the officer violated his fourth amendment right when the officer knocked on the plaintiffs motel door and replied that he was maintenance and that he was there to fix the sink 1: holding that following his invocation of counsel fbi agent handed mr comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon mr comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by mr comosona within the meaning of edwards 2: holding the defendant lacked any expectation of privacy in his cell so the jailer had the right to inspect anything in his cell 3: holding that following his invocation of counsel when mr mccree subsequently knocked on his cell door and stated he had something to say this constituted initiation under edwards 4: holding police violated edwards when they continued questioning a defendant after his initial invocation of the right to counsel even though he responded to the subsequent questioning


Input: favor of the Board. W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In the complaint, the Board describes damages to individual unit owners but is silent on how the Board itself was injured. Under the ILSA cause of action, the Board seeks rescission, refunds, costs for “each purchaser for whom this action is brought,” and injunctive relief and damages “for itself and for the purchasers.” Presumably, because injury to the Board is not pled in the complaint, defendants have assumed in their motion that the Board cannot meet its injury-in-fact requirement of standing without invoking associational standing. See generally Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (<HOLDING>). The Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Holdings: 0: holding that evidence that defense witnesses were members of the same organization of tax protesters as defendant was properly admitted to show bias 1: holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did 2: holding that a nonprofit organization lacked standing under unruh because its civil rights had not been personally violated and it failed to show that any of its members would suffer injury 3: holding that an organization whose members were potential targets of future prosecutions had standing to seek injunctive relief 4: holding that an organization whose members are injured may represent those members even where the organization itself cannot show injury