Input: court considers constitutionally impermissible factors in imposing a sentence. Nawaz v. State, 28 So.3d 122, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Reliance on constitutionally impermissible factors is a violation of a defendant’s due process rights. See Ritter v. State, 885 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); see also Holton v. State, 573 So.2d 284, 292 (Fla.1990). Examples of factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process include the race, religion or political affiliation of the defendant. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). “[S]imilar principles apply when a judge impermissibly takes his own religious characteristics into account in sentencing.” United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740 (4th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, Holdings: 0: recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so 1: holding that judge violated due process by stating at sentencing that those of us who do have a religion are ridiculed as being saps from moneygrubbing preachers or priests 2: holding that it violated due process for one adjudicator to act as grand jury and judge for same defendants 3: holding that because restitution hearings are a part of sentencing and have nothing to do with a defendants guilt or innocence the rules of evidence do not apply 4: holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant


Input: as we do, that public participation in preliminary hearings provides a significant and positive role on the functioning of the judiciary. Id. at 12-13, 106 S.Ct. at 2742. B. Judicial Documents [¶ 20] While not specifically. finding that the First Amendment right to access attaches to judicial documents, the United States Supreme Court has observed, "It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records[.]" Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 1312, 55 LEd.2d 570 (1978). Additionally, numerous federal courts have affirmed the right of public access to judicial documents pursuant to the First Amendment. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 10 Holdings: 0: recognizing that corporations have first amendment speech rights but declining to address the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the first amendment 1: holding that a district judge does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the guidelines sentence should apply 2: holding no presumption of openness applies to midtrial hearings into juror misconduct because of the disruptive effect on the ongoing trial 3: holding that agency decisions enjoy a presumption of correctness 4: holding that docket sheets enjoy a presumption of openness under the first amendment


Input: rule we only consider cases involving issues in dispute; we shall not address moot, abstract, academic, or hypothetical questions.”). We also have held that “[a] case is moot if it raised a justiciable controversy at the time the complaint was filed, but events occurring after the filing have deprived the litigant of an ongoing stake in the controversy.” Seibert v. Clark, 619 A.2d 1108, 1110 (R.I.1993). See also Pelland v. State, 919 A.2d 373, 378 (R.I.2007); In re New England Gas Co., 842 A.2d 545, 554 (R.I.2004) (concluding that because the underlying labor dispute had settled, New England Gas no longer had a continuing stake in the controversy, thereby rendering the case moot); Associated Builders & Contractors of Rhode Island, Inc. v. City of Providence, 754 A.2d 89, 91 (R.I.2000) (<HOLDING>). One narrow exception to the mootness doctrine Holdings: 0: holding the case to be moot where construction of the pro ject had been entirely completed 1: holding that the settlement of a dispute generally renders a case moot 2: holding that the plaintiffs claim was moot because the construction project which was the subject of the dispute had been completed 3: holding that a construction lender may voluntarily assume a duty to inspect the construction project for the borrowers benefit in addition to the lenders independent contractual right to inspect the project for its own exclusive benefit 4: holding that complaint seeking to enjoin highway construction project pending completion of environmental impact statement for larger project no longer presented any live controversy after highway project was completed and thus was moot and provided no basis for federal court jurisdiction


Input: See Chamberlain, 589 F.2d at 840-42. It insisted on an appropriate explanation for why the exempt documents could not reasonably be segregated from non-exempt material. See Pac. Fisheries, 539 F.3d at 1148. FOIA is not designed “as a substitute for civil discovery.” Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1103, 71 L.Ed.2d 199 (1982). The fact that the Cheungs wish to use the documents they seek in their civil tax proceeding does not make Exemptions 3 and 7(A) inapplicable. Indeed, it is precisely because of the uses to which the Cheungs might put the documents that the exemptions are applicable. The district court properly denied Shannahan’s discovery requests for information concerning the nature and origins of documents he requested. See Lane, 523 F.3d at 1134 (<HOLDING>). The Cheungs’ problem is partly of their own Holdings: 0: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 1: holding that unauthorized disclosure of documents does not constitute a waiver of the applicable foia exemption 2: holding that in foia cases discovery is limited because the underlying case revolves around the propriety of revealing certain documents 3: holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents 4: holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents


Input: voluntarily waived his right to counsel. For that reason, his appellate counsel’s failure to raise a Faretta argument on appeal does not meet Strickland’s prejudice prong. First, Rose was fifty-five years old at the time of sentencing, had obtained a GED and had no history of mental- or physical-health issues. See Nelson, 292 F.3d at 1301 (concluding, under § 2254, that nothing in the defendant’s history undermined the reasonableness of the state court’s determination that his waiver was valid where the defendant was fifty years old and had obtained a GED). Second, he had extensive contact with counsel prior to his decision to proceed pro se, including three court-appointed lawyers in this very case. In fact, one had represented him through a jury trial. See Stanley, 739 F.3d at 647-48 (<HOLDING>); cf. Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1066 (explaining Holdings: 0: holding that if an attorney is discharged without cause he is entitled to a charging lien for the reasonable value of his services rendered prior to the date of the substitution of counsel where 1 his representation was entirely competent and successful up until his discharge 2 any potential conflict of interest was disclosed and the plaintiff chose to continue to be represented by the attorney and 3 the discharge of the attorney occurred solely because of a fee dispute 1: holding that representation by counsel until the first day of trial likely exposed the defndant to the complexity of his case and the legal process 2: holding that courts should consider a number of factors including the type and complexity of the case and whether the indigent is capable of adequately presenting the case 3: holding that when evaluating a settlement agreement the court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the parties nor is it to run consideration of the adequacy of the settlement into a trial or a rehearsal of the trial  rather the cjourts responsibility is to reach an intelligent and objective opinion of the ultimate success should the claims be litigated and to form an educated estimate of the complexity expense and likely duration of such litigation and all other factors relevant to a full and fair assessment of the wisdom of the proposed compromise 4: holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection


Input: satisfied section XIV of Procedure 00-01-003, they still did not establish that Mr. Pavey, who could not write his own grievance and did not have access to help from his fellow inmates, did not reasonably rely on the assurance that his excessive-force allegations would be investigated. We make one final observation. Section 1997e(a) may prove to be irrelevant if further development of the record shows that prison officials rendered the established grievance procedures unavailable to Mr. Pavey by lending him no assistance in creating what would qualify as a written grievance while at the same time isolating him from other inmates who might have assisted him. Mr. Pavey always has insisted — and the defendants never have denied — that he was confined to his cell in pain co 2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Holdings: 0: holding that threats to an inmates safety after his use of the prison grievance system supported a retaliation claim 1: holding nonexhaustion to be an affirmative defense 2: holding that district court erred in dismissing inmates complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmates allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms 3: holding that a prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not utilize grievance procedures that permitted waiver of the time limit for good cause 4: holding that defendants are estopped from raising nonexhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmates ability to utilize grievance procedures


Input: residence; awarded the wife $4,000 per month in periodic alimony and $50,000, payable in 5 annual installments of $10,000, as alimony in gross; awarded the wife one investment account valued at approximately $31,000 out of the husband’s sizable financial portfolio; and awarded the wife $42,916.37 in attorney fees. The wife appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in the award of custody to the husband, in the awards of alimony and the division of property, and in the award of attorney fees. I. Custody and Visitation The wife argues that the trial court’s award of custody to the husband is a punishment for her alleged marital indiscretions, and she argues that, as such, the award of custody is an abuse of discretion. See Etheridge v. Etheridge, 375 So.2d 474 (Ala.Civ.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). She also argues that the trial court should Holdings: 0: holding that personal jurisdiction is not required to make an outofstate parent a party to custody action where the state court has subject matter jurisdiction under the uniform child custody jurisdiction act 1: holding that psychological parent was not entitled to custody or visitation 2: recognizing that the child custody act required that the natural parent presumption must be seriously considered and heavily weighted in favor of the parent but that the presumption is rebutted if the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the third party 3: holding fact that the parties failed to communicate and had continuing hostility does not constitute a material change in custody to warrant modification of custody 4: holding that although adulterous conduct can be considered in determining custody adultery in and of itself does not automatically bar an award of custody to the adulterous parent


Input: 471-72, 199 S.W.2d 146, 148-49 (1947); see also Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468, 490-91 (Tex. 2016) (recognizing that when agreement cannot be performed without violating law or public policy, it is per se void). Courts will not enforce an illegal contract, particularly when the contract involves the doing of an act prohibited by statutes that were enacted for the protection of the public health and welfare. See, e.g., Merry Homes, Inc. v. Luu, 312 S.W.3d 938, 949-50 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (affirming judgment declaring lease void when lease required use of leased premises only for purposes prohibited by ordinance because of leased premises’ proximity to school); Swor v. Tapp Furniture Co., 146 S.W.3d 778, 783-84 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Peniche v. Aeromexico, 580 S.W.2d 152, 155 Holdings: 0: holding witness not licensed as real estate appraiser could not testify as expert on real estate valuation where statute made it unlawful to engage in real estate appraisal without license 1: holding oral agreement for finders fee void because finder was not licensed realestate broker in violation of real estate license act 2: holding that the purchaser could bring a 93a claim against the real estate broker because the broker misinformed the plaintiff as to the acreage of the parcel and failed to disclose that the property was encumbered 3: holding that a contract for sale of real estate was not void where the broker failed to obtain the required licenses 4: recognizing implied private action for violation of the real estate brokers and salesmen license act


Input: County Jail officers’ alleged unconstitutional actions, his liability must be based on something more than the theo L.Ed.2d 461 (1991). “The inquiry into causation must be a directed one, focusing on the duties and responsibilities of each ... individual defendant] whose acts or omissions are alleged to have resulted in a constitutional deprivation.” Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1381 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932, 104 S.Ct. 335, 78 L.Ed.2d 305 (1983). See also Swint v. City of Wadley, 5 F.3d 1435, 1446-47 (11th Cir.l993)(finding liability where sheriff was on notice of prior similar incident, thus inferring notice), vacated 514 U.S. 35, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995)(vacated for lack of jurisdiction); Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir.l991)(<HOLDING>); Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding sheriff liable for inter alia failing to properly investigate possible battery 1: holding no liability existed under the circumstances 2: holding summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff failed to establish product identification 3: holding a sheriff could not be liable for implementing county policies where no underlying violation of decedents rights had occurred 4: holding supervisory liability existed where sheriff failed to establish policies regarding accurate identification of suspects and where sheriff knew of prior instances of mistaken identity


Input: AEP that existed when Worth filed his complaint, and Worth nowhere disputes the district court’s finding, supported by an unchallenged agency affidavit, that HUD “will not renew the AEP that was in effect when MD-714 was operative.” Worth v. Jackson, No. 02-1576, slip op. at 11 (Jan. 5, 2004); Jackson Decl. at 2, Sept. 10, 2003 (stating that the AEP “will not be renewed or reissued”); see also United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203-04, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968) (finding in the mootness context that whether “the likelihood of further violations is sufficiently remote to make injunctive relief unnecessary ... is a matter for the trial judge”). That ends the matter. See Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363-65, 107 S.Ct. 734, 93 L.Ed.2d 732 (1987) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the Supreme Court has Holdings: 0: holding that defendants waived any challenge to the trial courts failure to hold an evidentiary hearing 1: holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute not of challenge to statute itself 2: holding that noncompete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where 1 the contract expressly provided that the provisions would continue to apply if the employee continued working and 2 the noncompete clause expressly stated it would continue to be in effect after the expiration or termination of employment 3: holding that amendment to the challenged statute mooted the claim when the state had expressed no intention to reenact the prior law 4: holding that a statutes expiration mooted any challenge to the statute


Input: officers, and “was told by all officers present that [plaintiff] was the aggressor.” 202 F.3d at 635. We also held that a charging officer at the station house was immune, because he “heard consistent versions of the events from at least three eyewitnesses,” who were all police officers, while only one account—that of the plaintiffs girlfriend— differed. Id.; see also Lee, 136 F.3d at 104 (finding arguable probable cause where officer arrested plaintiff husband for domestic abuse of his wife based upon the wife’s statement, but only after conferring with a physician who examined the wife and advised that although she seemed disoriented, intoxicated, or mentally impaired, she could accurately relate the facts about her alleged assault at the hands of her husband); Singer, 63 F.3d at 119 (<HOLDING>). By contrast, here, McGee has alleged facts Holdings: 0: holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself 1: holding that director of crisis center who was private individual and who acted under color of state law by conducting strip search of female detainees for contraband at request of police officer had qualified immunity from  1983 suit arising out of searches because she acted as agent of officer who also had qualified immunity 2: holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest 3: holding that officer had qualified immunity from  1983 action brought by arrestee because officer had probable cause to arrest based on statements of a witness store clerk who signed a criminal information and deposition detailing the theft and establishing each of the elements of the crime of larceny 4: holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause


Input: and Brown’s arrest.”). The problem is that Williams was not seen or heard from until fourteen months after the crime when he was arrested in Georgia. While Deputy Lucius patrolled Samspon Park looking for Williams, he did not offer any details supporting his efforts. There was no information that Williams was not at his usual haunts or had not reported for work. And there was no testimony that the police inquired of Williams’ -family and friends beyond the day after the crime. While Detective Hollis testified that he attempted to locate Williams’ friends, family members, and girlfriends, he did not give a time line or indicate that, he actually came into contact with any of these people beyond the day after the crime. Cf. Diaz-Gonzalez v. State, 932 So.2d 528, 530 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). This lack of evidence also supports the Holdings: 0: holding that a reasonable juror could infer defendant knew of the officers investigation for a crime that occurred a few months before his arrest because the investigating officer went to the residence of the defendants exwife made ten separate visits to the defendants business during which he informed those present that he wanted to talk to the defendant about something that happened on the date of the crime and gave this information to the defendants alibi witness 1: holding that the protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest in front of his house on suspicion of murder was not justified because the evidence that an accomplice was involved in the murder did not equate to evidence that someone would be hiding out in the defendants house a month after the crime occurred and at the time of the arrest the officers were not chasing the defendant from a crime scene 2: holding that no valid arrest had taken place before the search of the defendants person was conducted even though prior to that point a police officer had approached the defendant displayed his badge informed the defendant of his suspicions that the defendants luggage contained drug contraband informed the defendant of his constitutional rights and detained the defendant for twenty minutes after he had accompanied the officers to a police office located in the airport 3: holding that officers failure to talk to asserted alibi witnesses did not constitute a violation of the defendants constitutional rights 4: holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown


Input: previously through the exercise of due diligence, the defendant must establish that the newly discovered evidence probably would have produced a life sentence. Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 571 (Fla.2001); see also Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991) (“[T]he newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”); Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla.1992) (“The Jones standard is also applicable where the issue is whether a life or death sentence should have been imposed.”). Because the trial court denied Van Poyck’s motion solely on the basis of the pleadings, making a legal rather than a factual determination, this Court evaluates each of these matters de novo. See State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 137 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). Timeliness and Due Diligence Apart from Holdings: 0: holding that whether statements are testimonial is a legal issue subject to de novo review 1: holding that pure questions of law that are discernible from the record are subject to de novo review 2: holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review 3: recognizing that the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review 4: holding questions of law related to class certification are reviewed de novo


Input: it is not probative enough to meet Todd’s burden of production that Montoya acted with deliberate indifference. See In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 528-29 (6th Cir.1996) (“Northwest’s rewiring of the CAWS is circumstantial evidence, if only of a weak and suspect sort, that the CAWS as it existed at the time of the accident was not foolproof.”). Even if the evidence is not technically with rule 407’s scope: (i) rule 407’s underlying concerns are persuasive when evaluating the probative value of the evidence; and (ii) the circumstances of Montoya’s resignation in light of the other evidence in the record make the inference of wrongdoing one can draw from his resignation a weak one. See Gray v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 82 Fed.Appx. 639, 646-47 (10th Cir.2003) (unpublished)(<HOLDING>). It is the proverbial scintilla of evidence Holdings: 0: recognizing that while the evidence at issue was admissible under rule 407 its probative value was minimal 1: recognizing the probative value of objective and reliable hearsay evidence 2: recognizing high probative value of evidence providing conduct that was part of the very act charged 3: holding that inextricably intertwined evidence is intrinsic evidence that is admissible if its probative value outweighs the danger of prejudice 4: recognizing that rule 608b prior bad acts evidence admissible as probative of truthfulness is subject to rule 403 balancing


Input: 5 . DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex.1990) (quoting Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971)). 6 . Id. at 678 (quoting Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971)). 7 . Id. ("Florida has a substantial relationship to the parties and the transaction because Wackenhut's corporate offices are there, and some of the negotiations between DeSantis and George Wackenhut occurred there.”). 8 . Uniform Arbitration Act § 1 ef seq. 9 . Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 171.001 et seq. 10 . 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967). 11 . Id. at 403 olo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-22-221. 26 . Uniform Arbitration Act § 28. 27 . Compare Volt Info. Sciences v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (<HOLDING>), with Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Holdings: 0: holding that the faa did not preempt california law permitting court to stay arbitration pending resolution of related litigation where parties had selected california law in a standard choice of law provision 1: holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision 2: holding fee splitting provision of arbitration agreement unconscionable under california law 3: recognizing a hypothetical situation where california law left a party free to sue on a claim in maryland even after the claim was precluded in california because the california statute of limitations had expired 4: holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law


Input: Control Officer ... may issue a citation to the owner of such animal specifying the section or sections of this chapter so violated and identifying the specific nature of the violation. Such citation shall impose upon the owner the obligation of appearance to answer the charges specified in the citation ... at the time and place indicated on the citation. LMCO § 91.073(A). If an officer decides to issue a violation notice in lieu of a citation, that notice must “stipulate a compliance date and associated fee and late fee, as well as a waiver provision providing that the person to whom the violation notice is issued waives all rights to protest such violation and waives all rights to a hearing on the issues relating to that viola tion.” LMCO § 91.073(B). LMCO § 91. 57 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the circumstances as here Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was inadmissible in part because it was not similar to the allegations made by defendant 1: holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment 2: holding that because the allegations purportedly suppressed by the government were not material an evidentiary hearing further exploring the  allegations themselves and the governments knowledge of the allegations is unnecessary 3: holding that a parking citation provided adequate notice where it was reasonably calculated to inform the vehicle owners of the allegations against them and the procedures available to obtain a hearing to contest the allegations 4: holding that the plaintiffs complaint was valid because despite general allegations it provided notice


Input: (citing Sahadi v. Reynolds Chem., 636 F.2d 1116, 1117 (6th Cir. 1980)); see also Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 752 (6th Cir.1992) (“Spreading the former duties of a terminated employee among the remaining employees does not constitute replacement.”). Novotny’s reliance on this argument, therefore, is misplaced. Novotny also argues that she was treated differently than similarly situated males. Novotny’s argument in support of this statement is difficult to follow. Novotny appears to argue two distinct claims: 1) a pre-termination claim of discrimination, and 2) a claim of discrimination related to her termination. The Court reviews each of these claims. Novotny first asserts that she was discriminated against prior to her termination. Novotny claims that her calend th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Agnew v. BASF Corp., 286 F.3d 307, 310-11 Holdings: 0: holding that a negative criticism or performance evaluation unaccompanied by a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment does not constitute adverse employment action 1: holding that an employee accepted as a matter of law changes to an employment agreement by continuing employment with the company after he received notice of the changes 2: holding that reassignments without salary or work changes do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions in employment discrimination claims 3: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 4: holding that poor evaluations alone do not constitute an adverse employment action


Input: work on the project — including the land surveying tasks. In addition, there is substantial evidence that the construction documents produced by MLS were to be approved by either Comer or another engineer. Gregory Gardiner in his deposition even stated that he believed the services performed by MLS were engineering by nature and that the surveying services were incidental to the engineering work. While his statements are not dispositive as to the nature of the contract, they show that Gardiner believed MLS was to perform engineering services for his company. Under such circumstances, we believe that both the engineering and land surveying services encompassed by the cohtract are properly classified as professional and thus, are subject to KRS 413.245. See Vandevelde, 744 S.W.2d at 433 (<HOLDING>). It is important to note that while this Holdings: 0: holding that a corporate entity must be represented by licensed counsel 1: holding that absent some statutory infraction the task of education belongs to the educators who have been charged by society with that critical task 2: holding that since the performer of a task which could be performed by a layperson represented that he was in fact a professional engineer krs 413245 applied 3: recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice 4: holding that a defendant does not have the right to be represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings which are civil proceedings


Input: 77 F.Supp.3d at 1187-88, 2014 WL 7473806, at *27. These cases all stand for the same thing: at the pleading stage, the existence of a Monell policy is a “conclusion” to be built up to, rather than a “fact” to be baldly asserted. When there is no formal written policy and the § 1983 plaintiff is relying upon a practice or custom, some courts appear to look for a specific number of prior similar incidents — often saying that two or three instances will not suffice. See Wilson v. Cook Cnty., 742 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir.2014)(“Although this court has not adopted any bright-line rules for establishing what constitutes a widespread custom or practice, it is clear that a single incident — or even three incidents — do not suffice.”); Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>); Eugene v. Alief Ind. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a section 1983 plaintiff asserting police misconduct must allege a pattern of similar incidents in which citizens were injured or endangered by policyconsistent misconduct or that serious incompetence or misbehavior was general or widespread throughout the police force 1: holding that a finding of misconduct under section 44303626 requires intentional repeated instances of misconduct or violations of explicit policies after the employee has received warnings 2: holding that a refusal to make false statements that no misconduct occurred is a very different circumstance  than an affirmative statement of misconduct 3: recognizing that the court sanctions more harshly for cumulative misconduct than for isolated misconduct 4: holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct


Input: ” Town of Milford v. Boyd, 434 Mass. 754, 759-60 (2001), citing Gillette Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 425 Mass. 670, 674 (1997), in turn quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 393 Mass. 490, 497 (1984) (stating that “words of a statute must be construed with other statutory language and the general statutory plan”). In other words, in order to be consistent with the statutory scheme as a whole of G.L.c. 207, it is necessary that §§11 and 12 be read together 05, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that a zoning ordinance’s likely infringement of the plaintiffs First Amendment rights constituted irreparable harm where the city’s threat to enforce the ordinance operated as a prior restraint on adult bookstores); T&D Video v. City of Revere, 423 Mass. 577, 582 (1996) (<HOLDING>). See also, Wright & Miller, 11 Federal Holdings: 0: holding that an infringement on the right to vote necessarily causes irreparable harm 1: holding that even a temporary deprivation of first amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm 2: holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction 3: holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative 4: holding that plaintiffs necessarily demonstrated irreparable harm because they showed a substantial likelihood that their first amendment rights had been infringed


Input: intended to preclude separate convictions and sentences for the ongoing criminal conduct and underlying crimes used to establish such conduct. We too think the Iowa legislature sought to encourage the imposition of such cumulative sentences. B. Merger pursuant to Iowa Code section 701.9. Iowa Code section 701.9 — Iowa’s merger statute — provides: No person shall be convicted of a public offense which is necessarily included in another public offense of which the person is convicted; If the jury returns a verdict of guilty of more than one offense and such verdict conflicts with this section, thé court shall enter judgment of guilty of the greater offense only. Our resolution of Reed’s double jeopardy claim renders this section inapplicable. See Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d at 344 (<HOLDING>). IV. Corroboration of Accomplices’ Testimony. Holdings: 0: holding that the double jeopardy clause prohibits courts from imposing greater penalties than the legislature intended 1: holding that if double jeopardy clause is not violated because legislature intended double punishment section 7019 is not applicable and merger is not required 2: holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court 3: holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 4: holding double jeopardy clause applicable to civil penalties under the false claims act


Input: Before the February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652, 655 (4th Cir.1977); In re the Grand Jury Empaneled January 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir.1976); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir.1976); In re Investigation Before the April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 605 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1976). However, all of these cases come from an era when disqualification orders were widely presumed to be immediately appealable. See generally Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800, 804-05 (2d Cir.1974) (en banc) (collecting cases). Since then, the Supreme Court has refused to allow interlocutory appeals in every disqualification case that has come before it. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Roller, 472 U.S. 424, 430, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 270, Holdings: 0: holding that an order disqualifying counsel in a civil case is not a final judgment 1: holding that final judgment in a criminal case means sentence 2: holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal 3: holding that an order authorizing a sale is a final judgment 4: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence


Input: likely to have had counsel at the interrogation had he been arraigned on December 12, 2003, instead of December 19, 2003. This is particularly true given that Nguyen apparently was already represented by counsel concerning the indicted charges and could have requested the presence of his counsel at the December 15 interview. This does not, however, end the Sixth Amendment analysis. Although there is no evidence that the government conspired to deprive Nguyen of counsel, the government must still bear the burden of showing, as under the Fifth Amendment analysis, (i) that he was apprised of his right to have counsel appointed and to consult with counsel and (ii) that he knowingly waived that right. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298-99, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In this regard, the evidence makes clear (i) Holdings: 0: holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel 1: holding that the same waiver standard applies when assessing whether a defendant has waived his sixth amendment right to counsel during a postindictment interrogation as when assessing whether a defendant has waived his fifth amendment right to counsel preindictment 2: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel 3: holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial 4: holding that waiver of counsel during pcr review requires a judicial inquiry into whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel


Input: 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). A claimant can demonstrate pretext “by showing that the proffered reason (1) has no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the defendant’s challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct.” Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir.2000). “Regardless of which option is used, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of producing ‘sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably reject [the defendants’] explanation and infer that the defendants intentionally discriminated against him.’ ” Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir.2001) (alteration in original)). See also Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1466 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff can establish pretext only by showing that her employers explanation is a he 1: holding that temporal proximity together with evidence of a retaliatory atmosphere and the employers statement supported an inference of retaliation and satisfied the second part of the manzer pretext showing 2: holding that a plaintiff can establish a causal link by showing that the employers decision  was based in part on knowledge of the employees protected activity 3: holding that a petitioner did not make a prima facie showing of illegal discrimination because the petitioner needed to point to more facts than the number of africanamericans struck in order to establish a pattern of strikes supporting an inference of discrimination 4: holding that statistical evidence presented by the plaintiff showing an employers pattern of conduct toward a protected class is relevant to a showing of pretext and can create an inference of discrimination


Input: and with the DPS’s position in this appeal that sections 522.102(a) and 522.103 of the transportation code apply only to a person who is driving a commercial motor vehicle at the time of his arrest. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 522.102(a), 522.103; see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Chavez, 981 S.W.2d 449, 451 (TexApp. — Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). That is, an individual stopped for DWI in a noncommercial vehicle who refuses to submit a breath specimen does not automatically lose his commercial driving privileges for one year. However, section 522.089 mandates the automatic disqualification of a person to drive a commercial motor vehicle at least for the period of time that person’s license is suspended under any law. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 522.089(a); Chavez, 981 S.W.2d at 453 (<HOLDING>). In accordance with the Code of Construction Holdings: 0: holding that district court lacked authority to dismiss charges of driving under the influence reckless driving operating a motor vehicle without a seatbelt and operating a motor vehicle without insurance without states consent where dismissal was at gonzalezs request based on absence of arresting officer 1: recognizing that section 522089 applied to chavez even though he was not driving a commercial motor vehicle at the time of his arrest 2: holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  3: holding that the plaintiff filed suit within the statute of limitations even though he could not prove the time at which he mailed his petition 4: holding that assault conviction for driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and causing serious bodily injury to the person of another with the motor vehicle qualified as a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a


Input: a motion to compel arbitration filed by the Loudermilks, the trial court lacked jurisdiction; because the Loudermilks never demonstrated that their claims were within the warranty’s scope or that they satisfied the warranty’s conditions precedent to arbitration; and because the Loudermilks’ failure to file a motion to compel or to provide notice of their intent to arbitrate their claims against Appellants deprived Appellants of their right to present defenses to arbitration and to object to the court’s appointment of an arbitrator. We address these contentions in turn. A. Trial Court Jurisdiction It is clear that the trial court here had jurisdiction o ending the outcome of arbitration. Brooks v. Pep Boys Auto. Superctrs., 104 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In short, we are not aware of any authority, Holdings: 0: recognizing the trial court possesses continuing jurisdiction pending arbitration rather than requiring the filing of an additional lawsuit concerning pending arbitration or postarbitration matters 1: holding that completed arbitration pending appeal mooted district courts order directing arbitration 2: holding that where the trial court had referred the parties to arbitration but it was ambiguous as to whether the court had also dismissed the underlying case dismissal and referral to arbitration should really be construed as an order to stay litigation pending arbitration which under koczak and umana was not a final appealable order 3: holding that purpose of stay pending arbitration is twofold it relieves the party entitled to arbitrate of the burden of continuing to litigate the issue while the arbitration process is ongoing and it entitles that party to proceed immediately to arbitration without the delay that would be occasioned by an appeal of the district courts order to arbitrate 4: holding that rookerfeldman precludes jurisdiction over a federal lawsuit to compel arbitration under the federal arbitration act because the action was inextricably intertwined with the plaintiffs failed statelaw action to compel arbitration under the louisiana arbitration act


Input: aimed at establishing a defendant’s propensity to commit a crime. See Tenn. R.Evid. 404(b). The State contended that it was offering evidence of prior sexual misconduct not to prove the character of the defendant but, rather, primarily to corroborate the testimony of the victim concerning the incidents alleged in the indictment as well as to show the state of intimacy between the defendant and the victim, to explain the circumstances surrounding the charged offenses and to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim. Accordingly, the State argued that the evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual misconduct was admissible under those limited circumstances. In support of its argument, the State cited several cases including State v. Lockhart, 731 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn.Crim.App.1986) (<HOLDING>), overruled by State v. Rickman, 876 S.W.2d 824 Holdings: 0: holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment 1: holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction 2: holding that evidence of incest with the same victim prior to or after the offense charged is admissible to corroborate proof of the incident relied upon for conviction 3: holding that evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct with the victim is admissible to corroborate the victims testimony 4: holding that evidence of uncharged incest with the same victim is admissible to illustrate the relationship existing between the defendant and the victim


Input: related sentence. (Id.) In accordance with United States Supreme Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit recognizes that when a defendant has been convicted and sentenced on mulitiplicitous charges, “[t]he conviction as well as the sentence on one of the two mulitiplicitous counts must be vacated, to ‘avoid both the punitive collateral effects of multiple convictions as well as the direct effects of multiple sentences.’ ” United States v. Alerta, 96 F.3d 1230, 1239 (9th Cir.1996), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 850 F.2d 563, 569 (9th Cir.1988) and quoting United States v. Palafox, 764 F.2d 558, 564 (9th Cir.1985)); see also Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). Here, because the Holdings: 0: holding that proof of an overt act is not required in a  846 conspiracy 1: holding that the greater offense is  by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it 2: holding that in the conviction and sentencing for criminal offenses committed in the course of one criminal episode it is the intent of the legislature that there be a separate conviction and sentence for each criminal offense unless one of the offenses is a degree of the other a necessarily included lesser offense subsumed in the other or both offenses are identical 3: holding that a guilty verdict on a  848 charge necessarily includes a finding that the defendant also participated in a conspiracy violative of  846 conspiracy is therefore a lesser included offense  we adhere to the presumption that congress intended to authorize only one punishment accordingly one of petitioners convictions as well as its concurrent sentence is unauthorized punishment for a separate offense and must be vacated 4: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense


Input: and the debtors, provides the basis for a lien even after discharge since the mortgage does not purport to affect the debtor's personal liability. The Court agrees. "Therefore the Court finds that the law is with the plaintiff and accordingly grants relief by declaring that a valid, pre-filed lien which has not been avoided during the bankruptcy proceedings is not extinguished by the discharge of the debtors and remains enforceable in rem after the discharge even if there is no approved reaffirmation agreement. More specifically, the lien of Water-field's real estate mortgage is enforceable in rem against the real estate described in the mortgage." 24 B.R. at 624 (emphasis supplied). See also R.L. Shirmeyer, Inc. v. Ind. Revenue Bd. (1951), 229 Ind. 586, 594, 99 N.E.2d 847, 850 (<HOLDING>) The Ruths attempt to limit the effect of this Holdings: 0: holding witness not licensed as real estate appraiser could not testify as expert on real estate valuation where statute made it unlawful to engage in real estate appraisal without license 1: holding the real estate sale proceeds 2: holding article 9 inapplicable to an assignment of a mortgage on real estate 3: holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner 4: holding that granteepurchasers who acquired real estate subject to an existing mortgage while not personally lia ble did take real estate charged with the payment of the debt and such property became the primary fund out of which said mortgage must be paid


Input: evidence of alcoholism, which helped to explain the respondent’s conduct, but did not excuse it); Florida Bar v. Rodriguez, 489 So.2d 726 (Fla.1986) (disbarring attorney for the conversion of client funds and admitted commingling of clients’ moneys despite mitigating evidence relating to alcoholism and rehabilitation). Additionally, this case also involves other conduct that is extremely troubling, including the forgery of a judge’s signature on two orders, the forgery of a client’s signature on a guilty plea, and the forgery of a client’s signature on a check so Gross could deposit the funds of the check and use them for his own personal means. These acts alone can also constitute independent grounds for disbarment. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Kickliter, 559 So.2d 1123, 1124 (Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Gross attempts to distinguish this Court’s Holdings: 0: holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who converted partnership money to his own use without authorization and without disclosure to his other partners 1: holding that even with substantial mitigation disbarment was warranted for an attorney who had forged his chents signature on a will when the chent died without signing and then submitted this forged document into court 2: holding that a party failed to meet this burden when he presented no corroborating evidence by the persons who could have given testimony regarding the execution of the deed such as the person signing as witness to his signature and the notary public who subscribed as having notarized his signature or a handwriting expert in support of the contention that his signature to the deed was forged 3: holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction where an attorney misappropriated funds from his real estate partners 4: holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate


Input: rests with the Commission to show that the funds in the possession of [the relief defendant] are ill-gotten.” FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F.Supp.2d 373, 392 (D.Conn.2009) (citations omitted). “The ill-gotten gains must be linked to the unlawful practices of the liable defendants.” Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F.Supp.2d at 392. Where “it would be difficult, if not impossible, to trace specific ... [fraudulently obtained funds], a freeze order need not be limited ... to funds that can be directly traced to defendant’s illegal activity [because] ... the defendant should not benefit from the fact that he commingled his illegal profits with other assets.” Byers, 2009 WL 33434, at *3 (citations omitted); see also SEC v. Aragon Capital Mgmt., LLC, 672 F.Supp.2d 421, 443 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>). If disgorgement of “fraudulently obtained Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant compensated himself by spending investors funds for his own expenses 1: holding that tracing proceeds of illegal funds is unnecessary and where tainted funds have been commingled with potentially legitimate funds the sec is entitled to obtain disgorgement from the entire pool of funds 2: holding that sec interpretation of federal securities law is entitled to deference if it is reasonable 3: holding that even if the sec succeeded in showing defendants violated the exchange act or sec rules the sec is not entitled to a permanent injunction or an officerdirector bar 4: holding that remand is unnecessary when it is clear that the same decision would have been reached in the absence of the errors


Input: and would not have progressed to cardiopulmonary arrest. Although Mr. Smith’s clinical condition had a mortality of about twenty percent prior to the arrest, the above-discussed failures of Dr. Bolton, Dr. Russell, Dr. Suominen, PA Dizney, McElravy, Hammonds, and Gill probably led to the arrest and the sequelae that probably ensued and in reasonable probability led to his progressive weakness, increasing renal dysfunction, and multi-system organ failure and his death. These statements, all contained within the four corners of Dr. Halkos’s report, sufficiently link Dr. Halkos’s causation opinions to the facts and adequately describe the chain of events allegedly leading to Mr. Smith’s death. See Patel v. Williams, 237 S.W.3d 901, 905-06 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The trial court acted within its discretion Holdings: 0: holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report 1: holding expert report requirement fulfilled in claim against nurse by providing expert report of nurse as to standard of care and expert report of medical doctor as to causation 2: holding that earlier events set the stage for what followed and that factual disputes regarding those events were material 3: holding that it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself 4: holding expert report sufficiently set forth causation when it presented a chain of events beginning with a contraindicated prescription and ending with the patients death


Input: claims that the district court’s Case Management Order expressly limited discovery to the primary liability issues, namely CERCLA, the Spill Act, and breach of contract, and expressly stayed discovery on its state common law claims until after resolution of the threshold liability issues. While WCI raises a colorable claim, we nonetheless decline review of this issue, as WCI’s claim is raised for the first time on appeal and is not preserved for appellate review. See Plott v. General Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190, 1195 (6th Cir.1995) (stating that this Court generally will not review a post-judgment claim asserting a need for discovery where the non-movant failed to advance such claim before the district court); see also Vance ex rel. v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145, 1149 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). WCI’s failure to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit Holdings: 0: recognizing that while summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery it is the nonmovants responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery by filing an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f of the federal rules of civil procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery 1: holding that the court was precluded from considering whether the district court had abused its discretion in ruling on defendants summary judgment motion before allowing plaintiff to conduct requested discovery where the plaintiff had not filed an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f and stating that  when a party does not avail himself of relief under rule 56f it is generally not an abuse of discretion for the district court to rule on the motion for summary judgment  citation omitted 2: holding that entry of summary judgment while a motion for additional discovery was pending should be construed as an implicit denial of the motion for additional discovery 3: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 4: holding that rejection of the appellants rule 56f request for additional discovery was proper where the information as to which he sought discovery was immaterial to the question of whether he is liable


Input: CWs credibility and his use of a gun. In light of the unrebutted fact of CWs death improperly admitted during the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, the latter issue was of particular importance, as discussed supra. In sum, given the lost opportunity to confront CW in relation to the unavailable discovery, the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony at trial violated Nofoa’s right to confrontation as guaranteed by article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution and the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. Thus, we hold that the circuit court erred in allowing admission of CWs preliminary healing testimony at trial We additionally hold that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Mundon, 121 Hawai'i 339, 368, 219 P.3d 1126, 1155 (2009) (<HOLDING>). We are unable to say the error was harmless Holdings: 0: holding constitutional error may be harmless if court can  declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt  quoting state v napeahi 57 haw 365 373 556 p2d 569 574 1976 1: holding that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that a constitutional error is harmless where it can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained 4: holding that appellate court should review error in trial procedure to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt


Input: fractures and a large gash on his cheek. The wall, floor, and door to the restroom were covered with blood. Next to the restroom door, the police found a metal forming stick covered in blood. 2 . Friday afternoon at 3:00 p.m. is the routine time for arraignment hearings in Peoria County Circuit Court. 3 . Herman Cornish is a retired Peoria police officer. 4 . However, Geraldine testified at trial that she felt that she had no choice but to permit the police to take her fingerprints. 5 . Like Geraldine, Laurie testified at trial that she felt that she had no choice but to permit the police to take her fingerprints. 6 . Ms. Schumann is Plaintiffs' counsel of record in this matter. 7 . See People v. McClinton, 59 Ill.App.3d 168, 174-75, 375 N.E.2d 1342, 1348, 17 Ill.Dcc. 58, 64 (1978) (<HOLDING>). 8 . See Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause 1: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 2: holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed 3: holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry 4: holding that photographic identification coupled with the officers knowledge that a crime had been committed provides probable cause for a warrantless arrest


Input: regarding the reliability of expert evidence, as well as its decision to admit or exclude such evidence, for abuse of discretion. See Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 154 (3d Cir.2000). As we have discussed above, WARN Act liability does not turn on whether a party is a "parent” or a "lender,” or whether a "lender” behaved in typical fashion. Indeed, we have already acknowledged that GECC may well have been a parent of CompTech. Thus, because we have declined to create separate standards of liability for lenders and parents, regardless of whether the District Court was correct in concluding that Myers’s affidavit was lacking in a factual basis, his opinion was ultimately not germane and no hearing was necessary. Cf. Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the District Court's Holdings: 0: holding plenary hearings are required when there are contested issues of material fact on the basis of conflicting affidavits 1: holding that in limine hearings are encouraged when courts are concerned with the factual rather than legal dimensions of the evidence 2: holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived 3: holding under both florida law and faa that factual affirmative defenses are properly decided by the arbitrator rather than the court 4: holding that while trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review


Input: bands and subjecting them to excessive monitoring and racially-derogatory remarks); Johnson v. Smith, 878 F.Supp. 1150 (N.D.Ill.1995) (cross burned in front yard of African-American family and brick thrown through their window); People Helpers v. City of Richmond, 789 F.Supp. 725 (E.D.Va.1992) (police “bullied” their way into and selectively searched handicapped and African-American plaintiffs’ apartments). While this Court has, as Plaintiffs note, recognized that “violence or physical coercion is not a prerequisite to a claim under § 3617,” Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F.Supp.2d 602 (D.N.J.2000), the conduct complained of must nevertheless be of sufficient magnitude to permit a finding of intimidation, coercion, threats or interference. See, e.g., Babin, 18 F.3d at 347, 348 (<HOLDING>). That said, the actions allegedly taken by Holdings: 0: holding that actions of defendants in engaging in economic competition did not rise to the level of interference with the rights of plaintiffs and that actions of neighbors while interfering with plaintiffs negotiations were not direct enough to state a claim for violation of  3617 1: holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury 2: holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions 3: holding that rookerfeldman did not bar the plaintiffs federal action where a pennsylvania state court had previously dismissed the plaintiffs petition for review of an agencys decision for failure to comply with the pennsylvania rules of appellate procedure since the extent of the plaintiffs compliance with those rules had no bearing on the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claims 4: holding that the actions were not actions of public and general applicability but were actions directed principally and primarily at plaintiffs


Input: mitigating circumstances in this case. We believe the testimony demonstrated Johnston to be a generally honest lawyer. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Isaacson, 565 N.W.2d 315, 317 (Iowa 1997) (“We consider a lawyer’s general character for honesty ... in applying sanctions.”). In addition, he acknowledged he violated our disciplinary rules in certain respects. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Tofflemire, 689 N.W.2d 83, 93 (Iowa 2004) (“A mitigating factor is the attorney’s recognition of some wrongdoing.”). Furthermore, the prior discipline imposed on Johnston carries little weight as an aggravating factor under the circumstances of this case. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Iowa 2002) (<HOLDING>). Johnston’s previous discipline was imposed Holdings: 0: recognizing a heightened interest in ensuring discipline in police departments 1: holding that torture is something more severe than the kind of treatment that would suffice to prove persecution 2: recognizing prosecutors implicit obligation to refrain from suggesting more severe sentencing alternatives 3: holding that seconddegree manslaughter was not a crime of violence and thus was not an aggravated felony warranting an aliens removal 4: recognizing a previous reprimand was an aggravating circumstance warranting more severe discipline


Input: Commerce’s determination in the Final Results. (Pis.’ Br. on Jurisdiction 2-5.) In deciding between the appropriate bases for jurisdiction, the “ ‘mere recitation of a basis for jurisdiction, by either a party or a court, cannot be controllingt;]’ ” instead, the court “ ‘look[s] to the true nature of the action ... in determining jurisdiction.’ ” Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States, 472 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed.Cir.2006) (quoting Williams v. Sec’y of Navy, 787 F.2d 552, 557 (Fed.Cir.1986)). In this case, Plaintiffs challe t the time that the rule goes into effect because the relevant harm has already been inflicted: an interested party has lost the opportunity to alter the agency’s decision through full participation in the regulatory process. See, e.g., Wind River, 946 F.2d at 715 (<HOLDING>); Thrift Depositors of Am., Inc. v. Office of Holdings: 0: recognizing the cause of action 1: holding that the sixyear statute of limitations on a written contract is applicable to a cause of action based on a um policy 2: holding that grounds for a cause of action for facial or procedural challenges to a regulation will usually be apparent to any interested citi zen within a sixyear period following promulgation of the decision and because the governments interest in finality outweighs a latecomers desire to protest the agencys action as a matter of policy or procedure 3: holding that the rule of splitting of causes of action as related to res judicata does not permit the owner of a single or entire cause of action or an entire indivisible demand to divide or split that cause of action and that all damages from a single wrongful act must be claimed in one action 4: recognizing cause of action


Input: believed that he was acting “in the usual course of his business or employment.” See United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 32 (4th Cir.1995). To qualify under the employee or agent exception to registration under § 822, the person must be employed in the “legitimate distribution chain” of the controlled substance. See United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1244 (8th Cir.1973). Any possession or distribution outside of the legitimate distribution chain is unlawful. United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1151-52 (2d Cir.1986). Thus, if the possession is not in the “usual course of the registrant’s lawful professional practice,” then it is not in the legitimate chain of possession and therefore not within the § 822(c) exception. See United States v. Hill, 589 F.2d 1344, 1350 (8th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Here, Smith was directed by his employer to Holdings: 0: holding  1227a2bi limits the meaning of controlled substance for removal purposes to the substances controlled under  802 1: holding that defendants ability to pay may be considered in assessing penalty under controlled substances act 2: holding that a company registered with the new york department of state is found for purposes of rule b 3: holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual was not registered making the individuals possession of it necessarily unlawful 4: holding that mere fact that defendant was employee of company registered to possess and distribute controlled substances does not make otherwise unlawful conduct lawful


Input: a contract or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. Id. We have noted that actual litigation is not required for relief under our declaratory-judgment statute. Jessup v. Carmichael, 224 Ark. 230, 272 S.W.2d 438 (1954). However, the statue does require that litigation be pending or threatened. Id. We have also noted that while Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-104 recognizes a party’s right to a declaratory judgment, a justiciable controversy is required. Mastin v. Mastin, 316 Ark. 327, 871 S.W.2d 585 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The justiciability requirement was discussed Holdings: 0: holding that the insurers declaratory relief action presented a justiciable controversy for the injured parties even though the insured tortfeasor had suffered a default judgment 1: recognizing that a justiciable controversy is a real and substantial controversy that is ripe and appropriate for judicial determination as opposed to a dispute or difference of contingent hypothetical or abstract character 2: holding that the case presented no justiciable controversy and that a review of the matter would render an improper advisory opinion 3: recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue 4: holding that when the government conceded that a taxpayer has a right to monetary relief a justiciable case or controversy no longer exists and any declaratory interpretation would not be incident to a judgment


Input: Rules § 303A.02(b)(v) (providing that a director is not independent if he or she "is a current employee ... of a company that has ... received payments from, the listed company for property or services in an amount which, in any of the last three fiscal years, exceeds the greater of $1 million, or 2% of such other company’s consolidated gross revenues”). And, even if the amount paid to Stephens Cori exceeded $1 million, Byorum would still be considered independent under the NYSE rules, because that relationship is stale (i.e., she was paid over three years before the MFW transaction). 56 . Dinh Dep. 173:4-10. 57 . Id. at 14:8-15:4, 80:17-24. 58 . See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1167 (Del.1995); see also, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708 (Del.2009) (<HOLDING>). 59 . Dinh Dep. 72:5-75:21. 60 . Pis.’ Br. in Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that a defendant director was not disinterested on account of his business relationship with the company whose board he sat on because he was a man of comparatively modest means 1: holding that willfully violating the prohibition on engaging in business as a brokerdealer or agent without registering with the state means the defendant acted intentionally in the sense that he was aware of what he was doing 2: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 3: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 4: holding that allegation that company paid a director 50000 in consulting fees was not enough to demonstrate that the director lacked independence as plaintiffs had failed to allege that 50000 was material to the director


Input: language, the purpose of the statute, the evil to be corrected, the legislative history, and the pertinent case law that has applied the statute or similar enactments.” McKnight v. State, 906 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Because we base our decision on language that was not part of the 1985 statute construed in Dixon, we do not certify conflict with that opinion. Addressing another issue on appeal, we note that Hile’s in-court description of his conversation with Longval on the videotape was admissible over a hearsay objection. Longval’s statements to Hile were not hearsay under section 90.801(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2004), because they described and gave significance to ambiguous acts, her conduct on the videotape. See Stotler v. State, 834 So.2d 940, 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). Reversed and remanded. GUNTHER and HAZOURI, Holdings: 0: holding that a trial court may allow jurors to review a videotape of a witness previous statements under circumstances that will assure that such statements are not given undue weight or emphasis 1: holding that a witness could testify about statements made to him by a police department investigator because the statements were an admission by partyopponent and were thus not excluded by the hearsay rule 2: holding that defense witnesss incourt recitation of defendants out of court statements which where inaudible on surveillance videotape were not hearsay because they were statements describing ambiguous acts or verbal parts of acts 3: holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made 4: holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay


Input: the applicable substantive standard. Thus, if the substantive law required clear and convincing evidence to support an element of the claim or defense, the court might grant summary judgment if, in considering a motion for directed verdict on the same evidentiary basis, it would have concluded that the evidence presented was so “one-sided” it failed to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-56, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-14. Given this rule, in cases in which the burden is greater than a preponderance of the evidence, analytical constructs that turn on such concepts as “scintilla of the evidence” and “slightest doubt” are no longer useful. This court has already adopted Anderson’s holding in conjunction with first amendment cases. See Dombey, 150 Ariz. at 486, 724 P.2d at 572 (<HOLDING>). There are, of course, other civil cases in Holdings: 0: holding that on a motion for summary judgment the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient and there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff 1: holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff 2: holding that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies to section 101 challenges 3: holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied 4: holding that where the new york times clear and convincing evidence requirement applies the summary judgment inquiry will be whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either plaintiff or defendant


Input: of a landlord-tenant relationship, the court of appeals held that the dispute necessarily involved a dispute over title, which would require a court to determine the owner of the real estate by analyzing the contract for deed. Id. at 733-35. Consequently', on appeal," did not have jurisdiction to make such a determination. See Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, at *2; Geldard, 214 S.W.3d at 209. When a court’s void judgment, is appealed, we have jurisdiction tó declare the judgment void and render judgment dismissing the cáse. Kilpatrick v. Potoczniak, No. 14-13-00707-CV, 2014 WL 3778837, at *2 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 31, 2014, no pet.) (mem.op.) (per curiam). We vacate the county court’s judgment as void and dismiss the forcible detainer action for want of jurisdiction. See id. (<HOLDING>). 1 . The notice was sent on behalf of "the Holdings: 0: holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void 1: holding that tolling of the statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of a claim dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution 2: holding that personal injury action arising during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings was property of the estate 3: recognizing that any action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void and without effect 4: holding county courts judgment of possession was void because it was ren dered during pendency of bankruptcy stay and dismissing forcible detainer action for want of jurisdiction


Input: in the form of a guaranteed minimum benefit. See IRS Rev. Rul. 2008-7, at 12 (“Ordinarily, a period of zero annual rate of accrual followed by a period of positive annual rates of accrual would result in a plan failing to satisfy the 133 1/3% rule. However, because there is no ongoing accrual under the pre-conversion formula for these participants for service after the January 1, 2002 effective date of the conversion amendment, the lump sum-based benefit formula is the only formula under the plan ... and, pursuant to the special rule of § 411 (b)( 1 )(B)(i), that formula is treated as if it were in effect for all other plan years.”). 19 . Again, although not binding, Revenue Ruling 2008-7 supports this interpretation of the statute and regulations. See IRS Rev. Rul. 2008-7, at 10-12 (<HOLDING>), 18-19 (noting that if the applicable interest Holdings: 0: holding that new rule applied purely prospectively primarily because of reliance factor 1: recognizing district court application of the same rule 2: recognizing rule 3: holding interest rate and conversion factor for future years constant in application of 13313 rule and applying the rule only prospectively 4: holding that reasonable reliance upon the old rule is an important factor supporting prospective application of the new rule


Input: must show that he is a ‘refugee’ within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act, i.e., that he has suffered past persecution on account of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,’ or that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution on these grounds.” Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). Once an asylum applicant has established eligibility for asylum, the decision whether to grant asylum rests with the discretion of the Attorney General, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1), and is generally not reviewable unless “manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D); see also Melendez v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 216-18 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The BIA originally held that application of Holdings: 0: holding that findings of fact are reviewed for clear error 1: holding that while bias findings of fact informing decision whether applicant is eligible for asylum are reviewed for substantial evidence ultimate discretionary determination whether to grant asylum is reviewed for abuse of discretion 2: holding that a district courts decision on whether to hold a daubert hearing is reviewed only for abuse of discretion 3: recognizing that the decision of whether to give a jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion 4: holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion


Input: Court appreciates that there is a declining market for the PRRS vaccine which may limit the duration of Boehringer’s patent. Moreover, Schering has informed the Court that Bayer Corporation and other companies now market competing vaccines which will also affect the PRRS market. Therefore, it appears that the PRRS vaccine market is more competitive now such that the ability to compensate Boehringer for its losses will be more difficult to determine. These limitations on the commercial success of Boehringer’s patent and the effective duration of its patent, even if not caused by Schering’s conduct, is an indication that Boehringer’s Patent has a shortened duration and thus, Boehringer’s need to enforce its right to exclusivity is more acute at this time. See Polymer, 103 F.3d at 975 (<HOLDING>); Bell & Howell Document Management Products Holdings: 0: holding that a movant that clearly establishes likelihood of success on the merits receives the benefit of a presumption of irreparable harm 1: holding that evidence that the infringer was not the principal or the sole cause of the patentees lost sales does not rebut the presumption of irreparable harm 2: holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative 3: holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm 4: holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate


Input: for child support from May 16, 1986, to March 18, 1989. That portion of the trial court’s judgment which awards attorney fees to Lisa which were properly allocable to her attorney’s representation of Gary is REVERSED, and we REMAND this cause to the trial court for a determination of the proper amount of attorney fees. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. SMITH, J., concurs and dissents with opinion. 3 . We note that the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution has been held to be co-extensive with article 1, section 3 of the Texas Constitution. See Twiford v. Nueces County Appraisal Dist., 725 S.W.2d 325, 328 n. 5 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Burroughs v. Lyles, 142 Tex. 704, 711, 181 S.W.2d 570, 574 (1944) (<HOLDING>). We base our interpretation of section 13.42 Holdings: 0: holding that white persons may state a claim under section 1981 and noting  the racial character of the rights being protected  1: recognizing that rights under article i section 11 are subject to reasonable limitations 2: holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983 3: holding that states are persons but conceding that this change was not envisioned as broadening the class of persons who could be held liable under the act 4: holding that this section article 1 section 3 guaranteeing all persons equality of rights was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discrimination


Input: violations of the law, had their applications granted in or around the same time Plaintiffs had their applications denied. Moreover, a number of the examples cited by Plaintiffs involved licensees who had been convicted of crimes unrelated to alcohol and none of the examples involved licensees who had been convicted of alcohol related crimes and who had provided false information on their application. Id. at ¶ 36A. Consequently, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for violation of their right to equal protection of the law because they have not shown that individuals similarly situated to Plaintiffs were treated differently. See, Vukadinovich v. Board of School Trustees of Michigan, 978 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 133, 126 L.Ed.2d 97 (1993) (<HOLDING>) The Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Holdings: 0: holding that default judgment could not be rendered after the defendant had served plaintiff with a copy of a motion to dismiss that had not then been filed 1: holding that the district court had discretion where plaintiff sought to amend a count that had been dismissed with prejudice 2: holding that the plaintiff had not stated a claim for inducement to breach a contract where she had not alleged facts sufficient to show the existence of an enforceable underlying contract 3: holding so where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had colluded to claim falsely that the plaintiffs physician had informed the claims adjuster that the plaintiff had been released to work and where the plaintiff was later discharged from employment and denied workers compensation benefits 4: holding that plaintiff had not stated an equal protection claim where plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant treated him differently from anyone else who both had problems with alcohol and had been arrested


Input: faculty representatives. See § 23-40-104(l)(b), 7 C.R.S. (1997). 8 . We note that Tenth Circuit authority, while mirroring the three-factor analysis we adopted in Simon, recognizes this factor as most important. See Sonnenfeld v. City & County of Denver, 100 F.3d 744, 749 (10th Cir.1996); Haldeman v. State of Wyo. Farm Loan Bd., 32 F.3d 469, 473 (10th Cir.1994). 9 . Section 24-30-1517(2) excepts from coverage the University of Colorado at Boulder, Denver, and Colorado Springs and the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center. 10 . Our conclusion squares with the body of Tenth Circuit decisions which, applying a similar analysis, have consistently found state universities to be arms of the state. See, e.g., Watson v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 575, 577 (10th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>); Mascheroni v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Holdings: 0: holding that local school boards were not entitled to eleventh amendment immunity even though entitled to sovereign immunity in the same degree as the state itself from tort suits 1: holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981 2: holding that utah waived eleventh amendment immunity by causing removal to federal court and litigating merits of 42 usc  1983 action 3: holding that pennsylvanias judicial districts are entitled to immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment 4: recognizing general proposition and specifically finding university of utah medical center entitled to eleventh amendment immunity


Input: F.2d 1566,1571 (11th Cir.1990). In this case, the summary to the Revised Commentary states that the Commentary “applies and interprets the requirements of Regulation Z” and that the revisions “provide guidance” on certain issues addressed therein. 61 Fed. Reg. 14952. Moreover, for reasons discussed more specifically below, the Board’s interpretation applying TILA and Regulation Z to pawnbrokers is in accordance with the prevailing law. Therefore, the Revised Commentary applies to the case at hand unless it is demonstrably irrational. The Board’s application of TILA to pawnbrokers is not demonstrably irrational. Although few courts have addressed the issue, those which have uniformly hold that pawnbrokers are subject to TILA See Burnett v. Ala Moana Pawn Shop, 3 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Hyde v. Hutto Enterprises, Inc., 1994 WL Holdings: 0: holding that  1447c applies to counsel 1: holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action 2: holding tila applies to pawnbrokers 3: holding exemption applies to nondebtor 4: holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action


Input: jurisdiction over plaintiffs entire complaint. Def.’s Opp. at 3-10. The Court will decline to do so. I. Motion For Leave to File an Amended Complaint Defendant does not assert, and the Court does not find, that plaintiffs proposed amendments would trigger the Foman factors of undue delay, prejudice to defendant, or futility. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227. Plaintiff has amended her complaint only once before, and even if she is seeking to amend her complaint again solely to return to Superi- or Court, as defendants allege, this is not necessarily evidence of forbidden bad faith. If defendant’s claims are correct, here, plaintiff has simply “deleted causes of action that ERISA completely preempts].” Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, if the motions were denied, the ERISA Holdings: 0: holding that there was no waiver where attorney general appeared in federal court answered a complaint responded to discovery and later moved to amend its answer to the complaint in order to raise states eleventh amendment immunity 1: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination 2: holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court 3: holding in an appeal from the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 that when the papers before the sixth circuit indicate that the plaintiff could submit an amended complaint that would state a claim upon which relief can be granted the proper course is to remand to permit the plaintiff to amend 4: holding that a plaintiff had not engaged in improper forum manipulation when she simultaneously moved to amend her complaint to drop claims that were completely preempted by erisa and to remand the case to state court


Input: was proper. The order of the trial court is therefore, AFFIRMED. SHIVERS and JOANOS, JJ., concur. 1 . Section 440.49(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides workers’ compensation coverage "in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” Section 440.11(1) provides that the employer’s liability for such workers’ compensation "shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer ... to the employee.” 2 . Larson, supra, citing to Montanaro v. Guild Metal Prods., Inc., 108 R.I. 362, 275 A.2d 634 (1971). 3 . The employer did not object to this practice. See Serean v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 277 So.2d 732 (La.App.1973) cited in Larson's, supra at Section 21.60, (<HOLDING>). 4 .Whether this lobby was also used by the Holdings: 0: holding that accident which occurred thirty minutes before work was within the course where employee customarily showed up early and employer never objected 1: holding that employer did not have duty to protect allegedly intoxicated employee from risk that employee would have automobile accident after leaving work 2: holding that an assault that occurred immediately after the employee was discharged was in the course of the employment 3: holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work 4: holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred


Input: to be given full effect and did not intend any provision to be mere sur-plusage.” Id. G.S. § 160A-48(d)(2) provides that a non-urban area may be annexed if it is “adjacent, on at least sixty percent (60%) of its external boundary, to any combination of the municipal boundary and the boundary of an area or areas developed for urban purposes as defined in subsection (c).” (emphasis added). CP&L properly notes that “[o]rdinarily, when the conjunctive ‘and’ connects words, phrases or clauses of a statutory sentence, they are to be considered jointly.” Lithium Corp., 261 N.C. at 636, 135 S.E.2d at 577. However G.S. § 160A-48(d)(2) does not use the word “and” alone; the statute also includes other words which bear on its meaning. See Builders, Inc., 302 N.C. at 556, 276 S.E.2d at 447 (<HOLDING>). Notably, the statute uses the word Holdings: 0: holding that a contract must be read as a whole in order to give a reasonable and harmonious meaning and effect to all of its provisions citation omitted 1: holding that statutes must be read so as to give effect to all statutory language 2: holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language 3: holding that a contract should be read to give reasonable meaning to all provisions of that contract 4: recognizing courts must interpret statutes to give effect to all language used rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous


Input: the progression of his kidney disease, much less prevented it. Dr. Atta’s ultimate opinion was that no matter what Nurse Jordan did or didn’t do, Mr. Clanton was going to progress to end-stage kidney disease. Dr. Atta opined that Kevin Clanton would live 29.7 years after his first kidney transplant, or until he is approximately 65 years old. Unlike Mr. Clanton’s treating physicians and expert nephrologist, Dr. Atta opined that the half-life of a transplanted kidney is twelve years, and he believes Mr. Clanton will need only one more kidney transplant. Cathlin Vinett-Mitchell Cathlin Vinett-Mitchell was retained by the Government to develop a life care plan for Kevin Clanton. She is a registered nurse with a specialty in rehabilitat DAK, 2013 WL 595766, at *1 (D. Utah Feb. 15, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Duque v. United States, Case No. 05-1417, Holdings: 0: holding that physicians statement during the course of treating the plaintiff was admissible under rule 801d2d when offered against the government in ftca medical malpractice case 1: holding that where the alj had already  obtained and considered reports from treating physicians the alj had before him a complete medical history and the evidence received from the treating physicians was adequate for him to make a determination as to disability 2: holding that anonymous statement was admissible as a statement by a partys agent under rule 801d2d and noting that a district court should be presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who is alleged to have made the damaging statement is in fact a party or an agent of that party 3: holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations 4: holding that statement about deceased veteran made by va intake clerk during an interview with va legal counsel was admissible under rule 801d2d when offered against the government in ftca medical malpractice case


Input: (same). In this case, as in OBert, there was no question that Rasanen’s excessive force claim had to proceed to the jury. Brown claimed that he shot Rasanen while struggling to regain control of his own gun after Rasanen had lunged at the officer and Brown felt his gun pointed against him. Such a scenario plainly demonstrated “probable cause to believe that the suspect pose[d] a threat of serious physical harm.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694; see generally Florida v. Harris, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013) (describing probable cause as “practical,” “common-sensical,” “all-things considered” standard for assessing probabilities in particular factual context); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff never contended otherwise. Instead, Holdings: 0: recognizing probable cause as fluid standard that does not demand hard certainties but only the sort of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent men not legal technicians act 1: holding that probable cause inquiry is whether considering totality of the circumstances there is a fair probability that contraband  will be found in a particular place 2: holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime 3: holding that probable cause does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false 4: holding that new york law reasonable cause standard is equivalent to fourth amendments probable cause standard


Input: AT’s claim for damages against OFC. Because OFC had not breached its finance lease, and had no contractual obligation to provide conforming goods, AT did not state a claim against OFC for which relief could be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see also Milledgeville Water Co. v. Fowler, 129 Ga. 111, 58 S.E. 643, 644 (1907) (“where contract relations exist, the parties assume toward each other no duties whatever besides those the contract imposes”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the district court appropriately awarded fees to OFC under the terms of the lease, which provided that “Lessee shall reimburse Lessor for all charges, costs, expenses and attorney’s fees.... ” See Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Muscogee Iron Works, 265 Ga. 790, 462 S.E.2d 367, 368 (1995) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. * This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award 1: holding that a court has power to award attorney fees when authorized by contract statute or recognized ground of equity 2: holding the contract was not authorized by law 3: holding that although attorneys fees are usually not recoverable unless permitted by statute or contract contractual or statutory authorization was not necessary in a malpractice claim to recover attorneys fees and costs as damages 4: recognizing that under georgia law attorneys fees are allowed where authorized by statute or contract