Input: complaint, with nothing more to provide a defendant with notice, is not a charging instrument.’” Id. (citation omitted). The affidavit of complaint document in this case contemplates further action because the document provides choices allowing for the issuance of either an arrest warrant or criminal summons. Additionally, the fact that the document provides a choice for the issuance of an arrest warrant clearly suggests that the document is not itself an arrest warrant. Our supreme court has emphasized that the issuing of an arrest warrant is necessary even where, as here, “the defendant has already been taken into custody,” because “the purpose of the warrant is to serve as the charging instrument.” Ferrante, 269 S.W.3d at 913; cf. State v. Frasier, 914 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tenn. 1996) (<HOLDING>). At oral argument in a related case, the State Holdings: 0: holding that reasoning which would justify the arrest by the search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest  will not do 1: holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at the time of a  formal charge which we construe to be an arrest warrant or at the time of the preliminary hearing in those rare cases where a preliminary hearing is not preceded by an arrest warrant or by indictment or presentment when the charge is initiated by the grand jury quoting state v mitchell 593 sw2d 280 286 tenn 1980 2: recognizing that criminal contempt is not initiated by an indictment or presentment 3: holding admission of preliminary hearing testimony did not violate the sixth amendment where defendants motive during crossexamination was the same as at trial 4: holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed


Input: upon which relief can be granted. Because the GEO employees were not required to respond to Pollard’s complaint, we have no idea whether they could pursue the government contractor defense were Pollard’s claims to be tried under state tort law. Nor do the GEO employees have any incentive to make such an argument at this stage of the litigation, as their argument rests on the existence of adequate alternative remedies under state tort law which would be foreclosed by the successful invocation of such a defense. Thus, the GEO employees may have a complete defense to liability under state tort law or they may not; we simply don't know. 17 . Another, closely related, example of one of these potential defenses is federal preemption. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 11-13 (D.C.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). 18 . According to the United States Justice Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 1: holding that plaintiffs state law tort actions against private military contractors working for the federal government were preempted by federal law 2: holding the state law claims were not preempted 3: holding that the application of an element of a state law tort is preempted if in holding a defendant hable for the conduct  there would be conflict with federal patent law 4: holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law


Input: his case. Although “[a] defendant’s right to counsel of his choice is not an absolute one,” United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 1979), we have consistently recognized that the right of a defendant who retains counsel to be represented by that counsel is “ ‘a right of constitutional dimension’.” United States v. Wisniewski, 478 F.2d 274, 285 (2d Cir. 1973), quoting United States v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337, 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825, 90 S.Ct. 68, 24 L.Ed.2d 76 (1969). Hence we have observed that the “[cjhoice of counsel should not be unnecessarily obstructed by the court.” United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 788 (2d Cir. 1976), citing United States v. Sheiner, supra, 410 F.2d at 342. See also United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 203 (2d Cir. 1977) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing the right to counsel on appeal 1: recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel 2: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 3: holding the trial court violated bradleys right to counsel of choice because none of the conditions identified in wheat as overriding the right to counsel of choice were present 4: recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice


Input: his 15-year sentence, raising three arguments: (1) a 30-month upward variance was unwarranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); (2) his sentence creates an unwarranted disparity with Hawkins’s ten-year sentence; and (3) his sentence was greater than necessary to achieve the goals of § 3553(a). Jones contends that the court abused its discretion by varying upwards solely on his criminal record. But the record does not support Jones’s contention. The court did, as Jones suggests, rely on his past criminal conduct. But the court explicitly relied on past unscored criminal history. Under our reasonableness review, which gives due deference to the district court, see United States v. Barrett, 552 F.3d 724, 727 (8th Cir.2009), we cannot say the district court abused its discretion. See id. at 727 (<HOLDING>). Given the holding in Barrett, we cannot say Holdings: 0: holding that request for departure in sentencing based on a criminal history category that overstated defendants record violated plea agreement that prohibited departure requests but did not stipulate to a specific criminal history category 1: holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance after finding that the defendants criminal history category of i understated the seriousness of his criminal history 3: holding that when a defendant qualifies as a career felon it is not necessary to ascertain the defendants criminal history category because the sentencing guidelines mandate a criminal history category of vi 4: holding that a district court may depart upward based upon based criminal conduct when such conduct is not included in the computation of criminal history category


Input: is not bound by a stipulation of the parties. See O’Neil v. Behrendt, 212 Neb. 372, 322 N.W.2d 790 (1982). However, when stipulated expenses are undisputed, “that fact may be considered in determining whether or not the verdict was inadequate.” Id. at 377, 322 N.W.2d at 793. In this case, the stipulated expenses were incorporated into a jury instruction to which neither party objected. The jury was instructed that the reasonable value of funeral and burial expenses incurred by the estate was $6,880.75 and that the reasonable value of medical care provided to the deceased was $26,523.97. We have held verdicts in personal injury cases to be inadequate as a matter of law where the amount was in irreconcilable conflict with stipulated or uncontested damages. See, O’Neil v. Behrendt, supra (<HOLDING>); Webster v. Halbridge, 185 Neb. 409, 176 Holdings: 0: holding that verdict of 1000 was inadequate where special damages for medical expenses were stipulated in amount of 164118 1: holding verdict inadequate when stipulated medical expenses were 319499 and verdict was in same amount notwithstanding evidence of additional uncontested damages 2: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 3: holding that verdict of liability that awarded past medical expenses only and nothing for pain and suffering clearly shows it was result of compromised verdict where negligence was seriously disputed 4: holding that jurys damagesrelated questions and verdict of liability with clearly inadequate damages of only medical expenses but no noneconomic damages in case where liability was hotly contested strongly suggested compromised verdict


Input: more familiar with Wayne neighborhoods and road conditions; and (5) there is a risk of fraud inherent in solicitation that does not exist with respect to pure political campaigning. (Def. Br. in Opp., at 5, 12.) Defendant spends the majority of its brief addressing the Ordinance’s carve-out for political campaigning. However, Wayne articulates virtually no basis for why these same justifications apply to charitable organizations that do not solicit for donations yet do not apply to charitable organizations that do solicit for money. In addressing this question, Defendant simply relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Kokinda, where the Court upheld a postal regulation banning solicitation on post office sidewalks. 497 U.S with Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (<HOLDING>)(internal quotation marks and citation Holdings: 0: recognizing that time place and manner restrictions must be content neutral 1: holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information 2: holding a regulation is contentneutral as long as it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech 3: holding restrictions embodied in content neutral statute must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest while leaving open sufficient alternative channels of communication 4: holding that contentneutral time place and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication


Input: place him in the same position he would have occupied had the breach not occurred. Schneiker v. Gordon, 732 P.2d 603, 612 (Colo.1987); Taylor v. Colorado State Bank of Denver, 165 Colo. 576, 580, 440 P.2d 772, 774 (1968). However, damages are not recoverable for losses beyond an amount that a plaintiff can establish with reasonable certainty by a preponderance of evidence. Riggs v. McMurtry, 157 Colo. 33, 39, 400 P.2d 916, 919 (1965) (stating that the trier of fact may not base an award of damages on mere speculation, rather, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he has in fact suffered damage and that the evidence introduced provides a reasonable basis for a computation of damages); see also Bunch v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 505 P.2d 41, 43 (Colo.App.1972) (<HOLDING>); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 Holdings: 0: holding that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendants acted with malice 1: holding that there must be sufficient competent evidence from which the trier of fact could estimate the amount of damages with a reasonable degree of certainty 2: holding that a settlement letter is relevant evidence of the amount in controversy if it appears to reflect a reasonable estimate of the plaintiffs claim 3: holding that on a review of the sufficiency of the evidence the court determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding in part that the severity of a victims injuries may be sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a victim has been knowingly killed


Input: Williams’s certiorari petition and reinstating his parole. For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment reinstating Williams’s parole is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. McMILLAN, P.J., and COBB, BASCHAB, and WISE, JJ., concur. 1 . Pursuant to § 12-3-9, Ala.Code 1975, this Court has appellate jurisdiction over postcon-viction writs in criminal cases. Certiorari petitions challenging the Board’s revocation of parole are considered postconviction writs for purposes of § 12-3-9. See Ex parte Alabama Board of Pardons & Paroles, 849 So.2d 255 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). The Board filed a timely notice of appeal pursuant to § 6-6-641, Ala.Code 1975. See Dearborn Stove Co. v. Dean, 269 Ala. 561, 115 So.2d 258 (1959) (<HOLDING>); and Ex parte Wright, 860 So.2d 1253 Holdings: 0: holding that  1074 t7 code 1940 the predecessor to  66641 provides for appeals from final judgments of circuit courts in certiorari proceedings 1: holding that for purposes of certiorari review court of appeals must identify the basis for refusing to treat an issue 2: holding that this court will consider a petition for a writ of certiorari only after the court of appeals has overruled the application for rehearing on the point challenged in the petition implying that the decision by the court of criminal appeals must be final before certiorari review would be available 3: holding that previous legal ruling granting certiorari was law of the case in subsequent proceedings 4: recognizing that where a state prisoner declines to pursue certiorari in the united states supreme court that petitioners conviction is not final  until  after the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the supreme court has passed


Input: v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); Hunter v. State, 955 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). 17 . Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 770-71 (Tex. Crim.App.2002); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). 18 . United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). 19 . Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 65 n. 43 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (citing with approval United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651, 656 (6th Cir.1999), which holds that prolonging a detention for the purpose of issuing the citation is “well within the bounds of the initial stop”); see Coleman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 708, 719 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied,-U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 502, 166 Holdings: 0: holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished 1: holding complete prohibition on use of crime or accident reports for purpose of soliciting clients too broad a means of effectuating the intended purpose of the law 2: holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense 3: holding that purpose of stop was complete upon the issuance of the citation 4: holding that if an agent does not develop reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before the justifying purpose of a checkpoint stop has been accomplished he may not prolong the stop


Input: reliance on the mediation statement fails for several reasons. To begin, there is the language of Rule 3(c)(4), which says that a party’s intent to appeal must be gleaned “from the notice.” (Emphasis added); cf. Smith, 502 U.S. at 248, 112 S.Ct. 678 (“the notice afforded by a document, not the litigant’s motivation in filing it, determines the document’s sufficiency as a notice of appeal”). Consistent with the plain language of the rule, we have looked to the “text” of a notice of appeal, not to surrounding circumstances, to gauge compliance with the rule. Thoubboron, 749 A.2d at 748; see also Paramedics Electromedicina, 369 F.3d at 656-57 (similar); Meehan, 312 F.3d at 911 (similar); United States v. Carelock, 459 F.3d 437, 442-43 (3d Cir.2006) (similar); cf. Perry, 623 A.2d at 1215 (<HOLDING>). And just as importantly, under the Supreme Holdings: 0: holding that the appeal was properly before the court where the appellant appealed from an order amending a prior order without appealing from the prior order 1: holding that failure to designate the judgment or order being appealed is a jurisdictional defect 2: holding that appellant had standing to appeal because it was bound by the judgment even though it did not meet the second requirement 3: holding that appellant complied with rule 3as requirement to designate the judgment or order appealed where it was clear from the face of the notice of appeal which judgment appellant sought to appeal 4: holding that identification of appellant in notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement and that the failure to name a party in a notice to appeal constitutes a failure of that party to appeal


Input: express representations made by the applicant regarding the scope of the claims and an examination of any of the prior art cited. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583; Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 181 Ct.Cl. 55, 384 F.2d 391, 399 (1967). It is appropriate for the Court to consider not only the changes made during prosecution, but also the reason for the changes. See Insta-Foam Prods., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys., Inc., 906 F.2d 698, 703 (Fed.Cir.1990) (“A close examination must be made as to not only what was surrendered, but also the reason for such a surrender.”). Prosecution history “limits the interpretation of claim terms so as to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.” Southwall Techs. Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In most disputes over claim construction, an Holdings: 0: holding that the meaning of a term in a claim must be consistent with its appearance in other claims in the same patent 1: holding a technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention unless it is apparent from the patent and the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a different meaning 2: recognizing that plain meaning does not control where context shows that the parties have assigned an unusual meaning to a term 3: holding that statements made during the prosecution history may commit the applicant to a particular meaning for a patent term which meaning is then binding in litigation 4: holding that court of appeals erred in relying on the plain meaning of a statute when the legislative history clearly indicated another meaning


Input: See White, 45 F.3d at 362 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., § 1630.2(o)). Neither was Boeing obligated to transfer plaintiff to four of the other remaining positions — Plumber Maintenance B, A, and Special, and Millwright B — because transfer to any of those positions would have constituted a promotion. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., § 1630.2(o) ("[A]n employer is not required to promote an individual with a disability as an accommodation."). Finally, had Boeing transferred Aldrich to any of the last three disputed jobs — Maintenance Oiler, Assembler Sub-Assembly B, and Assembler Installer General B — it would have violated the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. This is not required by the ADA. See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 Holdings: 0: holding that a job transfer provided as a reasonable accommodation under the rehabilitation act did not conflict with a collective bargaining agreement when the agreement included a provision authorizing transfers and requiring a seniority preference in transfers ejxcept in the most unusual of circumstances 1: holding that antidiscrimination rights under title vii cannot be waived by a collective bargaining agreement 2: holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable 3: holding that a requested reassignment was not reasonable because it would violate the seniority rights of other employees 4: holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement


Input: treatment center for up to 60 days. We affirm because the district court neither extended Gaines’ supervised release nor revoked it, but simply reinstated the original, three-year term. Gaines admitted to violating the condition of his supervised release that he obey all federal, state and local laws. This court has held that “district courts possess the authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) to reinstate a defendant’s term of supervised release after the defendant has been found to have violated the conditions of that release.” Trenter, 201 F.3d at 1264. Although Games’ three-year term of supervised release began in September 1994, that term of supervised release was tolled while he was in state custody. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e); United States v. Crane, 979 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, reinstatement of his original term Holdings: 0: holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release 1: holding term of supervised release tolled while defendant was in state custody 2: holding that deportation does not extinguish term of supervised release 3: holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses 4: holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e


Input: Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Marquette, 717 F.2d 1016, 1020 (6th Cir.1983); see also Jerry v. UAW-Local 735, 818 F.2d 866 (6th Cir.1987) (unpublished table decision) (“A ruling on a Rule 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, motion to vacate is appealable.... ”). As other courts have noted in addressing the appealability of Rule 60(b) orders, “the finality of such orders derives from the finality of the underlying judgment upon which relief is sought.” Mason v. Integrity Ins. Co. (In re Mason), 709 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir.1983). In this case, the underlying order—the supplemental sale order- — is itself a final order. See Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir.2003); cf. Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 579 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). In concluding that this court lacks appellate Holdings: 0: holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment 1: holding that a bankruptcy order is not final unless it 1 2: holding that an unappealed order is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes 3: holding that a bankruptcy courts sale order is a final order for res judicata purposes 4: holding that an unappealed contempt order by a bankruptcy court is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes


Input: was the same caliber as the shell casings found at the scene of the murder, but a ballistics expert testified that he could not say one way or the other whether the shotgun was the murder weapon. Id. We held that the evidence was relevant and admissible, reasoning: The matching caliber was a circumstance of some probative value. The expert’s testimony that he could not say one way or the other whether the shotgun admitted was the murder weapon, was not conclusive or binding on the jury which was free to determine credibility and weight to be ascribed. Under those circumstances, the jury would be entitled to consider the shotgun and give whatever weight was due in light of the expert’s testimony. Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Delhall v. State, 95 So.3d 134, 155 (Fla.2012) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, when the nexus between the weapon Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err 1: holding that the trial judge did not err by admitting copies of the indictments as part of the defendants record of conviction  2: holding that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant was in the custody of the victim officer when he shot and killed the officer due to the undisputed evidence presented at trial including the defendants pretrial statement to police admitting that fact 3: holding that the trial court did not err admitting evidence of a 9mm cartridge found in a backpack owned by a murder defendant where the victim was shot with 9mm bullets although not made by the same manufacturer as the cartridge found in the backpack 4: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge


Input: to prove if the case were to go to trial. Based on those allegations, there is a substantial relationship between Proskauer’s prior representation of Interliant and the entirety of the current action where debtors’ entire background leading up to the request for bankruptcy relief is in question. V. Laches argument Little need be said of defendants’ argument that the motion to disqualify should be barred by the doctrine of laches, or that plaintiffs purported delay in bringing the motion shows that the motion is merely a tactical ploy. Even if there had been delay in moving to disqualify, the Second Circuit has held that “[s]inee ... disqualification is in the public interest, the court cannot act contrary to that inter of New York and New Jersey, 862 F.Supp. 889, 901 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (<HOLDING>); Schwed v. General Electric Co., 990 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that a year delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was no evidence that the motion was inspired by dilatory tactics 1: holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable 2: holding that a tenmonth delay did not bar the motion where there was no demonstration of prejudice and because disqualification is in the public interest where there is an ethical violation 3: holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay 4: holding that a twoyear delay did not bar the motion where there was no demonstration of unfair prejudice


Input: proceeding can be considered a debt to the child. In re Peters, 964 F.2d 166, 167 (2d Cir.1992) (per curiam), aff'g 133 B.R. 291 (S.D.N.Y.1991). In Peters, we endorsed the reasoning of the district court below, which had explained that “[i]t is ... generally accepted that fees incurred on behalf of a child are nondischargeable because they are deemed to be support when those fees are inextricably intertwined with proceedings affecting the welfare of a child.” Peters, 133 B.R. at 295; see also Spong, 661 F.2d at 9-10. Other circuits have concurred that the debt owed to an attorney appointed to represent a child in custody or support proceedings is properly considered a debt to that child within the meaning of § 523(a)(5). See, e.g., In re Miller, 55 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Dvorak, 986 F.2d 940, 941 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that legal fees for a childs guardian ad litem in a custody proceeding were clearly for the ehilds benefit and support and as such were nondischargeable under  523a5 1: holding that a paternity determination in which the child is not made a party and is not represented by a guardian ad litem is not binding on the child 2: holding that guardian ad litem and psychologist fees incurred in child custody proceedings and ordered to be paid directly to the guardian ad litem and psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 3: holding that where the trial court denies a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a child support case the order is unappealable 4: holding that debts for a guardian ad litem and a psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 because the emphasis is to be placed on the determination of whether a debt is in the nature of support rather than on the identity of the payee


Input: at 226). In In re Hall, the court held that a “single catalogued thesis in one university library” at Frieburg University, Germany, constituted sufficient accessibility to those interested in the art exercising reasonable diligence. Id. at 899-900. As the court in American Stock Exchange, LLC v. Mopex. Inc. recently observed: The need to flip through hundreds of documents, although time-consuming, clearly falls within the bounds of “reasonable diligence”. Surely, if a single copy of a doctoral dissertation maintained in one university library in Germany has been found to be “publicly accessible”, see In re Hall, 781 F.2nd at 899-900, so too is an application that is indexed in the Reference Room — the most logical place to look for prior art. 250 F.Supp. 2nd 323, 329 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>). To a person of skill in the art, browsing a Holdings: 0: holding that public demonstration of electronic organ at show for national association of music manufacturers constituted public use under section 102b despite fact that instrument was not then available for sale to the public 1: holding prior publication must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim internal citations omitted 2: holding a document accessible only through the public reference room at the securities and exchange commission constituted a printed publication under  102b 3: holding that plaintiffs personal opinion on how the kansas corporation commission should carry out the statutory purposes of the kansas securities act is not public policy 4: holding that the judges entry into the jury room constituted reversible error


Input: by the ratio of the verdict to the amount of Breen's medical expenses caused by the accident, which it claims to be approximately 50:1. A jury verdict may be set aside as excessive or a remittitur may be granted only if it appears that "the verdict is so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush, as being beyond all measure unreasonable and outrageous, showing the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption." Elmore v. Doenges Bros. Ford, Inc., 2001 OK CIV APP 27, ¶ 12, 21 P.3d 65, 70 (citing Currens v. Hampton, 1997 OK 58, ¶ 10, 939 P.2d 1138, 1141). Determination of whether a mistrial or a new trial was warranted based on prejudice depends on the facts and cireumstances of each case. Hutton v. Lowry, 1968 OK 114, ¶ 13, 444 P.2d 812, 814-16 (<HOLDING>). The fundamental and controlling question is Holdings: 0: holding that whether proximate cause exists is to be decided in a common sense fashion in the light of the attending facts and circumstances and unless the facts are undisputed and admit of but one inference the question is for the jury 1: holding that reference to the defendants insurance at trial is harmless unless the defendants rights are prejudiced thereby and whether such prejudice has occurred depends essentially upon the facts and circumstances of each case 2: holding that defendant was not deprived of any procedural rights or prejudiced by trial court hearing the evidence at defendants child molesting trial as evidence in the states petition to revoke defendants probation 3: holding the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of the case 4: holding that when there are multiple defendants rule 9b requires that a plaintiff allege facts specifying each defendants contribution to the fraud


Input: overdosed). Exhibit D-3. 10 . Although application of the Sentencing Guidelines is no longer mandatory, [in the Eighth Circuit] district courts are still required to consult the Guidelines and take them into account in calculating a defendant’s sentence. A district court must calculate a defendant's advisory Guidelines sentencing range based on his total offense level, criminal history category, and any appropriate departures. The court may also vary from the advisory Guidelines range based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as long as the resulting sentence is reasonable. Proper application of the Guidelines "remains the critical starting point” for fashioning a reasonable sentence under § 3553(a), and a sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines range Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>)- 12 . The court notes that Rebmann II is not Holdings: 0: holding defendant was not entitled to acceptance of responsibility in part because he suborned perjury 1: holding that where the defendant pleaded guilty subsequently denied his guilt and attempted to withdraw his plea and then attempted to minimize the significance of his statements at sentencing by averring that he accepted responsibility for the amount that me and the government have agreed to and offering a statement accepting responsibility  were insufficient to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility 2: holding that defendant was not entitled to reduction for acceptance of responsibility where he failed to fully account for the proceeds of his crime and attempted to delay a longscheduled hearing based on an incredible claim of innocence 3: holding that courts mention of a guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility to defense counsel was not reversible error 4: holding defendant was not entitled to acceptance of responsibility despite his plea of guilty where he attempted to suborn perjury


Input: in making the parallel determination of whether a police officer has the authority to open a vehicle door as part of issuing an order to exit the vehicle. In the realm of defining reasonable searches and seizures, no meaningful or relevant difference exists between the grant of authority to order an occupant of a vehicle to exit the vehicle and the authority to open the door as part of issuing that lawful order. Plain logic demands that the principles that govern whether a passenger of a vehicle lawfully can be ordered out of the vehicle must apply with equal force to whether a police officer is entitled, as a corollary and reasonable safety measure, to open the door as part of issuing a proper order to exit. See State v. Matthews, 330 N.J.Super. 1, 6, 748 A.2d 1125 (App.Div.2000) (<HOLDING>); State v. Conquest, 243 N.J.Super. 528, 533, Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant was entitled to counsel when the offense for which he was tried could result in the imposition of a jail sentence 1: holding that since the officer was entitled to order defendant out of the car he was equally entitled to open the door to accomplish that object 2: recognizing that trial court properly left the door open for defendant to prove its defenses to the fed complaint 3: holding that a secured creditor is not entitled to receive any more than that to which it was entitled pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan 4: holding a car was broken into or entered when defendant reached in through the open window of a car


Input: affirm the district court. The district court in this case denied Folkerts’ request to be absent from the deposition of the victim until the lawyers completed all questions pertaining to the description of the assailant. Folkerts objected to her presence at the deposition based on due-process grounds, and the issue presented was whether Folkerts had a right under the Due Process Clause to be absent from the deposition. The district court determined she did not, and we are presented with the same question in this interlocutory appeal. We have previously held that a defendant does not have a right to be absent from a deposition. State v. Davis, 259 N.W.2d 812, 813 (Iowa 1977); State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Iowa 1981); see also State v. Randle, 603 N.W.2d 91, 93 (Iowa 1999) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, our rules of criminal procedure Holdings: 0: holding a defendant is not vested with a right to be absent from trial 1: holding that when a constitutional right is vested in a party and there is a doubt as to whether that right has been waived the doubt should be resolved in the defendants favor 2: holding that a right to be released when a joint tortfeasor has been released is a vested right 3: holding that expenditures on architectural planning do not create vested right 4: recognizing that remedial statutes may be applied to pending cases because they usually do not affect vested right


Input: the double-damages provision to play an important role in compensating the United States in cases where it has been defrauded.”); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551-52, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (noting that the “chief purpose of the statute here was to provide for restitution to the government of money taken from it by fraud, and... the device of double damages plus a specific sum was chosen to make sure that the government would be made completely whole.”). There matters stood until 1986, when Congress amended section sh Sch. Bd., 46 F.Supp.2d 546, 558-59 (E.D.La.1999) (concluding that states and municipalities were “persons” under the FCA); and United States ex rel. Chandler v. Hektoen Inst. for Med. Research, 35 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1083 (N.D.Ill.1999) (<HOLDING>) with United States ex rel. Graber v. City of Holdings: 0: holding that county of delaware was not a person for purposes of fca liability 1: holding that county defendant was a person within meaning of fca for purposes of suit by private plaintiff 2: holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983 3: holding that suit against county sheriff in his official capacity was suit against county 4: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983


Input: decision that conclusively resolves this issue in the context of these specific Guideline provisions. However, circuit courts have addressed the relationship between Chapter 4 and § 2L1.2. See e.g., United States v. Frias, 338 F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir.2003) (“The Government disputes [Defendant’s] conclusion that there is a theoretical difference between Chapter 4 and § 2L1.2, arguing that each section is clearly aimed at the same thing, which is varying the punishment based on the criminal record and thus the expected dangerousness of the offender. We agree, believing that, while it may not always be appropriate to look at other sections of the Guidelines to interpret a term, such a course is warranted in this case.”); United States v. Moreno-Cisneros, 319 F.3d 456, 460 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Galicia-Delgado, 130 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a sentencing judge would violate section 3553a by limiting consideration of the applicable guidelines range to the facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant instead of considering the applicable guidelines range as required by subsection 3553a4 based on the facts found by the court 1: holding that section 4a12 is a broadly applicable section of the guidelines 2: recognizing that the epa can consider the section 404b1 guidelines when acting under section 404c 3: holding that standards used in section 1988 cases are applicable to determine prevailing party under section 505b of the rehabilitation act of 1973 4: holding that a prior conviction is not a predicate offense under the sentencing guidelines if the statute that provides the basis for the prior conviction sweeps more broadly than the generic crime described in the guidelines


Input: to allay the investor’s concern.” LC Capital Partners, 318 F.3d at 155. The statements cited by Gottex express optimism about a positive outcome to the investigations, but such “mere expressions of hope” are insufficient to dissipate Gottex’s duty to inquire. Id. at 156. Even if these were outright denials of the specific practices being investigated, they do not fulfill Gottex’s duty of inquiry and were insufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F.Supp.2d 429, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“A plaintiffs duty to inquire is not dissipated merely because of a defendant’s denial of wrongdoing.”); see also Great Rivers Co-op. of Southeastern Iowa v. Farmland Inds., Inc., 120 F.3d 893, 898 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Lenz v. Associated Inns & Restaurants Co. of Holdings: 0: holding that defendants answer sufficiently encapsulated the elements of an affirmative defense to have put plaintiff on notice that defendant intended to rely on it 1: recognizing that nondisclosure agreements did not have to list the secret information in order to put employees on notice 2: holding that selfserving statements about the invalidity of the suit do not  negate the other pertinent information that otherwise put plaintiff on inquiry notice 3: holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration 4: holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense


Input: judgment debtor to determine if there are any funds owed to the judgment debtor by the third party. Id. at §§ 63.001-.008. It requires a separate lawsuit against the third party consisting of an application supported by affidavits affirming that the defendant does not possess property in Texas subject to execution sufficient to satisfy the debt. It also requires a bond. Tex.R. Crv. P. 657-674. In the case before us, however, the creditor and the third party are effectively the same; the creditor is the State of Texas and the party holding the funds, the TDCJ, is an agency of the State. See Martin v. Tex. Bd. of Criminal Justice, 60 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (recognizing that TDCJ is a state agency); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976) (<HOLDING>). It is unlikely that the legislature Holdings: 0: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office 1: holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state 2: holding that the state police is a state agency 3: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 4: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state itself and not cognizable under  1983


Input: is irrelevant. The issue of whether Davis was entitled to prejudgment interest had already been determined and any countervailing equities should not have been a consideration for the Cibola County court. The surety bond states that Safeco is to pay claimants “such sum or sums as may be justly due claimant” following a lawsuit. It has long been black-letter law that “[i]nterest normally commences to run against the principal from the date that he violates his obligation and, since the surety is liable for the principal’s entire debt, he will be hable also for such interest on the debt.” Arthur A. Stearns, The Law of Suretyship § 8.19, at 283 (5th ed. 1951); cf. Social Sec. Admin., Baltimore Fed. Credit Union v. Employer’s Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 234 Md. 493, 199 A.2d 918, 919 (1964) (<HOLDING>); Borough of Totowa v. American Surety Co., 39 Holdings: 0: holding bond protecting credit union against loss from employees dishonesty made surety hable for interest on sum embezzled 1: holding that the breach occurs when the union acts against the interest of its members 2: holding school district strictly hable for sexual harassment by its employees 3: recognizing employers interest in protecting confidentiality of data bearing on employees basic competence 4: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted


Input: and calculations” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the Agreements were not otherwise justified by “avoided litigation costs or fair value for services.” Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2236. ‘ In light of the standard for dismissal on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have met their burden and have adequately alleged that the sum total of the Watson Agreement constituted a large and unjustified payment, as did the Lupin Agreement (challenged by the EPPs and Retailers only). Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden to allege facts that, with the benefit of fact and expert discovery, have the reasonable expectation of proving their prima facie case under the rule of reason. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (<HOLDING>). C. Fraud on the PTO, Sham Litigation, and Holdings: 0: holding ban violated the sherman act 1: holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act 2: holding that a complaint must plead enough facts to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and state a plausible claim 3: holding that a complaint must plead facts sufficient to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of a sherman act violation 4: holding that same activity violated  2 of the sherman act


Input: absence of probable cause is a long established constitutional right,” Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 128. Therefore, one who gives false information to a prosecutor that he knows will induce a prosecutor to commence or continue proceedings against a plaintiff, knowingly violates the law and is not entitled to qualified immunity for his actions. Cf id. at 131 (action against police officers who “create[d] false information likely to influence a jury’s decision and forward[ed] that information to prosecutors”). Moreover, extension of qualified immunity in such circumstances would thwart the basic purpose of § 1983 itself— to protect persons from abuse of official authority, see Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161, 112 S.Ct. at 1830, and, thus, must be rejected in any event. See id. at 164, 112 S.Ct. at 1831 (<HOLDING>). An examination of the specific inquiries Holdings: 0: holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law dictate the same absolute immunity under  1983 1: recognizing that the claim at issue was one under state common law between two private parties the experts in the federal system at resolving common law counterclaims  are the article iii courts 2: holding that the defense of good faith and probable cause is available to officers in common law actions for false arrest and imprisonment as well as in actions brought pursuant to section 1983 3: holding that irrespective of the common law support we will not recognize an immunity available at common law if  1983s history or purpose counsel against applying it in  1983 actions 4: recognizing common law privileges


Input: sexually abused Doe. Nelson did not testify at the hearing. Nelson appeals. II. Nelson argues on appeal that his equal protection and due process rights were violated by the family court’s failure to hold the family court action in abeyance pending resolution of the related criminal charges. The essence of Nelson’s position is that the pending criminal charges (and his right to remain silent) unduly and impermissibly influenced his decision whether to testify in the family court action and, more generally, his ability to defend himself against the family court abuse allegations, amounting to a constitutional violation. Case law from other jurisdictions has uniformly rejected Nelson’s constitutional challenge. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11, 90 S.Ct. 763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Peiffer v. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 848 F.2d 44, Holdings: 0: holding that simultaneous civil and related criminal proceedings do not constitute unfairness and want of consideration of justice requiring reversal of a criminal conviction 1: holding that isolated criminal attacks do not constitute persecution 2: holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings 3: holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings 4: holding a continuance of lawyer disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of related criminal proceedings is not constitutionally required


Input: in the Harris County -Jail. Although the trial court did not set aside its judgment of contempt, it later released Evans from confinement. There is no appeal from a contempt judgment, and a writ of habeas corpus is not available because Evans is no longer restrained. Therefore, this court has the ability to exercise mandamus jurisdiction over the contempt judgment. See Rosser v. Squier, 902 S.W.2d 962 (Tex.1995); In re K.S.E., 2003 WL 21269585, at *1, n. 2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Jun.4, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.). Under section 574.037(a), the trial court lacked authority to order Evans to provide outpatient mental health services. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment of contempt against Evans for violating that order is void. See Ex parte Evans, 939 S.W.2d 142, 144. (Tex.1997) (<HOLDING>); In re Villanueva, 56 S.W.3d 905, 908-10 Holdings: 0: holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment 1: holding that a defendant cannot be punished by contempt proceedings for disregarding a void order 2: holding that circuit court that had no jurisdiction to modify georgia custody determination could not enter valid contempt judgment against husband for violating void modification judgment 3: holding that an order or judgment issued by a disqualified judge is void but not because the court lacked jurisdiction 4: holding that judgment of contempt was void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter


Input: 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988). The Supreme Court has noted that “the selection of the appropriate design for military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function.” Id. In order for a contractor to claim the government contractor defense, (1) the government must have approved “reasonably precise” specifications; (2) the equipment must have conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier/contractor must have warned of those equipment dangers that were known to the supplier/contractor, but not to the government. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512, 108 S.Ct. 2510; Stout, 933 F.2d at 336. The government need not prepare the specifications to be considered to have approved them. See Trevino v. General Dynamics, 865 F.2d 1474, 1480 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). To determine whether “substantive review” Holdings: 0: holding that there was adequate opportunity when state court judicial review of an administrative proceeding was available 1: holding that substantive review is adequate 2: holding that pennsylvanias full judicial review of a denied building permit is adequate process 3: holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus 4: holding that standard of review is a matter of procedural rather than substantive law


Input: and Ms. Kirton], including but not limited to those involving any transaction or the construction, performance, or breach of this or any other agreement between [Merrill Lynch and Ms. Kirton], whether entered into prior [to], on, or subsequent to the date hereof.” We agree. Ms. Kirton and Ms. Adamson executed the 1995 customer agreement in connection with the creation of their joint account at Merrill Lynch. At her deposition, Ms. Kirton testified that before she signed that agreeme olding that a clause providing for arbitration of “all claims ... and controversies of every kind or nature that may arise between [the Buyer and the Dealer]” was broad enough to cover the plaintiffs claims of conversion and wrongful repossession); Jones v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., supra (<HOLDING>). See, also the following cases, from other Holdings: 0: holding that in a suit on a sworn account the petition with an attached sworn account and verified affidavit of the sworn account was a liquidated claim proved by written instruments 1: holding that the rights conferred to a joint account holder by massachusetts statutes and case law in fact give a joint account holder legal title in a joint account 2: holding that nonsignatory settlor and trust beneficiaries could be compelled to arbitrate under account agreement between trustee and merrill lynch which contained an arbitration clause because agreement was the underlying basis for all the claims of the beneficiaries and there would have been no claims without the agreement 3: holding that fathers investment account with stock brokerage firm was not a multipleparty account available for payment of child support 4: holding that language in a merrill lynch customer account agreement that the plaintiff signed upon opening the first account  providing for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of its business  applied to the disputed second account even though the plaintiff did not sign a separate customer account agreement for the second account


Input: 961, 115 S.Ct. 420, 130 L.Ed.2d 335 (1994); Hampel v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 235, 238, aff'd, 429 Fed. Appx. 995 (Fed.Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1105, 181 L.Ed.2d 973 (2012); Woodson v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 640, 650 (2009); McCullough v. United States, 76 Fed.Cl. 1, 3 (2006), appeal dismissed, 236 Fed.Appx. 615 (Fed.Cir.), reh’g denied (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1050, 128 S.Ct. 675, 169 L.Ed.2d 529 (2007); Agee v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 284, 290 (2006); Zhengxing v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 732, 739, aff'd, 204 Fed.Appx. 885 (Fed.Cir.), reh’g denied (Fed.Cir.2006). Any claim alleging negligence by government officials raises a question of tortious conduct, which is not reviewable in this court. See Husband v. United States, 90 Fed.Cl. 29, 35 (2009) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). This court, Holdings: 0: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort when the government seized and failed to return plaintiffs property or in the alternative that his property was lost as a result of the governments theft 1: holding that a passenger who lacked a property or possessory interest in the automobile or property seized lacked standing to challenge a search of the car 2: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort including fraud 3: holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property 4: holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property


Input: and obtained some benefit from it, “then section 503(b)(1)(A) comes into play irrespective of whether damages for breach might otherwise lie.” Id., citing In re Thompson, 788 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.1986); Kinnan & Kinnan P’ship v. Agristor Leasing, 116 B.R. 162 (D.Neb.1990). Other courts have also decided Section 365(d)(10) does not take away a personal property lessor’s right to apply for administrative expenses during the first sixty days of a case. See In re Magnolia Gas Co., 255 B.R. 900, 917 (W.D.Okl.2000); In re Eastern Agri-Systems, Inc., 258 B.R. 352, 354-55 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.2000) (finding administrative expense claims arising under § 365(d)(10) are independent from administrative expense claims under § 503(b)); In re Pan Am. Airways Corp., 245 B.R. 897, 899 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>); In re Russell Cave Co., 247 B.R. at 659 Holdings: 0: holding that in an agreement where the father agreed to pay reasonable expenses to the extent that such expenses are not provided by any scholarship grant or other assistance for his sons education those expenses did not include loan repayment because it was not one of the forms of enumerated assistance 1: holding that although the lessor was not entitled to an administrative expense claim under  365d10 for the debtors use of leased property during the first sixty days of the ease the lessor would be entitled to those expenses under  503b1 to the extent the lessor could prove the expenses represented the actual necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate 2: holding that debtors have the burden of proving that other necessary expenses on form b22c are actual reasonable and necessary expenses and that these expenses should be considered in light of schedule j and other relevant evidence 3: holding that expenses refers to costs 4: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid


Input: in good faith also requires an employer to supply relevant employment information when requested by the employees’ representative. E. Tenn. Baptist Hosp. v. NLRB, 6 F.3d 1139, 1143 (6th Cir.1993) (citing Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303, 99 S.Ct. 1123, 59 L.Ed.2d 333 (1979)). The Board found that Galicks had a duty to collectively bargain with the Union. It also found that Galicks violated this duty by withdrawing recognition from the Union and failing to respond to the Union’s information request in August 2006. Galicks does not dispute that it took either of these latter actions. Instead, Galicks argues that it did not have a duty to bargain in the first place because it had one or fewer journeymen in the bargaining unit. McDaniel Elec., 313 N.L.R.B. 126, 127 (1993) (<HOLDING>). But the Board found that Galicks could not Holdings: 0: holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify 1: holding that there can be only one final appealable order 2: holding that there is no duty to bargain if an employer can prove it has a stable one or noman bargaining unit 3: holding if there has been no termination of employment there has been no layoff or reduction in force 4: holding defendant did not prove an enforceable agreement only that there was some discussion of a plea bargain


Input: not be subjected to another trial where he attacked only excessiveness of sentence, not the conviction). Unlike the defendant in Goodley, Appellant collaterally attacked his conviction on the correct assertion that the non-waivable structural defect of an 11-person jury verdict rendered the entire proceeding invalid. Courts have addressed whether a trial is rendered a nullity due to “structural defect” or “structural error.” Generally, when an error is subject to a harmless error analysis, the reviewing court will not consider the entire trial invalid. By contrast, a structural error ‘affec[ts] the framework within which the trial proceeds’ and [is] not ‘simply an error in trial pro , United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), in which i th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), with North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, Holdings: 0: holding that when the jury acquitted the defendant on the greater offense but deadlocked on the lesserincluded offenses double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the lessers 1: holding double jeopardy prohibition not applicable where jury unable to agree on greater charge but convicts on lesserincluded offense because no implied acquittal occurred on greater offense 2: holding that where jury was instructed on both a greater offense and lesserincluded offense and the jury convicted on the lesserincluded offense the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense 3: holding that court of appealss remedy on remand from reversal for harmful charge error based on failure to meet second step of rousseau lesserincludedoffense test was to remand for a retrial for the lesser offense  because the jurys verdict that the appellant was guilty of the lesserincluded offense  operates as an acquittal of the greater offense  to which jeopardy had attached this prevents a retrial for the greater offense but not for the lesser offense 4: holding that when jury acquitted defendant on greater offense but deadlocked on lesserincluded offenses double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the lesers


Input: no significant requirements on cigarette manufacturers: the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 concerns smokeless products, not cigarettes; the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Amendments imposed a requirement on the Secretary of Health and Human Services to submit reports about cigarettes; and the ADAMHA Reorganization Act conditions block grants to states. Contrary to R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris’s argument, the statement of purpose in the Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331, does not preserve cigarette sales. The second listed purpose of establishing a program to “deal with cigarette labeling and advertising” states, “[C]ommerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy a F.3d 1183, 1197 (11th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Federal law is silent both by its terms and Holdings: 0: holding that the federal cigarette labeling and advertising act did not preempt plaintiffs state law claims 1: holding that the labeling act did not preempt design defect claim against cigarette manufacturer 2: holding that the federal cigarette labeling and advertising act did not preempt state law damages actions 3: holding that the labeling act did not preempt negligent and wanton design and manufacture claims against cigarette manufacturer 4: holding that federal law did not preempt commonlaw fraud claim against cigarette manufacturer based on advertising of light cigarettes


Input: for money under Section 306(a)(1), including tax liens, so far as the same can be paid out of the proceeds of the property subject to such mortgage or other hen”). 17 . See Tex Prob.Code §§ 319-21 (requiring court approval of all payments in statutory priority, with pro rata payments when assets are deficient). 18 . See id. 50(d)(2). 19 . "The Legislature shall have no power to release the inhabitants of, or property in, any county, city or town from the payment of taxes levied for State or counly purposes, unless in case of great public calamity in any such county, city or town, when such release may be made by a vote of two-thirds of each House of the Legislature.” Tex. Const, art. VIII, § 10. 20 . See Mexia Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Mexia, 134 Tex. 95, 133 S.W.2d 118, 122 (1939) (<HOLDING>). 21 .See, e.g., Tex Tax Code § 33.05(a)(2) Holdings: 0: holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city 1: recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket 2: holding notice of impending tax sale of property was not reasonably calculated to reach property owner when notice sent via certified letter by state was returned unclaimed and state did not take additional reasonable steps to ensure notice was provided 3: holding that cjourts may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute 4: holding statute requiring parties in tax suit to take notice of subsequent pleadings was not unconstitutional when city failed to take such notice


Input: (2007), which requires a showing of medical necessity. Here, the employer and carrier never contested the medical necessity of the referral, and the uncontradicted evidence was that claimant’s authorized medical care provider made repeated recommendations for an orthopedic evaluation. Claimant’s doctor testified that the compensable accident was the major contributing cause of the need for the evaluation, and that the purpose of the evaluation was to determine whether claimant’s ongoing symptoms were related to his injury — or at least to determine whether there was an objective basis for claimant’s symptoms. In such circumstances, this court has held a claimant is entitled to an evaluation. See Grainger v. Indian River Transport/Zurich U.S., 869 So.2d 1269, 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). Because the judge erroneously denied Holdings: 0: holding that records of students evaluation by school psychologist were not subject to the psychologistpatient privilege because the student and his mother did not expect the communications to remain confidential and because the purpose of the interview was to  assess  the students need for special education services not for the purpose of treatment or counseling 1: recognizing a breachofduty action by an employee against a workers compensation carrier even though the carrier issued its policy to the employer 2: holding that the judge of compensation claims erred by not requiring the employer and carrier to pay for an evaluation to determine the etiology of claimants medical problem and that it is the purpose of the evaluation not its result that determines its compensability 3: holding if a workers compensation carrier denies liability for medical expenses of its insured the nofault carrier is bound promptly to pay benefits concerning such expenses under its policy 4: holding that where the board had already made the necessary factual evaluation underlying the legal standard to be applied it then becomes the courts responsibility to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the boards findings were supported by substantial evidence


Input: case filed by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, section 263.405(i) bars this court from considering any issues not “specifically presented to the trial court in a timely filed statement of the points on which the party intends to appeal or in a statement combined with a motion for new trial.” Section 263.405(i) is effective for cases, like this one, appealed on or after September 1, 2005. We note that the legislature has also mandated that indigent parents in these termination cases receive appointed counsel. The Supreme Court of Texas has held that this “statutory right to counsel in parental-rights termination cases embodies the right to effective counsel,” and this court has specifically held that “the statutory right to appointed counsel aff 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); In re D.R.L.M., 84 S.W.3d 281, 291 Holdings: 0: holding statement of points in notice of appeal sufficient 1: holding failure to raise issue in statement of points does not forfeit it on appeal 2: holding an argument to be waived for inadequate briefing and failure to raise the issue in the statement of points on appeal 3: holding failure to file statement of points is no bar to appeal 4: holding failure to timely file statement of points does not forfeit issues on appeal


Input: arbitration award but citing cases showing split of authority), cases from other jurisdictions, including those from Texas, support our determination that whether goodwill is a distributable asset in a professional entity presents a question of fact. See, Stefanski v. Gonnella, 15 Mass. App. 500, 446 N.E.2d 734 (1983) (relating history of Massachusetts case law deciding issue as question of fact); Durio v. Johnson, 68 N.M. 82, 85, 358 P.2d 703, 705 (1961) (concluding in action by veterinarian partner to recover agreed-upon price for his interest from former partner that better rule was “good will also exists in professional practice, or in business founded upon personal skill and reputation and is salable”); Spaulding v. Benenati, 57 N.Y.2d 418, 442 N.E.2d 1244, 456 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Berg v. Settle, 70 Wash. 2d 864, 425 P.2d 635 Holdings: 0: holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 1: holding that goodwill of dental practice could be sold by deceased dentists wife who was sole beneficiary of his estate when sale of goodwill included something other than personal attributes of professional such as right to practice at same location 2: holding the real estate sale proceeds 3: holding in case where the asserted defense to plaintiffs contract action to recover fees for his professional services was that the professional services were for the unlicensed practice of law in new jersey and that the contract was therefore illegal and unenforceable that questions of unlawful practice of law will turn on the particular facts presented that the issue could be determined only on a full and complete appreciation of the events and surrounding circumstances that the trial court not evaluate the merits of appellees affirmative defense without reference to matters outside the pleadings and therefore that judgment on the pleadings was not warranted 4: holding contract for sale of law practice which included duty on part of selling attorney to refer clients as consideration for the sale violated rpc


Input: because it failed to secure a ruling as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The language of Rule 120a is specific that any affidavits “shall be served at least seven days before the hearing.” See Tex.R. Civ. P. 120a(3). Imlay and the law firm did not file their second affidavit until after the hearing. The rule provides that, when it appears from the affidavits of a party opposing the special appearance that he is unable to present by “facts essential to justify his opposition,” the trial judge may “order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.” See id. (emphasis added); see also Potkovick v. Reg’l Ventures, Inc., 904 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1995, no writ) (<HOLDING>). This part of the rule appears to permit the Holdings: 0: holding that after stem bankruptcy judges have the authority to enter interlocutory orders in noncore proceedings and in core proceedings as to which the bankruptcy court may not enter final orders or judgment consistent with article iii absent consent 1: holding that orders that deny some rule 3850 claims but dismiss others with leave to amend under spera are not final appealable orders 2: recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal 3: holding that there are two standards in review of orders on motions to vacate defaults simple abuse of discretion for orders denying relief and gross abuse of discretion for orders granting relief 4: holding that trial court does have some discretion under rule 120a to enter other orders as are just


Input: colleague also contends that the Court has a long history of interpreting the 120-day period prescribed by Congress to allow, in essence, additional time to file a Notice of Appeal. We disagree. In cases where the Court has allowed “additional” time — for example, in cases where the 120th day fell on a date the Court was closed, or where an incarcerated prisoner deposited his Notice of Appeal with prison authorities prior to the expiration of the time period but the Notice of Appeal was not received by the Court until after the expiration of the time period — technical compliance with section 7266(a) was not merely “difficult,” as our colleague asserts, but impossible. If the Court is closed, a document simply cannot be filed. Cf. Torres v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 15, 17 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Once a prisoner deposits mail with prison Holdings: 0: holding that because record did not contain notice of appeal in compliance with rule 3 there was no appellate jurisdiction and appeal must be dismissed 1: holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice 2: holding timely notice of appeal under fed rapp p 4a is jurisdictional 3: holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal 4: holding in a case in which the appellant mailed his notice of appeal to va at a time when the court had no physical facilities that literal compliance with filing requirements is not required in cases in which it cannot fairly be exacted  quoting fed rapp p 3 advisory comm note


Input: As we previously noted in the context of discrimination claims, “New York cases vary widely in the amount of damages awarded for mental anguish.” Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 177 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56, 78 (2d Cir.2004) (compiling discrimination cases in which New York courts reduce awards for mental anguish to $30,000 or below as well as cases in which New York courts uphold awards of more than $100,000)). Based on our survey of damages awards for emotional distress and malicious prosecution, $100,000 appears to reflect the upper end of the range of awards in comparable cases. Compare Patterson, 440 F.3d at 120 and Morsette, 764 N.Y.S.2d at 422, with Rohrs v. Rohrs, 17 A.D.3d 659, 793 N.Y.S.2d 532, 533-34 (2d Dep’t 2005) (<HOLDING>), Lynch v. Cnty. of Nassau, 278 A.D.2d 205, 717 Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff who proves a cause of action under  1981 may recover punitive damages where the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages even if nominal 1: holding that award of 50000 was reasonable 2: holding that a 50000 malicious prosecution compensatory damages award deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation and ordering a new trial on the issue of damages unless plaintiff stipulated to a reduction in the award to 25000 3: holding that award of 25000 was reasonable 4: holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages


Input: effect to a fully informed vote of the disinterested stockholders. In many of the cases, that effect was given to a statutorily required vote or one required by the certificate of incorporation. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 83 (Del. 1992) ("Inherent in [enhanced scrutiny] is a presumption that a board acted in the absence of an informed shareholder vote ratifying the challenged action.”); Solomon, 747 A.2d at 1127, 1133, aff’d, 746 A.2d 277 (dismissing a challenge to, a spin-off of a subsidiary because a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the stockholders that was required under the corpora tion’s charter invoked the business judgment rule); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 736-38 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Walker v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000) (<HOLDING>); In re Gen. Motors Class H S’holders Litig., Holdings: 0: holding that the only fraud that could vitiate the contract is fraud that would invalidate the merger clause itself ie fraud relating to the merger clause or fraud that invalidates the entire contract including the merger clause quoting 3 corbin contracts  578 1: holding that the fully informed stockholder approval of a merger invoked the business judgment rule 2: holding under delaware law that if the directors individually and the board collectively fail to inform themselves fully and in a deliberate manner then they lose the protection of the business judgment rule  3: recognizing that pursuant to the business judgment rule the decisions of business professionals on the board of directors should be presumed valid 4: holding that consistent with parol evidence rule a merger clause can be avoided based on fraud in the inducement


Input: too high. The district court relied on reasonable data in reducing Sandra Jasso’s counsel’s hourly billing rate to $288. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion and made no clearly erroneous factual findings in reducing the hourly rate of Sandra Jasso’s counsel. See Graves, 700 F.2d at 221. The district court also reduced the fees requested for time spent traveling to 17.5 hours at the hourly rate of $288, as opposed to the requested 35 hours at $375 per hour. Courts often reduce working and non-working travel time. See In re Babckock & Wilcox Co., 526 F.3d 824, 828 (5th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (noting' that generally “it is not an abuse of discretion to discount non-working (and even working) travel time”); see also Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). As the district court properly noted, counsel Holdings: 0: holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time 1: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court 2: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest at the colorado statutory rate of 8 percent 3: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the hourly rate billed by 50 for travel time


Input: to carry on the business of banking.’ ” Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh). “To prevent inconsistent or intrusive state regulation from impairing the national system, Congress provided: ‘No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law[J” Id. (citing § 484(a)). Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has “repeatedly made, clear that federal control shields national banking from 03 (Miss. 1976) (“Unanimously, other state courts have' held that a statute, similar to Mississippi’s, prohibiting a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the State from maintaining any action in any court of the State, does not apply to a national banking corporation.”); In re Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 21 S.W.3d 908, 909-10 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (<HOLDING>). As these cases demonstrate, “the iaw is Holdings: 0: holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas 1: holding that the nba preempted a kentucky statute that re quired a national bank as a foreign corporation transacting business in the state to obtain a certificate of authority prior to maintaining suit in a kentucky court as it significantly impaired the banks exercise of authority under the nba 2: holding that a florida statute requiring a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to transacting business in the state was preempted as it applied to national banks 3: holding that an iowa statute requiring a foreign corporation to hold a certificate of authority to transact business in the state was preempted by the nba as the statute pertained to national banks because it infringed on the powers provided to national banks by the nba 4: holding that the nba preempted application of a texas statute that would infringe on a national banks federally granted right to sue in any court as fully as natural persons by requiring the bank to obtain a certificate of authority before it could maintain a suit in texas


Input: aggravated felonies. As the record shows, she did not properly challenge that determination during her expedited removal proceedings; rather, the only point at which Sutariya appears to have challenged it was in the context of her motion to an IJ for bond redetermination, which did not directly challenge her removability and was filed over ten days after she received notice of the DHS’s intent to issue a final order of removal. Indeed, Sutariya admits in her brief that she did not properly challenge the determination that she was an aggravated felon, saying that she “would have challenged” it if she had been granted a hearing before an IJ. Thus, we lack jurisdiction over this claim. See Lubowa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., — Fed.Appx. -, -, 2008 WL 4148523, at *2 (11th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); see also Fonseca-Sanchez v. Gonzales, 484 Holdings: 0: holding that dhss motion to reconsider was a collateral attack on a bia order 1: holding that court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review aliens habeas claims seeking review of expedited removal order including whether expedited removal statute was lawfully applied to alien and whether expedited removal procedures violated his right to due process because language of section 1252e5 clearly precludes review in habeas proceedings of whether alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal 2: holding that we lack jurisdiction based on a failure to exhaust where an alien in expedited removal proceedings failed to challenge the dhss determination that he committed an aggravated felony after receiving notice of the dhss intent to issue a final removal order on that basis 3: holding that an alien raising a due process challenge to removal proceedings must show error and substantial prejudice 4: holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand


Input: to locate a seller in Peru, arrange for a purchase of cocaine which would have a street value of $280,000 in the United States, his “nerve” in handling such a transaction, and his expertise in securing a field test all support the sentencing judge’s inferences. The district court’s conclusions here were not unreasonable. The facts surrounding Robelo’s crime sufficiently support the conclusion that Robelo probably belonged to a group of persons involved in drug smuggling and that he probably had committed similar crimes previously. AFFIRMED. 1 . See United States v. Wondrack, 578 F.2d 808, 810 (9 Cir. 1978) (refusing to vacate a sentence when the allegedly unreliable allegations were not entirely without support). Cf. Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1360 (9 Cir. 1978) (en banc) Holdings: 0: holding that due to statute defendant cannot collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance sentence unless in violation of the right to counsel 1: holding that due process requires not only notice but sufficient information to allow petitioner to prepare and present objection to the agencys preliminary action or decision 2: holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case 3: holding due process requires a sentencing court not to give unwarranted weight to allegedly unreliable hearsay information to enhance sentence 4: holding that due process requires appellate courts to scrutinize the sentencing process to insure that sentences are based on reliable information


Input: under like circumstances, (4) the relative merits of the parties’ positions, and (5) whether the action conferred a common benefit on a group of pension plan participants.” Id. at 871. In this case, it is clear that the fourth factor, “the relative merits of the parties’ positions,” does not favor an award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs. The Court has found that both plaintiffs’ positions are entirely meritless. Likewise, the first and third factors are not satisfied because the defendants have not been found to have exhibited any “culpability and bad faith” at all, and accordingly there is no improper action to deter. The fifth factor is not met because plaintiffs’ suit did not have “the effect of conferring a common benefit” on any group of plan participants. Id. at 872 (<HOLDING>). Given that the Chambless factors tilt so Holdings: 0: holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege 1: holding that effect of suit rather than the purpose for which it was brought is controlling for purposes of the fifth factor 2: holding that a charge for the use of a public wharf was a user fee rather than a tax for constitutional purposes 3: holding with respect to another part of the plra that the court must determine the prisoners status on the date the suit or appeal is brought rather than at some other time 4: holding that despite the parties failure to address a controlling statute wle consider the statutes effect on this case sua sponte because it is controlling and it would be contrary to public policy to decline to do so


Input: law is the important question). Consequently, the subsequent opportunity for review of the arbitrator’s decision is irrelevant. See id. at 1123 (phrasing the second part of the consideration — possibility of application of U.S. law and subsequent review — in the conjunctive). Thus, the Court finds that Thomas appropriately governs the arbitration provision in this case. Accord Pavón v. Carnival Corp., Case No. 09-22935-CV-LE-NARD (S.D.Fla. Jan. 20, 2010) (remanding seaman’s Jones Act claims in part because to arbitrate such claims would contravene public policy where the Jones Act imposes strict liability on employers for the negligence of its employees); Sivanandi, 2010 WL 1875685 at *3; see also Sorica v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., Case No. 09-20917-CV-HUCK (S.D.Fla. Aug. 4, 2009) (<HOLDING>). The Court declines to adopt NCL’s narrow view Holdings: 0: holding that the jones act does not preempt state law in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens and thus state law governs 1: recognizing that a provision providing for arbitration under bermuda law in a bermuda forum of a jones act claim is void under the thomas analysis 2: holding that joinder of a nonremovable jones act claim with a removable claim under general maritime law that is not separate and independent is not grounds for removal 3: holding that injured seamans loss of consortium claim under state law was preempted by jones act 4: holding that a usbased company was an employer under the jones act


Input: either knew that Khan and Motey had inside information, or that he deliberately determined not to draw the obvious conclusion. See Svoboda, 347 F.3d at 480 (noting that the “same evidence that will raise an inference that the defendant had actual knowledge of the illegal conduct ordinarily will also raise the inference that the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of illegal conduct”). Accordingly, the district court did not err in instructing the jury on conscious avoidance. B. Knowledge of a Personal Benefit to a Tipper We have yet to decide whether a remote tippee must know that the original tipper received a personal benefit in return for revealing inside information. Compare United States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F.Supp.2d 491, 499 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Newman, No. 12cr121, Holdings: 0: holding that agreement between chicago mercantile exchange and its members did not impart direct benefit to nonparty clearing member of exchange 1: holding that a remote tippee must know that original exchange was given in exchange for benefit 2: holding the suspension in abeyance in exchange for not exercising privileges 3: holding that the witness had accepted immunity in exchange for no prosecution 4: holding that exchange of mutual promises to devise is sufficient valid consideration


Input: on the court of appeals, an amended notice of appeal filed by the State pursuant to Rule 25.2(d), which did contain the previously omitted certifications, could not retroactively confer jurisdiction on the court of appeals. Id. at 413. Specifically, the court said: It is true that Rule 25.2(d) allows an amendment to a notice of appeal. But when the Legislature granted this Court rule-making authority, it expressly provided that the rules could not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of a litigant. And our caselaw prevents a court of appeals from using an appellate rule to create jurisdiction where none exists. It does not matter which appellate rule the court of appeals attempts to use, be it former Rule 83, former Rule 2(b), or current Rule 25.2(d) Tex. Crim.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). Because appellant’s original notice does not Holdings: 0: holding that notice requirements under rule 252b3 are jurisdictional 1: holding service requirements under fedrcivp 4 to be jurisdictional 2: holding that notice requirements of 4206a are jurisdictional 3: holding that notice requirements under former rule 40b1 are jurisdictional 4: holding that regulatory requirements are not jurisdictional in nature


Input: removal from flight for disorderly conduct expressly preempted by federal law), with Smith v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir.1995) ("Neither the language nor history of the ADA implies that Congress was attempting to displace state personal injury tort law concerning the safety of the airline business."), and In re Air Disaster, 819 F.Supp. 1352 (E.D.Mich.1993) (negligence claims arising from an airplane crash, alleging negligent operation of airplanes, not preempted by ADA). 5 . Although Atlantic Coast does not raise the issue in precise terms on transfer, it seems to imply that federal law also preempts the Cooks' breach of contract claim. However that is not the case. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222, 115 S.Ct. 817, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 433 Holdings: 0: holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties 1: holding that contract terms themselves will be controlling when they establish the parties common meaning so that a reasonable person in the position of either party would have no expectations inconsistent with the contract language 2: holding a deviation from the terms of a contract constitutes an impairment of contract 3: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 4: holding that the adas preemption prescription bars stateimposed regulation of air carriers but allows room for court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves


Input: stated therein that it did not wish to “suggest, of course, that an employer can avoid his responsibilities by delegating discriminatory programs to corporate shells. Title VII applies to ‘any agent’ of a covered employer .... ” 435 U.S. at 718 n.33, 98 S.Ct. at 1380 n.33. Finally our conclusion here is in accord with that of a number of other courts. These courts have recognized that exempting plans not actually administered by an employer would seriously impair the effectiveness of Title VII, and have held Manhart applicable to pension plans run by third-party insurers. See Norris v. Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity, 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. pet. filed, Docket No. 82-52 (U.S.L.W. July 27, 1982); EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139, 1141 (1st Cir. 1978) (<HOLDING>); EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F.Supp. 1256, Holdings: 0: holding tiaacref subject to title vii 1: holding that title vii claim was subject to compulsory arbitration 2: holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration 3: holding title vii subject to equitable tolling 4: holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii


Input: to perform its obligations to Schwan’s under the Services Contract is not attributable to the bank. The bank advanced all funds to Good Stuff required by the Agreement. Third, Schwan’s contends that the bank improperly froze Good Stuffs credit line in June 2002. The bank, however, had no duty to continue to advance funds once Good Stuffs Borrowing Base eroded— even if the bank knew that the practical effect of its decision was likely to be Good Stuffs inability to perform for its clients. See In re General Plastics, 158 B.R. at 288. Rather, the bank was free to take steps to protect itself and its investment without considering the interests of Good Stuffs other debtors. See In re Sharp, 403 F.3d at 52; see also B.E.L.T., Inc. v. Wachovia Corp., 403 F.3d 474, 476-77 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Fourth, Schwan’s contends that the bank’s Holdings: 0: holding that a bank had no duty to inform other lenders of its borrowers financial problems even though those other lenders funds were used to pay off the borrowers debt to the bank 1: holding a bank liable where a bank officer held checks that were intended to pay the irs for withheld taxes 2: holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor 3: holding that the lenders excess withdrawal of soft costs warranted the equitable subordination of the lenders claim because the depletion of the funds available for construction and its attendant impact on the trusts renovation efforts was a sufficiently concrete harm to the trusts other creditors  4: holding that a construction lender may voluntarily assume a duty to inspect the construction project for the borrowers benefit in addition to the lenders independent contractual right to inspect the project for its own exclusive benefit


Input: proceeding” to an individual hearing, a trial, or - to either' the guilt/innocence phase or punishment phase of the trial,, rather than to the entire course of a criminal prosecution.’ In addition, there is a distinction between a “criminal proceeding” and a “criminal action.” The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “[a] criminal action is prosecuted in the name of the State of Texas against the accused, and is conducted by some person acting under the authority of the State, in accordance with its laws.” Tbx.Cod6 CRiM. Peoc. Ann. art. 3.02 (West 2015). Thus, the Legislature uses “criminal action” in the sense of encompassing the entire course of an action at law against the accused, i.e., the entire course of a criminal prosecution. See Howland, 990 S.W.2d at 277 n. 5 (<HOLDING>). This leads us , to the conclusion that by Holdings: 0: recognizing the cause of action 1: recognizing one definition of prosecution as used in section 1 of article 3837 is criminal action meaning the entire course of an action at law1  2: holding that  where an action is simply for the recovery  of a money judgment the action is one at law1  quoting whitehead v shattuck 138 us 146 151 11 sct 276 34 led 873 1891 3: holding that the rule of splitting of causes of action as related to res judicata does not permit the owner of a single or entire cause of action or an entire indivisible demand to divide or split that cause of action and that all damages from a single wrongful act must be claimed in one action 4: recognizing cause of action


Input: this case to the standa ore the United States Coast Guard has an effect within the sovereign territory insofar as the agency’s function is compromised and the laws that agency seeks to enforce undermined. RCCL next argues that § 1001 is not properly invoked because the United States has enacted a more specific “false statement” law, APPS, regulating the specific conduct at issue, and thus cannot elect instead to proceed under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The principle of statutory construction that a specific statute is given precedence over a more general statute addressing the same conduct is invoked by Defendant to suggest that APPS, with its penalty provisions, is the proper statute under which to proceed. See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15, 98 S.Ct. 909, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978) (<HOLDING>); see also San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d Holdings: 0: recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern 1: recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one 2: holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls 3: holding that a general statute is superseded by a more recent specific statute only if the two statutes are in conflict 4: holding that gl1956  43326 embodies a policy of statutory construction that requires courts to give precedence to a specific statute over a general statute when the two are in conflict


Input: possession, we consider several factors, including, [OJwnership and/or occupancy of the residence or vehicle where the drugs were found, presence of defendant at the time drugs were found, defendant's proximity to the drugs, previous drug use, incriminating statements or behavior, presence of drugs in a specific area where the defendant had control, ete. Id. ¶ 32; accord Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. This list is not exhaustive and "many of these factors, by themselves, are insufficient to establish the requisite nexus." Id. ¶¶ 32-33. For example, "[olJwnership and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs are found, although important factors, are not alone sufficient to establish constructive possession, especially when occupancy is not exclusive." See Fox, 709 P.2d at 319-20 (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, Holdings: 0: holding the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the defendant a front seat passenger of a vehicle occupied by three individuals was in constructive possession of marijuana found in white bag directly under the defendants seat 1: holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract 2: holding that evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession where the defendant was in jail at the time the drugs were seized from his residence 3: holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge 4: holding that evidence that the defendant lived in a home where marijuana was being cultivated was insufficient to support a finding of constructive possession