Input: or, alternatively, under 101.106(f). Section 101.106(a) provides: The filing of a suit under this chapter against a governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against any individual employee of the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter. Tex. Civ. Prao. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.106(a). The trial court dismissed Dr. Sotelo from the suit without stating which provision it relied on. Dr. Sotelo could have been properly dismissed under section 101.106(a) because Kamel’s addition of UTHSCH as a defendant constituted an “irrevocable election” that barred “any suit or recovery ... against any individual employee of the governmental unit.” See id.; see also Hintz, 305 S.W.3d at 769 (<HOLDING>); Villasan v. O’Rourke, 166 S.W.3d 752, 759 Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs election to sue entity foreclosed any possibility of adding employee in future pleadings 1: holding that a trial court entered judgment on the pleadings where the decision did not depend on any document outside the pleadings 2: holding that plaintiffs do not lose their right to sue for damages sustained within statute of limitations period by failing to sue on earlier incidents in timely manner 3: holding that employers have standing to sue 4: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue


Input: waive any of the requirements of rule 3.112. As pointed out by the FACDL, a capital defendant rarely retains private counsel and most private attorneys who would undertake such representation already meet the rule 3.112 standards. Further, if exceptional circumstances require representation by private counsel not meeting the requirements of the rule, the court may allow the representation in accordance with subdivision (k)., As to conflict counsel or the public defenders, we can see no valid reason to allow an indigent defendant to waive the requirements of the rule as they apply to these court-appointed attorneys. An indigent defendant does not have a right to insist on representation by an attorney appointed by the court at taxpayer expense. Cfi Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, there is legitimate concern that Holdings: 0: recognizing that a defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford 1: holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator 2: holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires 3: holding that when the prosecuting attorney    refuses to afford counsel to a county board in defense of an action    mandamus would be an appropriate remedy 4: holding that defendants response i cant  i cant afford it when informed that an attorney would be provided for him if he could not afford one did not without further explanation amount to a clear unambiguous or unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel


Input: 4 . The Civil Code articles dealing with obligations were extensively revised in 1984. The articles in effect before the 1984 revisions apply here. We will apply them throughout this opinion. 5 . Nine months into the first year of the plan, the Diocese and Gallagher modified the contract by agreeing that the Diocese would establish an additional loss fund of $200,000 and pay an extra premium. However, we do not see the parties' modification here as a new contract. As Gallagher stated in its endorsement, the parties here merely agreed to ''amend[]” the "aggregate sum agreed hereon in respect of the first period of insurance, from July 1, 1981 to July 1, 1982.” Because this amendment did not create a new contract, it did not discharge Gallagher's original express warranty. See id. (<HOLDING>). 6 . Gallagher also claims that there is a Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract 1: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 2: holding that parties who agreed to substitute a hotwater heating system for the hotair system stipulated in contract did not make a new contract but only amended the existing contract 3: holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract 4: holding that the law will not imply a contract where there is an existing express contract covering the same subject matter


Input: Given that the relevant regulations define the appropriate decisional unit as those who were considered for jobs in the same process as the terminated employees, those 208 employees constitute the appropriate decisional unit, and our inquiry is complete. Appellees finally argue that, regardless of the OWBPA’s informational requirements, the releases fail because they neglected to state the eligibility factors that McDonald’s used to determine who would be eligible for the termination program. This issue was not raised or decided in the district court and was therefore not raised in the order certifying the case for interlocutory appeal. We accordingly lack jurisdiction to decide the issue. E.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 677-78, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) (<HOLDING>); see also Schlumberger Techs., Inc. v. Wiley, Holdings: 0: holding that appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the coa 1: holding that a magistrate judge acting pursuant to   636b1  has no authority to issue a dispositive ruling on a motion to certify a district court order for interlocutory appeal under 28 usc  1292b  2000  2: holding that under 28 usc  1292b the appellate courts may review only matters in the order not all issues in the case 3: holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 4: holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court


Input: (2001) (where death results from firearm offense, the applicable homicide offense level applies). With conviction of an additional count, however, the applicable guideline range may be reached by the imposition of consecutive sentences on the multiple counts of conviction. See id § 5G1.2(d). It is doubtless true that an important advantage to the defendant of the plea agreement was that by the dismissal of Count Two, her maximum punishment was capped at ten years imprisonment, which is the statutory maximum for Count One. If she is convicted of Count Two, she faces imprisonment greater than ten years. Nevertheless, it does no violence to due process to hold the defendant to her bargain under the circumstances of this case. See Hentz v. Hargett, 71 F.3d 1169, 1174-76 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). IV Therefore, for the reasons stated in this Holdings: 0: holding that if a plea agreement is breached the district court may either grant specific performance or allow the defendant to withdraw the plea 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw guilty plea filed three weeks after entering the plea 2: holding that no constitutional violation occurred where state prosecutor did not allow defendant to withdraw guilty plea and reinstated additional charges after defendant violated plea agreement by failing to testify truthfully at codefendants trial 3: holding that a codefendants prior statements made at his guilty plea hearing were not admissible to corroborate his trial testimony because the witnesss guilty plea hearing did not predate any improper motive he may have had to testify against the defendant 4: holding that a defendant who is allowed to withdraw his plea must either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the state


Input: fee. The bottom of the notices contained a detachable section for plaintiffs to provide their credit card information to pay the debt. On Avila’s notice, this section again.stated her “current balance.” Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, alleging that the collection notices violated the FDGPA. They claimed, among other things, that the collection notices were misleading because they stated the “current balance,” but did not disclose that the balance might- increase due to interest and , fees. They alleged that they believed from reading the notice that the “current balance” was “static” and that their “payment of that amount would satisfy [the debt] irrespective of when [the] payment was remitted.” App’x at 31, 100. Avila alle V-3057 (JS), 2010 WL 2771832, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2010) (<HOLDING>), and Adlam v. FMS, Inc., No. 09 CIV. Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs allegation that debt collectors attempted to collect on a debt to a condominium association notwithstanding their knowledge that plaintiff did not really owe that debt to the condominium was sufficient to state a claim under the fdutpa 1: holding that debt collectors have no obligation to warn a consumer that her debt may increase over time 2: holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt 3: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or 4: holding that a debtor has primarily consumer debts if the aggregate amount of consumer debt is more than 50 of the total debt


Input: at the Riverview Terrace Apartments. Thus, on June 4, 2005, Officer Bickel arranged to have J.P. and his mother go to the police station so that he could question J.P. about the barn arson. During the suppression hearing and dispositional hearing, Officer Bickel testified that his questioning during the June 4 interview was limited solely to a discussion of the barn fire. Subsequently, on June 13, 2005, the State filed a petition alleging that J.P. was a delinquent child for committing acts that would be aiding in arson under cause number Cause # 53. Thus, when J.P. was questioned about the barn fire, he had not been charged with aiding in arson and, indeed, could not have even asserted a Sixth Amendment right to counsel for that offense. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204 (<HOLDING>). Although J.P. had asserted a Sixth Amendment Holdings: 0: holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings 1: holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial 2: holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel 3: holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach until a prosecution is commenced that is at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings 4: holding defendants sixth amendment right to counsel which applies only to criminal cases did not attach when juvenile petition for abuse and neglect was filed


Input: P.3d 149, 152 (2009). Y. Analysis A. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction over the Petition for Judicial Review The Idaho Constitution allows the Legislature to delimit the district courts’ appellate jurisdiction. Idaho Const. art. V, § 20. Actions by state agencies are not subject to judicial review unless expressly authorized by statute. I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1). Without an enabling statute, the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Williams, 149 Idaho 675, 678-79, 239 P.3d 780, 783-84 (2010) (dismissing a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction because no statute authorized an appeal); Taylor v. Canyon Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 147 Idaho 424, 431-32, 210 P.3d 532, 539-40 (2009) (same); cf. Regan v. Kootenai Cnty., 140 Idaho 721, 726, 100 P.3d 615, 620 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Respondents filed a petition for judicial Holdings: 0: holding appealable district courts order dismissing for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction due to determination of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction 1: holding the order is only reviewable if actually considered by the district court 2: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction 3: holding that a reviewable final order is necessary for subjectmatter jurisdiction 4: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case


Input: 436, 454 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation mark omitted). It is true that many of Bayerische’s allegations in the Amended Complaint, standing alone, fail to meet this high bar. The allegations about how Aladdin added specific Reference Entities to the Reference Portfolio that were “recklessly” exposed to the housing market and that experienced Credit Events appear to be pleading gross negligence by hindsight. Cf. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir.2000) (“[W]e have refused to allow plaintiffs to proceed with allegations of fraud by hindsight. Corporate officials need not be clairvoyant....” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Mosher-Simons v. County of Allegany, No. 17 94-CV-374S, 1997 WL 662512, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1997), aff'd, 159 F.3d 1347 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Nor do such allegations suggest that Holdings: 0: holding plaintiff cannot plead gross negligence through hindsight 1: holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case 2: holding that to rebut presumption plaintiff need only allege specific facts not plead evidence 3: holding a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to establish that a plausible contract exists but need not plead every detail of the contract 4: holding that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to allege affirmative misconduct on the part of the government


Input: Lloyds had 108 customers with Tennessee addresses between 1964 and 2002; (2) Lloyds had a correspondent relationship with AmSouth Bank of Tennessee for the purpose of sending and receiving wire transfers at the direction of its customers, which included three SWIFT wire transfers related to this case that were sent at customers’ directions through AmSouth; (3) Lloyds’ representatives visited the Tennessee offices of three subsidiaries of national corporations on eight occasions, between November 1999 and June 2004, in connection with line of credit/loan syndicates, whereby Lloyd han random, fortuitous, and attenuated contacts that fail to establish that Lloyds purposefully directed its conduct at Tennessee. See, e.g., Gregurek v. Swope Motors, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 882 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>); Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. of N. Carolina v. Holdings: 0: holding insurer was not obligated to repair the damaged automobile to both its preaccident condition and market value concluding that permitting coverage of diminished value would render meaningless the insurers clear policy right to repair rather than pay actual cash value 1: holding that auto repair shop was not subject to general jurisdiction where its employees attended occasional automobile auctions in tennessee and 17 out of its 29500 customers had tennessee addresses 2: holding that customers of registered representative were customers of memberfirm 3: holding as a general rule that a bank and its customers do not have a special or confidential relationship 4: holding that remedy of repair and service did not fail of its essential purpose when seller provided warranty service on the product and accomplished repair


Input: papers. When QCBT did not offer the testimony, Kircher did not lodge an objection to the testimony contained in the offer of proof and the court never issued a final ruling on the admissibility of this testimony. Thus, the general rule regarding error preservation for a motion in limine applies. Because QCBT did not offer the testimony contained in the offer of proof, the court never had a chance to rule on the admissi bility of the evidence; therefore, QCBT failed to preserve error as to the admissibility of Bolt’s testimony on the work papers and other issues unrelated to the ultimate issue of negligence. See, e.g., Johnson, 481 N.W.2d at 317 (“If the evidence is not offered, there is nothing preserved to review on appeal.”); State v. Delaney, 526 N.W.2d 170, 177 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). IV. The District Court’s Ruling Concerning Holdings: 0: holding error was not preserved where the courts ruling was not unequivocal and whether the evidence offered by the state fell within the parameters of the ruling was uncertain 1: holding if an appellant conceded trial courts ruling was not prejudicial he could not assert on appeal the ruling denied him a fair trial 2: holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered 3: holding that appellate court reviewing trial courts habeas corpus ruling must review record evidence in light most favorable to ruling and uphold ruling absent abuse of discretion 4: holding that a party failed to preserve error by not pursuing a ruling at trial where the courts motion in limine ruling invited the party to attempt to admit the evidence during trial


Input: 2009-2012. Although Morillion and Rutti both focused on employer control, both gave heightened consideration to the fact that the employer transportation was mandatory. Rutti, 596 F.3d at 1061-1062; Moril-lion, 22 Cal.4th at 587-588, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139. Moreover, Plaintiff has directed this Court to no case, and the Court’s research has yielded no case, where an employee has been found to be subject to an employer’s control where the plaintiff voluntarily elected to commute in the employer’s vehicle. Cf. Campbell v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 2013 WL 5302217, *7 (C.D.Cal.2013) (denying Best Buy’s motion for summary judgment due, in part, to a disputed issue of fact as to whether a home-start was required); Alcantar v. Hobart Service, 2012 WL 6539547, *1, *3-4 (C.D.Cal.2012) (<HOLDING>); Overton v. Walt Disney Co., 136 Cal.App.4th Holdings: 0: holding that commute time in company vehicle  even where use of the vehicle was restricted nonpersonal uses was not compensable because it was optional 1: holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes 2: holding a stop was effected where officers vehicle blocked defendants vehicle from proceeding 3: holding that time was not compensable where the employer provided but did not require use of a shuttle 4: holding that time was compensable where the crew was required to travel in the employers vehicle to job sites


Input: of the LUCKY mark within the reasonably foreseeable future during the short period of alleged nonuse. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Electro Source, 458 F.3d at 935. AFFIRMED. WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: I agree with our opinion resolving this appeal, but write separately on the burden-of-proof issue. We have held that under the Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 427, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1946), the burden of proving abandonment is “strict.” Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp. of Cal., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir.1982). We have also indicated that this strict burden is equivalent to a “high” one. See Edwin K. Williams & Co., Inc. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542 F.2d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir.1976), citing Am. Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 625 (5th Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>). Despite these statements, Judge McKeown Holdings: 0: holding that defendant failed to meet the burden of strict proof required to show abandonment 1: holding defendant failed to preserve burden of proof issue for appeal 2: holding district court order of restitution failed for lack of proof when government failed to meet burden 3: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 4: holding that the state failed to meet its burden when the record failed to show that the jurors would or would not be available after a weeks continuance


Input: claim. Further, the Commonwealth argues that Elliott has failed to demonstrate that the PCRA court abused its discretion by denying ineffective for failing to raise the issue on appeal. We further agree with the Commonwealth that Elliott has not demonstrated good cause for further discovery on this issue. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(2) (providing that discovery in a first counseled petition in a death penalty case is only permitted upon leave of court after a showing of good cause). Elliott offers no explanation regarding what further evidence or documentation exists to support his request. Thus, the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion by denying Elliott discovery additional to that already provided by the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Hanible, 612 Pa. 183, 30 A.3d 426, 484 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Issue VIII Instruction on Lie Detector Test Holdings: 0: holding that record must show that evidence is exculpatory for defendant to establish brady violation 1: holding that production of documents without seeking a protective order waives the right to such an order unless there is a showing of good cause for the delay 2: holding speculation insufficient to avoid summary judgment 3: holding that conjecture that opportunity to review homicide file might yield exculpatory evidence is inadequate to demonstrate good cause for discovery 4: holding that speculation that production of requested documents might reveal exculpatory evidence is insufficient to establish good cause for discovery


Input: given present effect to Waggoner’s pre-limitations-period actions is insufficient to make Waggoner’s otherwise unrelated actions similar in kind to Toomey and Carr’s decisions. Cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977) (“[T]he emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical question is whether any present violation exists.”). Waggoner’s pre-limitations-period conduct may have been frequent enough and sufficiently similar to Waggoner’s conduct within the limitations period, but the situation reached a degree of permanence long before August 7, 2012. As early as April 2010, Fahnestock was allegedly pressured to take the CFR position. See Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara, 104 Cal.App.4th 1031, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 660, 668 (2002) (<HOLDING>). And, by June 2010, when Fahnestock complained Holdings: 0: holding that a state of permanence was reached when the citys only response to plaintiffs complaint about the loss of job duties was to give her the opportunity to transfer out of the department 1: holding that plaintiff established a prima facie claim of retaliation because the defendants failure to transfer her out of her abusive working environment could be viewed as an adverse personnel action and there was a causal link between the filing of plaintiffs complaint and the defendants failure to transfer her 2: holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless  related to his job duties 3: holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action 4: holding that the plaintiffs challenge to a state law affecting the performance of her job duties was mooted when she left state employment


Input: 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (refusing to distinguish between exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the Brady context); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (refusing to distinguish between exculpatory and impeachment evidence in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct). Accordingly, we recognized in Davis that sometimes, newly-discovered impeachment evidence may be so powerful that, if it were to be believed by the trier of fact, it could render the witness’ testimony totally incredible. In such a case, if the witness’ testimony were uncorroborated and provided the only evidence of an essential element of the government’s case, the impeachment evidence would be ‘material’ under [the Harrington test]. 960 F.2d at 825; see also Taglia, 922 F.2d at 415 (<HOLDING>); 3 Wright et al., supra, § 557, at 560, 563 Holdings: 0: holding that the movant was not entitled to new trial under rule 59 based on a defense which if properly placed in issue would have affected the course of the jury trial 1: holding that a new trial would be warranted under rule 33 if it were discovered after trial that the governments star witness was utterly unworthy of being believed because he had lied consistently in a string of previous cases 2: holding that there is a presumption that new evidence discovered by criminal defendant after trial is over would not change outcome of trial 3: holding that upon remand if the trial court determined that the testimony in a newly discovered evidence claim was reliable the trial court must review that new evidence as well as brady claims that were previously rejected in a prior postconviction motion because the evidence was equally accessible to the defense and there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed 4: holding that affidavit from a new witness was not newly discovered evidence because trial counsel knew of the existence of the witness before trial trial counsel with due diligence could have discovered the evidence


Input: real covenant typically endures as long as the estate with which it runs. Id. We noted that the terms of the covenant in that case stated that the covenantor was to maintain the tile permanently. 'We also noted that continued maintenance of the drain was vital to keeping the covenantees's land arable. Id. Given the perpetual nature of the covenant in question and the importance of the drain to the covenantees's enjoyment of their land, we concluded that the parties intended that the covenantor's duty to maintain the drain and its tile extended beyond the useful life of the original tile. Id. In other words, we determined that the covenantor might be required to install new tile as part of its permanent maintenance obligation. See also Rhodes v. Mummery, 48 Ind. 216, 1874 WL 5865 (1874) (<HOLDING>); Ponsler v. Union Traction Co. of Indiana, 76 Holdings: 0: holding that the word maintained may properly be construed to require a fence to be rebuilt as well as repaired 1: holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled 2: holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage 3: holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy 4: holding 1 that the district court properly construed one  1983 claim as a habeas petition but improperly summarily dismissed it and 2 that the district court should have construed another  1983 claim as a habeas petition


Input: 600 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Ala.Civ.App.1992) (accord). Admittedly, this court has issued numerous opinions since Ex parte DCH Regional Medical Center that have declared judgments nonfinal for failing to completely resolve the employee’s workers’ compensation claim. See, e.g., Norment Sec. Group v. Chaney, 938 So.2d 424, 425 (Ala.Civ.App.2006) (judgment finding that employee sufficiently notified employer of injury held to be nonfinal for failing to ascertain and declare other aspects of claim); International Paper Co. v. Bracknell, 854 So.2d 116, 118 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (dismissing appeal from order that decided liability and temporary-disability-benefits issues but failed to address permanent-disability claim); USA Motor Express, Inc. v. Renner, 853 So.2d 1019, 1021 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (<HOLDING>); and International Paper Co. v. Dempsey, 844 Holdings: 0: holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment 1: holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal 2: holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable 3: holding that order finding that injury arose out of and in the course of the employment and awarding medical benefits was interlocutory order that would not support appeal 4: holding that an order awarding attorney fees is not appealable and instead the proper appeal lies from the judgment or amended judgment entered on the order


Input: and the difficulty in detecting the crime, the legislature could have reasonably determined that a severe penalty was required for the offense of disclosing confidential lottery information. Furthermore, we are not free “to set aside the legislative determination as to the appropriate penalty merely because it seems too severe.” State v. Moss-Dwyer, 686 N.E.2d at 112. In light of the presumption of constitutionality of statutes, and the heavy burden on the party asserting unconstitutionality, we are not convinced that the penalty for disclosure of confidential lottery information violates the proportionality provision of the Indiana Constitution. See e.g., Cole v. State, 790 N.E.2d 1049; Balls v. State, 725 N.E.2d 450; see also Ponciano v. State, 851 N.E.2d 305, 308 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147 Holdings: 0: holding that the statement i have a gun would cause a reasonable teller to fear being shot and that the phrase i am willing to use it would make a fear of death even more likely 1: recognizing threeyear loss position as strong evidence that at the beginning of the class period it was more likely than not that the company would not be able to realize dta 2: holding that to reopen a case an alien must show that the new evidence would likely change the result 3: holding relevance of evidence is established by any showing however slight that the evidence makes it more or less likely that the defendant committed the crime in question 4: holding that the elevated class c felony penalty for the offense of criminal recklessness by shooting a firearm from a vehicle into a place where people are likely to gather did not shock public sentiment or violate the judgment of reasonable people because among other things the use of a vehicle would make it less likely that the person would be identified which in turn would make it more likely that the offense would be committed


Input: F.2d 65, 67 (9th Cir. 1971). Trial courts must generally exercise their discretion in favor of awarding prejudgment interest in admiralty tort claims. Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1987). As a general rule, prejudgment interest should be awarded in admiralty cases — not as a penalty, but as compensation for the use of funds to which the claimant was rightfully entitled. Discretion to deny prejudgment interest is created only when there are ‘peculiar circumstances’ that would make it inequitable for the losing party to be forced to pay prejudgment interest. Id. at 1550 (quoting Noritake Co. v. M/V Hellenic Champion, 627 F.2d 724, 728 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980)); see also City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat’l. Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 195 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Where “peculiar circumstances” justify the Holdings: 0: holding that a court may in its discretion award prejudgment interest in erisa cases where appropriate but it is not axiomatic that such interest should be awarded simply because  the prevailing party has demonstrated entitlement to the funds 1: holding that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases except in peculiar or exceptional circumstances 2: recognizing general rule that prejudgment interest may be awarded in claims for liquidated amounts 3: holding in the absence of exceptional circumstances deference should be given to trial court 4: holding that prejudgment interest should be awarded when the claimant has been denied the use of money which was legally due


Input: a substantive due process claim in this case, where the Contracts Clause provides a specific source of constitutional protection against the government conduct of which they complain. Id. at 1318. IV Finally, we turn to the Lessees’ contention that the City’s alleged violations of the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause violate § 1983. As an initial matter, we note that from the face of the Lessees’ complaint and their subsequent filings in the district court, it is unclear whether they have preserved a claim for damages under § 1983 in the event the district court determines on remand that a constitutional violation has occurred. Nevertheless, both the Contracts Clause and the Due Process Clause may give rise to a claim under § 1983. See S. Cal. Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 886-87 (<HOLDING>); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims 1: holding that a contracts clause violation may support a  1983 claim 2: holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law 3: holding that there was no conflict between a contracts arbitration clause and its venue clause 4: recognizing such a claim under  1983


Input: of Count I should be affirmed, I believe the district court’s reliance on Rooker-Feldman was misplaced because Dodson alleges injuries caused by UAMS — not injuries caused by a state-court judgment. I would affirm the district court judgment with regard to Count I under the state-law doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. I concur in the majority’s remand as to Count II. I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction It is well established that lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over straightforward appeals from a state-court judgment even though they may otherwise be empowered to adjudicate the dispute; such appellate jurisdiction rests solely with the U.S. Supreme Court. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, Holdings: 0: holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar 1: holding that a federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that effectively sought review of an indiana state courts decision 2: holding that federal district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the decision of a district of columbia high court determining application of a local rule to the case before it 3: holding that district court lacked power to decide personal jurisdiction issue already decided by district of columbia superior court 4: holding that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiffs complaint to the extent they sought review  of the district of columbia court of appeals denial of their petitions


Input: of operability at issue here were not created with any specific case in mind. These operability certificates are intended to document the regular business function of maintaining a particular breathalyzer machine. As such, these documents are properly admissible as a business record under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6). Other jurisdictions that have considered this issue have come to a similar conclusion. Our appellate colleagues in New York succinctly expressed the underlying rationale supporting the application of the business record exemption: The certificates were prepared in the course of the certifier’s routine official duties and “systematically” produced “in the conduct of ... business” ... to fulfill an official mandate that the machines be maintained in working order. A .Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 Holdings: 0: holding that certifications of a breathtest machine are nontestimonial because they are not prepared for any specific defendant or any specific litigation 1: holding that warrants of deportation were properly characterized as nontestimonial official records that were prepared independent of this litigation and were not prepared to prove facts for use in future criminal prosecutions 2: holding that certified records of maintenance are nontestimonial and are not prepared for any particular defendant 3: holding that the certifications of accuracy of the breathalyzer machine are nontestimonial business records free from confrontation clause scrutiny 4: holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation


Input: name before the Agents entered. The Court finds that no knock-and-announce violation occurred. Agent Beck-man testified that the entry team knocked on the garage door, announced their presence, and waited before entering. Although she did not hear what the Agents were saying and thought someone was calling her name, Mrs. Thompson’s testimony was consistent with the Agents’ having announced their presence prior to entry. Moreover, even if the Court found that the executing agents failed to knock-and-announce their presence before executing the warrant, Thompson is not entitled to suppression because “[suppression is not a remedy for violation of the knock-and-an-nounee rule.” United States v. Roberge, 565 F.3d 1005, 1010 (6th Cir.2009); see also Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Thompson’s request for suppression Holdings: 0: holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings 1: holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials 2: holding that a violation of  6103 does not require the application of the exclusionary rule 3: holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to knockandannounce violations 4: holding that exclusionary rule does apply to civil forfeiture proceedings


Input: Ronnie, I wanted to ask you, since you were the breadwinner for your family, how has this affected it? [Burke:] It’s affected everything. We had to — we had to pull my daughter out of college. She was in the sorority and drill team and all of this stuff. We had to pull her out of college. We almost lost our home. We have been paying it for 20 years, we almost lost it. I had to borrow money from my sister, from my mother. Nancy borrowed some money from her mother. We got behind on all of our bills. All of it. It just — it changed everything. Burke’s testimony is not inconsistent with the receipt of insurance benefits because the testimony was limited to the financial hardship suffered as a result of his reduced earning capacity, not his medical expenses. See Snyder, 191 S.W.3d at 423 (<HOLDING>); Macias, 917 S.W.2d at 374 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that a wifes minimal involvement in her husbands business coupled with the lack of evidence that she knew of or intended to further her husbands fraudulent schemes was insufficient evidence of conspiracy 1: holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act 2: holding that jury should decide whether plaintiffs testimony proved reasonable and necessary medical expenses 3: holding that plaintiffs wifes testimony that she did not have money to pay for her husbands surgeries did not open door to collateral source testimony because large portion of plaintiffs future medical expenses would not be covered by insurance 4: holding that we could not weigh the prejudice suffered as a result of the exclusion of plaintiffs testimony because we had no way of knowing what the plaintiffs testimony would have been


Input: notice requesting comments on a petition that could potentially result in a change in the FCC’s position is simply not enough of a reason for this Court to stay this action. As described above, courts ch. ten weigh the benefits of applying the doctrine against the potential litigation costs resulting from complications and delay. See Nat’l Communs. Assn’n, 46 F.3d at 223; see also Roberts v. Chemlawn Corp., 716 F.Supp. 364, 365 (N.D.Ill.1989); Frydman, 2011 WL 2560221, at *7. A stay will not serve judicial economy here. The defendants have not offered any evidence or argument to suggest that if the FCC were to change its position that change would apply retroactively to the pending litigation. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Beller v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 703 F.3d 388, Holdings: 0: holding that agency is bound by its regulations 1: holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it 2: holding that epa regulations do not allow the agency to act contrary to federal statute 3: holding that a motion for administrative reconsideration which congress did not order the agency to entertain which the agency dismissed in relevant part on procedural grounds and which the petitioner filed over sixty days after the agency acted cannot effectively extend  retroactively the thirtyday period congress specified for judicial review petitions 4: holding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies where plaintiff sent a letter to the attorney general grieving the initial agency determination instead of following the administrative appeal process specified by agency regulations


Input: its own First Amendment rights were infringed, id. at 955, 104 S.Ct. 2839, the Court concluded that the company had overbreadth standing to pursue the claim. The Court reasoned that, as a result of the statute, charities were reluctant to contract with the plaintiff because it charged fees in excess of 25% and that the plaintiffs impetus to challenge the statute was therefore consonant with the charities’ First Amendment interests. Id. at 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839 (“The activity sought to be protected is at the heart of the business relationship between Munson and its clients, and Munson’s interests in challenging the statute are completely consistent with the First Amendment interests of the charities it represents.”); see also Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1010-11 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, Mothershed alleges that the Holdings: 0: holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner 1: holding that the owner of an adult entertainment establishment had overbreadth standing to pursue a first amendment challenge against provisions of an ordinance that required the employees of such establishments to obtain a license because the licensing scheme  although not directly applicable to the owner  threatened his businesss viability 2: recognizing a cause of action by the owner of contaminated property against a previous owner who allegedly caused the contamination 3: holding the fact that an exempt owner who acquired legal title after date when liability for current taxes had accrued was the equitable owner did not make the exemption applicable 4: holding that where both vessels had the same owner it was not an abuse of discretion to give 75 of the salvage award to the owner


Input: vehicle. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498-500, 93 S.Ct. 1827. For present purposes, the answer to the declaratory relief versus habeas riddle is suggested by Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir.1991), where we held that “[i]f the prisoner is seeking what can fairly be described as a quantum change in the level of custody-whether outright freedom, or freedom subject to the limited reporting and financial constraints of bond or parole or probation ... then habeas corpus is his remedy. But if he is seeking a different program or location or environment, then he is challenging the conditions rather than the fact of his confinement and his remedy is under civil rights law.” Id. See also Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 954, 120 S.Ct. 379 (<HOLDING>). Bunn argues that his claim indeed does relate Holdings: 0: holding that habeas is the proper vehicle for presenting a claim if but only if the prisoner is seeking to get out of custody in a meaningful sense 1: holding that a state prisoner must bring his claim in habeas only if by prevailing he would necessarily prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement 2: holding a claim is waived when there is no meaningful argument on the claim in the opening brief 3: holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over habeas petition by federal prisoner seeking to challenge ins detainer because detainer is merely a notice and lodging thereof does not constitute custody for habeas purposes 4: holding that in context of patent claim at issue if means only if


Input: written notices of the seizure of item 5 to the address on Norcross Lane (which were returned stamped “RETURNED TO SENDER, INSUFFICIENT AD DRESS”) and to an address on North “D” Street in Philadelphia (which were accepted for delivery). Notice of the seizure of item 5 was published in USA Today on March 31, April 7, and April 14, 1999. Rodriguez failed to respond to the notices or assert a timely claim to the items, which were administratively forfeited. We conclude that publication of the notices in USA Today satisfies the notice by publication requirement. There is no merit to Rodriguez’s argument that the DEA had an obligation to determine whether he was a subscriber before choosing a newspaper of general circulation. See United States v. Robinson, 434 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the notices sent by certified Holdings: 0: holding that governments choice to publish notice in the new york times did not violate statutory publication requirements even though publication in the houston chronicle would have been more likely to provide notice to the claimant 1: holding publication notice in the wall street journal adequate under bankruptcy law 2: holding that substantive changes made by administrative agencies in regulations are required to comply with certain notice and comment requirements which include publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking in the federal register an opportunity for interested persons to comment on that notice and after consideration of these comments publication of the final rule with a general statement of its basis and purpose citing 5 usc  553b c 3: recognizing that as to notice publication in the laws of florida or the florida statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions 4: holding publication in local and national editions of the new york times sufficient notice to claimant in pennsylvania


Input: not rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or.interests of third parties .., would exclude a case.such as this from initiation in federal court.”) (emphasis added). 47 . See Tex. Const. art. II, § 1. 48 . Ex parte Halsted, 147 Tex.Crim. 453, 457, 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944). 49 . See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007) (No justiciable controversy exists under Article III of the United States Constitution when the parties ask for an advisory opinion.). 50 . See supra n. 12. 51 . See also Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998) (indicating the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III prevents advisory opinions); Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>). 52 . At oral argument, the State claimed that Holdings: 0: holding that a claim under the first amendment overbreadth doctrine will not succeed unless  the challenged statute itself will significantly compromise recognized first amendment protections of parties not before the court 1: recognizing the application of overbreadth doctrine to state laws and explaining that because first amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity 2: holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of the challenged statute against him is actual or imminent and quoting prime media v city of brentwood 485 f3d 343 350 6th cir 2007 because overbreadth creates an exception only to the prudential standing inquiry the supreme court has made clear that the injury in fact requirement still applies to overbreadth claims under the first amendment 3: holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision 4: holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate


Input: the trial court did not comply -with this recommendation. Moreover, when a party requests certification, there is generally a hearing, accompanied by extensive documentation, depositions, admissions, interrogatories, affidavits, and oral testimony. Warner, supra, at 94, 521 N.E.2d at 1094-1095. Here, there were some general discovery materials and affidavits for the court to rely on, but the parties agreed that a hearing was unnecessary. As the trial court must assume the truth of allegations in the complaint and not consider the merits of the case, we must conclude that the court relied on virtually “undisputed” facts when deciding the Civ.R. 23 motion. See Ojalvo v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 230, 233, 12 OBR 313, 315-316, 466 N.E.2d 875, 877-878 (<HOLDING>), and Ungerbuhler v. Butler Rural Elec. Coop., Holdings: 0: holding that no subsequent class actions may benefit from tolling when class certification has been denied 1: holding that district court in making class certification decision should avoid focusing on merits of underlying class action 2: holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case 3: holding that a courts considerations do not involve the actions merits when it decides the propriety of class certification 4: holding that while it is not appropriate to consider the merits in determining certification the admissibility of all evidence which has relevance to the merits is not barred if it is relevant to the purpose of refuting or supporting the existence of a class


Input: in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Sneed first claims that his trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase because he failed to investigate the possibility that Sneed has organic brain damage and the possibility that he had been sexually abused as a child. The district court found that his counsel had produced a “wealth” of mitigation evidence (and recounted the testimony of 17 separate defense witnesses, including three psychological experts) and held that counsel’s investigation was sufficient. On appeal, Sneed contends that his counsel was obliged to discover the brain damage and sex abuse, and produce evidence of how it would mitigate the murder. The government counters that even Sneed’s own post-conviction psychologi 3, 18-19, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (2009) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, Sneed’s counsel produced Holdings: 0: holding performance not deficient because counsel gathered a substantial amount of information and then made a reasonable decision not to pursue additional sources 1: holding that trial counsels performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony 2: holding that to demonstrate deficient performance a petitioner must show counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed a defendant by the sixth amendment 3: holding that state courts factual finding that counsel made a strategic decision not to investigate further a mental illness that if reasonable would make counsels investigation not deficient was reasonable under aedpa review 4: holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel


Input: are income taxes for which the deadline for filing a return, “including extensions” falls within three years before the filing date of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i). In the instant case, the deadline for filing a federal income tax return for calender year 1992 was extended until October 15, 1993. See IRS Memorandum, Exhibit “1”. While this date clearly lies outside of the three year lookback period provided by the statute, the running of such period was suspended during the pendency of the Debtor’s prior bankruptcy case. In re Taylor, 81 F.3d 20 (3d Cir.1996); In re DiCamillo, 186 B.R. 59 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1995) (Raslavich, J.); accord, Montoya v. United States (In re Montoya), 965 F.2d 554 (7th Cir.1992); see also, West v. United States (In re West), 5 F.3d 423 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), certiorari denied, 511 U.S. 1081, 114 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that time period of article iii of the iad tolled during the pendency of defendants motion to dismiss 1: holding that the 240 day assessment period provided by code  507a7aii  now code  507a8aii  was tolled during the pendency of the debtors prior chapter 13 ease 2: holding that limitations period in section 13  214a of the code applies over limitations period for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code because former provision is more specific 3: holding that the limitations period is likewise not tolled during the pendency of a certiorari petition to the supreme court 4: holding that tolling of the statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of a claim dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution


Input: rate because they reasonably chose Minneapolis counsel after TCBY sued them. The [defendants] point out that they are Minnesota residents who were forced to litigate the case in Arkansas under the agreement’s forum selection clause, and they were unfamiliar with Arkansas counsel. [T]he district court could have properly based the fee award on the higher Minneapolis rates....”). 7 . Indeed, Polk said that the panel was simply applying established law. And when we decided Polk, circuit precedent was clear that district courts had considerable flexibility in setting the relevant legal community for purposes of determining the hourly rate to be used in calculating the presumptively reasonable fee. See, e.g., Cohen v. West Haven Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 638 F.2d 496, 506 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Were a strict forum rule the settled law Holdings: 0: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees 1: holding that the district court in setting fees appropriately relied upon prevailing market rates in the eastern district of new york where the case was commenced and litigated 2: holding that the district court should have looked to prevailing rates in the area 3: holding that a district judge may rely on his own knowledge of private firm hourly rates in the community in determining the prevailing market rate 4: holding that absent other evidence of prevailing market rates the district judge may establish a reasonable rate based on his familiarity with the prevailing rates in the area


Input: that aiding and abetting contains a separate mens rea element — a community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking — and a separate actus reus element— proof that the defendant participated in or assisted, encouraged, solicited, or counseled the crime. However, this argument overlooks Idaho’s statutory abolition of the distinction between accessories and principals. Idaho Code § 19-1430 provides: Distinction between accessories and principals abolished. — The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal and between principa .3d 203, 211 (D.C.Cir.2008) (“Aiding and abetting is not a separate offense; it is only a theory of liability — one ground upon which the jury may find him liable for the charged offense.”); United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Londono-Gomez v. Immigration & Naturalization Holdings: 0: holding that the protection of the double jeopardy clause does not preclude a defendant from being charged under a statute  defining as the criminal offense a discrete act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a distinguishable discrete act that is a separate violation of the statute 1: holding that an implicit congressional intent to impose  aiding and abetting liability could not plausibly be inferred from the statutory silence in  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 2: holding aiding and abetting is not a discrete criminal offense 3: holding the death penalty disproportionately cruel and unusual when imposed for aiding and abetting a robbery resulting in murder 4: holding that a private plaintiff is not entitled to maintain an aiding and abetting action under  10b or rule 10b  5


Input: process; who threatens, abuses or otherwise intimidates or attempts to intimidate a school employee or a pupil; or who willfully disobeys a school employee; or who uses abusive or profane language directed at a school employee. (g) For the purposes of this section: (1) “Pupil or student” shall include any child, youth or adult who is enrolled in any instructional program ... under public school direction [.] ... and (2) “teacher” shall mean all professional educators as defined in section one, article one of this ehapter[.j According to this statute, Ms. Cobb stands in loco parentis to her students and was authorized and, arguably, required to impose appropriate discipline when and where needed. See Syl. Pt. 4, Smith v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 170 W.Va. 593, 295 S.E.2d 680 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Rogliano v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 176 Holdings: 0: holding that a public school cannot compel students to perform the pledge of allegiance 1: recognizing that picture of jesus christ in public school impaired use of school by students and visitors 2: holding in loco parentis doctrine codified in w vacode  18a51 does not prohibit certain forms of physical punishment in disciplining public school students 3: holding that the defendant school officials did not create the students danger or increase their risk of harm where female students were physically verbally and sexually molested by male students in a unisex bathroom and in a darkroom 4: holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students


Input: and with intent to commit a crime” with the language that elevates the crime of burglary to a first-degree offense. Specifically, the State notes that in the provision elevating the burglary to first-degree when the burglar possesses a dangerous weapon upon “entering or at any time while in the building,” there is no mens rea attached to the requirement of possession. The State argues that the district court therefore erred in reading an additional mens rea requirement into the first-degree burglary statute. The State acknowledges that we have, in some limited instances, held that a mens rea element must be implied in particular criminal statutes notwithstanding the absence of any express mens rea language in those statutes. See State v. Ndi-kum, 815 N.W.2d 816, 818, 821 (Minn.2012) (<HOLDING>); In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Minn.2000) Holdings: 0: holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession 1: recognizing innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons possession 2: holding that the phrase possession or custody in  5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession 3: holding that the term carry requires knowing possession and bearing movement conveyance or transportation of the firearm 4: recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography


Input: 32, nor Rule 60(b) was applicable to juvenile-delinquency proceedings. W.B.S. appealed. W.B.S. contends on appeal'that the circuit court erred in dismissing both his Rule 60(b) motion and his Rule 32 petition. He argues that he should be allowed to seek relief under one of the above procedures. I. With regard to W.B.S.’s claim that Rule 60(b) provides a possible mechanism by which a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent may challenge the effectiveness of his or her counsel, that claim is without merit. Although he argues in his brief on appeal that he should be allowed to seek relief under Rule 60(b), W.B.S; correctly recognizes that juvenile-delinquency proceedings are “quasi-criminal in nature.” (W.B.S.’s brief, p. 10). See also Driskill v. State, 376 So.2d 678, 679 (Ala.1979) (<HOLDING>). Because juvenile-delinquency proceedings are Holdings: 0: holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil deportation proceedings and noting the rules incompatibility with the streamlined administrative nature of such proceedings 1: recognizing the quasicriminal nature of delinquency proceedings 2: holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings 3: holding that private attorney who acted as courtappointed counsel for child in state juvenile delinquency proceedings was not acting under color of state law 4: recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings


Input: 395 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). However, under Florida law, whether a condition precedent is at issue is not relevant to contract formation. Instead, even in the words of the case relied upon by the Holding Corporations, Ketchian, a condition precedent arises as a “defense of non-performance.” Id. at 396; see also Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So.3d 1086, 1096 (Fla.2010) (“[A] defending party’s assertion that a plaintiff has failed to satisfy conditions precedent necessary to trigger contractual duties under an existing agreement is generally viewed as an affirmative defense, for which the defensive pleader has the burden of pleading and persuasion.”) (emphasis in original); cf. Christian Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 163 F.Supp.2d 260, 262-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (<HOLDING>). As such, the issue is not one of contract Holdings: 0: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership 1: holding under new york law that conditions precedent are not a defense to contract formation 2: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york 3: holding that new york law did not preclude an arbitrators award of punitive damages despite a new york choice of law provision because there was no indication in the contract that the parties intended to limit their remedies in arbitration 4: holding that new york law applies to this matter


Input: become damaged as a consequence, there is no allegation in the complaint, nor any arguable factual support for an allegation that the product did not perform as represented within the short term of plaintiffs use or that damages were sustained by plaintiff. In Briehl v. General Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir.1999), a case upon which defendants rely, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint for the reason that the plaintiffs had not adequately pled damages. The opinion in Briehl reflects that the plaintiffs, owners of certain models of GM vehicles, had filed a class action complaint asserting claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty and violation of s ) (<HOLDING>); Khan v. Shiley Inc., 217 Cal.App.3d 848, 857, Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiffs belief that a product could fail in the future is not without more a legal injury sufficient to support plaintiffs claim 1: holding that because plaintiffs iied claim is based on the facts that support plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim plaintiffs iied claim did not accrue until the charges against them were dismissed 2: holding that if plaintiffs could not establish that the particular agent orange causing injury to the plaintiff was manufactured by that defendant then the burden would shift to each defendant to establish that its product could not have caused the plaintiffs injury or alternatively that it should only be responsible for a proportion of the damage 3: holding estoppel claim could not lie in tort where the facts that support the claim could not support a claim for fraud or misrepresentation 4: holding that plaintiffs failure to warn claim could not proceed independent of plaintiffs aemld claim


Input: at trial with respect to its counterclaim, McLaughlin could then, on appeal, press her interesting argument that there can be no counterclaim by an employer against an employee under the Jones Act. Had the District Court denied PMD the right to file the counterclaim or had it granted summary judgment to McLaughlin on PMD’s counterclaim, the rights and liabilities of the parties may well have been conclusively determined, in which case the District Court’s decision would have been appealable. See Nautilus Motor, 85 F.3d at 109-10 & n. 3 (finding appellate jurisdiction pursuant to § 1292(a)(3) to consider a decision holding plaintiff liable on defendant’s counterclaim that alleged plaintiff was solely responsible for the grounding of its tanker, but le (8th Cir.1964) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Because the District Court Holdings: 0: holding that partial summary judgment is not a final appealable judgment when it did not settle completely any of the matters in controversy or adjudicate completely the rights and liabilities of the parties 1: holding that denial of motion for summary judgment is interlocutory even though trial judge had stated that there was no just reason for delay because denial of motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of defendants rights and the appeal did not affect defendants substantial rights 2: holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  3: holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable 4: holding that denial of motion for summary judgment not appealable because did not determine any rights and liabilities


Input: that summary judgment in favor of defendants for the reasons relied upon by the district court was inappropriate, on remand, the district court was not enjoined from granting defendants summary judgment on some other ground including the ground that prima facie tort is not recognized as a valid cause of action under Pennsylvania law, a ground specifically not considered by the district court. See In re Carl M. Mazzocone, 200 B.R. 568, 572 (E.D.Pa.1996) (“ ‘the mandate rule applies ... only to those issues that were decided by the appellate court’ ”) (quoting Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 857 (3d Cir.), stay denied, 510 U.S. 1309, 114 S.Ct. 909, 127 L.Ed.2d 352 (1994) & citing Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 950 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>)). (2) While the Third Circuit and the Holdings: 0: holding that a trial court is free to make any order or direction in further progress of the case not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate court as to any question not settled by the appellate decision 1: holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand 2: holding an appellate decision becomes the law of the case and is controlling on both the trial court and on any further appeals in the same case 3: holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings 4: holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required


Input: original). It serves at least three distinct purposes. First, it “is a form of punishment for criminal conduct.” Songer v. State, 327 Md. 42, 46, 607 A.2d 557, 559 (1992). Second, it is intended to rehabilitate the defendant. Anne Arundel County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 329 Md. 677, 685, 621 A.2d 427, 431 (1993) (citing Lee v. State, 307 Md. 74, 78, 512 A.2d 372, 374 (1986)). Lastly, it affords “the aggrieved victim recompense for monetary loss.” Id. (quoting Lee v. State, 307 Md. 74, 78, 512 A.2d 372, 374 (1986)). In Maryland, restitution may be ordered, with qualifications, as a direct sentence for a crime or delinquent act, in addition to any other penalty prescribed by the underlying sentencing or remedial statute. § ll-603(a). Sentencing courts also ma 176, 1181 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 433, 488 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer 1: holding that department of transportation did not have control of motorists drivers license because although the department of transportation may have had a duty to recall the motorists license this authority to revoke does not involve physical possession or actual control sufficient to bring the license within the ambit of the personal property exception to sovereign immunity 2: holding improper a probation order under  641a of article 27 forbidding a defendant from driving even if the maryland transit authority which had specific regulatory power over drivers license suspensions under the transportation article gives the defendant a license 3: holding that home detention as a condi tion of probation under  641a of article 27 is improper without explicit statutory authorization 4: holding that probation order under  641a of article 27 was an illegal sentence when it ordered restitution to be paid by a defendant to a victim of an alleged crime for which the defendant was not convicted


Input: that the trial judge exceeded his authority in making any modification effective through the child’s nineteenth birthday. “One of the basic rules of construction of contracts is that the law in force at the date of making a contract determines the rights of the parties under the contract.” Paul, 214 Va. at 653, 203 S.E.2d at 125. The law in effect in 1993 contained a clause, found in former Code § 20-107.2, that is substantially similar to current Code § 20-124.2(C). That statute also authorized a judge to order support for a child until the age of nineteen or the child’s graduation from high school. Therefore, although the trial judge did not cite the correct statute, the remedy he applied is contemplated by the agreement in this case. See Paul, 214 Va. at 653, 203 S.E.2d at 125 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge’s Holdings: 0: holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed 1: holding that federal statutes and regulations can form the basis of a breach of contract claim if expressly incorporated into the contract 2: holding as much 3: holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made 4: holding that the law in effect at the time a contract is made is as much a part of the contract as if incorporated therein


Input: jury was discharged, therefore it has waived any error. Point of error five is overruled. In points of error six, seven, and eight, the City claims the trial court erred in awarding Shiba attorney’s fees because: (1) there was no statutory authority imposing liability on the City for attorney’s fees, (2) there was no evidence Shiba presented his claim for attorney’s fees to the City, and (3) Shiba failed to segregate the attorney’s fees for his defense from those for his counterclaim. Rule 33.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a party to present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion in order to preserve a complaint for appeal. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1; Moody Nat. Bank v. Riebschlager, 946 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). The City did not object at any time to Holdings: 0: holding under former rule 52a appellant must object to alleged error in the trial court or such error is waived 1: holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of trial by failing to object 2: holding that a defendant who fails to object to an error at a plea colloquy hearing must satisfy the plain error rule 3: holding that where the record is insufficient to show that the alleged error occurred the presumption that the trial court acted without error must prevail 4: holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error


Input: Berber-Tinoco, we must give due credence to officers who “may make reasonable deductions and inferences based on their experience and specialized training that might well elude an untrained person.” Berber-Tinoco, 510 F.3d at 1087 (quotation marks omitted). Finally, Palos-Marquez argues that the BIC agents’ observation that the pickup’s occupants appeared “nervous and shaky” occurred after he had been seized, and therefore cannot be included in the reasonable suspicion analysis. This is incorrect, as the record indicates that the BIC agents’ observations were made prior to Palos-Marquez’s stop. Accordingly, these observations provide another relevant consideration in the reasonable suspicion equation. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 276, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885, 95 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law 1: holding that passenger conduct can be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion 2: holding detention of passenger for warrant check violated fourth amendment absent reasonable suspicion 3: holding that nervous evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion 4: recognizing that furtive gestures undertaken in response to police presence can serve as a factor in establishing reasonable suspicion


Input: including “you gotta talk to us” or made declarative statements such as “talk to me ... just tell me,” we consider as we must the context in which those words were used. See Alston, supra, 204 N.J. at 626-27, 10 A.3d 880 (observing that meaning of vernacular or of colloquial expressions may only be evident from context and tone). None of those statements implied that defendant was required to respond; each was made in conjunction with an entirely permissible effort to persuade defendant that he would feel better, and could get the weight of the guilty knowledge of the crime off of his conscience, by explaining what had happened. Those efforts are not constitutionally infirm. Miller, supra, 76 N.J. at 398-99, 388 A.2d 218; see State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 462-63, 874 A.2d 546 (2005) (<HOLDING>); State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654-56, 628 Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an allegedly coerced interrogation where the taped interrogation was played for jurors and the defendant crossexamined the witness at length about the interrogation 1: holding that once the right to counsel is invoked custodial interrogation must cease until the suspects attorney is present 2: holding that lengthy intermittent interrogation is not inherently coercive and not sufficient in itself to overbear suspects will 3: holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda  4: holding that illiteracy is not of itself sufficient to prove fraud


Input: Rangen, 351 F.2d at 858; Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power, 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir.1943). But see Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d 367, 372 (3d Cir.1985) (“There is good reason to question whether Congress intended to sweep commercial bribery within the ambit of section 2(c).”). The Second Circuit has never reached the question of whether — and under what circumstances — commercial ■ bribery can form the basis of a claim under § 2(c). And we find that we need not decide the issue here. Even assuming that' a § 2(c) claim could be based on commercial bribery, a necessary requirement for stating such a claim would be allegations sufficient to establish commercial bribery. See, e.g., Excel Handbag Co. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 630 F.2d 379, 387-88 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the allegations in the Blue Holdings: 0: holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property 1: holding that a competitive commercial purpose is not of itself improper 2: holding that a  2c claim based on commercial bribery requires proof of commercial bribery 3: holding that evidence did not establish commercial bribery because there was no proof of inducement 4: holding that injury to business or property was not limited to commercial interests


Input: “[tjhere is little tactical wisdom in counsel resting on his hands and assuming the government would help make the defense case for him”); Barrow, 398 F.3d at 605 (rejecting claim that counsel’s failure to present any evidence was legitimate strategic move). In any event, the “strategy” failed, as a competent attorney might expect: the officers unanimously and consistently stated that they had not coerced Bynum. And without the admission to coercion that Graddick had hoped the officers would give, he was left with no evidence that Bynum’s confessions were coerced. A motion to suppress allegedly involuntary confessions cannot succeed without at least some evidence that the confessions were coerced. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Conner v. McBride, 375 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that indiana courts will only engage in statutory interpretation if the language of the statute is ambiguous 1: holding that police failure to inform the accused of his attorneys attempts to contact him and misstatements to the attorney as to whether the accused was at the police station did not violate the accuseds due process rights 2: holding that confession is involuntary only if police coercion or overreaching overbore the accuseds will and caused the confession 3: recognizing that the accuseds right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system 4: holding that an award of restitution is only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction


Input: price of Heartland stock moved above that price. Ps.Br. at 20. This allegation, and the part of the amended complaint on which it is based, are insufficient to give rise to a strong inference of fraud. Addressing only the terse contention set forth in the response brief, it is unclear why, if Jupiter and Sprague were motivated to commit fraud, Jupiter did not exercise its conversion rights during the third quarter of 1996, at a time when plaintiffs allege the stock was trading higher than the strike price and when defendants allegedly already knew Heartland’s true financial condition and the impact that disclosure would have on the company and the price of its stock. Plaintiffs have failed to plead a strong inference of fraudulent intent on this basis. See Phillips, 190 F.3d at 623-24 (<HOLDING>). Y Because the court holds that plaintiffs’ § Holdings: 0: recognizing that a misrepresentation need not be driven by an improper motive and does not require an intent to commit fraud 1: holding that stock sales by one defendant of approximately 8000 shares for profit of 173000 raised strong inference of fraudulent intent 2: holding that where knowledgeable insiders did not sell stock at a time that would have taken advantage of allegedly fraudulent statements there was not a strong inference of scienter 3: holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter 4: holding that court was unwilling to piece together speculative inferences to conclude that the defendant had a true motive to commit fraud where under plaintiffs theory defendant would have acted irrationally by depressing stock price and concluding that plaintiffs had failed under pslra to plead strong inference of fraudulent intent


Input: CURIAM. Affirmed. See Williams v. State, 919 So.2d 645, 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). SAWAYA, ORFINGER and LAWSON, JJ., Holdings: 0: holding that defendants waived any challenge to the trial courts failure to hold an evidentiary hearing 1: holding that a trial courts failure to hold a sheppard hearing may be considered harmless if the allegations in the rule 3170z motion are conclusively refuted by the record 2: holding that where the coercion alleged to enter a plea is legally insufficient or conclusively refuted by the record there is no need to hold an evidentiary hearing or appoint conflictfree counsel 3: holding that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing when the petitioners habeas submissions demonstrate that the petitioner is conclusively entitled to relief in such circumstances an evidentiary hearing would be a waste of judicial resources 4: holding that a postconviction claim that is refuted by the record is without merit


Input: that a prudént man acting in a like capacity and familiar with’ such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). As the Fourth Circuit has maintained, “[t]he fiduciary obligations of the trustees to the participants and beneficiaries of [an ERISA] plan are '... the highest known to the law.” Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 356 (4th Cir.2014), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2887, 192 L.Ed.2d 924 (2015) (quoting Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n. 8 (2d Cir.1982)). The Fourth-Circuit also stated: Congress enacted ERISA to protect “the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries ... by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obl ir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Holdings: 0: holding no fiduciary breach where plaintiffs argued plan should only offer institutional funds 1: holding that plan servicer which provided 401k plan a menu of investment options was not a fiduciary because parties contract required servicer to give the plan notice of and opportunity to reject any changes to the menu 2: holding no breach where unisys did not offer exclusively retail class funds in fact the unisys plan contains a variety of investment options 3: holding that general plan language did not make investment in employer stock merely permissible where specific plan provisions required that such an option be offered 4: holding that insurer was a fiduciary to a 401k plan because the insurer had the ability to substitute investment options and the plan had no meaningful opportunity to reject substitutions because of the penalty charges associated with doing so


Input: that the award should be reduced. For this reason, we reverse that part of the appellate court judgment holding that the trial court erred in reducing Judy’s maintenance award. B. Trial Court’s Order for Nonmodifiable and Nonreviewable Maintenance Steven next contends the Act gives trial courts discretion to make maintenance awards nonreviewable and nonmodifiable. The appellate court found that the trial court exceeded its authority under section 510 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2004)) in making Judy’s maintenance award nonmodifiable and nonreviewable. Section 502(f) (750 ILCS 5/502(f) (West 2004)) states that the parties to a marital settlement agreement may agree to make maintenance nonmodifiable and nonreviewable. See In re Marriage of Kozloff, 101 Ill. 2d 526, 533-34 (1984) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the appellate court that, Holdings: 0: recognizing that if the homeowner complies with the conditions of the tpp the lender breaches the contract by failing to provide a permanent modification agreement by the modification effective date 1: holding that denial of petition for modification of maintenance was proper when the parties agreement prohibited modification of maintenance 2: recognizing that recipient spouses improved financial security will support modification of maintenance award 3: holding appellants failure to plead affirmative defense of modification precluded trial court from considering evidence of oral modification at summary judgment hearing 4: holding that court lacked jurisdiction to modify visitation where it dismissed the modification petition


Input: supports his contract claims by alleging that the government’s criminal prosecution established “an implied or constructive trust relationship” between himself and the government, Compl. ¶ 9, and that his incarceration has resulted in a contract that binds Mr. Bobka “to the government’s terms,” Compl. ¶ 15, This court, however, lacks jurisdiction over both constructive trust claims, see Frank & Breslow, LLP v. United States, 43 Fed.Cl. 65, 68 (1999) (citations omitted), and implied-in-law contract claims where a party alleges that “the law imposes a duty in order to prevent injustice,” International Data Prod. Corp. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1; Murray v. United States, 817 F.2d 1580, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); Milas v. United States, 42 Fed.Cl. 704, 710 (1999) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted), aff'd, 217 F.3d 854 (Fed. Holdings: 0: holding that the court lacks jurisdiction over sixth amendment claims because the sixth amendment is not moneymandating 1: holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel 2: holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing 3: holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment 4: holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims


Input: capacity. In re Club Zippers, Inc., Adversary No. 04-01033, Docket No. 5, Ex. 58, ¶ IX. Therefore, the first three elements of Nikoloutsos are met because the complaint is a writing that contains a demand on the debtor by the creditor and evidences an intent to hold the debtor liable. Furthermore, the removal of Plaintiffs’ state court claim constitutes a filing of Plaintiffs’ complaint in satisfaction of the fourth element of Nikoloutsos because the complaint was filed as part of the Debtor’s Notice of Removal of an Adversary Proceeding. Finally, the fifth element of Nikoloutsos is met because allowance of the claim is equitable under the circumstances. The Nikoloutsos court explained that equity requires “being flexible when justice requires.” 199 F.3d at 237. In th 2 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Scott, 67 B.R. 1011, 1013 Holdings: 0: holding that when a creditor files a proof of claim the bankruptcy court has core jurisdiction to determine that claim even if it was a prepetition contract claim arising under state law 1: holding that a motion to liftthe bankruptcy stay in order to pursue a claim is an informal proof of claim 2: holding that bankruptcy court order that a stay applied to a particular party was a final order and noting that bankruptcy court orders lifting or denying relief from an automatic stay are final for purposes of appeal 3: holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added 4: holding dismissal is not precluded by bankruptcy stay


Input: Similarly, an agency’s “no effect” determination under, the Endangered Species Act must be upheld unless arbitrary and capricious. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1448 (9th Cir.1996). Ninth Circuit jurisprudence distinguishes between the level of deference afforded to agency decisions that are primarily legal in nature and that afforded to decisions that are factual. Alaska Wilderness Recreation & Tourism Ass’n v. Morrison, 67 F.3d 723, 727 (9th Cir.1995) (‘We find that it makes sense to distinguish the strong level of deference we accord an agency in deciding factual or technical matters from that to be accorded in disputes involving predominately legal questions.”); see Northcoast Envtl. Ctr. v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660, 667 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In the Ninth Circuit, “[a]n agency’s Holdings: 0: holding that the less deferential skidmore standard was a more appropriate standard to be applied to an agencys unpublished opinion 1: holding that the reasonableness standard applies to the final sentence not to each individual decision made during the sentencing process 2: holding that the less deferential standard of reasonableness applies to threshold agency decisions that certain activities are not subject to nepas procedures 3: holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard 4: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard


Input: Court recognized that even when a motion for summary judgment omits one of multiple causes of action, the trial court’s order granting summary judgment may still be upheld on appeal when the “omitted ground was intertwined with, and precluded by, a ground addressed in the motion.” G & H Towing Co., 347 S.W.3d at 297. In particular, the Court recognized that even when a trial court errs in granting a no-evidence summary judgment on a cause of action not expressly presented in the summary judgment motion, that error is considered harmless when the record clearly reveals that omitted cause of action was precluded as a matter of law by other grounds clearly raised and addressed by the trial court. Id. at 297-98; see also Zarzosa v. Flynn, 266 SW.3d 614, 621 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We have already determined that McCollum Holdings: 0: holding reversal would be meaningless because questioned recovery precluded as a matter of law 1: holding that the trustees preference actions against each of the defendants was precluded as a matter of law by the debtors earlier assumption of its agreements with them  2: holding that notice provided by plaintiff that alleged she  was injured  as result of fall was insufficient as matter of law and precluded invocation of savings clause 3: holding that it may be decided as a matter of law 4: holding that lack of subject matter jurisdiction precluded court from awarding injunctive relief as well as damages


Input: court found, Frison was actively involved at his market, continually reminded his vendors that he was in charge, and even involved himself in regulating the prices of counterfeit goods. Frison’s attempt to carve out a niche for the truly passive landlord is unavailing on the facts of this case. Even if Frison had been a less active landlord, a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably understand that intentionally selling counterfeit products at a flea market, or willfully infringing copyrighted works at the market for financial gain, could result in criminal liability, and that intentionally aiding and abetting such conduct could result in the same. See United States v. White, 882 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Knutson v. Brewer, 619 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1980)) (<HOLDING>). Frison makes no meaningful argument Holdings: 0: holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct 1: holding that it is not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent that is tortious malicious or even criminal or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress the conduct itself must be extreme and outrageous 2: holding that in a fifth amendment challenge pjrovided that conduct is of a sort widely known among the lay public to be criminal  a person is not entitled to clear notice that the conduct violates a particular criminal statute it is enough that he knows that what he is about to do is probably or certainly criminal 3: holding that when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer who is already subject to a search condition pursuant to his probation agreement is engaged in criminal activity then there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationers  privacy interests is reasonable 4: recognizing that when an informant is shown to be right about some things he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity


Input: not to investigate her. This is not a case where the client was ignorant of his opportunities and unaware of his lawyer’s errors. Contreras actually fired Gustavo Acevedo, the court-appointed lawyer, and replaced him with Zaney. Contreras claims that other lawyers heard him assert the investigation defense, but in a decade he has not produced that testimony, and the jury heard Contreras from the stand explain his actions. He had an opportunity then to tell his story his way, but he did not mention advice of counsel. Even if it were true that Zaney did not present the investigation defense, he is presumed to have omitted it because it is no defense rather than in an attempt to obscure his malpractice. See generally Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L,Ed.2d 987 (1983)(<HOLDING>) Just as every error at trial can be twisted Holdings: 0: recognizing that grounds for substitution under  3599 exist when an attorneys personal interests prevent her from advancing her clients best arguments 1: holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence 2: holding clients independent voluntary decision to dismiss products liability suit precluded finding that attorneys alleged negligent preparation of case proximately caused clients injury 3: holding that attorneys and not clients choose the arguments to present 4: recognizing an attorneys right to conduct the clients case with a certain degree of privacy


Input: after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a). “A ruling’s error is clear if, at the time it was made, a clear precedent in the Supreme Court or this circuit established its erroneous character.” United States v. Terrell, 696 F.3d 1257, 1260 (D.C.Cir.2012). But Martinez has pointed to no clear precedent that would have entitled him to advance notice of the government’s intention to seek a specific sentencing adjustment, which he concedes § 3B1.1 provides, as opposed to a departure. Cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(h) (requiring advance notice before a court “departís] from the applicable sentencing range” (emphasis added)); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714, 128 S.Ct. 2198, 171 L.Ed.2d 28 (2008) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not abuse its Holdings: 0: holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines 1: holding that rule 32hs notice requirement applies by its terms only to departures from a guidelines range 2: holding that despite the advisory nature of the sentencing guidelines they remain the starting point and the initial benchmark of a district courts sentencing analysis the district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable guidelines range and keep that range in mind throughout the sentencing process and that failing to calculate or improperly calculating the guidelines range  or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenceemdashincluding an explanation for any deviation from the guidelines range constitutes significant procedural error  3: holding notice no longer required even for traditional departures 4: holding that by its terms rule 50 applies only to jury trials