Input: v. Chamberlin, 206 Neb. 808, 295 N.W.2d 391 (1980). While we have held that one may in good faith make an occupational change even though that change may reduce one’s ability to meet financial obligations, we have never determined whether the termination of one’s employment due to one’s own bad acts or fault constitutes good cause justifying modification or termination of alimony payments. See Cooper, supra. Other jurisdictions have addressed this issue. For instance, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has stated, “Although unemployment or diminution of earnings is a common ground for modification, a petition for modific (employing good faith test to determine whether decrease in income should justify decrease in alimony); Antonelli v. Antonelli, 242 Va. 152, 409 S.E.2d 117 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Giesner v. Giesner, 319 N.W.2d 718 (Minn. Holdings: 0: holding that premium reduction was legal where the insured had given consideration for reduction 1: holding that husbands knowledge of his obligation of support and his subsequent election to enter employment that would substantially reduce his income and make it impossible to meet his obligations would not justify reduction in support 2: holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith 3: holding that reduction in income resulting from voluntary employment decision does not require corresponding reduction in payor spouses support obligations even if decision was reasonable and made in good faith 4: holding that fathers criminal activity resulting in incarceration did not constitute material change in circumstances justifying reduction in or termination of his child support obligations


Input: and C (Nelson Dep. at 13;24-14:12). They also caused the duplicative second lawsuit to be filed. This Court and the Fifth Circuit rejected the individual Defendants’ defense that they never read the LLC Purchase Agreement before signing it. # 52 at 5-6; # 55; # 170 at 2 (“Dallas Gas erred in not reading the addendum that effected the release, and Dallas Gas ratified the release by keeping the sums received under the contract.”). Where a court has previously held that an unambiguous release and covenant not to sue bars the plaintiffs claims, the plaintiffs breach of the release and covenant not to sue may be deemed “obvious” as a matter of law, and the sued party is entitled to damages. Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 957 F.2d 1302, 1306 (5th Cir.1992) (applying New York law) (<HOLDING>). See also McKissick v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, Holdings: 0: holding that where an action is brought in obvious breach of covenant not to sue court has wide discretion to impose liability for litigation expenses including attorneys fees 1: holding parties agreement provided clear contractual justification for the award of costs and expenses including attorneys fees to the prevailing party 2: holding that trial court has wide discretion in determining sufficiency of foundation for opinion testimony 3: holding that by choosing the words any actual expenses including attorneys fees incurred congress did not intend to remove the discretion of the district court to award fees in cases such as contingent fee or pro bono cases where the client has not actually incurred the obligation to pay her attorneys fees 4: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife


Input: WL 370461, at *4 (Minn.App. July 8, 1997) (stating that while section 197.46 specifically allows the veteran’s right to appeal, “both parties have the same right to appeal”), review denied (Minn. Sept. 3, 1997). These decisions cited Schrader as support. Stafne, 1998 WL 778931, at *3; Rollins, 1997 WL 370461, at *4. The district court relied on Schrader and Stafne as support for its dismissal order; Eldredge relies on Rollins in addition to Schrader and Stafne. But as unpublished cases, Stafne and Rollins are not binding authority. Minn.Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2008) (stating that “[u]npublished opinions of the [c]ourt of [ajppeals are not precedential”). And although unpublished cases may have persuasive value, see Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn.App. 1993) (<HOLDING>), because Stafne and Rollins did not involve Holdings: 0: holding that unpublished opinions have precedential effect 1: holding that unpublished opinions are of persuasive value at best and not precedential 2: holding onejustice opinion has no precedential value 3: recognizing that unpublished decisions issued after january 1 1996 are not controlling precedent but may be considered persuasive authority 4: recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted


Input: costs in the trial court on March 27, 2012. Analysis Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs inmate litigation when the inmate claims inability to pay costs. In its 2011 session, the Texas Legislature amended Chapter 14. Prior to the amendments, Chapter 14 “applie[d] only to a suit brought by an inmate in a district, county, justice of the peace, or small claims court in which an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs [was] filed by the inmate.” In its pre-amended state, it was clear that “Chapter 14 [did] not apply to appellate courts.” Nabelek v. Garrett, 94 S.W.3d 648, 649 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); see Jackson v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 178 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The amendments to Chapter 14 became effective Holdings: 0: holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged to be cause for the procedural default of other claims is itself an independent claim subject to the procedural requirements of exhaustion 1: holding that court had no obligation to inform pro se litigant of procedural requirements due to clear evidence in record including inter alia defendants mention of requirements in summary judgment motion that litigant knew requirements 2: holding that remand was necessary when the alj failed to adhere to  4041527d2s procedural requirements and noting that a de minimis violation of those procedural requirements may qualify as harmless error 3: holding procedural requirements of section 14004 inapplicable to appellate filings 4: holding frady inapplicable


Input: other acts providing there is a ‘reasonable’ basis ... to ... permit[] an inference that defendant had an aberrant sexual propensity that makes it more probable that he or she committed the sexual offense charged”). ¶ 15 Nor were the offenses so remote in time that evidence of each would not have been cross-admissible due to the danger of unfair prejudice. The attacks on Yolanda, Karen, and Melissa occurred within a three-month period. Although the attack on Alisa occurred two years and nine months before the attack on Yolanda, this time interval did not require the trial court to find that the probative value of the evidence of each attack was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Cf. State v. Arner; 195 Ariz. 394, 395 ¶ 1, 988 P.2d 1120, 1121 (App. 1999) (<HOLDING>); Rule 404 cmt. to 1997 amendment (remoteness Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 1: holding that a bankruptcy court did not err in ordering repayment over five years 2: holding that before a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of the victims character for violence there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was the first aggressor and that once the defendant testified that he was attacked and cut by the victim without provocation before using the victims utility tool to stab the victim the defendant was clearly entitled to question the victim about past acts of violence reflected in court documents from the state of oregon 3: holding that trial court did not err 4: holding trial court did not err by permitting evidence that defendant molested another child three years before the victim


Input: those who live in such humble circumstances to dwell there. That they cannot afford to have their own kitchens and bathrooms, and hallway access thereto, does not render such areas “public” with respect to the constitutional prerequisites for permissible entry by the police .... We should vigilantly guard against permitting ... inroads upon the reasonable expectations of privacy of the lesser situated of our citizens who are forced by economic circumstances to reside in rooming houses. People v. Garriga, 189 A.D.2d 236, 596 N.Y.S.2d 25, 29 (citation omitted), leave to appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 718, 602 N.Y.S.2d 815, 622 N.E.2d 316 (1993). We are aware that other courts have reached a contrary result on this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210, 1214 (D.C.Cir.1976)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Perkins, 286 F.Supp. 259, Holdings: 0: holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest 1: holding that the defendant committed assault under section 70813 where he came into the apartment for about two seconds with a gun in his right hand held the gun straight down at his side said wrong door then closed the door and started knocking on the other apartments door 2: holding that defendants constitutionally protected privacy interest began at the door to his room not at the door to the rooming house 3: holding that arrest by the back door of defendants house was unlawful 4: holding that rooming house residents had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the front hallway of the house they shared which was not obviously a rooming house open to the general public


Input: Gualberto Chavez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) summarily affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his motion to reopen deportation proceedings after he was ordered deported in absentia. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Celis-Castellano v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888, 890-91 (9th Cir.2002). We grant the petition. The IJ abused his discretion by denying Chavez’s motion to reopen. See Jerezano v. INS, 169 F.3d 613, 615 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Chavez stated in his motion to reopen that Holdings: 0: holding that denying a petitioners motion to reopen when he arrived 15 to 20 minutes late was an abuse of discretion 1: holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it 2: holding that an order denying a petitioners motion to reopen proceedings so that he could apply for adjustment of status was not a judgment regarding the granting of relief and was thus reviewable 3: holding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners motion to dismiss under 11 usc  707a 4: holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen


Input: to adequately plead an offer to tender the Plan's shares back to Defendants. After briefing on Defendants’ motion, the Court allowed Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint which included an offer of tender. Thus, Defendants' argument on that point is moot. 25 . The applicable statute of limitations in this case is governed by § 13 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m. As discussed in detail infra, § 13 has both a 1-year and 3-year limitations period. Truly, the 3-year period is a statute of repose, not of limitations. P. Stolz Family Partnership L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 99-107 (2d Cir.2004); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First RepublicBank Corp., 997 F.2d 39, 52 (5th Cir.1993) (judgment vacated on other grounds); Eureka Homestead Soc. v. Zirinsky, 1995 WL 542482, *2 (E.D.La.1995) (<HOLDING>). Because the parties have referred to § 13 in Holdings: 0: holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose 1: recognizing that tilas statute of repose acts to limit the clouding of a propertys title 2: holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed 3: holding that statute of repose acts as an outer limit or ceiling within which all suits must be brought 4: holding that the 3year limit is a period of repose


Input: at 467 (describing the practical problems that would ensue if tolling were not permitted in opt-in class actions). It also would place on the court the burden of timing class certification and implementing opt-in procedures in such a way as to make sure that the limitations period was met. This would be virtually impossible in cases such as this, where suit was filed late in the period. See, Brief of Amici Curiae Larry J. Rhutasel et al. at 11-12 (unintentional procedural delays in ruling on class certification would terminate putative class members’ claims if tolling did not permit putative members to opt in to a representative suit after the statute of limitations had run). Such a holding also would create an anomalous difference 8, 139-140, 127 S.Ct. 764, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we agree with the reasoning of the Holdings: 0: holding that congress intended to adopt a standard more stringent than the prepslra second circuit standard 1: recognizing the circuit split and applying the subjective standard as more stringent without deciding which standard applies 2: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 3: holding that terry  parental unfitness  standard is more stringent than the dependency best interests standard 4: holding that the standard for assessing whether a justiciable controversy exists should not be more stringent in lawsuits seeking a declaration of patent invalidity or noninfringement than in nonpatent fields


Input: anatomical areas.” Id. at 1503-1504. When terms are defined, however, a vagueness argument generally fails. See e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, supra, 427 U.S. at 60-62, 96 S.Ct. at 2447-2448, 49 L.Ed.2d at 320-321; Berg v. Health & Hospital Corp., supra, 865 F.2d at 803. See also State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 166, 475 A.2d 31 (1984). Here, N.J.S.A 2C:33-12.2 clearly defines specified sexual activity. In addition, N.J.S.A 2C:33-12.2a(4) contains the verb “facilitate,” which has uniformly been found not to offend the vagueness doctrine. See e.g., Matter of Kaster, 454 N.W.2d 876 (Iowa 1990) (reasoning that proscribed criminal activity was clearly defined and “facilitate” in the context of a forfeiture statute was not vague); People v. Chastain, 733 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Colo.1987) (<HOLDING>); State v. Bush, 195 Mont. 475, 636 P.2d 849, Holdings: 0: recognizing that congress desired a broad definition of a claim  1: holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary 2: holding that the double jeopardy clause was not violated by two convictions arising from the same criminal episode because the crimes of attempted burglary and possession of burglary tools each had an element the other did not and were thus separate crimes 3: recognizing broad definition of proscribed tools which facilitate burglary reflected legislatures understanding that a burglars choice of tool is limited only by his imagination and ingenuity 4: holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary


Input: damage to the tracks was done by the work of an independent contractor whom Chessie did not sue. The district court granted summary judgment on the trespass and negligent claims as a result, and Chessie does not ask us to review those decisions. Chessie’s idiosyncratic problems with its state-law claims do not provide a sound basis for finding an implied right of action, which would use congressional silence to work broad changes in the relationship between federal and state law affecting railroads. Finally, to support its argument for an implied right of action, Chessie cites court cases and administrative decisions in which the ICC Termination Act has been held to preempt various state laws. See, e.g., Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co. v. Bickham, 602 F.Supp. 383, 384 (M.D. La. 1985) (<HOLDING>), aff’d mem., 775 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1985); Holdings: 0: holding that under colorado law tjortious interference with a prospective business relation requires a showing of intentional and improper interference preventing formation of a contract 1: holding that railroads servitude could not be extinguished under state law and enjoining servient estate owners interference with railroad operation 2: holding that a claim for tortious interference with inheritance exists under texas law 3: holding federal court was not precluded by antiinjunction act from enjoining florida state court after state court entered a preliminary order 4: holding that to the extent compliance with the flsa interferes with the state budgetary process that interference is caused by state law not federal law


Input: improper voir dire questions, a party must make a timely, specific objection at the earliest possible opportunity. Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The State asked the jury panel members whether they would require more evidence than one witness if they found the witness to be credible and believed the State proved all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt through that witness. Appellant did not object until after the State had directed the question to two panel members, and one of those potential jurors had further dialogue with the State about the question. Accordingly, appellant did not object at the earliest possible opportunity and waived the issue for our review. See Thrift v. State, 134 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, no pet. granted) (<HOLDING>). Appellant’s first issue is overruled. Holdings: 0: holding error was not preserved where matter was explored with jury panel before defendant objected 1: holding that where the trial court is on notice of error in seating the panel before the jury is sworn and the error is not corrected automatic reversal is required 2: holding that error was preserved when defendant objected to question regarding defendant was under arrest immediately following question about postarrest event sufficient to put trial court on notice of appellants state constitutional grounds for objection 3: holding issues not raised before the district court are not preserved for appeal 4: holding that defendant must have clearly objected at trial to the matter he is raising on appeal


Input: State’s decision to characterize that failure as a finding drat K.S. was incompetent to testify. Yet the record demonstrates the State consistently and adamantly characterized Simpson’s efforts to prevent the witness from testifying as a disqualification issue and repeatedly urged the district court to conduct a hearing on her competency as required by statute. The district court’s failure to focus on the State’s argument or to provide any clear basis for its ruling should not fall upon the State. Instead, I would hold that the district court clearly abused its discretion by failing to identify or isolate any legal basis for its harsh ruling despite the State’s efforts to provide the court with a framework for doing, so. See State v. Hernandez, 294 Kan. 200, 207, 273 P.3d 774 (2012) (<HOLDING>); State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d Holdings: 0: holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention 1: holding that the bia abused its discretion when it denied petitioners motion to reopen by failing to consider evidence of country conditions 2: holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion 3: holding trial court abused its discretion when it denied a motion for mistrial after erroneously concluding an issue could be dealt with at sentencing 4: holding that the district court acted within its discretion when it denied plaintiffs request for counsel


Input: cited in City of Phila., 838 A.2d at 588. Accordingly, by 2003, germaneness had evolved to a standard of “whether the court can fashion a single, over-arching topic to loosely relate the various subjects included in the statute under review.” City of Phila., 838 A.2d at 587. Nevertheless, we cautioned that we should be careful not to render Section 3 “impotent to guard against the evils that it was designed to curtail” by fashioning a theme that is all-encompassing in its broadness. Id. at 588 (citing, e.g., DeWeese v. Weaver, 824 A.2d 364 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (finding the theme “business of the courts” too encompassing to uphold a law regulating DNA records and apportioning negligence liability); Pa. Ass’n of Rental Dealers v. Com., 123 Pa.Cmwlth. 533, 554 A.2d 998 (1989) (<HOLDING>)). Thus, in City of Philadelphia, Holdings: 0: holding that the topic of economic wellbeing of the commonwealth would turn the germaneness requirement into a nullity 1: holding the appellant was guilty of transporting illegal substances into the commonwealth the moment he crossed the border into virginia which took place well before they were discovered 2: holding that the petitioner may not turn a clerical error into a windfall of rights it would not otherwise enjoy internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding that school districts do not share in the commonwealth of pennsylvanias eleventh amendment sovereign immunity because they are not alter egos of the commonwealth 4: holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity


Input: right to free speech and association under the First Amendment’) with Compl. at 7 para. (1) (requesting an order ”[d]eclaring that Defendants are unlawfully depriving plaintiffs of their right to engage in organization and other expressive activity in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). Defs.' Reply at 6 n. 6. 6 . The Court concludes that because Counts I and II of the plaintiffs' complaint are barred pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, the Court need not address whether these counts state a claim for which relief may be granted. 7 . See Orange, 59 F.3d at 1273 (finding that the plaintiffs speech was a matter of public concern because it regarded "potential fraud at a public university.”); Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 935-36 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Speech is not of public concern "when it is Holdings: 0: holding that a public employees internal memoranda raising concerns about public corruption are protected first amendment speech because they addressed a matter of public concern 1: holding that issues of prison security public safety and official corruption are matters of public concern 2: holding police officer is a public official 3: recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern 4: holding that a public employees deposition testimony involves a matter of public concern if arguably a statement about misconduct or corruption in city government and regardless of whether testimony is given in employees official capacity


Input: arises, of course, because many formulary orders are not meant to convey anything as to the reason for the decision. Attributing a reason is therefore both difficult and artificial. We think that the attribution necessary for federal habeas purposes can be facilitated, and sound results more often assured, by applying the following presumption: where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground. If an earlier opinion “fairly appear[s] to rest primarily on federal law,” Coleman, [— U.S. at-], 111 S.Ct. at 2559, we will presume that no procedural default has been invoked by a subsequent unexplained order that leaves the judgmen 2d 737, 738 (N.Y.App.Div.1979) (<HOLDING>); see also People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, Holdings: 0: holding batson challenge untimely because objection made after all jurors were sworn 1: holding that defendant waived his objection to the prosecutors use of her peremptory challenges by failing to make a contemporaneous objection during jury selection 2: holding that defendant waived any objection to a peremptory strike against a minority juror by affirmatively accepting jury immediately prior to its being sworn without reserving earliermade objection 3: holding objection to jury selection process waived where not raised until after entire panel had been sworn 4: holding that objection was timely even though objection was not made until after question was answered


Input: States v. Swart, 679 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.1982), therefore, does not assist Sandoval-Vasquez. There, we ruled that officers’ entry into a business they knew was closed violated the Fourth Amendment. In this case, however, the officers entered an open business. Sandoval-Vasquez also attempts to distinguish Tolar on the basis that the officers here entered the premises with their weapons drawn, yelling that they were police officers and ordering the occupants against a wall. The officers’ entry in Tolar, in contrast, was peaceful. Sandoval-Vasquez thus maintains that in addition to entering the business shortly before it closed, the officers’ manner of entry into his business rendered the entry unlawful. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the district court that the Holdings: 0: holding that the common law knockandannounce principle forms a part of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry 1: holding that commonlaw knock and announce principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the fourth amendment 2: holding common law knockandannounce principle forms part of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry 3: holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure 4: holding that whether an officers force was reasonable must be analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment


Input: No. A-201, April 1997 Edition,” an industry standard. And in Avatar Properties, Inc. v. Greetham, 27 So.3d 764, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), although a home warranty was not attached to a purchase and sale agreement, “the agreement state[d] that the warranty was available for examination at [the seller’s] offices and, that upon request the warranty would be attached as an exhibit to the purchase and sale agreement.” The buyers initialed that paragraph, signaling an intent that the warranty be incorporated into the main contract. Id. at 766-67. During the formation of the contract in this case, Tradewinds expressed no similar intent to incorporate the “terms and conditions.” See also Mgmt. Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Constr., Inc., 743 So.2d 627, 631-32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we affirm the order of the Holdings: 0: holding that purchase contract for computer software referred to license agreement indicated where it could be obtained and provided it with software sealed with the warning by opening this packet you indicate your acceptance of sellers license agreement 1: holding that the uniform commercial code specifically encompassed a software licensing agreement 2: holding that licensing agreement controlled the scope of the users rights in the software 3: holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer 4: holding the following express language binding upon receipt  of an accepted counterpart of this letter our agreement to purchase from you and your agreement to issue sell and deliver to us  the captioned securities shall become a binding agreement between us emphasis added


Input: over KOH’s claims arises independently under article XI, section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution in light of specific provisions therein protecting native Hawaiian rights. Second, Respondent/Appellee-Appellee Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) was required to hold a contested case hearing prior to the issuance of a conservation district use permit (CDUP or permit), as a matter of constitutional due process, because Respondent/ Ap-pellee-Appellee University of Hawaii (UH) had a “property interest” in the CDUP, and the issuance of the CDUP would adversely impact KOH’s ability to engage in native Hawaiian traditional and customary practices as protected by art. XII, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution. See Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawaii 64, 881 P.2d 1210 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Third, jurisdiction arises under the public Holdings: 0: holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause 1: holding parental rights are constitutionally protected fundamental interest 2: holding that constitutional due process protections mandate a hearing where the issuance of a permit implicating an applicants property rights adversely affects the constitutionally protected rights of other interested persons who have followed the agencys rules governing participation in contested cases 3: recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights 4: holding that a rule which affects only the process of enforcing litigants rights and not the rights themselves does not exceed the constraints of the rules enabling act


Input: or in privity with a party in the first action.” Id. at 802 (emphasis in original). The second requirement need not detain us. Fullerton pled guilty to a violation of Tex. Penal Code § 19.02. By entering this plea, he admitted that he intended to kill his victims or at least knew that his actions would cause their deaths. In other words, his convictions were valid because he admitted that the deaths were not accidents. The convictions are inconsistent both with the Buckners’ suggestion that Fullerton’s delusions made the shootings acts of self-defense and with their contention that he was legally insane during the incident. If the criminal proceedings decided anything, it was that the shootings were not “occurrences.” See Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 352-54 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). The first and third requisites for issue Holdings: 0: holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime 1: holding that possession of a weapon is not in an of itself a crime 2: holding that a brady violation is waived by guilty plea 3: holding that a judicial confession in a guilty plea is itself sufficient evidence to support the crime charged 4: holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional


Input: condition, which the evidence primarily addressed and which United received for the first time on appeal. Thus, the physician suggested that United have Hall attend an IME if it intended to allow benefits based on Hall’s current condition. United immediately contacted Hall and set the IME within the extension deadline. A few days later, United sent another letter to Hall explaining this exact argument. Thus, United concludes that its request for an IME was made in good faith. The Court agrees. Accordingly, the Court finds that United’s plan allows it to require Hall to attend an IME during the appeal process and that Hall’s refusal to attend the IME resulted in him not exhausting his administrative remedies. See Zalka v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 65 F.Supp.2d 1369, 1371 (S.D.Fla. 1998) (<HOLDING>); accord Hunter, 251 F.Supp.2d at 111-12 Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs refusal to submit to an ime and immediately filing suit precluded the defendant from completing its administrative reviewing of her claim 1: holding that an employees private arbitration agreement with her employer precluded her from filing suit against the employer under the adea 2: holding that the timely filing of an administrative charge of discrimination is a prerequisite to bringing suit 3: holding that the plaintiff was precluded from asserting her failure to promote claim as a continuing violation 4: holding that plaintiffs failure to raise a claim in an administrative complaint with osha precluded pursuing that claim in district court


Input: Am. v. SPM Flow Control, Inc., 180 S.W.3d 761, 785 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.). A claim need not demand an exact amount or list every element of damage. Id. “The abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court’s factual findings as they relate to prejudgment interest; but the de novo standard applies to the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.” Figueroa v. Davis, 318 S.W.3d 53, 66 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). When settlement credits are at issue, the declining-principal formula should be used, under which settlements are credited w W.3d 819, 824-25 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied) (rejecting argument that trial court abused its discretion in 2d 702, 705 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Because the trial court must revisit Holdings: 0: holding issues not raised in appellate brief are waived 1: holding that issues not fairly presented to the trial court are waived 2: holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court 3: holding that issues not raised before a district court are waived on appeal 4: holding that arguments not presented to the district court in response to a motion for summary judgment are waived


Input: Johnston argues, as he did in the postconviction court, that he is exempt from execution under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because his severe mental illness places him in the same category as those whose executions are barred because they were under the age of eighteen at the time of the murder or are mentally retarded. The court below denied relief, finding Johnston’s claim was procedurally barred for not having been raised on direct appeal or in prior posteonviction proceedings and because, under this Court’s precedents, mental illness is not a per se bar to execution. We agree with both these conclusions. Relying on the reasoning behind the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (<HOLDING>) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 Holdings: 0: holding the death penalty unconstitutional for defendants under age eighteen at the time of the crime 1: holding the death penalty unconstitutional for mentally retarded defendants 2: holding that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes violates eighth amendment 3: holding the eighth and fourteenth amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed 4: holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants


Input: total incapacity but in lieu of all other payments for compensation” indicates that once a claimant receives permanent partial disability benefits he or she is not eligible for any other benefits. The plaintiff responds that this court previously has concluded that a claimant can receive total incapacity benefits after having received permanent partial disability benefits and nothing in the present case requires a departure from this precedent. We agree with the plaintiff, and conclude that in interpreting the language and interrelationship of §§ 31-307, 31-308 (b) and 31-315, we do not write on a clean slate, but are bound by our previous judicial interpretations of this language and the statutory scheme. See Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 282 Conn. 477, 501, 923 A.2d 657 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Over the course of the last 100 years, this Holdings: 0: holding that absent unusual circumstances this court must apply the plain meaning of a statute 1: recognizing that plain meaning does not control where context shows that the parties have assigned an unusual meaning to a term 2: holding that  12z does not require this court to overrule prior judicial interpretations of statutes even if not based on plain meaning rule 3: holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language 4: holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning


Input: Vance, 231 F.3d at 261. Several Sixth Circuit cases also suggest that liability is appropriate where the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to known prior acts of harassment by the same perpetrator against victims other than the plaintiff, although these cases ultimately declined to find liability because the particular fact patterns did not support a finding that the defendant both had notice of these prior incidents and acted with deliberate indifference. See McCoy v. Board of Educ. of Columbus City Schs., 515 Fed.Appx. 387 (6th Cir.2013); Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Schs., 469 F.3d 479 (6th Cir.2006); Williams ex. rel. Hart v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dist., 400 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2005) ; see also Lopez v. Metro. Gov’t, 646 F.Supp.2d 891 (M.D.Tenn.2009) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the court finds that there Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants notice of prior harassment against victims other than the plaintiff can give rise to title ix liability so long as the defendant possessed enough knowledge of the harassment that it could reasonably have responded with remedial measures to address the kind of harassment upon which the plaintiffs legal claim is based 1: holding that school districts are hable for peer sexual harassment in their schools under title ix only if they have actual knowledge of the harassment and act with deliberate indifference in response to it 2: holding that title vii does not address samesex harassment 3: holding that harassment of women working alongside plaintiff was relevant to question of creation of environment viola tive of title vii  although vinson was a sexual harassment case the principles underlying a hostile environment theory are equally applicable in sexual harassment and racial harassment cases 4: holding that the plaintiff must establish that a supervisors harassment was within the scope of his employment and that the employer failed to respond adequately and effectively when it learned of the harassment


Input: strategy of “humanizing” or showing only the good characteristics of a defendant is not necessarily deficient where the strategy is “ ‘dictated’ by the defendant’s insistence on his innocence.” Sliney v. State, 944 So.2d 270, 285 (Fla.2006) (citing Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 223 (Fla.1998)). However, in both Sliney and Rutherford, the trial attorney had a sound reason for believing the omitted mitigation would have been harmful in some respect to the defendant’s case. In Sliney, the defendant was examined by a mental health expert prior to the penalty phase, and the report supplied to counsel contained substantial harmful information about the defendant and would have been inconsistent with other mitigation. Id. at 283; see also Sexton v. State, 997 So.2d 1073, 1084 (Fla.2008) (<HOLDING>); Hodges v. State, 885 So.2d 338, 348 Holdings: 0: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 1: holding counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence 2: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to present mental mitigation that would have opened the door to testimony that the defendant was a sadistic sexual psychopath 3: holding that defendant cannot object to counsels attempt to rebut proposition once defendant has opened door to line of testimony 4: holding that defense counsel opened the door to the prosecutions questioning of the defendant about prior convictions when defense counsel asked a prosecution witness whether he was aware that the defendant was  a convicted felon


Input: moved to dismiss at the March 8 hearing. It was therefore defendant’s responsibility to present evidence of materiality at that time. See id. at 274. Defendant failed to do so. Thus the only record evidence concerning the issue of Argyle’s materiality is the above-quoted exchange between the trial court and defense counsel, which took place at the December 10 hearing. We therefore address whether that evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding. The December 10 exchange between the trial court and defense counsel reveals that defense counsel was not able to make a plausible showing that Argyle’s testimony would be favorable to the defense, but rather could only speculate as to how he thought Argyle might testify. Cf. State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Utah 1984) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as delineated infra in our analysis Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant to introduce evidence of witnesss pending indictment when witnesss testimony regarding defendants participation in murder was virtually identical to witnesss written statement which was sworn to on day of murder and prior to offense for which witness was indicted 1: holding that trial court did not err in refusing to parse witnesss testimony or to have it replayed in its entirety 2: holding that hospitalization of witnesss wife and his desire to be by her side was not a substantial basis for admitting witnesss testimony from first trial 3: holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility 4: holding that where no description of witnesss evidence offered and no suggestion made as to how testimony would affect defendants case trial court did not err in refusing to issue certificate ordering witnesss attendance


Input: impose on Louisiana abortion providers. In the context of a challenge to the provisions of a regulatory scheme, such as that at issue here, hardship will often result first and foremost from the “adverse effects of a strictly legal kind” inherent in the provisions at issue. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733, 118 S.Ct. 1665. The Supreme Court has explained that such legal harms inhere in laws or regulations that, for example, “command [some]one to do ... or to refrain from doing [something; ... grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal license, power, or authority; ... subject [some]one to ... civil or criminal liability; [or] create ... legal rights or obligations.” Id.; accord Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 809, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Texas, 497 F.3d at 499 (recognizing Holdings: 0: holding inter alia that a creditor may take a security interest in a licensees liquor license 1: recognizing that adverse effects of a strictly legal kind may amount to a showing of hardship where a regulation inter alia modifies a plaintiffs formal legal license or subjects a plaintiff to  civil  liability quoting ohio forestry 523 us at 733 118 sct 1665 2: holding that the statement failure to pay will leave our client with no choice but to consider legal action did not violate  1692e5 by threatening legal action because at most the language  threatened that the creditor will have to consider legal action and therefore no action of any kind is threatened by defendant collection agency 3: holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted 4: holding that to establish tort liability in a negligence action there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff


Input: Digital Technologies Corp., 306 B.R. 505, 509 (Bankr.D.Del.2004) ("In fact an overwhelming majority of courts have concluded that liability insurance policies fall within § 541(a)(l)’s definition of estate property.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing In re Matter of Vitek, Inc., 51 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir.1995)). 30 . In re Allied Digital, 306 B.R. at 509; see In re SN Liquidation, 388 B.R. at 584 ("Who owns the proceeds of an insurance policy presents a more complicated issue and requires a more careful analysis.”); In re CyberMedica, Inc., 280 B.R. 12, 16 (Bankr.D.Mass.2002) (observing that "courts are in disagreement on whether or not insurance proceeds are property of the estate.”) (emphasis in original); e.g., In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 298 B.R. 49 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>); In re First Central Financial Corp., 238 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding that where the policy names only the directors or officers as insured the proceeds are not property of the estate 1: holding the real estate sale proceeds 2: holding directors and officers liability policy was not property of the estate because it did not increase or decrease the worth of the bankruptcy estate 3: holding that because proceeds of a letter of credit were not secured by estate collateral the proceeds were not property of the estate 4: holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate


Input: inconsistent with federal law and, therefore, preempted. Fla. Stat. Section 812.014(1) defines theft more broadly than the crime defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 661; the Florida statute makes punishable not only a taking but also knowing usage or attempts to use the property of another with intent to either, temporarily or permanently, deprive the other person of a right or benefit of the property or appropriate the property to his own use. Fla. Stat. § 812.014(1). Defendant would be subjected to additional punishments inconsistent with maritime law, including treble damages and payment of attorney’s fees and costs if Fla. Stat. Sections 812.014(1) and 772.11 were applied. GE Seaco Servs., Ltd. v. Interline Connection, N.V., No. 09-23864-CIV, 2011 WL 98406, at *5 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 12, 2011) (<HOLDING>). Florida’s civil theft statutory scheme does Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court should reverse and remand issue of attorneys fees where damages are reduced on appeal in a manner that could affect the determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees 1: holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered 2: holding that a party may recover attorneys fees under section 38001 only if the party prevails on a cause of action for which attorneys fees are available and recovers damages 3: holding the attorneys fees and treble damages provisions of fla stat section 77211 are incompatible with maritime law 4: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees


Input: attaches an importance to prompt delivery, or simply because he desires to reduce shipping costs selectively. If selective cost savings were sufficient grounds to use a private courier to carry letters, the Private Express Statutes would be effectively nullified. 44 Fed.Reg. 40,076 (July 9, 1979) (emphasis added). Despite the soundness of this reasoning, the USPS proceeded in this case to ignore it, indeed to contravene it directly, by justifying an unqualified suspension solely on the selective cost and service benefits to businesses engaged in international commerce. This approach is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. Cf. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1074, 1091-92 (D.C.Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 913, 108 S.Ct. 1088, 99 L.Ed.2d 247 (1988) (<HOLDING>). The Postal Service replies that it did Holdings: 0: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public 1: recognizing the public interest exception 2: holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice 3: recognizing the importance of public welfare and conservation of water in administering its public waters 4: holding that agency administering a public interest standard did not engage in reasoned decisionmaking when it focused only on the economic impacts accruing to one segment of the power consuming public


Input: submit that he would not have pled to § 924 had he known of the term. He bases his claim strictly on a procedural rule violation which he cannot do under § 2255. Even if the Court’s error is a proper subject of collateral relief, the error did not affect Mr. Cooke’s substantial rights. The Presentence Investigation Report noted the mandatory term of supervised release; in addition, the Court informed Mr. Cooke of the mandatory term at his sentencing hearing. Mr. Cooke failed to object to that information either in the report or at sentencing. Mr. Cooke’s own conduct, or lack thereof, proves that his substantial rights were not affected by the Court’s error. See United States v. Carey, 884 F.2d 547 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067, 110 S.Ct. 1786, 108 L.Ed.2d 787 (S.Ct.1990) (<HOLDING>). Since Mr. Cooke’s substantial rights were not Holdings: 0: holding term of supervised release tolled while defendant was in state custody 1: holding that a completed term of confinement did not render a challenge to the reasonableness of a sentence moot where defendant could receive a reduced term of supervised release 2: holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release 3: holding that where trial court did not inform defendant of supervised release term during plea colloquy but did advise defendant of term in presentence report and at sentencing defendants sentence stands 4: holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses


Input: the duration of the proceedings, to cross-examine the State’s witnesses, and to call and subpoena witnesses on the defendant’s own behalf. See generally Rule 5-302 NMRA. {17} Because grand jury proceedings are conducted by a prosecutor acting under the indirect supervision of the grand jury judge, we rely on the structural protections of the grand jury statutes and procedural rules to preserve the target’s rights and the integrity of the grand jury process. If the target of a grand jury investigation establishes, pretrial, that the grand jury proceedings were conducted in violation of these structural protections, the target is entitled to dismissal of the indictment and is not required to demonstrate prejudice. See, e.g., De Leon v. Hartley, 2014-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 16-17, 316 P.3d 896 (<HOLDING>); Davis, 1977-NMSC-049, ¶4 (holding “that the Holdings: 0: holding that the supervisory control of the district court may be exercised through its equitable jurisdiction 1: holding district court should have abstained pursuant to younger and thus remanding to district court to dismiss without prejudice 2: holding that the prosecuting attorneys failure to instruct grand jurors on the record of the elements of the relevant criminal offenses warranted dismissal of the indictment without a showing of prejudice 3: holding that there was no prejudice where had the district court allowed the moving party the proper opportunity to respond the evidence would have been properly in front of the district court 4: holding that the district court should have quashed an indictment without requiring the target to show prejudice because the district attorney improperly exercised control over the selection and excusal of grand jurors and the defendant brought this to the attention of the district court before trial


Input: not limited to disputes between nonprofit entities. Conditions Precedent Teco asserts Valero has failed to comply with contractual conditions precedent to enforce the agreement to arbitrate. Valero, on the other hand, maintains that whether it has satisfied any condition precedent is a question for the arbitrator, not the court. In support of this contention, Valero cites several federal cases construing the Federal Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 149 (5 th Cir.1987); Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 838 F.Supp. 1156, 1158 (N.D.Tex.1993), aff'd, 47 F:3d 750 (5 th Cir.1995). We note that in construing the TGAA, there is a conflict among Texas courts of appeals on this issue. See, e.g., D. Wilson Constr. Co., 988 S.W.2d at 395 (<HOLDING>); City of Lubbock v. Hancock, 940 S.W.2d 123, Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court must determine whether an agreement to arbitrate was reached when several contracts the subject of a class action allegedly did not contain an arbitration provision 1: holding that court should consider issues relating to making and performance of agreement to arbitrate 2: holding that the trial court must determine whether there was an agreement to arbitrate when the party contesting arbitration claimed she had never signed the contract or intended to be bound 3: holding that a condition was precedent to performance because the contract language did not explicitly state that it was precedent to formation 4: holding the trial court may determine issue of condition precedent to enforcement of agreement to arbitrate


Input: on defendant’s long arrest record plus adjudicated criminal history without following § 4A1.3 in its “holistic evaluation” of § 3553(a) factors and affirming above-guidelines sentence); United States v. Perez-Molina, 627 F.3d 1049, 1049-51 (7th Cir.2010) (concluding that district court did not err in disregarding § 4A1.3 because it also relied on other § 3553(a) factors in imposing sentence that doubled high end of guidelines range). Nor was there any error in the court’s consideration of the pending Wisconsin charges during the § 3553(a) analysis because a sentencing court may further consider facts already taken into account during the guidelines calculations. See United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 951(7th Cir.2010); United States v. Tockes, 530 F.3d 628, 633 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). We are even less persuaded by Adams’s Holdings: 0: recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence 1: recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award 2: recognizing appellate courts discretion to consider issues raised in the district court but not resolved there 3: holding that a trial courts consideration of a new pending charge at a sentencing hearing for the purpose of determining a pattern of conduct and defendants character was not improper absent a showing that the trial judge used the pending charge in determining defendants sentence 4: holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole


Input: circumstances of Strada’s murder. Id. at 1312 (citations omitted). The robberies clarified the relationship between Mandacina, McGuire and Earlywine. The robberies brought both McGuire and Earlywine to Kansas City on numerous occasions to obtain firearms through the Mandarinas and to launder money. Most importantly, the robberies explained why McGuire would entrust Earlywine with knowledge of the Strada murder and why Mandacina would discuss a contract murder with McGuire, in Early-wine’s presence, without fearing that he would be reported to the authorities immediately. In light of the above, the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. The trial court need not issue a prior crimes limiting instruction sua sponte. See United States v. Williams, 994 F.2d 1287, 1290 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). We see no reason to treat the admission of Holdings: 0: holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error 1: holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error 2: holding that the defendant had waived any challenge to the district courts failure to give a limiting instruction addressing rule 404b evidence by failing to request one at trial or raise the issue on appeal 3: holding that the district court did not commit plain error in admitting physical evidence of the defendants prior drug arrest in addition to the fact of the arrest itself when the evidence was relevant under rule 404b and the district court gave a limiting instruction 4: holding that district courts incomplete 404b limiting instruction did not warrant reversal because district court told defense counsel what limiting instruction it would give and defense counsel did not object or request a more specific instruction


Input: of 9-mm ammunition. In response to Israel’s objections to the presentence report, the probation officer noted that the search also resulted in the seizure of video-surveillance equipment and $1,047 in cash. The district court found that Israel possessed the firearms in connection with drug trafficking, noting that there had been a number of controlled buys from Israel, that he was in possession of cocaine when the search warrant was executed, that the firearms were hidden, that there was “a lot” of ammunition, and that scales and other indicia of drug trafficking were found. The district court expressed concern about Israel’s possession of a firearm with a large capacity magazine: “I really don’t know why anybody would have one of those for any reason.” See Taylor, 648 F.3d at 433 (<HOLDING>). Israel argues that the temporal remoteness of Holdings: 0: holding that when determining prejudice under the objective test relevant considerations include 1 whether the extrinsic evidence was received by the jury and the manner in which it was received 2 whether it was available to the jury for a lengthy period of time 3 whether it was discussed and considered extensively by the jury 4 whether it was introduced before a jury verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations and 5 whether it was reasonably likely to affect the verdict considering the strength of the governments case and whether the governments case outweighed any possible prejudice caused by the extrinsic evidence 1: holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense 2: holding that the type of firearm and whether it is loaded are also considerations 3: holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used 4: holding that a relevant factor to consider in determining the applicability of the fortress theory is whether the type of firearm found in that case an automatic assault rifle is one that is commonly used by drug dealers


Input: F.2d 913 (2d Cir.1985). In essence, the plan becomes a binding contract between the debtor and the creditors and controls their rights and obligations. See In re Kentucky Lumber Co., 860 F.2d 674 at 679 (6th Cir.1988). “Absent special language in the plan, two propositions seem clear as a result of the substitution of plan obligations for pre-confirmation obligations. First, creditors may engage in all lawful collection activities to enforce plan obligations; second, creditors may not take any steps to collect pre-confirmation obligations.” Lander and Warfield; A Review And Analysis Of Selected Post-confirmation Activities In Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 62 Am.Bankr.L.J. 203, 217 (1988). See also Paul v. Monts (In re International Plastics, Inc.), 906 F.2d 1468, 1474-76 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION The Debtors’ confirmed plan became Holdings: 0: holding that confirmation of a chapter 11 plan creates a binding contract which may be enforced in state courts 1: holding that the good faith analysis for evaluating a chapter 11 petition and that in evaluating a chapter 11 plan are distinct 2: holding that provision in chapter 13 plan discharging postpetition interest on a student loan is binding on creditor under theory of res judicata where objection was not raised prior to plan confirmation and confirmation order was not appealed 3: holding that boilerplate language in a confirmation plan is binding if confirmed 4: holding that a confirmed chapter 13 plan is binding on all parties under 11 usc  1327a however the plan may be modified pursuant to 11 usc  1329


Input: price increase. 17 Although the Court of Appeals concluded that the regulation directly advanced the State’s interest, it did not dispute the District Court’s conclusion that the evidence suggested that, at most, a price advertising ban would have a marginal impact on overall alcohol consumption. Id., at 7-8; cf. Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Assn. v. Attorney General, 142 Mich. App., at 311, 370 N. W. 2d, at 336 (explaining that “any additional impact on the level of consumption attributable to the absence of price advertisements would be negligible”). 18 Outside the First Amendment context, we have refused to uphold alcohol advertising bans premised on similarly speculative assertions about their impact on consumption. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S., at 715-716 (<HOLDING>); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 1: holding that defendants communications sent into tennessee did not constitute purposeful availment because all were in response to communications initiated by the plaintiff 2: holding that easements using terms telephone telegraph and communications could properly be utilized for both internal communications and for thirdparty voice and data communications 3: recognizing state laws can be preempted by federal regulations as well as by federal legislation 4: holding ban preempted by federal communications commission regulations


Input: as those presented by three other cases, Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930 (9th Cir.1999), Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.1998), and Montero v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856 (9th Cir.1999), where plaintiffs endured multiple harassing incidents over two or more years. In reaching this conclusion, the district court appears to have impliedly adopted a legal standard that would require plaintiffs to suffer more than one incident of sexual harassment over a number of years in order to establish a hostile work environment. However, no such requirement exists or should be implied. Indeed, one incident of sexual harassment may suffice to establish a viable claim if it is sufficiently severe. See, e.g., Little v. Windermere, — F.3d -, -, 2002 WL 84237 at *5 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, Holdings: 0: recognizing this principle in the childpornography context 1: recognizing this principle as a settled rule 2: recognizing this principle in the failure to hire context 3: recognizing principle 4: recognizing principle but finding evidence at first trial sufficient


Input: absence of probable cause to believe the detainee has a mental disorder. (2) Recognition of Mental Disorder Harvey asserts that Perez’s deposition testimony supports a finding that Perez did not have any training as to § 5150 detentions beyond initial academy training. Harvey argues that had Perez been given additional training, Perez would have realized there was no probable cause to believe Harvey’s behavior was the result of a mental disorder. Where a plaintiff bases a Monell claim on the theory that the training provided on a specific subject is insufficient, the plaintiff cannot prevail by offering, without more, evidence that the government entity miscalculated the amount of time necessary to adequately prepare its employees. See Mateyko v. Felix, 924 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 814, 112 S.Ct. 65, 116 Holdings: 0: holding evidence police department trained officers for three to four hours in the use of tazer guns without more was insufficient to establish monell claim noting failure to provide a more lengthy training program suggests at most negligence on the part of the employer in miscalculating the amount of time necessary to adequately prepare its officers 1: holding that failure to follow gaap without more is insufficient to establish scienter 2: holding that the plaintiff had offered insufficient evidence to establish deliberate indifference in a failuretotrain claim in part because the plaintiff did not present evidence that the training received was inadequate or evidence of any specific additional training that the employees should have received 3: holding that the pittsburgh police department did not illegally terminate an officers hla benefits and that the police department was entitled to a subrogation interest against the officers thirdparty settlement 4: holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records


Input: eviction), interpreted in Wagoner v. Bennett, 814 P.2d 476, 481 (Okla.1991); Okla.Stat. tit. 41, § 124 (providing a tenant -with an action when a landlord makes an unlawful entry). Therefore, any “other invasion of the right of private occupancy” is appropriately interpreted as also requiring an invasion of a real property right. The clear weight of authority in other courts defines this term precisely as we have suggested. See Red Ball Leasing, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indent. Co., 915 F.2d 306, 312 (7th Cir.1990) (applying the rule of ejusdem generis to the personal injury definition of “other invasion of the right of private occupancy” to determine that under Indiana law, it “precludes covera 766, 215 Cal.Rptr. 416, 421-22 (1985) (same); Harbor Ins. Co., 1989 WL 112532, at *1 (<HOLDING>). Instead of creating an ambiguity, the term Holdings: 0: holding that under delaware law the policys definition of personal injury as wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy applies only to damages incurred as a result of an invasion of an interest in real property 1: holding intent as an essential element to an invasion of privacy by intrusion and not listing intent as a required element of invasion of privacy by publication 2: holding that under california law policy language referring to wrongful entry eviction and invasions of the right of private occupancy pertains to torts against the real property of another 3: holding that invasion of an identifiable customers account is not a necessary element proof under the statute 4: holding that a direct physical invasion of the property was not necessary under the 1876 constitution for a taking to occur


Input: as to the appropriate legal standard to be applied.” DiBiasi, 988 So.2d at 459.’ “Catrett v. Baldwin County Elec. Membership Corp., 996 So.2d 196, 199 (Ala.2008).” Moon v. Pillion, 2 So.3d 842, 845 (Ala.2008). Legal Analysis The elements of a claim of malicious prosecution are: (1) institution of a prior judicial proceeding by the present defendant, (2) a lack of probable cause, (3) malice on the defendant’s part, (4) termination of the prior proceeding in favor of the present plaintiff, and (5) damage. Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So.2d 824, 831-33 (Ala.1999). The parties agree that there is no dispute that Burnett instituted a criminal proceeding against Ravenel; that the criminal proceeding was terminated in favor of Ravenel, see Chatman v. Pizitz, Inc., 429 So.2d 969 (Ala.1983) (<HOLDING>); and that Ravenel sustained damages. “In this Holdings: 0: holding that defendants successful completion of pretrial intervention program in one county and the entry of a nolle prosequi as to the relevant charges in that county barred subsequent prosecution in a separate county for charges arising out of the same conduct 1: holding that criminal statutes of limitation should be construed in favor of the accused 2: holding that the entry of a nolle prosequi generally suffices as a termination of a criminal proceeding in favor of the plaintiff in a maliciousprosecution action 3: holding that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel in termination cases is generally the same as in criminal proceedings 4: holding that appellant was not entitled to a preliminary hearing under code  192218 because following the entry of the nolle prosequi at the preliminary hearing the original charges were terminated and the situation was the same as if the commonwealth had chosen to make no charge  until the return of the direct indictment quoting watkins v commonwealth 27 vaapp 473 475 499 se2d 589 590 1998 en banc


Input: Council of Young Israel; Rabbinical Alliance of America; Rabbinical Council of America; Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America; and Torah Umesorah-National Society of Hebrew Day Schools. See Movants’ Proposed Answer, dated May 31, 1996, at 2-4. The defendant, Rabbi Schulem Rubin, named in the amended complaint in his official capacity as the Director of the Kosher Law Enforcement Division of the New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets, is represented by the New York Attorney-General (“State” or “defendant”). Plaintiffs and the defendant object to intervention. By order dated July 11, 1996, the Honorable Denis R. Hurley referred this matter, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), to the undersigned. See United States v. Certain Real Property, 751 F.Supp. 1060 (E.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>). Briefs were submitted by all parties, and Holdings: 0: holding that in class action the claim or defense of the representative party must be typical of the claim or defense of each member of the class 1: holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive 2: holding that a party may not raise a new claim in its response to a dispositive motion 3: holding that a motion for rule 37 sanctions is dispositive 4: holding that a motion to intervene is not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party


Input: of the alleged error on appeal. See Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 514, 516 (640 SE2d 280) (2007). Appellant suggests that these evidentiary issues are subject to review on appeal for “plain error.” However, in criminal cases, plain error review currently is limited to appellate review of alleged errors in the sentencing phase of a trial resulting in the death penalty, see Sharp v. State, 286 Ga. 799, 801 (692 SE2d 325) (2010); to alleged violations of OCGA § 17-8-57, see State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 634 (690 SE2d 164) (2010); and, since July 1, 2007, to properly asserted errors in jury instructions, see OCGA § 17-8-58 (b); State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32 (718 SE2d 232) (2011). Thus, plain error review does not apply to the evidentiary issue raised in this case. See Brooks, 281 Ga. at 516 (<HOLDING>). We note that the new Georgia Evidence Code Holdings: 0: holding that plain error review was not available for alleged improperly admitted testimony 1: holding miranda error prejudicial in part because the defense presented testimony it otherwise would not have due to the improperly admitted statements 2: holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt 3: holding improperly admitted testimony was cumulative to the other properly admitted evidence and was therefore harmless 4: holding that omission was not plain error


Input: he was in the immediate area of the transaction shortly after the transaction. Unbeknownst to the arresting officer, another offic xclusionary rule have already been satisfied by the exclusion of the evidence from Mr. Mejia's criminal trial. See Townes, 176 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir.1999) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to § 1983 suit for, inter alia, false arrest and malicious prosecution). 28 . Mr. Mejia's account of the alleged phone call to his employee, Charlie Diego, in which an unidentified individual asked for the owner's name and asked whether the owner was Colombian, is inadmissible hearsay and cannot be considered on this motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e) (providing that summary judgment must be opposed by "such facts as would r.1991) (pre-Richardson ) (<HOLDING>); Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dep't of Holdings: 0: holding that private physician who conducted cavity search of drug suspect pursuant to facially valid search warrant was entitled to qualified immunity in suspects  1983 action where he did not act on his own initiative or out of selfinterest he was uniquely qualified to perform search procedure and where court found that extending qualified immunity to physicians under the circumstances of this case would benefitf society by effectuating acceptable means to execute body cavity searches pursuant to a warrant issued on probable cause and benefit the party being searched by providing a safe means of conducting the search in a medically approved manner 1: holding physician in action based on illegal cavity search to standard of a reasonable physician 2: holding that acquiescence to a strip and body cavity search did not extend the scope of defendants consent to search his person because of the highly intrusive nature of the search 3: holding that a visual body cavity search requires probable cause and a search warrant 4: holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises


Input: Powell’s second trial was for a second crime, separate and distinct from the crime for which he was tried in his first trial. Finally, it is important to note a further state law ground on which this claim founders. The Supreme Court of Virginia correctly found that Powell invited any error that may have been committed by the trial court in this regard. See Powell, 590 S.E.2d at 559-60. It was Powell who chose to disclose to the potential jurors that he had been previously convicted of capital murder. Hence, under the doctrine of “invited error,” Powell may not contend that potential jurors were tainted by their knowledge of his prior conviction when he is the one who disclosed the prior conviction to them. See Saunders v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Collins, 372 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that no exception to the invited error doctrine has ever been adopted by this circuit 1: holding that invited error does not entitle the defendant to any relief and of which he will not be heard to complain on appeal 2: holding that an appellant is not permitted to rely on invited error on appeal 3: holding that a court will not notice error which has been invited by the party seeking to take advantage thereof on appeal 4: holding that appellate review is precluded when the error is invited


Input: the Federal Defendants challenge the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court will address their arguments first. 1. Claims against the Federal Defendants. The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for obtaining damages based on tortious conduct committed by a federal employee acting within the scope of his employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1); Simpkins v. District of Columbia Gov’t, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C.Cir.1997). Here, Plaintiff has sued four federal employees for damages based on alleged torts that those employees committed while acting in the scope of their employment as officers of the USSS. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9. Accordingly, Plaintiffs tort claims against the Federal Defendants are governed by the FTCA. See, e.g., Ignatiev v. United States, 238 F.3d 464, 465 (D.C.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The United States’s waiver of sovereign Holdings: 0: holding that the public duty doctrine applied to claims against the town and fire chief for negligence in responding to a fire call although plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show the special duty exception applied 1: holding that the ftca applied to negligence claims against secret service uniformed division officers 2: holding that the plaintiffs claim against the united states for negligence was not a tort claim within the ftca where it was founded upon an alleged failure to perform explicit or implicit contractual obligations 3: holding that the assaultbattery exclusion applied to claims for negligence resulting in a shooting death 4: holding that the rule does not apply to bar tort claims against service providers


Input: CURIAM. Aaron Shelton pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). On appeal, Shelton argues for the first time that his conviction is unconstitutional because Congress does not have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the mere possession of a firearm, citing United States v. Lopez, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Although Shelton stipulated that the firearms Holdings: 0: holding the limitations to congresss commerce clause authority recognized in lopez have no effect on the establishment of the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act 1: holding that 42 usc  13981 exceeds congresss authority under the commerce clause 2: holding 18 usc  922o a valid exercise of congressional power under commerce clause 3: recognizing that there is an outer limit to congresss power under the commerce clause 4: holding unconstitutional 18 usc  922q as beyond congresss commerce clause power


Input: responsibility for interpreting provisions of G.L.c. 138 rests with Court, not Commission). Although the Court acknowledges that the Commission’s “experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge and discretionary authority” are entitled to “due weight,” this principle is “one of deference, not abdication.” Brown-Forman, 65 Mass.App.Ct. at 503 (quoting Leopoldstadt, Inc. v. Commissioner of Div. of Health Care Finance & Policy, 436 Mass. 80, 91 (2002). Accord Arnone v. Commissioner of Dep’t of Social Services, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 33, 34 (1997) (“[t]he approach is one of judicial deference and restraint, not abdication”). In this regard, no deference is owed to analysis of the Commission falling outside the purview of its institutional expertise. Brown-Forman, 65 Mass.App.Ct. at 504 (<HOLDING>). ANALYSIS Applying the foregoing standards to Holdings: 0: holding nondeferential review warranted because the commission drew no inferences from the unambiguous agreement other than its ultimate finding which no matter how couched is in fact a conclusion of law that an agency relationship existed 1: holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student 2: holding no liability existed under the circumstances 3: recognizing that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact 4: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude an agency finding of no discrimination on the ground that the report would suggest to the jury that it should reach the same conclusion as the agency


Input: mute swans, some of which may be those with which they have developed relationships, or have observed and plan to observe again in the future. Defendants have cited no authority suggesting that such an allegation of harm is insufficient based on failure to raise similar challenges in the past. Finally, although defendants appear to be correct in their assertion that the procedural harm arising from a NEPA violation is insufficient, standing alone, to constitute irreparable harm justifying issuance of a preliminary injunction, when combined with the irreparable aesthetic injuries alleged by plaintiffs, such procedural harm does bolster plaintiffs’ case for a preliminary injunction. See Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Fund for Animals v. Clark, 27 F.Supp.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that movant must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction 1: holding that loss of customers and resulting injury to goodwill can constitute irreparable harm that is not compensable by an award of money damages 2: holding that there could be no presumption of irreparable harm based on a statutory violation yet finding that ejnvironmental injury by its nature can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration ie irreparable if such injury is sufficiently likely  the balance of harms will usually favor issuance of the injunction to protect the environment 3: holding that where the uncontradicted evidence shows that a former employee is working for a direct competitor no finding of irreparable injury is necessary to support a permanent injunction to protect trade secrets because irreparable injury is established as a matter of law 4: holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate that in the absence of an injunction irreparable injury is likely and not merely a possibility


Input: shall constitute a waiver of notice of the meeting except where a person attends a meeting for the express purpose of objecting, at the beginning of the meeting, to the transaction of any business because the meeting was not lawfully called or convened”). Therefore, since a shareholder may waive notice by attending a meeting and not objecting, one cannot say that the failure to provide a shareholder with notice of a meeting causes the actions taken at the meeting to be void ab initio. Third, both this Court and our Supreme Court have consistently held that the failure to provide a director with the required notice of a special board meeting renders the actions taken at the meeting voidable — mot void — and thus subject to ratification. See Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts 385 (Pa.1833) (<HOLDING>); Moller v. Keystone Fibre Co., 187 Pa. 553, 41 Holdings: 0: holding that the trustee did not have constructive knowledge of an improperly executed mortgage because ohio law provided that an improperly executed mortgage does not provide constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser 1: holding that corporate president who called and participated in shareholders meeting to elect directors was estopped from questioning the legality of the meeting and election of directors who later removed him 2: holding that a corporation may ratify a mortgage executed by the directors at a special meeting convened without notice 3: holding that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the directors of a corporation  4: holding that independent directors can be entrusted with the decision to sue other directors on behalf of the corporation


Input: job performance. There is no suggestion of unlawful conduct or other impropriety. The Board’s decision is based on the lack of compatibility between Mr. McBride and the manner in which the Board desires the Authority to be operated. In Bristol Virginia School Board v. Quarles, the court held that public termination for “ineffective leadership” and “lack of communication with personnel” did not implicate protected liberty interests. 235 Va. 108, 366 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1988) (outlining the trend among federal courts to implicate liberty interests in eases involving “specific charges of moral turpitude, criminal activity, or serious character defects,” but not in cases involving “unelaborated charges relating to job performance”). See Robertson v. Rogers, 679 F.2d 1090, 1092 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Bunting v. City of Columbia, 639 F.2d 1090, Holdings: 0: holding that prospective adoptive parents do not have a fundamental liberty interest in adoption 1: holding that a prisoners loss of privileges for thirty days was not a property right that would constitute a violation of his constitutionally protected liberty interest 2: holding that a superintendents comments to prospective employers that plaintiff was terminated for incompetence and outside activities did not infringe on a protected liberty interest 3: holding there is no protected liberty interest in maintaining the foster family relationship 4: holding that a threeday suspension without pay did not infringe police officers liberty interest


Input: names of participants, specific examples of double billings, estimations as to the number of times the alleged fraud was perpetrated, examples of non-compliance with Medicare regulations, etc. While it is true that the Complaint discusses mostly common practices rather than specific dates and times of the submission of false claims, the court does not find that this is dispositive of the issue in this particular context. Plaintiffs argue that the documentation which demonstrates the exact dates of all submissions of the alleged false claims to the Government is in possession of Defendants. The court does not expect two former employees, whose employment was terminated almost two years ago, to remember each date. The Ninth Circuit agrees. See United States ex rel. Lee, 245 F.3d at 1051 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have, however, provided Defendants Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant 1: holding plaintiffs fraud claim failed rule 9b particularity requirement which in turn meant deceptive trade practices claim failed the particularity requirement 2: holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity 3: holding that under merck a fact is not deemed discovered until a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have sufficient information about that fact to adequately plead it in a complaint ie until he can plead that fact with sufficient detail and particularity to survive a 12b6 motion to dismiss 4: holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case


Input: 515, 107 L.Ed.2d 516 (1989). Moreover, “it is axiomatic that the proof required to show that a defendant knowingly associated with an existing conspiracy ‘need not be overwhelming.’ ” Viola, 35 F.3d at 44 (citation omitted). Indeed, participation in the conspiracy can be shown entirely through circumstantial evidence. Id. We find that the Complaint states a valid § 1962(d) claim against Ortoli. Specifically, although Ortoli was not an operator or manager of the RICO enterprise, we find that the facts alleged evidence his knowing association with the Madanes Brothers’ conspiracy to defraud the Plaintiff. The Court is satisfied that Ortoli’s alleged actions — ranging from the restructuring of family assets, to drafting paperwork intend p, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 588, 601-02 (N.D.Ill.1994) (<HOLDING>). Baltimore is likewise liable under § 1962(d). Holdings: 0: holding that although plaintiffs failed to state  1962c claim against outside attorneys for directing principals in rico enterprise to sign various legal documents allegations that these same outside attorneys knowingly agreed with promoter of tax shelter to violate rico and personally agreed to commit racketeering acts stated valid cause of action for conspiracy under  1962d 1: holding that although plaintiffs failed to adequately allege  1962c claim against professional broker and its officer based on operating or managing enterprise they adequately alleged rico conspiracy to violate  1962a against same defendants 2: holding that to state a  1962a claim plaintiff must allege that the defendants received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity and invested it in the acquisition of any interest in or the establishment or operation of a rico enterprise 3: holding that plaintiffs cannot claim that a conspiracy to violate rico existed if they do not adequately plead a substantive violation of rico 4: holding that the person charged with violating  1962c must be distinct from the rico enterprise


Input: in Keen, the process of weighing aggravating' and mitigating factors as was erroneously done in Mills’ case, and by the trial judge in Keen, simply does not apply in cases where the jury recommends life. See id. We further explained: Moreover, so there is no doubt as to the proper focus of a life recommendation analysis, reversal under Tedder is in no way prevented even assuming the presence of several valid aggravators. Indeed, that has been the rule rather than the exception. See Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 440, 474 n. 78 (11th Cir.1990) (listing 47 cases reversed by this Court under Tedder between 1975 and 1989 where between one to five valid aggravating factors existed or were assumed to exist), vacated on other grounds, 920 F.2d 721 (11th Cir.1990); Fuente, 549 So.2d at 658-59 (<HOLDING>). Keen, 775 So.2d at 287 n. 24. Clearly, the Holdings: 0: recognizing propriety of jury override reversal in brookings v state 495 so2d 135 143 fla1986 despite presence of four valid aggravators 1: holding that retrial did not violate the double jeopardy clause where reversal based on trial error distinguishing reversal for insufficient evidence 2: holding jury trial waiver valid despite defendants argument that district court failed to clearly distinguish between jury trial bench trial and the use of stipulated facts 3: holding the presence of counsel for a witness did not violate grand jury secrecy 4: holding that reversal for a new trial was required where jury instruction relating to fraud was incorrect


Input: essentially accidental injury to the person or property of another rather than coverage for disputes between parties to a contractual undertaking.” Redevelopment Auth., 685 A.2d at 589; see also Keystone Filler, 179 F.Supp.2d at 439 (“The policy defines an ‘occurrence’ as ‘an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.’ ”); Augenblick, 1999 WL 975118, at *2 (“An ‘occurrence’ is defined as ‘bodily injury or property damage resulting from an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same general condition.’ ”). The courts in these cases found that the insureds were not entitled to coverage because their underlying breaches of contract were not an “occurrence” or “accident.” Redevelopment Auth., 685 A.2d at 589 (<HOLDING>); Keystone Filler, 179 F.Supp.2d at 440 (“The Holdings: 0: holding insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify the insured since the underlying suit arises out of a breach of contract which is not an accident or occurrence contemplated or covered by the provisions of a general liability insurance policy 1: recognizing in context of general liability policy if petition contains allegations which when fairly and reasonably construed state cause of action potentially covered by policy insurer has duty to defend insured in underlying suit 2: holding that there was no coverage because there was no occurrence within the meaning of the policy because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident or an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy 3: holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the  insurance policy 4: holding that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured because the allegations of the initial complaint did not allege facts which would bring the case within the coverage of the title insurance policy


Input: are admissible if they meet one of the exceptions under the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. RULE EVID. 802. Thus, police investigative reports are admissible in certain circumstances under the business records exception. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(6); see also, United States v. Scallion, 533 F.2d 903, 915 (5th Cir.1976); Harris v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Chemical Svcs., Inc., 635 F.Supp. 1202, 1209 (M.D.La.1986). However, when police reports contain witness statements, and the witness statements are offered to prove their truth, the statements themselves generally are inadmissible. See Ariza v. City of New York, 139 F.3d 132, 133-34 (2d Cir.1998) (witness statements in police investigative report inadmissible as business record). United States v. Dotson, 821 F.2d 1034, 1035-36 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Halperin, 441 F.2d 612, Holdings: 0: holding that hearsay within a police report was inadmissible 1: holding that police report of witnesss statement was inadmissible because witness had not adopted report as accurate when matter was fresh in his memory 2: holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report 3: holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible 4: holding that a department of defense report was inadmissible


Input: more or less probable. Minn. R. Evid. 401. Although the first CHIPS petition was not pleaded as a basis for the termination petition, the district court took judicial notice of all court records relating to the first CHIPS petition, and appellant did not object. The neglect incident was relevant to whether appellant demonstrated a pattern of failing to comply with the duties of parenthood, including providing a safe and clean environment for the child. It was also relevant to projecting appellant’s future ability to provide a safe environment and suitable level of care for the child. Appellant’s hearsay argument is also unavailing. The reports were admissible under the public-records hearsay exception. Cf. Gardner v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 423 N.W.2d 110, 114 (Minn.App.1988) (<HOLDING>); see generally Minn. R. Evid. 803(8) Holdings: 0: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting highly probative and relevant evidence of other crimes 1: holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence 2: holding that court was within its discretion to refuse to consider reports that did not meet the supreme courts standards for admitting reports into evidence 3: holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony 4: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting police reports in civil case under publicrecords exception


Input: stating that it was “of the opinion that the suit was frivolous and without merit.” While section 1988 provides that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorneys’ fee ...,” the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees differs if a defendant rather than a plaintiff prevails. In Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 417, 98 S.Ct. 694, 698, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), the Supreme Court noted that under the attorneys’ fees provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976), attorneys’ fees should be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff in all but special circumstances. The Court held, however, that a prevailing defendant should be awarded attorneys’ fees 998 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Since we conclude that the record before us Holdings: 0: holding that there is no individual liability under title vii 1: holding title vii claim against western electric not frivolous as a matter of law 2: holding delayed title vii suit not frivolous where there was no evidence that the plaintiff knew he had been given a right to sue letter 3: holding as subject to equitable tolling title vii statute authorizing suit brought within 90 days of receipt of right to sue notice 4: holding defendant employer knew plaintiff had engaged in activity protected under title vii where plaintiff was identified as a potential witness by a coworker plaintiff in a deposition given in a prior title yii employment discrimination action brought by the coworker against the employer


Input: the plan would likely only perversely benefit ISN. Therefore, given these circumstances, the court acted within its discretion when it allowed the replacement fiduciary to formally terminate the plan. C. The issue of whether ISN’s request for a stay is moot is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Green v. City Of Raleigh, 523 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir.2008). Similarly, whether the district court order requiring ISN to pay Saakvitne was one for injunctive or monetary relief is also subject to de novo review. Because ISN has already paid Saakvitne and ISN did not appeal the district court’s denial of its request for a stay under Fed. R.App. P. 8(a)(2), ISN’s appeal of the earlier December 2009 order is now moot. See, e.g., Koger v. United States, 755 F.2d 1094, 1096-98 (4th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the posting of a supersedeas Holdings: 0: holding the rule against taxpayer standing applies both to federal taxpayers and state taxpayers challenging state tax or spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as state taxpayers 1: holding that an appeal by taxpayers in a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the government from collecting income tax deficiencies was mooted because the taxpayers had paid the deficiencies pending the appeal 2: holding that taxpayers failure to follow state requirement that he report change in federal income tax did not except state tax liability from discharge 3: holding that it was not the taxpayers responsibility to pursue the different tax units to which the illegally levied county tax was proportioned as the taxpayer was entitled to recover the full amount of the tax from the county the collecting entity 4: holding that wages are subject to oregons personal income tax and that a taxpayers argument to the contrary was frivolous