Input: to compel sterilization. According to the 2002 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, one parent in families with two children may be “encouraged” to undergo sterilization, but sterilization is not required. The reports depict the Chinese government as generally pursuing its family planning goals through economic incentives, delayed family licenses, the imposition of fines, and the imposition of mandatory birth control such as intrauterine devices or implants. Since the reports do not show that Zheng would be in danger of this procedure upon return to China, we find no substantial evidence that would warrant reversing the holding of the BIA. B. Zheng claims that he was denied his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. See Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Zheng alleges that the IJ denied his petition Holdings: 0: holding that confrontation clause protections do not extend to sentencing hearings 1: holding that various fifth and sixth amendment protections apply to juvenile proceedings 2: holding that neither rule 11 nor the protections of boykin apply to probation revocation hearings and observing that less process is due in prison disciplinary proceedings than in probation revocation hearings 3: holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel 4: holding that aliens in deportation hearings enjoy due process protections under the fifth amendment


Input: manifest itself or progress to sickness or disease during the policy period”). The undisputed medical evidence in this case establishes that exposure to and inhalation of asbestos fibers begins a cumulative process in which the body suffers virtually continuous injuries. The insurance policies in this case obligate the insurers to “pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury ... to which this insurance applies.” In light of the medical evidence of the pathogenesis of asbestos-related diseases and the policy language, coverage under the policies, obligating the insurers to afford a defense to and potential indemnification of l Ins. Co., 10 Cal.4th 645, 689, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 324, 913 P.2d 878 (Cal.1995) (<HOLDING>); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 138 Holdings: 0: holding that continuous trigger will be applicable when environmental contamination claimant is able to show that damage like asbestosis occurred on continuing basis 1: holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury 2: holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended 3: holding that there must be a causal connection between an insureds advertising and an alleged injury to trigger coverage for an advertising injury 4: holding that the continuous injury trigger of coverage should be applied to third party claims of continuous or progressively deteriorating bodily injury or property damage


Input: and health insurance and death benefits could not survive even minimum scrutiny under Alaska’s Equal Protection Clause and were invalid). 3 . Similarly, Procito argues that extending Nimitz and Kurtz to same-sex families would violate the Due Process Clauses of Article I, Sections 1 and 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. She argues that adopting a construction of Section 402(b) of the Law that categorically excludes same-sex couples from being able to establish the “necessitous and compelling” nature of their reasons for leaving employment would create an "irrebuttable presumption,” which would deprive them of the "meaningful opportunity to be heard” guaranteed by Due Process. See Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342, 684 A.2d 1060 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 4 . In a reply brief Procito asserts that Holdings: 0: recognizing irrebuttable presumption as synonymous with conclusive presumption which is a presumption that cannot be overcome by any additional evidence or argument because it is accepted as irrefutable proof that establishes a fact beyond dispute 1: holding due process was violated by the automatic rejection of an unwed fathers custodial relationship without granting the father opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent 2: holding that oneyear license suspension based on single epileptic seizure without opportunity to present evidence of fitness created irrebuttable presumption in violation of due process rights 3: holding that an illinois statute that conclusively presumed every father of a child born out of wedlock to be an unfit person to have custody of his children violated the due process clause and that due process required the father to be given an opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent 4: holding twoyear delay created rebuttable presumption of due process violation and citing cases in which delays of seventeento eighteenmonths either gave rise to or warranted inquiry into possible due process violation


Input: that Amendment 1984-1 was a valid part of the Plan and that the Reference B Report was not a reliable source of data, and had used the SPD’s actuarial factors despite a conflict with other Plan documents. (Def. Opp. 18-19; Def. R. 56.1 Statement ¶ 57.) Thus, plaintiffs assert that PBGC was obligated to affirmatively inform participants that, if these determinations were incorrect, they could potentially be entitled to greater benefits. While a fiduciary may not mislead participants about its decisionmaking processes, it does not have to affirmatively advise participants of every step in its internal deliberations, unless the fiduciary itself has created confusion as to the action being considered. Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir.1994); see also Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 278 (<HOLDING>). Any fiduciary making benefits determinations Holdings: 0: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant 1: holding that employer had no obligation to voluntarily disclose deliberations regarding a plan amendment before it had actually been adopted and noting burden on fiduciary and likelihood of confusion arising from overly stringent voluntary disclosure requirements 2: holding that concurrent use of same mark on similar product was sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion 3: holding that even several isolated incidents of actual confusion are insufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion 4: holding that plaintiff was likely to succeed on merits of  349 claim premised on likelihood of confusion between marks


Input: that the court’s decision to strike defendants’ pleadings and enter default was just, related to the claims at issue in the violated discovery order, and supported by a careful written analysis of the pertinent factors. Additionally, we conclude that appellants’ continued discovery abuses and failure to comply with the district court’s first sanction order evidences their willful and recalcitrant disregard of the judicial process, which presumably prejudiced Dingwall, Yang, and Chai. See Hamlett v. Reynolds, 114 Nev. 863, 865, 963 P.2d 457, 458 (1998) (upholding the district court’s strike order where the defaulting party’s “constant failure to follow [the court’s] orders was unexplained and unwarranted”); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products, 460 F.3d 1217, 1236 (9th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). In light of appellants’ repeated and Holdings: 0: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 1: holding that absent extraordinary circumstances a failure to comply with the statute requires a dismissal with prejudice 2: holding default was the appropriate remedy for failure to comply with numerous court orders and discovery requests 3: holding that dismissal for failure to comply with discovery orders is on the merits 4: holding that with respect to discovery abuses prejudice from unreasonable delay is presumed  and failure to comply with court orders mandating discovery is sufficient prejudice


Input: that Lukumi and Fraternal Order of Police forbid. We believe that the Borough’s selective, discretionary application of Ordinance 691 against the leehis violates the neutrality principle of Lukumi and Fraternal Order of Police because it “devalues” Orthodox Jewish reasons for posting items on utility poles by “judging them to be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons,” and thus “single[s] out” the plaintiffs’ religiously motivated conduct for discriminatory treatment. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537, 113 S.Ct. 2217; Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 364-65. Just as the exemptions for secularly motivated killings in Lukumi indicated that the city was discriminating against Santería animal sacrifice, and just as the medical exemption in Fr f Va., 515 U.S. at 831-35, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (<HOLDING>). In contrast, the principle of Northwest Holdings: 0: recognizing that property interest based on contractual relationship may arise  when a student enrolls in a college or university pays his or her tuition and fees and attends such school  1: holding that university violated first amendment by expelling student for printing indecent newspaper despite student code prohibiting indecent conduct or speech 2: holding that free speech clause precludes state university that pays student publications printing costs from denying funding based on publications religious viewpoint 3: holding unconstitutional a rule excluding all religious speech as viewpoint discrimination 4: holding that where university has opened its forum to other similar student groups its denial of recognition to homosexual student group was the sort of viewpoint based discrimination forbidden by perry and was invalid under the first amendment unless the university could support this discrimination by providing a compelling reason for its actions


Input: counselor who treated her. During the administrative hearing, Dr. Vargas testified that the plaintiff has a generalized anxiety disorder with a panic disorder. Opponent’s Evidence Submitted in Response to Exhibit D of the Court’s Order, Exhibit 2, at 150. Dr. Vargas also testified that the plaintiff had been prescribed anti-depressant medication in the past, id. at 134, 138-39, and that she had been suicidal, id. at 136. The plaintiff infers that “[t]he testimony of [her] psychotherapist, Dr. Vargas, was strong enough that Judge Volkman stopped the hearing immediately after hearing Dr. Vargas’ testimony.” Opponent’s Amended Responsive Submission in Response to Exhibit D of the Court’s Order, at 5. Again, the plaintiffs inference is not reasonable. See Brown, 848 F.2d at 1540 n. 12 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff commits the common fallacy of Holdings: 0: holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference 1: recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference 2: holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference 3: recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference 4: holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute


Input: embracing the commission of a. series of crimes so related to each other that proof of one or more tends to prove the crime charged and to connect the accused with its commission.” McClain, 240 N.C. at 176, 81 S.E.2d at 367. As a result, evidence that Defendant was involved in a long-standing plan to possess and sell or deliver prescription medications as evidenced by proof of the commission of prior bad acts is, under this State’s decisional law, admissible for the purpose of proving that Defendant possessed prescription drugs with the intent to sell and deliver on 22-23 August 2006 in furtherance of that same common plan or scheme. State v. Houston, 169 N.C. App. 367, 372-73, 610 S.E.2d 777, 781-82 (2005), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 359 N.C. 639, 617 S.E.2d 281 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Evidence that Defendant possessed a number of Holdings: 0: holding that exercising general jurisdiction over defendant was improper where its actual sales in florida were a small percentage of the total sales and therefore these sales were de minimis  1: holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that defendant possessed cocaine when although other people were present and had access to the yard the surveilling officers testified that in the period immediately prior to the search the defendant was the only person to retrieve items from the bucket where the cocaine was found which the defendant did repeatedly as police watched 2: holding that evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct with the victim is admissible to corroborate the victims testimony 3: holding evidence of uncharged prior cocaine sales with numerous similarities to those for which the defendant was on trial admissible for among other purposes showing the existence of a common plan involving the prior sales and the transactions which were the subject of the charges pending against the defendant 4: holding that the fact that defendants sales in forum were less than 5 percent of its total sales volume was irrelevant so long as its sales were part of a regular course of dealing and were not isolated or exceptional events


Input: and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), based on an adverse credibility finding. Mejia-Lopez argues that: (1) the IJ did not act as a fair and impartial arbiter because he was predisposed to make an adverse credibility determination; and (2) the adverse credibility provision of the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C), is unconstitutional on due process grounds. After thorough review, we dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part. We review de novo our own subject matter jurisdiction. Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 762, 765 (11th Cir.2007). We lack jurisdiction to review a claim unless the petitioner has exhausted her administrative remedies for that claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). We review only the BIA’s decision, except to Holdings: 0: holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider claims that have not been raised before the bia 1: holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider a claim not raised before the bia even when the bia sua sponte considers the claim 2: holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider claims not raised below by the alien even when the bia reviews the claim sua sponte 3: holding that we generally may not consider issues not raised before the bia 4: holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review claims that have not been raised before the bia


Input: Trust Company, 212 S.W.3d 893, 911 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). In Bell, a landowner filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking title to property upon which the State had built a highway. The State claimed title to the property by a lost deed and adverse possession. Id. This Court held that Bell’s suit was, in effect, a trespass to try title action against the state. Id. at 294. The landowner in Bell, however, did not seek compensation for an inverse condemnation, but instead sought title to the land. Id. Thus, our court’s holding in that case is distinguishable. In Texas Southern, a bank sued the university for inverse condemnation after the university refused to pay for equipment provided to it under a lease/purchase agreement. 212 S.W.3d at 898-99. Our court (<HOLDING>). Finally, the defendants respond that the Holdings: 0: holding that allegations that states lease and actions that resulted in taking of oil and gas were sufficient to state claim for inverse condemnation 1: holding that there is no right to monetary compensation for a regulatory taking in an inverse condemnation action 2: recognizing that plaintiff must have vested legal right of access and not merely historical permissive use to have actionable inverse condemnation claim 3: recognizing that publicly targeting a property for condemnation resulting in economic damage to the owner generally does not give rise to an inverse condemnation cause of action unless there is some direct restriction on use of the property 4: holding that inverse condemnation claim survived jurisdictional plea where foundation alleged that state mineral leases encroached on foundations property


Input: a party should not be held to the terms of the contract. See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Gerber Truck Serv., Inc., 870 F.2d 1148, 1149 (7th Cir.1989) (noting that the federal “receiver of a failed bank ... [is] entitled to enforce [a] writing without regard to understandings or defenses applicable to the original parties”); McCullough v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 870, 872 (1st Cir.1993) (reading Langley to mean that “a contractually bound party’s attempt to avoid a contractual obligation and/or to seek damages through a claim of misrepresentation is nothing more than a challenge to the truthfulness of a warranty ... and a concomitant claim that the truthfulness of that warranty was a condition of the first party’s performance”); FDIC v. Bell, 892 F.2d 64, 65-66 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, when a party alleges, on the basis of Holdings: 0: holding that failure to disclose that the defendant was involved on both the sellers and buyers side of transactions constitutes a concealment of a material fact sufficient to support a charge of fraud 1: holding claim based on failure to disclose information to the epa preempted 2: holding that whether attorney complied with fiduciary duty to disclose all material information was question of fact 3: holding state has affirmative duty to disclose favorable and material evidence to defense 4: holding that langley barred a defense based on banks failure to disclose a material fact regarding financial condition of company whose obligations were guaranteed by defendant


Input: of Utah violated a mandate issued by the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit by assigning certain criminal cases to himself. Because there is no such mandate in the instant case, and because the Chief Judge did not assign any cases to himself, Ritter is readily distinguishable from the instant case. 2. Sanctions The Court has inherent powers that enable it to enforce standards of conduct and to perform its case-management function. These inherent powers apply in both civil and criminal cases, Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d at 9, and “include the judicial authority to sanction counsel for litigation abuses which threaten to impugn the district court’s integrity or disrupt its efficient management of the proceedings.” Id. at 7. See also United States v. Stokes, 124 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The choice of an appropriate sanction is Holdings: 0: holding that courts may invoke their supervisory powers to implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights to preserve judicial integrity or to deter illegal conduct 1: holding that a plenary suit is required to invoke the district courts supervisory control over the commissioners court 2: holding that states may exercise their supervisory power to take custody of bank savings deposits 3: recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts 4: holding that federal law applies because judicial estoppel relates to protection of the integrity of the federal judicial process


Input: it considered the proposed density urban. 35 The principal cases cited by the parties are Patzkowsky v. Klamath Cty, 8 Or LUBA 64, 71 (1983) (requiring county to discuss whether subdivision into one-acre lots in area 14 miles from UGB and two miles from nearest unincorporated community would comply with Goal 14); 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Clackamas County, 3 Or LUBA 316, 327, 330 (1981) (to designate one-, two- and five-acre residential zones without addressing their impact on UGBs violates Goal 14); Medford v. Jackson Cty, supra, n 19, 2 Or LUBA at 389-91 (describing as “quasi-urban” a 2,600-acre area between Medford and Eagle Point containing 4,300 residents and the largest concentration of industry in the county); Metropolitan Serv. Dist. v. Clackamas Cty, 2 Or LUBA 300, 307 (1981) (<HOLDING>); In the Matter of Linn County’s Comprehensive Holdings: 0: holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence 1: holding that indigents have a right to a transcript on appeal as announced in griffin v illinois 351 us 12 76 sct 585 100 led 891 to be retroactive 2: holding that a foreclosure advertisements property description that included two unavailable subdivision lots was not defective as a matter of law 3: holding that although 13 lots on 31 acres 1 12 miles from ugb and 12 lots on 28 acres 12 mile from ugb are not necessarily  urban as a matter of law close proximity to ugb requires county to consider whether ugb would be affected by the approval of these subdivisions 4: holding that the trial court abused its discretion in giving virtually no consideration to the mothers historical role as primary caregiver in a custodyrelocation order regarding a twelve 12 yearold child


Input: Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. National Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992)). 14 . Grand Crossing, L.P. v. United States Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 03 Civ. 5429, 2008 WL 4525400, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008) (quoting S.E.C. v. Ashbury Capital Partners, No. 00 Civ. 7898, 2001 WL 604044, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2001)). Accord Commerce Funding Corp. v. Comprehensive Habilitation Servs., Inc., 233 F.R.D. 355, 361 (S.D.N.Y.2005) ("[A] movant may not raise on a motion for reconsideration any matter that it did not raise previously to the court on the underlying motion sought to be reconsidered.”). 15 . United States v. Treacy, No. 08 Cr. 0366, 2009 WL 47496, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009) (quotation omitted). Accord Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 16 . Makas v. Orlando, No. 06 Civ. 14305, Holdings: 0: holding that the bia may deny a motion to reopen on the ground that the movant has not established prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought 1: holding that constitutional questions will not be decided if case can be decided on other grounds 2: holding that district court lacked power to decide personal jurisdiction issue already decided by district of columbia superior court 3: holding that a party may not use a rule 60b motion as an occasion to relitigate its case 4: holding that a court will deny the motion when the movant seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided


Input: procedure.” Id. (Emphasis added). Similarly, the court in Wittenberg v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education, No. 1:05 CV 818, 2006 WL 2568937, at *5, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63812, at *17 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2006), held that the prior version of the stay-put provision “should be read to mandate an agreement after a decision of a hearing officer in a due process hearing conducted by the SEA only if there is no further appeal to a state review official.” (Emphasis added). The Wittenberg court premised its holding on its finding that “the statute on which the regulation is based does not contemplate a situation in which a hearing conducted by the state will be appealed to a state review official.” Id.; see also CJN v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 323 F.3d 630, 642 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, the court in Benjamin v. Greater Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules 1: holding that the district court did not err when it found that the stayput provision did not apply to a firsttier due process hearing conducted by a local school district 2: holding that district court did not err in concluding after an evidentiary hearing that the immunity agreement between defendant and the government did not extend to the charge being prosecuted 3: holding that the district court did not err in determining that inadvertent disclosure did not result in waiver 4: holding that trial court did not err


Input: adequacy of the summons in light of Rule 4.15(F), we bear in mind the constitutional due process protections which a defective summons must nevertheless satisfy.” In re J.H., 898 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied. "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality, is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec tions.” Munster, 829 N.E.2d at 58. However, Trial Rule 4.15(F) cures only technical defects in service of process, not a total failure to serve process. LaPalme, 621 N.E.2d at 1106; see also Idlewine v. Madison Cty. Bank & Trust Co., 439 N.E.2d 1198, 1201-03 (Ind.Ct.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Kelly v. Bennett, 732 N.E.2d 859, 862 Holdings: 0: holding that a clerical employee was not an agent authorized to accept service of process for the corporation 1: holding that trial rule 415f will not cure defective service of process where no person authorized by the rules was actually served 2: holding that service to defendants business address resulted in total failure to serve process rather than mere technical defect and thus could not be cured by rule 415f 3: holding service of process defective when the receipt card was signed by someone who was not the registered agent 4: holding service of process defective when the return receipt is not signed by the addressee


Input: to” an employee benefit plan and, consequently, be preempted, even though the state law’s effect on benefit plans is only incidental. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 139, 111 S.Ct. 478. These cases, where the state law’s effect on ERISA-encompassed employee welfare benefit plans, are the more difficult types of cases to ascertain the proper outcome. Further adding to the confusion is the fact that despite Congress’s intention that ERISA cut a wide swath of preemption through state laws, the Supreme Court has recognized certain limitations: “Some state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law ‘relates to’ the plan.” Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. 2890; see also Mackey, 486 U.S. at 841, 108 S.Ct. 2182 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Court’s decisions do not provide a Holdings: 0: holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans 1: holding that a specific provision of georgias garnishment statute was preempted by its express reference to erisa plans but at the same time refusing to extend erisa preemption to georgias entire garnishment procedure 2: holding that a georgia garnishment statute that solely applied to erisa employee benefit plans was preempted 3: holding florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause 4: holding that erisa did not preempt a states general garnishment statute even when applied to collect judgments against plan participants


Input: found defendant incompetent to stand trial). Second, the rules of construction indicate a strong preference for harmonizing the rule and the statute. See State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar, 115 N.M. 573, 575, 855 P.2d 562, 564 (1993) (instructing courts to presume that “the legislature did not intend to enact a law inconsistent with existing law” and to disfavor “judicial repeal of legislation by implication”). Third, Child’s interpretation is logical and avoids absurd results. See State v. Mendoza, 108 N.M. 446, 452, 774 P.2d 440, 446 (1989) (“Where the rule is unambiguous, we interpret it literally and give effect to the plain meaning of the rule ... unless to do so leads to an absurd or unjust result.”). See also State v. Ware, 115 N.M. 339, 342, 850 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). {13} In contrast, we are not persuaded by the Holdings: 0: holding that courts should avoid interpretations of statutes which would produce absurd results 1: holding that virginia courts must avoid absurd results 2: holding that contracts should be interpreted to avoid absurd results 3: holding that the rules of criminal procedure should be common knowledge to lawenforcement and judicial officers who have the duty and responsibility to authorize searches 4: recognizing that to avoid absurd results the court has a duty to interpret the rules of criminal procedure with logic and common sense


Input: States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (setting forth the second prong of the “discretionary function exception” test, which requires the court to determine that “the judgment or choice in question [is] grounded in considerations of public policy or susceptible to policy analysis” for the exception' to apply); Hardscrabble Ranch, L.L.C. v. United States, 840 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir. 2016)(ex-plaining that “the discretionary action must be based on the purposes of the applicable regulatory regime”)). According to C. Warren, where there is a risk of serious danger there cannot be a policy consideration that justifies the United States’ “inattentiveness or failure to intervene.” Motion to Amend Reply at 13 (citing Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 1991)(<HOLDING>)). Thus, C. Warren concludes the Motion to Holdings: 0: holding that the discretionary function exception was inapplicable to a center for disease control scientists failure to maintain safety procedures and to warn laboratory workers about a dangerous rabies sample to which he had exposed them 1: holding that a failure to warn was not a policy judgment 2: holding issuance of ldp to be a discretionary function and therefore recognizing no specific mandate by regulation or otherwise which renders the exception inapplicable 3: recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver 4: holding that decision to operate lighthouse is discretionary decision while failure to maintain lighthouse is not within discretionary function exception


Input: v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (1987); People v. Young, 334 Ill. App. 3d 785, 789 (2002). A trial court, upon determination of guilt, has no authority to assess a fine or impose a sentence other than that provided by statute. People ex rel. Daley v. Suria, 112 Ill. 2d 26, 38 (1986); People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542 (1981); People ex rel. Ward v. Moran, 54 Ill. 2d 552, 556 (1973); People ex rel. Ward v. Salter, 28 Ill. 2d 612, 615 (1963). This court and our supreme court have held that a void sentence is considered to have never been imposed and that “[a] void sentence is treated as a complete nullity, without legal effect, since inception.” People v. O’Neal, 281 Ill. App. 3d 602, 614 (1996), aff’d in part & rev’d in part by People v. Garcia, 179 Ill. 2d 55, 73 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Although O’Neal and Garcia deal with Holdings: 0: holding that remand for resentencing is appropriate when sentence for reversed conviction appears to have influenced trial courts sentence for the affirmed conviction 1: holding that on direct appeal appellate court may remand for resentencing of all counts 2: holding that in addition to a remand for clarification another option in these circumstances is to remand for resentencing 3: holding that consideration of original sentence on remand for resentencing was inapplicable when original sentences were void 4: holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing


Input: A lie does not become the truth simply because the person hearing it knows that it is a lie. The premise underlying this argument reveals the true nature of the matic because they are effectively invoking estoppel against the government. The Defendants contend that because the government’s remission of payment represents that the government entity has evaluated all the relevant information and (presumably) determined that a claim is valid, the government should be estopped from arguing that the claim is invalid in a subsequent judicial proceeding. The premise underlying this argument is contrary to our longstanding presumption that estoppel against the government is impermissible. See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 382, 386, 68 S.Ct. 1, 92 L.Ed. 10 (1947) (<HOLDING>); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, Holdings: 0: holding that legal injury occurred for purposes of negligence action against insurance agent when insurance company rejected the claim 1: holding that plaintiff could recover medical fees not actually paid by the insurance company pursuant to an insurance contract 2: holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims 3: holding that an insurance agent who does not procure the insurance coverage requested breaches his or her duty suggesting a negligence claim 4: holding that a farmer who obtained federal insurance based on improper advice by an agent of the federal crop insurance corporation that his entire crop qualified for insurance could not recover for the loss of his crop because the government could not be estopped from denying the claim by the agents erroneous statements


Input: 226.32(a). A “high cost” mortgage covered by HOEPA is a consumer credit transaction with a creditor: 3) that is secured by the consumer’s principal dwelling 4) and is a second or subordinate residential mortgage, not a residential mortgage transaction, a reverse mortgage transaction, or a transaction under an open credit plan For such loans, a failure to satisfy the requirements of TILA/HOEPA can result in civil liability for the lender, which may be asserted as a matter of defense by recoupment. See 15 U.S.C.A. §1640. The HOEPA, therefore, does not apply to credit transactions unless such transactions are secured by a property used or intended to be used as the mortgagor’s principal dwelling. 15 U.S.C. § 1603; see also Antanuos v. First Nat’l Bank, 508 F. Supp. 2d 466 (E.D. Va. 2007) (<HOLDING>). 3. Is the subject mortgage a residential Holdings: 0: holding that the determination of whether the debtor is using real property as his principal residence is made as of the petition date for the purposes of section 1322b2 1: holding tila applies only to credit transactions secured by real or personal property used or expected to be used as the principal dwelling of the debtor 2: holding that under delaware law the policys definition of personal injury as wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy applies only to damages incurred as a result of an invasion of an interest in real property 3: holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner 4: holding that the elements of a claim under  3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added


Input: and time of the sale. That notice, had it been given, would have stated the time of the sale. See Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 51.002. If appellants wanted to avoid the sale, they were required to pay the balance on or before that time. While it would have been preferable for the bankruptcy court’s order itself to have given the parties a specific time on August 1, 2000 in which to make the $650,000.00 payment, we cannot agree that that flaw allows us to ignore the plain language of the order. Appellees’ also direct us to other extrinsic evidence to show the bankruptcy court did not intend the sale to occur only on August 1, 2000. However, the bankruptcy court’s order is not ambiguous. When an order is not ambiguous, we enforce it literally. Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 441-42 (Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Bums Motors, Inc., 22 S.W.3d Holdings: 0: holding extrinsic evidence contradicting language in will inadmissible when will is unambiguous 1: holding that arbitration clauses as contractual agreements must be enforced to their terms 2: holding that in order for a contract to be enforced it is necessary that all the essential terms of the contract must first be established by competent evidence and shown to be definite certain clear and unambiguous 3: holding that unambiguous decree must be enforced literally without consideration of matters extrinsic to the decree 4: holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties


Input: at 7. In the absence of that certification, the Court has little difficulty concluding that the complaint was not served, and that in consequence, Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirement of Rule 25(a)(3) to serve the motion to substitute “on nonparties as provided in Rule 4.” Id. (emphasis added); see George v. United States, 208 F.R.D. at 31-32 (stating “non-party successors or representatives of the deceased party must be served the suggestion of death in the manner provided by Rule 4 for the service of a summons” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). It is axiomatic that a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a would-be party that has not been “served with a copy of the complaint.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(1); see Ayres v. Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A, 99 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Macaluso v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Holdings: 0: holding that rule 45b does not require personal service 1: holding that personal jurisdiction is not conferred if service under rule 4 is not properly effected 2: holding rule 45b does not require personal service to the exclusion of other manners of service so long as the nonpersonal service was effected by means reasonably sure to complete delivery 3: holding that if good cause does not exist the court has the discretion to either dismiss the action without prejudice or direct that service be effected within a specified time 4: holding that delivery of subpoena via federal express was sufficient because effective service under rule 45 is not limited to personal service


Input: CTL/Thompson Texas, LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 390 S.W.3d 299, 301 (Tex.2013). Here, in both his answer and in discovery, Frazier admitted that the HVAC design was faulty, thus giving merit to plaintiffs claims. Frazier’s, own admissions lend support to plaintiffs claims that negligence occurred in the construction of the HVAC system, and granting a motion to dismiss in this case would defeat the purpose of this statute. In light of this, we conclude that Frazier “substantially invoked the judicial process,” Murphy, 374 S.W.3d at 631, and thus waived his right to a certificate of merit. The dissent focuses on Texas cases that, emphasize the quantity of activity in a case rather , than the substance of activity. See, e.g., Crosstex Energy Services, 430 S.W.3d at 394-95 (<HOLDING>). The dissent claims that “the majority Holdings: 0: holding that an appeal waiver is valid when it is entered into knowingly and voluntarily 1: holding that plaintiff may be entitled to prevailing party status where the mediation agreement entered into by the parties was read into the record before a hearing officer 2: holding that a stipulation properly entered into the record where there is a clear understanding of the finality of that agreement is an effective and enforceable settlement notwithstanding that it is subject to reduction to a written document 3: holding that as a matter of contract no party can be forced to arbitrate unless that party has entered into an agreement to do so 4: holding that no waiver existed where a party filed an answer exchanged 11000 pages of written discovery and entered into a rule 11 agreement among other actions


Input: or reasonable and prudent at the time.” (citations omitted)). 22 . Thrift contends that the Second Note was a renewal of the First Note; the Hubbards do not agree with this characterization. 23 . At the time Thrift wrote the letter, he believed that the stock transfer had not satisfied the original debt. 24 . Peerless argues that allowing compounded interest would impermissibly add to the contract. Awards of prejudgment interest are damages, however, and need not be specified in the contract nor agreed to by the parties. 25 . See Enterprise-Laredo Assocs. v. Hachar's, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 822, 839 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (''[Pjrejudgment interest may be awarded on a breach of contract claim.”); O’Reilly v. Grafham, 797 S.W.2d 399, 401-02 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 26 . Tex.Rev.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-1.05, § 1 Holdings: 0: holding teague applies to capital cases 1: holding that strickland applies to cases involving successive representation 2: holding that cavnar rule applies to nonpersonal injury economic damages cases 3: holding that eaja applies to court proceedings for review of social security cases 4: holding that rule 9b applies to fca


Input: against Detectives Murphy, Kierse and O’Connell, since, according to the facts set forth above and admitted by Mr. Hickombottom, they were not involved in the interrogation or processing after Hickombottom’s arrest. McGuire and Tansey, however, are left with Hickombottom’s remaining claims. The court will address each in turn. First, Mr. Hickombottom claims that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to a prompt hearing by delaying his appearance before a magistrate. The defendants did question Hickombottom for about eleven hours after his arrest, but had nothing to do with him after that time. Eleven hours is not an unreasonable period in which to delay an appearance before a magistrate. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Whatev er happened afterward is not, or at Holdings: 0: holding that a sentence within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 1: holding that belowguidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable 2: holding that the defendants sentence was within the guidelines range and therefore presumptively reasonable 3: holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 4: holding that period of up to fortyeight hours between arrest and initial appearance before judicial officer is presumptively reasonable


Input: of the Small Estate Affidavit, which includes an estimate of the Property’s value. As evidence of Mrs. Brush's loan indebtedness, Wells Fargo relies on an affidavit attached as an exhibit to its summary judgment motion. This affidavit estimate falls outside the range of materials that a court may consider in a Rule 12(c) motion. Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied as to its argument that the Brushes’ have failed to show damages for Wells Fargo’s breach of the loan modification contract. 6 . The Texas Supreme Court has yet to address whether foreclosure is “debt collection” under the TDCA. Other courts applying Texas law have permitted foreclosure-related claims under the TDCA. See, e.g., Watson v. Citimortgage, Inc., 814 F.Supp.2d 726, 734-35 (E.D.Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>); Akintunji v. Chase Home Fin., L.L.C., 2011 WL Holdings: 0: holding that debtors allegation that mortgage holder failed to provide him with the statutorily required notice of foreclosure was sufficient to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure 1: holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale 2: holding that foreclosure is debt collection under the tdca and allowing the plaintiffs claim that the mortgagors representations surrounding the foreclosure were fraudulent deceptive or misleading 3: holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final 4: holding that 24 foreclosure was substantial under the facts of that case


Input: Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 254 F.Supp.2d 434, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). “The court must consider each mo tion independently of the other and, when evaluating each, the court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. (citing Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001)). Plaintiffs’ N.Y. Labor Law § 196-d Tip-Sharing Claim New York Labor Law Section 196-d prohibits any “employer or his agent” from “demanding] or accepting], directly or indirectly, any part of the gratuities, received by an employee, or retaining] any part of a gratuity or of any charge purported to be a gratuity for an employee.” N.Y. Lab. Law § 196-d (McKinney 2002); see Chung v. New Silver Palace Rest., Inc., 246 F.Supp.2d 220, 230 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). The drafters of Section 196-d “sought to end Holdings: 0: holding that the eighth amendment prohibits states from inflicting the death penalty upon a defendant who is insane 1: holding that probation department employees are not county employees 2: holding the mvra prohibits the court from examining the defendants ability to pay restitution 3: holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the state from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane 4: holding that section 196 d clearly prohibits partowner employees who wield  broad managerial authority from retaining tips


Input: is a misreading of the decision for review. In addition to erroneously concluding that the action should proceed to a jury determination, the trial court further erred by instructing the jury as if Bombay was an ordinary negligence case. The trial court instructed the jury on the liability issue without using the word “intentional.” The trial court then gave an instruction on comparative negligence and submitted to the jury a verdict form that allowed for a finding of comparative negligence. Such instruction was directly contrary to section 768.81(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), which provided that comparative negligence was not applicable in an intentional tort action, a principle which had long been the common law of Florida. See Mazzilli v. Doud, 485 So.2d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>), review dismissed, 492 So.2d 1333 (Fla.1986); Holdings: 0: holding that liability insurer had duty to defend insured against complaint that alleged intentional tort and negligence in the alternative even when policy excluded coverage for intentional torts 1: holding that the obviousness of a danger is a factor for comparative negligence not a bar to recovery 2: holding comparative negligence not defense to intentional tort 3: holding that federal comparative negligence principles prevailed over state comparative negligence principles on the basis that admiralty is not merely a basis of jurisdiction but instead it is a body of substantive principles as well 4: recognizing tort of negligence by words


Input: to reopen deportation proceedings, arguing that she was not removable because her assault charge fell within the “petty offense” exception of INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), and could not therefore be construed as a crime involving moral turpitude. The BIA denied that motion, and Membreno timely appealed. Discussion The Immigration and Nationality Act deprives a court of jurisdiction to review “any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 1182(a)(2).” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). This section also deprives a court of jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions denying motions to reopen or reconsider such final orders. See Sarmadi v. INS, 121 F.3d 1319, 1321 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Section 1182(a)(2) renders “any alien Holdings: 0: holding that withdrawal of judicial review over final orders of deportation also withdraws jurisdiction from motions to reconsider or reopen 1: holding that court of appeals statutory jurisdiction over final orders of removal extends to reinstatement orders 2: holding that the criminal jurisdiction bar applies to the denials of motions to reopen 3: holding that bia denials of motions to reopen or reconsider are reviewed for abuse of discretion 4: recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal


Input: 1999). Specifically, a RICO plaintiff must “(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, at 1231, the court held that a complaint did not meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard because it did not include “statements setting forth the content, date, or place of any alleged misrepresentations, and the identity of the persons making them.” Id. (brackets omitted). Instead, the complaint “contain[ed] sweeping and general allegations of mail and wire fraud directed at all the defendants rather than connecting the alleged fraud to the individual defendants.” Id.; see also McGee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 08-CV-392 FB CLP, 2009 WL 2132439, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2009) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, although a plaintiff may “allege Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant 1: holding that a plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity where he loosely alleged throughout his complaint that the defendants contacted each other by means of the mails andor the wires without specifying precise methods of communication or identifying any specific fraudulent statement 2: holding that plaintiffs did not plead fraud where the complaint only alleged a breach of fiduciary duty 3: holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity 4: holding that when there are multiple defendants rule 9b requires that a plaintiff allege facts specifying each defendants contribution to the fraud


Input: “input” from the respondent which was lacking in Go-dette. Ms. Lea testified at some length by telephone, but the hearing committee did not credit what she had to say. Since the committee’s credibility findings were not clearly erroneous, the Board was bound to accept them. There is no room here for the Board to “speculate” that Ms. Lea’s evasion of service, like that of Mr. Godette, may have been motivated by “hopelessness and perhaps despair.” In addition to the evidence of evasion of service, the Board also failed to consider other evidence of Ms. Lea’s deliberate disregard for the disciplinary process. In particular, given that substantial evidence supported the committee’s credibility findings, the Board erred in failing to accept those findings. See Temple, 629 A.2d at 1208-1209 (<HOLDING>). The committee found that Ms. Lea’s testimony, Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record 1: holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts 2: holding that the court may not overturn the administrative law judges factual findings as long as they are supported by competent substantial evidence 3: holding that where adequately supported credibility findings are for the alj to make 4: holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence


Input: findings or abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s request for partition. We note that EPIC vests the probate court with the jurisdiction to hear an equitable claim for partition. MCL 700.1303(l)(b); see, also, Van Etten, supra at 287 (observing that MCL 700.22 extended equitable jurisdiction to the probate court in limited instances, including granting the relief of partitioning property). In an action for partition, the court determines “whether the premises can be partitioned without great prejudice to the parties,” the property’s value and use, and any other matters the court finds pertinent. MCR 3.401(A). Here, none of the parties suggested a viable method to partition the property into the four equal parcels required to comply with the trust’s terms of distributio 1933) (<HOLDING>). The concerns discussed in these cases apply Holdings: 0: holding provision in oil and gas lease authorizing lessor to use gas for agricultural purposes contained no geographical limitations 1: holding assignment of oil and gas lease is subject to business and commerce code section 2601 2: recognizing oil gas and coal are minerals and holding if oil gas and minerals are reserved from the grant of the surface of several tracts of unseated land  they can be taxed as an estate in land 3: recognizing as impermissible the aggregation of claims seeking to recover royalties allegedly due under oil and gas leases 4: recognizing that a metes and bounds partition when land contains oil and gas results in a serious loss to a coowner who receives a lot without oil or gas under the surface with the loss due solely to the division of the land


Input: in denying supersedeas under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(3) and (a)(5), even though those provisions were in effect at the time of the ruling.” Cascos, 319 S.W.3d at 217. This analysis is clearly wrong, however, because, as noted above, the supreme court’s opinion in Long expressly referenced the trial court’s discretion under what is now TRAP rule 24.2(a)(3): Sweitzer [the judgment creditor] had possible mechanisms for seeking enforcement of the injunction.... Sweitzer could have sought denial of suspension of the injunction. See former Texas R.App. P. 47(f) (allowing trial court to decline to permit other judgments to be suspended) (currently Tex.R.App. P. 24.2(a)(3)); City of Robstown v. Westergren, 774 S.W.2d 739, 740-41 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi, 1989, no writ) (<HOLDING>). In re Long, 984 S.W.2d at 626. Thus, not only Holdings: 0: holding that district court has discretion under appropriate circumstances to rule on summary judgment motion before addressing pending class certification motion 1: holding that district court has discretionary authority under former rule 47f to deny a city suspension of an injunction pending appeal 2: recognizing that the district court has discretion to admit or deny motive evidence 3: holding that a district court of appeal opinion which cites as controlling authority a decision that is either pending review in or has been reversed by the court constitutes prima facie express conflict and allows the court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction 4: holding that when a state commission has the right under section 6001 of the texas civil practice and remedies code to supersede an order the trial court cannot deny suspension of a temporary injunction under former rule 43a currently texrapp p 291b pending an interlocutory appeal


Input: assignments. See id. at 304, 302. Appellants in this case did have notice that there was assigned parking at Le’Lisa; however, they did not have notice as to how the system worked. Further, appellants had notice from Article XVI of the by-laws that the document could be amended by a 66% percent vote of the unit owners. Appellants also had notice that the by-laws could contain “restriction^] on or requirement[s] respecting the use and maintenance of the units and the common elements.” RP § 11-104(c). See Allers v. Tittsworth, 269 Md. 677, 686, 309 A.2d 476 (1973) ("Every man is presumed to know the law”). Therefore, appellants knew the by-laws could be amended by the insertion of use restrictions. Cf. Board of Directors of By the Sea Council v. Sondock, 644 S.W.2d 774 (Tex.Ct.App. 1982) (<HOLDING>). Appellants also attempt to distinguish Juno Holdings: 0: holding that condominium owners knew at time of purchase they bought subject to all provisions of declaration one of which was right to amend it 1: holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made 2: holding that defendant must assert right of confrontation and right to be present at time of alleged violation and cannot claim those rights for first time on appeal 3: holding that allegations that defendants designed and implemented improper accounting practices failed to state claim for securities fraud in absence of allegations of particular facts demonstrating how defendants knew of scheme at time they made their statements of compliance that they knew the financial statements overrepresented the companys true earnings or that they were aware of a gaap violation 4: recognizing that the right of redemption is one of the most important rights provided by the states to owners of real property


Input: properly admitted as evidence of a common scheme or plan. We believe the trial court properly admitted the victim’s testimony as evidence of a common scheme or plan. See Clasby, 385 S.C. at 155, 682 S.E.2d at 896 (“Where there is a close degree of similarity between the crime charged and the prior bad act, both this [c]ourt and the [c]ourt of [ajppeals have held prior bad acts are admissible to demonstrate a common scheme or plan.”) (quoting State v. Gaines, 880 S.C. 23, 30, 667 S.E.2d 728, 731 (2008)). The victim’s testimony in this case established the incidents of abuse occurred in the same manner and in the same locations as the conduct that formed the basis of the charge of CSC with a minor brought against Berry. See State v. Whitener, 228 S.C. 244, 265, 89 S.E.2d 701, 711 (1955) (<HOLDING>); State v. McClellan, 283 S.C. 389, 392, 323 Holdings: 0: holding that the high level of similarity between the charged crime and prior bad acts necessary to prove common scheme or plan does not require evidence of common features to show a unique method of committing the crime 1: recognizing that the common scheme or plan exception is generally applied in cases involving sexual crimes where evidence of acts prior and subsequent to the act charged in the indictment is held admissible as tending to show continued illicit intercourse between the same parties 2: holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment 3: holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment 4: holding that the striking similarity between the acts alleged in the indictment and the prior incidents rendered incidents that occurred fifteen years prior to the acts alleged in the indictment relevant and admissible under rule 404b


Input: issued shares and options off the market. 3 . Flora asserts that he was somehow less sophisticated than Firepond's representatives and that the lock-up agreement was not the product of negotiation because it was offered on a take it or leave it basis, under the threat that if he refused to sign, the IPO might not go forward. The court finds neither argument persuasive. First, Flora was sophisticated enough to negotiate and perform multimillion dollar business agreements. Second, the court is not convinced that the lock-up agreement, in these circumstances, was a contract of adhesion. Even if it was a contract of adhesion, that fact alone does not create a special duty of care where none otherwise existed. See Vierkant by Johnson v. AMCO Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>); Safeco, 531 N.W.2d at 871 (not including Holdings: 0: holding that contingency fee contracts are voidable where attorneys fail to comply with disciplinary rules 1: holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable 2: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims 3: recognizing the doctrine of unenforceability of unconscionable contracts 4: holding that contracts of adhesion are not voidable unless unconscionable


Input: his more particular two-fold argument that it was the testimony about the specific crime— possession of a stolen firearm — and the fact it was also firearm related that made Officer Brumfield’s testimony more prejudicial than probative. As to this, we are mindful that Officer Brumfield only testified on direct that Grindle had been arrested and, when he was arrested, a .45-caliber pistol was recovered but did not match the murder weapon. And Grindle did not object to this testimony. It was Grindle’s attorney, not the State, that brought up the underlying reason for his arrest — that he allegedly possessed a stolen pistol. Because Grindle’s lawyer was the one who elicited the testimony, Grindle cannot argue now it was improperly introduced. See Rubenstein, 941 So.2d at 755 (¶¶ 52-53) (<HOLDING>). ¶58. Despite Grindle’s opening the door to Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts improper admission of an unauthenticated registration statement was harmless because the proponent of the registration statement later properly authenticated the statement in a motion to reconsider 1: holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection  and admonished the jury to disregard the statement 2: holding that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to introduce defendants prior consistent statement statement was not admissible because it was made after defendant had been arrested clearly not a time when the effect of the statement could not have been foreseen 3: holding appellate argument that statement violated rule 404b was improper because it was the defendant who elicited the statement at trial 4: holding that it was error for the court to rule that the statement of mortgage debt was incorrect prior to submission of the auditors statement of account


Input: S.Ct. 2305, 90 L.Ed.2d 881 (1986). Tribal sovereign immunity “is subject to the superior and plenary control of Congress,” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978), but the Court of Appeals has ruled that, as relevant to this suit, Congress did not impair the Nation’s immunity. Vann II, 534 F.3d at 749. Of course, like all sovereigns, the Nation is free to assert or to waive its immunity as it sees fit, see Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991), and “[i]t is settled law that a waiver of sovereign immunity in one forum does not effect a waiver in other forums.” West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 226, 119 , 137 Cal.App.4th 175, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 875, 883 (Cal.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted) (quoting Am. Indian Agric. Holdings: 0: holding that an official of an indian tribe should be stripped of his authority and corresponding immunity to act on behalf of his tribe whenever he exercises a power his tribe was powerless to convey to him 1: holding that waiver in a sue and be sued clause is limited to actions involving the corporate activities of the tribe and does not extend to actions of the tribe in its capacity as a political governing body 2: holding that an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity 3: holding that because a waiver of immunity is altogether voluntary on the part of the tribe and thus the tribe may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted    the issue must be determined in the forum that the tribe has chosen for determination of the viability of claims against it to wit arbitration 4: holding that as a matter of federal law an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity


Input: is, CMS requires approval from off-site corporate doctors to obtain required medical treatment. Plaintiff asserts that this policy results in a denial of medical care deemed appropriate by the patient’s treating physician. Finally, CMS has an orientation program that emphasizes cost and compliance over patient care. (ECF No. 224, pp. 13-14). Plaintiff asserts that he was denied care by at least two doctors, Dr. Nagaldinne and Dr. Hendricks, on the basis that the treatment would be too costly. The Court finds that Plaintiffs claims against CMS fail as a matter of law. The Court holds that CMS’s policy requiring administration of narcotic medication in the infirmary does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Peterson, 2012 WL 4108908, at *14, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132848, at *46 (<HOLDING>); see also Steele v. Weber, 278 Fed.Appx. 699, Holdings: 0: holding that the gratuitous infliction of wanton and unnecessary pain is a violation of the eighth amendment 1: holding that plaintiff who alleged he was in pain and discomfort after a bilateral otoplasty sufficiently showed a serious medical need noting that pain though subjective and difficult to measure may well be serious 2: holding that plaintiffs allegation that he was denied prescribed pain medication because of a mdoc policy that narcotic pain medications must be given in the infirmary fails to establish an eighth amendment violation 3: holding that prisoner must show prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions to establish an eighth amendment violation 4: holding that untimely provision of medication to hivpositive in mate did not cause sufficiently serious injury to give rise to an eighth amendment violation


Input: the venire. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel’s representation was objectively unreasonable and that, but for counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068-69 (1984); Foreman, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 142. In the present case, given all the evidence against defendant, there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel questioned, or asked the judge to question, the venire regarding the Zehr principles. Accordingly, defendant’s contention of ineffective assistance is without merit. See also Foreman, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 143 (<HOLDING>). In his reply brief, defendant argues that Holdings: 0: holding that to establish prejudice sufficient to warrant finding of ineffective assistance the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 1: holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different 2: holding that to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 3: holding that counsels failure to question the venire regarding the zehr principles did not constitute ineffective assistance where there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different 4: holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different


Input: the information had been sought only for possible impeachment purposes. See id. at 630. The proper test to be applied by the trial court in such circumstances is whether the safety of the informant will be compromised by disclosure. See Garcia v. Florida, 379 So.2d 441, 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). If so, then the court must weigh the interests of the state against the defendant’s right to develop his defense. See id. It is unclear whether the trial court in the instant case attempted to apply this balancing test in ruling on the motion to compel. We, therefore, quash the trial court’s discovery order and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. WOLF, KAHN and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur. 1 . See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) Holdings: 0: holding that suppression by prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where evidence is material to either guilt or punishment 1: holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused  violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 2: holding that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 3: holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 4: holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution


Input: without merit. “The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects those rights that are ‘fundamental,’ that is, rights that are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (citation omitted); see also Greenbriar Vill., L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook, City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.2003) (“Fundamental rights are those rights created by the Constitution.”) (citation omitted). In this case, Behrens has failed to allege the deprivation of any fundamental right. We have previously held that “[b]ecause there is no fundamental right to adopt or to be adopted, it follows that there can be no fundamental right to apply for adoption.” Lofton, 358 F.3d at 812; see also Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that prospective adoptive parents do not have a fundamental liberty interest in adoption 1: recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 2: holding that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 3: recognizing that noncustodial parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 4: holding that there was no liberty interest where adoption placement agreement made it clear that adoption was not a foregone conclusion


Input: officer was taking an interest in the plaintiff. Id. Here, no deputies under Sheriff Ball had ever engaged in sexually impermissible or suggestive conduct. And nothing in Fite’s record suggested that he had a proclivity to engage in sexually prurient behavior. As in Andrews, where we found no patently obvious need to train an officer not to rape young women even in the face of actual knowledge of deviant behavior, we do not believe that there is a patently obvious need to train an officer not to sexually assault women, especially where there is no notice at all that such behavior is likely. An objectively reasonable officer would know that it is impermissible to touch a detainee’s sexual organs by forcible compulsion. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1308 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Fite himself acknowledged in his Holdings: 0: holding that the court was not persuaded that a plainly obvious consequence of a deficient training program would be the sexual assault of inmates and that specific or extensive training hardly seems necessary for a jailer to know that sexually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior 1: holding that even in absence of copy of written decision inmates affidavit and notations on grievance form provided trial court with information necessary to determine whether inmates suit was filed within statutory time period 2: holding that inmates must demonstrate an actual injury 3: holding that consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault where the assault occurred in the context of a prison fight between inmates 4: holding that district court erred in dismissing inmates complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmates allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms


Input: as a deemed party under the doctrine. Under Texas law, Lapiner cannot satisfy any of the elements of the doctrine of virtual representation. Lapiner is not bound by the underlying judgment — Is-ramco is bound. The claims adjudicated in this shareholder derivative action are for injury to the corporation, as distinguished from injury to its shareholders. See Swank v. Cunningham, 258 S.W.3d 647, 661-62 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2008, pet. denied); see also Redmon v. Griffith, 202 S.W.3d 225, 233 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2006, pet. denied). Our analysis is not altered even though the shareholder derivative action judgment may “bring about reduced earnings, salaries, or bonuses.” See BJVSD Bird Family P’ship, L.P. v. Star Elec., L.L.C., 413 S.W.3d 780, 785-86 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Finally, there is no identity of interest Holdings: 0: holding that an action naming a state entity as a defendant did not constitute an action against the state because the state entity was sued in its capacity as receiver 1: holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense 2: holding that the appellants interest as a stakeholder in an entity did not satisfy the privity element of the virtual representation doctrine 3: holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury 4: holding the connection is an element


Input: at Soldier Field because parking facilities increased the usefulness of the stadium property); Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at 382-83, 657 N.E.2d at 893 (sidewalk deemed public recreational property within meaning of section 3—106 where school painted four-square court on sidewalk and allowed children to play on it). This extension of the law does not justify further expanding the application of section 3—106 to injuries occurring outside a public entity’s property line. The District’s interpretation of section 3—106 is too expansive and would overcome the common law duty of due care codified by section 3—102(a) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/3—102(a) (West 2000) (a local public entity has a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe conditio Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (<HOLDING>). The plain wording of the Illinois statute Holdings: 0: holding that the public policy considerations supporting public officials immunity required that the immunity be applied to bar contribution actions as well as direct actions 1: holding that a road not open to the public at all times was not a highway 2: holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine 3: holding that legislative purpose for new jersey governmental tort immunity statute encouraging public agencies to open unimproved lands to public use was not thwarted when immunity was not applied to injuries caused by dead tree collapsing onto adjacent public road or private residential property 4: holding that california governmental tort immunity statute would apply if decayed eucalyptus tree limb fell on user of governmental property and would not apply to injuries caused to nonusers on adjacent property


Input: allow the Restaurant to litigate the matter. Cf. Barr v. Resolution Tr. Corp. ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992) (“Res judicata, or claims preclusion, prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit.”). The Restaurant therefore attempted the other approach ad dressed in Mantas, that is, it filed a separate suit to resolve the settlement dispute and asked the appellate court to abate the appeal of the underlying cause pending that resolution. Our own precedent indicates that res judicata would not apply in these circumstances. See Wood v. Cosme, 447 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ) (<HOLDING>). In the unusual circumstances presented here, Holdings: 0: holding that res judicata does not bar litigation of a claim pleaded in an earlier case if the record of the case shows that the court refused to decide the issue 1: holding that res judicata does not bar those claims that arose after the original pleading is filed in the earlier proceeding 2: holding that res judicata barred a claim that had been voluntarily abandoned in a previous litigation 3: holding that when claims regarding the employment relationship arise after the plaintiffs first case is initiated the second case is not barred by res judicata 4: holding that res judicata is not applicable to a claim for relief that was unavailable in the earlier action


Input: 1255, 1260 (8th Cir.1994) (Cabbell), this court reversed an obstruction of justice enhancement because “the district court did not evaluate [the defendant’s] testimony in a light most favorable to him as required by section 3C1.1, application note 1.” Howev er, we note that, effective November 1, 1997, “an amendment to [§ 3C1.1] ... removed the ‘ “most favorable” language and advised courts simply to “be cognizant that inaccurate testimony or statement may result from confusion, mistake, or faulty memory, and thus not all testimony or statements necessarily reflect a willful attempt to obstruct justice.” ’ ” United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, —, 2000 WL 33709971, at *22, (2d Cir.2002) (amending previous opinion); see also United States v. Behler, 100 F.3d 632, 638 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 855, 118 S.Ct. 152, Holdings: 0: recognizing first amendment retaliation right 1: recognizing first amendment and fourteenth amendment interests in inmate correspondence 2: holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel 3: recognizing amendment to  3c11 4: holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment


Input: Esperanza Robles-Cruz and her husband Jorge Robles-Cruz, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition pro se for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the immigration judge’s denial of their applications for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review constitutional claims de novo, Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir.2002), and we deny the petition. The Petitioners contend that it is a violation of equal protection to treat aliens with U.S. citizen relatives differently than aliens without U.S. citizen relatives. We are unpersuaded by this contention because the differential treatment is not wholly irrational. See Hernandez-Mezquita v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 1161, 1164-65 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. ** This Holdings: 0: holding statutory classification of victim and a defendant involved in issuance of a protective order did not violate defendants equal protection rights 1: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 2: holding that petitioner must show that classification is wholly irrational in order to demonstrate equal protection violation 3: holding proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose required to show equal protection violation 4: holding that a petitioner must show prejudice in order to prevail on a claim that he or she was denied a full and fair hearing in violation of due process


Input: and his familial obligations did not warrant a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range. See United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir.2006) (rejecting defendant’s assertion the district court failed to consider adequately his personal history and troubled family life, holding sentence was reasonable as court considered each section 3553(a) factor and determined defendant’s claims did not “necessitate[;] deviation from the suggested guidelines sentence”); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 34 (2d Cir.2006) (concluding although the sentencing court had the power to reduce the sentence under section 3553(a) based on defendant’s cooperation, “the court was not obliged to provide any such benefit”); United States v. Laufle, 433 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1161 Holdings: 0: holding that plain error review is used for unpreserved challenges to the method by which the district court arrived at a sentence including arguments that the sentencing court failed to explain adequately the sentence imposed under the statutory factors in  3553a 1: holding that a district court is entitled to give more weight to the seriousness of the offense than to other factors 2: holding that where the plea agreement required the government to inform the sentencing court of all defendants cooperation the issue  is not whether the prosecutor enthusiastically disclosed his cooperation but whether the prosecutor disclosed all cooperation 3: holding although different sentencing court may have given more weight to defendants cooperation disagreement with the courts assessment does not warrant reversal since our task is confined to determining whether the district court considered the appropriate range of factors and arrived at a reasonable sentence 4: holding that judgment calls on the weight to be given various relevant factors are for the sentencing court not for this court


Input: As presented, the record supports a reasonable inference that SESH authored the “limited margin of error” language, and that inference must be credited on summary judgment. In short, SESH cannot now prevail on the ground that the ambiguous Easement terms are to be construed against the drafter because the identity of the drafter is, itself, a disputed question of material fact. Where, as here, the contract language is ambiguous, the rules of contract construction do not resolve it, and fact questions persist, it is for the finder of fact to decide the contract’s meaning. See McLemore, 7 So.3d at 327 (“Where factual issues arise, the resolution of the ambiguity becomes a task for the jury.”) (citations omitted); Murray v. Holiday Isle, LLC, 620 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1322 (S.D.Ala.2009) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s Motion is therefore denied as to Holdings: 0: holding that the issue of witness credibility is within the knowledge of the average layperson and must be determined solely by the finder of fact 1: recognizing that courts must submit the ambiguity to the finder of fact if application of  canons of construction proves insufficient to resolve it 2: holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review 3: holding that the courts in the absence of ambiguity should as a general rule confine themselves to a construction of a statute as written and not attempt under the guise of construction to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute or to insert exceptions not made by the legislature 4: holding that where an ambiguity exists in fact or by construction it is proper to consider the history of the legislation


Input: Rule 9(G)(l)(b)(vi) creates what appears to be an exception to an exception. Again, that rule provides that "[r]ecords of juvenile proceedings as declared confidential by Ind.Code § 31-39-1-2 [are excluded from public access], except those specifically open under statute.” Read literally, that rule states that all court records are public, except those specifically confidential by statute, except those specifically open by statute. It is not clear if the records "specifically open by statute” are the same records that are "accessible to the public” in the first place. See Admin. R. 9. 8 . One may think that our earlier statement that the transcript here is presumptively confidential is obviously true, or at least that it should be obviously true. See In re T.B., 895 N.E.2d at 345-46 (<HOLDING>). But the commentary to Administrative Rule Holdings: 0: holding that section 5601c does not authorize appeals from juvenile courts transferring a child to district court for criminal proceedings under section 5402 of the family code 1: recognizing that incidents in which inmates have obtained drugs weapons and other contraband are welldocumented in case law and regularly receive the attention of the news media 2: holding that representatives of the news media have the standing to contest a court order restricting public access to legal proceedings 3: holding under indiana code section 313262 that the juvenile court erred in releasing the transcript of a confidential proceeding to news media 4: holding that access rights of the news media and of the general public are identical in scope


Input: on work-life expectancies compiled by the United States Department of Labor). In this regard, however, we must agree with the appellant. If sufficient, reliable evidence of Weil’s actual expenses is available then the district court should give the appellant the latitude to introduce this evidence. Once again we note that the actual maintenance deduction is a jury question and if the evidence of Weil’s actual maintenance expenditures will assist the jury in this determination then the evidence should be permitted. Weil’s estate is free to argue to the jury as to why the statistics are more accurate than the evidence of actual maintenance expenses presented by the appellant. See, e.g., Strickland v. Roosevelt County Rural Elec. Coop., 99 N.M. 335, 657 P.2d 1184, 1191 (Ct.App. 1982) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 358, 658 P.2d 433 Holdings: 0: recognizing the limitations of estimates of worklife expectancy and personal maintenance deductions based on department of labor tables 1: holdingthat  301a confers jurisdiction on federal district courts over any agreement between employers and labor organizations significant to the maintenance of labor peace between them 2: holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration 3: holding that denial of petition for modification of maintenance was proper when the parties agreement prohibited modification of maintenance 4: holding neutrality and nondiscrimination provisions of election agreement enforceable under  301 of the lmra as an agreement between an employer and a labor organization significant to the maintenance of labor peace between them


Input: on or after June 30, 1994, to register as sex offenders. Id. at 373. In 2001, the Act was amended to require all offenders con-vieted of certain sex offenses to register as sex offenders regardless of conviction date. Id. The State determined that Wallace was required to register under the Act, but our supreme court held that the Act, as applied to Wallace, violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws contained in the Indiana Constitution "because it impose[d] burdens that [had] the effect of adding punishment beyond that which could have been imposed when his erime was committed." Id. at 384. We note that Herron has waived his ex post facto argument because he did not present the issue to the trial court. See Saunders v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1117, 1122 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trams. demied (<HOLDING>). Waiver notwithstanding, the Act is not an ex Holdings: 0: holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal 1: holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court 2: holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal 3: holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court 4: holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal


Input: by the Constitution’ ”) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2363, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974)); see also Roberson, 486 U.S. at 688-93, 108 S.Ct. at 2101-04 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). II Courts must be wary of exaggerating what are properly recognized as contemptible improprieties into grandiose visions of injustice. The temptation to entertain such visions is especially great in cases that pit lonely criminal defendants against the police and prosecutorial powers of their state governments. The danger in succumbing to such temptation is that rules designed to secure the integrity of the legal process can gradually take the form of escape valves whose only notable effect is to provide safe haven for indisputably guilty persons. Cf Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1264 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding harmless the admission of a nontestifying codefendants confession in violation of the confrontation clause when there was extensive evidence of the defendants guilt including the defendants allegedly coerced confession and an eyewitness who testified that he was absolutely certain that the defendant committed the crime 1: holding the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession is subject to a harmless error analysis when the defendants guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that question of whether a confession was coerced was not to be resolved by considering the truth or falsity of the confession 3: holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that  the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendants guilt or innocence  4: holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt


Input: appeared in Hinds County Justice Court and through them attorneys, pled not guilty. Similarly, on February 11, 2009, plaintiff Charles Shawn Lucrow was charged in Rankin County, Mississippi with driving under the influence. He initially appeared and pled not guilty in Rankin County Justice Court. On March 16, 2010, while the charges remained pending against them in the state justice courts, plaintiffs filed the present action in this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants, as a mat ter of official policy, custom and practice, systematically deny justice court defendants access to favorable evidence relating to both guilt and punishment, in violation of their due process rights. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-96, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>). More particularly, plaintiffs alleged that Holdings: 0: holding that suppression by prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where evidence is material to either guilt or punishment 1: holding that suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request by the defense violates due process where evidence is material either to guilt or punishment irre spective of the good faith of the prosecution 2: holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material 3: holding that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 4: holding that suppression by government of evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material to guilt


Input: a ROPS for this particular tractor other than the information set forth in the owner’s manual that Bren-Tex provided the Hensens with the tractor. 15 . Because it is not before us, we express no opinion on whether Bren-Tex may recover the attorney’s fees or costs it incurred for the trial or appeal of its indemnity claim, as contrasted from its defense of the Hensens’ lawsuit. KEM THOMPSON FROST, Justice, concurring. This court correctly reverses the trial court’s judgment because there was no evidence of independently actionable conduct by Bren-Tex that caused Michael Hensen’s death. There was no evidence to support independent liability in this regard as to the alleged DTPA and implied-warranty claims. The majority opinion also correctly holds that there was no eviden 1-83 (Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>); Winn ex rel. Winn v. Pollard, 62 S.W.3d 611, Holdings: 0: recognizing under illinois law that pharmaceutical manufacturer has duty to warn of any dangers associated with offlabel use of product if such dangers were reasonably known 1: holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution 2: holding manufacture had no duty to warn of the dangers of smoking because the dangers of cigarette smoking have long been known to the community 3: holding that manufacturer had no duty to warn its purchasers retailer and transporter of gas of dangers where those purchasers had operated a gas business for years were familiar with the trade journals and already knew the dangers 4: holding that seller of frontend loader had no duty to warn injured worker concerning the dangers of operating the loader without a rops because the dangers were obvious under an objective standard


Input: to which such conduct reasonably points.” Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Henson asserts that there is no evidence that he touched.either Daniel or Patterson. And he maintains that the State did not prove the mens rea elements of each offense. In particular, he contends that .there is. no evidence that he had the specific intent to use the car as a deadly weapon. We address each contention in turn. . . Touching As our Supreme Court has stated, “[w]hile battery requires [a] defen dant to have intended to touch another person, [he] need not personally touch another person since battery may be committed by the unlawful touching by [the] defendant or by any other substance put in motion by [the] defendant.” Matthews v. State, 476 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Ind. 1985) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Here, the State presented Holdings: 0: holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial 1: holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown 2: holding intent to touch satisfied where defendant fired bullets at officer 3: holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation 4: holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent


Input: 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977) (“A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute [Title VII] was passed.... [I]t is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences.”). Reno cannot, due to the circumstances surrounding Metro’s refusal to promote her in 1991 and 1992, prevail on her claim that these incidents evince an overall pattern of continuing discriminatory conduct by Metro. Reno’s promotion denials occurred over a three year period and each involved a different hiring manager, negating Reno’s contention that such decisions were linked to or otherwise shared commonality with the 1993 promotion denial. See Scott v. Claytor, 469 F.Supp. 22, 25 (D.D.C.1978) (<HOLDING>); Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp., 835 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a lender was barred from recovering repayment for loans made more than three years before filing suit where obligations without agreed repayment dates were deemed payable on demand and where the statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts was three years 1: holding that new york statute of limitations for  1983 actions was three years 2: holding that three sexually suggestive comments over a three month period were not frequent enough nor severe enough to be unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs work environment 3: holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation 4: holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident