Input: as a purchaser. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130,119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)(noting that injury-in-fact is a constitutional minimum). Thus, to prove constitutional standing, a plaintiff must show that it has suffered a cognizable “injury-in-fact” that has been caused by the defendant and is redressable by the court. See generally, Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18, 26-27 (1st Cir.2007); Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir.2006). BPI Global has satisfied that requirement here by showing that it took on investment risk as general partner for several of the very funds it managed. Whether less would be sufficient to satisfy the Constitutional minimum is a question I need n er, Peabody & Co., Inc., 604 F.Supp. 764, 767 (D.C.Mo.1985) (<HOLDING>). Although the First Circuit has not to date Holdings: 0: holding that a a representative plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the others requiring the representative to act in the best interest of class 1: holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes 2: holding that a purchaser for the purposes of  12a2 includes a representative or an agent for a purchaser 3: recognizing that authorized representative may be general or only for a certain claim 4: holding that a party waived the right to allege contrary facts on appeal eg that defendant was not an agent or instrumentality of the mexican government for sovereign immunity purposes where the party alleged that the defendant was an agent or instrumentality in its complaint


Input: for subsistence and lodging constitutes an improper increase in their compensation.” Id. at 225, 178 P.2d at 438. Noting that we had stated, in Olmsted & Gillelen v. Hesla, 24 Ariz. 546, 553, 211 P. 589, 591 (1922), that “[i]n the Constitution compensation is employed to designate salary,” we rejected the petitioners’ argument that legislators could not recover the per diem payments. We concluded that “[w]hen the State repays the legislators and their employees for personal expenses, this does not constitute additional compensation but is merely a reimbursement for actual cash outlays necessarily incurred for subsistence while away from home and in the performance of duty.” Earhart at 226, 178 P.2d at 438; see also Geyso v. City of Cudahy, 34 Wis.2d 476, 149 N.W.2d 611, 614-15 (1967) (<HOLDING>). B. ¶ 9 Although petitioners seek to Holdings: 0: holding that where a prior agreement fixed the salary of the plaintiff plaintiff could not seek to recover for his services on a theory of unjust enrichment 1: holding that the words amount and compensation in the regulation referred to cash or salary rather than to all forms of compensation 2: holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed 3: holding that employees vacation benefits are form of compensation for services rendered and are not gratuity 4: holding that the words salary and expense are separate and distinct terms which connote entirely different concepts salary is a fixed periodical compensation paid for services rendered whereas an expense is a charge incurred in performing those services


Input: waiver of appeal paragraph. This paragraph essentially indicates that the defendant acknowledges that he’s been advised of his rights to appeal only in very limited circumstances and that he will not be allowed to challenge his conviction under Title 28, 2255; and Title 18, Section 3742; however, he is reserving the right to appeal any punishment in excess of the statutory maximum. THE COURT: And the statutory maximum in this case, Mr. McIntyre, at least with respect to Count 3, is 240 months. MR. WELDON: That is correct. THE COURT: You understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. The record thus demonstrates that the district court made McIntyre fully aware of the waiver of his appellate rights regarding his sentence and thus complied with Rule ll(b)(l)(N). Cf. Almany, 598 F.3d at 240-41 (<HOLDING>). McIntyre’s only argument in opposition to the Holdings: 0: holding that district comets inquiry do you have anything else for the record failed to satisfy requirement that the court clearly ask for objections to the sentence that have not been previously raised 1: holding that verbal threats such as we going to get you you better drop the suit do not rise to the level of adverse action 2: holding that the district courts question do you also understand that under some circumstances you or the government may have the right to appeal any sentence that i impose did not comply with rule llbln and failed to properly notify the defendant about the waiver of his appellate rights 3: holding that if you do not qualify under the hup test you never get to the statute 4: holding that it is not extortion to threaten economic harm when you have a legal right to engage in the activity you threaten


Input: recognize that the services rendered to the patient are necessary for the protection of the third person. DiMarco, supra at 424-25 (footnote omitted). The DiMarco rule, which was underscored by the Superior Court’s subsequent holding in Troxel v. A.I. duPont Institute, 431 Pa.Super. 464, 636 A.2d 1179 (1994), is that a physician’s duty of care is owed not only to his or her patient, but also to identifiable third parties who will suffer if a physician negligently errs in the handling of a case of infectious disease. See also Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 557 Pa. 340, 733 A.2d 623, 628 (1999) (recognizing that the role of physicians in protecting the public from communicable diseases was central to our decision in DiMarco); Matharu v. Muir, 29 A.3d 375 (Pa.Super.2011) {en banc) (<HOLDING>). The rule I derive from DiMarco and the Holdings: 0: holding that broker owed no fiduciary duty to client as a matter of law 1: recognizing that negligent conduct of police investigations does not give rise to a cause of action because the duty to protect citizens and enforce the law is one owed generally to the public 2: holding law enforcement owed duty similar to that owed by dshs under rcw 2644050 3: holding that physicians owed a duty to protect an infant against rhsensitization 4: holding that an international relief organization owed no duty to protect aid contractor from murder by thirdparty somalis


Input: repealing act violated a prior constitutional provision virtually identical to Article 3, sec. 56 because it changed the city’s charter, the Court observed: From a reading of the entire section it is clear that its object and meaning is to prohibit the granting of special favors by the legislature, and to require that all legislation upon the subjects therein enumerated should be equal and uniform. It certainly did not mean to take away from the legislature its inherent power of repealing any law theretofore passed by it, and we must hold that said repealing act is a )(stating that adoption of a constitutional provision against special legislation does not prevent the repeal of previously enacted special law); Luehrman v. Taxing District of Shelby County, 70 Tenn. 425, 2 Lea 425 (1879)(<HOLDING>). We conclude that Article 3, sec. 56 does not Holdings: 0: holding that the repeal of  921a30 did not affect the validity of the prior version of  2k21a4b which continued to reference the repealed  921a30 1: holding that a city charter is a law under the whistleblower act 2: holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them 3: holding that legislation which repealed the charter of the city of jacksonville did not violate constitutional provision prohibiting local or special laws which change the charter of a city 4: holding that constitutional provision which prohibited local and special laws did not limit legislatures inherent power to repeal the corporate privileges of a particular community and therefore act which repealed the charter of the city of memphis was not unconstitutional


Input: basis review appears to be an issue of first impression in Michigan. Many other jurisdictions have faced similar challenges to the inclusion of false imprisonment crimes, even absent a sexual purpose, in their sex offender registration statutes. The majority have upheld the statutes under rational basis review. See, e.g., Moffitt v Commonwealth, 360 SW3d 247, 255-257 (Ky App, 2012) (concluding that although the defendant’s conviction of child kidnapping included a sexual component, the purpose of Kentucky’s registration statute was the protection of children and the requirement of registration for certain offenses against minors, regardless of a sexual component, did not offend substantive or procedural due process); State v Smith, 323 Wis 2d 377, 397-407; 780 NW2d 90 (Wis, 2010) (<HOLDING>); Rainer v State, 286 Ga 675, 676-679; 690 SE2d Holdings: 0: holding that the requirement of sex offender registration for the defendants conviction of false imprisonment of a minor was not cruel and unusual punishment and did not violate substantive or procedural due process 1: holding that even though the offense was not of a sexual nature requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender following his conviction for false imprisonment of a minor was rationally related to the government interest in protecting the public and did not violate the defendants right to due process or equal protection under the law 2: holding that the district court did not violate the defendants right to due process when it departed upward to life imprisonment pursuant to  5k221 because his sentence was within the maximum set forth in the united states code for the offense of conviction 3: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection as rule was uniformly applied not arbitrary and rationally related to legitimate government interest 4: holding that the admission of his juvenile conviction did not violate equal protection


Input: who purport to hire, as contractors, minions to carry out the proprietor’s own “regular trade or business” in an attempt to avoid workers’ compensation liability for employees. King v. Snide, 144 Vt. 395, 400-01, 479 A.2d 752,754 (1984). The legislative intent in designating these individuals as “statutory employers” was “to impose liability only upon the owner or proprietor of a regular trade or business . . . where an uninsured independent contractor is carrying out some phase of the owner’s or operator’s business.” Id. at 401, 479 A.2d at 754. ¶ 9. Thus understood, the statutory defini that unofficial manager of a wood lot was not statutory employer of an independent logger’s employee injured on the premises); Packett v. Moretown Creamery Co., 91 Vt. 97, 99-101, 99 A. 638 (1917) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, and like in In re Chatham Woods Holdings: 0: holding that a creamery was not statutory employer of a contractor hired to build a new structure 1: holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate 2: holding that a change in employer from one federal contractor to another caused employees no lack of work 3: holding that where owner and contractor frequently discussed progress of construction project and advancement of money by owner to contractor and contractor misappropriated some of the money debt was not excepted from discharge under bankruptcy code  523a2 because owner did not show that contractor had intent not to perform when the agreement was made 4: holding a premises owner is a general contractor for purposes of the statutory employer provision


Input: against imposition of punitive damages on governmental entities.” Vt. Agency of Nat. Res, v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 784, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (citation omitted). Consequently, the inquiry here is whether Plaintiffs argument that Defendant actually is not a municipality, and thus the punitive damages immunity is inapplicable, is valid. (See Br. in Opp’n (Doc. 21) at 13.) “The board of education of each county in the State shall be a body corporate ....” N.C. Gen. Stat., § 115C-40. Among other powers, duc., 315 F.Supp.2d 784, 810 (M.D.N.C.2004) (“Defendant Guilford County Board of Education is a governmental entity and therefore is immune from punitive damages,” (citation omitted)); Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 208, 293 S.E.2d 101, 115 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Ripellino v. N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, 158 Holdings: 0: holding that the state is immune from punitive awards 1: holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 2: holding that port authority is immune from punitive damages 3: holding that in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary municipal corporations are immune from punitive damages 4: recognizing that the municipal function test is used to determine both whether municipalities are immune from suit and immune from running of statutes of limitations


Input: testify one way or another. Id. Thus, there was no indication that the impeachment evidence would be relevant, or even admissible. Id. In this case, disqualification would rest at present upon the chance that the prosecution might call the personnel manager to testify regarding Padilla's personnel file. We have no evidence in this record to support a determination that the possibility of that cireum-stance w 82 (1994) (stating that a defendant has no standing to invoke a third party's privilege in either a criminal or civil action}; State v. Evans, 802 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo.1991) (stating that "the physician-patient privilege is personal to the patient, and generally no person ... other than the patient may so object"); Osborn v. Fabatz, 105 Mich.App. 450, 306 N.W.2d 319, 322 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Hence, it falls not to the defendant in this Holdings: 0: holding that where a third partys conduct is closely related to the contractual relationship or the contractual dispute and where the third party enjoys financial benefit from the contract the forum selection clause applies to the third party 1: holding that the defendant had no standing to invoke a third partys physicianpatient privilege in a paternity action 2: holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant 3: holding that the court must consider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third partys means of infringement 4: holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys


Input: compliment each other, but courts have found that in most cases they are so intertwined in the defendant’s argument that they appear to raise the same question: are the plaintiffs claims so “completely preempted” that the only way to avoid removal due to federal question jurisdiction is through the “artful pleading” of the state-law claim? Thus, these courts have viewed “complete preemption” as a prerequisite to the application of the “artful pleading doctrine”. See, Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475, 118 S.Ct. 921 (“The artful pleading doctrine allows removal where federal law completely preempts a plaintiffs state-law claim”); Braco v. MCI WorldCom Communications, Inc., 138 F.Supp.2d. 1260, 1268, n. 10 (C.D.Cal.2001); Crump v. WorldCom, Inc., 128 F.Supp.2d. 549, 559-60 (W.D.Tenn.2001)(<HOLDING>); Minnesota by Hatch, at 373. The instant Holdings: 0: recognizing doctrine 1: holding that the application of the fair use doctrine at the pleading stage is appropriate 2: recognizing that the artful pleading doctrine in practice is subsumed by the complete preemption doctrine 3: recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time 4: holding that jurisdiction must be resolved before applying the act of state doctrine because that doctrine is a substantive rule of law


Input: by other Nashville-area employers, and not the operating costs of its other facilities. After weeks of fruitless negotiations, Peterbilt locked out the employees on June 23, 2008. The parties ceased negotiations in August, and the Madison plant closed for good in 2009. After the unions filed an unfair labor practice charge against Peterbilt, the Board’s Regional Director filed a complaint alleging unlawful nondisclosure of relevant bargaining information and unlawful lockout under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(5), (d) (prohibiting employers from “interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or eoerc[ing] employees in the exercise of’ their collective-bargaining rights and requiring good-faith negotiations); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153, 76 S.Ct. 753, 100 L.Ed. 1027 (1956) (<HOLDING>); Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, Holdings: 0: holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant 1: holding that the only relevant public interest in disclosure is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the foia which is contributing significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government  2: holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy 3: holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege 4: holding that the acts duty of good faith includes the disclosure of information relevant to the employers bargaining position


Input: disclosure: “A record of an agency relating to a noncriminal investigation, including: .., -[i]nvestigative materials, notes, correspondence and reports.” Section 708(b)(17)(ii) of the RTKL (emphasis added). In the absence of definitions in the. RTKL for either “noncriminal” or “investigation,” we have concluded .that “noncriminal” applies to investigations- other than those which are criminal in nature and that “investigation” means “a systematic or searching inquiry, a detailed examination, or an official probe.” Dep’t of Health v. Office of Open Records, 4 A.3d 803, 810-811 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). The inquiry, examination, or probe must be “conducted as part , of the agency’s official duties.” Id. at 814. See also Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Chawaga, 91 A.3d 257, 259 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the OOR determined that Holdings: 0: holding that an official probe must be conducted pursuant to an agencys legislatively granted factfinding and investigative powers 1: holding that an agencys reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute must be affirmed 2: holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable 3: holding an action taken by an administrative agency in excess of its statutory powers is the well recognized exception to the general rule that an agencys final order  is immune from collateral attack 4: recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1


Input: Defendants have not shown that a reasonable officer could have believed that entry with intent to arrest would not violate clearly established law. Thus summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity would be inappropriate if the intent was to arrest or if facts as to intent are in dispute. A genuine dispute exists as to whether or not defendants ordered the storming of the house primarily for the purpose of arresting Quade. The fact that this dispute turns on an essentially subjective element (the officers’ purpose), while qualified immunity involves an inquiry into “objective reasonableness” does not mean that qualified immunity is any more or less available in this context than it would otherwise be. See Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir.1991) (Branch I) (<HOLDING>); Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1468-69 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that under the fourth amendment the motive of the officer when stopping a vehicle for a minor traffic infraction whether subjective or objective is completely irrelevant 1: holding that alleged misconduct by public officials particularly by law enforcement officials is matter of public concern 2: recognizing the tension between harlows emphasis on objective reasonableness and the subjective elements which are at times at issue in lawsuits against public officials including lawsuits based on alleged fourth amendment violations 3: recognizing private damage action for fourth amendment violations by federal officers 4: holding that claims that law enforcement officials used excessive force in making an arrest are properly analyzed under the fourth amendments objective reasonableness standard


Input: whether her voice, and theatrical style, would have been identifiable if another song had been presented, and not “her song”, which unfortunately for her was owned by others and licensed to the defendants. Id. at 716. Similarly, Plaintiffs in this case assert that the “sound associated with Plaintiffs’ ‘What I Like About You’ is part and parcel of who they are as entertainers.” (Pis.’ Mot. at 9.) Their claim is therefore that their “sound in connection with the music, lyrics and arrangement” is distinctive. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that their sound is identifiable separate from the Song. The Court therefore reaches the same conclusion as the Sinatra court and holds that Plaintiffs’ claim must fail. 2. First Amendment Defenda nc., 444 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1039 (C.D.Cal.2006) (<HOLDING>); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 Holdings: 0: holding that video game maker defendants have met both requirements of the rogers balancing test and are entitled as a matter of law to a first amendment defense to plaintiffs lanham act claims 1: holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute 2: holding that the video games at issue are expressive and qualify as speech for purposes of the first amendment 3: holding that a video game clearly qualifies as an artistic work entitled to first amendment protection 4: holding that the first amendment protects communicative aspects of video games


Input: U.S.C. § 2241 application for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (stating no appeal may be taken from a “final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court” until an applicant obtains a COA); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 869 (10th Cir.2000) (stating § 2253(c)(l)(A)’s requirements apply when a state habeas applicant is proceeding under § 2241). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny a COA and dismiss this matter. I.BACKGROUND Mr. Haff is a pretrial detainee at the Denver County Jail. He filed a § 2241 application for a writ of habeas corpus, urging the federal district court to stop the state criminal prosecution. See Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The § 2241 application asserted five claims: Holdings: 0: holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act 1: holding   2241 is the proper avenue by which to challenge pretrial detention 2: holding that  2241 was the proper statute for the petitioners pretrial double jeopardy challenge 3: holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction 4: recognizing that habeas corpus is a proper means to challenge the legality of pretrial detention under the jimmy ryce act


Input: the Department of Labor’s regulations were a permissible interpretation of § 196-d. See N.Y. Lab. Law § 199 (authorizing Department of Labor Commissioner to issue rules and regulations for enforcing state laws governing employers’ payment of wages to employees); Samiento v. World Yacht Inc., 10 N.Y.3d at 79, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 88, 883 N.E.2d 990 (instructing that “Labor Department’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference” pursuant to general administrative law principle that “construction given statutes and regulations by the agency responsible for their administration, if not irrational or unreasonable, should be upheld”). See generally Golf v. N.Y. State Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 91 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 674 N.Y.S.2d 600, 605, 697 N.E.2d 555 (1998) (<HOLDING>). But no court — state or federal — appears yet Holdings: 0: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 1: recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language 2: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 3: holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation 4: holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law


Input: not been briefed and because the case can be resolved under sufh-ciency-of-the-evidence review, we assume without holding that a penis is not an "object” within the meaning of § 2246(2)(C). 3 . Additionally, Rule 412 also would bar the admission of this evidence. When a party seeks to offer evidence that “someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence,” the party is required to file a motion describing the proposed evidence at least fourteen days before trial and to notify the victim of the proposed evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 412(c)(1). Here, Brown Thunder neglected to file a Rule 412 motion and failed to notify H.C. or her guardian or representative of the proposed Speker evidence. See United States v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir.1998) Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence based upon the defendants noncompliance with the deadlines in rule 412c 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding hearsay evidence and evidence that violated the best evidence rule in deciding a summary judgment motion 4: holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative


Input: was justified at its inception and then (2) whether the action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances for the stop in the first place. Id. at 24, ¶ 27, 170 P.3d at 273 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868). ¶ 46 The second detention started when Officer Craft grabbed Appellant’s arm and informed him he was being detained. Men-denhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (A person is “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only when by means of physical force or show of authority his freedom of movement is restrained.). Because Officer Craft and Appellant were engaged in a consensual encounter immediately prior to this point, Appellant was not seized and the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. United States v. Munoz, 590 F.3d 916, 920 (8th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Flores, 474 F.3d 1100, 1103 Holdings: 0: holding officers request for passengers identification during stop constituted lawful consensual encounter 1: holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring 2: recognizing that once a completed traffic stop evolves into a consensual encounter there is no seizure and the fourth amendment is not implicated 3: holding that the officers mere use of her spotlight and flashlight did not transform the consensual encounter into an investigatory stop 4: holding that the return of a defendants drivers license after a traffic stop can convert what was a brief seizure into a consensual encounter even where the officer questions the defendant about criminal activity immediately thereafter


Input: cannot alter the effect of the verdict. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d at 752. Submission of an immaterial issue is not harmful unless it confuses or misleads the jury, which we determine by considering its probable effect on the jury in light of the charge as a whole. Id. Here, reading the charge as a whole, we do not find that the question submitted was ambiguous or misleading. The question asked the jury to determine separately the negligence of the Bowens and Crow-son. A finding that the Bowens were not the proximate cause of the occurrence in question exonerated them from liability. Consequently, the question pertaining to Crowson’s negligence was immaterial — in other words, any answer pertaining to Crowson’s negligence would not have altered the verdict. See Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d at 752-53 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, putting the findings on Holdings: 0: holding that even if the district court erred in sustaining the objection the error was harmless because the witness answered the question in the negative and the court did not strike his answer 1: holding question of contributory negligence was harmless because once jury found defendant did not proximately cause the occurrence in question defendant was exonerated of liability such that neither an affirmative nor a negative answer to plaintiffs negligence could have altered the verdict 2: holding that in a fela case where the jury found negligence per se the defendant railroad could not challenge the validity of the verdict through postverdict discussions indicating that the jury believed the total award would be reduced by the plaintiffs contributory negligence 3: holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction 4: holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question


Input: “shall” in subsection (b) of F.L. § 5-1029 is obligatory, not permissive. Indeed, the word “shall” is used throughout F.L. § 5-1029 in its mandatory sense, with the word “may” being used when permissive action is implied, in explicit contrast to the word “shall.” Moreover, as we have explained, the historical context of the enactment of what is now F.L. § 5-1029 indicates that with respect to the alleged father in a paternity action, the testing afforded by that section upon motion has been referred to and treated as mandatory. To be sure, the Court of Appeals in child custody cases and in cases brought under the Estates and Trusts Article has held that it is within the discretion of the court to permit blood or genetic testing. See Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 621 A.2d 898 (1993)(<HOLDING>); Turner v. Whisted, supra, 327 Md. 106, 607 Holdings: 0: holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted 1: holding that the trial court erred by not considering whether ordering blood tests to disestablish paternity was in the best interest of the child 2: holding that although a putative father had standing to bring a paternity action the action could not proceed and the blood tests could not be ordered unless the trial court determined that the paternity action would serve the best interest of the child 3: holding that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in determining whether to order blood tests to determine paternity 4: holding that in domestic law custody case blood tests to determine paternity of child born out of wedlock may only be ordered upon a showing of good cause under the best interest of the child standard


Input: premises Coleman’s quiet title action on his contention that certain of the loan documents contain forged signatures. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 16.) Coleman does not dispute that he signed some documents at Fairway Financial, but he does dispute the validity of his signatures on the Balloon Note and TIL Disclosure Statement. (Doc. No. 46-1 at ¶¶ 6-7, 43.) Wells Fargo argues both that Coleman has, consistently with the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing, failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact with regard to the validity of the signatures, and ictions for the proposition at least some quiet title actions are unburdened by a statute of limitations as long as the challenged cloud on the title persists. See, e.g., Bangerter v. Petty, 225 P.3d 874, 879 (Utah 2009) (<HOLDING>); Salazar v. Thomas, 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 186 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial courts failure to dismiss the action to quiet title was error because the plaintiff was not in possession of the land in question but the error was not fatal to the claim because the superior court could sua sponte amend the pleadings to include an action in ejectment 1: holding that a plaintiff in possession of property may bring suit to quiet title against any or all tenantsincommon with competing claims 2: recognizing actions to quiet title are equitable in nature and a court sitting in equity has jurisdiction to quiet title as a remedy for fraud 3: holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations 4: holding there is no statute of limitations on action to quiet title by landowner who was in continuous possession of property under claim of ownership


Input: She, not [the child], bears the primary responsibility to ensure that [the child] visit with her father according to the parenting plan. And she must, in good faith, make every effort to require [the child] to do so.” (emphases added)). 10 . Because we find this issue is dispositive, we decline to reach Mother’s arguments regarding admitting evidence and limiting cross-examination. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when the resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). Moreover, our decision on those two issues would not change the ultimate disposition of this case. See Weir v. Citicorp Nat. Servs., Inc., 312 S.C. 511, 517, 435 S.E.2d 864, 868 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Recco Tape and Label Co. v. Barfield, 312 Holdings: 0: holding the exclusion of cumulative evidence was not prejudicial error 1: holding no abuse of discretion in trial courts exclusion of evidence where evidence was cumulative 2: holding exclusion was harmless error 3: holding that the exclusion of cumulative evidence did not materially impact defendants right to present a defense 4: holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record


Input: agreements because, the district court reasoned, the agreements violate the Assignment of Claims Act (hereinafter the Act), 31 U.S.C. § 3727, which governs the “transfer or assignment of any part of a claim against the United States Government,” id. § 3727(a)(1). This determination was in error. The Act provides, in relevant part, that the assignment of a claim may be made “after a claim is allowed, the amount of the claim is decided, and a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued.” Id. § 3727(b). In effect, the Act serves as a defense that the Government can raise against a claim and not, as the district court’s analysis indicates, an ex ante bar to forming a contingency-fee agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 386 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>); see also Applegate v. United States, 35 Holdings: 0: holding a violation of the travel act 1: holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective 2: holding that 31 usc  235 the predecessor to  3729 did not become operative until final payment had been made on the false claims 3: holding that antiassignment provisions are not per se invalid as applied to health care providers 4: holding that counsels claim against the government pursuant to a contingencyfee agreement was invalid because it was in violation of the antiassignment act 31 usc  203 predecessor to the assignment of claims act


Input: ing water right to acres put into irrigation within first years of appropriation)). Walton III allowed Walton to irrigate the 30 acres put into irrigation by his predecessors, but found that a delay of 23 years was not appropriation within a reasonable time, for the remaining acreage. Id. The parties generally agree that under Walton III the Court may look to Washington law for guidance in determining whether a non-Lummi has exercised due diligence to perfect a Winters right transferred with the sale of allotted lands. E.g. Lummi Brief, docket no. 718, at 32 (“Washington law provides guidance for a determination of reasonable diligence and suggests that a successor must put water to use within fifteen years of the parcel leaving Indian ownership.”); see also Walton III, 752 F.2d at 400 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff United States suggests that under Holdings: 0: holding the court may look to state law for guidance where federal law is not fully developed 1: holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law 2: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 3: holding that federal courts presiding over causes of action created by state law should apply state substantive law but federal procedural law 4: holding that a federal court may resort to state law analogies for the development of a federal common law of privileges in instances where the federal rule is unsettled


Input: 193 N.W.2d 744 (1972). Moreover, we determine probable cause by an objective standard of reasonableness: whether the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of crime will be found. See State v. Craven, 253 Neb. 601, 571 N.W.2d 612 (1997). Here, Reilly had probable cause to search the car because of the dog’s alert. A dog’s identification of drugs in luggage or in a car provides probable cause that drugs are present. U.S. v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1994). But a person’s mere proximity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 238 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, probable cause to search a car Holdings: 0: holding that a visual body cavity search requires probable cause and a search warrant 1: holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant 2: holding that there was not arguable probable cause to conduct extensive searches on night club and its patrons where only evidence was of one patron selling drugs 3: holding that search warrant for tavern and its bartender did not permit body searches of all bars patrons 4: holding that detaining club patrons in handcuffs for three hours after subjecting them to strip searches and warrant checks was unlawful


Input: 21, 2011 EEOC Addendum; November 15, 2012 EEOC Charge. Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to the Federal Defendants and her Title VII and ADEA claims fail on this independent basis. See Johnson v. Ashcroft, No. 00-cv-2743, 2001 WL 34366564, at *3 (D.D.C. June 21, 2001) (dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where the plaintiff did “not name either of the federal defendants” in the plaintiffs EEOC complaint). The plaintiffs Complaint also asserts a claim of wrongful discharge related to her termination. Yet, Title VII and the ADEA provide the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging race and age discrimination. See Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 318 Holdings: 0: holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies 1: recognizing title vii does not provide the exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims even if the title vii and section 1983 claim factually overlap 2: holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment 3: holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii 4: holding that title vii did not provide exclusive remedy for sex discrimination in public employment claim could also be brought under equal protection clause


Input: v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n. 34, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968)(“There is of course no question that the Federal Government, unless barred by some controlling constitutional prohibition, may impose the terms and conditions upon which its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed.”). If Congress imposes a “condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously;” otherwise, the State cannot “voluntarily and knowingly accept[ ] the terms of the ‘contract.’ ” Id. Spending clause legislation, when knowingly accepted by a fund recipient, imposes enforceable, affirmative obligations upon the states. See Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 427, 94 S.Ct. 2274, 41 L.Ed.2d 159 (1974), modified on another ground, 422 U.S. 1004, 95 S.Ct. 2625, 45 L.Ed.2d 667 (1975) (<HOLDING>); King, 392 U.S. at 333, 88 S.Ct. 2128; see Holdings: 0: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity 1: recognizing that states and local agencies must fulfill their part of a spending clause contract if they choose to accept the funds 2: holding that state agencies are treated as states under the eleventh amendment 3: holding that state and local government agencies were not persons under the fca 4: holding that appellate courts may choose to accept or reject concessions of counsel and are not bound by them


Input: which a fair-minded jury could find that intentional racial discrimination on the part of the Defendants caused Andromeda to close. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 434. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count III. VI. Supplemental Jurisdiction The rulings above dispose of Plaintiffs’ federal claims. The state law claims (Counts VI-V) remain. This Court could retain the state law claims only by exercising its supplemental jurisdiction. This case does not, however, present a compelling reason for this Court to decide claims that arise solely under state law. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Counts VI-V. The dismissal is without prejudice so that they may be refilled in state court if Plaintiffs so elect. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Revene v. Charles County Commr’s, 882 F.2d 870, 875 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). VII. Conclusion For the reasons stated Holdings: 0: holding that the lower court should have entered a final order on custody 1: holding appeal from an order dismissing action without prejudice was properly before this court 2: holding that a district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs statelaw claims after dismissing the plaintiffs federal claims and did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand the case to state court 3: holding that an order dismissing a claim without prejudice is a final appealable order if the statute of limitations for that claim has expired 4: holding that the district courts order dismissing the pendent statelaw claims  should have been entered without prejudice


Input: document, commonly referred to as the "blue seal document," stated: I, the Secretary of State, of the State of Maine, certify that the office of the Secretary of State is the legal repository of the Great Seal of the State of Maine and also custodian of the records relating to the revocation, restoration and suspension of operators’ licenses and registrations, and that the paper to which this is attached is a true copy from the records of this office. I further certify that, according to our records the license or right to operate of Morris D. Murphy, whose date of birth is July 9, 1958, was suspended effective September 15, 2008 by the Secretary of State Notice of suspension was sent by regular mail, no later than September 5, 2008 in accordance with the pro 406, 410-11 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Washington v. Kronich, 160 Wash.2d 893, 161 Holdings: 0: holding that the same types of evidence used to prove a title vii claim also may be used to prove a  1983 claim 1: holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination 2: holding that the invocation of a presumption of notice requires the agency to prove that the notice was properly addressed 3: holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner 4: holding that the dmv transcript used to prove revocation and notice was nontestimonial


Input: have no right to determine any additional deficiency in respect of the same taxable year, except in the case of fraud, and except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, relating to assertion of greater deficiencies before the Board, or in section 273(c), relating to the making of jeopardy assessments. * * * 6 The cases cited supra pp. 197—198 involve sec. 6212(c) or its predecessor, former sec. 272(f), both of which are textually similar to sec. 6223(f). One notable difference, however, is that sec. 6212(c) and former sec. 272(f) generally prohibit the Commissioner from mailing an additional deficiency notice for a taxable year for which the taxpayer has timely petitioned the Court with respect to a previous deficiency notice. Cf. Gmelin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-338 (<HOLDING>), aff’d without published opinion, 891 F.2d 280 Holdings: 0: holding that where notice of deficiency fails adequately to describe the basis on which the commissioner relies for his deficiency determination burden shifts to the commissioner to prove the accuracy of the deficiency determination 1: holding that irs could have discovered that its position was not justified had it adequately investigated the case before issuing the notice of deficiency 2: holding that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was valid where it determined a deficiency in a different type of tax than did the earlier deficiency notice 3: holding that former sec 272f does not require that the commissioner wait until the period for filing a petition as to a deficiency notice expires before issuing another deficiency notice as to the same taxable year 4: holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice


Input: accepted the scheme of entrant classes from England as adopted common law. The national character is now dominated by a rapid-paced urban and suburban culture. The exigencies of this urban civilization have produced a more ‘gregarious society and have increased the probability that people will enter the property of others. [Recent Developments, Torts — Abrogation of Common-Law Entrant Classes of Trespasser, Licensee, and Invitee, 25 Vand L.Rev. 623, 640 (1972) (footnote omitted).] “Today, the preeminence of land over life is no longer accepted. Human safety may be more important than a landowner’s unre stricted freedom.” Smith, supra, 469 F.2d at 101; see also Michael Sears, Comment, Abrogation of the Traditional Common Law of Premises Liability, 44 U. Kan. L.Rev. 175, 185-86 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Kerrie Restieri-Heslin, Note, 24 Seton Hall Holdings: 0: recognizing theory of constructive possession 1: holding in regard to admission of dna statistical evidence and product rule calculations that the expert must show more than the theory for the evidence to be admitted the theory must be valid in its application 2: holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case 3: recognizing the common enterprise theory of marriage 4: recognizing the emergence of the more modern and humanitarian theory of compensation


Input: has established procedures for termination that include elements such as a probationary period, warnings for proscribed conduct, or procedures for employees to air grievances. See Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 424, 427, 773 P.2d 1231, 1234 (1989) (upholding finding of implied contract based on employee manual, words, and conduct of parties); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20, 24-26, 766 P.2d 280, 284-86 (1988) (affirming finding of implied contract based on words and conduct of parties), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109, 109 S.Ct. 3163, 104 L.Ed.2d 1026 (1989); Lukoski v. Sandia Indian Management Co., 106 N.M. 664, 667, 748 P.2d 507-510 (1988) (upholding finding of oral contract amended by employee handbook); Forrester v. Parker, 93 N.M. 781, 782, 606 P.2d 191, 192 (1980) (<HOLDING>). We have upheld findings that there was no Holdings: 0: holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work 1: holding that when terminating nonprobationary employee employer is bound by policies established in personnel policy guide that control the employeremployee relationship 2: holding that agency is bound by its regulations 3: holding handbook binding on employment relationship where employee had not been issued a copy but employee helped draft the guide a copy was available in the department where she worked employees could review guide on request and it was published to employees in sense of having been made generally known to them and proclaimed officially by employer 4: holding that once the employees temporarytotaldisability period has ended and the employee is determined to suffer some permanent physical disability which prevents the discharge of assigned duties for the employer the employer bears no  341 liability for then terminating the employee under  341c


Input: does not necessarily doom an application for relief under” the CAT. Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003.) To qualify for relief under the CAT, an applicant must establish that it is “more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). As noted above, there is no evidence of past torture inflicted upon Funes, and, while Guatemala’s human rights record remains poor, there is no evidence of “gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights” of the sort that would entitle Funes to CAT relief. The IJ’s finding that it is not more likely than not that Funes would be tortured if removed to Guatemala is supported by substantial evidence. Cf. Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1218-23 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). PETITION DENIED. * This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody 1: holding that trial court abused its discretion in denying petitioners request for counsel in evidentiary hearing where petitioner had requested counsel and had indicated in his motion that all documents had been prepared by prison law clerk he had only ninthgrade education he had no training in the law and he lacked the skills necessary to participate in hearing 2: holding no past persecution where alien had twice been detained for twoday periods during which he was beaten and interrogated whose parents home had been searched whose work locker had been repeatedly broken into and who had been assigned poor work tasks denied bonuses and conscripted into the army where he was constantly harassed 3: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 4: holding that petitioner was entitled to cat relief where he had been tortured in the past for speaking out about war country conditions had deteriorated since he fled army had continued to look for him and had engaged in reprisals against his family


Input: to release a prisoner rests on a myriad of considerations.... The chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause.” Id. The Sandin court took pains to point out that the technical rule violation in that ease was not likely to affect the prisoner’s parole prospects. The appellant in the case at hand has argued that the “technical” violation in this case did, in fact, affect his parole prospects — it terminated those prospects. In Syllabus Point 3 of State v. Farmer, 193 W.Va. 84, 454 S.E.2d 378 (1994), we indicated that “ ‘[ejrrors involving deprivation of constitutional rights will be regarded as harmless only if there is no reasonable possibility that the violation cont th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); In re Shapiro, 122 Cal.Rptr. 768, 14 Cal.3d Holdings: 0: holding that one minute delay between the initial stop of the defendant and the officers question regarding whether the defendant had any illegal substances and his request to search the defendants car was sufficiently contemporaneous with the issuance of the citation such that there was no appreciable delay and certainly no unreasonable delay 1: holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea 2: holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant 3: holding defendant did not demonstrate that commonwealth failed to act diligently in commencing revocation hearing or that defendant prejudiced by delay 4: holding that no prejudice to the defendant arose from a delay in holding his parole revocation hearing twentyfour hours beyond the ninetyday limit


Input: contended for the first time at oral argument (and afterwards in a letter filed under 5th Cir. R. 28(j)) that the district court's determination was tantamount to finding him responsible for (1) the “reasonably foreseeable acts” of co-conspirators under U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3; (2) having “transferred any firearm ... with ... reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6); and (3) having committed first degree murder under § 2A 1.1, without addressing any of those guideline provisions. Because it was not properly briefed on appeal, that argument is waived. NLRB v. Seaport Printing & Ad Specialties, Inc., 589 F.3d 812, 816 n. 7 (5th Cir.2009); see also United States v. Thames, 214 F.3d 608, 611 n. 3 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 14 . See Bell, 371 F.3d at 244 ("Our concerns Holdings: 0: holding that an inadequately briefed assertion is waived on appeal 1: holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue 2: holding that inadequately briefing an issue constitutes waiver 3: holding that partys failure to develop issue in argument section constitutes waiver of issue 4: holding that failure to brief an argument constitutes waiver


Input: Cook chose not to present evidence available to him at the suppression hearing, but the issues he raised and were determined there are identical to the issues here. Next, Cook contends the suppression hearing was not a complete, full, and fair litigation of these issues, but was a summary proceeding addressing some immaterial evidentiary issues which likely would have been re-considered had he gone to trial. To the contrary, the constitutional issues in Cook’s criminal proceedings were litigated in an evidentiary hearing at which he was represented by counsel, and had the right and opportunity to testify, present evidence, call and cross-examine witnesses, and appeal the court’s ruling. See 3D Constr. & Dev., L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 117 P.3d 1082, 1087 (Utah App.2005) (<HOLDING>). There is no reason to doubt the quality, Holdings: 0: holding that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is filed is entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 1: holding a party seeking mandamus must serve the party against whom relief is sought 2: holding the completely fully fairly element is met if the party against whom preclusion is sought had adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue 3: holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 4: holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it


Input: on statutory grounds "to avoid constitutional issues.”)). The United States has represented that Jane Doe will testify at trial, and the Confrontation Clause will not bar admission of the statements, even if they are testimonial, so long as Wilson has an opportunity to cross-examine Jane Doe regarding them. The Court has no reason to believe that the United States will not be true to that representation. So long as the United States remains true to that representation and Jane Doe testifies, there is no constitutional reason to prohibit admission of the statements. It may be that Doe’s statements to Dr. Ornelas, which were part of a medical examination, were "made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment, rather than to inculpate” Chaco. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 755 (9th Cir.2009)(<HOLDING>). On the record before it, however, the Court Holdings: 0: holding that the state courts conclusion that statements to dr appleton were nontestimonial because they were made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment rather than to inculpate was not an unreasonable application of the legal principle established by crawford  1: holding that statements in medical records given for the primary purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment are nontestimonial 2: holding that driving records were nontestimonial 3: holding that federal rule of evidence 8034 the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not apply to statements made by doctors 4: holding statements inadmissible under colo r evid 8034  which was identical to the federal rule  because there was no evidence that the fiveyearold child was capable of recognizing at the time the challenged statements were made the need to provide accurate information for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment within the meaning of fedrevid 8034


Input: “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Here, Plaintiffs are the nonmoving party. II. DISCUSSION Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ consolidated, amended complaint on several grounds, the first of which is that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Section 13 of the 1933 Securities Act provides that a federal securities fraud action must be brought within one year following the discovery of the untrue statement or omission giving rise to the claim. 15 U.S.C. § 77m; see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1228 & n. Holdings: 0: holding that  10b and rule 10b5 apply to frauds against brokers 1: holding that a person violates  10b and rule 10b5 when he misappropriates confidential information  in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information 2: holding that actions asserting claims based on  10b and rule 10b5 must be initiated within a year of discovering the facts establishing the violation 3: holding only purchasers and sellers of securities can recover under section 10b and rule 10b5 4: holding that section 10b and rule 10b5 suits must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation


Input: of state. The proposed class therefore lacks the geographic diversity that favors a finding of numerosity. Finally, the Plaintiffs have not established that all fifty potential plaintiffs were deprived of compensation and would be able to participate in the litigation. Despite these concerns, case law demonstrates that plaintiffs may establish that join-der would be impracticable with as few as fifty members. See In re Thornburg Mortg. Inc. Sec. Litig., 912 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1234 (D.N.M.2012) (Browning, J.)(citing Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d at 936 (“[T]he difficulty in joining as few as 40 class members should raise a presumption that joinder is impracticable.”)); Lopez v. City of Santa Fe, 206 F.R.D. at 289 (citing Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 136 F.R.D. 672, 679 (D.Kan.1991) (<HOLDING>)). The Court has not refused to certify a class Holdings: 0: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members 1: holding that joinder is impracticable where the class consisted of at least fifty members 2: holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members 3: holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification 4: holding joinder not practicable where 100 to 150 class members were geographically dispersed


Input: CURIAM. Defendant Phillip Davis pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and the district court sentenced him to 120 months of imprisonment. The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in designating Davis as a “career offender” pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1 in light of Johnson v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (invalidating as unconstitutionally vague the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). For the reasons set forth in our recent decision in United States v. Pawlak, No. 15-3566, slip op. at 2-13, 822 F.3d 902, 903-11, 2016 WL 2802723 (6th Cir. May 13, 2016) (<HOLDING>), and upon the government’s concession of Holdings: 0: holding an identical residual clause in the us sentencing guidelines unconstitutionally vague 1: holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied 2: holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague 3: holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines notwithstanding the governments position that the residual clause of  4b12a was unconstitutionally vague following johnson 4: holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague


Input: point out that ERISA contains a savings clause. Id. at 398. “Specifically, the savings clause provides that ERISA’s preemption provision ‘shall not be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States.’ ” /¿.(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)(1998)). The Court then cited Gurry’s analysis with approval for the proposition that nothing in § 34-34 conflicts with ERISA. Id. at 399. Judge Payne recognized that the Bankruptcy Code explicitly contemplated that “state laws have a central role in defining applicable exemptions to be made in protecting property of the estate from the reach of lding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). See also In re Weinhoeft, 275 F.3d 604, 605 Holdings: 0: holding a tortious interference claim was preempted by erisa because it did not meet the legal standard announced by the supreme court in miller in order for it to regulate insurance within the meaning of erisas savings clause 1: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied 2: holding florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause 3: holding texas exemption law was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause 4: holding that erisa completely preempted certain state law claims and finding that erisa preempted an employees common law tort and contract claim when the employee sought benefits under the employers disability policy


Input: for the sole reason that they refused to perform an illegal act. Tennessee common law, however, only requires a showing that the employee’s refusal to perform an illegal act was a substantial factor in the employer’s decision. 3.Most Significant Relationship Test Texas courts resolve conflicts of law in tort claims by applying the “most significant relationship” test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318-19 (Texas 1979) (“[I]t is the holding of this court that in the future all conflicts cases sounding in tort will be governed by the ‘most significant relationship’ test as enunciated in Sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts.”); see also Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez, 365 S.W.3d 655, 661 (Tex.2012) (<HOLDING>). Section 6 states: (1) A court, subject to Holdings: 0: recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge 1: recognizing common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of ohio public policy based upon statutory and judicial sources 2: recognizing that a texas common law claim for retaliatory discharge is a claim sounding in tort 3: recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act 4: recognizing the difference between statutory cause of action for retaliation and common law tort of retaliatory discharge


Input: might hurt you? A. From him. From him hurting my mom. Q. Your mom told you about that, didn’t she? A. No. I was there. As indicated above, the definition of domestic abuse includes “the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm or bodily injury.” SDCL 25-10-1(1). Whether Erica’s fear was irrational, as the trial court concluded, must be analyzed in light of her knowledge of her father’s violent history: [The victim’s] state of mind could very well have been the product, in part at least, of her past interactions with appellant. The fear she claimed to have felt and the reasonableness of that fear could and should be determined with reference to her history with appellant. Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, 82 Ohio App.3d 809, 613 N.E.2d 678, 682 (1992); see also Gordon, 553 N.E.2d at 921 (<HOLDING>). [¶ 21] To ignore Kevin’s violent history is Holdings: 0: holding that a potentially inflammatory photograph of a victims face was relevant and that its admission was well within the discretion of the district court 1: holding that the impact upon the victims is relevant to circumstances of the crime 2: holding that evidence of prior confrontations was relevant as to whether victims fear was reasonable 3: holding that jury may consider victims mental capacity in determining whether defendant acted with victims knowledge and consent 4: holding that substantial evidence supported determination that petitioners failed to show that fear of sterilization was objectively reasonable


Input: did not burden the rights of private parties. Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 804 (Fed.Cir.2002) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483). The Supreme Court's opinion in Landgraf stresses repeatedly the concern that private rights not be retroactively burdened. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483 ("[ejlementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly” (emphasis added)), 282 (”[t]he introduction of a right to compensatory damages is also the type of legal change that would have an impact on private parties’ planning” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 266, 271, 272, 284, 114 S.Ct. 1483. 4 . See supra note 1. 5 . Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 308, 313 (1991) (<HOLDING>). 6 . See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104(b), 7105(c), 7266; Holdings: 0: holding that where the law or regulation changes after a claim has been filed or reopened but before the administrative or judicial appeal process has been concluded the version more favorable to the appellant should  apply unless congress provided otherwise or permitted the secretary to do otherwise and the secretary did so emphasis added 1: holding that the elements of a claim under  3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added 2: holding that this court has discretion to either address or remand arguments presented to it in the first instance provided it otherwise has jurisdiction over the claim 3: holding that where congress has directed the agency to issue a rule without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule  congress has amended the law and does not offend the constitution 4: holding that the other source of law might be a moneymandating constitutional provision statute or regulation that has been violated or an express or implied contract with the united states


Input: Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 4th 135, 140, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 333 (2004) (citing Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 967, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 45 P.3d 243 (2002)). Typically, commercial speech is “speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” Rezec, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 141, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 333 (internal citations omitted). The Court finds that the assurances made by RCHSD’s staff do not constitute commercial speech. However, because Ms. Prescott has sufficiently alleged a UCL claim, based on the alleged misrepresentations on RCHSD’s website, RCHSD’s motion to dismiss her UCL claim is denied. ii. Standing on Behalf of Decedent Ms. Prescott has standing, as an individual representative, to bring k “UCR” Rates Litig., 903 F.Supp.2d 880, 898 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (<HOLDING>). Here, as to the fraudulent prong of the UCL, Holdings: 0: holding that in the rule 23 class action context named plaintiff may appeal a denial of class certification even if his or her individual claims had been satisfied through the entry of judgment 1: holding that plaintiffs could only pursue ucl claims via assignment if they satisfied class action requirements 2: holding that a private party could pursue a representative action on behalf of others under the ucl only if the party met the requirements for a class action 3: holding that rule 23a requirements must be satisfied as if class were to litigate its claims 4: holding purposeful action of defendants in giving plaintiffs what they seek may not make moot plaintiffs claim in a class action


Input: Ass’n, 76 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex.App.2002) (stating that “[t]he phrase ‘unless otherwise provided’ or similar language, when used in a statute, usually refers to other statutes pertaining to the same subject matter” (reversed in part on other grounds, 141 S.W.3d 158 (Tex.2004))); Cook v. Turner, 219 Conn. 641, 644, 593 A.2d 504, 505 (1991) (concluding that the word “law” in the phrase “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by law” is “limited to state and federal statutes”); Oregon County R-IV Sch. Dist. v. LeMon, 739 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Mo.Ct.App.1987) (stating that “ ‘ “except as otherwise provided by law,” means except as otherwise provided by statute’ ” (quoting Yates v. Casteel, 329 Mo. 1101, 1104, 49 S.W.2d 68, 69 (1932))); Manchin v. Browning, 170 W.Va. 779, 785, 296 S.E.2d 909, 915 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Trujillo v. Tanuz, 85 N.M. 35, 40, 508 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding unenforceable a regulation that would have provided greater workers compensation benefits than permitted by statute 1: holding that based upon means similar to or supported by 2: holding that georgia refund statute signifies state waiver of immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of the statute 3: holding that the phrase provided by law means prescribed or provided by statute 4: holding a party was limited to recovery provided for by the strict terms of the mechanics lien statute


Input: Tatarinov did not contest that fact, the Oregon Court of Appeals declined to correct the error. Id. at 81. Tatarinov sought habeas relief in federal court, but the district court denied his petition. The adequate and independent state ground doctrine bars federal courts from considering a federal constitutional argument on habeas review if “a state court declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected Ta-tarinov’s claim based on its consideration of the equitable interests of the parties in his case, which is independent of federal law. See Nitschke v. Belleque, 680 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). The Oregon plain error rule is also an Holdings: 0: holding plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context 1: holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard 2: holding that plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context 3: holding that oregons plain error review is independent of state law 4: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error


Input: under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, but refused to do so because it interpreted the Guidelines to prohibit a departure where, as here, the crime involved actual violence. Because the district court rested its decision on an issue of law, this court has jurisdiction to review its decision, and its decision is subject to de novo review. Section 5K2.13 states that “the court may not depart below the applicable guideline range if ... (2) the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s offense indicate a need to protect the public because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 (1998) (emphasis added). The Guidelines thus prohibit departure where the offense involved actual violence. Accord United States v. Thames, 214 F.3d 608, 614 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The district court looked at all the Holdings: 0: holding that under  5k213 no departure may be given where the crime was violent in nature 1: holding that it was appropriate for the trial court to find that lack of a prior criminal record was not a mitigating factor in light of the violent nature of the crime committed 2: recognizing that postoffense rehabilitative efforts while normally not grounds for departure may support departure in extraordinary circumstances and noting that the totality of the circumstances may justify a departure where a single circumstance is not alone sufficient 3: holding that a reference to the violent crime sentencing statute in the second degree assault statute required automatic imposition of violent crime sentencing for a defendant convicted of second degree assault 4: holding that the force necessary to constitute a crime of violence must actually be violent in nature quotation and alteration omitted


Input: were sentenced, the amended VWPA thus had the potential to increase the amount of restitution they would have to pay, from an amount set by the court by taking into account appellants’ financial circumstances, to full restitution. Accordingly, if the court determines that the VWPA should apply to this case, it must use the old version to avoid running afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See United States v. Thompson, 113 F.3d 13, 15 n. 1 (2d Cir.1997) (dictum). Baggett, 125 F.3d at 1322. Accord, United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320, 1327 n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1997); Williams, 128 F.3d at 1241; United States v. Thompson, 113 F.3d 13, 15 n. 1 (2nd Cir.1997); United States v. Sclafani, 996 F.Supp. 400, 403-04 (D.N.J.1998). But see, United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). We are persuaded by the analysis adopted in Holdings: 0: holding that the ex post facto clause prohibited retroactive application of the mvra because before the mvra became effective the victim and witness protection act authorized but did not compel district courts to order restitution 1: holding that retroactive application of mvra does not violate the ex post facto clause because restitution is not a criminal punishment 2: holding retroactive application of idra would violate the ex post facto clause 3: holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause 4: holding ex post facto clause barred application of mvra to defendant whose criminal conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute


Input: is directed exclusively at whether notice was given by the uncertified, putative class. Because there is no case or controversy between the Oil Companies and the named appellants over this issue, the district court had no authority to reach this issue before ruling on certification. Nevertheless, despite this apparent flaw in the district court’s order, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that we lack the authority to vacate the ruling because there is no appealable order before us. 1 . Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir.2002). 2 . Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. 3 . Id. 4 . Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. 6 . See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 874 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Scott v. Maggio, 695 F.2d 916, Holdings: 0: holding that justiciability must be analyzed separately on the issues of money damages and the propriety of equitable relief 1: holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief 2: holding that money damages do not qualify as equitable relief within the meaning of  1132a3 3: holding that a jury trial was not required when the money demand although specific was incidental and ancillary to the equitable relief requested and would ripen only if equitable relief were granted 4: holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief


Input: of fault is analogous to principles of comparative negligence, which have been held to be substantive. See Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir.1970) (recognizing that “that the Mississippi comparative negligence statute, ‘is part of the substantive law of Mississippi’”) (citations omitted). The Mississippi Supreme Court similarly considers the right to contribution among tortfeasors to be substantive. Estate of Hunter v. GMC, 729 So.2d 1264, 1276 (Miss.1999). Furthermore, courts from other states consistently hold that laws on apportionment of fault are substantive, not merely procedural. See, e.g., Matter of Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz Off Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1992 A.M.C. 913, 35 Fed.R.Evid. Serv. 1204, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 20835 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Clawans v. United States, 75 F.Supp.2d 368, Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 1: holding that question of whether defendant tortfeasors were entitled to reduction in plaintiffs claims by amount of alleged nonparty tortfeasors responsibility was one of substantive law 2: recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law 3: recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts 4: holding the question of standing is distinct from the question of proof and once the plaintiffs alleged an interest peculiar to themselves and distinguishable from the public generally they were entitled to a factual hearing


Input: States v. Harmon, 742 F.3d 451, 459 (10th Cir.2014) (discussing Giglio rule). 2 . The defendants’ summary judgment briefs did contain some passing references to immunity. They argued that they did not lose the absolute immunity connected with the fulfillment of their duties under Giglio merely because third parties disseminated the Giglio materials to the police chiefs, the newspaper, and the website. The district court never reached this argument, because it found sufficient evidence that it was the defendants themselves who disseminated the materials to the police chiefs and the newspaper. We lack appellate jurisdiction to resolve a dispute concerning this factual finding in a qualified immunity appeal. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (<HOLDING>). To the extent we may reach factual issues in Holdings: 0: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 1: holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity 2: holding that an eeoc reasonable cause determination letter did not constitute evidence precluding summary judgment when the other evidence was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact 3: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence 4: holding district courts determination that summary judgment record raised genuine issue of fact concerning petitioners involvement in unconstitutional conduct did not constitute appealable final decision


Input: if the producer intends it to be used for that disease or condition. FDA responds that “for such disease or condition” refers only to the uses included on a drug’s label. The statute does not unambiguously foreclose FDA’s interpretation. Because Congress has not “directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” we must determine whether the agency’s interpretation is “a permissible construction” of the Orphan Drug Act. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); see also Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying Chevron). We conclude that it is. First, FDA’s reading of the statute closely hews to the text. See Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). As the Fourth Circuit reasoned in Sigma-Tau Holdings: 0: holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent 1: recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language 2: recognizing that the government  must demonstrate the reasonableness not only of its litigation position but also of the agencys actions   3: recognizing that the reasonableness of an agencys interpretation turns in part on the constructions fit with the statutory language 4: holding that stare decisis required the court to adhere to a prior statutory interpretation despite the agencys subsequent interpretation of the statute contrary to the settled law


Input: indirect criminal contempt proceedings must not only notify the alleged contemnor that sanctions are being sought, but that the proceedings will be criminal in nature. In re Marriage of Morse, 240 Ill. App. 3d 296, 304, 607 N.E.2d 632, 638 (1993), citing In re Marriage of Alltop, 203 Ill. App. 3d 606, 616, 561 N.E.2d 394, 400-01 (1990), and Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 58-59, 558 N.E.2d at 425. Thus, indirect criminal contempt proceedings cannot be initiated by a pleading captioned so as to imply that the proceedings will not be criminal. Instead, a party seeking a finding of indirect criminal contempt must say so explicitly by filing a pleading captioned “petition for adjudication of criminal contempt.” In re Marriage of Carpel, 232 Ill. App. 3d 806, 823, 597 N.E.2d 847, 860 (1992) (<HOLDING>). As with any other criminal defendant, an Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution 1: holding that the hospital failed to show how it was harmed by failure to verify the rule to show cause 2: holding that issuance of an order to show cause satisfied this requirement 3: holding that pleading captioned petition for rule to show cause implies that proceedings will be civil because a criminal defendant can never be compelled to show cause 4: recognizing petitioners must be afforded the opportunity to show good cause for filing a longer petition


Input: over Plaintiffs claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1340, 1346(a)(1) or 26 U.S.C. §§ 6330, 7429. 2. The United States Court of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over Tort Claims. The Complaint alleges numerous claims of fraud, including “mail fraud,” “constructive fraud,” “misrepresentation of material facts” and “conspiracy to defraud.” See Compl. at 1. These claims, however, sound in tort. The United States Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction does not extend to cases sounding in tort. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (“[t]he United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim ... for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” (emphasis added)); see also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Jurisdiction to hear such claims exclusively Holdings: 0: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 1: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 2: holding that the tucker act grants the united states court of federal claims jurisdiction to grant nonmonetary relief in connection with contractor claims including claims requesting an interpretation of contract terms 3: holding that plaintiffs negligence claims sounded in tort and thus could not be transferred to the united states court of federal claims 4: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort including fraud


Input: Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at 311 n. 16. Plaintiff’s claims herein were of such a nature. 183 . Rule 41(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a district court to dismiss a case when the plaintiff fails to prosecute his case. Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 771 (5th Cir.1997), (habeas corpus action); Dorsey v. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., 84 F.3d 170, 171 (5th Cir.1996), quoting Salinas v. Sun Oil Co., 819 F.2d 105, 106 (5th Cir.1987). The court may dismiss for want of prosecution either on a motion of a defendant or sua sponte when the court determines dismissal is necessary to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388-89, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); Clofer v. Perego, 106 F.3d 678, 679 (5th Cir.1997), (<HOLDING>); Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d at 771; Long v. Holdings: 0: holding that district courts possess the inherent authority to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute with or sans notice to the parties 1: recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process 2: holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss pursuant to rule 41b for failure to comply with a court order 3: recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff 4: recognizing a district judge may dismiss a case sua sponte under either rule 41b or its inherent authority to manage its docket


Input: Communications Act The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) prohibits “intentionally accessing without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided,” and thereby obtaining access to an “electronic communication while it is in electronic storage.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). It also provides for the recovery of civil damages by a person aggrieved by a violation of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a). Rene alleges that the Defendants violated the SCA when they accessed her email messages. The Defendants contend that any email messages viewed by them were not in “electronic storage,” and, as a result, do not fall within the protections of the statute. “Electronic storage” is defined as “any temporary, intermediate storage .Supp.2d 965, 987 (C.D.Cal.2010) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Weaver, 636 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that an individuals access to a service or website that requires an indication of assent to contractual terms before access to the service or website will be granted was sufficient evidence that the user clicked i accept  1: holding that even though an agreement was approved by the family court it retained its character as an agreement for purposes of legal analysis 2: holding that webmail messages opened and retained by the user absent a showing that the webmail service was archiving copies for backup purposes were not within the definition of electronic storage 3: holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service 4: holding that where weather alert service instructed user to reply stop to cease receiving text messages users message of stop to service was sufficient to create factual issue with regard to revocation of consent


Input: he has refunded or paid restitution within twelve (12) months from the date of this Order to: A. Thomas Dunn in the sum of $1,105.76, plus interest at the statutory rate from January 31, 1999; B. The McCarthys in the sum of $1,176.00, plus interest at the statutory rate from January 31, 2000. 8. Rishel is Ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings; the People shall subrait a Statement of Costs within ten (10) days of the date of this Order. Respondent shall have five (5) days thereafter to submit a response thereto. 1 . At the time of this proceeding Rishel was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day pursuant to the sanction imposed by the Supreme Court in People v. Rishel, 956 P.2d 542 (Colo.1998). See In re C de Baca, 11 P.3d 426, 430 (Colo.2000)(<HOLDING>). 2 . C.R.C.P. 251.5 provides that misconduct Holdings: 0: holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase 1: holding insufficient officers advisement that defendants license may be suspended if he refused to submit to breath test when statute mandates that license will be suspended for refusal of chemical test 2: holding that code sections dealing with suspended sentences are to be liberally construed and that revocation of a suspended sentence lies within the trial courts sound discretion 3: holding that a suspended lawyer remains subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the court for acts committed while suspended 4: holding that the good behavior requirement of a suspended sentence defined the period of suspension


Input: the court’s approval, that certain information and documents exchanged during discovery and throughout the proceedings shall be deemed confidential. This confidential material would be excluded from public inspection and may only be made available to specific persons directly involved with the case. Having examined the submissions, the motion for a protective order is DENIED without prejudice. The court recognizes the parties’ concern in keeping particular information confidential due to the sensitive nature of items such as trade secrets and customer lists. Nevertheless, the court is also required to balance that concern with that of the general rule of open, public proceedings within the United States court system. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Due to the significant nature of this issue, Holdings: 0: holding that records relating to a student court were not education records 1: recognizing a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents including judicial records and documents 2: recognizing that first amendment provides qualified right of access to judicial documents 3: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents 4: holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception


Input: of immunity.” Lymon v. Aramark Corp., 728 F.Supp.2d at 1251. Accord Barreras v. State of N.M. Corr. Dep’t, 133 N.M. 313, 319, 62 P.3d 770, 776 (Ct.App.2003) (“In the absence of affirmative legislation, the courts of this state have consistently declined to permit individuals to bring private lawsuits to enforce rights guaranteed by the New Mexico Constitution, based on the absence of an express waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act.”); Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, 124 N.M. 479, 482, 952 P.2d 474, 477 (Ct.App.1997) (noting that a plaintiff cannot seek damages for violations of rights under the New Mexico Constitution against a city or its employees or agents unless the NMTCA waives immunity); Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 106 N.M. 446, 449, 744 P.2d 919, 922 (CtApp. 1987) (<HOLDING>); Begay v. State, 104 N.M. at 488, 723 P.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that nature of alleged bias must be personal and not arising out of litigation 1: recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board 2: holding that a  1983 claim for damages was not prohibited by claim preclusion because the plaintiff could not have sought damages in his prior article 78 proceeding arising out of the same facts 3: holding that no waiver of immunity exists for damages arising out of alleged educational malpractice claim against a school board 4: holding that no recovery exists for speculative damages


Input: particular address at which service was attempted; therefore, there was no evidence indicating that the mother’s house was the defendant’s “dwelling house or usual place of abode.” Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller’s treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure discusses “dwelling house or usual place of abode” as follows: “The language ‘dwelling house or usual place of abode’ in Rule 4(e)(2) is taken directly from the former Equity Rule 13. Despite the length of time these words have been a part of federal practice, the judicial decisions do not rticular case. Courts evaluate those facts mindful that the purpose of Rule 4 is to ensure that service is reasonably calculated to provide a defendant with actual notice of the action. Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666 (4th Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., Holdings: 0: holding that the appellant had not changed his residence from his registered address despite the fact that the house had never had electricity service during the time that he had lived there 1: holding that one of several houses throughout the world among which the defendant divided his time constituted a dwelling house or usual place of abode for purpose of service of process regardless of the facts that it was not the defendants principal domicile and that he spent comparatively little time there 2: holding that one of the twelve or so homes throughout the world among which the individual defendant divided his time constitutes a dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of service of process even though that home is not the defendants principal domicile and even though he may spend comparatively little time there 3: holding that service of a statecourt summons and complaint after removal to federal court is valid service 4: holding that service was proper where a copy of the summons and complaint was left with the defendants wife at the defendants maryland house in which the defendant had lived before moving ahead of his family to arizona where he had purchased a house intending never to return to maryland and to move his family to arizona noting that the service was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of service at the defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode where the service succeeded in actually apprising him of the lawsuit