Input: attribute, entitles the defendants to immunit U.S. 167, 174-75, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005) (retaliation for complaints of unlawful discrimination is a form of discrimination). Under these precedents, plaintiffs such as Blasic can challenge as discriminatory actions that were taken against them for reporting unlawful discrimination, even if the plaintiffs were not subject to discrimination based upon their own race, gender, or similar protected status. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969) (permitting white plaintiff to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1982’s racial discrimination provisions because he suffered retaliation for protesting discrimination against black person); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171, 125 S.Ct. 1497 (<HOLDING>). In sum, the grant of summary judgment against Holdings: 0: holding eeoc could maintain action alleging discrimination against male employees in the administration of the retirement system although original charge was filed by female alleging discrimination on the basis of her sex 1: holding male athletic coach could bring suit under prohibition on sex discrimination in title ix of the education amendments of 1972 because coach alleged that he suffered adverse consequences for protesting discriminatory treatment of female athletes 2: holding that a class of all high school female athletes could not be certified  even if the alleged conduct of the defendant school system was discriminatory  when some female athletes did not share the same goals or interests as the named female plaintiffs because those unnamed female athletes were satisfied with andor benefitted from the alleged discriminatory treatment 3: holding that third persons do not have standing to assert title ix claims on behalf of female athletes 4: holding that discriminatory employment practices are cognizable under title ix


Input: actions which are instituted before the administrative remedies are exhausted under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), even in cases where no substantial progress has taken place in the litigation before the administrative claim is finally denied. See also Lazarini v. U.S., 898 F.Supp. 40, 44 (D.P.R.1995) (“Plaintiff must comply with the procedures established in order to proceed with suit against the United States, and failure to comply with the procedural regulation mandates the dismissal of the action.”); see also Flory v. U.S., 138 F.3d 157, 159-160 (5th Cir.1998) (reading FTCA as literally requiring plaintiff to first exhaust administrative remedies with the appropriate agency and wait for a denial of that claim before filing judicial suit); see also Jerves v. U.S., 966 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The language of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) is Holdings: 0: holding that a district court had sufficient reason to reject the plaintiffs belated attempt to amend her complaint fifteen months after the commencement of her action and nine months after the initial amendment to her complaint 1: holding that section 591610 applies to actions commenced before its effective date 2: holding jurisdictional requirements were not satisfied when victim commenced her action before receiving agencys final denial of her claim or before allowing six months to elapse from date of initial administrative filing 3: holding that party waived disqualification complaint by filing her motion six and onehalf months after learning of the potential conflict 4: holding the petitioner abandoned her cat claim when she failed to raise it in her initial appellate brief


Input: recusal.” Hall v. Hall, 333 Pa.Super. 483, 482 A.2d 974, 976 (1984) (citations omitted). 4 , Rule 313 provides that an appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order. A collateral order is defined as “an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). 5 . Father also contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the guardian ad litem by order filed September 10, 1998. We conclude that this is not a final order, and, therefore, we shall not address the merits of the issue at this time. See Givens v. Givens, 304 Pa.Super. 571, 450 A.2d 1386 (1982) (<HOLDING>). We note that if we were to conclude that the Holdings: 0: holding that courtappointed guardian ad litem for child in child custody dispute did not act under color of state law 1: holding that guardian ad litem and psychologist fees incurred in child custody proceedings and ordered to be paid directly to the guardian ad litem and psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 2: holding that a statute that provided that the court may appoint a guardian ad litem left the court with discretion to make an appointment 3: holding that a paternity determination in which the child is not made a party and is not represented by a guardian ad litem is not binding on the child 4: holding that where the trial court denies a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a child support case the order is unappealable


Input: Smith upon execution of the land-sale contract. In sum, the contract called for possession to transfer to Smith at closing. None of the evidence designated is inconsistent with that provision. As a matter of law, liability under section 348, the only provision addressed by the parties, lies with Smith as the possessor of the land. II. Negligence Per Se Scheible also argues that summary judgment is improper because Jackson's violation of a city ordinance constitutes negligence per se. We do not believe the cited ordinance applies to Jackson. At the time of the accident, a Columbus city ordinance required property "owners" to trim street trees to certain specifications. "Owner" was defined to include include "any part owner, joint owner, ten ant in commo , 225 & n. 11 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. 4 . The parties have not Holdings: 0: holding that marina could not be liable for injury on a houseboat even though the marina had the right to move the houseboat in an emergency 1: holding that an award of attorney fees for services rendered at the instance of the custodial parent in defending an action for change of custody may be allowed even though the defense was unsuccessful and even though it was claimed that such an award violated public policy 2: holding that an attorney charged with misconduct had standing on the basis of reputational injury to appeal those portions of the district courts opinion that reflected unfavorably on the attorneys professional conduct even though the district court had otherwise dismissed the charges 3: holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees 4: holding that the plaintiff had established an entitlement to relief on the merits of the claim  and was therefore entitled to fees even though it was remanded to the agency for further action


Input: 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976) (citing United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858-59, n. 25, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 44 L.Ed.2d 621 (1975); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94, 94 S.Ct; 334, 38 L.Ed.2d 287 (1973)) (noting that courts have refused to follow administrative guidelines when they conflict with past pronouncements of an agency); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (requiring an agency to provide reasoned analysis before changing its standards). The majority’s reliance by analogy on state police power legislation is particularly inappropriate considering that the federal government lacks a similar police power. See Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 23 S.Ct. 321, 47 L.Ed. 492 (1903) (<HOLDING>). Although I will discuss this point more fully Holdings: 0: holding there is no such thing as a nonviolent burglary 1: recognizing that a municipal council acting as a governmental agency  is bound always to act as trustee of the power delegated to it and may not surrender or restrict any portion of such power conferred upon it 2: holding that under the public standing doctrine it is only necessary that the relator shall be a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws 3: holding that there is no such thing as a federal police power except in respect of those specific subjects delegated to congress such as treason counterfeiting piracies and felonies on the high seas and offences against the laws of nations 4: holding such action violative of the high obligation of good faith and fair dealing imposed by such agreements


Input: to be tried, not to deciding them.’ ” Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994)). B. Preemption Plaintiff, an i there are regulations issued by the Secretary of Transportation dealing with the warning horns that “ ‘cover’ ” or “ ‘substantially subsume’ ” the issues raised by plaintiffs FELA claims here. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 352, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Eastenvood, 507 U.S. at 664-665, 113 S.Ct. 1732) (noting that the term “cover” requires more than just a showing that the regulations “ ‘touch upon’ or ‘related to’ ” to the subject matter); see also Major v. CSX Transp., 278 F.Supp.2d 597, 608-10 (D.Md.2003) (<HOLDING>). There are specific federal regulations Holdings: 0: holding that when the federal government puts into play a series of events which result in a taking of private property the fact that the government acts through an  agent does not absolve it from the responsibility and the consequences of its actions 1: holding that where train speed and locomotive design complied with federal regulations railroad employees fela claims were preempted by the frsa since congress has established a policy of national uniformity of laws rules regulations orders and standards 2: holding that the control factor did not weigh heavily in favor of either party after noting the detailed statutory regime the political nature of the appointment of the members of the board of trustees the retirement systems corporate status and the boards powers to sue and be sued and to buy and sell property 3: holding that the county government not the federal government was liable for the taking of an air easement over plaintiffs property even though the airport was funded in part by a federal grant based on compliance with federal regulations 4: holding that when the federal government applies its regulations and requirements to signal systems through inspection and testing the result is preemption by the frsa of the fela claims based on the design and operation of those signal systems


Input: the county in which such real estate or a part thereof is located . . .”). 6 See Heritage Creek Dev. Corp. v. Colonial Bank, 268 Ga. App. 369, 372 (1) (601 SE2d 842) (2004) (“Not every irregularity or deficiency in a foreclosure advertisement will void a sale”); accord Oates v. Sea Island Bank, 172 Ga. App. 178, 179 (2) (a) (322 SE2d 291) (1984); Walker v. Northeast Production Credit Ass’n, 148 Ga. App. 121, 122 (2) (251 SE2d 92) (1978). 7 Se. Timberlands, Inc. v. Sec. Nat. Bank, 220 Ga. App. 359, 360 (1) (469 SE2d 454) (1996) (“The minimum legal requirements of a foreclosure advertisement are prescribed in OCGA § 9-13-140 (a), and only a failure to properly include those items will render the advertisement defective as a matter of law.”); ac . App. 529, 531 (1) (744 SE2d 369) (2013) (<HOLDING>); Heritage Creek Dev. Corp., 268 Ga. App. at Holdings: 0: holding that a typographical error in a security deed does not necessarily invalidate the legal description when the deed also referred to the propertys physical address 1: holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed 2: recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title 3: holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed 4: holding that deed was valid when the deed was conveyed to grantee corporation which formally incorporated after the conveyance


Input: and Le-Blanc on all claims and awarded them damages for past mental anguish. The trial court granted a judgment n.o,v. that let stand the jury’s findings on liability, but set aside the jury’s award of mental-anguish damages, holding that mental anguish relating to the birth of a child is not a compensable injury as a matter of law. The issue in this case is whether Texas law prohibits Hardin and LeBlanc from recovering mental-anguish damages on their claims for IIED, conversion, and breach of contract. Our analysis is guided by two conflicting rules of law. The first is that “victims of conduct that is determined to be utterly intolerable in a civilized community” should have a “reasonable opportunity for redress” of their injuries. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 622-26 (Tex. 1993) (<HOLDING>); cf. Pat. H. Foley & Co. v. Wyatt, 442 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a wife who invited and encouraged children to visit her premises even though she knew that husband had molested women and children in the past and might do so again could be held liable in negligence 1: holding that wife had standing to seek disinterment where death of husband occurred prior to entry of decree of divorce 2: holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted 3: holding wife abandoned her attempts to seek sanctions against husband and husband was not placed on notice that those issues would be raised again by guardian ad litem 4: holding that wife could bring iied claim against her husband and could do so within divorce proceeding subject to limitations preventing double recovery


Input: muddy the decree. Rangen, Inc., 159 Idaho at 808, 367 P.3d at 203 (noting that adopting a perspective that would render a “partial decree less, rather than more, clear” is disfavored). Second, an adjudicated water right is a judicially decreed property right. Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 797, 252 P.3d 71, 78 (2011) (“When one has legally acquired a water right, he has a property right....” (quoting Bennett v. Twin Falls North Side Land & Water Co., 27 Idaho 643, 651, 150 P. 336, 339 (1915))). It is binding on the IDWR, indeed the Director has a “ ‘clear legal duty’ to distribute water” according to decreed water rights. In re SRBA, 157 Idaho 385, 393, 336 P.3d 792, 800 (2014); see also Musser v. Higginson, 125 Idaho 392, 395-96, 871 P.2d 809, 812-13 (1994) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Rincover v. Holdings: 0: recognizing the right to use water to generate power 1: holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district 2: holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially 3: holding that mandamus was appropriate to require the director to deliver the full decreed water rights of a water right holder 4: recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest


Input: statement of what the statute mean[s].... ”); Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 160, 6 L.Ed. 289 (1825) (“[T]he construction given by this Court to the constitution and laws of the United States is received by all as the true construction .... ”). Our previous applications of Zadvydas have recognized the broad scope of its ban against continued and potentially indefinite detentions. See Xi, 298 F.3d at 836 (“The Supreme Court’s unqualified holding provides that[§ 1231(a)(6)] ‘does not permit indefinite detention.’ It is a venerable principle of statutory interpretation ‘that where the Legislature makes a plain provision, without making any exception, the courts can make none.’ ”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). It is also noteworthy that, although federal Holdings: 0: recognizing that at a bond hearing there is no limit to the discretionary factors that may be considered  in determining whether to detain an alien pending a decision on  removal 1: holding that the ins lacks authority under  1231a6 to detain a resident alien for more than a reasonable time beyond the removal period if there is no reasonable likelihood that the alien will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future 2: holding that the phrase resident alien means an alien lawfully residing in the united states 3: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien established that he will more likely than not be tortured if  removed 4: holding that an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future


Input: home was justified under the emergency exception because the police had a reasonable belief that there might be an injured person or another shooter lurking inside Espinoza’s home. The government’s argument is not supported by the record. At the time of the entry into Espinoza’s house, Espinoza was in custody and detained in the back of a police car. Neighbors had reported that Espinoza lived alone, and no one reported seeing or hearing anyone besides Espinoza inside the house. When the police arrived, they did not see anyone enter the house or hear any other voices coming from inside. In short, there were no facts upon which an officer could base a reasonable belief that an emergency existed after Espinoza was in custody. See United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court stated in Michigan v. Holdings: 0: holding that warrantless search of a shooting suspects tent was unreasonable because suspect was in custody and there was no actual ongoing threat despite the recent discharge of a firearm 1: holding that threat occurring 36 days before possession of firearm not present threat 2: holding that strip search incident to arrest was not per se unreasonable but holding that search was performed in an unreasonable manner when conducted in view of the public 3: holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent 4: holding that an officer did not employ excessive force in shooting a suspect who turned out to be unarmed because at the time of the shooting the officer had a reasonable belief that the suspect posed a threat and was armed


Input: to believe his workers’ compensation benefits would not be reduced as a result of his decision to take disability retirement. Rather, Mr. Richard asked her “will this workman’s comp affect my retirement” [emphasis added]. Ms. Dodge’s negative response to this question would not cause a reasonable person to believe his workers’ compensation payments would not be reduced. Considering the facts of this case, we find the court of appeal erred in holding DOTD was estopped from claiming that it is owed an offset under La. R.S. 23:1225. Likewise, we find no evidence of any agreement for purposes of La. R.S. 23:1225(C)(l)(d) which would prohibit DOTD from reducing Mr. Richard’s workers’ compensation benefits. See Jones v. General Motors Corp., 03-1766, p. 12 (La.4/30/04), 871 So.2d 1109, 1118 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Mr. Richard argues that even if the Holdings: 0: holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed 1: holding that contracts between employers and employees concerning wageloss benefits are not prohibited however an agreement which waives or alters statutorily established rights must be clear and unambiguous 2: holding that in order for a contract to be enforced it is necessary that all the essential terms of the contract must first be established by competent evidence and shown to be definite certain clear and unambiguous 3: holding that only deliberate clear and unambiguous statements are judicial admissions 4: holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous


Input: (<HOLDING>), and 371 (conspiracy). The indictment and bill Holdings: 0: recognizing involuntary manslaughter as an offense that does not in and of itself constitute a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of attorney disbarment 1: recognizing that a defendant may commit involuntary manslaughter if he acts in selfdefense but is criminally negligent in doing so 2: holding in involuntary servitude 3: recognizing that motor vehicle can be a deadly weapon in involuntary manslaughter case for purposes of providing notice in indictment 4: holding that both involuntary manslaughter and selfdefense instructions are proper when there is evidence that the killing was accidental


Input: Price understood that he had the right to conflict-free representation.” Id. Here, Movant testified at the plea hearing that he understood that, by pleading guilty, he was giving up certain rights, including the right to be tried by a jury, confront witnesses, and present evidence. Movant also testified that, before making his statement to the police, he was “advised that [he] had the right to be represented by a lawyer, and if [he] did not have the money to hire one, one would be appointed for [him] before answering any questions ...” However, there is no indication in the record that the plea court or counsel informed Movant that, if Movant could not afford counsel at trial, the court would appoint trial counsel for him. Cf. Phillips v. State, 356 S.W.3d 179, 183 (Mo.App. E.D.2011) (<HOLDING>). Nor does Movant’s tentative expression of Holdings: 0: holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires 1: holding that the defendants prior conviction was not obtained in violation of his right to counsel because he had the opportunity for appointed counsel at public expense 2: holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel 3: holding that at resentencing the district court was entitled to assume that the waiver was still in effect and was not required to again advise defendant of his right to counsel where defendant had waived counsel at the plea stage 4: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present


Input: evidence that his net yearly income, averaging the years 2009 through 2011, was $138,056, or about $11,505 monthly. See In re Marriage of Knickerbocker, 601 N.W.2d 48, 53 (Iowa 1999) (explaining that when a person’s income fluctuates, the court must average the person’s income over a reasonable period of years). Melissa argues Scott’s income is higher. She presented evidence that Scott’s net income, again- averaging the years 2009 through 2011, was $284,889, or about $23,741 monthly. The disparity results from a dispute over whether to calculate Scott’s income using straight-line or accelerated-depreciation deductions under the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 168 (2006). Notably, our caselaw favors the straight-line method of depreciation. See Knickerbocker, 601 N.W.2d at 52 (<HOLDING>); In re Marriage of Gaer, 476 N.W.2d 324, 329 Holdings: 0: holding that the court of appeals may not reverse a trial courts judgment in the absence of properly assigned error 1: holding that an issue first argued in a reply brief is not properly before a court of appeals 2: holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals 3: holding a new constitutional challenge not raised in district court was not properly before court of appeals 4: holding court of appeals properly recalculated income under straightline method of depreciation


Input: 787 So.2d 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(allowing non-signatories to compel arbitration when they received rights and accepted obligations under agreements containing arbitration clauses, and the claims against them arose solely in connection with their activities as officers and directors of a signatory); Ocwen Fin. Corp. v. Holman, 769 So.2d 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(same). This case is distinguishable from Koech-1% Tenet and Ocwen. In each of those cases, in addition to receiving rights and accepting obligations under an agreement containing an ■ arbitration provision, the non-signatory party was an agent, officer, or director of a signatory. We conclude that such a relationship is critical to the exception that Turner wishes to apply. See MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (<HOLDING>). However, neither Turner nor Advanced has such Holdings: 0: holding that state law governs whether an arbitration clause is enforceable against a nonsignatory under the faa 1: holding that an exception to the rule that a nonsignatory cannot invoke arbitration exists when under agency or related principals the relationship between the nonsignatory and a signatory is sufficiently close that the only way to avoid eviscerating the arbitration agreement is to allow the nonsignatory to compel arbitration 2: holding nonsignatory defendants who were sued separately from signatory defendants on same claims could enforce arbitration agreement under this equitable exception further nonsignatory defendants were undisputedly agents or servants of signatory defendants 3: holding nonsignatory defendant companies affiliated with signatory defendant company could enforce arbitration agreement against signatory plaintiff when same operative facts were involved 4: holding that nonsignatory was estopped from denying applicability of arbitration clause where nonsignatory received direct benefits from contract including lowered insurance rates and the ability to sail under the french flag


Input: facts] claim. Wood v. Nat’l Computer Sys. Inc., 814 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir.1987) (addressing situation where one teacher’s certification scores were sent to another teacher). According to the United States District Court for the District of Utah, dissemination of private facts to an individual’s employer, mother, and two siblings is insufficient “publicity” as well. Jones v. U.S. Child Support Recovery, 961 F.Supp. 1518, 1520-21 (D.Utah 1997). The United States District Court for the District of Nevada found that a creditor’s telephone calls to no more than six co-workers of a debtor was not sufficient “publicity” of private information. Kuhn v. Account Control Tech., Inc., 865 F.Supp. 1443, 1448 (D.Nev.1994). See also Davis v. Monsanto Co., 627 F.Supp. 418, 421-22 (S.D.W.Va.1986) (<HOLDING>); Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 64 Holdings: 0: holding that employer telling two persons outside of management level of information regarding an employees private mental health status was not the widespread publication requiredto establish a cause of action 1: holding that where statutory remedies exist private employees do not have a private cause of action for violation of state constitutional rights 2: holding that hiring of only two mental health experts was not deficient 3: recognizing the cause of action 4: holding that the medicaid statute did not create an enforceable cause of action against a private health care facility


Input: enjoyment of a dwelling may support a claim under section 3617 of the Act, see Halprin v. Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir.2004) (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2)), the interference must constitute more than a simple landlord-tenant dispute; it must constitute a “pattern of harassment, invidiously motivated.” Id. Farrar’s only allegation to support her claim is that she is African-American while the owner of her building is “non-Black” and the representative of her building’s management company is white. The mere fact that Farrar has a dispute over rent or services with the “non-Black” owner and manager of her building does not establish a claim under the Fair Housing Act. Id.; see also Maki v. Laakko, 88 F.3d 361, 364-65 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). As this appeal is frivolous, the decision of Holdings: 0: holding that police officers warrantless search of rented home with consent of landlord but not tenant violated tenants fourth amendment rights 1: holding that increase in rent combined with friction between tenant and landlord does not establish claim under fair housing act 2: holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant despite retaining keys because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property 3: holding over and paying the increased rent showed an intent to exercise the option and acceptance by landlord waived notice 4: holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant


Input: Amendment of the United States Constitution. The state argued the officers’ entry into the apartment was with the consent of someone having apparent authority and that the search and seizure were valid because the officers had probable cause to believe a valid arrest warrant for appellant’s arrest existed, and a warrant did in fact exist. For purposes of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, “[a] warrantless, nonconsensual intrusion of one's dwelling * * * is considered presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn.1989), aff'd, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684,109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). See U.S. Const, amend. IV; Minn. Const.' Art. 1, § 10. See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1375, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (<HOLDING>). As a preliminary matter, since appellant was Holdings: 0: holding that in die absence of exigent circumstances the mere existence of probable cause does not justify a nonconsensual entry by police into a home without an arrest or search warrant 1: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 2: holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry 3: holding that absent exigent circumstances the fourth amendment prohibits warrantless nonconsensual entry into a suspects home in order to make a felony arrest  notwithstanding the existence of probable cause to arrest 4: holding the fourth amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspects home in order to make a routine felony arrest


Input: of the dry cask storage containers, see 10 C.F.R. § 72.214 (List of approved spent fuel storage casks), or regarding whether the site and the installation, including the cask storage pads, are adequate to withstand the weight of the casks, or threats posed by natural phenomena such as earthquakes and tornados, or the threat of sabotage. See 10 C.F.R. § 72.212. Moreover, while defendants have claimed authority to consider Maine Yankee’s “financial capacity” (e.g. to deal with future economic contingencies related to spent fuel disposal) in determining whether to issue a Site Law permit, they of course cannot employ a “financial capacity” requirement to indirectly regulate in the field of spent nuclear fuel storage. Cf. United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 553 F.Supp. 1220, 1232 (D.R.I.1982) (<HOLDING>). That is, the state cannot stand in the way óf Holdings: 0: holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted 1: holding that state statute requiring nuclear processing plant that had ceased operations to post a ten million dollar twenty year bond to cover any expenses incurred by the state in decontaminating areas surrounding the plant was preempted by federal law 2: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 3: holding that erisa preempted state law claim brought by employer against insurance company for wrongful claims processing 4: holding the state law claims were not preempted


Input: of such acts. (iii) The shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through this Commonwealth. (iv) The engaging in any business or profession within this Commonwealth, whether or not such business requires license or approval by any government unit of this Commonwealth. (v) The ownership, use or possession of any real property situate within this Commonwealth. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. §§ 5322(a)(1)(i)-(v). 6 . We also note that the use of video conferencing, videotape depositions for trial, and the internet are commonplace in litigation today. 7 . Since we have general jurisdiction over Defendants, we need not engage in a specific jurisdiction analysis. See, e.g., InfoMC, Inc. v. Comprehensive Behavioral Care, Inc., No. 10-4907, 2012 WL 1114360, at *9 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 30, 2012) (<HOLDING>); Corporate Aviation Concepts, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction 1: holding that since the court already determined that it had general jurisdiction over a defendant it was unnecessary to engage in the specific jurisdiction analysis 2: holding that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related statelaw claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction 3: holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property 4: holding that a defendant that invokes the jurisdiction of a court as a plaintiff waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim for which it invoked the courts jurisdiction


Input: CONCLUSION Because the Department of State’s decisions were not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise unlawful, the Court cannot disturb those decisions; thus, Mr. Fox’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. # 9]. A memorializing Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 1 . Section 3 of the Law of Return grants every Jewish individual the right to come to Israel as an " 'oleh ” (a Jew immigrating to Israel) and become an Israeli citizen. Compl. ¶ 28; see also Israeli Citizenship Law of 1952, § 2(b)(4). See id.., Attach. 1, Ex. E. 2 . Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The APA provides a cause of action to a Holdings: 0: holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law 1: recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights 2: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states 3: holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar the united states from asserting an indemnity claim against a state 4: recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys


Input: Dec. 21, 2011) (generic drug manufacturers’ failure to update their labels, “after the brand named manufactur ers enhanced their warning labels in 2004, might preclude the application of conflict pre-emption, but only as to the labeling information added by the brand named manufacturers in 2004”); In re Reglan Litigation, No. 289, 2012 WL 1613329 (Super.Ct. Atlantic County, N.J.2012); Fisher v. Pelstring, 817 F.Supp.2d 791, 805 (D.S.C.2011). Generic Defendants have argued that since there is a federal statute specifically excluding private causes of action for violations of FDA regulations, 21 U.S.C. § 337(a), state tort suits premised on violations of federal law are impliedly preempted. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Cmte., 531 U.S. 341, 348, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001) (<HOLDING>). However, these failure to update claims are Holdings: 0: holding state law fraud and deceit claims to be preempted 1: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 2: holding the state law claims were not preempted 3: holding that state law fraud on the fda claims were impliedly preempted by the food drug and cosmetic act 4: holding that state claims for fraudulent submissions to the fda were preempted


Input: limit set forth in HRPP Rule 48(b) was not violated. The State argues the because HRPP Rule 48 was not violated, Maddox’s counsel had no duty to file a HRPP Rule 48 motion to dismiss and was not ineffective for failing to do so. Maddox did not include as part of the record on appeal transcripts of hearings held on the State’s motions to continue the trial that were granted by the circuit court. Maddox therefore failed to meet his burden of demonstrating “error by reference to matters in the record.” State v. Hoang, 93 Hawai'i 333, 334, 3 P.3d 499, 500 (2000). Without the missing transcripts, Maddox cannot show that HRPP Rule 48 had been violated and thus cannot meet his burden of demonstrating that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a HRPP Rule 48 motion to dismiss. Id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reject Maddox’s claim that Holdings: 0: holding that the presumption is that the trial court acted reasonably in sentencing and that the defendant must show some unreasonable or unjustifiable basis in the record that amounts to an abuse of discretion 1: holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error 2: holding that error will not be presumed from a silent record and that without the relevant transcript there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error and the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged error in the record 3: holding that where the record is insufficient to show that the alleged error occurred the presumption that the trial court acted without error must prevail 4: holding that an alien must show error and substantial prejudice in order to prevail on a due process claim


Input: its claim against [the] debtor” but pursuant to § 727(a)(2)(A). Id. at 288. The complaints alleged various facts concerning loan transactions between the plaintiff and the debtor and conduct by the debtor. However, the facts did not present any allegations of “fraud in the execution of the note and subsequent guarantee, defalcation and/or injury to property by conversion.” Id. at 292. Therefore, when the plaintiff sought to amend the amended complaint beyond the bar date by adding new facts to support new claims under §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4) and (a)(6), the bankruptcy court denied leave to amend. Id. at 292. Other cases which have denied relation báck of a § 523 claim to an original § 727 complaint include: Rufenacht, Bromagen, and Hertz, Inc. v. Russell, 69 B.R. 394, 395 (D.Kan.1987) (<HOLDING>); In re McClellan, 60 B.R. 719, 721-22 Holdings: 0: holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions 1: holding that the actions were not actions of public and general applicability but were actions directed principally and primarily at plaintiffs 2: holding that adea class actions are optin actions under  216b not optout actions subject to rule 23 3: recognizing that employment actions can be adverse even if such actions are subsequently withdrawn 4: holding that actions under  727 are factually different from actions under  523


Input: and found that Benitez did understand his Miranda rights. On the other hand, it is also possible that the trial court accepted Dr. Henley’s opinion as accurate that Benitez did not understand those rights and applied the incorrect standard of “diminished mental capacity” to its finding. Because the trial court’s order denying Benitez’s motion to suppress and its failure to make critical Ramirez determinations of fact may have resulted from the trial court’s erroneous view of the law, we reverse and remand for either a written order which makes the required findings and conclusion as to whether Benitez knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights or a new hearing and an order, whichever the trial court deems necessary. See Phillips v. State, 707 So.2d 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); Wright v. State, 766 So.2d 467 (Fla. 1st DCA Holdings: 0: holding a party must timely present his legal theories to the trial court so as to give the trial court an opportunity to rule properly 1: holding that where trial court erred in applying established law to the facts of the case it must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to address the issue 2: holding that the trial court must give due consideration to the applicable law and facts 3: holding that where supreme court in prior appeal reversed and remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary to determine the issue of accounting only trial court on remand could not consider defendants new defenses to joint venture and fraud claims determined in first trial 4: holding that this court had jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court order which remanded the case so that a new hearing examiner could be appointed and a new hearing conducted where the appellant raised the issue of commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions during the original hearing


Input: based on the automobile's 'ready mobility,, an exigency sufficient to exeuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear."). In the instant case, the warrantless search of Myers's vehicle was improper because the automobile exception to t the police to obtain a search warrant. The canine sweep at Austin High School was conducted on Thursday, December 12, 2002, at approximately 9:00 am. Myers was locked inside a classroom, and his car was parked in the school lot, police officers and school officials surrounded Myers's vehicle, and the vehicle was not obstructing traffic. The courts were probably open that day and a judge was likely available to sign a search warrant. See Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I would reverse the denial of Holdings: 0: holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant 1: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 2: holding that search of defendants purse which he carried was authorized by a warrant to search his person 3: holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises 4: holding it was reasonably practicable to obtain warrant to search defendants vehicle where courts were open on day of warrantless search and judges were available to sign warrant


Input: 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991); McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284, 290, 104 S.Ct. 1799, 80 L.Ed.2d 302 (1984). 3 . In determining the appellants’ claims here, we need not decide whether Puerto Rico is a state under the Fourteenth Amendment or a federal territory under the Fifth Amendment. See Examining Board of Eng'r, Architects & Surveyors v, Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600-01, 96 S.Ct 2264, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976). 4 . In their brief, the plaintiffs also appear to complain that the defendants engaged in "illegal detention of Plaintiffs and their employees.” Appellant Br. 1, 4. However, the Complaint itself contains no allegations that the plaintiffs were actually detained. See JA 15. 5 . B & B Trucking, Inc, v, U.S. Postal Serv., 406 F.3d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Hughes Commc'ns Galaxy, Inc, v. United Holdings: 0: holding that if the usps abridged the plaintiffs contract rights the proper recourse would be a breachofcontract claim not a takings claim 1: holding breachofcontract claim preempted because the plaintiff tried to enlarge the federal rights that were incorporated into the contract 2: holding by texas supreme court that takings claim failed as a matter of law because the state took possession of the property in question under a contract with the plaintiff and therefore with the plaintiffs permission and consent 3: holding breachofcontract claim preempted because contract did not explicitly incorporate a federallaw provision 4: holding breachofcontract claim was preempted


Input: he reports or gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person or who has requested the information from a person that the peace officer has good cause to believe is a witness to a criminal offense. Act of May 29, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 869, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2944 (amended 1993) (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02 (Vernon Supp.2005)). 52 . See Sims v. State, 84 S.W.3d 805, 809-10 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (defendant not "lawfully detained” within meaning of st icense and warrant check on driver is generally viewed as reasonable law enforcement exercise and an "additional component” of a routine traffic stop). But see State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454, 460 (2004) (<HOLDING>); see generally 4 LaFave, supra note 35, § Holdings: 0: holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation 1: holding taint from illegal detention attenuated by discovery of outstanding warrant where there was no evidence officer stopped appellant solely to request identity in order to run warrant check 2: holding encounter became improper detention when officer took passengers license back to police car to run warrant check 3: holding warrant check not unreasonable where detention not extended solely for that purpose 4: holding that one must look to circumstances of encounter to determine whether detention under fourth amendment took place


Input: but also pure water and fresh oxygen for humankind. 21 . The opinions do not mention any allegation by the plaintiffs in those cases that wilderness characteristics had to be considered in NEPA documents. 22 . Several district courts are in accord with this analysis. See Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. Shuford, No. 06-242-AA, 2007 WL 1695162 (D.Or. June 8, 2007) (upholding the BLM's NEPA wilderness analysis where the "BLM evaluated ONDA’s proposed [wilderness areas] and identified one parcel ... as having wilderness characteristics”); Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance v. Norton, 507 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1235-38 (D.N.M.2007) (recognizing the BLM's duty to "address potential wilderness-quality lands through NEPA”); Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Rasmussen, 451 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1212-13 (D.Or.2006) (<HOLDING>). 23 . The BLM also suggests that it did not Holdings: 0: holding that in a redistricting case the legislature has the initial responsibility to act but in the event the legislature fails to act the responsibility shifts to the state judiciary 1: holding that the movant has the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion 2: recognizing a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty in failing to provide relevant information under section 502a3 of erisa where the fiduciary had knowledge that its failure to provide the participant andor his beneficiaries with complete and accurate information would mislead them as to the coverages in effect 3: holding that the blm has a responsibility to provide accurate information regarding any changes to the wilderness characteristics in an area affected by its actions 4: recognizing that blm discussed the modeling results and explained the basis for its decision to discount those results


Input: as exempt. See id. at 1192-93. The Court found this “surcharge” to be improper, holding that “federal law provides no authority for bankruptcy courts to deny an .exemption on a ground not specified in the Code” and that § 105(a) does not empower bankruptcy courts to surcharge a debtor’s allowed exemption for payment of administrative expenses, despite the debtor’s fraudulent conduct in claiming the exemption, as doing so contravened § 522. Id, at 1195-96. While the Court’s specific holding was limited to the interpretation of § 522(k), its further comments on the authority of bankruptcy courts to use their § 105 powers to remedy debtor fraud has “affect[ed] a sea-change among lower courts facing this issue.” Mateer v. Ostrander (In re Mateer), 525 B.R. 559, 565 (Bank. D. Mass. 2015) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court closely scrutinized § 522 Holdings: 0: holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes 1: holding that debtors cannot claim an exemption in a homestead after trustee avoided the transfer of the property as a fraudulent conveyance because the transfer by the debtors was voluntary 2: holding that a debtors technically incorrect exemption in a wrongful death claim based on west virginias homestead exemption stands as claimed because the trustee did not object to the exemption in time 3: holding that while the court would have stood on solid ground presiegel in denying a claimed exemption based on the debtors attempt to conceal the existence of an insurance claim and cash payments received from his insurer and mortgage lender the debtor was entitled to claim a massachusetts homestead exemption which included the insurance proceeds despite his intentional and fraudulent conduct 4: holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other


Input: postconviction motion, because access to the files and records pertaining to his case in the possession of certain state agencies has been withheld in violation of chapter 119, Florida Statutes; (9) the jury was misled in the penalty phase by comments, questions, and instructions that unconstitutionally and inaccurately diluted the jury’s sense of responsibility in the sentencing process, and trial counsel was ineffective for not properly objecting; and (10) Franqui’s sentence of death is premised on fundamental error because the jury received inadequate guidance under Florida’s capital sentencing statute concerning the aggravating circumstances to be considered, and trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to these errors. 5 . Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified 1: holding that the  district court did not give the plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to be heard where it failed to conduct an in limine hearing and denied oral argument on the evidentiary issues 2: holding that the judge must allow the attorneys the opportunity to be heard on an initial 3850 motion in a capital case for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion 3: holding that a hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal is not required if the parties are given an opportunity to respond on the record 4: holding that once a trial court has set a date for a summaryjudgment hearing the court must allow the nonmoving party an opportunity to be heard


Input: 270, 274 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (stating that all shareholders are indirectly affected by and benefit from a derivative lawsuit); see also Kaplan v. Rand, 192 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir.1999) (“We think that a shareholder who objects to the payment of a fee from corporate funds in compensation of attorneys who have brought a derivative action on behalf of the corporation has an interest that is affected by the judgment directing payment of the fee.”). A 2 (10th Cir.1995) (“To merely object to the settlement of a derivative action, however, the objector apparently need only own stock in the corporation at the time of the settlement hearing, and appear at the settlement hearing to raise his or her objections.”); Saylor v. Bastedo, 78 F.R.D. 150, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (<HOLDING>). Also, as discussed in Part II below, most Holdings: 0: holding noncontemporaneous shareholders status is that of an objector 1: holding that refugees who have already acquired lpr status are ineligible for a  209c waiver in light of the language in that adjustment of status can be granted to an alien who has not acquired permanent resident status 2: holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review denial of motion to continue to pursue adjustment of status if application to adjust status is futile 3: holding that the status exception extends to termination proceedings because the tjermination of parental rights is nothing more than a determination of the legal status between the natural parent and the child 4: holding that firing authority is indicative of employer status


Input: “TAP shall purchase TAK390MR preparations from [Takeda Japan] until the last TAK390MR patent is expired.” Offer Letter at DEX1169490 (emphasis added). The Offer Letter also contains other terms indicative of an offer for sale: an initial payment of 3 billion Yen upon signing the license agreement, a royalty payment of 6% of net sales, and a transfer price per 60 mg capsule. Id. In addition, the letter indicates that the transfer price would be the same for TAK-390MR as for Prevacid®, which Takeda Japan was already selling to TAP. Id. Viewing this competing evidence in the light most favorable to Takeda, the Court finds a genuine dispute as to whether the Offer Letter amounts to an offer for sale under § 102(b) or an offer to license rights under a patent. See Grp. One, 254 F.3d at 1049 (<HOLDING>). Because there is a genuine dispute of Holdings: 0: holding that the documentary evidence was unclear as to whether group one was offering only to license the patent to hallmark and was not offering to license or sell the invention as such and that as a result the district judge erred in deciding this disputed question of fact on summary judgment 1: holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer 2: holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent 3: holding that the verification of mishlers medical license was part of the protected property interest in the license and reversing the district courts dismissal of his complaint 4: holding that whether the gerrymandering at issue was the product of impermissible racial motivation was a disputed fact and that it was error in this case for the district court to resolve the disputed fact of motivation at the summary judgment stage


Input: rules apply depending on whether the cause of action sounds in contract or in torf’); Buchanan v. Doe, 246 Va. 67, 71, 431 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1993) (“forum state applies its own law to ascertain whether the issue is one of tort or contract”). See, also, Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws §§ 3.3 to 3.5 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing, generally, importance of initial subject matter characterization in conflict analysis). “[I]t is well-settled Nebraska law that an insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured, whose respective rights and obligations must be determined by application of contract principles.” Volquardson v. Hartford Ins. Co., 264 Neb. 337, 344, 647 N.W.2d 599, 606 (2002). See, also, Schrader v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 259 Neb. 87, 608 N.W.2d 194 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The right of an insured to recover benefits Holdings: 0: holding that in order for insured to qualify for uim benefits there must have been a liability policy in effect um coverage does not satisfy this requirement 1: holding that um carriers are subrogated to any substantive defense that the tortfeasor may have been able to assert against the insured 2: holding that neb rev stat  446413le reissue 2004 barring actions for um or uim coverage when insureds underlying claim against tortfeasor expires is inapplicable when insured timely files action against tortfeasor in that circumstance applicable statute of limitations on claim against insurer for um or uim benefits is statute governing actions on written contracts 3: holding that because plaintiff released the tortfeasor plaintiff may not assert a claim against the uim carrier because of the derivative nature of the uim carriers liability 4: holding that the sixyear statute of limitations on a written contract is applicable to a cause of action based on a um policy


Input: not warranted. This error relates solely to the issue of damages. The jury did not reach the issue of damages because it found that the appellees were not liable for Peterson’s injuries. Recognizing this obstacle, Peterson argues: The message was ... sent to the jury that Brian Peterson would always be properly cared, for “free,” and thus there was no need to give an award against the Appellee for this aspect of damages. Appellee’s strategy thereby transcends the damage issue and impacts (or “spills over”) on the determination of liability. Initial Brief of Appellant, p. 24. We recognize that in some situations, errors relating to damages may “spill over” into a jury’s determination of liability. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., 624 F.2d 749, 759 (6th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Here, however, we find no evidence of “spill Holdings: 0: holding that since the jury was prejudiced with respect to its award of damages it cannot be said that its finding of liability was free from prejudice 1: holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages 2: holding that under privacy act federal government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actual damages but not with respect to damages for mental or emotional distress 3: holding that when a jury finds section 1988 liability but fails to award damages nominal damages are available to plaintiff 4: holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative


Input: and offering a reasonable compromise. Nevertheless, no substantive response was received. Slightly more than a month later, defendant was “locked-out” of her home and, three months after that, she made her first application to vacate the sheriff’s sale. Finally, since the date defendant was “loeked-out” of her home, nothing has happened at or to the property; plaintiff continues to hold title to it and the record reflects that it remains vacant. In the balance of equities that lies at the very foundation o 64, 232 A.2d 679 (App.Div.1967) (explaining that where mortgagor did not receive mandatory notice of sheriffs sale and had no knowledge of sale for five months, sale can be set aside). Cf., Heinzer v. Summit Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 87 N.J.Super. 430, 439, 209 A.2d 662 (App.Div.1965) (<HOLDING>). We are constrained, therefore, to reverse the Holdings: 0: holding that where defense of laches was not pleaded denial of equitable relief on grounds of laches was error 1: holding that private plaintiffs can seek equitable relief under rico 2: holding that identical language in montana postconviction relief statute bars application of laches 3: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 4: holding that laches bars relief where second mortgagee failed to seek relief for almost seven months after learning of sheriffs sale


Input: should have been instructed as to attempted second-degree murder. Accepting defendant’s premise that the offense of attempted second-degree murder existed, this Court held that there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction. Our Supreme Court, faced with a similar argument, reached a similar result in State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 496 S.E.2d 357 (1998). We are constrained and guided by our precedent. Thus, while North Carolina appellate courts previously have assumed the existence of attempted second-degree murder and have shown no skepticism toward the existence of the crime, they have never directly confronted the challenge raised here by defendant. Because this Court has been advertent to logical inconsistencies in the law, see Lea, 126 N.C. App. 440, 485 S.E.2d 874 (<HOLDING>), we find guidance in our previous ready Holdings: 0: holding that attempted felony murder is a logical impossibility 1: holding that attempted felony murder was abolished 2: holding that the crime of attempted first degree felony murder does not exist 3: holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in florida 4: holding that the crime of attempted felony murder no longer existed in florida


Input: aerial observation of these areas did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the marijuana in these areas was first detected in plain view while the helicopter was positioned over the abandoned property outside the curtilages. The position of the helicopter when it first spotted the marijuana is a fact-intensive inquiry that we would normally review for clear error; however, the district court made no fact findings with respect to the exact position of the helicopter upon first spotting the marijuana on Defendants’ properties because the government did not raise this argument below. Accordingly, because the government failed to raise the issue below, we deem the argument waived on appeal. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 208-09, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1646, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981) (<HOLDING>). We also decline to review for plain error Holdings: 0: holding argument waived for failure to raise it in opening brief 1: holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court 2: holding that a litigant who fails to raise an argument in opposition to a properly raised motion for summary judgment will not be permitted to raise that same argument later either in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal 3: holding that government lost right to raise lack of expectation of privacy argument on appeal when it failed to raise argument below 4: holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief


Input: (1923) (Repl. Vol.2005) (a juror with any case that is to be tried by a jury during the same term); W. Va. Code § 61-5-3 (1923) (Repl.Vol.2005) (a juror who has been convicted of perjuiy, subornation of perjury or false swearing); W. Va.Code § 61-6-12 (1923) (Repl.Vol.2005) (a juror who participated in a mob or riotous assemblage, committed such crimes or expressed an opinion in favor of such crimes). 7 . "We traditionally have not applied [Beckett ] to mandate the automatic disqualification of a prospective juror merely because of a ... social relationship with an employee of a law enforcement agency who is actively involved in the prosecution of the case." State v. Mills, 211 W.Va. 532, 538, 566 S.E.2d 891, 897 (2002). See State v. King, 183 W.Va. 440, 451, 396 S.E.2d 402, 413 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Mr. Mills has also attempted to rely upon Holdings: 0: holding that new evidence impeaching credibility of governments key witness was cumulative of other evidence of witness criminal activity 1: holding that juror was not automatically disqualified under beckett because of the jurors friendship with a law enforcement officer who was a key witness for the stale 2: holding that the trial court should have granted the defendants motion for mistrial after it was revealed that a police officer who also was a prosecution witness had sat with several jurors during a lunch break even though the witness testified that he did not discuss the business of the case with the jurors 3: holding that there could be no conscious or subconscious influence from shadow jurors contact with juror when juror was unaware of shadow jurors affiliation with a party 4: holding that a court must allow the defendant to ask in voir dire whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty and suggesting that such a juror should be disqualified for cause


Input: in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1999). Trademarks cannot be sold or assigned apart from their business as they do not have discrete value as property. The assignment of a trademark may be declared invalid if the trademark is assigned or sold without the asso tutory basis for the invalidation of an assignment in gross. In interpreting this Statute, courts have consistently held that the policy for invalidating such transfers is to protect the public from being misled or confused about the source and nature of the goods. Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258 (5th Cir.1999). The most telling sign of an assignment in gross is the transfer of the trademark separate and apart from any tangible assets. Pepsico, Inc., supra; Haymaker Sports v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 261 (C.C.P.A.1978) (<HOLDING>); Greenlon, Inc. v. Greenlawn, Inc., 542 Holdings: 0: holding the assignment invalid because the assignee never used the mark and never acquired any of the assignors tangible assets or goodwill 1: recognizing that a broad definition of stolen is consistent with the guidelines purposes and finding that the enhancement was properly applied where a defendant found a gun that was lost or mislaid by its owner who never authorized anyone to take the gun never sold it and never gave it away as a gift 2: holding that because the repose period in question was eliminated before it expired it never operated to insulate defendants from liability and never vested defendants with any substantive rights 3: holding that employee did not invoke grievance procedure where he never mentioned the word grievance to the union and where he never asked the union to take any action on his behalf 4: holding that because a claim was never raised in the district court this court would not consider it for the first time on appeal


Input: standing. See id. To determine whether a licensee is a bare licensee or an exclusive licensees the court must “aseertain[ ] the intent of the parties to the license as manifested by the terms of their agreement and examining the substance of the grant.” Textile Productions, Inc. v. Mead Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1484 (Fed.Cir.1998); see Ortho Pharmaceutical, 52 F.3d at 1032 (“To resolve the issue of standing, we must examine the licensing agreement to determine whether the parties intended to effect a transfer of proprietary rights to the licensee as an incident to protection of its interests.”). In particular, if the patent owner reserves the right to grant other licenses in the future, then the licensee is not an exclusive licensee. See Ortho Pharmaceutical, 52 F.3d at 1033-34 (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Textile Productions, 134 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that an exclusive license granting the licensor a reversionary interest in the patent in the event of the licensees bankruptcy was a grant of all substantial rights such that the licensee could sue for patent infringement 1: holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion 2: holding governments repudiation of license gave patentee right to terminate license 3: holding that a licensee was nonexclusive on the ground that the patentee had reserved the right to grant additional licenses despite the existence of a righttosue clause in the license 4: holding that nonexclusive license is not transferable without copyright owner authorization


Input: After a foreign judgment has been duly filed, the grounds for reopening or vacating it are limited to lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction of the rendering court, fraud in procurement (extrinsic), satisfaction, lack of due process, or other grounds that make a judgment invalid or unenforceable. The nature and amount or other aspects of the merits (i.e., defenses) of a foreign judgment cannot be relitigated in the state in which enforcement is sought. See Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 67 S.Ct. 451, 91 L.Ed. 488 (1946). Id. at 867-68 (citations omitted). 987) (stating that “the grounds mentioned in Rule 60(b) which allow relief from a judgment are not available to vacate a foreign judgment” under the South Dakota UEFJA); Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Wyo. 1976) (<HOLDING>). This interpretation of the UEFJA also finds Holdings: 0: holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack 1: holding that a motion brought under rule 60b6 two years after the district courts judgment was untimely where the reason for the attack upon that judgment was available for attack upon the original judgment 2: holding that a foreign judgment for alimony and child support arrearages was not subject to attack in wyoming except on grounds that would permit attack upon any other money judgment such as want of jurisdiction in the court entering the judgment or lack of service so as to vest jurisdiction over the defendant 3: holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions 4: recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack


Input: receive “lump-sum alimony” in section F of the antenuptial agreement, did, in fact, relinquish the right to a division of the property acquired during the marriage. The Alabama trial court had no authority to disregard the antenup-tial agreement and to ameliorate, via the mechanism of a “property settlement,” any perceived harshness resulting from the wife’s waiver of “alimony in any form” because, under Mississippi law, lump-sum alimony is the functional equivalent of a property settlement. The trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding the wife any “property settlement,” much less a property settlement of $520,000, which amounts to 37.5 percent of the husband’s separate property acquired during the marriage. See Richardson v. Richardson, 912 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion The husband has already paid the Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of frauds applies to a sellers wife holding only a dower interest in the property so the wife must sign the purchase agreement as well as the seller husband 1: holding that money invested in voluntary investment plan during marriage was marital property because it was property acquired during marriage 2: holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage 3: holding that the trial court committed manifest error by substituting its judgment for that of a valid and enforceable contractual agreement between the parties when it awarded wife nearly half the value of specific assets acquired during the marriage in disregard of antenuptial agreement calling for husband to take 23 and wife to take 13 of property acquired during the marriage 4: holding that tjhere is a strong legal presumption that all property acquired during marriage is community property


Input: Appellees Chapter 7 Trustee Tracy D. Trunnell and Lee D. Dorsey, trustee of the Dorsey Loving Trust, concerning certain property of the bankruptcy estate (the “Property”). We review de novo an appeal from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, Paulman v. Gateway Venture Partners III, L.P. (In re Filtercorp, Inc.), 163 F.3d 570, 576 (9th Cir.1998), and conduct an independent review of a bankruptcy court’s rulings. Racusin v. Am. Wagering, Inc. (In re Am. Wagering, Inc.), 493 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir.2007). We affirm. 1. We reject Dorsey’s contention that the appeal is moot. Should Appellants prevail in their claims, disgorgement of monies received by Dorsey on the sale of the Property could be effective and equitable relief. See Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman), 491 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). 2. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its Holdings: 0: holding that the reviewing court must accept the adverse credibility finding so long as one of the identified grounds is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of the petitioners claim of persecution internal quotation marks omitted first alteration in original 1: holding that a case is not moot so long as the court can fashion some form of meaningful relief for the injured party 2: holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding that appeals are moot when appellate courts can provide no effective relief 4: holding that an appeal is not moot so long as the appellate court can fashion relief that is both effective and equitable internal quotation marks omitted alteration in original


Input: dimensions even after accounting for on-the-job training. (Docket Entry No. 37-1, at 60-61). The consent decree, however, would use a passing score on the knowledge test only to determine which candidates could proceed to the next steps of the exam. Although the record shows that exclusive use of a multiple-choice job-knowledge test is linked to disparate impact, the record does not show that reducing the job-knowledge test to one part of the promotion exam and grading it pass/fail — and making it otherwise irrelevant to the promotion decision— are steps tailored to the disparate impact remedy. Cf. Clements, 999 F.2d at 847 (stating that “any federal decree must be a tailored remedial response to illegality”); United States v. City of New York, 637 F.Supp.2d 77, 118-21 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>). It appears that once a candidate’s Holdings: 0: holding that a promotional exam was not jobrelated when it failed to test important cognitive and noncognitive abilities 1: holding that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem 2: holding that evidence of a witnessess refusal to take a polygraph exam is inadmissible 3: recognizing and discussing difficulty in determining whether mistrial should be declared when error involves evidence that defendant refused to take polygraph exam rather than involving clearly inadmissible evidence regarding results of exam 4: holding that even if plaintiff could demonstrate that failed drug test proffered by defendant as ground for dismissal was in error that showing would not demonstrate that reliance on test was pretext for discrimination


Input: heavy,” as “the determination of reasonableness is a factual one, requiring consideration of all the facts and circumstances.” Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 235 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting WellSpan Health v. Bayliss, 869 A.2d 990, 999 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005)). Varga challenges only one aspect of the non-compete covenant, that of its seemingly unlimited geographic extent. Varga argues that the non-compete covenant’s lack of a geographic scope renders the covenant unenforceable. Such is not the case. Courts have upheld non-compete covenants lacking geographic limits (or with very broad geographic restrictions) where the employee’s duties and the employer’s customers were geographically broad. See Fisher Bioservices, Inc. v. Bilcare, Inc., 2006 WL 1517382, at *13 (E.D.Pa. May 31, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Nextgen Healthcare Info. Sys., Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that noncompete lacking geographic restriction was enforceable because the former employer sought only to prevent the employee from soliciting customers she dealt with while at the former employer 1: holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration 2: holding that a former employee was not entitled to recover a yearend bonus from his former employer where no definite sum of money or percentage of profits was promised and where the employee left the company before the end of the fiscal year in question 3: holding that question of whether former employer was entitled to preliminary injunction ordering former employees to comply with noncompetition provisions of employment agreements was moot since the noncompetition restriction expired by time of appeal 4: holding that former employees state law claim of fraud brought against his former employer was preempted by labor management relations act


Input: promised financial assistance under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. We hold that Dr. Johnson has failed to present evidence of reasonable reliance, and thus her promissory estoppel claim fails. The district court granted summary judgment on this claim on the ground that it was barred by the statute of frauds. Georgia law is unclear regarding whether the statute of frauds can defeat a claim of promissory estoppel. See Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 Willamette L.Rev. 263, 367-69 (1996) (attempting to summarize Georgia law on promissory estoppel and expressing confusion over whether Georgia recognizes the doctrine as a defense to a statute of frauds argument). Compare Presto v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 193 Ga.App. 606, 388 S.E.2d 719, 720 (Ga.Ct.App.1989) (<HOLDING>), and Godwin v. City of Bainbridge, 172 Ga.App. Holdings: 0: holding that the absence of a binding agreement does not defeat a promissory estoppel claim 1: holding that the plaintiff failed to allege breach of a valid and enforceable contract but stated a claim for promissory estoppel 2: holding that promissory estoppel is applicable only in the absence of an enforceable contract 3: holding that unenforceable promises cannot form the basis for a claim of promissory estoppel 4: holding that the issue of whether a contract exists under promissory estoppel is grounded in contract law


Input: Inc. v. Carpenter, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 599, 606, 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009). There, the Supreme Court's primary concern was setting a high bar before permitting "piecemeal, prejudgment appeals” that run counter to "the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until the final judgment has been entered.” Id. at 605 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In this context, there is no similar concern, and thus the Objectors’ argument in this respect is unpersuasive. 20 . See In re Iida, 377 B.R. 243, 259 (9th Cir. BAP 2007) ("This public policy exception is narrow and, by virtue of the qualifier 'manifestly,' is limited only to the most fundamental policies of the United States.”); In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., 349 B.R. 333, 335-337 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (<HOLDING>); In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Inv., 421 Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action for wrongful death 1: holding that personal representative may amend personal injury suit to state wrongful death claim following plaintiffs death 2: recognizing and enforcing canadian insolvency courts claims resolution procedure even though it did not provide for jury trial for personal injury and wrongful death claims 3: holding that claims under 42 usc  1983 are not personal injury tort claims 4: holding that federal courts apply the forum states personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 claims


Input: defense based on the defense of illegality. Finally, several jurisdictions have allowed a plaintiff to assert an ECOA violation as an affirmative defense, even after the two-year statute of limitations has run for an offensive ECOA claim, based on the principle that a contract in violation of a statute is void and unenforceable. See, e.g., Integra Bank/Pittsburgh, 839 F.Supp. at 329 (stating “a creditor may not claim legal reliance on a signature that was illegally required in the first instance”); Boone Nat’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n, F.A. v. Crouch, 47 S.W.3d 371, 374-76 (Mo.2001) (citing broad equitable principles when permitting defendant to assert an ECOA affirmative defense after the statutory period had run); Eure v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 248 Va. 245, 448 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The basis for this position is that the Holdings: 0: holding a plaintiff cannot assert a violation of the ecoa as an affirmative defense 1: holding that ecoa violation cannot be asserted as affirmative defense 2: holding defendant was entitled to assert an ecoa violation as an affirmative defense to avoid only her liability because to do otherwise would be to enforce conduct that is forbidden by the ecoa 3: holding even though an affirmative action for damages is barred the debtor may assert an ecoa violation defensively in the nature of recoupment 4: holding that an ecoa violation is not properly asserted as an affirmative defense to liability and should instead take the form of a compulsory counterclaim


Input: than Goldens factors. Gump, 35 Kan. App. 2d at 509-12; see Board of Johnson County Comm’rs, 263 Kan. at 677. While Intervenors join the Plaintiffs in arguing the Golden factors should apply, they primarily attack the three bases characterized by Judge Ireland as forming the basis for the Board’s decision. We need not determine whether, as the Board argues, it also relied upon other bases, e.g., commercial wind farms would harm the county infrastructure. As explained below, we hold the bases identified by Judge Ireland are sufficient to sustain the Board’s action. Aesthetics As the court held in Gump, Kansas appellate courts have long allowed aesthetics to be considered in zoning matters. 35 Kan. App. 2d at 509-10; see, e.g., Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 157, 214 P. 99 (1923) (<HOLDING>). As our court acknowledged 60 years later: Holdings: 0: recognizing state laws can be preempted by federal regulations as well as by federal legislation 1: holding that zoning regulations which tend to preserve the residential or historical character of a neighborhood andto enhance the aesthetic appeal of a community are considered valid exercises of the public power as relating to the general welfare of the community 2: holding that ordinance conferred unbridled discretion where issuance of permit was subject to broad findings that proposed use will not have a harmful effect upon the health or welfare of the general public and will not be detrimental to the welfare of the general public and will not be detrimental to the aesthetic quality of the community or the surrounding land uses 3: recognizing in a zoning case that tjhere is an aesthetic and cultural side of municipal development which may be fostered within reasonable hmitations citations omitted such legislation is merely a liberalized application of the general welfare purposes of state and federal constitutions 4: recognizing tjhere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case


Input: ” (Maj. Op. at 640 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S.Ct. at 2658).) Ber cause I find that this standard of intent sweeps- more broadly than required by the Equal Protection. Clause, I am unable to agree with the intent prong of the majority’s three-prong test. Rather, I would require Plaintiffs to prove that‘this intent predominated over other considerations in the redistricting process. Although “ [legislation is frequently multipurposed,” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 n.11, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), the Supreme Court has expressly held that courts are equipped, in the particular context of redistricting legislation, to discern whether one consideration predominated over others, see Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16, 115 S.Ct. 2475 (<HOLDING>). I see no reason to believe that courts are Holdings: 0: holding in the context of racial gerrymandering cases that plaintiffs must prove that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislatures decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district 1: holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant 2: holding that universities can  consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a plus factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant and that a diverse student body is a sufficiently compelling interest to justify such use of race 3: holding that custody decision based on race is not justified 4: holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion


Input: added). The important and relevant part of the standard established by the Second Circuit was that it allowed scienter to be shown in two different ways: (1) by alleging facts “establishing a motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to do so,” or (2) by alleging facts “constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior.” In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269; see also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir.1994). There is currently a split among the circuits as to what the appropriate pleading standard is under the PSLRA and whether it mirrors the preexisting Second Circuit standard. Compare Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.1999) and Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1999 WL 688050 (11th Cir. Sept.3, 1999) (<HOLDING>) with Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the pslra imposes a more rigorous pleading standard than applied by any of the courts of appeals prior to the enactment of the statute 1: holding that congress intended to adopt a standard more stringent than the prepslra second circuit standard 2: holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter 3: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 4: holding the pslra standard for pleading scienter is more stringent than the second circuits standard prior to the act and that motive and opportunity is not an independent basis to show defendants had scienter


Input: Resisting this conclusion, Monster invokes St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938), to argue that Zuckman cannot now make representations to reduce the amount in controversy below the jurisdictional minimum. See Def.’s Supplemental Br. at 2 & n. 2. But St. Paul Mercury turned on the fact that the complaint was facially clear in requesting an amount of damages above the jurisdictional minimum — the complaint there expressly sought an amount greater than required under the then-governing statute, see 303 U.S. at 284, 58 S.Ct. 586, and the Supreme Court held that “a subsequent amendment, reducing the sum claimed to substantially less than that amount,” did not warrant remand to state court. See id.; see also id. at 296, 58 S.Ct. 586 (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court reasoned that a subsequent Holdings: 0: holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount 1: holding that the petitioner could demonstrate its constitutional standing for the first time on judicial review of an order of the land use board of appeals because the need to do so first arose when the petitioner sought to invoke the courts jurisdiction on judicial review 2: holding that in the absence of an exception a motion filed outside the twoyear period will not invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court 3: holding that on the face of the pleadings petitioner was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court and a reduction of the amount claimed after removal did not take away that privilege 4: recognizing that federal removal jurisdiction is determined by the amount of damages a plaintiff seeks


Input: 9, (Vernon Supp. 1995), which provides that the judge shall direct the preparation of a report on “the criminal and social history of the defendant and any other information relating to the defendant....” Appellant responds that the admissibility of the extraneous offense evidence in this case is governed not by article 42.12, but by article 37.07, which specifically made such evidence inadmissible to the of fense in this case. We agree with the appellant. We note that article 37.07 is the more specific statute concerning the admissibility of evidence at the punishment stage of trial. Moreover, it has been held in other contexts that article 37.07 controls over article 42.12 in the event of a conflict. Turcio v. State, 791 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>); Stewart v. State, 732 S.W.2d 398, 401 Holdings: 0: holding that preparation of a psi report is discretionary under article 3707 rather than mandatory under article 4212 1: holding that when the type of insurance procured is not listed in article 2104 the article does not apply 2: recognizing one reason for affirmative deadly weapon finding under article 4212 is to act as a deterrent 3: holding same conduct can be used as element of offense and also serve as basis for a deadly weapon finding under article 4212 section 3ga2 and explaining that to hold otherwise would conflict with the unambiguous language of article 4212 section 3ga2 4: holding wjhere an appeal is taken the terms of probation do not commence until the mandate of this court is issued and citing former section 8 of article 4212 texas code of criminal procedure


Input: is “unclaimed” and mail that a party “refuses to claim.” See Pressler, supra, comment on R. 1:5-2, comment 1 on R. 1:5-4. Although a literal distinction between the two phrases may suggest otherwise, we are satisfied that Caldwell’s interpretation is consonant with the intent underlying the rules. See Town of Morristown v. Woman’s Club of Morristown, 124 N.J. 605, 610, 592 A.2d 216 (1991) (observing that plain language of statute [or rule] should be given effect unless there is “specific indication of legislative intent to the contrary”). D. Due process is implicated in this case because a wage garnishment affects defendant’s interest by depriving him of the continued use of some portion of his property. See Township of Montville v. Block 69, Lot 10, 74 N.J. 1, 8, 376 A.2d 909 (1977) (<HOLDING>). In New Jersey, as elsewhere, “[t]he essential Holdings: 0: holding that deprivation of property must conform to due process principles 1: holding written judgment must conform to oral pronouncement 2: holding that the trial courts oral pronouncement must conform to the written judgment 3: holding that courts written sentence must conform to oral pronouncement 4: recognizing that before due process guarantees are implicated there must be a deprivation by the government of constitutionally protected interest


Input: Carroll’s scope, however, is quite modest, as the decision holds only that the Commission lacks authority to invalidate licensees’ contracts with third parties and to abrogate state-law contract remedies. See id. Although the data roaming rule dictates certain interactions between licensees and third parties, this kind of third-party impact differs in kind from the state-law contract issue at stake in Carroll. Because Verizon nowhere suggests that the data roaming rule will void third-party contracts, Carroll does not stand in the Commission’s way. Third, Verizon contends that Title III gives the Commission no authority to make “fundamental changes” to the terms of existing licenses. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT & T, 512 U.S. 218, 228, 114 S.Ct. 2223, 129 L.Ed.2d 182 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Community Television, Inc. v. FCC, 216 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding right to be fundamental 1: holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes 2: holding that a court errs when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of  changes in statutory or decisional law 3: holding that a hearing does not contemplate an oral presentation unless required by express language or context 4: holding that a sentence exceeding statutory authority constitutes fundamental error


Input: private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver. Such a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent as well as a practically useful principle of interpretation. We therefore hold that the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States. Congress, of course, may provide otherwise if it wishes to do so. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95-96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (citations omitted). That passage from Irwin, which was quoted in Bailey, supra, refers to a presumption that equitable tolling is potentially available to toll specific statutory time limits absent Congress’ clear intent otherwise to rebut that presumption. See also Bailey, 160 F.3d at 1365 (<HOLDING>). The appellant cites to no language in Bailey, Holdings: 0: holding that absent a contrary congressional expression the court  would be entitled to toll the statute of limitations found in section 7266 1: holding that equitable considerations did not toll the statute of limitations under the tort claims act where plaintiffs conduct was not in strict compliance with congressional waiver of immunity 2: holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations 3: holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations 4: holding that a veteran who seeks redress of a claim and misfiles his or her request for reconsideration at the same varo from which the claim originated is entitled to toll the statute of limitations of 88 usc  7266


Input: and substantial evidence on the whole record.” Id. (citations omitted). A FOF is clearly erroneous when “(1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding or determination, or (2) despite substantial evidence to support the finding or determination, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as “credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). We review the Water Commission’s action “pursuant to the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Paul’s Electrical Service, Inc. v. Befitel, 104 Hawai'i 419, 91 P.3d at 501-02 (2004) (<HOLDING>). However, because water is a public trust Holdings: 0: recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard 1: holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard 2: holding that if the legislature has granted the agency discretion over a particular matter then we review the agencys action pursuant to the deferential abuse of discretion standard  bearing in mind that the legislature determines the boundaries of that discretion 3: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion 4: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion