Input: is afforded virtually unlimited latitude in this regard as long as the argument is supported by the evidence and made in good faith. Porter v. State, 832 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.). The record here reflects that, in fact, after a series of questions by the prosecutor Officer Hatton was asked, “Okay. So Tanoah indicated that her daddy had cut her mom’s neck and that her daddy had cut his own wrist?” And Officer Hatton responded, “That’s correct.” Detective Graham also opined that Davis’s neck wound was self-inflicted. Thus, the State’s argument quoted above was a reasonable deduction from the evidence and did not interject any new or harmful facts into the record. Accord Arnold v. State, 234 S.W.3d 664, 674 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); DeLarue v. State, 102 S.W.3d 388, 406 Holdings: 0: holding the states argument that the best way to protect the community was to give the defendant substantial time in prison was a proper plea for law enforcement 1: holding states argument was proper deduction from evidence 2: holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument 3: holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper 4: holding that argument raised at oral argument that was not included in brief is waived


Input: of fact and a review of the trial court’s application of a legal standard to the facts.” Id. at 1215 (internal citation omitted). In Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-604, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 2435-37, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994), the Supreme Court held that collateral statements contained within a broader inculpatory confession are not admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). The Court was particularly concerned with the reliability and admissibility of statements implicating codefendants within a broader self-inculpatory confession. Id. The Court instructed that to determine whether a statement is self-inculpatory, it must be viewed in context and in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Id.; see also United States v. U.S. Infrastructure, Inc., 576 F.3d 1195, 1208-09 (11th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 288 Holdings: 0: holding that suit against county sheriff in his official capacity was suit against county 1: holding that a defendant was pot unduly surprised by the delayed disclosure of evidence showing that he made an inculpatory statement 2: holding recording of eyewitnesss inculpatory statement made in custodial interrogation testimonial in nature 3: holding that a statement made by a county official regarding bribes was inculpatory because it did not seek to lessen blame as to his crime by spreading blame to others 4: holding that plaintiffs testimony in employment discrimination case about statement made to her by manager was inadmissible hearsay because it included statement made by others who were unidentified


Input: which held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment”). A second circumstance arises when the State destroys, loses, or fails to preserve evidence that has previously been collected during the investigation of a crime. Steffes, 500 N.W.2d at 613; State v. Judge, 100 Wash.2d 706, 675 P.2d 219, 225 (1984) (en banc) (recognizing that the State’s duty to preserve material evidence “is derived from the duty to disclose exculpatory evide Rptr. 269, 274 (Ct.App.1985) (the duty to preserve evidence does not include an initial duty to gather or collect potential evidence for defendant’s use at the crime scene); People v. Rivera, 765 P.2d 624, 628 (Colo.Ct.App. 1988) (<HOLDING>); rev’d on other grounds, 792 P.2d 786 (1990); Holdings: 0: holding trial counsels failure to investigate and present substantial mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that the mere passive extension of credit does not constitute any form of reliance 2: holding that the failure to investigate and present the confession of a third party deprived defendant of the most critical evidence supporting his best defense 3: holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material 4: holding that the mere failure to investigate does not constitute suppression of the evidence


Input: that the officer’s testimony was an inadmissible expert opinion because it was unreliable and the officer lacked expertise. Whether the opinion testimony requires expertise or not, as was discussed in Dunnington, an objection was required to preserve any error by the trial court in allowing the opinion to be expressed by the officer. Weatherly complains only of the lack of an objection as to expertise and reliability, however. The State established the expertise of the officer to express the opinion and a sufficient basis for this opinion. See Hernandez v. State, 53 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd) (stating that experience may provide a sufficient basis for an expert’s testimony); Hardin v. State, 20 S.W.3d 84, 92 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). The evidence indicated appellant’s actions Holdings: 0: holding experts experience knowledge and training is considered in determining reliability 1: recognizing that virtually all of the studies show  that relatively few juvenile sex offenders are charged with a subsequent sex crime and sexual recidivism of juvenile sexual offenders posttreatment was very rare 2: holding that proper foundation existed for qualified experts testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome where expert had extensive training and experience with sexually abused children expert testified regarding the characteristics of the syndrome and its recognition by specific agencies and defense counsel rigorously crossexamined witness concerning the basis of her knowledge of the victims conduct 3: holding experts twenty years of experience investigating and supervising sex offenders and her extensive and continuous training qualified her to testify as an expert on the issue of whether a convicted sex offender posed a continuing threat to society 4: holding the trial court violated the separation of powers doctrine when it ordered the department of corrections to pay for a convicted sex offenders treatment program


Input: surrounding its execution, and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby. See Richard’s Original Long Creek Lodge v. Seymour Inn, Inc., 791 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Mo.App.1990). On the other hand, MECO’s basic premise that the presence of the condition precedent in the Addendum meant “there was either no agreement at all, or no enforceable agreement until [the financing contingency] was satisfied” is flawed. First, such argument runs counter to the general principle that a condition precedent presupposes the existence of a contract and not the converse, as MECO argues. Career Aviation Sales, Inc. v. Cohen, 952 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Mo.App.1997); Highland Inns Corp. v. American Landmark Corp., 650 S.W.2d 667 (Mo.App.1983). See Morgan v. City of Rolla, 947 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Mo.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). Under certain circumstances not implicated Holdings: 0: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 1: holding that a contract must entitle the plaintiff to money damages in the event of the governments breach of that contract 2: holding a condition precedent is an act or event that must be performed or occur after the contract has been formed before the contract becomes effective 3: holding that parol evidence is admissible to establish a condition precedent to the existence of a contract 4: holding that a contract is not effective until the performance of the conditions precedent and that a condition precedent calls for the happening of some event or the performance of some act after the terms of the contract have been agreed on before the contract shall be binding on the parties


Input: sought to quash the subpoenas duces tecum on the alternate basis that the materials sought were privileged under the physician-patient privilege set forth in section 8 — 802 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 8 — 802). While it is only problematic that this issue would arise again upon remand, we point out that an exception to the physician-patient privilege exists in reckless homicide cases under subsection (1) of section 8 — 802 (People v. Bates (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 218, 225, 523 N.E.2d 675) and in prosecutions where written results of blood-alcohol tests are admissible pursuant to section 11 — 501.4 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, under subsection (9) of section 8 — 802. (See People v. Saulsburry (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 857, 862, 533 N.E.2d 1154 (<HOLDING>).) Whether these exceptions to the Holdings: 0: holding to the same effect 1: holding that for the purposes of admiralty jurisdiction a tort occurs where the negligence takes effect not where the negligent act occurred 2: holding in dicta that subsection 9 as a rule of evidence would apply to litigation pending when the law takes effect 3: holding that a trust comes into immediate effect upon being established and funded while a will never takes effect until the death of a testator 4: holding that an adverse action occurs when the decision is carried out when it is communicated or actually takes effect


Input: of their attendance do not conflict with the Establishment Clause, since Riles, it has also upheld the constitutionality of other governmental programs that benefit all students, including those who attend private and parochial schools. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645, 662 (2002) (concluding that a law in which the state of Ohio created a program that provided tuition assistance to parents of eligible children to attend a participating public or private school of the parent’s choosing was “entirely neutral with respect to religion” and did not violate the Establishment Clause); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 793 (upholding program lending educational materials and equipment to public and private schools based on enrollment); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209-10, 240 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 Holdings: 0: holding that establishment of christmas day as legal public holiday did not violate establishment clause 1: holding that a school board policy prohibiting employees from sending their children to private schools interfered with employees constitutional right to control the education of their children 2: holding that a federallyfunded program in which public school teachers provided remedial education to disadvantaged children in parochial schools as well as public schools did not violate the establishment clause 3: recognizing the districts duty of care for the protection of school children in its schools 4: recognizing that public schools are owned by the government maintained with tax revenue and used for mandatory classroom attendance as well as for other public functions


Input: court’s balancing of the preliminary injunction factors. A preliminary injunction requires both a showing of irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on the merits. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir.2009). The district court concluded that the harm to Pro’s was irreparable because it was difficult to ascertain the specific amount of revenue being lost, and because damages might come too late to adequately compensate the plaintiffs business. See Hess Newmark Owens Wolf, Inc. v. Owens, 415 F.3d 630, 632 (7th Cir.2005) (“[I]t is precisely the difficulty of pinning down what business has been or will be lost that makes an injury ‘irreparable.’ ”); Somerset House, Inc. v. Turnock, 900 F.2d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The district court heard live testimony on Holdings: 0: holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate 1: holding that harm is irreparable where damages would come too late to save the plaintiffs business 2: holding that the potential loss of valuable business may constitute irreparable harm 3: holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative 4: holding that monetary damages do not generally constitute irreparable harm


Input: court dismissed the charges against Cruz before trial based on a rule of procedure and due to the prosecution’s lack of preparedness. The appellate court stated: “Under Super. Ct.Crim. R. 48(b): “ ‘a court has inherent authority to dismiss for want of prosecution. However, there are limitations on this authority to dismiss for want of prosecution: Such authority may not be exercised in an “arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable” manner, and the court may dismiss with prejudice for want of prosecution only when it [has] concluded] that the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated.’ “United States v. Mack, 298 A.2d 509, 510 (D.C.1972) (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).” (Footnote omitted.) In Cruz, the court concluded that the t .2007) (<HOLDING>); State v. Fisher, 212 S.W.3d 378 Holdings: 0: holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well 1: holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory 2: holding that trial court improperly dismissed charges pretrial because the state did not disclose the identity of a confidential informant 3: holding that it was error for the trial court to allow the state to question the confidential informant on direct examination about her lack of felony charges when there was no prior attack of the witnesss credibility 4: holding that the district court was within its discretion not to order disclosure of the governments confidential informant where the informant only helped orchestrate the search that led to discovery of incriminating evidence not the crimes themselves and could not testify to any relevant fact


Input: statement underlying the claims was made.”); NAHC, 306 F.3d at 1330 (stating that statement or omission must have been misleading at time it was made and that “liability cannot be imposed on the basis of subsequent events”) (citation omitted); Northwestern, 2004 WL 2166293, at *18 (stating that Section 10(b) violation occurs “on the date that the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation is made or, in the case of an omission, on the date a duty to disclose the withheld information arises.”); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F.Supp. 584, 605 (D.N.J.1996) (finding that three-year limitations period for Section 10(b) claims begins on date a defendant makes an affirmative misrepresentation); In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., 892 F.Supp. 676, 686 (W.D.Pa.1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 832 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that section 10b violation occurs on date of alleged misrepresentation not the date of the sale or purchase of securities 1: holding breach of best execution duty is a material misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of the securities 2: holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale 3: holding that for statute of limitations purposes the injury in a section 10b action occurs at the time of plaintiffs entry into purchase agreement not on later date when plaintiffs failed to receive expected payment 4: holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due


Input: where he passed the bar examination but falsely reported on his application that he had no pend ing professional misconduct charges. The attorney’s Pennsylvania license was revoked shortly after his representation of the defendant. In determining that the representation was not per se ineffective, the court noted: The courts have consistently looked to the licensing authorities of the legal profession to determine in circumstances of this kind the boundaries of the per se exception to the Strickland rule. If a lawyer is authorized by those authorities to practice law, his or her performance on a criminal defendant’s behalf is acceptable for Sixth Amendment purposes so long as the Strickland criteria are not m rt. denied 459 U.S. 1218, 103 S. Ct. 1221, 75 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1983) (<HOLDING>); People v Pubrat, 451 Mich. 589, 548 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding representation at a suppression hearing by lawyer disbarred on final day of hearing not per se ineffective 1: holding defendants request to call someone about possible representation to be ambiguous 2: holding representation by attorney who met all requirements for obtaining license but failed to take oath for admission not per se ineffective distinguishing circumstance from representation by someone impersonating lawyer 3: recognizing that a defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford 4: holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator


Input: release from custody less likely and increasing the risk he poses to the public. See id. at 42:20-44:06. General and specific deterrence are achieved by a below-Guidelines sentence. Assuming the court’s recommendations, as outlined below, are followed, defendant will serve approximately fifteen mandatory years in prison. He will be entitled to a credit of up to 54 days at the end of each year for “exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). Upon his release, he will have to live with the serious collateral consequences of his conviction: he will perpetually bear the scarlet letter that comes with being a convicted felon registered as a sex offender. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related Holdings: 0: recognizing that a plaintiff can demonstrate that samesex harassment is because of sex by showing that the conduct was motivated by the coworkers sexual desire for persons of the same sex 1: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins 2: holding that one essential element of the crime of failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offenders change of address is that the defendant is a person required  to register  3: recognizing that a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination is actionable under title vii 4: recognizing that the stigma imposed for a violation of a sex crime statute is not trivial


Input: and necessarily made this very determination when we held (in the prior appeal) that the trial court had no legal basis upon which to overturn the arbitrator’s determination (that there was no prevailing party) and to declare that Castro was the prevailing party. As a result, the trial court should have granted Wells’ motion for attorney’s fees, under section 57.105(l)(b), from February 14, 2012 — the date that the arbitrator expressly determined that there was no prevailing party as between Wells and Castro. See In re Forfeiture of 100,000 Euros, 170 So.3d 810, 817 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (reversing trial court’s denial of 57.105 fees where “neither the facts nor the law supported in any fashion” the claims of the appelléés.) See also Albritton v. Ferrera, 913 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). We reverse the order denying Wells’ hiotion Holdings: 0: holding that it is the results not the procedure which govern the determination of which party prevailed for purposes of awarding attorneys fees 1: recognizing that there can be compelling circumstances in which a trial court can determine that neither party prevailed in a contract case 2: holding that a party does not need a net recovery to be awarded attorneys fees all that is required is that the party prevail on a just claim 3: holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed 4: holding that party is not insulated from 57105 fees just because they prevailed in the trial court


Input: distinct evidence. In addition, Oscar’s alert was not even a factor in Mr. Long’s final conclusion that the fire was caused by arson. ¶ 34 Furthermore, Mr. Long directly testified that the fire investigation guide upon which all new fire investigators are tested directly states that “[a]ny canine alert not confirmed by laboratory analysis should not be considered validated.” Ms. McNair also testified that the laboratory results were negative. Such testimony basically negates the evidentiary value of Oscar’s alert. ¶ 35 The jury easily could have based its decision to convict upon evidence entirely independent of the testimony concerning Oscar’s accelerant detection, such as Mr. Long’s fire investigation results and eyewitness testimony. Cf. Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62,-¶29, 29 P.3d 638 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Marji, 158 F.3d 60, Holdings: 0: holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of  one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others 1: holding that the trial court had erred by excluding the expert testimony of a doctor 2: holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others 3: holding that excluding expert testimony was harmless and did not affect the jury verdict because the subject matter of the testimony was only one factor and by no means a determinative one 4: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive


Input: a petition for a writ of certiorari. Those forms of relief are properly sought in modem Pennsylvania practice via a petition for review of governmental action. See Pa. R.A.P. 1502 and 1561; 1 G. Ronald Dar-lington, Kevin J. McKeon, Daniel R. Schuckers, Kristen W. Brown, Pennsylvania Appellate Practice 2d § 1501:1 (2d ed.2002); see also Harvey. ¶ 8 While our rules of procedure distinguish between civil actions, actions in equity, actions in mandamus, and petitions for review of governmental determinations, see Pa.R.C.P. 1001, 1091, 1501, and Pa. R.A.P. 1511, for purposes of jurisdiction, all of these are nonetheless civil. In this context, “civil action” simply means “as opposed to criminal actions.” See State Board of Dentistry v. Weltman, 168 Pa. Cmwlth. 197, 649 A.2d 478, 479 (1994) (<HOLDING>). No matter which category we put Dan-ysh’s Holdings: 0: holding court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant injunction against agency with statewide authority 1: holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review aliens eligibility for special rule cancellation of removal 2: holding that where the question did not involve subject matter jurisdiction this court should not have raised sua sponte whether the local commission had authority to enforce a provision not analogous to any in the statewide human relations statute 3: holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute 4: holding that the grant of subject matter jurisdiction in  502e1 is exclusive


Input: that, although the trial court entered only a single order on defendant’s change of plea for all of these cases, that order did not consolidate them into a single case. As defendant implicitly acknowledges, the four armed robberies involved in these prior cases did not occur on the same occasion so as to render them related. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 comment, (n. 3); U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(f) (stating that it does not apply where the prior sentence for crimes of violence “are considered related because the offenses occurred on the same occasion”). Moreover, defendant does not argue that these four prior armed robberies “were part of a single common scheme or plan” so as to constitute related cases. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 comment, (n. 3); United States v. Irons, 196 F.3d 634, 638-39 (6th Cir.1999)(<HOLDING>). As the district court correctly noted, all of Holdings: 0: holding that separate instances of harassment committed against the same victim were not related because the defendant did not jointly plan the crimes 1: holding evidence of uncharged prior cocaine sales with numerous similarities to those for which the defendant was on trial admissible for among other purposes showing the existence of a common plan involving the prior sales and the transactions which were the subject of the charges pending against the defendant 2: recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence 3: holding that as to whether the defendants prior convictions were part of a single common scheme or plan so as to be related under ussg  4a12a2 defendant has the burden of establishing that those prior offenses were jointly planned or that the commission of one entailed the commission of the other 4: holding that two robberies committed within hours of each other were not part of a common scheme or plan when the defendant did not originally plan to rob his second victim


Input: erroneous deprivation is "primarily temporal,” as “there is little concern that in the Article 78 proceeding a plaintiff who is legally entitled to the return of confiscated longarms will ultimately be denied a proper remedy.” Razzano, 765 F.Supp.2d at 188 (emphasis added). But a lengthy deprivation can be enough to violate the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Cf. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389, 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975) ("[T]he possible length of wrongful depriva tion ... is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests.... the rapidity of ... review is a significant factor in assessing the sufficiency of the entire process.”); Cty. of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 770 N.Y.S.2d 277, 802 N.E.2d 616, 623-24 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 10 . In any event, the hearing ordered by the Holdings: 0: recognizing the potential length of the deprivation in evaluating whether a procedure is adequate 1: holding that idea administrative procedures provided an adequate post deprivation remedy 2: holding that deprivation of personal property does not violate the constitution if there are adequate state remedies available 3: holding that a prior hearing is not required where the potential length or severity of the deprivation does not indicate a likelihood of serious loss and where the procedures  are sufficiently reliable to minimize the risk of erroneous determination 4: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional


Input: court’s holding that Belson was entitled to counsel of his own choosing to be paid for by the insurance companies and, as such, is entitled to reimbursement of his reasonable legal fees. Appellants’ Br. 47-52 (discussing Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 336 F.Supp.2d at 625-26). We disagree. The district court recognized that, at the outset of the White and Anglin litigation, Belson and the other defendants had divergent interests. If Belson and the other defendants lost the “he said/she said” argument about Belson’s conduct, the other defendants had an alternative argument unavailable to Belson: Belson’s conduct was outside the course and scope of his employment; therefore, the other defendants should not be liable. See, e.g., Frazier v. Badger, 361 S.C. 94, 603 S.E.2d 587, 591 (S.C.2004) (<HOLDING>); Doe v. S.C. State Budget and Control Bd., 337 Holdings: 0: holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii 1: holding that assistant principal could not use an immunity defense because his sexual advances and ensuing retaliatory conduct towards a teacher were outside the scope of his official duties of employment 2: holding that a state official can be held individually hable under  1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties 3: holding that a janitorial workers sexual assault of a student deviated from his duties and was clearly outside of the scope of his employment 4: holding that a police officers rape of an arrestee was outside the scope of his employment


Input: Docket Nos. 54, 58, & 61.) Under Puerto Rico law, “the consent of the contracting parties is an essential element of a contract.” P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 31, § 3391. “ ‘Consent is shown by the concurrence of the offer and acceptance of the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.’ ” Marrero-Garcia v. Irizarry, 33 F.3d 117, 122 (1st Cir.1994) (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3401). Additionally, there must be a “meeting of the minds as to the terms agreed upon.” K-Mart Corp. v. Davis, 756 F.Supp. 62, 66 (D.P.R.1991) (finding that the parties did not reach a final contract because the text of the agreement evidenced the defendant’s intent not to be bound until the parties had finalized negotiations); see also Soc. de Gananciales v. Velez & Asoc., 145 D.P.R. 508, 517 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs’ primary argument in response to Holdings: 0: holding that the one thing without which a contract cannot be made  is the assent of the parties to the agreement the meeting of the minds upon a definite proposition 1: recognizing that an implied contract must result from a meeting of the minds of the parties in mutual assent to the terms and must be based upon a sufficient consideration free from fraud or undue influence not against public policy and sufficiently definite to be enforced 2: holding that a valid contract requires a meeting of minds that gave rise to an obligation situation or state of law resulting from an agreement and that created certain expectations on the basis of which the parties acted 3: recognizing that the duty arises not from the terms of the insurance contract but from an obligation imposed in law as a result of the special relationship 4: holding that contract between parties not law of negligence gave rise to duty and accordingly provided exclusive source of remedy


Input: of the Statements and had no way to verify the numbers. Joint Ex. A, at 1939-43. And the Board has rejected that uncertified financial statements are sufficient to meet an employer’s burden to produce financial information. See, e.g., R.E.C. Corp., 307 NLRB 330, 333 (1992) (“Indeed even absent such evidence of financial ‘looseness’ of employers, uncertified financial statements have not been deemed sufficient to meet the employers’ obligations under Truitt.”); Am. Model & Pattern, 277 NLRB 176, 184 (1985) (“Respondent, in order to satisfy its duty to bargain in good faith, was under a clear obligation to produce, for inspection and analysis, any and all books and records available to it which would tend to support its bargaining position.”); Tony’s Meats, Inc., 211 NLRB 625, 626 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Although Respondents argued before ALJ Holdings: 0: holding that while the investigatory hearing is not a full evidentiary hearing it nevertheless must be expanded to permit the accused attorney to cross examine witnesses 1: holding that records relating to a student court were not education records 2: recognizing it is common and reasonable for doctors to examine medical records and arrive at professional opinions 3: holding counsel must examine public information like prior conviction records prosecutor is likely to use 4: holding that an employer must permit cpa to examine employers records


Input: relationships under Virginia law. Many of those courts have done so in cases involving contracts governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, which, pursuant to Va.Code § 8.1A-304, there is no question “impose[] an obligation of good faith in [their] performance and enforcement.” See, e.g., Charles E. Brauer Co., Inc. v. NationsBank of Virginia, 251 Va. 28, 466 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1996) (stating “[t]he breach of an implied duty under the U.C.C. gives rise ... to a cause of action for breach of contract”). Many of those decisions, however, have acknowledged an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in cases involving contracts not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, and therefore outside Va.Code § 8.1A-304’s ambit. See, e.g., Stepp v. Outdoor World Corp., 18 Va. Cir. 106, 111 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Holdings: 0: recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages 1: holding where parties had not reached a binding contract the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not apply 2: holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract 3: recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate 4: recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract


Input: 576 F.2d at 564, our Court of Appeals elected to “stand with the vast majority of courts of appeals and hold that the receipt of Hill-Burton construction funding, Medicare and Medicaid funds, and the existence of tax exemption, as well as state licensing requirements for nonprofit hospitals, do not constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Four years later, the Supreme Court in Blum reached the same conclusion, holding that despite the state’s subsidization of the operating and capital costs of nursing homes, payment of the medical expenses of more than ninety percent of the nursing homes’ residents, and licensing of the facilities, the state was still not responsible for the nursing homes’ decisions. See also, e.g., Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254, 258 (1st Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Based on this abundance of case law, we find Holdings: 0: holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college because the language of the section does not distinguish between direct and indirect receipt of federal funds 1: holding that medicaid and medicare funds are subject to levy and that even if the inability to pay was the result of government regulation it would not excuse the tax liability 2: holding that government regulation even extensive regulation and the receipt of federal funds such as medicare medicaid and hillburton funds are insufficient to establish that a hospital or other entity acted under color of state law 3: holding that private hospital and physicians who involuntarily committed plaintiff under massachusetts statute were not state actors noting that state regulation even if extensive and receipt of federal funds do not establish state action 4: holding that a federal regulation did not create privity of contract between the plaintiff and the government


Input: the sort of question which can be decided only in the concrete factual context of the individual case * * * ”, (Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 1. c. 59, 88 S.Ct. 1. c. 1901), Judge Donnelly in the Moody opinion noted: “ * * * We limit the holding in this case to ‘the precise facts to which it is to be applied’ * * * ”, 443 S.W.2d 1. c. 804. It is also argued the trilogy of cases in the Durham litigation upheld an automobile search and seizure similar to that involved herein. Durham, however, involved not only search incident to arrest, but the added factors of visibility of a portion of the stolen goods on the floor of the auto and safety of the arresting officers (the automobile was driven by the three suspects to the police station behind the police car). State v. Novak, 42 d 283 (<HOLDING>); and Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Holdings: 0: holding that sniff test of automobile trunk not a search requiring probable cause 1: holding that an officer had probable cause to search bags in the trunk of the car when he opened the trunk and smelled a strong odor of methamphetamine 2: holding trunk search was for general exploration not for detaining prisoner or preventing escape 3: holding search of trunk unnecessary to protect officers or prevent defendants escape 4: holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not


Input: omitted). “The purpose of an action for reformation is to change a written instrument by inserting some omitted provision or deleting some existing provision so that the document conforms to the original agreement of the parties.” 66 Am. Jur. 2d Reformation of Instruments § 5, at 253 (footnote omitted). “In order to support reformation, the evidence must show that the instrument is not the true expression of the agreement.” Gagnon, 97 N.H. at 64 (quotation omitted). Generally, “to be entitled to the reformation of a deed, one must be a party to the deed or in privity with a party to the deed.” 66 Am. Jur. 2d Reformation of Instruments § 59, at 304; see id. § 60 (entitled “Persons in privity with original parties to instruments”); Bourne v. Lajoie, 540 A.2d 359, 361 (Vt. 1987) (<HOLDING>). The nature of an action to reform a deed is, Holdings: 0: holding merger by deed prohibits reformation when one of the parties learns of a mistake before closing and still signs the deed 1: recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title 2: holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed 3: holding in part that party seeking reformation of deed must show the original intent or agreement of parties by clear and convincing evidence 4: holding that sellers agreement to furnish title policy was a separate agreement not superseded by the deed and properly not included in the deed


Input: due process claims because there was no clearly established law guiding Detective Rogers’ conduct on the night in question. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over the district court’s partial summary judgment to Eric on those same claims. With respect to the jurisdictional issue, I believe that the majority’s disposition deviates from important binding Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, resulting in an unacceptable conflict of law in our circuit. I “[T]he right to a judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice...." Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940); see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Thus, “[i]t must be remembered that the Holdings: 0: recognizing that it is well settled law that an action is commenced by the service of a summons and without valid service of process the trial court has no jurisdiction to act 1: holding that it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal 2: holding that there is no federal or colorado constitutional right to postconviction counsel but there is a limited statutory right 3: holding that the obviousness of an error is hard to determine where there is no settled appellate law on point 4: holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction


Input: Mkts., Inc., 891 S.W.2d at 644-45 (internal citations omitted). 54 . Id. at 645. 55 . Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Amburn, 388 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex.Civ.App.1965) 56 . 891 S.W.2d 640. 57 . American Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Canal Indem. Co., 352 F.3d 254, 260 (5th Cir.2003). 58 . Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 233, 235 (5th Cir.2003). 59 . Id. 60 . Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir.2002) (Title VII action). As the TCHRA was designed to align Texas state law with federal law, courts look to federal law interpreting Title VII when analyzing TCHRA claims. Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex.2001). 61 . Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Gee, 289 F.3d at 345). 62 . Id. 63 . Id. at 488-89 (<HOLDING>). 64 . Although Ameen contends in her brief Holdings: 0: recognizing a cause of action under texas law for misappropriation 1: holding that texas cause of action for retaliation does arise under its workers compensation laws 2: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied 3: holding that but for standard applied to retaliation case brought under texas law 4: holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law


Input: ha[d] cooperated with the government, and [was] a single-mother with a child with medical issues”); United States v. Price, 618 F.Supp.2d 473, 475 (W.D.N.C.2008) (finding that a defendant’s pregnancy and the impending birth of the child constituted exceptional circumstances meriting release); United States v. Mitchell, 358 F.Supp.2d 707, 708-09 (E.D.Wis.2005) (finding that “exceptional reasons” were present where the defendant had fully cooperated with the government, performed well in pretrial release, renounced criminal activities, secured full-time employment, successfully passed all drug screenings, and fulfilled all of his familial responsibilities, including paying child support); United States v. Reboux, No. 5:06-CR-451 (FJS), 2007 WL 4409801, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hooks, 330 F.Supp.2d 1311, Holdings: 0: recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 1: holding that plaintiffs work environment was not affected by comments and conduct of which she was not aware 2: holding that exceptional reasons for release existed where the defendant underwent selfimprovement through his faith community and work environment and was completely and unconditionally cooperative with the federal authorities 3: recognizing that the elements of title vii sexually hostile work environment claims apply to icra sexually hostile work environment claims 4: holding that unfair scrutiny was not sufficiently severe to result in a finding that an objectively hostile or abusive work environment existed


Input: it at least arguable in the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3182, when it refers to "the agent of [the executive authority of the demanding state] appointed to receive the fugitive,” where, as here, there is some basis to conclude that private extradition services are not authorized under the law of the demanding state. See Off. Att'y Gen., New York, Informal Op. No. 90-18 (March 19, 1990). 4 . See, e.g., Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 919 (9th Cir.1986); Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 649-50 & n. 4 (3d Cir.1981) (per curiam); Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758, 764 (8th Cir.1980); McBride v. Soos, 594 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir.1979); Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 323 (4th Cir.1977); Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir.1974); but see Barton v. Norrod, 106 F.3d 1289, 1295 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The Supreme Court has also suggested as Holdings: 0: holding that since the constitutional and statutory extradition provisions are not designed to protect fugitives but rather  are designed to facilitate the administration of justice between states the failure to comply with established procedures does not deprive the fugitive of any protected right and therefore provides no basis for a  1983 claim 1: holding that the protections of the iad are not founded on constitutional rights or the preservation of a fair trial but are designed to facilitate a defendants rehabilitation in prison and to avoid disruptions caused when charges are outstanding against the prisoner in another jurisdiction 2: holding that punitive damages are not duplicative since they are designed to punish rather than to compensate 3: holding that the extradition procedures are a matter of state law 4: holding the failure to comply with the act does not bar defendant from raising a constitutional challenge to jury selection procedures


Input: of crime. State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 380-81, 323 S.E.2d 316, 327-28 (1984) (citing State v. Smith, 66 Ore. App. 703, 706, 675 P.2d 510, 512 (1984); United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976)). The underlying theory behind excluding hearsay observations of police officers at the scene of the crime is that they may not be as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases. State v. Harper, 96 N.C. App. 36, 40, 384 S.E.2d 297, 299 (1989) (citation omitted). For example, the notes of a non-testifying, undercover officer summarizing alleged drug transactions 295, 629 S.E.2d 288 (2006); United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 72 (1st Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, the photos in the Holdings: 0: holding that a booking sheet does not recount the work that led to an arrest so much as the mere fact that an arrest occurred and thus constituted a nonadversarial ministerial observation that was not excluded by rule 8038b 1: holding that it is equally wellestablished that a suspects mere flight to escape arrest does not violate the resisting arrest statute 2: holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment 3: holding avoiding arrest is not the same as resisting arrest 4: holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest


Input: Overland Park, Kansas. The Chapter 13 Standing Trustee, William H. Griffin, appears by his attorney, Cynthia F. Grimes of Grimes & Rebein, L.C., Lenexa, Kansas. 2 . Debtors’ Motion for Discharge filed August 30, 2000 (Doc. # 47). 3 . Trustee's Objection to Motion for Discharge filed September 8, 2000 (Doc. # 50), para. 7 at 3-4. 4 . Debtors’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed April 3, 2001 (Doc. # 75). 5 . Trustee’s Objection to Motion for Discharge filed September 8, 2000 (Doc. # 50), para. 4 at 2. 6 . "Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts” in Debtors’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judg ment filed April 3, 2001 (Doc. # ) (vesting property of the estate in the debtor upon confirmation). 23 . In re Gyulafia, 65 B.R. 913 (Bankr.D.Kan. 1986) (<HOLDING>). 24 . McCray v. McCray (In re McCray), 62 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding that confirmation vests in the debtor property of the estate not dedicated to the plan 1: holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support 2: holding that workers compensation awards remained property of the estate despite confirmation of the debtors plans where the confirmation orders specifically provided that property of the estate did not vest in the debtor until the completion of the plan 3: holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor 4: holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate


Input: for standing are that the plaintiff have suffered an injury in fact, that the injury be fairly traceable to the challenged action, and that the injury be fairly redressable by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1991). In seeking mandamus, the injury Appellant is trying to cure is the failure of the territorial auditor to audit the legislature. He is not seeking the return of the property he alleges has been taken — i.e., his income tax. As was stated above, Appellant has shown no property interest in the audit itself. There are innumerable cases in which the plaintiff, although having standing to bring a due process challenge, is ultimately found to have no property interest. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 805 F.2d 874, Holdings: 0: holding that claim against nursing home regarding patients death from spider bite fell within the statutory definition of a health care liability claim 1: holding that the medicaid statute as amended by the federal nursing home reform amendments did not create a private cause of action for nursing home residents against nursing homes 2: holding that nursing home patients did not have a property interest in receiving care at a particular facility 3: recognizing that a patients choice of a health care facility does not render the facility a beneficiary under 502a1b 4: holding that an assisted living facility licensed to provide personal care was not licensed to engage primarily in providing nursing care


Input: added). Coady presented no evidence at trial with respect to whether Toyota’s regional office in Mansfield, Massachusetts (approximately 15 miles from Coady’s dealership) is within its “relevant market area.” Given that the formula for determining the “relevant market area” of a dealer has been said to “perplex even the most percipient logician,” Bernardi’s, 432 Mass, at 428, 735 N.E.2d at 351, the absence of any such evidence is fatal to Coa-dy’s claim and this Court concludes that Coady has failed to prove that Toyota violated § 4(3)(k) by owning and operating a motor vehicle dealership of the same line make within Coady’s “relevant market area.” 6. Arbitrary, in Bad Faith or Unconscionable Acts As a catch-all provision, M.G.L. c. 93B, § 4(1) broadly declares that acts t .E.2d at 15 (<HOLDING>). C. Defamation In Massachusetts, defamation is Holdings: 0: holding that the denial of a motion to find a violation of the automatic stay was a final order 1: recognizing that where the board properly finds a violation of the act it can order reinstatement under its remedial powers granted by  160c although finding no violation of the act here 2: holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation 3: recognizing that it would be anomalous to find a violation under  41 without a prior finding of a violation of  431 4: holding that there can be no violation of  1986 without a predicate violation of  1985


Input: in 2006, OxBlue utilized a script to gather confidential information from EarthCam’s customers’ webpages, including customer names, camera names, images from customer cameras, the URL to the image for each camera, and the date and time stamped on the last image taken from a camera. The OxBlue Defendants dispute that the script accomplished what EarthCam argues. Even if the Court assumes that the script accessed all of the information alleged—even though there is no evidence it did—EarthCam has the burden to show that the customer information gathered in 2006 “(1) derive[s] economic value from being a secret not readily ascertainable by proper means, and (2) [ ] [is] the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.” Vito v. Inman, 286 Ga.App. 646, 649 S.E.2d 753, 757 (2007) (<HOLDING>). EarthCam is “required to prove both prongs to Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof because he offered absolutely no evidence to support his claim that the costs of arbitration will deny him an effective forum to vindicate his statutory rights 1: holding that the plaintiffs customer list was not a trade secret in part because there was no evidence that by the nature of the plaintiffs business extraordinary effort was involved in compiling the customer list 2: holding that plaintiff failed to prove both prongs because he admitted that his competitors would not seek to use the customer list to take his patients from him 3: holding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that its customer list was a trade secret because the plaintiff presented evidence that the list took ten years and great expense to the company to develop 4: holding former employee could properly use recollection of customer information where he did not otherwise misappropriate an actual customer list


Input: decide whether the refusal of NOCO to enter into an “interactive process” alone would foreclose summary judgment. See Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 214 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir.2000) (citing Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir.1999)). In like vein, the plaintiff, and the EEOC as amicus cu/riae, urge us to hold, as have other circuit courts of appeals, that the defendant had not only a duty reasonably to accommodate the plaintiffs disability, but an independent duty to institute and engage in an “interactive process” with the plaintiff to attempt to find a reasonable accommodation the breach of which is itself a violation of the ADA. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1111-17 (9th Cir.2000) (in banc) (collecting cases); id. at 1117 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff did not raise this argument in Holdings: 0: holding that if the employer requests reasonable medical evidence to support an employees claim of changed condition the employer is under no obligation to engage in further interactive processes if the employee fails to submit such evidence 1: holding that the interactive process requires both sides to communicate directly and exchange essential information such that the employer may be liable only if the employer is responsible for the breakdown of the interactive process 2: holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation 3: holding that in a failuretotransfer case if after a full opportunity for discovery the summary judgment record is insufficient to establish the existence of an appropriate position into which the plaintiff could have been transferred summary judgment must be granted in favor of the defendant  even if it also appears that the defendant failed to engage in good faith in the interactive process 4: holding that in light of the defendants failure to engage in the interactive process liability would be appropriate if  reasonable accommodation would otherwise have been possible


Input: the District Court that the acts of the BOP officials in this case involved an element of judgment or choice, thereby satisfying the first prong of the Mitchell analysis. See Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that “even if § 4042 imposes on the BOP a general duty of care to safeguard prisoners, the BOP retains sufficient discretion in the means it may use to fulfill that duty to trigger the discretionary function exception”). As to the second prong of Mitchell, a judgment as to how best to protect one prisoner from attack by another “is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Mitchell, 225 F.3d at 363 (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Cohen, 151 F.3d at 1340-45. As a result, we Holdings: 0: holding that erisa does not require plan administrators to give special deference to treating physicians opinions although administrators may not arbitrarily refuse to credit them 1: holding that erisa does not require plan administrators to give special deference to treating physicians opinions 2: recognizing the considerable deference afforded to regulations concerning medicare 3: holding that prison administrators should be afforded wideranging deference in implementing and executing policies because discretion is needed to preserve internal discipline and maintain institutional security 4: holding that the secretary is not entitled to deference when construing the acts implementing regulations


Input: class of persons 16 and over, or drinking to a class of persons 18 and over. In addition, classifications by gender have been utilized to require men to register for the draft, but not women, see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981), and to qualify only men for employment in maximum security prisons, see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). In short, the Fourteenth Amendment “does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways.” Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). When a regulation undertakes to define a class, however, the criteria for defining the class must be related to the purpose of the regulation. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 76, 92 S.Ct. at 254 (<HOLDING>). We may thus begin the analysis for Holdings: 0: holding that a similar hawaii statute violates equal protection 1: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause 2: holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court 3: holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause 4: holding that idaho statute which gives preference to the appointment of men over women as estate administrators violates the equal protection clause


Input: the juror had been sufficiently attentive in response. The Court did not agree with defense counsel’s assertion that the juror had been sleeping during the second day of trial, and stated that it was “pleasantly surprised” with the attention that Juror # 3 had been paying. In refusing to dismiss Juror # 3, the District Court acted well within its broad discretion to decide when to remove a juror, see United States v. Purdy, 144 F.3d 241, 247 (2d Cir.1998), and we will not second-guess the Court’s judgment. B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Zhao also asserts that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel because her attorney would not allow her to testify, despite her having repeatedly expressed a desire to do so. See Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim Holdings: 0: recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted 1: holding that issues not argued specifically and distinctly in a partys opening brief are waived internal quotation marks and citations omitted 2: holding that strategic refiling in district court violatefd the spirit of the sixmonth rule internal quotation marks and citation omitted 3: holding that regardless of strategic considerations that a lawyer concludes weigh against such a decision a defendant who wishes to testify must be permitted to do so citations and internal quotation marks omitted 4: recognizing that absent illegality we do not weigh the wisdom of any particular employment decision internal quotation marks and citation omitted


Input: salt and the intent that the adulterated product enter into interstate commerce, we need not address the milk container issue: Whether the milk was within interstate commerce because it was bottled into containers that were in interstate commerce manufactured and labeled by Champion International Corporation, which is located in Morristown, New Jersey. 4 . Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 ("[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 Holdings: 0: recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce 1: holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce 2: holding that the presence requirement of the carjacking statute was satisfied when keys were taken from a restaurant employee whose car was parked outside the restaurant 3: holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute 4: holding that arson of an owneroccupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property used in commerce and is not subject to federal prosecution under federal arson statute


Input: 60(c)(1). 44 . In re Osborne, 379 F.3d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 287-88 (5th Cir. 1985)). 45 . Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing First RepublicBank Fort Worth v. Norglass, Inc., 958 F.2d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("What constitutes ‘reasonable time' depends upon the facts of each case, taking into consideration the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties.”). 46 . Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting 11 Wright & Miller, Federa ir. 2014) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 56 . - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 185 L.Ed.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant who had waited thirteen months after trevino was decided before seeking appointment of conflictfree counsel had not filed his rule 60b motion within a reasonable time 1: holding that defendant abandoned his motion by failing to pursue it within a reasonable time after it was filed 2: holding defendant entitled to appointment of conflictfree counsel to assist with preparation of facially sufficient motion to withdraw plea 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a rule 60b motion when the relevant change in law occurred eight months prior and petitioner filed the motion two days before his execution 4: holding that the insurer was estopped from asserting coverage defenses when it waited to file a declaratory action until 10 months after it had notice of the claim and several months after it had notice of a potential settlement of the underlying litigation


Input: Amendment right.”). Because the supreme court found subsection (C) applicable in Jones, the question became whether there was “evidence to support the judge’s ruling that Jones acted in self-defense.” Id. at 300-01, 786 S.E.2d at 141. “Consistent with the Castle Doctrine and the text of the Act, a valid case of self-defense must exist, and the trial court must necessarily consider the elements of self-defense in determining a defendant’s entitlement to the Act’s immunity. Therefore, the defendant must demonstrate the elements of self-defense, save the duty to retreat, by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 301, 786 S.E.2d at 141 (quoting State v. Curry, 406 S.C. 364, 371, 752 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2013)); see also State v. Douglas, 411 S.C. 307, 318, 768 S.E.2d 232, 238 (Ct. App. 2014) (<HOLDING>); Curry, 406 S.C. at 372, 752 S.E.2d at 267 Holdings: 0: holding that if the reason the victim cannot testify at trial is that the accused murdered her then the accused should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation right even though the act with which the accused is charged is the same as the one by which he allegedly rendered the witness unavailable 1: holding that a defendant asserting immunity based on selfdefense under  13a323d ala code 1976 is entitled to an opportunity to prove that claim by a preponderance of the evidence at a pretrial hearing before the court 2: holding that the district court determines the amount of loss under the preponderance of the evidence standard 3: holding at trial a criminal defendant has the burden to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence 4: recognizing that immunity under the act is predicated on an accused demonstrating the elements of selfdefense to the satisfaction of the trial court by the preponderance of the evidence save the duty to retreat quoting curry 406 sc at 37172 752 se2d at 26667


Input: 740, 742 (1962). Estoppel “cannot have created liability where non existed under the policy.” Empire Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1191, 1198 (Colo. 1988). An insurer that reconsiders its decision to provide a defense under a reservation of rights is not barred from later contesting coverage and its duty to defend. See, e.g., American Economy Ins. Co. v. Schoolcraft, 551 F.Supp.2d 1235, 1241 (D.Colo.2007) (“I conclude that the fact that American Economy at some point made the strategic decision to offer a defense under a reservation of rights, and then reconsidered, does not create a legal duty to defend where there is none under the facts alleged in the complaint under the law.”); cf. Flannery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 49 F.Supp.2d 1223, 1228-29 (D.Colo. 1999) (<HOLDING>). I therefore grant Mid-Con’s motion with Holdings: 0: holding that claims were clearly excluded from coverage under assault and battery exclusion and therefore insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify 1: holding the duty to indemnify is narrower than the duty to defend 2: holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend 3: holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify 4: holding that an insurer is not estopped from challenging its duty to indemnify even if it hadand breachedits duty to defend


Input: not present sufficient evidence that defendant failed to release the child in a safe place, and thus the charge of second degree kidnapping should have been submitted to the jury, instead of the charge of first degree kidnapping. We again note that the General Assembly has neither defined nor given guidance as to the meaning of the term “safe place” in relation to the offense of first degree kidnapping. See N.C.G.S. § 14-39. Further, our case law in North Carolina has not set out any test or rule for determining whether a release was in a “safe place.” Several of the cases that have addressed the question of whether the defendant released the victim in a safe place have centered on whether there was a voluntary release by the defendant. See Heatwole, 333 N.C. at 161, 423 S.E.2d at 738 (<HOLDING>); State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 263, 307 Holdings: 0: holding that releasing a victim when the kidnapper is aware he is cornered and outnumbered by law enforcement officials is not voluntary 1: holding that a defendant is aware of the consequences of his plea for sentencing purposes and the plea is voluntary as long as he understands the length of time he might possibly receive 2: holding that it is not 3: recognizing that it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present and  that in such cases those officials  should not be held personally liable 4: holding that alleged misconduct by public officials particularly by law enforcement officials is matter of public concern


Input: withstand. In granting summary judgment because Bispo failed to produce evidence of risk, the district court misapplied California law. Even where a plaintiff never so much as mentions “risk-benefit,” a prima facie showing of injury and causation shifts the burden to the defendant. McCabe v. American Honda Motor Co., 100 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1127, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 303 (Cal.Ct.App.2002). In any event, the district court’s determination that Bispo produced no evidence of risk was clearly incorrect. The accident itself, caused by the failure of the rubber seal and resulting in severe injury, is evidence of risk. Moreover, Robertshaw did not show any benefits of its valve design. See Bernal v. Richard Wolf Medical Instruments Corp., 221 Cal.App.3d 1326, 1335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 41 (Cal.Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). Robertshaw cannot carry its burden of showing Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury 1: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden to show that the defendant acted with intent to deceive 2: holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review 3: holding that the defendant not the plaintiff bears the burden with regard to feasible alternative designs 4: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden when relying on the discovery rule


Input: especially illustrative: Neal asked the court, “[I]s there any way possible I could go to trial on the conspiracy?” Finally, while it is hardly disposi-tive, Neal submitted his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas the day after he entered them, giving a good indication of how he would have pleaded had he understood his options. In the letter, he makes clear that he is particularly upset at the idea of having a murder conviction on his record. Unlike cases where, for instance, the sentencing court merely failed to make the sentencing consequences clear to a defendant, and it is therefore debatable what the counterfactual scenario would have looked like, here, Neal clearly articulated the alternative he would have explored. Cf. United States v. Watch, 7 F.3d 422, 429 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). But for the district court’s mistake in Holdings: 0: holding that due process requires that defendant be fully aware of direct consequences of guilty plea 1: holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence 2: holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to a sixperson jury and the failure to consult the defendant as to his wishes was an error for which a new trial was the only remedy 3: holding that a failure to inform the defendant of the minimum possible sentence meant that the defendant did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and his rights were therefore automatically substantially affected 4: holding that in light of the trial courts inquiry the defendants verbal responses and the defendants answers to the questions on the transcript of plea the trial court did determine that defendant was fully informed of the consequences of his choice to enter an alford plea


Input: intervention in arbitration “must be prompt and simple or the values of arbitration will be largely dissipated through prolonged litiga tion.” Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 204 (1954), cited in Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis, Inc., 380 Mass. at 96, 401 N.E.2d at 842-43 (1980). Uniform Acts should be interpreted consistently. The Tennessee Supreme Court declared: It is axiomatic that a purpose in enacting uniform laws is to achieve conformity, not uniqueness____ This court should strive to maintain the standardization of construction of uniform acts to carry out the legislative intent of uniformity. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Olsen, 692 , 751 P.2d 542 (1988); General Cable Corp. v. Citizens Utils. Co., 27 Ariz. App. 381, 385, 555 P.2d 350, 354 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Because we do not consider W.E.S. to be a Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure is on the party that seeks nondisclosure rather than on the party that seeks access 1: holding that successful party is one who is the ultimate prevailing party in the litigation 2: holding that where complaint seeks greater damages than counterclaim and court denied relief to both parties there is no successful party 3: holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief 4: holding that it is possible to have no successful party when one prevails on the complaint and the other prevails on the counterclaim


Input: the prosecutor rhetorically asked in closing argument, “ ‘ “[I]s there any evidence that it didn’t happen? Is there any evidence that the things she told you didn’t happen?” ’ ” 278 Kan. at 92. We held that these comments were improper attempts to shift the burden of proof. 278 Kan. at 92; see also State v. Stone, 291 Kan. 13, Syl. ¶ 4, 237 P.3d 1229 (2010) (“It is improper for the prosecutor to attempt to shift the burden of proof to the defendant.”). The comments made by the prosecutor in this case were not like those made in Tosh. Rather, in context, it appears the prosecutor here was commenting on the efficacy of Wilson’s defense by pointing out to the jury where Wilson’s version of events logically broke down. See, e.g., State v. Duong, 292 Kan. 824, 832-33, 257 P.3d 309 (2011) (<HOLDING>); Stone, 291 Kan. at 18 (finding prosecutor’s Holdings: 0: holding prosecutors arguments questioning duongs failure to present evidence of misidentification did not improperly shift the burden of proof to the defense because prosecutor did not call upon defense to disprove the occurrence of a crime but rather pointed out that evidence supporting defense theory was thin 1: holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify 2: holding that defense counsel may call attention to the states failure to produce evidence 3: holding that it was permissible for prosecutor to comment on the general failure of the defense to produce any evidence 4: holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second


Input: where it is undisputed that the defendants received notice through the indictments, and where the Government has made available to the defendants and their counsel the results of the intercepted communications as part of the lengthy pretrial discovery that has transpired in this case. See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 439 n. 26, 97 S.Ct. 658 (finding that respondents were not prejudiced by their failure to receive post-intercept notice under either of the district court’s inventory orders where the Government made available to all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers and where, in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Government produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations); see also United States v. Davis, 882 F.2d 1334, 1344 & n. 13 (8th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). In light of the foregoing, the Court does not Holdings: 0: holding suppression not required where the government mailed the required notice 34 days after the 90day statutory period because defendant had access to the recorded calls and transcripts and failed to demonstrate actual prejudice 1: holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice 2: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 3: holding that there was no actual prejudice where the defendant has the functional equivalent of the notice required 4: holding that plaintiff complied with plain language of the notice requirement when notice was mailed within statutory period although it was not received until after


Input: ("It is not for the Court to decide, on a motion to dismiss, ... whether or to what extent the market functioned efficiently. [That is an] issue[] of fact for trial.”); In re Ashanti Goldfields Sec. Litig., No. CV 00-0717, 2004 WL 626810, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2004) (“[P]roof of market inefficiency ... or rebuttal of the presumption of reliance is best left to the trial phase of litigation.”) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n. 29, 108 S.Ct. 978) (other citations omitted); Rmed Int’l v. Sloan’s Supermarkets, No. 94 Civ. 5587, 2002 WL 31780188, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2002) ("Whether or not a market for a stock is open and efficient is a question of fact.”) (citing In re Laser Arms Corp. Sec. Litig., 794 F.Supp. 475, 490 (S.D.N.Y.1989)); In re Laser Arms Corp., 794 F.Supp. at 490 (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 969 F.2d 15(2d Cir.1992). 137 . IPO I, Holdings: 0: holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury 1: holding it is a question of fact 2: holding that whether in fact laser arms traded in an efficient market is a question of fact therefore resolution of that issue must await presentation of further proof at trial 3: holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact 4: holding that estoppel was a question of fact


Input: motive from circumstantial evidence.” Id. Among the factors on which the Board may base such inferences are “the timing of the discharges in relation to the union activity [and] the simultaneous nature of otherwise unconnected dismissals.” Id. at 580. Both the timing and the nature of the discharges in this case suggest anti-union motivations. The firings occurred just as Local 23’s campaign was picking up steam, and the employees, who worked in various different departments, were all dismissed on the same day for entirely disparate reasons. Furthermore, of the eight employees laid off, six were union supporters, and this occurred at a time when only thirteen out of more than one hundred employees had signed cards. Cf. NLRB v. Cameo, Inc., 340 F.2d 803, 810 (5th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>); see also Brief for NLRB at 40 (relying on Holdings: 0: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 1: holding that knowledge of union activities could be inferred from the fact that an employer discharged eleven of sixteen union adherents without discharging any of its remaining seventyfour employees 2: holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity 3: holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union 4: holding that an employer could only distribute its proposal to union employees when the proposal was properly before the union


Input: and no discriminatory effect of its application, we cannot conclude that the plan “in some sense was designed to accord disparate treatment on the basis of racial considerations.” Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 485, 102 S.Ct. 3187, 73 L.Ed.2d 896 (1982). Consequently, the district court correctly held that the New Plan was not subject to strict scrutiny. 3. Rational Basis Review Instead, since race-based classifications are not in play and plaintiffs failed to show that the New Plan was adopted with a discriminatory purpose, the New Plan must only survive rational basis review; as long as the plan is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, it must be upheld. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (<HOLDING>). As we have explained at some length, Holdings: 0: holding that the classification made by  252242 was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary 1: holding that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end 2: holding that the trial courts classification of property will not be disturbed as long as there is competent evidence to support that determination 3: holding that juveniles form neither a suspect nor semisuspect class for equal protection purposes 4: holding that neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history suggests that appointment is permissible only in some limited set of circumstances


Input: despite the text’s reference only to "property described in subsection (a)”). 33 . The conclusions reached here are also based on the sworn statement of facts made a part of the plea agreement of co-conspirator Paul V. Mederos, which is in the public record. See United States v. Mederos, Case No. 1:04cr314 (E.D.Va. July 26, 2004) (Statement of Facts). 34 . In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 353 (4th Cir.1994) (upholding in camera review of evidence establishing crime-fraud exception to subpoena recipients’ attorney-client privilege objection and holding that such review did not violate due process even though subpoena recipient had no opportunity (i) to view the submission or (ii) to offer rebuttal evidence); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 884 F.2d 124, 126 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, Holdings: 0: holding that governments weak interest in preserving grand jury secrecy did not warrant in camera submission where party seeking access to submission would learn of submission contents as soon as he was called as a grand jury witness 1: holding that where government does not intend to disclose grand jury materials in camera proceedings are appropriate to protect govern ments interest in secrecy 2: holding the presence of counsel for a witness did not violate grand jury secrecy 3: recognizing the importance of grand jury secrecy 4: holding that right was available in grand jury proceedings


Input: the petitioner’s “subsequent release from custody does not itself deprive the federal habeas court of its statutory jurisdiction.” Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1279 (9th Cir.1983). Physical custody is not indispensable to confer jurisdiction. “History, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man’s liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus.” Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963). “[T]he boundary that limits the ‘in custody’ requirement is the line between a ‘restraint on liberty’ and a ‘collateral consequence of a conviction.’ ” Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1183-84 (<HOLDING>). These above precedents go to the first Holdings: 0: recognizing for the first time that the habeas court had the power to retain the petitioner in conditional custody before granting relief 1: recognizing that federal habeas statutes require petitioner to be in custody when petition filed 2: holding habeas petition challenging denial of custody credits is not related to the conditions of  confinement and was properly brought in the district of conviction 3: holding that compliance with registration statute did not abrogate common law and statutory trademark law 4: holding that a habeas petitioner challenging washingtons sexoffender registration law did not meet the in custody requirement because the law did not impose a significant restraint on the petitioners liberty


Input: 1998, the appellant entered into a fee agreement with her counsel, Robert A. Laughlin. That fee agreement includes the following: Robert A. Laughlin shall have the right to claim attorney fees or [sic] expenses, based upon the appeal which is the subject of this Contract, to the full extent that such rights are conferred upon the Client by the [Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (EAJA)]. Fee Agreement at 1. This provision is unreasonable and unenforceable because it transfers to the attorney the client’s EAJA rights. See Shaw v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 498, 506 (1997) (“the law gives the EAJA cause of action and standing to the client[,] ... and the attorney cannot amend the law by bestowing such standing on the attorney”); accord Fritz v. West, 13 Vet.App. 190, 192-93 (1999) (<HOLDING>); In the Matter of the Fee Agreement of Mason, Holdings: 0: holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met 1: holding retroactive application 2: holding that where there is a substantial question as to whether the instant eaja application has the appellants authorization appellant must provide a verification that he approves the submission of the instant eaja application 3: recognizing district court application of the same rule 4: holding that there is no rational reason for the retroactive application of 80173 and the prospective application of 833


Input: Although the Court recognized the cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, it nevertheless held that summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the defendant-employer, because the controversy merely involved a difference in medical opinions and plaintiff was not asked to engage in a project which constituted a violation of a clear mandate of public policy. Id. at 75, 417 A.2d 505. The Court indicated that the interests of the employee, the employer, and the public must be balanced in recognizing this cause of action. Id. at 71, 417 A.2d 505. See also Lepore v. National Tool and Mfg. Co., 224 N.J.Super. 463, 471, 540 A.2d 1296 (App. Div.1988), aff'd, 115 N.J. 226, 557 A.2d 1371 (1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 366, 107 L.Ed.2d 353 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In order to maintain a Pierce claim, Holdings: 0: holding that appellant failed to state a claim of retaliatory discharge where the record showed he merely gave his supervisor feedback and did not report alleged violations to any outside authority 1: holding that employee may maintain retaliatory dis charge claim where he alleged that he was terminated for reporting violations of the occupational safety and health act 2: holding that a union employee protected by a collective bargaining agreement was in no different position than an atwill employee and could similarly maintain an action for wrongful discharge for reporting workplace safety violations 3: holding that no commonlaw cause of action for a discharge in retaliation for reporting violations existed before passage of the wpa which thereafter became the exclusive remedy for an employee whose employment is terminated in retaliation for reporting an employers violation of the law 4: holding employee has cause of action for retaliatory discharge in contravention of public policy where employee was fired for reporting fellow employees alleged criminal activities to local law enforcement


Input: from the debt- or’s request for use of cash collateral; and (3) The court must determine whether the debtor’s adequate protection proposal protects value as nearly as possible against risks to that value consistent with the concept of indubitable equivalence. Martin v. United States (In re Martin), 761 F.2d 472, 476-77 (8th Cir.1985). In addition to reviewing the debt- or’s adequate protection proposal, the court should consider whether there is any reasonable chance of reorganization. If a debtor is engaged in an obviously futile attempt to reorganize, it should not be permitted to jeopardize a creditor’s cash collateral. In re C.F. Simonin’s Sons, Inc., 28 B.R. 707, 711 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.1983). See also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 159 B.R. 165, 172 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1993) (<HOLDING>). Debtor does not dispute that under the First Holdings: 0: holding that the debtor in possession was liable for civil contempt when he disobeyed the courts order to turn over the cash collateral and violated 11 usc  363 1: holding that debtor could not use cash collateral although objecting creditors were oversecured when business plan was unrealistic and unattainable 2: holding transfers of cash totaling 32350000 made by a debtor to an insider creditors company void under the statute 3: holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor 4: holding that the interest of the public  especially the debtor and creditors  could limit compensation to a debtors counsel


Input: indictment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444 (2011) (listing the issues that a defendant who has pled guilty is entitled to appeal as a matter of right); see also State v. Absher, 329 N.C. 264, 265 n. 1, 404 S.E.2d 848, 849 n. 1 (1991) (“While it is true that a defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of a trial court, such challenge may be made in the appellate division only if and when the case is properly pending before the appellate division.”). Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s appeal. However, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(e) and N.C. R. App. P. 21, Defendant has petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. We elect to grant Defendant’s petition and review the issues. See State v. Keller, 198 N.C. App. 639, 641, 680 S.E.2d 212, 213 (2009) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); see also State v. Demaio, Holdings: 0: holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari 1: holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea 2: holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea 3: holding that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea as a matter of right before it is accepted by the court based on ndr crim p 32d3 which states that a defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty as a matter of right once the plea has been accepted by the court  alteration in original 4: holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea


Input: Court construes the debtor’s motion as a request for the Court to reopen his ease for the pur pose of revoking the discharge and dismissing the case. Although the Court is sympathetic to t relief sought by the debtor under the circumstances he presents. Although the debtor has not relied on any authority or rule in seeking relief, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated that the Bankruptcy Court’s inherent powers to reconsider its own orders must be determined within the parameters of Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable to bankruptcy cases by Rule 9024 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. In re Met-L-Wood Corp., 861 F.2d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, Gekas v. Pipin, 490 U.S. 1006, 109 S.Ct. 1642, 104 L.Ed.2d 157 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The Court’s review of the debtor’s motion Holdings: 0: holding that the old inherent power to reconsider bankruptcy orders has been merged into  rule 60b  1: recognizing the inherent power of the court to coerce compliance with its orders 2: recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it 3: holding that bankruptcy courts have inherent power and authority under 11 usc  105a to sua sponte reconsider modify or vacate orders previously entered 4: holding that the bankruptcy court has the inherent power to award sanctions for badfaith conduct in a bankruptcy court proceeding


Input: benefits or for breach of fiduciary duty. Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324-25. Some equitable remedy may have been available. However, because Gibson sought only damages, summary judgment is appropriate. CONCLUSION The district court’s summary judgment order is AFFIRMED. 1 . The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Prudential on the basis of res judicata. Because we affirm the dismissal on the basis of ERISA preemption we do not reach the res judicata issue. 2 . Appellant has found a few situations where a state law claim has been permitted in a benefits case. However, in those cases the premise underlying the claim has been that a duty, unconnected to the administration of the benefit plan, has been violated. See e.g., Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1505-06 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Greenblatt v. Budd Co., 666 F.Supp. 735, 742 Holdings: 0: holding that when an employee had his duties changed but had no interest created or protected by the constitution or state law in those duties then no liberty interest claim was stated 1: recognizing similar duties 2: holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders 3: holding that the amount of time devoted to managerial duties and the significance of those duties present factual questions 4: holding that one claim was not preempted because it did not allege the violation of duties created by any welfare plan but a violation of duties as a past employer


Input: Ross’s care and thereby induced the hospital to care for him. But as we observed above, federal law already required Denver Health to treat Ross. And once he arrived on the hospital steps, Arvada’s representations no' longer dictated whether Ross would receive care. Regardless, the facts do not disclosé misrepresentation. When the hospital presented an Arvada Officer with .a “Guarantee of Payment for Patient/Inmate” form, the officer signed it but noted next to the medical expenses, “suspect is responsible—he shot self.” ¶ 42 We will not shoehorn contractual facts into a tort theory. See id. at 1007 (explaining that we apply a “case-by-case analysis” to determine whether an unjust enrichment claim - could lie in tort); cf. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. DeLozier, 917 P.2d 714, 717 (Colo. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Denver Health, by virtue of its statutory Holdings: 0: holding that this court erred in concluding that richmond stands for the proposition that equitable estoppel will not lie against the government for any monetary claim and remanding for consideration of the facts supporting the estoppel claim 1: holding estoppel claim could not lie in tort where the facts that support the claim could not support a claim for fraud or misrepresentation 2: holding that when the essence of the claim is either negligent or intentional misrepresentation the claim could lie in tort 3: holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim 4: holding that although the form of relief alone does not govern the categorization of a claim as a tort or other type of action a trial court must consider the nature of the relief sought to determine whether a particular claim lies in tort or could lie in tort


Input: 290, 292, cited with approval in GenCorp, Inc., supra, 477 F.3d at 372. {¶ 44} Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is therefore granted in part. All of plaintiffs allegations contesting or denying guilt, or suggesting any notion of actual innocence are barred by his federal conviction. IX. Defendants’ Intervening-Cause Argument {¶ 45} Defendants also seek summary judgment premised upon the view that Blackwell’s “acts of witness intimidation and false testimony are an intervening cause of his conviction” separate and apart from the law firm’s alleged legal malpractice. Reply Memorandum filed Jan. 25, 2007, at 7. Because all of the events implicated in plaintiffs conviction cannot be revisited in this case, this argument is moot. X. Ohio St. 47, 51-52, 44 O.O. 72, 97 N.E.2d 549 (<HOLDING>), following Gillette v. Tucker (1902), 67 Ohio Holdings: 0: holding that whether in tort or contract all malpractice claims are covered by the same statute of limitations 1: holding that covered employee stands in the same position as an insured in a private insurance contract 2: holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations 3: holding the same 4: holding that whether in contract or tort all bodilyinjury cases are covered by the same statute of limitations


Input: Stephenson and the government adequate notice of and an opportunity to respond to the sentencing issues each party had raised on the day of the hearing. To the extent that Stephenson has not waived appellate review of the district court’s decision by withdrawing his departure request and agreeing to proceed immediately with the sentencing hearing without the district court considering either party’s last-minute suggestion, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Zamora-Hernandez, 222 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1200, 121 S.Ct. 1208, 149 L.Ed.2d 122 (2001) (reviewing the district court’s decision to grant or deny a continuance for abuse of discretion); United States v. Green, 105 F.3d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding that the district court must give parties notice of intent to depart 1: holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent 2: holding that district court must provide reasonable notice of intent to upwardly depart from guideline range 3: holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart 4: recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart


Input: incorrect burden shifting instruction did not deny petitioner due process. With regard to the “acquittal first” contention, the trial court did not expressly require the jury to acquit petitioner of aggravated murder and murder before considering his guilt of voluntary manslaughter. The Ohio Supreme Court dealt with a similar instruction in State v. Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 220, 533 N.E.2d 286 (1988). The Court stated that, although such instruction is not proper, the instruction did not have a coercive effect on the jury because the instruction dealt primarily with the jury’s inability to find an element of a greater offense. Similarly, the instruction in this case did not fundamentally deny petitioner a fair trial. See Jamison v. Collins, 100 F.Supp.2d 647, 719 (S.D.Ohio 2000) (<HOLDING>). b. Flight Instruction Petitioner next Holdings: 0: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given 1: holding virtually identical instruction did not deny petitioner a fair trial 2: holding that identical error did not prejudice defendant because by giving the instruction the judge merely gave the jury the opportunity to overturn his own ruling 3: holding that in a criminal trial the trial court must correct or amend an improper instruction if the proper instruction is necessary for the jury to understand the case 4: holding that district court did not err in giving an instruction identical to that proposed by jenkins