Input: trial. In Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (1980), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute which gave health care arbitration panels original jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims. The court based its decision on statistical evidence that the delays involved in processing claims under the statutory procedures oppressively burdened the right of a jury trial so as to “ ‘make the right practically unavailable,’ ” concluding that the actual operation of the arbitration procedure was not “ ‘reasonably designed to effectuate the desired objective’ of affording ‘the plaintiff a swifter adjudication of his claim, at a minimal cost.’ ” Id. 421 A.2d at 195 (quoting Parker v. Children’s Hosp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932, 939 (1978) (<HOLDING>)). In concluding, the court narrowed its Holdings: 0: holding that an infringement on the right to vote necessarily causes irreparable harm 1: holding that statute was too new to determine whether its actual operation resulted in unconstitutional infringement on jury trial right 2: recognizing the right to waive a jury trial 3: holding that trial court erred by granting a directed verdict on statute of limitations defense and remanding for a new trial on the statute of limitations only 4: holding that even though new jersey supreme court found that state antidiscrimination law did not entitle party to jury trial in state court jury trial was still provided as matter of right in federal court


Input: “purposeful and deliberate attempt ... to suppress dissent within the union.” Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir.1973); Cotter, 753 F.2d at 229 (2d Cir.1985). This is because “the rights of union members to belong to an open democratic labor organization are infringed” when a “dominant group •strives to stifle dissent and efforts at reform” through removal of a political opponent from office. Adams-Lundy v. Association of Professional Flight Attendants, 731 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir.1984). To fall within this exception, a plaintiff must present “clear and convincing proof’ that her dismissal was “part of a series of oppressive acts by the union leadership that directly threaten the freedom of members to speak out.” Cotter, 753 F.2d at 229; see also Schonfeld, 477 F.2d at 904 (<HOLDING>). In the past, we have allowed such claims to Holdings: 0: holding that before pretrial detention may be ordered in a life felony case state must show that proof is evident or the presumption great 1: holding that ratification by a union of disciplinary acts of the local leadership against members would occur if the union affirmed the discipline with full knowledge that it was part of an overall scheme to suppress dissent in violation of the lmrda 2: recognizing the cause of action 3: holding that to state a cause of action the alleged scheme to suppress dissent must be evident either in the established history or articulated policy of the union 4: recognizing cause of action


Input: security if [it] is a security issued by an investment company that is registered, or that has filed a registration statement, under the Investment.Company Act of 1940.” 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2). The Second Circuit recently stated that a variable insurance product is a “covered security” under SLUSA when: (1) it is a “security”; and (2) the separate accounts used for marketing the product are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See Lander, 251 F.3d at 109. First, the plaintiffs variable universal life insurance policy is a “security” because it invests in mutual funds which are regulated by the SEC. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 70-72, 79 S.Ct. 618, 621-22, 3 L.Ed.2d 640 (1959) (<HOLDING>); Lander, 251 F.3d at 109 (same). See also Holdings: 0: holding a summary calendar does not violate due process as long as defendant is able to properly present issues on appeal 1: holding that claims not properly raised on direct appeal will not be considered as a basis for collateral relief 2: holding that a variable annuity is properly classified as a security 3: holding that seventh application for postconviction relief which was rejected because evidence on which it was based was not properly authenticated was properly filed 4: holding that a constitutional challenge to a statute is not properly preserved for appellate review if as here it is not presented to the trial court and is raised for the first time on appeal


Input: is critical in discerning the source of a victim’s injuries by excluding other possible causes of injury. Further, this Court is satisfied a victim’s motive in making a statement excluding a possible source of her injuries is consistent with promoting her treatment for those injuries. Thus, Appellant’s claim that the answer did not meet KRE 803(4) is simply incorrect. Of greater concern is Appellant’s claim that the statement improperly identified him as the victim’s assailant. Under KRE 803(4), “the general rule is that the identity of the perpetrator is not relevant to treatment or diagnosis.” Colvard, 309 S.W.3d at 244. This Court has a long history of finding this type of hearsay extremely prejudicial when repeated by a professional on the stand. See Colvard, 309 S.W.3d at 247 (<HOLDING>); Sharp v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 542, 545 Holdings: 0: holding that it was error to admit a videotaped interview of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse because the defendant was deprived of the right to crossexamine the child 1: holding improper admission of hearsay evidence is reversible error only when the admission causes prejudice 2: holding that the doctrine of harmless error applies when a due process violation is alleged and affirming a conviction when defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice 3: holding evidence of past uncharged sexual encounters admissible in child sexual abuse case to show relationship between defendant and alleged victim 4: recognizing extreme prejudice and reversible error due to physicians testimony repeating hearsay of alleged victim of sexual abuse identifying defendant as alleged perpetrator


Input: view of the unsettled state of the law on this issue, IBM’s adoption of the position that it viewed as favorable to itself, and its decision to raise the issue as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, was not unreasonable (imprudent, perhaps, but not unreasonable). Therefore, TM’s motion in limine to prevent IBM from asserting a defense under § 1498 is denied and the amendment is allowed. 5. TM’s motion for sanctions as per Fed.R.Civ. , 57 F.Supp.2d 961 (C.D.Cal.1999) (surveying the caselaw and holding that § 1498 is jurisdictional as to governmental defendants and, in the case of private defendants, establishes an affirmative defense that must be timely asserted). 2 . See Croll-Reynolds Co. v. Perini-Leavell-Jones-Vinell, 399 F.2d 913 (5th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1050, 89 S.Ct. 688, 21 Holdings: 0: holding that given the version of  1498 then in place the governments authorization and consent to allegedly infringing manufacture formed a basis for a transfer of jurisdiction from the district court to the court of claims now the court of federal claims 1: holding that the accused item was used by the government under an older version of  1498 and that therefore the only remedy was a suit against the united states in the court of claims now the court of federal claims 2: holding that to exhaust a claim the claims raised at the administrative appeal must be so similar that the district court can ascertain that the agency was on notice of and had an opportunity to consider and decide the same claims now raised in federal court 3: holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims 4: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute


Input: 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.1994); Ruston Gas Turbines, 9 F.3d at 418. The “minimum contacts” aspect of due process can be satisfied by either finding specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction. See Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647. If the conduct of a defendant that supports personal jurisdiction is related to a stated cause of action, personal jurisdiction is known as “specific jurisdiction.” See Ruston Gas Turbines, 9 F.3d at 418-19. The minimum contacts prong for specific jurisdiction can be satisfied by a single act if the nonresident defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit and protection of its laws.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state because there was no evidence the defendant knew where the product would be sold 1: holding that the defendant must have created a substantial connection to the forum state by action purposefully directed toward the forum state or otherwise invoking the benefits and protections of the laws of the state 2: holding that sufficient minimum contacts exist when nonresident defendant purposefully directed action toward texas 3: holding that a defendant establishes minimum contacts by purposely engaging in conduct directed toward the forum state such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there 4: holding that minimum contacts exist if the defendant has purposely directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities


Input: The second question we must address is whether the plaintiffs’ cause of action is time-barred. The district court addressed both the general five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims found at Ark.Code Ann. § 16-56-111(b), and the general three-year statute of limitations for constructive fraud claims found at Ark.Code Ann. § 16-56-105(3), and concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims were not barred under either statute. We agree with the district court’s conclusion, but not with its reasoning. Hav ing determined that NEI may be subject to liability for the original developer’s obligations pursuant to the Arkansas TimeShare Act, we conclude that Time-Share Act’s statute of limitations governs this action. See Shelton v. Fiser, 340 Ark. 89, 8 S.W.3d 557, 560 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The Time-Share Act actually contains two Holdings: 0: holding that a general statute is superseded by a more recent specific statute only if the two statutes are in conflict 1: holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter 2: holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls 3: holding that under arkansas law a specific statute of limitations involving the particular subject matter governs over more general statutes 4: recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one


Input: after a juror indicated that the verdict did not represent her individual verdict, and Muller asserted that the evide 6, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (concluding that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when, without probable cause, they seized the defendant from a neighbor’s home and transported him to the police station for interrogation without telling him he was free to go); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724-28, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969) (ruling that an unreasonable seizure occurred when police brought the defendant to the police station without probable cause, a warrant, or his consent for fingerprinting and brief questioning before he was released); see also Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 631-33, 123 S.Ct. 1843, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1491 (3d Cir. Holdings: 0: holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station 1: holding that police executed an illegal arrest when they took a teenage suspect from his home and brought him in handcuffs to the police station for questioning 2: holding that the line separating a terry stop and an arrest is crossed when police forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station where he is detained although briefly for investigative purposes 3: holding that an illegal arrest occurred when the defendant was transported without probable cause from his home to the police station for fingerprinting and that the line is crossed when the police without probable cause or a warrant forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station where he is detained although briefly for investigative purposes 4: holding that merely because questioning was designed to produce incriminating responses took place at the police station and occurred only after the defendant was identified as a suspect did not trigger miranda


Input: J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So.2d 401, 402 (Fla.1978), to define statutes of repose and distinguish them from statutes of limitations). Consistent with their function, statutes of repose are understood to set “an outer limit beyond which [claims] may not be instituted.” Hess, 175 So.3d at 695. As such, they are generally regarded as establishing an absolute bar to the filing of any claim after the expiration of the repose period and as being immune to the efforts of claimants to avoid-it. See, e.g., May v. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, 1156 (Fla.2000) (describing nonclaim statute in the probate code as' a statute of repose and as creating “a self-executing, absolute immunity to claims”); Sabal Chase Homeowners Ass’n v. Walt Disney World Co., 726 So.2d 796, 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). On its face, section 726.110 is a repose Holdings: 0: recognizing risks in construing statutes of limitations in favor of repose 1: holding that the legislature never intended for the dismissal and renewal statutes to overcome the statute of repose 2: holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed 3: holding that statute of repose was not subject to toiling provision applicable to statute of limitations because among other reasons it would ignore fundamental distinctions between ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose 4: holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose


Input: of paternity as if it were any other regulatory issue entrusted to that administrative body, judicial review of a decision of great importance affecting matters beyond the scope of the agency’s purview will have been significantly curtailed. Our common understanding of the essential nature of the parent-child relationship is such that we do not easily countenance the possibility that a person could be considered a child in one context, but not in another. However, if the question of paternity is decided by an administrative body — particularly one that is uneasy or ill-equipped to make the decision — there is the unwelcome possibility of different determinations of parentage in different fora. See Oubre v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 680 A.2d 699, 703 (D.C.1993) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, unless the governing statute has a Holdings: 0: holding that a summary judgment is a determination on the merits for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes 1: holding that collateral estoppel and res judicata apply to quasijudicial agency decisions 2: holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration award 3: recognizing exception to application of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles to decisions of administrative proceedings where there has been manifest error in the record 4: recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings


Input: primary arguments why the district court’s sentence should be vacated. First, Hernandez contends that because the sentencing guidelines are advisory after Booker, a district court has discretion as to how and when it determines § 3553(f) eligibility. Second, Hernandez argues that because § 3553(f) contains mandatory language, it is invalid after Booker, Hernandez’s Hoofcer-based challenges are foreclosed by recent Ninth Circuit opinions in United States v. Hernandez-Castro, 473 F.3d 1004, 1005-06 (9th Cir.2007), where we held that § 3553(f)(1) was not “rendered advisory by Booker,” and United States v. Cardenas-Juarez, 469 F.3d 1331, 1334-35 (9th Cir.2006), where we held that despite its mandatory language, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) survives Booker, and if triggered 336-37 (8th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Echeverri-Jaramillo, 777 Holdings: 0: holding that possession of the equivalent of 279 pounds of marijuana valued at 279000 dollars justified the district courts refusal to provide a lesser included instruction 1: holding that due process does not require a lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter where not requested 2: holding that possession of more than thirtyfive pounds of cocaine valued at between 5 and 7 million ruled out a simple possession jury instruction 3: holding that jurys failure to find the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana could not be reconciled with a verdict of guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to purchase 4: holding that possession of more than seven tons of marijuana justified the district courts refusal to provide a simple possession instruction


Input: “require” tracked section 7B1.3(f)’s provision that a revocation sentence “shall be ordered to be served consecutively” to the sentence for the new criminal offense. See USSG § 7B1.3 (1990); see also USSG § 7B1.3 (2011) (same). As noted above, the Guidelines in effect when Head committed the underlying offense included no requirement or presumption of consecutive prison terms upon revocation of supervised release. See USSG ch. 7 (1988). Unconstrained by section 7B1.3(f), the district court had discretion under the 1988 Guidelines and the general guidance offered by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e), and 3584 to impose either a consecutive or concurrent sentence. See United States v. Ayers, 795 F.3d 168, 172 (D.C.Cir.2015); see also United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 852 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Reliance on section 7B1.3(f) here created at Holdings: 0: holding that  3145c authorizes district courts to grant release pending sentencing 1: holding in assault and involun tary manslaughter case that district court has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences based on finding of whether multiple counts involved the same harm 2: holding that supervised release sentences are normally reviewed for abuse of discretion 3: holding in agreement with fourth fifth seventh eighth ninth and eleventh circuits that courts general sentencing discretion under 18 usc  3584 authorizes district courts revoking supervised release to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences 4: holding that  5g12 did not limit the district courts authority to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release since the policy statements in chapter 7 governed revocation sentences


Input: 829 S.W.2d at 271-72. 23 . Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Texas v. Texoma Directional Drilling Co., 622 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ). 24 . Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. McManus, 633 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex.1982). 25 . See Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 387 S.W.2d at 24 (disagreeing with the Court of Civil Appeals who held that a court must look beyond the pleadings and policy); Brooks, Tarlton, Gilbert, Douglas & Kressler v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1358, 1367-68 (5th Cir.1987) (applying Texas law to hold that the proper question in determining duty is not what could have been pled, but what was pled). 26 . Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 633 S.W.2d at 788. 27 . Houston Petroleum Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 830 1464 (N.D.Cal.1992) (<HOLDING>); Qualman v. Bruckmoser, 163 Wis.2d 361, 471 Holdings: 0: holding that pecuniary damages are not property damages under insureds policy 1: holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages 2: holding that claims alleging negligent misrepresentation and failure to disclose seek economic damages not property damages within insureds policy 3: holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property  damage claims 4: holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient


Input: estoppel claim dismissed because Cornell fails to identify any promise any of the Individual Defendants made. I agree with the Individual Defendants. As I noted above, the only basis that exists for Cornell’s promissory estop pel claim is the sewage facility agreement and the surrounding promises. See supra Part IV.E. In the complaint, Cornell only alleges that the Borough made the promises regarding the dedication of the facility and the reimbursement of Cornell’s expenses. See Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 31, 33-34, 148. Cornell does not claim that any of the Individual Defendants made any of these or other promises. Accordingly, I will dismiss the promissory estoppel claim against the Individual Defendants. See Crouse v. Cyclops Industries, 560 Pa. 394, 745 A.2d 606, 610 (2000) (<HOLDING>). E. Immunity Defenses The Individual Holdings: 0: holding that objection must reasonably be expected to alert the trial court to the ground subsequently raised on appeal 1: holding that the first element of a promissory estoppel claim is the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected to induce action emphasis added 2: recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim 3: holding that the trial court erred when it did not consider what the husband could have been reasonably expected to have earned  based upon the recent work history and other pertinent circumstances 4: holding that due process required a hearing so the putative father would have an opportunity to present evidence to show as a factual matter that he could not reasonably have complied with utahs statutory requirements or deadlines because he could not reasonably have expected his baby to be born in utah


Input: articulate its intent. Moreover, we can imagine an altogether rational reason the legislature might decide to write a statute with a strict Hability punishment provision. As Judge Staton wrote for the Court of Appeals, "A dealer's lack of knowledge of his proximity to the schools does not make the illegal drug any less harmful to the youth in whose hands it may eventually come to rest." Williford v. State, 571 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). Accordingly, we hold that the conviction was not deficient for failure to prove that Walker knew he was within 1,000 feet of a school when he committed the crime. Walker also argues that the evidence of dealing was insufficient because he did not have the $20 bill given to him by Witten in his possession at the time of his arrest. In ligh 988) (<HOLDING>) (collecting cases); Mullins v. State, 486 Holdings: 0: holding that proof of scienter is required to succeed on a claim under  1991a1 but not under  1991a2 or  1991a3 1: holding obscenity statute required proof of scienter 2: holding trial court should have required segregation because tort claims entailed proof of facts unnecessary for proof of the contract claim 3: holding child molesting statute required proof of scienter 4: holding that proof of an explicit agreement is not required


Input: Article 78.” (citing N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 89)). Accordingly, plaintiffs claim that defendant Pickering violated FOIL will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Section 1983. 7. First Amendment Mail Interference The First Amendment protects an inmate’s right to send and receive both legal and nonlegal mail, although prison officials may regulate that right if the restrictions they employ are “ ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’ ” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)); see also Johnson v. Goord, 445 F.3d 532, 534 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Legal mail is entitled to Holdings: 0: holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells 1: holding that routine monitoring and recording of the calls of convicted prisoners does not violate the prisoners fourth amendment rights 2: holding that even capital prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel in habeas cases 3: recognizing a first amendment right to receive mail subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security 4: holding that prisoners do have a right  albeit a limited one  to send and receive mail


Input: physician. The physician that treated Street testified as to the adequacy of Street’s care. Street offers only his own conclusory statements to the contrary. "[Ijnadequate prison medical care violate[s] the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause [only when it amounts to] 'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners'”. Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1978 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). Street's medical needs were met. While there is evidence that Street had requested more medical care (i.e., pain medication prior to his hospital visit), "there is no evidence that [the defendants] either w[ere] aware of or had any responsibility for this lack of medical attention.” Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 155 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 14 . In Farmer, the Court noted, "At what Holdings: 0: holding that statements in medical records given for the primary purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment are nontestimonial 1: holding failure to check medical records of inmate that eventually died to be mere negligence 2: holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records 3: recognizing negligence cause of action for failure to maintain medical records preservation of which was required by statute 4: holding that to the extent medical records may be properly categorized as business records such records are properly categorized as nontestimonial


Input: carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Smith, 718 F.2d at 1276 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)). The reasonable doubt instruction in this case, viewed in the context of the charge as a whole, diluted this burden by creating a standard that “could mislead [the members of the court-martial] into finding no reasonable doubt when in fact there was some.” Holland, 348 U.S. at 140, 75 S.Ct. at 138. The strongest language in the charge that might serve to correct this impression, that stating that “[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt means proof to a moral certainty,” see United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333, 1347-48 (10th Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936, 94 S.Ct. 1934, 40 Holdings: 0: holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning 1: holding that the court did not abuse its discretion by tracking the statutory language in the instruction 2: holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language 3: holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical 4: holding that moral certainty language compensated for willing to act language in an otherwise proper reasonable doubt instruction


Input: the plain language of the public disclosure bar to hold that "[i]t does not deny jurisdiction over actions based on disclosures other than those specified”); United States ex rel. O’Keeffe v. Sverdup Corp., 131 F.Supp.2d 87, 91 (D.Mass.2001). 71 .LeBlanc I, 913 F.2d at 20. 72 . See Mathews, 166 F.3d at 863-64; United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (4th Cir.1994); O'Keeffe, 131 F.Supp.2d at 92; United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 874 F.Supp. 35, 40 (D.Mass.1995) ("LeBlanc II"). 73 . O’Keeffe, 131 F.Supp.2d at 92 (quoting United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d Cir.1992)) (emphasis in original); see also United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 386-88 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Holdings: 0: holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant 1: holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known 2: holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege 3: holding that a qui tam action is based upon a qualifying disclosure if the disclosure sets out either the allegations advanced in the qui tam action or all of the essential elements of the qui tam actions claims 4: holding that a valid final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action


Input: 7 Sexuality Res. & Soc. Pol’y 176, 186, 188 (2010) (noting that in a national survey, 95 percent of gay men and 84 percent of lesbian women reported that they “had little or no choice about their sexual orientation.”). Finally, Plaintiffs note that homosexual citizens constitute a minority group that lacks sufficient political power to protect themselves against discriminatory laws. In fact, the history of same-sex marriage bans across the nation illustrates the historical lack of political power possessed by gays and lesbians. Plaintiffs point out that not only do homosexuals fit all factors to be considered a suspect classification, but in fact, several courts have already admitted as much. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 480-84 (9th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>); see also Pedersen, 881 F.Supp.2d at 294 Holdings: 0: holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race 1: holding use of peremptory strike against gay juror failed heightened scrutiny 2: holding that it was not iac to decline to use peremptory strike on a potential juror whose statements hinted at possible bias against defendant where counsel strategically used peremptory strikes against jurors who might have been more likely to convict 3: holding that trial courts erroneous refusal to strike juror for cause impaired defendants statutory right to his allotted number of peremptory challenges 4: holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause


Input: Eastern District of Texas, the plaintiffs choice of venue. Nintendo informed the district court that the majority of NOA’s relevant documents are located within the transferee venue. The record also shows that all of Nintendo’s research and development documents are located in Kyoto, Japan. Notwithstanding this evidence, the district court assumed that Nintendo’s relevant documents were equally spread between its headquarters in Japan and Washington, and minor satellite offices in California and New York. By including these minor offices in the equation, the trial court hypothesized that the Eastern District of Texas could serve as a centralized location. This court has already questioned this type of reasoning in another case involving the Eastern District of Texas. See id. at 1344 (<HOLDING>). Because most evidence resides in Washington Holdings: 0: holding that venue in the district identified in  9 was mandatory 1: holding that the district court is free to consider the full record in the case when selecting the appropriate sanction 2: holding that the district court in setting fees appropriately relied upon prevailing market rates in the eastern district of new york where the case was commenced and litigated 3: holding that it is improper to consider the centralized location of the eastern district of texas when no identified witness resides in the district 4: holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm


Input: true or false. Certainly, different members of the general public might provide different specific definitions of this term or might emphasize different factors in assessing whether housing is “decent, safe, and sanitary.” However, the fact that each individual's exact definition of the meaning of this phrase might differ does not undermine the proposition that the general meaning of the concept is commonly understood. As we have noted in another, quite different context, despite the fact that certain words or phrases might “strike distinct chords in individual jurors,” they can nevertheless have a “plain meaning of sufficient content that the discretion left to the jury” is “no more than that inherent in the jury system itself.” Milton v. Procunier, 744 F.2d 1091, 1096 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); see also James v. Collins, 987 F.2d 1116, Holdings: 0: holding that failure to appear for sentencing is a continuing offense because a convicted criminal has a continuing obligation to face sentencing and presents an ongoing threat to the integrity and authority of the court so long as he has not appeared 1: holding that the right applies at capital sentencing in particular 2: holding presumptive sentencing standards applied retroactively where defendant objected at sentencing hearing on the basis that the presumptive sentencing standards applied to his case 3: holding that the texas capital sentencing scheme is permissibly applied when the sentencing jury evaluates the terms deliberately probability criminal acts of violence and continuing threat to society without any specific definitions 4: holding a specific sentencing statute controls over the general sentencing provisions of section 9031


Input: process that would reflect a lower cost than others ” (emphasis added)). The harm BBSSI will suffer outweighs the harm to defendant and to CMR. 4. Whether Injunctive Relief Is in the Public Interest BBSSI asserts that “Safeguarding the integrity of the procurement process is a matter of high public interest that is best served by enjoining arbitrary and capricious agency action, or action generally inconsistent with procurement law and regulations.” Pl.’s Mot. 31. Defendant describes the “detrimental impact” upon the military as “severe” if injunctive relief is awarded, noting that there exists a strong public interest in not interfering with an agency’s procurement process. Def.’s Mot. 31. CMR argues that the public interest is not served “by issuing contrac Fed.Cl. 431, 434 (2005) (<HOLDING>). The public interest was compromised by the Holdings: 0: recognizing the publics interest in receiving the best value in public services 1: recognizing the publics interest in ensuring that the ultimate awardee offers the best value to the government pursuant to the terms of the solicitation and applicable procurement regulations 2: recognizing the public interest exception 3: holding that when information which potentially undermines the best interest of the child as well as the interest sought to be protected by the legitimation statutes and the policy of this state it must first be tested in light of the best interest of the child standard 4: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public


Input: need not be treated as an •element required to be found by the jury suggests that the same fact need not be treated as an element that is required to be alleged in the charging instrument. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 568, 122 S.Ct. 2406 (stating that factor increasing a defendant’s minimum sentence “need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt”). The symmetry between charging and fact finding suggested by Apprendi has not been universally embraced. Some courts have concluded that the notice guarantee of the Sixth Amendment may be satisfied with respect to a fact that is an element under Apprendi by means other than an allegation in the charging instrument. See, e.g., State v. Nichols, 201 Ariz. 234, 33 P.3d 1172, 1176 (Ariz.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>). But other courts have followed the line of Holdings: 0: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner 1: holding that alien need not receive actual notice for due process requirements to be satisfied 2: holding that facts related to commission of offense necessary to establish eligibility for enhanced penalty of life imprisonment need not be alleged in the charging document provided that the notice of them given to the defendant comports with arizonas traditional notice requirements for alleging sentence enhancements 3: holding that the notice afforded by a document determines its sufficiency as a notice of appeal 4: holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense


Input: did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to the search. She also assigned error to certain of the trial court’s findings of fact. Although the Court of Appeals held that Ellen consented to the search, it did not address her challenge to the trial court’s findings. She did F.2d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding the validity of a warrantless search where the defendant was present and did not consent, but his wife did consent, because the rule developed in Mat-lock did not depend on the defendant’s absence); People v. Sanders, 904 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Colo. 1995) (“The valid consent of a person with ‘common authority’ will justify a warrantless search of a residence despite the physical presence of a nonconsenting co-occupant.”); State v. Frame, 45 Or. App. 723, 609 P.2d 830, 833 (1980) (<HOLDING>); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Holdings: 0: holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent 1: holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion 2: holding that the consent to search given by the defendants wife and cohabitant was an effective consent because it was consistent with the rationale set forth in united states v matlock 3: holding that consent was freely and voluntarily given despite officers advisement that the police could get a search warrant if consent was not given 4: holding that the defendants consent to allow the officer to search her purse by way of holding it open for the officer was for consent to a limited view of the purses interior not to surrender possession  for an unrestricted search and thus the officer exceeded the scope of the defendants consent


Input: has also held that nervousness alone does not constitute reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and grounds for detention. See Laime v. State, supra. Despite the fact that Lilley was shaking, he did not exhibit any additional signs of nervousness, such as an inability to maintain eye contact with Officer Bowman or evasiveness, prior to the conclusion of the traffic stop. Accordingly, his nervousness, without any other questionable circumstances, would not constitute reasonable suspicion. Nor does there appear to be anything inherently suspicious about using a rental car rented by a third party even when combined with the nervousness of the suspect. Certainly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agrees with that conclusion. See United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). In the case at hand, Lilley explained to the Holdings: 0: holding that defendant who was a passenger in a car had joint constructive possession of drugs found next to the defendants luggage in truck of car even where she disclaimed ownership of the drugs 1: holding that the totality of the circumstances failed to generate reasonable suspicion to warrant becks renewed detention where 1 beck was driving a rental car rented by an absent third party 2 the car was licensed in california 3 there was fastfood trash on the passengerside floorboard 4 there was no visible luggage in the passenger compartment of the car 5 beck had a nervous demeanor 6 becks trip was from a drugsource state to a drugdemand state and 7 the officer disbelieved becks explanation for the trip 2: holding that an arrest to retrieve car keys where ownership of the car was in dispute was not supported by probable cause 3: holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had knowledge of firearm in close proximity to him when he was driving the car for the cars owner who was a passenger 4: holding that a car passenger had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his closed brown paper bag found on the floorboard of his companions car


Input: on the part of the officers. Having concluded that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated any constitutional violation, it becomes unnecessary for us to consider whether the rights at issue were clearly established such that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 608, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). The district court correctly ruled that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Because the police officers did not violate Caricofe’s constitutional rights, the other defendants may not be held liable for failing to train or supervise those officers. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, Holdings: 0: holding that a municipality cannot be held liable for an official policy or custom if it has been determined that the individual defendants did not violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights 1: holding that a municipality may only be held liable under  1983 for a policy practice or custom 2: holding that a municipality may not assert the defense of qualified immunity but may be held liable under  1983 only for a constitutional deprivation inflicted by the execution of a governments policy or custom whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy  3: holding that a municipality may not be held liable under section 1983 under a theory of respondeat superi or but may be liable for policies or customs that violate an employees constitutional rights 4: holding that a defendant can only be sued in his official capacity under  1983 if he acted pursuant to an official policy or custom in causing the constitutional injury


Input: letter. On March 22, 2001, Perch filed suit against the City of Quincy for sex and disability discrimination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, and for sex discrimination under the Equal Protection clause, on the basis of both CFS-related and cancer-related conduct. On November 30, 2001, the City of Quincy moved to dismiss Perch’s cancer-related discrimination claims. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court is to accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favora t from filing claims in court which allege different types of discrimination, or are based on materially different facts, from the administrative charge. See, e.g., Lattimore, 99 F.3d at 465 (<HOLDING>); Silva v. Hit or Miss, 73 F.Supp.2d 39, 41 Holdings: 0: holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union 1: holding that settlement with one defendant could not be setoff from verdict against second defendant where the claims were separate and distinct ie involving different elements of damages 2: holding that a plaintiff could not add civil claim based upon different facts that are separate and distinct both qualitatively and temporally  and relate to the conduct of different individuals from facts in administrative charge 3: holding that arizona rule of civil procedure 52a requires the court to find only the ultimate facts not the evidentiary facts upon which the ultimate facts are based 4: holding that plaintiff who filed administrative charge for racial harassment and discrimination could add claim for retaliation because some of the same facts supported both types of claims


Input: and denied the rest. On March 1, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint in this Court alleging ERISA violations. After an extension of time, Defendants moved to dismiss on May 10, 2004. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on June 22, 2004. On October 14, 2004, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which does not modify Plaintiffs’ original claims, but merely adds a new Count V. Defendants have also moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. DISCUSSION A. Motion to Dismiss Standard For the purposes of the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court assumes that the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are true, unless such allegations are contradicted by documents referenced in the Complaint. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will be Holdings: 0: holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences 1: holding that courts are to accept allegations in the complaint as being true including monell policies and writing that a federal court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint has a limited task 2: holding that if a district court dismisses a  2255 claim without holding an evidentiary hearing we take as true the sworn allegations of fact set forth in the petition unless those allegations are merely conclusory contradicted by the record or inherently incredible 3: holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint 4: holding that a court need not accept a plaintiffs allegation if it contradicts documents properly considered with the complaint


Input: that a defendant is “able to provide.” Id. ¶ 12. The statute in Keller is also part of a recoupment scheme whereby a state seeks to recover costs from providing court-appointed counsel to indigent defendants. not support her argument. The fact that Fuller and its progeny require a finding of ability to pay does not mean that one is required here because those cases concern whether schemes to exact payment for the costs of appointed counsel from criminal defendants unconstitutionally impinge upon the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Here, no constitutional right to counsel is implicated; the trial court instead ordered defendant to pay the costs of caring for her animals during the litigation. See State v. Diamondstone, 132 Vt. 303, 305, 318 A.2d 654, 656 (1974) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14. Defendant also cites State v. Haught, Holdings: 0: holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it 1: holding that under fuller sixth amendment requires trial court to make finding that defendant has or will have ability to pay reimbursement amount within statutory time period before imposing payment obligation 2: holding that the statute in effect at that time ie section 7750832b florida statutes 2003 required the court to conduct an inquiry into the defendants ability to pay the fine before imposing it 3: holding that court not required to find ability to pay before imposing criminal fine 4: recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error


Input: the law restricting third party beneficiary status remained unchanged by our decision in Montana. Accord Roedler v. Dept. of Energy, 255 F.3d 1347 (Fed.Cir.2001). Accordingly, because the shareholders did not stand to directly benefit under the contract, they are at most incidental beneficiaries of the contract with no rights to enforce the contract against the United States. We reverse the Court of Federal Claims summary judgment of liability in favor of the shareholders and remand the case so that the court may consider any remaining claims asserted by the shareholders. II. FDIC’s Breach of Contract Claims We review the Court of Federal Claims’ legal conclusion that the FDIC has asserted a justiciable claim de novo. See Alger v. United States, 741 F.2d 391, 393 (Fed.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Article III, section 2 of the United States Holdings: 0: holding that we review a district courts interpretation of a statute de novo 1: holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo 2: holding that we review constitutional challenges de novo 3: holding appellate court reviews legal conclusions de novo 4: holding that we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo


Input: Company was forced kicking and screaming to settle.”); id. ("They are intent now on buying your vote.”). Compare Riley, 529 A.2d at 252. 22 . See, e.g„ id. at 1 ("They are so afraid of you finding out what they are up to.”); id. at 2 ("They haven’t disclosed any of this because they want you to think that they are doing this all on their own.”). 23 . Doe v. Cahill, 884 A,2d at 465 (noting the known unreliability of internet blogs and chat rooms). See also Riley, 529 A,2d at 252 (same for newspaper editorials); SunEnergy 1, LLC v. Brown, 2015 WL 7776625, at *4 (Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2015) (same for online reviews). 24 . Austin, 418 U.S, at 284, 94 S.Ct. 2770 (calling plaintiff a "traitor" in the course of a labor dispute was nonactionable opinion); Bresler, 398 U.S, at 14, 90 S.Ct. 1537 (<HOLDING>) 25 . Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 183-84 Holdings: 0: holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured 1: holding that for the administrative position of the government to be substantially justified it must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact 2: holding governments position unreasonable where government advanced no legal authority for its position and applicable principle of law was long settled 3: holding in the chevron context that deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agencys convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate 4: holding a characterization of a real estate developers position as blackmail to be nonactionable opinion because in context even the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole a vigorous epithet used by those who considered breslers negotiating position extremely unreasonable


Input: renewed his policy that was in effect on the date of the accident, March 24, 2006. From 2002 until the date of the accident, Murray never alleged that he attempted or recommended to place liquor liability coverage for Ennie. Considering these facts, Murray created an “unreasonable risk of harm” to Ennie at the earliest in the fall of 2002 and at the latest during the last policy renewal in December 2005. Any meeting between Poeng and Murray that occurred in 2006 regarding insurance coverage was a continuation of Murray’s wrongful act of failing to provide the proper coverage. As such, Murray’s wrongful acts did not occur “wholly after” the retroactive date of January 1, 2006. Therefore, we hold that Murray is not covered under the AAIC policy, and that the Dist 5, 627-28 (8th Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). Here, AAIC named Easter and Ennie in its Holdings: 0: holding that there is an actual controversy between an insurer and the party injured by the insured 1: holding that an insurer who brought a declaratory judgment action and out of an abundance of caution named the injured party as an additional defendant 1 must have thought the injured party had some potential interest in the insurance policy and 2 had tacitly conceded the injured partys standing to appeal by not contesting the appeal on the ground of lack of standing 2: holding that an injured party in an underlying tort action was not a necessary party in an action by an insurer for declaratory judgment of nonliability where the injured person had not obtained judgment against the insured 3: holding that an injured third party does not have the right to bring a direct action against a tortfeasors liability insurer 4: holding that an injured person having a possible claim against an insurer who has been made a party defendant to an action for declaratory judg ment possesses the requisite interest to be heard on appeal


Input: v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 704 F.Supp. 441, 447-448 (same); White v. Fed. Res. Bank (1995) 103 Ohio App.3d 534, 538-539 [660 N.E.2d 493, 496] (same); Osei-Bonsu v. Federal Home Loan Bank of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 726 F.Supp. 95, 97-98 (dealing with section 12 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, as amended, as codified at section 1432(a) of title 12 of the United States Code, its common designation, which, in line with the model of section 24, Fifth, grants a federal home loan bank the power to “dismiss” any of its officers, among others, “at pleasure” by its board of directors: holding to the effect that section 1432(a) has been impliedly amended by Title VII). But compare Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d 1093, 1100 (<HOLDING>). 5 In stating that section 24, Fifth, as Holdings: 0: holding that even when applied retroactively the reexamination statute does not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment the jury trial guarantee of the seventh amendment or article iii of the constitution 1: holding in the context of section 341 fifth that the mere existence of federal agediscrimination laws apparently including the adea does not create a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution in the form of job entitlements for government employees over a certain age 2: holding outside of the context of title vii or the adea to the effect that section 341 fifth preempts conflicting state law 3: holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government 4: holding that entitlement to benefits is a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution


Input: of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (“Facial neutrality is not determinative .... The [Free Exercise] Clause forbids subtle departures from neutrality and covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In reaching this conclusion we do not suggest that “every religious sect or group within a prison— however few in number — must have identical facilities or personnel.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). But under Turner, neutrality must be ensured, or its absence sufficiently explained in light of a legitimate penologoical interest, for summary judgment to be appropriate. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415-16, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Hammer v. Ashcroft, 512 F.3d 961, Holdings: 0: recognizing that it serves no discernible public purpose to draw distinctions between clinical social work and other mental health professions with regard to the need for confidentiality 1: holding that prison regulations impinging on prisoners constitutional rights are only valid where reasonably related to legitimate penological interests 2: holding that turners neutrality requirement allows a prison policy to draw distinctions so long as those distinctions flow from the governments legitimate penological interest 3: holding that prison administration may infringe upon prisoners first amendment rights as long as the infringement is reasonably related to legitimate penological interest 4: holding a publisheronly rule was constitutional because prison administrators are accorded deference and rule was reasonably related to the penological interest of maintaining internal prison security


Input: indispensable party. Id. This aspect of the opinion must not be overstated, as the court ultimately held that the patent owner did not transfer all of the substantial rights in the patent to the plaintiff; rather, it transferred only the right to license the patent to one specific (sub)lieensee. Id. at 1379-80. While the case was decided in the context of a Rule 19 dispute, the decision rested on the fact that none of the named plaintiffs had rights of ownership that created standing to sue. Alternatively, in one case requiring Rule 19 joinder of the holder of a reversionary right, the reversionary right was triggered upon the expiration of an agreement transferring all of the substantial rights of the patent. Moore U.S.A. Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 60 F.Supp.2d 104 (W.D.N.Y.1999) (<HOLDING>). In Moore, any extension of the agreement Holdings: 0: holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement 1: holding that the assignor of a patent retained substantial rights in the patent and must be added as an indispensable party 2: holding that  1338a jurisdiction inures when a complaint establishes that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the wellpleaded claims 3: holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent 4: holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent


Input: clearly established law. See Levine v. City of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir.2008) (“Under the defense of qualified immunity, a government official is immune from civil damages unless his conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known”); see also Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85 (clarifying that sincerity of prisoner’s religious beliefs, not objective doctrinal centrality of beliefs, determines whether Free Exercise Clause applies). The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on Campbell’s Equal Protection claim because Campbell did not present evidence indicating that he was similarly situated to inmates who were permitted to possess religious oil. See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 623 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Campbell’s remaining contentions are Holdings: 0: holding that to assert a viable equal protection claim plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were differently treated from others who were similarly situated to them 1: holding that equal protection claim by prisoner lacked merit where prisoner not similarly situated to others who were permitted to engage in relevant conduct 2: holding equal protection under the federal constitution applies to similarly situated persons 3: holding members of two distinct pension plans were not similarly situated for equal protection analysis 4: holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated


Input: that an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for appellate review). As to the merits, we are troubled by the lack of evidence in the record regarding the authority of M.P.H. Holdings to initiate the supplemental proceedings. A plain reading of section 33-15-102(a) requires a foreign corporation to have a certificate of authority prior to initiating any action in this state. See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (“Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.”); see also Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 307 S.C. 33, 37, 413 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Although the master referred to section Holdings: 0: holding that the funds in the privatelyheld corporations account belonged to the corporation not to the individuals who owned the corporation and expressly stating that directors officers and shareholders of a corporation do not have standing to claim an ownership interest in corporate property in their individual capacities they must state a claim in the corporate name 1: holding that a florida statute requiring a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to transacting business in the state was preempted as it applied to national banks 2: holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporations capacity to sue but did not affect the courts subject matter jurisdiction 3: holding that plaintiff an officer and shareholder of a corporation with signatory authority over the corporations checking account was not a customer of the bank and could not file suit for wrongful dishonor of the corporations checks 4: holding that while a state statute granted a foreign corporation the rights and privileges enjoyed by domestic corporations it did not transform such corporations into domestic or resident corporations


Input: F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2012). Parker did not advance the procedural error argument before the district court, and we therefore review it for plain error. Miller, 557 F.3d at 916. Having reviewed the sentencing transcript, we find no plain error in the district court’s consideration of the statutory factors or explanation of its sentence. The district court announced that it had considered the factors, and the colloquy with defense counsel indicated the district court was thinking about Parker’s specific history and characteristics. The court had detailed information regarding Parker’s history of supervision, criminal history, original offense of conviction, and the numerous violations of supervised release conditions. See United States v. Robinson, 516 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Nor is Parker’s within-Guidelines-range Holdings: 0: holding that appellate review is precluded when the error is invited 1: holding that an appellate court may review the entire record to determine whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable 2: holding that there is no due process right to appellate review 3: holding that the context for appellate review is the entire sentencing rec ord 4: holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review


Input: denied, 529 Pa. 625, 600 A.2d 541 (1991). Here, Licensee first argues that the trial court erred in determining that he had, in fact, refused the blood test, maintaining that, although he refused to sign the hospital consent form, he agreed to submit to the actual blood test. Although acknowledging that our holding in Smith would defeat this argument, Licensee urges that we reconsider that opinion, contending that, in Smith, this court exceeded its authority and usurped legislative authority by superimposing upon section 1547 the requirement that a licensee execute a hospital consent form. In Smith, we relied on the underlying principles expressed in Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Miller, 155 Pa.Cmwlth. 564, 625 A.2d 755 (Pa.Cmwlth.1993) (<HOLDING>), Lewis v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa.Cmwlth. 326, Holdings: 0: holding that a request to the licensee to sign a consent form is not an impermissible precondition to testing 1: holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 2: holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime 3: holding consent not voluntary where police threatened to arrest defendants girlfriend if he refused to sign consent form 4: holding consent invalid where defendant threatened by officer that everyone in the house would go to jail if he did not sign consent form


Input: arise where, at some point, the factual detail in a complaint is so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Id. A plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” to show entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955; accord, e.g., Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231-32; Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir.2007) (the court is not “compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”) (quotations and citations omitted); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir.2005). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: recognizing that rule 8 pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations but it demands more than an unadorned thedefendantunlawfullyharmedme accusation 1: holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983 2: recognizing rule 3: holding that the fact that federal rule of civil procedure 9b requires a heightened pleading standard for some claims but not for a section 1983 claim against a municipality means that the rules do not require a heightened pleading standard for such a claim 4: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard


Input: Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Thus, at this stage of these proceedings, the Court must decide whether the Sykes are entitled to offer evidence to support their claims, not whether they will ultimately prevail. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In doing so, the Court may consider “official public records” that are relevant to the Sykes’ claims without converting Bayer’s motion to one for summary judgment. See Gasner v. County of Dinwiddle, 162 F.R.D. 280, 282 (E.D.Va.1995); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2509, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (<HOLDING>). III. First, the Sykes claim that Bayer is Holdings: 0: holding that a court may rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice in deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 1: holding that in considering a rule 12b6 motion a court may only rely on the complaint its proper attachments documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice 2: holding that 1 the complaint is deemed to include any documents incorporated in it by reference and any document upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint and that the court may consider such documents on a motion to dismiss pursuant to fedrcivp 12b6 3: holding that a court may consider documents that have not been incorporated by reference where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect which renders the document integral to the complaint 4: holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint


Input: the trial court erred in allowing the jury to award mental-anguish damages to the homeowners. Id. The Bowerses argue that, in a negligence case, the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff is not in a zone of danger, should be allowed to recover damages for mental anguish resulting from an incident that causes damage to property if the damage to the property is committed under circumstances of insult or contumely. See Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986). We disagree. Under Alabama law, it is well established that damages for mental anguish are not recoverable in tort where the tort results in mere injury to property unless the damage to property is committed under circumstances of insult or contumely. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Bush, 608 So.2d 361, 364 (Ala.1992) (<HOLDING>); Smith & Gaston Funeral Directors v. Wilson, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff could not recover mentalanguish damages in connection with the birth of healthy children 1: holding that a plaintiff could not recover mentalanguish damages because he had failed to rebut the defendants prima facie showing that the alleged trespass was not attended by words or acts of insult or contumely 2: recognizing that where a plaintiff failed to perform because of the defendants breach the plaintiff could recover damages caused by the defendants breach 3: holding plaintiff could not pursue ejectment or damages for alleged continuing trespass by power company 4: holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position


Input: liability is not cut down by the subsequent 'additional condition’ making defendant liable for actual cost of repairs or replacement.”). 16 . In at least some of these cases, however, courts found the policy language ambiguous and therefore applied the rules of construction requiring the court to construe the terms of the insurance policy against the insurer. See, e.g., Delledonne, 621 A.2d at 354; Campbell, 109 S.E.2d at 577. In others, courts applied rules of construction contrary to those followed in Texas and strictly construed the policy language against the insurer without first finding that the language was ambiguous. See, e.g., Gibbs, 127 S.E.2d at 461; Corbett, 134 S.E. at 338. 17 . See, e.g., Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 1, 754 P.2d 330, 331 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Ray v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 200 Cal.App.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a claim against an insurer for vexatious refusal to pay cannot be maintained where the court finds that the insurer has no duty to defend under the policy 1: holding that if despite repairs there remains a loss in actual market value estimated as of the collision date such deficiency is to be added to the cost of repairs 2: holding that an insurer has no obligation to pay diminished value in addition to repairs 3: holding that if the insurer cannot return the vehicle to substantially the same condition then the actual cash value is the appropriate measure where insured sued for damages caused by insurers inappropriate election to repair and the value after repairs was almost sixty percent less than its preloss value 4: holding insurer was not obligated to repair the damaged automobile to both its preaccident condition and market value concluding that permitting coverage of diminished value would render meaningless the insurers clear policy right to repair rather than pay actual cash value


Input: with the “executive” privilege. Such importation is potentially misleading because the executive privilege is inspired, at least in part, by a policy consideration that plays little or no role in cases against police officers. At the root of the executive privilege is concern about preserving a constitutionally appropriate balance and separation of the largely disparate powers of the three great branches of the federal government. In the seminal cases about executive privilege the courts have been concerned primarily about finding an appropriate accommodation between the constitutionally independent status and needs of the presidency of the United States and the needs of our system of justice. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3107, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (<HOLDING>). These high level, politically most sensitive Holdings: 0: recognizing separation of powers doctrine 1: recognizing a referendum on a court judgment would violate separation of powers 2: recognizing that standing doctrine is fundamentally rooted in respect for the separation of powers of the independent branches of government 3: holding that executive branch prosecution of disciplinary charges against a judge violated the separation of powers provision in the nevada constitution a provision identical to article v section 1 of the utah constitution 4: holding that the presidential privilege is inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the constitution


Input: 3 .It is the content of this section that compels the temporary sealing of this memorandum opinion. See United States v. Lentz, 1:01cr150 (E.D.Va.) (sealing orders). 4 . In a memorandum opinion dated August 22, 2005, defendant's motion to suppress the recordings of these telephone calls and to preclude their disclosure to the government’s trial team under either the attorney-client privilege or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied. See United States v. Lentz, v. Blakney, 581 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir.1978) (stating that "if the exemplars would provide probative and relevant evidence in the case there would seem no merit in the claim of prejudice when questions were asked which brought out the refusal to provide them”); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 36 (6th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). 9 . Only one circuit has Holdings: 0: holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss pursuant to rule 41b for failure to comply with a court order 1: recognizing that a 11 evidence must be relevant to be admissible 2: holding that an administrative agency is not subject to a contempt proceeding for failure to comply with an order 3: recognizing that evidence that defendant refused to comply with the court order to provide a voice exemplar is admissible 4: holding that evidence that a polygraph test was offered to or refused by a defendant was not admissible


Input: to address whether this letter could lead an objectively reasonable, but unsophisticated recipient, to believe the discharged debt was still payable. Merely focusing on the statutory notice contained in the letter, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a), as the court did, neither constitutes such a finding nor fulfills our mandate because such an inclusion in a collection letter does not, by itself, exempt a party from liability under § 1692e. During the course of the bench trial, evidence, testimonial or otherwise, was received, but without findings of fact on this evidence from the trier of fact, we cannot conduct a meaningful review of the magistrate judge’s judgment, and therefore must again remand. See Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415, 422, 63 S.Ct. 1141, 87 L.Ed. 1485 (1943) (<HOLDING>). Based on the record before us, therefore, we Holdings: 0: holding that even though the medical evidence did not support the commissions findings that the plaintiff was restricted from any and all employment the award of total disability should be affirmed based on findings that the plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought suitable employment 1: holding that errors of law in a magistrates findings and recommendations pursuant to section 636b1b can be challenged on appeal even in the absence of the filing of objections in the district court 2: holding that in general an agencys conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard but questions concerning whether an agency has followed proper procedures or considered the appropriate factors in making its determination are questions of law which are reviewed de novo 3: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 4: holding that a proper determination of the questions of law  cannot be made in the absence of suitable findings


Input: deserve deference. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699-700, 116 S.Ct. 1657. However, although we review the district court’s findings of fact only for clear error, our review of the district court’s probable cause determination is de novo. Id. at 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657. Mr. Brown’s primary argument is that the officers lacked probable cause because they confronted him, not on the basis of “reasonably trustworthy” information, but on the basis of information obtained from an “informant,” Dill, whose credibility was previously unknown to the police. Mr. Brown rests this argument on cases holding that information from anonymous sources might not be sufficiently reliable to constitute probable cause for arrest. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 80 (3d Holdings: 0: holding that anonymous call that gave police no predictive information to corroborate tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify stop and frisk 1: holding stop invalid where anonymous tip provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informants knowledge and credibility 2: holding an anonymous tip had the requisite indicia of reliability to justify a stop when the caller told the police of the alleged erratic driving automobile location and vehicle description 3: holding that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability that an individual is carrying a gun is not enough to justify a terry stop 4: holding that an anonymous tip must have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop and frisk


Input: fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response. Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. 466 U.S. at 216-17, 104 S.Ct. at 1762-63 (citations omitted). Thus, Consiglio did not continue to detain Appellee by merely asking him a question about whether he was transporting contraband. When a traffic stop ceases to be a detention and the driver voluntarily consents to additional questioning, no further seizure occurs. See United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, Holdings: 0: holding detention lawful when police referred driver to secondary to check ownership of the vehicle after the driver admitted that the car did not belong to him and the registration revealed that the car was owned by another 1: holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer 2: holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation 3: holding that detention ended when police officer returned drivers license and registration and driver voluntarily consented to additional questioning 4: holding that traffic stop ceases to become a detention and becomes a consensual encounter when police officer returns license and registration unless driver has objectively reasonable cause to believe that he or she is not free to leave


Input: to do so may result in a reprimand, a suspension of their license, or a permanent revocation of their license. See Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 377 (Iowa 1987) (stating that “the code of professional responsibility sets the standard for an attorney’s conduct in any transaction in which his professional judgment may be exercised”); Iowa Sup.Ct. R. 118.10 (discussing discipline by supreme court). It is also significant that the underlying goal of the licensing and supervision of attorneys is to protect the public from the consequences of unqualified legal advisors. See Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Lawler, 342 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1984). These facts unquestionably demonstrate that the attorney licensing requirement has a regulatory purpose. Cf. Mincks, 611 N.W.2d at 277 (<HOLDING>). We now determine whether “the interest in the Holdings: 0: holding that grain dealer licensing statute has a regulatory purpose where the department of agriculture and land stewardship has general supervision over grain dealers and the purpose behind the statutory licensing requirement is protection of the public 1: recognizing that the primary purpose of tr  162051 is protection of the public 2: holding that the prohibitions under the statute do not prevent a manufacturer from terminating a contract with a dealer where the dealer has over a long period of time violated a valid and material clause of the contract and has failed to comply with the continuing insistence of the manufacturer upon performance 3: recognizing frustration of purpose where an unexpected regulatory change substantially frustrated the principal purpose of the agreement to the unfair advantage of one party 4: holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation


Input: (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2014); Clark v. New York State Office of State Comptroller, 09-CV-716 (GLS/CFH), 2014 WL 823289 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014); Davis v. Vermont, Dep’t of Corr., 868 F.Supp.2d 313, 322 (D.Vt.2012); Perciballi v. New York, 09-CV-6933 (WHP), 2010 WL 3958731 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010); Padilla v. New York State Dep’t of Labor, 09-CV-5291 (CM)(RLE), 2010 WL 3835182 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2010) (“[E]very district court in this Circuit to consider the issue has concluded that sovereign immunity bars Title V claims.”); Emmons v. City Univ. of New York, 715 F.Supp.2d 394, 408 (E.D.N.Y.2010); Mosh-enko v. State Univ. of New York at Buffalo, 07-CV-0116 (RJA)(JJM), 2009 WL 5873236 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2009); Chiesa v. New York State Dep’t of Labor, 638 F.Supp.2d 316, 323 (N.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Demshki v. Monteith, 255 F.3d 986, Holdings: 0: holding state immune from suit involving a federal question 1: holding state immune from suit brought in state court 2: holding that the state is immune from punitive awards 3: holding that if a state is immune from underlying discrimination then it follows that the state must be immune from claims alleging retaliation for protesting against discrimination 4: holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from claims alleging conspiracy to present false testimony but witnesses including police officerwitnesses are not absolutely immune from such claims


Input: to discharge its liabilities to all creditors who extended credit or whose claims arose before such return. N.Y. Partnership Law § 106(4) (McKinney 1988). 9 . The court cited Barbro Realty Co. v. Newburger, 53 A.D.2d 34, 385 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1st Dept.1976) for this proposition. Barbro held that a partner who joins a partnership during the term of a preexisting lease is personally liable for the partnership's rent payments while he or she is a partner. Id., 53 A.D.2d at 36, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 70 ("The lease agreement may have been executed prior to the entry of the defendants into the partnership, but the defendants, who were partners at the time of the default, may be held personally liable therefor.” (citing Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785, 244 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1968) (<HOLDING>) and In re Ryan's Estate, 294 N.Y. 85, 60 Holdings: 0: holding that future rent is not attachable under statute providing that a debt is not attachable unless it is certain to become due 1: holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa 2: holding that unearned rent is not a debt  and instead constitutes a contingent liability because rent does not accrue to the lessor as a debt unless the lessee has enjoyed the use of the land 3: holding that it is not 4: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or


Input: Rules provide pleading requirements for fraud claims in federal court, and are therefore the governing authority on this issue. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, most causes of action need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “Special matters,” such as fraud claims, however, must be “stated with particularity.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) (“Rule 9(b)”). The elements of a fraud claim requiring particularity include “ ‘the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the representations and what he obtained thereby.’ ” Harrison, 176 F.3d at 783-84. Also, reasonable detrimental reliance on a misrep ah River Co., 352 F.3d 908, 921-22 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In the complaint in the instant case, the Holdings: 0: holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well 1: holding that confidential sources need not be named provided they are described in the complaint with sufficient particularity to support the probability that a person in the position occupied by the source would possess the information alleged 2: holding that fraud claims were wrongfully dismissed for insufficient particularity as they provided sufficient notice of the facts of the alleged misconduct 3: holding that the fraud claims against the defendant should not have been dismissed as the complaint provided him with fair notice of the claims made against her 4: holding that notice of judgment was insufficient


Input: Grievance v. Webster, 402 Md. 448, 463-64, 937 A.2d 161, 170 (2007), quoting Guida, 391 Md. at 53, 891 A.2d at 1097. Regardless of if an attorney deposits unearned fees into a personal or operating account, he or she must have the consent of the client. Shakir, 427 Md. at 206, 46 A.3d at 1167 (attorney violated Rule 1.15(c) when he failed to deposit unearned fees into attorney trust account without client consent although the record did not indicate whether it was a personal or operations account). Here, Respondent deposited Ms. Nelson’s fee in an account other than an attorney trust account without the written informed consent of Ms. Nelson and failed to keep any sort of record of the transaction, and therefore violated Rules 1.15(a) and ( d. 673, 712, 810 A.2d 996, 1019 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Here, Respondent accepted a $1,500.00 fee, Holdings: 0: holding an attorney violated his duty of candor to the tribunal by changing his clients interrogatory answers without the clients knowledge 1: holding that the attorney violated mlrpc 81b when he failed to respond to two letters from the attorney grievance commission 2: holding that because attorney violated several rules of professional conduct the attorney also violated rule 84a 3: holding an attorney violated rule 84c when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients money in trust 4: holding that an attorney violated rule 84c when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients


Input: Royal Colony of New Jersey: 1760-1769 52-53 (providing for fines as well as forfeiture and destruction of heavy steel and iron traps before “any one Magistrate or Justice of Peace”); “An Act for the more effectual Preservation of Deer in this Colony,” (passed Dec. 6, 1769), id. at 582-85 (providing for forfeiture and destruction of steel and iron traps weighing over five pounds in proceeding before magistrate or justice of peace); “An Act for the Preservation of Deer and other Game, and to prevent trespassing with Guns,” (passed Dec. 21, 1771), Paterson, supra, at 19-22 (providing that anyone who sets a trap larger than that commonly set for foxes and muskrats, shall suffer £5 fine, three month imprisonment, and forfeiture and destruction of trap in pro 00, 602, 10 A. 108 (Sup.Ct.1887) (<HOLDING>); Shivers v. Newton, 45 N.J.L. 469, 476 Holdings: 0: holding no right to jury trial in action to recover penalty for violation of 1882 act to prevent the adulteration and to regulate the sale of milk 1: holding that right to trial by jury did not attach in suit to recover penalty for violation of 1886 act to prevent deception in the sale of oleomargarine butterine or any imitation of dairy products since violation was petty offense 2: holding that penalty action instituted pursuant to fish and game procedure act of 1897 did not include jury trial because it has been repeatedly held in this state that in a summary procedure for the collection of a penalty for violation of a police regulation neither party is entitled to a trial by jury 3: holding a violation of the travel act 4: holding that a charge of first offense dui is constitutionally petty and no right to jury trial attaches


Input: abrasions and his November 2010 C & P examination that mentioned the presence of a scar on his buttocks. The Secretary argues that the Board (1) addressed the evidence of record concerning whether Mr. Johnson’s service-connected skin condition resulted in scarring, and (2) provided an adequate statement of reasons and bases for concluding that it did not. The Secretary notes that the Board found that Mr. Johnson’s disability involved hyperpigmentation, pruitis, and dryness, but not scarring. The Secretary also notes that, although mild abrasions were observed on Mr. Johnson’s November 2013 C & P examination report, the examiner did not find scarring. Moreover, the Secretary contends that the scar noted on Mr. Johnson’s buttocks in his November 20 .3d 1560, 1564 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Meeks v. West, 12 Vet.App. 352, 354 (1999) Holdings: 0: holding that all parts of a statute must be construed together without according undue importance to a single or isolated portion 1: holding that a statute should not be construed so as to invalidate other parts of the same statute 2: holding that if a document is facially clear it will be construed according to its language 3: holding that all parts of the same statute dealing with the same subject are to be construed together as a whole    and individual expressions be accorded only that meaning which other modifying provisions and the clear intent and purpose of the act will permit internal citations omitted 4: holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts


Input: Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980)). In this case, the officers discovered 110 pounds of marijuana during a search pursuant to a warrant, the validity of which is not contested. The record is clear that the officers decided to procure this search warrant before the initial entry into the house. Moreover, the record reflects that the probable cause relied upon to obtain the warrant was based on information gathered by the officers before the initial entry into the house. Therefore, the officers’ initial entry into the house did not contribute in any way to the discovery of the marijuana appellant was charged with possessing. Cf. Guo, 64 S.W.3d at 668 (<HOLDING>); State v. Aguirre, 5 S.W.3d 911, 914-15 Holdings: 0: holding that where information obtained from illegal warrantless search of a briefcase was used to establish probable cause for the warrant to search briefcase evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant was properly suppressed 1: holding that the evidence obtained as part of an illegal stop should have been suppressed even where the defendants consented to the search 2: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 3: holding that evidence obtained from a search made subsequent to an illegal stop was admissible when before the search the police officer discovered that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant and the defendant was thereupon arrested pursuant to that warrant 4: holding that because evidence supporting search warrant was illegally obtained evidence recovered by executing warrant was fruit of the illegal search


Input: or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process. Rivers-Frison v. Southeast Mo. Community Treatment Ctr., 133 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir.1998) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, plaintiffs have not established that Hood had any role in the decisionmaking process at issue in this case. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “ ‘some causal relationship is necessary to demonstrate the significance of non-contemporaneous statements, or statements made by persons other than the relevant decision-maker, to the resolution of the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination.’ ” Kohrt, 364 F.3d at 898 (quoting Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 779 (8th Cir.1995)); see Richards v. Farner-Bocken Co., 145 F.Supp.2d 978, 995-96 (N.D.Iowa 2001) (<HOLDING>). In this instance, there is no evidence that Holdings: 0: recognizing that the seventh circuit consistently has held that isolated comments that are no more than stray remarks in the work place are insufficient to establish that a particular decision was motivated by discriminatory animus 1: holding that comments which were considered by personnel board in normal course of considering employment action were relevant to establish discriminatory intent and were not just stray remarks 2: holding that ageist comments by coworkers were merely  stray remarks that while indicating an agediscriminatory animus on the part of those employees under the circumstances of the case were of no probative value as to the employers decisionmaking process 3: holding that stray remarks made almost two years prior to employment action was outdated and lacking in apparent probative value 4: holding that stray comments without more cannot establish a case of employment discrimination but if other indicia of discrimination are properly presented the remarks can no longer be deemed stray and the jury has a right to conclude that they bear a more ominous significance


Input: or internally inconsistent; (3) whether the interpretation conflicts with the substantive or procedural requirements of the ERISA statute; (4) whether the Plan Administrator interpreted the words at issue consistently; and (5) whether the interpretation is contrary to the clear language of the Plan. Finley, 957 F.2d at 621. The Plan Administrator does not render any language in the Plan meaningless or inconsistent. In fact, the interpretation is consistent with the Plan’s goals of excluding coverage for certain injuries arising out of particular circumstances, such as criminal activity. There is no evidence that the words at issue were ever interpreted inconsistently with regard to other claimants. Further, the interpretation is not contrary to the 1998 WL 385897, *2-3 (6th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>). “When a plan administrator offers a Holdings: 0: holding plan administrators denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious because the administrator in effect applied a per se rule treating all drunk driving deaths as nonaccidental 1: holding that a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied to the decision to deny benefits under the erisa plan 2: holding that the plan administrators decision to deny benefits to wifes claim for accidental benefits was not arbitrary and capricious because a clause in the husbands policy specifically excluded from accidental death coverage any purposeful selfinflicted injuries and any injuries caused by drug use and husband had died as a result of drunk drivingxper curiam 3: holding that under erisa a plan administrators decision to deny an employee longterm disability benefits is arbitrary and capricious if the administrator ignores favorable evidence  and selectively reviews the evidence it does consider 4: holding that in the absence of any definite anatomic explanations of plaintiffs symptoms we cannot find that the administrators decision to deny benefits was not arbitrary and capricious