Input: second-category Lopez power. Marek, 238 F.3d at 318 (footnote omitted) (quoting Photogrammetric Data Services, 103 F.Supp.2d at 882). Other courts have reached similar conclusions, upholding convictions based upon criminal statutes which serve to protect instrumentalities of interstate commerce even though the specific conduct involved arose from intrastate activities. For example, in United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273 (8th Cir.1996), the Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction of a police officer under the Travel Act, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952(a) (West 2000), premised upon extortion activity in which the officer escorted his victim, a man he had arrested, to an automatic teller machine to withdraw money in return for being released from custody. Because an interstate networ 9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1527 Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants stipulation that the gun had moved in interstate commerce was sufficient evidence to support his conviction under 18 usc  922g1 1: holding that because cellular telephones and cellphone id numbers are instrumentalities of interstate commerce protectable under the second category of lopez no further inquiry was necessary to sustain conviction under 18 usca  1029a west 2000 2: holding the limitations to congresss commerce clause authority recognized in lopez have no effect on the establishment of the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act 3: holding after lopez that the interstate nexus element of the hobbs act still requires the government to show only a minimal connection to interstate commerce 4: holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce


Input: significantly, whether or not the Justice Department can be said to have been authorized to represent STS residents, this Court finds that the Justice Department did not adequately represent such residents. A finding of inadequate representation is required based upon the above discussion of the limited causes of action and types of relief available to and pursued by the Justice Department in United States v. Connecticut. Since the Justice Department did not seek all of the types of relief which plaintiffs seek in this case, it follows directly that the Justice Department’s representation was inadequate from a res judicata perspective, and that the plaintiffs are therefore not in privity with the United States. See Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201, 1203 (2d Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 981, 93 S.Ct. 1893, Holdings: 0: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 1: holding that six employees bringing suit under title vii were not in privity with the united states which had brought a previous suit against the same employer because the employees sought a type of relief which the united states had not sought 2: holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations 3: holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law 4: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states


Input: taken away by government regulation”) (quoting Allen v. City and County of Honolulu, 58 Haw. 432, 571 P.2d 328, 329 (1977)); Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council of City & County of Honolulu, 61 Haw. 390, 606 P.2d 866, 902 (1980) ("The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on a change of position on the part of a land developer by substantial expenditure of money in connection with his project in reliance, not solely on existing zoning laws or on good faith expectancy that his development will be permitted, but on official assurance on which he has a right to rely that his project has met zoning requirements, that necessary approvals will be forthcoming in due course, and he may safely proceed with the project.”); Denning v. County of Maui, 52 Haw. 653, 485 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1971) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination 1: holding that a person has standing to bring suit under the civil rights act if she or he can show that she or he was punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities 2: holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right 3: holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired 4: holding that a zoning estoppel plaintiff must show that he or she has been given assurances of some form by the county that his or her proposed construction met zoning requirements and that he or she had a right lo rely on such assurances


Input: Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (finding that a prosecutor’s appearance at a probable cause hearing is “connected with the initiation and conduct of a prosecution, particularly where the hearing occurs after arrest ...” (emphasis added)); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1994) (“According to the complaint, the interrogation and payments took place early in the investigation, while the prosecutors were just beginning to piece events together. Thus there cannot be absolute immunity.”); Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 368 (7th Cir.1992) (finding that because the alleged prosecutorial acts took place after conviction, the prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity); White, 369 Ill.App.3d. at 772, 308 Ill.Dec. 518, 861 N.E.2d 1083 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the temporal remoteness of the Holdings: 0: holding that the timing of the alleged actions of the prosecutor supported the courts conclusion that the prosecutors actions were associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process instead of the investigatory phase because the conduct occurred one month before plaintiffs trial and more than five years after the grand jury indicted plaintiff 1: holding that counsels failure to investigate the defendants personal and psychiatric history constituted ineffective assistance during the penalty phase but not during the guilt phase 2: holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase 3: holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury 4: holding that the effects of the victims deaths upon the families is part of the circumstances of the crime and is properly presented to the jury at the penalty phase


Input: that bar does not extend to his requests for withholding of removal or CAT protection. We conclude, however, that because the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence, Aung did not meet his burden of establishing his eligibility for these forms of relief. See Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir.2004) (reviewing an adverse credibility determination for substantial evidence). There was an inconsistency in Aung’s testimony regarding the date he joined the National League for Democracy (“NLD”) and there was an inconsistency as to whether Aung participated in NLD political activities during his foreign business travels. Because Aung claimed persecution based on his political beliefs, these inconsistencies go to the heart of his claim. See id. (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. ** This Holdings: 0: holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum 1: holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination 2: holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true 3: holding that the ijs adverse credibility determination must be upheld so long as one of the identified grounds is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of the claim of persecution emphasis added 4: holding that the reviewing court must accept the adverse credibility finding so long as one of the identified grounds is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of the petitioners claim of persecution internal quotation marks omitted first alteration in original


Input: decision on the basis that “no evidence was presented” by means of which the director could have found that the employee was physically capable of cutting cores on June 18,1993. With this conclusion and the inherent requirement it weaves into an otherwise. unambiguous statute, we disagree. Had the Legislature deemed it necessary to insert into the statute a requirement that an employer present expert medical testimony that at the precise time an offer of light-duty work is tendered by the employer the employee was physically capable of performing that assignment, the Legislature could have done so. Our careful review of the statutory language and our prior decisions in interpretation thereof reveal no such rigid requirement. See Worcester Textile v. McIntosh, 593 A.2d 70, 73 (R.I.1991) (<HOLDING>). Although we agree that there was not an Holdings: 0: holding that under the first amendment speech can be pursuant to a public employees official job duties even though it is not required by or included in the employees job description or in response to a request by the employer 1: holding an employee must be able to perform essential job functions at the time of termination 2: recognizing that medical evidence need not address employees physical capability to perform the particular job offered but rather the capacity of that employee for workrelated activity 3: holding that an administrator need not address each piece of evidence 4: holding that under pwdcra the inability to perform a particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation instead the impairment must significantly restrict an individuals ability to perform at least a wide range of jobs


Input: to appeal on August 30, 2005. The petitioner’s conviction ther to file his habeas petition. The petitioner filed his habeas petition on June 23, 2008, within that time frame. But to toll the one-year habeas statute, a post-conviction motion must be “properly filed,” see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), and the respondent contends that the petitioner’s application for leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of the post-conviction motion was not properly filed because it was not submitted within 21 days. However, the petitioner filed a delayed application within the time allowed by the state court rules. See Mich. Ct. R. 7.205(F). In Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780 (6th Cir.2003), the Sixth Circuit, applying Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-21, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002) (<HOLDING>), held that the gap between the trial court’s Holdings: 0: holding that if a state court grants leave to pursue an out of time appeal the proper period of exclusion for  2244d purposes is all time between the filing of the request to excuse the default and the state courts decision on the merits if it elects to excuse the default 1: holding that the tolling provision in  2244d2 covers the time between a lower state courts decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court 2: holding that the other collateral review provision of  2244d2 encompasses federal review 3: holding that equitable tolling of the time to file a notice of appeal is not permitted 4: holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal


Input: became the only state that requires preser vation of a second breath sample. Because only one state requires this, according to the State, only one manufacturer makes the instrument that captures and preserves a breath sample, and only one company makes the silica gel tubes used for capturing samples. The State also asserts that the second breath sample requirement has prevented New Hampshire “from staying current with emerging technology,” such as models that test each of a subject’s breath samples with two different technologies. For all of these reasons, the State contends that requiring the capture and preservation of a suspect’s breath sample for independent testing is no longer required by due process. See Moss v. Superior Court, 857 P.2d 400, 404-05 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (<HOLDING>), review denied, 868 P.2d 318 (Ariz. 1994). We Holdings: 0: holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court 1: holding that jury trial in civil cases is not so fundamental to the american system of justice as to be required of state courts by due process 2: holding that when neither the petitioners state court briefs nor the state courts decision made any reference to any federal constitutional claim or cited any federal constitutional cases the lack of fundamental error found by the state court was a lack of fundamental error under arizonas state constitution 3: holding that to declare a denial of due process we must find a denial of fundamental fairness 4: holding that because of the reliability and accuracy of the model used by the state to test breath samples neither due process nor fundamental fairness required the state to provide defendants with breath samples


Input: of twenty years. Given the district court’s recognition of Barrientos-Maldonado’s “very serious” criminal history, his sentence of fifty-seven months, which is at the low end of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, is not unreasonable. Barrientos-Maldonado also challenges his sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds, arguing that any fact beyond the mere fact of conviction that justifies increased punishment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This claim is precluded by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), and United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 414 (9th Cir.2000). Contrary to Barrientos-Maldonado’s challenges, Almendarez-Torres remains good law. See Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d at 414 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reject BarrientosMaldonado’s Holdings: 0: holding that almendareztorres remains the law after apprendi 1: holding that almendareztorres is dispositive in rejecting a sixth amendment apprendi challenge to an 8 usc  1326b2 sentence enhancement 2: holding that apprendi carved out an exception for prior convictions that specifically preserved the holding of almendareztorres 3: holding that almendareztorres was not overruled by apprendi 4: holding that almendareztorres remains good law after apprendi


Input: open terms; (4) partial performance; and (5) the custom of such transactions.” Id. (citing Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass’n of America, 670 F.Supp. at 499-503). 2 . In Jackson, the Supreme Court rejected the Board’s argument that Jackson could not state a claim for retaliation under Title IX because he is an "indirect victim,” i.e. the high school females at the Birmingham public schools were the actual victims. Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1507. The Court explained that "[t]he statute is broadly worded; it does not require that the victim of the retaliation must also be the victim of the discrimination that is the subject of the original complaint.” Id. The Court noted, however, that if the statute's wording tracked Title VII, then the Court would have accepted the Board's position. See id. (<HOLDING>). Retaliation under Title VII is made unlawful Holdings: 0: recognizing that 42 usc  2000e2a1 provides that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate because of such individuals race color etc 1: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 2: holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge pursuant to  706 of title vii 42 usc  2000e5 did not toll the statute of limitations for an action brought on the same facts under 42 usc  1981 3: holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc  1983 4: recognizing that title iii enforcement statute 42 usc  12188 which incorporates the remedies of 42 usc  2000a3a does not include money damages


Input: the defendant in view of ... its financial condition.” Fifth, the instruction told the jury that in fixing punitive damages, it could consider the “nature of defendant’s conduct” and “plaintiffs actual damages.” Haslip recognized the “plaintiffs actual damages” as an important constitutional factor with respect to punitive damages. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580-81, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1601-02, 134 L.Ed.2d 809, 829-30 (1996) (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24, 111 S.Ct. at 1046, 113 L.Ed.2d at 23). In addition, separate instructions defined “willful and wanton conduct” and “preponderance of clear, convincing, and satisf aslip holding and therefore has demonstrated no constitutional or legal error. State ex rel. Miller v. DeCoster, 596 N.W.2d 898, 904 (Iowa 1999) (<HOLDING>); Olson v. Nieman’s, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d 299, 316 Holdings: 0: holding we review claim construction de novo on appeal 1: holding that we review a district courts interpretation of a statute de novo 2: holding that we review agency determinations of law de novo 3: holding that we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo 4: holding that we review constitutional challenges de novo


Input: and, further, that the incidents in Varon’s claim were isolated and indiscriminate and did not rise to the level of persecution. We agree. We first note that while the 1996 detention and the 2001 telephone threats were on account of Varon’s political opinion, it is less clear whether the 1999 Molotov cock tail incident and the 2002 detention in the forest likewise were motivated by Varon’s actual or imputed political opinion. With respect to the bombing, Varón merely speculates that the bomb was thrown at him by a member of the FER and concedes that he was unable to identify who threw the bomb. Accordingly, the record does not compel the conclusion that the bombing was connected to his political activity. See Silva v. United States Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1238 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). As to the kidnapping in 2000, Varon’s Holdings: 0: holding that where petitioner testified she did not know who fired shots at her ear or why the evidence did not compel the conclusion that the shooting was based on her political opinion 1: holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her social security disability benefits but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not stay in bed all day as she claimed 2: holding that debtor who was separated from her husband and who testified that she would only return to the marital home if her husband vacated the house or died or if she was required to care for him or her adult son there or if the couple reconciled was an abandonment of the marital home as her homestead 3: holding that the elevenyearold victims twentyonemonth delay in reporting her grandfathers inappropriate sexual conduct was adequately explained where the child testified that she did not tell anyone about the incident because her grandfather told her not to tell she did not think anybody was going to believe her and she felt scared and threatened by the defendant 4: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination


Input: her primary or secondary attachment figure was abruptly and inappropriately removed from her life. This potential psychological damage was the only alleged incidence of abuse, abandonment or neglect presented at the hearing. After considering the evidence and argument of counsel, the trial court found no legal basis to conclude that depriving M.N.B. of contact with Appellant, someone to whom the child has no legal connection, constitutes the level of abuse needed to support a finding of a dependency. We agree with the trial court that a parent’s decision to deprive a child of contact with someone who has no legal custody or visitation rights vis-á-vis the child is an inadequate ground upon which to base an adjudication of dependency. Cf. Clock v. Clock, 649 So.2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. A.W., 519 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA Holdings: 0: holding the mere act of relocating or separating a child from familiar surroundings by an otherwise fit and proper custodial parent against the childs wishes does not constitute abuse under the statutory definition and therefore does not render the child dependent 1: holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 2: holding any person who has supplied necessities to a child may sue and recover from the childs parent for value of the supplies or services furnished to the child 3: holding that abusive or violent conduct by a parent or other resident of the childs home supports conclusion that childs surroundings endanger his physical or emotional wellbeing 4: holding that juvenile court that determined child was not dependent had no jurisdiction to thereafter determine custody of child


Input: 8 S.W.3d at 638. 14 . See id. at 639. 15 . See Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993); City of Saginaw v. Carter, 996 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. filed). 16 . See Curbo v. State, 998 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.App.—Austin 1999, no pet. h.); Little-Tex Insulation Co. v. General Servs. Comm’n, 997 S.W.2d 358, 360 (Tex.App.—Austin 1999, pet. filed); C Ann. §§ 554.002(a), 554.0035. 27 . Id. § 554.001(4) (emphasis added). 28 . See Thompson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 789 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex.1990). 29 . See Bennack Flying Serv., Inc. v. Balboa, 997 S.W.2d 748, 751 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72, 86 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1998, pet. denied). 30 . See Curbo, 998 S.W.2d at 344 (<HOLDING>). 31 . See Continental Coffee Prods. Co. v. Holdings: 0: holding that there is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure 1: holding that an ineffective grievance procedure bars employers defense based on that procedure 2: holding that because plaintiffs were reasonable in interpreting defendants grievance procedure to apply only to active employees plaintiffs did not act in bad faith when they alleged that no applicable grievance procedure existed 3: holding that a jail inmate does not have a constitutional entitlement to an adequate grievance procedure and the ineffectiveness or even absence of a grievance procedure does not give rise to a constitutional claim 4: holding that inmates have no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in access to grievance procedure


Input: by Fort Worth officials. The court presumes good faith on the part of the procurement officers at the Corps’ Baltimore District Office, absent proof to the contrary. See T & M Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1279, 1285 (Fed.Cir.1999) (“[G]overnment officials are presumed to act in good faith, and ‘it requires ... proof to induce a court to abandon the presumption of good faith.’ ” (quoting Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 211 Ct.Cl. 192, 198, 543 F.2d 1298 (1976))). While that presumption may have been shaken by the whistleblower letter related to the actions of the Fort Worth District Office, nothing indicates that officials of the Baltimore District Office have been tainted in the same way. See Chapman Law Firm Co. v. Greenleaf Constr. Co., 490 F.3d 934, 940 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Given the removal of authority from the Fort Holdings: 0: holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith 1: holding that if corrective action is reasonable the court is required to assume that the government will carry out the corrective action in good faith 2: holding failure to take action may have some bearing on good faith 3: holding that this court is required to assume that the jury followed the limiting instructions given by the district court 4: holding that beneficiaries of an alleged will may recover reasonable expenses and attorneys fees when defending a will in good faith


Input: No. 146, Ex. C. While the obituary states that Jeanne Decker was defendant John Nelson Decker’s wife of fifty-one years, it establishes nothing more than that. See id. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to establish that Jeanne Decker was a representative of the estate of her late husband John Nelson Decker or that he had an estate. 2. “Successors” Under Rule 25(a), a “successor” of the deceased party is also a proper party for substitution. A successor of the deceased party is a “distributee” of the decedent’s estate if the decedent’s estate has been distributed at the time the motion for substitution has been made. Gronowicz v. Leonard, 109 F.R.D. 624, 626 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citations omitted); see e.g., Hardy v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 842 F.Supp. 713, 716-717 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (<HOLDING>). a. Mary Beth Ciaschi Pethybridge As Holdings: 0: recognizing a fallacy that the wife has  an estate or interest in the husbands lands in his lifetime as she can mortgage as her separate property   1: holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts 2: holding that the deceased defendant trustees wife was a representative of her husbands estate and a proper party for substitution purposes where the wife was the primary distributee of her deceased husbands estate 3: holding that proper forum for debtor to challenge actions of coexecutor of debtors deceased husbands estate was state probate court not bankruptcy court 4: holding the family court properly awarded a wife attorneys fees incurred as the result of her husbands contempt


Input: license, noting that the license ordinance “has no .provisions, explicit or implicit, for sentencing” and “in simple and direct, terms, authorizes the city to put out of • business those businesses used for illegal or immoral purposes”). The court need not decide the issue based on the denial alone, however, because ATM challenges not only the Council’s denial of its license, but also the pre-denial operation of the ordinance itself. ATM has presented sufficient evidence for the court to conclude (at least for a determination of standing) that operation of the ordinance impermissibly and indefinitely delayed ATM’s ability to engage in activity presumptively protected by the First Amendment. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. at 504, 98 S.Ct. 2796; Gayesty Theatres, Inc., 719 F.2d at 1552 (<HOLDING>); City of Daleville, Ala., 695 F.Supp. at 1171. Holdings: 0: holding that legislative immunity is not forfeited simply because the activities if unprotected might violate a plaintiffs first amendment rights 1: recognizing the preliminary issue in a first amendment challenge is whether the speech at issue is protected or unprotected 2: holding in a case addressing the revocation of an adult theaters business license that while the citycould prevent the viewing of an obscene videotape it cannot constitutionally pierce the first amendment shield and bar  presumptively protected expression based only on prior unprotected conduct 3: holding first amendment claim requires actual protected conduct 4: holding that regulating the location of adult films does not violate the first amendment and citing as support the proposition that reasonable regulations of the time place and manner of protected speech where those regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests are permitted by the first amendment


Input: trial court allowed Tucker to read the victim’s statement into the record and certified Tucker as “an expert in Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner.” {54} We hold that the victim’s statement to the SANE practitioner is testimonial because it falls into the third category of evidence labeled testimonial by Crawford, “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” 541 U.S. at 52,124 S.Ct. 1354 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {55} We first note that the fact that the SANE practitioner is not a government official does not preclude statements given to her from being testimonial. See, e.g., State v. Mack, 337 Or. 586, 101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or.2004) (en bane) (<HOLDING>). However, many cases involving statements Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not err in precluding crossexamination of police officer as to statements made during an internal police investigation because the purpose for which such testimony was sought was pure speculation which has no support in the record 1: holding victims statement testimonial where it was elicited in response to structured police questioning pursuant to a police investigation 2: holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements 3: holding that accusers 911 call initial statement to police upon their arrival at the crime scene and statements made to police a short time later were testimonial 4: holding statements made to a social worker to be testimonial because she was acting as a proxy for the police


Input: definition of “frivolous” in interpreting its own postconviction act. See People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1209-12 (2009) (concluding that a petition can be summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit “only if the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact”). The definitions in Rickert, Neitzke, and Hodges closely track the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “frivolous.” See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 913 (2002) (defining “frivolous” as “of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact ”) (emphasis added). Indeed, those definitions are also consistent with the way we have defined the term “frivolous” in other contexts. See, e.g., Bond v. Comm’r of Revenue, 691 N.W.2d 831, 839 (Minn.2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that a petition is Holdings: 0: holding that second state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit was properly filed 1: holding that a district court may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff paid the statutory filing fee 2: holding return filled with zeros despite w2 showing considerable income was substantially incorrect or frivolous 3: holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant 4: holding that the taxpayer filed a frivolous return because it had no basis in law or fact


Input: — affects the FDIC’s ability to function as receiver in the case. The “disposition of a failed [bank’s] assets ... is one of the quintessential statutory powers of the [FDIC] as a receiver.” Pyramid Constr. Co. v. Wind River Petroleum, Inc., 866 F.Supp. 513, 517 (D.Utah 1994). If an asset sold to a third-party purchaser is subject to dilution in a later judicial proceeding, there would be a substantial chilling effect upon the receiver’s ability to perform its statutory functions. In Pyramid, the court rejected the argument that § 1821(j) did not apply because a plaintiff sought relief against the receiver’s successor. The plaintiffs argument in Pyramid sounded much like Dittmer’s here — because the receiver had alread 4, 1993 WL 149084, at *2 (N.D.Cal. April 30, 1993) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Of the many cases Dittmer cites in support of Holdings: 0: recognizing claim against bank receiver 1: holding that the antiinjunction act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings in the suffolk county district court fifth district because the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims under the real estate settlement procedures act 2: holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale 3: holding that a bank receiver by filing a claim permits challenge to the secured portion of its claim 4: holding that  1821 barred a claim to enjoin a bank and its trustee from conducting a foreclosure sale because enjoining these parties indirectly enjoins the receiver which a district court has no power to do


Input: evidence linking any of the 54 nonparty victims to Nevada, but neither did the evidence establish that none of the victims were Nevada residents. This gap in the evidence was critical because the jury heard plaintiffs’ counsel assert that Nevada residents purchased Ford truck models affected by the rollaway problem in disproportionate numbers. Thus, jury members may have assumed that at least some of the 54 nonparty victims lived in Nevada. To remedy the due process violation, we may either remand for a new trial on punitive damages or “change ... the level of the punitive damages award.” Williams, 127 S.Ct. at 1065. We conclude that a new trial on punitive damages is the proper remedy. See Werbungs Und Commerz Union Austalt v. Collectors’ Guild, Ltd., 930 F.2d 1021, 1027 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). On remand, the district court must explain to Holdings: 0: holding that remittitur is not designed to compensate for excessive verdicts in cases where jury is improperly instructed 1: holding that in excessive force cases the threshold question for the court is whether the officers conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right 2: recognizing that the district court could merge duplicative convictions after the jury verdicts are recorded 3: recognizing validity of these rules and noting that their principal purpose is to prevent fishing expeditions in search of information with which to impeach jury verdicts 4: holding that the sixth amendments right to trial by jury was not violated by eleventoone and tentotwo guilty verdicts in state noncapital cases


Input: was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not contest the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257 (1975) (internal citations omitted). The only element in dispute in the instant case is the last element — defendant argues that the arrest was privileged as a matter of law because it was supported by probable cause. Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d. Cir.2002) (“A § 1983 claim of false arrest based on the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures may not be maintained if there was probable cause for the arrest”); see also Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 387 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest 1: holding that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a  1983 claim alleging false arrest 2: holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause 3: holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity 4: holding that existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest  quoting bernard v united states 25 f3d 98 102 2d cir 1994


Input: with, an offense like that at issue in the case; or, as a result of having been a victim of, a witness to, or charged with a crime, could not be fair and impartial to both sides. 2 . The court also asked two-part questions about whether the panel members: were acquainted with other panel members; were currently studying or had previously studied law; had previously served as jurors; had previously served as grand jurors; or were currently or previously involved in crime prevention groups. 3 . Cf. Butler v. City of Camden, 352 F.3d 811, 816 (3d Cir.2003) (noting that the Third Circuit has "found error and reversed in cases where the district court barred all inquiry into a relevant subject matter designed to elicit a disqualifying prejudice”). 4 . See Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d at 84-85 (<HOLDING>). 5 . In the interim between Swain and Holdings: 0: holding that the only relevant public interest in disclosure is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the foia which is contributing significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government  1: holding that the sca violates the fourth amendment to the extent that it allows government agents to obtain the contents of emails without a warrant 2: holding where 1 the government provided the defendant with all the necessary drugmaking materials 2 the government provided instructions on how to make the drugs and 3 the defendant sought out the materials and help from the undercover government agents the case set the outer limits to which the government may go in the quest to ferret out and prosecute crimes but the governments conduct did not rise to the level of a due process violation 3: holding that criminal defendants are entitled to obtain for impeachment purposes statements made by government witnesses to government agents that relate to the subject matter of the witnesses direct testimony 4: holding that whether error in failing to ask a question about bias in favor of law enforcement testimony requires reversal hinges on such factors as the importance of the government agents testimony to the case as a whole the extent to which the question concerning the venire persons attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions  the extent to which the credibility of the government agentwitness is put into issue and the extent to which the testimony of the government agent is corroborated by nonagent witnesses internal quotation marks and citation omitted


Input: whether Essie can make a pri-ma facie case of discrimination. The burden would then shift to Goodman to demonstrate a “neutral explanation” for employing two of his three allocated peremptory challenges to exclude members of the black race. We agree with Essie that her decedent, Jones, would have been entitled to the benefit of Edmonson. Because the rule enunciated in that case involves the extension of a federal right, we believe its fruits are mandated by the Supreme Court’s decision in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991). The question of re-troactivity of Supreme Court decisions wherein a new rule is announced has had a somewhat varied past. Cf., e.g. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding no retroactive application 1: holding mcnally not to be retroactive in habeas corpus proceeding reversed on appeal 2: holding the rule of griffith v kentucky 479 us 314 107 sct 708 93 led2d 649 1987 does not require retroactive application to convictions challenged on habeas corpus 3: holding retroactive application 4: holding on the basis of melendezdiaz v massachusetts  us  129 sct 2527 174 led2d 314 2009 that a certificate of norecord is testimonial


Input: Grenvik, we may not presume that he was represented. Defendant misperceives the nature of a “silent” record. In each of the cases in which we or the Supreme Court have held that the defendant made a prima facie showing from a silent record, a record of the prior proceeding existed but either made no reference to an attorney or contained documents on which spaces for the name of the defendant’s attorney were left blank. See, e.g., Grenvik, 291 Or at 102; Riggins, 180 Or App at 532; State v. Manfredonia, 105 Or App 537, 539, 805 P2d 738 (1991). In other words, the record existed, but its silence on the subject of the defendant’s representation constituted circumstantial evidence from which the court could infer that the defendant was unrepresented. See Manfredonia, 105 Or App at 540 (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, the record of proceedings in Holdings: 0: holding that there is an inference from the existence of a blank for the name of defendants lawyer and from the absence of any evidence to the contrary that defendant was not represented by counsel 1: holding there was no evidence to support the existence of any alleged fiduciary duty 2: holding that where the record shows defendant was represented by counsel and the conviction is valid on its face the defendant is precluded from attempting to undermine the validity of that conviction by collateral attack 3: holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to call a witness where the defendant never provided the witnesss name to counsel and no evidence existed that counsel had any notice of the witnesss identity 4: holding that defendant was denied counsel even though his lawyer asked another defendants lawyer to take notes or whatever in the defendants lawyers temporary absence


Input: conducts a lawful traffic stop and has been told by a reliable informant that the driver of the stopped vehicle is transporting a stash of illegal drugs, the officer has a reasonable fear that a passenger in the vehicle is armed and dangerous if that passenger disobeys the officer’s command to keep his hands in plain view and instead reaches back toward his waistband in a motion that is consistent with an attempt to retrieve a weapon. See United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C.Cir.2001) (“[E]ven though a single factor might not itself be sufficiently probative of wrongdoing to give rise to a reasonable suspicion [justifying a Teiry stop], the combination of several factors — especially when viewed through the eyes of an experienced officer — may.”); see also id. at 61-62 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the District Court properly denied Holdings: 0: holding that passenger conduct can be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion 1: recognizing a defendants giving of evasive answers when asked what he was doing in the area as a factor establishing reasonable suspicion 2: recognizing that furtive gestures undertaken in response to police presence can serve as a factor in establishing reasonable suspicion 3: holding that flight from police can help establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop 4: holding that a nervous and possibly furtive demeanor was insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion to detain


Input: 4) that Petitioners were treated differently than others; and 5) that the Commission abused its discretion by finding no mitigating circumstances. Because we conclude that the Commission’s proceedings unconstitutionally commingled prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, we do not discuss Petitioners’ other arguments. Discussion Our Supreme Court in Lyness v. State Board of Medicine, 529 Pa. 535, 605 A.2d 1204 (1992), held that a violation of due process occurs when an administrative board, which initiates a professional licensing prosecution, issues the ultimate adjudication in the case. Due process protection is not limited to the revocation of professional occupational licenses. See e.g. Brewster v. Department of Transportation, 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 277, 503 A.2d 497 (1986) (<HOLDING>). In determining what process is due, the Holdings: 0: holding that department of transportation did not have control of motorists drivers license because although the department of transportation may have had a duty to recall the motorists license this authority to revoke does not involve physical possession or actual control sufficient to bring the license within the ambit of the personal property exception to sovereign immunity 1: holding that age disclosed on a drivers license constituted an admission where the party swore to the truth of the statements made in the license application 2: holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer 3: recognizing that the due process guaranteed under the alabama constitution is coextensive with the due process guaranteed under the united states constitution 4: holding that the commonwealth cannot revoke a drivers license without due process required by the constitution


Input: were neglected and placed them in the temporary custody of CCDCFS. The subsequent motion filed by CCDCFS was a motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody, filed pursuant to R.C. 2151.413 and 2151.414. Such proceedings are governed by Juv.R. 34, which specifically provides that: {¶ 58} “ ‘Hearings to determine whether temporary orders regarding custody should be modified to orders for permanent custody shall be considered dispositional hearings and need not be bifurcated.’ Juv.R. 34(1). {¶ 59} “Because the hearing regarding the motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody was a dispositional hearing, rather than an adjudicatory hearing, Juv.R. 29 did not apply.” Id. at ¶ 6-9. See also In re Lakes, 149 Ohio App.3d 128, 2002-Ohio-3917, 776 N.E.2d 510, at ¶ 34 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 60} In the instant case, Juv.R. 29(D) was Holdings: 0: holding the trial court was not required to engage in a colloquy with a parent in an rc 2151414 proceeding    such as that required by juvr 29 at adjudicatory hearings 1: holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper 2: holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion 3: holding that trial court could take judicial notice of the contents of the court files to the extent it considered previous court orders evidence admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule and testimony and evidence admitted at any previous adjudicatory proceedings such as when the children were determined to be dependent 4: holding that consistent with due process telephone hearings may be conducted to resolve interstate unemployment compensation claims because abolition of such hearings would not materially reduce the risk of erroneous deprivations and such hearings are a reasonable means of conserving fiscal and administrative resources


Input: uniformly rejected attempts to abrogate pursuant to other Article I powers. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 749-50, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002) (“Congress, pursuant to its Article I powers, cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity ....”); Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) (“Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I.”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) (“Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65, 72, 116 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the patent clause of article i 1: holding that congress could abrogate the eleventh amendment pursuant to the commerce clause 2: holding that congress had no power under article i to abrogate state sovereign immunity 3: holding that congress did not properly abrogate states eleventh amendment immunity from suits under the patent act 4: holding that congress may abrogate a states immunity pursuant to its enforcement power under  5 of the fourteenth amendment


Input: on Virginia’s recognized list. d. Specific Facts Can Give Rise to a Special Relationship As mentioned supra, the absence of one of the enumerated special relationships recognized by the Virginia Supreme Court does not end the analysis. “[PJarents, students, and the general community still have a reasonable expectation, fostered in part by colleges themselves, that reasonable care will be exercised to protect resident students from foreseeable harm.” Schieszler, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (quoting Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983)). Even without recognizing one of the special relationships alleged by Doe, the particular facts alleged in a case can give rise to a special relationship. Id. at 609; see also Yuzefovsky, 261 Va. at 107, 540 S.E.2d at 139 (<HOLDING>). For instance, in Burdette v. Marks, the Holdings: 0: recognizing special circumstances exception 1: holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school 2: holding that a special relationship may arise from the factual circumstances of a particular case 3: holding that a duty of care may arise out of a contractual relationship between two parties 4: recognizing the existence of the special relationship


Input: arbitration those judicial remedies that the drafting party with superior bargaining power is likely to need, while providing no such exemption for the non-drafting party with inferior bargaining power. See Rivera v. American General Financial Services, Inc., 2011-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 53-54, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d at 818-19; Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 32, 146 N.M. 256, 208 P.3d at 907-10. By contrast, an arbitration agreement that contains a bilateral carve-out that explicitly excludes from mandatory arbitration a certain set of claims is not substantively unconscionable, even if the party with superior bargaining power is more likely to assert the excluded claims in a judicial forum. See Dalton v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 2016-NMSC-035, ¶ 21, 385 P.3d at 624 (<HOLDING>). Hatton marshals three arguments for Holdings: 0: holding that an arbitration agreement between a lender and a borrower that included a bilateral exception for claims less than 10000 was not substantively unconscionable even if one party is substantively more likely to bring small claims actions   1: holding that based upon the facts presented the arbitration provisions restricting or banning class actions are substantively unconscionable 2: holding district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever numerous substantively unconscionable terms from arbitration agreement 3: holding unconscionable arbitration provision that applied to all claims brought by borrower in reverse mortgage contract but not claims brought by the drafting party the lender 4: holding that a 30day limitations provision is substantively unconscionable


Input: prosecution has not met its heavy burden of demonstrating that Scheetz’s continued representation will cause him to be an unsworn witness that will impair the fact finding process or prejudice the prosecution. 2. Prosecution rebuttal witness Melton also challenges Judge Scoles’s conclusion that Scheetz must be disqualified from representing Melton because he may be called as a prosecution rebuttal witness. The applicable Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct provides: Rule 32:3.7. Lawyer as witness (a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) disqualifica 888, 891-92 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Weigel v. Farmers Ins. Co., 356 Ark. 617, 158 Holdings: 0: holding that disputed questions of fact and all ambiguities in state law must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party 1: holding that evidence that defendant plaintiffs former client consistently failed to pay other lawyers was relevant to prove the element of intent to defraud 2: holding that jurisdiction exists for determining if disputed facts are material 3: holding under georgia rule of professional conduct 37a that party seeking disqualification must demonstrate that the lawyers testimony is relevant to disputed material questions of fact and that there is no other evidence available to prove those facts 4: holding that a lawyer is a necessary witness where the lawyers testimony is relevant to disputed material questions of fact and where there is no other evidence available to prove those facts


Input: and the creditor is free to foreclose upon the case’s conclusion without violating the discharge injunction. Johnson, 501 U.S. at 84, 111 S.Ct. 2150 (“[A] bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim-namely, an action against the debtor in personam— while leaving intact another — namely, an action against the debtor in rem.”). Any deficiency that remains after the creditor forecloses on its liens and sells the property continues to exist, but is an uncollectible debt. Thus, following the discharge, the debt becomes nonrecourse debt. Id. at 86, 111 S.Ct. 2150 (“Insofar as the mortgage interest that passes through a Chapt ll.2008) (finding discharge a necessary prerequisite to permanency of lien avoidance); In re Lilly, 378 B.R. 232, 236-37 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.2007) (<HOLDING>). The court respectfully declines to reach the Holdings: 0: holding that where there was no value in the collateral to secure the claim after application of section 506a creditor did not hold a secured claim and therefore lacked basis for asserting rights under 11 usc  1325a5 1: holding that by virtue of section 1325a5 holder of secured claim retains the lien until the underlying debt is paid in full 2: holding that the words allowed secured claim in  506d refer to a claim that is secured by a lien and allowed under  502 3: holding that operation of state law requiring lien holder to renew lien in state court was not stayed by section 362 because extension  simply allows the holder of a valid lien to maintain the status quo  a policy not adverse to bankruptcy law but rather in complete harmony with it 4: holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond


Input: the stop of Johnson’s vehicle had not been converted to an impoundment, the mobility requirement of the automobile exception was satisfied. In conclusion, the searching officers had probable cause to believe that defendant’s backpack contained evidence of a crime, and the vehicle in which it was found was mobile when stopped. Therefore, the search was justified by the automobile exception. Affirmed. 1 Defendant does not appeal from two additional convictions for manufacture of a controlled substance and two further convictions for possession of a controlled substance. 2 Defendant does not contend that, because he had no interest in the vehicle, there was insufficient evidence to connect him with the contraband in the trunk. Cf. State v. Herrin, 323 Or 188, 194, 915 P2d 953 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 3 Therefore, cases addressing the mobility of Holdings: 0: holding that officers lacked objective probable cause to search the defendants car and belongings where drug paraphernalia was found in possession of passengers with no interest in the vehicle and there was no reason to believe that either passenger had additional property with her 1: holding that defendants suspect activity in the trunk and passenger compartment of his car immediately after he engaged in an apparent drug sale established probable cause to search the vehicle for drugs and drug money 2: holding that the officers examination revealed that there was probable cause to believe that the property was stolen 3: holding that officers had objective probable cause to search the pocket of a jacket found on the seat of the defendants truck where the discovery of marijuana in two different locations in the truck combined with the defendants possession of marijuana reasonably led officers to believe that other caches would be found elsewhere in the vehicle 4: holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle


Input: The E/C also argues that the JCC erred by reserving jurisdiction on “claims” for workers’ compensation benefits that were not listed on any petition for benefits (PFB) filed by the injured employee (Claimant). We affirm the rejection of the partial affirmative defense without comment, but modify the order on appeal by striking the reservation of jurisdiction over any claims that were not the subject of a pending PFB at the time of the final hearing. This court has previously held that a JCC may properly reserve jurisdiction over PFBs that have been filed, but not mediated, because mediation is mandatory under section 440.25(2), Florida Statutes; such unmediated claims are not procedurally ripe for adjudication. Parodi v. Fl. Contracting Co., Inc., 16 So.3d 958, 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Ake v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 112 So.3d Holdings: 0: holding jcc properly reserved jurisdiction on unmediated pfbs 1: holding that the district court properly predicated jurisdiction on  1361 2: holding order in dependency proceeding was nonfinal where order reserved jurisdiction to determine integrallyrelated visitation and support issues 3: holding order was nonfinal where order reserved jurisdiction to determine integrallyrelated visitation and child support issues 4: holding jcc has subject matter jurisdiction over discovery requests filed by injured worker who is pursuing benefits even before pfb is filed


Input: it was made. When Lucas pled guilty, this court’s decisions required the district court rather than the jury to determine the quantity of drugs for which a defendant was responsible under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). United States v. Jinadu, 98 F.3d 239, 247-48 (6th Cir.1996) (explaining that “the determination of the quantity of drugs involved is not an element of the offense” and that the sentencing judge, not the jury, must decide this issue). Although Lucas’s indictment t “had earlier announced the principle underlying the Apprendi rule in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999),” United States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932, 936 (6th Cir.2000), but Jones’s explicit holding was based on statutory construction. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-52, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (<HOLDING>). The Court’s statement that “under the Due Holdings: 0: holding that a similar statute created separate offenses 1: holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive 2: holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident 3: holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive 4: holding that matters of statutory construction are questions of law for the court to decide rather than issues of fact


Input: all four were involved in a single conspiracy. The idea that a conspiracy can exist solely because two people deal with the same middleman, but act independently, was previously rejected in United States v. Durades, 607 F.2d 818, 819-20 (9th Cir.1979) (“The government succeeded in proving that Lugo was the hub of the two separate conspiracies but failed to show that there was some kind of rim binding the spokes.”). In this case, the only connection between Nye and Jimenez that the government proved was that they both sold to Herrera and Theodoratos. The government failed to show “some kind of rim binding” Nye to Jimenez. Id. It did not show that Nye was aware Jimenez was dealing with Herrera, let alone that Nye ever received any benefit from those dealings. See Duran, 189 F.3d at 1081 (<HOLDING>). Thus, as Herrera claims, the government did Holdings: 0: holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy 1: holding that a conspiracy claim must contain supportive factual allegations describing the general composition of the conspiracy some or all of its broad objectives and the defendants general role in the conspiracy 2: holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators 3: holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges 4: holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman


Input: fair opportunity to obtain the assistance of counsel of his choice to prepare and conduct his defense,” that "constitutional mandate is satisfied so long as the accused is afforded a fair or reasonable opportunity to obtain particular counsel, and so long as there is no arbitrary action prohibiting the effective use of such counsel." United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1215 (3d Cir.1969). The record shows that Jackson had ample opportunity to retain counsel of his choice, and the District Court's refusal to further postpone his trial date was not arbitrary. 3 . Some cases add a requirement to the first prong o'f the test that the purpose is "at issue,” though others have not incorporated this requirement. Compare United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 291 (3d Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, Holdings: 0: holding that the federal action at issue must be authorized 1: holding that deposition testimony offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice case must reveal that the witness is competent to testify as to the matters at issue 2: holding that evidence must be offered for a proper nonpropensity purpose that is at issue in the case 3: holding that proponent of 404b evidence must identify a proper 404b purpose for admission  that is at issue in  the case 4: recognizing that other crimes evidence may be admissible if offered for any nonpropensity purpose and identifying the need to provide necessary background information about the relationships among the players as a proper purpose


Input: 1112, 1119 (5th Cir.1987) (“If a prisoner challenges a single hearing as constitutionally defective, he must first exhaust state habeas remedies.”); Alexander v. Ware, 714 F.2d 416, 419 (5th Cir.1983) ("If a prisoner challenges a 'single allegedly defective [disciplinary] hearing,’ he attacks, in essence, the fact and duration of his custody.’’). In such cases, we have required prisoners to exhaust the TDCJ grievance procedures. See Baxter v. Estelle, 614 F.2d 1030, 1031-32 (5th Cir.1980) ("[A] federal court may not grant ha-beas corpus relief to a petitioner who has failed to exhaust all administrative remedies, including an appeal to the Director of Corrections.”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1085, 101 S.Ct. 873, 66 L.Ed.2d 810 (1981); Lerma v. Estelle, 585 F.2d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848, 100 S.Ct. 95, 62 Holdings: 0: holding that a prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies even though his grievance was untimely 1: holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted 2: holding that a texas prisoner who had not exhausted his clearly available administrative remedies was properly denied habeas relief in the district court 3: holding that the prisoner has the burden of demonstrating he has exhausted his administrative remedies in his complaint 4: holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court


Input: for her obedience, they would protect her from physical and emotional injury. This count of the plaintiffs revised complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations since the alleged act of Watchtower that disfellowshipped her can be considered as the date the breach of the implied agreement occurred, which is less than six years from the date this action was instituted. The defendants also argue that the first amendment prohibits this court from considering the breach of contract claim, since, to determine this claim, the court necessarily would become involved in an “excessive entanglement” with religion. The first amendment does not bar application of a secular standard to certain tortious conduct in a chinch setting. See Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn. App. 759, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Holdings: 0: holding that claim of breach of fiduciary duty can be resolved under connecticut law 1: recognizing respondeat superior liability 2: holding that respondeat superior claim against institutional defendant for tort committed by defendant priest can be resolved under connecticut law without resorting to ecclesiastical standards of church doctrine 3: holding that first amendment barred child victim of sexual abuse by priest from bringing breach of fiduciary duty claim against priest church official and church 4: holding that the liability reform act preempted in part the common law doctrine of respondeat superior


Input: of scale in operating the fund as it grows larger; 4) comparative fee structures; 5) fallout benefits, i.e., indirect profits to the adviser attributable in some way to the existence of the fund; and 6) the independence and conscientiousness of the directors. See Krinsk v. Fund Asset Management, 875 F.2d 404, 409 (2d Cir.1989) (citing Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929-30.) At the pleading stage, a complaint must state more than a legal conclusion that a fee is excessive in order to survive a motion to dismiss. See Levy v. Alliance Capital Management L.P., No. 97-Civ-4672, 1998 WL 744005, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.26, 1998) (dismissing § 36(b) claim against investment adviser because plaintiff failed to allege why a new advisory agreement’s fees were excessive); Strougo I, 964 F.Supp. at 805 (<HOLDING>); Wexler v. Equitable Management Corp., No. Holdings: 0: holding that eaja fees may be awarded for fee litigation without a separate finding that the government was not substantially justified in its position as to the fee litigation as the single finding that the governments position lacks substantial justification  operates as a onetime threshold for fee eligibility  and presumptively encompasses all aspects of the civil action 1: holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee  2: holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied 3: holding that the allegation that the investment advisers fee increased substantially as a result of a funds rights offering to existing shareholders does not support an excessive fee claim under section 36b although it might under section 36a 4: holding that petitioner had failed to exhaust alternative remedies for review of his fee agreement because the ssa notified petitioner he could obtain his fee by filing a fee petition


Input: that the appellant might speak untruthfully in response. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 254 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 837, 114 S.Ct. 116, 126 L.Ed.2d 82 (1993). In our review, we look to whether the circumstances of the promise would reasonably induce a defendant to admit to a crime he did not commit. Sossamon v. State, 816 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), abrogated on other grounds by Graham v. State, 994 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). 2. Analysis Appellant argues that the condition of his d mination of credibility and demeanor, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the conditions of Appellant’s detention did not render his videotaped statement involuntary. See Bell v. State, 169 S.W.3d 384, 391-92 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>). Appellant also argues that his oral Holdings: 0: holding eight hours of questioning while in handcuffs and leg shackles did not render confession involuntary where appellant never indicated he did not want to answer any more questions or wanted to speak to attorney and never requested food water or bathroom breaks 1: holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him 2: holding that defendants request to speak to his parents was not an invocation of the right to remain silent because defendant never gave the police any indication that he wanted to stop talking only indicating he wanted to take a break from the interrogation to speak with his parents 3: holding officers failure to obtain a written waiver from defendant did not render his oral waiver or subsequent confession involuntary 4: holding suspects contradictory answers on miranda waiver form that he would answer questions without an attorney and that he wanted to talk to a lawyer to be ambiguous


Input: may have been actionable under the 1933 Act is an academic question. As noted earlier, Plaintiffs bring no claim under the 1933 Act. Plaintiffs make these allegations to provide support for their claim that Defendants engaged in an ongoing, consistent scheme of depressing revenue predictions to achieve quick and sustained growth in share prices. 186 .Salinger, 972 F.Supp. at 229. 187 . See Exs. A-G to First Boyle Decl. 188 . See Ex. B to First Boyle Decl. 189 . See Exs. A-B, D-G to Issuer Opp.; Exs. A-E to 12/9/03 Declaration of John Boyle ("Second Boyle Decl.”). 190 . See Menowitz, 991 F.2d at 42; Ezra Charitable Trust v. Frontier Ins. Group, Inc., No 00-5361, 2002 WL 87723 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.23, 2002), aff'd, LC Capital Partners v. Frontier Ins. Group. Inc., 318 F.3d 148 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 191 .See Ex. H to First Boyle Decl. 192 . See Holdings: 0: holding that failure to disclose that the defendant was involved on both the sellers and buyers side of transactions constitutes a concealment of a material fact sufficient to support a charge of fraud 1: holding no due process violation where the state took one position regarding the credibility of a witness during the trial against defendant and changed its position in a subsequent trial of another defendant involved in the underlying crime 2: holding that defendants answer sufficiently encapsulated the elements of an affirmative defense to have put plaintiff on notice that defendant intended to rely on it 3: holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense 4: holding that filing of litigation against the same defendant put a plaintiff on inquiry notice of the probability of fraud with another transaction involving the defendant where the complaints in both lawsuits involved similar allegations that defendant failed to disclose its inadequate loss reserves and did not sufficiently monitor its operations


Input: See Def.’s Opp’n at 11. Consequently, Monster contends that Zuckman’s claims for injunctive relief satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. See id. The parties dispute whether the cost of relief should be measured from the perspective of the plaintiff or defendant. Whatever perspective is used, they also disagree as to how the cost should be apportioned here given the claims on behalf of the general public. The Court need not resolve these issues, however, because Monster’s claims about the costs are too speculative to serve as the basis for determining the amount in controversy. Courts have found that general assertions that the cost of injunctive relief would exceed $75,000 are too speculative to establish diversity jurisdiction. See Nat’l Consumers League, 680 F.Supp.2d at 140 (<HOLDING>); Wexler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 496 Holdings: 0: holding that where plaintiff has set forth in the complaint a specific request for damages and attorneys fees that on its face is an amount less than the jurisdictional minimum the defendant must prove to a legal certainty that plaintiffs claim must exceed 75000 1: holding that the stipulation included in the plaintiffs petitionthat the maximum amount of damages sought or that would be accepted wpuld not exceed 75000 exclusive of costs and interest bound the plaintiff and was sufficient to defeat diversity jurisdiction 2: holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer 3: holding that in order to establish standing the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling must not be too speculative 4: holding that defendants claim that the cost of injunctive relief would exceed 75000 was too speculative


Input: stay (to the extent it was applicable), and the Debtor— whose Chapter 13 case had no filed claims — filed a motion to allow a late proof of claim on behalf of an unsecured creditor. All arguments and submissions concerning these matters have been considered by the court, and the issues are ripe for decision. I. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are not in dispute. The Creditor is the holder of a deed of trust on the Debtor’s principal residence, which secures a note on which the Debtor owes about $114,040. The Debtor’s payments on the note were in arrears, and the Creditor conducted a foreclosure sale on December 29, 2005. The foreclosure sale was conducted in accordance with West Virginia law, and the Debtor’s real property was sold to Gracie Mews, LLC (“Grade Mews”) for $130 997) (<HOLDING>); In re Rambo, 199 B.R. 747, 751 Holdings: 0: holding that the debtors were entitled to cure the mortgage arrearage through their chapter 13 plan because the creditors failure to record the sale deed prior to the bankruptcy filing rendered the sale incomplete under state law 1: holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court 2: recognizing the language of  1322c1 as a minimum floor in cutting off the debtors right to cure and permitting the debtor to cure until the deed was delivered to the successful bidder which would complete the sale under new jersey law 3: holding that the debtors could cure their arrearage until the expiration of the 10day upset bid period which would render the foreclosure sale complete under north carolina law 4: holding that the debtors could cure the default until the delivery of a sheriffs deed to the successful purchaser rendering the sale complete under new jersey state law


Input: P. J. Husband appeals from a judgment modifying a 1997 dissolution judgment that awarded spousal support to wife by extending its duration for an indefinite period of time. ORS 107.135 (2001). We conclude that the trial court lacked authority to order indefinite support under the circumstances of this case and reverse. The 1997 judgment provided that husband’s spousal support obligation would end on November 30, 2002. The parties agree that husband paid the final support installment required by the 1997 judgment on October 15, 2002, and that, 9), rev den, 288 Or 335 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Wife argues, notwithstanding the provisions Holdings: 0: holding that a trial court has broad discretion to modify a spousal maintenance award 1: holding that the trial court was without authority to modify a spousal support obligation when the modification proceeding was initiated ten years after the obligation to pay spousal support under the dissolution judgment had been terminated by order 2: holding that there is no spousal exception to the statute 3: holding that the trial court lacked authority to renew spousal support payments pursuant to a motion that was filed after the expiration of time during which spousal support was required to be paid under the original judgment 4: holding that the testimony of an obligor as to amount of payments was sufficient evidence to support findings of actual support paid


Input: employee generally will not support a claim of wrongful discharge under Alabama law. See Mack, 929 So.2d at 483-85; Cunningham v. Dabbs, 703 So.2d 979, 981 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997). And Plaintiffs failure to allege facts showing that he had an employment contract or any other basis for a legitimate expectation of continued employment as required to establish a federal due process claim under § 1983 also calls for the dismissal of any parallel due process claim arising state law. See Jefferson County v. Braswell, 407 So.2d 115, 122 (Ala.1981) (“We consider our analysis of the ... due process issues under the United States Constitution equally applicable to those same issues under the Alabama Constitution.”); Alabama State Personnel Bd. v. Garner, 4 So.3d 545, 550 n. 2 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008) (<HOLDING>). IV. Demand for Attorney’s Fees Hannah’s Holdings: 0: recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution 1: holding that entitlement to benefits is a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution 2: holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution 3: recognizing that the due process guaranteed under the alabama constitution is coextensive with the due process guaranteed under the united states constitution 4: holding parents custodial rights are a fundamental interest guaranteed due process protection


Input: that Plaintiff did not, including training and recruiting, and the hospital changed from an ongoing enterprise with approximately 700 employees during Casanova’s tenure to a winding-down enterprise with approximately 300 employees during Plaintiffs tenure. 3. Summary judgment was proper on Plaintiffs retaliation claim because, on the facts deemed true, Plaintiff did not complain of discrimination when she requested a higher salary, and she did not suffer an adverse employment action. See Wrighten v. Metro. Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1354 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Further, even if Plaintiff had made out a Holdings: 0: holding that a temporal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action may in some cases be sufficient to create an inference of retaliation 1: holding that the fact that employer had knowledge of the employees protected activity was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation where the timing of the discharge was not proximate to the protected activity 2: holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under title vii must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that she engaged in a protected activity that she was subjected to an adverse employment action by her employer and that there was a causal link between the two 3: holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action 4: holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action


Input: some tension among the different circuits as to the interaction between sections 107 and 113.” United States v. Hunter, 70 F.Supp.2d 1100, 1103 n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1999). For example, courts are split on the question of who may bring a CERCLA § 107 cost-recovery action, and more specifically, whether a PRP is entitled to bring a CERCLA § 107 cost-recovery action. We have held that a private PRP who incurs response costs may not bring a cost-recovery action under CERCLA § 107, and instead may only bring a claim for contribution under CERCLA § 113(f). Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1301. We have not yet considered, however, whether a government PRP such as a municipality that similarly incurs response costs may bring a cost-recovery action under CERCLA § 107. Compare Hunter, 70 F.Supp.2d at 1108 (<HOLDING>), with City of Fresno, 1995 WL 641983, at **2-5 Holdings: 0: holding that joint and several liability for entire actual loss could have been imposed on each fraud defendant as condition of probation 1: recognizing that joint and several liability of  107 seems unfair but the solution is found in apportionment and contribution 2: holding that where none of the events for accrual of a  113f1 contribution claim can arise because a prp has incurred response costs based on its agreement to remediate in accordance with a state agencys administrative order the relevant period of limitations and accrual is provided in  113g2 the court found that under such circumstances the contribution action becomes the initial action for cost recovery under cercla  107 thus bringing such action within  113g2 applicable to initial actions for recovery of the costs referred to in  107 3: holding that the government prp may bring a costrecovery action pursuant to cercla  107 thereby imposing joint and several liability on the defendant prp 4: holding that a statute imposing joint and several liability on a vehicle owner for a minors conduct while driving the vehicle with permission imputed financial liability rather than fault to the vehicles owner


Input: — • and the majority errs in dismissing it. III. The majority notes that “lower courts have issued conflicting and confusing opinions” under Elrod and Branti (internal quotation mark omitted). At least some of these inconsistencies can be laid at the feet of courts, like today’s majority, that are simply antagonistic to the Supreme Court’s Elrod-Branti jurisprudence. Even if inferior courts believe that Supreme Court holdings are ill-advised, they are not at liberty to ignore those holdings. Time and again, inferior federal courts have sought to circumvent the Elrod-Branti jurisprudence by refusing to apply it to decisions regarding promotions, transfers, or dealings with independent contractors. See, e.g., O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 47 F.3d 883 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668 (3d Cir.1986) (en Holdings: 0: holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively 1: holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review 2: holding that  1447c does not apply to counsel 3: holding elrodbranti does not apply to independent contractors 4: holding that title ii does not apply to the states


Input: opinions.... ” We have no trouble concluding that Rule 703 encompasses hearsay statements in a context such as the instant one, where the government expert specifically testified that his opinion was based on his experience and expertise, in conjunction with the information he received from a DEA intelligence agent and Bermudan authorities, and that such sources of information were regularly relied upon in valuating narcotics. See also 2A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 455 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that “expert testimony, based in part upon reports of others that are not in evidence but of a sort the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession, are [sic] admissible”); cf. United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Further, even before the enactment of Federal Holdings: 0: holding where defense counsel argued that the prosecution had not presented the testimony of a law enforcement agent because it would have been favorable to the accused the prosecutor properly argued in rebuttal that clark could have called the agent as a witness on his own 1: holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes 2: holding that the employer was not the insurers agent 3: holding that expert testimony by an atf agent based partly on his own analysis but verified by consultation with an atf technical specialist was properly admitted under rule 703 where the agent testified that the consultation was of the kind regularlyrelied upon by experts in his field 4: holding that party was an agent under the plain terms of his contracts


Input: therewith on a particular occasion." CRE 608(a), on the other hand, provides a limited exception that permits evidence of a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness only after that character has been attacked: The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 115 This state's case law disfavors comments by one witness about another witness's truthfulness. See, e.g., People v. Gaff-ney, 769 P.2d 1081, 1085-86 (Colo.1989) (<HOLDING>); Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 338, 341 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court erred by admitting a doctors testimony that a child victims description of a sexual crime was very believable 1: holding that the trial court erred by permitting testimony regarding uncharged acts of sexual misconduct by the defendant and that a substantial likelihood existed that the forbidden inference contributed to the verdict given that the only evidence of each instance of child molestation came from the victims 2: holding that trial court erred but harmlessly by admitting into evidence for all purposes chart summarizing officers testimony 3: holding that the trial court had erred by excluding the expert testimony of a doctor 4: holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse


Input: under 18 U.S.C. § 1593 for considerable, involuntary time and expense resulting from the need to respond to frivolous and unauthorized actions of the Defendant in the mis-enforcement of the internal revenue laws of the federal United States. Id. at ¶ 6.3.1. See also Brief, at pp. 15-17 (further detailing the “History of of Interaction With Defendant(s) and Their Employer”). Under similar facts, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Atkinson v. O’Neill, 867 F.2d 589, 590 (10th Cir.1989), that “[w]hen an action is one against named individual defendants, but the acts complained of consist of actions taken by defendants in their official capacity as agents of the United States, the action is in fact one against the United States.” Accord Burgos v. Milton, 709 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Insofar as the Petition may be read to assert Holdings: 0: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states 1: holding that despite plaintiffs allegations of a conspiracy they did not suggest that any of the acts committed by individual defendants occurred in the united states 2: holding that ajlthough the  action is nominally one against individual defendants the acts complained of consist of actions taken by defendants in their official capacity as agents of the united states and that under such circumstances the action is in fact one against the united states 3: holding that plaintiffs in the absence of a contrary expression from congress  shall have an action under ftca against the united states as well as a bivens action against the individual officials alleged to have infringed their constitutional rights 4: holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states


Input: 2008 WL 5392320, 208 Haw. LEXIS 304 (2008); Gore v. Indiana Ins. Co., 376 Ill.App.3d 282, 315 Ill.Dec. 156, 876 N.E.2d 156, 165-66 (2007) (finding plaintiff lacked standing to bring declaratory judgment action because statute at issue did not confer private right of action); Nichols v. Kansas PAC, 270 Kan. 37, 11 P.3d 1134, 1146-47 (2000) (refusing to grant declaratory relief under consumer fraud statute because it contained no private right of action); Alliance for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905, 916 (Minn.Ct.App.2003) (stating that where “there was no private right to enforce” the statute, the “Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act cannot create a cause of action that does not otherwise exist”); Delgado v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 66 A.D. 3d 607, 888 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (2009) (<HOLDING>). See also Boston Med. Ctr. v. Sec’y of the Holdings: 0: holding that petitioners did not possess a private right of action for injunctive and declaratory relief sought because only the citys housing official could enforce the citys housing maintenance code 1: holding that neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the fdcpa 2: holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc  1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action 3: holding that a prisoners transfer mooted claims for declaratory and injunctive relief 4: recognizing private right of action


Input: and prior confrontations they had had.” 3 . The State argues that the prosecutor's statement that Appellant provoked the fight by calling the deceased and his family “niggas” was a reasonable inference from Officer Pate's testimony that Appellant admitted he had used racial slurs when he first spoke to the deceased. I cannot agree. First, Officer Pate did not testify that "niggas” was the racial slur Appellant used. Unfortunately, many ethnophaulisms exist but most people consider this one exceptionally offensive and inflammatory. Appellant’s concession that he used racial slurs does not support an inference that he used this particular one. Second, neither Officer Pat .-Texarkana 2014, pet. ref'd) (same); Jimenez v. State, 298 S.W.3d 203, 214 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, pet. ref’d) (<HOLDING>); see Rogers v. State, 725 S.W.2d 350, 358 Holdings: 0: recognizing emergency exception 1: recognizing the public interest exception 2: recognizing exception under state constitution 3: recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception 4: recognizing exception


Input: even though the store benefitted from the advertising, the court found this did not rise to the level of consideration. Id. In State v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., the Court of Civil Appeals contrasted Brice with Cole and found no consideration where a filling station paid for bingo cards but gave them away free to any and all persons who came to their stations to request them, and a local TV station broadcast games in which bingo cards were used with winners being awarded cash prizes. 386 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1964). Some jurisdictions outside of the State of Texas have held that requiring a person to actually go to the location of the sweepstakes sponsor in order to participate constitutes consideration. See Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 N.J. 399, 117 A.2d 487, 496 (1955)(<HOLDING>); Knox Indus. Corp. v. State ex rel. Scanland, Holdings: 0: holding a store vicariously liable for wrongful death when its employee shot and killed a customer 1: holding that murder committed by customer was not foreseeable result of excessive sale of alcohol to customer 2: holding that consideration exists where a customer is burdened by having to visit the store where the coupons are being offered 3: holding that negligence of a store customer in failing to perceive a strip of black substance was a question for the jury 4: holding that grocery store did not have duty to foresee and protect customer from rowdy children


Input: even though the store benefitted from the advertising, the court found this did not rise to the level of consideration. Id. In State v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., the Court of Civil Appeals contrasted Brice with Cole and found no consideration where a filling station paid for bingo cards but gave them away free to any and all persons who came to their stations to request them, and a local TV station broadcast games in which bingo cards were used with winners being awarded cash prizes. 386 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1964). Some jurisdictions outside of the State of Texas have held that requiring a person to actually go to the location of the sweepstakes sponsor in order to participate constitutes consideration. See Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 N.J. 399, 117 A.2d 487, 496 (1955)(<HOLDING>); Knox Indus. Corp. v. State ex rel. Scanland, Holdings: 0: holding a store vicariously liable for wrongful death when its employee shot and killed a customer 1: holding that murder committed by customer was not foreseeable result of excessive sale of alcohol to customer 2: holding that consideration exists where a customer is burdened by having to visit the store where the coupons are being offered 3: holding that negligence of a store customer in failing to perceive a strip of black substance was a question for the jury 4: holding that grocery store did not have duty to foresee and protect customer from rowdy children


Input: individuals are cooperating with law enforcement authorities.” (Id.) As a general proposition, courts have repeatedly recognized that materials, including even judicial documents which are presumptively accessible, can be kept from the public if their dissemination might “adversely affect law enforcement interests.” Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050; see also Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 (noting that the “danger of impairing law enforcement” may be a countervailing factor outweighing the qualified right of access); Madoff, 626 F.Supp.2d at 427 (rejecting press access to emails sent by victims in a major fraud case, because “disclosing the details of the Government’s efforts to obtain evidence will undoubtedly hamper the investigation”); United States v. Park, 619 F.Supp.2d 89, 94 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>). Thus, where public disclosure of certain Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to intervene to assert the publics first amendment right of access to criminal proceedings is proper 1: holding that the privacy interests of the employee police officers did not exceed the publics right to know 2: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents 3: holding that court may seal documents if publics right of access is outweighed by competing interests 4: holding that the need to maintain the secrecy of the governments investigation outweighed the publics right of access to sentencing documents


Input: For example, the Commission at one point says that it will “require the pipelines to show why their existing tariffs should not be considered unjust and unreasonable,” Order No. 637-A at 31,591, and that “individual pipelines [will have] an opportunity to demonstrate that their own circumstances justify deviation from the general conclusion that segmentation is appropriate,” FERC Br. at 101. INGAA’s suspicion is also fueled by the fact that on several previous occasions the Commission had impermissibly blurred the distinction between § 4 and § 5, see Western Res., 9 F.3d at 1578 (“We now make it an even six” times that the Commission failed to respect this distinction), or tried to use another section of the NGA to “trump” its § 5 obligations, see Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 866 F.2d at 491 (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, the orders contain some express Holdings: 0: holding that the appropriate sanction was to require the defendant to disclose the nature of the agreement with the witness 1: holding that  16 of the nga which grants the commission the right to require filings needed to exercise its powers under the nga did not permit ferc to require a company to make periodic  4 refilings 2: holding that on remand ferc had the authority to order  recoupment of losses caused by its errors 3: holding that section 211103 grants a party to an action under the open meetings act the right to trial by jury 4: holding that statute grants the commission the authority to request that the parties present adequate evidence