Input: been shown that the defendant’s insurer was doing anything other than investigating and processing an insurance claim, which is the nature of an insurer’s business. That Aetna learned of attorney Majewski’s involvement as early as October 26, 1987, is not dispositive, for the defendant has failed to prove that it switched to a litigation posture because of such knowledge. The mere awareness by an insurer that an injured person was seeking legal advice would not ordinarily cause one to anticipate litigation. Thus, any statements made by witnesses to the defendant, its agents, or its insurer (per the express language of Rule 26(b)(3)) soon after the incident are not protected by the work product doctrine. Accord, Schmidt v. California State Auto. Ass’n., 127 F.R.D. 182, 184 (D.Nev.1989) (<HOLDING>) Some eight months later on June 8,1988, Aetna Holdings: 0: holding that court erred in admitting letter as business record where testimony was not adequate to establish that the letter was compiled as a matter of regular practice as opposed to one prepared in anticipation of litigation 1: holding that letters addressing dispute that was subject of litigation and that were written in anticipation of litigation did not fall under business record exception under rule 8036 of the federal rules of evidence and noting that it is wellestablished that one who prepares a document in anticipation of litigation is not acting in the regular course of business 2: holding that the work product doctrine applied to a document prepared in anticipation of litigation and was therefore protected from disclosure under foia exemption 5 3: holding that the workproduct doctrine was inapplicable where there was no indication a memorandum was prepared in anticipation of litigation 4: holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation


Input: at some later date. Id. Therefore, a reasonable basis for the different classification of unwed fathers and unwed mothers in section 78-30-4 is the fact that while identification of both parents of an illegitimate child is necessary, identification of a child’s mother is automatic because of her role in the birth process, while identification of the father is not. A reasonable basis for the different classification of filing and nonfiling fathers is the state’s need to distinguish those fathers who have accepted legal responsibility for the care of their children from those fathers who have not. Id. ¶ 21 Based on this analysis and prior decisions, section 78-30-4.13 does not violate C.F.’s right to equal protection. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62, 103 S.Ct. at 2993-94, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (<HOLDING>); Wells, 681 P.2d at 204; In re J.P., 648 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 1: holding that statute that imposed different requirements to establish parental rights on father than on mother did not violate fathers right to equal protection under the law 2: holding that termination of fathers parental rights should be reversed since it was done to facilitate childs adoption and would prejudice rights of child and mother to receive support from father 3: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 4: holding that new york statutory scheme governing adoption did not violate unmarried fathers right to equal protection by according different legal rights as between birth mother and putative father


Input: (“[Wjhere the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or properties ... even though nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute.... ”). But this does not make the invocation of the United States’s name a mere formality. Indeed, in a recent case involving § 81, the Seventh Circuit rejected a standing challenge based on the non-Indian relators’ having no connection whatsoever with the contracts, because the United States was the plaintiff, and it had standing. See United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1211-15 (7th Cir.1995); cf. United States ex rel. Mosay v. Buffalo Bros. Management, Inc., 20 F.3d 739 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Congress wished to protect tribes by aligning Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue 1: recognizing that a buyer may sue for specific performance of a realestate contract 2: holding that tribal members may sue as relators 3: holding plaintiff may sue federal agents for money damages for violation of his constitutional rights 4: holding that employers have standing to sue


Input: Taylor argues that: (1) his conviction was unconstitutional, under the Commerce Clause, because § 922(g)(1) does not regulate an activity with a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce; and (2) he was sentenced in violation of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), because the district court enhanced his sentence based upon facts not charged in the indictment or admitted by him, pursuant to a mandatory sentencing scheme. We review the constitutionality of statutes de novo. United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1271 (11th Cir.2001). Taylor preserved his Booker error by objecting, based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), at sentencing. See United States v. Mathenia, 409 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, he is entitled to preserved Holdings: 0: holding that blakely does not apply to the federal sentencing guidelines 1: holding that appellant properly preserved booker claim by citing blakely in his written objections to the psi and reminding the court at sentencing of his blakely objection 2: holding blakely not retroactive 3: holding neither booker nor blakely can be applied retroactively 4: holding that blakely did not apply to a case that was final but not on direct review when blakely was decided and in which the trial court later allowed a belated appeal


Input: As we have often stated, the focus of inquiry at the summary judgment stage “always remains on the ultimate question of law: whether the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of [the protected characteristic].” Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1336-37 (8th Cir.1996). This approach “is consistent with the Supreme Court’s ... decision in St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, [509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407] (1993), where the Supreme Court held that a plaintiffs proof of pretext is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination.” Davenport, 30 F.3d at 945 n. 8; accord McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court’s Holdings: 0: holding that at the pretext stage the plaintiff must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision 1: holding that when a plaintiff proves the defendants stated reasons for hiring someone else were pretext for offering the position to a personal friend and not a pretext for racial discrimination she does not establish triable issues of fact 2: holding that posthoc reasons for an adverse employment decision constitute evidence of pretext 3: holding that even if the plaintiff had produced evidence of pretext  the evidence did not tend to establish a discriminatory purpose 4: holding that there were genuine issues of material fact and reversing the district courts grant of summary judgment because in part the everchanging nature of the proffered reasons given for plaintiffs termination could be viewed as evidence tending to show pretext


Input: to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may ... certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Although we have never addressed the precise issue of whether § 406(b)(1)(A) authorizes an award of attorney’s fees where the district court’s judgment remanding the case to the Commissioner does not explicitly mention attorney’s fees, we have noted that the congressional intent behind § 406(b) is, in part, “to encourage effective legal representation of claimants by insuring lawyers that they will receive reasonable fees directly through certification by the Secretary.” Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>). We have also noted that one of § 406(b)’s Holdings: 0: holding that a district court may not authorize an attorney to charge fees for representation in court when the commissioner has already authorized that attorney to charge fees for representation in administrative proceedings and declining to reach the secretarys contention that  406b does not allow a court to authorize attorneys fees unless it renders a judgment on the merits favorable to the claimant 1: holding that direct payment of attorney fees for representation before the court is to be made on the basis of the claim or application for benefits underlying the issues successfully appealed to this court 2: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case 3: holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal 4: holding that rule 11 does not authorize a district court to award appellate attorneys fees due to similar concerns


Input: of Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). IPS Card Solutions, Inc. v. Boyd, No. 00 CIV.0776 (MBM), 2000 WL 620213, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 12,2000). 6 . Courts and text writers have characterized the attorney-client privilege as the oldest privilege for confidential communication known to the common law. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981); Federal Ins. Co. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 816 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn.1991); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: Evidentiary Privileges § 6.2.4, at 471 (2002); Edna S. Epstein, TheAttomey-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine 2 (4th ed. 2001) ("Epstein”). 7 . Johnson v. Patterson, 81 Tenn. 626, 649 (1884) (<HOLDING>); McMannus v. State, 39 Tenn. (2 Head) 213, Holdings: 0: holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege 1: holding that the codification of the attorneyclient privilege embodies the commonlaw rule 2: holding that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel waives attorneyclient privilege 3: recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination 4: holding that an invocation of the advice of counsel defense waives the attorneyclient privilege


Input: and performance benefits. In any event, the tag-line is too vague and non-specific to conclude that it necessarily implies a direct comparison to Gatorade. 28. Moreover, the claim “Upgrade your game” is also puffery. The claim is exaggerated and boastful, and no reasonable consumer, having read the slogan, would be justified in believing that it would actually result in improved athletic abilities, such as playing a better game of basketball. See, e.g., Time Warner Cable, Inc., 497 F.3d at 160 (an “ ‘exaggerated, blustering, and boasting statement upon which no reasonable buyer would be justified in relying’ ” is puffery) (quoting Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir.2000)); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 29. The tagline is also puffery in that any Holdings: 0: holding that a wellfounded fear requires petitioner to show more than a generalized or random possibility of persecution 1: holding that an officer responding to a call that individuals were dealing drugs had more than a generalized suspicion 2: holding that statement less is more was generalized boasting upon which no reasonable buyer would rely 3: holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death because a reasonable teller upon hearing the statement normally and reasonably would fear that his or her life is in danger 4: holding that a company which knew when it issued a policy that the insureds interest in the insured property was less than fee simple could not rely upon a provision rendering the policy void if the insureds interest was less than fee simple


Input: conflicts with another provision of the restrictive covenants in this case and in Buckner. In the present case, the provision reads, [T]he owner or owners of any of the above land shall have the right to sue for and obtain an injunction, prohibitive or mandatory, to prevent the breach of or to enforce the observance of the restrictions, in addition to ordinary legal actions for damages, and failure to of the parties or owner or owners of any of the lot or lots ... to enforce any of the restrictions herein set forth at the time of its violation shall in no event, be deemed to be a waiver of a right to do so thereafter. [Emphasis added.] The covenants in Buckner contained substantially similar language. See Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Stroud v. VBFSB Holding Corp., 917 S.W.2d 75, Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court may judicially notice its own records 1: recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket 2: holding that lack of standing cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time by an appellate court on its own motion 3: holding that a trial court may take judicial cognizance of records on file in its own court punctuation omitted 4: holding that the appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in related proceedings


Input: F.Supp.2d 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y.2007); Kreinik v. Showbran Photo, Inc., No. 02CV1172, 2003 WL 22339268, at *8, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18276, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2003) (“To state a claim under Section 215, [employee] must adequately plead that [employer’s] counterclaims constituted an adverse employment action taken because of [employee’s] complaints under the Labor Law.”). In addition, New York’s anti-retaliation provision requires a nexus between the employee’s complaint and the employer’s retaliatory action. Kreinik, 2003 WL 22339268, at *8, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18276, at *29 (finding that employee’s allegations sufficiently plead that his labor law complaints were a motivating factor for employer’s adverse action); Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.Supp.2d 151, 162 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). The defendant asserts entitlement to summary Holdings: 0: holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony  regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone  be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim 1: holding that the close connection in time between the complaint and termination indicated that complaints could have been a motivating factor for employees termination 2: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable 3: holding that a 17 month time period between the employees protected speech and his termination could not support an inference of causation 4: holding that plaintiff must come forth with sufficient facts to permit a determination that his statements were a substantial motivating factor in his employment termination


Input: district courts may expand the record in a case to include “additional materials relevant to the determination of the merits of the petition.” Rule 7, 2254 Rules. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Notes state that Rule 7’s purpose is to “eliminate some unnecessary hearings.” In accordance with Rule 7, therefore, Twill expand the record in this case to include Pursell’s mitigation evidence. This approach is consistent with Rule 7 and case law interpreting that provision. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Horn, 129 F.Supp.2d 390, 403 (M.D.Pa. 2001) (expanding the record on a claim for ineffective assistance based on trial counsel’s failure to introduce mitigating evi dence during the sentencing hearing when the facts were not in dispute); see also Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454, 1460 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Admittedly, questions arise when courts use Holdings: 0: holding that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing when the petitioners habeas submissions demonstrate that the petitioner is conclusively entitled to relief in such circumstances an evidentiary hearing would be a waste of judicial resources 1: holding that such statements were not even enough for an evidentiary hearing 2: holding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing when parties submissions in contempt proceedings raise disputed issue of material fact 3: holding that the trial court did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing when the dispute could be resolved as a matter of law 4: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required if there are no factual issues in dispute


Input: constitutional due process claim and does not raise any additional arguments on appeal, the State is not entitled to relief. We express no opinion as to the merits of the State’s arguments with respect to Superintendent Hawkins or the validity of the Secretary’s decision-making process. III. CONCLUSION We dismiss the appeal for lack of standing. 1 . The Honorable Roberto A. Lange, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota. 2 . Nearly six years elapsed between Superintendent Hawkins' final term as council chairman and his appointment with the BIA. See South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t. of Interior, 775 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1139 (D.S.D.2011). 3 . In 1975, the Supreme Court of the United States held an wentieth Jud. Cir., St. Clair Cnty., Ill., 986 F.2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). The State has not argued on appeal or before Holdings: 0: holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment 1: recognizing that corporations are persons within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment 2: holding municipalities  are not persons within the meaning of the due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments 3: holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause 4: holding school boards are persons within the meaning of the fifth amendment due process clause


Input: 678, 683 (N.D.Ga.1993) (for purposes of motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, court may consider document that is authenticated by and attached to affidavit, and affiant must be person through whom the exhibits could be admitted into evidence), aff'd, 42 F.3d 645 (11th Cir.1994). Kuchersky also declares, under penalty of perjury, that he has attached “true and correct copies of’ business and governmental records relating to Navoi. Translations of the Kuchersky declarations and other attached documents were provided by Alexander Ahmedov, Counsel at the Embassy of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The exhibits and declarations submitted by Navoi are properly before the court and establish Navoi’s prima facie case. Cf. Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Development B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 847-49 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 979, 121 S.Ct. 426, Holdings: 0: holding that affidavits and exhibits submitted by defendant made prima facie showing that entity was organ of foreign state 1: holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo 2: holding that plaintiffs conclusory allegations were insufficient to make out prima facie case for mere department status of foreign corporation defendant 3: holding that the burden of establishing prima facie case of discriminatory treatment may be satisfied by minimal showing 4: holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review


Input: Curiously, however, the Currys do not direct us to either video or photographic evidence in the record of Andrew and Grace’s recordings of their comings and goings. In any event, it is undisputed le an uninvited invasion of the inside of plaintiffs home could constitute a claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion, harassment of plaintiff in a restaurant or on the public street outside his home could not). The surveillance cameras did not intrude into the Currys’ private physical space. As for the Currys’ claim that a police officer came to their house to investigate Andrew and Grace’s report of vandalism, they have neither alleged nor proven that the officer did not have a right to be there, especially since probable cause was found for Jeffery’s arrest. See Cullison, 570 N.E.2d at 31 (<HOLDING>). Based on the undisputed facts, the trial Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff must demonstrate that there was an intrusion upon his or her physical solitude or seclusion such as by conducting an illegal search 1: holding that the plaintiff further must demonstrate that the conspiracy was motivated by a class based animus such as race 2: holding that plaintiff must on his or her own initiative prove that the product reached him or her without substantial change 3: holding that a defendant must demonstrate that the governments intrusion upon his relationship with his attorney created a possibility of either injury to his defense or benefit to the government in order to establish a violation of the right to counsel 4: holding that plaintiff must present such evidence


Input: at oral argument, however, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Abbott v. United States forecloses that argument, and Smith’s claim fails. * * * We AFFIRM. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(l)(B)(iii). 2 . 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). 3 .18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). 4 . See Fifth Cir.Crim. Pattern Jury Instr. (2001) § 1.30. 5 . See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). 6 . See United States v. Seale, 600 F.3d 473, 487 (5th Cir.), cert denied,-U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 163, 178 L.Ed.2d 97 (2010); see also United States v. Mejia, 844 F.2d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>). 7 . See United States v. Salinas, 480 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a violation of the hearsay rule was harmless 1: holding that an objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve for appeal an exception to the hearsay rule that was not specifically raised 2: holding florida drivers handbook hearsay and not within any recognized exception to hearsay rule 3: holding that general objection did not preserve error on appeal 4: holding that hearsay objection does not preserve a confrontation clause challenge


Input: review was ordered for February, 2000. At this review, the Board interviewed Appellant and informed him that he had failed to complete his mandatory therapeutic substance abuse program, failed to obtain a favorable recommendation from the Department of Corrections, and, moreover, the Board still did not have an updated INS report. Consequently, the Board denied parole the second time concluding that the fair administration of justice could not be achieved through Appellant’s- release. The Board again reviewed Appellant’s eligibility for parole in February of 2002, but refused to parole him for the same reasons it denied parole in February of 2001. Evidently believing his continued incarceration to be unlawful, Appellant filed a mandamus petition with the Com 2d 502 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (<HOLDING>). Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 4/9/2002. The court, Holdings: 0: holding that it is well settled that the pennsylvania board of probation and parole has exclusive authority to determine parole when the offender is sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of two or more years 1: holding that a right to confrontation exists in parole revocation proceedings 2: holding that parole is not a right in pennsylvania 3: holding defendant does not waive fourth amendment protection by signing parole agreement but the search condition does confirm right of parole officer to conduct reasonable searches within scope of parole mission 4: holding that there was no legal right to court review of parole board decision because there is no legal right to release on parole


Input: declaration, the individual Plaintiffs provide over 91 years of experience at CUC’s main power plant. (Gary Camacho Deck, ECF No. 7-3 at 5.) Without their expertise, Camacho argues that there will continue, to be a “direct deterioration of service to the Utility’s customers and the general public of the CNMI.” (Id. at 6.) This includes an increase in overtime pay to cover the lack of manpower, delayed preventative scheduled maintenance on generators and other equipment, and delayed projects and other scheduled maintenance. (Id. at 7.) A plaintiff satisfies the irreparable harm requirement by demonstrating that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 129 S.Ct. 365; Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>). “The possibility that adequate compensatory Holdings: 0: holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm 1: holding that likelihood of irreparable harm must be based on evidence in the record not unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm the plaintiff might suffer 2: holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative 3: holding that a plaintiff meets the injuryinfact requirement for standing if he faces a credible threat of harm and that harm is both real and immediate not conjectural or hypothetical 4: holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate


Input: Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirming a March 30, 2010 Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) decision that found there was no clear and unmistakable error (“CUE”) in a September 6, 1973 rating decision (“September 1973 Rating Decision”) that granted total disability resulting from individual unemployability (“TDIU”), effective June 27, 1973. Peterson v. Shinseki, No. 10-2433, 2012 WL 87578, at *1 (Vet.App. Jan. 12, 2012). In February 2006, Mr. Peterson sought to revise the September 1973 Rating Decision on the basis of CUE, and on March 30, 2010, the Board determined that the September 1973 Rating Decision was not the result of CUE. The Veterans Court agreed, reasoning that the alleged error was not outcome-determinative. See Willsey v. Peake, 535 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (citing Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet.App. 310 Holdings: 0: holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision 1: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision 2: holding that an error is harmless where it is highly probably that the error did not affect the outcome of the case 3: holding that cue required a showing that the alleged error in the challenged decision would have manifestly changed the outcome at the time it was made 4: recognizing that cue may be based on a showing that there was no evidence before the adjudicator that could have supported a denial of the claim on the merits that is that all of the evidence militated in support of the claim


Input: 261 S.W.3d at 368-69; Starrin, 2005 WL 3343875, at *1. We agree that if section 547.3215 had been relied upon by the officer and argued in the trial court, it would have made Officer Gilbert’s traffic stop abundantly reasonable. But nothing at the suppression hearing—not Officer Gilbert’s testimony and not the argument of counsel—presented that theory to the trial court. In this case, the State effectively relied strictly on subsections (a) and (c) of section 547.323 of the transportation code. Elsewhere in the State’s brief, it conceded that its failure to rely on section 547.3215 at trial precludes it from relying on that provision here on appeal. Any reliance on section 547.3215 was not preserved. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; State v. Mercado, 972 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (<HOLDING>). Because the State did not rely on section Holdings: 0: holding that issues not argued in initial brief are deemed waived 1: holding that in cases in which the state is the party appealing the basic principle of appellate jurisprudence that contentions not argued at trial are deemed to be waived applies equally to the state and the defense 2: holding that issues not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned 3: holding that claims made but not argued in a brief are waived 4: recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state


Input: causation standard under the enhanced penalty provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1347: Our decision is also guided by the principles of proximate cause. “The concept of proximate cause incorporates the notion that an accused may be charged with a criminal offense even though his acts were not the immediate cause of the victim’s death or injury.” Guillette, 547 F.2d at 749. “In many situations giving rise to criminal liability,” the harm “is not directly caused by the acts of the defendant but rather results from intervening forces or events.” Id. “Where such intervening events are foreseeable and naturally result from [the defendant]^ criminal conduct,” the defendant is “criminally responsible for the resulting harm.” Id.) see also Hoopengamer v. United States, 270 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.1959) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, even if [the defendant] did not Holdings: 0: holding defendant culpable for the natural and probable consequence   of his conduct 1: holding that the bar against the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures comes into play only where negligence or other culpable conduct is alleged 2: holding that a trial court errs by failing to limit the definitions of the culpable mental states as they relate to the conduct elements involved in the particular offense 3: holding destruction of trial transcript pursuant to court rule ten years after defendants escape disadvantaged defendant due to his own culpable misconduct 4: holding negligent conduct was not culpable meaning not devious deliberate or in bad faith


Input: probate court approved the Master’s conclusion that Adkins “attacks the ‘trust’ as a sham, but does not present a showing that the [relinquishment] agreement was entered into mistakenly, fraudulently, or by coercion. The terms of the ‘trust’ are of no concern to Mr. Adkins if he has relinquished any interest in it.” Although Adkins opposed the Master’s recommendations, there was no subsequent action by the probate court. Adkins does not appeal this order. With regard to the fraud-related defenses, Adkins filed a “Petition to Rescind and Void the ‘Relinquishment Agreement’ for the Causes of Fraud and Constructive Fraud,” but later withdrew the motion. Where a party has withdrawn pleadings, he cannot later appeal based on such grounds. See Ogden v. State, 395 P.2d 371, 372 (Alaska 1964) (<HOLDING>). Adkins’ fraud-related claims relating to the Holdings: 0: holding that it was error for the trial judge to answer a jurys question without giving defendants counsel an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responded 1: holding appeal improper where trial judge did not rule upon question 2: holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith 3: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for mistrial where the trial court sustained defendants objections to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information and instructed the jury to disregard the question 4: holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion lacked specificity


Input: Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 224 Or 57, 61, 355 P2d 742 (1960) (“The purpose of an exclusion clause is the opposite of that of a coverage clause. * * * [T]he effect of an exclusion clause is to deny the protection of the policy to someone who, but for the denial, would be an insured.”); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 793 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining an “exclusion clause” as “a clause in an insurance policy barring certain losses or risks from coverage”). A condition of forfeiture exists where, initially, the policy provides coverage for the loss, but acts of the insured nullify the coverage. Day-Towne v. Progressive Halcyon Ins. Co., 214 Or App 372, 381, 164 P3d 1205 (2007), rev den, 346 Or 65 (2009); see, e.g., Kabban v. Mackin, 104 Or App 422, 429, 801 P2d 883 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Here, for a condition of forfeiture to exist, Holdings: 0: holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage 1: holding that the policy insured property but failure to occupy premises negated coverage 2: holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed 3: holding that the decoration contractor freeman was not subject to premises liability because it did not occupy own control or make special use of the premises at the javits center 4: holding that an ownedproperty exclusion did not apply with respect to property that the insured bought only after the policy periods for which the insured sought coverage


Input: felt safe. Accordingly, we find that § 1040.18a promotes a compelling State interest as applied to Appellant. 133 As compelling as the State's interest of protecting minors is in the present case, the statutory provision must still be narrowly drawn to serve those interests if the provisions is to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126-27, 109 S.Ct. at 2886-37. The statute must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms. Id., 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2886-87. This standard necessarily disfavors a blanket ban or complete prohibition. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813-14, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 1886-87, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000); Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28, 109 S.Ct. at 2887-88 (<HOLDING>); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 Holdings: 0: holding that section 33021b was overbroad because it prohibited a wide array of constitutionally protected speech and was not drawn narrowly enough to achieve only the legitimate objective of protecting children from sexual abuse 1: holding total ban on indecent dialaporn telephone communications not narrowly drawn to serve the governments compelling interest in protecting children 2: holding that the governments interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse but also protecting childrens interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents 3: holding on summary judgment that a regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest 4: holding the online solicitation statute was not narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest and there were more narrow means of achieving the states interest in protecting minors


Input: no reasonable person in Plaintiffs position would have believed that the activities listed in her Complaint constituted a violation under any law or regulation pertinent to SOX. Finally, even assuming Plaintiffs activities were protected under SOX, she cannot demonstrate that these activities were a contributing factor in her termination — the last prima facie element. Although Plaintiff alleges that her reports from March 2003 to January 3, 2008, caused her discharge on August 8, 2008, without additional evidence, the eight-month gap between Plaintiffs last complaint and her discharge “is not sufficiently proximate to permit the inference that protected activity was a contributing factor to her termination.” Pardy v. Gray, No. 07-6324, 2008 WL 2756331, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2008) (<HOLDING>); Sussberg v. K-Mart Holding Corp., 463 Holdings: 0: holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation 1: holding that a threeyear gap was insufficient to demonstrate staleness where the criminal activity was ongoing 2: holding that a sixmonth gap between the protected activity and the employees termination was insufficient to infer that the protected activity was a contributing factor 3: holding that twentyfour days between protected activity and termination is sufficient to infer existence of causal connection 4: holding that the fact that employer had knowledge of the employees protected activity was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation where the timing of the discharge was not proximate to the protected activity


Input: forced prosecutors to institute bargaining systems that allowed them to dispose of minor cases expeditiously. Id. at 32. In 1945, for example, eighty-five percent of the 36,114 cases brought in federal court were resolved by guilty pleas. See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, University of Albany, Table 5.22.2010, http://www.albany.edu/ sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf (last visited August 10, 2015). By 1955, eighty percent of the 35,501 federal cases brought were settled by plea deals. Id. In 1965, post Gideon, ninety percent of the 28,757 federal cases opened were .resolved with plea agreements. Id. In 1970, the Supreme Court declared constitutional the practice of plea bargaining. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 Holdings: 0: holding guilty pleas are not constitutionally forbidden and are valid if made voluntarily and intelligently 1: holding that such provisions are valid 2: holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel 3: holding that conditional guilty pleas are valid when entered into in accordance with certain standards 4: holding that the defendants guilty plea was entered into knowingly voluntarily and intelligently


Input: or otherwise demonstrating that they received little or nothing of value under the contract. See, e.g., Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1097 (W.D.Mieh.2000) (“[N]either the text nor the commentary to the Holder Rule limits the availability of affirmative consumer claims against assignee-creditors to those who assert a right of rescission under common law.”); Simpson v. Anthony Auto Sales, Inc., 32 F.Supp.2d 405, 409 fn. 10 (W.D.La.1998) (“[A] plaintiff should not be required to first prove that she has received little or nothing of value in order to recover from her creditor, as the FTC notice does not advise the creditor” of such a requirement); Jaramillo v. Gonzales, 132 N.M. 459, 50 P.3d 554 (App.2002), cert. denied, 132 N.M. 288, 47 P.3d 447 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Alduridi v. Community Trust Bank, N.A., 1999 Holdings: 0: holding that ftc holder rule does not limit affirmative claims to those instances where rescission would be appropriate 1: holding that the holder of the note must act in a manner that effectively provides notice that the holder has exercised his option 2: holding that procedural bar rule does not apply to ineffectiveness claims 3: holding that equitable exception to one year limit applied where defendant had no reason to believe that plaintiff would increase the scope of claims after the filing of the original complaint 4: holding that the rights of a bona fide purchaser outweighed those of an under secured second mortgage holder


Input: statute, a party may not secure a declaration of its statutory rights by seeking relief under the DJA. This general principle is implied by the Court’s decision in In re Resolution of State Comm. of Investigation, supra, 108 N.J. at 46, 527 A.2d 851. The Court declined to render a declaratory judgment on the question whether the State Commission on Investigation (SCI) unlawfully disclosed information about the plaintiffs. The Court held that plaintiffs lacked a private right of action to secure injunctive relief against the SCI arising out of the alleged disclosures. Ibid. (“[0]ur decision that the plaintiffs may not obtain the injunctive relief they sought undermines their need for a declaratory judgment.”); see also In re A.N., 430 N.J.Super. 235, 244-45, 63 A.3d 764 (App.Div.2013) (<HOLDING>); Med. Soc. of N.J. v. AmeriHealth HMO, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that the attorney generals decision not to provide representation to an employee is reviewable by the appellate division not by the law division where the actions against the employee are pending 1: holding that the chancery division lacked jurisdiction under njsa 2a1655 to determine medicaid eligibility where the authority to do so was vested in the division of medical assistance and health services 2: holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement 3: holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division 4: holding that a transfer was a demotion where there was testimony that few people transferred voluntarily from jobs in the plaintiffs prior division to jobs in the plaintiffs new division  everybody viewed a transfer from the plaintiffs new division to the prior division as a promotion and the two departments had different seniority systems


Input: may conduct a pat-down search (or “frisk”) if he or she “harbors an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous.” Davis, 94 F.3d at 1468; see also United States v. Duncan, 131 F.3d 894, 898 (10th Cir.1997) (concluding that officers had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in on-going criminal activity and therefore could order him to get out of car and conduct a pat-down search). Here, the evidence supporting the officers’ reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs (i.e. his coming and going from the apartment named in the search warrant and the hand-to-hand contact observed outside the apartment) also indicated that he might be armed and dangerous. See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that reasonable suspicion justifies an investigatory detention 1: holding that an officers diligent pursuit of an investigation during the detention is a factor in determining the reasonableness of an investigatory stop 2: holding that officer safety and other concerns authorize police officers to open car doors during an investigatory seizure 3: holding that personal injury settlement proceeds are disposable income to the extent that they are not reasonably necessary for the support of the debtors 4: holding that during an investigatory detention officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo


Input: scheme by filing a parallel proceeding before the NLRC complaining about his employment with IPS. The ap-pellees argue that the district court should not exercise jurisdiction because some conduct about which the appellants complain is actually required by Filipino laws and regulations. In their motion to dismiss, the appellees relied heavily upon Section 10 of the Migrant Workers Act to argue that the NLRC has exclusive jurisdiction and is a strong expression of the Philippines’ interest in this case. While Section 10 is one fact that weighs in favor of dismissal insofar as it demonstrates that the Philippines regulates the complained-of activity, contrary to the appellees’ argument, Section 10, alone, does not support dismissal of the appellants’ ease. See Randall, 778 F.2d at 1150 (<HOLDING>). On balance, some evidence relevant to the Holdings: 0: holding that the grant of subject matter jurisdiction in  502e1 is exclusive 1: holding that the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of saudi arabias labor law cannot deprive an american court of subject matter jurisdiction rejecting outright the notion that the law of a foreign country can unilaterally curtail the power of our  courts to hear a dispute unless some other agreement or treaty requires that result 2: holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petitioners collateral attack under  1331 3: holding that because the contract dispute between the parties in this case constitutes a justiciable matter that is cognizable in our trial courts our courts had subject matter jurisdiction 4: holding that the state law of preclusion must be followed even when federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim is exclusive


Input: judicial notice that Denton County had a population of over 25,000. 3 . Officer Stewart testified that he did not have Lyons sign the warnings as it was not required by Department policy. 4 . According to Jessee this letter was mailed a day or two after July 2nd. 5 . We have attempted to summarize this somewhat confusing portion of the charge, which portion takes up four double-spaced legal size sheets of paper. 6 . See Weaver, 700 S.W.2d at 777 (interpreting section 24 of TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6701/-1 to require that visual recordings be made of DWI suspects). 7 . We make no holding that the trial court was required to so instruct the jury; only that it had discretion to do so and to see that it was done properly. Compare Drewett v. State, 704 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could find constructive notice from evidence that the defendants knew of a recurring dangerous condition 1: holding that although it is proper to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown it is error to instruct the jury on the mcdonnell douglas burden shifting scheme 2: holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial 3: holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant 4: holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error


Input: has held that SORA is rationally related to a “legitimate state interest of protecting the public.” See Golba, 273 Mich App at 620. Put another way, SORA in general is rationally related to the Legislature’s stated purpose of protecting the people of Michigan from those who have committed offenses that “pose[] a potential serious menace and danger to the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people, and particularly the children, of this state.” MCL 28.721a; see also Temelkoski, 307 Mich App at 270 (“SORA . . . has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose . . . .”); Fonville, 291 Mich App at 380. However, the issue of whether the requirement of registration for offenders who commit the crime of unlawful imprisonment of a minor without a sexual purpose survives r 27 (2010) (<HOLDING>); People v Cintron, 46 AD3d 353, 354; 848 NYS2d Holdings: 0: holding that the requirement of sex offender registration for the defendants conviction of false imprisonment of a minor was not cruel and unusual punishment and did not violate substantive or procedural due process 1: holding that even though the offense was not of a sexual nature requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender following his conviction for false imprisonment of a minor was rationally related to the government interest in protecting the public and did not violate the defendants right to due process or equal protection under the law 2: holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved 3: holding that sex offender registration and notification do not constitute punishment 4: holding evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction for violation of sex offender registration requirement


Input: the trial court to hold a hearing on the issue of a defendant's absence at trial in order to allow the defendant to rebut the initial presumption of waiver. In support of this position, he cites Willis, 525 N.E.2d 610. In Ellis, the defendant failed to appear for trial, and the trial court later questioned him, without his attorney present, about the reason for his absence. Another panel of this court ordered a new hearing regarding the defendant's absence at trial, finding that "Ellis was entitled to a hearing affording him an opportunity to explain his absence," and that it was a critical stage of the proceedings at which he was entitled to representation. Id. at 612. In support of its conclusion, this Court cited Gilbert v. State, 182 Ind.App. 286, 290, 395 N.E.2d 429, 482 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Holtz argues that this Court's position in Holdings: 0: holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction 1: holding that reviewing court may consider trial evidence in reviewing denial of motion to suppress 2: holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board 3: holding that a reviewing court has an obligation to satisfy itself of the jurisdiction of the court below 4: holding that for reviewing court to look solely at the facts initially before the court regarding defendants absence would be patently unfair


Input: Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), "was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds”). The ICA unanimously decided the case in a two-page summary disposition order relying on settled law that the charge failed to allege an attendant circumstance of the offense. State v. Wheeler, 120 Hawai'i 256, 203 P.3d 676 (App. 2009) (summary disposition order) (citing HRS § 702-205 and Jendrusch in concluding that the ch ir.1996) (stating that a prior U.S. Supreme Court decision did not announce a new rule of constitutional law because it merely engaged in statutory interpretation); United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278, 279 (9th Cir.1997) (accord); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1195-96 (4th Cir.1997) (accord); United States v. McPhail, 112 F.3d 197, 199 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 34 . To the extent the concurrence’s Holdings: 0: holding johnson announced a new substantive rule and prior supreme court holdings make it retroactive 1: holding that court is bound by prior panels interpretation of supreme court decision 2: holding that padilla does not announce a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure and listing in footnotes three eases finding that padilla announced a new rule of criminal procedure and seven cases finding that padilla is simply the application of an old rule 3: holding that a prior us supreme court decision did not present a new rule of criminal procedure but merely interpreted a statute 4: holding that the supreme courts decision in jones v united states 529 us 848 120 sct 1904 146 led2d 902 2000 did not effect a material change in the law but only clarified a prior supreme court decision and two ninth circuit opinions consistent with joness holding


Input: v. 4B Elevator Components Unlimited, 148 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir.1998) (applying Section 388 under Iowa law); Erickson v. Monarch Indus., 216 Neb. 875, 347 N.W.2d 99, 108 (1984) (stating that “warning of a product’s defects is unnecessary where the supplier of the product has reason to believe that those who will use it will have such special experience as will enable them to perceive the danger”) (quotation omitted). U t] was under a duty to warn, its failure to do so could not have been the proximate cause of the accident because [the employer] and the plaintiffs decedent [a supervisory employee] were aware of the danger”); Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 300 (8th Cir.1996) (same); Hammond v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 204 Neb. 80, 86, 281 N.W.2d 520, 524 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, under Nebraska law, the “rule of Holdings: 0: holding that failure to warn of a gas leak could not have been a proximate cause of the accident if the gas company already knew of the leak 1: holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury 2: holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury 3: holding defendants act of disconnecting gas service for nonpayment was not proximate cause of plaintiffs carbon monoxide poisoning 4: holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury


Input: Appellant provides no evidence — and indeed does not even assert — that the court’s order was ever given effect. Appellant is not entitled to relief merely on the basis of a trial court order that, although inconsistent with a current rule, led to no improper action or omission. Consistent with Rule 576, decisional law from this Court has clarified Commonwealth policy regarding hybrid representation. No defendant has a right to hybrid representation, either at trial or on appeal. Commonwealth v. Ellis, 534 Pa. 176, 626 A.2d 1137, 1139 (1993); Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.3d 282, 293 (2010) (characterizing as a “legal nullity” a pro se Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement filed by an appellant who was represented by counsel); Commonwealth v. Colson, 507 Pa. 440, 490 A.2d 811, 822 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Here, Appellant was represented by Holdings: 0: holding that there is no federal or colorado constitutional right to postconviction counsel but there is a limited statutory right 1: holding that it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal 2: holding that there is no constitutional right for a represented defendant to act as cocounsel 3: holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction 4: recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice


Input: filed because of sudden illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment. At the same time, this is not a case of debtors who ran up debt by consistently living beyond their means. Rather, it appears that they were the victims of a collapsing real estate market that caught them by surprise as they were attempting to move from one house to another that was more suited to their needs. In retrospect, they clearly extended themselves unwisely, but certainly they were not the only home buyers in the 2005 to 2007 time frame who did not foresee the precipitous drop in property values that took even experienced real estate professionals in Northern Virginia by surprise. In any event, poor financial decisions, standing alone, do not equate to abuse. In re Smith, 354 B.R. 787 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 2006) (<HOLDING>). The fall-off in real estate values left the Holdings: 0: holding that thrift savings plan monthly payroll deductions could be included as part of a hypothetical chapter 13 disposable income calculation in determining whether a chapter 7 case could be dismissed as a substantial abuse 1: holding that a debtors ability to make reduced payments under the icrp is relevant to the inquiry of whether the debtors reasonable future financial resources will cover payment of the debt while still allowing a minimal standard of living 2: holding that a debtors right to convert his or her chapter 7 case is not absolute 3: holding that a chapter 7 debtors duty to file a section 521albv statement of monthly net income can only be fulfilled by filing form b22a 4: holding in prebapcpa case that chapter 7 filing was not a substantial abuse simply because debtors made unwise financial decisions that increased their monthly living expenses


Input: the Due Process Clause because it failed to provide any protection for the parent’s “fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughter.” Id. at 70, 120 S.Ct. at 2062, 147 L.Ed.2d at 59. The Court then cited with approval state statutes and court decisions that, unlike the Washington statute, protect that fundamental right. See, e.g., Cal. Fam.Code § 3104(e) (West 1994) (rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation not in child’s best interest if parents agree otherwise); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann., tit. 19A, § 1803(3) (West 1998) (authorizing visitation if in child’s best interest and does not significantly interfere with parent-child relationship or “parent’s rightful authority over the child”); Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 (N.D.1999) (<HOLDING>). Summing up, the Court described the Holdings: 0: holding that for a compelling state interest to exist justifying an order of visitation over the objection of a childs parents a court must find an actual harm to the childs health or welfare without such visitation construing virginias statute as requiring such a finding 1: holding visitation statute unconstitutional because it disregards presumption favoring parental decisionmaking forcing parents to prove visitation not in childs best interest 2: holding conclusory statements in visitation dispute were not adequate to support awarding visitation rights 3: holding troxel not controlling where states supreme court previously held rational basis review sufficient based on minimal intrusion of grandparent visitation and other parental protections afforded by visitation statute 4: holding that uncertainty regarding amount of visitation ordered is fatal to the validity of a trial courts visitation  award


Input: they have elsewhere within the State or Territory: :(! ‡ !{« S}! * ifc “(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States . ' . . ; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein. “(c) Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian tribe, 4, 18 L.Ed.2d 643 (1967) (<HOLDING>). See Board of Regents v. New Left Education Holdings: 0: holding local ordinances not state laws within the meaning of the railroad safety act of 1970 45 usc  434 1: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 2: holding that venue for litigation was proper based on 28 usc  1441 regardless of whether defendant was doing business in the district within the meaning of 28 usc  1391 3: holding local ordinances are not state statutes within the meaning of 28 usc  2281 requiring convening of a threejudge district court to enjoin a state statute 4: holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound


Input: 19(a), and; (2) if the absent party is necessary and cannot be joined, then the court must decide if “in equity and good conscience” the action should be dismissed because the nonparty is indispensable. Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir.1990). (1) In order to determine if the absent party is necessary to the suit; (a) a court must determine if complete relief is possible among those already parties to the suit and; (b) whether the absent party has a legally protected interest in the suit. Id. at 558. This interest must be more than a-financial stake, and more than speculation about a future event. Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir.1986); See McLaughlin v. International Ass’n of Machinists, 847 F.2d 620, 621 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., Holdings: 0: holding that determination of the oklahoma and texas common boundary in a prior suit was conclusive in future litigation 1: holding that equitable relief is only appropriate where legal remedies are inadequate 2: holding that speculation about a future event is inadequate interest in a suit 3: holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit 4: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state


Input: hospitals’ records undoubtedly assert that baby Joseph’s condition at the time of discharge was that of “no fever, alert, no distress”, and “good, stable”. However, plaintiffs’ experts conclude through their opinions after scrutinizing the hospitals’ records that the lack of sufficient documented objective vital signs at the time of discharge from HHM, and the mere reliance on the child’s appearance accompanied by a normal chest x-Ray at the time of discharge from San Pablo is meager evidence of baby Joseph’s stability at time of discharge. The Court must, therefore, leave the issue to be resolved by a jury’s weighing of the hospitals’ documented record against the opinion of plaintiffs’ experts suggesting that the records were insufficient. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (<HOLDING>). Without entering into an opinion one way or Holdings: 0: holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence 1: holding that credibility determinations are for the jury 2: holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony 3: holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses 4: holding that credibility determinations the weighing of the evidence and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions not those of a judge


Input: no earlier than December 7, 2003. If their claims accrued before that date, then this court is without jurisdiction to hear them. A. Claim Accrual and Statute of Limitations in Overflight Takings Cases A claim against the government under the Tucker Act first accrues “when all the events which fix the government’s alleged liability have occurred and the plaintiff was or should have been aware of their existence.” Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1988) (emphasis in original). In determining whether plaintiffs knew, or should have known, of the requisite factual predicates establishing the government’s alleged liability in this case, the court must apply an objective standard. See Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Because plaintiffs bear the burden of Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action 1: holding that a plaintiff does not have to possess actual knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for the cause of action to accrue 2: holding that ratification requires full knowledge of all the facts upon which the unauthorized action was taken 3: holding illinois courts have frequently recognized  a cause of action for legal malpractice will rarely accrue prior to the entry of an adverse judgment settlement or dismissal of the underlying action in which plaintiff has become entangled due to the purportedly negligent advice of his attorney 4: recognizing the cause of action


Input: of the entire state over the parochial interests of individual municipalities. 2 . In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Baer appears to translate the common-law maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas into a federal constitutional duty, on the part of local municipalities, to protect property owners from the use of neighboring properties in ways that are undesirable to them. See Concurring Opinion, at 729-31, 734-37, 83 A.3d at 1002-03, 1005-06. The decisions referenced in the concurrence, however, generally concern the boundaries of the police power to establish zoning regulations restricting the ability of landowners to do as they wish with their own properties. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S.Ct. 114, 121, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926) (<HOLDING>); City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 Holdings: 0: holding that a zoning ordinance impinging upon a landowners desired use of his property does not offend substantive due process norms so long as the regulation is not clearly arbitrary and unreasonable having no substantial relation to the public health safety morals or general welfare 1: recognizing privilege for adjoining landowners defamatory statements about plaintiff to zoning board given landowners private interest in the protection of her property to advance 2: holding that allegations that the city arbitrarily applied a zoning ordinance were insufficient to state a substantive due process claim and stating in dicta that the decision would be the same even if the city had knowingly enforced the invalid zoning ordinance in bad faith a badfaith violation of state law remains only a violation of state law 3: holding that discretion of zoning board was not sufficiently circumscribed to support substantive due process claim 4: holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a trier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the towns zoning boards actions and that as a result the zoning board violated appellants rights to substantive due process


Input: against each other, thereby avoiding ‘the absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A.’ ”) (quoting Studley v. Boylston Nat’l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528, 33 S.Ct. 806, 57 L.Ed. 1313 (1913) (emphasis added)). In this case, allowing Bechtel to set off its obligation to Shaw against Bechtel’s claim against the Debtor would result in a different absurdity — essentially, A (Bechtel) would not have to pay B (Shaw) because C (Debtor) owes A. Shaw argues that the phrase “other transactions” in the Offset Provision means other transactions with “SUBCONTRACTOR,” which is now Shaw. Shaw concedes that to the extent there are any sums due by it to Bechtel under any of the Contracts assigned by the Debtor to it, Bechtel may offset those sums against t le’s State Bank, 68 F.2d 110, 111 (4th Cir.1934) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Bechtel asserts that the parties Holdings: 0: holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff 1: holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder 2: holding that party that did not establish ownership in specific funds was a general creditor that only had a right to payment 3: holding that contract party could still offset funds placed on deposit by assignor to secure payment of assigned note 4: holding that the debtors deposit of funds was not in the ordinary course of business and was for the purpose of creating a setoff right for the bank


Input: spent more time on Mar Oil matters after the New York action was dismissed than he had prior to and during the action is unsupported and seems so improbable that, on the basis of all the evidence, we are left with the firm conviction that a mistake was made. Since the court made no explicit finding of the number of hours Morrissey spent in service of Mar Oil after January 26, 1983, and its implicit finding was clearly erroneous, and since the record provides no clear quantification of those hours, we remand to the district court for a further finding on this question. Second, we have difficulty with the fee award because the court applied its $200/ hour rate to all of the time spent by Morrissey. Application of a judicially calculated reasonable rate .S.2d 285, 288 (1st Dep’t) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 1028, 517 Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff could recover money mistakenly paid in excess of contract price 1: holding defendant that did not present its own claim under chapter 38 could not recover attorneys fees 2: holding that attorneys could not recover fees in excess of amount billed 3: holding that court of appeals erred by rendering judgment for full amount of attorneys fees sought after reversing 0 fee award because jury awarded less in damages than amount sought and therefore uncontroverted attorney testimony on amount of attorneys fees did not establish amount of reasonable and necessary fees as a matter of law 4: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees


Input: are not under oath and not subject to cross-examination.” United States v. Chong, supra, 104 F. Sup. 2d 1234 n.5. Moreover, it is important to remember that “[t]he imposition of death by public authority is . . . profoundly different from all other penalties . . . .” Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 605. In a capital sentencing proceeding, there is no verdict of “not guilty”—rather, a capital defendant who is not sentenced to death will receive a sentence of life imprisonment. Therefore, because the potential harm from an erroneous sentencing verdict is far greater for the defendant than it is for the state, the balance of equities requires that any inaccuracies in the capital sentencing process be resolved in favor of the defendant. See State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. 233-34 Holdings: 0: holding that recidivism may support the imposition of a severe penalty 1: holding the death penalty excessive punishment for the crime of rape 2: holding that the penalty is applicable 3: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty 4: recognizing the unique and irrevocable nature of the death penalty and    the consequently overarching need for reliability in the imposition of such a penalty


Input: as denying to any party the right to trial by jury where there are substantial issues of fact to be determined. A summary judgment may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damage.”). 21 See OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) (“[A]n action for medical malpractice shall be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.”). 22 See OCGA § 9-11-10 (b) (providing that “[e]ach claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth”). 23 Cf. Deen v. Pounds, 312 Ga. App. 207, 211 (1) (718 SE2d 68) (2011) (<HOLDING>); Goodman v. Satilla Health Servs., 290 Ga. Holdings: 0: holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury 1: holding that knowing but failing to communicate a correct diagnosis may constitute a separate act of negligence 2: holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action 3: holding that negligence does not violate the due process clause but reserving the question whether gross negligence does 4: holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe reglan and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence punctuation omitted


Input: legal rights of the parties but also took steps toward decreeing a proper remedy. Thus in its January 20, 1998 order, the court resolved the merits of the Hospitals’ claims, and with its April 30, 1998 order, directed the Secretary to calculate the amount of outlier payments due to the Hospitals and to make payment accordingly. This latter order has spawned some confusion about our jurisdiction because of the general rule applicable to civil actions that “where assessment of damages or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved,” a district court’s judgment is not “ ‘final’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976); see also A & S Council Oil Co. v. Lader, 56 F.3d 234, 238 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). For it is clear that neither of the district Holdings: 0: holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court 1: holding an order of default was not final where it resolved only the question of liability and the case was continued for proof on the issue of damages 2: holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award 3: holding that an order granting a motion or application to compel arbitration is nonappealable because it is not listed in the uaa arbitration provision and because it is not a final order 4: holding that an order establishing liability but referring the issue of damages to arbitration is not final


Input: it from either the United States, one of the fifty states, or the District of Columbia; all others are 'foreign' corporations”). The United States Supreme Court has also suggested that whether a corporation is foreign or domestic is dependent on its "charter.” See, e.g., Can. Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 537, 3 S.Ct. 363, 27 L.Ed. 1020 (1883) ("A corporation 'must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty,’ though it may do business in all places where its charter allows * * *. But wherever it goes for business it carries its charter, as that is the law of its existence * * *."). We have expressed a similar view on nationality. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohsman & Sons, Co. v. Starkweather, 214 Minn. 232, 237, 7 N.W.2d 747, 749 (1943) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Our conclusion is confirmed by Treas. Holdings: 0: holding that a corporations principal place of business for determining diversity jurisdiction under 28 usc  1332c1 is the nerve center meaning the corporations headquarters or the place where a corporations officers direct control and coordinate the corporations activities 1: holding that while a state statute granted a foreign corporation the rights and privileges enjoyed by domestic corporations it did not transform such corporations into domestic or resident corporations 2: holding that general laws affecting corporations form essential parts of the charters of the corporations as though copied into them 3: recognizing a corporations legal rights to confidentiality and privilege 4: recognizing a cause of action against a corporations directors brought by a creditor for the fraudulent misrepresentation of the corporations financial condition


Input: without inference or presumption.” Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir.1993) (emphasis added). For example, we have held that a job interviewer’s statement that the plaintiffs age caused him concern was not direct evidence of discrimination in the employer’s decision not to hire the plaintiff. Haas v. ADVO Sys., Inc., 168 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir.1999). Although the interviewer’s remarks were neither vague nor remote in time — and despite a reasonable inference that the interviewer had influenced the employer’s hiring preferences — we nevertheless noted that an additional inference was required before we could conclude that the decisionmaker himself chose not to hire the plaintiff based on age discrimination. Id. at 734; cf. Fierros, 274 F.3d at 195 (<HOLDING>). In the context of TxDOT’s motion for summary Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim 1: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination 2: holding that a decisionmakers own statement  that the plaintiff would not receive a pay increase because she engaged in protected activity  is direct evidence of discrimination 3: holding that a plaintiffs retaliation claim is cognizable even in the absence of protected activity as long as his employer perceived him to be engaged in such activity 4: recognizing that plaintiff undoubtedly engaged in a protected activity when he contacted the eeoc alleging discrimination


Input: definition that is applicable in all settings' Thus, 'the meaning of [cohabitation] depends upon the con text in which it is used.' '' Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App 37, ¶ 7, 107 P.3d 693 (second alteration in original) (quoting Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985)). The jury instructions employed the definition of eohabitant found in the Cohabitant Abuse Act, informing the jury that Watkins was a cohbabitant of Father if either he was "related by blood or marriage to [Father]" or he "resides or has resided in the same residence as [Father]." See Utah Code Aun. § 78B-7-102(2) (2008). However, that definition is limited to the provisions of the Cohabitant Abuse Act and is not necessarily applicable in other contexts. See Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866, 868-69 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). \ 13 The definition found in the Cohabitant Holdings: 0: holding that threat as used in the coercion definition as that definition is incorporated into section 3605s witnesstampering prohibition was not unconstitutionally vague because nature of threat was informed by the harms enumerated in the definition in that case hatred contempt and ridicule 1: holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract 2: holding that the cohabitant abuse acts definition of cohabitant did not abrogate the definition of cohabitant developed by case law in the context of alimony termination 3: holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts 4: holding that the definition of supplier under the ocspa is substantially broader than the definition of debt collector under the fdcpa


Input: breadth of the consent decree as follows: [By THE COURT:] Well, I've reviewed the matter and the case started out as a residence case, and I know that the consent decree has some additional broad language in it. But it started out as a residence case. And now under the mantle, let us say, of a contempt proceeding, it has shifted ground, and it's becoming a testing and selection case. App. I at 5. Even if the case did initially center on the residency requirement, the proper focus must be on the language contained within the consent decree itself. A judicially approved consent decree, like a settlement agreement, is essentially a contract for purposes of construction. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3078, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (<HOLDING>); Kasper v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding in a challenge to a zoning deci sion that the plaintiff was not similarly situated to others who received different treatment for different reasons 1: holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union 2: holding that the plaintiffs had relied on illinois law because they could have filed in a different forum having a different statute of limitations 3: recognizing that the legislature would not generally use a different meaning for the same word in a legislative provision unless a different purpose was intended 4: recognizing that consent decrees have a dual character that of contract and that of judicial decree subjecting them to different treatment for different purposes


Input: “prima facie, classifiable under two or more headings” (ie., heading 9405 and heading 7013), the merchandise would nevertheless be properly classified under heading 9405, pursuant to GRI 3(a) — the rule of “relative specificity.” As outlined above, GRI 3(a) requires that— where merchandise is prima facie, classifiable under two or more headings — “[t]he heading which provides the most specific description shall be preferred to headings providing a more general description.” See GRI 3(a). As the Explanatory Notes emphasize, only if merchandise cannot be classified pursuant to GRI 3(a) does GRI 3(b) come into play. See Explanatory Note GRI 3(b)(VI) (stating that GRI 3(b) “applies only if Rule 3(a) fails”); Bauer Nike Hockey USA, Inc. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1246, 1252 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). It is clear beyond cavil that heading 9405, Holdings: 0: holding that for purposes of gri 2a essential character analysis it is the ability to process data that gives the essential character to articles under a tariff provision covering automatic data processing machines and units thereof 1: holding dismissal proper where complaint fails to allege an essential element of plaintiffs claim 2: holding that for purposes of gri 2a essential character analysis incomplete merchandise as imported does not have the essential character of the complete or finished article  the ability to strain salt from water and thus cannot be classified as straining cloth 3: holding that where the gri 3a rule of relative specificity adequately resolved proper classification of merchandise customs erred in reaching gri 3b essential character analysis 4: holding that plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context


Input: even if we were to accept Kovler's contention that he backed up his vehicle before taking the photographs, Kovler admitted that "the rear of his vehicle [was] no more than a foot beyond the pole” (marking the beginning of the stopping prohibited zone) as originally parked. (O.R. at 52.) 12 . Kovler also appears to argue that the trial court should not have considered this matter as an appeal. Rather, Kovler contends that the trial court should have required the City to file a civil complaint under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure to allow the matter to be fully litigated. Kovler envisions a process involving discovery and a full civil trial; however, Kovler offers no legal support for such a contention. See Boniella v. Com., 958 A.2d 1069, 1072 n. 8 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (<HOLDING>), appeal denied sub nom. In re Handgun, 600 Pa. Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court is not required to review an appellants point relied on which appears without citation of applicable or relevant authority 1: holding issue spotting without legal citation precludes appellate review 2: holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review 3: holding the appellants failure to raise a particular issue in its directed verdict motion precludes appellate review of that issue 4: holding that lack of objection at trial precludes appellate review of allegedly misused evidence


Input: of the Model Act, especially when the General Assembly would have been fully aware of the Model Act’s commentary when enacting our Business Corporation Act. This interpretation is also consistent with opinions of this Court in analogous situations. See Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 103 N.C. App. 479, 482, 405 S.E.2d 794, 796 (“Jeanne Lowder’s claims arise from and depend on the role of her husband as officer of the corporation. To regard her claims otherwise would be to enable officers of a corporation to defraud their companies and avoid any accounting or detection by acting through their spouses and then allowing a spouse to assert claims.”), disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 119, 409 S.E.2d 595 (1991); cf. City of Asheville v. Morris, 133 N.C. App. 90, 92, 514 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, there is no need, in this case, to Holdings: 0: holding that civil service board members had interests in the matter and should have recused themselves when one member had a husband and another a son who would be affected by the boards decision 1: holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school boards president constituted the decision of the board 2: holding that the boards finding that a matter was not before it because a substantive appeal had not been filed was error and determining that because a timely nod had been submitted and the ro never responded by issuing an soc as required by law and regulation the proper remedy was to vacate the board decision as to the matter and remand to the board for appropriate procedural compliance specifically the issuance of an soc 3: holding that an associations president who was not a party before the board of appeals was not entitled to appeal the boards decision granting a zoning application that his association had opposed in the board proceedings 4: holding that because pennsylvania law limited a state courts review of a zoning boards decision to the issue whether the boards determinations were supported by substantial evidence the rookerfeldman doctrine did not prevent the plaintiffs from filing a federal action claiming that the zoning board had engaged in disability discrimination following a state courts review of the boards determinations


Input: MedtroMc first argues that res judi-cata requires KulinsM to plead all bases for jurisdiction in his original pleading. TMs argument is inconsistent with our precedent. In McCarney v. Ford Motor Co., 657 F.2d 230 (8th Cir.1981), we held that a dismissal based on subject matter jurisdiction: should preclude relitigation of the same [jurisdiction] issue but not a second smt on the same claim even if arising out of the identical set of facts_ [W]here the second suit presents new theories of relief, admittedly based upon the same operative facts as alleged m the first action, it is not precluded because the first decision was not on the merits of the substantive claim. Id. at 233-34 (citations omitted); cf. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407, 1411 (8th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Ku-linsM based his first action on federal Holdings: 0: holding second action barred by res judicata because plaintiff asserted identical claims and jurisdictional grounds as the first action 1: holding that where no member of present plaintiff class had cause of action at time prior judgment was entered claim cannot be barred by res judicata 2: recognizing the express reservation of the plaintiffs right to maintain a second action as an exception to the doctrine of res judicata 3: holding that the plaintiffs due process claims were completely barred by res judicata because the underlying factual predicate for each of these claims  is substantially identical to the allegations presented in state court 4: holding that when claims regarding the employment relationship arise after the plaintiffs first case is initiated the second case is not barred by res judicata


Input: denying their motions for a new trial and an evi-dentiary hearing on the basis of alleged juror misconduct and extrinsic influence on jurors. According to William and Chantal, since their motions demonstrate a color-able showing of extrinsic influence, the court erred by not conducting an eviden-tiary hearing on their motions. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree. The only evidence offered by William and Chantal in support of their motions for a new trial and an evidentiary hearing consisted of the Porter and the Roberts Affidavits. With respect to the Porter Affidavit, all but two of the statements contained therein are excluded by Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) because they involve thé jury’s deliberative process and the mental impressions of juror Hart. The two statem (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion Holdings: 0: holding that allegations of influence by an unnamed person outside the jury required the holding of an evidentiary hearing to determine extrinsic influence 1: recognizing that trial court is obligated to conduct evidentiary hearing only when defendant makes a colorable showing of extrinsic influence  2: holding that it was not error for trial court to decline to conduct full evidentiary hearing before trial on outrageous government conduct claim 3: holding that the trial court did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing when the dispute could be resolved as a matter of law 4: holding that where partys allegations raise a colorable entitlement to relief pursuant to rule 1540b3 a formal evidentiary hearing is required


Input: from hourly ongoing client matters relates to bankruptcy law in the following way. Under 11 U.S.C. § 548, a bankruptcy trustee has the power to avoid any fraudulent transfer of an interest of the debtor in property within a specified period before the bankruptcy. A transfer will be fraudulent if it was done with intent to “hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors, § 548(a)(1)(A), or if it meets certain criteria for a constructive fraudulent transfer, § 548(a)(1)(B). For purposes of bankruptcy law, debtors have an interest in any property that would have been part of the bankruptcy estate if not for the transfer. See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58, 110 S.Ct. 2258, 110 L.Ed.2d 46 (1990). Certain subsequent transferees of the debtor’s property can also be 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945) (<HOLDING>). The answers provided will help clarify the Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state law that determines the outcome of the case 1: holding in the conflict of laws context that district courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the forum state 2: holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases 3: holding that federal courts sitting in diversity shall apply state substantive law 4: holding that a federal court sitting in diversity is bound to follow the law of the forum state


Input: policy on the basis of speculation that the l 66 (1999) (finding electronic monitoring does not place a defendant “in custody” within meaning of sentencing credit statute); State v. Climer, 127 Idaho 20, 896 P.2d 346, 350 (Idaho Ct.App.1995) (concluding “house arrest” through electronic monitoring is not “incarceration”); State v. Muratella, 240 Neb. 567, 483 N.W.2d 128, 129-30 (1992) (“Being confined to one’s home, subject to electronic monitoring, with the freedom to engage in employment and probation-related activities, is far less onerous than being imprisoned.”); State v. Faulkner, 102 Ohio App.3d 602, 657 N.E.2d 602, 604 (1995) (finding pretrial electronic home monitoring does not entitle defendant to sentencing credit); Commonwealth v. Kyle, 582 Pa. 624, 874 A.2d 12, 20 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Tagorda v. State, 977 S.W.2d 632, 633-34 Holdings: 0: holding electronic home monitoring is not time spent in custody because there is a difference in restrictions between electronic home monitoring and jail 1: holding the legislatures approval of granting a defendant credit against his sentence in a statute governing postsentence 17electronic monitoring by the department of correction but omission of that approval in a separate statute relating to pretrial electronic monitoring is evidence that the legislature did not intend for credit to be given for electronic monitoring while a defendant is awaiting trial 2: holding that due process clause does not require a federal prisoner to receive credit for time spent on supervised release if release is revoked 3: holding as a matter of law pretrial electronic monitoring and home confinement merits sentencing credit under its statute 4: holding time spent on electronic monitoring while on bail release does not constitute custody within meaning of sentencing credit statute


Input: the Constitution or federal law, it should “afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure rather than for the federal court to devise ... its own plan.” Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978). This case presents an exceptional circumstance, however: the General Assembly enacted the 2016 Plan after another panel of this Court invalidated the 2011 Plan as a racial gerrymander. Harris, 159 F.Supp.3d at 627. When a court finds a remedial districting plan also violates the Constitution, courts generally do not afford a legislature a second “bite-at-the-apple” to enact a constitutionally compliant plan. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27, 95 S.Ct. 751, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586, 84 S.Ct. 1362 Holdings: 0: holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error 1: holding that if the defendant fails to file a motion in the trial court to withdraw his plea he cannot attack it for the first time on appeal 2: holding that if a state fails to enact a constitutionally acceptable remedial districting plan the responsibility falls on the district court 3: holding that plain error review applies when a party fails to raise a claim before the district court 4: holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error


Input: differs not at all from the speculation in Hughes Properties that a jackpot might never be paid by a casino. As we observed in Hughes Properties, the potential of nonpayment of a liability always exists, and it alone does not prevent accrual. The beneficiary of a liability always has the option of waiving payment, but a taxpayer is still unquestionably entitled to deduct the liability. An injured employee entitled absolutely to reimbursement for medical services under a workers’ compensation statute, for example, may fail to utilize the medical services. The employer, however, has been held to be entitled to deduct the expected medical expenses because the workers’ compensation law creates liability. See Wien Consolidated Airlines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 528 F. 2d 735 (CA9 1976) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, any business liability could Holdings: 0: holding that accrual basis taxpayer may deduct expected workers compensation payments in year of injury even though injured workers may not utilize medical benefits 1: holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act 2: recognizing that a federal court may not review a challenge to a benefits determination of the office of workers compensation programs in the department of labor 3: holding that pursuant to statute unemployment benefits must be offset against workers compensation payments 4: holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity


Input: that summary judgment in its favor meant that the School District was not negligent, it does not follow that Edison Learning was negligent. For example, both Edison Learning and the School District may have fully complied with their duties and the assault may have been the sole fault of Viruet’s attacker. Indeed, if dismissing the School ■ District was sufficient to establish Edison’s negligence, Viruet himself could have asserted collateral estoppel against Edison at trial. Nor does the fact of settlement between Edison Learning and Viruet es tablish Edison Learning’s negligence. Settlements are not final adjudications for the purposes of collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Eighth N.-Val, Inc. v. William L. Parkinson, D.D.S., P.C., Pension Trust, 778 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa.Super.Ct.2001) (<HOLDING>); Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff because the facts of the case amounted to a contract dispute 1: holding a compromise to settle the dispute meant there was therefore no actual litigation 2: holding that because there was no factual dispute between the parties the presumption of correctness is not relevant 3: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required if there are no factual issues in dispute 4: holding that there was an impermissible compromise because the damages award was inadequate and liability was hotly disputed by the parties and struggled over by the jury