Input: the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss on grounds of Alamo’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Martin argues that we are precluded from considering the merits of this issue because Alamo did not file a timely notice of appeal. We need not decide whether Alamo’s notice of appeal was timely because Alamo inadequately briefed the issue and, thus, abandoned its Eleventh Amendment arguments. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 243 F.3d 936, 940 (5th Cir.2001) (dismissing appeal as abandoned because the Appellant failed to challenge the district court’s application of the applicable test for Eleventh Amendment immunity); Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824, 831 (5th Cir.0993); L & A Contracting Co. v. Southern Concrete Servs., 17 F.3d 106, 113 (5th Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>); Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (requiring Holdings: 0: holding appeal to be abandoned because appellant cited no authority in a onepage argument 1: holding the appellant was deemed to have abandoned an issue for which he failed to provide any argument or supporting authority 2: holding that an issue is waived where the defendant failed to develop an argument in his appellate brief and cited no authority 3: holding an issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority 4: holding that appellant abandoned argument by failing to argue it in body of brief


Input: (i.e., the principle and the methodology) on which the proffered DNA evidence is based ‘relevant’ to understanding the evidence or to determining a fact in issue? “Trial courts should use the flexible Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1998)], analysis in making the ‘reliability’ (scientific validity) assessment. In making that assessment, the courts should employ the following factors: (1) testing; (2) peer review; (8) rate of error; and (4) general acceptance. “Trial courts should make the ‘relevance’ assessment by addressing the ‘fit’ between what the scientific theory and technique are supposed to show and what must be shown to r 197 [ (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1062, 114 S.Ct. 734, 126 L.Ed.2d 697 (1994) ] (<HOLDING>). We recognize that the state of scientific Holdings: 0: holding that the existence and content of a police report are not properly the subject of judicial notice 1: holding that another courts decision is a proper subject of judicial notice 2: holding that the reliability of the restriction fragment length polymorphism rflp procedure was subject to judicial notice 3: holding that reliability of the polymerase chain reaction pcr method of dna typing would be subject to judicial notice in future cases 4: recognizing that pleadings in the underlying case are subject to judicial notice by an appellate court


Input: for a debt- or’s refusal to obey them. See § 1325(a); § 1307(c) (providing that the trustee or a party in interest may seek to dismiss a Chapter 13 case or convert it to Chapter 7 “for cause, including ... material default by the debtor with respect to a term of a confirmed plan”); see also In re Talbot, 124 F.3d 1201, 1209 (10th Cir.1997) (“Upon becoming final, the order confirming a chapter 13 plan represents a binding determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties as ordained by the plan.”). Thus, interpreting the relevant statutory language according to its plain meaning, we easily conclude that the confirmation order in this case qualifies as a “lawful order of the court” for purposes of § 727(a)(6)(A). See also In re Foster, 335 B.R. 709, 716 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.2006) (<HOLDING>). The Standiferds contend that this natural Holdings: 0: holding that representation as to financial solvency of partnership was statement of financial condition because it reflected overall economic condition of partnership 1: holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents 2: holding that  727a6a clearly includes orders requiring the debtor to produce documents relating to his or her financial condition 3: holding that evidence of a defendants financial condition is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages 4: holding that scope of discovery in tread separation case should include documents relating generally to the tread separation defect or problem because otherwise the defendant would not produce documents probative on the issues of notice defectiveness and dangerousness


Input: It is not a limitation upon the right to seek another office. The incumbent of an office has the choice under the statute to retain it unmolested, or give it up and seek another.” Id. at 239; see also Hill v. Galliher, 65 So. 3d 362, 377 (Ala. 2010) (upholding resign-to-run provision against challenge that it unconstitutionally added qualification to run for office, observing that it merely “established requirements for retaining employment” (quotation and emphasis omitted)); Holley v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 401, 406 (Fla. 1970) (rejecting claim that resign-to-run statute was unconstitutional qualification for office, ruling that it was merely limitation upon right to retain one office while seeking another). But see Moore v. Knightdale Bd. of Elections, 413 S.E.2d 541, 544-45 (N.C. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, other jurisdictions construing similar Holdings: 0: holding  13981 constitutional under the commerce clause 1: recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern 2: holding that specific wording of constitutional qualifications clause invalidated resigntorun statute 3: holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls 4: holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause


Input: that failure to respond to the notice will result in a Notice to Appear in municipal court “and you may be charged with a new offense.” Moreover, the Ordinance expressly provides that “[ujnder no circumstances may a person be imprisoned for such violation [of the Ordinance].... ” While the Ordinance does allow for additional prosecution for failure to appear at a scheduled hearing in municipal court, “it is not duress to do, or threaten to do, what one has a right to do.” Slone v. Purina Mills, Inc., 927 S.W.2d 358, 371 (Mo.App.W.D.1996). Ellisville is entitled to pursue legal action against an alleged violator if he or she fails to respond to a Notice to Appear in municipal court. See Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. v. Missouri Bd. of Fund Com’rs, 384 S.W.3d 238, 275 (Mo.App.W.D.2012) (<HOLDING>). Because the voluntary payment doctrine bars Holdings: 0: holding that the crime of knowingly and willfully threatening the president required only that the threat be made under circumstances where a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom it is addressed as a serious threat and not be the result of mistake duress or coercion 1: holding after long discussion of the various opinions in black that that case established that a defendant can be constitutionally convicted of making a true threat only if the defendant intended the recipient of the threat to feel threatened 2: recognizing that missouri courts do not recognize the threat of legitimate legal process as duress because the party threatened is entitled to plead and prove that he is not liable 3: holding that bankruptcy is no exception to the due process principle that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party to or to which he has not been made a party by service of process internal quotation marks omitted 4: holding that the district courts finding that an allegedly coercive threat did not specifically motivate the defendants confession where 1 there was no evidence that the threat was repeated at the police station 2 defendant offered no admissible evidence that the threat was the crucial factor motivating his confession and 3 he confessed immediately after the officer threatened to administer a gun residue test as opposed to confessing immediately after the allegedly coercive threat was made thus the gunresidue test was just as plausible a motivating factor for the confession as was the threat


Input: USAMRIID, and the “tunnel vision” and lack of flexibility characteristic of some scientists. Similarly, in a memorandum to the Commander of the USAMRMC, in which Glenn gave his Review & Analysis of the USAMRMC, Glenn noted the “problem” of the “average age going higher.” He stated that “only US-AMRIID cut below the authorization limit to hire back either younger or different technology skills.” In appellants’ view, these statements by Glenn, like those made by Franz, reveal a discriminatory animus against older employees and establish pretext. We disagree. ■ First, we have consistently held, along with other circuits, that general or ambiguous remarks referring to the process of generational change create no triable issue of age discrimina tion. See, e.g., Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 511-12 (<HOLDING>); EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, Holdings: 0: recognizing that although there was no property in a dead body at common law  the one whose duty it is to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes and that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or mutilating it in any way 1: holding that the reference to needing younger blood was insufficiently probative of age bias 2: holding that a suretys standing to sue  comes from the fact that it is also subrogated to  the contractor 3: holding that the statement that there comes a time when we have to make way for younger people is insufficient to create any inference of age bias because it is a stray remark which merely reflects a fact of life 4: holding it is a question of fact


Input: defects,” specifically, defects in establishing citizenship for the purpose of establishing diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 223. See also Harmon v. OKI Sys., 115 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir.1997) (citing with approval the reasoning in In re Allstate that “a defendant’s failure to allege citizenship as opposed to residency ... constituted a procedural defect”). We agree with the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of § 1447(c) and construction of a party’s failure to establish citizenship in its notice of removal as a procedural defect. “[Wjhere subject matter jurisdiction exists and any procedural shortcomings may be cured by resort to § 1653, we can surmise no valid reason for the court to decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” In re Allstate, 8 F.3d at 223. See also Ellenburg, 519 F.3d at 198 (<HOLDING>). Section 1653 provides that “[d]efec-tive Holdings: 0: holding that district court has no jurisdiction to take further action where there was no remand order 1: holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal 2: holding that a remand order entered by a magistrate judge was beyond his statutory authority and concluding that review was proper because the court of appeals was not reviewing the merits of the remand order itself 3: holding remand orders not subsumed under statute barring review of remand orders based on defect in removal or on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be appealed pursuant to 28 usc  1291 4: holding that the district court cannot remand sua sponte for defects in removal procedure


Input: of habeas corpus is denied. III. Analysis of the Petition A. Inadequacy of court-appointed interpreter The Supreme Court has never decided what degree of interpretive assistance is constitutionally required for non-English speaking defendants. See United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 901 (2d Cir.1967) (noting lack of Supreme Court precedent); see also United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir.2001) (noting that the Supreme Court has not even specifically found a constitutional right to any interpreter at all). The Second Circuit, however, has held that a non-English speaking defendant has a constitutional right to an interpreter. See United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 387 (2d Cir.1970); see also United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Sin v. Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal 1: holding that a defendant whose fluency in english is so impaired that it interferes with his right to confrontation or his capacity as a witness to understand or respond to questions has a constitutional right to an interpreter 2: holding right to testify was federal constitutional right 3: holding that witness grand jury testimony was admissible when defendant waived his constitutional right of confrontation by making witness unavailable by threats to his life 4: holding defendant had no constitutional right to a mitigation specialist or a right to an effective one


Input: places [a defendant convicted of conspiracy] on a fundamentally different plane” than a defendant who has not been convicted of conspiracy. Harrisortr-Philpot, 978 F.2d at 1523. An analysis of the “totality of the circumstances” of Sluder’s and Saturday’s loss enhancement underscores our point. Sluder’s and Saturday’s sentences, even after the loss enhancement, fall within the maximum sentence authorized for the crimes alleged in the indictment. The loss enhancement neither negates the presumption of innocence nor alters the burden of proof for wire fraud or conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Nor does it hold Sluder and Saturday responsible for any offenses for which they have not been convicted by a jury. Cf. Nijhawan v. Holder, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 2297-98, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009) (<HOLDING>). The loss enhancement is based on a conspiracy Holdings: 0: holding rla duty of fair representation claim preempts identical state law claims of fraud and deceit 1: holding hellorhighwater clause enforceable in the absence of fraud or deceit 2: holding state law fraud and deceit claims to be preempted 3: holding intent as an element for disciplining an attorney for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation is proven by establishing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing 4: holding that in the context of federal immigration law the amount of loss to the victim of fraud or deceit does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit but rather refers to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed fraud or deceit


Input: to “issue a declaratory judgment in a criminal cause” regarding appellant’s status as sex offender, regardless of the decision in Doe I. Id. at 140, 20 A.3d 192. Although the Court in Doe I held that the 2009/2010 amendments had crossed the line from “civil regulation to an element of the punishment of offenders” in the ex post facto context, that ruling did not transform the sex offender registration scheme into a sanction in the context of a criminal case. See Doe I, 430 Md. at 578, 62 A.3d 123 (McDonald, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Accordingly, registration remains a collateral consequence of criminal punishment, and thus appellant can seek removal from the sex offender registry only through a civil action for declaratory judgment. See Sinclair, 199 Md.App. at 137, 20 A.3d 192 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, regardless of the merits of Holdings: 0: holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending 1: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action 2: holding that a motion for a summary judgment is an appropriate means of seeking an adjudication on the merits 3: holding that a complaint seeking declaratory judgment remains the procedure for obtaining under appropriate circumstances a ruling on the constitutionality of a statute the violation of which carries criminal sanctions 4: holding that filing of infringement action twelve days after complaint for declaratory judgment obviated the need for a declaratory judgment in this case


Input: proceeded to a bench trial. The district court found Kooima guilty. Kooima appealed. We transferred the cáse to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court. Kooi-ma sought further review, which we granted. III. Issues. The issue before the court is whether the investigatory stop of Kooima by the Rock Valley police violated his rights against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. IV. Standard of Review. Kooima argues the district court should have granted his motion to suppress on state and federal constitutional grounds because the State deprived him of his right against unlawful searches and seizures. State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Iowa 2010) (<HOLDING>). We review constitutional issues de novo. Holdings: 0: recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights 1: holding that a defendants personal involvement in an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights is a necessary element of a  1983 complaint 2: recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel 3: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states 4: recognizing a motion to suppress based on the deprivation of the defendants constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures


Input: judge in your absence.” Thompson signed his Notice to Appear despite this admonition and the fact that the form listed an address where he knew he could not be reached. We are left to wonder how Thompson expected the government to contact him regarding his pending removal hearing when the form he signed listed an incorrect address. The fact that the immigration official made the alleged error does not absolve Thompson. Thompson had both the opportunity to provide his current, correct address at the time he received the Notice to Appear an 11th Cir.2005) (noting that one “who has executed a written contract and is ignorant of its contents cannot set up that ignorance to avoid the obligation”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Puente, 982 F.2d 156, 159 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Even if Thompson were to argue that the Holdings: 0: holding that form 4790 is not an administrative rule but is merely incidental to the statute and regulations and therefore false statements on the form can lead to criminal prosecution 1: holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government did not constitute a trap for the unwary 2: holding that false statements are constitutionally protected 3: holding that a defendant who deliberately avoids reading the form he is signing cannot avoid criminal sanctions for any false statements contained therein 4: holding that spreading of deliberately false statements that employee in effect committed forgery constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct


Input: Leaks v. State, 339 Ark. 348, 5 S.W.3d 448 (1999). No request for admonishment is necessary. Id. [cdiscussion Appellant objected to certain prosecu-torial comments made during the State’s closing argument that challenged the veracity of both his and Ms. Hughes’s testimony. The trial court overruled appellant’s objection and also denied his subsequent request for a mistrial. Appellant acknowledges a lack of appellate decisions dealing with prosecuting attorneys’ improper comments on the veracity of a witness or defendant. He cites Gates v. State, 338 Ark. 530, 2 S.W.3d 40 (1999) (finding that prosecutor’s comment that appellant was guilty not grounds for mistrial; counsel failed to ask for a curative instruction after objection); Leach v. State, 38 Ark.App. 117, 831 S.W.2d 615 (1992) (<HOLDING>); and Harrison v. State, 276 Ark. 469, 637 Holdings: 0: holding that while the prosecutors question was improper in light of the overwhelming evidence there was no reversible error in the denial of defendants motion for mistrial 1: holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors 2: holding that a prosecutors argument about the special agents disincentive to lie was impermissible vouching 3: holding that while not reversible error a prosecutors vouching for a witness was improper and should be avoided on retrial 4: holding that prosecutors remark vouching for credibility of government agent was certainly improper


Input: to punitive damages under California law, a plaintiff must demonstrate “oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cal. Civ.Code § 3294. By contrast, once a plaintiff has successfully met the “deliberate indifference” standard under the Eighth Amendment — requiring that the conduct be “wanton,” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) there is little more that such a plaintiff would need to prove to establish a convincing argument for an award of punitive damages. These significant differences in the potential liability faced by privately operated federal prisons are prime examples of the “marginal deter rence” that Bivens offers. Thus, we do not find that this “special factor” counsels hesitation. (c) Asymmetrical Liabilit Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (<HOLDING>), and Holly, 434 F.3d at 294 (stating that Holdings: 0: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 1: holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery 2: holding that federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of protection when they violate federal constitutional rules than do state officers emphases removed 3: recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights 4: recognizing a cause of action for damages against officials who violate constitutional or statutory rights under color of federal law


Input: 15 C.R.S. (1990); Orr, 753 P.2d at 1223; Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 106, 371 P.2d 775, 783-84 (1962); City of Colo. Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 294, 249 P.2d 151, 153 (1952). This protection extends not only to surface water users but to users of all water tributary to a natural stream, including appropriators of tributary underground water. See §§ 37-92-102(l)(a), -103(11) (incorporating all waters of a natural stream in scope of Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, and including tributary underground water as a component of a natural stream); see also Danielson v. Vickroy, 627 P.2d 752, 757-58 (Colo.1981) (distinguishing tributary groundwater from designated groundwater); Safranek v. Town of Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 334, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (1951) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, this protection extends to Holdings: 0: recognizing presumption that all groundwater is tributary and subject to prior appropriation doctrine as part of the waters of the stream 1: recognizing a connection between surface and groundwater even where the water table falls below the stream bed 2: holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters 3: holding that waters in utah are of two classes private and public and title to public waters is in the public all are equal owners that is have coequal rights therein 4: recognizing doctrine


Input: that [the opposite] approach permits a court to deny effect to an arbitration provision in a contract that the court later finds to be perfectly enforceable.’ ” Id. (quoting Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 448-49, 126 S.Ct. 1204). This' dilemma is resolved by allocating such decisions to arbitration in accordance with the liberal policy favoring arbitration. Id., K-Stemcell and Biostar have not raised a challenge to the agreement to arbitrate that is “specific to the arbitration clause itself’. Because Biostar’s and K-Stemcell’s challenge to the motion to compel attacks the enforceability of the entire Agreement, the trial court did not err in submitting the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator. See TMI, Inc. v. Brooks, 225 S.W.3d 783, 793 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we overrule Biostar’s Holdings: 0: recognizing exception to general rule that disputes arising under contract with valid arbitration clause are referred to arbitrator 1: recognizing the existence of antagonistic defenses does not require severance unless defenses are actually irreconcilable 2: holding defenses concerning the contract as a whole must be referred to ah arbitrator while defenses to the arbitration provision itself are considered by the court 3: holding that whether in federal or state court a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole and not specifically to the arbitration clause within it must go to the arbitrator and not the court 4: holding under both florida law and faa that factual affirmative defenses are properly decided by the arbitrator rather than the court


Input: Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880). 18 . The phrase "communication, exchanges, or conversations” is a direct quote from Edwards (451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880); however, based on our contextual analysis of Hutchins, the conclusion that the CAAF drew ("Edwards ... prohibits further 'communication, exchanges, or conversations that may ... lead to further interrogation’ ”) appears to have its genesis in the following two sentences from Bradshaw: There are some inquiries, such as a request for a drink of water or a request to use a telephone, that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation. Such inquires or s 10, 1112-13 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). 21 .The Government argues that even if the Holdings: 0: holding that following his invocation of counsel fbi agent handed mr comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon mr comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by mr comosona within the meaning of edwards 1: holding that following his invocation of counsel when mr mccree subsequently knocked on his cell door and stated he had something to say this constituted initiation under edwards 2: holding suspects contradictory answers on miranda waiver form that he would answer questions without an attorney and that he wanted to talk to a lawyer to be ambiguous 3: holding that defendants request to speak to his parents was not an invocation of the right to remain silent because defendant never gave the police any indication that he wanted to stop talking only indicating he wanted to take a break from the interrogation to speak with his parents 4: holding that the defendants conclusory assertion that he told his counsel he wanted to testify but that counsel failed to call him as witness was insufficient to require a hearing or a response from government but the defendant should have been allowed an opportunity to state his claim with greater specificity


Input: support under section 14.05(a) must have been filed before the children reached eighteen years of age. Otherwise, relator argues, the 303rd Court did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion or sign the order extending the child support, and, therefore, the order is void. Relator cites Red v. Red, 552 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.1977), in which the supreme court held that modification of a divorce decree to include payments for a child who requires continuous care and personal supervision because of a mental or physical disability and who is not able to support himself must be sought before the child turns eighteen. Thereafter, the court held, there is no pending order subject to modification. See also Attaway v. Attaway, 704 S.W.2d 492, 494-95 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1986, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Red and Attaway, however, dealt with Holdings: 0: recognizing that nonparent standing turns on the quality of the relationship between the nonparent and the child 1: holding that a judgment for attorneys fees may be rendered in the nature of child support regardless of whether the underlying action is one of enforcement or modification 2: holding that the modification order itself must be signed before the child turns eighteen 3: holding that the order on the wifes petition for modification of child support was a final order because it disposed of all the issues except for the ancillary issue of attorneys fees 4: holding that jurisdiction existed to enforce a consent order issued by the department despite a pending appeal before the board seeking modification


Input: when he or she exercises “supervisory authority over the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation” while acting in the employer’s interest. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing individual liability under the FLSA’s analogous definition of an “employer”). As the Fifth Circuit explained in interpreting the FLSA’s analogous employer provision, an individual supervisor has adequate authority over the complaining employee when the supervisor “independently exercise[s] control over the work situation.” Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir.1983)); see also Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195, 94 S.Ct. 427, 38 L.Ed.2d 406 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Prob. & Holdings: 0: holding meal periods compensable work under flsa if employees perform duties predominantly for the benefit of the employer 1: holding owner of company qualified as an employer due to inter alia his authority to hire and fire employees and overall financial control of company 2: holding under flsa 3: holding that a company exercising substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work of the employees is an employer under the flsa 4: holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work


Input: the jury as to the law applicable to the case but was not related to the burden of proof, was cured by the trial court’s instruction to the jury correctly advising it of the applicable law. See Souvorin v. Lerich, 180 So.2d 180 (erroneous admission into evidence of county ordinance which effectively authorized the jury to conclude that the plaintiff, as a pedestrian, had the right-of-way was cured, inter alia, by court’s instruction informing jury that “the right of pedestrians and motor ists in a public street are [sic] equal and reciprocal,” id. at 182). The rule of Souvo-rin controls the present case. Affirmed. 1 . Defendant did not object on hearsay or other grounds. See Sikes v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 429 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 440 So.2d 353 (Fla.1983) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The trial court did instruct the jury Holdings: 0: holding that a violation of the hearsay rule was harmless 1: holding florida drivers handbook hearsay and not within any recognized exception to hearsay rule 2: recognizing that the united states constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception 3: holding that victims statements were hearsay admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and constitutionally permissible under ohio v roberts citations omitted 4: holding that an objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve for appeal an exception to the hearsay rule that was not specifically raised


Input: from September 4, 1998 to February 9, 2000. In addition, the plaintiff had been misled by the Clerk’s Office into believing that he had done everything required of him. Scary had filed his complaint well before the 90-day deadline and was in active communication with Clerk’s Office until he was told that his complaint would be heard, that there was no need to continue calling the court, and that he would be notified when a hearing date was set. Those statements do not amount to “active deception” by the Clerk’s Office, but they nevertheless had the effect of misleading the plaintiff, who, as a pro se plaintiff, can be expected to rely particularly heavily on the representations of court personnel. See Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir. 1983) (<HOLDING>). Given this, it was natural for Scary to Holdings: 0: holding that tolling the statute of limitations was appropriate when the eeoc acknowledged that it had advocated the mistaken interpretation relied upon by the plaintiff 1: holding that a pro se prisoners incarceration before the enactment of the aedpa and his lack of notice of the statute of limitations does not present an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling 2: holding that  2244d is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases 3: holding that equitable tolling was appropriate where a pro se plaintiff had relied on the representations of the court clerk 4: holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling


Input: ed.1994) (“to circulate (as a counterfeit note) continuing offenses, use of a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration document does not by its nature involve ongoing perpetration that produces an ongoing threat of harm. There is nothing about the “use” of an immigration document that denotes temporal longevity. As explained above, a person uses a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration document when he employs the document for a purpose. This may take the form of employing the counterfeit or fraudulently obtained document to obtain employment, gain entry into the country, or obtain other rights and privileges that normally proceed from the employment of a valid immigration document. Cf. Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 335, 61 S.Ct. 599, 85 L.Ed. 862 (1941) (<HOLDING>). Any of these uses of a counterfeit or Holdings: 0: holding that apparel cleaners submission of false statements of their receipts a percentage of which were to be paid to the united states did not constitute false claims within the meaning of the federal false claims act 1: holding an initial four dollar fee allowing reentry during the course of the patrons stay permitted the use of a vehicle in the park and did not constitute a charge for the recreational use of the park 2: holding that a conviction obtained through the knowing reckless or negligent use of false testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury 3: holding that use by an american citizen of a passport obtained by false statements to facilitate reentry into the united states is a use within  2 of the passport title of the act of june 15 1917 40 stat 217 227 4: holding that standing of a qui tam plaintiff under the false claims act requires an injury to the united states


Input: thereby giving the federal contract provisions clear authority.”). Additionally, Representatives Cummings and Mica pointed out on the House floor that, with the goal of ensuring uniform provision of benefits to federal employees across the country, the amendment would fortify FEHBA’s preemptive effect over local and state law. 144 Cong. Reo. H9354 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1998) (statement of Rep. Cummings); 143 Cong. Rec. H9916, H9917 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statements of Reps. Mica and Cummings). Since the enactment of the 1998 amendment, three federal district courts have examined FEHBA’s preemptive force. Two of these courts conclude that Congress intends for FEHBA to preempt state law completely, while the third holds that FEHBA lacks complete preemption. Carter, 61 F.Supp.2d at 1241 (<HOLDING>); Weathington, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1321 (rejecting Holdings: 0: holding that general maritime law preempts state law 1: holding fifra preempts no commonlaw claims 2: holding that the flsa preempts certain state law claims 3: holding that article 2 of the ucc preempts common law claims 4: holding that fehba completely preempts


Input: NCMEC as mandated by NDBCI. The NCMEC report was not offered as evidence at trial and not necessary to prove the jurisdictional element of the offense: But see Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2540 (affidavits were “prepared specifically for use at petitioner’s trial.”) Agent Helderop testified that the labels affixed to the hard drives showed they were manufactured outside the United States. He also testified to a conversation with personnel at Maxell, the CDs’ distributor, in completing his analysis of the materials. But an examination of the labels alone showed the interstate transportation of the hard drives. Thus, this evidence undermines Huether’s contention that Agent Helderop’s testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Koch, 625 F.3d 470, 480 (8th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the district court did not err in Holdings: 0: holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence 1: holding district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony that defendants computer and flash drive were labeled as having been manufactured abroad to prove interstate commerce element 2: holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony 3: holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert to testify as to the place of manufacture of weapon since his testimony could have been useful to the jury to determine whether the weapon had traveled in interstate commerce and court gave a limiting instruction


Input: “implied duty that each party to a contract owes to its contracting partner.” Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1304 (Fed.Cir.2005). This covenant applies to government contracts, as well as contracts between private parties. Id. The covenant “includes the duty not to interfere with the other party’s performance and not to act so as to destroy the reasonable expectations of the other party regarding the fruits of the contract.” Id. Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is assessed under a reasonableness standard and depends on the “particular contract, its context, and its surrounding circumstances.” Commerce Int’l Co. v. United States, 167 Ct.Cl. 529, 338 F.2d 81 (1964); see also Essex Electro Engineers, Inc., v. Danzig, 224 F.3d 1283, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The record establishes that the equipment was Holdings: 0: holding that breach will depend on whether the government acted reasonably in the substance and pace of its responses 1: holding that the government was liable for partial breach of contract 2: recognizing that mere passage of time does not make evidence irrelevant as it will also depend on the nature of the evidence and its relation to what is to be proven 3: holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract 4: holding in the context of the major fraud act that determining when a scheme is executed will depend on factors including the goal of the plan its nature the benefits intended and whether the conduct created a new and independent financial risk


Input: of an appeal process. Further, Isley’s actions, Ryder contends, should estop the Union from asserting the statute of limitations, i. The Statute of Limitations Was Not Tolled During Ryder’s Contact With International Union Officials Having already decided that Ryder’s so-called “appeal” to the International Union did not constitute an “internal appeal” of the sort which can provide the basis for the non-accrual of a claim, the court rejects Ryder’s concomitant theory that his hybrid Section 301 claim was tolled while he communicated with the International Union representative and the management of Philip Morris. It is true that pursuit of internal appeals can toll the statute of limitations. Frandsen v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 782 F.2d 674, 681 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. Teamsters Local 71, 714 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that statute of limitations is tolled by pursuit of internal union remedies even where those remedies are ultimately determined to be futile 1: holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted 2: holding that the remedies are exclusive 3: holding that a party may gain judicial review without exhausting its administrative remedies where pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile where strict compliance would cause irreparable harm and where the applicable statute is alleged to be void on its face 4: holding that the statute of limitations on employees claim under 29 usc  411a is tolled by pursuit of internal union remedies despite fact that employee pursued such remedies for more than the four months required by statute


Input: days and two weekend days. Appellant goes on to assert that, under the proper interpretation of rule 34.04, the three-day extension should have been added onto that prescribed period of seven calendar days, thus, making a total of ten calendar days. Appellant relies on Kenzie v. Dalco Corp., 309 Minn. 495, 245 N.W.2d 207 (1976), and In re Estate of Iofredo, 241 Minn. 335, 63 N.W.2d 19 (1954). This reliance, however, is misplaced. The findings in Kenzie and Iofre-do support the district court’s findings, not appellant’s interpretation. The court in Iof-redo did not exclude weekends in computing the time period; the court simply looked at the prescribed period and added three days. Iofiredo, 241 Minn, at 337-38, 63 N.W.2d at 21; see also Kenzie, 309 Minn, at 497, 245 N.W.2d at 208 (<HOLDING>). “In Minnesota, the practice is to combine the Holdings: 0: holding that demonstration of error does not necessarily entitle petitioners to a writ unless the standards for granting a writ have been met 1: holding writ was discharged because relator failed to serve writ within the 33 days prescribed by law 2: holding that common pleas erred in setting aside the writ of execution on the basis that the union erroneously filed a writ of execution instead of filing a writ of mandamus 3: holding that a court may grant a writ of mandamus if 1 the petitioner demonstrates that he lacks an adequate alternative 2 the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to the writ and 3 the court is convinced that issuing the writ is warranted 4: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances


Input: 648-49, 5 P.3d 569, 570-71 (2000); 50A C.J.S. Judicial Sales § 87 (1997). 10 See Deal v. Baines, 110 Nev. 509, 513, 874 P.2d 775, 778 (1994). 11 NRCP 41(e) states, in pertinent part: Any action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed by the court in which the same shall have been commenced ... on motion of any party . . . after due notice to the parties, unless such action is brought to trial within 5 years after the plaintiff has filed the action, except where the parties have stipulated in writing that the time may be extended. 12 See Morgan v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 118 Nev. 315, 320, 43 P.3d 1036, 1039 (2002) (acknowledging only two circumstances in which the prescriptive period of NRCP 41(e) is tolled). 13 Cf. Goodwyn v. Carter, 555 S.E.2d 474, 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Notably, although there is no federal Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered 1: holding that a garnishment proceeding could not proceed because the underlying judgment was null and void 2: recognizing that orders entered after the passage of the fiveyear deadline requiring automatic dismissal are null and void for lack of jurisdiction 3: holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void 4: holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void


Input: in making procurement decisions.”). 2. Judgment On Administrative Record. Rule 56.1 of the United States Court of Federal Claims provides that a motion for judgment on the administrative record will be treated under the same standard as Rule 56(a)-(b). See RCFC 56.1; see also Banknote Corp. of America, Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“judgment on the administrative record is appropriate when there are no issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). In reviewing agency procurement decisions, a motion for judgment on the Administrative Record is appropriate, because such decisions usually involve interpretation of regulations or contracts and present no disputed issues of material fact. Id. at 1352 (<HOLDING>). 3. For A Permanent Injunction. The standard Holdings: 0: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate 1: holding that a probable cause determination is appropriate for summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact and no credibility issues 2: holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law 3: holding it is a question of fact 4: holding that interpretation of contract documents regulations or a solicitation present no disputed issues of material fact and is a question of law


Input: threatening nature is insufficient to establish a “threat of death,” pointing to U.S.S.G, § 2B3.1, Application Note 6. The Sixth Circuit recently addressed the issue using the newer version § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) in United States v. Clark, 294 F.3d 791 (6th Cir.2002). In Clark, the Court held that “a note stating T have a gun. Do what you are told and you wont [sic] get hurt,’ unaccompanied by any gestures or display of a weapon would instill in a reasonable person a fear of death” and, thus, would warrant the enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). Id., at 795. Although the notes used here don’t contain the admonition contained in the one used in Clark, other circuits have held that notes similar to the ones at issue here did constitute a “threat of death.” See, e.g., Carbaugh, 141 F.3d at 794 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Figueroa, 105 F.3d 874, 880 Holdings: 0: holding that threat i have a gun and nothing to lose was not an express threat of death because there was not express mention of death and could also be interpreted to mean that robber was desperate and willing to turn alleged gun on himself 1: holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death because a reasonable teller upon hearing the statement normally and reasonably would fear that his or her life is in danger 2: holding that the phrase i have a gun constitutes a threat of death under  2b31b2f 3: holding that i have a gun give me money may imply threat to use gun but was not an express threat of death 4: holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death


Input: against him by executing promissory notes to the plaintiff payable only to the extent that his insurer paid on his claims. The court in Griffith held that the defendant was not, under those circumstances, legally obligated to pay the judgment, and, therefore, the insured was not required to provide coverage under the terms of the policy. The circuit court recognized that both Bendall and Griffith were “persuasive authority,” but it declined to follow those cases. The circuit court stated: “Since Bendall, numerous courts in other jurisdictions have held that an injured party’s agreement not to collect a judgment against an insured does not necessarily nullify insurance coverage. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 547 So.2d 148[, 151] (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989)(<HOLDING>). See also Red Giant Oil Co. v. Lawlor, 528 Holdings: 0: holding r 4429a6 to be inapplicable to direct actions brought by the insured against the carrier to enforce coverage 1: holding that a plaintiffs agreement to collect only against a defendants insurance company was merely a covenant and did not constitute a release of the defendants from liability and stating that the defendant is still legally obligated to the injured party and the insurer still must make good on its contractual promise to pay 2: holding that where a duty to obtain specified insurance coverage exists a plaintiff must prove that the loss is one insured against in some policy 3: holding that an insurance company which chose not to defend its insured could not later deny coverage by asserting the legally obligated to pay provision in the policy after the insured reached a settlement where the injured party agreed to collect only against insurance proceeds 4: holding that a covenant not to execute on a judgment against an insured does not negate insurance coverage and stating that many courts including floridas look with disfavor on the idea that a covenant not to enforce against one party automatically releases that partys insurance carrier


Input: failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire,” a plaintiff may only recover for acts of discrimination that occur within the statutory time period). Thus, because Plaintiff did not file her EEOC complaint until September 21, 2007, only Plaintiffs claims that U.S. Airways impermissibly denied her positions arising after November 26, 2006 are timely under the ADA. Although U.S. Airways correctly points out that Plaintiffs amended complaint does not identify those positions that she was denied between November 26, 2006 and the “end of 2006,” when Plaintiff was no longer considered employed by U.S. Airways, such facts may be adequately determined in the normal course of discovery and are not required in an initial pleading. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (<HOLDING>) With respect to employment discrimination Holdings: 0: holding that a complaint must contain only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face 1: holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief 2: holding that a complaint must plead enough facts to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and state a plausible claim 3: holding that the defendants failed to establish an entitlement to dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint when the alleged fraud was immaterial to any issue that would ultimately be presented to the fact finder 4: holding that a complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face


Input: the apportionment of the nonretiring spouse effective if, as, and when the benefits are received by the retiring spouse. We approve this method of apportionment....” Id. at 666 (emphasis added). The Cearley Court thus equated “if and when” the spouse retires with “if, as, and when” that spouse receives the benefits, which we have previously held is a term of art requiring valuation at receipt date. See Hurley, 960 S.W.2d at 289. We do the same and hold that “If and when [Edwin] retires and/or receives a pension ... [Gloria] shall receive fifty percent of the retirement benefit to [sic] which ... Edwin ... is entitled to receive” requires valuation at the date of receipt. See Cearley, 544 S.W.2d at 666; Barnard v. Barnard, 863 S.W.2d 770, 773, 774 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Berry — the first post-Tag-gart Holdings: 0: holding the following language unambiguously awarded a taggart fraction of benefits valued at receipt date one hundred sixtyeight 168 over the total number of months of actual service  at the time of his retirement divided by onehalf ½ 1: holding that a former spouse is a proportionate owner of the other spouses future military retirement pay and is thus entitled to onehalf of the percentage of such pay representing the number of military marriage years relative to the total length of military service 2: holding that the plaintiffs claim that he was wrongfully denied a promotion prior to his retirement accrued on the date that he was finally denied that promotion  the date of his retirement at the lower rank 3: holding former wifes cause of action accrued at the time of former husbands failure to pay her the portion of his retirement benefits to which she was entitled which was no earlier than the date of his actual retirement 4: holding that although disability benefits cannot be included as part of the marital estate a court may consider the waiver of retirement pension benefits in favor of disability benefits in determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances which would justify modification of an alimony award to a former spouse who was previously awarded a fixed percentage of the retirement pension benefits


Input: fiduciary under ERISA as a matter of law based on the sufficiency of the pleadings. Assuming, without deciding whether Hartford is a fiduciary, the Scotts’ claim fails to state a cause of action under ERISA as a matter of law because damages are not available under ERISA. The causes of actions available to an ERISA participant are exclusively listed in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). Assuming Hartford was an ERISA fiduciary, the Scott’s allegations do not state a cause of action under ERISA because only equitable relief, as opposed to monetary damages, is available under ERISA. Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 959, 113 S.Ct. 2928, 124 L.Ed.2d 678 (1993). See also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255-56, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 2068, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (<HOLDING>). Unreimbursed medical expenses, mental anguish Holdings: 0: holding empkwers strictly liable for equitable damages and relief 1: holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief 2: holding that monetary damages do not generally constitute irreparable harm 3: holding that money damages do not qualify as equitable relief within the meaning of  1132a3 4: holding that claims for equitable relief under  502a3 are only available when a plaintiff has no other relief under erisa


Input: Use, 18 A.L.R.3d 497, 531-32. B. 1. There are several mutually exclusive means of measuring damages for loss of use. They are: “(1) the rental value or the amount that could have been realized by renting out the property; (2) the reasonable cost of renting a substitute; or (3) the ordinary profits that could have been made from the use of the property.” Damages in Tort, supra at § 37.13[1], 73-74; see also Remedies, supra § 124, at 387-90. United did not rent a substitute. Therefore, option number two is inapplicable. The third option is usually only used to determine loss of use damages when a rental substitute is not available or when the kind of property damaged is not the type that is normally rented. Southern Crate & Veneer Co. v. McDowell, 163 Ga.App. 153, 293 S.E.2d 541 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Peterson v. Bochar, 193 Kan. 161, 392 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that an unestablished business may recover lost prospective profits 1: holding that the plaintiffs attempted to recover lost profits which under the facts of the case were consequential damages 2: holding that plaintiff whose truck was demolished in an accident could not recover lost profits unless he could show that he could not obtain a suitable substitute vehicle 3: holding that a business owners testimony was insufficient to establish lost profits where he was not able to specify which contracts they lost how many they lost how much profit they would have had from the contracts or who would have awarded them contracts and explaining that the plaintiffs could have supported their lost profits with testimony that they had lost out on specific contracts but failed to do so 4: holding that in an action to recover damages to a pulpwooder truck where there was testimony that pulpwood machinery could not be rented the jury was properly instructed as to lost profits


Input: among other things.” Dolce, supra, 383 N.J.Super. at 18, 890 A.2d 361 (citing Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 545, 443 A.2d 1031). The critical evaluation required for emancipation determinations typically necessitates a plenary hearing, especially “when the submissions show there is a genuine and substantial factual disputef,]” which the trial court must resolve. Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.Super. 102, 105, 917 A.2d 269 (App.Div.2007); see also Tretola v. Tretola, 389 N.J.Super. 15, 20, 910 A.2d 630 (App.Div.2006) (reversing motion on emancipation because the court “failed to recognize there were material facts in dispute and evidence beyond the motion papers necessary for resolution of the matter” required a plenary hearing); Conforti v. Guliadis, 128 N.J. 318, 322, 608 A.2d 225 (1992) (<HOLDING>). However, “[a]s is particularly the case in Holdings: 0: holding that disputed issues of fact cannot be resolved based on affidavits and must be decided based on evidentiary hearings the only admissible procedure for resolving such issues 1: holding plenary hearings are required when there are contested issues of material fact on the basis of conflicting affidavits 2: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate 3: holding that contested factual issues in  2255 cases must be decided on the basis of an evidentiary hearing not affidavits 4: holding that defendant bears the burden of showing there are material facts in dispute and an evidentiary hearing is only required when the motion to suppress raises factual allegations that are sufficiently definite specific detailed and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in issue


Input: on the second note. Id., 241 S.E.2d at 4-5. The court held that lack of confirmation of the sale under the first deed did not bar the action for the deficiency on the second note because they were separate transactions involving different properties. Id. 144 Ga.App. at 166, 241 S.E.2d at 5. In contrast, the deeds in the case at bar involve the same two properties. Defendant Yates argues that the fact that the 1986 Deed covers a tract in addition to the Tift County tracts makes this case analogous to those he cites in his brief. The 1986 Deed does cover one additional property, and if that additional property were still security for the 1986 Note, then the SBA would be free to foreclose on that property. See Salter v. Bank of Commerce, 189 Ga. 328, 332, 6 S.E.2d 290, 293 (1939) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, if the SBA had foreclosed on this Holdings: 0: holding in the analogous context of choiceoflaw in relation to the sale of personal property that compensation for arranging the sale is assessed apart from underlying sale 1: holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property 2: holding that the confirmation statute does not inhibit subsequent sale under power of property other than the property which at a former sale under power had failed to bring the amount of the debt  3: holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien 4: holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser


Input: of notice in a “major local newspaper”). At the same time, it should not be defined so broadly as to include those who would lack any real interest in commenting on it. To require Aviall to solicit comments from such persons would be to impose the same type of rigid formality that the NCP seeks to avoid. See 55 Fed.Reg. at 8793-94. Similarly, Aviall need only contact those parties who might have a foreseeable interest in commenting on the response action. The NCP does not require, for example, that a private party publish nationwide notice of a response action merely because it is possible that an unknown person living in blic meeting held after plaintiff had already begun an “early and essential step” in remediation process was not meaningful); Pierson Sand, 1996 WL 338624, at *3-*4 (<HOLDING>). It also typically requires that some type of Holdings: 0: holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful and that the only public meetings held before remedial action were not meaningful because they did not discuss selection of remedy 1: holding that notice of judgment was insufficient 2: holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful 3: holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice 4: holding that public meetings were not meaningful where first was held without adequate notice and second was held after remedy was already selected by means of consent judgment


Input: count, specifying the charge title, degree of offense, and maximum penalty defined by statute; (3) state general and specific conditions or sanctions; (4) make all findings of fact required by law; (5) state the date and time when issued and the county and court where issued; and (6) be signed by the court with the title of office. In N.C.’s case, a copy of the written disposition was provided to N.C. and the other relevant parties. This disposition and its contents provided sufficient notice of the court’s findings and the court’s action. Furthermore, N.C. was provided an opportunity to challenge the disposition order under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.135. Therefore, we conclude that due process was adequately satisfied through the issuance of a written disposition CA 1994) (<HOLDING>); and L.M. v. State, 610 So.2d 1314, 1317 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that disposition order be remanded to the trial court for revision to conform to the trial courts oral pronouncement 1: holding that unsegregated attorneys fees must be remanded 2: holding that disposition order be vacated and the cause remanded for correction thereof 3: holding void judgment must be vacated 4: holding that where the trial courts determination that the defendant was mentally capable to proceed with trial was not supported by the evidence the verdict and judgment must be vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings against the defendant


Input: discretionary authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act. See, e.g., Phonometrics, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Split Pivot, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 987 F.Supp.2d 838, 882 (W.D. Wis. 2013), aff’d, No. 2014-1241, 585 Fed.Appx. 1011 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2014). In addition, the Court’s resolution of Plaintiffs claim of infringement in Defendant’s favor ensures that Defendant will not face any further claims that its accused process infringes the ’824 Patent. See Wells-Gardner Electronics Corp. v. C. Ceronix, Inc., No. 10-C-2536, 2011 WL 1467182, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2011) (citing the court’s finding of non-infringement as a basis for declining to consider a request for a declaration of invalidity); see also Phonometrics, 133 F.3d at 1468 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court declines to address Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc  1367a 1: holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent 2: holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement 3: holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent 4: recognizing a district courts discretion to dismiss a counterclaim alleging that a patent is invalid where it finds no infringement


Input: 1397, 173 L.Ed.2d 640 (2009). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Odom, 329 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir.2003). Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Defendant’s actions affected interstate commerce. He used a cell phone whose service provider is T-Mobile, a business in interstate commerce, to recruit the minor, manage her prostitution, and arrange her travel from Los Angeles to Seattle. He made numerous interstate calls using this phone. He used America Online instant messaging to coax the minor to work for him as a prostitute. See United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Finally, he provided the minor with Durex Holdings: 0: recognizing probable cause as complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution in new york internal quotation marks and brackets omitted 1: holding that the electronic submission of information across state lines qualifies as in or affecting interstate commerce internal quotation marks and brackets omitted 2: holding that if and when abuse does occur  it is well within the supervisory powers of the courts of appeals to establish summary procedures and calendars to weed out frivolous claims brackets and internal quotation marks omitted 3: recognizing that the nsa qualifies as a withholding statute under exemption 3 because it refers to particular types of matters that are to be withheld internal quotation marks and citations omitted 4: holding that involuntary transport to a police station for questioning is sufficiently like arrest to invoke the traditional rule that arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause internal quotation marks and brackets omitted


Input: 78 . Blake, 2010 WL 702958, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23014. 79 . Hansel, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54725; Thomas, 2006 WL 140558, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3266; Christy, 2010 WL 2977610, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71300; Farris, 2008 WL 1944131, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36937. 80 . R.R., 2010 Ark. App. 689, 2010 WL 4132867, 2010 Ark.App. LEXIS 738; B.W. v. State, 909 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.App.2009); Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 947 N.E.2d 9. 81 . Mudge, 79 A.D.3d 1395, 914 N.Y.S.2d 339. 82 . Nash, 317 Or. 354, 855 P.2d 1112. 83 . United States v. Berg, 640 F.3d 239, 252 (7th Cir.2011) (federal criminal enticement statute “targets the sexual grooming of minors as well as the actual sexual exploitation of them”); Powell’s Books v. Kroger, 622 F.3d 1202, 1206, 1215 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Am. Booksellers Found., 202 F.Supp.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that the first charging phrase of section 505 is unconstitutionally vague as applied where it was not clear whether touching a minors genitals through her pants constituted sexual conduct as defined by the statute 1: holding that despite the fact that police conduct is governed by extensive regulations statutes and caselaw officers responding to dispatch or making an arrest are engaging in discretionary conduct because they are required to make splitsecond decisions based on incomplete information 2: recognizing that oregon criminal statutes were aimed at practices of luring and grooming that expose minors to sexually explicit materials in the hopes of lowering their inhibitions against engaging in sexual conduct but finding the statutes unconstitutional because they reach a significant amount of material that is not obscene as to minors 3: recognizing that federal circuits view discussions as a substantial step when they involve arrangements for meetings discussion of sexual acts to be performed during meeting or grooming whereby the defendant exposes the child to sexual material in an effort to lower the childs inhibitions toward later sexual activity 4: holding that plaintiffs had standing because they were directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints were directed


Input: with the plain language of the Guideline itself. See United States v. Tigney, 367 F.3d 200, 203 (4th Cir.2004) (rejecting a party’s Guideline interpretation because it conflicted with the Guideline’s plain language). This section of the Guidelines provides for a four-level enhancement to a defendant’s offense level if his offense “substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a financial institution.” USSG § 2Bl.l(b)(14)(B)(i). The commentary to section 2B1.1 directs a district court to consider a list of four “non-exhaustive” factors in determining whether the safety and soundness of a financial institution has been substantially jeopardized by the defendant’s offense conduct. USSG § 2B1.1, cmt. n. 12(A)(i)-(iv). See United States v. Seay, 553 F.3d 732, 737 (4th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). The commentary does not require the Holdings: 0: holding that commentary in the guidelines manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of that guideline 1: holding that commentary accompanying guidelines is binding 2: recognizing the guidelines commentary is authoritative 3: holding that commentary is not authoritative if it is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of the guideline it interprets or explains 4: holding that commentary to the guidelines is treated as an agencys interpretation of its own legislative rule


Input: brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); counsel now moves to withdraw that motion, and asks to continue this appeal as a non-Anders appeal or, alternatively, for remand in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw her initial motion to withdraw, but otherwise deny her motion because any possible Booker argument fails. The record reveals that the district court properly calculated a sentencing range under advisory Guidelines and considered the sentencing factors in section 3553(a), and we conclude the sentence is not unreasonable. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756-57 (Guidelines are only advisory); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 551 (8th Cir.2005) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 266, Holdings: 0: holding statutory booker error was not harmless where district court imposed sentence in middle of guidelines range and there were no statements in the record reflecting that the court would have imposed the same or greater sentence under advisory guidelines 1: holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 2: holding booker error is avoided when district court calculates proper guidelines sentencing range treats guidelines as advisory and imposes reasonable sentence 3: holding sentence within properly calculated advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 4: recognizing that booker error may occur even in the absence of judicial factfinding where district court treats guidelines as mandatory


Input: whether the statements were voluntary within the meaning of - the fifth amendment.” United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1518 (6th Cir.1988). Voluntariness, then is the touchstone for determining the validity of all consents to search, including those obtained after invocation by a suspect of rights that would automatically cut off interrogation. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (noting that “the Miranda presumption, though irre-buttable for purposes of the prosecution’s case in chief, does not require that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently. tainted”). Voluntariness must be determined by assessing the totality of the circumstances. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (internal citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). The factors used to determine the Holdings: 0: holding that once the defendant is before the court the court will not inquire into the circumstances surrounding his presence there 1: holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession 2: holding that courts may consider extrinsic evidence including the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract in order to determine whether a contractual ambiguity exists 3: holding that question is whether defendants will was overborne by police at the time of the confession 4: holding that a district court should decide a motion for expedited discovery on the entirety of the record to date and the reasonableness of the request in light of all the surrounding circumstances unless the circumstances are such that the notaro factors apply


Input: 1291. We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment, Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.1998), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crespo’s claim concem ing delay of an orthopedic consultation and medical care to treat his injured leg because Crespo failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the delay caused him harm. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). The district court correctly concluded that Crespo’s contention that prison medical staff failed to provide him proper treatment is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Crespo’s remaining contentions are Holdings: 0: holding that deliberate indifference to prisoners medical needs is cruel and unusual punishment 1: holding that a difference of medical opinion was insufficient as a matter of law to establish deliberate indifference 2: holding that a difference of opinion about the best course of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference 3: holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs 4: holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation


Input: CURIAM. The State appeals from the imposition of a downward departure sentence in a case in which the defendant pled guilty to the offense of selling cocaine to a police officer. Because there were no valid reasons for departure, we reverse. See Atwaters v. State, 519 So.2d 611 (Fla.1988) (<HOLDING>); State v. Ford, 739 So.2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA Holdings: 0: holding that the quantity of drugs involved in an offense does not support a downward departure because the legislature intended the quantity of drugs to be a determining factor in varying penalties 1: holding apprendi does not require proof of knowledge as to type or quantity of drugs 2: holding that the quantity of drugs may not be used to support a departure 3: holding the large quantity of drugs sufficient evidence of intent to distribute 4: holding that when the indictment charges that a certain minimum quantity of drugs is involved in the offense proof of that quantity is a fourth element of the offense


Input: discretion to correct the error only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The elements of conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 are: (1) the existence of an agreement, (2) an overt act by a conspirator in furtherance of the agreement, and (3) an intent by the conspirators to agree to defraud the United States. United States v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V., 411 F.3d 502, 516 (4th Cir.2005). “Fraudulent intent may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence.” United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir.1993). This is a so-called “Klein conspiracy.” See United States v. Klein, 124 F.Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y.1954) (<HOLDING>), aff’d, 247 F.2d 908 (1957). Fuller argues Holdings: 0: recognizing a cause of action for conspiracy to deprive a class of persons of their fundamental rights under the laws of the united states 1: recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 usc  1983 and suits under united states constitution 2: recognizing under 18 usc  371 conspiracy to defraud united states by impeding functions of irs 3: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states 4: holding that subversion of a federally coordinated program can constitute a conspiracy to defraud the united states even if no federal officials are participants in the conspiracy and federal fund allocation had not yet occurred when the conspiracy was in effect


Input: Courts have split regarding whether searches conducted for reasons other than institutional safety violate the Fourth Amendment. The Second Circuit has held that the Supreme Court’s rationale in Hudson applies only to searches for institutional purposes, not to searches initiated by prosecutors outside the prison “solely to obtain information for a superseding indictment.” United States v. Cohen, 7 on decision holds more broadly that inmates per se lack any Fourth Amendment privacy rights in their cells and lockers. See United States v. Reece, 797 F.Supp. 843, 846 (D.Colo.1992) (concluding that a prisoner has no expectation of privacy in his cell, and lacks Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure); State v. Martin, 322 N.C. 229, 367 S.E.2d 618, 621-22 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Betterley, 191 Wis.2d 407, Holdings: 0: holding contrary to the second districts reasoning in mccoy 639 so2d 163 that pretrial detainees lack any expectation of privacy so the fourth amendment does not protect them from cell searches 1: recognizing that a modern cell phone is a computer and not just another purse or address book so that the potential invasion of privacy in a search of a cell phone is greater than in a search of a container in a conventional sense 2: holding the defendant lacked any expectation of privacy in his cell so the jailer had the right to inspect anything in his cell 3: holding seizure of arrestees cell phone lawful but finding the fourth amendment requires a warrant to perform a forensic search of the lawfully seized cell phone 4: recognizing record supported determination that defendant lacked expectation of privacy in house


Input: or mistake as to (a) the origin, association or approval of the product with or by another, or (b) the characteristics of the goods or services; and (4) injure the plaintiff. Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 980 (10th Cir.2002), citing Cottrell, Ltd. v. Biotrol Int’l, Inc., 191 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir.1999). 1. Material false representations a. Literal Falsity In the false advertising arena, some courts have concluded that a showing that the challenged statement is likely to be found literally false is sufficient, on its own, to justify issuing the injunction. Gillette Co. v. Norelco Consumer Prods. Co., 946 F.Supp. 115, 120 (D.Mass.1996). See also Camel Hair and Cashmere Inst. of America, Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 15-16 (1st Cir.1986)(<HOLDING>); Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc. v. Wilson Holdings: 0: holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court 1: holding preliminary injunction improper where it exceeded the relief sought and granted the same relief which would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction 2: holding that literally false finding in itself warranted the grant of the injunction sought 3: holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim 4: holding that where a district courts preliminary injunction preventing the appellant from terminating its agreement with the defendant had expired the appellants appeal of the district courts decision to grant that injunction was moot


Input: time for real parties in interest to join, substitute, or ratify; explicitly rejecting the argument that plaintiff “must have had standing at the time an action was brought” and that, consequently, “only assignments made prior to the commencement of this suit can possibly establish that Individual Plaintiffs have standing to sue”). Given this clear law, Whittington’s only hope is to argue that there is something particular to non-dischargeability actions that would alter this usual practice. But contrary to his arguments, Bankruptcy Rule 4007 requires no special treatment in this respect. Missing the deadline for an objection to discharge is not a “jurisdictional” defect and may be waived if not timely made. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 447, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004) (<HOLDING>); id. at 448 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 906 (acknowledging Holdings: 0: recognizing that immunity may be waived 1: holding that defenses under rule 60b may be waived 2: holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss pursuant to rule 41b for failure to comply with a court order 3: holding that notice to counsel may be waived 4: holding that failure to comply with bankruptcy rule 4004 may be waived


Input: Trust Co., 263 U. rights have been violated in the course of his present confinement, Gordon is required to exhaust state remedies before seeking redress in federal courts. See Montez, 208 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir.2000) (“A habeas petitioner is generally required to exhaust state remedies whether his action is brought under § 2241 or § 2254.”) Gordon makes general claims that he has been threatened by state officials, retaliated against for pursuing legal redress of his grievances, and denied due process and equal protection in the proceedings regarding his children. Gordon does not, however, demonstrate that he has exhausted state remedies for these claims. Nor does he make any attempt to excuse his failure to exhaust. See, e.g., Wilson v. Jones, 430 F.3d 1113, 1118 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Gordon urges us to consider that the district Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims 1: holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement 2: recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different 3: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 4: holding exhaustion requirement inapplicable when requiring exhaustion would be futile


Input: 261 S.W.3d at 894; McFarland, 293 S.W.3d at 763-64 (cases holding creditor could collect debt on account stated where, based on the series of transactions reflected on the account statements, creditor established that card holder agreed to the full amount shown on the statements and impliedly promised to pay the indebtedness). Further, because the evidence also showed that Eaves’ account was purchased by Unifund Portfolio and that Unifund Portfolio assigned the rights to collect on the account to Unifund Partners, Eaves has not shown that Unifund Partners could not bring a cause of action on a stated account. Butler v. Hudson & Keyse, L.L.C., No. 14-07-00534-CV, 2009 WL 402329, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 19, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in Holdings: 0: holding that an assignee of a debt can step into the shoes of the original creditor for purpose of  523a2a 1: holding assignee could collect debt on stated account 2: holding that attempt to collect a timebarred debt was permissible if litigation not threatened 3: holding that plaintiffs allegation that debt collectors attempted to collect on a debt to a condominium association notwithstanding their knowledge that plaintiff did not really owe that debt to the condominium was sufficient to state a claim under the fdutpa 4: holding that the act extends to claims by individuals against whom a debt collector has made purposeful targeted and directed attempts to collect a debt alleged to be owed by the plaintiffs


Input: a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. The court finds that under the facts as the Plaintiff has alleged them, the instant case is like the parked car that accidentally strikes a passerby. Because the Plaintiff has neither pleaded nor offered any evidence to prove that Defendant Inabinett’s ramming was intentional, nor, according to the Plaintiff, was the action taken in an attempt to apprehend her, the Court finds that the accident does not amount to a seizure and, thus, does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See Estate of Story v. McDuffie County, Ga., 929 F.Supp. 1523 (S.D.Ga.1996) (finding no seizure because the Plaintiffs did not present any evidence to support their claim that the Officer intentionally forced them off the road); Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200 (6th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Excessive Force Claim Against Officer Holdings: 0: holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation 1: holding that passengers of automobiles that are pulled over by a police officer for a traffic stop are seized under the fourth amendment 2: holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring 3: holding police officer engaged in a high speed pursuit of a traffic offender had not seized the offender 4: holding that a vehicles passenger had been seized and was entitled to challenge the traffic stop


Input: F.2d 664, 667 (6th Cir.1987) (“A defendant relying upon the argument that he has received a disproportionate sentence must establish more than the mere fact that other defendants have received less harsh sentences for similar crimes.”). During oral argument before this court, a crucial issue surfaced as to wheth er the district court properly imposed a two-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. That enhancement, as we have already noted, raised the sentencing level to 43 and required a mandatory life sentence. A review of the record indicates that there is neither evidence nor any hearing supporting this enhancement and thus, this case must be remanded for re-sentencing. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (<HOLDING>). We review the evidence in the record Holdings: 0: holding that before a court imposes an enhancement for obstruction of justice the court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice  1: holding that enhancement for obstruction of justice which uses similar mandatory language must be applied where factual predicates are satisfied 2: holding that willful failure to appear at sentencing supported obstruction of justice enhancement 3: holding that district courts factual findings for purposes of obstruction enhancement are reviewed for clear error 4: holding that obstruction of justice enhancement was properly applied where the defendant provided materially false information to a magistrate judge


Input: and justifies a sentence from within the aggravated range. In addition, the trial court completed individual judgment and commitment forms specifying the relevant aggravators and mitigator for each conviction. These forms specifically indicated that “each and every aggravated factor in and of itself outweighs all the mitigating factors and justifies from within the aggravated range this sentence.” Thus, the trial court here eliminated the need for any appellate “second guessing” as to the weight it accorded each factor on each sentence, and it properly exercised discretion in “determin[ing] that one factor in aggravation outweigh[ed] more than one factor in mitigation.” Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 597, 300 S.E.2d at 697; see also State v. Daniels, 319 N.C. 452, 454, 355 S.E.2d 136, 137 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, defendant’s argument fails. To Holdings: 0: holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion 1: holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion 2: holding that a trial courts weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion 3: holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court 4: holding that trial court retains wide discretion to apply or reject mitigating and aggravating factors as well as to interpret meaning of individual factors and its determination must be upheld absent abuse of discretion


Input: CURIAM. Maria B. Martinez appeals from a final judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of ALS IV, LLC (“ALS”). We affirm- the final judgment of foreclosure, but reverse the award of attorney’s fees because AlLS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the award. We reverse, and remand the attorney’s fee order for additional findings, or an additional hearing, if necessary. See Rodriguez v. Campbell, 720 So.2d 266, 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and Holdings: 0: holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the rowe factors reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorneys fees 1: holding that when the party seeking attorneys fees presents some competent substantial evidence supporting the fee yet fails to include some essential evidentiary support the appellate court will reverse and remand the order for additional findings 2: holding that appellate court should reverse and remand issue of attorneys fees where damages are reduced on appeal in a manner that could affect the determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees 3: holding that this court will reverse and remand when appellate review of a suppression order is hindered by the absence of factual findings 4: holding that when competent substantial evidence supports a trial courts ruling the appellate court will not secondguess the trial court


Input: 33.30.065(c) provides: A decision by the commissioner to designate a prisoner to serve a term of imprisonment or a period of temporary confinement, or a part of the term or period, by electronic monitoring does not create a liberty interest in that status for the prisoner. The prisoner may be returned to a correctional facility at the discretion of the commissioner. This statutory provision, although not determinative in our independent review, indicates that the legislature did not intend to create a liberty interest in participation in the electronic monitoring program. 42 . - Article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution identifies the principle of reformation as one basis of criminal administration. See, e.g., Ferguson v. State, Dep't of Corr., 816 P.2d 134, 139-40 (Alaska 1991) (<HOLDING>); Rathke v. Corr. Corp. of Am., Inc., 153 P.3d Holdings: 0: holding there is no protected liberty interest in maintaining the foster family relationship 1: holding that neither the due process clause nor florida statutes bestowed a liberty interest in prisoners position as a law clerk 2: recognizing that foster parents do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a continued relationship with their foster child 3: holding that a prisoners loss of privileges for thirty days was not a property right that would constitute a violation of his constitutionally protected liberty interest 4: holding prisoners have protected liberty interest in continued participation in rehabilitation programs based on the reformation clause


Input: of the goods does not necessarily mean they are no longer in interstate commerce. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. 332. If the stop represents “a convenient intermediate step in the process of getting them to their final destinations, [the goods] remain ‘in commerce’ until they reach those points.” Id. Goods picked up and delivered intrastate are considered to be in interstate commerce if they originated out of state and the intrastate part of the route is the final phase of an unmistakably interstate transport. See Siller v. L & F Distributors, Ltd., 109 F.3d 765, *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished) (stating that “placing goods in a warehouse interrupts, but does not necessarily terminate the goods’ interstate journey”); Barefoot, 16 F.3d 1216, *3 (<HOLDING>); Merchants Fast Motor Lines v. I.C.C., 5 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the halt of shipments of unprocessed milk without processing or commingling did not remove the interstate character of the shipments 1: holding that appointment of guardian over incompetent adult does not remove legal disability so as to halt tolling and commence running of statute of limitations 2: holding that interstate shipments to a warehousedistribution point through to samestate retail outlets retained their interstate character where the warehouse was merely a convenient instrumentality for the division of the shipments coming to it and the continuation of the movement of each part to the retail stores 3: holding shipments from a distribution point supplied by outofstate shipments made pursuant to preexisting orders were interstate in character 4: holding that warehouse distributions to companyowned stores constituted interstate commerce since inter alia the company knew at the time oufiofstate shipments to the warehouse commenced that the shipments were bound for its retail stores


Input: judgment as a matter of law on the informed consent claim in this case because Garcia failed to adduce sufficient expert testimony to proceed upon his claim under HRS § 671-3(b)(5). Under this subsection, Garcia was required to establish that increased pain and a worsened condition were “recognized material risks of serious complications” associated with the back surgery performed. See Ngo, 136 Hawai'i at 67-68, 358 P.3d at 39-40. Although expert testimony is not required under HRS § 671-3(b), “expert testimony is typically necessary to establish the medical information statutorily required to be disclosed.” Id. at 69, 358 P.3d at 41. In appropriate cases, a defendant physician, by his or her own testimony, may satisfy the plaintiffs evidentiary burden. See id. at 71, 358 P.3d at 43 (<HOLDING>); Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai'i 475, 487, 904 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions 1: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive 2: holding expert testimony remedies speculation by the court 3: holding that the general principles of rule 702 recognized by the daubert decision are applicable to other species of expert testimony 4: recognizing that plaintiffs counsel elicited valid expert testimony from the defendantphysician regarding recognized alternative treatments


Input: an intoxicated motorist. 598 N.E.2d at 634 n. 2. Jerry contends that his case goes beyond Hawn and the cases cited therein because the pleadings show that Shannon entered into a joint agreement with Candice, and this agreement ultimately resulted in activity that caused his injuries. Thus, he argues that Shannon went beyond the gratuitous undertakings described above. First, we note that this is not a case where a person tried to prevent an intoxicated driver from driving; indeed, it is a case where a person assisted the intoxicated in driving. Second, we note that others have held that gratuitous undertakings concerning drivers may result in liability to a party other than the one who injured the third party. See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car 1: holding that convenience stores sale of beer to eighteenyearold was not cause in fact of drunk drivers fatal car accident because sale was to passenger and not to driver 2: holding a reasonable officer could perceive a threat to his safety from a potentially drunk person acting erratically 3: holding that the statute and the rule give a person suspected of drunk driving a right to contact his attorney prior to deciding whether or not to take a breathalyzer examination 4: holding that south dakotas law requiring a person arrested for drunk driving to submit to a blood alcohol test or face having his refusal used against him did not violate the fifth amendment