Input: to file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days of any discrete act of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). The latest date on which Plaintiff learned definitively of her impending termination was October 5, 2005, the date of a second letter Defendant sent to Plaintiff. That letter clearly and unequivocally told Plaintiff that her position would be eliminated and that she could be re-employed by Defendant through a 60-day bidding process. The letter dated October 5, 2005, if not the earlier letter relaying the same message on September 28, 2005, was the adverse employment action that triggered the running of the 300-day statute of limitations. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The fact that Plaintiff did not have evidence Holdings: 0: holding that  2401a statute of limitations on procedural challenge began to run at the latest on the date the challenged regulation was amended 1: holding that the date of discrimination is the date on which a decision not to hire a plaintiff becomes effective 2: holding that when the representations and warranties were made on the date of closing the statute of limitations began to run on that date even though the contract imposed cure and repurchase obligations on the defendant 3: holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run 4: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered


Input: 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). With this caveat in mind and after careful review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly ruling that the plaintiffs’ claims were not frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, groundless, or brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. All defendants initially argued the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims were frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, and brought in bad faith based on the immunity provided by HCQIA and TMPA. But, not all of the plaintiffs’ claims relied upon actions allegedly taken in the context of a peer review or medical committee; therefore, any immunity under HCQIA and TMPA did not entirely shield the defendants from liability. See Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 738 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Jeung, 264 F.Supp.2d at 574 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was inadmissible in part because it was not similar to the allegations made by defendant 1: holding that allegations of refusal to provide coverage and that other physicians openly attacked plaintiffdoctors before nurses and in neurosurgical group meetings cannot be brought within hcqias immunity 2: holding that none of the physicians insurers had a duty to provide coverage since the effects of the negligence first manifested themselves prior to the coverage periods of any of the three policies 3: holding that a bivens claim cannot be brought against a federal agency 4: holding that issue not raised in first appeal cannot be attacked in later appeal


Input: their cumulative impacts. Even if the fire-lines had only a small impact, “[cjumula-tive impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.” 40 C.F.R. 1508.7 Further, the Forest Service fails to explain how such post-fire “rehabilitation” could eliminate the effects from the construction and existence of the fire-lines. As plaintiffs expert demonstrated, and the Forest Service does not dispute, “[flirelines cause significant and persistent reductions in soil productivity via elevated erosion, compaction and the removal of all organic matter, which is critical to soil productivity.” (See AR 8772 [Rhodes Declaration] ¶ 18.) Such significant effects must be disclosed within the EIS. See City of Carmel, 123 F.3d at 1160 (<HOLDING>). The Forest Service also asserts that the Holdings: 0: holding supplemental eis not necessary for sitespecific infestation and reforestation program where impacts of site specific program were the same as those considered in the programmatic eis 1: holding that a cumulative impacts analysis was insufficient where the agency had examined single projects in isolation because there were several foreseeable similar projects in a geographical region that added to the cumulative impacts 2: holding supplemental eis not necessary for sitespecific infestation and reforestation program where impacts of sitespecific program were the same as those considered in the programmatic eis 3: holding agency had burden to describe other area projects and detail the cumulative impacts of these projects 4: holding that eis must provide a useful analysis of the cumulative impacts of past present and future projects


Input: of protection for "free citizens” from the rights accorded pretrial detainees (under the Fourteenth Amendment) and criminal convicts (under the Eighth Amendment). See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843, 118 S.Ct. at 1715. 4 . This statement has led at least one court to refer to Justice Rehnquist's reasoning, specifically his reliance on the Fourth Amendment’s text, as only adopted by a plurality. See Lamont v. Woods, 948 E.2d 825, 835 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that "[t]o a plurality of the Court, the use of the phrase ‘the people’ suggested that the Framers of the Constitution intended the amendment to apply only to ■those persons who were part of or substan tially connected to the national community”). But it does not throw Chief Justice Rehnquist’s holding,, that only aliens 329 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, Holdings: 0: holding that a foreign citizen with no substantial connections to the us has no claim under the fifth amendments takings clause 1: holding that prior circuit precedent that the fifth amendments takings clause subsumes or preempts substantive due process claims was undermined by lingle 2: holding that no takings claim can arise unless a permit is denied 3: holding that taxes are not takings unless the government tries to achieve through special taxes what the takings clause of the fifth amendment forbids if done directly 4: holding that rights in a government benefits program were not vested property for purposes of the takings clause of the fifth amendment


Input: does not state an actionable claim for a deprivation of equal protection under the ADA. See Manning v. N.M. Energy, Minerals & Natural Res. Dep’t, 2006-NMSC-027, ¶ 45, 140 N.M. 528, 144 P.3d 87 (“The ADA provides [a] remedy . . . when a state violates the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving an individual of . . . equal protection[.]”); Fofey v. Horton, 1989-NMSC-061, ¶ 8, 108 N.M. 812, 780 P.2d 638 (stating that an equal protection claim requires the plaintiff to allege or otherwise demonstrate that the at-issue conduct constituted impermissible state action). {37} Furthermore, the district court’s mere adjudication of Mr. Firstenberg’s lawsuit does not constitute “state action” within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. See King v. King, 174 P.3d 659, 671 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Insofar as the United States Supreme Court in Holdings: 0: recognizing that consensual policecitizen encounters do not implicate constitutional protections 1: recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify 2: recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights 3: recognizing that a state courts adjudication  of private rights is not sufficient state action in the sense necessary to implicate constitutional protections 4: holding that where statutory remedies exist private employees do not have a private cause of action for violation of state constitutional rights


Input: fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, breaking of limbs, denial of food and water, and threats to rape or otherwise harm relatives. The security forces killed many of their torture victims and mutilated their bodies before returning them to the victims’ families. There are persistent reports that the families are made to pay for the costs of the execution, before the bodies are returned to them. Iraqi refugees arriving in Europe often reported instances of torture to the receiving governments and — as was the case with a group of refugees arriving in Italy in June — displayed scars and mutilations to substantiate their claims. The BIA must take this into consideration when assessing whether an applicant qualifies under the Convention. Cf. Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Al-Saher was informed that if he told anyone Holdings: 0: holding that general crime conditions are not a stated ground for a wellfounded fear of future persecution 1: holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable 2: holding that such a report provided substantial evidence to support the conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of future persecution 3: holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution 4: holding that iraqi petitioner who failed to establish past persecution nonetheless had a wellfounded fear of future persecution because evidence of country conditions supported the conclusion that the iraqi government would persecute as traitors any evacuees who returned to iraq


Input: the Turnover Action against the Debtor’s law firm were taken in his official capacity on behalf of the bankruptcy estate and within the scope of his statutory duties to investigate, collect assets and property of the estate, and seek turnover of materials relating to the Debtor’s financial affairs and interests. C. Conclusion The essence of GKH’s contention that the Trustee acted ultra vires or outside the scope of his authority is that the Trustee acted improperly or even wrongfully in filing the Avoidance and Turnover Actions without a reasonable legal basis. However, a showing that the Trustee’s actions were wrongful or improper “does not equate to a transgression of his authority.” Cutright, 2012 WL 1945703, at *8; see also McDaniel v. Blust, 668 F.3d 153, 157 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); Satterfield, 700 F.3d at 1236 (refusing to Holdings: 0: holding that agency could not claim confidentiality for tax returns that had been exhibits in tax court and were therefore public records 1: holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury 2: holding that if federal income tax statutes are intended to benefit anyone it is the federal government to whom the withheld tax is to be remitted there is no indication anywhere in the language of the statutes that congress intended to confer rights on employees with respect to the withholding of tax 3: holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions 4: holding barton applied to claims that counsel for the trustee sought court orders to obtain irrelevant personal income tax records because the actions even if wrongful were taken in the context of attempting to prove the adversary action


Input: that just as the IJ may not rely on his or, her own speculation and conjecture, neither may the IJ rely on the speculation and conjecture of a government report. The conclusions in Agent Schultz’s report derive from his analysis of general trends and conditions in Sri Lanka, not from individualized facts about Suntharalinkam or the evi dence presented before the IJ. Moreover, the IJ must conduct an individualized credibility analysis, and it is improper to rely exclusively on a general assertion in a government report to declare an applicant not credible. See Ge, 367 F.3d at 1126 (to the extent that the IJ relied on blanket statements in the State Department report regarding detention conditions in China, the IJ’s finding was not sufficiently individualized); Shah, 220 F.3d at 1069 (<HOLDING>). Here, Schultz bases his conclusion that Holdings: 0: holding that an ij may not use general information contained in a state department report to discredit specific testimony regarding an applicants personal experience 1: holding that an ij need not first identify the particular pieces of missing relevant evidence and show that this evidence was reasonably available to the applicant when he or she is not otherwise credible 2: holding that an ij made an explicit credibility when the ij found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies 3: holding that party may not rely on conclusory statements or an argument that the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment are not credible 4: holding that the ij may not rely on a factually unsupported assertion in a state department report to deem an applicant not credible


Input: imaginary, or frivolous.” Id. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered. Id. We will not affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment unless the evidence could not support any reason able inference in favor of the non-movant. Id. Summary judgment is seldom appropriate in employment discrimination cases because such cases inherently require the resolution of factual disputes that turn on inferences, rather than direct evidence, of discriminatory animus. Id. However, if a defendant can establish that an essential element of a discrimination claim cannot be established as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. ITT Commercial, 854 S.W.2d at 381 (<HOLDING>). Analysis Fuchs asserts three points on Holdings: 0: holding that to survive a motion for summary judgment a party must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial 1: holding that defending party may establish a right to summary judgment by showing that the plaintiff after an adequate period of discovery has not been able to produce and will not be able to produce evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of any one of the claimants elements 2: recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence 3: holding that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish constructive notice because the plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that the oil was on the floor for any length of time 4: holding that rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for discovery and upon motion against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial


Input: If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty. A statement is false if untrue when made and then known to be untrue by the person making it or causing it to be made. Govt. Sug. Jury Instr. No. 27-28 (emphasis supplied). The district court denied both of Roster’s good faith defense instructions, concluding that the “knowledge” element of the mail fraud and false statement charges encompassed any good faith defense. We agree with the district court’s conclusion. An action taken in good faith is the other side of an action taken knowingly. United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257, 265 (7th Cir.1986); cf. Brimberry, 961 F.2d at 1291 (<HOLDING>). On the mail fraud charges, the district Holdings: 0: holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions 1: holding that requiring the jury to unanimously find liability for exemplary damages necessarily includes a finding on the underlying theory of liability 2: holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions 3: holding that the district courts instructions requiring the jury to find that the defendant acted willfully to convict on income tax evasion necessarily encompassed the defendants theory on good faith reliance 4: holding the trial courts subsequently corrected instruction that the jury must find the defendant personally committed the offenses in order to convict the defendant on those charges did not prejudice the defendant


Input: of the officer’s unlawful conduct (e.g., an unconstitutional search or arrest). The evidence must be such that it would not have been obtained but for the unlawful conduct of the investigating officer. We are of the opinion that G.S. 15A-974(2) requires, at a minimum, this sort of causal connection between violations of Chapter 15A and the evidence objected to if such evidence is to be suppressed. In so holding, we do not decide that a mere “cause in fact” or “but-for” relationship is sufficient ipso facto to require exclusion of evidence obtained as a consequence of substantial violations of Chapter 15A. In certain cases, intervening circumstances might “dissipate the taint” of unlawfulness so that such evidence would be admissible at trial. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, supra (<HOLDING>). We leave all such decisions to future cases. Holdings: 0: holding that the government may not introduce evidence obtained through violations of the fourth amendment 1: holding that only materials which were included in the pretrial record and that would have been admissible evidence may be considered 2: holding admissible certain evidence which would not have been obtained but for violations of constitutional requirements 3: holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible 4: holding that evidence that would not have been obtained but for an unlawful search must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree


Input: discharge claim. 2. The district court did not err by granting summary judgment to Caldwell on Sorenson’s retaliatory discharge claim, because he did not raise a triable issue of fact regarding a causal link between his involvement in a protected activity and an adverse employment action. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding a plaintiff must show the following for a prima facie case of retaliation: “(1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action and (3) a causal link between the two”). Sorenson did not allege facts showing that his age-discrimination complaint was a but-for cause of any adverse employment action. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2534, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (<HOLDING>); Hard-age v. CBS Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, Holdings: 0: holding the third element of the test requires a plaintiff to show that his or her protected activity was a butfor cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer 1: holding in the title vii context that the plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him know of the employees plaintiffs protected activity 2: holding that the plaintiff had to provide direct or circumstantial evidence that the supervisors who took the adverse action against the plaintiff knew about the protected activity prior to taking that action 3: holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity 4: holding that although evidence that the alleged adverse action occurred shortly after the employer became aware of the protected activity is sufficient to make a prima facie causation case the opposite is equally true  a lengthy time lapse between the employer becoming aware of the protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action  negates any inference that a causal connection exists between the two


Input: 55, 604 N.E.2d 117, 119 (1992); Kappel v. Fisher Bros., 6th Ave. Corp., 39 N.Y.2d 1039, 387 N.Y.S.2d 251, 355 N.E.2d 305, 306 (1976)). Such limitation of liability stems from “the basic common-law principle that ‘an owner or general contractor [sh]ould not be held responsible for the negligent acts of others over whom [the owner or general contractor] had no direction or con trol.’ Ross, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49, 618 N.E.2d at 88 (quoting Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Coiy., 44 NY.2d 290, 405 NY.S.2d 630, 376 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (1978)). Liability in the absence of direction or control over the worksite may attach only where the person to be charged in fact caused the defective condition giving rise to injury. See Murphy v. Columbia Univ., 4 A.D.3d 200, 773 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (N.Y.App.Div. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Here, the record demonstrates clearly that Holdings: 0: holding that a general contractors right to forbid the work from being performed in a dangerous manner and the fact that he would have stopped the work and required protective equipment had he seen the employee of the independent contractor not using such equipment merely showed the possibility of control not actual control 1: holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment 2: holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment 3: holding that proof of control was not required where the injury arose from the condition of the work place created by or known to the contraetor 4: holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence


Input: to the same amount of money if Husband opts to increase his disability benefits, thereby decreasing his military retirement, (2) calls for direct payment by the Military Finance Center where the parties were not. married for ten years during Husband’s military service, and (3) provides for retained jurisdiction to supervise and enforce the payment of military retirement pay. The Trial Court denied the motion for new trial on November 20, 2002. Husband appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 5 Because a divorce action is one of equitable cognizance, a trial court has discretion to divide the marital estate. Teel v. Teel, 1988 OK 151, ¶ 7, 766 P.2d 994, 998. We will not disturb a trial court’s order dividing marital property unless we find the court abused its discretion or that its (N.M.App.2000) (<HOLDING>); and Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 894 Holdings: 0: holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits 1: holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits 2: holding that although disability benefits cannot be included as part of the marital estate a court may consider the waiver of retirement pension benefits in favor of disability benefits in determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances which would justify modification of an alimony award to a former spouse who was previously awarded a fixed percentage of the retirement pension benefits 3: holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa 4: holding that federal law does not prohibit a marital settlement agreement which provides for indemnification if husband takes voluntary action to reduce wifes share of military retirement benefits as along as the disability benefits are not specified as the source of the payments to wife


Input: notified of infringement rests on the alleged infringer. To the extent that Newbridge contends that it was not put on notice of infringement, the Court likewise rejects Newbridge’s contention, as the record demonstrates otherwise. (See e.g. Tr. 1218-1219, 1487-1489, 3220-3222, 3266, PX 839). In addition to the foregoing failure to investigate and/or obtain valid opinions of counsel, the Court notes the existence of other aggravating factors against New-bridge including the prolonged nature of Newbridge’ infringement (Tr. 1487, 1816, 2967), its failure to discontinue its infringement once notified of Lucent’s law suit, and its failure to take remedial action to remedy its alleged infringement. See e.g. Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1328 (Fed.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Based on the jury’s findings of willful Holdings: 0: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because it was filed before the final order awarding attorneys fees 1: holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award 2: holding that appellate court should reverse and remand issue of attorneys fees where damages are reduced on appeal in a manner that could affect the determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees 3: holding that enhanced damages and attorneys fees are appropriate where the district court found that the infringer did not procure a patent search and continued to manufacture and sell infringing products after the law suit was filed against it 4: holding that attorneys fees and costs spent by an insurance company to defend against civil suit filed by defendant are not recoverable under the vwpa


Input: The district court denied Wade’s subsequent 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habe-as corpus petition and we affirm. 1. We assume, as does the respondent warden, that the introduction at trial of Wade’s co-defendant’s statements violated the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (“Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are ... testimonial under even a narrow standard.”). But, “[hjabeas relief on a trial error claim is appropriate only if the error results in ‘actual prejudice.’ ” Hall v. Haws, 861 F.3d 977, 991 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Davis v. Ayala, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2197, 192 L.Ed.2d 323 (2015)); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Wade has not demonstrated that the trial Holdings: 0: holding that confrontation clause violations are subject to harmless error review 1: holding that a  455b violation is subject to harmless error review 2: holding trial errors are subject to a harmless error analysis 3: holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error 4: holding that confrontation clause issues are subject to harmless error analysis


Input: homestead exemption, even though the title of the property is held by a revocable trust. In the case at hand, Mary is the trustee and one of the beneficiaries of the Mary D. Fitton Revocable Trust. She is also the person who formed the trust. The property in question is her principal place of residence. She was married at all times pertinent to the mortgage and conveyances at issue. Relying on the reasoning in Richardson, and case law from this court relied upon therein, we hold that, according to the facts presented, Mary Fitton was entitled to a homestead exemption even though the title to the property was held by her trust. Furthermore, the fact that the trust holds the property as a tenant in common does not affect the outcome. See Simpson v. Biffle, 63 Ark. 289, 38 S.W. 345 (1896) (<HOLDING>). As for the Bank of Little Rock’s argument Holdings: 0: holding that when a husband first acquired property and then conveyed it to his wife they could not hold the property as tenants by the entirety or joint tenants because the four unities did not coincide so the deed created a tenancy in common with a right of survivorship 1: holding that the property held by the revocable trust in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence was a constitutionally protected homestead property 2: holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead 3: holding that marital property was not attachable for the sole debts of the husband because it was held in tenancy by entirety 4: holding that property held by husband and wife in tenancy by entirety is exempt from attachment or execution for the sole debts of husband


Input: while working for The District at Project Forward.” (Plaintiffs Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 7.) But Thomas’s position at Project Forward, another program in the District where Thomas was employed before the STAR Academy, is irrelevant. Moreover, by her own testimony, plaintiff knew before she even began working at the STAR Academy that plaintiff was explicitly told that he was not a supervisor at Project Forward and that he should not hold himself out to be. Plaintiff argues in the alternative that even if Thomas was not a supervisor, he “masqueraded” as one. But if plaintiff erroneously thought that Thomas had some supervisory role in relation to her, her belief was not clearly reasonable, and cannot create liability for the district. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (<HOLDING>). There is no evidence in the record from which Holdings: 0: holding that false arrest is one means of committing false imprisonment 1: holding that amtrak was a state actor 2: holding that a supervisor was not similarly situated to another supervisor with the same title where the former could not perform the latters duties 3: holding that such a physician was a state actor under  1983 4: holding that in cases where there is a false impression that the actor was a supervisor when he in fact was not the victims mistaken conclusion must be a reasonable one


Input: made some positive efforts in collecting rebates which should be commended. At this juncture, the most pertinent issue is how best to expend Federal Defendants’ limited resources to accomplish the purpose of the Court’s decrees-the enforcement of the regulatory duties. This suit comes at a time of frugal federal budgets and limited resources for federal officials. Doubtless the conservation of these resources will assist them in fulfilling their regulatory duties generally and more specifically the ones at issue in this suit. Finally, if for no other reason, compensatory sanctions are inappropriate because competent proof of the amount of losses and attorney fees have not been submitted to the Court. See O’Connor v. Midwest Pipe Fabrications, Inc., 972 F.2d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Gen. Signal Corp. v. Donallco, Inc., 787 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that monetary sanction was not supportable as a compensatory civil contempt sanction because there was no proof of the amount of loss 1: recognizing that the stated purposes of a contempt sanction alone cannot be determinative 2: holding that 25 surcharge added to fees that otherwise would be compensatory was a criminal contempt sanction even though it was payable to the adverse party and not to the court reversing order for sanctions because court did not follow procedural requirements for criminal contempt 3: holding that a trustee can recover damages in the form of costs and attorneys fees under section 105a as a sanction for ordinary civil contempt 4: holding that a postjudgment contempt sanction for refusal to obey orders whether it is characterized as a civil or a criminal sanction is immediately appealable as a final order under  1291


Input: that the blood draw was reasonable under a general Fourth Amendment balancing test outside of any exception. Finally, it argues that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless blood draw, namely, the difficulty that the law enforcement officers would have faced obtaining a warrant late at night when tasked with investigating a large-scale fatality accident. a. Whether the Texas implied-consent statute is its own exception to the warrant requirement The State argues that the Transportation Code provides its own exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have rejected the contention that a statute may create a per se exception to a warrant requirement. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561-63 (<HOLDING>); Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d at 797-800 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment 1: holding that the statutory definition of responsibly connected provided a per se rule 2: holding that constructive amendments which are per se reversible under harmless error analysis are also per se reversible under plain error analysis 3: holding such agreements to be per se illegal 4: holding expert testimony is not required as a per se rule  in bad faith actions


Input: doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). a. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to convict Connelly of the false statement charge. A rational jury could have concluded that (a) E.J.R.C. was truthful when she testified that Connelly threatened her with jail if she did not perform oral.sex; (b) Connelly, an experienced police officer and former tribal prosecutor, fully understood the FBI agents’ questions; and (c) Connelly was not credible because his statements to Agent Kimball and Agent Smiedala about whether he threatened E.J.R.C. with jail were inconsistent. See, e.g., Selby, 557 F.3d at 978 (<HOLDING>). b. Moreover, we find no inconsistency between Holdings: 0: holding that persecution of a woman because of her government job or her husbands position as a police officer was not on account of a particular social group 1: holding that a wifes minimal involvement in her husbands business coupled with the lack of evidence that she knew of or intended to further her husbands fraudulent schemes was insufficient evidence of conspiracy 2: holding that no rational jury could conclude there was no intent to distribute where the defendants possessed 3000 pounds of marijuana 3: holding that it was appellants burden to prove that her husbands death occurred in the scope of employment and that she was eligible for widows benefits 4: holding a rational jury was entitled to conclude that a government officials misstatement regarding her husbands employment was not an inadvertent mistake


Input: of exceptional circumstances ordinarily required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(b). See, e.g., White v. General Services Administration, 652 F.2d 913, 915-16 (9th Cir.1981). Morse argues that § 706(f)(5) should not be construed to authorize reference to a magistrate when neither side wants the reference. The court disagrees. The statute calls for the judge “to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5). If the case cannot be scheduled for trial within 120 days after issue has been joined, the judge has the discretion to appoint a master. Id. Nothing in Title VII conditions this authority on the consent of the parties. See, e.g., Brown v. Wesley’s Quaker Maid, Inc., 771 F.2d 952, 954-55 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 116, 93 Holdings: 0: holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard 1: holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard 2: recognizing that mixed questions of fact and law that are essentially factual in nature should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard as opposed to the generally administered de novo standard 3: holding that magistrates findings following a nonconsensual reference of a title vii ease are reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard 4: holding that findings of fact are reviewed for clear error


Input: law, our review is de novo. See, e.g., State Police Ass’n of Mass. v. Comm’r, 125 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.1997). Persons subject to the federal estate tax are required to file estate tax returns within fixed time parameters. I.R.C. § 6075. If such a person fails to file an estate tax return in a timeous manner, he has the burden of showing “that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.” Id. § 6651(a)(1). In the absence of such a showing, “there shall be added to the amount required to be shown as tax on such return” a late-filing penalty. Id. Imposition of this penalty is mandatory unless the failure to file on time was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. See Comm’r v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219, 224, 64 S.Ct. 511, 88 L.Ed. 684 (1944) (<HOLDING>); Plunkett v. Comm’r, 118 F.2d 644, 649 (1st Holdings: 0: holding pennsylvanias similarly worded sixyear statute of limitations for paternity actions unconstitutional 1: holding defendant could not recover attorneys fees under predecessor to statute 38001 when defendant did not present contract claim 2: holding fees mandatory under predecessor statute of  38001 3: holding latefiling penalty mandatory absent reasonable cause under a similarly worded predecessor statute 4: holding that the statute is mandatory


Input: is insufficient ground for diversion from the presumption set forth in Holmes. The trial court is afforded the discretion to determine whether a sufficient showing has been made to necessitate questioning by the court on whether juror exposure actually transpired. Pure conjecture that jurors might inadvertently violate admonitions not to read outside newspaper articles is insufficient to require court ex- animation of the jurors. See People v. Green, 323 Mich. 128, 35 N.W.2d 142 (1948). The Holmes presumption is sufficient to permit the trial court to deny a request to question the jury unless the court has reason to believe that such inquiry would be fruitful. See United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 686 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39, 50 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). IV The majority finds that the reasonable Holdings: 0: holding that trial court not required to conduct a voir dire on counsels unsubstantiated suspicion where issue was whether jurors had overheard any part of a bench conversation 1: holding that the extent to which parties may examine prospective jurors on voir dire lies within the trial judges discretion 2: holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice 3: holding that absence of defendants from part of voir dire discussing trial publicity with prospective jurors was error under rule 43 4: holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire


Input: on which he relied is barred “from seeking relief pursuant to FDUTPA, as he acted unreasonably.” Rosa v. Amoco Oil Co., 262 F.Supp.2d 1364, 1368 (S.D.Fla.2003). Here, the terms of the reinstated contract are inconsistent with the alleged misrepresentations upon which the Buyer supposedly relied. The contract provided that TRG made no representations regarding governmental approvals and expressly re moved any references to the “Intended Use” of 218 units for the property. As such, the Buyer could not justifiably rely on any representations from TRG concerning governmental approvals and the number of units that could be built on the property. The trial court should have granted TRG’s motion for a directed verdict. See St. Joseph’s Hosp. v. Cowart, 891 So.2d 1039, 1042 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the Holdings: 0: recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party 1: holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict 2: holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict 3: holding that a motion for directed verdict should be granted if there is no evidence on which a jury could legally base a verdict for damages against the moving party 4: holding a directed verdict motion stating specific grounds is a prerequisite for a subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict


Input: in the initial inquiry, it likewise cannot be rewarded for engaging in the most cursory of investigations into this child's heritage, notwithstanding Mother’s unequivocal assertions that Father was an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation. I construe the events following that initial response from Cherokee Nation as Appellants’ good-faith reliance on the tribe’s representations that Baby Girl was not Cherokee and ICWA was not applicable. Ignoring the bonding that occurred here is simply ignoring the reality of this case. 72 . By way of supplemental citation, Father contends Mother’s preference that Baby Girl be placed with Appellants is, standing alone, insufficient to constitute good cause warranting deviation from section 1915(a). See In re T.S.W., 276 P.3d 133 (Kan.2012) (<HOLDING>). I do not disagree. Although I recognize that Holdings: 0: holding that probation does not constitute a sentence 1: holding placement preference of birth mother alone does not constitute good cause to deviate from placement preferences under icwa 2: holding that perjured testimony standing alone does not constitute fraud upon the court 3: holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause 4: holding that the accrual of attorneys fees alone is sufficient to establish cause


Input: “exercised some level of oversight” over a contractor’s activities. Burn Pit, 744 F.3d at 339. Instead, a court must inquire whether the military clearly “chose how to carry out these tasks,” rather than giving the contractor discretion to determine the manner in which the contractual duties would be performed. Id. (emphasis added); see also Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F.3d 458, 467 (3d Cir.2013) (stating that plenary control does not exist when the military “merely provides the contractor with general guidelines that can be satisfied at the contractor’s discretion” because “contractor actions taken within that discretion do not necessarily implicate unreviewable military decisions”); McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1359-61 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The second Taylor factor concerns whether “a Holdings: 0: holding that a contract for aviation services in afghanistan did not manifest sufficient military control to present a political question because the contractor retained authority over the type of plane flight path and safety of the flight 1: holding that fathers military service alone was neither political opinion nor sufficient to establish imputed political opinion 2: holding that independent contractor claiming denial of public contract because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment 3: holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of political affiliation not protected by first amendment 4: holding that contract charged primary contractor with a duty of care for all employees on the work site including employees of its subcontractors where contract required primary contractor to comply with applicable state and federal safety statutes and regulations made primary contractor responsible for reviewing safety programs of its subcontractors and primary contractor employed a safety officer to oversee its subcontractors operations


Input: to testify, violates his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under the United States Constitution as well as his confrontation rights under the Texas Constitution. The State argues that, because Hale does not point out any distinction in the analysis we are to apply under the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and under the Texas Constitution, we should not apply a separate analysis and should overrule his second point. We agree, and we analyze Hale’s contention under the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause only. See, e.g., Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 917, 118 S.Ct. 305, 139 L.Ed.2d 235 (1997); Varnes v. State, 63 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We overrule Hale’s second point. We review de Holdings: 0: holding that the idaho constitution provides no greater protection from double jeopardy than does the federal constitution 1: holding that appellate court assumes appellant claims no greater protection under state constitution than that provided by federal constitution when state and federal claims not briefed separately 2: holding missouri constitution requires stricter separation of church and state than does federal constitution 3: recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution 4: recognizing exception under state constitution


Input: ha-beas relief unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). B. Analysis Mr. Morehead argued in his § 2254 application that his conviction violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on “the suppression of evidence [Ms. Burbach’s academic records] which would have revealed perjury to the jury.” Aplt. App. at 10. He contended the suppression was contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny, which hold due .2012) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Mr. Morehead does not contest the Holdings: 0: holding claims not raised in  2254 application are forfeited 1: holding that a coa is required to appeal the denial of a rule 60b motion from a judgment in a  2254 proceeding 2: holding a coa applicant forfeited a claim of error in district courts failure to hold an evidentiary hearing by not seeking a hearing in his  2254 proceeding 3: holding that defendants waived any challenge to the trial courts failure to hold an evidentiary hearing 4: holding that the magistrates recommended order terminating temporary supervision and placing the child in permanent guardianship was not supported by competent substantial evidence because the magistrate failed to hold an evidentiary hearing and that the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing violated the fathers due process rights


Input: development of a full factual record.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 13. Sarvis’s demand for discovery, however, misapprehends the nature of a motion to dismiss. Here, the district court properly recognized that “[t]o survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must ‘provide enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face,’ ” Sarvis, 80 F.Supp.3d at 696 (quoting Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009)), and that to reach facial plausibility, Sarvis must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). The pr rtarian Party of Ill., 591 F.2d 22, 25-27 (7th Cir. 1979) (<HOLDING>). It remains far from clear, moreover, that Holdings: 0: holding illinois high school associations version of the transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 1: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 2: holding that where racial bias motivated its original enactment a facially neutral felon disenfranchisement law violated the equal protection clause 3: holding that an illinois countys facially neutral twotiered ballot ordering system did not violate the equal protection clause 4: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection


Input: general and conclusory allegation that “Axesa’s actions and omissions undoubtedly created a hostile work environment.” In order to defeat summary judgment, Plaintiffs cannot rest on conclusory allegations. See Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2005). Moreover, in their objections, Plaintiffs did not cite to any specific record citation in support of this assertion. Thus, Plaintiffs failed to again comply with Local Rule 56(e). This Court also notes that Plaintiffs failed to object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Cintron’s comments were “too mild” to form the basis for a hostile work environment claim. Therefore, this Court need not effect a de novo review of this portion of the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning. Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons just stated, this Court finds Holdings: 0: holding the failure to file objections to a magistrates report issued pursuant to 28 usc  636b1 waives the right to appeal all issues both factual and legal 1: holding that district courts adoption of the magistrate judges report and recommendation one day after issuance did not constitute reversible error where district court conducted a meaningful review of the report and recommendation 2: holding that a partys failure to raise objections to the report and recommendation waives the partys right to review in the district court 3: holding that failure to object in a timely fashion to a magistrate judges report and recommendation generally constitutes a waiver of the defaulting partys right to appeal provided that the parties received clear notice of the consequences of their failure to object 4: holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error


Input: Opinion at 4-5. His fears are unfounded. First, the state action requirement, operating entirely apart from the standing requirement, would obviously screen out the vast majority of consumer-preference grievances, for a consumer aggrieved about the disappearance of his favorite brand would have to find a cause of action against a governmental body or face dismissal for failure to state a claim. In any event, of those claims that remain, the independent causation requirement of the standing requirement would bar the tenuous claims Judge Silberman fears from ever reaching the merits. Only those consumers who could prove that a "substantial likelihood,” see Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 75 n. 20, 98 S.Ct. at 2631 n. 20, existed that the governmental 2232, 2241, 65 L.Ed.2d 184 (1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Autolog Corp. v. Regan, 731 F.2d 25, Holdings: 0: holding that the measure of damages of converted property is the market value at the time of conversion 1: holding that a city could not sell bonds below par value effectively raising the interest rate because that would change the terms of the bond measure that voters approved 2: holding that fair market value was proper measure of damages for stock brokers breach of margin agreement caused by sale of plaintiffs shares without authorization noting that generally speaking fair market value is proper measure of damages for breach of contract relating to sale of goods which have an ascertamable value on the market 3: holding that plaintiffs seeking to purchase lands in imperial valley had standing to to compel application of federal reclamation requirements to those lands because that measure would likely lead although not compel some landowners to sell their lands at below market value 4: holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration


Input: that the district judge cannot analyze it and make his final decision in time to avert harm to the plaintiff due to delay, then the plaintiff can move for a preliminary injunction. That would be the kind of case in which a court of appeals might grant a stay of administrative action if that court was the first tier of judicial review of the agency’s action, rather than the district court. 5 U.S.C. § 705; Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C.Cir.1958); Busboom Grain Co. v. ICC, 830 F.2d [74,] 75 [(7th Cir.1987) ]. The standard is the same whether a preliminary injunction against agency action is being sought in the district court or a stay of that action is being sought in this court. Id.”); Ohio v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 812 F.2d 288, 290 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Kansas ex rel. Graves v. United States, 86 Holdings: 0: holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss 1: holding that a motion for a preliminary injunction and a hearing on that motion were insufficient to prevent the plaintiff from dismissing by notice 2: holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict 3: holding that a motion for a  705 stay should be judged by the same standard as a motion for a preliminary injunction 4: holding that court can consider inadmissible evidence in the context of a motion for preliminary injunction


Input: nonbreaching provisions of FIR-REA and other factors, caused its wounded bank damages. Def. Mot. at 64-65; Def. Reply at 84-88. Plaintiffs principal response as to causation is an argument that it need only show that the breach was a “substantial” causal factor, not the “sole” cause, in its wounded bank damages, and that it has made such a showing. Pl. Response at 88; see Energy Capital, 47 Fed.Cl. at 395 (“[T]he Court will require the Plaintiff to prove that the breach was a ‘substantial factor’ in causing its losses.”). The court finds that the “substantial factor” standard is appropriate. The court now considers whether plaintiff has furnished sufficient evidence to support a finding that the breach was, in fact, a substantial causal factor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (<HOLDING>). In support of its claims of $130.1 million in Holdings: 0: holding that it is clearly settled that where there is a failure to establish an essential element of the defamation cause of action the case becomes one of law for the court 1: holding that the nonmovant must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case 2: holding that to survive a motion for summary judgment a party must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial 3: holding that rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for discovery and upon motion against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial 4: holding that rule 56c requires summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys ease and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial


Input: that “the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order being appealed from is entered.” Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Because Mr. Lilly filed his notice of appeal more than 10 days after the district court entered its order granting his petition for clarification, our appellate jurisdiction is contingent on whether this appeal is properly labeled “criminal” or “civil.” The Government continues to urge us to dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. According to the Government, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the district court lacked' jurisdiction, in the first instance, to entertain Mr. Lilly’s petition for clarification. Moreover the Government submits that, even if Mr. Lilly’s petition was properly before the dist Cir.) (<HOLDING>), amended on other grounds, 919 F.2d 57 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that rule 4as timing requirements apply to an appeal from an order granting or denying a criminal defendants motion for the return of property under fedrcrimp 41e 1: holding that federal court may not issue writ of coram nobis for state prisoner 2: holding same for writ of error coram nobis 3: holding that rule 4as time limits govern an appeal from a district court order granting or denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis 4: holding that in the absence of a valid excuse for delay a coram nobis petition is subject to denial


Input: the district court was as follows: Q: ... Now, you were convicted of abuse of a household member in the year 2000, correct? A: Yes. Q: And the charge that you were convicted of included you hitting — was it your former girlfriend? A: Yes ma’am. Q: Okay. And so you were convicted of hitting your former girlfriend? A. Yes. 2 . Another example is that the Hawaii statute applies to all "persons related by consanguinity,” including both "children” and “parents,” while the federal statute applies only to one specified blood relationship — that in which the defendant is the parent of the victim. 3 . The only document in the record that suggests how Nobriga’s assault met the section 709-906(1) standard is a police report, which we are barred by Shepard from considering. See 125 S.Ct. at 1263 (<HOLDING>). 4 . Such a post hoc admission is not Holdings: 0: holding that courts applying taylor may only look to the terms of the charging document the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual ba  sis for the plea was confirmed by the defen dant or to some comparable judicial record of this information 1: holding that in determining whether the defendant has a prior conviction for burglary under the armed career criminal act the federal court may look only to the terms of the charging document the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant or to some comparable judicial record of this information 2: holding that court could look only to the statutory definition of a crime the charging document written plea agreement transcript of plea colloquy and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented in determining if prior conviction qualified as a generic burglary for purposes of enhanced sentencing under armed career criminal act 3: holding that a courts inquiry as to disputed facts in connection with a prior conviction is limited to the terms of the charging document a plea agreement a transcript of the plea colloquy or a comparable judicial record 4: holding federal court is not bound by terms of plea agreement between defendant and state authorities


Input: individuals from discrimination on account of their sexual orientation. In 1974, a New Jersey court held that the parental visitation rights of a divorced homosexual father could not be denied or restricted based on his sexual orientation. In re J.S. & C., 129 N.J.Super. 486, 489, 324 A.2d 90 (Ch.Div.1974), aff'd per curiam, 142 N.J.Super. 499, 362 A.2d 54 (App.Div.1976). Five years later, the Appellate Division stated that the custodial rights of a mother could not be denied or impaired because she was a lesbian. M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J.Super. 425, 427, 404 A.2d 1256 (App.Div.1979). This State was one of the first in the nation to judicially recognize the right of an individual to adopt a same-sex partner’s biological child. J.M.G., supra, 267 N.J.Super. at 625, 626, 631, 632 A.2d 550 (<HOLDING>); see also In re Adoption of Two Children by Holdings: 0: recognizing the concept of dual paternity in which a child born into a marriage with a nonbiological father retains a legal parentchild relationship based on presumptive fatherhood for purposes of legitimacy and inheritance while becoming the child of a newlyestablished biological father for purposes of child support 1: recognizing the unique relationship between mother and child during pregnancy and birth and permitting mothers claim for emotional distress where the mothers emotional wellbeing and the birth of the child are inextricably intertwined 2: holding that a wife with a child from a prior relationship was not entitled to use and possession of the family home 3: recognizing importance of the emotional benefit of formal recognition of the relationship between the nonbiological mother and the child and that there is not one correct family paradigm for creating supportive loving environment for children 4: holding that a mother and her two children failed to establish a  1983 claim where there was no evidence that threats made to the mother were directly aimed at the relationship between parent and child


Input: 79 N.E.2d at 423. For all of these reasons, and under our deferential standard of review of the determinations of administrative agencies, we affirm the Board’s award of worker’s compensation benefits to Payne for the subsequent shoulder injury resulting from his fall on April 18, 2009. Affirmed. FRIEDLANDER, J., and RILEY, J., concur. 1 . Citing Muncie Ind. Transit Authority v. Smith, 743 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), Moorehead claims that Payne was required to establish the causal connection between the two injuries by expert medical evidence. Appellant's Br. at 3. But the holding in that case, requiring medical evidence to establish a causal relationship between the employment and the injury, is limited to injuries not caused by “a sudden and unexpected event.” Id. at 1217 Holdings: 0: holding expert testimony necessary to establish the existence of a causal relationship between a particular toxin and its effect on the human body 1: holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury 2: holding that the citys decision was arbitrary and capricious when it was contrary to the evidence and based solely on speculation arising from prior unrelated acts 3: holding that the boards decision was contrary to law because it was based solely on smiths testimony and is not supported by medical evidence which shows a causal relationship between smiths employment and his carpal tunnel syndrome 4: holding that an aljs own medical analysis which is contrary to medical evidence is invalid


Input: 19, are preemptive. See supra ¶¶ 19-21. T39 Contrary to the majority's view, these definitions are not preemptive because the doctrine of equitable adoption is not premised on our ability to judicially define the statutory term "child" or "parent." The version of the probate code in effect when Williams' Estates was decided provided for intestate succession by a decedent's "child" or "issue." Utax CopE § 74-4-5(1)-(2) (1958). We did not reach our holding in Williams' Estates by judicially defining these statutory terms, as the majority suggests. See supra ¶ 20. Instead, w 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule "authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding change of beneficiary effective where city employee listed a new beneficiary for his group life insurance policy in an employee personal data form next to the words designated beneficiary even though this did not comply with the policy terms 1: holding that creditors of a trust beneficiary were prohibited from intervening in an action involving a dispute between the trustee and a beneficiary concerning distribution of the trust corpus 2: holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts 3: holding single coexecutors release of mortgage debt paid to estate was valid and binding on estate because acts of any coexecutor in respect to the administration of the effects of the estate are deemed to be the acts of all as where one releases a debt or settles an account of a person with the deceased or surrenders a term or sells the goods and chattels of the estate his act binds the others characterizing conversion of decedents personal property into cash as act in due course of administration of estate 4: holding that a contract beneficiary may be liable in restitution where the beneficiary by his conduct induces the conferral of the benefit


Input: The evidence at trial established that Defendant: (1) was informed of the delivery to his property and suggested that it be done at night, (2) was also informed when the truck arrived, and (3)was informed the next day when the drivers left his lot. Defendant claims that the only evidence of affirmative conduct on this occasion was his suggestion that the unloading take place at night. This evidence, stand ing alone, Defendant argues, is insufficient to support his aiding and abetting conviction. Defendant also argues that his previous act of giving the key to his property cannot be considered as evidence here because such only aided a general scheme of possession of marijuana, not the specific offense on October 4, 1998. See United States v. Lombardi, 138 F.3d 559, 561 (5th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>). We conclude, however, that Defendant’s assent Holdings: 0: holding that the government must prove actual subjective knowledge and that a defendant may not be convicted on just what he should have known 1: holding that the government must show only that a defendant had knowledge of the reporting requirements and acted to avoid them 2: holding that under a similar statute the government need only show that the defendant had the intent to carry on illegal activity and that the crime occurred in conjunction with interstate travel 3: holding that broker willfully aided and abetted manipulative wash and match trades scheme when he knew or had reason to know that such trading was economically irrational 4: holding that the government must show that defendant aided and abetted the specific crime not just the overall scheme


Input: 1415(e)(2). The only evidence outside the administrative record the plaintiff proffers is a report from Dr. Daniel Ling. See Pl.’s Resp., Exhibit 27. Thus, the court will decide the defendant’s summary judgment motion based on the administrative record and Dr. Ling’s report. 2 . Shortly after the death of the plaintiff’s mother, Mr. O'Toole began dating Ms. Fulgham. Ms. Fulgham took an active role in the plaintiff's education. In October of 1993, Mr. O’Toole and Ms. Fulgham were married. 3 . The plaintiff controverts this key fact. However, the plaintiff does not refer to anything in the record supporting her contention as required by Fed.RXiv.Pro. 56 and D.Kan. Rule 56.1 and, therefore, the fact is deemed uncontroverted. Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir.l995)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact 1: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate 2: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 3: holding that in order to withstand summary judgment the nonmovant must identify a genuine issue of material fact by reference to an affidavit a deposition transcript or a specific exhibit incorporated therein and that a court need not search the record to find uncited evidence which controverts a material fact 4: holding nonmoving partys affidavit created genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an employment relationship


Input: and hold that 25 U.S.C. § 410 continues to protect any money accruing from the lease of Indian trust land, even after it has been distributed to a Native American and placed in a personal bank account. 1. Jurisdiction ¶14 “Where a federal statute is silent on the question of jurisdiction, state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction.” Law Offices of Vincent Vitale, PC v. Tabbytite, 942 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Alaska 1997) (citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506-08, 82 S. Ct. 519, 7 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1962)). Because 25 U.S.C. § 410 does not purport to impose exclusive federal jurisdiction, Washington courts have subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether 25 U.S.C. § 410 bars garnishment of the funds in the Harrisons’ bank accounts. See Vitale, 942 P.2d at 1147 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction Holdings: 0: holding that a nevada state court had no jurisdiction to entertain a civil action filed by a nonindian against an indian for events that occurred on indian land 1: holding that a nevada state court had no jurisdiction over indian claims to land allotments 2: holding that alaska state courts had jurisdiction to determine application of 25 usc  410 to proceeds of condemnation action on indian trust land 3: holding that the arrest of an indian on indian land was illegal because the state had no jurisdiction over the reservation to enforce its laws  including the execution of a search warrant  unless congress consented to the states jurisdiction 4: holding that county law enforcement officers lacked jurisdiction to arrest indian at ballpark located on indian trust land


Input: that, in addition to recruiting Hayes to prepare returns for Ellerbe, she twice hired him ■ to prepare her own returns. The first return included deductions not supported by the information Peeples had provided to Hayes, and Peeples was audited as a result. She testified that she subsequently instructed Hayes “to do my taxes, but only put the figures on my taxes of what I give you.” J.A. 564-65. The jury could reasonably infer that Peeples would not adhere to this policy for herself and yet provide Hayes with false information about her sister’s taxes. This inference is particularly strong in light of the substantial similarities connecting the misstatements in the Ellerbe return with those in other returns prepared by Hayes. Cf. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 944 (4th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). B.Counts 12 and 13: Ronald Gullette Like Holdings: 0: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse 1: holding that evidence that two halfsisters suffered similar sexual abuse tended to show that they were abused by their common parent or grandparents 2: holding that although there were six occurrences under the general liability policy there was only one sexual abuse occurrence where sexual abuse occurrence was defined as a single act or multiple continuous sporadic or related acts of sexual molestation or abuse caused by one perpetrator 3: holding that similar fact evidence regarding prior act of sexual misconduct by defendant was properly admitted to show the defendants common scheme plan or design to sexually exploit his patients and that such evidence is relevant even if it is not uniquely similar 4: holding evidence of past uncharged sexual encounters admissible in child sexual abuse case to show relationship between defendant and alleged victim


Input: the government from bringing unfounded suits or engaging in arbitrary or unjust administrative behavior. That goal is in part achieved by rectifying the ‘disparity in resources and expertise of ... individuals and their government.’ ” Oguachuba, 706 F.2d at 98-99, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4984. 6. Other District Courts Have Looked Beyond the Statutory Language of the EAJA and Held Attorneys Can Be Paid the Award of Attorney’s Fees Directly Other district courts that have engaged in analysis beyond the plain meaning of the EAJA, have held that awards of attorney’s fees under the EAJA can be paid directly to attorneys. The Northern District of Alabama determined that the Savings Clause dictates that attorney’s fees can be payable directly to the attorney because .D.F1.2007) (<HOLDING>). In addition to the district court cases Holdings: 0: holding that a court has broad discretion in awarding attorney fees under the eaja but is not required to make an award in all cases where a party seeks supplemental or increased fees 1: holding that payment of eaja fees directly to the attorney also is consistent with the broad purpose for enacting the eaja  if the commissioners narrow position was adopted there would be a substantial risk that counsel for a successful plaintiff might not be paid which would have a chilling effect on the willingness of attorneys to represent indigent claimants in social security cases thus thwarting the primary purpose the eaja was enacted 2: holding that the eaja application satisfied the eaja content requirements because it contained among other things an itemized statement of the fees sought  supported by an affidavit from the appellants counsel 3: holding that the buckhannon rule governs an application for fees under the eaja 4: holding that a cause of action based on eaja will be deemed to have survived the death of the aggrieved party and  the personal representative of the deceased partys estate or any other appropriate person may be substituted as the prevailing party to whom payment of an eaja award may be made


Input: of a complaint’s factual allegations. Id. In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir.1993). Accordingly, to determine whether a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court must examine the applicable substantive law and the facts alleged in the plaintiffs complaint. Preliminary Injunction Standard To determine whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a district court must consider: (1) the plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction; (3) whether granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and, (4) the impact of an injunction upon the public interest. Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. 78 F.3d 1111, 1123 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The essence of this standard is “whether the Holdings: 0: holding that trademark infringement under michigan common law is governed by the likelihood of confusion standard 1: holding that concurrent use of same mark on similar product was sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion 2: holding that as in an action alleging infringement of a mark likelihood of confusion is the essence of an unfair competition claim 3: holding that the use of the shoneys name over any subsidiary product line mark  reduces the likelihood of confusion 4: holding that even several isolated incidents of actual confusion are insufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion


Input: v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). A fundamental miscarriage of justice is established by showing that the alleged constitutional violation “has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent” of the crime for which he has been convicted. Murray, supra, at 496,106 S.Ct. 2639. Under the circumstances of the instant case, Mercer has demonstrated cause and prejudice such that the court has jurisdiction to entertain his claim for federal habeas relief that the reasonable doubt instruction was unconstitutional. Specifically, cause is established by the novelty of the issue of whether the reasonable doubt instruction given at Mercer’s trial imper-missibly lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof. Reed, supra, at 17-20, 104 S.Ct. 2901 (<HOLDING>). Further, the previously unrecognized Holdings: 0: holding fact that a constitutional claim is so novel that it is not reasonable for counsel to raise it until after the supreme court articulates that such claim is a basis for federal habeas relief constitutes cause for failure to raise that claim in accordance with applicable state procedures 1: holding that a federal court may excuse a state habeas petitioners procedural default if the petitioner can show cause for the failure to raise the claim and prejudice resulting from such failure 2: holding that a plaintiff is not required to state the statutory or constitutional basis for his claim only the facts underlying it 3: holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate 4: holding that failure to raise an issue until it is brought up at oral argument constitutes a waiver


Input: 734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex.1987) (“Justice demands a speedy resolution of child custody and child support issues.”). Section 153.0071 serves the first goal of peaceful resolution by providing procedures for alternate dispute resolution. However, because section 153.0071 is silent on the options available to a court when an arbitrator’s award is vacated, the second goal of a speedy resolution is not served, as is clear in this case. Nevertheless, until the Legislature amends the Family Code provisions on arbitration, we are bound by section 153.0071’s silence, this court’s decision in Koch, and the provisions of the TAA. Accordingly, the trial court did not have discretion to rule on a claim or controversy that the parties agreed to submit to binding arbitration. See Koch, 27 S.W.3d at 97 (<HOLDING>). Because the trial court was limited to Holdings: 0: holding that where the trial court had referred the parties to arbitration but it was ambiguous as to whether the court had also dismissed the underlying case dismissal and referral to arbitration should really be construed as an order to stay litigation pending arbitration which under koczak and umana was not a final appealable order 1: holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties 2: holding that because taa is silent on whether section 171089b includes right to order parties to trial when the arbitration is vacated explicit language of statute should be followed 3: holding that an order granting a motion or application to compel arbitration is nonappealable because it is not listed in the uaa arbitration provision and because it is not a final order 4: holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived


Input: from the scene.” Id. “As Plaintiff drove away, [Sgt. Sloan] jumped onto Plaintiff's car and fell off the vehicle as Plaintiff ultimately left the scene.” Id. Plaintiff attributed defendants’ actions on February 13, 2004 to "retaliation for the earlier incident in which Plaintiff drove away from his home, causing Defendant Sloan to fall off of Plaintiff’s vehicle.’’ Id. ¶ 21 (emphasis in original). 2 . Because plaintiff's common law claims are dismissed as untimely, the Court need not determine whether plaintiff complied with the mandatory notice requirements of D.C.Code § 12-309. Plaintiff's compliance or lack thereof has no impact on his constitutional claims. Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1510 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1073, 105 S.Ct. 2153, 85 L.Ed.2d 509 (1985) Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs noncompliance with dccode  12309 cannot bar federal claims 1: holding that a procedural rule that is not firmly established and regularly followed cannot bar federal court review 2: holding that federal evidentiary standard for impeachment by prior conviction should apply to dccode offenders tried in federal court 3: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 4: holding that  1997ee did not bar plaintiffs first amendment claims


Input: 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (“The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” (internal quotations omitted)). The Tenth Circuit has stated that whether there is a real nexus in a particular case depends on the circumstances of the case: The under color of law determination rarely depends on a single, easily identifiable fact, such as the officer’s attire, the location of the act, or whether or not the officer acts in accordance with his or her duty. Instead one must examine “the nature and circumstances of the officer’s conduct and t f Pawnee Cnty., Okla., 894 F.2d 1176, 1182-92 (10th Cir.1990)(<HOLDING>). In Jojala, v. Chavez, the plaintiff was a Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant who was an elementary school teacher on contract only from august to may who sexually abused children at a nonschoolsponsored summer camp over the summer did not act under color of state law 1: holding that private attorney who acted as courtappointed counsel for child in state juvenile delinquency proceedings was not acting under color of state law 2: holding that a nurses aide who sexually assaulted a patient while under heavy sedation was not acting under color of state law because as there was no allegation it was the aide who sedated the patient the sexual assault conduct   could have been done by anyone who wandered into the patients room 3: holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee 4: holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action


Input: restitution ... is ... to mete out appropriate criminal punishment for ... conduct.”). 19 . Gonzalez, 647 F.3d at 66-67. 20 . Clay, 537 U.S. at 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072. 21 . Id.; see also Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993) ("A judgment of conviction includes both the adjudication .of guilt and the sentence.”). 22 . See, e.g., United States v. Certified Envtl. Serv., Inc., 753 F.3d 72, 99-102 (2d Cir.2014) (reviewing restitution order as part of appeal from a criminal judgment); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o) ("A sentence that imposes an order of restitution is a final judgment.”). 23 . 560 U.S. 605, 618, 130 S.Ct. 2533, 177 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010). 24 . Id. at 617-18, 130 S.Ct. 2533. 25 . 375 U.S. 169, 174-75, 84 S.Ct. 298, 11 L.Ed.2d 229 (1963) (<HOLDING>). 26 . 757 F.3d 1243, 1249-50 (11th Cir.2014). Holdings: 0: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence 1: holding that sentencing court could consider whether the applicable guidelines were outdated and disproportionate but that imposing sentence based on the guidelines did not render sentence substantively unreasonable 2: holding an order imposing sex offender registration after the juvenile courts initial disposition can be a final appealable order 3: holding that the lower court should have entered a final order on custody 4: holding that where district court committed defendant to custody but held off on imposing final sentence defendant could have appealed from initial imposition but the appeal following final order imposing full sentence was also timely


Input: “repeatedly told courts ... not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2084, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). We are aware of no case that would preclude a reasonable officer from believing there was probable cause to detain a person who alluded to committing suicide. Cf. Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 922 (9th Cir.2009) (granting qualified immunity where plaintiffs did not cite “a single case squarely holding that an officer cannot rely” on a particular victim’s statements in making an arrest); F.E. Trotter v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.1989) (finding that a violation could not be clearly established where no case had held so previously); see also Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1220 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). While the dissent discounts Hall’s statement Holdings: 0: holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had 1: holding officer did not violate fourth amendment by taking defendant into custody under  5150 where it was reasonable to infer from facts known to detaining officer that plaintiff was at least temporarily disordered and as a result of mental disorder was a danger to herself 2: holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself 3: holding that a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to detain a person under section 5150 after she alluded to committing suicide despite her protest that the officer should have known the allusion was merely hyperbole 4: holding arrest was valid because there was probable cause of cdw even though officer incorrectly believed at the time that he had probable cause of ppw


Input: review conducted by the Department of Children and Family Services, Office of Administrative Hearings. Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.014(4)(a)-(b). If the parent fails to make a timely review request, the parent is deemed to have waived the right to contest the certification, and the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement must notify the United States Department of the Treasury of the past-due support owed by the parent. Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.014(4)(d). The Secretary of the Treasury is required to withhold from a tax refund “an amount equal to the past-due support.” 42 U.S.C. § 664(a)(l)-(2). The Department shall retain the intercepted tax refund “up to the amount of past-due support assigned to the department as a condition of eligibility for temp Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). The Department further claims that the trial Holdings: 0: holding constitutional challenge to void statute may be raised for first time on appeal 1: holding that the propriety of an order modifying child support without proper pleading notice and opportunity to be heard may be raised for the first time on appeal 2: holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered 3: holding that the sovereign immunity defense may be raised for the first time on appeal 4: holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal


Input: to future PIP benefits by executing the release. In so arguing, Bear River relies on language in its insurance policy with the Walls stating that the insured shall not be entitled to receive “duplicate benefits.” However, as Bear River recognizes in its brief, the duty to pay PIP benefits to the insured is governed by Utah law. Utah’s no-fault statute requires that insurance policies bought to satisfy the security requirements of Utah law contain provisions providing for minimum PIP benefits. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302(2) (1994). Therefore, an insurance policy may not limit the insured’s right to receive minimum PIP benefits as provided by Utah law, as this would violate those provisions of the Utah no-fault statute. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231, 233-36 (Utah 1985) (<HOLDING>); Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263, Holdings: 0: holding household or family exclusion clause in automobile insurance policy contravenes statutory requirements found in utahs nofault statute as to minimum benefits which must be provided to all persons sustaining personal injuries 1: holding that the mcca was not obligated to indemnify a claim under a california automobile insurance policy that was reformed into a michigan nofault automobile insurance policy five years after the subject accident and stating that the mcca can refuse to indemnify claims paid under mcl 5003163 2: holding that united states in ftca action may rely on immunities available to a private automobile owner covered by new jerseys nofault insurance law even though it was not literally the owner of an automobile under the new jersey statute 3: holding that household exclusion clauses in policies of automobile liability insurance are contrary to public policy 4: holding that in order for claim to be within scope of coverage of title insurance policy it must be specifically provided for


Input: did not err in concluding that Tenala had failed to carry its burden to show adverse possession of the disputed strip after 1984. C. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Holding that Mayo Adversely Possessed a Portion of the Northern End of Lot 5D, but Erroneously Determined the South Boundary Line of the Mayo Lot. Tenala does not dispute that the Ma-yos’ physical encroachments and use of the northern end of Lot 5D possess the requisite characteristics for acquiring a fee simple estate; Tenala argues instead that the better public policy would be to award an easement. Tenala’s arguments are contrary to the existing law, which holds that fee simple title is acquired if all of the required elements of adverse possession are met. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Curtiss, 684 P.2d 842, 849 (Alaska 1984) (<HOLDING>). The law has long recognized adverse Holdings: 0: holding that   1635f completely extinguishes the right of rescission at the end of the 3year period 1: holding that title automatically vests in the adverse possessor at the end of the statutory period if all the requirements are met 2: holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end 3: recognizing that insurance policy may lapse if the statutory renewal notice requirements are met 4: holding that even if statutory requirements are met courts must inquire into totality of the circumstances to determine if waiver was knowing and voluntary


Input: therefore, our review is limited to a determination of whether the admission of this evidence amounted to “plain error.” “Plain error” has been defined as including error so grave as to deny a fundamental right of the defendant so that, absent the error, the jury would have reached a different result. State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 22, 409 S.E.2d 288, 300 (1991). The Confrontation Clause prohibits testimonial statements from an unavailable witness being presented at trial without the defendant having an opportunity to cross-examine the witness prior to trial. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-52, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 187 (2004). It is clear that Ms. Charlesworth’s report was testimonial in nature. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, — U.S. —, —, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314, 321-22 (2009) (<HOLDING>). There was no evidence that defendant had an Holdings: 0: holding that lab reports are accusatory and subject to confrontation clause 1: holding that testimonial statements are subject to the requirements of the confrontation clause even if they are otherwise admissible under the hearsay exception for excited utterances 2: holding that the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay 3: holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements 4: holding that reports of chemical analyses were testimonial in nature and subject to the confrontation clause requirements


Input: (1979). Accordingly, in the interest of justice, SMUD is granted 30 days to amend the June 9, 1998 Complaint to articulate the regulatory takings claim discussed in the December 16, 2002 Response at 15 and properly allege the threshold elements discussed above. The Government’s motion to dismiss as to Count IV is denied. 2. Count V — Taking Of Real Property Claim. The complaint also alleges that the Government’s breach has “forced SMUD to devote economically valuable real property to the storage of the SNF in the ISFSI. The government has taken this real property by denying SMUD its rights as owner of this property to put it to other valuable economic uses.” Compl. at ¶ 72; see also id. at ¶¶ 71-73. Real property is constitutionally protected. See Cienega Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1328-31 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, taking these allegations as true, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 1: recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest 2: holding that forfeiture of real property may be adjudicated before the seizure occurs because real property cannot abscond 3: holding that inmates have a property interest in their money 4: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in vested contractual rights


Input: Koenig v. Perez, 104 N.M. 664, 665, 726 P.2d 341, 342 (1986)); Garrity v. Overland Sheeps kin Co. of Taos, 121 N.M. 710, 718, 917 P.2d 1382, 1390 (1996) (same); Tabet Lumber Co. v. Romero, 117 N.M. 429, 431, 872 P.2d 847, 849 (1994) (same). At issue in the vast majority of summary judgment eases presented to New Mexico’s appellate courts is the first prong; that is, whether there are genuine issues of material fact. See, e.g., Silva v. Town of Springer, 121 N.M. 428, 433, 912 P.2d 304, 309, (Ct.App.) (concluding that a material disputed factual issue existed precluding the grant of summary judgment), cert. denied, 121 N.M. 375, 911 P.2d 883, and cert. denied, 121 N.M. 444, 913 P.2d 251 (1996); Blauwkamp v. University of N.M. Hosp., 114 N.M. 228, 233, 836 P.2d 1249, 1254 (Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). In such cases, the rationale behind the Holdings: 0: holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity 1: holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves 2: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate 3: holding that a probable cause determination is appropriate for summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact and no credibility issues 4: holding that plaintiffs re sponse to defendants motion for summary judgment indicated the existence of material issues of fact


Input: suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” See Hahn v. Mirda, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 748, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 (2007). Here, because Ford, as discussed above, owed plaintiffs no duty to disclose the risk that its ignition locks would fail, Ford is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claim. See Oestreieher II, 322 Fed.Appx. at 493 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs’ Holdings: 0: holding because plaintiff had not alleged defendant made a misrepresentation or that the alleged defect posed a safety risk the district court  properly dismissed plaintiffs  fraudulent concealment claim 1: holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim 2: holding that alleged defects in special interrogatories could not be the basis for a new trial when counsel had not pointed out the alleged defect to the court 3: holding plaintiffs misrepresentation claim preempted where the only alleged misrepresentations shown by plaintiff were those contained in their labeling or safety data sheet 4: holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment


Input: a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction. See NMSA 1978, § 30-2-l(A)(l); SCRA 1986, 14-201. Defendant’s conviction is AFFIRMED. IT IS SO ORDERED. MONTGOMERY and FROST, JJ., concur. 1 . Defendant raised numerous other issues in his docketing statement. These issues, however, are deemed to be waived as defendant did not brief or argue them on appeal. See State v. Clark, 108 N.M. 288, 311, 772 P.2d 322, 345, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct. 291, 107 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989). 2 . The record does not contain evidence that the State intentionally deprived defendant of the shoes. However, the State "concede[d] that it may have breached its duty to the defendant [to preserve that evidence]." See State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 368, 369, 600 P.2d 820, 821 (1979) Holdings: 0: holding that to consider whether to apply a spoliation sanction the evidence must be relevant to an issue in the case and the party who destroyed the evidence must be under a duty to preserve the evidence 1: recognizing that a 11 evidence must be relevant to be admissible 2: recognizing the practical difficulties of contemporaneous objections to a trial judges conduct 3: recognizing states duty to preserve relevant evidence where practical 4: holding that the states duty to preserve evidence attaches at the time the state has gathered and taken possession of the evidence