Input: (J.A. at 179.) The district court reasoned that “[i]f the parents believed that [FBDS was] denying the hool Disk 200 v. Illinois State Bd. of Ed., 79 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir.1996) (stating that the IDEA’S authorization to courts to grant “appropriate” relief “encompasses the full range of equitable remedies and therefore empowers a court to order adult compensatory education if necessary to cure a violation”); Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir.1994) (same); Pihl v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir.1993) (same); Hall v. Knott County Bd. of Ed., 941 F.2d 402, 407 (6th Cir.1991) (same); Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853, 857-58 (11th Cir. 1988) (same); Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Compensatory education involves Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff who proves a cause of action under  1981 may recover punitive damages where the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages even if nominal 1: recognizing appropriateness of compensatory education award and holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory education if she prevailed in her claim that she was denied a fape for several years 2: recognizing appropriateness in some circumstances of award of compensatory education beyond age 21 and re manding for determination of whether it should be awarded 3: recognizing that family court cannot eliminate compensatory part of maintenance award 4: recognizing appropriateness in some circumstances of award of compensatory education beyond age 21 and remanding for determination of whether it should be awarded


Input: S.W.2d 426, 431-2 (Mo. banc 1985). “A duty may .... be imposed by the legislature or the common law based upon a relationship between the parties,” or “imposed by a court under the circumstances of a given case based upon what the tort-feasor knew or should have known.” Strickland, 849 S.W.2d at 132; See also, Hoover’s Dairy, Inc., 700 S.W.2d at 431. However, no duty is owed to persons outside “the orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance.” Krause, 787 S.W.2d at 710, quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad fireworks company personally hable for employee’s injuries where president personally held a board directly against spinning spool of fuse to prop it up, with the fuse catching fire and burning employee operating the machine); Tauchert, 849 S.W.2d at 574(<HOLDING>); Biller, 795 S.W.2d at 634(finding corporate Holdings: 0: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed 1: holding summary judgment improper against employee where supervisor had personally arranged the faulty elevator hoist system 2: holding that a county was entitled to summary judgment where the claims against the individual defendants had failed 3: holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them 4: holding that where there was no evidence that program director was personally or directly involved in alleged violation of constitutional rights or that as supervisor she knew about allegedly unlawful conduct and facilitated approved or deliberately ignored it summary judgment was properly granted in her favor in  1983 action


Input: We addressed a similar circumstance in Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2001). In Frazier, a crime-scene investigator challenged the district court’s conclusion that his job’s essential functions included being able to run, carry a firearm, and physically restrain offenders. Frazier, 254 F.3d at 1250-51. We agreed with the district court that these were essential functions, regardless of how infrequently a crime-scene investigator may have to do them. We explained that even “assuming that an investigator may be required to perform these physical activities infrequently, the potential for physical confrontation with a suspect exists any time [the plaintiff] conducts a crime scene investigation.” Id. at 1260; see Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Trustees Holdings: 0: recognizing the potentially dire consequences of not requiring a corrections officer to be able to run restrain violent offenders or respond to emergencies 1: holding that a pro se party must be advised of consequences of failing to respond to a dispositive motion including an explanation that the failure to respond  may result in the district court granting the motion and dismissing the case 2: holding that unable to respond constitutes no response 3: holding that the secretary of corrections is not a law enforcement officer under the tca 4: holding that legitimate law enforcement interests were served by local police officers delay while waiting for state police officer to arrive to conduct dwi investigation because state officers had more dwi experience and local officers needed to be available to respond to emergencies


Input: provides that a statement made by a child is admissible only if, inter alia, “the child has at some time before the making of the statement received from the magistrate a warning that the child may remain silent and not make any statement at all and that any statement the child makes may be used in evidence against [him].” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see also § 51.095(a)(5). In Sosa v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a warning of rights made to any adult defendant that differs only slightly from the language of the statute governing the admissibility of evidence — in that case, article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure — complies with the statute as long as it conveys its exact meaning. 769 S.W.2d 909, 915-16 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Subsequent criminal cases, many unpublished Holdings: 0: holding that defendants prior arrests were insufficient to establish that defendant was aware of his right to appointed counsel even though he told dea officers that he understood his rights 1: holding that defendants written statement was voluntarily made when he was read his rights three times during course of evening in accordance with miranda and article 3822 and on each occasion defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights that he wished to waive them and that he wished to talk with fbi agents 2: holding that even though defendant stated he did not read and discuss psr with his counsel he could not show any error that affected his substantial rights 3: holding that defendant received requisite notice under rule 11 where inter alia he acknowledged at plea hearing that he had read the information understood it and discussed it with his attorney 4: holding the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his bedroom based upon evidence that defendant 1 did not contest the fact that he had voluntarily given verbal consent to the search 2 did not appear to be nervous or scared and was cooperative with the officers 3 led officers to his bedroom and 4 was present for the search and did not indicate at any time that he wished to revoke his consent


Input: is not the test.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). III. DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 and Constitutional Claims Defendants correctly argue that plaintiffs § 1983 claim, through which he seeks vindication of a variety of constitutional rights, is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The time limitations for § 1983 claims are governed by the state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (“When Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law ... ”); Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 372, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004) (<HOLDING>). In Connecticut, the limitations period for Holdings: 0: recognizing a fouryear statute of limitation for fraud claims 1: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations set out in 28 usc  2244d applies to  2241 petitions 2: holding that new uniform fouryear statute of limitations in 28 usc  1658 only applies to lawsuits made possible by post1990 enactments 3: holding that fouryear residual statute of limitations applied to claim for commonlaw rescission 4: holding that 28 usc  2401 is a jurisdictional statute of limitations


Input: be “futile” because the state courts’ procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir.2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (post-conviction review is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). A state post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F,3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). This type of procedural default is known as Holdings: 0: holding that circuit court should have treated the habeas petition as a motion for postconviction relief 1: recognizing untimeliness under ariz rcrim p 324a as a basis for dismissal of an arizona petition for postconviction relief distinct from preclusion under rule 322a 2: holding that a petition to correct sentence was properly considered as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 371 because it challenged a judgment entered on a plea of guilty on grounds cognizable under the rule 3: recognizing a defendant may seek postconviction relief pursuant to rule 32 ariz rcrim p on ground that trial counsel had been ineffective by inducing defendant to enter guilty plea 4: holding statute of limitations for filing petition for postconviction relief not tolled by general savings statute tolling limited to reasons enumerated in state postconviction relief act


Input: serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 466 F.3d at 613-14, 615 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Nonetheless he argues that, in light of language in other opinions and the Golden dissent, we should reconsider our holding in Golden. See Chambers, 473 F.3d at 727 (in dicta) (noting that future research establishing whether failures to report or return to jail actually present a serious risk of physical injury might call into question the characterization of such crimes as violent felonies); Golden, 466 F.3d at 616-19 (Williams, J., dissenting) (reasoning that failure to report to jail does not create a serious risk of physical injury, and opining that characterizing it as such raises due process concerns); United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). But in Chambers we recently rejected a Holdings: 0: holding that california residential burglary is categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause of ussg  4b12a2 which requires the criminal conduct to present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another 1: holding that the texas offense of possession of a prohibited weapon could only qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause of  4b12a2 2: holding that  16 encompasses conduct that constitutes a crime of violence ie breaking into and entering a persons home see ussg  4b12a2 burglary of a dwelling is a crime of violence and conduct that almost certainly does not ie breaking into and entering a vehicle  3: holding that  459 is categorically a crime of violence under guidelines  4b12a2 because the usual or ordinary firstdegree burglary in california involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical violence and injury to others 4: holding that a peaceful failure to return to a halfway house is not a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a2 a provision analogous to  924e2bii


Input: of cocaine. We review the district court’s denial of a section 2241 petition de novo, see Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1178, 120 S.Ct. 1214, 145 L.Ed.2d 1115 (2000), and we affirm. Quintero contends that the district court erred by dismissing his section 2241 petition, alleging that the Government breached the plea agreement by failing to file a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b). This contention is without merit. The district court correctly determined that Quintero’s claims were more properly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and that his inability to bring a second or successive motion under section 2255 does not render federal habeas relief ineffective or inadequate. See Moore, 185 F.3d at 1055 (<HOLDING>); Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that a subcontract agreement could not circumvent the requirements of section 327a 1: holding that a petitioner may not circumvent the requirements of the aedpa by filing a section 2241 petition 2: holding that  2253clas requirements apply when a state habeas petitioner is proceeding under  2241 3: holding that utility customers mailing of a petition did not constitute the filing of the petition as filing was not effectuated until the petition was received by the clerk 4: holding that a petitioner may amend a habeas petition rather than filing a second or successive petition when the first petition has not yet reached a final decision


Input: of a train of vehicles; that is registered in Indiana and manufactured or assembled after January 1, 1956, must be equipped with at least two (2) tail lamps mounted on the rear that, when lighted, complies with this section. The trial court construed this statute as requiring “only that a motor vehicle be equipped with at least one (1) tail lamp mounted on the rear that when lighted emits a red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear.” App. p. 29. This construction of the statute apparently relies only upon subsection (a); however, subsection (c) applies to vehicles manufactured after January 1, 1956, such as Cunningham’s vehicle undisputedly was, and requires two operating tail lamps. See Freeman v. State, 904 N.E.2d 340, 342-43 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (<HOLDING>). We recently re-addressed Section 9-19-6-4 in Holdings: 0: holding that court did not err by refusing to charge jury with exercise of judgment instruction where issue was whether nurse had duty to constantly monitor patient because case did not involve selection between one of two courses of treatment or two schools of thought 1: holding in light of several red flags  that brokers reliance on approval of firm and its lawyers did not negate finding that he acted willfully 2: holding in light of this courts decision in harkness ii that section 774 was not an unconstitutional infringement on this courts exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law 3: holding that section 91964 requires vehicles to have two constantly illuminated tail lamps that emit red light that a rearmounted brakeonly red light does not satisfy this requirement and stop of vehicle was justified where one of vehicles tail lamps was burned out 4: holding that a false light claim requires pleading and proof of special damages


Input: the portion of the statute affecting Sharper Image. As appellant. argues, however, “[t]he demarcation between the favored and non-favored classifications of taxpayers in Eastern, i.e., between agricultural and fishing interests on the one hand, and airlines on the other, was not itself an unconstitutional distinction,” whereas in this casé the line separating taxable and nontaxable publications has been drawn based on unconstitutional criteria, i.e., the contents of those publications. Because appellant’s constitutional claim thus involves a content-based approach to taxation of publications, it does appear, contrary to appellee’s assertion, that appellant has standing. See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1726-27, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987) (<HOLDING>). See also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 Holdings: 0: holding that publisher of general interest magazine had standing to challenge constitutionality of sales tax scheme which exempted sales of newspapers and religious journals even though it did not publish such newspapers or religious journals 1: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise 2: holding that exercising general jurisdiction over defendant was improper where its actual sales in florida were a small percentage of the total sales and therefore these sales were de minimis  3: holding that iowa sales and use tax law as amended is of general application 4: holding property lien for nonpayment of sales tax was beyond boroughs authority to collect sales tax


Input: frauds. Mineral interests are treated as real property interests and are therefore subject to the rules relating to real property, including the statute of frauds. See Hill v. Heritage Resources, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89, 134 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997). Therefore, a lease of mineral rights for longer than one year must be in writing. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 26.01(b)(5). Thus, if the Letter Agreement here is a contract with a missing term, then it must meet the statute of frauds. If the future agreement is covered by the statute of frauds, then the agreement to make a future agreement must also meet the statute of frauds. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. C. Springs, 300, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009) (citing Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen, 221 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tex.2007) (<HOLDING>)). If the Letter of Agreement is an agreement Holdings: 0: holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract 1: holding that the statute of frauds bars a breach of contract claim based on an oral agreement to enter a future employment contract that would need to meet the statute of frauds 2: holding a court must find among other things clear evidence of the existence of an oral agreement for part performance to remove the contract from the statute of frauds 3: holding that where an oral contract was removed from the statute of frauds by clear and convincing evidence under arkansas law the defendant could not terminate the contract at its will only a contract of indefinite duration may be so terminated  4: holding sufficient part performance of an oral trust agreement is required to remove it from the statute of frauds


Input: that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id. {14} A statutory scheme providing for the receipt of government benefits may give rise to property interests protected by the due process clause. In Mathews, the United States Supreme Court determined that the private interest affected by state action was the claimant’s continued receipt ofbenefits, which was a source of income, pending a final decision on his claim for Social Security disability benefits. See 424 U.S. at 339-40. Similarly, a private interest affected by state action is a claimant’s continued receipt of welfare benefits. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.Ct 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (<HOLDING>); Roth, 408 U.S. at 576 (“a person receiving Holdings: 0: holding that an administrator was not in substantial compliance with  1133 where the initial denial notice omitted one of the grounds later relied on for the denial of benefits 1: holding that a termination of benefits must go handinhand with a termination of the liability of an employer 2: holding that the pretermination hearing has one function only to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare departments grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of his benefits citations omitted 3: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of social security disability benefits 4: holding that the district courts application of batson was clearly erroneous but then reviewing the record to make our own determination as to the validity of the objection


Input: that if the appropriator does not own the land he intends to irrigate, at least rightful possession - that is, a possessory interest - is necessary to his acquisition of a valid water right. This requirement is satisfied by lawful entry and settlement on public lands or a bona fide intent to acquire title to both land and water, or by one holding lands under contract for its purchase. Also acceptable is rightful possession of land under a contract with the owner the nature of which does not appear in the record. Hutchins, at 263-64. See also In re Powder River Drainage Area, 216 Mont. 361, 702 P.2d 948 (1895) (validating stockwater rights appropriated by lessees on and for use on school trust land, even though ownership accrued to state); Sayre v. Johnson, 33 Mont. 15, 81 P. 389 (1905) (<HOLDING>); Bullerdick v. Hermsmeyer, 32 Mont 541, 81 P. Holdings: 0: holding that appropriation protects the right of an earlier appropriator to the extent of his beneficial use against a later appropriator 1: holding that land that is permanently appropriated to an inconsistent use is abandoned 2: holding that subsequent patent did not convey lands that had previously been appropriated it is a familiar principle of public land law that statutes providing generally for disposal of the public domain are inapplicable to lands which are not unqualifiedly subject to sale and disposition because they have been appropriated to some other purpose the general words of the granting act are to be read as subject to such exception 3: recognizing validity of water right appropriated to irrigate land appropriator only occupied on public domain 4: recognizing validity of water rights appropriated on public domain for use on school trust land even though appropriator did not own or intend to patent place of use


Input: 1150, 1155 (2d Cir.1978) (an employee “only needs to demonstrate that [she] possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the job.”). Tomassi suffered an adverse employment action because her employment was terminated. See Cordoba v. Beau Deitl & Assoc., No. 02 Civ. 4951, 2003 WL 22902266, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.8, 2003). Finally, the fact that her responsibilities were taken over by a newly-hired 25-year-old is enough to warrant the inference — at the prima facie stage — that Tomassi was the victim of age discrimination. See id. (terminating an employee in the protected age group while retaining a 27 year old and 34 year old is enough to warrant the inference that the plaintiff was the victim of age discrimination); see also Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, Insignia and MetLife can rebut Holdings: 0: holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add count when no prejudice resulted from two and onehalf year delay and facts underlying new and old counts were similar 1: holding that it is wellsettled that rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues presenting the case under new theories  or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple 2: holding that when a 56year old employee was replaced by a 40year old employee this qualified as someone substantially younger for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case 3: holding inference is warranted when a 67 year old is replaced by a 59 year old 4: holding that a change between old and new rules was fundamental to a degree that impacts our jurisdiction over the plaintiffs challenges to the old rules


Input: this case, argued that “the sole significance of [roadlessness] is that the [roadless] parcel is potentially eligible for wilderness designation.” Id. at 1077. Because the Forest Service was not required to consider permanent protection for the areas at issue, see id. at 1074 (citing the Washington State Wilderness Act, Pub.L. No. 98-339, 98 Stat. 299 (1984)), the Forest Service maintained that “the fact that a parcel of ... land is roadless is, in itself, immaterial and need not be addressed in NEPA documents.” Id. at 1078. We rejected that argument, observing that roadlessness has environmental significance apart from permanent wilderness preservation and, as a result, “[t]hat the land has been released by Congress for nonwilderness use does not excuse the agency from comp ir.1997) (<HOLDING>). We review final agency action under § Holdings: 0: holding a rod to be final agency action 1: holding it well settled that a final eis or the record of decision issued thereon constitute  final agency action  2: holding that the rod and eis for a program were final agency action 3: holding that the designation of the rod as final agency action under the apa is generally recognized 4: holding that it appears wellestablished that a final eis or the rod issued thereon constitute the final agency action for purposes of the apa and collecting cases


Input: must provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the property owner, see Systems Contractors Corp. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 148 F.3d 571, 575-76 (5th Cir.1998) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)), for “[w]hen protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount,” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). The “root requirement” of due process is “that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.” McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Dept. of Bus. Regulation of Fla., 496 U.S. 18, 37, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. 58 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, the state provides unsuccessful bidders Holdings: 0: holding that a state court injunction was an adequate predeprivation remedy in a condemnation case where the property owner received notice 30 days before the demolition and could file an injunction that automatically halted any demolition plans by the city 1: holding that the relevant inquiry when assessing irreparable injury is whether there is an adequate remedy in the absence of an injunction 2: holding that the failure of the applicant to file a bond before the issuance of the temporary injunction renders the injunction void ab initio 3: holding an appeal of injunction moot where the injunction expired three months before the appellate court heard arguments in the case 4: holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy


Input: which was so inflammatory that it necessarily prevented a fair trial. Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir.1998); see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 923 (9th Cir.2006) (“Even if there are no permissible inferences the jury can draw from the evidence in question, due process is violated only if the evidence is of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has made “very few rulings regarding the admission of evidence as a violation of due process”; specifically, it has never “made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant the issuance of the writ.” Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101; see McGuire, 502 U.S. at 70, 112 S.Ct. 475 (<HOLDING>). The court of appeal was not objectively Holdings: 0: holding violation of rule 23a does not entitle petitioner to habeas relief 1: holding that admission of evidence must be fundamentally unfair to constitute a due process violation 2: holding that the mere fact that relevant evidence is shocking to the sensibilities does not make the admission of that evidence a violation of due process 3: holding that admission of relevant evidence generally not due process violation warranting habeas relief 4: holding that evidence of specific competitive injury establishes irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief


Input: 979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981). In this respect, she needs only to prove that she has suffered an adverse personnel action that was causally-related to her engaging in protected activity. See Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen, 843 F.2d 1395, 1423 (D.C.Cir.1988). Here we have a proposed stipulation by the defendants that the plaintiff at all times relevant to her retaliation claim engaged in protected activity. This means that at the forthcoming trial the jury should be informed generally about the plaintiffs prior allegations of sexual harassment, but not about the specific events underlying the same. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence mandates such a procedure. See Morris v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 702 F.2d 1037, 1043 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, at trial, the jury shall be informed of Holdings: 0: holding that where the defendant was in default the district court correctly accepted the fact allegations of the complaint as true 1: holding that speech about financial assistance and handling racial discrimination does not qualify as protected speech 2: holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been 3: holding in a retaliation case that the trial court correctly excluded testimony about the details of the plaintiffs race discrimination complaint where the defendant had stipulated to the protected nature of the plaintifps speech 4: holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected


Input: (6) whether the alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Id. In applying these factors, only the “clearest proof’ that a law is punitive in effect will overcome a legislative categorization to the contrary. Commonwealth v. Williams, 574 Pa. 487, 505, 832 A.2d 962, 973 (2003). There is not the “clearest proof’ of the seven factors that are required to demonstrate that 24 P.S. § 1 — 111(e)(1) is so punitive in either its purpose or its effect so as to negate the General Assembly’s intent that it be civil in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Regarding the first factor, while the lifelong ban from certain employment positions is hars 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898) (<HOLDING>). Regarding the third factor, the employment Holdings: 0: holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment 1: holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function 2: holding that the jury is not to consider the potential punishment which could result from a conviction 3: holding that prohibiting felons from practicing medicine is not punishment 4: holding that forbidding felons from working as union officials is not punishment


Input: also could have gone forward with filling its land without a permit. The cease and desist order (or, in this case, the injunction) was the point at which the agency first asserted regulatory jurisdiction over the landowner. Up to that point, no permit was required either in Tabb Lakes or here. To the extent Boise argues that the ESA did hot give the district court the power to enjoin logging without a permit, its argument is not well taken. First, as discussed above, a takings claim before'the Court of Federal Claims cannot ask that court to review the propriety of a district court’s handling of a case. Second, as the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held, the district court did have the authority to enjoin Boise from logging. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 Holdings: 0: holding that a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species is sufficient for issuance of an injunction under section 9 of the esa 1: holding that even though irreparable harm is not required it had been shown and weighed in favor of issuance of the preliminary injunction 2: holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence 3: recognizing that irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction 4: holding that if defendants violated substantive or procedural provision of esa a court does not have traditional equitable discretion instead any threatened harm is per se irreparable harm and  public interest always favors the imposition of an injunction


Input: and which did not provide any indication of the grounds on which it was based. We noted that a requirement that District Courts accompany such orders with some articulation of their reasoning would not impose a serious burden, would assist parties in crafting appellate briefs responsive to dis-positive issues, and would clearly frame appellate review. Thus, we exercised our supervisory power “to require the district courts in this circuit to accompany grants of summary judgment hereafter with an explanation sufficient to permit the parties and this court' to understand the legal premise for the court’s order.” Vadino, 903 F.2d at 259. Other situations in which we have established similar supervisory rules include, e.g., Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 295 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (citation and internal quotation marks Holdings: 0: holding defendants failure to file motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict did not prevent district court from granting motion for directed verdict for which court reserved decision 1: holding that a court entering a directed verdict pursuant to rule 50 should set forth an explanation sufficient to permit this court to understand the legal premise for the courts order 2: holding that appellate court will not remand a case to the district court for a violation of rule 50 if the district courts rationale is apparent from the record 3: holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict 4: holding that a trial court had the authority to impose a default judgment as a sanction for violating a rule 16 scheduling order pursuant to rule 37b2 stating we agree with the basic premise that a default sanction can under certain circumstances be an appropriate response to a violation of a rule 16 order after all the express terms of rule 37 permit a trial court to impose sanctions when a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery


Input: of money, funds, or other assets from the financial institution. United States v. Christo, 129 F.3d 578, 580 (11th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836, 847 (4th Cir.1994)). Any conduct charged in the indictment which may have placed the bank at a financial risk occurred prior to June 19, 1987. Once Anderson had control of the money, the scheme ended. Otherwise, under the government’s theory, the scheme could continue as long as Anderson maintained control of the money, thus defeating the purpose of criminal statutes of limitations. So long as she did not take part in any additional conduct that would have placed the bank at a separate, distinguishable risk, the statute of limitations continues to run. Cf. United States v. Meador, 138 F.3d 986, 994 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The conduct on which the government hangs its Holdings: 0: holding that the legislature never intended for the dismissal and renewal statutes to overcome the statute of repose 1: holding that criminal statutes of limitation should be construed in favor of the accused 2: recognizing risks in construing statutes of limitations in favor of repose 3: holding that statute of repose was not subject to toiling provision applicable to statute of limitations because among other reasons it would ignore fundamental distinctions between ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose 4: holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose


Input: plaintiffs, the allegations do not satisfy their minimal pleading requirements. Accordingly, plaintiffs do not satisfy the requirements of prudential standing, and their Equal Protection claim is dismissed. Even if the court were to conclude that plaintiffs had standing to pursue their Equal Protection claim, it would nonetheless fail on the merits. As defendants correctly point out, any burden on the right to interstate travel here is minimal and insufficient to constitute a deprivation. They cite several cases in support of their contention that “something more than negligible or minimal impacts on the right to travel is required ...” in order to invalidate a state action allegedly discriminating against the fundamental right to travel. Kan. v. U.S., 16 F.3d 436, 442 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Barber v. State of Haw., 42 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring 1: holding that the wright amendment an air traffic regulation restricting air traffic from love field in the dallasforth worth area did not violate the right to travel because any impact on interstate travel  even air travel to and from the dallasfort worth area  is negligible 2: holding that an air traffic controllers failure to report weather conditions from another faa location to a planes pilot was not negligent 3: holding that the construction of a median in a roadway that causes traffic traveling to and from an abutting property to travel a cireuitous route does not constitute a compensable taking under indiana eminent domain law 4: holding that time was compensable where the crew was required to travel in the employers vehicle to job sites


Input: of paternity, the party so requesting a jury has the right thereto.” 4 In the trial court, respondent argued in his memorandum opposing the department’s effort to change the trial from a jury trial to a court trial, in part: “no legislative intent is present on the face of the legislation that would indicate a retroactive application of the legislation is appropriate. Absent such clear intention, the presumption is that the legislation should not be applied to pending cases.” 5 The dissent resorts to legislative history without a determination that there is an ambiguity. The fact that two statutes appear to conflict does not amount to an ambiguity that would allow the court to rely on legislative history. See J.R. Simplot Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 321 Or 253, 262, 897 P2d 316 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Further, the dissent’s analysis is Holdings: 0: holdingafter considering the statutes whole text legislative history and purpose  that a consumer fraud provision did not impose criminal sanctions 1: recognizing longstanding precedents that permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text 2: holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear 3: holding that the court does not examine legislative history when the statutes text and context are not subject to more than one plausible reading 4: holding that we may consult legislative history as an aid to the interpretation of ambiguous text


Input: Univ., 979 F.2d 552, 553 (7th Cir.1992). In this case, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Zakaras’ claims were filed within 300 days of the discriminatory act. The “accrual date” of a plaintiffs claim is the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir.1990). In cases of alleged discriminatory demotion (or termination), the period begins to run on the date the employee is notified that he will be demoted. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (“limitations periods commenced to run when the [adverse employment action] was made and [the employee] was notified.”); see also Murrell v. USF & G Ins., 81 F.Supp.2d 912, 921 (N.D.Ill.2000) (<HOLDING>). The pivotal question, therefore, is when did Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered 1: holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made 2: holding that accrual date begins to run on the date the employee is notified unambiguously of the adverse employment action 3: holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court 4: holding that rule 6e is inapplicable where the time for filing begins to run on the date of mailing


Input: dismissals of Counts I (Knowingly Presenting False Claims t strict court properly dismissed Smith’s case in response to the violation. The procedural requirements of the False Claims Act, including its seal provision, “are not jurisdictional, and violation of those requirements does not per se require dismissal.” Lujan, 67 F.3d at 245. Further, “[n]o provision of the False Claims Act explicitly authorizes dismissal as a sanction for disclosures in violation of the seal requirement.” Id. Thus, the False Claims Act, on its face, neither mandates nor expressly supports dismissal with prejudice. But we recognize that every other circuit to consider this issue has read such authority into the False Claims Act. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Summers v. LHC Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 287 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Lujan, 67 F.3d 242 (9th Cir.1995) (creating a Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs failure to raise his constitutional claims in the military court system bars him from raising them in federal court 1: recognizing autonomy of state and federal bars 2: holding that the requirements for establishing a rehabilitation act violation are similar to those for establishing an ada violation 3: holding that the court bars a party from raising an issue on remand that  was not raised on appeal 4: holding that violation of the seal requirements bars qui tam plaintiffs from qui tam status


Input: prior perjury conviction and her acknowledgment of guilt for that offense “ ‘did not influence the [fact finder], or had but slight effect.’ ” Clay, 262 Va. at 260, 546 S.E.2d at 731 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764, 66 S.Ct. at 1248, 90 L.Ed. at 1566). Because I believe our prior holdings in Cole and Craddock compel the conclusion that the trial court’s error was not harmless, I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. Thus, I respectfully dissent. 5 . Even if Pierce had later opted to testify, our case law would support the conclusion that this decision would not render harmless the court’s knowingly erroneous admission of impeachment evidence in the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief. Cf. Purvis v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 298, 309-10, 522 S.E.2d 898, 903 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The majority asserts "LeBray testified Holdings: 0: holding exclusion was harmless error 1: holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 2: recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error 4: holding erroneous refusal to sever offenses in bench trial is not harmless error where only fact that would render refusal harmless is defendants decision to testify and clear evidence establishes that the trial court  used the harmless error doctrine  prospectively  as a basis to disregard an established rule of law  quoting hackney v commonwealth 28 vaapp 288 296 504 se2d 385 389 1998 en banc


Input: that this court has consistently approved of consideration by the district court as relevant conduct pursuant to § lB1.3(a) conduct that was uncharged, that was charged in a count that was subsequently dismissed, or that was charged in a count of which the defendant was acquitted). We perceive no rational basis upon which to conclude that consideration of such relevant conduct for purposes of departure would create any greater difficul 5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (same); United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337, 341 (10th Cir.1990) (same), disapproved on other grounds, Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 198, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1118, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992); and United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 684 (2d Cir.1990) (same), with United States v. Harris, 70 F.3d 1001, 1002-04 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); and United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 927 Holdings: 0: holding it was unfair for the trial court to rely upon factors already considered in the presumptive sentence as a basis for a durational departure 1: holding that issues underlying all counts were sufficiently intertwined that the separate appeal of the summary judgment counts would complicate the trial of the remaining counts 2: holding that only factors specifically prohibited by the sentencing guidelines cannot form the basis for a downward departure 3: holding that severance was not required when a defendant was charged with five counts of forcible rape two counts of felonious restraint three counts of kidnapping two counts of armed criminal action two counts of forcible sodomy one count of second degree assault one count of first degree robbery and one count of stealing 4: holding that conduct from dismissed counts cannot be relied upon as a basis for departure


Input: that the time for filing them petition did not begin to run until their attorney received the BIA’s decision on September 15, 2008, and that since their petition was filed less than 30 days later, it was timely filed under section 1252(b)(1). Even if the time for filing a petition for review begins to run only when the BIA mails its decision to the petitioner’s, or petitioner’s counsel’s, address of record, Radkov v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 96, 99 (1st Cir.2004) (dicta); Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1258-59 (9th Cir.1996) (collecting cases), but see Nowak v. INS, 94 F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir.1996) (rejecting that proposition), that does not help petitioners here, who concede that the BIA mailed the decision to the correct address. See Nowak, 94 F.3d at 392; cf. Radkov, 375 F.3d at 99 (<HOLDING>). Respondent suggests that petitioners may ask Holdings: 0: holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen 1: holding that the bia did not err in putting the burden of proof to demonstrate grounds for granting a motion to reopen on the alien 2: holding that even if  the mailing  somehow went awry without any fault on the part of the bia that circumstance alone would not excuse the failure to file a timeous motion to reopen 3: holding that the bia does not err by denying a motion to reopen without an opposition from the government 4: holding that the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider with the bia does not toll the time period for seeking appellate court review and that the mere act of filing the motion does not render nonfinal the underlying bia decision


Input: v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 (87 SC 1056, 18 LE2d 62) (1967) (informant had provided information to affiant 15 or 16 times within the past year, resulting in numerous arrests and convictions); Clyatt v. State, 126 Ga. App. 779 (1), 781 (192 SE2d 417) (1972) ("within the past 90 days the informant had furnished information which resulted in the arrest of one person and the recovery of various illegal drugs”); Tomblin v. State, 128 Ga. App. 823 (1) (198 SE2d 366) (1973) (informant used "numerous times” in past and personally known to affiant for several years). Otherwise the police would be enabled to obtain search warrants to enter private homes on the basis of assertions so vague and conclusory that they could never be challenged. Cf. Franks v. Delaware, — U. S. — (57 LE2d 667) (1978) (<HOLDING>). In summary, we find that the language used in Holdings: 0: holding that a warrant was needed to perform an administrative search upon private property 1: holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause 2: holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant 3: holding that a defendant has a right to challenge the factual assertions in a search warrant upon a preliminary showing that they are untrue 4: holding that the fourth amendment requires that a defendant be allowed an opportunity to challenge the veracity of an affidavit supporting a search warrant


Input: is presumed when one spouse voluntarily separates from and abandons the other spouse without adequate legal reason. See Commonwealth ex rel. Udis v. Udis, 174 Pa.Super. 624, 101 A.2d 144, 145 (1953); 27 Am.Jur.2d Proof of Facts 737 § 2 (1981). Moreover, the law fails to require that the abandoned spouse, Kim in this case, be blameless. See 27 Am.Jur.2d Proof of Facts 737 § 3 (1981); see also Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, 172 A.D.2d 719, 569 N.Y.S.2d 107, 108 (N.Y.App.Div.1991). ¶ 38. A determination of whether Kim’s conduct rose to the necessary level should be based upon factual findings showing that Kim’s fault factually supported an independent ground for divorce or an independent contributory or proximate cause of the separation. See Goodwyn v. Goodwyn, 222 Va. 53, 278 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1981) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 39. The evidence in the record satisfied Holdings: 0: holding that a wife with a child from a prior relationship was not entitled to use and possession of the family home 1: holding that temporary cessation of sexual relations for less than two months prior to wifes hospitalization where wife worked and financially contributed to the family was insufficient to show wilful desertion 2: holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was at least somewhat capable of supporting herself where evidence of wifes depression and other mental health problems was uncontested but where other evidence showed that these conditions did not totally bind her to the family home and that wife had been financially successful in the past 3: holding that defendant who had been married for ten years was the main breadwinner for wife and two children and did chores for wifes grandmother did not have unusual family circumstances 4: holding that sufficient evidence of causation existed where adverse employment action occurred less than two months after protected activity


Input: as lacking in plausibility, and could reasonably have found 1950) (same); Kilduff v. Kalinowski, 136 Conn. 405, 71 A.2d 593, 594-95 (1950) (same). B. The Union’s Liability 1. Standard of Proof The Union argues that the Johnsons’ suit stems from a labor dispute and that therefore its liability should be governed by the “clear proof" requirement of the Norris-La-Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106, infra. Johnson sued his labor union for the harassment he suffered after testifying against other Union members at an arbitra tion hearing. Whether the events underlying the suit can be characterized as a labor dispute for the purposes of § 106 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is a close question. See Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145-47, 62 S.Ct. 520, 521-23, 86 L.Ed. 750 (1942) (<HOLDING>); Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained 1: holding that the district court erred in not determining whether the amount in controversy necessary to create diversity jurisdiction was met at the time of removal 2: holding that the critical element in determining whether the provisions of the norrislaguardia act apply is whether the employeremployee relationship is the matrix of the controversy 3: recognizing the motives of the officer as a critical factor in determining whether a particular instance of excessive force rises to the level of a constitutional violation 4: recognizing that the critical question is whether any present violation exists


Input: passenger gua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy" in the car or its contents. Id.; see also State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007-08 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (finding defendant passenger did not have an expectation of privacy in the car itself where he left some personal items in the glove box). T9 Bissegger argues, however, that she has standing to challenge the search of her personal belongings left in a closed container in the car. Although Utah appellate courts have not addressed this precise issue, other jurisdictions have overwhelmingly held that a separate search of a car passenger's personal belongings left in the car gives the passenger standing to challenge the search. See, e.g., United States v. Salazar, 805 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); People v. Manke, 181 Ill.App.3d 374, 130 Holdings: 0: holding that a car passenger had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his closed plastic shopping bag found on the floor of the car 1: holding that a car passenger had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his closed brown paper bag found on the floorboard of his companions car 2: holding evidence did not connect defendant to narcotics found in individual bags inside a larger bag in a car following the defendants car when the only connection was his fingerprints on outer bag and when the driver and passenger of the car in which the drugs were found exhibited nervousness and other factors indicating consciousness of guilt 3: holding that car passenger had legitimate expectation of privacy in his jacket found crumpled on the back seat of car 4: holding that the owner of a shoulder bag located on the front seat of his girlfriends car had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag and its contents


Input: potentially actionable claim against it — patent infringement — lies exclusively in federal court. In sum, the City argues that, because there is no possibility of liability against it if suit were ever filed in state district court, the state district court, likewise, has no jurisdiction over the Rule 202 petition. Even if we were to agree that the state district court would have no jurisdiction over the City for the claims that U.S. Filter seeks to investigate, the district court would have jurisdiction over Altivia. For example, if the depositions reveal facts constituting a civil conspiracy between the City and Altivia, U.S. Filter could pursue a claim against Altivia, even if the City were immune. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 30, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186-87, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980) (<HOLDING>); B.K. v. Cox, 116 S.W.3d 351, 358-59 Holdings: 0: holding that  1983 does not override a states eleventh amendment immunity 1: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 2: holding that immunity given judge under section 1983 does not inure to benefit of those accused of conspiring with him 3: holding that  1983 does not override states eleventh amendment immunity 4: holding that qualified immunity under  1983 does not apply to actions brought under  521


Input: to remain on bond pending sentencing. The court construed “exceptional” as meaning “a unique combination of circumstances giving rise to situations that are out of the ordinary.” See Lea, 360 F.3d at 403 (quoting United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir.1991)). It also favorably cited United States v. Lippold, 175 F.Supp.2d 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y.2001), which stated that “circumstances that are ‘purely personal’ do not typically rise to the level of ‘exceptional’ warranting release.” See id. The court then concluded that there was “nothing ‘exceptional’ about going to school, being employed, or being a first-time offender, either separately or in combination” that merited the defendant’s release pending sentencing. See id. at 403-04; see also Lippold, 175 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (<HOLDING>). The Court is persuaded by the reasoning of Holdings: 0: holding that hcv constitutes an objectively serious medical condition 1: holding that the district court erred when it departed based on defendants status as a single mother with three children under the age of four one of whom was being breastfed and where incarceration would require placing the children in foster care 2: holding that when the plaintiffs child was examined only once by a physician and was not required to be absent from day care for more than three days he had no serious medical condition within the meaning of the fmla 3: holding that taking care of three young children one of whom suffered from a serious medical condition and being needed at work were purely personal circumstances not exceptional reasons for release 4: holding that the district court erred when it departed based on the defendants status as a single mother with three children under the age of four one of whom was being breastfed and where incarceration would require placing the children in foster care


Input: Justice § 6-3.6 commentary at 6.39-40 (2d ed.1982 supp.) (footnotes omitted and alterations made in James I ). 12 . See James II, 739 P.2d at 1316; see also Evans v. State, 822 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Alaska App.1991). 13 . James II, 739 P.2d at 1316. 14 . Id. 15 . 663 P.2d 967 (Alaska App.1983). 16 . Id. at 970. 17 . Id. 18 . James I, 730 P.2d 811. 19 . - Id. at 814. 20 . Id. 21 . Id. at 814-15. 22 . James II, 739 P.2d at 1315. 23 . Id. 24 . Id. 25 . Id. at 1316. 26 . Kelly, 663 P.2d at 969. 27 . Id. at 970. 28 . James I, 730 P.2d at 819 (Singleton, J. dissenting). 29 . Id. at 815. 30 . James II, 739 P.2d at 1316. 31 . James I, 730 P.2d at 815 (Bryner, C.J., concurring). 32 . O'Dell v. Anchorage, 576 P.2d 104, 108 (Alaska 1978). 33 . See State v. Jones, 759 P.2d 558, 570 (Alaska App.1988) (<HOLDING>). 34 . James II, 739 P.2d at 1316; Kelly, 663 Holdings: 0: holding there is no constitutional right to an attorney much less an effective attorney in state postconviction proceedings 1: holding that where an attorney serves as trustee and attorney for the trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding the attorney must distinguish time spent in each role 2: holding a defendant must either supply an affidavit from his former attorney or show why the attorney will not supply an affidavit 3: holding an arrestee has the right to contact an attorney but not a specific attorney who is unavailable when called 4: holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term


Input: Corp., No. 02-681, 2007 Mass.Super. LEXIS 442, 2007 WL 3260199, *4-5 (Mass.Super.Ct. Sept. 25, 2007). But neither court held, as this Court does, that trial courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims. Indeed, in concluding that a plaintiff suing for allegedly defective Gen-3 buckles stated a cognizable claim, a Florida court noted: This case turns on a relatively simple question, at least as to damages — Is a car with defective seatbelt buckles worth less than a car with operational seatbelt buckles? Common sense indicates that it is, but, at this stage of the case, we need not decide that issue. Rather, we only determine that Collins is entitled to go forward with her case. Collins v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 894 So.2d 988, 989-90 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). The Court relies in part on Rivera v. Holdings: 0: holding that no products liability claim lies in admiralty when commercial party alleges injury only to product itself resulting in purely economic loss insofar as the tort concern with safety is reduced when an injury is only to the product itself 1: holding that allegations of intentional acts causing injury resulted in the complaint falling outside the coverage of an insurance policy insuring only against accidental injury 2: holding that florida consumer protection statute did not require that a defect manifest itself by failing to operate in an emergency or by causing injury  actual injury in form of insufficient product value was enough and whether allegations have merit remained to be decided 3: holding that if plaintiffs could not establish that the particular agent orange causing injury to the plaintiff was manufactured by that defendant then the burden would shift to each defendant to establish that its product could not have caused the plaintiffs injury or alternatively that it should only be responsible for a proportion of the damage 4: holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision


Input: error affected defendant’s substantial rights requires the defendant to “show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004). If there is “evidence tending to show that a misunderstanding was inconsequential to a defendant’s decision,” there is no effect on the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 84, 124 S.Ct. 2333. To affect a defendant’s substantial rights, there must be “nothing in the record [that] indicates that the defendant independently knew or was advised of the correct” mandatory minimum sentence. United States v. Smagola, 390 Fed.Appx. 438, 442 (6th Cir.2010) (unpublished); see also United States v. Syal, 963 F.2d 900, 906 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). While the record does seem to show that Holdings: 0: holding that invitederror doctrine precludes defendant from challenging sentence of supervised release where defendant requested sentence of supervised release 1: holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses 2: holding that courts failure to tell defendant in rule 11 plea hearing that he faced a mandatory period of supervised release was harmless error because the defendant was on notice of the supervised release requirement set out in the plea agreement and the defendant did not claim he was unaware of the requirement only that court technically had failed to comply with requirements of rule 3: holding that the failure to notify the defendant of the term of supervised release and its possible effect on his sentence was not harmless error where nothing in the record suggests that the defendant understood that his sentence would include supervised release and there was no written plea agreement by which he might have been warned 4: holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release


Input: that information.”). Rather, Beckley sought to supplement that report with relevant evidence relating to the topic of most concern to the trial court-information that was otherwise absent. 5 . While there is some contention in the brief that the motion for a continuance was not filed as quickly as it could have been because of informal discussions occurring between the State and Beckley's trial counsel relating to further psychological testing, that evidence is not contained in the record and we do not consider it here. 6 . Even if the dissent were correct in noting that the trial court “was well informed as to the detail and extent of Beckley’s perverse conduct,” infra ¶ 36, that is not the question. The question is whether Beckley was denied the statutory right to pre (S.D.1988) (<HOLDING>). Beckley's motion was filed six days prior to Holdings: 0: holding that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in denying a continuance because she acted within reason by accommodating the attorney 1: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance to allow defendant to present mitigating evidence in the form of letters and affidavits from family members when they were not requested until the day before the hearing 2: holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a continuance requested by telephone when the party requesting same was served with notice of the proceeding less than one hour before the hearing 3: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form 4: holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion


Input: case the debtor was clearly aware of the Plaintiffs’ claim, as evidenced by the fact that the lawsuit filed by Plaintiffs led to the bankruptcy filing. Thus, equity requires the allowance of the informal proof of claim because debtor’s sole argument is that Plaintiffs failed to follow a procedural step. Defendant Schoch argues that Nikolout-sos “is distinguishable from the case at bar because the creditor in that case filed a Complaint to Determine Dischargeability and specifically told the Court that the Complaint was being filed as an informal proof of claim.” [Docket No. 51, ¶ 44, Response to Plaintiffs’ Position Statement] While that may be accurate, an informal proof of claim can come in many forms. See, e.g., In re Anderson-Walker Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); In re Pizza of Hawaii, Inc., 761 F.2d 1374, Holdings: 0: holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee 1: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or 2: holding that bankruptcy discharge eliminates only a debtors personal liability and not the debt itself and that a bankruptcy trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and can bring a legal malpractice claim as trustee 3: holding that letters notifying the trustee of a debt constitute an informal proof of claim 4: holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt


Input: case: Equitable estoppel ... comes into play only after the statute of limitations has run and addresses itself to the circumstances in which a party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to an admittedly untimely action because his conduct has induced another into forebearing suit within the applicable limitations period. considering equitable estoppel as an avoidance of the statute of limitations involved plaintiffs that recognized the basis for the suit during the limitations period. The law in the district courts of appeal, on which we relied in both Morsani and S.A.P., has been identical. Every case that has applied the doctrine to avoid a statute of limitations defense involved plaintiffs who knew of their cause of action (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>); Salcedo v. Ass’n Cubana, Inc., 368 So.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period 1: holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations 2: holding that when the department of insurance acknowledged that it had received an accident report of a claim within the statute of limitations  it was thereafter estopped after the expiration of the statute of limitations to deny receipt of the claim 3: holding that the property appraiser was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations where the failure to bring the action within the limitations period was the direct result of the property appraisers failure to timely perform a related duty owed to plaintiff 4: holding that failure of the property appraiser to strictly comply with statutory notice provisions tolls the running of the sixtyday period within which to bring an action contesting a tax assessment


Input: photographs, items of personal hygiene, or other effects of a private nature whose public disclosure could offend a student’s reasonable expectations of privacy. Here, however, the search of KP.’s bag was conducted in the privacy of the principal’s conference room. Only school officials, no students, were present. More importantly, the search was presumably limited in good faith to actions necessary to uncover a metal object like a pistol. Such a search would not include an intentional hunt for other contraband, although if discovered, such items need not be ignored. For example, such a search would not entail reading written materials, scrutinizing photographs, activating cellphones, or inspecting small pockets, crevices, wallets, containers, or purses too small to harbor a gun. U 6) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180 Holdings: 0: holding that a random visual and manual search of bags and packages carried onto the new york city subway was minimally intrusive 1: holding that a search of bags carried onto an airplane was minimally intrusive 2: holding that random searches of subway passengers carryon bags which include the visual inspection of the contents of such bags to be minimal 3: holding tacit consent to search of person was insufficient to prove consent to search bags where bags were not in defendants actual possession defendant merely pointed out bags at officers request and officer never specifically asked for consent to search bags 4: holding that new york city agencies cannot be sued


Input: to “willfully and unlawfully entering] a building with the intent to commit theft” where the building was an “inhabited dwelling house [or other residential building] ... within the meaning of Penal Code section 460.” By pleading guilty, Rodriguez admitted the factual allegations in the indictment. See United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 852 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir.1995). Because Rodriguez’s conviction included the unlawful entry requirement absent in California’s statutory definition of burglary, his conviction meets the definition of “burglary of a dwelling” under Taylor and is, therefore, a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n. l(B)(iii); see also Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d at 852-52 (<HOLDING>). Rodriguez’s alternate argument, that his Holdings: 0: holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary 1: holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary 2: holding that a california burglary conviction was burglary under a modifiedcate gorical approach because velascomedina pled guilty where the indictment alleged unlawful entry 3: holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary 4: holding that a conviction under a divisible statute could not qualify as acca burglary pursuant to the modified categorical approach when there were no shepard documents to show that the crime of conviction was generic burglary


Input: who received it. Finally, Mr. White’s affidavit claims Continental has spent “well over $100,000 in promotion and advertising” of its esp® product line over the past seven years, and has benefitted from the promotional efforts of its nationwide distributor, Fisher Scientific. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 15.) This evidence lacks probative value for a variety of reasons. Continental’s alleged $100,000 promotional expenditure, over a seven year period, amounts to a paltry $15,000 per year, often the cost of a single advertisement in a national publication. Continental offers no evidence as to how it put these funds to use, nor does it provide a coherent explanation as to how these expenditures contribute to secondary meaning. See Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 872 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Notably, White fails to itemize the amounts Holdings: 0: holding that an agreement to pay sons college education expenses was nondischargeable support even though arkansas law does not require payment of such expenses 1: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 2: recognizing importance of itemizing promotional expenses because not all such expenses contribute to the creation of secondary meaning 3: holding that debtors have the burden of proving that other necessary expenses on form b22c are actual reasonable and necessary expenses and that these expenses should be considered in light of schedule j and other relevant evidence 4: holding that in an agreement where the father agreed to pay reasonable expenses to the extent that such expenses are not provided by any scholarship grant or other assistance for his sons education those expenses did not include loan repayment because it was not one of the forms of enumerated assistance


Input: repayment or it was convenient for him or her to do so, and the statute of limitations would begin to run at that time. Despite the evidentiary problems inherent in proving the state of the debtor's finances at various times before an action is initiated, some courts have found that this view is better aligned with the parties' intent and the general rules of contract law. See Annotation, 14 A.L.R. 4th at 1385; see also Rees v. Heyser, 404 N.E.2d 1183 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (where individual sought repayment of oral loan which did not contain a definite time of repayment, the court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on the promise until a reasonable time for performance had elapsed); Phillips & Jordan Invest. Corp. v. Ashblue Co., 86 N.C.App. 186, 357 S.E.2d 1 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Because this intermediate approach emphasizes Holdings: 0: holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury 1: holding that the statute of limitations for an attorney malpractice suit did not begin to run until the client had suffered some actual damage 2: holding in an action on a verbal agreement which failed to specify time for repayment that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until reasonable time for repayment had passed 3: holding that where parties to an oral loan agreed that the loan would be repaid on demand the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan 4: holding that where oral loan was silent as to the time of repayment the statute of limitations began to run at the time the contract was made


Input: dispute. 342 So.2d at 106. Sunshine Associates filed various defensive pleadings including an answer with affirmative defenses. Sunshine Associates also responded to discovery requests. Id. It was only after B & H Sales moved for summary judgment that Sunshine Associates revealed that the correct name of the defendant was The Fusco Corporation, which had been doing business as Sunshine Associates. Id. at 106-07. On those facts, we concluded that applying the statute of limitations to bar the amended complaint would be “manifestly unjust” because the mistake in naming the defendant was merely a misnomer. Id. at 107. Thus, we held that the amended complaint related back to the original pleading. Id.; see also Schwartz v. Metro Limo, Inc., 683 So.2d 201, 203-04 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>); Galuppi v. Viele, 232 So.2d 408, 410-11 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion 1: holding that where incorrectly named defendant filed a motion to dismiss and an answer with affirmative defenses and actively participated in discovery it led the plaintiff to believe that the correct defendant had been sued and that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to amend its complaint to correct the misnomer 2: holding that plaintiff failed to state a securities fraud claim based on a duty to correct since an alleged duly to correct did not appear anywhere in the amended complaint and did not enter the case until wright mentioned it for the first time in her opposition memoranda to the motion to dismiss 3: holding that a misnomer does not render a summary judgment void provided the intention to sue the correct defendant is evident from the pleadings and process such that the defendant could not have been misled 4: holding that the defendant could not raise affirmative defenses initially in its dispositive motion but remanding the case to the trial court to determine if leave to amend answer to incorporate affirmative defenses was appropriate so that the defendant could then properly raise those defenses in its dispositive motion


Input: cancellation. But we reject this argument because it obviates the phrase “benefits accrued.” Under Louisiana law, we should not assume that two different terms in a statute are synonymous. See Colwell v. State, 506 So.2d 941, 944 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 508 So.2d 89 (La.1987); Spragio v. Board of Trustees of the State Employees Group Benefits Program, 468 So.2d 1323, 1326 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 472 So.2d 32 (La.1985). Mrs. Gahn, on the other hand, argues that she “incurred” the expense for the treatment of her liver cancer when she was diagnosed with the disease, and she relies on prior interpretations of coverage provisions in insurance policies to support that position. See, e.g., Valladares v. Monarch Ins. Co., 282 So.2d 569, 572-73 (La.Ct.App. 4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), writs denied, 284 So.2d 603, 604 (La.1973); Holdings: 0: holding that cost of plastic surgery to repair scarring was an expense incurred within one year of the accident even though the physician waited more than a year after the accident to perform the operation 1: holding that the debtor gave his prior express consent even though he didnt give his number until one year after debt was incurred 2: holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident 3: holding that an insureds personal belief that he was not liable for an accident provided no basis for submitting the question of the reasonableness of his delay in notification to a jury when the insured knew the day after the accident that it had been claimed that the cable he had installed had caused the accident 4: recognizing that in the usual case no information or evidence comes to light more than one year after imposition of sentence


Input: outcome of the plea process.” Id. At the evidentiary hearing on his motion, Movant made no assertions that his trial counsel failed to adequately explain the charges against him or failed to object to the factual basis underlying his plea. In fact, in his testimony at the evi-dentiary hearing, Movant asserted his trial counsel wrongly advised him to plead guilty because she had failed to investigate three potential witnesses and she failed to explore certain issues relating to one of the victim’s in his case. Accordingly, the issue raised in Movant’s point relied on was not presented to the motion court in his Rule 24.035 motion and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Day v. State, 208 S.W.3d 294, 295 (Mo.App.2006); see Amrine v. State, 785 S.W.2d 531, 535 (Mo. banc 1990) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, plain error review is not available Holdings: 0: holding ineffectiveness cannot be raised for first time on appeal 1: holding that issues not properly presented to the bankruptcy court  cannot be raised  for the first time on appeal 2: holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 3: holding that claims which were not presented to the motion court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 4: holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal


Input: to the expedited removal process, we are not persuaded. Shunaula introduced no evidence before the IJ, and makes no argument on appeal, regarding the general nature of the expedited removal system. He argues only that due process was violated in his particular expedited removal proceeding, a complaint that does not fall within § 1252(e)(3). Even if Shunaula’s complaint could be viewed as systemic, however, such a challenge can be brought only in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See supra n. 4 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)). This action did not originate there. In concluding that § 1252(a)(2)(A) bars our review of Shunaula’s claim, we join every other circuit to have considered this matter. See Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329-30 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Garcia de Rincon v. DHS, 539 F.3d 1133, Holdings: 0: holding that  1252a2a barred review of petitioners claims including asapplied due process challenges to expedited removal order 1: holding that court did not have jurisdiction under 8 usc  1252a2a to hear aliens collateral attack on his order of expedited removal where he alleged illegality in attorney generals particular decision to remove him and in specific way his removal was carried out 2: holding that court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review aliens habeas claims seeking review of expedited removal order including whether expedited removal statute was lawfully applied to alien and whether expedited removal procedures violated his right to due process because language of section 1252e5 clearly precludes review in habeas proceedings of whether alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal 3: holding that  1252a2a presents jurisdictional bar to collateral attack on expedited removal order 4: holding that under  1252a2a court lacks jurisdiction to inquire whether the expedited removal procedure to which the khans were subjected was properly invoked


Input: Circuit Judge. In November 2006, Domick R. Nelson defaulted on a consumer debt of $751.87. On February 25, 2015, she filed a Chapter 13 petition in bankruptcy court. Midland Credit Management, Inc., as agent for the creditor, filed a proof of claim in bankruptcy court for the amount of the debt. According to the proof of claim, Nelson made no payment on the debt after November 2006. Nelson objected to the proof of claim, arguing it was time-barred. See § 516.120(1) RSMo 2000; Discovery Grp. LLC v. Chapel Dev., LLC, 574 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). The bankruptcy court agreed, disallowing Holdings: 0: holding that standard of review is a matter of procedural rather than substantive law 1: holding that statutes of limitations are considered substantive matters for purposes of the erie doctrine 2: holding that substantive aspects of claims under federal discrimination statutes and fcra are identical 3: holding that courts apply the procedural law of the forum and the substantive law of the jurisdiction originating the claim 4: recognizing that missouri statutes of limitations are procedural not substantive and merely suspend the remedy without extinguishing the right


Input: was discriminatory. Pl.’s Mot. at 4, 7-8; Pl.’s Opp’n at 6-8. Where a plaintiff seeks an inference of discrimination based on “disparate treatment,” he must show that “all of the relevant aspects of [his] employment situation were ‘nearly identical’ to those” of the other employees who did not suffer similar adverse employment actions. See Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C.Cir.1995) (finding that a female plaintiff failed to demonstrate disparate treatment where comparator was both male and “lower in seniority” than the plaintiff); see also Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1345 (D.C.Cir.1999) (finding that two employees were not similarly situated where one was a GS-12 and the other a GS-13); Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 261-62 (D.C.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Here, the other employees the plaintiff Holdings: 0: holding codefendants were not similarly situated because one had a less extensive criminal history 1: holding that potential class members are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs if they are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions 2: holding that employees of differing seniority levels were not similarly situated 3: holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated 4: holding that fourth element of a prima facie case is satisfied when the employees who were more favorably treated were situated similarly to the plaintiff


Input: officials); Doe v. State of La., 2 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir.1993) (concurring opinion) (noting that while “the actions of which Doe complains are egregious”, that fact alone “does not mean that he has asserted the violation of a federally protected right, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir.) (“[T]he Constitution is not a criminal or civil code to be invoked invariably for the crimes or torts of state educators who act in contravention of the very laws designed to thwart [abuse by teachers].”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 279, 112 L.Ed.2d 233 (1990). In fact, this Court has even held that a rape perpetrated by a state official was not an act under color of state law. City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>); see also Screws, 325 U.S. at 108-09, 65 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that a janitorial workers sexual assault of a student deviated from his duties and was clearly outside of the scope of his employment 1: holding that a police officers rape of an arrestee was outside the scope of his employment 2: holding neither a phone call by the police requesting an arrestee to come to the station for questioning nor the questioning of an arrestee at the station was a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment 3: holding intentional assault by coworker to be outside the course and scope of employment 4: holding that transportation of arrestee to police station is service of police under the ada


Input: of the injurious instrumentality at the time of the alleged negligence.” Id. at 33, 574 P.2d at 826. ¶ 13 However, we decline to view Jackson as a departure from the rule that a claimant must identify, to a degree of probability, which of multiple defendants controlled the instrumentality that injured him. Notably, the court in Jackson did not reject, but rather reiterated, the general rule that a claimant must bring “circumstantial evidence supporting the inference that the defendant(s) probably is responsible for the harm to the plaintiff.” Id. at 32, 574 P.2d at 825. And, since Jackson, our appellate courts have repeatedly applied the exclusive-control rule without correction from the supreme court. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Otis Elevator, 146 Ariz. 98, 101, 703 P.2d 1247, 1250 (App.1985) (<HOLDING>); Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 50, 588 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings 1: holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings 2: holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties 3: holding res ipsa applies to two defendants in joint control of instrumentality 4: holding authority to control limits duty to control


Input: trading costs for the Fund, “as the vast majority of the fixed income spreads ended up benefitting a third-party broker — East West — that provided nothing of value to the pension fund,” as Mayer put it, concluding from comparison with the actual performance of the portfolios Great Northern managed and with bond indices in the relevant period that the Fund would have earned about $300,000 on the commission dollars diverted to East West, not counting investigation costs. Berkowitz concluded that Great Northern obtained disadvantageous prices due to the criminal conspiracy involving Roach, Tringale, and Close. Great Northern challenges the admissibility of the Fund’s experts’ testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Evidence that is inadmissible because it is Holdings: 0: holding that federal rule of evidence 702 superceded the frye standard of admissibility of scientific evidence and that under rule 702 the district court had to determine that proffered expert testimony was both reliable and relevant 1: holding future dangerousness expert testimony to be admissible 2: recognizing that a 11 evidence must be relevant to be admissible 3: holding that under fedrevid 702 expert testimony must be reliable to be admissible 4: holding that expert testimony may be admissible even if not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community provided that it qualifies in some other way as reliable under federal rule of evidence 702


Input: that Article 9 provisions apply to any assignment of accounts has also been developed in case law in states whose commercial codes substantially parallel provisions of U.C.C. Article 9. See Major’s Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., Inc., 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir.1979) (stating that Article 9 governs all transactions in accounts, including both sales of accounts and secured interests in accounts, thus even an outright buyer of accounts by definition has a security interest in the accounts which it purchases); Valley Bank of Nevada v. City of Henderson, 528 F.Supp. 907 (D.C.Nev.1981) (noting that any transaction intended to create a security interest in accounts and any sale of accounts falls within the scope of Article 9); and In re Cripps, 31 B.R. 541 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1983) (<HOLDING>). The official comments to the U.C.C., Holdings: 0: holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision 1: holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property 2: holding that where buyer had opportunity to inspect goods and failed to inform seller in timely manner of defects buyer deemed to have accepted goods pursuant to  672606 3: holding that seller carried insurance for benefit of buyer and held proceeds in trust for buyer when seller agreed to maintain insurance until possession date but bam burned before buyer took possession 4: holding that where an outright buyer of accounts receivable failed to perfect her interest in debtors account by filing a financing statement the buyer could not prevail over the bankruptcy trustee as lien creditor


Input: the following five requirements to be entitled to reimbursement from the Section 443 Fund: (1) a supersedeas must have been requested; (2) the request for supersedeas must have been denied; (3) the request must have been made under Section 413 of the Act; (4) payments were.continued because of the order' denying supersedeas; and (5) in the final outcome of the proceedings, it was determined that such compensation was not, in fact, payable. See, e.g., H.A. Harper Sons, Inc. v. WCAB (Sweigart), 84 A.3d 363, 366 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). As will be discussed in further detail infra, there is 'no dispute among the parties that the fund established under Séction 443 does not permit reimbursement of attorney’s fees. See Universal AM-CAN, Ltd. v. WCAB (Minteer), 870 A.2d 961 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (<HOLDING>). 4 . As noted, the County's reimbursement Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys fees could notbe reimbursed from the section 443 fund 1: holding that a party may recover attorneys fees under section 38001 only if the party prevails on a cause of action for which attorneys fees are available and recovers damages 2: holding that appellate court should reverse and remand issue of attorneys fees where damages are reduced on appeal in a manner that could affect the determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees 3: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees 4: holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances


Input: under section 1915(d) without prejudice. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315 (5th Cir.1993). 3 . Denton v. Hernandez, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). 4 . Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1734. 5 . Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1985). These options are, of course, unnecessary in cases where the facts alleged are "fantastic or delusional scenarios” or the legal theory upon which a complaint relies is "indisputably meritless." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). 6 . Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.1983); Mitchell v. Sheriff Dept., Lubbock County, Tex., 995 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.1993). 7 . See, e.g., Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that although prison inmates have a first amendment right to access to the courts prison officials may regulate law library access including reasonable time place and manner of access taking into account the administrative needs of the institution 1: holding that the total denial of all access to the law library for seven months violated the plaintiffs constitutional right of access to the courts 2: holding that during a postriot lockdown refusal of access to main law library is constitutional as long as access to basic law library for initial legal research is permitted 3: holding that prisoner did not have right to access law library because he had courtappointed counsel 4: recognizing that inmates have no freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance


Input: the trial court re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18. In determining that the trial court reversibly erred in granting the Motion (and that the Insureds’ motion for rehearing should be granted), the majority relies on its conclusion that the trial court did not re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18. But, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, in their Motion for Rehearing, the Insureds assert that the trial court did re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18; however, the Insureds claim that they did not receive notice that the Motion had been re-set until March 18. The Insureds state that “giving notice on March 18 — the day summary judg 14-04-00064-CV, 2004 WL 2933575, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); Rios v. Texas Bank, 948 S.W.2d 30, 32-33 Holdings: 0: holding appellant waived her complaint that trial court gave her no notice of summaryjudgment hearing by not raising the objection in the trial court 1: holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing 2: holding that parties waived any choice of law objection by not raising an objection 3: holding that once a trial court has set a date for a summaryjudgment hearing the court must allow the nonmoving party an opportunity to be heard 4: holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal


Input: been violated. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704; Realmuto v. Department of Transportation, 161 Pa.Cmwlth. 613, 637 A.2d 769 (1994); Swoyer v. Department of Transportation, 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 1, 626 A.2d 1247 (1991), appeal dismissed, 533 Pa. 318, 623 A.2d 321 (1993). 4 . Unless the context "clearly indicates otherwise,” the term driver refers to any "person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.” Section 102 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 102. 5 . Moreover, the purpose behind the acknowl-edgement requirement of section 1541 is not furthered by its application to Smith. The requirement of submitting an Acknowledgement Form is to ensure that the driver has notice of the suspension. See Commonwealth v. Kane, 460 Pa. 582, 333 A.2d 925 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Here, Smith does not argue that he did not Holdings: 0: holding that police chiefs suspension letter omitting statutorily required information about process for appeal of suspension did not deprive hearing examiner of jurisdiction over suspended officers appeal and require reinstatement of officer 1: holding the state did not meet its burden of proving defendant operated a motor vehicle while suspended where the only evidence of actual notice of suspension was that dot mailed defendant the notice of suspension 2: holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice 3: holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice 4: holding that the good behavior requirement of a suspended sentence defined the period of suspension