Input: court denied the motion, but did clarify that “the Lummi U & A should include nearshore waters immediately to the south of San Juan Island and Lopez Island.” The Lum-mi appealed both the district court’s original decision and its denial of their motion for reconsideration. Standard of Review The parties disagree over what standard of review we should apply in analyzing the district court’s conclusion that the law of the case holds that the Lummi U & A does not include the waters west of northern Whidbey Island. The Klallam argue that the correct standard of review is abuse of discretion, and that there are only five circumstances under which a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the ease, none of which applies here. See Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d at 452-53 (<HOLDING>). Abuse of discretion, however, is the standard Holdings: 0: recognizing that the trial court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary decision 1: holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand 2: holding law of the case principles do not prevent this court from revisiting a prior ruling if that ruling was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice 3: recognizing that four reasons for granting a rule 59e motion are manifest errors of law or fact newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence manifest injustice and an intervening change in controlling law 4: holding that application of the doctrine of law of the case is discretionary and that a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine only if 1 the first decision was clearly erroneous 2 an intervening change in the law occurred 3 the evidence on remand was substantially different 4 other changed circumstances exist or 5 a manifest injustice would otherwise result


Input: good cause is not shown. See In re Madar, 218 B.R. 382, 383 n. 1 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1998); Byrd, 94 F.3d at 219. Since Madar was decided, the Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed Byrd. See Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 289 n. 10 (6th Cir.1998), amended, 243 F.3d 234 (6th Cir.2001); Leisure v. State of Ohio, No. 00-4569, 2001 WL 700866, at *1 (6th Cir. June 11, 2001). Because the latter case is unpublished, it has no precedential force. See, e.g., Salamalekis v. Commissioner of Soc. Security, 221 F.3d 828, 833 (6th Cir. 2000). As in Byrd, the Sixth Circuit in Catz simply assumed without discussion that Rule 4(m) requires a finding of good cause. Thus neither case is binding. See Madar, 218 B.R. at 383 n. 1; see also Wise v. Department of Defense, 196 F.R.D. 52, 56 (S.D.Ohio 1999) (Rice, J.) (<HOLDING>); Slenzka v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 204 F.R.D. Holdings: 0: holding that rule 4m permits extensions in the absence of good cause and explicitly declining to follow catz or byrd 1: holding invalid procedurally defective interim regulations that were issued without notice and comment and in the absence of good cause 2: holding that an extension of time in which to serve process may be granted despite the absence of good cause 3: holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause 4: recognizing controversy over the continuing use of catalyst theory but explicitly declining to rule on it


Input: and Recommendation, ahead of the deadline for filing objections,, and enter an order consistent with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. As officers of the Court, J.A. Besteman Company’s counsel indicated in their filings that, as of July 7, 2006, Carter’s Inc. is no longer in operation. Further-, J.A. Besteman Company states, “[i]t is unclear what action Carter’s Inc. is tak ing or will take, including bankruptcy, or as to what will happen to its assets impressed with Besteman’s PACA trust.” PL’s Br. at 2 (Docket # 14). Clearly, time is of the essence in this matter. Given the precarious situation presented in this case, the Court has conducted an expedited, yet careful, review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. See McGill v. Goff, 17 F.3d 729 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds Kansa Reins. Corp. Holdings: 0: holding that failure to object to magistrate judges recommendation waived issue on appeal 1: holding that district courts adoption of the magistrate judges report and recommendation one day after issuance did not constitute reversible error where district court conducted a meaningful review of the report and recommendation 2: holding that a partys failure to raise objections to the report and recommendation waives the partys right to review in the district court 3: holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error 4: holding that by blindly adopting the magistrate judges findings apparently without ever having received a report and recommendation the district court violated  636b1


Input: which is a “bedrock requirement” of jurisdiction under the Constitution, Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997), citizen plaintiffs, like other plaintiffs, must satisfy all relevant Article III requirements. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.... Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct c rvs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563, 112 Holdings: 0: holding that if the harm alleged in fact affects the recreational or even the mere aesthetic interests of the plaintiff that will suffice for standing purposes citing sierra club v morton 405 us 727 73436 92 sct 1361 31 led2d 636 1972 1: holding that harms to  aesthetic conservational and recreational as well as economic values are cognizable injuries for the purposes of demonstrating standing quoting assn of data processing serv orgs inc v camp 397 us 150 154 90 sct 827 25 led2d 184 1970 2: holding that plaintiffs had established an injury in fact because the challenged activity directly affected their recreational aesthetic and economic interests 3: holding in suit under the cwa that environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened  quoting sierra club v morton 405 us at 735 92 sct 1361 4: holding that plaintiffs adequately pled injuryinfact to allege nepa violations where the plaintiffs had used the affected area for cultural and religious ceremonies for countless generations


Input: and Texas Crude’s assignees’ interests in the remaining 12.5 percent of the working interest. Defendant Burlington has also asserted a claim for indemnity against Texas Crude based on those parties’ [JOA] that may or may not become ripe, depending on final resolution of the question of law decided by this Order. 6 . The parties agree that the assignments at issue are unambiguous; they just disagree about what the assignments unambiguously mean. 7 . The 25% gas royalty provision also stated that it is "free and clear of all production and post-production costs and expenses.” Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Hyder, 483 S.W.3d 870, 873 (Tex. 2016). But the majority in Hyder noted that "[tjhis addition has no effect on the meaning of the provision” and may be regarded as surplusage. Id. (<HOLDING>). 8 . Burlington suggested at oral argument Holdings: 0: holding that the pricereceived basis for payment in the lease is sufficient in itself to excuse the hyders from bearing postproduction costs 1: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan 2: holding that the costs of severance taxes transportation processing and treatment are considered to be postproduction costs and are therefore borne proportionately by the lessee and the royalty owner 3: holding that it was not essential to an action by a supplier on a payment bond under the miller act that a demand be made on the general contractor for payment  although there was evidence in the case from which it could be found that the materialman looked to the general contractor for payment  since the statute does not require a demand for payment but merely requires written notice of the claim 4: holding that the term reverse payment is not limited to a cash payment


Input: Wiggins was cited to support the arguments regarding the need for a reasonable investigation for mitigation evidence. The application then stated that such “deficient performance of trial counsel raises a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different” and cited the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The general rule is that arguments not raised before the district court are waived on appeal. State Indus. Prods. Corp. v. Beta Tech., Inc., 575 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir.2009). Errant headings in briefs, though, do not waive arguments. Balentine raised a Sixth Amendment argument. Both the magistrate judge and this court ruled on it. See Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403, 409 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Balentine’s claim was for ineffective Holdings: 0: holding an issue not raised to the family court is not preserved for appellate review 1: holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal 2: holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived 3: holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   4: holding that an issue was not preserved for appellate review because appellants trial objection does not comport with the issue he raised on appeal


Input: will be granted only as to those issues that respond to an issue raised in a petition for reconsideration, the scope of a cross-petition for reconsideration is limited to those issues raised in a petition for reconsideration. In the present case, Eagle Water’s cross-petition for reconsideration was not filed within twenty-one days of the IPUC order certificating certain areas to United. Therefore, Eagle Water’s cross-petition for reconsideration was not timely as a petition for reconsideration and was necessarily limited in scope to those issues raised in United’s petition for reconsideration. A party may seek judicial review of an order of IPUC in accordance with I.C. § 61-627. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Intermountain Gas Co., 100 Idaho 368, 373, 597 P.2d 1058, 1063 (1979) (<HOLDING>). I.C. § 61-627 provides: After a petition for Holdings: 0: holding that prior ro decision that had not become final was not subject to cue collateral attack 1: holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack 2: holding that final orders of ipuc are generally not subject to collateral attack and should be challenged either by a petition for reconsideration or appeal to this court in accordance with ic  61627 3: holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders 4: recognizing that both final and nonfinal orders may be the subject of motions for reconsideration


Input: and seven years imprisonment plus a $10,000 fine for Count Four, unauthorized possession of ammunition. He argues that the crimes of unauthorized possession of a firearm and unauthorized p mendment, no person may “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. CONST, amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to imprisonment and monetary penalties, and protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. $184,505.01 in U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1165 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). In determining whether two crimes are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes: The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the V.I. 2005) (<HOLDING>). To convict under title 14, section 2256 of Holdings: 0: holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense 1: holding that a claim of exemption is an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded 2: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 3: holding that whether the defendant is a member of a group specifically authorized to possess firearms is an affirmative defense rather than an element of the crime 4: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense


Input: (5th Cir.1986) (same). 49 . In re Stonebridge Techs., Inc., 430 F.3d 260, 269 (5th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (“It is well-established in this circuit that letters of credit and the proceeds therefrom are not property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.”); see also In re Lockard, 884 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir.1989) (”[W]e conclude that the surety bond at issue in this case is not ‘property of the estate,’ within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541.”). 50 . 516 F.3d 301 (5th Cir.2008). 51 . Id. at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted). 52 . In re Trinity Gas Corp. (Reorganized), 242 B.R. 344, 350 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1999) ("[T]he obvious purpose of § 541(a)(7) is to include property and rights which are acq . See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 327, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a proceeding that by its nature could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case is a core matter subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court 1: holding that a bankruptcy court could not use jurisdictional bootstraps to exercise jurisdiction that would not otherwise exist 2: holding that district court did not have jurisdiction over any claims that could not exist independently of a contract 3: holding under former jurisdictional limit that diversity jurisdiction did not exist where plaintiff sought damages of exactly 5000000 4: holding that bankruptcy court could not enjoin third party tort claims that would not affect estate


Input: evidence presented to the district court in support of Echo’s motion. As in Atlantic Richfield, the evidence upon which Echo relied was of a general nature; the plaintiffs’ arguments, like those that failed to persuade the Atlantic Richfield court, are entirely based on ratios derived from financial statements — ie., the Average Return on Equity and Average Return on Receivables — without any specific proof as to how the withheld amounts were deployed. Compare J.A. 2685-86 (Echo’s motion), and Aplee. Br. at 21-23; with Atlantic Richfield, 226 F.3d at 1158-59. Indeed, Echo’s own expert noted his “understanding that [HRSI] did not escrow the[ ] withheld monies and such funds were commingled with the working capital of the corporation.” J.A. 2729; cf. Atlantic Richfield, 226 F.3d at 1159 (<HOLDING>). Echo not only failed to carry its own burden Holdings: 0: recognizing that the specific proof requirement has the effect of permitting large corporate defendants to shield themselves against claims for moratory interest simply by eomingling funds with other corporate assets 1: holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract 2: holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors 3: holding that grand jury testimony of officer and inhouse counsel for corporate defendant was properly admitted as admission against the corporate defendant 4: holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter


Input: that because the City had no control over Judge Travis in his judicial capacity, it had no power to authorize or ratify his conduct and thus could not be responsible for his acts. Plaintiffs contend Judge Travis was a city policy maker because the actions of municipal judges may constitute official municipal policy if the judge holds absolute sway over particular tasks. In Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir.1980), the court found that under Texas law, county judges have duties such as presiding over county commissioners and preparing the county budget which can constitute official county policy making. A city may be liable for a judge’s acts if those acts are in accordance with city policy. Williams v. Butler, 863 F.2d 1398, 1402-03 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906, 109 S.Ct. 3215, Holdings: 0: holding that city managers single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability 1: holding that a city may be held liable on account of the unconstitutional conduct of city officials only if the citys policy or custom played a part in the violation 2: holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city 3: holding a city liable for personal injuries caused by a driver colliding with a girder in the center of a city street where the city did not give a warning 4: holding a city liable for the unconstitutional firing of two clerks by a municipal judge when it was clear the city had delegated to him final administrative authority over employment matters


Input: “Embedded Software” warranty. No record evidence supports Plaintiffs claim that his television’s inability to process a native 1080p signal through its HDMI ports is software-related. To the extent this claim is based on Mitsubishi’s use of the phrase “1080p” to describe Plaintiffs television, under Cal. Com.Code § 2813, it also fails. Notwithstanding counsel’s argument to the contrary, Plaintiffs television satisfies his expert’s definition of 1080p, insofar as it is ready to receive a native 1080p signal through its antenna if and when broadcasters begin transmitting in 1080p. Plaintiffs belated reliance on the television’s “Parts” warranty is unavailing, as he never invoked that warranty below. See Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029, 1031 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Harik v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 326 F.3d 1042, Holdings: 0: holding that a court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found 1: holding that the district court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact where the evidenceis not set forth in the moving papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found 2: holding that the court is not obligated to comb the record in order to make the plaintiffs arguments for it 3: holding that a district court need not comb the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment particularly where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found 4: holding that while a district court has discretion to consider other materials in the record it has no obligation to do so where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found


Input: Barnes appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of AT & T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program (Plan). We review de -17, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008) (explaining that a conflict of interest is but one “factor” that courts consider in determining the deference to afford an administrator’s decision). Barnes’s arguments as to why the court should review the Plan’s decision de novo are unpersuasive. Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 674 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Gatti v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 415 Holdings: 0: holding that erisa does not require plan administrators to give special deference to treating physicians opinions although administrators may not arbitrarily refuse to credit them 1: recognizing the conflict 2: holding in the absence of exceptional circumstances deference should be given to trial court 3: holding that the court discounts deference given to administrators decision to the extent to which it was influenced by a conflict of interest 4: holding that the court must consider the adequacy of the inquiry into the conflict the extent of the conflict and the timeliness of the motion


Input: applicable. The California court in Gionfriddo characterized the information conveyed by the defendant as “mere bits of baseball’s history.” Id. Significantly, the California court further held that the First Amendment protects “recitations of [baseball] players’ accomplishments. ‘The freedom of the press is constitutionally guaranteed, and the publication of daily news is an acceptable and necessary function in the life of the community.’ (citations omitted). ‘Certainly, the accomplishments ... of those who have achieved a marked reputation or notoriety by appearing before the public such as ... professional athletes ... may legitimately be mentioned and discussed in print or on radio and television.’ ” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 968 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the manner in which CBC uses the Holdings: 0: recognizing first amendment protection for news gathering 1: holding that students action wearing black armbands was expressive conduct entitled to first amendment protection 2: holding that an equal protection claim was no more than a first amendment claim dressed in equal protection clothing and was thus subsumed by and coextensive with the first amendment claim 3: holding that because the defendants parody baseball cards disseminated information the trading cards were entitled to full first amendment protection 4: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause


Input: In Beach Resorts International, there was neither a contractual agreement nor an applicable statute authorizing an award of attorney’s fees. The court noted that the mechanic’s lien statute, pursuant to which the proceedings were initiated, authorized attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party.” The court held, however, that there was no need to impose a lien to enforce the arbitrator’s award, since the defendant voluntarily paid the amount awarded, and therefore the plaintiff’s recovery was pursuant to the arbitration clause and. not the mechanic’s lien statute. Id. at 691. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for attorney’s fees. See Consolidated Labor Union Trust at 549. Compare Fitzgerald & Company, Inc. v. Roberts Electrical Contractors, Inc., 533 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). There are other cases which also reach the Holdings: 0: holding university grievance committee hearing was not an arbitration proceeding even though hearing had significant characteristics of arbitration without substantial evidence to support an arbitration agreement 1: holding that a subcontractor whose dispute with a contractor and a surety insurer was settled through arbitration could be awarded attorneys fees pursuant to sections 627428 and 627756 even though the arbitration award had been paid in full 2: holding that section nine does not limit confirmation of an award to the district court in the district of arbitration and confirmed a new york arbitration over whose parties the court had personal jurisdiction 3: holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties 4: holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees


Input: to establish their prima facie EPA claim, plaintiffs must show the employer paid male and female employees different wage rates for substantially equal work. Broadus v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 226 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir.2000). Plaintiffs offer the differing tuition remission plans afforded faculty of St. John’s and St. Ben’s to prove their disparate pay claim. The EPA’s regulations support plaintiffs’ view that a disparity in fringe benefits support an EPA claim. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.11. Defendants do not dispute that each college’s professors perform approximately equivalent work and receive comparable salaries at each institution. See Sorenson Aff., Ex. C, at 76. They do, however, challenge plaintiffs’ choice of the male comparator. See Strag v. Board of Trustees, 55 F.3d 943 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Hofmister v. Mississippi State Dept. Health, Holdings: 0: holding that an individual who was selected employed controlled trained and paid  by the employer was an employee emphasis added 1: holding that an epa plaintiff must show she has selected an appropriate comparator 2: holding that because the plaintiffs skills had deteriorated during the period she claims she was paid less than a male employee who performed equal work the plaintiff was not entitled to proceed further under the epa 3: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination 4: holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired


Input: the Supreme Court in Heller. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783. This Court finds further support for its conclusion in recent decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court, which has also concluded that Heller and McDonald affirm a Second Amendment right to bear arms in the home but not outside of the home. See People v. Williams, 2011 IL App (1st) 091667-B, 357 Ill.Dec. 247, 962 N.E.2d 1148, 1153-54 (Ill.App.Ct.2011) (finding that the 355 Ill.Dec. 193, 959 N.E.2d 221, 227-28 (Ill.App.Ct.2011) (same); Mimes, 352 Ill.Dec. 119, 953 N.E.2d at 77 (same); People v. Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d 931, 939-40, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011) (same); Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d at 142-50, 348 Ill.Dec. 575, 944 N.E.2d 816 (same); Dawson, 403 Ill. App.3d at 510, 343 Ill.Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d 598 (<HOLDING>). This Court concludes that the Illinois UUW Holdings: 0: recognizing that the right to bear arms is fundamental 1: holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right 2: holding right to be fundamental 3: holding that us supreme court cases do not define the fundamental right to bear arms to include activity barred by the auuw statute 4: holding that because defendants did not prevent plaintiff from acquiring another weapon they did not impede plaintiffs right to bear arms


Input: Ray’s conviction on this basis unless the instructions amounted to plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30(d) & 52(b); United States v. Douglas, 371 Fed.Appx. 562, 565 (6th Cir.2010) (citing United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 605 (6th Cir.2006)). “In the context of challenges to jury instructions, plain error requires a finding that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions were so clearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” Newsom, 452 F.3d at 605 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). Where there is evidence that the jury is confused over a central legal issue not covered by the original jury instructions, “a district court abuses its discretion by not clarifying the issue.” United States v. Nunez, 889 F.2d 1564, 1567-69 (6th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). “A district court, however, should refrain Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts decision to delay jury instructions and deliberations did not warrant a presumption of prejudice 1: holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present 2: holding that the district court was required to give a supplemental jury instruction where the original instructions did not address whether there could be a conspiracy comprised of a single defendant and an undercover officer a legal issue that was key to the jurys deliberations 3: holding that it was not plain error for the court not to give a self defense jury instruction where the defendant did not request one 4: holding that although the instruction at issue could have been worded more specifically the jury instructions as a whole did not mislead the jury as to the law


Input: would unilaterally determine the date and thus might have an incentive for manipulation. Plaintiff itself cites a number of cases holding that a party’s mail room or internal filing policies should not control the date when a letter is deemed to have been received. E.g., Kasler/Continental Heller/Fruin Colnon v. United States, 9 Cl.Ct. 187, 189 (1985); Alpine v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 802 (1990). The court’s interpretation of the term “notify” as issuance in this case rather than receipt is consistent with that of the Boards of Contract Appeals, which have found 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(2)(B) notification letters to be timely even when issued very late in the 60-day period, and not received at all within that period. See John C. Grimberg Co., (1991 ASBCA) 91-3 BCA 1124, 074, 1991 WL 128196 (<HOLDING>); Defense Systems Company, Inc., (1997 ASBCA) Holdings: 0: holding that a bankruptcy rule equivalent to rule 6a ala r civ p should be construed to give the benefit of extending the deadline for submission to the day after the holiday regardless of whether the deadline is expressed as the last day of a period of days or as a date certain 1: holding that a notification letter issued and dated one day before the deadline was timely without reference to when it was received 2: holding that a complaint that a report was not timely served was not subject to the twentyone day deadline to object to the sufficiency of a report under former section 74351a 3: holding that a telephone request to the court for a continuance the day before the trial was to start was a nullity 4: holding that the plain language of rule 6a of the federal rules of civil procedure which authorizes the extension of a deadline where the deadline expires on a saturday sunday or legal holiday is limited to situations where periods of time must be computed and therefore class settlement optout forms that were postmarked on the first business day after the courtordered saturday deadline were not timely filed


Input: held that if a demand for repayment of an oral loan is not made within a reasonable time analogous to the statute of limitations, the claim is barred. See DeSouza, 708 So.2d at 993. The decisions in Stoudenmire and De-Souza are in accord with the majority of other jurisdictions that have held or recognized that statutes of limitation for actions based on oral promises to pay money that do not contain provisions for the time of repayment begin to run from the date the promises were made. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins To Run Against Action Based On Unwritten Promise To Pay Money Where There Is No Condition Or Definite Time for Repayment, 14 A.L.R.4th 1385 (1982 & Supp.2001); see also In re Estate of Musgrove, 144 Ariz. 168, 696 P.2d 720 (Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Estate of Whitehead, 895 S.W.2d 129, Holdings: 0: holding in an action on a verbal agreement which failed to specify time for repayment that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until reasonable time for repayment had passed 1: holding trial court abused its discretion by not extending the time for service where the statute of limitations had run and where service had been achieved at the time of the hearing on the motion to dismiss 2: holding that the statute of limitations for a miscalculation of benefits claim began to run at the time at which some event other than a denial of a claim should have alerted the claimant to his entitlement to the benefits he did not receive 3: holding that where oral loan was silent as to the time of repayment the statute of limitations began to run at the time the contract was made 4: holding that where parties to an oral loan agreed that the loan would be repaid on demand the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan


Input: of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title, whichever occurs first[.] Id. § 1306(a)(1). There is a split of authority on the issue of whether life insurance proceeds acquired by a debtor more than 180 days after filing a Chapter 13 case are property of the estate. However, “[t]he overwhelming majority of courts to have addressed this issue ‘agree that § 1306 modifies the § 541 time period in Chapter 13 cases.’ ” Carroll v. Logan, 735 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir.2013) (quoting Vannordstrand v. Hamilton (In re Vannordstrand), 356 B.R. 788 (10th Cir. BAP 2007) (collecting cases)); accord Dale v. Maney (In re Dale), 505 B.R. 8, 13 (9th Cir. BAP 2014). But see In re McAllister, 510 B.R. 409, 420 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2014) (<HOLDING>); In re Key, 465 B.R. 709, 712 Holdings: 0: holding that an executor named in a will is not subject to the nonresident restriction set forth in  43222 1: holding that the specific date restriction set forth in  541a5 controls and that  1306a1 does not eliminate that restriction 2: holding valid an ownedbutunscheduled restriction in a um policy 3: holding that the judges restriction of the class was not an abuse of discretion 4: holding that grantee of restriction may enforce covenant in equity


Input: Roberts Assoc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307, 386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 353 N.E.2d 590 (1976). Such agreements may be justified by the employer’s need to protect itself from unfair competition by former employees. See BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 391, 690 N.Y.S.2d 854, 712 N.E.2d 1220 (1999) provide for any geographic limitations. Plaintiffs introduced no evidence to support the proposition that a covenant restricting competition of the kind at issue in this case, anywhere in the world, is reasonable in terms of scope; nor have Plaintiffs pointed to any cases in this jurisdiction that would support the Court drawing such a conclusion. Indeed, the case law suggests just the opposite. See, e.g., Silipos, Inc. v. Bickel, No. 06 Civ. 2205(RCC), 2006 WL 2265055, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (<HOLDING>); Heartland Sec. Corp. v. Gerstenblatt, No. 99 Holdings: 0: holding that a restrictive covenant will be upheld where a franchisor has a protectable interest in the sale of his franchise 1: holding that a roadway is a structure and its construction would violate the restrictive covenant limiting the land to residential purposes 2: holding that a restrictive covenant with a tenyear term was unenforceable 3: holding that the restraint of a covenant not to compete must be reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case and that only a legitimate business interest may be protected by the covenant 4: holding that a restrictive covenant with worldwide restrictions on competition is not reasonable


Input: firearm in violation of § 5861(d), the court stated: “The term ‘firearm’ is not used in its conventional sense; instead it is specifically defined for purposes of the National Firearms Act.” As the Supreme Court has observed, the National Firearms Act as amended in 1968 “is a regulatory measure in the interest of public safety.” United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971); see United States v. Walsh, 791 F.2d 811, 820 (10th Cir.1986). Contrary to Dwyer’s assertion, possession of an unregistered weapon is not akin to ‘simple’ possession. Rather, the statute making possession of an unregistered weapon illegal is targeted at specific weapons deemed to be particularly dangerous. See United States v. Rivas-Palacios, 244 F.3d 396, 397 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brazeau, 237 F.3d 842, 845 Holdings: 0: holding possession of an unregistered firearm is presumptive evidence of unlawful violent intentions and therefore involves the substantial risk of violence necessary to label the possession a crime of violence 1: holding unlawful possession of any unregistered firearm involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another will occur 2: holding that in a prosecution for possession of an unregistered firearm evidence of an armed robbery committed with the firearm was admissible 3: holding that kidnapping involves a serious potential risk of physical injury to the kidnapped person 4: holding that exception did not apply to uncharged federal offense of unlawful possession of unregistered firearm even though defendant already had pending state charge of armed robbery involving the same weapon


Input: makes, particularly when those arguments are raised only in passing.” United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.2008). In his sentencing position paper, Escalon-Velasquez did not argue that a within-Guidelines sentence would waste government resources. His counsel raised the issue only at the end of his presentation, stating cursorily that “the resources that we would expend in incarcerating him any longer than necessary for him to be — for him to be deported should also be taken into consideration.” (Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 14.) We therefore conclude that the argument was raised “only in passing,” and the court was not required to address explicitly this mitigating argument to satisfy the constitutional requirement of procedural reasonableness. Cf. Madden, 515 F.3d at 611-12 (<HOLDING>). Escalon-Velasquez’s second critique— that the Holdings: 0: holding that reviewing court first ensures that district court committed no significant procedural error then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence describing factors demonstrating procedural error 1: holding that a party cannot preserve an argument if it presents only a skeletal or undeveloped argument to the trial court 2: holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error 3: holding sentencing court did not commit procedural error when record showed court had psr heard oral argument from both parties and was aware of section 3553a factors 4: holding that the district court did not commit a  significant procedural error  by not explicitly addressing an undeveloped mitigating argument quoting gall 552 us at 50 128 sct 586


Input: ch. 13, § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 16 (codified at Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(c)). 3 .The Texas Supreme Court subsequently held that the statutory right to counsel in parental-rights termination cases includes the right to effective counsel. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex.2003) ("we believe that '[i]t would seem a useless gesture on the one hand to recognize the importance of counsel in termination proceedings, as evidenced by the statutory right to appointed counsel, and, on the other hand, not require that counsel perform effectively’ ”). The supreme courts of several other states have examined statutes that provide a right to counsel and have held that the right to counsel entails that such counsel be effective. See Patchette v. State, 374 N.W.2d 397, 398 (Iowa 1985) (<HOLDING>); Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 14-15 (Iowa Holdings: 0: holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel 1: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 2: holding that a parents statutory right to counsel in termination proceedings guarantees the right to effective counsel 3: holding that statutory grant of postconviction applicants right to courtappointed counsel in proceeding arising out of prison disciplinary hearings necessarily implies that that counsel be effective 4: recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel


Input: waived his opportunity to challenge the district court’s ERISA ruling when he failed to contest it in his initial appeal. See Kesselring v. F/T Arctic Hero, 95 F.3d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“Since appellant failed to raise this issue in its first appeal, it is waived.”). We previously vacated and remanded for the district court to reconsider the unrelated issue of whether Schoenfeld’s debt was dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code, and did not disturb the district court’s order as it pertained to Schoen-feld’s violations of ERISA. In addition, contrary to Schoenfeld’s contention, the satisfaction of his debt did not moot the injunctive relief designed to protect against future violations of ERISA. See F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1238 (9th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>); S.E.C. v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing mootness if it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur citation omitted 1: holding that injunctive relief is not moot based on voluntary cessation unless the defendant shows that it is absolutely clear his wrongful activities cannot reasonably be expected to recur 2: holding that dismissal is inappropriate unless it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations 3: holding that it is not 4: holding that an error cannot be plain unless it is clear under current law quotation omitted


Input: cash flow in nine months, when the equity in the real estate is also considered, Magnolia’s interest in cash collateral is adequately protected. Debtor’s argument is flawed for several reasons. First, whether Magnolia’s interest in the hotel room revenues is characterized as personal property or as real property, Magnolia has a continuing security interest in the revenues under § 552(b)(2). Unlike other forms of cash collateral, a pre-petition security interest in hotel room revenues continues to attach to post petition revenues. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b). Under these circumstances, the offer of a replacement lien on the post-petition rents is meaningless because the creditor already has a lien on these assets. See In re Buttermilk Towne Center, LLC, 442 B.R. 558, 566 (6th Cir. BAP 2010) (<HOLDING>); In re Las Torres Dev., LLC, 413 B.R. 687, Holdings: 0: holding that the state has no obligation to provide adequate housing 1: holding preliminary hearings in colorado do not provide adequate opportunity for crossexamination 2: holding that the equal protection and due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not provide a sufficient basis for jurisdiction because they do not mandate payment of money by the government 3: holding that future rents do not provide adequate protection for the debtors expenditure of prior months rents 4: holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability


Input: So the statute and all the Guideline references, including the Policy Statement of the Sentencing Commission, are consistent with our construction of the statute, which is that the authority of a district court to depart from the Guidelines following a motion by the government under § 3553(e), acknowledging substantial assistance, is not limited so that a finite sentence must be imposed, rather probation is authorized. Id. at 859-60. Thus, under Wilson, there was no limit on how low the district court in this case could have departed under § 3553(e) as long as the extent of the departure was reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). This reading of Wilson is con sistent with decisional law from one of our sister circuits. Cf. United States v. Auld, 321 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). It has been suggested, and interpreted by Holdings: 0: holding that where a defendants guideline range is 121 to 151 months and his statutory minimum sentence is 240 months and the government moves for a downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the starting point for the departure is 240 months and the court is not limited to the low end of the guideline range in determining the extent of the departure 1: holding that after granting the governments motion for downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the district court did not err when it determined that the starting point for departing downward was the higher statutorily required minimum sentence and not the lower otherwise applicable guideline range 2: holding that the district courts use of an incorrect method for calculating the amount of drugs at issue was harmless because the end result under either method would have resulted in the court departfingj downward from the guidelines range and rendering a sentence within the statutory maximum of 240 months imprisonment and njothing in the record moreover suggests that the district court would have imposed a sentence of less than 240 months 3: holding that a motion under  5k11 permitted a downward departure from the guideline range but that the departure could not extend below the statutory minimum sentence absent an additional motion by the government under  3553e 4: holding that defendants diminished capacity while grounds for departure from the guidelines sentencing range is not grounds for departure below the minimum sentence set by congress


Input: from the Office of the State Engineer, and the hearing examiner denied their application in 2001. Applicants appealed to the district court, as provided for by NMSA 1978, § 72-7-1 (1971). The district court denied the application, and Applicants appeal from this order. Additional facts appear below as they pertain to the decision. DISCUSSION ISSUE ONE: The district court correctly interpreted and applied the Templeton doctrine. {4} Applicants argue that the district court incorrectly interpreted New Mexi co law governing ground water wells that are used to compensate for a surface water shortage. We review the question of whether the district court properly interpreted the applicable law de novo. See Gallegos v. N.M. Bd. of Educ., 1997-NMCA-040, ¶ 11, 123 N.M. 362, 940 P.2d 468 (<HOLDING>). {5} New Mexico law recognizes that an Holdings: 0: recognizing that the standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo 1: holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo 2: recognizing de novo standard of review 3: holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo 4: holding that this court is not bound by the conclusions of law reached by the trial court and the applicable standard of review for such issues is de novo


Input: and loss of interaction opportunities to qualify as materially adverse on their own. However, Ghori-Ahmad offers a clearer example of materially adverse action in alleging that USCIRF reduced her workload and downgraded the quality of her assignments.' Such allegations require precisely the kind of fact-bound contextual inquiry that the Supreme Court prescribed in Burlington Northern. See Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C.Cir.2007) (“Whether a particular reassignment of duties constitutes an adverse action for purposes of Title VII is generally a jury question”). Changes in job duties and responsibilities are not actionable where they cause a purely subjective harm to reputation or satisfaction, but may at a certain magnitude become materially adverse. See id. at 364-65 (<HOLDING>); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 902 Holdings: 0: holding that potentially indefinite suspension of employee from work without pay could constitute materially adverse employment action even where employer awards full backpay for the entire period and that reassignment of responsibilities could constitute materially adverse employment action even absent demotion 1: recognizing possible adverse action where reassignment left plaintiff with significantly different  and diminished  supervisory and programmatic responsibilities 2: holding a transfer or reassignment may rise to the level of an adverse employment condition if it is a significant change in working conditions 3: holding that a teachers reassignment with a 17000 decrease in salary to take place one year following a teachers reassignment constituted an adverse employment action notwithstanding that the teacher was not demoted 4: holding that a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities is not an adverse employment action


Input: of a personal attack in a Council meeting and not on the expressive content of the personal attack. Scroggins v. City of Topeka, Kan., 2 F.Supp.2d at 1371. On the other hand, two district court cases out of California have concluded that a very similar restriction to Section 5Ff were facially invalid viewpoint-based speech restrictions. In Baca v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 936 F.Supp. at 725, Judge Timlin struck down a policy providing that “[n]o oral or written presentation in open session shall include charges or complaints against any employee of the District, regardless of whether or not the employee is identified by name.” 936 F.Supp. at 725. Judge Timlin wrote: District’s policy clearly contains content-based prohibitions on speech, despite defendant 713 (C.D.Cal.l993)(<HOLDING>). Baca v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 936 Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance 1: recognizing that the first amendment prohibits laws where the state seeks to achieve its policy objectives through the indirect means of restraining certain speech by certain speakers 2: holding that an ordinance granting greater first amendment rights to speakers who support the human services objectives of the city was impermissibly contentbased 3: holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law 4: holding city could not enforce through administrative adjudication a city ordinance limiting vehicle weight


Input: were available both in 1994, when the ordinance was adopted, and in 1999, when the earlier dispute was settled. 2008 WL 2079044, at *20. 4 . This does not mean that a municipality must identify the exact locations to which adult establishments may locate, "as opposed to identifying the general areas that remain available and proving that such areas contain enough potential relocation sites that are physically and legally available to accommodate the adult establishments." Hickerson, 146 F.3d at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 . The Court's assertion of the time, place, and manner test in Young notably omitted that test's traditional content-neutrality requirement. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Even if such a requirement applies to zoning Holdings: 0: holding restrictions embodied in content neutral statute must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest while leaving open sufficient alternative channels of communication 1: holding that regulating the location of adult films does not violate the first amendment and citing as support the proposition that reasonable regulations of the time place and manner of protected speech where those regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests are permitted by the first amendment 2: holding that contentneutral time place and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication 3: holding on summary judgment that a regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest 4: holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information


Input: The movant carries the burden of demonstrating that dismissal is appropriate. Intel Corp., 496 F.Supp.2d at 408. However, Bankruptcy Rule 7009 further provides that Fed.R.Civ.P. 9 applies in adversary proceedings. While Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) provides that: “all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity,” Rule 9(b) only applies to allegations of actual fraud. Furthermore, this Court takes the view that claims of constructive fraud, i.e. fraudulent transfers, are evaluated using Rule 8(a)(2). A fraudulent transfer complaint “need only set forth the facts with sufficient particularity to apprise the defendant fairly of the charges made against him.” In re Astro-Power Liquidating Trust, 335 B.R. 309, 333 (Bankr.D.Del.2005) (<HOLDING>). Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), made applicable to this Holdings: 0: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 1: holding that the fact that federal rule of civil procedure 9b requires a heightened pleading standard for some claims but not for a section 1983 claim against a municipality means that the rules do not require a heightened pleading standard for such a claim 2: holding that a constructive fraud count need not comply with rule 9s heightened pleading standard 3: holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983 4: holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions


Input: explained upward deviation based primarily on Sterling’s criminal history without making an upward departure under the guidelines. This is the proper procedure when imposing a non-guideline sentence. See United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 708 (5th Cir.2006). Whether an upward departure would have been warranted is immaterial, because the court made an upward deviation outside the guidelines range, instead of an upward departure. See id. at 708 n. 3. Sterling’s assertion that the sentence imposed was unreasonable because the court imposed a non-guideline sentence instead of an upward departure story and offense conduct as found by the district court, the extent of the deviation, while large, was not unreasonable. See United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 491-93 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants 121month sentence was reasonable even though his codefendants sentences ranged from 41 to 53 months imprisonment because the defendant had coordinated the offense 1: holding upward departure from 41 months of imprisonment to statutory maximum of 120 months for unrepentant conartist with long criminal history reasonable 2: holding that dismissal was required where overall length of prosecution was 16 months state was responsible for 13 months of delay and six months of that delay was due to simple neglect 3: holding one and onehalf months establishes causation while three months is too long and does not 4: holding that where a defendants guideline range is 121 to 151 months and his statutory minimum sentence is 240 months and the government moves for a downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the starting point for the departure is 240 months and the court is not limited to the low end of the guideline range in determining the extent of the departure


Input: we will vacate and remand for new findings if the agency’s reasoning or its fact-finding process was sufficiently flawed. See Cao He Lin v. DOJ, 428 F.3d 391, 406 (2d Cir.2005). Because the IJ found that Veretelnikov was credible and the BIA did not disturb that finding, we assume his credibility. See Yan Chen, 417 F.3d at 271-72. We conclude that the BIA properly reversed the IJ’s grant of the petitioners’ application for asylum. Even assuming that Veretelnikov had established that the treatment he faced at the hands of the Uzbekistani government was on account of a protected ground, he failed to establish that “any future punishment for his failure to perform mandatory military service for which he contracted constitutes persecution.” See In re A-G- 19 I. & N. Dec. 502 (BIA 1987) (<HOLDING>). As the BIA found, “in light of the Holdings: 0: holding that it may not 1: holding military service disability payments are community property 2: holding that under the 1948 version of csrs civil servants were required to meet the fiveyear service requirement exclusive of military service  3: holding that a former spouse is a proportionate owner of the other spouses future military retirement pay and is thus entitled to onehalf of the percentage of such pay representing the number of military marriage years relative to the total length of military service 4: holding that a government may require military service and may enforce that requirement using reasonable sanctions


Input: “I never thought of that. I can ask them to come.” That Lu was insufficiently prescient about the type of additional corroborating evidence the IJ would require fails to justify an inference that his roommates would have testified unfavorably or that Lu is not currently practicing Falun Gong, especially given that he offered to have them come testify as soon as the government attorney brought it up. Because none of the BIA’s proffered grounds supports its adverse credibility determination, we must take Lu’s testimony at face value. Kaur, 379 F.3d at 890. Lu testified that, as a direct result of his Falun Gong practice, he was detained, beaten, electrically shocked, dragged into a courtyard, and tied to a tree for three hours. See Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 720-21 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Because the BIA never reached the issue, we Holdings: 0: holding that a showing of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of future persecution 1: holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution 2: holding that retaliation for opposition to government corruption can constitute persecution on account of a political opinion 3: holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political 4: holding that the persecution of falun gong practitioners constitutes persecution both on the basis of spiritual and religious belief and on the basis of political opinion


Input: Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). See State ex rel. McMillian v. Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 285-86 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986) (in context of probation revocation, "[d]ue process is satisfied when an opportunity is accorded to be heard in a court at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"). 38 See State v. Beyer, 2001 WI App 167, 247 Wis. 2d 13, 633 N.W.2d 627 (Beyer's appeal regarding delay in holding the probable cause hearing for his initial commitment); cf. State ex rel. Jones v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 195 Wis. 2d 669, 674, 536 N.W.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Due process requires that Jones have a parole revocation hearing within a reasonable time ... and prevents ... indefinite detention. . . ."). 39 Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 326; cf. Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 72 (<HOLDING>). 40 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Holdings: 0: holding that placement of a contractual limitations period in a section entitled claims was reasonable 1: recognizing that parents seeking an alternative placement may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board but concluding that the ideas mainstreaming requirement remains a consideration that bears upon a parents choice of an alternative placement and may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate 2: holding that protective placement statute unconstitutionally deprived individuals of an automatic periodic reexamination of the need for continued protective placement 3: holding that personal jurisdiction can be premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce 4: holding that a private alternative placement need not meet the criteria of a fape


Input: act in rendering such services or in conducting such sports program.” This case seeks to answer whether providing bleachers and supervising spectators falls under the ambit of “sports program.” No available case law construes §85V. Nonetheless, judicial construction of the §85K of the same chapter does provide adequate guidance. §85K limits the lia bility of charitable organizations for torts committed in the course of activities conducted to directly accomplish its charitable purposes. The provision caps liability at $20,000. The Supreme Judicial Court has broadly construed the statute stating that only activities with no connection to the organization’s charitable purpose fall outside of the statute’s protection. Missett v. Cardinal Cushing High School, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 5, 11 (1997) (<HOLDING>). “[P]ainting a building ... or maintaining Holdings: 0: holding the tlo standard governs school searches when school resource officers  who although employed by the local police department are primarily responsible to the school district  are acting in conjunction with school officials 1: holding that a school may not prohibit expressive activity unless there are facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities 2: holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours 3: holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school 4: holding that extracurricular activities like a high school dance are within the charitable purpose of conducting a school for learning even where the organization charged admission


Input: loss, as required by I.R.C. § 465. Because the Tax Court did not address those arguments, and because we agree that Crispin’s CARDS transaction fails to satisfy the economic substance doctrine, we do not address the Commissioner's other arguments. 16 . The Tax Court noted that the true net cost of the CARDS transaction to Crispin was only $72,926, primarily the structuring fee paid to Chenery and the cost of the Pullman Opinion. The ordinary loss actually reported by Murus, by comparison, was $7,641,706. 17 . With exceptions not relevant in this case, "[t]he basis of property shall be the 7) (same), Gilman v. Comm’r, 933 F.2d 143, 151 (2d Cir.1991) (same), and Massengill v. Comm’r, 876 F.2d 616, 619-20 (8th Cir.1989) (same), with Heasley v. Comm’r, 902 F.2d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>), Gainer v. Comm'r, 893 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that when the irs totally disallows a deduction the underpayment is not attributable to a valuation overstatement but rather to claiming an improper deduction 1: holding that trial delay for dna testing was attributable to the state but was mere negligence 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply laches where the only prejudice shown by the government was attributable to its own delay rather than to that of the movant 3: holding that valuation should occur on the date of the trial at which property issues are determined 4: holding that dismissal of indictment was abuse of discretion when delay attributable to the government was twelve months


Input: stop. The agent responded, “I could see him as plainly as I can see him sitting there, actually probably a little bit closer.” This evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the person who had committed the crimes in question was indeed Robert Castaneda. III. Because we conclude that the evidence presented prior to the initial close of the prosecution’s case was sufficiently strong to identify Castaneda, we need not reach Castaneda’s second contention. The explicit identification presented after the reopening did not affect the outcome of the case, and therefore even if we were to assume that the court erred in allowing the prosecution to reopen its case, any such error was harmless. See United States v. Toles, 297 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The judgment below is AFFIRMED. * This order Holdings: 0: holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that federal appellate courts are authorized to engage in constitutional harmless error analysis in the first instance when a state appellate court does not undertake such an analysis and that such error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that appellate court should review error in trial procedure to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that the improper denial of a defendants opportunity to impeach for bias is subject to harmlesserror review in which the reviewing court must determine if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding that trial court must determine whether fifth amendment violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt


Input: Washington Board of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129, 113 S.Ct. 580, 121 L.Ed.2d 513 (1992). “[T]o determine whether a state law has the forbidden connection, we look both to ‘the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive,’ as well as the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.” California Div. of Labo preempts a state law wrongful death cause of action based upon an insurance company’s negligent administration of a claim. Spain, 11 F.3d at 132. “ERISA preempts Appellants’ wrongful death action because the state law in its application directly ‘relates to’ the administration'and disbursement of ERISA plan benefits.” Id. See also Kanne v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 494 (9th. Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Washington state courts have also recognized Holdings: 0: holding that erisa preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and negligent misrepresentations 1: holding that breach of good faith and fair dealing claim requires showing of breach of contract 2: holding that the plaintiffs state common law causes of actions for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as well as a statutory cause of action for unfair insurance practices under the california insurance code were preempted by erisa 3: holding plaintiffs causes of action for breach of contract breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the arizona insurance code were preempted by erisa 4: holding that where the conduct forming the basis of the plaintiffs breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim is the same conduct forming the basis for the breach of contract claim the claims merge and there is no separate cause of action for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing


Input: delegate to local school boards the responsibilities of providing educational services, “[t]here is no question but that local boards of education acts as agencies of the state when they are fulfilling the statutory duties imposed upon them pursuant to the constitutional mandate of article eighth, § 1.” Id. at 258, 438 A.2d 88. The court concludes that the torts allegedly committed by the defendants-assault, infliction of emotional distress and negligence-stem from the defendants providing special education services pursuant to a delegated state responsibility. The defendants are therefore entitled to sovereign immunity from liability on counts five, six and seven of the complaint. See Todd M. v. Richard L., 44 Conn.Supp. 527, 539-40, 696 A.2d 1063 (Conn.Super.Ct. July 14, 1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Milhomme v. Levola, No. Holdings: 0: holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to defendants who were providing transportation services to a disabled child as part of the childs iep 1: holding that a determination of the proper esy services must be contemplated by the childs iep and linked to his or her developmental goals 2: holding that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available in the absence of a statute providing immunity to a municipal corporation in a negligence action 3: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity 4: holding that in the absence of a statute providing immunity the defense of sovereign immunity is not available to a municipal corporation in an action for damages alleged to be caused by the tortious conduct of the municipality


Input: a full investigation into Acosta’s behavior. Later that month, a new federal monitor advocate was assigned to the Minnesota region. In March of 1996, Costilla was required to go to a meeting where Acosta would be present. Although she talked to her supervisor about not attending, the supervisor again told her that she could not avoid meetings that Acosta would attend. The supervisor added that Costilla needed to be strong and attend the meeting because Minnesota’s connection to the national level depended on it. Due to the state’s untimely action, Costilla brought a complaint against the state in January 1996 alleging: sexual harassment under the MHRA; intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and breach of contra age Realty Corp., 507 F.Supp. 599, 608 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (<HOLDING>); Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 Holdings: 0: holding employer may be hable when its employee is sexually harassed by employers patrons and employer either ratifies or acquiesces in harassment by not taking immediate andor corrective action 1: holding employer hable for requiring hotel worker to wear sexually reveahng costume that lead to harassment by public 2: holding school district strictly hable for sexual harassment by its employees 3: holding employer could be hable for sexual harassment of employees by nonemployees including employers customers 4: holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor


Input: and creditors. Although the bankruptcy court seemed to agree with Judge Crabb that federal courts have jurisdiction to assess the validity of a lien asserted against the debtor’s estate in light of federal law, in its view she applied “the wrong federal law.” Id. According to the Ridgely court, had Judge Crabb followed cases holding that broadcasting licenses qualify as property of the estate within the meaning of section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, see id. at 377-78, she would have ackn F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1992)). Second, the fact that a license of this sort may constitute property of the estate within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code does not necessarily mean that a creditor may hold a security interest in the license. See In re Smith, 94 B.R. 220, 221-22 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1988) (<HOLDING>). Whatever the practical benefits might be to Holdings: 0: holding that a trustees interest in letter of credit proceeds acting as a security deposit is property of the estate 1: holding that the debtors interest in a broadcasting license constitutes property of the estate 2: holding that a professionals license is a protected property interest 3: recognizing that distributees interest to estate property is subject to divestment until estate is closed 4: holding that a broadcasting license was property of the estate but not subject to a security interest


Input: equally conclusory. Moreover, both in the complaint and in Rojo’s opposition to summary judgment, the incompletely-developed argument appears in paragraphs and under headings concerning the alleged absence of consideration for the contractual amendments. The district court thus did not err by responding to conclusory statements with brief conclusions. Second, Rojo’s argument that DB violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing was waived. Rojo mentioned that claim for the first time in his memorandum of law in opposition to summary judgment. We have refused to address the merits of claims raised for the first time at that stage of the litigation. See Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 356, 361 (2d Cir.2006); Syracuse Broad. Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1956) (<HOLDING>); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Holdings: 0: holding that district court was justified in brushing aside further argument not alleged in complaint but raised for first time in opposition to summary judgment 1: holding argument not raised in opening brief but raised for the first time in reply brief was waived 2: holding that an argument raised for the first time in response to defendants motion to dismiss instead of in an amended complaint was not properly raised before the district court and would not be considered on appeal 3: holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived 4: holding that claims raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not properly before a court


Input: contact with each other was the municipal court’s direction to him as a condition of the suspension of his 180-day jail sentence. According to Salupo, the girlfriend would not have been committing an unlawful act if she met him. {¶ 7} The state submitted a copy of Salupo’s prior conviction for telecommunications harassment and domestic violence to the trial court. The order provided, “[Salupo] is to have no contact with [his former girlfriend] as a condition of jail suspended.” The state did not present evidence of any order prohibiting the girlfriend from having contact with Salupo. Had the girlfriend met with Salupo, she could not have been charged with violating the condition of his suspended sentence. See State v. Lucas, 100 Ohio St.3d 1, 2003-Ohio-4778, 795 N.E.2d 642, at syllabus (<HOLDING>). Salupo, therefore, did not try to induce the Holdings: 0: recognizing aiding and abetting trespass 1: recognizing both aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting conversion 2: holding that an individual who is the protected subject of a    protection order may not be prosecuted for aiding and abetting the restrainee under the protection order in violating said order 3: recognizing aiding and abetting conversion 4: holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting


Input: with respect to Direct and October. Ms. Goren alleges that Direct and October knew that there was “no basis” for certain statements on Dr. Wallach’s tape (“Dead Doctors Don’t Lie”), R.21 ¶ 32, that unspecified misrepresentations regarding New Vision products appear in “free literature published and/or distributed” by Direct, R.21 ¶ 63, and that Direct and October “conducted or participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise [New Vision]” through a pattern of racketeering activity. R.21 ¶¶ 110 & 118. These conclusory allegations fail to specify the time, place and content of any of the misrepresentations attributed to these defendants and therefore fall short of the particularity demanded by Rule 9(b). See Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 1317 Holdings: 0: holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim 1: holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet rule 9bs particularity requirement where they did not present any evidence at an individualized transactional level 2: holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim 3: holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action 4: holding that plaintiffs must provide more than conclusory allegations to satisfy rule 9bs requirement that circumstances of fraud be pleaded with particularity


Input: in 2012, including his failure to successfully complete the 2012 PIP. Dr. Chawla does not claim that Ms. Garfield or Ms. Kaplan acted with discriminatory animus and does not raise a material dispute with Ms. Garfield’s assessment of his 2012 performance, including that, after May 10, 2012, he continued to “make reporting and other errors,” “to not perform work assigned to him by his leader,” “delegate[ ] tasks assigned to him by his leader,” and “communicate in a confrontational and nonproductive manner that prevents meaningful conversation.” Docket No. 37-8 at 9-11. Thus, Dr. Chawla’s attempt to cast doubt on LMC’s other stated reasons, namely, Dr. Chawla’s work performance prior to 2012, does not cast doubt on LMC’s predominant reason for termination. Cf. Bryant, 432 F.3d at 1126-27 (<HOLDING>). It is not incumbent upon the Court to Holdings: 0: holding that because plaintiff cast doubt on the employers dominant stated reason for her termination failure to address the other less consequential reasons for her termination does not entitle farmers to summary judgment 1: holding requirement in contract to provide notice for termination but not limiting reasons for termination constitutes atwill employment relationship 2: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable 3: holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony  regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone  be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim 4: holding that the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of the persons primarily responsible for plaintiffs termination when coupled with the timing of plaintiffs termination and the conflicting reasons given by defendants agents for the termination might well persuade a jury that defendant fired the plaintiff in retaliation for  the letter sent by her attorney to defendants general counsel


Input: his plea to count 35 thus fails. IV. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the factual resumes submitted in support of Hildenbrand’s and Stone’s guilty pleas are sufficient to sustain their convictions. The remaining issues appellants raise are related to their sentences. Because the defendants waived their right to appeal their sentences, we DISMISS THE APPEAL of their sentences, and AFFIRM their convictions. 1 . Count 36 alleged forfeiture of assets. 2 . See also our discussion of the similar term "benefit” infra under § 666 relating to Stone’s conviction. 3 . That the benefit is intended ultimately to pass to the low-to-moderate-income purchaser of the program homes does not change the result. See Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 677, 120 S.Ct. 1780, 146 L.Ed.2d 707 (2000) Holdings: 0: recognizing that there may be multiple beneficiaries of federal programs 1: holding that an agreement may provide elements of a plan by setting out rules under which beneficiaries will be entitled to care 2: holding that trust beneficiaries have no authority to maintain an action as third party beneficiaries of contracts between the trustee and agents of the trustee concerning the internal affairs of the trust 3: holding that beneficiaries could not sue attorneys of the trust for legal malpractice because beneficiaries are not direct recipients of the attorneys services 4: recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract


Input: court reserved jurisdiction to determine at a later date the appropriate amount of attorney fees and costs relating to the bank’s collection efforts, we conclude that the summary judgment was final. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greenway Enters., Inc., 23 So.3d 52, 55 (Ala.Civ.App.2009). In Liberty Mutual, the Court of Civil Appeals stated: "Rule 58(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., states, in pertinent part, that '[tjhe entry of the judgment or order shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs.’ Hence, the failure to tax costs did not affect the finality of the summary judgment. Holman v. Bane, 698 So.2d 117, 119 (Ala. 1997). Pursuant to caselaw, the failure to award attorney fees also does not render the summary judgment nonfinal. See Gonzalez, LLC v. DiVincenti, 844 So.2d 1196, 1201 (Ala.2002) (<HOLDING>).” 7 .The Dotsons have since filed for personal Holdings: 0: holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment 1: holding that the requirement to serve a motion for attorney fees or costs within thirty days after filing of judgment applies even where the final judgment reserves jurisdiction to award same 2: holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees 3: holding a summary judgment to be final although motion to assess attorney fees remained pending because award of attorney fees is collateral to judgment 4: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case


Input: the circumstantial evidence was not inconsistent with a passenger having placed the gun on the seat when they fled. See 724 So.2d at 1215. See also Bailey v. State, 442 So.2d 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). In Daniels v. State, 718 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), the defendant was driving a car when it was stopped by police. While the defendant was being handcuffed, a passenger was alone in the car. Police subsequently found a gun in the car that was not readily visible. This court reversed the defendant’s conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, holding that the State did not show that the defendant had actual knowledge of the gun or other circumstances from which the jury could possibly infer knowledge. See 718 So.2d at 1275. See also Green v. State, 586 So.2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, there was no evidence Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant possessed a firearm in connection with a crime when the firearm was kept in a car across the street from where the defendant was selling drugs 1: holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had knowledge of firearm in close proximity to him when he was driving the car for the cars owner who was a passenger 2: holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile 3: holding that a defendant who had borrowed a car for a limited period of time had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the cars locked trunk where it was the very person from whom he had borrowed the car who first called the police after he failed to return the car 4: holding that a defendant exercised control over a firearm that was found in a vehicle he was driving


Input: Amend Notice of Removal Within the thirty-day period prescribed by § 1446(b), a defendant may freely amend its notice of removal. Blakeley v. United Cable System, 105 F.Supp.2d. 574, 578 (S.D.Miss.2000). And the majority of courts—including the Fifth Circuit—recognize that even after expiration of this thirty-day period, a defendant may still amend its removal petition in order to cure defective allegations of jurisdiction. See Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 920 n. 9 (5th Cir.2001); (“[Pjrior to judgment, a party may amend its pleadings to allege omitted jurisdictional facts”); Whitmire v. Victus, Ltd., 212 F.3d 885, 888 (5th Cir.2000) (emphasizing that § 1653 should be broadly construed); D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co., 608 F.2d 145, 146 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). The authorization for such amendments derives Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to join all the defendants in a removal petition is not a jurisdictional defect 1: holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand 2: holding that removal was proper where the petitioning defendant stated that all parties agreed in its notice of removal and the petition was followed by the supplemental consent signed by each of the parties but filed outside the 30 day period 3: holding that plaintiffs failure to allege citizenship of first defendant did not constitute good cause for second defendants failure to timely join in removal petition 4: holding that amendment of removal petition was properly allowed to correct jurisdictional allegations in removal petition which were defective or faulty due to defendants failure to specifically allege the citizenship of the parties at the time the suit was brought and at the time the removal petition was filed missing allegation was not a fatal omission which could not be cured by amendment


Input: omnibus clause did not contain such an express limitation; it merely adopted the “corruptly, by threats or force” formula of §§ 1503 and 1505. In any event, however, the omnibus clause of § 1512 was not enacted. After the Senate had passed its version, the House debated that bill together with its own victim protection bill. A section-by-section analysis of the House bill indicates that the House Judiciary Committee was also aware that some courts were interpreting § 1503 narrowly. 128 Cong.Rec. 26,350 (1982). The analysis cites Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754 (applying the ejusdem generis rule and stating that “the manner in which the statute may be violated would ordinarily seem to be limited to intimidating actions,” id. at 757), and United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, neither the bill that passed the Holdings: 0: holding that  1503 is not violated merely by making a false statement id at 21718 1: holding that materiality does not require a showing that the creditors were prejudiced by the false statement 2: holding that an attorney who made false representations to a court did not violate okla rpc 33 because that rule addresses professional misconduct as an advocate for making false statements to a tribunal not false statements by a lawyer as a witness 3: holding that plaintiff failed to prove reasonable reliance on a false statement 4: holding that materiality is not an element of  1542 because any false statement is sufficient


Input: and only reviews for abuse of that discretion. Austin v. U.S. Bank of Wash., 73 Wash.App. 293, 869 P.2d 404, 410 (1994). A trustee abuses his or her discretion only when they act “arbitrarily, in bad faith, maliciously, or fraudulently.” Id. Here, the record contains no evidence that Ms. Montague abused the considerable discretion the Trust Agreement vested in her. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Blume, 65 Wash.2d 643, 399 P.2d 76, 79 (1965) (upholding summary judgment against trust beneficiaries claiming bad faith where the trustee’s actions were “well within the bounds of reasonable judgment”). The record indicates that Ms. Montague administered the trust consis tent with the terms of the trust agreement, and Mr. Vaughn has submitted no evidence to the contrary. Id. (<HOLDING>). Mr. Vaughn contends that Ms. Montague abused Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan 1: holding that the trustee did not breach its fiduciary duty when its actions were consistent with the trust instrument 2: holding that the deferential standard of review of a plan interpretation is appropriate only when the trust instrument allows the trustee to interpret the instrument and when the trust ee has in fact interpreted the instrument 3: holding that a debtor could not relitigate the claim that the trustee breached his fiduciary duty because the bankruptcy court had already held that the trustees actions were not improper 4: holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions


Input: first publication took place before the beginning of the policy period.... The policy defines “personal injury” as injury, other than "bodily injury," arising out of one or more of the following offenses: d. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization’s goods, products or services; or e. Oral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy. “Advertising injury” is defined as: injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses: a. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization’s goods, products or services; b. Oral or written publication of mate 8 Pa.Super. 326, 614 A.2d 295 (1992) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The insurer’s unjustified refusal to Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court erred in looking beyond the allegations of the complaint to determine whether a duty to defend arose 1: holding that attorneys fees can be awarded only from time duty to defend arose 2: holding that awarded fees were reasonable and that proof that attorneys fees are necessary apart from testimony as to the reasonableness of the fee is not required 3: holding that a thirdparty claimant could be awarded attorneys fees and penalties pursuant to  221220 because the insurers failure to defend was arbitrary and capricious 4: holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend


Input: lay jurors. As the trial court concluded, “[I]n my judgment he presents a specialized knowledge that the rule talks about that would assist the jury in assessing whether or not the offender— whoever the offender ... — derived sexual gratification from his actions.” (R. 78.) Cf. United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 594, 116 L.Ed.2d 618 (1991)(hold-ing testimony of expert witness could testify that pictures would be of sexual interest to pedophiles especially when “ ‘contested materials are directed at ... [such] a bizarre deviant group that the experience of the trier of fact would be plainly inadequate to judge whether the material appeals to the prurient interest.’ ”); United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir.1984)(<HOLDING>); and United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 Holdings: 0: recognizing that although no obstruction occurs when an individual lies to fbi agents who might or might not testify before a grand jury it may occur if the agents acted as an arm of the grand jury or indeed that the grand jury had even summoned the testimony of these particular agents 1: holding that the trial court improperly allowed a hydrologist to testify regarding safe warehousing practices where he lacked the education employment or other practical experiences to testify as an expert 2: holding that government agents or similar persons may testify as to the general practices of criminals to establish the defendants modus operandi 3: holding that whether error in failing to ask a question about bias in favor of law enforcement testimony requires reversal hinges on such factors as the importance of the government agents testimony to the case as a whole the extent to which the question concerning the venire persons attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions  the extent to which the credibility of the government agentwitness is put into issue and the extent to which the testimony of the government agent is corroborated by nonagent witnesses internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify


Input: plaintiff nor the' defendants have questioned the Court’s authority here. The Court is issuing legal conclusions on a motion to dismiss; issues of fact are not considered. A review of the Court’s conclusions would thus be de novo. See Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2165, 2175, 189 L.Ed.2d 83 (2014). In the event a superi- or court determines that some or all of the causes of action here are not constitutionally core proceedings or not properly subject of this Court’s authority, the conclusions here are submitted as proposed conclusions. See Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) (addressing constitutional authority of bankruptcy court); Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2165, 189 L.Ed.2d 83 (2014) (<HOLDING>); and Galaz v. Galaz (In re Galaz), 765 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a proceeding that by its nature could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case is a core matter subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court 1: holding that stem does not change bankruptcy courts authority to decide fundamental core procedures of bankruptcy court 2: holding that the bankruptcy court has constitutional and implied statutory authority to conduct jury trials in core proceedings 3: holding that bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings and conclusions in a core proceeding over which the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority 4: holding district court may treat bankruptcy courts findings and conclusions as proposed


Input: threat. Further, he was hitting the building with the bat, which could be a form of intimidation. (R. 47, Sent. Tr. 8, PagelD# 146). We agree with the district court that Wagoner’s conduct evidenced an intent to carry out his threat against Carey, warranting application of the 6-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(l). Wagoner told Carey, “If you do not give me my check by Friday, I will come and terminate you.” (R. 30, Notice of Factual Basis 2, Pa-gelD# 86). On Friday, Wagoner went to the SSA office with an aluminum bat and said, “If I do not get my money today someone is going to get hurt.” (Id.). Going to where Carey worked on the stated deadline with an aluminum bat establishes a nexus between Wagoner’s conduct and his threat to “terminate” Carey. See Newell, 309 F.3d at 402 (<HOLDING>). Because the district court properly applied Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants purchase of a firearm and ammunition on the same day that he made a threat demonstrates that his threats are more than mere puffery and evidences an intent to carry out the threats 1: holding that threats to inflict financial or personal harm are not true threats where no ones personal safety is threatened 2: holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a  924c sentence for the same firearm 3: holding that threats standing alone  constitute past persecution in only a small category of cases and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm  4: holding that threats to fire employees based on legitimate concerns about productivity do not constitute harassment because any threats made to these plaintiffs  were no greater than justified by their lack of sales


Input: not, plead an antitrust injury causally linked to Andrx’s alleged anticom-petitive behavior. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Friedman, 83 F.Supp.2d 179, 185-87 (D.D.C.2000) (“Court cannot find that Bio-vail can establish that it has suffered ‘antitrust injury.’ ”). On February 2, 2000 Bio-vail moved for reconsideration under FRCP 60(b) and on February 4, 2000 it filed a notice of appeal (No. 00-5050). The district court subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration and Biovail noticed its appeal of that decision (No. 00-5396) on November 3, 2000. This court granted Biovail’s motion to consolidate the appeals. III. Analysis We give de novo review to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See NRA v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 126 (D.C.Cir.2000); see also Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1507 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). “The complaint should not be dismissed unless Holdings: 0: holding that antitrust standing is question of law reviewed de novo 1: holding that whether consent was valid under the fourth amendment is a question of law to be reviewed de novo 2: holding that the threshold question of whether to adopt a doctrine is reviewed de novo 3: holding the ultimate question of probable cause should be reviewed de novo 4: holding question of law applied to undisputed facts reviewed de novo