Input: § 2253(c)(1) & (B), the nature of which remains unaltered by the fact that the dismissal was on jurisdictional grounds. In sum, we hold that the district court’s dismissal of an unauthorized § 2255 motion is a “final order in a proceeding under section 2255” such that § 2253 requires petitioner to obtain a COA before he or she may appeal. In so holding, we join a number of our sister courts who have reached the same result. See Resendiz v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 456 (5th Cir.2006) (per curiam); Sveum v. Smith, 403 F.3d 447 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 944, 126 S.Ct. 442, 163 L.Ed.2d 336 (2005); Jones v. Braxton, 392 F.3d 683 (4th Cir.2004); see also Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54 (1st Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1123, 118 S.Ct. 1807, 140 L.Ed.2d 945 (1998) (<HOLDING>). With this much resolved, we must next ask Holdings: 0: holding that district courts dismissal of  2255 motion as unauthorized is final order where petitioner disputed aedpas applicability 1: holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order 2: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered 3: holding that complaint that appellee used an unauthorized procedure to obtain dismissal of appellants claims was not waived because the trial court lacked authority to enter the order of dismissal 4: holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order


Input: if such rights do not exist). They argue, correspondingly, that plaintiffs’ strident warning that Local Law 15 would require attorneys to violate their ethical duties to clients — by forcing an attorney seeking to collect a time-barred debt to inform the debtor of the running of the statute of limitations, an affirmative defense to litigation — is misplaced. But this argument misses the point. Unlike the New York City Council, the federal government is not obligated to draft its statutes so as to comport with New York law. Cf. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing the supremacy of federal law). Rather, the federal government may — and does — regulate the conduct of attorneys acting as debt collectors. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 131 L.Ed.2d 395 (1995) (<HOLDING>). New York City Council, by contrast, may only Holdings: 0: holding the fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activity even when that activity consists of litigation 1: holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt 2: holding that fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activities 3: holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa 4: holding that where the defendant obtained a nondefaulted debt under the mistaken belief that the debt was in default and where the defendants subsequent collection activities were based on that mistaken belief the defendant was a debt collector for purposes of the fdcpa


Input: our nation’s copyright laws when a defendant “authorizes” another to commit infringing acts, notwithstanding the fact that such acts are committed abroad. See Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir.1986); ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. California Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F.Supp. 854, 862 (E.D.Cal.1992), affd in part, rev’d in part, 3 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir.1993). This line of cases has been subsequently repudiated, and it is now generally accepted that there can be no liability under the Copyright Act for authorizing an act that itself could not constitute infringement of rights secured by United States law. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093-94 (9th Cir.1994); see also Fun-Damental Too, 1996 WL 724734, at *6 (<HOLDING>); PrimeTime, 24 Joint Venture, 1999 WL 163181, Holdings: 0: holding that generalized notice of copyright infringements was insufficient to establish knowledge for the purpose of contributory liability 1: holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement 2: holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession 3: holding that mere authorization and approval of copyright infringements taking place outside the united states is not a copyright violation and does not create jurisdiction over those extraterritorial acts 4: holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply


Input: or desire,” which might weigh in favor of construing a waiver narrowly, but rather by the “need to avoid inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness,” which requires a general assessment of the equities associated with the state’s participation in the bankruptcy litigation. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620, 122 S.Ct. 1640. As discussed above, the balance of these equities favors a construction of the Eleventh Amendment that would permit a debtor to assert a permissive counterclaim capped by a setoff limitation against a state that has filed a proof of claim. Second, the Supreme Court developed the “narrow construction” rule as a means of interpreting a state’s “unequivocal expression” of waiver in state statutes, state constitutions, and the like. Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 34, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Holdings: 0: holding  2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed 1: holding that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the persons sought to be subjected to their operation 2: holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed 3: holding that a statute enacted in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed   4: holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign


Input: to receive full and fair disclosures regarding the true value of a company’s stock”. Employers-Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Anchor Capital Advisors, 498 F.3d 920, 922 n. 1 (9th Cir.2007). Thus, from this approach, as long as the investment advisor has discretion in determining what securities to buy and sell, it qualifies as a purchaser with standing to bring a securities fraud claim. See In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 101, 108 (W.D.Penn.2003) (basing its inquiry “not on the presence or absence of specific ‘attorney-in-fact’ language in the agreements, but on the level of discretion exercised by [the investment advisor] in the day-to-day purchase of securities for its clients.”); In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 299 (D.Del.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Newman v. Eagle Bldg. Technologies, Holdings: 0: holding that investment advisors with authority to make investment decisions for their clients have standing 1: holding that plaintiffs had stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty where they alleged that the revenue sharing payments to the thirdparty service provider were excessive because the underlying mutual funds investment management fees covered all of the necessary investment managementadvisory services needed for the mutual fund 2: holding defendant sold investment contracts when it substituted new investors money for real investment return on old investors funds 3: holding that an africanamerican investment advisor who accompanied two clients into a bank could assert a  51 claim alleging discrimination against the bank even though his clients were the actual customers of the bank 4: holding that an investment advisor has standing in a securities fraud litigation because its clients appointed it as their attorneyinfact


Input: environment, .... 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2. The regulations further propose no fewer than nine alternate means of providing notice to the public where a proposed action will, like this one, primarily implicate local concerns. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(b)(3); see also Human Soc’y of the United States v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 98-1950, Tr. Hr’g Mot. T.R.O. at 11 (D.D.C. Jun. 23, 1998). The Court finds that FWS provided the public with insufficient information regarding the proposed action and its potential environmental impacts and insufficient time in which to comment on the Draft EA. Accordingly, the agency’s approach to public involvement and consideration of what public input it did receive do not support a finding that it took a “hard look” at the problem and alternative m 47 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); cf. Wroncy v. Bureau of Land Management, 777 Holdings: 0: holding five day public comment period on a portion of an ea insufficient remanding for further public comment 1: holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail 2: holding the prosecutors statements were not an inappropriate comment on the defendants failure to testify but rather a comment on the defendants failure to present convincing evidence to support his defense 3: holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify 4: holding that the agency failed to provide for any public participation in the ea process and ordering 45 day period for public comment on ea


Input: limitations period on Plaintiffs hybrid claim. 2. Federal Tolling Principles. The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on whether mental incompetency may toll federal statutes of limitations. Indeed, in Atkins v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 685 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1982), the Court explicitly left open the question of whether a plaintiffs mental incompetency could toll the statute of limitations on the Federal Employer’s Liability Act. After finding that the Plaintiff had not established facts sufficient to support a finding that he was mentally incompetent, the Court stated, Because we find no issue of fact, we need not decide whether the plaintiffs in-competeney will ever toll the FELA statute of limitations. But see, Brooks v. Southern Pacific Co., 105 Ariz. 442, 445, 466 P.2d 736, 739 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Id. at 1148 (citation in original). The cases Holdings: 0: holding that the untimely petition in that case tolled the aedpa statute of limitations 1: holding that the statute of limitations is tolled during a malicious prosecution suit when a timely complaint is filed 2: holding statute of limitations should not be equitably tolled for taxpayer who filed a refund claim after the applicable statute of limitations 3: recognizing that  2244dlds statute of limitations can be tolled 4: holding that fela statute of limitations is tolled by incompetence


Input: Subsection (a)(1) provides for forfeiture of “any interest” that the defendant “acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962.” 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, under (a)(1) an interest is subject to forfeiture only if and to the extent that it was acquired or maintained in violation of § 1962. Forfeiture under (a)(1) is not limited to a defendant’s interest in the RICO enterprise. It also includes a defendant’s interest in the proceeds of the RICO violation. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21-22, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983). Moreover, a “but for” test is used to determine whether the government has proven the required nexus between the interest in question and the RICO violation. United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1213 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the only evidence of any Holdings: 0: holding that in a mixed motive retaliation case the but for test applies to pretext but further holding that the burden shifts after employee has shown pretext under the but for test to the employer to show that absent retaliation the plaintiff would have lost his job anyway 1: holding that but for test applies under a1 and that forfeiture is limited to property interests that would not have been acquired or maintained but for violation of  1962 2: holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property 3: holding admissible certain evidence which would not have been obtained but for violations of constitutional requirements 4: holding that injury to business or property was not limited to commercial interests


Input: by contrast, the Federal Rules of Evidence are inapplicable, see Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d)(3); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1084-85, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949) (endorsing the use of hearsay evidence at sentencing), and hearsay normally may be considered subject only to the modest due process requirement that it bear “some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation,” United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir.1982); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”); United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 97 (3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 553, 107 Holdings: 0: holding that even in the absence of a sixth amendment violation the imposition of a sentence under the former mandatory guidelines regime rather than under the advisory regime outlined in booker is plain error 1: holding that judicial factfinding at sentencing is permissible  indeed required  under an advisory guidelines regime 2: holding that sentencing under the mandatory guidelines regime creates a presumption of prejudice that the government must rebut with clear and specific evidence that the district court would not have  sentenced the defendant to a lower sentence if it had treated the guidelines as advisory 3: holding that the reliability analysis is not heightened by the shift from an unstructured sentencing regime to a more determinate guidelines system 4: holding that the application of the determinate sentencing law parolesuitability guidelines to prisoners sentenced under the indeterminate sentencing law does not disadvantage them


Input: at 1567-68 (explaining that expert provided “merely generalized testimony as to overall similarity” and there was “no discussion of whether or how the way” part of the triple identity test was met); Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d at 1327 (explaining that an expert’s “offhand and conclusory statements ... are not particularized evidence”). In addition, the court finds that Honeywell’s equivalence arguments were not legally insufficient. See e.g., CFMT, Inc. v. Steag Microtech, Inc., 14 F.Supp.2d at 591 (explaining that the plaintiffs expert did not “spend any time” specifically discussing the doctrine of equivalents, but instead, the plaintiff chose to focus its efforts on a theory of literal infringement); LifeScan, Inc. v. Home Diagnostics, Inc., 103 F.Supp.2d at 361 (<HOLDING>). Rather, the court finds that Honeywell Holdings: 0: holding that the use requirement exists for  proposed state law claims and is analyzed in the same manner as under the federal claims 1: holding that under the ambit of strickland counsel was ineffective in failing to provide in a timely manner the identity and opinion of an expert witness who tended to prove the defendants alibi defense 2: holding that the expert failed to explain how the defendants device operated in an equivalent manner to one of the patent claims 3: holding that summary judgment was appropriate because no genuine issue of material fact existed and no expert testimony was required to explain the nature of the patented invention but observing that district courts should approach summary judgment motions in patent cases with great care 4: holding due process claim failed because plaintiff failed to explain how confrontation and crossexamination would have changed the outcome of his hearing


Input: not scientifically supported at any time. Thus, the FDA’s mandate directing Abbott not to provide for retesting of samples near the cutoff — the concept on which plaintiffs base their warnings claim — remained in force as part of a conscious ongoing risk-benefit analysis by the FDA in managing a public health crisis. Plaintiffs’ state law claims would directly contradict the FDA’s requirements and interfere with the FDA’s objectives, and therefore are preempted. IV. The Court’s conclusion, that plaintiffs’ state law claim is preempted by the FDA’s unique regulation of the Test based on principles of implied preemption rather than express preemption under the MDA, is not in conflict with the holdings of Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at 492-502, 116 S.Ct. at 2254-58, 135 L.Ed.2d at 720-26 (<HOLDING>), or Baird, supra, 155 N.J. 54, 713 A.2d 1019 Holdings: 0: holding the mda did not preempt plaintiffs state common law claims for defective design defective manufacture and failure to warn 1: holding that plaintiffs negligence defective manufacturing defective design breach of warranty and failure to warn claims were preempted by the mda and fdca defined below 2: holding that acts of improper maintenance were insufficient to defeat plaintiffs defective design claim 3: holding that the labeling act did not preempt negligent and wanton design and manufacture claims against cigarette manufacturer 4: holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control


Input: Rule of. Civil Procedure 23, Gomez held Pitts was not clearly irreconcilable with Genesis Healthcare. See id. Although Genesis Healthcare “undermined some of the reasoning employed in Pitts ..,, courts have universally concluded that the Genesis discussion does not apply to class actions.” Id. at 875. “In fact, Genesis itself emphasizes that ‘Rule 23 [class] actions are fun-, damentally different from collective actions under the FLSA.’ ” Id. at 875-76 (alteration in original) (quoting Genesis Healthcare, 133 S.Ct. at 1529). Because Gomez’s holding that Pitts is not clearly irreconcilable with Genesis Healthcare is hot itself clearly irreconcilable with intervening Supreme Court authority, we are bound by Gomez. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Pitts remains the law of this Holdings: 0: holding that when intervening supreme court case law is clearly irreconcilable with a prior circuit decision a panel of this court is bound by the later and controlling authority and should reject the prior circuit opinion 1: holding a threejudge panel may not reexamine normally controlling circuit precedent in the face of an intervening united states supreme court decision unless the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority 2: holding that a threejudge panel may depart from circuit precedent that has not been expressly overruled when an intervening en banc or supreme court decision has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable 3: holding that a three judge panel is not bound by prior circuit precedent if an intervening decision of a higher authority undercuts the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable 4: holding that a three judge panel is free to reexamine the holding of a prior panel when the supreme court has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable


Input: to comment publicly on the allegations in other similar cases. See, e.g., Jackie Willis, Bill Cosby Addresses Allegations: "I’ve Never Seen Anything Like This,” ETOnline (May 15, 2015), http://www. etonline! com/news/164575_bill_cosby_first_ tv_interview_since_sex_scandal/; Nick Vada-la, Bill Cosby Jokes About Sexual Assault Allegations Facing Him at Second Canadian Tour Stop, Philly.com (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www. philly.com/philly/blogs/trending/Bill-Cosby-jokes-about-Sexual-assault-allegations-at-' second-Canadian-tour-stop.html. 16 . See, e.g., Damiano, 168 F.R.D. at 491-93 (finding in favor of Bob Dylan’s privacy interests, in light of plaintiff's improper commercial purpose of directly monetizing revealed material). 17 . See, e.g., Paisley Park Enters., Inc., 54 F.Supp.2d at 349 (<HOLDING>). 18 . See, e.g., Morgan, 2015 WL 3882748, at Holdings: 0: holding appearance of township attorney before zoning board did not create potential conflict where he advocated position not for his own private interest but for the publics interest 1: recognizing records material to selfdefense claim outweigh victims interest in confidentiality 2: holding that the publics interest in every imaginable detail about the life of a rock star did not outweigh princes privacy concerns 3: holding that every citizen has a constitutional right of privacy in his or her medical records 4: holding that the privacy interests of the employee police officers did not exceed the publics right to know


Input: DOT submitted a copy of the Uniform Traffic Complaint and Summons/Voluntary Assessment (Complaint) that it had received from the state of Delaware. The Complaint, which was issued by an Aider-man’s Court in Newark, Delaware, indicated that Licensee pled guilty to violating a local ordinance relating to “D.U.I. — Alcohol.” (R.R. at 31a.) In Delaware, an Alderman’s Court is a small local court with jurisdiction over misdemeanors, municipal ordinances and traffic offenses that occur within the town limits. (Trial ct. op. at 4-5.) After considering the matter, the trial court granted Licensee’s appeal. In doing so, the trial court relied upon Tripson v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 773 A.2d 195 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 690, 796 A.2d 320 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Because the Complaint appeared to come Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner 1: holding that under the compact dot has the burden of proving that it received the outofstate conviction report from the party states licensing authority 2: holding that the burden of proving a violation of the idea lies on the party seeking relief during the administrative process 3: holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances 4: holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction


Input: of probable cause. Greene’s assertion that Houston had no personal, “first-hand” knowledge of the location of the stolen property is immaterial. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether the information in Lt. Hiller’s affidavit established a substantial basis for a finding by the magistrate that there was probable cause that the stolen property would be found at 2139/2141 Ashland. See Davidson, 936 F.2d at 859. Here, the perpetrator of the crime, under direct questioning from the affiant, stated that his partner (Arnold) disposed of the stolen property at 2139/2141 Ashland. Moreover, Lt. Hiller also averred that he had personal knowledge that stolen property was located at that dwelling. Such information is enough to support a finding of probable cause. Cf. Allen, 211 F.3d at 971-72 (<HOLDING>). Greene next argues that information from the Holdings: 0: holding inter alia that experienced officers observations that the defendant was under the influence of either methamphetamine or cocaine did not by itself establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime 1: holding that a smell associated with pcp was enough to establish probable cause 2: holding statement by unidentified confidential informant with no connection to the crime observing possession of cocaine enough to establish probable cause 3: holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute 4: recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell


Input: Second, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) includes as enumerated offenses under the IMCA “murder, manslaughter, ... [and] felony child abuse or neglect.” 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). Given that 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) discusses both manslaughter, and felony child abuse or neglect, it is difficult to say that 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) qualifies as defining both manslaughter and felony child abuse or neglect. A court should strive to give both of these words in the IMCA operative effect when interpreting the statute. See United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503-U.S. at 35, 112 S.Ct. 1011. Allowing involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) to define both manslaughter, and felony child abuse or neglect, would run contrary to this canon of construction. See United States v. Other Medicine, 596 F.3d at 680-81 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the Court declines to adopt Holdings: 0: recognizing that 18 usc  113a5 could not serve as more than one enumerated crime under the imca specifically both an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years and felony child abuse or neglect 1: holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc  16 2: holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16 3: holding dui causing serious bodily injury is not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16 4: holding that a conviction for simple assault under pennsylvania law does not qualify under 18 usc  16b by way of 11 usc  1101a43 as an aggravated felony


Input: 981 F.2d at 259; Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d at 191 n. 1; and Mayfield v. Collins, 918 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir.1990). 101 . Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d at 281-82, quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. 102 . See Anear v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d at 468, (suggesting tha 1304-05 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied sub nom. Conley v. Eugene, 517 U.S. 1191, 116 S.Ct. 1680, 134 L.Ed.2d 782 (1996); Colle v. Brazos County, Texas, 981 F.2d at 244-45; Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 970 F.2d 82, 92 (5th Cir.1992); Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.1992); Matthias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir.19 on the face of the pleadings may turn out to he so when the pleadings are pierced at summary judgment. See Johnson immons, 77 F.3d 878, 879 (5th Cir.1996), (<HOLDING>); McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss pursuant to rule 41b for failure to comply with a court order 1: recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff 2: holding that a district court may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff paid the statutory filing fee 3: holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket 4: recognizing a district judge may dismiss a case sua sponte under either rule 41b or its inherent authority to manage its docket


Input: left with Mr. Coates’s agreement stipulating to a twenty-year sentence. In light of this plea agreement, we hold that Mr. Coates’s sentencing challenges necessarily must fail because any error by the district court in setting the length of the sentence at twenty years was invited. See United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1055 (10th Cir.2007) (“[H]e has invited any error regarding the length of his sentence ... and his claims [raised] now for the first time on appeal are waived.”); see also United States v. Grillo, 431 Fed. Appx. 677, 680 (10th Cir.2011) (“[The appellant] received a sentence within the range she requested, so she has waived her argument that her sentence was substantively unreasonable.”); United States v. Perez-Cruz, 404 Fed.Appx. 255, 257 (10th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1831, 179 Holdings: 0: holding that the appellant waived this argument 1: holding that because at sentencing the appellant had asked the district court to impose the same sentence he now claims is substantively unreasonable the argument he seeks to make was waived 2: holding that by requesting a sentence at the low end of the guidelines it is clear  that the appellant waived any argument that he was entitled to a belowguideline sentence 3: holding that to exhaust a claim the claims raised at the administrative appeal must be so similar that the district court can ascertain that the agency was on notice of and had an opportunity to consider and decide the same claims now raised in federal court 4: holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument


Input: in accordance with administrative law principles.” Gailius v. INS, 147 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir.1998). Specifically, we afford Chevron deference to the BIA’s statutory interpretation, applying the agency’s interpretation unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or clearly contrary to law. Mejia-Orellana v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 13, 16 & n. 1 (1st Cir.2007); Maghsoudi v. INS, 181 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.1999). IV. ANALYSIS A. Why the Moral-Turpitude Issue Matters Let us take a step back for a moment. It is uncontested that Idy is presently removable. An adjustment of status could cure this problem, if Idy is eligible. His eligibility for a status adjustment hinges on whether his criminally sanctioned reckless conduct involved moral turpitude: if so, he cannot adjust his status; if not, B.I.A.1976) (<HOLDING>). Applying Chevron deference, our sister Holdings: 0: holding that involuntary manslaughter defined either as reckless or negligent was not a crime of moral turpitude because itwas based on unintentional conduct in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent it is not an offense that is mala in se and thus does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude 1: holding that assault with a deadly weapon was not a crime involving moral turpitude 2: holding that illinoiss reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude 3: holding that the bia did not act unreasonably in concluding new yorks first degree reckless endangerment statute is a crime involving moral turpitude 4: holding that robbery under california law categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude and noting precedent in this and other circuits that theft crimes are crimes involving moral turpitude


Input: rebate method on voluntary prepayment of the contract. The Court of Appeals based this conclusion on the statement in Milhollin that “... acceleration rebate practices need be disclosed only when they diverge from other prepayment rebate practices...” Ford Motor Co. v. Milhollin, supra, 444 U. S. at p. 569. In Milhollin, the question for decision was whether under TILA, as well as Regulation Z, the existence of an acceleration clause must be disclosed on the face of a credit agreement. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, because of conflicting resolutions of this question by various federal circuit courts of appeal. See Griffith v. Superior Ford, 577 F2d 455 (8th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Hornell v. One 1976 Chevrolet, 585 F2d 978 (10th Cir. 1978) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 Holdings: 0: holding that the existence of probable cause vitiated the need for an inquiry into an underlying motive for the arrest 1: holding that the existence of an acceleration clause need never be disclosed 2: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 3: holding that the acceleration clause was not cognizable as a large and unjustified payment 4: holding that establishment clause claim need not be predicated on coercion


Input: an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was valid, they were lawfully present in Legg's apartment during execution of the warrant." Id. at 244. The Legg court further noted: "We recognize that an officer's reasonable good faith belief in the validity of a warrant does not cause his presence in an individual's home to be any less viola-tive of the Fourth Amendment.... Nonetheless, we conclude that the rationale of Leon should apply to render an officer lawfully present for purposes of applying the plain view doctrine as long as the officer possesses a reasonable good faith belief in the validity of the warrant and the warrant was issued by a detached and neutral magistrate." Id. at n. 2 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Morris, 904 F.2d 518 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 2. Inadvertence Frasier claims that the Holdings: 0: holding that plain view requirement that there be a prior justification for the officers presence was met by search warrant and that even assuming that warrant was invalid good faith exception was applicable to permit admission of the evidence 1: holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant 2: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 3: holding that the observation of evidence in plain view is not a search for purposes of the fourth amendment and does not require a warrant 4: holding that a warrant lacking a description of items to be seized was not facially invalid and finding in the alternative that even if the warrant were found to be deficient the seized evidence was admissible under the good faith exception


Input: the existence of general jurisdiction. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d at 810. The Texas Instruments contract, as set forth above, was a patents cross-licensing agreement that allowed both companies to “design and sell semiconductors without dispute from each other.” Thus, it did not require performance by DENSO Japan in Texas. Moreover, the agreement contains a choice of law provision upport to U.S. Subsidiaries. Appellees argue “[DENSO Japan’s] U.S. subsidiary companies rely on [DENSO Japan] for technical, manufacturing, business, and legal support, which have impacted the Texas f 6) (concluding that there was no general jurisdiction and stating there must be an indication that defendant intended to serve the Texas market before personal jurisdiction can be found); Reid, 130 S.W.3d at 220 (<HOLDING>). We sustain DENSO Japan’s second issue. Holdings: 0: holding sending two employees to work in texas and using an office in texas for limited purposes did not support finding of general jurisdiction 1: holding that jurisdiction existed over nonresident printing customer despite the fact that texas printer solicited the business in alabama and nonresident sent no personnel to texas because nonresident placed additional orders from which it expected to profit sent payments to texas sent and received printing materials to and from texas paid for shipping of printed goods from texas and sent payments to texas the transactions were governed by texas law and substantial part of performance occurred in texas 2: holding there was no general jurisdiction even though defendant sent  its chief executive officer to texas for a contract negotiation session accepted into its bank account checks drawn on a bank in texas purchased 4 million of goods and equipment from a company in texas and sent employees to texas for training and technical consultation 3: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied 4: holding there was no general jurisdiction when there was no evidence that defendants advertised or promoted their goods or services in texas solicited business in texas sold their goods or services to a texas entity established a general business office or general business presence in texas or targeted texas markets


Input: company had issued a policy which stated that the company would pay on behalf of “[t]he school district ... any amount it is required or permitted to pay as indemnity to any person insured under the applicable Coverage Plan....” 783 S.W.2d at 611. The applicable Coverage Plan insured the members of the board of trustees of the school district. The company defended the trustees in a lawsuit that was brought against the school district and the trustees. When the trustees were dismissed from the suit leaving only the school district as a defendant, the company withdrew the defense and the school district sued for a declaratory judgment. The court held that the insurance policy unambiguously only insured the trustees. Id. at 612. See also St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co., 548 So.2d at 1160 (<HOLDING>). The court was not persuaded by the argument Holdings: 0: holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself 1: holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee 2: holding that bankruptcy discharge eliminates only a debtors personal liability and not the debt itself and that a bankruptcy trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and can bring a legal malpractice claim as trustee 3: holding that under texas law where liability of insured and liability of its agent were related and interdependent court must look to whether agents fraud was covered by policy 4: holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school


Input: are without intrinsic merit, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his habeas petition. I On December 11, 1994, a state trooper arrested Allen for committing an OUI offense. The State preferred charges against him. As directed by law, the Secretary of State (the Secretary) then suspended Allen’s driver’s license for ninety days. See 29 M.R.S.A. § 1311-A, reprinted in the appendix. It is said that every action produces an equal and opposite reaction. Having felt the lash of the administrative suspension, the petitioner moved to dismiss the pending criminal charge on double jeopardy grounds. The nisi prius court denied the motion, relying upon an opinion issued by Maine’s highest tribunal (the Law Court) two months earlier. See State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me.1995) (<HOLDING>). Instead of appealing the ruling to the Law Holdings: 0: holding that suspension of driving privileges is not punishment and does not violate an individuals right not to be subject to double jeopardy or constitute a disproportionate penalty 1: holding in materially identical circumstances that an administrative license suspension did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes 2: holding that the fcas fixedpenaltyplusdoubledamages provisions does not in most cases constitute punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy 3: holding that civil forfeitures are neither punishment nor criminal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause 4: holding that a delinquency proceeding places a juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the double jeopardy clause


Input: plain text of subsection (c) does not require the counterclaim to arise from the same “transaction or occurrence” as the original claim. All that is required is that the claim “be property of the estate.” USDA makes two related arguments for why Supreme Beefs setoff should be barred. First, it argues that whether claims are property of the estate turns on substantive law, in this case the FTCA. Second, it argues that the language of § 106(a)(5) — “[njothing in this section shall create any substantive cl nina Marine Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 391, 395 n. 8 (5th Cir.1998) (“A recoupment claim within the scope of Frederick need not also fall within another statutory waiver of sovereign immunity”) (citing Frederick, 386 F.2d at 488); United States v. Johnson, 853 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Second, and more important, accepting USDA’s Holdings: 0: holding that when the government waives sovereign immunity as to matters in recoupment it does so even as to those claims that ordinarily are barred by the ftca 1: holding that the ada does not contain a waiver of sovereign immunity and thus does not apply to the federal government 2: holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official 3: holding that when state voluntarily submits a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding the state waives its sovereign immunity 4: holding that sovereign immunity barred claim for compensatory sanctions against the government


Input: intended to clarify the scope of those registrations, not expand it”).) However, these changes amount to far more than cosmetic adjustments to various titles; they would, if valid, affect both the titles and the content of the registered works—introducing thousands of additional CardPac component files not registered in PaySys’s Initial Registrations and impermissibly expanding the scope of the Initial Registrations from eight discrete component files to the entire CardPac software package. Courts have consistently rejected such attempts to squeeze additional works into a registered copyright through the supplementary registration process. See, e.g., Muench Photography, Inc. v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ’g Co., No. 09-cv-2669 (LAP), 2012 WL 1021535, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd. v. Holdings: 0: holding that a hearing would serve no purpose because the registration act and notification law subject all sex offenders as defined by the registration act to the registration and notification provisions and law enforcement authorities have no discretion to determine which offenders would be exposed to public dissemination 1: holding that supplementing a registration by adding new works impermissibly changes the content of the originally registered work in violation of 17 usc  408d and 37 cfr  2015b2 2: holding that the postmark on the registration application was the determining factor when a registration is subsequently approved 3: recognizing the plaintiffs burden of proving a violation of 48 cfr  6301c 4: holding that 8 cfr 10031d3iv merely prohibits the bia from taking new evidence into the record


Input: state framework for addressing the plaintiffs’ claims. New York does have a mechanism permitting the re-opening of workers’ compensation claims before the Workers’ Compensation Board on grounds of fraud. N.Y. WORK. Comp.Law § 123 (McKinney 1993). - Under the circumstances of this case, however, the review provided by the state administrative agency is not comparable to that afforded by the federal court. The principal defendants in this case are not proper parties to workers’ compensation proceedings in New York. Furthermore, the Board cannot require a claimant to return moneys already paid. Id. § 22. The substance of the plaintiffs’ RICO claims — including, for example, the alleged existence of a “pattern” and “enterprise”, see McLaughlin v. Anderson, 962 F.2d 187, 190 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>) — cannot be adjudicated in proceedings before Holdings: 0: holding that to state a  1962a claim plaintiff must allege that the defendants received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity and invested it in the acquisition of any interest in or the establishment or operation of a rico enterprise 1: holding that under rico plaintiff must prove an injury because of violation of statute 2: holding that to prevail under civil rico plaintiff must prove that defendants participated in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity 3: holding that instructions allowing a jury to find an enterprise from evidence of its activity as opposed to its structure properly conveyed the holding in turkette that proof of a pattern of racketeering activity may be sufficient in a particular case to permit a jury to infer the existence of an associationinfact enterprise 4: recognizing that by accepting bribes in exchange for allowing violations of a collective bargaining agreement the defendant was conducting the rico enterprise local union through racketeering activity even though the union was harmed by the racketeering activity


Input: S.Ct. 2267, 2272, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011)). “[C]ourts normally start-and stop-by looking at ‘the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.’ ” United States v. Medina-Almaguer, 559 F.3d 420, 422 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607. 602 (1990)). Sanbria-Bueno was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 846 for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Nevertheless, Sanbria-Bueno contends that the offense was not categorically a “drug trafficking offense” within the meaning of § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(i) because a generic conspiracy requires an overt act while § 846 does not. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Sanbria-Bueno would have this court apply the Holdings: 0: holding that an overt act may be a verbal statement or a physical act 1: holding that the elements of a drug conspiracy under 21 usc  846 do include an overt act requirement 2: holding that an 18 usc  1956h conspiracy does not require proof of an overt act 3: holding that proof of overt act is not required to support admission of evidence of statement of coconspirator during course of conspiracy 4: holding proof of an overt act is not required to establish a violation of  846


Input: termination proceeding, without relying on any findings from the proceeding in which Father did not participate. Under Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, judicially noticed facts are conclusively established in civil actions for purposes of the fact finding process and a "party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed." Utah R. Evid. 201(e). In addition, "[clonsider-ations regarding a child's welfare are rarely, if ever, static. In fact, it is more likely that the child's environment is constantly evolyv-ing, thus justifying the court's continuing jurisdiction." In re J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163 (Utah Ct.App.1994); see also In re A.S., 12 Kan.App.2d 594, 752 P.2d 705, 711 (1988) (<HOLDING>). ¶11 In this case, the juvenile court granted Holdings: 0: recognizing that a 11 evidence must be relevant to be admissible 1: holding counsel must only provide relevant facts of the crime 2: holding that court must be free to examine all cireumstances evidence prior facts and orders and other relevant information in termination proceedings 3: holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence 4: recognizing that a court granted jurisdiction by statute to review the legality of administrative orders is also empowered to examine the constitutionality of the statute by virtue of which such orders were entered


Input: that the district court erred in reaching this conclusion because 39 U.S.C. § 409 states that “[ejxcept as otherwise provided in this title, the United States district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought by or against the Postal Service.” He also points out that the language of section 3662 is permissive rather than mandatory. See 39 U.S.C. § 3662 (“Any interested person ... may lodge a complaint ... ”) (emphasis added). Mr. Foster made the same arguments before the district court, and that court found them to be unpersuasive. We also consider these arguments to be unavailing. As the district court pointed out, the legislative history of § 3662 suggests that “Congress intended a plaintiff to e LLC, 597 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Long v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict 1: holding that state law provides the standard of review for a denial of a rule 50 motion in a diversity case 2: holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss 3: holding that the standard of review for the denial of a motion for reconsideration is governed by the law of the regional circuit 4: holding under third circuit law that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion


Input: Cir.1989). There is no finite time limitation within which the trustee must complete its pursuit of assets of the bankruptcy estate. Partial distributions of cash on hand can be made to creditors, with additional distributions made later as the assets are collected. Thus, when jurisdiction over disputed claims is placed by law in a specialized tribunal, we expect that the litigation over the trustee’s claims to recovery will be conducted in that forum. See, e.g., Hiser v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Public Welfare (In re St. Mary Hosp.), 125 B.R. 422, 431-32 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1991) (invoking primary jurisdiction doctrine to require trustee to submit claim to state Office of Hearings and Appeals for resolution); Burner v. Security State Bank (In re Burner), 109 B.R. 216, 227 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1989) (<HOLDING>). The bankruptcy court in the instant case Holdings: 0: holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code 1: holding that proper forum for debtor to challenge actions of coexecutor of debtors deceased husbands estate was state probate court not bankruptcy court 2: holding that contracts are not binding before court approval because the debtorinpossession operates as a fiduciary any actions taken by the debtor are to be in the best interests of the creditor body as a whole for that reason  the debtors actions are subject to  review by the creditors of the estate and the bankruptcy court 3: holding that the deceased defendant trustees wife was a representative of her husbands estate and a proper party for substitution purposes where the wife was the primary distributee of her deceased husbands estate 4: holding bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue injunction of state court litigation against debtors principal stating this power under 11 usc  105a  includes the authority to enjoin litigants from pursuing actions in other courts that threaten the integrity of the debtors estate


Input: with a finding of a one-day violation and a 762-day violation; to order a fine greater than $50,000, the trial court had to find facts beyond those evident from the verdict. 567 US at_ cts that the Oregon Supreme Court will reverse our decision in N. R. L. and extend the civil jury trial right to restitution determinations. She requests that we “recognize that the law is unsettled in this area and * * * consider forestalling further litigation in this case by-anticipating the [S]upreme [C]ourt’s decision in N. R. L. by reversing the trial court’s restitution order in this case.” Ultimately, defendant pins her hopes on N. R. L. being decided in her favor before we decide her appeal. Only then, under State v. Jury, 185 Or App 132, 136, 57 P3d 970 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 504 (2003) (<HOLDING>), would any error in awarding restitution Holdings: 0: holding that where the law is unsettled at the time of trial but settled by the time of appeal the plainness of the error should be judged by the law at the time of appeal 1: holding that statutory good time credits must be calculated under the law in effect at the time of resentencing after an appeal of the sentence is determined 2: holding that the nature of the taxpayers legal interest in the subject property is determined by reference to state law 3: holding that whether error is apparent is determined by reference to the law as of the time the appeal is decided 4: holding that appellate courts analyze plain error by reference to the law as of the time the appeal is decided rather than the extant law at the time of the disputed trial court ruling


Input: support the trial court's conclusion that the People failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Castro spoke English well enough to voluntarily consent to a search of the vehicle in which he drove. Officer Dodge and Detective D'Amour testified that Castro spoke English well enough to respond appropriately to the officers' questions and the record detailing his responses reflects the same. Even Castro's lawyer stated that she did not need to be present at the proceedings involving the Spanish speaking officer's testimony because the hearing did not concern Castro. Officer Dodge testified that Castro gave permission for the police to search the vehicle. The record contains no evidence to indicate that Castro's consent was not voluntarily obtained. See Licea, 918 P.2d at 1113 (<HOLDING>); Drake, 785 P.2d at 1265-66 (holding that a Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants consent is not rendered involuntary by the fact that he was in custody and was not advised of his constitutional rights before the officers requested his consent to search or by the fact that he was eighteen years old chemically messed up and tired 1: holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime 2: holding that defendants consent was involuntary where defendant consented to search following a warrantless entry and officers explained that absent consent the officers would obtain a warrant 3: holding the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his bedroom based upon evidence that defendant 1 did not contest the fact that he had voluntarily given verbal consent to the search 2 did not appear to be nervous or scared and was cooperative with the officers 3 led officers to his bedroom and 4 was present for the search and did not indicate at any time that he wished to revoke his consent 4: holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent


Input: doctrine, holds that the Due Process Clause generally does not require pre-deprivation process if the deprivation results from the random and unauthorized act of a state officer. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). A State cannot possibly ensure hearings before its officers act randomly and without authority, and “the State cannot be required constitutionally to do the impossible by providing predeprivation process.” Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 129, 110 S.Ct. 975. Accordingly, all the process the victim of such a deprivation is due is' an effective post-deprivation state law tort remedy against the offending officer. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534-35, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (<HOLDING>). Justice' Kennedy’s concurrence in Albright v. Holdings: 0: holding that postdeprivation tort remedy constitutes all the process that is due for unauthorized negligent and intentional torts by state officials 1: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional 2: holding that a prison guards intentional destruction of a prisoners possessions did not give rise to a federal due process claim because state law provided an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy 3: holding that a federal due process malicious prosecution claim against an indiana police officer could proceed because indiana law did not provide an adequate postdeprivation tort law remedy 4: holding that theft by prison guards does not violate due process when postdeprivation remedy exists


Input: that the letter agreements do not constitute enforceable contracts as they are unenforceable for want of mutuality. As set forth above, Connecticut choice of law principles direct that the law of Singapore govern the contract claims. Under Singapore law, mutuality of obligation is necessary for a contract to be enforceable. It is generally accepted in the common law of this country that agreements that impose no specific purchase obligation on a distributor cannot obligate a manufacturer to sell to the distributor. Billings Cottonseed, Inc. v. Albany Oil Mill, Inc., 178 Ga.App. 825, 328 S.E.2d 426, 430 (1985). In such cases, mutuality of obligation is lacking, and the agreement is therefore unenforceable. Kraftco Corporation v. Kolbus, 1 Ill.App.3d 635, 274 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1971) (<HOLDING>). “An agreement that does not expressly or Holdings: 0: holding a distributionlicense agreement unenforceable for lack of mutuality where the distributors only obligation was to maintain a record of the sales and remit royalties thereon but was not obligated to sell any of the product 1: holding that an alleged oral agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor lacked mutuality of obligation and was enforceable where the distributor had no obligation to sell any specific quantity and no obligation to meet any quotas 2: recognizing that a divorce decree obligation to hold an exspouse harmless from a debt creates an obligation between the debtor and the exspouse separate from any obligation the debtor may owe to the creditor 3: holding that there may be an obligation to defend under an insurance policy even though there is no obligation to indemnify 4: holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation


Input: allegedly used the investor’s funds to execute physical trades for his account contrary to his instructions. Id. at 323. 9 . In a footnote in their sur-reply brief, plaintiffs suggest that the very fact that RCM sold their property — regardless of whether the sales were made on their behalf or for RCM’s own benefit — is sufficient to make them "sell ers” under the Bimbaum rule. (P. Sur-reply Mem. 7 n. 19.) Although Caiola does make passing mention to the fact that Citibank "purchased physical shares and options with [plaintiff's] funds,” as explained above, the Court of Appeals made explicitly clear that for purposes of Rule 10b-5 standing, the “key fact is that [plaintiff] has alleged that the purchases were made on his behalf." 295 F.3d at 324 (emphasis added); see id. at 323 (<HOLDING>). 10 . Plaintiffs’ citation to SEC v. Zandford, Holdings: 0: holding that purchaserseller requirement is met where plaintiff adequately alleges that the broker bought physical stock on his behalf and for his account emphasis added 1: holding in an age discrimination case that even though a plaintiff need not revisit his prima facie case after a trial on the merits he still must show that he has met his ultimate burden of proving that the employer terminated him because of age emphasis added 2: holding that an application is  pending from the time it is first filed  emphasis added 3: holding that bank was equitably estopped from recovering against stock broker for conversion of stock certificates that were assigned in blank and that broker had sold for a bank employee who misappropriated the stock certificates from the bank 4: holding that the first grable requirement was met where the plaintiff in order to prevail on his legal malpractice claim had to show that he would have prevailed on his claim under federal patent law


Input: provides that dealers who violate the statute are subject to civil penalties. The statute does not void transactions that violate the statute. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Shue, 134 Ind.App. 322, 327, 182 N.E.2d 796, 799 (1962) ("Failure to strictly comply with title conveyancing statutes does not affect transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle. The certificate of title is not of itself proof of ownership or legal title to the vehicle.") Although the failure to comply with Ind.Code § 9-17-8-8 may, combined with other suspicious cireumstances, raise questions about a purchaser's good faith, we find no such cireumstances here. Consequently, the Medleys were good faith purchasers for value pursuant to Ind. Code § 26-1-2-403. See, e.g., DBC Capital Fund, 551 N.E.2d at 477 (<HOLDING>). Lastly, Marlow also argues that the Medleys Holdings: 0: holding that a purchaser may be a buyer in the ordinary course and defeat a security interest even if no insistence that the mso accompany delivery 1: holding that purchaser of used car from dealer was buyer in ordinary course under sections 9307 and 2403 even though lender still held certificate of title 2: holding that purchaser was buyer in the ordinary course despite fact that lender still held mso 3: holding that where no evidence was designated to show that a car buyer knew that a sale violated the rights of the dealership that owned the car the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of indcode  26112019 4: holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale


Input: statute, “as a matter of public policy,” against the owner of a crop-dusting plane, when the plane, piloted by the owner’s partner, struck a field worker. Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481, 482-83 (5th Cir.1955). In 1957, the Iowa Supreme Court followed the Fifth Circuit and the New Hampshire Supreme Court in construing its own state statute. Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622, 625 (1957); cf. Heidemann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d 164, 166-67 (1972) (involving choice of law, assuming that Nebraska would follow Lamasters, but instead applying South Dakota statute with no imputed negligence absent a master-servant relationship); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. U.S., 504 F.2d 104, 114-15 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978, 95 S.Ct. 1979, 44 L.Ed.2d 470 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Ross v. Apple, 143 Ind. App. 357, 240 N.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that 49 usc  44112 did not preempt state law imposing vicarious liability on an owner of an aircraft 1: holding that a somewhat different indiana state statute imputes liability to absent owner of an aircraft 2: holding that a federal due process malicious prosecution claim against an indiana police officer could proceed because indiana law did not provide an adequate postdeprivation tort law remedy 3: holding that once possession of an aircraft was delivered to the owner a repairman had no right to repossess the plane 4: holding that a statute imposing joint and several liability on a vehicle owner for a minors conduct while driving the vehicle with permission imputed financial liability rather than fault to the vehicles owner


Input: an insolvent financial institution.”). While neither the D’Oench doctrine nor 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) prevents plaintiffs from asserting affirmative claims or defenses that do not depend on “agreements,” see Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 938 F.2d 591, 595 (5th Cir.1991) (citing Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 93-4, 108 S.Ct. 396, 402, 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987); FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir.1986)), court have interpreted the term “agreement” very broadly. Beitzell & Co. v. FDIC (In re Beitzell), 163 B.R. 637, 647 (Bankr.D.D.C. 1993); see, e.g., Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 90-93, 108 S.Ct. 396, 400-62, 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987) (interpreting “agreement” to include all conditions to the parties’ performance of the bargain); FDIC v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 58 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has noted that the term Holdings: 0: holding that an implicit covenant of good faith and fair dealing constitutes an agreement under 12 usc  1823e 1: recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract 2: recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages 3: holding that an insurers violation of covenant of good faith and fair dealing was actionable under the consumer protection act 4: holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract


Input: United States “had gained no foothold” in the country). His entitlement to a removal procedure of the sort that would trigger the provisions of section 1362 was therefore limited to what Congress and the INS saw fit to provide. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that the full protections of the Due Process Clause apply only to “ ‘persons’ within the United States”); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32, 103 S.Ct. 321, 74 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982) (noting that “an alien seeking initial admission to the United States ... has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative”); U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the applicable statutory Holdings: 0: holding that it is not 1: recognizing burden is on alien when alien is removable 2: holding that wjhatever the procedure authorized by congress is it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned 3: holding that there is no due process violation where the ijs finding was not arbitrary and the alien was not denied a full and fair opportunity to present his claims 4: holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing


Input: to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 401 and 402. We fail to see the logical connection between the fact of Archer Bank’s filing of CTRs and Van Allen’s guilt or innocence. The actions of Archer Bank following Van Allen’s various deposits and withdrawals do not demonstrate anything material about Van Allen’s state of mind. At most, the filing of CTRs may have indicated something about the knowledge of officials at Archer Bank; but such knowledge would not make it more or less likely that Van Allen knew of the reporting requirements or acted to avoid them. Whether or not Van Allen actually fooled Archer Bank has no bearing on the substantive violation under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a). See Cassano, 372 F.3d at 878 (<HOLDING>). The multiple cases cited by Van Allen for the Holdings: 0: holding that the presumption is that the trial court acted reasonably in sentencing and that the defendant must show some unreasonable or unjustifiable basis in the record that amounts to an abuse of discretion 1: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden to show that the defendant acted with intent to deceive 2: holding that in a prosecution for willfully violating federal law against structuring financial transactions to evade bank reporting requirements the government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful 3: holding that a plaintiff must comply with the notice of claim requirements in order to maintain an action against a government employee even if the plaintiff claims that the employee acted with fraud or malice 4: holding that the government must show only that a defendant had knowledge of the reporting requirements and acted to avoid them


Input: v. Rushen, 705 F.2d 355, 357 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting Powell v. Spalding, 679 F.2d 163, 166 (9th Cir.1982)). We are not persuaded that the trial court committed such an error. The Eighth Circuit considered a similar situation in Futrell v. Wyrick, 716 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir.1983). There, an unsuccessful habeas petitioner claimed that the introduction of police mugshots at his trial violated his due process rights. The court of appeals disagreed. “The manner in which the photographs were introduced,” the court found, “was unexceptionable. The photographs were never referred to as ‘mugshots’ and all police data was removed from them.” Id. at 1208. Thus, their introduction did not violate notions of fundamental fairness. Id.; see also United States v. Terry, 760 F.2d 939, 944 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The photographs in Reiger’s case did not Holdings: 0: holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion 1: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 2: holding that introduction of mugshots containing no incriminating police data was not an abuse of the district court judges discretion 3: holding abuse of discretion is established if district court decision was based on an error of law 4: holding that the judges restriction of the class was not an abuse of discretion


Input: depends in part on Carrington Gardens’ allegation that HUD’s declaring the 241 Loan in default was wrongful. Specifically, the reason later denials of financial requests constituted breaches of the Regulatory Agreements, according to Carring-ton Gardens, is that the denials were based on a wrongful declaration of default. To the extent that Carrington Gardens must prove that HUD wrongfully declared the 241 Loan in default in order to advance its theory of the case, Carrington Gardens’ claim is barred. Carrington Gardens attempts to avoid the statute of limitations problem by arguing that the “continuing claim” doctrine applies here. See Brown Park Estates, 127 F.3d at 1456-57; see also Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Department of the Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 606 n. 4 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Carrington Gardens emphasizes that its theory Holdings: 0: recognizing that the artful pleading doctrine in practice is subsumed by the complete preemption doctrine 1: recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time 2: recognizing that the alter ego doctrine is an equitable doctrine which should be used to prevent inequitable results 3: recognizing doctrine 4: recognizing separation of powers doctrine


Input: 523.1 0[ I ][c], 523-71 (15th ed. rev.Mar. 1997). It is the Plaintiffs burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the dischargeability exception is warranted. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291, 111 S.Ct. 654, 661, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently addressed the nondischargeability provision under § 523(a)(4) for debts arising from defal (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1997) (noting that the traditional meaning of the term fiduciary is far too broad for bankruptcy purposes.); Ducey v. Doherty (In re Ducey), 160 B.R. 465, 469 (Bankr.D.N.H.1993) (noting that the term fiduciary in § 523(a)(4) is narrower in scope than the word as traditionally used under sate law); Hartwood Aviation, Inc. v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 147 B.R. 779, 783 (Bankr.D.Col.1992) (<HOLDING>). Fowler Bros., 91 F.3d at 1371 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that an attorney is a fiduciary under section 523a4 1: holding a duty of care without more insufficient to satisfy the fiduciary relationship element of  523a4 the federal courts adopting this narrow interpretation of fiduciary for purposes of the bankruptcy code gen erally hold that an express or technical trust is necessary to trigger the defalcation provision of  523a4 2: holding that the fraud or defalcation prong of  523a4 requires the showing of an express trust 3: holding that a statutorilyimposed fiduciary obligation created an express trust fiduciary relationship for purposes of  523a4 4: holding general fiduciary duties of confidence trust loyalty and good faith insufficient to establish the necessary fiduciary relationship for purposes of  523a4


Input: are descriptive. The composite may be more than the mere sum of its parts. ... Common words in which no one may acquire a trademark because they are descriptive or generic may, when used in combination, become a valid trademark. 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11:26 (4th ed. 2016); see also id. § 11:31 (explaining that the “slight misspelling of a word will not generally turn a descriptive word into a nondescriptive mark”). Examples of such composite marks include SUGAR & SPICE, MOUSE SEED, and SEASON-ALL, all of which are non-descriptive marks imbued with secondary meaning, but which are composed of generic or descriptive terms that are not themselves eligible for trademark protection. Id. § 11:26; see also Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1097 (<HOLDING>), (a) Effect of Registration Notwithstanding Holdings: 0: holding that if a motion implicates the merits of a cause of action the district court should find jurisdiction exists and treat the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiffs case 1: recognizing that the district court did not reach the merits 2: holding that although the mark duluth newstribune merits some level of protection the shorthand newstribune merits none 3: recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court 4: holding that a security award separable from the merits of the arbitration which was rendered prior to a hearing on the merits was sufficiently final to be reviewed under the faa


Input: offer subject to the express condition that the Seller assent that this [p]urchase [o]rder constitutes the entire agreement between Buyer and Seller.” Purchase order, ¶ 1. In other words, the purchase order was a conditional acceptance. See Ralph Shrader, Inc. v. Diamond International Corp., 833 F.2d 1210, 1215 (6th Cir.1987) (Ralph Shrader). In Ralph Shrader, the Sixth Circuit held that, when a party limited acceptance to “[t]he terms set forth on the reverse side,” it was a conditional acceptance. Id. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that language in a contract had to mimic the “expressly made conditional” language of UCC § 2-207(1) in order to be a conditional acceptance. Id. n. 4; see also Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 101 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). To require the exact language of the UCC Holdings: 0: holding that the offerors signature on the offerees conditional acceptance bound the offeror to all the terms therein 1: holding that a private actors conduct was not state action just because the government failed to supervise that partys conduct 2: holding that a conditional acceptance can be manifested merely in a partys conduct 3: holding that performance may be valid acceptance 4: recognizing that a partys initial entry of a restricted appearance manifested its lack of consent to personal jurisdiction but that partys subsequent actions constituted a waiver of its jurisdictional defenses


Input: to secure a continuance on the morning of the hearing is a factor relevant to the decision-maker’s consideration of the promptness and good faith of her actions. See King v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 803 A.2d 966, 970 (D.C.2002) (reversing agency’s dismissal of protest for non-appearance with the observation that the petitioner who telephoned the agency within an hour of the hearing with a plausible explanation for the inability to appear was not a classic “no-show”). Therefore, the ALJ should have addressed it. To the extent that the ALJ deemed it necessary for Frausto to substantiate her claim that she called the clerk’s office to request a continuance, the ALJ should have given her an opportunity to provide it. See Miranda v. Contreras, 754 A.2d 277, 280 (D.C.2000) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Starling, supra, 495 A.2d at 1162). Holdings: 0: recognizing the trial courts responsibility to inquire where matters are raised which might entitle the movant to relief under rule 60b  1: holding violation of rule 23a does not entitle petitioner to habeas relief 2: holding that rule 60b bars sua sponte relief 3: holding that rule 60b cannot provide any relief from the district courts judgment on an 18 usc  3582 motion because  3582 actions are criminal in nature and rule 60b is applicable only to civil proceedings 4: holding attorneys failure to object does not warrant rule 60b relief


Input: act following Jorge’s initial act of fraud, and his petition makes it very clear he is complaining that appellees’ acts proximately caused him this second injury. Appellees’ allegations, by focusing solely on Jorge’s first act of malfeasance, do not respond to Roberto’s claim and therefore provide no valid grounds for summary judgment. We conclude the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on this ground. Conclusion We reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of appel-lees and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 1 . This analysis also holds true for appellees' statute of limitation arguments in response to Roberto's claims of breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and conversion. See Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex.1988) (<HOLDING>); In re Estate of Herring, 970 S.W.2d 583, 586 Holdings: 0: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba 1: holding that economic loss rule barred claim for breach of fiduciary duty where precontract misrepresentations were directly related to alleged breach of contract 2: holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan 3: holding that breach of fiduciary duty justified using discovery rule to toll limitations 4: holding that claim of breach of fiduciary duty can be resolved under connecticut law


Input: that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because she incorrectly believed that under Arizona law, the state was required to disprove Lewis’s defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-205(A) (providing that the burden is on the defendant to prove self-defense by a preponderance). The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim, reasoning that although counsel’s performance was deficient, Lewis had not shown prejudice. This state court decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.Ct. 362, 365-66, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the district court properly denied Holdings: 0: holding that to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 1: holding that in order to show prejudice defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 2: holding that to establish prejudice there must be a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 3: holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 4: holding that ineffective assistance of counsel occurs when there is deficient performance and prejudice which is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different


Input: skepticism about the substantive validity of this monopoly lease claim based on maintenance of a single lease by an alleged monopolist.” National Souvenir Center, supra, 728 F.2d at 513. Indeed, we noted that Appellees’ sale of the Lynch figures to other wax museum franchisees seriously undercuts appellants’ arguments that ap-pellees relied on the lease as a mechanism to discourage replacement of the figures with those of competitors during the lease term, or that leasing rather than selling significantly affected the market for figures. Id. Despite its submission of evidence of additional leases (between appellees and other museums), appellant gives us no cause to question the appropriateness of our initial skepticism. Gatlinb Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 88 S.Ct. 2224, 20 L.Ed.2d 1231 (1968) (<HOLDING>). However, United Shoe is clearly Holdings: 0: holding ncaas television restrictions violated  1 of the sherman act 1: holding that uniteds lease provisions violated  4 of the sherman act 2: holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act 3: holding that same activity violated  2 of the sherman act 4: holding ban violated the sherman act


Input: J. Although we note that the defendant, Alvin Williams, has conscientiously reported for over ten years as required by section 954.0435(14)(b) of the Florida Statutes, we find that the trial court correctly concluded that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.040, which extends a deadline where the deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, is not applicable to the reporting requirements set forth in section 954.0435(14)(b), as the reporting requirement does not require a computation of time, but instead requires the defendant to “reregister each year during the month of the sexual offender’s birthday and every third month thereafter.” See Violette v. P.A. Days, Inc., 427 F.3d 1015, 1019 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 3 F.3d 148, 151 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that a bankruptcy rule equivalent to rule 6a ala r civ p should be construed to give the benefit of extending the deadline for submission to the day after the holiday regardless of whether the deadline is expressed as the last day of a period of days or as a date certain 1: holding that the plain language of rule 6a of the federal rules of civil procedure which authorizes the extension of a deadline where the deadline expires on a saturday sunday or legal holiday is limited to situations where periods of time must be computed and therefore class settlement optout forms that were postmarked on the first business day after the courtordered saturday deadline were not timely filed 2: holding that the drastic sanction of preclusion of expert witnesses was not warranted based on failure to furnish discovery by the discovery deadline when the deadline could have been shifted 3: holding that the 180day filing deadline is jurisdictional and mandatory 4: holding that the bankruptcy court could not extend a deadline for filing a notice of appeal beyond the 20 day extension period allowed by the bankruptcy rules


Input: companies engaged in the same type of business as Cereva and Pirus. This court stated, “in view of [defendant’s] position at EMC and access to confidential and proprietary information relating to EMC’s product and marketing plans ... a restriction of one year is reasonable.” Id. This court further held that, ”[t]he market for open storage products in which EMC and Sun [the subsequent employer] compete is worldwide.” Id. The covenant not to compete in the Agreement at bar is likewise reasonable in geographical scope and length of time. III. Irreparable Harm Cereva has made a showing that it will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction fails to issue since it stands to lose customer good will which cannot be completely remedied through monetary damages. See Kroeger, supra, at 322 (<HOLDING>). IV. Balance of Harm This court is well aware Holdings: 0: holding that where a defendant acknowledged awareness of the consequences of his plea agreement counsels erroneous explanation of the consequences was not prejudicial 1: holding that an attorney is required to advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea and will not be found ineffective for failing to advise of collateral consequences of the plea 2: holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law 3: holding courts role is to ensure that agency took hard look at the environmental consequences and convincingly documented its fonsi 4: holding that the task of quantifying the consequences of violating a noncompetition clause is a particularly hard and elusive one


Input: process disrupts the process, see e.g., Acura v. Reich, 90 F.3d 1403, 1408-09 (9th Cir.1996); Federal Trade Comm’n v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 242, 101 S.Ct. 488, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980) (stating that judicial intervention before the agency process is final “denies the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise.”), this Court holds that aliens like Petitioner still have a right to petition a district court for a writ of habeas corpus and the Court has jurisdiction to review such petitions, especially where they involve constitutional challenges to statutes. See e.g., Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir.1999); Hinojosa-Perez v. Eddy, 55 F.Supp.2d 1001, —, slip op. at 7 (D.Alaska 1999); cf. Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 120 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Henderson v. Immigration & Naturalization Holdings: 0: holding that the new stoptime rule applies to all aliens applying for either suspension of deportation under the old law or cancellation of removal under the iirira amendments 1: holding that iirira does not bar us from staying removal orders pending resolution of petitions for review 2: recognizing that after iirira habeas review remains available  to raise substantial constitutional questions 3: holding that neither aedpa nor iirira expressly repeals the availability of habeas review of deportation or removal orders 4: holding that the procedural aspects of iirira  309c apply only to ongoing exclusion or deportation proceedings and are irrelevant in cases involving aliens whose orders of deportation or exclusion were final on the effective date


Input: the district court felt that the maximum sentence was the appropriate punishment. Judging from the record, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion by giving the maximum sentence. So long as the district court acts within the guidelines, a harsh sentence, in and of itself, does not constitute error. See United States v. Ponce, 917 F.2d 841, 842 (5th Cir.1990) ("[W]e will uphold the district court’s sentence so long as it results from a correct application of the guidelines to factual findin Cir.1995) (“The 100 to one ratio is extreme, but it is not the province of this Court to second-guess Congress’s chosen penalty. That is a discretionary legislative judgment for Congress and the Sentencing Commission to make.”); United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 928, 112 S.Ct. 1989, Holdings: 0: holding that no unconstitutional infirmity exists in the sentencing guidelines treatment of crack visavis powder cocaine 1: holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack 2: holding that a judge may consider the disparity between the guidelines treat ment of crack and powder cocaine offenses in deciding upon a sentence 3: holding that sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine is constitutional 4: holding that the sentencing guidelines disparate treatment of crack cocaine is not racially discriminatory under the fifth amendments equal protection guarantees


Input: relevant price is the price at which the government could have bought the tape from other vendors. When Coker herself relies on theory to which the government “switched,” any “switch,” if it was impermissible, was not prejudicial. III Coker also objects to the manner in which her sentence was calculated, and asserts that she suffered ineffective assistance of counsel. We decline to address the merits of either argument because she has withdrawn her ineffective assistance claim and waived her sentencing objections. A In Coker’s first brief, her trial counsel, who continues to represent her on appeal (with Coker’s apparent approval), argued that his own performance at trial was constitutionally deficient. After the government pointed out that claims of ineffective ass 94 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Fifth Circuit declared an attempt to Holdings: 0: holding that sentencing enhancements and sentencing departures are not synonymous and that a waiver for upward departures imposed by the court does not permit the challenging of sentence enhancements 1: holding that sentencing disparity produced by substantial assistance departures was intended by congress and is thus not a proper sentencing consideration under section 3553a6 2: holding that prior convictions are merely sentencing enhancements rather than elements of the offense 3: recognizing that sentencing guidelines may provide enhancements for mere possession of firearm during other offense 4: holding that adequate notice exists for upward enhancements for factors presently in the guidelines to allow an average defense counsel adequately to prepare for sentencing


Input: from the date on which they were taken.”). Ganesan argues he is entitled to a new trial because he “timely requested” the record and it was lost or destroyed “without appellant’s fault.” See Tex.R.App. P. 34.6(f). The Texas Supreme Court has expressly held that “[i]f a litigant has not requested the reporter to prepare a statement of the facts within three years, nor specifically requested that the notes of a proceeding be preserved beyond three years, then the litigant is not free from fault....” See Piotrowski, 873 S.W.2d at 371. Because Ganesan could have requested the reporter to prepare the record within three years of the proceeding, or at minimum requested that the record be preserved, he is not free from fault. Accordingly, he is not entitled to a new trial. See id. at 370 (<HOLDING>). Appellant argues that his request for the Holdings: 0: holding appellant is not entitled to a new trial unless the reporters notes have been lost or destroyed without appellants fault and the parties cannot agree on a statement of facts 1: holding that motion for a new trial whether for guilt or punishment requires a valid legal claim a court cannot grant a new trial unless the defendant shows that he is entitled to one under the law 2: holding that if appellant preserves legal sufficiency complaint in motion for new trial new trial is all the relief appellate court can give because that is all the relief appellant requested in trial court 3: holding that plaintiff cannot introduce new allegations or new facts in opposition to a motion to dismiss 4: holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement


Input: City had instituted a civil proceeding (this action), that it was withdrawing its request for a restitution hearing against the criminal defendants, and that it would be very difficult to determine what the appropriate amount of restitution would be. See id. at 4-5. Although Plaintiff may be able to properly rely on these documents and statements in a motion for summary judgment or at trial, they are not properly considered in the present motion to dismiss. Plaintiff did not rely on the terms and effects of these documents and statements in drafting its complaint, and Plaintiffs knowledge of their existence is insufficient for this exception to apply. See Global Network Commc’ns, Inc., 458 F.3d at 156 (quotation omitted); Williams v. Time Warner Inc., 440 Fed.Appx. 7, 9 (2d Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). In light of this conclusion, the Court finds Holdings: 0: holding that a court may consider documents that have not been incorporated by reference where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect which renders the document integral to the complaint 1: holding that a mere passing reference or even references however to a document outside the complaint does not on its own incorporate the document into the complaint itself citation omitted 2: holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint 3: holding that a court may consider a document submitted by a defendant in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because it was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs do not challenge its authenticity 4: holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint


Input: the court, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, “reserving in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2); see also United States v. Cain, 155 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir.1998). This is a narrow exception to the ordinary rule that a defendant who pleads guilty cannot appeal his conviction. United States v. Dimitrov, 546 F.3d 409, 416 (7th Cir.2008). To preserve an issue for appeal, a conditional plea must “precisely identify which pretrial issues the defendant wishes to preserve for review.” United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1313 (7th Cir.1993). All non-jurisdictional issues not specifically preserved in the conditional plea agreement are waived. See, e.g., Dimitrov, 546 F.3d at 416 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Doherty, 17 F.3d 1056, Holdings: 0: holding an issue was preserved in part because the trial court immediately understood the basis of the objection 1: holding that although the defendant had preserved his objection to the constitutionality of a mental state requirement he had not preserved another constitutional objection 2: holding that claim was preserved for subsequent appeal by objection at original sentencing hearing 3: holding that error was preserved by running objection because of defendants immediate objection to states specific question in combination with trial courts comments showing that it understood nature of defendants objection 4: holding that a claimed violation of the right to a public trial must be preserved for review by a timely objection at trial


Input: Error If a “[federal] court finds that the state court engaged in an unreasonable application of established law, resulting in constitutional error, it must next consider whether such error was harmless.” Howard, 406 F.3d at 122 (citations omitted). Asked must be whether the application of the law “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 115 S.Ct. 992, 994, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995) (citations omitted). “When a [federal judge in a habeas proceeding] has grave doubt about whether a trial error ... had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict, that error is not harmless. And; the petitioner must win.” Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83, 99 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). V. Plea Agreements Plea bargaining, defined Holdings: 0: holding that statute allowing videotaped testimony of child witnesses at trial violated state constitutional right of confrontation but not sixth amendment right 1: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error 2: holding that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to introduce defendants prior consistent statement statement was not admissible because it was made after defendant had been arrested clearly not a time when the effect of the statement could not have been foreseen 3: holding that petitioners videotaped statement made after he invoked his right to counsel was wrongfully admitted at trial and not harmless error 4: holding that defendants statements not admissible once he had invoked right to counsel without proof of waiver


Input: Ninth Circuit reasoned that, “to survive summary judgment, a copyright infringement plaintiff seeking to recover indirect profits damages [i.e., damages for profits that have an attenuated connection to the infringement] under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) must proffer some evidence to create a triable issue regarding whether the infringement at least partially caused the profits that the infringer generated as the result of the infringement.” Id. at 911. “Because Mackie [had] failed to adduce any non-speculative evidence that would even suggest a link between the infringement and the Symphony’s supposedly enhanced revenues,” summary judgment in favor of the Symphony was appropriate. Id.; see id. at 916; see also Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur 1: holding that a nexus between the corporate officers or directors official activity and the matter for which indemnification is sought must be shown though no more than a nexus whether a nexus exists is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court considering all the circumstances surrounding the proposed indemnification 2: recognizing that derogatory comments may serve as circumstantial evidence of discrimination but the plaintiff must still show some nexus between the statements and the defendants decision to terminate the employee 3: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 4: holding that no federal nexus is required