Input: at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.16, 2001); see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). An arbitrator’s interim ruling is not a final award if i ance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir.1991) (“[Temporary equitable orders calculated to preserve assets or performance needed to make a potential final award meaningful ... are final orders that can be review Mut. Ins. Co., No. Misc. 88-0600, 1996 WL 557513, at *3 n. 8 (E.D.Pa. Sep.30, 1996) (“Even though the arbitration panel’s award is a interim provision for pre-hear-ing security, and the panel has not reached the merits of the case, this court may rule on motions to confirm and vacate the award.”). Indeed, courts have reviewed such interim orders even when they were issued prior to a hearing on the merits. See British Ins. Co. of Cayman, 93 F.Supp.2d at 513 (<HOLDING>); Atlas Assurance Co. of Am., 1991 WL 4741, at Holdings: 0: holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal 1: holding that only claims properly presented to the bia and considered on their merits can be reviewed by this court 2: holding that a dismissal based on a jurisdictional statute of limitations does not constitute a judgmerit on the merits because a judgment on the merits can only be rendered after a court has jurisdiction 3: holding that a security award separable from the merits of the arbitration which was rendered prior to a hearing on the merits was sufficiently final to be reviewed under the faa 4: recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court


Input: to use the word "rendition” in the statute of limitations. 5 . This rule is clearly analogous to, although not identical to, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. 6 . Furthermore, under this same body of Michigan law, we must reject the defendants’ assertion that ARCO failed to timely "commence" the instant renewal action (and toE the statute of limitations) because of aUegedly improper service of process by someone not an "officer” for pin-poses of the Michigan tolling statute, Mich. Comp.Laws Aim. § 600.5856(c) (West Supp. 1995). Michigan Court Rule 2.101(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 both state that an action is "commenced" when a complaint is filed with the court, and that rule controls insofar as it conflicts with the toEing statute. See Buscaino, 189 N.W.2d at 205-06 Holdings: 0: holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident 1: holding that the statute of limitations for an attorneys fees action under  1415e4b is three years 2: holding new mexico statute of limitations for filing a  1983 action is three years 3: holding that a lender was barred from recovering repayment for loans made more than three years before filing suit where obligations without agreed repayment dates were deemed payable on demand and where the statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts was three years 4: holding that new york statute of limitations for  1983 actions was three years


Input: Wide’s claims is the fact that each of these agreements contains a provision limiting the agreement’s scope. The Management Agreement states that "[t]he subject of this Agreement shall be the transfer to World Wide of the right to manage, control, use and own the State-owned or controlled block of shares in [TGK].” Management Agreement ¶ 1. And the Pledge Agreement includes an integration clause stating that ”[t]his Pledge Agreement constitutes and contains the entire agreement of the parties.” Pledge Agreement ¶ 21.1. Although the Pledge Agreement grants World Wide a security interest in TGK shares and assets, id. ¶2.1, it does not itself include an agreement to repay World Wide’s loans to TGK. 15 .See Strategic Alliance Agreement ¶ 9.3 ("If any dispute or difference ar .Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>). 18 . In Count XI, World Wide asks the court Holdings: 0: holding that subject to certain exceptions the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for economic damages arising out of matters governed by contract 1: holding valid forum selection clause providing that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under in connection with or incident to this contract shall be litigated if at all in and before a court located in the state of florida quoting underlying contract 2: holding that the court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code 3: holding that a leases waiver of trial by jury for any matters whatsoever arising out of or in any way connected with this lease did not extend to a tort claim 4: holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured


Input: brother was convicted and served time in prison. The State noted that J.C.’s “unique situation” would “have any prosecutor move to remove any potential juror regardless of race, under that scenario.” The State further noted that J.C. was “saddened by [her brother’s conviction] and ... can’t necessarily not refer back to it ... in this process” and that “[e]ven when she was asked if the system worked fairly in her brother’s case and she said [it] did, she hesitated and paused.” On appeal, Carridine claims that “[b]ecause a white juror [M.B.] ... had a family member involved in the criminal justice system” and was seated on the jury, the State’s fust reason for the peremptory challenge was a pretext for purposeful discrimination. See Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1362 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. The fact that M.B. was seated on Holdings: 0: holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason 1: holding that pretext may be established by proving that prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to exclude africanamerican venirepersons for a given reason or reasons but then failed to apply the same reason or reasons to exclude similarly situated white venirepersons 2: holding that trial judges determination  that the prosecutors use of peremptory challenges to strike all four africanamerican venirepersons for lack of education and business experience was not pretextual  was not clearly erroneous 3: holding that reviewing record in its entirety prosecutors raceneutral reason was not a pretext where state applied this reason to strike black veniremember and most but not all similarly situated nonblack veniremembers 4: holding raceneutral basis for preemptory challenge was pretext where stated reasons for challenge not supported by venirepersons statements


Input: government had no obligation to prove that the defendant had such knowledge. Id. at 189, 194, 118 S.Ct. 1939. Rather, the term “willfully” in that context required the government to prove only that the defendant “knew that his conduct was unlawful.” Id. at 195, 118 S.Ct. 1939. In light of these precedents, we conclude there is no basis for requiring the government to prove that a person charged with violating IEE-PA and the ITR was aware of a specific licensing requirement. While the prohibitions imposed by IEEPA and the ITR are for conduct that is not “obviously illegal,” see Henderson, 243 F.3d at 1173, the “danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct,” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194, 118 S.Ct. 1939, is no greater under IEEPA than under the st 57, 61 (D.D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). Applying these principles to the Holdings: 0: holding that proof of relevant market is essential under  2 1: holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act 2: holding that under bryan proof of willfulness under  1705c of ieepa does not require knowledge of the licensing requirements under the itr 3: holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applicable in fraud actions does not apply to the proof of misrepresentations under ors 743612 4: holding that a conviction under section 2422b does not require the involvement of a minor


Input: ended up in, than it was with someone firing from where Robert Foley was standing. Had the bullet been fired from where Robert Foley was standing, one would expect to see a shallow groove running along the wall towards the hole where the bullet gradually entered, due to the oblique angle. There was no evidence that this was the case and, consequently, the hole is consistent with someone firing from approximately where Robert Foley alleged Lynn Vaughn was standing, towards where Robert Foley alleged Rodney Vaughn was located. “Newly discovered evidence is evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 250 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Ky.2008). See also Sanders v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 427, 437 (Ky.2011) (<HOLDING>). Certainly, testimony in the form of an Holdings: 0: holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision 1: recognizing an exception to the twoyear time bar imposed on rule 3850 claims when the claim asserted is based on facts that were unknown to the movant and could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence 2: holding that cr 6002 allows appeals based upon claims of error that were unknown and could not have been known to the moving party by exercise of reasonable diligence and in time to have been otherwise presented to the court 3: holding substance of claim must have been presented to state court 4: holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel


Input: SPD at issue in this case, including calling one or both of the federal offices listed in the SPD, would not have been aware of the one-year limitations period set forth in the Plan, and instead presumably would have relied on the general principles of law applicable to ERISA claims. Under those principles, an action seeking benefits under ERISA must comply with the “most analogous” state statute of limitations. Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990). In this case, which was brought in Utah, the most analogous state statute of limitations is Utah's three-year statute of limitations applicable to written policies or contracts of first party insurance, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(1). Lang v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, absent the one-year limitations period Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims 1: holding that the most analogous claim for relief under new york law is a claim for employment discrimination 2: holding that the virginia disabilities act constitutes the most analogous state statute of limitations for claims brought under the ada 3: holding that this statute was the most analogous state statute for purposes of erisa action filed in utah 4: holding that statute of limitations governing the most closely analogous state substantive claim controls rather than the forum states borrowing statute


Input: “the only plainly discernible purpose for Article 120 was to seek to impose an additional measure of punishment upon those who had violated the laws of the Commonwealth.” Plaintiffs point to the a transcript of the debates at the 1998 and 2000 Constitutional Conventions over the bill that ultimately became Article 120. Plaintiffs also rely on language from Acting Governor Cellucci’s proposed amendment and his statements to the public, an amendment which was not accepted. These statements include: “The time has come to tell would-be criminals in Massachusetts that committing crimes has serious consequen Facto Clause. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has stated that felon Holdings: 0: holding preventative detention under the bail reform act was permissible because it was regulatory and preventative rather than punitive 1: holding that a defendants propensity to commit crime generally even if the resulting harm would be not solely physical may constitute sufficient risk of danger to come within contemplation of the bail reform act 2: holding that a prisoners claim was saved by his request for nominal and punitive damages even though he could not recover compensatory damages under the prison litigation reform act 3: holding that under the bail reform act for a defendant to have been convicted of two or more offenses constituting crimes of violence offenses must have been committed on different occasions 4: holding that the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 publ no 95598 92 stat 2549 precluded dismissal of cases pending before enactment of the reform act in order to refile under the act


Input: totality-of-the-circumstances review was infected by its misapprehension of the standard “dictated by the U. S. Supreme Court under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.” App. 1229a. Whereas the focus of §§ 205(a) and 206(a) is on the reasonableness of the rates charged, not the conduct of the contracting parties, FERC restricted its review to the contracting parties’ behavior around the time of formation. See id., at 1280a-1284a. FERC seems to have thought it was powerless to conduct just-and-reasonable review unless the contract was already subject to abrogation based on contract defenses such as fraud or duress. By including contracts within the scope of § 206(a), however, Congress must have concluded that contract defenses are insufficient to protect the public interest. But see ante, at 547 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, nothing in the FPA or this Court’s Holdings: 0: recognizing presumption 1: holding that to establish grounds for reversal an appellant must challenge all grounds on which the trial court ruled against it 2: holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified 3: holding that the mobilesierra presumption applies in all circumstances absent traditional grounds for    abrogation or illegal action by a contracting party 4: holding that fourteenth amendment is the only recognized source of authority for abrogation


Input: has come to be so closely associated with ‘means-plus-function’ claiming that it is fair to say that the use of the term ‘means’ ... generally invokes 112(6) and that the use of a different formulation generally does not”). Intel next argues that the functional language used in the claims does not equate to means-plus-function. See Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583 (“The fact that a particular mechanism ... is defined in functional terms is not sufficient to convert a claim element containing that term into a ‘means for performing a specified function’ within the meaning of 112(6)”). Rather, because each of the three terms at issue “has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art” as the name for a structure, 112, ¶ 6 should not apply. Id.; see also Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 705 (<HOLDING>). Last, Intel contends that when a claim Holdings: 0: holding the function of a public utility is controlling not how the term is defined 1: holding that use of term black box did not render the claim indefinite because that term was known in the field to represent video standard detector circuitry 2: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance 3: holding that what is important is not simply that the element at issue is defined in terms of what it does but that the term as the name for a structure has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art 4: holding that detector is a sufficiently definite structural term to preclude the application of 112  6 even though the detector was defined in terms of its function because the term detector refers to a wellknown structure for those knowledgeable in the art


Input: this language suggests is that the provisions in section 708.11(3)(b), including the provision dealing with protective orders (section 708.11(3)(b)(l)), are not elements of the offense of stalking, but rather are merely predicates to an enhanced punishment. We also note that the explanation to the 1998 amendment to section 708.11(3)(b)(l) suggests this provision is a punishment enhancement. See 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1021 (“An act relating to certain crimes against persons ... by providing for the application of enhanced stalking penalties for persons who are the subject of certain restraining or protective orders-”). We have previously indicated that predicates used only for enhancement purposes are not elements of the offense charged. See State v. Tobin, 333 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Iowa 1983) (<HOLDING>). Reviewing similarly worded stalking statutes, Holdings: 0: holding that double jeopardy does not bar reprosecution of an accused who refuses to perform a condition of his guilty plea 1: holding that prior convictions are merely sentencing enhancements rather than elements of the offense 2: holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand 3: holding that a recidivist provision in theft statute providing that theft of property not exceeding 500 in value by one who has before been twice convicted of theft constitutes theft in the second degree does not violate protection against double jeopardy prior convictions are predicates for enhanced punishment rather than elements of current theft charge and hence current charge is not reprosecution of prior offenses 4: holding that nurses fiftysix prior convictions for theft made his assault on elderly female visitor foreseeable


Input: yet the district court, like the hearing officer in Arlington County, succumbed to its temptation to inject itself into matters of professional educational judgment. 7 . For example, the ALJ stated that DB claimed the IEP goals drafted by Dr. McCarthy were the "only appropriate ones for the Child,” and noted that Drs. McCarthy and Antell "testified in great detail as to the inferiority of the AACPS IEP and the superiority of the special education services that the Child is receiving at the Summit School.” ALJ Op. at 24 (J.A. 29). Yet the ALJ reached a completely opposite result, holding that the IEP complied with IDEA. 8 . As discussed above, AB’s report card for his year at Millersville, ante n. 3, also supports the ALJ's findings. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 n. 28, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (<HOLDING>). 9 . Additionally, Appellees argue, relying on Holdings: 0: recognizing that among other factors the location and level of the precedent as well as its age are important factors in a qualified immunity analysis 1: recognizing that achievement of passing marks and advance ment from grade to grade are important factors in determining educational benefit 2: holding that most important factors in evaluating confusion in product configuration eases are marketing and labeling of products 3: recognizing same factors 4: holding that the family court is required to consider all relevant factors in determining alimony


Input: statistics but also all the surrounding facts and circumstances”); Police Officers for Equal Rights v. City of Columbus, 644 F.Supp. 393, 432 n. 13 (S.D.Ohio 1985) (stating that even if plaintiff fell short of cut-offs for statistical significance, “other evidence submitted in this case ... tends to support the inference of disparate impact suggested by plaintiffs statistical data”). The Plaintiffs bolster their evidence on statistical significance by presenting evidence that the 2005 and 2008 exams violated the four-fifths rule. As this Court has already held, “a violation of the four-fifths rule ... may demonstrate adverse impact, particularly when coupled with other statistical evidence of adverse impact.” Cotter, 193 F.Supp.2d at 348 n. 12; see also Bradley, 443 F.Supp.2d at 163 (<HOLDING>). The Court also considers the fact that if the Holdings: 0: holding that numbers alone are not sufficient to establish or negate a prima facie ease 1: holding that statistical evidence that was too broad to support a prima facie case of systemic disparate treatment was nevertheless admissible in plaintiffs individual disparate treatment case but noting that a valid statistical analysis must encompass the rel evant labor market 2: holding that a plaintiffs failure to establish the statistical significance of her evidence fatally undermines her claim 3: holding that the plaintiffs established a prima facie ease of statistical significance by using the fourfifths rule combined with a chisquare analysis 4: holding that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of disparate impact despite a lack of statistical significance based on past discrimination which reduced the number of africanamericans eligible to sit for the promotional exam


Input: so requests, the arresting government shall inform his local consular post of his arrest, and he shall be permitted to communicate with the consular officials. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77, 101. 3 . Although Gordon’s waiver of appellate rights did not encompass the sentence corresponding to his illegal reentry conviction, Gordon fails to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion. See Gall v. United States, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Gordon’s 240-month sentence for this offense was imposed concurrent to the 420-month sentence for the § 846 offense. Therefore, Gordon’s substantial rights were not affected by the 240-month concurrent term. See United States v. Ellis, 326 F.3d 593, 599-600 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Burns, 298 F.3d 523, 544-45 Holdings: 0: holding that sentence exceeding statutory maximum by twenty years did not affect substantial rights because defendant received equal or longer concurrent sentences on other counts 1: holding that santoss concern regarding the evisceration of congresss choice of a low statutory maximum penalty for an underlying offense did not apply where the underlying offenses carried maximum sentences of twenty years and the money laundering offense carried a lower maximum sentence of ten years 2: holding that an apprendi error was harmless where the defendant received a concurrent sentence on another count longer than the statutory maximum applicable to the count affected by the error 3: holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony 4: holding that sentencing error did not affect defendants substantial rights because error did not result in longer term of imprisonment


Input: recommendations respecting plan administration is not indicative of fiduciary status. Toomey, 855 F.Supp. at 24; 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8(D-2). The Court concludes, therefore, that John Hancock’s performance of plan design services lacks the discretionary authority in the administration of an employee benefit plan necessary to qualify it as a fiduciary under ERISA. Turning to an analysis of the other services John Hancock provides to the Plan, the Court recognizes that urging the purchase of an insurance company’s plan services does not make that company a fiduciary with respect to those services. American Fed’n of Unions v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 841 F.2d 658, 664 (5th Cir.1988); see also Consolidated Beef Indus. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 960, 964-65 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 1670, Holdings: 0: holding that when employers serve as plan administrators they assume the role of fiduciary under erisa 1: holding that plan trustees do not breach their fiduciary duty by failing to reverse a companys decision to amend an erisa plan 2: holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan 3: holding that salesman of companys financial products not fiduciary to erisa plan 4: holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under  502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan


Input: issue when applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is whether the claim at issue is 'inextricably intertwined' with the state court judgment.” Abboud, 232 B.R. at 798. This is not accurate. The Rooker-Feld-man doctrine bars consideration not only of issues actually presented to and decided by a state court, but also bars consideration of claims that are "inextricably intertwined” with issues ruled upon by the state court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303; see Facio, 929 F.2d at 543. Analysis of whether a claim is "inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment is necessary only if the claim before the federal court was not raised in the state court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303; Facio, 929 F.2d at 543; see Kiowa Indian Tribe, 150 F.3d at 1169 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the statute of limitations Holdings: 0: holding that issue preclusion extends to a matter that the court must necessarily albeit implicitly have decided 1: holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court 2: holding that law of the case acts as a bar only when the issue in question was actually considered and decided by the first court 3: holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator 4: recognizing that inextricably intertwined analysis extends to issues not actually decided by the state court


Input: charged the following: “Name calling, insults and profanity, absent the showing of special damages is not slander.” The trial judge seemed troubled by the broad statement of law offered by defense counsel. The judge did not believe he could give the charge as proposed without some quote or further explanation. The judge was correct, and it would have been an incorrect statement of the law to have charged the jury that insults or profanity cannot be defamatory, as extrinsic facts may be proven to show the defamatory nature of the remarks. We find the charge as a whole was proper, and note that the judge did not preclude the defense from arguing that the alleged defamatory statements were mere insults or name-calling. Keaton v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 334 S.C. 488, 514 S.E.2d 570 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial Holdings: 0: holding jury charge is proper if as a whole it is free from error and reflects the current and correct law of south carolina 1: holding that sufficiency of the evidence is measured against a hypothetically correct jury charge 2: holding error in calculation of amount due on accelerated note secured by deed of trust does not require reversal of cause appellate court may correct judgment 3: holding that the constitutional guarantee of a right to trial by jury includes the right to a complete and correct charge of the law so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the jury on proper instructions 4: holding a jury charge which is substantially correct and covers the law does not require reversal


Input: of disorder or lapsed mentality. Id. Contestants’ evidence surrounds the impropriety of Estha giving family stock to non-family members. Contestants point to inferences that can be drawn from Estha singling out Cook from his other two brothers and the absence of gifts to long-time friends in favor of the charities as more than a scintilla of evidence of undue influence. In spite of these assertions, excluding collateral heirs in favor of charities is not unnatural. See Naihaus v. Feigon, 244 S.W.2d 325 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (upholding testatrix’s will disposition which left bulk of estate to two synagogues and rabbi to the exclusion of surviving nieces and nephews); In Re Caruthers’ Estate, 151 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tex. Civ.App.-Beaumont 1941, writ dism’d) (<HOLDING>). Further, there is a direct connection between Holdings: 0: recognizingpublic policy favors arbitration 1: recognizing that public policy favors limiting the duration of spousal maintenance to encourage a transition toward independence 2: recognizing this texas rule 3: holding that public policy favors the exclusion of intentional acts as contained in the mjua policy 4: recognizing that texas public policy favors charitable gifts


Input: remedies, power to pursue equitable remedies in the context of discovery. See S.Rep. No. 89-1159 (1965), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2032, at 2466. Hoskins asks this Panel to interpret § 544(a)(2) to give a trustee all the substantive rights of the hypothetical execution lien creditor, which in California include standing to bring a claim for relief for aiding and abetting fraudulent transfers against a third party. See Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1118 (C.D.Cal.2003). Other courts within the Ninth Circuit have declined to grant a trustee standing to pursue such a claim, albeit under a different subsection of the strong arm statute. See Wyle v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs Inc. (In re Hamilton Taft & Co.), 176 B.R. 895, 902 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1995) (<HOLDING>); Ciolino v. Ryan (In re Ryan), 2008 WL 4829947 Holdings: 0: recognizing aiding and abetting conversion 1: holding that the trustee did not have power to pursue an aiding and abetting claim for relief under  544b 2: holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting 3: recognizing both aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting conversion 4: recognizing aiding and abetting trespass


Input: to meet their obligations in this case. 4. Feasibility of Reorganization The Court has already concluded that Liberty Bank lacks adequate protection. Supra Part 11(C). However, the staggering size of the Danleys’ arrearage and the length of their delinquency also indicated that this case was filed in bad faith. Even with Stacy Danley’s judgment against Alabama State University, the Danleys have no reasonable prospect of confirming a plan that would allow them to keep the properties securing Liberty Bank’s mortgages. When combined with the timing of their prior bankruptcy cases and the lack of good faith in which they were prosecuted, the futility of reorganization in this case is further evidence of a scheme intended to delay or- defraud Liberty Bank. See Henderson, 395 B.R. at 904 (<HOLDING>). The Court also gave great weight to the fact Holdings: 0: holding that the objective futility of a reorganization is grounds for a finding of bad faith and for in rem relief 1: holding title company liable for bad faith 2: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort 3: holding that although courts have inherent power to dismiss bad faith litigant  707a does not provide basis for dismissal on grounds of bad faith filing 4: holding that futility prejudice or bad faith may justify refusing to grant leave to amend


Input: failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008), citing Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). To be a “significant change in employment status,” the adverse action “must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Ford v. General Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 553 (6th Cir.2002). Defendant contends that Plaintiffs transfer was simply an inconvenience, not an adverse employment action, because it did not involve a change in title, compensation, responsibility or working conditions. See Russell v. Drabik, 24 Fed.Appx. 408, 413 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (citing Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 Holdings: 0: holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits 1: holding that in order to constitute a materially adverse change in the terms of plaintiffs employment a transfer must include either diminished responsibilities a demotion evidenced by a change in salary title or benefits or other indices unique to the particular situation 2: holding that a negative criticism or performance evaluation unaccompanied by a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment does not constitute adverse employment action 3: holding that a materially adverse action is of the magnitude of a termination of employment or a decrease in salary or a material loss in benefits 4: holding that potentially indefinite suspension of employee from work without pay could constitute materially adverse employment action even where employer awards full backpay for the entire period and that reassignment of responsibilities could constitute materially adverse employment action even absent demotion


Input: such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property ... belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax. 26 U.S.C. § 6331(a); see also id. § 6331(d)(4) (enumerating information that must be included with a notice of levy). Although plaintiff argues that the Notice of Levy was deficient because it “did not have a valid OMB number on the form[,] ... did not have a court stamp or ... complete signature,” Compl. U 1, neither section 6331 nor its implementing regulations require this information, see 26 U.S.C. § 6331; 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.6331-1,-2 (2006). Moreover, courts have rejected such arguments. See, e.g., Tavano v. Comm’r, 986 F.2d 1389, 1389 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, section 6331(a) explicitly Holdings: 0: holding that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was valid where it determined a deficiency in a different type of tax than did the earlier deficiency notice 1: holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice 2: holding that the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff first received notice of an alleged deficiency from the irs not when he received a final determination of tax liability 3: holding that a notice of tax deficiency sent to a taxpayer by the irs need not be signed in order to be valid 4: holding that although irs failed to comply with procedures of section 6335 tax sale was valid due to ratification by taxpayer


Input: Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 855, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 405, 101 S.Ct. 1836, 68 L.Ed.2d 248 (1981); Local 334, 452 U.S. at 627, 101 S.Ct. 2546; Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966). At the same time the Court has admonished federal courts not to engage in a “freewheeling inquiry” into what might be the most desirable rule irrespective of congressional pronouncements. Reis, 451 U.S. at 406, 101 S.Ct. 1836 (quotation omitted). Here, there is no dispute that the SEIU constitution is a “contract between labor organizations,” within the bailiwick of federal courts. See Local 334, 452 U.S. at 623, 101 S.Ct. 2546 (<HOLDING>). The SEIU constitution is an agreement between Holdings: 0: holding that labor union membership fell outside commerce 1: holding that union constitutions are contracts between labor organizations within section 301a 2: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 3: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims 4: holding section 301a jurisdiction existed in a dispute between an international and a local union which arose under the union constitution and affirming a preliminary injunction against the suspended board members of the local


Input: for juror confusion about which role the lawyer is serving during trial. “A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear [to the factfinder] whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.” Rule 3.7, Comment (2). See also Chapman Engineers v. Natural Gas Sales Co., 766 FSupp. at 957 (14) (“One of the strongest rationales for this lawyer-witness rule is to prevent jury confusion over the separate roles of an advocate and a witness.”). We find, however, that concerns about possible juror confusion are not relevant to pre-trial proceedings. See Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera-Rios, 846 F2d at 100-101 (II) (<HOLDING>); Pyne v. Procacci Bros. Sales Corp. &c., 1997 Holdings: 0: holding that rule 37 does not prohibit a lawyer who will testify at trial from acting as counsel in pretrial discovery 1: holding that where no discovery order was violated sanctions could not imposed pursuant to rule 37 but nevertheless upholding the sanction order under the courts inherent power 2: holding that correspondence between counsel cannot suffice as a rule 34 request that may be compelled through rule 37 3: holding that judge presiding at trial may not testify in that trial as witness 4: holding that lawyers who were necessary witnesses in the case under rule 37 were not prohibited from representing their clients in all pretrial matters including discovery


Input: Agreement provides that is governed by New York law. Settlement Agreement at § 9.6. 3 . The Levy Claimants argue that it is unclear whether CPLR 2104 applies to settlement agreements entered into by litigants in federal court in New York. See Levy Claimants’ Brief at 13 (citing Kaczmarczyk v. Acme Contracting LLC, No. 06-CV-1005, 2009 WL 3739442, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2009)). The case they cite is distinguishable, however, as it did not involve an agreement that expressly provided that it “shall be governed, construed, and interpreted and the rights of the parties ... determined in accordance with New York law,” as does the Settlement Agreement here. Settlement Agreement at § 9.6. See also Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Sears Realty Co., Inc., 932 F.Supp. 392, 403 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>) The Court will thus apply CPLR 2104 to the Holdings: 0: recognizing that courts disagree whether federal common law or state law governs the interpretation of negotiated settlement agreement 1: holding that the court must determine whether the employees consent to the settlement agreement was knowing and voluntary 2: holding that the analysis to determine whether a claimant has established a reasonable basis to plead a claim for punitive damages is similar to the analysis applied to determine whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action 3: holding that under oregon law an agreement must be supported by consideration to be legally enforceable 4: holding that new york common law must be applied to determine whether the parties formed an oral settlement agreement and state statutory law must be applied to determine whether the agreement if any is enforceable


Input: Walton v. Petway, 833 So.2d 292, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). There is one exception to the Rivendell rule: a PTD award to a claimant who has not reached psychiatric MMI is not premature if he or she has reached physical MMI and the award is predicated solely on the physical injury. See McFarlane, Ferguson v. Whaley, 641 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), cited in Reyes v. Granite Constr. Co., 894 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). This exception does not apply here because the final order’s award of PTD is based on the JCC’s determination that a combination of physical and psychiatric conditions rendered Claimant unemployable and entitled to PTD. We REVERSE the compensation award. Claimant may seek PTD benefits again in the future. Cf. Daws Mfg. Co. v. Ostoyic, 756 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). KAHN, C.J., and THOMAS, J„ concur. * A Holdings: 0: holding appellant produced no evidence that when she made her complaints to management she ever mentioned that she felt she was being treated unfairly due to her race or sex 1: holding that plaintiff must on his or her own initiative prove that the product reached him or her without substantial change 2: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination 3: holding that a claimant could pursue ptd benefits on her physical condition alone as to which she had reached mmi on her psychiatric condition alone after she reached psychiatric mmi or on both again after she reached psychiatric mmi 4: holding that a juror who initially equivocated as to her impartiality could be found impartial after she affirmatively said she thought she could be fair


Input: between the employment and the injury, while "in the course of” refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurred. Id. The test we articulate today takes into consideration the nuances of each of these phrases. 3 . In Haugen, a police officer incurred a back injury while weight lifting at home during his off-duty hours. The injured officer was following a self-designed exercise program in order to meet the physical fitness requirements provided in the job specifications for police officers. Based on the reasoning quoted above, the court held that the officer’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur in the course of or arise from the officer’s employment. See also Meeks v. Eddy County Sheriff’s Dep't, 118 N.M. 643, 646, 884 P.2d 534, 537 (App.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 731, 885 P.2d 1325 Holdings: 0: holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury 1: holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act 2: holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was an employee not an official and therefore entitled to benefits under the workers compensation act 3: holding that a judge was not entitled to absolute immunity for firing an employee 4: holding that an employee was not entitled to compensation for suffering an injury from selfdirected offduty athletic activity


Input: militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis of the major issues.” (Emphasis supplied [by Brimmer court].) Application of these elements leads us to conclude that the first is met because both the pro-life parties and the pro-choice .parties have current, concrete rights or interests relating to this controversy. Our judgment, either allowing the initiative to be included on the ballot, or precluding its inclusion, would effectively operate upon the factual dispute between these parties. Thus, the second element is satisfied. As to the third element, our determination will have the force and effect of a final judgment upon the rights, status, or other legal relationships of the real parties in interest. See Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass’n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163 (Wyo.1982) (<HOLDING>). We also perceive this matter as one involving Holdings: 0: holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment 1: holding that if a declaratory judgment will not end the controversy it is not proper 2: holding that the case or controversy requirement applies with equal force to actions for declaratory judgment 3: holding that actual controversy requirement is met where there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment 4: holding that it is not


Input: ZR 231/91, 1992 Neue Juristische Wochensehrift-Rechtsprechungsreport [NJW-RR] 1151 (F.R.G.). Schoeps has offered no contrary view of German law. Simply because Schoeps may be sued in his individual capacity, however, it does not necessarily follow that a declaratory judgment against one individual heir is an appropriate way to proceed. That question involves both an issue of law and an issue of discretion. The issue of law is whether there is an “actual controversy” for declaratory judgment purposes, ie., whether Schoeps as an individual actually has an interest adverse to that of the Museums. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (authorizing declaratory judgment remedy in cases “of actual controversy”); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, -, 127 S.Ct. 764, 771, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Schoeps argues that Webber bars him from Holdings: 0: holding that the case or controversy requirement applies with equal force to actions for declaratory judgment 1: holding that if a declaratory judgment will not end the controversy it is not proper 2: holding that to establish jurisdiction in action for declaratory judgment controversy must be actual and present a case for the consideration of the court wherein plaintiff is asserting some legal or property right adverse to defendant 3: holding that there is an actual controversy between an insurer and the party injured by the insured 4: holding that actual controversy requirement is met where there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment


Input: from seeking payment other than its authorized CJA compensation without the express permission of the district court. The district court based its decision on a misapprehension of the extent of its authority under the CJA. Nevertheless, we must affirm its judgment because, on the record before us, Mr. Shippers has not made out a case for contempt. It does not appear that Mr. Shippers’ petition is based on a violation by Mr. Cain or AFTI of any specific order of the district court. See Goluba v. School Dist. of Ripon, 45 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir.1995) (“To win a motion for civil contempt, a party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the opposing party violated a court order.” (internal quotation omitted)); D. Patrick, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F.3d 455, 460-61 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Our ruling today does not preclude Mr. Holdings: 0: holding that a district court may order restitution despite a settlement agreement 1: holding that court enforcement of a settlement agreement is not state action for constitutional purposes 2: holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement 3: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt 4: holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable


Input: held that “ ‘in a case such as this the defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek termination of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence ... suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause[.]” Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 11, 107 S.Ct. 2680 (emphasis added). Here, Appellant has successfully demonstrated that, but for the Sixth Amendment violation, he would have demanded “termi nation of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence.” Both parties, therefore, must be returned to their original position. Once Appellant and the State are returned to the status quo ante, Appellant could be subject to trial for capital murder. Compare Chaffin v. Stynehcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 35, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Bordeaux, 121 F.3d 1187 Holdings: 0: holding that retrial did not violate the double jeopardy clause where reversal based on trial error distinguishing reversal for insufficient evidence 1: holding possibility of more severe sentence on retrial after appeal or collateral attack does not violate double jeopardy or due process protections 2: holding that imposition of more severe sentence following trial de novo does violate defendants due process rights 3: holding that doctrine does not violate due process 4: holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds


Input: official policy, in flicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. Id. at 691-94, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (emphasis added). Here, the record does not contain any plausible allegations that the Municipality was acting in a sovereign capacity pursuant to any statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom when it terminated the contract and took over the construction site and temporarily detained OSSAM’s property. There is no allegation in the Complaint that the Municipality acted pursuant to a statute, ordinance, or regulation. The complaint did state that the Municipality implemented “customs and policies” wh sometimes lead to governmental liability for breach of contract. See United States v. Winstar Corn,, 518 U.S. 839, 897, 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 7 . We do not suggest here that a Holdings: 0: holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous 1: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims 2: holding that the enactment of firrea breached certain government contracts 3: holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts 4: holding that a breach of contract claim was properly dismissed where plaintiff did not identify the contracts allegedly breached


Input: in excuse. See Robinsion at 242-43. 4 . A closely related affirmative defense is the defense of entrapment by estoppel, an affirmative defense also grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Entrapment by estoppel provides an affirmative defense for action taken in reasonable reliance on assurances by government officials that the conduct is legal. See United States v. Howell, 37 F.3d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir.1994). We have questioned the meaningfulness of the difference between the two defenses. See United States v. Baker, 438 F.3d 749, 753 (7th Cir.2006). To the extent the distinction is meaningful, the main difference is that, in the case of the public authority defense, the defendant engages in conduct at the request of a government official t 257, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959) (<HOLDING>); Howell, 37 F.3d at 1204 (stating that the Holdings: 0: recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination 1: holding the protective order forbidding the deposition of the chairman of the judicial inquiry commission on the grounds of blanket privilege was improper 2: holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific 3: holding that the drug tax violated the privilege against selfincrimination 4: holding that it would offend due process to permit criminal prosecution of an individual for invoking a privilege against selfincrimination in hearings before a state legislative commission after having been assured of his right to do so by the chairman members and counsel of the commission


Input: v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 117 F.3d 1414 at *3 (4th Cir.1997) (“[b]y definition ... § 6972(a)(1)(B) excludes waste that no longer presents a danger.”); See also Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.1994) (finding that since plaintiff could not show soils under its house presented any threat to public health or environment, RCRA claim could not stand). In Leister, the Court found that plaintiffs failed to show imminent and substantial threat of harm to human health simply by pointing to the presence of a pollutant on their dairy farm, because drinking water from the well was the “most direct pathway of exposure,” but a filtration system had eliminated any threat. Id.; accord Two Rivers Terminal, L.P. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 96 F.Supp.2d 432, 446 (M.D.Pa.2000) (<HOLDING>). . Similarly, Defendant cites to Tilot Oil, Holdings: 0: recognizing a connection between surface and groundwater even where the water table falls below the stream bed 1: recognizing that coverage could be triggered by need to prevent imminent contamination of groundwater 2: holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted 3: holding that mere presence of contaminants in groundwater could not prove imminent and substantial endangerment to human health where no one was drinking the water 4: holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially


Input: room. [Michael T. Flannery, First, Do No Harm: The Use of Covert Video Surveillance to Detect Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy — An Unethical Means of “Preventing” Child, Abuse, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 105, 155-56 (1998).] Courts in other jurisdictions have reasoned similarly. See, e.g., Buchanan v. State, 432 So.2d 147, 148 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in emergency room of hospital); Jones v. State, 648 So.2d 669, 676-77 (Fla.1994) (observing that defendant reasonably could expect that police would not make warrantless seizure of his clothing, not found in plain view, in his hospital room), cert. denied sub nom., Jones v. Florida, 515 U.S. 1147, 115 S.Ct. 2588, 132 L.Ed.2d 836 (1995); Morris v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 331,157 S.E.2d 191, 195 (1967) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the order that resulted in Holdings: 0: holding warrantless search of motel room after occupant was arrested outside room for drug possession could not be justified as search incident to arrest absent other exigent circumstances 1: holding that hospital may be held liable for negligence of emergency room physicians under apparent agency doctrine 2: recognizing that at least for certain purposes a hospital room is fully under the control of the medical staff yet for other purposes it is the patients room  because patient understands that nurses doctors food handlers and others enter and exit hospital room in accordance with medical need and hospital routine 3: holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room rented by relatives when he had a key to the room and permission to use the room at will 4: holding that warrantless seizure of defendants clothing from private hospital room was improper


Input: was the proper party to authorize the sale, George Bailey signed the revised Consignment Agreement in his official capacity as trustee and general partner of Orchard. Based on Crabtree’s March 13, 1987, letter and the revised Consignment Agreement, Christie cannot assert that it was ignorant of the limitations on Crabtree’s authority. And, “one who deals with an agent knowing that his authority is circumscribed and that the agent’s acts transcends the agent’s powers cannot hold the agent’s principal” liable. State v. West, 796 P.2d 1178, 1180 (Okla.App.1990) (citing Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Wilhoit, 270 P.2d 645 (Okla.1954)) (relating to a claim of apparent authority) (emphasis added); see also Truscon Steele v. Cooke, 98 F.2d 905, 909 (10th Cir.1938) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>); Hartford Fire Ins. v. McAvoy, 177 Okla. 60, Holdings: 0: holding that a principal is not hable for the actions of an agent when these actions exceed the agents authority and the thirdparty has knowledge that the agent does not have the authority asserted 1: holding that the insurer is not bound by acts of the agent which are beyond the scope of his authority when the insured has notice of the limitations upon an agents authority or when the circumstances are sufficient to suggest that an inquiry should be made as to such limitations 2: holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal 3: holding that while an agents knowledge is imputed to the principal due to the identity of interests that is presumed when an agent acts within the scope of an agency relation this rule does not operate in the converse and the agent cannot be imputed with the information which its principal has failed to give it 4: holding that when an agent has limited authority and informs the third party of this limitation the principal is not bound by the agents actions that exceed that authority


Input: so doing, the court cited Mercer v. Cedar Rapids, 308 F.3d 840 (8th Cir.2002), for the proposition that “no liberty interest of constitutional significance is implicated when the employer has alleged merely improper or inadequate performance, neglect of duty or malfeasance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court further explained that “ ‘[describing [Brown’s] conduct as malfeasance due to its capacity to damage public confidence in the [c]ounty’s emergency response system adds little to the reputation injury Brown suffered as a result of the disclosure of the conduct itself.’” Id. “[0]ur Supreme Court has held that absent a pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court, decisions of the inferior federal courts are not binding upon Pennsyl .Supp.2d 487, 498 (M.D.Pa.2011) (<HOLDING>). Due to the weight of authority supporting the Holdings: 0: holding that a similar written reprimand provided to an architect of the capitol employee was not materially adverse because it merely criticized his job performance 1: holding that competency hearing not required when judge alone raises issue of competency 2: holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits 3: holding that statements did not satisfy stigma prong because they concerned only professional competence 4: holding that statements did not stigmatize employee because they concerned competency and job performance


Input: Hicks nor White may be held personally liable for acts occurring within the scope and course of their employment. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7(2). Accordingly, Craddock’s individual claims against the two are dismissed. However, under the MTCA, a governmental entity such as the City may be held liable for Hicks’ actions within the scope of his employment if Hicks “acted in reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of the injury.” Miss.Code Ann. § ll-46-9(l)(c). Hicks concedes that Craddock was not engaged in any criminal activity at the time of her arrest. Accordingly, the City may be held liable for her arrest if Hicks’ conduct rises to the level of reckless disregard. Maldonado v. Kelly, 768 So.2d 906, 909 (Miss.2000)(<HOLDING>). While reckless disregard is not defined by Holdings: 0: holding that police officer did not exhibit reckless disregard for safety and wellbeing of others by negligently causing auto accident where officer looked both ways at intersection even though view was partially blocked 1: holding that written reprimand stating that officer failed to exercise due care and failed to comply with section 546005 were evidence that officer only acted negligently and did not raise fact issue on reckless disregard 2: holding that it is reasonable  that a police officer at the scene of  an investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement 3: holding officers failure to adhere to policy requiring emergency vehicles to come to complete stop and failure to remember looking both ways before entering intersection did not raise fact issue as to whether officer acted in conscious indifference to or reckless disregard for safety of others 4: holding no evidence of reckless disregard for safety of others when officer entered intersection without stopping and witness did not hear brakes being applied


Input: scope of that license. See Shaver, 74 F.3d at 774-76 & n. 8; Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 303-04 (7th Cir.1983). If one receives a license to reproduce and sell five copies, then he may reproduce and sell five copies, but no more. See, e.g., Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 831-33 (8th Cir.1992) (finding that promoter was authorized to reprodu f its use exceeds the scope of its license.’ ” Shaver, 74 F.3d at 775 n. 8 (quoting S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1087); see also S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1087-88 (“The critical question is not the existence but the scope of the license.”); Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 20-21 (2d Cir.1976) (noting that “[o]ne who obtains permission to use a copyrighted” work “may not exceed the specific purpo . 311, 314-19 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (<HOLDING>); In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff who has not sustained any damage as the result of a transfer of property cannot seek to set that transfer aside as fraudulent 1: holding that nonexclusive licensees cannot transfer their licenses without prior authorization from copyright owner but that exclusive licensees can transfer licenses without authorization 2: holding transfer restriction granted right of first refusal in event of voluntary or involuntary transfer of stock 3: holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court 4: holding that transfer was not discipline because transfer neither altered salary nor fringe benefits


Input: on Behalf of Bartholomew v. Foster, 115 Pa.Cmwlth. 430, 541 A.2d 393, 397 (1988), affd per curiam 522 Pa. 489, 563 A.2d 1390 (1989). We have not hesitated to effectuate the Equal Rights Amendment’s prohibition of sex discrimination by striking down statutes and common law doctrines predicated upon traditional or stereotypical roles of men and women. See Hartford, 482 A.2d at 548 (applying the Equal Rights Amendment to find that the Insurance Commissioner properly disapproved of an automobile insurer’s discriminatory sex-based rates); Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635, 639 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“Tender years doctrine” offends concept of equality of the sexes embraced in Equal Rights Amendment.); Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 347 A.2d 477 Holdings: 0: holding that the equal rights amendment requires that wife as well as husband be permitted to recover for loss of consortium 1: holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled 2: holding that a similar hawaii statute violates equal protection 3: holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy 4: holding that the adoption acts failure to require parental consent of unwed father as well as unwed mother violates equal rights amendment


Input: of G.S. 75-1.1, damages may be recovered either for the breach of contract, or for violation of G.S. 75-1.1 .. . .” Marshall v. Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530, 542, 268 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1980), modified and aff'd, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981). Colonial argues that there should be a division of the breach of contract action and the § 75-1.1 claim. However, as evidenced by the jury verdict, the breach of contract accompanied by aggravating factors is what gave rise to the § 75-1.1 claim. Moreover, the court will not allow a defendant to divide the breach of contract action and the conduct which aggravated the breach when in substance there is but one continuous transaction amounting to unfair and deceptive trade practices. See Garlock v. Henson, 112 N.C. App. 243, 435 S.E.2d 114 (1993) (<HOLDING>). C Pre-judgment interest may be awarded on Holdings: 0: holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action 1: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach 2: holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract 3: holding that where there was a breach of contract accompanied by aggravating factors that it was proper to treble the breach of contract damages 4: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract


Input: 338, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953)) “[A]n unwise, or even an unconsidered decision by the union is not necessarily an irrational decision.” Air Line Pilots, supra, 499 U.S. at 78, 111 S.Ct. 1127. The arbitrariness standard has been described as “highly deferential,” id., and “quite forgiving,” Trnka v. Local Union No. 688, 30 F.3d 60, 61 (7th Cir.1994). The Sixth Circuit has stated that, “[i]n essence then, to prevail, a plaintiff has the difficult task of showing that the union’s actions were wholly irrational.” Garrison v. Cassens Tr olding that the establishment of a two-tiered seniority system which favors one group over another is insufficient to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation); Baker v. Constr. & Gen. Laborers, Local 26b, 822 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). In Forte, supra, 2000 WL 377698, *3, an Holdings: 0: holding expert testimony is not required as a per se rule  in bad faith actions 1: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort 2: holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial courts exercise of discretion to award fees 3: holding that unions practice in running a hiring hall that required plaintiffs to run up the stairs to receive a referral slip was demeaning but not arbitrary discriminatory or motivated by bad faith 4: holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims


Input: of his evidence.”). Here, at the time of the court’s involuntary dismissal of the entire petition, Former Husband had not yet finished presenting his casein-chief. Accordingly, “[b]y denying [Former Husband] the opportunity to complete [his] case-in-chief, the trial court denied [Former Husband his] due process.” A.N. v. M.F.-A., 946 So.2d 58, 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). The trial court further erred in dismissing the entire multi-count petition based solely on Former Husband’s inability to establish one of the listed grounds for modification. In actions involving numerous counts, dismissal of the entire case is proper only if the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case as to each of the counts. See Xamnad, Inc. v. Patio Cafe, Inc., 486 So.2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Sec. Abstract & Ins. Co. v. Fid. Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court reversibly erred in dismissing the multicount complaint in its entirety when the facts therein supported at least one cause of action 1: holding that the trial court reversibly erred in involuntarily dismissing the case before the plaintiff finished presenting its caseinchief 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court 3: holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim 4: holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence


Input: Therefore, she argues that providing corroboration for her testimony was not reasonably possible. See id. However, while Mary alleges that Ronald threatened her in private, she does not address the lack of corroboration for her other claims. Further, Mary and Ronald did not live in isolation. Mary worked outside the home and visited family members throughout the marriage. Ronald and Mary shared their home with their two adult children and a grandchild who was in Mary’s custody. Neither of the couple’s children, who should have known of Ronald’s cruel and inhuman treatment of Mary, testified at the trial. Their children would have witnessed Ronald’s controlling behavior and the negative impact Mary claims Ronald’s behavior caused on her health. See Cochran, 912 So.2d at 1089 (¶¶ 14-15) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 15. Ronald admitted at trial that he had Holdings: 0: holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim 1: holding that nonsignatory wife asserting in her individual capacity claims for damages such as her own mental anguish and loss of consortium earnings companionship society and inheritance lacked the type of privity contemplated for the contracting parties to bind her to a contract that she did not sign in her individual capacity 2: holding that because a claimant testified that she had no insurance and could not afford treatment her failure to take medication for her symptoms is not a clear and convincing reason for discrediting her symptom testimony 3: holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney 4: holding that wife must provide corroboration for her allegations of cruel and inhuman treatment despite her claim that the parties were isolated


Input: (Iowa App. 1994) (same); Fox v. Contract Beverage Packers, Inc., 398 N.E.2d 709 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (same); Scott v. Altmar, Inc., 272 Kan. 1280, 38 P.3d 673 (2002) (same); Hoffman v. Nat’l Mach. Co., 113 Mich. App. 66, 317 N.W.2d 289 (1982) (same); Danek v. Meldrum Mfg. & Eng'g Co., 312 Minn. 404, 252 N.W.2d 255 (1977) (same); Colbert v. Mississippi Marine Corp., 755 So.2d 1116 (Miss.App.1999) (same); Daniels v. Pamida, Inc., 251 Neb. 921, 561 N.W.2d 568 2 Ill.2d 341, 45 Ill.Dec. 126, 412 N.E.2d 477 (1980) (a contract of employment between the borrowed servant and the paving company was found by the acquiescence in and acceptance of the paving company's control and instructions.); Beach v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 542 F.Supp. 1328 (N.D.Ind.1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d 407 (7th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Bright v. Bragg, 175 Kan. 404, 264 P.2d 494 Holdings: 0: holding that service of subpoena on plaintiffs counsel as opposed to the plaintiff himself renders such service a nullity 1: holding that in a bivens action service upon employee in his official capacity does not amount to service in his individual capacity 2: holding service on corporation proper where process server went to corporate defendants headquarters identified himself to an employee of corporate defendant and stated that he was there to serve legal papers and the employee then directed him to another employee who accepted service even though neither employee was authorized to accept service and neither represented that she was in fact so authorized because both were obviously corporate defendant employees and the employee redelivered the summons and complaint to an employee authorized to accept service on the same date 3: holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract 4: holding that although plaintiff never considered himself an employee of owenscorning his acquiescence in direct supervision by owenscorning demonstrated an implied contract of service


Input: “served by delay in taking legal action.” Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed.Cir.1995) (quoting BP Chemicals, Ltd., 4 F.3d at 977). 6 . Citizen relies primarily on the following two statements: "The critical language here is the plurality of paths have a substantially equal path length inside the luminescence conversion element. That’s the disputed language in this case” and "The evidence of infringement is undisputed, that everybody has homogenous white light.” (Gasser Deck, Ex. 11 at 85:17-20 and 89:12-13.) 7 .Plaintiff' also cites to OSRAM's suit in Germany against Citizen, but this is not relevant because it was filed after January 18, 2005. Reasonable apprehension must exist at the time suit was filed. See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 (<HOLDING>); Holley Performance Prods., Inc. v. Barry Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations is tolled during a malicious prosecution suit when a timely complaint is filed 1: holding that the presence of conclusory terms in a complaint does not insulate it from dismissal when the facts alleged cannot support the charges contained in the complaint 2: holding despite authority for the general proposition that the duty to defend is determined based on the allegations of the complaint that an insurer had no duty to defend where the underlying claim was covered by the policy based on the facts pleaded in complaint but other facts not appearing in the complaint excluded coverage 3: holding that a demand for jury trial should be denied if the issues in the original complaint and the amended complaint turn on the same matrix of facts 4: holding thatjurisdiction depends on the facts existing when the complaint is filed


Input: 507-08. The statement in this case about which defendant complains is distinguishable from that made by the Harbison attorney and does not amount to ineffective assistance. Trial counsel here was pointing out to the jury that specific intent was lacking in this case and that the lack of specific intent was the only difference between second-degree and first-degree murder. Defense counsel was arguing to the jury that, without specific intent, the most serious crime for which defendant could be convicted would be second-degree murder. This situation differs substantially from Harbison, where the attorney argued, “ T think you should find him guilty of manslaughter and not first degree.’ ” Id. at 178, 337 S.E.2d at 506. See State v. Harvell, 334 N.C. 356, 361, 432 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The statement in the present case does not Holdings: 0: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins 1: holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder 2: holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways 3: holding that unlike the specificintent crime of firstdegree murder seconddegree murder is a generalintent crime for which the defense of voluntary intoxication is not available 4: holding counsel must only provide relevant facts of the crime


Input: for its adjusters to follow, (2) failed to train its employees on the specifics of Oklahoma insurance law, and (3) failed to independently investigate Plaintiffs insurance claim. As for Plaintiffs first two allegations of bad faith, we are not persuaded an insurer acts in bad faith under Oklahoma law by simply failing to adopt written standards or provide state-specific training to its employees. We see no basis in the record for a finding of bad faith with respect to Defendant’s general handling of claims and training of employees. As for Plaintiffs third bad-faith allegation, there is no evidence in the record to support a claim that Defendant’s investigation was incomplete or biased in any way. See Timberlake Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 345 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff further argues Defendant acted in Holdings: 0: holding that even though insurance company could have completed claim investigation more quickly delay was not clear and convincing evidence for jury to determine presence of bad faith 1: holding that the defendants were not liable for failing to perform the thorough professional investigation the plaintiff would have preferred 2: holding that there is no constitutional duty to do a better investigation and that a decision not to conduct a more thorough investigation does not invade an accuseds rights 3: holding that under oklahoma law a bad faith claim  premised on inadequate investigation must be supported by a showing that material facts were overlooked or that a more thorough investigation would have produced relevant information 4: holding investigation was not deficient in part because counsel hired an experienced death penalty investigator who conducted a thorough investigation into defendants history


Input: his or her own statement concerning the lawsuit, which is in the possession, custody or control of any party. Tex.R.Civ.P. 192.3(h). 8 . This was the point at which Madden entered Hilbrich's room and found him deceased. Madden’s statement does not refer to the four calls for assistance contained in Schmidt's statement. 9 . The MLIIA limits liability in any health care liability claim where final judgment is rendered against a physician or health care provider to an amount not to exceed $500,000; however, this limit is adjusted for inflation, or deflation, under a formula based on the consumer price index. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art 4590i §§ 11.02(a), 11.04 (Vernon Supp.2001). 10 . See Columbia Hosp. Corp. of Houston v. Moore, 43 S.W.3d 553, 558 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Because this case is not subject to Holdings: 0: holding that prejudgment interest may inelude compound interest 1: holding that prejudgment interest in suit filed before september 2 1987 not governed by article 5069105 section 6 2: holding that award and rate of prejudgment interest are within trial courts discretion 3: holding that section 1602 of the mliia which became effective september 1 1995 requires that judgments include prejudgment interest 4: holding that prejudgment interest may include compound interest


Input: (Tex. 1981); Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., 47 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000), aff'd, 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex.2001). Appellants were bound by the division orders because they accepted royalty payments based on the unit percentages under the division orders, and they did not revoke the division orders: See Tex. Nat. Res.Code Ann. § 91.402(g); Cabot Corp., 754 S.W.2d at 107-08. Section 91.402(h) of the Texas Natural Resources Code does not render obsolete the “excuse” defense or the longstanding rule that division orders are binding until revoked. Cabot Corp., 754 S.W.2d at 107 — 08; see Sun Oil Co., 626 S.W.2d at 734 (estoppel based on division orders is valid and binding until division order is revoked); Neel v. Killarn Oil Co., 88 S.W.3d 334, 341-42 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), disapproved on other grounds, Hausser v. Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs had waived their right to arbitrate where they had consistently resisted arbitration and only when an unfavorable judgment was entered against them at trial did they seek to compel arbitration 1: recognizing that plaintiffs had standing to allege infringements of their first amendment rights where the record established that they had been threatened with enforcement of the statute and that such enforcement would cause them injury 2: holding that the rights of an aggrieved party are substantially affected if the outcome either would have or may have been different had the error not occurred 3: holding that if claimants had signed new division orders they would have waived their rights to a larger royalty payment 4: holding that certain veniremen had been improperly excluded because they acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might affect their deliberations but only to the extent that they would view their task with greater gravity


Input: acted well within its statutory authority in requiring Oncor to prepare and provide the direct-assignment study and did not exercise that authority arbitrarily and capriciously. Next, we consider Oncor’s arguments on the merits of the use of direct assignment in setting wholesale rates. The Commission responds that Oncor’s attempt to engage this Court in consideration of the merits is premature (ie., the issue is unripe) because the Commission has not yet decided to use that methodology in setting Oncor’s rates and is merely exploring the option by requesting further information in the form of the study. We agree with the Commission. See City of El Paso v. Public Util. Comm’n, 839 S.W.2d 895, 923 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992), rev’d in part on other grounds, 883 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>). The ripeness doctrine aims to conserve Holdings: 0: holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review 1: holding unripe appellants issue contending that commission failed to consider excess capacity of electric generating unit that was not yet operational 2: holding that although the issue of coverage had not yet been decided appellants action under 8371 was a separate claim and the dismissal of that claim was instantly appealable 3: holding that the appellants claim that the circuit court failed to make specific findings of fact relating to issues raised at an evidentiary hearing on the appellants postconviction petition was not preserved for review because the appellant did not raise the issue in the circuit court 4: holding officers articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellants contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellants prior arrests for drug offenses appellants lie about his prior criminal history and appellants possession of small jewelers bags used in cocaine trafficking


Input: and plaintiffs believe AIG should reimburse the. United States for those payments: “AIG, et al.” is DEMANDED to REIMBURSE “the Government, Social Security Department” for “all” past paid Social Security Disability Payments made (4/28/1999-present) which [must be] Funded “out-of AIG, et al. legitimately owned Asset’s” — “AIG, et al.” is the cause in fact of said Disability (i.e„ Life-Altering Injuries) and therefore,' Responsible As A Matter of LAW. Regardless, plaintiffs may not bring a social security claim in this court. The Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under the Social Security Act. See Addams-More v. United States, 81 Fed.Cl. 312, 315, aff'd, 296 Fed.Appx. 45 (Fed.Cir.2008) (citing Marcus v. United States, 909 F.2d 1470, 1471 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>)). The statute at 42 U.S.C, § 405(g) (2012) Holdings: 0: holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over claim for interim social security benefits during pendency of administrative proceedings 1: holding that the tucker act grants the united states court of federal claims jurisdiction to grant nonmonetary relief in connection with contractor claims including claims requesting an interpretation of contract terms 2: holding that the tucker act gives the united states court of federal claims jurisdiction over cda claims only when a decision of the contracting officer has been issued under section 6 of the cda  3: holding that the tucker act does not provide independent jurisdiction over claims for injunctive relief in contractual dispute cases 4: holding that the claims court has no jurisdiction under the tucker act over claims to social security benefits


Input: it, inquired about whether he was on probation or had any warrants and if he could run a records check). For a police officer’s verbal inquiries to amount to a seizure, “something more than just asking a question, requesting information, or seeking an individual’s cooperation is required of an officer’s conduct.” State v. Backstrand, 354 Or 392, 403, 313 P3d 1084 (2013). That “something more” can be “the content or manner of questioning, or the accompanying physical acts by the officer, if those added factors would reasonably be construed as a ‘threatening or coercive’ show of authority requiring compliance with the officer’s request.” Id. (quoting Ashbaugh, 349 Or at 317); see also, e.g., State v. Zaccone, 245 Or App 560, 563-67, 261 P3d 1287 (2011), rev den, 355 Or 381 (2014) (<HOLDING>). In light of the circumstances here, Haugen’s Holdings: 0: holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation 1: holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown 2: holding that the defendant was not seized when two officers approached the defendant on a public street and asked him questions 3: holding that a mistrial was not required after a police officer testified that he had once chased the defendant after the defendant had fired a gun where the testimony was a logical response to the prosecutors questions the statement was not made maliciously the evidence against the defendant was great and the jury was instructed to disregard the testimony 4: holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority


Input: of care, or proximate cause. The only expert testimony in the record concerning the standards of care applicable to the settling defendants, any breach of those standards of care, or any proximate cause is, as pointed out by Chesser, wholly conclusory and constitutes no evidence. See, e.g., Coastal Transp. Co., 136 S.W.3d at 232; Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711-12 (Tex.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1119, 118 S.Ct. 1799, 140 L.Ed.2d 939 (1998). For example, Dr. Stephen Koch, one of Chesser’s experts whose testimony Appel-lees point to as providing evidence of the settling defendants’ standard of care, breach, and causation, simply testified: Q. You render opinions as an — as an expert witness in this case that Dr. Dad-dyo — Adedokun was neg 820 (Tex.2009) (<HOLDING>); Coastal Transp. Co., 136 S.W.3d at 232; Holdings: 0: holding evidence legally insufficient 1: holding evidence legally insufficient to support causation because patels opinions were conelusory and provided no evidence 2: holding evidence legally sufficient 3: holding evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction for violation of sex offender registration requirement 4: holding evidence legally insufficient to support causation because dr beyler may be qualified in fire research but his testimony in this case lacks objective evidencebased support for its conclusions


Input: omitted). The listing for mental retardation sets out four distinct ways to establish disability. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.05(A)-(D). We focus here on hsting § 12.05(C): “[m]ental retardation refers to significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the developmental period: i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before age 22” and “[a] valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function.” Mr. Smith correctly argues that the ALJ did not specifically address fisting § 12.05(C). The ALJ cites to the standard for e 214 (10th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Smith believes that the ALJ failed at Holdings: 0: holding failure to make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law did not preclude meaningful appellate review 1: holding meaningful appellate review is impossible where it would require drawing factual conclusions on al js behalf and court would not be reviewing for substantial evidence 2: holding that reviewing courts will review the engineers decision for substantial evidence 3: holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo 4: holding it is impossible to apply the substantial evidence test where the alj has failed to sufficiently explain his decision


Input: Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 181 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). Jones, 529 U.S. at 852-54, 120 S.Ct. 1904. In contrast to Jones, the instant statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 401, 3559(a)(1), and their terms are neither ambiguous, nor are they susceptible to two potential interpretations. Thus, the principle in Jones of choosing between two viable constructions does not apply to the instant action. As in the present case, when the language of the statute is not open to another intellectually honest interpretation, the proper course of action is to adopt the plain meaning of the statute while highlighting the awkward or unwise result to Congress for it to amend the statute. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989) (<HOLDING>), superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990 Supp.) Holdings: 0: holding that the court of federal claims had pendant jurisdiction over a state law contract claim that was part of the same case as a claim over which the court of federal claims had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc  1498b 1: holding that exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims was proper on the basis of supplemental jurisdiction even though the plaintiffs had erroneously claimed diversity jurisdiction because a legitimate federal question was also presented and the state law claims formed part of the same case or controversy as the federal claim 2: holding that a court may exercise pendant personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant with respect to state law claims that arise out of a nucleus of operative facts common to a federal antitrust claim 3: holding that a federal court may adjudicate claims for which there is no independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction if the nonjurisdictional claims are related to other claims for which the does have jurisdiction 4: holding the federal tort claims act did not permit exercise of pendant jurisdiction over additional parties as to which no basis for federal jurisdiction existed


Input: and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). Our courts have recognized the authority of a trial court to grant a verdict in arrest of judgment to prevent entry of judgment on the insufficiency of the indictment or some other fatal defect appearing on the face of the record. Id. at 286, 337 S.E.2d at 886 (Ness, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Brown, 201 S.C. 417, 23 S.E.2d 381 (1942) (ruling that motion for arrest in judgment should have been granted where trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose sentence); State v. Cooler, 30 S.C. 105, 8 S.E. 692 (1889) (finding that the fact a juror was a member of the grand jury that indicted defendant was not grounds for arrest of judgment); State v. Jeter, 47 S.C. 2, 24 S.E. 889 (1896) (<HOLDING>); State v. Blakeney, 33 S.C. 111, 11 S.E. 637 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury 1: holding that trial court erred in denying motion for judgment of acquittal when state failed to prove venue 2: holding trial court erred in denying defendants motion for arrest of judgment where indictment was insufficient 3: holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds 4: holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss


Input: immunity because its contract with a federal agency was not the result of lobbying, and did not involve the First Amendment right to petition the government. Because that case concerned copyright misuse, the Ninth Circuit gave this issue cursory treatment. Significantly, the Ninth Circuit has ruled, in the company of the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, that a so-called commercial exception to antitrust immunity does not exist. See In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 693 F.2d 84, 86 (9th Cir.1982); TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560, 1572 (11th Cir.1996) (rejecting as erroneous district court’s reliance on “perceived commercial exception”). See also Independent Taxicab Drivers’ Employees v. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 760 F.2d 607, 613 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted)—a circumstance not unlike Holdings: 0: holding that the government contractor defense applies in situations in which the government makes the informed decision not to include a specification or require a warning because in the governments view one would be unnecessary or problematic 1: holding in land use situations courts have concluded in order for a regulatory takings claim to be ripe there must be a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue 2: holding that noerrpennington extends to situations where the government enters into a contractual relationship with a private entity at least in situations where the government engages in a policy decision and at the same time acts as a participant in the marketplace  3: holding that the government may intervene in the marketplace to protect consumer welfare 4: holding that the government is liable under the ftca in the same respect as a private person under the law of the place where the act occurred


Input: caused by Visa’s absence from this litigation. Any such harm would result from FIFA’s alleged conduct in awarding Visa sponsorship rights it could not legally give. We would be significantly broadening both Rule 19(a)(2)® and the principle discussed in Crouse-Hinds if we found that because the outcome of this case may impact a separate contract involving a different party, that finding would transform the action into “an action to set aside a lease or a contract.” Crouse-Hinds, 634 F.2d at 701 (quoting Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1325). Crouse-Hinds involved an actual .action to set aside a contract; here we have an action that could in the future impact a third party’s rights under a separate contract. We, therefore, do not find Crouse-Hinds controlling here and decline to b Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), we do not find this reasoning applicable Holdings: 0: recognizing actions to quiet title are equitable in nature and a court sitting in equity has jurisdiction to quiet title as a remedy for fraud 1: holding that federal government may not under michigan law attach lien to entireties property to satisfy individual tax liability of one spouse 2: holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety 3: holding that a lien holder who is not served and joined as a party to a tax suit cannot have his lien extinguished by the tax sale 4: holding that in an action to quiet title by aggrieved tax payer against government seeking to recover automobiles sold to satisfy tax lien purchasers of automobiles were necessary parties