Input: to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines."); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) ("[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner...."); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (<HOLDING>); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 Holdings: 0: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals 1: recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it 2: holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine restitution and probation costs 3: recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants 4: holding that courts have inherent power to hire and require salaries be paid to secretaries clerks probation officers and assistants


Input: by reference the Condominium Documents, and indicates that these Documents would be provided to Venezia at some indeterminate point after execution of the Purchase Agreement. (See Purchase Agreement at 1 (“DEVELOPER WILL FURNISH [Condominium Documents] TO BUYER.” (emphasis in original).) In other words, the terms of the Purchase Agreement provided either the same period or a longer period of time within which Venezia had the opportunity and ability to cancel the Agreement without cause, which again obviates his cause of action based on the failure of the Purchase Agreement to include language that precisely mirrored the language set forth in the statute. Cf. Werdmuller Von Elgg v. Carlyle Developers, Inc., No. 09-cv-132-Orl-31 KRS, 2009 WL 961144, at *2 (M.D.Fla. April 7, 2009) (<HOLDING>). Venezia’s response does not even address Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of 15 usc  1703b where their purchase contract gave notice that they had a right to cancel the agreement by giving notice to the seller until midnight of the fifteenth day following the signing of the contract 1: holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract 2: holding that contract for purchase of real property terminated by its own terms upon buyers giving of a certain notice and that therefore the contract was no longer valid and enforceable 3: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 4: holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made


Input: remedies must be exhausted.” Id at 810, 554 P.2d at 1307. This Court, in Carter v. State, Dept, of Health & Welfare, 103 Idaho 701, 652 P.2d 649 (1982), reaffirmed this holding by stating: In V-1 Oil Company v. County of Bannock, we held that the proper method of contesting an agency or judicial decision is by appeal, and that an order or judgment may not later be collaterally attacked by means of a declaratory judgment action. The appellants’ collateral attack upon their orders of commitment by means of a declaratory judgment action is thus clearly impermissible. Id at 702, 652 P.2d at 650 (citation omitted); see also Conley v. Looney, 117 Idaho 627, 630, 790 P.2d 920, 923 (Ct.App.1990) (citing Bills v. State Dept, of Revenue and Taxation, 110 Idaho 113, 714 P.2d 82 (Ct.App. 1986)) (<HOLDING>). Count I of Ag Air’s amended complaint seeks Holdings: 0: holding that appellant hjaving failed to exercise administrative appeal  cannot now collaterally attack the tax deficiency determination in an independent action 1: holding that a party could not collaterally attack a default judgment obtained against him in a foreclosure action 2: holding that a defendant cannot collaterally attack his sentence under 18 usc  3582c2 3: holding that where notice of deficiency fails adequately to describe the basis on which the commissioner relies for his deficiency determination burden shifts to the commissioner to prove the accuracy of the deficiency determination 4: holding that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was valid where it determined a deficiency in a different type of tax than did the earlier deficiency notice


Input: we grant the Levy defendants’ Rule 50 motion in part, on other grounds, we need not reach the issue of whether in any circumstance, duress may toll the copyright statute of limitations. However, we note that Judge Broderick, in his April 15 Order, held "that under the facts of this case, the recognition of a toll for duress would be consistent with the purposes of the Copyright Act and the duress toll which should be utilized is that provided under the law of this court's forum state, New York.” April 15 Order at 11; Cf. Donahue v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 633 F.Supp. 1423, 1442 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (acknowledging that duress toll may have a role, albeit a narrow one, in antitrust actions.) But cf. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 808 F.Supp. 213, 225 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (<HOLDING>). In any event, it is doubtful that'we could Holdings: 0: holding petition for writ of mandate seeking return of property does not toll the statute of limitations 1: holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations 2: holding there is no authority to toll statute of limitations based on mental incompetence 3: holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations 4: holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim


Input: that a new trial is not warranted. United States v. Rochan, 563 F.2d 1246, 1250 (5th Cir.1977). III. CONCLUSION We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to instruct the jury on Appellant’s theory of temporary innocent possession of a firearm. Further, the district judge’s conduct in this case does not warrant a new trial. Accordingly, we affirm Palma’s conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. 1 . Almonte testified at trial that she stood away from Palma and German during the transaction and rejoined them when they left the store. 2 . German paid for the grips, upon Palma’s request. 3 . In the past, we have declined to entertain the theory of a "mere inspection” defense. See United States v. Beverly, 194 Fed.Appx. 624, 628 (11th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). And while we have indicated that a Holdings: 0: holding that the court did not abuse its discretion by tracking the statutory language in the instruction 1: holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a mere inspection instruction in a firearm possession case 2: holding that court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give effect to defendants answer when filed almost one year after default entered against them 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order production of government files under rule 16a1c 4: holding that trial court acted properly in refusing to give jury instruction on fleeting possession theory


Input: only if that effect can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.” United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir.1994) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Even assuming — without in any way deciding — that the law disproportionately impacts Native Americans, Parshall provides no meaningful evidence that Congress intended to discriminate against Native Americans when it passed 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). He argues that Congress should have been aware of the law’s likely disproportionate impact on Native Americans, which suggests, according to Parshall, “at least a possibility” of discriminatory intent. Such assertions fall short of establishing the Congressional intent necessary to show a violation of the Fifth Amendment. See id.; United States v. DeMarce, 564 F.3d 989, 1000 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). C. Eighth Amendment Parshall argues that his Holdings: 0: holding that the cap does not violate equal protection 1: holding that statute that imposed different requirements to establish parental rights on father than on mother did not violate fathers right to equal protection under the law 2: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 3: holding that a 30year sentence imposed under 18 usc  2241c did not violate a defendantnative americans equal protection rights 4: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection


Input: suit. Fourth, the patent explicitly disclaims any relation between Figure 4b and the aspects of the invention dealing with the discharge of the primary switch’s parasitic capacitance. See col. 5, 11. 44-51 (“neglecting ... parasitic effects including the ones associated with ... the capacitance of non-ideal hardware realizations of the primary switch 10 ..., the operation of the magnetizing current mirror as a reset mechanism is illustrated by an example in 4b.”). It is therefore less plausible that the inventor would rely on this figure to define the invention’s switch-timing properties. Finally, Unitrode presses an argument based on claim differentiation for adopting a voltage-based definition for ON period. See Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987 (Fed.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>).* The doctrine of claim differentiation is a Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of the scope of a particular claim can be found on review of other claims 1: holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action 2: holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court 3: holding that declaratory judgments fall outside the scope of the court of claims jurisdiction 4: holding the scope of a particular claim can often be determined on inspection of other claims


Input: before magistrate or justice of peace “without any reference to the act for trial of small causes in this colony”). As the preceding statutes indicate, in colonial New Jersey, as in England, certain forfeiture and penalty proceedings to enforce police statutes and to punish minor criminal offenses, such as violations of the fish and game acts, proceeded before justices of the peace without juries. See Greely v. City of Passaic, 42 N.J.L. 429, 431 (E. & A. 1880) (noting that “[Pjarliament conferred upon the [justice of the peace] certain judicial functions, as a means of enforcing the game acts” by “a summary proceeding, technical in character, of a quasi-criminal nature, and totally unlike an action at law”); State v. Lakewood Mkt. Co., 84 N.J.L. 512, 523, 88 A. 194 (Sup.Ct.1913) (<HOLDING>); Carter Bros. v. Camden Dist. Court, 49 N.J.L. Holdings: 0: holding denial of jury trial was harmless because evidence was insufficient to create issue of fact for submission to jury and insurer would have been entitled to directed verdict 1: holding that penalty action instituted pursuant to fish and game procedure act of 1897 did not include jury trial because it has been repeatedly held in this state that in a summary procedure for the collection of a penalty for violation of a police regulation neither party is entitled to a trial by jury 2: holding no right to jury trial in action to recover penalty for violation of 1882 act to prevent the adulteration and to regulate the sale of milk 3: holding that jury trial not required before imposition of penalty for selling intoxicating liquors contrary to city ordinance reasoning that prior to 1776 the legality of convictions before magistrates for petty offenses and for violations of police regulations without trial by jury was unquestioned 4: holding that the penalty is applicable


Input: of defense). It should be noted that even inadequate provocation coupled with an objectively unreasonable reaction may be relevant to a case, like this one, because the jury may find that it creates a reasonable doubt about the existence of the “malice” (under our new Code, the mental state of knowledge or purpose) required for murder, id. at 314-15, thus warranting a possible verdict on a lesser-included offense of murder. Murder eases will almost always turn on the mental state of the accused. Deciding that question is the jury’s function. 2 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 164, at 259 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1979) (where there is dispute, jury should decide questions of adequate provocation); see also American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 210.3, at 57-61 (perm. ed. 1980) (<HOLDING>). Even “words alone,” when they are racial Holdings: 0: recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure 1: recognizing limited value of categorical rules on mitiga tion developed by common law 2: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents 3: recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence 4: recognizing common law privileges


Input: notice of its elements to those who may potentially be charged under that statute: “The underlying principle is that no person shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which one could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.” Server v. Mizell, 902 F.2d 611, 613 (1990). I agree with the magistrate judge that the statutory definitions of “sexual contact” and “sexual intercourse” are clear. That they are similar does not make them ambiguous. The definitions in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5) explicitly describe, in graphic detail, the conduct required for each act. Furthermore, as I said above,- each act requires different elements. I believe that an ordinary person is able to understand the meanings of, and the differences between,' these definitions. See Server, 902 F.2d at 613-14 (<HOLDING>). The petitioner’s last claim is that the same Holdings: 0: holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii 1: holding that the illinois statutory definitions of sexual penetration and sexual conduct cover clearly distinct conduct and that therefore the statute was not unconstitutionally vague 2: recognizing the two distinct generic definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and holding that a statute contains the element of abuse under the medinavilla definition if it applies to sexual conduct with children younger than fourteen years 3: holding that the clergy sexual conduct statute requires general intent and does not impose strict liability because the act of sexual penetration must be intentional 4: holding that a jury instruction listing additional modes of sexual penetration than those listed in the information did not impermissibly amend the charge of sexual assault becausein part the added modes of sexual penetration did not change the applicable statute sentence or level of offense


Input: McDonough intercepted the package at the mail facility located at the Dayton Airport, sometime during the morning of September 5, 2001. The label for the package indicated that delivery had been promised by noon on September 5th. In other words, the Defendant did not have a right to possess it until noon. Judge Merz issued that warrant at 9:54 a.m., on that date. There is no indication that the package could not have been delivered from the Dayton Airport to Mail Boxes, Etc., in Centerville, in two hours, if Judge Merz had refused to grant the requested search warrant or if no contraband had been discovered therein. Consequently, one could question whether the detention of the package was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. England, 971 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). However, since the Government has failed to Holdings: 0: holding inspector had reasonable suspicion when the return sender was fictitious the package was shipped special delivery the label was handwritten the package had been mailed from california and the package had been taped up at all the seams 1: holding package was not seized when it was detained since it could have been delivered in timely fashion if cocaine had not been discovered inside 2: holding that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to introduce defendants prior consistent statement statement was not admissible because it was made after defendant had been arrested clearly not a time when the effect of the statement could not have been foreseen 3: holding that it was not fatal when the notice of appeal did not state that the transcript had been ordered when in actuality it had been ordered 4: holding that state had waived argument because it could have been raised in an earlier appeal but was not and because it fell outside the scope of remand


Input: Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Government action challenged as violating the Establishment Clause must satisfy the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971): To pass muster under Lemon, the challenged practice must (1) reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. Preliminarily, to prevail on its Establishment Clause claim, plaintiff must prove two key facts: (1) anthroposophy constitutes a “religion” for Establishment Clause purposes; and (2) if anthroposophy is a religion, that there is an anthroposophieal curriculum at the subject public Waldorf-method schools. See Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1227 (<HOLDING>). As set forth above, the parties agreed that Holdings: 0: holding that the establishment clause forbids studentinitiated religious meetings on public secondary school property 1: holding that there is no statute of limitations for establishment clause challenges to stillexisting religious displays 2: holding no violation of federal establishment clause 3: holding that establishment of christmas day as legal public holiday did not violate establishment clause 4: recognizing that the court had to first consider whether the object in question can be defined as religious for establishment clause purposes


Input: Brief, 1. Klayman’s response is twofold. He admits to making the income alleged by the Government but points out his annual income over that period fluctuated greatly from as low as $61,000 to $328,000. Plaintiffs Response to Gov’t’s Facts ¶ 26. Secondly, he points out that for the years 2001 through 2003 the majority of the reported income constituted “phantom,” or passive, non-cash income passed through from Herkly, his Subchapter S corporation. See Response to Gov’t’s Facts ¶ 24; Klayman Dep. 47-49 attached to Plaintiffs Response; see also Government Ex. 118-120, Form 1040 for 2001-2003, Schedule E. Neither of these reasons, however, explains why no payment at all was made toward his tax debt for the previous years. See In re Scarpiello, 240 B.R. 203, 209 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1999) (<HOLDING>); In re Lacheen, 2005 WL 1155257 *4 Holdings: 0: holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety 1: holding this court generally lacks jurisdiction over the sec 6651a2 addition to tax for failure to pay tax 2: holding that failure to make any tax payment despite having resources sufficient to pay all or a substantial portion of tax liability constitutes evasion 3: holding that state and city tax evasion considered relevant conduct under conviction for federal tax evasion 4: holding that franchisees tax evasion scheme provided cause for termination


Input: and the court, after a noticed hearing that Michelle failed to even attend, then ordered restitution in early 2007. ¶ 19 Unlike Alton D., this is not a case in which the juvenile court set a reasonable deadline, or for that matter any time limit, within which a restitution claim had to be submitted. See Alton D., 196 Ariz. 195, ¶¶ 2, 19, 994 P.2d at 403, 406-07. And, unlike the situation in Kevin A., in this ease the juvenile court never indicated that “ ‘restitution [would] be closed’ ” at a certain point in time. Kevin A., 201 Ariz. 161, ¶ 3, 32 P.3d at 1089; see also In re Richard B., 216 Ariz. 127, ¶ 17, 163 P.3d 1077, 1081 (App.2007). Nor did the victim fail to comply with any deadline or other order concerning restitution. Compare Alton D., 196 Ariz. 195, ¶ 19, 994 P.2d at 407 (<HOLDING>), and Kevin A., 201 Ariz. 161, ¶¶ 4, 8, 32 P.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses  1: holding that when in light of the circumstances of a particular case the court sets a reasonable deadline by which victims must present their restitution claims and supporting evidence any victim who fails to comply is barred from recovery 2: holding that a district court cannot order restitution in amounts that will result in the payment to the victim of an amount greater than the victims loss 3: holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted 4: holding that even though the victim has settled a civil claim and signed a release the state is not barred from seeking or the court from imposing reasonable restitution


Input: two fundamental reasons. First, appellant’s reliance on the fact that she was convicted of murder under a theory of accomplice liability is misplaced in this context. As we implicitly held in Ramsey, in determining whether Wharton’s Rule applies to a substantive offense the conviction of which is based on accomplice liability, the focus must be on the underlying criminal act of the particular substantive offense rather than on the accomplice aspect of the offense. 2 Va.App. at 272, 343 S.E.2d at 470. The accompliceship itself is not the completed criminal act upon which the conviction is based but simply the means by which criminal responsibility for the completed criminal act is incurred under Code § 18.2-18. See Snyder v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1009, 1017, 121 S.E.2d 452, 458 (1961) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the accomplice aspect of the Holdings: 0: holding that a statute imposing a one dollar court cost for law enforcement on every person convicted of a crime was not a violation of the separation of powers doctrine because it is reasonable that one convicted of a crime should be made to share in the improvement of agencies that society has had to employ in defense against the very acts for which he has been convicted 1: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins 2: holding that code  18218 directs that an accessory before the fact is accountable in all respects as the principal who carries out the intended crime as well as any of its natural probable and incidental crimes 3: holding that before the accessory to a crime can be convicted as such it must be shown that the crime has been committed by the principal 4: holding punishment must be proportional to the crime convicted


Input: § 20.2b, at 906 n. 21 (5th ed.2005). And, finally, the petitioner argues that the district court was required to grant her request for an evidentiary hearing under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-13, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). As a matter of statutory law, we reject the Commonwealth’s importunings. Here, the petitioner adduced extensive evidence in the state court. The exact manner in which she elected to make the point is less important than the fact that she did make the point; her proffer went directly to the merits of the claims that she later sought to pursue in the federal court proceedings. We conclude, therefore, that the district court was not statutorily prohibited from taking evidence on those claims. See Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Matheney v. Anderson, 253 F.3d 1025, 1039 Holdings: 0: holding that an evidentiary hearing may be used to develop the factual basis of a prisoner complaint 1: holding that  2254e2 does not apply where the petitioner diligently sought to develop the factual basis underlying his habeas petition but a state court prevented him from doing so 2: holding that when a state has given petitioner a full and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed to develop material facts to support it he is not entitled to develop further facts in a federal habeas evidentiary hearing unless he demonstrates either cause for the failure and prejudice resulting therefrom or a fundamental miscarriage of justice 3: holding federal evidentiary hearing not statutorily barred when petitioner had sought to develop factual basis for claim in state court 4: holding that when a petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing in state court to develop the factual basis of a claim but the state court denies such a hearing entitlement to a federal court hearing is analyzed pursuant to preaedpa law rather than the standards set out in  2254e2


Input: was the pipe cut incident, we refrain from deciding whether that incident, standing alone, would qualify as a “sudden and accidental” release. Although we may disagree with the district court’s legal analysis of the issue, because we affirm on other grounds, a further discussion by this court is unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. C. The Administrative Proceedings FAG’s insurance policy declares that Liberty has a duty to defend “any suit against the insured seeking damages.” Liberty asserts that it does not, and never did, owe an obligation to FAG to defend against agency action in administrative proceedings because those proceedings are not “suits.” FAG disputes this assertion, claiming that the relevant Eighth Circuit opinion, Gen. Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d at 713-14 (<HOLDING>), is no longer viable because it relies on a Holdings: 0: holding that agency litigating positions are not entitled to judicial deference when they are merely posthoc rationalizations for agency action and are advanced for the first time on appeal 1: holding that agency demand letters are not suits 2: holding that section 1823e applies only to assets and does not apply to claims regarding letters of credit because letters of credit are liabilities rather than assets 3: holding that an agency could invoke an exemption that was not previously asserted in its letters with the foiaprivacy act requester 4: holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review


Input: Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir.1995). “ ‘[Objections disputing] the correctness of the magistrate’s recommendation but failing] to specify the findings ... believed [to be] in error’ are too general.” Spencer, 449 F.3d at 725 (quoting Miller, 50 F.3d at 380). The defendant did not object to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the plaintiff established the first two elements of his prima facie case. “[T]he failure to file specific objections to a magistrate’s report constitutes a waiver of those objections.” Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir.2004). Since the defendant did not challenge those conclusions, the Court need not address those items, since those arguments are waived, see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, Holdings: 0: holding that under current eleventh circuit rule the failure to object limits the scope of our appellate review to plain error review of the magistrate judges factual findings  however failure to object to the magistrate judges legal conclusions does not preclude the party from challenging those conclusions on appeal 1: holding that the failure to object to the magistrate judges report releases the court from its duty to independently review the motion 2: holding that failure to object to magistrate judges recommendation waived issue on appeal 3: holding that failure to object in a timely fashion to a magistrate judges report and recommendation generally constitutes a waiver of the defaulting partys right to appeal provided that the parties received clear notice of the consequences of their failure to object 4: holding failure to timely object to magistrate judges recommendation waives appellate review of factual and legal questions


Input: C.R.S. (2006). 2 . 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2000) states: In any State court proceeding [concerning] ... an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe.... 3 . Article VI, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution establishes the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver. Denver is the only county to have separate probate and juvenile courts. Other counties in Colorado handle probate and juvenile matters in their district courts. 4 . See, e.g., L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d 1271, 1274, 1277 (Colo.2000) (<HOLDING>). While L.L. was a case of guardianship in the Holdings: 0: holding foster parents not liable for willful act of their foster child 1: recognizing childrens need for stability and permanency and thus upholding placement of children in permanent guardianship of foster parents 2: holding that a superior court properly considered the childrens need for permanency a crucial need for young children in evaluating the best interests of the child in a termination proceeding 3: recognizing that prolonged pattern of failed treatment threatens childrens future stability 4: recognizing need for custodial stability and permanency planning for children adjudged dependent or neglected and removed from physical custody of their parents without terminating the parentchild relationship


Input: although specifically invited to do so, the State has presented no evidence from the record that Raphael’s attorney knew of the nature of the ex parte hearing and yet deliberately chose not to object. To the contrary, the record shows that the trial court did not fully inform Raphael’s attorney of the nature or content of the hearing. Based on the trial court’s abridged account to Raphael’s attorney of its contact with I.W., along with the lack of support for the theory that Gould knew the full extent of the constitutional errors and deliberately chose not to object, we cannot say that Raphael’s failure to object to the ex parte hearing and to I.W.’s testimony was tactical. Because the trial court committed plain error, we recognize Raphael’s constitutional claims on (E.D.Mich.19.72) (<HOLDING>); cf. J & L Diversified Enters. v. Municipality Holdings: 0: holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial 1: holding prosecutions failure to disclose promise of leniency to witness provided in exchange for that witnesss testimony violated due process 2: holding that the polices torturing of a witness until he provided incourt testimony incriminating the defendant violated the defendants right to due process 3: holding that a conviction violated due process because the prosecutor knowingly allowed a government witness to commit perjury 4: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand


Input: 901-950 [1957], for injuries sustained when he fell asleep while driving home after being required to work twenty-six hours without sleep because hazard of journey arose out of and in course of “extraordinary demands of employment”). See Hed v. Brockway Glass Co., 309 Minn. 73, 76 (1976) (affirming compensation award to worker who fell asleep while driving home after being required to work longer hours as bricklayer than generally required); Snowbarger v. Tri-County Elec. Coop., 793 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Mo. 1990) (affirming award of compensation to worker who fell asleep while driving home after being required to work “unusually long overtime hours” of manual labor, eighty-six hours in one hundred hour period). See also Deland v. Hutchings Psychiatric Ctr., 203 A.D. 2d 776, 778 (N.Y. 1994) (<HOLDING>). In all such cases, however, the employer had Holdings: 0: holding that state courts failure to discuss or even to be aware of federal precedent does not in itself render the decision contrary to federal law 1: holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court 2: recognizing substantial body of authority from other states and the federal courts holding that fatiguerelated injuries can be compensable in some circumstances but remanding case for explanation why contrary precedent within jurisdiction was not followed 3: holding that it is axiomatic that remanding a case to state court terminates the jurisdiction of a federal bankruptcy or district court over that case 4: recognizing that although federal precedent was not binding it was persuasive authority


Input: has held on more than one occasion, not inconsistent with Magnolia, that the language in section 85.321’s predecessor (section 13 of article 6049c) does, in fact, create a private cause of action. Turnbow v. Lamb, 95 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir.1938) (“Article 6049c, section 13, Vernon’s Civil Stat. Texas, expressly recognizes and preserves to an injured party his cause of action for damages ‘or other relief against a violator of the oil production laws.”); see Sun Oil Co. v. Martin, 330 F.2d 5, 5 (5th Cir.1964) (adopting the lower court’s reasoning in Sun Oil Co. v. Martin, 218 F.Supp. 618, 621-22 (S.D.Tex.1963) (explaining that a violation under section 13 of article 6049c “may give rise to an action for damages”)); see also Ivey v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 36 F.Supp. 811, 816 (S.D.Tex.1941) (<HOLDING>). Although section 85.321 and section 13 of Holdings: 0: holding in accord with fifth circuit law that a plaintiff does not have standing to sue pursuant to section 13 of article 6049c if no railroad commission regulation or state law violation occurred 1: recognizing that while in a diversity case a federal court may not address the plaintiffs claim unless the plaintiff has standing to sue under state law the plaintiff must also meet article iii standing requirements 2: holding that employers have standing to sue 3: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue 4: holding that an incidental beneficiary does not have standing to sue for breach of a contract


Input: in the sexual battery statute, we must hold it was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction over, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment of defendant’s guilt of, that offense. An arrest of judgment is proper when the indictment “wholly fails to charge some offense cognizable at law or fails to state some essential and necessary element of the offense of which the defendant is found guilty.” State v. Gregory, 223 N.C. 415, 418, 27 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1943). Further, “[w]hen an indictment has failed to allege the essential elements of the crime charged, it has failed to give the trial court subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, and the reviewing court must arrest judgment.” State v. Bullock, 154 N.C. App. 234, 244, 574 S.E.2d 17, 23 (2 t. App. 1995) (<HOLDING>). However, this Court reached a contrary result Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant could be convicted of sexual battery a lesser crime not included in the offense for which he was indicted where the defendant requested that sexual battery be submitted to the jury 1: holding that when an appellant affirmatively declines a bill of particulars he can not on appeal claim that he was misled when convicted of a lesser included offense 2: holding that the defendant who was indicted for first degree rape and convicted of sexual battery had no remedy on appeal when he requested that the erroneous lesser nonincluded charge be submitted to the jury 3: holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same 4: holding there are no grounds to appeal when defendant receives the remedy he requested from the trial court


Input: that if the last overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed on July 12, 1979, the July 12, 1984 indictment was filed one day too late. Id. at 1531. Finding the Guerro decision persuasive, the Eleventh Circuit held that in conspiracy cases — whether an overt or covert act is alleged — the day following the event is when the statute of limitation begins to run. Id. at 1532-33. In a case where the conspiracy continued until July 12, 1979, the following day was the first day of the limitation period, and the indictment filed on July 12, 1984 was timely. Id. at 1533. This Circuit has long held that the day of the offense is excluded when determining the trigger date for the statute of limitation. See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 64 F.2d 950, 950-51 (9th Cir.1933) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Tawab, 984 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 1: holding that an indictment returned on march 7 1930 was not barred by a threeyear limitation statute where the offense occurred on march 71927 2: holding that subsections 7751515  16 did not apply where threeyear statute of limitations expired on january 25 2006 and thus prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations 3: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense 4: holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient


Input: arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities” may a court assert general jurisdiction over a defendant. Id. at 318, 66 S.Ct. at 159. For example, in Helicópteros Nacionales, the Supreme Court held that a defendant corporation’s contacts with the forum state, which included the temporary physical presence of a corporate officer for contract negotiations, regular purchases of equipment and training services from a business in the forum, and personnel training in the forum, were not sufficiently continuous and systematic so that the attempted exercise of general jurisdiction would satisfy the requirements of due process. 466 U.S. at 418-19, 104 S.Ct. at 1874; cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445, 447-48, 72 S.Ct. 413, 418, 419, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952) (<HOLDING>). While the record shows that Flex-sys sold its Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff an officer and shareholder of a corporation with signatory authority over the corporations checking account was not a customer of the bank and could not file suit for wrongful dishonor of the corporations checks 1: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties 2: holding that the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was reasonable and just when the corporations president maintained an office in the forum where he conducted activities on behalf of the company such as keeping company files holding directors meetings carrying on business correspondence and distributing salary checks drawn on forum bank accounts 3: holding that independent directors can be entrusted with the decision to sue other directors on behalf of the corporation 4: holding president of corporation liable as employer where he inter alia maintained control over the corporations employment and pay practices and had the authority to make all major decisions regarding the corporations business affairs


Input: 28-29 (homemade key designed to burglarize coin-operated machines). The Legislature cannot foresee what these objects might be. The Legislature may have intended section 16.01 to cover possession of these objects, which would otherwise go unpunished. Third, we are not convinced that the Legislature intended section 16.01 to be construed more broadly, in all respects, than the statute it replaced. Under the plain language of the former statute, it applied to objects “commonly used” to commit burglary or safecracking. But under section 16.01, objects must be “specially designed, made, or adapted for use in the commission of an offense.” “Commonly used” allows for broader application than “specially designed, made, or adapted.” See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). We also note that the practice commentary Holdings: 0: holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent 1: holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language 2: holding legislatures intent is determined from plain and common meaning of words used 3: recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect 4: holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous


Input: evidence on you. Even if what you told us is true, a jury will still convict you of first degree murder. You’ve got 12 people sitting back there and they’ve read about all this stuff in the papers and, man, these people will just string you by the nape of your neck right now if they get their hands on you. Hell, we know you done it. You know you done it. We can prove it in court. Admit it. Say you’re sorry. Try and get off light. That’s your only recourse. Brewer, 386 So.2d at 234-35 (emphasis supplied). To advise a suspect of potential penalties and consequences does not amount to a threat. See Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d at 1475. In a similar manner, encouraging a suspect to cooperate with law enforcement is not coercive conduct. See Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 512 (Fla.2005) (<HOLDING>). It is recognized that advising a suspect that Holdings: 0: holding defendant does not waive fourth amendment protection by signing parole agreement but the search condition does confirm right of parole officer to conduct reasonable searches within scope of parole mission 1: holding that parole officers advisement to defendant to cooperate did not vitiate the voluntariness of his statements 2: holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendants tendered instruction regarding the voluntariness of his confession 3: holding that the defendant had no legitimate basis to justify his refusal to cooperate with his appointed attorney and therefore did not demonstrate good cause for the court to appoint substitute counsel 4: holding that habeas petition challenging the state boards decision to defer his scheduled parole release date was rendered moot by prisoners release from custody on parole and subsequent incarceration for violating his parole


Input: of twelve counts of mail fraud and three counts of copyright infringement, and specifically found Susel was in the business of receiving and selling stolen property. Before sentencing, Susel objected to the jury’s finding, which subjected him to an increase in his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4), and asserted he should receive a three-level reduction for only partially completing his offense under U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b). The district court applied the § 2B1.1(b)(4) increase, denied the § 2X1.1(b) decrease, and sentenced Susel under the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines to fifty-one months in prison and three years of supervised release. A few days after sentencing, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756-57, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (<HOLDING>). The district court held a resentencing Holdings: 0: holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 1: holding guidelines to be only advisory 2: holding that the pennsylvania sentencing guidelines are purely advisory in nature 3: holding that even though the guidelines are advisory a district court must accurately calculate and consult the defendants guidelines range 4: recognizing only that the guidelines must be advisory not that judges may find no facts


Input: the jury’s joint enterprise finding. Subsection (a)’s vicarious liability language therefore cannot apply to Hospital based on a joint enterprise theory of vicarious liability. Second, also as set forth above, the instructions and definitions given to the jury in connection with the negligence question, question 2, submitted to the jury only the issue of LMS’s and Hospital’s direct liability. The jury did not make any other fact finding that would support the imposition of vicarious liability on LMS for Hospital’s breach of its direct duties to Chesser. See, e.g., St. Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 537-38 (discussing various theories of vicarious liability); accord Obstetrical & Gynecological Assocs., P.A. v. McCoy, 283 S.W.3d 96, 105 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Thus, absent some fact finding that would Holdings: 0: holding that investigative report regarding potential premises liability claim was protected work product 1: holding that expert report failed to implicate defendant in context of plaintiffs direct liability theory and thus trial court had no discretion to grant extension but only to dismiss 2: holding expert report requirement fulfilled in claim against nurse by providing expert report of nurse as to standard of care and expert report of medical doctor as to causation 3: recognizing that purely vicarious liability claim against entity as opposed to direct liability claim did not require expert report in addition to report filed regarding doctor employed by entity 4: holding that because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert report adequate as to the vicarious liability claim against the hospital based on the actions of the doctors plaintiffs suit against the hospital including her claim that the hospital was vicariously hable for the actions of its nurses could proceed


Input: Furthermore, Wiggins’s contention violates the purpose of the notice provision to “immediately” give notice of legal process: “to afford [State Farm] an opportunity to control litigation.” See Reeves, 539 So.2d at 256 (citation omitted). Thus, written notice to State Farm of the Incident and of Wiggins’s suit was delayed by more than three years and one year, respectively. Sanders has not offered an excuse for the delay. In fact, the correspondences to State Farm by Sanders and his parents show that they did not want State Farm to be involved in the matter relating to the Incident. Although Wiggins contends that she gave written rt’s declaratory judgment that a one-year delay with insufficient reasons for the delay was too late to require indemnification); Pharr, 429 So.2d at 1019— 20 (<HOLDING>); Thomas, 334 So.2d at 885 (holding that a Holdings: 0: holding that a five month delay was unreasonable 1: holding that an eightmonth delay without excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law 2: holding that an over twoyear delay without any excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law 3: holding threeyear delay without mitigating circumstances was unreasonable 4: holding inability to locate attorney who would prosecute infringement suit inadequate as matter of law to excuse delay


Input: other elements required for a viable defamation claim under Louisiana state law. See Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So.2d 552, 559 (La. 1997) (“Four elements are necessary to establish a defamation cause of action: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.”); see also Lee v. Pennington, 830 So.2d 1037, 1045 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding report of the plaintiffs arrest was neither false nor defamatory). Indeed, we have already concluded that there was probable cause for Thorn’s arrest, and under these circumstances, Louisiana law affords police officers a qualified privilege against defamation actions. See Trentecosta, 703 So.2d at 562-64 (<HOLDING>); see also Roche v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 303 Holdings: 0: holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 1: holding that merely declining to rehire a person did not constitute defamation for deprivation of liberty interest purposes absent any charges against the good name or reputation of that person 2: holding that burglary may qualify as offense against person if as committed it is in fact a crime against a person 3: holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983 4: holding that police officers have a qualified privilege against defamation claims for reporting the fact that a person was arrested and the charges for which the person is being held


Input: the next sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id. However, if the allegations taken as true do not establish a violation, “there is no- necessity for further inquiries.” Id. The United States Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he qualified immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Peng alleges that Gage violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free of an unlawful seizure because Gage arrested him without probable cause. Gage arrested Peng for robbery. In California, where the arrest occurred, “robbery” is defined as (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Second, Peng asserts that there is a material Holdings: 0: holding that possessing property of another for the purpose of security on a debt does not give rise to probable cause to arrest 1: holding that the first amendment does not by itself give rise to a cause of action for damages 2: holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action 3: holding that a dispute regarding payment of a restaurant bill does not give rise to probable cause to arrest 4: holding that arrest made with probable cause and without excessive force does not give rise to iied claim


Input: since it was not brought within the statutory “reasonable time.” W.S. 14-2-104(a)(ii). In addition, we hold that the petition is barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and judicial es-toppel. In 1977, Wyoming adopted a slightly modified version of the Uniform Parentage Act, W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120. See generally, Uniform Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A. 287, 287-345 (1987 & 1991 Cum. Supp.). The Act was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in response to several United States Supreme Court decisions premised on the discriminatory treatment of illegitimate children and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S.Ct. 872, 35 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, Holdings: 0: holding that the word tort is not technically construed and hence a fathers breach of the statutory duty to pay child support for his illegitimate child constitutes a tortious act within the meaning of the statute 1: holding that the trial court had erred in imposing an obligation to pay child support when clear and convincing evidence established that the husband was not the father of the child 2: holding that an illegitimate child is guaranteed a right of support from his father 3: holding illegitimate child acknowledged by putative father stands on same footing as legitimate child under workers compensation statute 4: holding biological father responsible under uniform parentage act for back child support notwithstanding stepparents support of child


Input: a provision of CSRS that requires five years of civilian service for disability retirement eligibility. See 757 F.2d at 264-65. We rejected the argument that military service creditable under § 8332 for the purpose of calculating the proper annuity should also count as civilian service to meet the eligibility requirements of § 8337(a). Id. at 265. We explained that the five-year civilian service require ment is a “threshold standard of eligibility” and only if this threshold standard is met could military service be counted to determine the appropriate annuity. Id. “Congress obviously wanted only those individuals with a minimum of federal civilian service to be entitled to a federal civil service annuity.” Id.; see also Tizo v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 325 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (citing Pub.L. No. 80-426, § 5, 62 Stat. 48, Holdings: 0: holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service 1: holding that under the 1948 version of csrs civil servants were required to meet the fiveyear service requirement exclusive of military service  2: holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service 3: holding military service disability payments are community property 4: holding the rule 4 requirement of delivery to the appropriate united states attorney required personal service not service by certified mail


Input: Defendant asserts that the 1991 Amendments to Title VII do not apply to § 1981 claims, and therefore that a successful mixed-motive defense is still a complete bar to liability under § 1981. The Second Circuit has not directly addressed this question. However, that court has concluded that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not apply to retaliation claims under Title VII, see Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir.2000), nor to claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), see DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir.1993). Other circuits that have directly addressed this question have concluded that the 1991 Amendments do not apply to § 1981. See Mabra v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local Union No. 1996, 176 F.3d 1357, 1357 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Aquino v. Honda of Am., Inc., 158 Fed.Appx. Holdings: 0: holding that the protect act amendments to the standard of review apply retroactively 1: holding that the  1981 amendments contained in  101 of the civil rights act of 1991 do not apply retroactively 2: holding that 1991 amendments to other aspects of  3910114lai clarified intent of 1988 amendments to statute 3: holding that a plaintiff could not assert a  1981 claim based on gender discrimination 4: holding that the 1991 mixedmotive amendments do not apply to  1981 based on an independent analysis of the amendments and  1981


Input: causation in the context of a claim based on the principles of informed consent doctrine. That concession, therefore, does not extend to the determination of plaintiffs’ wrongful birth claim. Plaintiffs contend that the PDR, which contained specific warnings that Provera could cause bilateral limb reduction, the retention of a defective ovum, and general genetic anomalies, constituted evidence of the standard of care governing the doctors’ duty of disclosure. In determining what constitutes a medically accepted risk when defining a doctor’s duty to warn, we have recognized that the PDR, standing alone, is not and should not be the touchstone of what risks a physician must reveal to his or her patient. See Morlino v. Medical Ctr. of Ocean County, 152 N.J. 563, 580, 706 A.2d 721 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the fact that the PDR contained Holdings: 0: holding that a general acute care hospital may not delegate its duty to provide physicians for emergency room care because the law imposes a duty on hospital to provide that health care 1: holding that because pdr warnings are written for many reasons including compliance with fda requirements advertisement the provision of useful information to physicians and an attempt to limit the manufacturers liability pdr warning alone does not establish physicians duty of care 2: holding physicianpatient privilege does not apply to nurses or other medical staff working under physicians supervision or acting as physicians agent 3: holding that nontreating physicians opinions are entitled to little weight when contradictory to treating physicians opinions and will not constitute substantial evidence standing alone 4: holding that emtala does not provide a private cause of action against individual physicians or against physicians medical corporations


Input: would result in direct and immediate hardship and would entail more than possible financial loss. " Winter, 900 F.2d at 1325. The district court found DSC’s risk of additional seizures and injunction actions “too speculative to warrant judicial intervention.” DSC claims the district court erred in failing to distinguish between the potential risks of tentative FDA policy statements and the very real liabilities imposed by a final, announced enforcement position and actual seizures. Again, DSC’s position assumes that the FDA has made a final determination as to the general status of CoQlO. In light of our rejection of DSC’s finality argument, we hold the district court correctly found that DSC failed to show sufficient hardship to require bypassing final agency 86 n. 18 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The cases are also distinguishable on the Holdings: 0: holding fda seizure action did not constitute final agency action 1: holding a rod to be final agency action 2: holding that epa action initiating permitting proceedings was not final agency action 3: holding a general prediction set forth in order does not constitute final agency action 4: holding that epa regions policy statement does not constitute final agency action because it does not compel action


Input: rather than among investors.” (citing Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.1978)), rev’d on other grounds, 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir.1990) (per curiam); Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F.Supp. 797, 803 n. 6 (E.D.N.C.1986) (“A common enterprise exists where the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts of and success of the party seeking the investment or of a third party.” (citing SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir.1974)), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir.1987) (table). Other courts, although not directly addressing the issue whether vertical commonality alone is sufficient, have indicated which approach to vertical commonality they follow. See In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F.Supp. 1192, 1248 (E.D.Va.1988) (<HOLDING>), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other Holdings: 0: holding that a person who obtains drugs from a seller is not an accomplice of the seller 1: holding that there was no common venture where the fortunes of the purchasers were not tied to the fortunes of the seller 2: holding that breach occurred when seller told buyer that seller would do no more to rectify alleged warranty violation 3: holding that the seller of a business implicitly transferred a property right in the firms good will to the buyer and that the seller could not then impair that right by actively soliciting the customers of his former business 4: holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93a action against a prior owner of the land who was not the seller because there was no business connection between the two parties


Input: in that year for EARN centers had worked out financially. PWDC’s President’s statement that many of the EARN centers “earned above the contract amount in certain performance benchmarks” and that those payments “ ‘busted’ the budget” could have given the jury a basis for accepting KRA’s interpretation of the contract. (App. at 2586.) If performance payments had “busted” the budget, then the jury could have concluded that PWDC had not eabined profit to 10% and had instead allowed contractors to keep all of their profits. But even if the District Court should have allowed the e-mail into evidence, the error was harmless. It is highly likely that the admission of the e-mail would not have altered the jury verdict. See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 917 (3d Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>). While the e-mail could have supported KRA’s Holdings: 0: holding that bia error is harmless when it is highly probable that error did not affect cases outcome 1: holding that noneonstitutional errors in civil suits are harmless only if it is highly probable that the errors did not affect the outcome of the case 2: holding that it is an abuse of discretion to make errors of law or clear errors of factual determination 3: holding that instructional errors that are trial errors are subject to harmless error analysis 4: holding that an error is harmless where it is highly probably that the error did not affect the outcome of the case


Input: common area premises where the marijuana was actually found were accurately described in the search warrant. Trial counsel does not provide ineffective assistance by failing to make a meritless objection. Forrest v. State, 290 S.W.3d 704, 717 (Mo. banc 2009). “[Before an individual can challenge a search and seizure, he or she must establish that he or she had a ‘legitimate expectation’ of privacy in the area searched or the items seized.” State v. Martin, 892 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Mo.App. W.D.1995) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). “[TJenants of multifamily dwellings have no legitimate expectation of privacy in common or shared areas.” U.S. v. Mendoza, 281 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir.2002); U.S. v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Movant lived in an apartment complex where he Holdings: 0: holding bank clients had no legitimate expectation of privacy in banking information revealed to a third party 1: holding that in a multifamily dwelling where other residents had access to a basement storage locker there was no legitimate expectation of privacy 2: holding common areas of a storage facility not entitled to reasonable expectation of privacy because any tenant could invite anyone in 3: holding that even though student had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker school officials properly conducted a warrantless search of the students locker because the officials had probable cause to believe that the locker contained marijuana 4: holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed


Input: 2112, 2189 ("[traditionally, the interest of truth in the administration of justice has been subordinated in the law to the interest of preserving privileged communications where [certain] relationships have been involved: ... husband-wife_ [18 U.S.C. §2517(4)] is intended to vary the existing law only to the extent that an otherwise privileged communication does not lose its privileged character because it is intercepted by a stranger"). See also 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5711 ("[n]o otherwise privileged communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged character.”); U.S. v. Geller, 560 F.Supp. 1309, 1326 (E.D.Pa.1983), aff'd, 3rd Cir., 745 F.2d 49 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109, 105 S.Ct. 786, 83 L.Ed.2d 780 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 28 . 370 U.S. 139, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d Holdings: 0: holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b 1: holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 2: holding 18 pacsa  7508 effectuates the legislative purpose of reducing drug crimes 3: holding that 18 pacsa  5711 and its federal counterpart 18 usc  25174 prevent the government from introducing recordings of communications between spouses resulting from tap on third partys telephone 4: holding that the relating to parenthetical in 18 usc  1961 was merely to aid identification of 18 usc  2314 rather than to limit its application


Input: distanced Issa from the egregious crimes that occurred inside the victims’ home and best explained why Issa’s blood was found outside on the fence but was not conclusively matched with any of the blood found inside the home. And this is exactly the kind of 8 SE2d 840) (2014) (same). 43 Alvelo, 290 Ga. at 615 (5) (punctuation omitted); accord Wheeler, 327 Ga. App. at 318 (3). 44 See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b); see also State v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213, 214 (1) (790 SE2d 66) (2016) (noting that when trial counsel fails to object to a jury cha Jefferson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 842, 852 (6) (720 SE2d 184) (2011); see Whitaker v. State, 283 Ga. 521, 524 (3) (661 SE2d 557) (2008) (noting that the fact that a defen itted); see Parks, 281 Ga. App. at 681 (2) (same). 53 See Whitaker, 283 Ga. at 524-25 (3) (<HOLDING>); Jefferson, 312 Ga. App. at 853 (6) (same). 54 Holdings: 0: holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify 1: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial and instead giving a curative instruction when an improper comment on a defendants silence was not directed to any particular statement or defense offered by the defendant was made during the witnesss explanation of the course of events and did not have the effect of being probative on the issue of guilt or innocence 2: holding court did not abuse discretion in deciding to deal with the jurors note solely by giving a curative instruction when there was no evidence of misconduct or prejudice 3: holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail 4: holding that comment on defendants silence was not reversible error because inter alia it did not have the effect of being probative on guilt or innocence


Input: theory of the case, any weakness or implausibility in that theory is a matter for the jury, not for the court. See Folger v. State, 648 P.2d at 113. Admittedly, there are some exceptions to this doctrine where the defense of necessity is concerned. There are several Alaska eases which conclude that trial judges did not abuse their discretion in refusing to give necessity defenses. However, we believe that a close reading of those cases establishes that the defendants in those cases had clear legal alternatives to violating the law. See Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977, 980 (Alaska 1979) (finding that defendant had several lawful alternatives and that “[t]he seriousness of the offenses committed by Nelson were disproportionate to the situation he faced.”); Schnabel, 663 P.2d at 966 (<HOLDING>); Cleveland, 631 P.2d at 1081 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted 1: holding that there was adequate opportunity when state court judicial review of an administrative proceeding was available 2: holding that defendant had adequate alternatives in judicial and administrative remedies to the course he took 3: holding that requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is appropriate where doing so can protect administrative agency authority and promote judicial efficiency 4: holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court


Input: relevant law of the two states is similar. Robinson bases its argument that the Committee lacks standing on the holding in Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir.1991), that when “a bankrupt corporation has joined with a third party in defrauding its creditors, the trustee cannot recover against the third party for the damage to the creditors.” Moreover, when the alleged malfeasor is the corporation’s sole shareholder and decision-maker, the Wagoner rule bars the trustee from suing even if the trustee claims that the debtor was harmed because, in that situat kruptcy trustee had no standing to sue a professional for aiding and abetting the unlawful investment activity of the president and sole shareholder of the bankrupt company); Mediators, 105 F.3d at 822 (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, the Committee, citing Reider v. Holdings: 0: holding that the interest of the public  especially the debtor and creditors  could limit compensation to a debtors counsel 1: holding that the debtor in possession could utilize the strongarm powers of the trustee to avoid an unperfected security interest even though the debtor knew of the interest prior to bankruptcy because the two are distinct entities and the debtor in possessions responsibility is to preserve the estates assets for the benefit of the creditors 2: holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank 3: holding that the creditors committee could not sue third party aidersandabettors because the participation of the sole shareholder and decisionmaker of the debtor rendered the debtor a participant 4: holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default


Input: holds, that the placement of traffic control devices is a discretionary duty. Because the placement of traffic control devices, i.e., the road construction signs, is a discretionary duty, § 11 — 46—9(1)(d) applies, and Hinds cannot be liable “whether or not the discretion be abused.” Even if an abuse of discretion standard were to apply to the placement of the road construction signs, the Court would find that Hinds did not abuse its discretion. The Court is aware that such a finding would require the Court to engage in fact finding. However, the Court finds that even if an abuse of discretion standard applied, no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Hinds is liable for the placement of the road construction signs. See Gonzalez v. Denning, 394 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir.2004)(<HOLDING>). The Court reaches this conclusion after Holdings: 0: holding that a nonmovant could not oppose a summary judgment motion with an unauthenticated letter 1: holding that on appeal a nonmovant need not have answered or responded to the motion for summary judgment to contend that the movants summaiy judgment proof is insufficient as a matter of law to support summary judgment 2: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate 3: holding that summary judgment was appropriate when no reasonable factfinder could have found for the nonmovant 4: holding courts review motion for summary judgment in light most favorable to nonmovant


Input: recordings made by a participant to the conversation who was “acting under color of law.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c). Second, § 2511(2)(d) allows the use of recordings made by participants in a conversation unless that party had a “criminal or tortious” purpose in making the recording. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). Because we find that Whitacre acted under color of law, we do not need to reach the second possibility. The government asserts that Whitacre was acting as a cooperating witness, and therefore under color of law, from November 1992 through the end of the conspiracy. See Obron Atlantic Corp. v. Barr, 990 F.2d 861, 864 (6th Cir.1993) (allowing use of tape recordings made by corporate executive in price-fixing investigation); United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1582 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319, 322 Holdings: 0: holding that informant acted under color of law when fbi supervised recording 1: holding that cooperating witness under direction of fbi was acting under color of law 2: holding that a federal drug informant acting under the partial direction of the fbi and for pay was not a federal employee under the ftca 3: holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability 4: holding intentional gender discrimination in public employment by persons acting under color of state law violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and is actionable under section 1983


Input: Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). First, banks like Regions are not subject to LUTPA, which provides that: The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to: (1) Any federally insured financial institution, its subsidiaries, and affiliates or any licensee of the Office of Financial Institutions, its subsidiaries, and affiliates or actions or transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana Public Service Commission or other public utility regulatory body, the commissioner of financial institutions, the insurance commissioner, the financial institutions and insurance regulators of other states, or federal banking regulators who possess authority to regulate unfair or deceptive trade practices. La. R.S. 51:1406; see Bank One, N.A. v. Colley, 294 F.Supp.2d 864, 868 (M.D.La.2003) (<HOLDING>); State Bank of Commerce v. Demco of Louisiana, Holdings: 0: holding that the united states was a statutory employer under missouri law 1: holding that a national banking association chartered by or under the authority of the united states was exempt from the lutpa as a matter of law 2: recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys 3: holding that the united states was a statutory employer under kansas law 4: holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states


Input: Restitution Order In issue three, appellant argues that the trial court had no authority to compel appellant, as a condition of probation, to make restitution to anyone other than DBS, the named complainant. A trial court may not order restitution to be paid to a person who was not a victim of the charged offense. Martin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 674, 677-78 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). In order to preserve error concerning a probation order, however, a defendant must make a timely and specific objection. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see Idowu v. State, 73 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (stating if defendant wishes to complain about appropriateness of trial court’s restitution order, he must do so in trial court); see also Lemos v. State, 27 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>). There is no evidence in the record to reflect Holdings: 0: holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial 1: holding party failing to adequately brief complaint waived issue on appeal 2: holding that party waived complaint regarding instruction where it did not raise specific objection 3: holding that a complaint is waived by the failure to object during the witness unsworn testimony 4: holding defendant waived complaint


Input: agencies have some procedural limitations on their discretion, it does not follow that substantively they have no discretion. Such a conclusion is overly formalistic and ignores the on-the-ground reality that DSHS was the party that had control over the formula for authorized service hours. ¶26 As described above, when a party has discretion over a future contract term, it has an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in setting and performing that contractual term. Here, the contract provided that service providers wo the duty of good faith did not apply to a landlord’s refusal to consent to a lease agreement when the contract gave the landlord the unconditional right to do so); Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Westwood Lumber, Inc., 65 Wn. App. 811, 820, 822-23, 829 P.2d 1152 (1992) (<HOLDING>). DSHS relies heavily on Monotype Corp. v. Holdings: 0: holding that course of dealing may render uncertain terms sufficiently definite 1: recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties bargain in fact but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties 2: holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty 3: holding that the trial court erred by imposing a duty of good faith on seattlefirst in relation to a course of dealing when that course of dealing conflicted with the express terms of the contract 4: holding that duty of good faith and fair dealing did not extend to thirdparty claimant


Input: v. Giordano, 41 Fed.Appx. 522, 522-28 (2d Cir.2002) (reviewing application of rebuttable presumption for plain error (if at all) where defendant failed to object to it at detention hearing); United States v. Guebara, 15 Fed.Appx. 584, 589 (10th Cir.2001) (reviewing issue that was not raised at bond revocation proceedings for plain error). Under plain-error review, in the light of the lack of authority in this, or any other, circuit regarding whether the rebuttable presumption is limited only to cases whose facts involve actual minor victims (again, Emmons’ conduct involved undercover agents), the district court could not have plainly erred in applying the rebuttable presumption in favor of detention pursuant to § 3142(e). See United States v. Hull, 160 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). As discussed, Emmons’ alternative contention Holdings: 0: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error 1: holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious 2: holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error 3: holding that omission was not plain error 4: holding that an error whose identification requires the extension of precedent is not plain


Input: In their summary judgment motion, Defendants argued Plaintiff failed to show a vegan diet is central or indispensable to the practice of Buddhism. (Defendants’ .Brief in Support at 4-6.) The Magistrate Judge concluded “[wjhile a reasonable juror could perhaps conclude that such is the case, the evidence of record more than supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs religious beliefs are sincerely (and intensely) held.” (R & R at 894.) Defendants object, arguing whether a belief is sincerely held is a distinct issue from whether the belief is central to the practice of a religious faith. Defendants reassert that Plaintiff has not established that his request for a vegan diet is central to the practice of his religious faith. See Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, Holdings: 0: holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review 1: holding that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case in a religious discrimination suit because among other reasons employer hired someone else with identical religious practices 2: holding the plaintiffs failed to establish the centrality or indispensability to their religious observances of the location at issue 3: holding that the plaintiffs location on the supply barge at the time of the accident did not alter his status 4: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise


Input: by insured; insured not directed by government to remediate site; action against insured by those remediating the property pursuant to government cleanup directive; held: suit for "damages"). Under Hills, there is insurance coverage in connection with this second category of sites. ¶ 7. The third category presents a situation where the insured is responsible for at least part of the contamination of a site that it does not own, and has been directed by a government to remediate the site, but has not done so. The insured is sued by the government to recover money it spent to clean up the site. There is no insurance coverage in connection with the scenarios encompassed by category three. Regent Ins. Co. v. City of Manitowoc, 205 Wis. 2d 450, 463, 556 N.W.2d 405 (Ct. App. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Johnson Controls argues that the supreme Holdings: 0: holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution 1: holding that cleanup costs incurred pursuant to a consent decree were not incurred voluntarily and must be sought through a  113f contribution action 2: holding that the plaintiffs suit for workrelated costs incurred pursuant to a consent decree was a contribution action under  113f 3: holding plans suit against law firm for constructive trust was a suit for appropriate equitable relief 4: holding that where the government sues an insured to recover incurred cleanup costs under  107a4a of the cercla  or to impose a plan for remediation that action is not a suit for damages but is rather a suit for equitable monetary relief


Input: at the car wash, see Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (finding relevant characteristics of the location may be considered in assessing reasonable suspicion); (4) both men were wearing heavy cotton, dark-colored hoodies with their hoods pulled over their heads on a very warm night, see Lee v. Hefner, 136 Fed.Appx. 807, 809-10 (6th Cir.2005) (affirming the district court’s finding of reasonable suspicion where one of the factors cited by the officer was that the suspect was “wearing dark clothing”); (5) Royal and Kelley were visibly nervous, sweating profusely, and had given evasive answers to the officers’ questions, see Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (“[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.”); Waldon, 206 F.3d at 604 (<HOLDING>); and (6) the officers observed what appeared Holdings: 0: recognizing that furtive gestures undertaken in response to police presence can serve as a factor in establishing reasonable suspicion 1: holding that nervous evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion 2: holding that nervous evasive behavior such as flight is a relevant factor in an examination of reasonable suspicion 3: recognizing presence in a high crime area unprovoked flight and nervous evasive behavior as factors supporting a reasonable suspicion 4: recognizing a defendants giving of evasive answers when asked what he was doing in the area as a factor establishing reasonable suspicion


Input: six or seven months, they purchased approximately one-half of a kilogram of cocaine to split; (2) Bolware and Chisolm also purchased cocaine powder from an individual named “B” on 20 to 40 different occasions, and Bolware estimated that they received over 50 kilograms of cocaine from “B”; and (3) McCloud testified that on approximately 20 occasions from January through June 2006, he would buy 4 or 5 crack cocaine “cookies,” which were approximately 21 to 23 grams each, from Chisolm and Bolware. This evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Chisolm conspired to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base between April 17, 2006, and June 3, 2008. See Hernandez, 433 F.3d at 1333; Thompson, 422 F.3d at 1292 (<HOLDING>). Because the evidence was sufficient for a Holdings: 0: holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction 1: holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute 2: holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine 3: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 4: holding that sufficient evidence supported conspiracy because the government established the existence of a continuing relationship between mr stratton and ms thompson in which mr stratton would supply ms thompson cocaine the bulk of which she would distribute to customers


Input: CURIAM. The State presented insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for possession of alcohol by a minor under section 562.111, Florida Statutes. See State v. Williams, 742 So.2d 509, 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). Even considering the relatively low burden of Holdings: 0: recognizing that evidence regarding the high price the defendant had paid for the substance in question was relevant to show the substance was cocaine 1: holding that possession of a controlled substance is a crime only if the defendant knowingly possesses the substance and has knowledge of the nature of that substance 2: holding that quantity of the controlled substance does not have to be measurable to support a conviction for possession of such controlled substance particularly when the immeasurable amount of the substance is found on an implement used to consume the substance 3: holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance 4: holding to prove possession the state must show that a defendant possessed a certain substance the substance was illegal and he had knowledge of the presence of the substance


Input: reasoning is nonetheless apropos in cases of addiction. Where the State seeks to introduce drug addiction without first establishing a defendant’s identity as the culprit, his drug addiction has no relevance or probative value as to the motive of an otherwise unknown culprit. In other words, without a sufficient identification of the defendant as the intruder, the necessary chain of reasoning breaks and we need not reach the relationship between drug addiction and motive. In the absence of some identification of the defendant as the intruder, his heroin addiction, though introduced to show motive, would necessarily fill in the missing logical gaps that Rule 404(b) requires a prosecutor to fill. See Gould v. State, 579 P.2d 535, 539 (Alaska 1978) (introduction of heroin (Kan. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Adkins v. Com., 96 S.W.3d 779, 783-85, 793 Holdings: 0: holding evidence of defendants prior drug use and heroin addiction admissible to establish defendants motive to commit robbery 1: holding that the defendants prior distribution of crack was admissible to prove that he had intent and knowledge regarding crack found in a gym bag 2: holding crack cocaine addiction admissible to prove motive to kill and rob when accomplice identified defendant and defendants cell mates testified she had admitted her actions 3: holding evidence of defendants gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims but claimed he did not kill them 4: holding rap recordings about dealing cocaine were relevant to show knowledge and motive when the defendant testified he had never purchased or sold cocaine


Input: argue that they cannot be exempt even though salaried because AEP requires them to account for at least 40 hours of work each week and to make up for partial-day absence either by working extra hours or by taking vacation time or paid time off. An employer may require exempt salaried employees to make up for time missed from work due to personal business. It is only when an employer actually deducts from an employee’s paycheck that the employee is ineligible for the exemption. See, e.g., Cowart v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 213 F.3d 261, 265-66 (5th Cir.2000) (finding that employees who were required to make up personal time off and suffered no salary deductions for the lost time were paid on a salary basis); Haywood v. North Amer. Van Lines, Inc., 121 F.3d 1066, 1070 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Because the planners concede that AEP has not Holdings: 0: holding that provisions protecting classified service employees from administrative demotion or discipline did not preclude reclassification of employees and warning against misinterpretation of scope of protections afforded to employees where protections apply only to administrative actions such as the promotion or discipline of employees they do not limit or preclude the city councils legislative authority to make necessary policy and budget decisions they do not somehow override the express authority for the city councils actions  and thus they do not create a constitutionallyprotected property interest that prohibits the city council from passing the ordinance at issue in this case 1: holding that the first amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employees expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities 2: holding that the regulations prohibit only monetary discipline of exempt employees 3: recognizing right of this court to regulate and discipline members of the bar 4: holding that threatening to discipline employees for not reporting union solicitation violated  8a1


Input: whether to order the prisoner’s removal in this category of cases, ‘it follows that such a case may proceed without attendance by the prisoner-parent.’ ” (In re Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 599.) Counsel could have rightly perceived that the court was not under a mandatory obligation to order father’s removal, and thus any objection to proceeding without him would have been futile. 2. Findmg of Intent to Abandon Under Section 7822 Father also contends the trial court erred because it could not terminate his parental rights without a finding of intent to abandon under section 7822. Father argues that, without this finding, there was no showing of parental unfitness as required by Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 849 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216] (Kelsey S.) (<HOLDING>). As we explain in part 1. of the Discussion, Holdings: 0: holding that due process allows parental rights to be terminated only upon clear and convincing evidence of unfitness 1: holding due process was violated by the automatic rejection of an unwed fathers custodial relationship without granting the father opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent 2: holding that a father who impregnated his childs mother in the usual and customary manner after signing a preconception agreement to forego parental responsibilities was not merely a sperm donor and thus was not statutorily bound to give away his parental rights 3: holding that petitioner could maintain his action seeking parental rights and responsibilities under rsa chapter 461a notwithstanding his lack of biological relationship to the child so long as he alleges sufficient facts to establish his status as a parent by other means 4: holding that if an unwed father promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities  emotional financial and otherwise  his federal constitutional right to due process prohibits the termination of his parental relationship absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent


Input: F.3d at 217 — 18 (classifying the “radio dispatch tape made during defendant’s arrest” as potentially useful evidence). Generett has given us no reason why the LeSabre or its contents plainly would exculpate him and indeed he has not even cited Brady v. Maryland in his brief to this court. Generett fares no better under the “potentially exculpatory evidence” test. Most importantly, he has given us no reason to believe that the government officials acted in bad faith by auctioning off the LeSabre in this case. The record reveals no evidence of a “calculated effort to circumvent [Brady’s] disclosure requirements” or “official animus” or a “conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488,104 S.Ct. 2528; Young-blood, 488 U.S. at 58; Jobson, 102 F.3d at 218 (<HOLDING>); cf. Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 580 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that instruction was not supported by the evidence and was properly refused where the defendant never seriously argued that the police exercised bad faith in failing to preserve evidence and the police gave a reasonable explanation 1: recognizing that even where the plaintiff presents evidence of selective treatment failure to demonstrate malice or bad faith requires dismissal of the claim 2: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort 3: holding that officers were not justified in conducting a protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest despite the defendants alleged involvement with narcotics and possession of weapons because the defendant did not resist and there was no noise or other evidence suggesting anyone else was present in the house 4: holding that despite the governments dilatory response to defendants discovery requests the government did not act in bad faith because there is no evidence that anyone  suspected that the tape was exculpatory and the tape was erased not as a result of malice but routine police department policy


Input: conspiracy of which he was a part. In affirming the trial court’s conviction, we held that the defendant’s actual participation [in the conspiracy] (answering telephone, taking drug orders and referring buyers to the independent contractors, delivering and selling drugs, as well as occasionally picking up drug shipments and preparing packages for sale) in [the] drug trafficking conspiracy went well beyond that of a simple buyer-seller relationship. The full activities of the drug conspiracy were not only reasonably foreseeable to [the defendant], but were also performed in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity and advanced an objective within the scope of the conspiracy that he joined. Id. at 1327. See also United States v. Magana, 118 F.3d 1173, 1206 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In the ease under consideration, Gray-Bey’s Holdings: 0: holding defendant responsible for conspiracys entire drug quantity where defendant played managerial role in the conspiracy coordinated drug distribution and shared in conspiracys profits 1: holding defendant responsible for conspiracys entire drug quantity where defendant played managerial role in conspiracy coordinated drug distribution and shared in conspiracys profits 2: holding that the sentencing court erred in failing to make a factual determination as to the amount of drugs attributable to the defendant after his participation in the charged conspiracy 3: holding that defendant is liable for entire quantity of drugs attributable to conspiracy in circumstances where defendant is one of conspiracys central figures 4: holding that in order for a trial court to determine which of the three graduated penalty subsections of 21 usc  841b applies to defendants convicted of a  846 drug conspiracy the jury must be instructed to determine the threshold quantity of drugs attributable to each conspiracy defendant on trial


Input: a veteran-friendly procedure that would enable accrued-benefits beneficiaries to more readily substitute, and that a more restrictive procedure for requesting substitution may thwart Congress’s objectives in enacting section 5121 A. Nevertheless, although the Secretary notified Mrs. Reliford that she could waive the right to submit additional evidence, he did not notify her that she could waive substitution, in contravention of his policy. Thus, the Court holds that the Board erred by failing to follow the Secretary’s own established procedures. See Morton, supra. The Court is cognizant of its statutory duty to take due account of the rule of prejudicial error. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) (requiring the Court to “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error”); Shinseki v. 06 (2005) (<HOLDING>). These matters are to be provided expeditious Holdings: 0: recognizing that the necessary inquiry  is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest 1: holding that the existence of our jurisdiction turns on whether the claim was reasonably raised to the board and remanding for determination of whether the claim was reasonably raised when there was an evidentiary factual basis therefor 2: holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 3: holding that regarded as claim was reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability 4: holding that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the board had erred in finding that certain picketing was lawful because no party had raised the issue to the board either during the initial proceedings or on motion for reconsideration