Input: claims, and clarify the contours of controversies for cases that are ultimately brou did not pursue his administrative remedies in the seventeen days he had remaining after Suarez denied him the form. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a) (stating that the deadline for filing a step two grievance form is twenty days after the even RIOR TO FILING A CLAIM UNDER THE FTCA Even if the Court construes Indelicato’s complaint as asserting a claim under the FTCA, the Court finds that he has failed to adequately plead such a claim. To file a claim under the FTCA, a claimant must first present the claim to the appropriate federal agency, in this case the BOP, and receive a written denial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Pender v. United States, 63 F.Supp.2d 473, Holdings: 0: holding that the ftca bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies 1: holding that a claimants claim is barred when administrative remedies that are clearly required under an erisa plan are not exhausted 2: holding that habeas corpus petitions are premature until administrative remedies have been exhausted 3: holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court 4: holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court


Input: these decisions and their reasoning. The sex discrimination provisions of Title VII and the ICRA were enacted to stop the perpetuation of sexist or chauvinistic attitudes in employment which significantly affect employment opportunities. Title VII and the ICRA were not meant to prohibit employers from instituting personal grooming codes which have a de minimis affect on employment. Applying these principles to Fareway’s unwritten personal grooming code, we conclude this grooming code did not constitute discrimination based on sex within the meaning of Title VII or the ICRA. This grooming code was never intended to be covered by Title VII’s or ICRA’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex. See Kleinsorge v. Eyeland Corp., 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1601 (E.D.Pa.2000) (<HOLDING>); Capaldo v. Pan Am. Fed. Credit Union, 43 Holdings: 0: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 1: holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability 2: holding that title vii prohibits discrimination based on any race including caucasian 3: holding personal grooming code which allows females to wear earrings but prohibits men from wearing earrings does not constitute a violation of title vii 4: holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine


Input: of that Constitutional doctrine and allows the political branches to set the parameters of the United States’ dealings with Ecuador. Ecuador’s proper recourse, therefore, is not in the courts but rather in negotiating a tax treaty with our political branches or adjudicating and enforcing these claims within its own territory. D. Civil vs. Criminal RICO — Is there a Distinction? Ecuador urges this Court to follow two criminal RICO cases from the Second Circuit, where it held abstention under the revenue rule improper. See generally United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir.1997); United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158 (2d Cir.2000). In Trapito and Pierce, the Second Circuit held the revenue rule did not bar adjudication of a criminal RICO prosecution. See Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 552 (<HOLDING>); Pierce, 224 F.3d at 167-68 (reversing Holdings: 0: holding that both federal and state tax statutes are revenue production laws and not enacted for plaintiffs benefit 1: holding that revenue rule did not bar prosecution of a money laundering scheme to defraud the canadian government of tax revenue 2: holding that it is apparent that this act is not a revenue bill within the contemplation of said section of the constitution fpr the reason that the revenue to be derived therefrom is merely an incident to the main object of the bill and that its general purpose was not that of raising revenue id  5 3: holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue 4: holding that charge of money laundering need not satisfy rule 9b


Input: Stat. § 14-32.1(a), does not make the definition an essential element of the crime pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.1(e). Therefore, we reject Defendant’s argument that it is not sufficient for the indictment to “merely state that the victim was ‘handicapped.’ ” Furthermore, the indictment provided Defendant with enough information to prepare a defense for the offense of felony assault on a handicapped person. See Leonard, _ N.C. App. at _, 711 S.E.2d at 873 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the indictment was not sufficient because the indictment tracked the relevant language of the statute, listed “the essential elements of the offense[,]” and provided the defendant “with enough information to prepare a defense”); State v. Crisp, 126 N.C. App. 30, 36, 483 S.E.2d 462, 466 (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 346 Holdings: 0: holding that even when a jury instruction is defective such a defect is cured when the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that although the indictment did not track the exact language of the statute the indictment when read as a whole sufficiently stated facts which support every element of the crime charged and apprised defendant of the specific charge against him 2: holdingthat an error in instructing the jury that an offense could be committed by a statutory method not charged in the indictment is cured where  the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt  citation omitted 3: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense 4: holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment


Input: incentive to dispute invalid claims when it would be reimbursed by the insured pursuant to the retrospective premium payment plan. 110 S.W.3d at 97. The court specifically rejected this argument relative to the insured’s negligence action — not breach-of-contract. See id,, at 89-90, 97. But, obviously, this argument did not sway the court when rejecting both causes of action as a matter of law. See id. at 89-90. We acknowledge a retrospective premium payment plan is not the same as a deductible. Nevertheless, the fact the insured might incur financial loss if the insurer paid an invalid claim did not persuade the court to disregard the right-to-settle provision or impose an extra-contractual duty not recognized under Texas law. See id. at 97; see also Dear, 947 S.W.2d at 912, 913-15 (<HOLDING>). In fact, a Texas court has addressed, albeit Holdings: 0: holding insured had no viable breachofcontract or negligence theories of recovery for liability insurers improper handling and settlement of thirdparty claim although he complained its actions caused him loss of business and increased costs for professional liability insurance because he was bound by terms of policy he purchased including provision vesting insurer with right to settle any claim 1: holding that insurers assurances that it would pay for repairs including its attempt to settle with a thirdparty did not waive right to deny coverage 2: holding that insured was not required to suffer an excess judgment before it could sue its excess insurer and primary insurer for bad faith failure to settle where it was alleged the insurers arbitrarily refused to settle and insured was required to pay 1 million in settlement to avoid near certainty of larger judgment that would exceed all available coverage 3: holding insured relinquished right to sue general liability insurer for breach of contract relative to insurers allegedly improper handling and payment of thirdparty claim by purchasing policy which gave insurer right to settle 4: holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer


Input: the parties,” Pungitore, 965 F.Supp. at 673 n. 1, or had any legal consequences independent of its substantive content. Compare United States v. Montana, 199 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir.1999) (explaining difference between verbal acts such as “a promise, offer, or demand,” which “commit the speaker to a course of action,” and hearsay statements, which “narrate, describe, or otherwise convey information, and so are judged by their truth value”) (emphasis added), and Trepel v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 194 F.3d 708, 717 (6th Cir.1999) (upholding exclusion of statement as hearsay where statement “was not an offer to sell” but rather, a declaration of the price range the owner “would be willing to take ... should someone make an offer to buy”); with Puma v. Sullivan, 746 A.2d 871, 874-76 (D.C.2000) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not abuse its Holdings: 0: holding that the district court erred in ruling that a plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence to survive summary judgment on its discrimination claim where the district court had simply discounted plaintiffs admissible evidence as less probative than defendants 1: holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment 2: holding that oral statement containing an offer which statements proponents had accepted was admissible for consideration on summary judgment as a verbal act 3: holding that when the courts oral statements in the plea colloquy conflict with the written agreement the courts oral statements control 4: holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment


Input: (2006). The Minnesota Supreme Court has generally “agreed with the [United States] Supreme Court that most constitutional errors can be harmless.” State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 252 (Minn.2005) (quotation omitted); see State v. Shoen, 598 N.W.2d 370, 376 (Minn.1999) (stating that the United States Supreme Court has applied harmless-error analysis even to errors deemed presumptively prejudicial, such as a court official’s improper statements about the merits of a case in front of the jury). The Minnesota Supreme Court has also applied the structural-error analysis set forth in Fulminante, Neder, and Recuenco to determine that certain errors constitute structural errors’requiring automatic reversal without regard to the evidence presented. See, e.g., State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 253 (<HOLDING>); State v. Moore, 699 N.W.2d 733, 737-38 Holdings: 0: holding that a jury instruction directing the verdict on one element deprived defendant of the right to a jury determination on every element of the charged offense and thus constituted structural error 1: holding that the judges entry into the jury room constituted reversible error 2: holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report 3: holding that the judges independent investigation into a factual assertion and revelation of the results of that investigation to counsel deprived defendant of his right to an impartial judge and finder of fact and thus constituted structural error 4: holding that a new york statute allowing judges in a criminal bench trial to deny counsel the opportunity to make a closing argument deprived defendant of his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel


Input: could make, and is based instead on the specialized knowledge obtained through experience in the field,” must comply with Rule 702 as expert testimony. United States v. Jones, 739 F.3d 364, 369 (7th Cir.2014). But that .was not the sort of testimony offered here. Dermenchyan’s and Redman’s testi mony contained rudimentary statements about supply and demand, concepts that are relatively easy to grasp. As traders, the witnesses had to speak about these concepts in order to describe their own observations about market activity at specific points in time. Because the statements were based on their personal knowledge and were not offered as opinions based on their years of expertise, the statements complied with Rule 701. See, United States v. Cheek, 740 F.3d 440, 447-48 (7th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). Dermenchyan and Redman also made statements Holdings: 0: holding that when a law enforcement officer testifies using technical terms but based on his personal knowledge of a relevant investigation the officer testifies as a lay witness 1: holding that agent who interpreted the conversations based on personal knowledge as opposed to his general involvement in the investigation gave permissible lay witness testimony 2: holding that a witnesss testimony is incredible as a matter of law if the witness testifies as to facts that the witness could not have possibly observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature 3: holding that defendants remarks cannot be a statement for jencks act purposes when the agent testifies as a government witness because it does not represent the agents own words 4: holding that lay opinion testimony on the technical subject of asbestos in the workplace was inadmissible when the witness failed to demonstrate sufficient personal experience or technical knowledge to qualify him to offer an opinion


Input: just as the act of walking precludes one from running. For this reason, Juarez’s affidavit suffices to create a disputed issue of fact. A disputed issue only warrants an evi-dentiary hearing, however, “if the difference in facts is material, that is, only if the disputed fact makes a difference in the outcome.” United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1385 (7th Cir.1991). An eviden-tiary hearing was not necessary in this case because it is undisputed that the officers were justified in conducting a Terry stop whether Juarez was walking or running. While Juarez challenged this conclusion in his brief, his counsel conceded at argument that the facts in the affidavit provided reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Because no disputed issue of material fact Holdings: 0: holding that officers may consistent with the fourth amendment conduct a brief investigatory stop when they have a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot 1: recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot 2: holding reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to support the investigatory stop of a vehicle in view of the time of day and the officers prior knowledge of reports of criminal activity in the area 3: holding that absent probable cause to arrest a police officer may approach an individual to conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal conduct is afoot 4: holding that an officer  may detain a person in order to determine identity and circumstance when that officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot


Input: regarding all partnership issues. The order determined the judgment amount that Kenneth owed Gregory. Proceeds from the real estate and equipment sales were to be used to adjust the accounts between the brothers. The only details that remained were those that were required to enforce the already decided issues, i.e., the realty and personalty sales. The court also needed to make a determination regarding Gregory’s request for prejudgment interest. In our view, the order disposed of the rights of the parties and was final and appealable as nothing remained for the trial court to do except implement its order. Because Kenneth did not appeal from that order within 30 days, he is precluded from appealing those issues now. See McCaffrey v. Nauman, 204 Ill. App. 3d 761, 562 N.E.2d 628 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Kenneth cites McCaffrey v. Nauman, 204 Ill. Holdings: 0: holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay 1: holding that the requirement that an alien appeal a removal order within 30 days is jurisdictional 2: holding that the appeal was properly before the court where the appellant appealed from an order amending a prior order without appealing from the prior order 3: holding that an order that finally determines the rights of the parties in a partnership dissolution must be appealed within 30 days 4: recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees


Input: to occur in the environmental design branch. See PL’s Ex. 20 at ¶ 3. Meyers stated that “if there is a valid reason for not seriously considering Mr. Vernon’s qualification for an executive level position ..., I was unable to uncover it.” See id. at ¶ 8. Meyers also noted that staff with less tenure and fewer related credentials than Vernon has been promoted to more senior positions at a faster rate. See id. at ¶ 9. He pointed out that Rosenberg, who started working for Port Authority later than Vernon and had less credentials, was promoted more quickly than Vernon. See Meyers Oct. Dep. at 47. Most importantly, Meyers wrote that Krishner claimed that “he preferred to promote younger staff.” See Pl.’s Ex. 20 at ¶ 5; Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the position was not filled by Holdings: 0: holding that discriminatory remarks made nearly a year before the challenged employment decision could not support an inference of discrimination 1: holding that remarks made by decisionmakers could be viewed as reflecting discriminatory animus 2: holding that repeated remarks about need to bring in new blood or young blood by one of the decisionmakers were not stray remarks and may permit inference of discrimination 3: holding that  ambiguous remarks tending to suggest animus based on age are insufficient standing alone to prove an employers discriminatory intent  4: holding that plaintiff may prove discriminatory motive by presenting evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged retaliatory attitude


Input: accordance with the foregoing understandings and the terms in the General Conditions, Specifications and Agreement of the Contract * * * and all supplements thereto.” Id. at 298. The broad language in the McGrath subcontract binding the subcontractor to “General Conditions, Specifications and Agreement of the Contract” has no parallel in the subcontract between plaintiff and Bakke. Mindful that we may not read into contracts provisions that the parties themselves have not included, Thompson v. Bolliger, Hampton & Tarlow, 118 Or App 700, 710, 849 P2d 526, rev den 317 Or 163 (1993), we decline to read into Bakke’s purchase order a broader incorporation by reference than is apparent on the face of the document. Accord Edward E. Morgan Co. v. United States, 230 F2d 896, 903 (5th Cir 1956) (<HOLDING>); John W. Johnson, Inc. v. Basic Construction Holdings: 0: holding that prime contractor plaintiffs in an interpleader action could not press arbitration for a counterclaim by a subcontractor 1: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 2: holding that subcontract requirement that work    be performed in accordance with specifications in prime contract meant that prime contract governed the manner of the performance of the work not    the basis for computing the amount to be paid the subcontractor 3: holding that only provisions relating to work specifications and performance were incorporated into the subcontract because the relevant clauses limited the incorporation of the terms insofar as they relate  to the work undertaken herein 4: holding that prime contractor must prove that it is liable to the subcontractor before it can assert a passthrough claim


Input: In analyzing whether Section 346a precludes judicial review under the APA, we first note that the FDCA is unique in that it only commits certain specific agency actions to appellate court review. Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 888 n. 61 (D.C.Cir.1987). Because the FDCA contains no “single, overarching provision governing judicial review” — instead subjecting “discrete agency actions” to specialized review provisions — actions taken under sections silent as to appellate review are “directly reviewable in a district court under some appropriate head of jurisdiction, for courts of appeals have only such jurisdiction as Congress has chosen to confer upon them.” Id.; see also Alabama Tissue Ctr. v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir.1992); Nader v. EPA, 859 F.2d 747, 754 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Despite the absence of an overarching Holdings: 0: holding epas rejection of rulemaking petition was not an order appealable to the court of appeals because the sections permitting appellate review allowed such review only of orders issued under subsections not implicated in the litigation 1: holding that such an order is not sufficiently final to be suitable for appellate review 2: holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review 3: holding that an appellate court may not exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal district court order where the merits of the nonfinal order are not inextricably intertwined with the properly appealed collateral order or where review of the former is not necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter 4: holding that noncriminal aliens could seek review of the agencys orders through either a petition for review or a  2241 petition


Input: spouse of the person aggrieved. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 905 F.Supp. 141 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (finding that the ADA along with the New York State Human Rights Law and a parallel New York city ordinance did not allow for loss-of-consortium claims); Miller v. CBC Cos., Inc., 908 F.Supp. 1054 (D.N.H.1995) (allowing loss-of-consortium claims ancillary to state law tort claims to stand, but holding that ”[t]he spouse of an alleged federal civil rights victim [bringing ADA and Title VII claims] is not permitted an ancillary cause of action for loss of consortium” (citations omitted)); Reed v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 704 F.Supp. 170 (E.D.Wis.1989) (ADEA preempted spouse’s loss-of-consortium claim). But see Kulling v. Grinders for Indus., Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 828 (E.D.Mich.2000) (<HOLDING>). It appears that none of the Circuit Courts of Holdings: 0: holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award 1: holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse 2: holding no individual liability under the adea 3: holding that the adea itself did not provide for the recovery of damages under theories of wrongful death or loss of consortium but that the adea did not preempt state wrongfuldeath or lossofconsortium claims 4: recognizing loss of consortium claims


Input: If the trial discloses that the services were not formally ordered, then the discussion herein concerning constructive ordering of services is applicable. 12 . See United Artists Payphone Corp. v. New York Tel. Co., 8 FCC Rcd 5563 (1993); see also AT & T v. City of New York, 83 F.3d 549 (2d Cir.1996); AT & T Corp. v. Community Health Group, 931 F.Supp. 719 (S.D.Cal.1995); In re Access Charge Reform, 14 FCC Rcd 14221 (1999). 13 . See also City of New York, 83 F.3d at 553 (relying on United Artists to hold that a party can become a " ‘customer,’ in one of two ways: (1) by affirmatively ordering the service ... or (2) by constructively ordering [service] and creating an 'inadvertent carrier-customer relationship ....' ”). 14 . See US Wats, Inc. v. AT & T Co., 1994 WL 116009, at *5 (<HOLDING>). 15 . While not directly stating so, AT & T Holdings: 0: holding that filedrate doctrine does not apply when adjudication of the plaintiffs claim will not result in rate discrimination nor embroil the court in a dispute over reasonableness of charges 1: holding that the doctrine does not apply in such circumstancesi 2: holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims because the court may review neither criminal matters nor the decisions of district courts 3: holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine 4: holding the same for the other separate rate plaintiffs in this action


Input: considered the content, form and context of the Plaintiffs’ speech and held the Plaintiffs’ speech is constitutionally protected because it was in response to Superinten dent Brezina’s request for an update on the implementation of the improvement plan. The Plaintiffs were charged with this duty as members of the ICC and the SBDM committees. To hold that the Plaintiffs’ speech is not protected is to require teachers to sit on their hands, abandoning their legislatively created duties as committee members, allowing the school environment to deteriorate to an even more deplorable level in order to keep their jobs. Additionally, we note that while our statement in Noyola v. Texas Dep’t of Human Resources, 846 F.2d 1021, 1026 (5th Cir.1988) still reflects the law of this circ r.1992) (<HOLDING>). JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissents from Holdings: 0: holding the failure of defendants to claim any disruption in workplace resulting from speech is fatal to his claim of qualified immunity 1: holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that speech was public concern 2: holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision 3: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 4: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit


Input: oath. Such a prior statement is substantive evidence. D.C.Code § 14-102(b) (2001). As we understand the record, however, the trial court initially admitted the video only to impeach D.J.’s credibility and show her demeanor at the CAC. It later allowed the tape to be treated as substantive evidence because, after the vid 3d 1, 289 P.3d 791, 828 (2012) (comparing refusal to testify to claimed memory loss and holding that “a witness’s refusal to answer may be materially inconsistent with prior statements, exposing the witness to impeachment”). In contrast, some courts have reasoned that a witness’s refusal to testify is unlike a claim of memory loss because there is no current testimony to compare with the pri- or statement. See Tyler v. State, 342 Md. 766, 679 A.2d 1127, 1132 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Barksdale v. State, 265 Ga. 9, 453 S.E.2d 2, Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand 1: holding that the effect of witnesss refusal to testify was virtually the same as if he had not physically taken the witness stand and if he had not taken the stand his prior testimony could not be deemed inconsistent  2: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case 3: recognizing that a witness may claim the privilege if his new testimony might suggest that he had perjured himself in testifying on the same subject at a prior proceeding 4: holding that the defendants prior conviction referenced in his presentence report could be taken as admitted because he had made no objection to the facts in his report


Input: Co v Long, 588 F2d 538, 541 (CA 6, 1978); Nix v Spector Freight Sys, Inc, 264 F2d 875, 877 (CA 3, 1959). 62 As previously noted, one of the fundamental purposes of the CLA is to protect contractors, workers, and suppliers by providing a method to secure payment for their labor and materials. 63 The dissent frets that allowing attorney fees when a party prevails on the related contract action will open the floodgates to claims for attorney fees under § 118(2) any time a party prevails on other, unspecified, ancillary claims. However, it is hard to imagine other ancillary claims bearing as close a relationship as the lien foreclosure and underlying contract claims. The plain language of the CLA contemplates that a party may achieve its main objective thro 3 Wy 31, ¶ 9; 64 P3d 739 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Murphy v Nat’l Union Fire Ins Co, 438 Mass Holdings: 0: holding continuing controversy not moot 1: holding that payment does not moot a confirmation request 2: holding that a trial court may deny a confirmation motion when satisfaction has rendered the controversy moot 3: holding that dismissal for failure to prosecute rendered moot any prior ruling of the district court 4: holding a case becomes moot when a ruling will have no practical effect upon the existing controversy


Input: that makes the injury possible.’” Id. (quoting Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 343). Assuming without deciding that the failure properly to secure Mark within the car can be equated with the car’s overall use to restrain and to transport him, we hold that his injury did not arise from those uses. The actual cause of Mark’s death was his deliberate decision to flee into freeway traffic and a separate car’s hitting him there; the failure to secure Mark in the first place merely furnished the condition that made it possible for him to escape and then run into oncoming traffic. There is thus no “direct nexus” between the failure properly to secure Mark in the car and the impact causing his death. See City of Kemah v. Vela, 149 S.W.3d 199, 204 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); compare Gutierrez, 54 S.W.3d at 866 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that during a routine traffic stop it is reasonable for an officer to search the driver for weapons before placing the driver in a patrol car if placing the driver in the patrol car during the investigation prevents officers or the driver from being subjected to a dangerous condition and placing the driver in the patrol car is the least intrusive means to avoid the dangerous condition 1: holding mr contrisciane was occupying his insured vehicle when he was struck and killed by an uninsured vehicle after leaving his car to walk over to patrol car with his drivers information as directed by police officer 2: holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his fourth amendment rights by requiring him to get back in his car before questioning him 3: holding that officers exiting and leaving patrol car running beside jail near jail escapee who then commandeered car was use of vehicle within meaning of ttcas motorvehicle waiver 4: holding that injury of plaintiff  who was detained in negligently parked patrol car that along with another patrol car was struck by thirdparty vehicle  did not arise out of use or operation of patrol car within meaning of ttcas motorvehicle waiver rather patrol car merely furnished condition that made injury possible


Input: in ordering a new punishment trial. The Code of Criminal Procedure gives a trial judge broad discretion in im posing conditions of community supervision. See Tex.Crim. PROc.Code Ann. art. 42.12, § 11(a) (Vernon Supp.2000) (“The judge may impose any reasonable condition that is designed to protect or restore the community, protect or restore the victim, or punish, rehabilitate, or reform the defendant”). Nevertheless, where a trial judge imposes an “invalid” condition, “the proper remedy is to reform the judgment of conviction by deleting the condition.” Ex parte Pena, 789 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (deleting condition where trial judge was without lawful authority to impose jail time as condition of probation); see also Ex parte Gingell, 842 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>); Milligan v. State, 465 S.W.2d 157, 158-59 Holdings: 0: recognizing that before a special condition of probation may be imposed there must be an oral pronouncement of the condition at sentencing 1: holding that a court has no power to impose jail time as a condition of a deferred sentence 2: holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition and deleting the provision as a condition of applicants deferred adjudication probation 3: holding electronic home monitoring is not time spent in custody because there is a difference in restrictions between electronic home monitoring and jail 4: holding that trial judge was not authorized to impose jail time as condition of probation and deleting the 90 day jail penalty


Input: at issue is a person’s “right to cut off questioning.” Id., at 474 [86 S.Ct. at 1627]. Through the exercise of his option to terminate questioning he can control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation. The requirement that law enforcement authorities must respect a person’s exercise of that option counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting. We therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda, on whether his “right to cut off questioning” was “scrupulously honored.” Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04, 96 S.Ct. 321 (footnote omitted). Compare Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Appellant maintains that Mosley is Holdings: 0: holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police 1: holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications 2: holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police 3: holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available  unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police 4: holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police


Input: Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir.1989) (stating that automatic stay seeks “to protect the bankrupt’s estate from being eaten away by creditors’ lawsuits and seizures of property before the trustee has had a chance to marshal the estate’s assets and distribute them equitably among the creditors”). To effectuate these congressional purposes, section 362(a) generally must be construed broadly. See 2 Collier on BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.04 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1994) (“The stay of section 362 is extremely broad in scope and ... should apply to almost any type of formal or informal action against the debtor or the property of the estate.”); see also Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 504, 106 S.Ct. 755, 761, 88 L.Ed.2d 859 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Its breadth is not unlimited, however. As the Holdings: 0: holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay 1: holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void 2: recognizing that in enacting  362 in 1978 congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay 3: holding that refusal to provide chapter 7 debtor transcript because of default on student loan was a violation of the automatic stay based on the plain language of 11 usc  362 4: recognizing fdcpa claim for violation of bankruptcy codes automatic stay provision 11 usc  362 which explicitly provides private cause of action


Input: because the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are substantial.” Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981)); see Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (stating that legitimate law enforcement interests supporting detention include (1) “preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found,” (2) “minimizing the risk of harm to the officers,” and (3) the “orderly completion of the search,” which “may be facilitated if the occupants of the premises .are present”); see also Barrera v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Civil No. 07-3879, 2009 WL 825787, at *5 (D.Minn. Mar. 27, 2009) (<HOLDING>). “An officer’s authority to detain incident to Holdings: 0: holding that agents were allowed to seize and question occupants of business while executing search warrant for illegal aliens 1: holding that officers may detain the occupants of a vehicle while executing a search warrant 2: holding that officers may detain the occupants of a house while executing a search warrant 3: holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted 4: holding that it is permissible under the fourth amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence


Input: challenged by Plaintiff. Plaintiff relies instead on a statistical analysis of a company-wide data pool and makes no attempt to narrow the data pool to the locations in which she worked or the positions which she challenges. As this Court noted in the order denying class certification, the probative value of Plaintiffs statistical evidence is therefore highly questionable, in significant part due to the treatment of factors such as experience, education, and specific promotion processes. Cooper v. Southern Company, 205 F.R.D. 596, 613-14 (N.D.Ga.2001). The analytical deficiencies of Plaintiffs statistics diminish the probative value of this evidence such that it cannot by itself support a claim of disparate treatment. See Brown v. American Honda Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 Holdings: 0: holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext 1: holding reliance on statistical evidence of inexorable zero was sufficient to establish prima facie case notwithstanding plaintiffs failure to reference appropriate workpool 2: holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 3: holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons 4: holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position


Input: Court is “mindful of the Supreme Court’s repeated suggestion that HHS interpretations, in particular, should receive more respect than the mine-run of agency interpretations.” Landers, 545 F.3d at 107 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994)); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43, 101 S.Ct. 2633, 69 L.Ed.2d 460 (1981). In fact, “in cases such as those involving Medicare or Medicaid, in which CMS, ‘a highly expert agency[,] administers a large complex regulatory scheme in cooperation with many other institutional actors, the various possible standards for deference’ — namely, Chevron and Skidmore — ‘begin to converge.’ ” Landers, 545 F.3d at 107 (quoting Cmty. Health Ctr. v. Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>)). The Court additionally notes that Holdings: 0: holding ceq regulations entitled to substantial deference 1: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 2: recognizing the considerable deference afforded to regulations concerning medicare 3: holding regulations entitled to chevron deference 4: holding that the secretary is not entitled to deference when construing the acts implementing regulations


Input: 604 N.W.2d 43, 48 (Iowa 1999). For this reason, we have viewed the effect of promissory estoppel to imply a contract in law based on detrimental reliance. Id. However, other principles of contract law can conflict with the doctrine of promissory estoppel, such as the requirement of a writing for some types of contracts under the statute of frauds, and Miller opened the door to expand the promissory estoppel doctrine beyond its role as a substitute for consideration. Thus, promissory estoppel is not only a substitute for consideration, but is also recognized as an exception to the statute of frauds even in cases where the promise may be supported by consideration. See Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc., 274 N.W.2d at 343; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139 cmt. b, at 355 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Like part performance, it focuses on Holdings: 0: holding appellants deposition testimony that he believed his oral contract would exist for another eight to ten years was unenforceable pursuant to statute of frauds 1: recognizing circumstances that justify enforcement of a promise unenforceable under the statute of frauds 2: holding that the statute of frauds operates even when there has been reliance on a promise 3: holding that the statute of frauds bars a breach of contract claim based on an oral agreement to enter a future employment contract that would need to meet the statute of frauds 4: holding that a parol modification of a lease having two years to run reducing the amount of rent was unenforceable under the statute of frauds


Input: violated public policy “in that, termination of any employment based on the employee’s status as a victim of domestic violence tends to be injurious to the public and against the public good.” On 30 October 2002, the trial court entered an order granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, from which Plaintiff appealed. The issue on appeal is whether Plaintiff’s complaint states a valid claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be based, and we affirm the order of the trial court. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Considine , 528 S.E.2d 368, 370 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The complaint filed in the instant case does Holdings: 0: holding a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is not available where the employee has an existing statutory remedy 1: holding that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to state a claim for wrongful discharge where he alleged he was discharged due to his political affiliation and activities 2: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 3: holding the complaint stated a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where the employee was discharged for refusing to comply with his employers demand that he continue to operate a commercial vehicle for periods of time that violated federal regulations 4: recognizing claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where the employee alleged he was handicapped and that his employer discharged him because of his handicap in violation of nc gen stat  1434222


Input: at 671. 31 5 USC 552(b)(6) exempts “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy 32 493 US 182; 110 S Ct 577; 107 L Ed 2d 571 (1990). 33 Id. at 200-201. 34 Id. 35 MCL 15.232(c); MSA 14.1801(2)(c); Swickard, n 14 supra at 544. 36 Tobin, n 2 supra at 668-669. 37 Albro v Allen, 434 Mich 271, 286; 454 NW2d 85 (1990). 38 Swickard, n 14 supra at 556. 39 MCL 15.243(l)(a); MSA 4.1801(13)(l)(a). 40 MCL 15.232(c); MSA 4.1801(2)(c). 41 401 Mich 80, 95; 257 NW2d 522 (1977). 42 MCL 15.243(l)(a); MSA 4.1801(13)(l)(a); Swickard, n 14 supra at 546-547; State Employees Ass’n v Dep’t of Management & Budget, 428 Mich 104, 123; 404 NW2d 606 (1987); Kestenbaum, n 20 supra at 528, n 7. 43 See Booth, n 5 supra at 234 (<HOLDING>). 44 See Tobin, n 2 supra at 677-678. 45 Holdings: 0: holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively 1: holding that in a personal injury suit the timely notice requirement does not apply  2: holding that title ii does not apply to the states 3: holding that subsection 13la does not apply if the information is not of a personal nature 4: holding that  1447c does not apply to counsel


Input: similar to those of the plaintiff. See id. at 1265-67; see also G-Force Entertainment, Inc. v. G-Force Partners, Inc., 2000 WL 1346699 *2, No. 00-372 (M.D.Fla., Aug. 23, 2000) (“The use of another’s unregistered, i.e., common law, trademark, can constitute a violation of ... the Lanham Act where the alleged unregistered trademarks used by the plaintiff are so associated with its services that the use of the same or similar marks by another company constitutes a false representation that its goods came from the same source.”). All of the circuits that have analyzed whether an item in the public domain could be subject to a claim for reverse palming off have reached the same result. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found’n Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1241-42 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 Holdings: 0: holding that defendant who had copied plaintiffs swath was not liable for reverse palming off where it represented to public that its swaths were interchangeable with those of plaintiff 1: holding that plaintiff had not stated an equal protection claim where plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant treated him differently from anyone else who both had problems with alcohol and had been arrested 2: holding that plaintiff had established reverse palming off claim against defendant who modified plaintiffs seeds after obtaining them in open corn field 3: holding that a plaintiff who had asserted no claim against a thirdparty defendant lacked standing to complain of the courts action with regard to the thirdparty defendant 4: holding that because plaintiffs iied claim is based on the facts that support plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim plaintiffs iied claim did not accrue until the charges against them were dismissed


Input: agreed to withdraw his claim of mental retardation. The PCRA court did not authorize the parties to raise new issues in the written submissions filed in support of the already established claims. Nevertheless, Elliott raised for the first time in his 2010 Supplemental Brief the discrete contention that he was entitled to a new trial pursuant to this Court’s holding in Brooks, ie., that trial counsel is deemed ineffective if he fails to meet with the defendant in person prior to trial. Because Elliott did not include in his PCRA petition the claim alleging trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to meet with him prior to trial, and did not obtain permission to amend his petition to include the same, the issue is waived. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 613 Pa. 510, 35 A.3d 4, 14 (2012) (<HOLDING>); Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(B) (providing that the Holdings: 0: holding that a pcra petitioner may not raise new claims by merely supplementing a pending pcra petition without court authorization because to do so would wrongly subvert the time limitation and serial petition restrictions of the pcra 1: holding that because an untimely pcra petition was premised on claims that were cognizable under the pcra the statutory writ of habeas corpus was unavailable 2: holding no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely pcra petition 3: holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition 4: holding that the constitutional nature of the violations alleged in a pcra petition has no effect on the application of the pcra jurisdictional time bar


Input: of one penalty precludes the execution of the other; and (4) since he has paid the fine, his prison sentence must be vacated. Discussion 1. The Validity of the Sentence The criminal contempt statute provides: A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority ... as— (3) Disobedience ... to its lawful ... order____ 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (emphasis added). Before the SRA was passed, it was clear that a defendant convicted of criminal contempt could not be sentenced to both a fine and imprisonment under section 401. See In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 51, 63 S.Ct. 470, 470, 87 L.Ed. 608 (1943) (construing similarly worded predecessor to section 401); United States v. Sampogne, 533 F.2d 766, 767 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). Our first issue is whether the SRA eliminates Holdings: 0: holding that reasoning of in re bradley applies to section 401 1: holding that lockheed reasoning applies to permit thirdparty actions under the lhwca 2: holding that section 888e applies only to vehicles seized under section 881a4 3: holding that the rule applies for purposes of habeas corpus under section 2254 4: holding that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies to section 101 challenges


Input: Defendants’ Memorandum of Law at 5 (arguing that the City Charter gives the Mayor appointive power over only administrative and not legislative employees). Plaintiff has never alleged that defendant Spencer personally fired him. Instead, plaintiff has alleged that each of the defendants, all political allies, conspired to terminate plaintiff because of their disapproval with Fuentes’ voting record. If the defendants thus acted in concert, it is of little import if, for example, only one of the defendants was formally empowered under the City Charter to fire employees. One need not be vested with the formal power to fire an individual in order to take adverse employment action against them. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 75, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action 1: holding that mere reprimand even if it does not result in actual dismissal can constitute adverse employment action 2: recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually 3: holding that the action taken need not be the substantial equivalent of dismissal in order to constitute adverse employment action 4: holding that termination is an adverse employment action


Input: § 541, Comment a (1976)). 67 . 84 B.R. 653, 657 (9th Cir. BAP 1988). 68 . Id. 69 . See e.g. AT&T Universal Card Serv. v. Burdge (In re Burdge), 198 B.R. 773, 775 (9th Cir. BAP 1996); AT&T Universal Card Serv. v. Reneer (In re Reneer), 208 B.R. 731, 733 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1997); AT&T Universal Card Serv. Corp. v. Sziel (In re Sziel), 206 B.R. 490, 493-94 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1997) Agreement established an annual percentage rate of 16.4 percent, however, the two statements received by Ms. Ellingsworth also disclose the effective annual percentage rate when the cash advance fees are included. On the first statement the effective annual percentage rate was 29.54 percent. PI.Ex. A. 79 . See American Express Travel Related Serv. Co. v. Christensen (In re Christensen), 193 B.R. 863, 867 (N.D.Ill.1996) (<HOLDING>). 80 . Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co. v. Ward Holdings: 0: recognizing statutory credit 1: holding that the defendant maintained a passive website and was therefore not subject to general jurisdiction 2: holding that the mere passive extension of credit does not constitute any form of reliance 3: holding that the mere failure to investigate does not constitute suppression of the evidence 4: holding that the fcras provision that a lender may only use and obtain consumer credit information for the purpose of making a firm offer of credit requires that the lender offer something of value as an extension of credit alone


Input: used; he just had a different opinion. And comparable sales are just that; they are not required to be identical. Estate of Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d at 182 (under comparable sales analysis, appraiser finds data for sales of similar property, makes upward or downward adjustments to sales prices based on differences in subject property); Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Kempwood Plaza Ltd., 186 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (discussing comparable sales method). Moreover, whether an expert’s appraisal is- based on non-comparable sales is an issue for the trial court when determining admissibility of the expert’s opinion concerning the market value of the property. See City of Garland v. Joyce, 462 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco, 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). And here, MISD does not complain about the Holdings: 0: holding that the fact that defendants sales in forum were less than 5 percent of its total sales volume was irrelevant so long as its sales were part of a regular course of dealing and were not isolated or exceptional events 1: holding that exercising general jurisdiction over defendant was improper where its actual sales in florida were a small percentage of the total sales and therefore these sales were de minimis  2: holding opinion testimony of sales should have been excluded because opinion not based on comparable sales 3: recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue 4: holding that sales made to contractor who builds roads for the state are not sales to the state and therefore are not exempt


Input: and “sufficient, equitable, and consistent in application to a class of consumers”); Minn.Stat. § 216B.08 (“The commission is hereby vested with the powers, rights, functions, and ju whether exigent circumstances exist is not a question requiring application of the Commission’s technical knowledge because it is merely a question of basic arithmetic. The dissent’s conclusion is misguided. Minnesota Statutes § 216B.09, subd. 1, requiring the Commission to fix just and reasonable rates, and Minn.Stat. § 216B.16, subd. 3(b), requiring the Commission to determine whether exigent circumstances exist, mandate not only that the Commission identify the factors that impact the setting of rates and the questi t calls for application of the Commi Minn. 442, 448-49, 181 N.W.2d 696, 699-700 (1970) (<HOLDING>). The Commission discussed three “extraordinary Holdings: 0: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public 1: holding that determination of public convenience and necessity by the public service commission was an issue of fact which warranted substantial judicial deference to the factfinding processes of the administrative agency 2: holding the separate classification of one purported administrative convenience claim can never be reasonable and necessary for administrative convenience 3: holding that the convenience of the witnesses has less relevance where the case involved judicial review of an administrative decision 4: holding that a plaintiff was not obligated to apply for a certificate of convenience and necessity and submit to the administrative procedures incident thereto before bringing an action


Input: is accepted by the court, there will not be a further trial on the issue of the defendant’s guilt; and “(viii) The fact that there is no right to appeal unless the defendant has, before entering the plea of guilty, expressly reserved the right to appeal with respect to a particular issue or issues, in which event appellate review shall be limited to a determination of the issue or issues so reserved.” Here, the circuit court failed to employ the safeguards required by Rule 14.4, Ala. R.Crim. P., and Boykin before accepting Clark’s stipulation of guilt. (R. 3-4.) Indeed, there is no indication in the record that Clark understood and voluntarily waived any of his constitutionally protected rights when he entered the “good behavior” stipulation. See Fleming v. State, 972 So.2d at 836 (<HOLDING>). Because this court cannot presume a valid Holdings: 0: holding that when the defendant voluntarily and knowingly pleaded guilty he waived any claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the defendants inculpatory statements 1: holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional 2: holding that the record must establish that a defendants guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made and that the circuit court complied with rule 144 ala rcrim p 3: holding that the defendants guilty plea was entered into knowingly voluntarily and intelligently 4: holding trial court failed to make a finding of fact but rather made a finding of the ultimate question of law  that the defendants plea was not knowingly and intelligently made


Input: killed a cop.” The indictment read to Madison’s third jury charged him with the capital murder of a law enforcement officer who was “on duty” or who was performing some “official or job-related act.” Section 13A-5-40(a)(5), Ala. Code 1975, defines the following capital offense: “Murder of any police officer, sheriff, deputy, state trooper, federal law enforcement officer, or any other state or federal peace officer of any kind, or prison or jail guard, while such officer or guard is on duty, regardless of whether the defendant knew or should have known the victim was an officer or guard on duty, or because of some official or job-related act or 'performance of such officer or guard.” (Emphasis added.) The indictment contained two counts. The counts set forth alternative theories 87) (<HOLDING>); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 Holdings: 0: holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of firstdegree murder 1: holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory 2: holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed firstdegree murder not on the theory by which it reached the verdict 3: holding that defensive theory must be submitted to jury when theory is raised by evidence from any source 4: holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case


Input: added). ¶ 20 Further, common law from other states has developed addressing the responsibility of tenants using an easement regardless of them status as servient or dominant tenant. These cases set forth a general principle that a party having rights to use an easement should share in the maintenance and repair expense for that easement. See Barnard v. Gaumer, 146 Colo. 409, 361 P.2d 778, 781 (1961) (noting that “the burden of upkeep should be distributed between dominant and servient tenements in proportion to their relative use of the road, as nearly as such may be ascertained”); Story v. Bly, 217 P.3d 872, 878-79 (Colo.Ct.App.2008) (relying on § 4.13 of the Restatement (Third)); Lakeland Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Larson, 121 Ill.App.3d 805, 77 Ill.Dec. 68, 459 N.E.2d 1164, 1170 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Larabee v. Booth, 463 .App.1980) (“In this Holdings: 0: holding that the duty to maintain an easement was upon those entitled to its use rather than upon the servient estate 1: holding that one who possesses deeded easement need not use the easement to maintain his title and easement cannot be extinguished from nonuser alone 2: recognizing that an easement may entitle the easement owner to do acts which were not for the easement would constitute a nuisance 3: recognizing that where a grantee has an easement which he shares with others his duty to repair and maintain it must be apportioned with all other easement holders based upon the extent of the individuals use of the easement 4: holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement


Input: not to call Morales, but the allegation that counsel failed to interview Morales after Vazquez informed his counsel that Morales had exculpatory information and was willing to testify on Vazquez’s behalf. “We have stated that failing to interview witnesses or discover mitigating evidence may be a basis for finding counsel ineffective within the meani L.Ed.2d 201 (1989). Vazquez has provided no affidavits or any other information supporting his claims to the court. The only information about what Morales’s potential testimony would have been is speculation on the part of Vazquez. Recognizing the deferential standard when reviewing the conduct of counsel, we decline to find prejudice in this situation when there is no evidence other than speculation to support the finding. See id. (<HOLDING>). Because Vazquez cannot satisfy both Holdings: 0: holding that experts opinion that doctor performed surgeries in order to avoid financial losses due to insurance deductibles was nothing more than conjecture and speculation 1: holding that grant of summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party adduces nothing more than speculation to support its claims 2: recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance 3: holding that it would be improper for original trial counsel to raise the issue of his own alleged ineffectiveness in a posttrial habeas corpus case 4: recognizing the general rule of avoiding excessive posttrial inquiry into actions of counsel at trial in order to avoid any chilling effect on attorneys willingness to serve and stating that nothing would encourage a proliferation of ineffectiveness of counsel claims more than to permit an accused to establish the prejudice prong of strickland on a showing of nothing more than speculation that he had been prejudiced by his counsels performance


Input: women. Schwan’s contends that the portion of Milliren’s charge that she added in February 2009-alleging systemic gender dis crimination — is invalid because it was filed more than 300 days after Milliren resigned, but this argument is premature. As the district court concluded, the appropriate time to address the timeliness issue is if and when an actual lawsuit is filed, not during the subpoena enforcement stage. Accord EEOC v. Tempel Steel Co., 814 F.2d 482, 485 (7th Cir.1987) (rejecting the argument of untimeliness because “[i]f every possible defense, procedural or substantive, were litigated at the subpoena enforcement stage, administrative investigations obviously would be subjected to great delay”); EEOC v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 719 F.2d 1426, 1429 (9th Cir.1983) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Gilmer v. Holdings: 0: holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc 1: holding that plaintiff stated a discrimination claim despite not including a discrimination heading in eeoc complaint because the facts included in eeoc complaint were sufficient to trigger an investigation into whether plaintiff suffered an adverse action because of his religion 2: holding that general employment practices are relevant to eeoc investigation of individual disparate treatment claim 3: holding that a valid defense to a subsequent lawsuit does not prevent an eeoc investigation 4: holding that statements made to internal investigator of employer were made in an investigation under this subchapter where investigation was pursuant to a charge filed with eeoc


Input: “fear” of economic harm. The case law, however, indicates that threats of litigation may not constitute inducement of “fear” under the Hobbs Act. See, e.g., I.S. Joseph Co., Inc. v. J. Lauritzen A/S, 751 F.2d 265, 267 (8th Cir.1984) (even bad faith threat of civil action does not constitute infliction of “fear” under Hobbs Act); Peterson v. Philadelphia Stock Exchange, 717 F.Supp. 332, 336 (E.D.Pa.1989) (“The ordinary resort to legal process does not rise to the level of a ‘wrongful use’ of force or fear” under Hobbs Act). But see United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 774 (1st Cir.1989) (implying by hypothetical example that threat of litigation may constitute violation of Hobbs Act); Hall American Center Associates Limited Partnership v. Dick, 726 F.Supp. 1083, 1093-97 (E.D.Mich.1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, it is not clear that the acts alleged Holdings: 0: holding that impossibility is not a defense to attempts or conspiracy under the hobbs act 1: holding that proof of racketeering was not a separate prerequisite to criminal liability under the hobbs act 2: holding that at least where part of extensive scheme of other extortionate activity threat of litigation may constitute extortion under hobbs act 3: holding the meaning of commerce element in a different federal statute the hobbs act to be a question of law 4: holding that the test is whether at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country


Input: of law that the videotape itself is not a judicial record to which the common law right of public access attaches. Appellants are incorrect to assume that this issue turns on whether or not the videotape itself was admitted into evidence and that, therefore, the litigants at trial have control to decide whether or not the public’s right may be exercised. See Brief for Appellants (Reporters) at 13 (“The defendants should not be permitted to circumvent the common law and constitutional rights to access by marking only the transcript of the videotaped deposition.”). Even if the defendants had moved for the admission of the videotape into evidence, the videotape itself would not necessarily have become a judicial record subject to public review. See, e.g., Nixon v. War 58 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>)). In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. and Holdings: 0: holding that defendant is under an obligation to give the government notice of an alibi witness even if defendant is unable to locate the witness 1: holding that absent extraordinary circumstances the press has a common law right to inspect and copy the videotape of depositions used at trial where the witness is unable to provide live testimony privacy interests of an ill witness were not sufficiently extraordinary to preclude press access 2: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case 3: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 4: holding that closure was limited not only because it lasted only for the testimony of one witness  but also because there was no limitation at all on the right of the public or the press to examine the transcript of the officers testimony


Input: with Judge Campbell that “[t]he Forshees’ fail[ed] to explain how they supposedly were damaged other than as shareholders, and they ... presented no evidence in support of such a claim.” ApltApp. at 17. Finally, even if we were to overlook the deficiencies in the Forshees’ summary judgment opposition and assume that Manheim owed certain duties directly to the Forshees based on their guarantees, it is undisputed that the Forshees’ guarantees were never enforced. Instead, as noted above, Manheim used the proceeds it obtained from the sale of Forshee Auto’s vehicle inventory to satisfy Forshee Auto’s obligations under the promissory note and security agreement. Consequently, the Forshees did not suffer any sort of direct injury based on their guarantees. See Marchman, 898 P.2d at 717 (<HOLDING>). C. Bankruptcy Court Orders. This court does Holdings: 0: holding under pennsylvania law that where fraud mismanagement or other wrong damages a corporations assets a shareholder does not have a direct cause of action however a corporation can suffer an injury unto itself and any claim it asserts to recover for that injury is independent and separate from the claims of shareholders creditors and others 1: holding that a shareholders status as a guarantor of a corporations debts did not give him standing to assert individual claims against a creditor of the corporation where the guarantees were never enforced and all of the injuries alleged were indirect damages suffered by the parties in their capacities as shareholders or employees 2: holding that a shareholderguarantor did not suffer direct injury for standing purposes where the guarantees entered into by the shareholder were never enforced 3: holding that unless a shareholder can show personal cause of action and personal injury claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty belong to the corporation and not the shareholder 4: holding that shareholder could not prevail on breachoffiduciaryduty claim against other shareholder because alleged mishandling of funds did not result in any injury to the corporation


Input: testimony — after giving her considerable leeway — to limit it to matters relevant to the case. Similarly, the district court interrupted defense counsel’s questioning about the amnesty forms to ensure that the questioning would focus on the “portions on the application which [were] in question in the suit.” In addition, at the end of the trial, the district court instructed the jury that it was to ignore any comments that the court had made during the trial and reiterated that the jurors were the final arbiters of the facts. Given the district court’s wide discretion in limiting repetitive or irrelevant testimony and its curative instructions, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in this case. See United States v. Day, 405 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 4. The Deliberate Ignorance Jury Instruction Holdings: 0: holding that counsels failure to object or request a limiting instruction for evidence of defendants incarceration was sound trial strategy 1: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial 2: holding that district court enjoys broad latitude in managing a trial including commenting on evidence questioning witnesses clarifying facts and limiting counsels examinations 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony 4: holding that counsels decision not to call witnesses was unreasonable because counsels stated reasons for disputing the witnesses credibility were not supported by objective evidence


Input: by the government. See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir.2005). If she cannot show past persecution, then a petitioner must demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution that is both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289. The subjective component can be established “by the applicant’s credible testimony that he or she genuinely fears persecution,” while the objective component “can be fulfilled either by establishing past persecution or that he or she has a good reason to fear future persecution.” Id. (quotation omitted). Liu challenges the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. We have required that an IJ must make “clean” credibility determinations. See Yang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). This means that the IJ, or BIA, must provide Holdings: 0: holding that ijs and bias finding of applicants lack of credibility was substantially supported by the inconsistencies regarding the date of spouses alleged sterilization 1: holding that an ijs statement that applicants testimony was extremely inconsistent and made absolutely no sense whatsoever was not a clean credibility finding but a comment on the sufficiency of the evidence 2: holding that the ij must make clean determinations of credibility 3: holding that an ij failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he disbelieved applicants testimony 4: holding that in light of an applicants omission of various relevant facts from his asylum application substantial evidence supported the ijs adverse credibility determination


Input: move to dismiss Gaines’ RICO claims. The court need only address whether Gaines has alleged an injury to his business or property. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides that a person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of RICO may recover treble damages and attorney’s fees. Section 1964(c) imposes a significant limitation upon the types of injuries that are compensable under RICO. In this case, it is unclear precisely what injuries Gaines alleges that he suffered. He has not responded to defendants’ motions to dismiss and his pleadings are not models of clarity on this issue. Nevertheless, this court may not dismiss Gaines’ RICO claims in the Fed.R.Civ.P 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979)). Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1180 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 847-48 (11th Holdings: 0: holding that under the common law a claim for personal injuries died with the victim 1: holding that recovery for loss of consortium is a right  separate and apart from right of injured spouse to receive compensation for personal injuries 2: holding that the appropriate state statute of limitations to borrow for section 1983 actions is that for recovery of damages for personal injuries 3: holding that  1964c does not permit recovery for personal injuries 4: holding that the avoidance powers provide for recovery only if the recovery is for the benefit of the estate


Input: This is the same public policy alluded to by the trial court in its order/judgment as a basis for sustaining the respondents’ motion for summary judgment that a party cannot insure against that party’s own unlawful acts. Given this public policy and the fact that the alter ego rule would logically apply in piercing the corporate veil or reverse piercing of the corporate veil, the question remains open as to whether in the absence of the “right to direct and control” or similar language in a policy, an argument could be made that public policy alone would be sufficient to invoke the alter ego defense to prevent a corporate insured from recovering for the fraudulent or dishonest acts of its corporate alter ego. See Halpin v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. banc 1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Interstate Agri Servs., Inc. v. Bank Holdings: 0: recognizing that the legislature sets public policy to be enforced by the courts in the absence of constitutional infirmity 1: holding that as a matter of contract no party can be forced to arbitrate unless that party has entered into an agreement to do so 2: holding that enforcing new jersey law would violate new yorks strong public policy against interest rates which exceed 25 which policy must be enforced 3: recognizing that an insurance contract will generally be enforced as written unless to do so would violate the law or public policy 4: holding that where a merger clause is included in the written contract alleged collateral promises will not be enforced through fraud because under fraud the reliance must be reasonable


Input: to chapter 602. (Emphasis added.) 18 .Petitioners acknowledge that twice since the adoption of the RUAA, this court has restated its holding in Swinerton that appeals are allowable under the collateral order doctrine. (Citing Luke, 105 Hawai'i at 246, 96 P.3d at 266 n. 10; Douglass, 110 Hawai'i at 522, 135 P.3d at 131 n. 1 (2006).) However, Petitioners explain that the RUAA, which applies only to contracts made "on or after July 1, 2002,” HRS § 658A-3 (Supp. 2011), did not govern those cases because the contracts at issue were ent L 4078421 (N.C.App. Sept. 18, 2012) (unpublished) ("[0]ur Court has consistently held that ‘an order compelling the parties to arbitrate is an interlocutory order.’ ”); Teufel Const. Co. v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 3 Wash. App. 24, 472 P.2d 572, 573 (1970) (<HOLDING>). 29 . At oral argument, Petitioners stated Holdings: 0: holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final 1: holding that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable because it is not final and because it is not listed in the uaa appeals provision 2: holding that orders compelling arbitration are not appealable not because of the uaa appeals provision but because it has been definitely settled by the supreme court of this state that an order compelling arbitration is not final and therefore is not appealable 3: holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court 4: holding that an order granting a motion or application to compel arbitration is nonappealable because it is not listed in the uaa arbitration provision and because it is not a final order


Input: activity. Breeden., 532 U.S. at 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (reasoning that the EEOC’s issuance of a right-to-sue letter is not a protected activity because the employee takes no part in it). By the plaintiffs own version of events, approximately three to four months elapsed between his attorney’s inquiry and the allegedly retaliatory evaluation. Pl.’s Opp’n at 19. This time gap is too large for the plaintiff to establish the temporal proximity required to show that the allegedly retaliatory action is causally connected to his protected activity. Id. (citing cases holding that a three or four month gap between the plaintiffs protected activity and the defendant’s adverse action was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); see also Sullivan-Obst, 300 F.Supp.2d at 94 (<HOLDING>). (5) The Plaintiff Did not Establish a Causal Holdings: 0: holding that the more than three month gap between the plaintiffs eeoc complaint and the allegedly adverse action was insufficient to show causation 1: holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation 2: holding more than eightmonth gap between eeoc complaint and retaliatory action suggested a causal relationship 3: holding that three and onehalf months between the filing of an eeoc charge and the adverse employment action was insufficient by itself to establish causation 4: holding eightmonth gap between eeoc complaint and retaliatory action suggested a causal relationship


Input: of the importer’s intent and the relief sought.” Mattel, Inc., 72 Cust. Ct. at 262, 377 F. Supp. at 960. Directly relevant to this dispute, 19 U.S.C. § 1514 governs the timing of protests. Title 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3) provides as follows: A protest of a decision, order, or finding described in subsection (a) of this section shall be filed with the Customs Service within ninety days after but not before— (A) notice of liquidation or reliquidation, or (B) in circumstances where subparagraph (A) is inapplicable, the date of the decision as to which protest is made. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3). Both parties to this actio requirement strictly. Boe, 64 Ct. Cust. App. at 15, 543 F.2d at 154; see also Star Sales & Distrib. Corp. v. United States, 10 CIT 709, 710, 663 F. Supp. 1127, 1128 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The Court now considers Plaintiff’s protest Holdings: 0: holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review 1: recognizing that motions to reopen to adjust status must be filed no later than ninety days after the bia issues its final decision 2: holding that the court does not have jurisdiction over an action contesting the denial of a protest filed more than ninety days after notice of liquidation 3: holding that a notice of removal based on fraudulent joinder was procedurally defective because it was filed more than thirty days after defendants could have intelligently ascertained that the action was removable 4: holding that the court lacks jurisdiction where a complaint was filed more than 30 days after the filing of the summons


Input: dispute, may effectively question the attorney regarding the reasonableness of his fee." Id. But that is not the' case with testimony offered under the Property Owner Rule, where the adverse party is less likely to share a corresponding knowledge of the property’s market value. 8 . See also 2 Steven Goode et al., Texas Practice Series, Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence § 701.3, at 11-12 (3d ed.2002) (noting that "[cjlassifying an opinion as either lay or ex pert has proved particularly troublesome when the opinion is rooted in ‘other specialized knowledge,'" and observing that cases allowing owners to testify to the fair market value of their property "do not fit th[e lay witness opinion] mold as neatly”). 9 . Cf. Dietz v. Consol. Oil & Gas, Inc., 643 F.2d 1088, 1094 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See also Rich v. Eastman Kodak Co., 583 Holdings: 0: recognizing that an owners opinion testimony on the value of his property cannot be based on naked conjecture or solely speculative factors 1: holding improperly admitted testimony was cumulative to the other properly admitted evidence and was therefore harmless 2: holding that district court properly admitted property owners opinion testimony that was based on more than naked conjecture 3: holding the district court properly admitted expert testimony on defendants active gang membership 4: holding that experts opinion on proximate causation amounted to no more than mere conjecture and speculation as to events surrounding accident


Input: by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim "federal.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004). Following Baldwin, we have demanded less of state ha-beas petitioners seeking to raise a federal claim, exemplified by Taylor v. Cain, 545 F.3d 327 (5th Cir.2008), where we deemed a claim fair writ and presented although the petitioner "did not label his claim as a federal constitutional one,” because "his brief made the type of arguments that support a Confrontation Clause claim” and he cited two Louisiana cases mentioning the federal confrontation right. Id. at 333-34; see also Kittelson v. Dretke, 426 F.3d 306, 316-17 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Absent certain exceptions not available Holdings: 0: holding that a state defendant has a sixth amendment right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendments due process clause to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor 1: holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment 2: holding that the sixth and fourteenth amendments imply the right to selfrepresentation 3: holding municipalities  are not persons within the meaning of the due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments 4: holding that petitioner fairly presented federal confrontation and due process claims by invoking those concepts and citing the sixth and fourteenth amendments


Input: claims are not subject to mandatory arbitr ing because it was decided under the Bankruptcy Act, before the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. However the Defendants have not pointed to any changes between the Act and the Code that would lead to a different result. While the present Bankruptcy Code includes substantial amendments to sections 547 and 550 from their pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act counterparts, none of those changes alters in any way the underlying rationale of Allegaert that exempts statutory avoidance claims from arbitration. Defendants also argue that since Allegaert’s holding that securities claims are not arbitrable has subsequently been rejected by the Supreme Court, see Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (<HOLDING>), Allegaert’s holding that fraudulent Holdings: 0: holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement 1: holding that claims brought under section 10b of the securities exchange act and rico claims were arbitrable 2: holding that claims under the securities act of 1934 and the rico statutes are arbitrable 3: holding that claims under  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement 4: holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 are arbitrable


Input: to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United St Inc., 729 F.2d 676, 681 (10th Cir.1984) (requiring a plaintiff bringing a claim under § 13(a) to show that the price differential had a detrimental effect on competition). Because the plaintiffs have failed to allege a viable civil conspiracy claim against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the Individual Defendants, albeit on different grounds than those stated by the district co . Activities Assn. 483 F.3d 1025, 1031 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Whether a "sue or be sued" clause in a Holdings: 0: holding argument waived for failure to raise it in opening brief 1: holding that argument not raised in opening brief is waived 2: holding an argument made in plaintiffs reply brief but not in their opening brief waived 3: holding issue was waived when appellant identified issue in its opening brief but devoted less than one page of brief to it and provided no other argument and no citations 4: holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief


Input: the FTCA’s contractor exception to liability, Congress did not simultaneously adopt the various state exceptions to the independent contractor rule. 412 U.S. at 528, 93 S.Ct. 2215. Rather, Congress expressly granted jurisdiction for suits brought against the United States for its employees’ conduct, and not the conduct of contractors. State common law principles cannot overcome this federal statute. See Roditis v. United States, 122 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir.1997); Berkman v. United States, 957 F.2d 108, 112-13 (4th Cir.1992); Flynn v. United States, 631 F.2d 678, 681-82 (10th Cir.1980); Alexander v. United States, 605 F.2d 828, 835 (5th Cir.1979); Gibson v. United States, 567 F.2d 1237, 1243-44 (3d Cir.1977). But see Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 1577, 1583 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ attempts to hold Holdings: 0: recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor 1: holding that the government is liable under the ftca in the same respect as a private person under the law of the place where the act occurred 2: holding that the owner of property who retained an independent contractor did not owe any nondelegable duty of care to the plaintiff who had slipped and fallen on the adjoining sidewalk 3: holding that the independent contractor exception in the ftca would not insulate the government from the contractors negligence if the duty was nondelegable under florida law 4: holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate


Input: of approaches that are available when making decisions that may affect the environment, even if they ultimately decide that some are impractical for reasons such as loss of flexibility. The very purpose of NEPA is to force agencies to take stock of environmental factors in their decisionmaking, and not automatically to reject potential courses of action without first assessing the relevant environmental concerns. By narrowing its objectives to flexibility and power generation, BPA impermissibly circumvented consideration of alternatives that would have guaranteed at least some benefit to fish from the outset. City of New York v. U.S. Department of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 743 (2d Cir.1983); cf. City of Carmel-By-the-Sea v. U.S. Department of Transp., 95 F.3d 892, 907 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The two alternatives that BPA did consider — Holdings: 0: holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact 1: holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen 2: holding district court abused discretion by changing characterization of defendants conduct without a reasoned explanation 3: holding that agency abused its discretion by changing statement of purpose to eliminate all but one of the initial range of alternatives 4: holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case


Input: not itself a state court, the form of the proceeding is not determinative under Rooker-Feldman; rather, it is the nature, character, and effect of the proceedings themselves that is controlling. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303. In Feldman, the Supreme Court took note of the judicial nature of state bar disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 482 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982)). Additionally, this court has held that the disciplinary board of a state bar can be considered as part of the “system of state courts” and that their judicial decisions are not subject to review by the federal courts. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. West Virginia State Bar, 233 F.3d 813, 817-18 (4th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Virginia State Bar is, by statute, an arm Holdings: 0: holding rookerfeldman doctrine deprived district court of jurisdiction to review decision of west virginia state bar 1: holding that rookerfeldman doctrine bars federal determination of claim where the district court must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff 2: holding rookerfeldman doctrine inapplicable to claims that do not require review of a judicial decision in a particular case 3: holding that the rookerfeldman doctrine is broad enough to bar all federal claims that were or should have been central to the state court decision 4: holding that a state court judgment that modifies a discharge in bankruptcy is void ab initio and the rookerfeldman doctrine would not bar federal court jurisdiction


Input: damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent factors,” citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269, 112 S.Ct. 1311). In deciding whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged proximate causation, the court focuses on "three nonexhaustive factors ... [which determine] whether the injury is `too remote’ to allow recovery: (1) whether there are more direct victims of the alleged wrongful conduct who can be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general; (2) whether it will be difficult to ascertain the amount of the plaintiffs’ damages attributable to defendant’s wrongful conduct; and (3) whether the courts will have to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries." Mendoza, 301 F.3d at F.3d 957, 963-67 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, 31 F.3d at 928-29 Holdings: 0: holding that beneficiaries of an estate lacked standing under rico to sue for an injury derivative of the estates injury 1: holding that a rico plaintiff alleging destruction of the value of his stock lacks standing because his injury is derivative of the corporations injury 2: holding that a union health trust had standing to sue tobacco companies to recover medical expenses paid by the trust and allegedly caused by beneficiaries smoking 3: holding that health care trust funds that paid medical claims could not sue tobacco companies under rico because their injury was derivative of smokers injury and stating a direct relationship between the injury and the alleged wrongdoing although not the sole requirement of rico  proximate causation has been one of its central elements citations omitted 4: holding that under rico plaintiff must prove an injury because of violation of statute


Input: Lorisme v. INS, 129 F.3d 1441, 1444-45 (11th Cir.1997)). We view “the record evidence in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of that decision.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir.2004) (en banc). Under this highly deferential standard of review, the IJ’s decision can be reversed only if the evidence “compels” a reasonable fact finder to find otherwise. Sepulveda v. U.S. Attorney General, 401 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th Cir.2005). When the BIA issues its own opinion, we review only the decision of the BIA, except to the extent the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision. R ompel a reasonable factfinder to find that it was more likely than not she would face persecution upon her return to Indonesia. See id. at 1232 (<HOLDING>). Tan relies on stories of attacks on churches, Holdings: 0: holding that the clear probability standard for withholding of removal is higher than the standard for asylum which requires only a reasonable possibility of persecution 1: holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal 2: holding that petitioner must demonstrate it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon his return 3: holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum 4: holding that the standard for withholding of removal is a showing that it is more likely than not that a petitioner will face persecution upon her return