Input: Therefore, Conway has failed to put forward any evidence that National relied on counsel’s advice so as to have reasonable cause for its failure to pay the pre-petition taxes. Similarly, there is no evidence in the record that National’s failure to pay its post-petition taxes was due to reliance on the advice of counsel. Conway’s reference to a few vague and conclusory statements of reliance in the record falls far short of pointing to specific substantive evidence that would support a conclusion that the taxes were not owed. While there is some evidence that counsel told management what debts to pay, no evidence suggests that counsel advised that preferring other creditors would not subject National’s officers to personal liability for the excise taxes. See Newsome, 431 F.2d at 748 (<HOLDING>). Nor is there evidence of any specific Holdings: 0: holding that an attorneys advice to execute a chattel mortgage in favor of the taxpayers bank did not provide reasonable cause where the attorney did not advise the taxpayer that he could prefer the bank over the united states without sub jecting himself to section 6672 liability 1: holding a bank officer who informed a third party that it would be safe to extend 8000 credit to bank customer although customer did not have an open account at the bank could be held liable for the material misrepresentation 2: holding the bank liable where the bank had almost complete control over the operation of the company during its last three quarters of operation and where withheld taxes were not paid to the irs on instructions from the bank 3: holding that a bank customer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank 4: holding that a copy of an agreement executed by an insolvent bank found in the draft documents of the banks attorney did not satisfy section 1823es requirements because it was not an official record of the failed bank


Input: 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has expressed “greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). The evaluation of whether section 4022.13 is vague as applied to Perez must be made with respect to Perez’s actual conduct “and not with respect to hypothetical situations at the periphery of the [regulation’s] scope or with respect to the conduct of other parties who might not be forewarned by the broad language.” diLeo v. Greenfield, 541 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding appellant waived his challenge to statute as vague as applied because he did not specifically object at trial 1: holding that statute that permitted termination of teachers for due and sufficient cause was not vague as applied 2: holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied 3: holding statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to mere possession of money on jail premises 4: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable


Input: The EEOC interpretive guidance gives as an example of "broad range of jobs in various classes”: [A]n individual has an allergy to a substance found in most high rise office buildings, but seldom found elsewhere, that makes breathing extremely difficult. Since this individual would be substantially limited in the ability to perform the broad range of jobs in various classes that are conducted in high rise office buildings within the geographical area to which he or she has reasonable access, he or she would be substantially limited in working. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j). 12 . The Seventh Circuit has held that truck driving constitutes a class of jobs. Best v. Shell Oil Co., 107 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir.1997); see also DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Baulos v. Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the selection of the jury constitutes part of a public trial 1: holding that a nonnamed class member with opportunity to opt out constitutes a party bound by a settlement 2: recognizing that truck driving constitutes a class of jobs 3: recognizing that failure to develop claim on appeal constitutes waiver 4: holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation


Input: they are guaranteed the rights encompassed in the warnings. As far as we can tell, Davis had never been advised of his Miranda rights with respect to this case before talking to Judd. Under these circumstances, we are compelled to conclude that Davis’s untaped confession to Judd should have been suppressed. Notwithstanding, the erroneous admission of this confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Shortly after confessing in his holding cell, Davis gave a taped statement in which he voluntarily gave the same information contained in his prior statement to Judd. This statement was clearly admissible because Davis was fully informed of (and waived) his Miranda rights before the start of the taping session. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (<HOLDING>). As to the second taped confession, given on Holdings: 0: holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible 1: holding that where a suspect was given miranda warnings and then immediately spoke without police prompting that statement was voluntary and therefore admissible 2: holding inadmissible a statement made after incomplete miranda advisement but holding a subsequent statement admissible because the court found it was given after a full advisement 3: holding that a confession obtained in violation of miranda was admissible for impeachment 4: holding that miranda warnings do not have to be given in the exact form stated in the miranda opinion as long as an effective equivalent is given


Input: could ever be established by the testimony of a party, which concept the law long abandoned. See Schoenvogel ex rel. Schoenvogel v. Venator Group Retail, Inc., 895 So.2d 225, 238 (Ala.2004) (citing Herbert E. Tucker, Colorado Dead Man’s Statute: Time for Repeal or Reform?, 29 Colo. Law. 45, 45 (January 2000) (tracing the movement away from the common-law rule that rendered parties incompetent to testify in their own cases)). When the record contains no legitimate reason for questioning the credibility of a party’s statements, a decision to disregard those statements based solely on the fact that they assist the party in proving his or her case is necessarily arbitrary and contrary to the law. See generally Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417, 11 S.Ct. 733, 35 L.Ed. 501 (1891) (<HOLDING>). The record lacks any basis on which the trial Holdings: 0: holding that industrial commission is ultimate fact finder 1: holding the question of necessity is one of mixed law and fact and accordingly one for the fact finder in the ordinary case 2: holding that fact finder may draw reasonable inferences from evidence and choose which inference is most reasonable 3: holding that a finder of fact may not arbitrarily disregard uncontradicted evidence 4: holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review


Input: Whitestown Court held that the trial court erred by finding that Whitestown had failed to carry its burden of proof. The Court also sought to “remind trial courts of ... the deferential standard accorded to annexing municipalities[.]” Id. at 927, 2015 WL 4557062 at *10. In the end, the Whitestown Court reversed the trial court and instructed that judgment be entered in favor of Whitestown on the remonstrators’ petition. 2. Boonville Annexation [28] As for the case before us, we agree with Boonville that what a municipality needs and can use “is first and foremost a legislative determination.” Ap-pellees’ Br. p. 33. A court, should not substitute its judgment for-what a municipality determines is needed to accomplish its purposes. State v. Collom, 720 N,E.2d 737, 741 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, we observe that necessity “is Holdings: 0: holding that questions of government necessity and expediency are understood to be exclusively for the legislature 1: holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction 2: holding that questions of procedure are for the arbitrator not the courts 3: holding that in general an agencys conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard but questions concerning whether an agency has followed proper procedures or considered the appropriate factors in making its determination are questions of law which are reviewed de novo 4: holding that matters of statutory construction are questions of law for the court to decide rather than issues of fact


Input: under the ADA are “defined in terms of 12 extensive categories,” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 676, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.2d 904 (2001), and includes places of education, see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J). However, 42 U.S.C. § 12187 states: The provisions of the subchapter [III] shall not apply to private clubs or estab lishments exempted from coverage under title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.2000-a(e)) [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a et seq.] or to religious organizations or entities controlled by religious organizations, including places of worship. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the ground that it is exempt from coverage under Title III of the ADA as a religious private school that is controlled by a religious F.3d 1275, 1279-1280 (10th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678 Holdings: 0: holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead 1: holding that to avoid an affirmative defense  a plaintiff must plead specifically matters of affirmative avoidance pursuant to rule 5508 2: holding that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded 3: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 4: holding that a claim of exemption is an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded


Input: of a separate, published opinion filed contemporaneously with this disposition. 2 . Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, we do not restate them here except as necessary to explain our disposition. 3 . Cervantes is the only one of the petitioners who might benefit from the motion to reopen on the hardship determination, given that the applications of Alma, as discussed herein, and Serrano, as discussed in the separate, published opinion, fail on independent bases. 4 . The BIA properly determined that equitable tolling excused petitioners’ untimely filing of their motion to reopen, in light of their prior counsel’s statements that petitioners’ only option was to appeal to our circuit. See SocopGonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1184-1185 (9th Cir.2001) Holdings: 0: holding trial court abused its discretion when case had been on file for only three months the discovery sought was material to the plaintiffs claims and the plaintiff exercised due diligence in obtaining discovery 1: holding that the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff was privy to facts which would provoke inquiry in the mind of a person of reasonable prudence and which if followed up would have led to the discovery of the fraud 2: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 3: holding that one need only show that reasonable diligence would not have led to the discovery of essential information bearing on the claim 4: holding that general allegations of a need for additional discovery will not suffice the person presenting such a claim must show what discovery has been obtained why it is inadequate and the what additional information he expects to obtain from additional discovery


Input: information in the past” is sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for a stop. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923 (1972). See also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 309, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (1990) (observing that “reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause” and noting that, in Adams, the Court had reasoned that “the unverified tip from the known informant might not have been reliable enough to establish probable cause, but nevertheless found it sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop”); State v. Morton, 363 N.C. 737, 738, 686 S.E.2d 510, 510, adopting per curiam, 198 N.C. App. 206, 217, 679 S.E.2d 437, 445 (2009) (Hunter, J., dissenting) (<HOLDING>); State v. Downing, 169 N.C. App. 790, 794-95, Holdings: 0: holding that the detectives in this case had reasonable suspicion to believe defendant could be armed based solely on the confidential informants tip that defendant was involved in a recent driveby shooting and was wearing gang colors 1: holding that it was  reasonable for the defendant to foresee that in an encounter between armed robbers and armed guards protecting an armored car a shooting was likely to occur 2: holding an informants tip can establish reasonable suspicion without investigative confirmation if the tip is credible 3: holding circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion to make a stop included that the defendant was on a comer on which recent multiple drugrelated arrests had been made 4: holding corroboration is not a necessity where confidential informants reliability was well established and his tip was based on direct personal observation of criminal activity


Input: whether they wish to proceed with' their own lawsuit, or to join a class, if one has been certified. Id. (quoting In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F.Supp.2d 431, 452 (S.D.N.Y.2003)). Plaintiffs argue vehemently that Wyser-Pratte is not binding on this Court because it constitutes an improper limitation of Supreme Court doctrine, represents the minority rule, and was wrongly decided. We recognize that Wyser-Pratte now represents the- minority rule. Compare Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 739 (1st Cir.1983) (approving in dicta of-forfeiture rule), with State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir.2008); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1009 (9th Cir.2008); In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 254-56 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). That several of our fellow Circuits chose not Holdings: 0: holding american pipe tolling continued when court of appeals reversed district courts class certification but remanded for further proceedings on certification as to subclass that included plaintiff 1: holding that no subsequent class actions may benefit from tolling when class certification has been denied 2: holding that american pipe  tolling applies to plaintiffs who file actions while class certificationis pending 3: holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case 4: recognizing that american pipe established that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the class


Input: 3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983). In Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir.1980), we held that § 1985(3) only covers conspiracies against: 1) classes who receive heightened protection under the Equal Protection Clause; and 2) “those individuals who join together as a class for the purpose of asserting certain fundamental rights.” Id. at 1150; see also Haverstick Enterprises, Inc. v. Financial Federal Credit, Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 994 (6th Cir.1994). Bartell’s claim that Defendants discriminated against her on account of her mental disabilities therefore is not actionable. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has not conferred suspect or quasi-suspect status on statutory classifications covering the disabled, see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442, 105 S.Ct. 3249; see also Haverstick, 32 F.3d at 994 (<HOLDING>). Further, Bartell has not alleged that Holdings: 0: recognizing that as with tax rates no one has a legal right to the maintenance of an existing rate or duty 1: holding party must support argument with legal authority 2: holding that the appellant failed to preserve a claim of error that was based on an argument that precedent was wrongly decided where in the trial court the appellant had conceded that the precedent was controlling 3: holding that no existing legal precedent supports the plaintiffs argument that  19853 covers discriminatory conspiracies against the handicapped 4: holding that improper argument about purging jurors community of drug conspiracies did not rise to level of plain error


Input: questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.” Goosby, 409 U.S. at 518, 93 S.Ct. 854. In other instances, the Supreme Court has described insubstantial claims as “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,” “wholly insubstantial,” “obviously frivolous,” and “no longer open to discussion.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (collecting cases) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has suggested that this standard is rarely met. See Hagans, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372; Goosby, 409 U.S. 512, 93 S.Ct. 854. Our limited treatment of the “insubstantial” standard makes use of similar language. See Loeber v. Spargo, 144 Fed.Appx. 168, 170 (2d Cir.2005) (unpublished summary order) (<HOLDING>); Green, 380 F.2d at 448 (stating that a claim Holdings: 0: holding that the taxpayer filed a frivolous return because it had no basis in law or fact 1: holding defendant may receive only the portion of his fees under 42 usc  1988 that he would not have paid but for the frivolous claim 2: holding that a claim is insubstantial only if prior decisions render the issue inescapably frivolous and leave no room for any inference of controversy 3: holding trial courts finding that claim was frivolous insufficient to meet statutory requirement that claim constitutes harassment is groundless and not made in good faith 4: holding that in context of patent claim at issue if means only if


Input: of compensation is not controlling to our determination of whether it is a wage. Gurnik v. Lee, 587 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Rather, we will consider the substance of the compensation to determine whether it is subject to the Wage Payment Statute. Id. We have recognized that wages are "something akin to the wages paid on a regular periodic basis for regular work done by the employee." Wank v. St. Francis College, 740 N.E.2d 908, 912 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (quotation and citation omitted), trams. denied. Deferred payment of compensation that accrued during an employee's tenure is a wage. Id. However, if the compensation is linked to the financial sue-cess of the employer, it is not a wage. See id.; see also Highhouse v. Midwest Orthopedic Inst., P.C., 807 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind.2004) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Pyle v. Nat'l Wine & Spirits Corp., Holdings: 0: holding that an employer is accountable to a discharged employee for unpaid compensation if the employee was terminated in bad faith and the compensation is clearly connected to work already performed 1: holding that financial gain from compensation for professional services is not a sufficient motive for purposes of pleading scienter 2: holding that compensation is a wage if it is compensation for time worked and is not linked to a contingency such as the financial success of the company 3: holding that it is not 4: holding that the words amount and compensation in the regulation referred to cash or salary rather than to all forms of compensation


Input: PCI Transp., Inc. v. Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 545 (5th Cir.2005) (no need to enjoin allegedly improper fees, when any improper fees levied would be recoverable upon success on the merits); Jayaraj v. Scappini, 66 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir.1995) (no need for injunction where failure to renew his employment contract for an additional term can be redressed by money damages upon success on the merits). 3 .Mr. Alvord accuses the appellees of filing the malpractice action separately as "an end run around amending the complaint in the present action.” We note that our holding would be no different if the malpractice action were in the same proceeding as the probate action, for the two claims are separate and distinct. See Astor Pictures Corp. v. Shull, 64 A.2d 160, 161 (D.C.1949) (<HOLDING>). 4 . D.C.Code § 14-302(a) (2001) ("In a civil Holdings: 0: holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case 1: holding that the separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated to establish jurisdiction 2: holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms 3: holding that if a single primary right should be invaded by two distinct and separate legal wrongs two causes of action would result 4: holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders


Input: of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices ... unique to a particular situation.” Terry, 336 F.3d at 138 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Dunphy argues that the terms and conditions of his employment would have been materially altered by these transfers because they would have enabled him to work out of his home and thus avoid a long commute. While “the difference in location is certainly of tantamount importance to Plaintiff, it does not raise the denial of Plaintiffs transfer request to the level of an adverse employment action.” Duncan v. Shalala, No. 97 Civ. 3607, 2000 WL 1772655, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2000) (<HOLDING>); Nonnenmann v. City of New York, 174 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a lateral transfer without a loss in benefits does not constitute an adverse employment action 1: holding that denial of a lateral transfer which would have allowed plaintiff to be near his wife was not an adverse employment action 2: holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action 3: holding that a denial of transfer was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff asserted only that the transfer would allow him to work closer to home 4: holding that denial of a bonus was not an adverse employment action


Input: Qureshi and parents. 3 . The plaintiff also sued Principal Johnson for abuse of a teacher, but she conceded at the pretrial conference of this case that she will forgo this claim. 4 . These latter non-suspension-related allegations are substantive due process claims because the plaintiff argues that these actions were categorically unconstitutional, not that they were unconstitutional because they were taken before she received notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1352-53 (6th Cir.1990). 5 . The collective bargaining agreement between the JCTA and the Board (the "CBA”) does appear to grant the plaintiff a property interest in continued pay and benefits since it provides that a teacher may be suspended only for "just cause.” See Cleveland Bd 85)(<HOLDING>); with Gillard v. Norris, 857 F.2d 1095, 1098 Holdings: 0: holding that fiveday suspension was not de minimis deprivation where it was unreviewable under state law and included first amendment claims 1: holding that district court properlydiscounted four calls as de minimis 2: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss on de minimis grounds where his expert witness testimony was inadmissible 3: holding that a robbery of 40 to 50 satisfied the de minimis standard 4: holding that a suspension from employment and deprivation of duties and equipment constitute discrete acts


Input: price reduction of $500,000. Ultimately, the general partners agreed to a settlement whereby the price to be paid by Horsham was reduced by $200,000, of which $100,000 would be deducted from the sum to be received by the partnership and $100,000 deducted from the commission to be received by Padmar. Padmar also agreed to guarantee Horsham $500,000 of future lease payments as they became due under the Leases. The sale then closed, and the cash proceeds of sale were distributed to and accepted by all of the limited partners. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The general partners contend this is a derivative action, cognizable in equity and thus this court may find facts in accordance with our view of the preponderance of the evidence. Pelfrey v. Bank of Greer, 270 S.C. 691, 244 S.E. (2d) 315 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, the limited partners argue Holdings: 0: holding that derivative actions do not require the support of a majority of shareholders or even all of the minority shareholders 1: holding that shareholders had standing to bring derivative suit against the government but not direct suit due to lack of privity 2: recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action 3: holding a shareholders derivative action even where the only relief allowed is a recovery of damages is nevertheless a suit in equity and not an action at law 4: holding that in rendering judgment following the settlement of a derivative action that did not involve a class action trial court lacked jurisdiction to render judgment that would adjudicate rights and personal claims of individual shareholders who were not parties to derivative action that was being settled


Input: in federal court. See Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2007) (distinguishing between prudential and jurisdictional exhaustion requirements, and holding that the administrative-exhaustion requirement found in the Rehabilitation Act is prudential in nature). Turning now to the case before us, we note that HHC has raised a legitimate question as to whether Allen’s and Slone’s disparate-impact claims have been exhausted. Specifically, HHC plausibly contends that the plaintiffs did not adequately describe their discrimination claim such that an EEOC investigation into potential liability based on disparate impact could have “reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” See Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 545 (6th Cir.1991) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). Allen simply stated in her EEOC charge that Holdings: 0: recognizing this rule 1: holding that this court does not necessarily require the claim to be specifically raised in an eeoc charge provided that it satisfies this scopeofinvestigation test 2: holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc 3: holding that because a claim was never raised in the district court this court would not consider it for the first time on appeal 4: holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court


Input: the incarceration that results from revocation is a consequence of the underlying crime of conviction. Indeed, New York law provides that time served as a result of revocation must be credited against the original sentence. See id. § 70.40(3) (providing that original sentenc (5th Cir.2011), and United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir.1999), relied on by Bussey, warrant no different conclusion. In Garcia-Rodriguez, the Fifth Circuit ruled that supervision was not tolled during administrative detention pending deportation, see 640 F.3d at 133-34; in Morales-Alejo, the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion with re spect to pre-trial detention where the defendant later pleaded guilty, see 193 F.3d at 1105; but see United States v. Goins, 516 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The reason for these conclusions is that such Holdings: 0: holding that pretrial detention credited against ultimate sentence triggers tolling 1: holding that juvenile pretrial detention implicates due process rights 2: holding   2241 is the proper avenue by which to challenge pretrial detention 3: holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act 4: holding that a pretrial motion triggers an automatic exclusion under  3161h1f even though no actual delay results


Input: 99 S.Ct. at 1757. Here, defendant’s silence and his participation in the debriefing sessions did not constitute waiver. More than a failure to request counsel and subsequent conversations with the prosecutor pursuant to a cooperation agreement are required to find waiver in the debriefing context. For purposes of clarity, it is helpful to explain precisely what is required. Defendant and his counsel should be given reasonable notice of the time and place of the scheduled debriefing so that counsel might be present. A cooperating witness’s failure to be accompanied by counsel at debriefing may later be construed as a waiver, providing defendant and counsel have had notice so that the consequences of counsel’s failure to attend could be explained to defendant. Cf. Auen, 864 F.2d at 5 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 1: holding that an ijs failure to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel from a pro se petitioner is a due process violation 2: holding that defendants waiver of counsel when pleading guilty was an implied waiver as to any subsequent proceedings including sentencing four days later 3: holding that defendants failure to obtain counsel despite opportunities to do so implied a waiver of counsel 4: holding that in order for a waiver of counsel to be valid the trial court must ensure that the defendants waiver of his right to counsel is done knowingly and intelligently so that the record establishes that the defendants choice is made with eyes open


Input: HRS § 386-88 supersedes HRS § 91-14 and removes the circuit court from the appellate process with regard to the proceedings brought under HRS ch. 386”. Id. In DeVictoria v. H & K Contractors, 56 Haw. 552, 545 P.2d 692 (1976), the supreme court confirmed HRS § 91-14(b) provides that “proceedings for review shall be instituted in the circuit court ... except where a statute provides for a direct appeal to the supreme court." DeVictoria, 56 Haw. at 556 n. 3, 545 P.2d at 697, n. 3 (emphasis added). Therefore, under Ras and DeVictoria, HRS chapter 91 applies except with respect to the circuit court provision. Thus, HRS § 91-14 concerning the standard of review on appeal governs in the present case. See Ostrowski v. Wasa Elec. Servs., Inc., 87 Hawai'i 492, 495, 960 P.2d 162, 165 (App.1998) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Kleenco, 2 Haw.App. 219, 219, 629 Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court can review a district courts decision to remand when that decision rests upon a ground not authorized by statute 1: holding that appellate review in a first amendment case of a lower courts finding concerning the motivation behind a decision to terminate a faculty member is governed by the clearly erroneous standard 2: holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit 3: holding that appellate review of the boards decision is governed by hrs  9114 4: holding that the standard of review for the denial of a motion for reconsideration is governed by the law of the regional circuit


Input: categories .... “ ‘[U]nless an employee at will identifies a specific expression of public policy, he may be discharged with or without cause.’ ” Id. (quoting Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980)). Accordingly, the courts interpreting New Mexico law have adhered to the rule that retaliatory discharge is a narrow exception to the rule of employment at will and have refused to expand its application. See Zaccardi v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473, 1475-76 (10th Cir.l988)(discharge for refusal to take polygraph examination did not violate public policy); Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir.1985) (discharge for use of employer’s grievance procedure did not violate public policy); Jeffers v. Butler, 762 F.Supp. 308, 310 (D.N.M.1990)(<HOLDING>), aff'd without opinion, 931 F.2d 62 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that no public policy stated where employee and not public at large would benefit from employees whistleblowing actions 1: holding that employees retaliatory discharge based on employees election to public office did not violate public policy 2: holding employees identified no clear public policy which their termination violated 3: holding that federal law can provide source of state public policy for determining whether discharge of employee violated clear mandate of public policy 4: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public


Input: income tax return for the appropriate year, the Commissioner constructed a fraction, using as the numerator the amount of prejudgment interest set by the trial court ($112,000) and as the denominator the total amount of the judgment ($287,000). He then multiplied the total settlement ($250,000) by this fraction and assessed a deficiency on the basis that the resulting product ($97,561) represented the (taxable) interest component of the settlement. See id. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner’s determination, as did we. See id. at 23. Specifically, we approved the Commissioner’s use of a ratio based on .the judgment in apportioning the undifferentiated settlement proceeds as between prejudgment interest and compensatory damages. See id. at 25-26; accord Robinson, 70 F.3d at 38 (<HOLDING>). Since the Commissioner used exactly the same Holdings: 0: holding that a motion denying summary judgment will not be reviewed on appeal from a jury verdict where sufficient evidence supports the jurys verdict 1: holding that evidence regarding the existence of an oral contract and its subsequent modification supported the jurys verdict 2: holding that the appellants appeal of the jurys verdict was a material breach of the no appeals provision in the parties settlement agreement 3: holding explicitly that the jurys verdict furnishes the best indication of how to prorate an ensuing settlement 4: holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict


Input: pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) (document no. 7). Dwyer already amended her complaint once as of right. The United States objects. Standard of Review The United States’ 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a). If the exception applies, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. See id.; Magee v. United States, 121 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1997). Therefore, the court must resolve the 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss first, before undertaking a summary judgment analysis on the merits of the plaintiffs claim. See Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304-05 (4th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, 191 F.3d 30, 46 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. George Arpin & Sons, Inc., 949 Holdings: 0: holding that consideration of summary judgment motion should await determination of jurisdiction 1: holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion 2: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed 3: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed 4: holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment


Input: Johnson and Wallace, saw two men flee the scene upon their approach. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (stating that “[h]eadlong flight — -wherever it occurs — is the consummate act of evasion”). Furthermore, as the court discussed above, the “totality of the circumstances” to be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed to support Johnson’s seizure also includes all of Johnson’s non-compliant conduct after being ordered to show his hands. See Valentine, 232 F.3d at 358. In the present case, as Silvers stepped out of the police car, Johnson had a “very surprised look” on his case. Tr. at 49. Because Johnson’s eyes got “real wide,” Silvers was led to believe that something was not right. Tr; at 49, 53, see also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (<HOLDING>) As Silvers approached, Johnson pushed Senquiz Holdings: 0: holding nervous behavior and inconsistent story justified reasonable suspicion and subsequent search 1: recognizing presence in a high crime area unprovoked flight and nervous evasive behavior as factors supporting a reasonable suspicion 2: holding that nervous behavior and failure to make eye contact did not give rise to reasonable individualized suspicion 3: holding that nervous evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion 4: holding that nervous evasive behavior such as flight is a relevant factor in an examination of reasonable suspicion


Input: for Offer of Proof and Request for In Camera Inquiry and Combined Incorporated Memorandum of Law.” 8 . On appeal, Smith assigns as error the district court's decision to deny an offer of proof. We do not reach that issue because we reverse and remand with instructions for other reasons. 9 . We note that our decision in Smitherman was not available to the district court when it ruled on the motion at issue in this appeal. 10 . In applying an earlier version of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, we recognized screens could be effective in mitigating imputed conflicts under certain circumstances. See Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d at 344, 348 (discussing the effective use of a "Chinese wall” by the public defender’s office); Doe v. Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 650 N.W.2d 594, 597-98 (Iowa 2002) (<HOLDING>). It should be noted, however, that under the Holdings: 0: holding that a disqualification order in a criminal case is not appealable 1: holding a motion is untimely if not filed after the party has knowledge to support disqualification and after the party suffers an adverse ruling 2: holding disqualification was appropriate but referencing several aba formal opinions where screening prevented the disqualification of an entire firm 3: holding that disqualification orders do not fall in the collateral order exception 4: holding that the disqualification order is an issue completely independent of the merits of the action


Input: ch. 12, at 2196 (emphasis added). The subject at issue (amendment of RCW 9A.28-.020) is clearly expressed in the title of ESSB 6151. The bill has an overarching theme related to the management of sex offenders, and the title references the criminal attempt statute. The title notifies an interested reader that the amendments to the criminal attempt statute relate to the management of sex offenders. Because the title gives notice of the subjects contained within the legislation, Alexander’s claim that the criminal attempt statute violates the subject-in-title rtain 1999 tax and fee increases be nullified, vehicles exempted from property taxes, and property tax increases (except new construction) limited to 2% annually?” was a general title); Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 193, 217 Holdings: 0: holding that dyfs was not required to try the title 9 action to conclusion before filing a title 30 action for the termination of parental rights 1: holding title shall voter approval be required for any tax increase license tab fees be 30 per year for motor vehicles and existing vehicle taxes be repealed was a general title 2: holding that a renter who stole a motor home had void title not voidable title and could not convey good title 3: recognizing that in 1982 kentucky converted to a new title system for motor vehicles under which the secured creditor must perfect its security interest by noting the lien on the certificate of title to the motor vehicle 4: holding that in order for claim to be within scope of coverage of title insurance policy it must be specifically provided for


Input: that even assuming the ground invasion had reached the subsurface and become an “offending concentration under some of the appellants’ properties ... some type of physical damages or interference with use must have been demonstrated for appellants to recover for a trespass.” Id. “Stigma damages” were not enough, as they did not indicate actual damage or interference with use. Id. Plaintiff urges that this Court is bound to follow the standard in Chance, and hold that it must find only “some” interference with use or damage caused by the indirect air and water invasion in this case. Plaintiff argues that despite the clear holding in Chance, the Sixth Circuit in Baker incorrectly added a “substantial” damage or interference standard to the holding in Chance. 533 Fed.Appx. at 522-23. (<HOLDING>). In so holding that “substantial” damage or Holdings: 0: holding that damage to realty was not excluded from coverage if such damage resulted from subsidence caused by something other than soil condition despite homeowners experts description of the damage as settling 1: holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did 2: holding that the phrase arising out of the use is ambiguous and interpreting it as originating from or growing out of or flowing from 3: holding that a landowner who lost a strip of property to a highway widening project could not recover losses caused by concurrent placement of a median strip because when less than the entire property is taken compensation for damage to the remainder can be awarded only if such damage is caused by the taking and cjonstruction of the median not the taking caused the alleged damage 4: holding that plaintiffs could not show aerial vapors originating in subsurface plume caused substantial damage or interference with use


Input: that these education advocates are “other like fiduciar[ies]” under Rule 17(c). See Gardner ex rel. Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131 (3d Cir.1989); Adelman ex rel. Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.1984); Life Ins. Co. v. Cashatt, 206 F.Supp. 410 (E.D.Va.1962). Furthermore, while the Tenth Circuit cautions against appointing multiple individuals to represent a child, see Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir.1989) (reasoning that “[allowing two parties, the court-appointed guardian ad litem and [a next friend], to represent the minor children interferes with the orderly development of the lawsuit”), it does not support the defendant’s proposition that the court does not have the power to replace a guardian ad litem with another guardian for a specific purpose, see Id. (<HOLDING>). Here, after appointing a guardian ad litem, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the person appointed as a guardian ad litem may not have interest adverse to those of the ward 1: holding that tolling statute applicable to incompetent plaintiffs continues in effect in spite of appointment of guardian ad litem 2: holding indigent mothers due process rights were not violated by trial courts failure to appoint attorney ad litem for her until six months after parental termination suit was filed against her where counsel was appointed giving mother a year to prepare for trial when department of protective and regulatory services made clear its intent to pursue dualtrack of both termination and reunification 3: recognizing that upon request a district court may remove the guardian ad litem andor  appoint another guardian ad litem to protect the childrens interests 4: holding that the recommendations of the childrens caseworker and guardian ad litem coupled with evidence of the mothers extensive drug history her incompletion of courtordered services and testimony that the children were happy and doing well in their foster homes were sufficient for the trial court to determine that termination of parental rights was in the childrens best interest


Input: 121 S.Ct. 365. The Court reached this holding on the bases that the property at issue had to be property that was valuable in the hands of the victim, not just valuable in the hands of the defendant, and that an unissued video poker bcense did not constitute property that was valuable in the hands of the State of Louisiana. Id. at 22-27, 121 S.Ct. 365. In contrast to the facts in Cleveland, because a government has a property right in tax revenues when they accrue, see Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co., 338 U.S. 561, 566, 70 S.Ct. 386, 9.4 L.Ed. 346 (1950), the tax revenues owed Canada and the Province of Ontario by reason of the Defendants’ conduct in the present case constitute property for purposes of the wire fraud statute. United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 495 (4th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis' ádded). Indeed, the Court in Holdings: 0: holding that sales puffery cannot constitute mail fraud to support rico claim 1: recognizing that a mailing must be sufficiently related to the fraudulent scheme to support a charge of mail fraud 2: holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language 3: holding that the first element of mail fraud  knowing participation in a scheme to defraud  can extend beyond the specific mailing and that the loss calculation for a mail fraud conviction may include any loss from the fraudulent scheme that the mailing furthered 4: holding that plain language of the mail fraud statute condemns any scheme to defraud in which the mails are employed including the evasion of  sales and use taxes


Input: Co., 120 F.R.D. 82, 86-87 (N.D.Ind.1987)); Aiken v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 151 F.R.D. 621, 623 n. 2 (E.D.Tex.1993) (citing Shields v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 864 F.2d 379, 382 (5th Cir.1989); United States v. AT & T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C.Cir.1980)). Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the burden of proving waiver of work-product protection falls on the party asserting waiver. See High Tech Communications, 1995 WL 83614, at *5. C. Joint Defense Privilege The “joint defense” privilege, sometimes called the “common interest” or “community of interest” rule is not an independent privilege, but merely an exception to the general rule that no privilege attaches to communications that are made in the presence of or disclosed to a third party. See In re Auclair, 961 F.2d at 69 (<HOLDING>); LTV, 89 F.R.D. at 604 (The joint defense Holdings: 0: holding that the joint defense privilege preserved the attorneyclient privilege against waiver in the context of a group with common interests seeking common representation 1: holding that an invocation of the advice of counsel defense waives the attorneyclient privilege 2: holding that failure to timely assert attorneyclient privilege constitutes waiver 3: holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege 4: recognizing privilege


Input: that the statute be read to mean that a mailing must occur at any time, but not later than three days after posting. See, e.g., Jensen v. Nelson, 19 N.W.2d 596, 598-99 (Iowa 1945) (ruling that where testator had willed a portion of his estate to the county to build a courthouse if the building was completed within ten years after the testator’s death, the estate must furnish the money where the building was completed between the writing of the will and death of the testator); Tanzilli v. Casassa, 324 Mass. 113, 85 N.E.2d 220, 221 (1949) (permitting appeal of a zoning board decision prior to the rendering of that decision, where statute said the appeal must be made within fifteen days after the decision of the board); Reifke v. State, 31 A.D.2d 67, 296 N.Y.S.2d 667, 669-70 (1968) (<HOLDING>); Adams v. Ingalls Packing Co., 30 Wash.2d 282, Holdings: 0: holding that an action cannot be maintained under young in unique circumstances where the suit against the state officer affects an essential attribute of state sovereignty in a manner that the action must be understood as one against the state 1: holding that in the absence of an adequate state remedy one whose constitutional rights are violated has a direct claim against the state under the state constitution 2: holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law 3: holding that a property owner can make a claim against the state prior to the completion of the state action where statute says claim must be made within six months after completion of the action by the state 4: holding that the actual amount of capital employed in the state by a foreign corporation was to be based on the property of the corporation that was within the state and that was used in business transacted within the state


Input: of its status as that of a mail carrier similar to the U.S. Postal Service would, in any event, not be availing in its bid for immunity. Cf. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 408, 117 S.Ct. at 2106 (rejecting defendant's argument that "[sjince private prison guards perform the same work as state prison guards, ..., they must require immunity to a similar degree”); cf. also id. at 409, 117 S.Ct. at 2106 (stating that approach based on primary activity of private defendants "bristles with difficulty, particularly since, in many areas, government and private industry may engage in fundamentally similar activities, ranging from electricity production, to waste disposal, to even mail delivery ” (emphasis added)). 32 . Cf. Warner v. Grand County, 57 F.3d 962, 965-67 (10th Cir.1995) (pre-Richardson) (<HOLDING>); Sherman v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 Holdings: 0: holding that director of crisis center who was private individual and who acted under color of state law by conducting strip search of female detainees for contraband at request of police officer had qualified immunity from  1983 suit arising out of searches because she acted as agent of officer who also had qualified immunity 1: holding under facts presented that probation officer was entitled to at least qualified immunity 2: holding that private attorney who acted as courtappointed counsel for child in state juvenile delinquency proceedings was not acting under color of state law 3: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 4: holding that officer had qualified immunity from  1983 action brought by arrestee because officer had probable cause to arrest based on statements of a witness store clerk who signed a criminal information and deposition detailing the theft and establishing each of the elements of the crime of larceny


Input: step one allows, and perhaps requires, consideration of legislative history in determining “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue”, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843; and • an analysis of the additional question we have to answer after Brand X, 545 U.S. at 984: Did the Supreme Court hold in Colony that its interpretation of the key phrase “omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein” is “the only permissible reading” of the statute? We agree with the majority that it is wise for us as a trial court to avoid the issue of what level of deference to give this regulation. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 96, 180-181 (2006) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (listing circuit conflicts), vacated and remanded 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). We are particularly cautious about the Holdings: 0: holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority 1: holding ceq regulations entitled to substantial deference 2: holding regulations entitled to chevron deference 3: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 4: holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency


Input: conduct sales, merely that it can be viewed by potential customers. Moreover, Boschetto does not allege that any of the Defendants made any other eBay sales or posted listings either before or after the initiation of the lawsuit. While it might be jurisdictionally relevant if Hansing or the Boucher Defendants had used eBay to conduct a significant quantity of automobile sales to California residents or in other states, neither Boschetto’s complaint nor his affidavit allege that any of the Defendants are engaged in such sales. The denial of Bos-chetto’s request for discovery, which was based on little more than a hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally relevant facts, was not an abuse of discretion. See Butcher’s Union Local No. 198 v. SDC Inn, Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion The sale of one automobile Holdings: 0: holding that while as a general matter discovery should be freely permitted  j jurisdictional discovery is justified only if the plaintiff reasonably demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations through discovery 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to extend discovery where no effort was made to explain why the requested discovery could not have taken place within the original discovery period 2: holding that it was within the trial courts discretion to refuse any additional discovery and that the courts refusal to allow additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion 3: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiffs state only that they believe discovery will enable them to demonstrate sufficient california business contacts to establish the courts personal jurisdiction 4: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law


Input: private agreement that lured his investment. D'Amico also testified that Freeman attended the meeting at which Sudeen explained the structure of the investment. D’Amico's check was deposited in one of Sudeen’s accounts for which Freeman was a signatory, the funds of which were traced to lulling payments that Freeman made to other investors. 8 . United. States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 766 (5th Cir.1994) ("We have held that in some cases the likelihood of criminal wrongdoing is so high, and the circumstance surrounding a defendant’s activities and cohorts are so suspicious, that a failure to conduct further inquiry or inspection can justify the inclusion of the deliberate ignorance instruction.") (internal citations omitted); see United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 967 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Stouffer, 986 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding no deliberate indifference when a failure to take reasonable measures was due to defendants mistake 1: holding that the deliberate indifference instruction was appropriate where the defendant handled calls from irate loan applicants who received no money but made only made a trivial attempt to discern whether anything was wrong 2: holding that disgorgement was appropriate only as to the profits made prior to the time insider information was made public 3: holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs 4: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given


Input: (3) the blameworthiness of the actor; (4) the nature and severity of the potential penalties for a violation of the law. Id. Applying this analytical framework, we must determine whether Minn.Stat. § 609.165 is criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory. Recently, we addressed this exact issue in an unpublished opinion in State v. Bellanger, No. A06-1907, 2007 WL 4472287, at *l-*2 (Minn.App. Dec. 24, 2007), review denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2008), and concluded that Minn.Stat. § 609.165 was criminal/prohibitory. Although not prece-dential, we find the reasoning in Bellanger to be persuasive, and we adopt it here. See Minn.Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2008) (“[Ujnpublished opinions of the court of appeals are not precedential.”); Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). In Bellanger, we held that Minn.Stat. § Holdings: 0: holding that a duty to disclose did not arise under the special facts doctrine where while there may have been concealment of opinions there was no concealment of the facts upon which those opinions were based and de fendants were not bound to volunteer their opinions citation and internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding in an unpublished opinion that manifest disregard survives hall street as a nonstatutory ground for vacatur 2: holding that a taxpayer is required to present  substantial and persuasive evidence that the boards valuation is erroneous 3: holding that unpublished opinions may be persuasive 4: holding that direct evidence of a fact is not necessary and that circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient but may also be more certain satisfying and persuasive


Input: of both types of aggravated robbery, and Terry pled guilty to conspiracy to commit both. Hence, Terry was convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery in contravention of section 18-4-302(a) and (b). Because aggravated robbery under section 18-4-302(b) is a per se crime of violence under the reasoning of this court’s holding in Alonzo Terry, conspiracy to commit that crime “is itself a crime of violence” under section 18-2-201(4.5). Therefore, under our holding today, Terry must be sentenced according to the provisions of section 16-11-309(1)(a), resulting in a minimum lawful sentence of five years. We thus affirm the court of appeals’ order vacating Terry’s sentence, and we remand this ease for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 . 791 P.2d 374 (Colo.1990) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Section 16-11-309 crimes of violence are Holdings: 0: holding different rule applicable for conviction of second degree murder 1: holding that fourthdegree aggravated assault is a violent felony 2: holding that consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault where the assault occurred in the context of a prison fight between inmates 3: holding that a high degree of foreseeability is required to impose a duty to hire security guards and that the requisite degree of foreseeability rarely if ever can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the landowners premises 4: holding that a reference to the violent crime sentencing statute in the second degree assault statute required automatic imposition of violent crime sentencing for a defendant convicted of second degree assault


Input: judicial or quasi-judicial function, as was the case in Lyons. Rather, Showers alleges that Musson negligently performed its excavation, construction, and drainage responsibilities under the contract. Specifically, Showers' complaint alleges that Musson is liable for "improper drainage, . . . maintenance, excavation, construction procedures, and failure to take corrective measures." ¶ 53. These assertions are fundamentally different from the assertion that a governmental entity negligently selected a design that a contractor imple mented for a government project. Design selection is a type of governmental entity decision that we have determined is within the legislative or quasi-legislative function immunized under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). See, e.g., Chart, 57 Wis. 2d at 100-01 (<HOLDING>); Lange v. Town of Norway, 77 Wis. 2d 313, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision 1: recognizing that the decision to undertake a project or how to design the project may be immunized as the exercise of a legislative or quasilegislative function 2: holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission 3: holding that a zoning decision pertaining to a specific property is not a legislative act but is rather quasijudicial in nature 4: recognizing legislative or quasilegislative nature of design decision


Input: 12(e); Wallace, 597 F.3d at 798; United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 692 (6th Cir.2009) (“Thus, because the record reveals that Deitz failed to file a Rule 14(a) motion prior to trial, he waived his objection.”); see also United States v. Rox, 692 F.2d 453, 454 (6th Cir.1982) (determining that the defendant waived her objection to misjoinder when she failed to raise the issue until the third day of trial and could not challenge the allegedly improper joinder on appeal). A court may grant relief from the waiver “[f]or good cause,” Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(e); Wallace, 597 F.3d at 798, where the defendant can “articulare] some compelling reason for not filing the motion within the deadline,” United States v. Walden, 625 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir.2010); see also Wallace, 597 F.3d at 798-99 (<HOLDING>). The defendant did not file a motion to sever Holdings: 0: holding that the verdict must stand because defendant waived her right   has suffered no constitutional harm as a result of all charges being tried together in a single trial and failed to make  any substantive objections to the allegedly improper joinder quoting abboud 438 f3d at 567 1: holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal 2: holding that a communication between the judge and juror which is unrelated to the case being tried is not improper and prejudicial 3: holding that a defendant was entitled to a transcript of the trial of codefendants who were tried together and convicted where one of the convictions was reversed on the ground of reasonable doubt 4: holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue


Input: 630 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir.1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A compromise verdict results when jurors resolve their inability to make a determination with any certainty or unanim of damages was not inadequate as a matter of law because the parties did not stipulate to a minimum amount of damages and the evidence at trial did not indisputably set a range of monetary recovery. But there need not be an agreed-upon damages range for an award to be inadequate. See Mekdeci 711 F.2d at 1514 (finding that the zero dollars in damages awarded by the jury to an injured child was inadequate because defendant never disputed the child’s damages and the evidence was uncontroverted). The other required indicia of a compromise verdict are also present here. See Westminster, 12 So.3d at 842 (<HOLDING>); Newalk v. Florida Supermarkets, Inc., 610 Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating 1: holding that there was an impermissible compromise where the damages award was inadequate liability was hotly contested at trial the jury was deadlocked the court charged the jury to continue deliberating to reach a decision and less than one hour later the jury returned a verdict 2: holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury 3: holding that there was an impermissible compromise because the damages award was inadequate and liability was hotly disputed by the parties and struggled over by the jury 4: holding that jurys damagesrelated questions and verdict of liability with clearly inadequate damages of only medical expenses but no noneconomic damages in case where liability was hotly contested strongly suggested compromised verdict


Input: to defense counsel” must be disclosed to the defendant when no request has been made, but it limited that holding to evidence “obviously of such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a specific request.” Id. at 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392. The courts of appeals, including the Sixth Circuit, have attached an additional gloss to the Brady rule. “ ‘[T]here is no Brady violation if the defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of the information in question, or if the information was available to him from another source.’ ” Jones v. Bagley, 696 F.3d 475, 487 (6th Cir.2012) (quoting Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir.2000)); see also Doan v. Carter, 548 F.3d 449, 460 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). To be entitled to a new trial under Brady, Holdings: 0: holding as brady violation prosecutions failure to disclose to defense that prosecution had agreed not to prosecute key witness in exchange for his testimony at trial 1: holding that the failure to disclose evidence known to the defense cannot form the basis of a brady violation 2: holding failure of prosecution to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the accused is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 3: holding that the brady rule encompasses evidence known only to police investigators but not the prosecutor 4: holding that the prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession


Input: P. 9(g). As a practical matter, the effect of a trial court’s finding that a defendant is mentally retarded is that the State loses the option to pursue the death penalty. Once a defendant is tried and judgment is entered, the State has no appeal as of right under the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tenn. R.App. P. 3(c) (providing for State’s appeal as of right in limited circumstances, not including a trial court’s finding that a defendant is mentally retarded). Furthermore, even if a defendant were to appeal on other grounds and successfully obtain a retrial, the State would arguably be barred by principles of double jeopardy from seeking the death penalty in subsequent sentencing proceedings. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, denying the State an Holdings: 0: holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law but conviction was later reversed neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty 1: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty 2: holding that a defendant must have notice that the trial court might sentence him to death 3: holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error 4: holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing


Input: The defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by not appointing him counsel for his sentencing hearing, citing to case law holding that where the sentencing error is due to judicial error the defendant is entitled to representation. See Nickerson v, State, 927 So.2d 114, 117 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). The State concedes that a defendant is generally entitled to counsel at sentencing or re-sentencing. See Cross v. State, 18 So.3d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (stating that a defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney at resentencing). However, the State argues that the defendant was not entitled to the appointment of counsel because the trial court’s actions were ministerial. See generally Frost v. State, 769 So.2d 443, 444 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); Navarrete v. State, 707 So.2d 803, 804 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that a trial courts changing of the written sentence to conform with the oral pronouncement of sentence is ministerial 1: holding that the failure of a written sentence to conform to the courts oral pronouncement cannot be raised in a rule 3800a motion 2: holding that the trial courts oral pronouncement must conform to the written judgment 3: holding written judgment must conform to oral pronouncement 4: holding that in cases of direct conflict between a courts oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment the oral pronouncement controls


Input: 133 S.Ct. at 2082. We remand for resentencing so as not to pretermit the trial judge’s role in exercising the full discretion the law provides. B. The three other Olano factors also support vacatur and remand for resentencing here: The ex post facto violation was plain, it affected Head’s substantial rights, and it impaired the integrity of the sentencing proceeding. 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The district court’s error was “plain.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. In this circuit, one circumstance in which an error may be plain is “if, at the time it was made, a clear precedent in the Supreme Court or this circuit established its erroneous character.” United States v. Terrell, 696 F.3d 1257, 1260 (D.C.Cir.2012); see In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851 (D.C.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). In January 2012, when the district court Holdings: 0: holding that an error can be plain even in the absence of binding case law where it violates an absolutely clear legal norm 1: holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error 2: holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious 3: holding that a trial court does not commit plain error unless the error is clear under current law 4: holding that an error cannot be plain unless it is clear under current law quotation omitted


Input: as natural persons. 12 U.S.C.A. § 24. "While apparently never decided in Tennessee, courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that the NBA preempts -state statutes requiring a national bank to register or obtain a certificate of authority before transacting business in a state. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City First Bank of D.C., N.A., 88 A.3d 142, 143-44 (D.C. 2014) (finding that the NBA preempted a statute that prevented a foreign entity from maintaining an action in the District of Columbia unless it registered to do business in the District because such a requirement infringed on national banks’ ability to maintain suits “as fully as natural persons” in accordance with the NBA); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Baker, 204 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 502, 506 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (<HOLDING>); 770 PPR, L.L.C. v. TJCV Land Trust, 30 So.3d Holdings: 0: holding a federal law permitting national banks to sell insurance in towns with less than 5000 residents preempted a state statute prohibiting banks from selling most types of insurance 1: holding that an iowa statute requiring a foreign corporation to hold a certificate of authority to transact business in the state was preempted by the nba as the statute pertained to national banks because it infringed on the powers provided to national banks by the nba 2: holding that the nba preempted application of a texas statute that would infringe on a national banks federally granted right to sue in any court as fully as natural persons by requiring the bank to obtain a certificate of authority before it could maintain a suit in texas 3: holding that a florida statute requiring a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to transacting business in the state was preempted as it applied to national banks 4: holding that the nba preempted a kentucky statute that re quired a national bank as a foreign corporation transacting business in the state to obtain a certificate of authority prior to maintaining suit in a kentucky court as it significantly impaired the banks exercise of authority under the nba


Input: action under § 113(f). The Supreme Court stated that, for the purposes of the case before it, “it suffices to demonstrate that costs incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by way of § 107(a)(4)(B), and costs of reimbursement to another person pursuant to a legal judgment or settlement are recoverable only under § 113(f). Id. The Court noted, however, that it was not suggesting that §§ 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) do not have any overlap at all. Id. at 2338 n. 6. The Court noted that a PRP may sustain expenses pursuant to a consent decree following a suit under § 106 or § 107(a): “In such a case, the PRP does not incur costs voluntarily but does not reimburse the costs of another party.” The Court did “not decide whether these compelled ., 565 F.Supp.2d 399, 402 (N.D.N.Y.2008) (<HOLDING>); New York v. Next Millennium Realty, LLC, No. Holdings: 0: holding that under the identical rule of professional conduct in alaska slinee the rule limits the clients authority to those decisions it follows that the lawyer has the ultimate authority to make other decisions governing trial tactiecsincluding whether to request lesser included offenses 1: holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant 2: holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions 3: holding that there is nothing for a court to review when an agency has never issued a final and binding judgment that has the force of law 4: holding that nothing in atlantic research provides authority to change the circuits previous decisions holding that a party that has incurred expenditures under a consent order with a government agency and has been found partially liable under  113f1 may not seek to recoup those expenditures under section 107a


Input: for a sweep that requires information to justify it in the first place”). {15} Our review of the testimony at the suppression hearing indicates an absence of any facts suggesting the presence of, much less any danger posed by, other persons on the scene. Burrell admitted he had no facts to suggest that anyone else was in the house, and he admitted that he neither saw nor heard any movement in the house. To the extent other agents conducted surveillance of the residence before Burrell arrived, they also failed to detect the presence of any other persons. We therefore conclude that the search was unwarranted because there was no evidence to support any specific safety concerns involving any other persons at the arrest scene. See United States v. Chaves, 169 F.3d 687, 692 (11th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). {16} The State contends that other courts Holdings: 0: holding that the protective sweep of a van was lawful where officers stopped the van on reasonable suspicion that the driver had just committed an armed bank robbery and officers could not see inside the van to determine whether other occupants posed a danger to them 1: holding that the officers were justified in conducting a protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest on outstanding warrants because the officers had information that the defendant was suspected of running a methamphetamine operation on the premises other people were living there and assisting the defendant and at the time the sweep began the defendant had not yet been located 2: holding that officers were not justified in conducting a protective sweep of the suspects garage and backyard incident to his arrest for possession of marijuana in the back yard because the government pointed to no specific articulable facts suggesting that someone else was on the premises who posed a danger to the officers 3: holding that in the absence of specific and articulable facts showing that another individual who posed a danger to the officers or others was inside the warehouse the officers lack of information could not justify the warrantless sweep and dismissing the governments argument that someone must have been guarding the cocaine inside the warehouse as the kind of unparticularized suspicion or hunch that buie held was insufficient to justify a warrantless sweep internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: holding that the officers awareness that the defendant could be dangerous and that he had a previous weapons conviction was not enough to justify the sweep because once the defendant was in custody he no longer posed a threat to the police


Input: enforcement agencies, who theoretically could have stopped the supervisor. Id. at 537. In those circumstances, the Cudney court could not say the actions the employee took were the ‘only available adequate means’ to protect the public from drunk driving. Id. at 536-38. ¶16 Then, in Piel v. City of Federal Way, 177 Wn.2d 604, 609-17, 306 P.3d 879 (2013), our Supreme Court held the administrative remedies available through the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) under chapter 41.56 RCW were inadequate, on their own, to fully vindicate public policy when a public employer discharges a public employee for asserting collective bargaining rights. Unlike Korslund and Cudney, Piel involved a prior case holding PERC remedies failed to fully address th 474, 478-79, 276 P.3d 382 (2012) (<HOLDING>), remanded, 180 Wn.2d 1001. Division One of Holdings: 0: holding that the remedies available under massachusetts law to challenge tax assessments were sufficient to preclude federal declaratory action 1: holding the employee remedies available under the commercial motor vehicle safety act 49 usc  31105 adequately protected truck drivers who refuse to violate commercial motor vehicle safety laws even though a statute declared these remedies do not preclude others 2: holding that deprivation of personal property does not violate the constitution if there are adequate state remedies available 3: holding that the remedies are exclusive 4: holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted


Input: of the purchase price owed under the contract was not excused. Question 4 included no grounds for excusing Bartush’s failure to comply with the agreement except the existence of a prior material breach by Cimco; other grounds for excusing Bartush’s failure to comply were submitted in question 5, and the jury answered no to that question also. See, e.g., Tex. Standard Oil & Gas, L.P. v. Frankel Offshore Energy, Inc., 394 S.W.3d 753, 779 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (refusing to construe jury’s answer to excuse question as finding that party’s first-occurring breach was immaterial when excuse question combined prior-material-breach ground with other excuse grounds); Miller v. Kennedy & Minshew, Prof'l Corp., 142 S.W.3d 325, 341 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, although the court’s charge Holdings: 0: recognizing that where a plaintiff failed to perform because of the defendants breach the plaintiff could recover damages caused by the defendants breach 1: holding unchallenged jury finding that defendants subsequentlyoccurring breach was not excused by plaintiffs prior material breach required defendant to pay plaintiff per the terms of the agreement 2: holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract 3: holding plaintiff not required to perform its residual contract obligations after defendants material breach 4: holding that after jury findings of dual breach unchallenged finding that defendants breach was not excused based on prior material breach of plaintiff constituted implicit finding that there was no material breach by plaintiff


Input: any defect in the aircraft or component part — ceases to be material or admissible in any civil action[.] H.Rep. No. 103-525(11), at 6, reprinted in 1994, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1994, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 1648 (emphasis added). 16 . Here, it appears to be undisputed that the replacement parts alleged to have caused the accident were not manufactured by Appellants or supplied by them within the eighteen-year period. See Plaintiffs' Mem orandum of Law In Support of Their Response In Opposition To Defendant Textron Lycoming's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5 (acknowledging that Appellants did not manufacture the carburetor installed on the accident aircraft at the time of the crash); id. at 21 (same, with respect to the other allegedly defective parts); id. at 15 & Exhibits T, U (<HOLDING>). It should be noted that Appellants now Holdings: 0: recognizing that reviewing court considers effect of charge on jury rather than component parts 1: recognizing that the overhaul in which relevant replacement parts were installed was not undertaken by appellants but rather was accomplished by mattituck airbase inc 2: holding that a defendants right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions 3: holding that 1 even if some conduct is not actionable as securities fraud that conduct cannot support a civil rico claim if it was also undertaken in connection with the purchase of a security and 2 conduct in maintaining ponzi scheme was conduct undertaken in connection with the purchase or sale of securities 4: recognizing that delancie implied that secret monitoring of conversations between detainees and visitors undertaken for the purpose of gathering evidence for use in criminal proceedings rather than to maintain the security of the jail was unlawful


Input: evidence of extraneous offenses of delivery of narcotics and possession of weapons to be admitted with no objection). Here, Garcia’s counsel repeatedly elicited or opened the door to evidence that set his client up for impeachment by the State and damaged Garcia’s credibility with the jury. Given the inherently prejudicial nature of extraneous offense evidence, the fact that the evidence would not have been otherwise admissible by the State during guilt/innocence, and the fact that Garcia’s defense rested almost entirely on his credibility, there could have been no reasonable trial strategy for Garcia’s counsel to elicit and open the door to the similar extraneous offense and the numerous instances of “bad acts.” See Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 484-86 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d 128, Holdings: 0: holding that where defense turned on defendants credibility there could be no strategic basis for allowing jury to hear defendant had prior conviction for same offense for which he was being tried and concluding counsel rendered ineffective assistance 1: holding that where defense depended on defendants credibility there was no possible reasonable strategy and defense counsel rendered deficient performance by intentionally eliciting and opening the door to otherwise inadmissible and clearly prejudicial evidence of defen dants current incarceration on two prior convictions one of which involved similar conduct to the charged offense during the guiltinnocence phase 2: holding trial record affirmatively showed defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by purposefully eliciting testimony as to defendants remote prior conviction for a different offense where there could be no possible reasonable strategy because defendants credibility was crucial to his alibi defense 3: holding counsel deficient because she could have had no reasonable basis for not objecting to certain inadmissible evidence despite no evidence of counsels strategy 4: holding that defense counsel opened the door to the prosecutions questioning of the defendant about prior convictions when defense counsel asked a prosecution witness whether he was aware that the defendant was  a convicted felon


Input: on the merits.” Ibid, Settled law holds that these relaxed evidentiary standards permit a district court to consider hearsay at the preliminary injunction stage. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 412 n. 8 (7th Cir.1991) (“[Hjearsay can be considered in entering a, preliminary injunction.”); Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2nd Cir.2010) (“hearsay evidence may be considered by a district court in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction”); Levi Strauss & Co, v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir.1995) (“At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction.”); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). As the First Circuit explained: “Affidavits Holdings: 0: holding that a court may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence including hearsay evidence at the preliminary injunction stage 1: holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial 2: holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction 3: holding otherwise inadmissible evidence supporting employers good faith in a wrongful discharge claim was not hearsay 4: holding that court can consider inadmissible evidence in the context of a motion for preliminary injunction


Input: ADEA claims. We reject PwC’s construction of the worksharing agreement for another reason: it would effectively rewrite the ADEA’s administrative prerequisites, making them traps for the unwary, poised to spring into action and deny those who may have suffered employment discrimination their right to seek redress in federal court. Indeed, the Supreme Court has announced “a guiding principle for construing the provisions of Title VII,” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 397, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982), which applies with equal force to the ADEA: a technical reading of the statute’s filing requirements is “particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.” Love, 404 U.S. at 527, 92 S.Ct. 616 (<HOLDING>); see also Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 755, 99 Holdings: 0: holding that unreviewed state administrative proceedings do not have preclusive effect on title vii claim 1: holding that a title vii claimant need not refile a charge after termination of state proceedings 2: holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii 3: holding that the antiretaliation provision of title vii reaches to employees who involuntarily participate in such proceedings and employees who do not seek to assist title vii claimant 4: holding that arbitration agreement that did not provide for award of attorney fees to successful title vii claimant was unenforceable because the right to attorneys fees  is central to the ability of persons to seek redress from violations of title vii


Input: for refund with the IRS for the amount of tax at issue. See 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (stating that “[n]o suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, ..., until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary ... ”). Third, a plaintiff is required to provide the amount, date, and place of each payment to be refunded, as well as a copy of the refund claim, when filing a refund suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims. See RCFC 9(h)(6). Failure to plead that a timely refund claim has been filed, even in pro se actions, deprives the United States Court of Federal Claims of jurisdiction. See Wozniak v. United States, 618 F.2d 119 (Ct.Cl.1979) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff has not satisfied the prerequisites Holdings: 0: holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them 1: holding that a tax refund claim must be dismissed if the principal tax deficiency has not been paid in full 2: holding that the taxpayer met the claim requirement where the taxpayer first filed a timely letter with the irs that requested a refund and subsequently filed a formal refund claim 3: holding that refund suit for tax imposed in violation of export clause filed beyond applicable period of limitations was barred where claimant had failed to first present timely administrative claim to internal revenue service even though there was little  if any  reason to believe that claim would have been granted 4: holding that even in a pro se tax suit a timely claim for refund must be filed to invoke the courts jurisdiction


Input: of the bill she sent had a tendency to expose Lieberman to “hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy,” or injury in her occupation. Copp v. Paxton, 45 Cal.App.4th 829, 839, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 831 (1996). Lieberman failed to demonstrate any such defamatory meaning, and the allegedly inaccurate statement as to the amount of the bill thus cannot sustain a slander claim. Lieberman’s other two examples of “explicit” factual assertions made by Fieger are equally unavailing because they constitute protected opinion. Fieger’s statement that the criminal court “laughed at her and gave her zero” merely offers a hyperbolic and colorful description of the actual outcome: the court denied the request for expert witness fees. See Ferlauto v. Hamsher, 74 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 843 (1999) (<HOLDING>). In Lieberman’s ease, as in Ferlauto, Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties 1: holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified 2: holding that statements that the judge laughed at their motion and thought their motion was a joke merely provided colorful descriptions of the incontestable fact that the court indeed denied the motion 3: holding that if there is any issue of fact which remains upon a motion for summary judgment the motion must be denied 4: holding that a district court judge to whom a case had been reassigned could grant the defendants motion for summary judgment after the previous judge had denied the motion


Input: a government actor under the facts of this case under a “functional” or “federal action” analysis. Hall correctly points out that the Red Cross has been considered a government instrumentality in tax immunity cases. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359-60, 87 S.Ct. 464, 467-68, 17 L.Ed.2d 414 (1966); United States v. City of Spokane, 918 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir.1990). However, this fact is not dispositive of the issues presented here. The question of whether a corporation is performing sufficient secondary or derivative government functions to be shielded from state taxation under M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) is a far different question from whether it is subject to a constitutional restriction against burdening 127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). As with many other government-chartered Holdings: 0: recognizing statutory credit 1: holding that credit for social security old age and survivor benefits does not also include credit for federal disability benefits 2: recognizing that stateimposed restrictions upon property may be attributed to the federal government for purposes of a takings analysis where the state officials acted as agents of the federal government or pursuant to federal authority 3: holding a federal credit union not to be a government actor for constitutional purposes 4: holding that amtrak is an agency of the government  for purposes of the constitutional obligations of government


Input: and the court granted a running 404(b) objection to the extraneous evidence regarding Cantu’s previous drug use. D. Analysis Cantu’s defense included informing the jury that Jackie had, during past arguments, taken a gun and placed it to her head. The State attempted to rebut that defensive theory by showing that the previous fights were over Cantu’s drug use and this incident was different because the drug test taken after Jackie’s death showed Cantu was not on drugs. The State’s evidence of Cantu’s previous drug use generally would be inadmissible under Rule 404(b), but because the State used it to rebut Cantu’s defensive theory, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the evidence admissible. See Tex.R. Evid. 404(a), (b); Moses, 105 S.W.3d at 626 (<HOLDING>); Albrecht, 486 S.W.2d at 100 (“Probably the Holdings: 0: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in its admitting extraneous evidence to rebut a defensive theory 1: holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony 2: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting highly probative and relevant evidence of other crimes 3: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a transcript of a recording even though defense counsel did not stipulate to its accuracy 4: holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence


Input: Id. First, the communication must be “predecisional;” in other words, it must be “antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy.” Jordan, 591 F.2d at 774; Access Reports v. Dep’t of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1194 (D.C.Cir.1991). In determining whether a document is predecisional, an agency does not necessarily have to point specifically to a final decision, but need only establish “what deliberative-process is involved, and the role played by the documents in issue in the course of that process.” Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 868. In other words, as long as a document is generated as part of such a continuing process of agency decision-making, the deliberative-process protections of Exemption 5 may be applicable. Id.; Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 39 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Second, the communication must be Holdings: 0: holding that a document is predecisional if it was prepared to assist an agency in arriving at a decision rather than supporting a decision already made 1: holding that a guidance document is not binding where it provided only a list of factors the agency would consider rather than a clear statement of policy 2: recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision 3: holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review 4: holding that guidelines although advisory and only one factor among others to be considered in arriving at a reasonable sentence are entitled to substantial weight in the sentencing decision


Input: woman ingests a controlled substance that continues to affect the child postpartum; specifically, the child tests positive for a controlled substance following birth. The offense of endangerment of a child under N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-22.2(2) states: “a person who knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or vulnerable adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia ... is guilty of a class C felony.” The State conceded in oral argument that none of the Defendants committed any act exposing her child postpartum, but rather argued the prenatal act of each defendant continued to affect her child postpartum. The State argues that a child is still “exposed” to the controlled substanc 0 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893 Holdings: 0: recognizing the unique relationship between mother and child during pregnancy and birth and permitting mothers claim for emotional distress where the mothers emotional wellbeing and the birth of the child are inextricably intertwined 1: holding child abuse statute clearly did not apply to fetuses and therefore did not apply to a mother who ingested cocaine during pregnancy 2: holding ohios child endangerment statute does not apply to mothers who abuse drugs during pregnancy 3: holding a criminal charge of endangerment of a child does not apply to a pregnant woman who ingests an illegal substance that results in the transmission of drugs to her child through the umbilical cord 4: holding an unborn viable fetus is not a human being under the new mexico child abuse statute and the mothers use of cocaine during pregnancy was not child abuse