Input: Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 162. Although Rule 39 provides for joinder in mandatory terms, “there is no arbitrary standard or precise formula for determining whether a particular person falls within its provision.” Cooper v. Tex. Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 204 (Tex.1974); see Kodiak Res., Inc., 361 S.W.3d at 248-49; Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 180. In this regard, we note that the trial court has “broad” discretion in deciding matters regarding joinder. Royal Petroleum Corp. v. Dennis, 160 Tex. 392, 332 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex.1960); Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 180. Similarly, the standard of review on severance is abuse of discretion. In re Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.). Appellees assert that joinder of the McAdams and Chilcoat 477 (1942) (<HOLDING>); Kodiak Res., Inc., 361 S.W.3d at 248-49 Holdings: 0: recognizing that other courts have applied rule 8b to cases involving multiple defendants but stating that it seems to us that contrary to the jurisprudence in other circuits when a joinder of offenses charged against the same defendant is challenged the literal meaning of the rule 8 requires application of rule 8a irrespective of whether multiple defendants are involved in the case 1: holding under prior rule regarding joinder that royalty owners under the other lease contracts in a unitized block are necessary parties to suit under prior version of rule 39 2: holding that a case may be dismissed sua sponte under rule 12b6 prior to service without motion by defendants or briefing by the parties 3: recognizing rule 4: holding that a necessary party under rule 19a would be entitled a priori to intervene as of right under rule 24a


Input: requires that the property be acquired in joint names of husband and wife.”) (quoting Fratangelo v. Fratangelo, 360 Pa.Super. 487, 498, 520 A.2d 1195, 1201 (Pa.Super.Ct.1987)); Augello v. United States, No. 1:92-CV-697, 1993 WL 330472, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 1993) (“Under Pennsylvania law, a tenancy by the entirety is a special form of co-ownership that arises between husband and wife when property is placed in the name of both spouses.”); United States v. Cusumano, No. 90-00091-01, 1991 WL 274835, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 18, 1991) (“Property acquired in the names of both husband and wife is presumed to be held by the entireties, and the placing of property in the names of both spouses, without more, creates an entirety estate.”); Raffaele v. Granger, 100 F.Supp. 390, 391 (W.D.Pa.1951) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir.1952). The Holdings: 0: holding that property held by husband and wife in tenancy by entirety cannot be reached by husbands creditors absent fraud 1: holding that bank accounts in husbands and wifes joint names were property in a tenancy by the entirety 2: holding that husband and wifes failure to recite marital status in the deed did not defeat tenancy by the entirety 3: holding that contents of joint bank accounts which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant were sufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion 4: holding that where bank account titled in the names of two married persons a presumption arises that both hold the funds in the account as a tenancy by the entirety


Input: the domain of expert testimony. The weight to be given such an opinion is for the finder of fact, in this case the commissioner, and that may be affected by the completeness of the premise given the expert and other surrounding circumstances. (Internal citations omitted.) The deputy’s reference to the physicians’ opinions reflects that he accepted such opinion and gave weight to it so as to find causation in this case. While the deputy’s findings of fact could have expanded on the details of causation, his reference to the opinion of the two treating physicians was sufficient. The deputy’s analysis adequately supports the deputy’s conclusion that the mental injury was compensable due to a traumatic work-related injury. See Mortimer v. Fruehauf Corp., 502 N.W.2d 12, 17 (Iowa 1993) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, a remand for further findings and Holdings: 0: holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable 1: holding that sexual assault of a minor resulting in psychological harm may be compensable under the tca even in the absence of personal injury 2: recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury 3: holding that psychological trauma resulting from abuse that impedes disclosure does not constitute mental incapacity for purposes of statute of limitations 4: holding in aggravated sexual assault case that testimony regarding psychological trauma suffered by child victim and its physical manifestations properly admitted


Input: acts because of the information she obtained as a public employee.” Kelly v. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 09-CV-2101 (JFB) (ETB), 2012 WL 1077677, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012). In the face of this clear and consistent case law, plaintiff was unable, in either her brief or at oral argument, to cite a single decision holding that speech analogous to the e-mails at issue here is protected under the First Amendment. Thus, pursuant to Garcetti and its progeny, the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that plaintiff was speaking as a public employee, rather than as a private citizen, in her internal correspondence to District employees. See Nadolecki v. William Floyd Union Free Sch. District, No. 15-CV-2915 (JMA) (AYS), 2016 WL 4768823, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2016) (<HOLDING>), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs complaints  were all pursuant to his official duties as a teacher because he made complaints regarding the reading program integration of classes the math curriculum special accommodations and services having to do with student ieps and the effects that scheduling cuts would have on his math class 1: holding that an official has defrauded the public of his services if he secretly makes an official decision based on his own personal interests rather than the best interests of his constituents 2: holding that a plaintiff did not complain to the eeoc pursuant to official duties but rather as a citizen 3: holding that a seventeenyearold student lacked the capacity to consent to engage in sexual conduct with a teacher and consequently her allegations of a seeminglyconsensual sexual relationship with the teacher were sufficient to state a  1983 claim based on a violation of substantive due process 4: holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law


Input: regard as improper[.]” Id. at 419. The same test for undue influence applies to wills and deeds, although the absence of independent advice may be more significant in the case of deeds than wills. Ryan v. Colombo, 77 Or App 71, 77, 712 P2d 139 (1985) (citations omitted). In such cases, the first question is whether there was a confidential relationship, in which the testator placed confidence in the beneficiary and the beneficiary exercised dominance over the testator. Knutsen v. Krippendorf, 124 Or App 299, 308, 862 P2d 509 (1993), rev den, 318 Or 381 (1994). Plaintiffs contend that, given Wilma’s role in administering Jack’s medication and taking him to medical appointments, among other factors, there was a confidential relationship. See In re Reddaway’s Estate, 214 Or at 421 (<HOLDING>); Ramsey v. Taylor, 166 Or App 241, 262-63, 999 Holdings: 0: holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave 1: holding as a general rule that a bank and its customers do not have a special or confidential relationship 2: holding that the physicianpatient relationship terminated when the patient missed a scheduled appointment and did not see the physician again and that the relationship did not continue despite the fact the patient later secured a refill of a prescription that was prescribed during the relationship 3: holding special relationship existed between caregiver and developmentally disabled individual 4: recognizing that a caregiver and patient relationship may be confidential


Input: to defectively record their mortgage in reliance on a settled expectation that they could avoid the bank’s lien. We next address the presumption that an amendment altering a prior statute suggests that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the law “unless it clearly appears that the amendment was passed to clarify the legislature’s original intent.” Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Indiana Dept. of Ins., 868 N.E.2d 50, 56 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (citing Wright v. Fowler, 459 N.E.2d 386, 389-90 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (interpreting an amendment to have changed the law in part because the assembly added categories of employers to the statute and separately added provisions to provide procedures for addressing those employers)); Olatunji v. State, 788 N.E.2d 1268, 1272 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court of Indiana recently muddied Holdings: 0: holding that a legislative amendment that appeared to approve the analysis of a recent indiana supreme court case was a clarification rather than an amendment 1: holding district court erred in relying on authority other than that of the supreme court of the united states in its analysis under  2254d 2: holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case 3: holding that the 2010 amendment was a clarification 4: holding that the supreme court of pennsylvania is a state entity for purposes of the eleventh amendment


Input: did not provide transcripts from the hearing where the order was entered; her appeal only notes the order granting possession to the Trust, and at the sanctions hearings (transcripts of which Crockett did provide) she did not object to the entry of the order, only to the subsequent grant of possession. Even mindful that Crockett is proceeding pro se, we are unable to assess the initial entry of the protective order both because the point is raised for the first time on appeal, and because we have no record by which to evaluate the trial court’s exercise of discretion. See Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, 799 A.2d 381, 388 (D.C.2002) (arguments not raised below are normally spurned on appeal); Van Durr v. Kator & Scott, Chartered, 788 A.2d 579, 580-81 (D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Dudley Trust Found., 675 A.2d 45, Holdings: 0: holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond 1: holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial 2: holding petitioners pro se status did not constitute adequate cause for failure to raise claims earlier 3: holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se 4: holding that this court was unable to reach alleged errors where pro se appellant did not provide an adequate record


Input: applied the relevant substantive law. Id. The grant of summary judgment in this case is reviewed in light of the quite summary procedural requirements provided by the statutory law of civil forfeitures. United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir.1983). 3 . Ordinarily, collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the party seeking to use it, or else it is waived. See, e.g., Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 840 F.2d 730, 735 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948, 109 S.Ct. 378, 102 L.Ed.2d 367 (1988). The government did not brief the issue in this case; however, we raise it sua sponte in order to affirm the district court’s decision. See Russell v. SunAmerica Sec., Inc., 962 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The preclusive effect of a state court Holdings: 0: holding that sua sponte grant of summary judgment without notice to the parties constitutes reversible error 1: holding that the court can raise res judicata sua sponte even on appeal 2: holding that district courts sua sponte grant of summary judgment to nonmoving party is an accepted method of expediting litigation 3: recognizing that in the interest of judicial economy res judicata may properly be raised by a district court sua sponte particularly where both actions are brought in the courts of the same district 4: holding that a court can raise the issue of res judicata sua sponte in order to affirm a grant of summary judgment


Input: “[n]ot all exceptional treatment is persecution.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir.2000). For example, in Zheng v. United States Att’y Gen., 451 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam), we held that the petitioner, who was dragged by his arms to a detention yard, detained for five days, forced to watch reeducation videos, to stand in the sun for two hours, and to sign a pledge not to practice his religion, failed to establish past persecution. Id. at 1289-92. Because Zheng had presented no evidence that he was physically injured, we concluded that the “five-day detention during which he was not harmed [did] not compel the conclusion that he experienced past persecution.” Id. at 1290; see also Djonda v. United States Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Tawm v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 740, Holdings: 0: holding that insults harassment death threats and a beating did not compel eligibility for withholding of removal 1: holding that evidence of kidnapping at gunpoint interrogation and beating did not compel finding of persecution 2: holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution 3: holding that minor abuse during brief detention did not compel finding of past persecution 4: holding that a minor beating even in conjunction with threats did not compel a finding of persecution


Input: negligent misrepresentation, estoppel, and breach of contract claims when the assignee sued only in its capacity as a third party health care provider). Defendant therefore misapplies the general rule of exclusivity to the facts of this case, which resemble those in The Meadows. In that case, an assignee of the plan participant filed negligent misrepresentation, estoppel, and breach of contract claims against the plan. The district court dismissed the action, stating that because the plaintiff sued in its capacity as assign-ee, ERISA preempted the state law claims. Id. at 1008. When the plaintiff filed similar claims based on its status as a third party provider, however, and not as an assignee, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s remand of the case to state court, /¿(<HOLDING>). In its complaint, its motion for remand, and Holdings: 0: holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted 1: holding the state law claims were not preempted 2: holding that state law fraud claims are preempted by the federal labor law duty of fair representation 3: holding state law fraud and deceit claims to be preempted 4: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law


Input: to the superior court “for appointment of mental health experts,” Ariz. R.Crim. P. 11.2(d), the supreme court evinced its intent that, once a court has made the reasonable grounds finding, the matter move on to the next phase of the Rule 11 process and the issue of a defendant’s competency be determined after full proceedings consistent with the rule. See, e.g., Ariz. R.Crim. P. 11.3(a) (requiring court to appoint two or more mental health experts upon finding reasonable grounds for examination exist). Were we to interpret Rule 11.2 as permitting the superior court to review another court’s reasonable grounds finding, we would be inserting words into the rule that do not exist. This we cannot and will not do. See Cervantes v. Cates, 206 Ariz. 178, ¶ 24, 76 P.3d 449, 455 (App.2003) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14 For the reasons stated, we conclude the Holdings: 0: holding rules of appellate procedure are obviously procedural in nature 1: recognizing appellate courts are not free to rewrite rules 2: recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings 3: recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts 4: holding that where both the appellate and trial courts are reviewing the paper record  there is no reason for the appellate courts to defer to the trial courts finding


Input: each factor.” Hemmer, 729 F.2d at 17; see also Wellington, 102 F.3d at 506 (explaining that a district court is “not required to weigh all statutory factors equally” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts have unanimously held that a district court does not abuse its discretion in placing primary emphasis on the gravity of the juvenile’s offense. See Hemmer, 729 F.2d at 18 (“In light of the gravity of the crime involved [ (armed robbery) ], weighed against the other five section 5032 factors, we cannot say that the district court struck the balance improperly.”); see also Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 307 (explaining that “[t]he seriousness of the offense, for instance, can be given more weight than other factors” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wellington, 102 F.3d at 506 (<HOLDING>); A.R., 38 F.3d at 705 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that a district court is entitled to give more weight to the seriousness of the offense than to other factors 1: holding that a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived for failure to present the issue first to the trial court 2: holding that the weight of a classification determination depends upon all those factors which give it power to persuade 3: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 4: holding that a secured creditor is not entitled to receive any more than that to which it was entitled pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan


Input: “the mere imposition of hardship on family relationships ... necessarily accompanies the order of any prison sentence”). Here, the district court explained that a below-Guidelines sentence was warranted because the Guidelines range was based on Edwards’s intended loss, not the actual loss he caused. But it is unexceptional that the actual losses were less than the intended losses. I expect the amount the run-of-the-mill thief intends to steal is usually greater than the amount he actually steals. The fact that the losses attributed to Edwards were intended rather than actual simply reflects the fact that Edwards got caught. He should not benefit from that fact. Fourth, we should consider whether the district court “base[d] the sentence on impermissible factors.” Hunt, 521 F.3d at 649 (<HOLDING>). Here, although the district court’s sentence Holdings: 0: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint 1: holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention 2: recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard 3: holding that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a belowguidelines sentence in part because it disagreed with the jurys finding that the defendant had the intent to defraud 4: holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it


Input: tire had at one time possessed confidential information for the construction of OTR’s Outrigger tire. The district court therefore drew a reasonable inference that West, through its manufacturer, improperly used trade secrets related to OTR’s Outrigger tire. See id. 3. The district court did not clearly err in finding that OTR was likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. Loss of control over business reputation and damage to goodwill are cognizable irreparable harms in the trademark infringement context. See Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir.2013). Although the district court’s finding of reputational injury was not based on any evidence that West’s lookalike tire was an inferior product, see id. at 1250-21 (<HOLDING>), the court’s finding of goodwill injury was Holdings: 0: holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative 1: holding that temporaryinjunction orders simple recitation of conclusory statement that plaintiff will suffer an irreparable injury for which it has no other adequate legal remedy does not satisfy rule 683s requirement that a temporary injunction order specify reasons why plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law 2: holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate 3: holding that likelihood of irreparable harm must be based on evidence in the record not unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm the plaintiff might suffer 4: holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief


Input: lot. Finally, the third paragraph again declares that Tilbury I and Tilbury II are separate lots that could be remodeled or replaced subject to compliance with the current Deed Restrictions’ regulations on matters such as building materials, color, and location relative to the setback lines. Plaintiffs contend the declaratory judgment does not duplicate their preexisting pleadings because, in their view, these declarations deal with future rights. As explained above, however, the declarations focus on present compliance with the Deed Restrictions. Moreover, to the extent these declarations have future operation, they duplicate the relief plaintiffs sought by injunction. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Luxemburg, 93 S.W.3d 410, 425-26 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs also cite cases addressing the Holdings: 0: recognizing that a party can obtain declaratory relief but still not be entitled to an award of attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act 1: holding that the case was not moot even though claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were no longer alive because the plaintiff had requested pecuniary relief 2: holding plaintiff had no right to recover attorneys fees under declaratory judgments act because declarations requested no greater or different relief than claim for injunctive relief for constitutional violation 3: holding attorneys fees waived in lawsuit brought under declaratory judgments act to interpret statute 4: holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending


Input: should be made only rarely, and because the Court has already adjusted downward Class Counsels’ rates and hours to make them reasonable, the Court DECLINES to make any adjustment to the lodestar figure. See Clark, 803 F.2d at 990-91 (1986). Accordingly, the Court awards attorneys’ fees in the amount of $197,318.27. II. Costs “An award of standard costs in federal district court is normally governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), even in diversity cases.” Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., 342 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.2003) (citation omitted); see Drumm v. Morningstar, Inc., 695 F.Supp.2d 1014 (N.D.Cal.2010) (“Since the awarding of costs here is procedural, not substantive, federal law governs.”); In re Glacier Bay, 746 F.Supp. 1379, 1393-94 (D.Alaska 1990) (<HOLDING>). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) Holdings: 0: holding that judgment based on terms of settlement agreement must be interpreted under law of contracts rather than law of judgments 1: holding that state court with jurisdiction over  301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law 2: holding that federal circuit would henceforth apply its own law rather than regional circuit law to questions involving the relationship between patent law and other federal and state law rights 3: holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law 4: holding that federal law regarding costs applies rather than more generously interpreted state law


Input: ... mitigation.”). In either event, this court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ or DEP on this issue. In this appeal, the Authority argues that section 373. urance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)). While the Authority cites to legislative history that seems to indicate that the legislature’s intent was to require the mitigation to “fully offset” the adverse impacts, the statute as enacted does not contain that language, and this court cannot rewrite the statute to say so. See State v. Jett, 626 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1993) (“It is a settled rule of statutory construction that unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction, however wise it may seem to alter the plain language.”); Ervin v. Collins, 85 So.2d 852, 855 (Fla.1956) (<HOLDING>). Ironically the statute itself, as written, Holdings: 0: holding that it is not 1: holding that speculation as to how the evidence might have been beneficial was not enough 2: holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous 3: holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law 4: holding that the court is not permitted to revise an unambiguous statute by engrafting  our views as to how it should have been written


Input: principles, this Court has long recognized three categories of police interactions with private citizens: (1) a full-scale arrest, which requires probable cause, see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209-10, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 277 (Tenn.2012); (2) a brief investigatory detention, requiring reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Tenn. 2012); and (3) a brief police-citizen encounter, requiring no objective justification, see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746, 756 (Tenn.2011). See United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d at 656; State v. Holdings: 0: recognizing that warrantless arrests with probable cause do not give rise to  1983 claims 1: holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry 2: holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry 3: holding that police officers warrantless search of rented home with consent of landlord but not tenant violated tenants fourth amendment rights 4: recognizing a threetier analysis for warrantless encounters with police


Input: and definite promise that the parties would enter into a legally executable lease that would induce detrimental reliance by Andersen. See Moore, 2007 WL 2331021, at *6-7 (rejecting a landlord’s claim that a tenant’s promise that he “will start putting the package together ... [the tenant] would like to get this in the June 17th meeting for approval.... This is a busy time for everyone ..., but lets get this deal done, behind us, and open!” was a “clear and definite promise”). Andersen argues that Kranz’ internal e-mail to Gower on February 25 was a clear and definite promise that FCOA would sign the lease. However, this cannot constitute a clear and definite promise because the promisee must be aware of the promisor’s promise. See Johnson v. Pattison, 185 N.W.2d 790, 795-96 (Iowa 1971) (<HOLDING>). Even if Kranz’ e-mail constituted a clear and Holdings: 0: holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence 1: holding that promissory estoppel existed when the grantor agreed to use the property for only residential purposes took title with knowledge of that promise and the grantee relied upon that agreement 2: holding that any promise involving real property is enforceable only if that promise meets the requirements of the statute 3: holding when a deed provides grantee would take subject to the state of facts which a personal inspection or accurate survey would disclose grantee has no claim against grantor for power line easement 4: holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title


Input: tenants, and brokers verified that the increased proximity decreased the building’s market value. Further, contrary to the court of appeals’ conclusion, there is evidence that other landowners in the area did not suffer the same injuries. The land north of INP was vacant, and the properties south of INP endured only minor changes. Additionally, there is no evidence that the frontage road’s relocation impaired the perceived safety of any buildings on those properties or placed them in violation of city ordinances or deed restrictions. And, in any event, even if the condemnation did affect some neighboring landowners similarly, “injury to several landowners on the same street is not community injury simply because they all suffer alike.” Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 781. In sum, .1965) (<HOLDING>). The court of appeals agreed with the State Holdings: 0: recognizing no right to damages if landowner retains reasonable access to property after a condemnation 1: holding that where by virtue of state action access is limited but remains reasonable there is no such denial of access as entitles the landowner to compensation 2: holding that landowner was entitled to compensation because the condemnation destroyed all reasonable access to remainder property 3: holding that in condemnation proceedings the landowner has the burden of establishing the value of the property 4: recognizing when a lease terminates upon condemnation tenant is entitled to no compensation for loss of leasehold interest


Input: Thus, Blair extended Bassler beyond its reach. Neither Blair nor Bassler offers authority for the proposition that the Borrowers need a private right of action under Section 7(d) or Section 29(b) in order to assert an affirmative defense that the Notes are void and unenforceable because they violate Section 7(d) and Regulations G and U. No private right of action under a statute is necessary to assert a violation of that statute as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 86, 102 S.Ct. 851, 70 L.Ed.2d 833 (1982) (allowing defense under § 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act where defendant had no private right of action to enforce the statute); United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 566, 81 S.Ct. 294, 5 L.Ed.2d 268 (1961) (<HOLDING>); E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 Holdings: 0: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 1: holding conflict of interest on the part of a government official who participated in contract negotiations in violation of federal law rendered contract unenforceable 2: holding an administrative rule referred to in the contract became part of the contract under the doctrine of incorporation 3: holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable 4: recognizing an exception to the conflict rule where the conflict arose after the award of the contract


Input: formal County policies or longstanding County practices. a. Seizure under § 5150 It is undisputed that Deputy Perez made the decision to take Harvey into custody pursuant to § 5150. Section 5150 provides that “[w]hen any person, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled, a peace officer [or other designated persons] may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into custody and place him or her in a facility designated by the county and approved by the State Department of Mental Health as a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation.” See Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code § 5150. The lawfulness of a detention under § 5150 is measured by Fourth Amendment standards. See Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); People v. Triplett, 144 Cal.App.3d 283, 287, Holdings: 0: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same 1: holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest 2: holding seizure of suspected mentally ill person for psychiatric evaluation is analogous to a criminal arrest and must therefore be supported by probable cause 3: recognizing that an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person has been is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity to frisk an individual for weapons and must have probable cause to conduct a further seizure 4: recognizing that an immigration arrest and detention needs to be supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion


Input: position on what constitutes "examined.” 6 . According to Citrix’s invalidity expert Dr. Jeffay, the name "ReadMe” was a play on the Alice in Wonderland story, in which Alice confronts magical treats labeled "Eat Me” and "Drink Me.” 7 . However, courts have found software manuals to be sufficiently enabling. See Microstrategy Inc. v. Bus. Objects Americas, 410 F.Supp.2d 348, 362-63 (D.Del.2006), aff'd, 238 Fed.Appx. 605 (Fed.Cir.2007) ("manuals are themselves prior art and provide clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support a conclusion of invalidity”). 8 . Because the Court will limit its analysis to prior public use, Pixion's reliance on cases concerned only with prior publication is unavailing. See e.g. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). 9 . See also Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Holdings: 0: holding prior publication must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim internal citations omitted 1: holding that the elements of a hostile work environment claim are the same across discrimination contexts and applying those elements specifically to the age discrimination in employment act 2: holding that apprendi leaves undisturbed the principle that while the prosecution must indeed prove all the elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt the legislation creating the offense can place the burden of proving affirmative defenses on the defendant internal citations omitted 3: holding that the creditor must prove the elements of actual fraud 4: holding that the plaintiffs failure to meet any one of the elements requires dismissal of claim


Input: cannot dispose of the tortious interference counts. See doc. 184, at 55 n. 88. 13 . See amended complaint, doc. 172, ¶ 19.3(d) (allegation (7)); ¶ 19.3(c)-(d) (all other allegations). 14 . See Burton v. Linotype Co., 556 So.2d 1126, 1128 (Fla.3d DCA 1989) (“Fraud in the inducement and deceit are independent torts for which compensatory and punitive damages may be recovered”), citing Sprayberry v. Sheffield Auto & Truck Serv., Inc., 422 So.2d 1073 (Fla.lst DCA 1982) (“[0]ne who has been fraudulently induced into a contract may elect to stand by that contract and sue for damages for the fraud”); accord, Gold v. Wolkowitz, 430 So.2d 556, 557 (Fla.3d DCA 1983), review denied, 437 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1983); see also Wallis v. South Florida Savings Bank, 574 So.2d 1108, 1110 (Fla.2d DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>); Lou Brachrodt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Savage, 570 Holdings: 0: recognizing fraud in the inducement claims independent of contract claims without discussion of economic loss rule 1: holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property  damage claims 2: holding economic loss rule did not bar recovery of tort damages on statutory fraud claim based upon fraudulent inducement 3: holding that the public harm requirement applies to fraudulent inducement claims because the fraud claims arise from related contract claims 4: holding that the economic loss rule does not preclude independent tort claims that fall outside the scope of a breach of contract


Input: capacity to make that choice intelligently and understanding^,’ any subsequent plea should be deemed involuntary as a matter of law and the appellate court would have the authority to reverse absent a motion to withdraw or a contemporaneous objection. Id. at 213 (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.165(b)(2)). A. Case number 2014-CJ-655 The unverified “I choose to represent myself’ form and the trial court’s five questions to D.A.C. are inadequate to constitute the “thorough” waiver of counsel required by rule 8.165(b)(2). See T.G., 800 So.2d at 211 (“Although the inquiry for juveniles must be at least equal to that accorded adults, courts should be even more eáreful when accepting a waiver of counsel from juveniles.”); A.S. v. State, 62 So.3d 695, 697 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>); G.T. v. State, 948 So.2d 900, 902 (Fla. 2d Holdings: 0: holding that lower courts misunderstood the requirement for finding a valid waiver of the right to counsel where neither the trial court nor the arizona supreme court undertook to focus on whether edwards understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it 1: holding fundamental error occurred because the trial court failed to inquire thoroughly whether the juvenile understood her right to counsel and had the capacity to intelligently choose to waive counsel and failed to obtain the required verified written waiver 2: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel 3: holding that accused must competently and intelligently waive the right to counsel 4: holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel


Input: 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Further, Sattler cannot demonstrate a legitimate claim of entitlement to a particular prison grievance procedure. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988). Sattler’s claim that he did not receive adequate notice that prison regulations prohibited being naked in his cell, however, may have merit. Due process requires fair notice of prohibited conduct before a sanction can be imposed. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949-50, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988). Although “indecent exposure” was proscribed in the prison’s regulation on sexual misconduct, it is not clear that this prohibition would include Sattler’s nudity within the confines of his own cell. See United States v. Christopher, 700 F.2d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). To the extent Sattler has alleged a due Holdings: 0: holding that a regulation must sufficiently convey the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices to avoid unconstitutional vagueness 1: holding that interpretation of regulation by va that conflicted with plain meaning of regulation not entitled to deference 2: holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot because the regulation had been substantially amended 3: holding that the taxpayer sufficiently tendered its unconstitutional vagueness challenge against the boards regulation in the claim for a refund 4: holding that ojrdinarily when a regulation is not promulgated in compliance with the apa the regulation is invalid however when equity demands the regulation can be left in place while the agency follows the necessary procedures citation omitted


Input: giving rise to their complaint occurred. 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1309, at 696 (2d ed.1990). In some cases, however, the substantive na ture of the lawsuit and the general rules of pleading require the plaintiff to allege when defendant’s illegal acts occurred. Id. Significantly, courts have required that a plaintiff plead time when the events in question spanned a number of years and when the date plaintiff discovered his injury appeared to be remote in time. See, e.g., Bankest Imports, Inc. v. ISCA Corporation, 717 F.Supp. 1537 (S.D.Fla.1989) (requiring a more definite statement of time and place where events underlying breach of contract claim spanned seven years); Stewart Coach Indus., Inc. v. Moore, 512 F.Supp. 879 (D.Ohio 1981) (<HOLDING>). A claim that the applicable statute of Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs did not plead fraud where the complaint only alleged a breach of fiduciary duty 1: holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud 2: holding that the time of discovery of fraud is not a proper matter for summary judgment 3: recognizing that the risk of fraud or corruption is more remote at the petition stage of an initiative than at the time of balloting 4: holding that a plaintiff has a duty to plead the date of discovery of fraud where the alleged fraud apparently occurred at a remote time


Input: is not.’ ” Id. (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188, 96 S.Ct. 2909) (alteration in original). In the case of statutory aggravating circumstances in a capital punishment scheme, a circumstance may be so vague as to provide no such meaningful basis for distinguishing a death penalty case from other murders and, thereby, run afoul of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. Such “[c]laims of vagueness ... characteristically assert that the challenged provision fails adequately to inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty and as a result leaves them and appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid in Furman.” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-362, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29, 100 Holdings: 0: holding that heinous atrocious or cruel is unconstitutionally vague language 1: holding that oklahomas especially heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague 2: holding that there is no serious argument that the especially heinous cruel or depraved aggravating factor is not facially vague 3: recognizing that north carolinas heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance requires a limiting construction 4: holding unconstitutionally vague under the reasoning of godfrey an aggravatingcircumstances instruction directing jurors to determine whether the murder was especially heinous atrocious and cruel


Input: and the objective reasonableness of the expectation of privacy considering the specific facts of the case.” Gomez, 16 F.3d at 256. See also, McCaster, 193 F.3d at 83-84 (8th Cir.1997) (finding abandonment where the defendant told officers bag was not his and that he had never seen it before). Even without this express disclaimer by Defendant, the seizure and search of the trash bag would still not be subject to suppression. The Supreme Court held in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988), that there is no expectation of privacy in a trash bag left in an area accessible by others, including animals, children, scavengers and members of the public. Id. 486 U.S. at 40, 108 S.Ct. 1625; accord, United States v. Trice, 864 F.2d 1421, 1423-24 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The lack of an expectation of privacy is even Holdings: 0: holding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of plastic bags placed in or near his open garbage cans and that the police did not violate his fourth amendment rights in seizing and searching the bags where they were able to do so without trespassing on the defendants property 1: holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street 2: holding that while the necessary regulation of garbage must compel a person to reasonably expect that a licensed trash collector will remove his garbage this expectation does not also infer an expectation of governmental intrusion 3: holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed in trash cans 4: holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage located outside curtilage of home


Input: doctrine as codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107. (Def.’s’ Br. at 2). In support of their fair-use defense argument, the defendants have submitted video of the original WWITB video and the South Park episode “Canada on Strike.” (Docket # 10). Ordinarily, courts may not rely upon materials outside of the pleadings when considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). There is an exception to this general rule, however, where the material in question is expressly referenced in the complaint and is central to the plaintiffs claim. See Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir.2002); see generally Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Here, there is no doubt that the two videos Holdings: 0: holding that in considering a rule 12b6 motion a court may only rely on the complaint its proper attachments documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice 1: holding that a court may consider documents that have not been incorporated by reference where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect which renders the document integral to the complaint 2: holding that a court may rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice in deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 3: recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice 4: holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint


Input: that Ann. § 1.201(b)(10) (Vernon Supp.2006) (defining “conspicuous” for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code). Nothing appears on the face of the two-page, single-spaced “Bank of America Mortgage Addendum to Contract” to attract the attention of a reasonable person to the jury waiver provision when he looks at the addendum. See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex.1993) (recognizing that to be conspicuous, something must appear on the face of the contract to attract the attention of a reasonable person when he looks at it). Nor did Martin or Powell initial the waiver provision, which would have established their actual knowledge of the waiver. See, e.g., Sydlik v. REEIII, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 329, 332-33 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, factor six, the conspicuousness Holdings: 0: holding that signatorys initials by specific indem nity provision established signatorys actual knowledge of provision 1: holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them 2: holding that question was within arbitration provision because provision contained no specific language precluding arbitrators from reaching question 3: holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision 4: holding that fehbas complete preemption provision closely resembles erisas express preemption provision and precedent interpreting the erisa provision thus provides authority for cases involving the fehba provision


Input: in essence a volunteer to reimbursement of attorney and accounting fees is not an absurd result. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Lamie has pointed the way toward a strict reading of parts of the Code dealing with compensation. See Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004). It is true that section 503(b) is “inclusive” in its listing of administrative expenses. See Code §§ 503(b), 102(3). However, the specificity (and exclusive language) of section 503(b)(4) suggests a limited scope for that category of expense. Moreover, section 503(b)(4) represents a limited exception to the general rule that general unsecured creditors are not entitled to payment for professional fees incurred. See In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). For all these reasons, the court holds the Holdings: 0: holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case 1: holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client 2: holding that a creditors attorney must ordinarily look to its own client for payment 3: holding that an attorney could obtain a judgment for attorney fees against his own client in the divorce division of the circuit court of cook county where there was no objection 4: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client


Input: trial court to strike the improper findings of violation). AFFIRMED and REMANDED with directions. WOLF, C.J.; PADOVANO and POLSTON, JJ., concur. 1 . The State argues that the trial court’s finding that appellant violated his probation by leaving the scene of a traffic accident involving property damage was permissible because leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage only, in violation of section 316.061, Florida Statutes (2002), is a lessor included offense of leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, in violation of section 316,027 (2002). The trial court did not, however, find that appellant committed a lesser offense. Rather, it found that appellant committed both offenses. This cannot be so. See Peterson v. State, 775 So.2d 376, 377-78 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The Appellant also argues that the trial Holdings: 0: holding that an automobile dealers liability insurer was not liable for any damage allegedly caused by the negligence of the dealer and sustained in an accident involving an automobile purchased from the dealer or to defend the dealer in the negligence action where the injury occurred outside of the policy period and occurrence was defined in the policy as an accident including injurious exposure to conditions which results during the policy period in bodily injury or property damages   1: holding that the defendant was guilty of leaving the scene because the injured party and a police officer were present at the scene within a reasonable time after the accident 2: holding that the words at the scene   imply a specific place    and limit rather than expand the officers power to arrest and the scene is the place where the accident occurred 3: holding scene of accident was suspicious place 4: holding that convictions for both leaving the scene of an accident involving injury and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage only were inconsistent and therefore could not be sustained


Input: and remand the case to the district court. Riley and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J. 1 MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1). 2 MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i). 3 Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, ante, p 482, n 11, defendant has not been charged with conspiracy to deliver narcotics to Hoyt in Florida or in Michigan. Defendant is charged with conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver, and possession with intent to deliver does not logically require two persons for its completion. A conspiracy between Hoyt and his Michigan partner already existed before Hoyt traveled to Florida to purchase cocaine. It is this preexisting Michigan conspiracy that the prosecutor alleges that Blume became a member of by all y murder, 50 U Chi LR 1431, 1433-1439 (1983) (<HOLDING>). 11 LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (2d ed), § Holdings: 0: recognizing six bases territorial national protective universal passive personality and objective territorial 1: recognizing common law privileges 2: recognizing four bases territorial roman injured forum cosmopolitan 3: recognizing three bases common law or territorial significant activity and integral relation 4: recognizing five bases territorial national protective universal and passive personality


Input: understanding of the English language and the complexity of the proceedings, issues, and testimony. United States v. Khehra, 396 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir.2005). Applying those factors, the court in Khehra did not find error in the trial court’s refusal to appoint an interpreter for a defendant whose native language was a Punjabi dialect, but who communicated in English to his customers and vendors on a regular basis, failed to assert any problem with communication, informed his counsel that he did not need an interpreter, had evidence presented against him at trial of him communicating in English while committing the alleged crime, and did not have a complex trial. Id. Similarly, in United States v. Osuna, 3 Fed.Appx. 739, 740-41 (10th Cir.2001), cert. de 2d 505, 508-09 (1989) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied, superseded on other grounds by Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court was under no obligation to appoint an interpreter where defendant did not request one and spoke english reasonably well 1: holding that it was not error for a trial court to have failed to provide sua sponte a competent interpreter where counsel did not request one prior to trial and defendant spoke and understood english well enough to conversantly discuss the crime with a police officer and had no trouble answering questions at the sentencing hearing 2: holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys 3: holding that trial court need not appoint an interpreter where counsel indicated that he could communicate with defendant and that defendant could understand questions and answers 4: holding that it was improper when prosecutor posed questions to defense counsel that could have been read as posed only to the defendant and whose answers could only have been provided by the defendant


Input: with our Davis approach of analyzing the testimonial nature of a statement independently of its admissibility under the rules of evidence. See Moore v. State, 169 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Tex.App.-Texarkana July 26, 2005, no pet. h.). 14 . See Spencer v. State, 162 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (witness initiated contact); Wilson v. State, 151 S.W.3d 694, 697-98 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. filed) (finding that admission of non-testifying witness’s self-initiated statements to police officers in response to unstructured questions during the investigation of a crime did not violate Crawford)-, Davis v. State, No. 2-03-305-CR, 2005 WL 183141, at *2, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 712, at *4 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Jan.27, 2005, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Forrest, 164 N.C.App. 272, Holdings: 0: recognizing that not all statements obtained by the police after a person has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of interrogation 1: holding statements by coconspirator nontestimonial and thus admissible 2: holding that certified records of maintenance are nontestimonial and are not prepared for any particular defendant 3: holding that miranda does not apply to statements of the defendant which are voluntary and unsolicited and not the product of custodial interrogation 4: holding that voluntary statements to police initiated by witness are not interrogation and therefore are nontestimonial


Input: (2004). “Common issues ... predominate if they ‘ha[ve] a direct impact on every class member’s effort to establish liability and on every class member’s entitlement to injunctive and monetary relief.’ ” Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1255 (11th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Each party must be able to prove their own individual case, and in so doing, prove the case of the other unnamed class members. See Earnest v. Amoco Oil Co., 859 So.2d 1255, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). If Plaintiffs must still present a great deal of individualized proof or argue individualized legal points to establish most or all of the elements of their claims, class certification is not appropriate. See Klay, 382 F.3d at 1255; see also Terry L. Braun, P.A. v. Campbell, 827 So.2d 261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). A. Failure to prove elements of claims Here, Holdings: 0: holding that fmla does not impose individual liability 1: holding no individual liability under the adea 2: holding that where both liability and damages depend on individual factual determinations claims may only be determined on individual basis 3: holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud 4: holding that there is no individual liability under title vii


Input: the burdens of the regulation upon the interstate market, while excluding similar in-state interests. The court concludes therefore that, in light of the exemption for the local preference, Section 115A.47 is not evenhanded in its application. Further, in support of its argument that the effects of Section 115A.47 are merely incidental, the State asserts that any impact on interstate commerce is small because most waste is already managed in Minnesota. The MPCA estimates that approximately 193,000 tons of Minnesota waste per year, or four percent of the total waste generated in Minnesota, is managed outside of the State. The court finds that this argument misconstrues the nature of the incidental impact on interstate commerce that is permissible. See Waste Systems, 985 F.2d at 1387 (<HOLDING>). The volume of interstate commerce impacted is Holdings: 0: holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss 1: holding under the policy language that diminution of market value is not a cause of loss but a measure of a loss caused by something else 2: holding that the loss of a contract failed to constitute ascertainable loss under cutpa 3: holding that loss of an arm includes loss of the hand 4: holding that the loss of 10400 tons annually was not incidental


Input: harm in order to further the military goals of that organization. Id. at 323-24. Judge Williams focused instead on those who (1) "attempt!] or engage!] in belligerent acts against the United States, either domestically or in a foreign combat zone; (2) on behalf of an enemy force.” Id. at 285. 32 . See generally id. at 230-31 (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment); but see id. at 314-22 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that law-of-war principles must account for recent developments in how warfare is conducted). 33 . Id. at 231 (emphasis added). . 34 . al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 555 U.S. 1066, 129 S.Ct. 680, 172 L.Ed.2d 649 (2008). 35 . al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220, 129 S.Ct. 1545, 173 L.Ed.2d 671. 36 . See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (<HOLDING>); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, P.L. 109-148, Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts have statutory habeas jurisdiction over petitions filed by guantanamo detainees 1: holding section 1252a2c precludes habeas jurisdiction 2: holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to guantanamo 3: holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration 4: holding alien detained as enemy combatant at guantanamo bay has no constitutional right to writ of habeas corpus


Input: manner. See id. IV Finally, Queen challenges his sentence, contending that the district court,.in adjusting his offense level upward by two levels based on perjury, failed to make findings detailed enough to satisfy the requirements for an upward adjustment outlined in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). Under Dunnigan, in. order to make an adjustment for perjury, a court must find that all of the elements of perjury were present in the defendant’s testimony. That is, the court must find that the defendant’s testimony was untruthful as to a material matter, and that, the false testimony was willful. Id. at 94-95, 113 S.Ct. at 1116-17. Although “it is preferable for a district court to address each element of the alleged perju Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of threats or intimidation of a witness is admissible under rule 404b to show consciousness of guilt 1: holding evidence of prior witness intimidation admissible to show criminal intent and guilty conscience 2: recognizing that even evidence of a defendants and a witnesss prior bad acts was admissible to show inter alia the defendants familiarity with the witness 3: holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties 4: holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime


Input: by Pub.L. No. 76-2004, § 4 (eff. July 1, 2004); Pub.L. No. 82-2004, § 2 (eff. July 1, 2004); and Pub.L. No. 2-2005, § 36 (eff. April 25, 2005)). 2 . Ind.Code § 9-30-5-1 (2004). 3 . Ind.Code § 9-30-5-5. 4 . We note that, had the jury found Radiek guilty of both operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class C felony and operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II causing death as a class C felony, the trial court could not have entered judgment of conviction on both verdicts due to double jeopardy principles. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that "[ejnhancement of one offense for the very same harm as another is not permissible.” Carrico v. State, 775 N.E.2d 312, 314 (Ind. 2002); see also Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind.2002) (<HOLDING>). SULLIVAN, Judge, dissenting. The jury did not Holdings: 0: holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory 1: holding that defendants auto theft conviction could serve to support his conviction for auto theft as a class c felony and as a prior unrelated felony conviction under the habitual offender statute 2: holding that where a burglary conviction is elevated to a class a felony based on the same bodily injury that forms the basis of a class b robbery conviction the two cannot stand 3: holding in part that robbery as a class b felony is not necessarily a lesserincluded offense of robbery as a class a felony 4: holding that the defendants homeinvasion robbery conviction violated double jeopardy because it arose from the same incident as the defendants burglary with an assault or battery conviction


Input: the FLSA is the exclusive remedy for FLSA created rights, particularly where the state law claims arise out of the same facts and circumstances as the federal claims, thus the plaintiffs are impermissibly attempting to enforce the FLSA by using Rule 23 to create an opt-out class. Id. at 4-5, 7. According to the defendants, allowing an opt-out class on parallel state law wage and hour claims would frustrate the FLSA’s § 216(b) goal of “limiting private FLSA plaintiffs to employees who asserted claims in their own right and freeing employers of the burden of representative actions.” Id. at 6-7 (quoting Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480(1989)). In contrast, the plaintiffs argue there is no conflict between the 4, 1152-54 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not Holdings: 0: holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim 1: holding that the flsa does not preempt a state law contractual claim that seeks to recover wages for time that is compensable under the contract but not under the flsa 2: holding that the flsa preempted plaintiffs fraud claim 3: holding that the flsa does not preempt state law contract provisions that are more generous than the flsa demands 4: holding under flsa


Input: to rely upon them. However, in each of those cases there was no evidence presented (beyond the fact that the employees commenced or continued to work) that the employees assented to the policies. When an employer offers to restrict its power to discharge, the employee’s assent to the restriction need not be evinced by anything more than commencing or continuing employment. As a matter of public policy, we see no need for any further manifestation of assent. Once the employee has successfully shown that the employer has demonstrated an intent to restrict its power to discharge, absent evidence to the contrary, the court will imply in law that the requirement of mutual assent has been met. There need be no separate factual finding of mutual assent. Accord Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892 (<HOLDING>). In this case, if Paxton made a sufficiently Holdings: 0: holding employer statements of policy can give rise to contractual rights without evidence of mutual agreement 1: holding that mutual mistake as to essential element of plea agreement can invalidate entire agreement 2: holding that the implementation of a policy that violated a consent decree could give rise to contempt proceedings 3: holding that evidence of a cursory investigation can give rise to an inference of an unlawful motive 4: holding that the creation drafting editing or making of the statements at issue can give rise to liability under  10b


Input: and were in any event rescinded before they were enforced; and the last was a prudent precaution for this employer in these circumstances. Kader has demonstrated that an uneasy and stressful environment existed, but he has adduced no evidence to support an inference that his employer intentionally created an intolerable workplace. Kader’s showing is therefore insufficient as a matter of law: a claim.of constructive discharge must be dismissed as a matter of law unless the evidence is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to infer that the employer deliberately created working conditions that were “so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.” Stetson, 995 F.2d at 361 (citations and internal quotations omitted) (<HOLDING>). See also Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding defendants belief that his work was unfairly criticized is not sufficient for constructive discharge 1: holding the claim of constructive discharge does not accrue until an employee resigns 2: recognizing that a constructive discharge claim and a hostile work environment claim are not equivalent because a constructive discharge claim imposes a higher standard 3: holding that employee must prove that the sole reason for their discharge was their filing of a workers compensation claim to prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge under marylands workers compensation act 4: holding no claim for constructive discharge where employee was dissatisfied with his compensation assignments and criticisms of his work but rank and salary were never reduced


Input: in a civil legal malpractice action for breach of contract. In the instant case, the Plaintiffs requested damages “including, but not limited to, the loss of the value of BCA’s stock (estimated to be $2.5M), and the interest and penalties that have accrued on the taxes since July 14, 2006, when the Company was sold [to] Avant.” Amended Complaint, 1/10/11, par. 39. Defendants contend that the above claim for damages is inconsistent with proof of actual loss as required in legal malpractice actions. See Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa.Super. 599, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs’ Holdings: 0: holding breach of fiduciary duty claim is essentially a negligence or professional malpractice claim 1: holding that  the threat of future harm not yet realized is not enough  2: holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages speculative harm or the threat of future harm 3: holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm 4: holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict


Input: filed its petition in the justice court against Basil Brown and all occupants, one of whom was Basil’s wife Yvonne. After Basil and Yvonne signed and filed an answer, the justice court signed a judgment of eviction against Basil. In response, Basil and Yvonne signed and filed a notice of appeal from that judgment pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 749, and Yvonne signed and filed a pauper’s affidavit pursuant to rule 749a. After the case was appealed to the county court at law, Apex amended its petition to name Yvonne as one of the defendants, and Yvonne testified at the de novo trial. Both an appeal bond filed pursuant to rule 749 and a pauper’s affidavit filed pursuant to rule 749a operate as an answer. See Hughes v. Habitat Apts., 860 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex.1993) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Montgomery v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. Holdings: 0: holding paupers affidavit sufficed as a pro se answer 1: holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance 2: holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond 3: holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial 4: holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them


Input: 1 . Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term Disability Plan, 493 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir.2007). 2 . Id. 3 . Id. 4 . Corry v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 499 F.3d 389, 397 (5th Cir.2007). 5 . Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn,-U.S.-,-, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989)). 6 . Ellis v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 394 F.3d 262, 270 n. 18 (5th Cir.2004). 7 . Corry, 499 F.3d at 397 (quoting Ellis, 394 F.3d at 273) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). 8 . Ellis, 394 F.3d at 273. 9 . Bellaire Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 97 F.3d 822, 828 (5th Cir.1996). 10 . Duhon v. Texaco, Inc., 15 F.3d 1302, 1309 (5th Cir.1994). 11 .See Duhon, 15 F.3d at 1308 (<HOLDING>). 12 . See 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1274 Holdings: 0: holding that an employees inability to lift more than 30 to 40 pounds did not substantially limit his ability to engage in ordinary daily activities 1: holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator 2: holding that a plan administrator did not abuse its discretion in denying disability benefits to a sixtyfiveyearold man where medical evidence showed he was capable of performing sedentary to light work despite being unable to squat stoop bend or lift more than twentyfive pounds 3: holding that restrictions that plaintiff not lift more than twentyfive pounds or bend repetitively are not evidence of a permanent impairment that substantially limits any major life activity 4: holding that the plan administrator did not abuse her discretion by denying benefits when faced with conflicting medical reports


Input: R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King, Orín S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 6.9(b) at 824 (3d ed.2007) ("it is not in the sense of shrewdness that Miranda speaks of intelligent waiver, and thus in this context intelligence is not equated with wisdom”) (quoting Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735 (3d Cir.1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 28 . See Dolchok v. State, 639 P.2d 277, 281 (Alaska 1982); Trumbly v. State, 515 P.2d 707, 708 (Alaska 1973); cf. Bowker v. State, 373 P.2d 500, 501-02 (Alaska 1962). 29 . 100 P.3d 440 (Alaska App.2004). 30 .422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). 31 . 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). 32 . Crawford, 100 P.3d at 446-47. 33 . Stock v. State, 191 P.3d 153, 156 (Alaska App.2008); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 86) (<HOLDING>); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 548 A.2d 887, Holdings: 0: holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights 1: holding request to lie down and think about what happened  not a clear invocation of the right to silence 2: holding defendants request to lay down and think about what happened did not constitute invocation of right to silence as not every break in questioning compels renewed administration of the miranda warnings 3: holding a suspects request for some time to think alone was not an invocation of the right to silence 4: holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease


Input: statutes, it does not express a legislative intent to override the double jeopardy principle prohibiting the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense, i.e., a primary offense and one lesser included within it. See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734; Turner, 221 Va. at 529-30, 273 S.E.2d at 46-47. Thus, I would hold the Commonwealth may simultaneously prosecute an individual for aggravated involuntary manslaughter and a lesser-included offense but double jeopardy protections prevent it from imposing multiple punishments for those crimes because (1) they constitute only one offense and (2) the legislature has not clearly expressed an intent to permit the imposition of multiple punishments. Cf. Phillips v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 548, 553, 514 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1999) (<HOLDING>). A second set of interpretations involves the Holdings: 0: holding that in the conviction and sentencing for criminal offenses committed in the course of one criminal episode it is the intent of the legislature that there be a separate conviction and sentence for each criminal offense unless one of the offenses is a degree of the other a necessarily included lesser offense subsumed in the other or both offenses are identical 1: holding that under section 172550 two prior violations of the controlled substances act occurring in the same incident should be treated as one offense and noting that if multiple prior convictions are obtained for violations of the controlled substance act unrelated to one another and not arising out of a single incident there is no prohibition against counting each conviction separately for sentencing purposes 2: recognizing legislature knows difference between prosecution and conviction by noting former jeopardy provisions of code  192294 provide that if the same act be a violation of two or more statutes  conviction under one of such statutes  shall be a bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other or others and holding that if the legislature had intended that the statutory bar apply to  felony cases tried in the circuit court after the resolution in district court of misdemeanor charges arising out of the same act it would have provided that a conviction for a criminal offense arising out of one act would bar a later conviction for another offense arising out of the same act 3: holding that where a conviction is reversed after trial the double jeopardy clause does not bar a government appeal that if successful would only reinstate the conviction and would not subject defendant to a second trial 4: holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law


Input: its character. Woertman v. People, 804 P.2d 188, 190 (Colo.1991). Such evidence "forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury." People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Colo.1994) (quoting United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir.1985)); see People v. Lobato, 187 Colo. 285, 289-90, 530 P.2d 493, 496 (1975) ("[Where ... the events leading up to a crime are a part of the scenario which explain the setting in which it occurred, no error is committed by permitting the jury to view the criminal episode in the context in which it happened."). For example, res gestae evidence can be used to explain the cireumstances surrounding an arrest. People v. Walters, 821 P.2d 887, 890 (Colo.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Evidence considered to be part of the res Holdings: 0: holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 1: holding that sheriffs testimonythat when he arrived on the scene he believed that a crime was occurringwas admissible 2: holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force 3: holding that a defendant charged with voluntary manslaughter would be entitled to an acquittal on the ground of selfdefense if he reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm from which he could save himself only by using deadly force 4: holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave


Input: an ERISA plan administrator to conduct or permit discovery. Id. The district court’s remand for further development of the record indicated that the district court would refuse to uphold the decision to expel the employer on the existing record. Id. But we noted that the pension fund “remain[ed] free, on remand, to confirm or reinstate the expulsion order on the existing record and then defend its decision in the district court. The issue would then be reviewable on appeal from the court’s final judgment.” Id. We then held that “[t]he fact that an interlocutory discovery order may be onerous or inconvenient does not make the order immediately appeal-able under the collateral order doctrine.” Id.; see also Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Liberty relies on Chronister in support of Holdings: 0: holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator 1: holding that an employees claim against plan administrator for denied benefits is preempted 2: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant 3: holding that district courts order remanding an erisa benefits determination to a plan administrator was nonfinal and therefore not appealable after the remand to plan administrator plan participant still could appeal the district courts decision that erisa preempted her state law claim and if successful she would be able to pursue punitive damage 4: holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan


Input: court to Claims Court. In the instant matter, this very court is the proper forum for the proceeding erroneously filed in our district court. That fact should make the case for transfer all the more compelling. This court’s qualification as the proper forum also suggests the appropriateness of our rendering the transfer decision here and now. It would be a curious procedure indeed to remand this aging matter to the district court so that a district judge could decide whether or not to ticket as a “transfer” the parties’ return trip here. Nor is such a convoluted procedure necessary to a fair decision: all the considerations relevant to “the interest of justice” appear from the record to be within our plain view. See Brock v. L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc., 773 F.2d 1377, 1388 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). To assure that we have given that interest Holdings: 0: holding that remand is unnecessary when it is clear that the same decision would have been reached in the absence of the errors 1: holding that it is appropriate to remand to the plan administrator when the administrative record is incomplete 2: holding that remand is unnecessary when only one conclusion is supportable on the record 3: holding that in the absence of demonstrated prejudice remand is unnecessary 4: holding remand unnecessary where outcome is clear as a matter of law


Input: the two-prong test set forth in Terry v. Ohio.” United States v. Nee, 261 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir.2001). “First, we ask whethe not have a key to the closet does not defeat standing because he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the room containing the closet. ORDER The motion to suppress is ALLOWED. 1 . Nearby, on Route 44, the Sheriffs office instituted a ruse called the Sugar Tree stop. A sign states that there is a drug stop ahead with drug-sniffing canines. When cars take the "Sugar Tree” exit, cruisers follow them in order to detect a motor vehicle violation. Once a car is stopped, if the inhabitants don't consent to a search, the car is held until a canine arrives. This practice has been heavily litigated. See United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 827-28 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005, Holdings: 0: holding that the sugar tree checkpoint program violated the fourth amendment when officers operating the checkpoint were instructed to stop every vehicle that took the exit regardless of whether a traffic violation had occurred 1: holding that the sugar tree ruse did not violate the fourth amendment when officers only stopped vehicles for minor traffic violations 2: holding that fourth amendment rights of a passenger of a legally stopped vehicle were not violated by police officers instruction that he remain inside the vehicle during traffic stop after passenger repeatedly tried to exit 3: holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring 4: holding that probable cause to believe the traffic code had been violated rendered the stop reasonable under the fourth amendment regardless of officers subjective intent


Input: days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.” Other circuits have uniformly held that § 3161(b)’s thirty-day rule is not violated “[w]hen a defendant is indicted within the thirty-day period and then re-indicted on identical charges based on identical facts after the expiration of the thirty-day period.” United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 151 (6th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Perez, 845 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir.1988) (finding that initial indictment returned by a grand jury whose term had expired tolled the thirty-day period such that a subsequent valid indictment which was “identical in all material respects to the void indictment” was timely); United States v. Mitchell, 723 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rabb, 680 F.2d 294, 297 (3d Holdings: 0: holding that additional facts in superseding indictment filed more than thirty days after arrest did not violate sta 1: holding that a subsequent indictment does not restart the thirtyday speedy trial clock but rather tolled it when the original indictment was dismissed the thirtyday period again continued to run it did not begin anew the second indictment was then filed before the thirtyday period expired therefore the filing of the second indictment even though filed after thirty days following defendants arrest did not violate his rights under the speedy trial act 2: holding that when first indictment was filed within the thirtyday period there is no speedy trial act violation when a subsequent indictment repeating one charge from the initial indictment and adding other counts is filed outside the thirtyday window 3: holding that when initial indictment was filed within the thirtyday period a superseding indictment filed outside the thirtyday window which did not change the original charges did not violate the speedy trial act 4: holding initial indictment which was subsequently found to be invalid tolled the thirtyday period and superseding indictment alleging different charges based on same fraudulent acts as earlier indictment was therefore timely


Input: the injury became manifest. In the alternative, he asserts that the side effects resulting from the castration represent an injury that is “separate and distinct” from the original mutilation and, accordingly, the cause of action did not accrue until discovery. Since we hold, infra, that Briley’s cause of action against those who participated in the “plea bargain” did not accrue until he discovered the fraud or could have done so in the exercise of reasonable diligence, we need not reach the merits of these assertions. 6 . We are aware of California Code of Civil Procedure § 352 which allows for tolling the limitations period on account of minority, insanity, and imprisonment, none of which, however, is relevant here. See Ney v. State of California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir. 1971) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Indeed, it was a concern for the remedial Holdings: 0: holding that the threeyear statute of limitations applicable to  1983 actions in arkansas governed idea claims 1: holding that a twoyear statute of limitations period applies to all  1983 actions brought in pennsylvania 2: holding that in california the oneyear statute applies to a  1983 action 3: recognizing  3381 as the applicable statute of limitations for  1983 actions brought in california but nevertheless applying  3523 to a case where the plaintiff had been previously imprisoned 4: recognizing a hypothetical situation where california law left a party free to sue on a claim in maryland even after the claim was precluded in california because the california statute of limitations had expired


Input: v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.1996)(en banc) (citation omitted). A reviewing court does not assess the credibility of witnesses, but rather assumes “that the jury resolved all contradictions in testimony in favor of the Government.” Green, 599 F.3d at 367 (quoting United States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1402 (4th Cir.1993)). 1. As a preliminary matter, we reject the notion that Darby’s conviction should be vacated on the conspiracy charge merely because his co-conspirator Melvin Wright was acquitted on the same charge. It is well established that an acquittal of the appellant’s alleged co-conspirator does not necessitate that the appellant’s conviction be vacated. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Collins, 412 F.3d 515, Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant cannot challenge his conviction merely because it is inconsistent with jurys verdict of acquittal on another count 1: holding that a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with the jurys verdict of acquittal on another count citations omitted 2: holding that conviction for seconddegree murder operates as implied acquittal on firstdegree murder count 3: holding that the jurys guilty verdict for the offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a class a misdemeanor was not wholly inconsistent with its acquittal of the defendant on the charge of public intoxication 4: holding that under aspinwall when the trial court submits to the jury a good count  one that is supported by the evidence  and a bad count  one that is not supported by the evidence  and the jury returns a general verdict this court cannot presume that the verdict was returned on the good count in such a case a judgment entered upon the verdict must be reversed


Input: to show bias or motive to lie it probable would have effected the trial’s outcome. In short, the Confrontation Clause error cannot be deem harmless under either the Chapman or Brecht standard. Brief in Supp. of Delayed Application for Leave to Appeal Denial of Mot. for Relief of Judgment at 20-21. As mentioned, it is not clear why the trial but only if its application trenches upon a defendant’s confrontation or due process rights. See Vasquez v. Jones, 496 F.3d 564, 573-74 (6th Cir.2007); Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 736-37 (6th Cir.2000). Those rights can be curtailed if the State has articulated “very substantial” interests served by the limitation on those rights. Vasquez, 496 F.3d at 573; see also Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (<HOLDING>). That begs the question here. The Sixth Holdings: 0: recognizing defendants right to confront witnesses with adequate crossexamination 1: holding that although there is a right to appeal a change in permanency plan that right is not absolute and does not require the stay of a tpr proceeding 2: holding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to jury trial to defendants in serious criminal cases in state courts 3: recognizing that the beyondareasonabledoubt standard of proof is appropriate in criminal cases due to the gravity of the private interests affected and the severe societal loss that occurs when an individual is erroneously subject to criminal punishment 4: holding that the right to confront and to crossexamine is not absolute and may in appropriate cases bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process


Input: where there was no evidence son was dishonest, financially irresponsible or self-dealing, or uncaring and did not tend to her needs); In re Moses, 273 Ga.App. 501, 615 S.E.2d 573 (2005) (affirming trial court's decision to appoint ward’s sister rather than daughter as guardian of the person where although there was statutory preference for children over siblings, evidence showed ward expressed preference for sister and daughter was neglectful and abusive to ward); In re Hodgman, 269 Ga.App. 34, 602 S.E.2d 925 (2004) (finding no abuse of discretion for trial court to depart from statutory preference in appointing guardians where evidence demonstrated son mismanaged ward's assets, acting in a manner contrary to the ward's best interest); Brown v. Storz, 710 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. App. E.D.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Whitton, supra note 5, at Holdings: 0: holding that where the trial court denies a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a child support case the order is unappealable 1: holding that where there is competent evidence to support the courts findings the admission of incompetent evidence is not prejudicial 2: holding evidence supported appointment of mother as guardian of incompetent ward where substantial evidence demonstrated wards spouse was a habitual drunkard 3: holding that the same inference on the same record as that here was supported by substantial evidence 4: holding substantial evidence supported jury finding of abuse of process


Input: constitutional rights, the specific relief which they presently request cannot be granted. We have already determined that the district court is without jurisdiction to review the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision that Guess’ license was properly revoked. Because of this decision, the relief the Patients seek, homeopathic care from Guess, cannot be given. In limiting their prayer for relief to an injunction against the Board’s revocation of Guess’ medical license, to the extent of the relief requested, the Patients become “a litigating agent of a person who was a party to a prior action_” Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449 n. 7 (1981) (citing St. Louis Typographical Union No. 8 v. Herald Co., 402 F.2d 553 (8th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>)). The Patients effectively seek to relitigate Holdings: 0: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 1: holding that a union may not relitigate an action for severance pay which the employees previously lost even though the union facially asserts a new theory of recovery and was not involved in the initial action 2: holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union 3: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 4: holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity


Input: testimony was admissible because it did not directly comment on whether the victim at issue had symptoms consistent with “rape trauma syndrome.” Id. In a later case, we allowed expert testimony to explain to a jury why children victims may delay reporting their sexual abuse. State v. Payton, 481 N.W.2d 325, 327 (Iowa 1992). Again, the expert witness avoided commenting directly on the child at issue and only testified generally about victims of sexual abuse. Id. We have also analyzed expert witness testimony under the hearsay exception. Under a hearsay analysis, when the child makes statements for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment, those statements fall under the hearsay exception contained in Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(4). See State v. Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d 167, 169-70 (Iowa 1998) (<HOLDING>). The child must make the statements to a Holdings: 0: holding a social worker treating the child was permitted to testify to statements the child made about the abuse including the victims identification of the perpetrator because the statements were necessary to the treatment of ensuring the continued safety of the child 1: holding that the trial court did not err in allowing a witness to testify regarding the child victims hearsay statements prior to the child testifying because ocga  24316 allows testimony about a childs outofcourt statements even in cases when the child does not appear as a witness as long as the child is available at the trial to testify 2: holding that a sevenyearolds statements to a nurse practitioner about her fathers alleged child abuse were nontestimonial because there was no evidence that the child was aware that the statements would later be used at a trial 3: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child 4: holding the record does not show that the statement to the social worker was for medical treatment because the social worker testified that he questioned the child to determine whether he needed to notify child protective services of a case of suspected child abuse


Input: that portion of the agreement over twenty years ago, the Tennessee U.D.C. knew of Vanderbilt’s noncompliance, and the Tennessee U.D.C. did not file suit to enforce the agreement. The agreement regarding the name of the dormitory is another matter. Vanderbilt did not publicly announce its intention to rename Confederate Memorial Hall until September 2002, and the Tennessee U.D.C. filed its lawsuit seeking to enforce the portion of the agreement pertaining to the name of the dormitory well within any applicable statute of limitations. It would be fatuous to assert that the Tennessee U.D.C.’s delay of less than two months in filing the lawsuit was "unreasonable” or that Vanderbilt was somehow prejudiced in the interval. Dennis Joslin Co. v. Johnson, 138 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). Vanderbilt did not renew this particular Holdings: 0: recognizing laches as an equitable defense to a motion to reopen 1: recognizing laches as an affirmative defense 2: holding that laches is an affirmative defense 3: holding that where defense of laches was not pleaded denial of equitable relief on grounds of laches was error 4: holding that a laches defense must be premised on an unreasonable delay that has somehow prejudiced the party asserting the defense