Input: must be interstate or foreign.”). The FAA requires the enforcement of an arbitration agreement upon proof (1) that a written agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) that the written agreement is contained within a contract involving “commerce.” 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1947). However, Mary argues the FAA does not apply to insurance contracts in South Carolina. Section 15-48-10(b)(4) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2012) provides that a written agreement to arbitrate shall not apply to “any claim arising out of personal injury, based on contract or tort, or to any insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy or annuity contract.” Mary correctly states the FAA’s mandate conflicts with section 15-48-10(b)(4). See Am. Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 272 F.Supp.2d 578, 582 (D.S.C.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Cox v. Woodmen of The World Ins. Holdings: 0: holding section 154810b4s prohibition on arbitration reverse preempts the faa through application of the mccarranferguson act and prohibits the enforcement of arbitration clauses in insurance policies governed by south carolina law 1: holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed 2: holding that the federal arbitration act requires enforcement of class action waivers in arbitration clauses even when massachusetts law provides for a substantive right to bring a class proceeding 3: holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added 4: holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists


Input: petition for certiorari and vacate the death penalty in this case. Even if I did not take this view, I would grant the petition because it raises the recurring issue whether evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal conduct may be introduced at the sentencing stage of a capital trial. As I have noted before, see, e. g., Miranda v. California, 486 U. S. 1038 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Williams v. Lynaugh, 484 U. S. 935 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), the States’ highest courts have reached varying conclusions on this issue. In addition, the petition poses a second question of profound constitutional significance: whether a defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury in a capital sentencing , 492 N. E. 2d 1303, 1315-1316 (1986) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 1101 (1987). In 1978, Holdings: 0: holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants 1: holding that a court need only explain that a unanimous vote is required before a jury can impose the death penalty 2: recognizing that before the case was submitted to the jury the trial court charged the jury that if it were unable to reach a unanimous recommendation the court would impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 3: holding that where a jury fails to return unanimous answers to some of the questions on a special verdict form the trial judge can enter judgment on the basis of the unanimous verdicts if they are dispositive of the case 4: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty


Input: or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches. § 443.036(21)(d)l, Fla. Stat. (2002). Although Comanic’s job remained the same throughout her base period , her employer technically changed. Specifically, for the first quarter of her base period her pay checks were issued by the Peace Child Care Center, Inc. In the last three quarters of Comanic’s base period, her pay checks were issued directly by the Church. We find that these employers both qualify as non-liable employers under section 443.036(21), Florida Statutes (2002), and w only with small children, performing day-to-day responsibilities, with no direct contact with the Church, is irrelevant in determining the primary purpose of the child care center. St. Martin, 451 U.S. at 783, 101 S.Ct. 2142 (<HOLDING>). Further, the employee policy, which Comanic Holdings: 0: holding that a company exercising substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work of the employees is an employer under the flsa 1: holding that where only one interpretation of contractual terms is possible a court may decide the meaning of those terms as a matter of law 2: holding because legislature knew how to include terms within statutory definition and did not do so statutory definition did not include terms in light of the terms contemporaneous inclusion of the same terms in a separate provision 3: holding futa after which florida molded its unemployment law is phrased entirely in terms of the nature of the employer and not in terms of the work performed or the place at which the employee works 4: holding that the court could review the south dakota supreme courts interpretation of its unemployment compensation tax statute because its analysis depended entirely on its understanding of the meaning of futa and the first amendment


Input: agree for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the following four elements must be present: (1) An issue decided in a prior action is identical to one presented in a later action; (2) The prior, action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (3) The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior action, or is in privity with a party to the prior action; and (4) The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Frederick v. Action Tire Co., 744 A.2d 762, 766 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999). We agree with defendant that decisions of the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board may preclude relitigation of the same issue, that is the causation of plaintiffs injuries. See, e.g., id. (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff does not appear to contest this Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employers motor vehicle carrier preparing to travel was very close to the vehicle and engaged in a task related to the vehicle and therefore was an occupier of a motor vehicle 1: holding that victims injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle when the victim received injuries from a gun fired in the vehicle 2: holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  3: holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling 4: holding that the wcabs decision that an employees motor vehicle accident did not cause his injuries precluded a subsequent tort action on the same issue


Input: governmental agency responsible for enforcing the code or regulation. (b) Complained to the landlord concerning the maintenance or condition of the park, rent charged or rules and regulations. (e) Organized, became a member of or served as an official in a homeowner's association, or similar organization, at a local, regional, state or national level. (d) Retained counsel or an agent to represent his interests. The plain language of this section creates a retaliatory eviction defense that may be raised in an unlawful detainer action. This is an affirmative defense, and the tenant therefore bears the burden to prove that the primary motive for the eviction is retaliation for tenant actions that are protected by the statute. Cf. Wright v. Brady, 126 Idaho 671, 889 P.2d 105 (Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). Here, Powell presented evidence and argument Holdings: 0: holding that laches is an affirmative defense 1: holding that retaliatory eviction is an affirmative defense to an unlawful detainer action brought pursuant to ic  6301 et seq 2: holding that an action brought pursuant to  1983 cannot lie against federal officers 3: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 4: holding that to avoid an affirmative defense  a plaintiff must plead specifically matters of affirmative avoidance pursuant to rule 5508


Input: company. The member-agent allegedly funneled the substantial profits acquired by these schemes through her attorney’s trust account into M.I.’s bank accounts. Because the title company im-permissibly used the Fund’s title insurance and closing forms to conduct these deals, the Fund maintained that the substantial profits should be preserved so the money would remain available to insure the non-party purchasers. The trial court granted the Fund’s ex parte motion for injunction. Following a hearing, the trial court denied M.I.’s motion to dissolve the injunction, but modified some of its terms. The instant appeal and cross-appeal followed. Generally, an injunction seeking to freeze a bank account is improper. E.g., Hiles v. Auto Bahn Fed’n, Inc., 498 So.2d 997, 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>). However, injunc-tive relief is appropriate to Holdings: 0: holding that the loss of trade secrets cannot be measured in money damages 1: holding that the loss of money from a bank account does not constitute irreparable harm because that loss can be compensat ed by money damages 2: holding that the potential loss of valuable business may constitute irreparable harm 3: holding that monetary damages do not generally constitute irreparable harm 4: holding that loss of customers and resulting injury to goodwill can constitute irreparable harm that is not compensable by an award of money damages


Input: KSU is bound and which clearly require more than moving for dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment. See 34 C.F.R. § 674.49(b)-(e). Therefore, we hold that KSU knowingly and voluntarily waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by agreeing, as a prerequisite to its participation in the Perkins Loan program, to undertake certain enumerated actions in federal bankruptcy court in the event of a claim for discharge filed by the student-borrower. C. Finally, even though we have concluded that KSU waived immunity by entering into an agreement with the DOE which subjects it to the jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy court, we must examine whether the waiver is valid. This determination hlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 1517, 140 Holdings: 0: holding that although congress expressed its intent to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity in 11 usc  106a it could not do so under seminole tribe 1: holding that  106a  b offend the eleventh amendment 2: holding that judgments for prospective relief that have an ancillary effect on the state treasury do not offend the eleventh amendment 3: holding that the eleventh amendment applies in  1981 litigation 4: holding 11 usc  106a unconstitutional to the extent that it purports to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity


Input: federal authority by making all assaults against them felonies. The latter would require us to glean an “assault prong” from two subsections and apply the simple assault clause. But without a good reason to do so, we cannot disregard the statutory structure of § 111(a) in this manner, particularly where the text clearly directs that “acts in violation of this section constitute only simple assault.” Contra Jones, 526 U.S. at 239, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (interpreting statute contrary to structure to avoid “grave and doubtful constitutional questions”). Moreover, in addition to the plain language of the statute, case law supports Vallery by stating or implying that the simple assault provision applies to the entirety of § 111(a). See United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Yates, 304 F.3d at 822 (“We hold that, in the Holdings: 0: holding that specific intent is not element of assault resulting in serious bodily injury 1: holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established 2: holding that a reference to the violent crime sentencing statute in the second degree assault statute required automatic imposition of violent crime sentencing for a defendant convicted of second degree assault 3: holding the second element of assault is assault resist oppose impede intimidate or interfere with and that the word forcibly  modifies each of the prohibited acts specified in the second element 4: holding that consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault where the assault occurred in the context of a prison fight between inmates


Input: 478 U.S. 675, 684, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3165, 92 L. Ed.2d 549, 559 (1986). Moreover, we agree with the trial court that there is little doubt that, in the context of a boarding school, the school effectively acted as the “household” within which the abusive conduct occurred. The school acted in a parental capacity to the students within its care, providing for them necessary shelter, food, education, recreation, and succor. Its control over and duty of care for the students housed within its confines did not markedly differ from that assumed by parents. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 160 N.J. 562, 602, 734 A.2d 1196 (1999), rev’d on other grounds, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L. Ed.2d 554 (2000). Compare Smith v. Estate of Kelly, 343 N.J.Super. 480, 502, 778 A.2d 1162 (App.Div.2001) (<HOLDING>). In a very real sense, the school and its Holdings: 0: holding that requiring church to make contributions to workers compensation fund opposed by such church did not violate first amendment 1: holding that the catholic church was not within a parishioners household 2: holding church services constitute property within meaning of  548 3: holding that denial of tax exemption for part of church property that was not necessary for occupancy and enjoyment of church did not violate first amendment 4: holding that irs examination of corporate minute books of a church to determine whether it qualified for tax exemption was not unconstitutional interference with religious affairs of the church under the first amendment


Input: jurisdiction over the custody determination.” We conclude that the juvenile court did not have the power to assume jurisdiction over the case or to make a custody determination. Even assuming that the father’s dependency petition was sufficient to invoke the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, and we maintain that it was not, the juvenile court failed to address the allegation of dependency in any of its orders or judgments. There is no mention of dependency in the juvenile court’s final judgment entered on July 17, 2008, yet the juvenile court proceeded to make an adjudication of the child’s custody. In K.C.G. v. S.J.R., 46 So.3d 499, 501-02 (Ala.Civ.App.2010), this court stated: “Once the dependency jurisdiction of a juvenile court has been properly invoked, the juvenile court has an 2) (<HOLDING>); J.W. v. W.D.J., 743 So.2d 467, 469 Holdings: 0: holding that juvenile court that had never declared child dependent had no jurisdiction to enter order affecting visitation rights of father 1: holding that once juvenile court found children dependent it had exclusive jurisdiction to determine their custody 2: holding that juvenile court never assumed jurisdiction to determine issue of custody of child when evidence revealed that there was no emergency situation rendering the child dependent as al leged in mothers petition 3: holding that juvenile court that determined child was not dependent had no jurisdiction to thereafter determine custody of child 4: holding that juvenile court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims


Input: be issued, the check was a direct transfer from Video Depot to Hilton. Once the check was issued, Arlynn no longer had legal control over the funds, even if he retained physical control over them. Arlynn therefore did not have the right to use the money for any other purpose than to give it to Hilton. Hilton maintains that Arlynn had dominion over the $65,000 because he was Video Depot’s principal and, in that capacity, directed Video Depot to purchase the cashier’s check. The bankruptcy courts are split on the question of whether the principal of a debtor corporation necessarily is the initial transferee of corporate funds used to satisfy a personal obligation. Compare General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc. v. Broach (In re Lucas Dallas, Inc.), 185 B.R. 801, 809 (9th Cir.BAP1995) (<HOLDING>); Richardson v. FDIC (In re M. Blackburn Holdings: 0: holding that the principal of a corporate debtor does not become a transferee by the mere act of causing the debtor to make a fraudulent transfer 1: holding that principal who caused debtor to issue cashiers check to satisfy personal obligation was not initial transferee 2: holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default 3: holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it 4: holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors


Input: defense counsel to make a reasonable showing of materiality before the court will order discovery. When requesting an officer's personnel file, defense counsel must show that it is reasonably likely that the file will contain relevant information. We review an order denying a motion to compel discovery for abuse of the discretion granted by this rule. In this case, the ree-ord supports Judge Miller's conclusion that Booth's request was based only on conjecture. Booth did not make any showing that the police used excessive force against him in this case. And Booth did not make a showing of any likelihood that 0) (denying disclosure of psychiatric evaluation of prosecution witness in the absence of a showing of relevance); Sawyer v. State, 244 P.3d 1130, 1133-34 (Alaska App. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Carman v. State, 658 P.2d 131, 140 (Alaska Holdings: 0: holding that other incidents involving children handling firearms were not sufficiently similar to require discovery 1: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 2: holding that no discovery is permissible in similar circumstances 3: holding that evidence of similar incidents is probative as to notice element in premises liability case 4: holding 911 dispatchers promise to send someone out was not affirmative act as there was no indication that the dispatcher handling of a victims call exceeded or was markedly different than her handling of other similar calls and situations


Input: of a federal constitutional right and an allegedly retaliatory action[,]” Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir.2001), some district courts have generally concluded that “a passage of two months between the protected activity and the adverse employment action seems to be the dividing line.” Cunningham v. Consol. Edison Inc., No. 03 Civ. 3522, 2006 WL 842914, at *19, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22482, at *55-56 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2006) (collecting cases). However, because the Second Circuit has found periods well beyond two months to be sufficient to suggest a causal relationship under certain circumstances, courts must carefully consider the time lapse in light of the entire record. See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Holdings: 0: holding eightmonth gap between eeoc complaint and retaliatory action suggested a causal relationship 1: holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury 2: holding that the more than three month gap between the plaintiffs eeoc complaint and the allegedly adverse action was insufficient to show causation 3: holding that a close temporal proximity between a public employees speech and a defendants actions suggested a causal relationship 4: holding in the context of a title vii retaliation claim that a twoyear gap between the plaintiffs protected activity and the claimed retaliatory act proves fatal to plaintiffs assertion that there is a causal connection


Input: Its proceedings are not adversary in nature, but rather consist of inquiries conducted by laymen without resort to the technicalities of trial procedure”). 21 We have held, however, that “the grand jury may request advice and that the prosecutor is authorized to explain matters of law.” Sheriff v. Keeney, 106 Nev. 213, 218, 791 P.2d 55, 58 (1990). 22 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8. 23 See Gordon v. Ponticello, 110 Nev. 1015, 1017-19, 879 P.2d 741, 743 (1994) (stating that discovery does not fall within the scope of rights afforded to persons under grand jury investigation); Bright, 108 Nev. at 502, 835 P.2d at 785 (declining to extend the right to counsel to indigent grand jury targets). 24 Accord State v. Augustin M., 68 P.3d 182, 187-88 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003) Holdings: 0: holding that new mexicos rule that the state must present known evidence that directly negates a targets guilt does not extend to instructions respecting possible defenses 1: holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative 2: holding that rule b attachment does not extend to afteracquired property 3: holding that the evidence did not present the proof necessary to warrant the findings of guilt and disbarment 4: holding that plaintiff must present such evidence


Input: Stanton-Negley asserts that if DPW had provided adequate and timely notice of this Project requirement, Stanton-Negley would have obtained the required accreditation and submitted a bid in response to RFP No. 31-06. Thus, according to Stanton-Neg-ley, DPW’s failure to make a timely disclosure of the accreditation requirement violated due process by depriving Stanton-Negley’s owners of the ability to conduct their business and profession in the manner they had established and with patients they had served prior to the issuance of RFP No. 31-06 and the Project it seeks to implement. We disagree. ' Contrary to Stanton-Negley’s position, it has no protected property right to full participation in the MA Program. Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Houstoun, 998 F.Supp. 522 (E.D.Pa.1997) (<HOLDING>). Further, Stanton-Negley has no protected Holdings: 0: holding due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the charged offense and new york law that requires the defendant in a second degree murder prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter when no element of the charged offense is presumed does not violate the due process clause 1: holding that an agreement on the one side to sell and on the other to buy does not constitute a conspiracy even if the buyer intends to resell the drugs so long as the buyer and seller do not have an agreement to further distribute the drugs 2: holding that the quantity of drugs may not be used to support a departure 3: holding that the kersey rule applies in a case involving an attorneys addiction to prescription drugs legally obtained 4: holding that an agreement between the commonwealth and a provider of prescription drugs for the medicaid program does not involve the extreme dependence necessary to support a due process claim


Input: past persecution at the hands of their mother, who abused and subsequently abandoned them. While we are sympathetic to the cruel treatment endured by petitioners, such treatment does not constitute past persecution “on account of’ a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). Petitioners allege that they are “children of the Gomez-Romero Family,” a “particular social group” entitled to protection under the Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(i). While we agree that kinship ties may constitute a “particular social group,” Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 995 (6th Cir.2009), the domestic abuse suffered by petitioners was not on account of this status. Rather, petitioners were abused because of their exposure to a violent, unstable person. Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the mother’s abuse was not limited to Holdings: 0: holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution 1: holding that isolated criminal attacks do not constitute persecution 2: holding that threats standing alone generally do not constitute past persecution 3: holding that to constitute persecution harm must be more than harassment 4: holding that personal disputes do not constitute persecution


Input: 755 F.2d 158, 163, 225 USPQ 34, 38 (Fed.Cir.1985); see also Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 963, 1 USPQ2d 1196, 1201 (Fed.Cir.1986) (excusing failure to make express findings as to the level of ordinary skill where there is no showing that the court’s failure to make such a finding influenced the ultimate determination). In this case, Okajima stated during the final hearing that there was no dispute that the level of skill was high. Where the parties agree that the level of skill in the art is high, any finding by the Board that the proper level of skill is less than that urged by the parties would only reinforce the Board’s conclusion of nonobviousness. See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1574, 230 USPQ 81, 88 (Fed.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find no harm under the Holdings: 0: recognizing that the determination is an equitable one 1: recognizing that particular findings as to level of skill do not influence the ultimate determination under  103 where there is a determination that an invention would have been nonobvious to those of extraordinary skill 2: holding that this court should review de novo ultimate determination of reasonableness of search under fourth amendment 3: holding that courts may decline to make a constitutional determination at the first stage of the qualified immunity inquiry where that determination would be based on an interpretation of uncertain state law 4: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case


Input: to Kelley, in print and in the telephone conversation, were related to a contemplated judicial proceeding. Bleisch in his deposition and Dolcefino in his affidavit affirmatively and clearly stated that if the controller’s office persisted in denying access to KTRK, legal proceedings to gain access were contemplated. Thus, the statements are absolutely privileged. Where, as here, communications are protected by the absolute privilege, those communications may not serve as the basis of a civil action for libel or slander, regardless of the negligence or malice with which they are made. See Thomas, 940 S.W.2d at 342-43. It follows that when a statement is so protected, publication of the statement does not defeat the privilege. Id. at 344. Acc , Inc., 838 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C.Circ.1988) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, there can be no claim against a Holdings: 0: holding prepublication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in upjohn  1: holding that communications between the university of colorados counsel and former employees of the university concerning activities during their period of employment may be protected by the attorneyclient privilege under the rationale presented in upjohn but holding that the university waived the privilege by disclosing the documents 2: holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits those claims fall squarely within the scope of erisa 3: recognizing the distinction between a landowner and a possessor as defined by  328e of the restatement 4: holding issues within scope of administrative hearing are within the reviewing courts purview


Input: led to counts one through three and “most of the money went to Pessar.” Our precedent is clear that “[e]quity may require a defendant to restore his victims to the status quo where the loss suffered is greater than the defendant’s unjust enrichment.” Stefanchik, 559 F.3d at 931; see also Commerce Planet, slip op. at 10-11, — Fed.Appx. at —(explaining that there is “no support in our case law” for .the proposition that a restitution award “must be limited to the unjust gains each defendant personally received”). Moreover, as described above, Gordon had control over and approved the marketing materials used, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to hold Gordon and his entities jointly and severally liable for the full amount. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d at 931-32 & n. 1 (<HOLDING>). Lastly, Gordon challenges the time period, Holdings: 0: holding that the individual defendants were acting as principals andor officers of the corporation and therefore there was no third party present to interfere in the relationship to which their corporation was a party 1: holding that there was no abuse of discretion where the district court found an individual stefanehik and the corporation he solely owned beringer corporation jointly and severally liable for the full amount of sales made despite other defendants settling where stefanehik and beringer were the driving force behind the marketing scheme 2: holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity 3: holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed 4: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation


Input: were discriminatory do not pass muster under Harris. The record reflects that McCaw made several accommodations, accompanied by certain quid-pro-quo requests, to Kwiatek once it learned that Kwiatek’s HIV condition could require continual absences. Although Kwiatek argues that he felt he was generally treated differently than other employees with chronic and debilitating medical conditions, he presented no objective evidence of an abusive or hostile work environment. Moreover, there was no evidence that McCaw’s requests unreasonably interfered with his job performance, nor that the terms or conditions of Kwiatek’s employment materially changed as a result of its actions. As such, his claim must fail. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Foothill Capital Corp., 3 F.Supp.2d 925, 938-39 (N.D.Ill.1998) (<HOLDING>); Speer v. Rand McNally & Co., 123 F.3d 658, Holdings: 0: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 1: holding that mere reprimand even if it does not result in actual dismissal can constitute adverse employment action 2: holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se 3: holding a mere warning that termination is possible does not per se constitute adverse employment action 4: holding that where an employee was transferred to a new job site over 120 miles away that transfer while not per se an adverse employment action was an appropriate factor for the jury to consider in determining whether an adverse employment action occurred


Input: (App.1979)); Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48 of Maricopa County v. KPNX Broad. Co., 188 Ariz. 499, 503, 937 P.2d 689, 693 (App.1997), vacated on other grounds by Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48 of Maricopa County v. KPNX Broad. Co., 191 Ariz. 297, 300-01, 955 P.2d 534, 537-38 (1998). 4 . From the context, we presume this to have referred to department reports or other departmental records. 5 . To the extent that a custodian's mistake might inform the promptness of the disclosure (and thus the wrongfulness of the denial), we agree with courts interpreting FOIA that the denial would not be wrongful only if the custodian made reasonable efforts and acted in good faith. See, e.g., Ill. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 545 F.Supp. 1229, 1237 (N.D.Ill.1982) (<HOLDING>) (Emphasis added.). Custodial inattentiveness Holdings: 0: holding that when a plaintiff has no pending foia request with an agency and has not averred that he intends to make foia requests to the agency in the future any claim of future injury is simply too speculative and remote to give him standing 1: holding in a case where there was no assertion that the custodian was lying or that she was negligent that a custodian did not improperly withhold a book that was mislaid and stating that no improper withholding within the meaning of the foia occurs when an agency fails to locate documents within the ten day time limit  if the agency has made reasonable efforts to locate the documents and if its failure to do so has been in good faith 2: holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents 3: holding an agency need not demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist 4: holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint


Input: Ex. 16. Specifically, the letter states, “Enclosed, please find copies of documents from [the plaintiff] that relate to her EEO investigation” and then lists the enclosed documents. Id. The letter does not mention discrimination or harassment. Therefore, the June 2007 letter is not a protected activity. See Paquin, 119 F.3d at 31; see also Fox v. Eagle Distrib. Co., Inc., 510 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir.2007) (requiring specific references to alleged acts of discrimination). Moving to whether the agency’s action following the November 2006 letter was materially adverse, the defendant claims that proposed removals do not qualify as materially adverse actions. Def.’s Reply at 21. Proposed removals, however, are exactly the kind of acts which the statute covers. See Powell, 390 F.Supp.2d at 9 (<HOLDING>); Willingham v. Gonzales, 391 F.Supp.2d 52, 59 Holdings: 0: holding that each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice  for which an administrative charge must be filed 1: holding that statutory damages were appropriate for each discrete violation of that states deceptive trade practices act 2: holding in the context of a title yii claim that discrete acts such as termination  or refusals to hire are separate retaliatory adverse employment decisions that each constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice  3: holding that the protection of the double jeopardy clause does not preclude a defendant from being charged under a statute  defining as the criminal offense a discrete act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a distinguishable discrete act that is a separate violation of the statute 4: holding that a proposed termination is the very type of discrete act   identified  as separate actionable unlawful employment practices


Input: period of disability income received in 1997 before or after the period of disability. We also hold that the commission erred to the extent that it may have included business profits rather than wages or their equivalent in its calculation of claimant’s pre- or post-injury wage. The propriety of including all net income of a sole proprietorship in the average weekly wage calculation, without differentiating between wages and scrutinized] to determine if the profits are the functional equivalent of wages.” Hotaling v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 153 Vt. 581, 572 A.2d 1351, 1354 (1990) (citing 2 Arthur Larson, Larson’s Workers’Compensation Law % 60.12(e)); see The Washington Post, 675 A.2d at 42; cf. Pishotta v. Pishotta Tile & Marble, Inc., 613 So.2d 1373, 1375-76 (Fla.Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). New York courts hold that “ ‘where a Holdings: 0: holding that corporate profits may be considered personal earnings of sole shareholder to extent they are fairly attributable to management andor labor of sole shareholder rather than labor of others or mere return on capital 1: holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration 2: holding that state court with jurisdiction over  301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law 3: holding a state court tort action for retaliatory discharge removable because it arose under  301 of the labor management relations act rather than illinois state law 4: holding that labor management relations act  303 which authorizes recovery of damages for employers injured by an unfair labor practice does not provide authorization for awarding attorneys fees for board proceedings


Input: A Defendant’s first contention is that a reasonable jury could have found that he negligently caused Russell’s death while acting in self-defense. He argues that an involuntary manslaughter instruction was warranted because he attempted to use nondeadly force, but did so in a criminally negligent manner and death resulted. See United States v. Begay, 833 F.2d 900, 901 (10th Cir.1987). As discussed in the preceding section, a rational jury could have believed Arvin’s actions were in self-defense. This court has recognized that involuntary manslaughter “can occur in circumstances that would support a defense of self defense.” Begay, 833 F.2d at 901 (quoting United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908, 915 (9th Cir.1983)); see also United States v. Browner, 889 F.2d 549, 555 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Iron Shield, 697 F.2d 845, Holdings: 0: holding that when selfdefense is carried out with excessive force a defendant would be guilty of manslaughter 1: holding that trial court should instruct the jury that if they had any reasonable doubt as to whether unlawful killing was murder or manslaughter it was jurys duty to convict defendant of the lesser offense manslaughter 2: holding that both involuntary manslaughter and selfdefense instructions are proper when there is evidence that the killing was accidental 3: holding that this instruction is appropriately given when there is both evidence of selfdefense and evidence that the defendant provoked the aggression from which he was defending himself 4: recognizing that a defendant may commit involuntary manslaughter if he acts in selfdefense but is criminally negligent in doing so


Input: (5th Cir.1974). In order to show that a homestead has been abandoned, there must be a strong showing that the debtor did not intend to return to the residence. In re Goode, 146 B.R. 860 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1992). A debtor that leaves his home for financial, health, or family reasons does not abandon the homestead. In re Imprasert, 86 B.R. 721, 723 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1988). Temporary absences from the homestead residence for reasons of busine olding that where property was occupied as residence of the bankrupts on the day they filed bankruptcy, it was entitled to a homestead exemption, even though the bankrupts intended to, and did, leave that house permanently on the following day) (citing Beensen v. Burgess, 218 So.2d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); In re Beebe, 224 B.R. 817 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.1998)) (<HOLDING>). In the present instance, Debtor admitted that Holdings: 0: holding even though debtor would have been entitled to iowa homestead exemption but for former spouses iowa code section 59821 lien debtor could not avoid the lien because it attached to the homestead prior to or simultaneously with debtors acquisition of the interest in the homestead 1: holding that homestead exemption was unavailable even though claimants were  living on the land and claiming it as homestead with the permission or acquiescence of the owner for they could have no homestead right or interest in land to which they had no title 2: holding that debtors did not abandon homestead and lose benefits of homestead exemption simply because they had left property with no intention of returning in order to move into rental housing closer to debtorhusbands new job 3: holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property 4: holding that the general rule is that temporary absence from the premises will not itself cause an abandonment of the homestead but to retain the homestead exemption one leaving the homestead must in good faith intend to return albeit the intent to return need not be at any particular time in the future


Input: occurred after his alleged onset date of disability. 9 . The information on the check-list form was for purposes of determining Phillips’ eligibility for state medical welfare benefits, not DIB or SSI. A finding of disability under the Act is a legal determination to be made by the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e). The opinion expressed by checking a box on a form is conclusoty in nature. Indeed, Dr. Falatyn did not cite to any specific work restrictions resulting from Phillips' impairments that would have prevented him from performing all work activity. Under the Commissioner’s regulations, this kind of conclusory report is not entitled to significant weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2)(ii), 416.927(d)(2)(ii); see also Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1965 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 10 . The check-list form also contained boxes Holdings: 0: holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence 1: holding recoupment statute itself served as a form of notice 2: holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial 3: holding that a form report that requires a physician only to check a box or fillin blanks is not substantial evidence by itself 4: holding that form 4340 is probative evidence in and of itself and shows in the absence of contrary evidence that notices and assessments were properly made


Input: Accordingly, because the Department did not provide a meaningful opportunity for comment, and did not solicit or receive relevant comments regarding the substance or merits of either set of regulations, we have no difficulty in concluding that the Department “ignored important aspects of the problem.” Kempthorne, 473 F.3d at 103. Therefore, we hold that the Department’s reinstatement of the 1987 regulations was arbitrary and capricious in that the Department’s action did not follow procedures required by law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); see also Mack Trucks, 682 F.3d at 95-96 (vacating agency interim rule when good cause exception did not apply, and APA notice and comment procedures were not followed); Buschmann, 676 F.2d at 358 (same); Kollett v. Harris, 619 F.2d 134, 144-46 (1st Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). VI. Under the terms of the 2009 Notice and Holdings: 0: holding that an extension of time in which to serve process may be granted despite the absence of good cause 1: holding that notice of foreclosure that failed to provide a reinstatement balance was not defective in the absence of harm caused by the omission 2: holding that proper service of new notice of deficiency and new notices of levy moots question as to whether prior actions were procedurally defective 3: holding invalid procedurally defective interim regulations that were issued without notice and comment and in the absence of good cause 4: holding tax foreclosure invalid without adequate notice


Input: of plaintiffs discrimination claim was inappropriate given that the CBA “neither created the right [plaintiff] asserts nor can it remove or alter that right”); Daniels v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 789 F.Supp.2d 161, 164-165 (D.D.C.2011) (concluding that plaintiffs DCHRA discrimination and retaliation claims were not preempted because plaintiffs claims did not require interpretation of the CBA, and were “based on rights created by DCHRA and not rights created by the CBA”). ' However, where the rights are created by the CBA, or involve negotiable state duties “around which parties may contract,” Section 301 will preempt the claim. Humble, 305 F.3d at 1007 n. 3; see also, Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 861-62, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 217-18, 105 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 1: holding that plaintiffs had standing to bring section 301 lawsuit to enforce seniority rights under cba 2: holding that the plaintiffs claim that he was owed wages following his discharge was preempted because this right was created by a cba provision stating that an employee who is discharged shall be paid immediately 3: holding that an employees retaliation claim was not preempted by section 301 because he was exercising his rights under the states antidiscrimination laws and the terms of the cba were at most relevant background for the employees termination 4: holding that plaintiffs negligence claim was preempted by section 301 because employers duty to provide a safe workplace was expressly created by the cba


Input: are not subject to dismissal, even though those of the Relator are. However, that fact does not render our consideration of this motion premature. “Intervention by the United States into a qui tam suit does not automatically endow the court with subject matter jurisdiction over both the claims by the United States and by the relator.” United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 798 (10th Cir.2002); see also Federal Recovery Services, Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 452 (5th Cir.1995) (rejecting a relator’s attempt “to end-run the ‘original source’ inquiry by arguing that the United States’ intervention in the action cured any jurisdictional defect”); Eitel v. United States, 242 F.3d 381 (Table), 2000 WL 1529237, at *2 (9th Cir.2000) (unpublished disposition) (<HOLDING>). Thus, despite the Government’s notice of its Holdings: 0: holding that because proceeds of a letter of credit were not secured by estate collateral the proceeds were not property of the estate 1: holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate 2: holding that whether or not the government proceeds with this action eitel cannot because he is not an original source 3: holding that section 853n6a is likely never to apply to proceeds of the crime given that the proceeds cannot exist before commission of the crime 4: holding that a  1983 claim is an independent original action rather than a review proceeding even when it challenges an administrative action


Input: DNA expert goes to weight of evidence, not its admissibility; even if error rate of expert’s proficiency tests presented challenge to reliability of polymerase chain reaction analysis, that argument would not result in exclusion of PCR evidence, as error rate would only be one factor considered in determining admissibility); Keen v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 795, 485 S.E.2d 659 (1997)(concluding that even if the proficiency test results of expert had been admitted and could have been used by Keen to establish state laboratory had previously made erroneous findings, this information would not have affected admissibility of the DNA evidence, but rather, would have only affected the weight the fact finder accorded the DNA evidence); State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996)(<HOLDING>); State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash.2d 879, 846 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that laboratory error is a matter of weight and not admissibility under frye v united states 293 f 1013 dccir1923 under rule of evidence 702 if lab error or error rates are so serious that results are not helpful to the jury the trial court may in its discretion rule the evidence inadmissible 1: holding that federal rule of evidence 702 superceded the frye standard of admissibility of scientific evidence and that under rule 702 the district court had to determine that proffered expert testimony was both reliable and relevant 2: holding that rule 702 admissibility determinations are reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard 3: holding that even if a trial court errs in a ruling on the admissibility of evidence we will reverse only if the error is inconsistent with substantial justice and that the error was harmless 4: holding under former rule 52a appellant must object to alleged error in the trial court or such error is waived


Input: against the unknown aggressor, particularly if they resemble highwaymen in ski masks. Second, permitting the police to attempt an unannounced forcible entry subverts the interest in protecting private property. Finally, attempting entry without warning precludes the officers’ ability to recognize possible mistakes in identity or location of the suspect or the place to be searched. Therefore, our previous analysis in Fike no longer serves as the basis for assessing attempted forcible entries under the knock-and-announce rule. Rather, the reasonableness test outlined by the Supreme Court in Richards applies with equal force to attempts at forcible entry as it does to the actual breaking and entering of a person’s home. See also United States v. Gable, 401 F.2d 765, 766 (3rd Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McCloud, 127 F.3d 1284, 1289 Holdings: 0: holding that the insertion of a key into the door of a car to see if it fit constituted the beginning of a search because there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 1: holding that arrest by the back door of defendants house was unlawful 2: holding that mere insertion of key was not a search or at least not an unreasonable search protected by the fourth amendment 3: holding that defendants constitutionally protected privacy interest began at the door to his room not at the door to the rooming house 4: holding that insertion of a crowbar into the door of a suspects house by officers before they announced their presence constitutes an unreasonable search


Input: have retained wide discretion to fashion equitable remedies in situations in which legal remedies are insufficient. Therefore, I cannot agree with defendant’s argument that section 8371 im-permissibly delegates public policy to “individual courts on an ad hoc basis.” C. The Application of the Seventh Amendment to Section 8371 Claims Brought in Federal Court The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” The Seventh Amendment is inapplicable to state trials. See Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F.Supp. 1025, 1027 (1972) (<HOLDING>), aff'd sub nom. Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding right to be fundamental 1: holding that courts may only review claims for fundamental miscarriage of justice 2: holding that jury trial in civil cases is not so fundamental to the american system of justice as to be required of state courts by due process 3: recognizing that the accuseds right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system 4: holding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to jury trial to defendants in serious criminal cases in state courts


Input: the law to the undisputed facts. In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d 702, 703-04 (Tex.1998) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); Barnes, 127 S.W.3d at 846. Mandamus is generally proper if a trial court acts without jurisdiction. Barnes, 127 S.W.3d at 846 (citing In re Sw. Bell, 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex.2000); In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex.1998)). The existence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Barnes, 127 S.W.3d at 846. Despite the general requirement that a party seeking relief by mandamus must establish he has no adequate remedy by appeal, such is not the case when the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In re Office of Attorney Gen. of Tex., 264 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>); see In re Oates, 104 S.W.3d 571, 575 Holdings: 0: holding that a party who is erroneously deprived of the benefits of an arbitration contract under the federal arbitration act is without adequate remedy by appeal and entitled to mandamus relief 1: holding that mandamus is an appropriate remedy because the trial courts issuance of temporary orders is not subject to interlocutory appeal 2: holding that upon commencement of the election process mandamus will not lie to prevent the inclusion of a candidate on the official ballot because by that time the case has become moot 3: holding mandamus will lie to prevent trial court from exercising jurisdiction it does not have even if there is adequate remedy by appeal 4: holding that mandamus will issue to reverse a trial courts ruling on a discovery issue only 1 where there is a showing that the trial court clearly exceeded its discretion and 2 where the aggrieved party does not have an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal the petitioner has an affirmative burden to prove the existence of each of these conditions


Input: damages was displaced by federal statutes, including the CWA.” The Court rejected this argument indicating “nothing in the statutory text points to fragmenting the recovery scheme this way, and we have rejected similar attempts to sever remedies from their causes of action.” In Part IV, to which Justice Stevens specifically dissented, the Court, citing Miles, reiterated that admiralty courts should look to legislative enactments for policy guidance, but where Congress had not specifically acted, the Court had responsibility to fashion controlling rules and remedies in maritime law: To the extent that Justice STEVENS suggests that the very subject of remedies should be treated as congressional in light of the number of statutes dealing with 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (<HOLDING>). And for the very reason that our exercise of Holdings: 0: recognizing action for wrongful death based on unseaworthiness 1: recognizing cause of action 2: holding that a cause of action for wrongful death is an asset of an estate 3: recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge 4: recognizing cause of action for wrongful death


Input: to those packages”). The bill of lading made out by Tropical states the following: marks & numbers quantity description of goods gross weight As Addr. 1 x 40’ Stc. 39 Big Pack Containing 24207 27,908 units boy’s pants As Addr. 1 x 40’ Stc. 17 Big Pack Containing 10552 13,719 Units Boy’s Pants The customs declaration form made out by Fishman includes all the same information but also indicates the value of the items being shipped. Neither form refers to the number of dozens of pants being shipped. Fishman contends that the cargo manifest and reembarque are the relevant documents to be examined as they were prepared by Fishman and were simply miscopied from Fishman’s form to the bill of lading. See In re Belize Trading, Ltd. v. Sun Ins. Co. of New York, 993 F.2d 790, 792 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the reembarque states, although Holdings: 0: holding that a judgment is construed like other written documents and that the intent of the court is determined by viewing the document as a whole 1: holding that in determining motion to dismiss on basis of res judicata the court could take judicial notice of all of the documents which are part of the record before it as well as the documents contained in the record before the state court without having to convert the motion to one for summary judgment 2: holding that when the bill of lading and the shipping documents do not conform the bill is construed as having reflected the number of packages designated in the shipping invoices and as such be in conformity with cogsa 3: holding that purchaser of vehicle was required to arbitrate her claims even though seller did not sign bill of sale containing arbitration clause when seller accepted and acted upon bill of sale by contemporaneously executing retail installment contract 4: holding that specific guarantees in the bill of rights have penumbras one of which is the right of privacy


Input: arguing that plaintiffs do not ascribe any economic significance to the eight county area. They argue that plaintiffs’ experts reach contradictory conclusions and have not made findings supporting the alleged eight county geographic market. Plaintiffs allege in their amended complaint that the alleged antitrust violation, injury and damage occurred in the eight county area and that defendants and their co-conspirators have market power in this area. The court of appeals has approved geographic markets consisting of multiple counties in antitrust cases involving the provision of health care. See Blue Cross, 65 F.3d at 1411 (noting that either the individual counties or a group of counties where defendants operate would be an appropriate geographic market); Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1284-85 (<HOLDING>). Whether plaintiffs’ expert reports or other Holdings: 0: recognizing that what is a reasonable area is a factual matter to be determined in each noncompete case 1: recognizing the uncertain state of federal law in this area 2: holding physician in action based on illegal cavity search to standard of a reasonable physician 3: recognizing that a geographic market is hard to define but approving a three county area based on defendants service area and physician and patient preference for nearby hospitals 4: holding that a plaintiff physician alleging race and national origin discrimination was not required to pursue his claims initially with the phc because the hospitals basis for revoking his privileges was sexual harassment allegations and not patient care deficiencies


Input: sense and meaning, as a ‘gift,’ an allocation or appropriation of something of value, without consideration to a ‘person, association or public or private corporation.’ ” Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. at 28, 303 P.2d at 926-27. The Attorney General of New Mexico has identified two components prohibited by the Anti-Donation Clause: (i) “the state may not make any donation to or in aid of any private corporation;” and (ii) the state is prohibited against “lending or pledging of the state’s or municipality’s credit.” N.M. Attorney General Opinion No. 85-27 at 3,1985 WL 204889 (October 22,1985). New Mexico courts, and the New Mexico Attorney General’s Office, have generally, in analyzing the state’s Anti-Donation Clause, scrutinized contracts for consideration. 314 P.2d at 720 (<HOLDING>); Hutcheson v. Atherton, 44 N.M. at 144, 99 Holdings: 0: holding that legislative diminishment of tax obligation constituted an unconstitutional subsidy to the liquor industry in violation of the antidonation clause 1: holding an action for postpetition breach of an agreement to purchase property to be a core proceeding 2: holding that an appropriation to pay states share of emergency feed certificates issued to livestock owners for the purchase of hay was an unconstitutional subsidy of the livestock industry 3: holding husbands early retirement subsidy was not marital property as a vested right but an option contingent upon his continued employment and eventual qualification for the subsidy in nine years based upon value of the pension frozen at the time of dissolution 4: holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court


Input: to have occurred. It is therefore difficult to know exactly what effects such a tumor could produce. The district court thus had to make a difficult finding based on conflicting evidence regarding a rare tumor. The only undisputed facts were that the tumor existed during Stevens’s employment with the company, and that Stevens’s. symptoms subsided after the tumor was removed. After a review of' the record, we are not left “with a definite and firm conviction” that the district court made a mistake. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the tumor caused Stevens’s headaches and personality changes from which- he suffered during his employment. Cf. Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 109, 80 S.Ct. 173, 175, 4 L.Ed.2d 142 (1959) (<HOLDING>). B. The company must provide maintenance and Holdings: 0: recognizing the cause of action 1: holding that the incontestability provisions of the policy did not cause a preexisting illness to be covered because the illness first manifested itself before the policy became effective 2: holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause 3: holding plaintiffs counsels illness constitutes good cause 4: holding that a jury may draw an inference as to the cause of an illness despite the lack of unanimity among experts as to the cause


Input: knotted in a manner indicating that they had been used to package crack cocaine. Moreover, Moore had come running from an apartment in which there had be .1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1124, 119 S.Ct. 1781, 143 L.Ed.2d 809 (1999) (upholding a Terry frisk of the driver of a car stopped for speeding because the stop occurred late at night, the car had stopped abruptly, there were multiple people in the car, and there had been a commotion among the other occupants of the car); United States v. Villanueva, 15 F.3d 197, 198-99 (1st Cir.1994) (upholding a daytime Terry frisk of an individual who had engaged in disorderly conduct, such as yelling obscenities and banging on train windows, at a subway station known for volatile conduct); United States v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 56 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The district court expressed skepticism that Holdings: 0: holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop an occupant of a parked car based on his presence late at night in an area known for drug activity his leaning over the car console with a faint light and his attempt to hide something upon seeing a police officer 1: holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on his presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking and his flight upon seeing police officers 2: recognizing that emergency lights convey a signal that an officer approaching a car at night presents no threat to the occupant of the car 3: holding that no seizure occurred when an officer approached a parked car and initially asked the occupant where his gun was after seeing an empty holster on the seat 4: holding that police officer could reasonably have impounded defendants vehicle either because there was no known individual immediately available to take custody of the car or because the car could have constituted a nuisance in the area in which it was parked


Input: three offenses on September 26, 2003, during a single criminal episode. The trial court sentenced Mr. Perez to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the home invasion robbery and the armed burglary and to another concurrent term of fifteen years’ imprisonment for the false impersonation offense. Although it may have little practical effect, we must reverse the judgment and sentence for armed burglary because it either violates double jeopardy under article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution, or contravenes section 775.021(4)09, Florida Statutes (2003). It has been held that convictions arising from a single episode for home invasion robbery and burglary violate either double jeopardy or section 775.021(4)(b)(3). See, e.g., Mendez v. State, 798 So.2d 749 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>); Barboza v. State, 786 So.2d 675 (Fla. 3d DCA Holdings: 0: holding that the state conceded that appellants convictions for both home invasion robbery and burglary with an assault were improper 1: holding convictions for burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery and home invasion robbery violated double jeopardy and section 7750214b because burglary of a dwelling was subsumed by the home invasion robbery offense 2: holding that the defendants homeinvasion robbery conviction violated double jeopardy because it arose from the same incident as the defendants burglary with an assault or battery conviction 3: holding that the double jeopardy clause was not violated by two convictions arising from the same criminal episode because the crimes of attempted burglary and possession of burglary tools each had an element the other did not and were thus separate crimes 4: holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary


Input: sought blood tests to establish his paternity of a child born while the mother of the child was married to another man. While holding that it was necessary for the trial court to consider the impact of a paternity action on the child before the paternity proceedings, the Supreme Court of Washington reasoned: “Child development experts widely stress the importance of stability and predictability in parent/child relationships, even where the parent figure is not the natural parent. .... A paternity suit, by its very nature, threatens the stability of the child’s world. We are concerned that the best interests of the child standard, too broadly interpreted, could become a blanket license for any person to disrupt long-fostered family relationships by claiming to be the (A.D.1991) (<HOLDING>); Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 234 Conn. 51, 661 Holdings: 0: holding that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in determining whether to order blood tests to determine paternity 1: holding that the trial court erred by not considering whether ordering blood tests to disestablish paternity was in the best interest of the child 2: holding that husband who was excluded from paternity of children and could not intervene in a paternity action to obtain custody would be able to bring an independent action per tql 3: holding that the trial court must specifically consider whether it would be in the best interest of the child for the case to proceed before a putative father may be permitted to seek blood tests in an attempt to rebut the presumption of paternity 4: holding that although a putative father had standing to bring a paternity action the action could not proceed and the blood tests could not be ordered unless the trial court determined that the paternity action would serve the best interest of the child


Input: and specific. Id. Federal courts have found that indirect evidence is not substantial and specific where no evidence beyond what is produced to satisfy the plaintiffs prima facie case is produced. See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.1996) (finding indirect evidence insufficient where no evidence beyond that produced for the prima facie case was presented); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir.1995) (finding indirect evidence insufficient where no evidence beyond that produced for the prima facie case was presented). “[C]ourts only require an employer honestly believed its reason for its actions, even if its reason is foolish or trivial or even baseless.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Respondents rely on Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics Holdings: 0: holding that the district court erred in failing to consider all of the employers proffered evidence of legitimate business reasons for the plaintiffs termination 1: holding that in producing nondiscriminatory reasons for its challenged action the employer is not obligated to support these reasons with objective evidence sufficient to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard 2: holding that plaintiff need only point to sufficient evidence to support an inference that the employer did not act for its proffered nondiscriminatory reasons 3: holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the defendants reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretext because the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence other than her own subjective testimony that she was more qualified for the job than the selectee 4: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext was insufficient because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer did not honestly believe its proffered reasons for its action


Input: [the federal controlled substance statute], which requires nothing more specific than an intent to distribute a controlled substance.”); United States v. Carranza, 289 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.2002) (“[A] defendant can be convicted [of possessing a controlled substance] if he believes he has some controlled substance in his possession.”) (quotation omitted); United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 458 (3d Cir.2001) (“[I]t is well settled that the Government must show that the defendant knew that the substance in which he trafficked was a controlled substance.”); United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 830 (7th Cir.2001) (“The government need only prove that the defendant was aware that some controlled substance was involved.”); United States v. Sheppard, 219 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted); United States v. Holdings: 0: holding that the government need not prove that the defendant actually knew the exact nature of the substance to establish mens rea knowledge of drugs illegality is sufficient 1: holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance 2: holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea 3: holding that possession of a controlled substance is a crime only if the defendant knowingly possesses the substance and has knowledge of the nature of that substance 4: holding that it was not necessary for the state to prove that the defendant knew the precise nature of the controlled substance he was convicted of delivering when evidence established that he knew it was a controlled substance


Input: 618, 564 N.E.2d 1280, 1290-92 (1990). 35 . Id., 151 Ill.Dec. 618, 564 N.E.2d at 1292-93. 36 . Koenig v. McCarthy Const. Co., 344 Ill.App. 93, 100 N.E.2d 338, 340 (1951). 37 . 1999 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 91-524 (S.B.458) (West) (Public Act 91-524, Medical Practice— Automatic External Defibrillator Act). 38 . TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31, 122 S.Ct. 441, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001). 39 . Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill.2d 318, 307 Ill.Dec. 592, 860 N.E.2d 246, 252-55 (2006). 40 . 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). 41 . 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/4 (1998). 42 . Allegis Realty Investors, 307 Ill.Dec. 592, 860 N.E.2d at 253. 43 . Id. 44 . The Illinois Good Samaritan Act also provides an exemption from civil liability for those using AE p.2d 802 (N.D.Ill.2005) (<HOLDING>). In Muno v. Condell Medical Center, 383 Holdings: 0: holding that the fact that the insurance agents perform functions that are an essential part of the companys normal operations is a decisive factor 1: holding that evidence of prior similar act was not relevant for the purpose of proving doctors negligence in performing operation at issue on particular occasion 2: holding that the samaritan act does not immunize doctors from suit when they are performing their normal job functions 3: holding that qualified immunity extends to government officials performing discretionary functions 4: holding advice of counsel does not per se immunize a person from a malicious prosecution suit


Input: informant’s information was corroborated by his personal observations and corroborated by the personal observations of officers Tate and Deer. The controlled buy was corroborated by the participation and observation of officers Tate and Deer: Sergeant Deer searched the informant and his vehicle for any illegal contraband or monies; the informant was given money to make the controlled buy; Tate and Deer followed the informant to a location near Morgan’s residence; and, Tate and Deer observed the informant walk into the residence, stay approximately two minutes, and return with drugs. Sergeant Deer’s account of the drug buy, alone, was sufficient to establish probable cause to search Morgan’s home for drugs and other contraband. See Langford v. State, 332 Ark. 54, 962 S.W.2d 358 (1998) (<HOLDING>). We do not find the fact that the officers did Holdings: 0: holding that an officers account of a controlled buy made by an informant was by itself sufficient to es tablish probable cause for issuance of a search warrant 1: holding that a totality of circumstances standard was proper for determining probable cause for issuance of a search warrant based on information from an informant 2: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 3: holding that a controlled buy at a particular home provided probable cause for the search of that residence 4: holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where the officers corroboration of events that occurred during the controlled buy as set forth in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause


Input: or other supporting evidence with the motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA finding that he had not satisfied any. However, even construing broadly Liu’s pro se brief, see Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006), we cannot find that Liu has challenged the BIA’s findings before this Court. Accordingly, we deem any argument based on ineffective assistance of counsel waived. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005). Furthermore, because each of these findings is an independent ground upon which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, the waiver of arguments challeng ing these findings is dispositive of Liu’s petition for review. See Jian Yun Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 409 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (requiring Holdings: 0: recognizing that while slavish adherence to matter of lozada is not required when an alien does not comply with those requirements in any respect the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is forfeited 1: holding that failing to substantially comply with the matter of lozada requirements in a motion to reopen before the bia forfeits an ineffective assistance claim in this court 2: holding that the petitioner was not entitled to claim ineffective assistance because she did not comply with the lozada requirements and made no effort to explain her lack of compliance 3: holding that the petitioners failure to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the bia deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear the issue 4: holding that the petitioners failure to comply with the lozada requirements results in a forfei ture of his ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel claim


Input: "show cause” is not defined in our rules, of course, but it has long been employed to denote an order, usually summary, providing notice 'of a hearing. The kind of hearing, its form and procedural requisites, will depend on the questions to be addressed and is not determined merely by the ."show cause” label. Wilcher v. Wilcher, 566 S.W.2d 173 (Ky.App.1978). 18 . While it is well established that individual government officials may be held in criminal' contempt for willfully violating a court order, Commonwealth ex rel. Dep’t of Nat. Res: & Envtl. Prot. v. Williams, 536 S.W.2d 474 (Ky.1976) (citing Wallace v. Sowards, 313 Ky. 360, 231 S.W.2d 10 (1950)), entity liability.is not so clear. Cf. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (<HOLDING>); and 'see Stuart P. Green, The Criminal Holdings: 0: holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 1: holding that municipalities are immune from liability for punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 in part because a municipality  can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials damages awarded for punitive purposes therefore are not sensibly assessed against the governmental entity itself 2: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under  1988 3: holding that in employment discrimination cases falling under 42 usc  1983 municipalities are not subject to punitive damages for the actions of government officials 4: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities in actions brought pursuant to 42 usc  1983


Input: conduct of the parties to the joint venture: “We have long held that concerted activity does not turn simply on whether the parties involved are legally distinct- entities. Instead, we have eschewed formalistic distinctions in favor of a functional consideration of how the parties involved in the alleged anticompetitive conduct actually operate.” 560 U.S. at 191, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (emphasis added). The Court went on to say that in looking at how the parties actually operate, “we have repeatedly found instances in which members of a legally single entity violated § 1 when the entity was controlled by a group of competitors and served, in essence, as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.” Id. (citing United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 87 S.Ct. 1847, 18 L.Ed.2d 1238 (1967) (<HOLDING>)). The stated intent on the part of the Holdings: 0: holding that a party waived the right to allege contrary facts on appeal eg that defendant was not an agent or instrumentality of the mexican government for sovereign immunity purposes where the party alleged that the defendant was an agent or instrumentality in its complaint 1: holding that sealy was not a single entity but instead an instrumentality of the individual parties 2: holding that an action naming a state entity as a defendant did not constitute an action against the state because the state entity was sued in its capacity as receiver 3: holding that connecticut courts look to the identity or instrumentality test to determine whether one corporate entity can properly be held responsible for the obligations of another corporate entity 4: holding that an entity majorityowned by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is itself an agency or instrumentality of that foreign state under the fsia


Input: issue in Faretta, however, was whether the Constitution forbids a State from forcing a lawyer upon a criminal defendant, which is an entirely different issue. 4 This problem does not exist under federal law because the long-standing right of self-representation in federal courts is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982), which provides that “[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . . 5 We recognize, of course, that commensurate with Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), a state is forbidden under the Fourteenth Amendment from forcing a lawyer upon a criminal defendant. Meads, Judge, dissenting. I cannot agree with the to reverse this case. In the first place, neither Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (<HOLDING>), nor Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Holdings: 0: recognizing that when a defendant voluntarily intelligently and unequivocally elects to proceed without counsel under the sixth amendment a court cannot force the defendant to accept counsel against his or her will 1: holding that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent constitutional right of selfrepresentation and that he may proceed to represent himself without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so 2: holding that defendant waived his right to selfrepresentation where he told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself and the public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of trial without objection 3: holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel 4: holding petitioner cannot claim he was denied right to assistance of counsel when he knowingly and voluntarily decided to represent himself


Input: Plaintiffs still believed the fees being charged were too high. From July 1, 1997 until the agreement terminated in late 1999, Plaintiffs paid the higher fees s ere decided unilaterall ment may be amended only in writing, by the agreement of the parties.” The Agreement does not require that amendments be signed. See T.R. Mills Contractors, Inc. v. WRH Enters., LLC, 93 S.W.3d 861, 865-66 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002) (a written agreement does not have to be signed to be binding). BCBST memorialized the terms in writing and sent the proposed written amendment to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs paid the amounts specified by the proposed written amendment but refused to sign it. The two requisites of amendment under the Agreement were met: written terms and the agreement of the parties to amend. See id. (<HOLDING>). Although a signed writing is a superior way Holdings: 0: holding that when a contract is signed by one party but not the other the manifestation of consent by the nonsigning party is sufficient to bind that party 1: holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it 2: holding that validity of contract may be established by one or more writings signed by party to be charged 3: holding that successful party is one who is the ultimate prevailing party in the litigation 4: holding that parol evidence is admissible to show that an individual who signed a contract but is not named in the body is a party to the contract


Input: v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n. 1 (10th Cir.2007). 2 . In this application, Mr. Ciocchetti asserts that his attorneys were ineffective not only for failure to competently cross-examine Mr. Ferguson, but also for "fail[ure] to investigate the facts and interview witnesses who would have verified” his account. Aplt. Combined Opening Br. & COA Appl. at 17. Beyond this cursory reference, however, Mr. Ciocchetti makes no effort to develop his failure-to-investigate claim, and, therefore, we will not address it further. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.2007) ("[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant’s opening brief.”); see also Mathews v. McKune, 133 Fed.Appx. 512, 514 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Mr. Ciocchetti faults the district court Holdings: 0: holding that the court has discretion not to consider an issue abandoned on appeal 1: recognizing that the appellants claim on appeal had been abandoned because although his motion for a coa  briefly asserted the claim he did not brief the issue 2: holding that the appellant waived his claim on appeal because he failed to address that claim in either his application for a coa or his brief on appeal 3: holding that issues not raised in an appellants initial brief are deemed abandoned 4: holding that petitioners claim asserted in a subsequent brief was not waived due to omission from the coa application


Input: (taking judicial notice of prior litigation filings, press releases, articles and financial publications); In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F.Supp.2d 351, 358 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (publicly available analysts’ reports). Public documents issued by government agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) may also be considered. See, e.g., Noble Asset Mgmt. v. Allos Therapeutics, Inc., No. 04-CV-1030 (RPM), 2005 WL 4161977, at *2 (D.Colo. Oct. 20, 2005) (denying motion to strike FDA guidance documents, reasoning that such public documents are related to FDA’s “process for reviewing new drug applications and that process is central to an evaluation of the claims made in this case.”); DeMarco v. DepoTech Corp., 149 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1218 (S.D.Cal.2001) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 32 Fed.Appx. 260 (9th Cir.2002). The Holdings: 0: holding that documents integral to the complaint are properly considered on a motion to dismiss 1: recognizing that on motion to dismiss a court may properly consider transcript of fda advisory committee meeting 2: recognizing that statute of limitations questions may be resolved on a motion to dismiss 3: holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion 4: holding that a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may consider a document that is referenced in the complaint and is central to the plaintiffs claims


Input: of alimony, maintenance, or support.” The argument is unpersuasive as an initial matter because nothing in the language of section 523(a)(5) indicates that the dis-chargeability of an obligation turns on state laws regulating alimony and support. Had Congress intended. state law to be determinative, it likely would have stated that intent expressly. See Harrell, 754 F.2d at 904 (“If Congress had intended dischargeability to be determined by whether an obligation could be imposed under state law, it might have addressed dischargeability in those terms.”). In fact, as indicated above, the legislative history of section 523(a)(5) demonstrates that Congress determined that state support laws should not be determinative of whether a particular obligation is dischargeable. Cf. id. at 905 (<HOLDING>); Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1315-17 (holding that a Holdings: 0: holding that derivative actions do not require the support of a majority of shareholders or even all of the minority shareholders 1: holding that a statute that lowered the age of majority to 18 did not have retroactive effect on the plaintiffs lawsuit when the applicable statute of limitations was shortened because it was tied to the age of majority 2: holding that support does not encompass miscellaneous expenses 3: holding that a promise to pay postmajority educational expenses was nondischargeable support even though the relevant states law does not require such support past the age of majority 4: holding that an agreement to pay sons college education expenses was nondischargeable support even though arkansas law does not require payment of such expenses


Input: loss of ability to meet any of these basic work-related activities would severely limit the potential occupational base. This, in turn, would justify a finding of disability.... SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857 (S.S.A.), at *4. In implementing the five-step sequential evaluation process outlined above, the ALJ is under an affirmative duty to adequately develop the medical record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(d) (stating that the SSA will make reasonable efforts to obtain a complete medical history from treating sources); see also Tejada, 167 F.3d at 774. The ALJ is thus “obligated to explore the facts by obtaining relevant medical records and asking questions ... to assist the claimant in developing her case.” Jones v. Apfel, 66 F.Supp.2d 518, 538 (S.D.N.Y.1999); see also Perez, 77 F.3d at 47 (<HOLDING>). This duty becomes even more paramount when, Holdings: 0: holding that there may be an obligation to defend under an insurance policy even though there is no obligation to indemnify 1: holding that a failure to advise even when the defendant has an affirmative obligation to do so is not the same as engaging in affirmative misconduct  2: holding that an alj cannot discredit lay testimony solely because it is not supported by medical evidence in the record 3: holding it is error for an alj to fail to consider factors relevant to the pain analysis which are supported by the record 4: holding that where there are deficiencies in the record the alj is under an affirmative obligation to develop the relevant medical history


Input: 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). The Supreme Court held in Buckley that a prosecutor is not absolutely immune when he allegedly fabricated evidence during the investigation by retaining a dubious expert witness. Id. at 273-75, 113 S.Ct. 2606. The Court reasoned that “[t]here is a difference between the advocate’s role in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, ... and the detective’s role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested....” Id. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (citations omitted). Because the prosecutor’s conduct in Buckley fell within the latter category, the Supreme Court denied absolute immunity. See also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342-43, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the District Attorney Holdings: 0: holding that a police officer who secures an arrest warrant without probable cause cannot assert an absolute immunity defense 1: holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest 2: holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest 3: holding that a prosecutors preparation and filing of an information and a motion for an arrest warrant are protected by absolute immunity 4: holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity


Input: of trust,” Partnership Agreement Article 7.2, and the lack of any duty on the part of the limited partners to make further contributions to the partnership. The evidence does not support Travers’ argument that the partnership was voluntarily dissolved. On the contrary, the evidence presented demonstrates that Travers, by joining with his wife to buy the note and to cause the foreclosure sale of the property, dissolved the partnership in contravention of his duties under the partnership agreement. See Partnership Agreement, Article VII, ¶ 2. He did not have authority to buy the partnership property pursuant to the partnership agreement, his actions constituting self dealing divesting the partnership of its only significant asset. Virginia Code § 50-21; Klotz v. Klotz, 202 Va. 393 (1961) (<HOLDING>); Lindsay v. Bevins, 204 Va. 74, 77 (1963) Holdings: 0: holding that partners have a fiduciary relationship and are held to high standards of integrity in their dealings with each other 1: holding that a partner owes a duty to all other partners to exercise the utmost good faith fairness and loyalty 2: holding that the relationship of partners is of a fiduciary character and imposes upon them the obligation to exercise good faith and integrity in their dealings 3: holding general fiduciary duties of confidence trust loyalty and good faith insufficient to establish the necessary fiduciary relationship for purposes of  523a4 4: holding that partners may not agree to eliminate the fiduciary character of their relationship


Input: ¶ 10 The testimony of Dr. Stahl in this case was much less compelling than the evidence excluded in Hays. Nonetheless, Dr. Stahl’s testimony had some relevance. We cannot ascertain the weight the court placed on Dr. Stahl’s testimony due to the court’s limited findings. Therefore, we cannot gauge the degree, if any, to which Father was disadvantaged by this testimony. We note, however, that Father chose not to seek a continuance to depose Dr. Stahl. Moreover, the timing of the disclosure was not entirely Mother’s fault, but was due, in part, to the late date on which the parties received the custody evaluation. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the family court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Stahl to testify. II. Adequacy of Findings of Fac 0 P.3d 775, 780 (App. 2003) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 13 As in the aforementioned eases, the Holdings: 0: recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings 1: holding that the lower courts findings were insufficient as a matter of law and remanding for the court to make the findings required under ars  25403 2: holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence 3: holding that objections are required to challenge magistrate judges findings as well as magistrates failure to make additional findings 4: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case


Input: evidence were introduced or victim was asked about it, we don’t have any way to resolve that event or to give any meaningful way for the jury to evaluate the event without having witnesses to either corroborate or impeach victim’s statements.” In the end, the court expressed its view that asking the victim about the California incident “would not be helpful to the jury” and it precluded defendant from questioning her about that incident or introducing other evidence about it. That ruling was not an abuse of discretion. A trial court has authority to preclude this type of cross-examination on allegedly false prior accusations when it reasonably determines that exploration of the previous incident would essentially require an unhelpful trial within a trial. See Arellano, 149 Or App at 91 (<HOLDING>); LeClair, 83 Or App at 131 (noting that the Holdings: 0: recognizing that risk of unfair prejudice is diminished in bench trial 1: recognizing that proof of extreme delay establishes prejudice 2: recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings 3: recognizing that a delay in proceedings to explore a collateral matter can create a risk of prejudice 4: holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant


Input: 161 L.Ed.2d 181 (2005). While other portions of § 1591 have been challenged on vagueness grounds, the question of § 1591(d)’s facial validity has not been considered by federal courts. See United States v. Clinton, CR 12-40018-01-KES, 2012 WL 5195987 (D.S.D. Oct. 19, 2012). Defendant contends that he could not know what actions could expose him to criminal liability under the statute. It is true that § 1591 lacks the heightened “corruptly” mens rea of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, the general obstruction of justice statute, and that “criminal offenses requiring no mens rea have a ‘generally disfavored status.’” Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (citation omitted); see also Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (<HOLDING>). In the context of a vagueness challenge, this Holdings: 0: holding that before a court imposes an enhancement for obstruction of justice the court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice  1: holding under predecessor to  1503 that a person is not sufficiently charged with obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice in a court unless it ap pears that he knew or had notice that justice was being administered in such court 2: holding that trial court had discretion to relax the thirtyday rule in the interests of justice 3: holding that the court will not consider an issue not raised in the district court unless 1 it involves a pure question of law and refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice 2 the party raising the issue had no opportunity to do so before the district court 3 the interest of substantial justice is at stake 4 the proper resolution is beyond any doubt or 5 the issue presents significant questions of general impact or great public concern 4: recognizing inherent power in the courts to preserve the efficient and expeditious administration of justice and protect it from being impaired or destroyed


Input: faith in the performance of contracts.’ ” Dick Broad. Co. of Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Wallace v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tenn. 1996)). “As a result of this covenant, each contracting party promises to per form its part of the contract in good faith and, in return, expects the other party to do the. same.” Goot v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., No. M2003-02013-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 3031638, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2005). “To avoid the imposition o A.2d 1121, 1132 (2001) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant with unilateral pricing authority under contract because of potential for evidence of lack of good faith); CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Emp’s Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Alaska 1993) (<HOLDING>); Cobb v. Ironwood Country Club, 233 Holdings: 0: holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract 1: holding that unilateral right to select independent counsel is subject to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 2: holding that negligence alone is not sufficient to constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to insureds 3: recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract 4: recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages