Input: is entitled to one-half of that portion ... in this case." Id. at 488-84. 127 Wife concedes that Woodward is the controlling case in Utah regarding how retirement assets are valued and divided, but attempts to distinguish the present case factually because "the overwhelming growth of [Husband's] retirement accounts ... [occurred] during the period of the parties' marriage." Presumably, this is because appreciation of the accounts was greater in the later years. Wife argues that the value of Husband's accounts should be ascertained as of 1993, when the parties married, and the balance exceeding that 1993 value should then be divided between the parties. Woodward, however, made no such distinction, and treats all years of a defined benefit plan as having equal value. See id. at 488 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted)). The trial court followed Holdings: 0: holding that where the trial court awarded the former husband the value of his pension plan but failed to calculate the present value of the plan case must be reversed and remanded for redetermination of equitable distribution 1: recognizing that the fact that a defendant has liability insurance can be established at trial where the issue of ownership is in dispute 2: holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition 3: holding that if the market value of an asset can be ascertained the decree should account for the change in value between the date of the decree and the timely execution of the distribution plan in the decree the distribution based on value at the distribution date 4: holding that a fixed system of distribution is applicable where no present value can be established


Input: the federal rules, recognized that it was to be “guided by court decisions interpreting these rules.” Miscellaneous Changes to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Rules, 63 Fed.Reg. at 48,084. The majority relies on TBMP § 523.04 which states that where a party “fails to file a motion to challenge the sufficiency of the response [to its discovery request], it may not thereafter be heard to complain about the sufficiency thereof.” It is far from clear whether this provision was designed to deal with the supplementation requirement, or whether it was limited to deal with the failure to provide initial responses. In any event, unlike the regulations, this section of the TBMP does not have the force and effect of law. See In re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053, 1059 (Fed.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). In the past, we have declined to follow Holdings: 0: holding that directive not promulgated according to apa procedure lacks force and effect of law 1: holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract 2: holding that the trademark manual of examining procedure tmep does not have the force and effect of law 3: holding that compliance with registration statute did not abrogate common law and statutory trademark law 4: holding that the defendants reference to the plaintiffs trademark in the metatags of the defendants web page was a violation of trademark law


Input: Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449-58, 84 S.Ct. 1738, 12 L.Ed.2d 953 (1964)(rejecting the plaintiffs attempt to place glass and metal containers in different relevant markets based on different characteristics). News America points to ample evidence in the record supporting its contention that the consumers of at-shelf coupon dispensers do in fact view at-shelf coupon dispensers as reasonably interchangeable with other in-store marketing vehicles, despite the fact that each in-store marketing vehicle may have its own unique advantages and features. Based on the record presented, the Court cannot accept Menasha’s definition of a relevant market limited to at-shelf coupon dispensers. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 242, 113 S.Ct. 2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168 (1993)(<HOLDING>). Because Menasha has failed to provide a Holdings: 0: holding that if an experts opinion is dependent upon information that is inaccurate or lacks support in the record it is deemed incompetent 1: holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion 2: holding that it is not the courts role to decide whether an experts opinion is correct 3: holding even though experts are permitted to give an opinion they may not offer an opinion regarding the credibility of others 4: holding that when an experts opinion regarding the relevant market is not supported by sufficient facts or when the record contradicts or renders the opinion unreasonable it cannot support a jurys verdict


Input: lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thereafter, the federal court granted Al-Challah's request and signed Al-Challah's proposed order dismissing her federal claims with prejudice and dismissing her state law elaims without prejudice. A complaint that is voluntarily dismissed is treated as if it never existed and, thus, cannot toll the statute of limitations. Kohlman, 509 N.E.2d at 232. Because Al-Challah voluntarily dismissed her federal lawsuit, her action did not "fail" within the meaning of the Journey's Account Statute. Therefore, the trial court did not err by finding that the Journey's Account Statute was not applicable by granting Barger's motion to dismiss Al-Challah's complaint as time barred. See, e.g., id.; cf. City of Evansville v. Moore, 563 N.E.2d 113, 115-116 (Ind.1990) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Holdings: 0: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 1: holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second 2: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered 3: holding that where plaintiffs claims are timely on the face of the allegations of the complaint a court should strike the affirmative defense of statute of limitations 4: holding that the plaintiffs voluntary dismissal did not bar the application of the journeys account statute where the dismissal was not unilateral but merely occurred as a professional courtesy in compliance with the defendants request and assurance that he would waive any affirmative defense under the statute of limitations


Input: the benchmark well above the ALI’s hope that class members might receive 100 percent recovery. And the court recognized that the cy pres fund serves the goals of civil damages by ensuring AstraZeneca fairly pays for the class’s alleged losses. We asked at oral argument why AstraZeneca would be willing to pay a total sum more than the treble damages for each class member. Counsel for Plaintiff Townsend replied that the plaintiffs had insisted on AstraZeneca paying a larger sum to better represent the losses of the entire class, including those class members who would never claim their recovery. The district court’s approval reflected another important concern: facilitating a settlement in a hard-fought, complex class action. See Durrett v. Housing Auth., 896 F.2d 600, 604 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Achieving settlement in such cases is not Holdings: 0: recognizing a policy encouraging class action settlements 1: holding that a schools excess policy was primary over a students homeowners policy for injuries to the student during physical education class 2: recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine 3: holding fjraud on the part of the insured in the procurement of the policy  is sufficient to defeat a recovery in an action on such policy 4: recognizing that policy determines duty


Input: defendant’s method of measuring the productivity of its sales staff singled her out and devalued her contribution. It is well-established that an employer may rely upon supervisor evaluations to assess an employee’s performance when carrying out an employment decision. Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985). As articulated by plaintiff, however, by considering the small, less time-consuming agreements the younger salesmen were able to obtain as equivalent to the those plaintiff sought, defendant intentionally undervalued plaintiffs work. As further evidence of the pretext of the methodology, plaintiff cites the following examples: that it was applied retroactively to diminish the value of her sales, th (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, plaintiff denies the Holdings: 0: holding that based upon discrepancies in defendants articulated basis for discrimination reasonable juror could infer that these were pretextual and developed over time to counter evidence suggesting discrimination 1: holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination 2: holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex 3: holding that a reasonable juror could not infer discrimination based on a supervisors comments that the company needed to get rid of its old fart pilots 4: holding that a reasonable juror could infer that the shifting and inconsistent explanations given by the employer at trial were pretextual developed over time to counter the evidence suggesting discrimination


Input: court, Mr. Lilly’s appeal is a criminal appeal subject to Rule 4(b) notice of appeal filing requirements. Mr. Lilly maintains that we have appellate jurisdiction because this appeal is subject to the timing requirement of Rule 4(a) for appeals in civil matters. According to Mr. Lilly, his petition for clarification was in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, which is a civil proceeding that would give rise to a civil appeal. B. It is true that a number of proceedings involving criminal matters are treated as civil for purposes of Rule 4’s filing requirements. See, e.g., Browder, 434 U.S. at 265 n. 9, 98 S.Ct. 556 (observing that habeas corpus is undeniably a civil proceeding to which the time limits of Rule 4(a) apply); United States v. Taylor, 975 F.2d 402, 403 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Craig, 907 F.2d 653, 657 Holdings: 0: holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration 1: holding that rule 4as timing requirements apply to an appeal from an order granting or denying a criminal defendants motion for the return of property under fedrcrimp 41e 2: holding that a district court has jurisdiction to entertain a rule 41e motion for the return of property before a criminal prosecution has begun believing such a motion to be in effect a civil action 3: holding that rule 4as time limits govern an appeal from a district court order granting or denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis 4: holding that rule 41e motion for return of seized property is treated as a civil equitable proceeding when criminal proceedings against moving party are not yet pending


Input: activity. State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 503 (Utah 1979). “[T]he transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the agent and the defendant, and the response to the inducements of the agent” must all be evaluated. Id. Moreover, “[e]xtreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money, are examples, depending on an evaluation of circumstances in each case, of what might constitute prohibited police conduc ts of money, or large quantities of marijuana for an extremely low price. Rather, Wakefield used the market rate to determine the price of the marijuana. Furthermore, Wakefield did not make repeated requests or badger J.D.W. to buy the marijuana. Cf. Sprague, 680 P.2d at 406 (<HOLDING>). J.D.W. immediately responded positively to Holdings: 0: holding that where defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation agent did not violate the fifth amendment by contacting defendant for questioning after defendant refused to answer questions without a lawyer present 1: holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant 2: holding that uncharged amounts of drugs may be included as relevant conduct even if the defendant never actually possessed or distributed the drugs 3: holding that agent entrapped defendant by goading defendant and repeatedly requesting drugs from him 4: holding that evidence that the defendant and a witness sold drugs together was relevant to prove how the witness knew the defendant


Input: misinformation, the analysis differs where the government affirmatively misleads an alien about the availability of relief. Cf. Holmberg v. Armbreckt, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946) (explaining that equity will toll a statute of limitations because of fraud or concealment). We did not find Copeland’s two-year delay in seeking to exhaust his administrative remedies unreasonable where he had been misinformed by the IJ. This reasoning is equally applicable to Lopez’s failure to seek judicial review in the eighteen months between his final order of deportation and his deportation. Deportation, now removal, is a civil proceeding with its own administrative procedures. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048-50, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Because it is an administrative process, Holdings: 0: holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil deportation proceedings and noting the rules incompatibility with the streamlined administrative nature of such proceedings 1: holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings 2: holding that exclusionary rule does apply to civil forfeiture proceedings 3: holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings 4: holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials


Input: (7th Cir.2011). ANALYSIS CVR disputes both parts of the 10(j) test. It contends there is no reasonable cause to believe that it committed unfair labor practices because it is not a successor to Berry obligated to negotiate with Local 100 ULU. Second, CVR contends that injunctive relief is not “just and proper” in this case, largely because of the 16-month gap between the filing of the charge and this 10(j) petition. A. Reasonable Cause It is well settled that, under certain circumstances, a successor to an employer is subject to the predecessor’s duty to negotiate with the representatives of the appropriate employee unit, and the failure to negotiate can be an unfair labor practice. See NLRB v. Burns Int’l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 280-81, 92 S.Ct. 1571, 32 L.Ed.2d 61 (1972) (<HOLDING>). CVR contends that this successor-ship Holdings: 0: holding that where the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent the successor employer must bargain with the incumbent union 1: holding retirees are not employees within the bargaining unit 2: holding that a county had no duty to bargain with a union of its employees 3: holding that the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement and that in appropriate circumstances present here the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the agreement 4: holding that the employer was not the insurers agent


Input: them until after the petition, and the amount debtor was to pay to fund those benefits likewise was not determined or payable until after the petition was filed. At issue was whether the obligation to fund those unemployment benefits paid to the former employees was a pre-petition or post-petition claim against the debtor. The court ruled that because the event that under local law triggered the liability, i.e. the termination of the employees, occurred pre-petition, the claim was not a post-petition administrative expense. Id. at 515. 8 . See, e.g., Columbia Gas System, 146 B.R. at 118 (ruling that under local law debtor obligation to pay taxes arose not when it was assessed but "when it owned and operated properly within the prior calendar year”); Northeastern Ohio, 126 B.R. at 515 (<HOLDING>); In re Brent Explorations, Inc., 91 B.R. 104, Holdings: 0: holding that taxes were a claim against the estate that had to be filed in probate court thus reversing an order requiring heirs to pay taxes on estate property because the district court did not have jurisdiction 1: holding petitioner could not deduct real estate taxes imposed on property he did not own because these taxes were not imposed on him 2: holding that plaintiff explained why statements were fraudulent where the complaint alleged that defendants statements requested port fees and customs taxes  but no such fees or taxes were due 3: holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes 4: holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable


Input: personally upon them. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama, 104 F.3d 1453, 1457-58 (4th Cir.1997) (opining that so long as the government has suffered an injury-in-fact, the qui tam plaintiff possesses general standing as the government’s representative); United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1212-1214 (7th Cir.1995) (stating “[o]nce we accept the premise that the United States is the real plaintiff in a qui tam action, it stands to reason that challenges to the standing of the government’s representative are beside the point____Requiring an additional showing of injury on the part of the qui tam relator would be an analytical redundancy.”); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 748 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1154 (declaring that Holdings: 0: holding that standing of a qui tam plaintiff under the false claims act requires an injury to the united states 1: holding that a state or agency is not a person subject to qui tam liability under the false claims act 2: holding that to be protected by the fca when confronting an employer the employee must sufficiently allege activity with a nexus to a qui tam action or fraud against the united states government 3: holding that the fca effectively assigns the governments claims to qui tam plaintiffs  who then may sue based upon an injury to the federal treasury 4: holding that plaintiff could not maintain a qui tam fca action against a municipal entity


Input: An employer is found liable for negligent hiring if, at the time of hiring, the employer had reason to believe that hiring this person would create an undue risk of harm to others. Connes v. Molalla Transp. System, Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Colo.1992); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 emt. d (1958). Hence, the court does not inquire into the employer’s broad reasons for choosing this particular employee for the position, but instead looks to whether the specific danger which ultimately manifested itself could have reasonably been foreseen at the time of hiring. This inquiry, even when applied to a minister employee, is so limited and factually based that it can be accomplished with no inquiry into religious beliefs. See Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320-21 (Colo.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2153, 128 Holdings: 0: holding that although courts must not become embroiled in interpreting or weighing church doctrine a claim of negligent hiring of a minister is actionable because it does not require such interpretation or weighing of religious belief but instead is merely application of a secular standard to secular conduct 1: holding that cemetery owned and operated by association of churches was not entitled to unemployment compensation tax exemption because services it provided were the same as those of secular cemeteries and therefore its primary purpose was not religious 2: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise 3: recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous 4: holding application of civil rights act to pastors claim of racial discrimination would encroach upon the churchs right to be free from secular interference and to decide for themselves matters of church government


Input: fiduciary relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other to so act.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1). There is no manifestation by either the federal government or the State of California of an intent to create an agency relationship under the facts of this case. First, both the Supreme Court and our predecessor court, the United States Court of Claims, have held that the federal government’s conditioning a state or locality’s receipt of federal funds on the state’s taking a particular action does not make that state or locality an agent of the federal government. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, Pa., 369 U.S. 84, 89, 82 S.Ct. 531, 7 L.Ed.2d 585 (1962) (<HOLDING>); D.R. Smalley & Sons, Inc. v. United States, Holdings: 0: holding that the federal government was liable for a taking of property where california officials acting under the authority of a federal order occupied land 1: recognizing that stateimposed restrictions upon property may be attributed to the federal government for purposes of a takings analysis where the state officials acted as agents of the federal government or pursuant to federal authority 2: holding that the county government not the federal government was liable for the taking of an air easement over plaintiffs property even though the airport was funded in part by a federal grant based on compliance with federal regulations 3: holding that employees of county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to contract with the federal government were not federal employees even though county jail had to comply with federal rules and regulations 4: holding that the federal government was liable for a taking of property where city of burlington acted under federal authority


Input: [] is a matter which lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.” Consol. Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Const. Co., 383 F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir.1967). Even where a defendant does not explicitly ask for default to be set aside, a brief in opposition to default judgment will be treated as a request to have default set aside, and will be analyzed under the “good cause” standard. See FDIC v. Danzig, 10 F.3d 806, 1993 WL 478842, at *2 (4th Cir.1993) (unpublished table decision) (‘Where, as here, a court is ruling upon a plaintiff’s application for a default judgment, it properly treats the defendant’s opposition as a motion to set aside the entry of default, which is assessed under Rule 55(c)’s good cause standard.”) (citing Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>)). Therefore, as stated above, Wong’s Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that motion to set aside default made at least seven months after defendant learned of entry of default was not made within a reasonable time 1: holding that in considering the appellants opposition to the motion for a default judgment it is proper to apply the rule 55c standard for setting aside the entry of a default 2: holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact 3: holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment 4: holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment


Input: “[i]t is enough for the movant to bring up the fact that the record does not contain such an issue,” the movant must also “identify that part of the record which bears out his assertion.” City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Assoc. Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988) (emphasis added). “Once this is done, [the moving party’s] burden is discharged, and, if the record in fact bears out the claim that no genuine dispute exists on any material fact, it is then the [non-moving party’s] burden to set forth affirmative evidence, specific facts, showing that there is a genuine dispute on that issue.” Id. at 274. However, if the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, the burden is never passed to the nonmoving party. See Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1346 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). “ ‘[E]ven when the non-movant bears the Holdings: 0: holding that the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial 1: holding due to the moving partys failure to meet its initial burden the onus never passed to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial  citation omitted 2: recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case 3: holding that an adverse party must state specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of fact for trial 4: holding the moving party must meet its burden by showing  that is pointing out to the trial court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case


Input: of the best mode. See United States Gypsum Company v. National Gypsum Company, 74 F.3d 1209, 1213 (Fed.Cir.1996) (quoting the inventor definitively stating “[a]t the time the application was filed, I considered a perlite supplied by Silbrico ... to be the best commercially available .... ”)• Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 112. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . The court agrees with Plaintiffs that its use of various terms throughout the specification to signify a theoretical win profile do not arise to the level of semantic indefiniteness as was found in Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus. Inc. 299 F.3d 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002)(<HOLDING>) 2 . For purposes of Defendants' Summary Holdings: 0: holding that the scope of coverage of the claims may change if a patentee has relinquished a potential claim construction in an amendment to the claim or in an argument to overcome or distinguish a reference 1: recognizing the validity of the holding in south middlesex with respect to parallel claims under  3604 of the fha and section 1983 2: holding that at least with respect to the constitutionally inadequate notice in that case the errors were not structural 3: holding that the argument that an additional limitation be read into claims 1 3 and 4 was only correct with respect to claim 1 and thus only claim 1 was invalid 4: holding that in the case where patentee was attempting to argue that parallel meant perpendicular with respect to a particular claim and a claim ended with an incomplete limitation the claims at issue were indefinite


Input: causing significant change in benefits.” Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). To constitute an adverse employment action, the conduct must be ‘“materially adverse’ to the employee’s job status.” Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1213 (2003)(quoting Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d at 533). In Wells v. Colorado Dep’t of Transportation, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether a supervisor’s “poor treatment” of the employee was sufficient to establish an adverse employment action. 325 F.3d at 1214. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the supervisor undermined her authority at a work site when they had a disagreement in front of other workers. See id. In denying the plaintiffs claim that 98, 1104 (10th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>). “There is little support for the argument Holdings: 0: recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually 1: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 2: holding that a written warning may be an adverse employment action for purposes of a fmla claim only if it effects a significant change in the plaintiffs employment status 3: holding that written warnings that impacted the probability an employee would be terminated are adverse employment actions 4: recognizing that employment actions can be adverse even if such actions are subsequently withdrawn


Input: outlining the offenses, not the later date of indictment. Id. The appeals court disagreed, holding that denial of parole due to pending charges is not equivalent to arrest on the charges. Id. at 1043. Therefore, the defendant’s continued incarceration was for his prior conviction, rather than pretrial detention for the uncharged offense, and so the speedy trial clock began to run from the date of indictment. Id.; see also People v. Roscoe, 162 Mich.App. 710, 413 N.W.2d 483 (1987); State v. Johnson, 92 Wash.2d 598, 599 P.2d 529 (1979). Likewise, the Alaska Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that the speedy trial clock begins to run when a defendant is indicted, rather than when arrested on other offenses or for probation violations. Harmon v. State, 908 P.2d 434 (Alaska Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>); Demientieff v. State, 814 P.2d 745 (Alaska Holdings: 0: holding that although plaintiff was liable for medical services rendered he was not bound by the amount of the charges listed in the admission contract as he was entitled to question the reasonableness of the charges 1: holding that the speedy trial clock for state charges did not begin to run when the defendant was taken into custody by federal authorities on federal charges but rather when he was indicted for the state charges 2: holding attorneys must be given reasonable notice of the charges they face before the referees hearing on those charges 3: holding that  1983 claims accrued when all charges were dismissed rather than a previous date on which the conviction was vacated on the theory that the charges remained pending until the dismissal 4: holding that an exception to the charges having to do with contributory negligence  charges two three and four was insufficient to preserve issue for appeal


Input: 13-3. Defendant contends that the 2010-2011 IEP does not preclude G.M. from earning a Regents diploma in the future, but that earning Carnegie credits in her mainstream classes is currently outside G.M.’s ability. See Dkt. No. 15 at 24. Under the IDEA, a student with a disability is eligible to earn a high school diploma until his or her twenty-first birthday. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 100.9(e). At the time this action was brought, G.M. was fifteen years old, thus Defendant’s contention that she still has ample time to earn a Regents diploma is correct. Given G.M.’s significant deficits, however, Defendant’s decision that G.M. would not receive Carnegie credit for her course work for 2010-2011 does not amount to a violation of the IDEA. See J.S., 586 F.Supp.2d at 86 (<HOLDING>). The record shows that G.M. struggled Holdings: 0: holding that the districts decision that the plaintiff could only pursue an iep diploma was reasonably calculated to benefit the plaintiff and was in conformity with the requirements of the idea 1: holding that a plaintiff must comply with the notice of claim requirements in order to maintain an action against a government employee even if the plaintiff claims that the employee acted with fraud or malice 2: holding that courts must construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff by  giving the plaintiff the benefit of all the inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the pleaded facts 3: holding that the plaintiff could bring an action for negligent misrepresentation although the plaintiff could not sue on the contract because the contract was void 4: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff


Input: did not abuse its discretion in admitting La Mott’s testimony. Wilson next argues that the statement was not made “in furtherance of’ the conspiracy. To be “in furtherance of’ a conspiracy, “the statements must further the common objectives of the conspiracy or set in motion transactions that are an integral part of the conspiracy.” Kearns, 61 F.3d at 1426 (quotations omitted), “mere conversation between coconspirators” does not qualify as nonhearsay. United States v. Bibbero, 749 F.2d 581, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1984) (quotations omitted). Here, Ware’s statement concerned the source of the pseudophendrine pills and it is plausible that the statement was made to convince Meier, a member of the conspiracy, that the source was loyal, consistent and reliable. See Williams, 989 F.2d at 1069 (<HOLDING>); Kearns, 61 F.3d at 1425-26 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that telephone conversations and meetings were overt acts in furtherance of a drug conspiracy 1: holding that statements aimed at preventing detection and punishment were not admissible under the coconspirator exception because admission of such statements would expand exception to hearsay rule to include declarations made not in furtherance of conspiracy charged but made in furtherance of an alleged implied but uncharged conspiracy aimed at preventing detection and punishment 2: holding that the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction requires that the outofstate coconspirator was or should have been aware of the acts performed in the forum state in furtherance of the conspiracy 3: holding that statements made to keep a coconspirator informed as to the groups drug supply were made in furtherance of the conspiracy 4: holding that statements by a cooperating coconspirator to known authorities made after the commencement of cooperation are not admissible under rule 801d2e because such statements are not made in furtherance of the conspiracy


Input: as a witness, he did not receive any money for his actions. See infra, p. 587. 8 .Although the Third Circuit, in Klem, analyzed the definition of "substantial burden” in the context of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, this test has been used interchangeably in the RFRA context. See Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 442-43. 9 . It is worth mentioning that, though not applicable to the case at hand, the test to determine the validity of a prison regulation which impinges on prisoners' constitutional rights includes as one factor “whether inmates retain alternative means of exercising the circumscribed right.” DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir.2004); see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), 10 . The Suprem (9th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943, 90 S.Ct. 956, 25 Holdings: 0: holding that the federal kidnapping act does not make the kidnappers motivation an ingredient of the crime 1: holding that assault and kidnapping charges do not merge as they are not the same act for purposes of blockburger  and as each required proof of an element the other did not 2: holding the connection is an element 3: recognizing that kidnapping under oklahoma law is a felony 4: holding that a kidnappers motivation is not an element of the federal kidnapping offense


Input: the application of the Code. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 160-61, 111 S.Ct. 2197, 115 L.Ed.2d 145 (1991). This holding also applies to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See In re Thomas, 203 B.R. 64, 67 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.1996) (applying plain meaning doctrine to bankruptcy rules) (citing Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643-44, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992)). Under the plain meaning of Bankruptcy Rule 9001(5), a “controlling stockholder” may be designated by the Court. In the case at bar, Rubicon is unquestionably a controlling shareholder; it owns the most stock of any shareholder, [Finding of Fact No. 9.], and its percentage ownership (45%) constitutes control. See, e.g., Riggs Nat. Bank of Wash. D.C. v. Allbritton, 516 F.Supp. 164, 179 (D.D.C. 1981) (<HOLDING>); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (presuming control by Holdings: 0: holding approximately 21 percent of petitioners common stock 1: holding when defendant raised affirmative defense of total failure of consideration that even assuming the acquired stock became worthless the worthlessness of the stock did not constitute a failure of consideration when in exchange for note defendant received 2500 shares of stock   as well as all the rights privileges and benefits of a shareholder director and officer emphasis supplied punctuation omitted 2: holding that shares of stock in husbands name had not been transmuted 3: holding in action for breach of contract caused by wrongful foreclosure and sale of shares of stock plaintiff was entitled to recover the fair market value of the stock at the time of its sale 4: holding that ownership of thirtyfive percent of total outstanding shares of a stock constitutes effective control


Input: first enacted section 499A.1(1), it contained the same phrases that are the subject of this litigation. Compare 1947 Iowa Acts ch. 250, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 499A.1 (1950)), with Iowa Code § 499A.1(1). A search of the 1946 Code shows the general assembly used language similar to section 499A.1Q) in other sections of the Code. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 504.1 (1946) (requiring incorporators of nonprofit corporations to be “persons of full age, a majority of whom shall be citizens of the state”), repealed by 1990 Iowa Acts ch. 1164, § 27. The use of the phrase “persons of full age” denotes that the person performing the organizing has reached the age of majority and is capable of executing a contract. See Martin v. Stewart Motor Sales, 247 Iowa 204, 207-08, 73 N.W.2d 1, 3-4 (1955) (<HOLDING>); cf. Black’s Law Dictionary 78 (3d ed. 1933) Holdings: 0: holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive 1: holding an individual not of full age who misrepresents his or her age cannot invoke the defense of infancy to void a contract 2: holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference 3: holding that comments relating to age made some three to fifteen or more years prior to plaintiffs discharge were not relevant to show that he was fired because of his age 4: holding age discrimination claim barred


Input: Wife disclosed some of Husband’s emails to Cooke and BJR, who allegedly used the emails to obtain additional information about Husband’s affair, the SCA does not punish such conduct. See Cardinal Health, 582 F.Supp.2d at 976 (“While [the] SCA punishes the act of accessing a ‘facility through which an electronic communication service is provided’ in an unauthorized manner, the SCA does not punish disclosing and using the information obtained therefrom.”). Accordingly, the circuit court did not err by granting summary judgment to Wife, Cooke, and BJR. See Fischer, 207 F.Supp.2d at 926 (granting summary judgment to defendants who did not access plaintiffs email accounts); Cardinal Health, 582 F.Supp.2d at 977-79 (same); see also Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir.2003) Holdings: 0: holding agreed abatement to allow compliance with 60day notice requirement of section 74051a did not extend 120day deadline or constitute an agreement of the parties to extend 1: holding that civil liability under section 2707 does not extend to those who aid abet or conspire with a person or entity engaging in a violation of section 2702 2: holding that section 409 requires a causal connection for liability under section 405a3 3: holding that bivens liability does not extend to a corporate entity because the deterrence rationale applies only to individual actors 4: holding that prior to 1986 amendment when congress replaced with intentionally the word willfully in section 2511 to establish a civil violation of section 2511 a plaintiff had to prove that any violation was intentional or undertaken with reckless disregard


Input: his motion for summary judgment, predicated upon his version of the events. Here the Court considers the issue on Nuon's motion, but on Kinney’s facts. 8 . An arrest without probable cause also establishes liability under the MCRA. The MCRA was intended to provide a state law remedy co-extensive with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, except that the MCRA also reaches private action, and requires a showing that a constitutional violation was effected “by threats, intimidation or coercion.” See Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 718, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 822-23, 473 N.E.2d 1128 (1985). An arrest without probable cause has been found to constitute coercion within the meaning of the MCRA. See Daley v. Harber, 234 F.Supp.2d 27, 31-32 (D.Mass.2002) (<HOLDING>); Zurakowski v. D’Oyley, 46 F.Supp.2d 87, 88 Holdings: 0: holding that a police officers actions in effecting arrest without probable cause constituted coercion under the mcra 1: holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry 2: holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause 3: holding that the defense of good faith and probable cause is available to officers in common law actions for false arrest and imprisonment as well as in actions brought pursuant to section 1983 4: holding that police officers have probable cause to arrest an individual with a sufficiently similar appearance to the description in a warrant


Input: in 2010. In the cases where courts have denied equitable estoppel despite fraud by a fiduciary, the parties have been informed of at least some particulars indicating suspicious or fraudulent behavior. See Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 623-24 (Tex.2011) (declining to- apply fraudulent concealment doctrine because plaintiffs were aware of numerous suspicious facts underlying their cause of action); Doe v. Henderson Indep. Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 631, 2000 WL 1701752, at *4-5 (5th Cir.2000) (unpublished) (denying equitable estoppel because plaintiffs were aware of the facts of the injury they suffered even if they did not fully appreciate its practical or legal consequences); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Housing Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 749-50 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). The case of Thomas v. Barton Lodge II, Ltd. Holdings: 0: holding that loss to bank occurred without regard to its possible remedies when its funds in fact were diverted  through the fraud and dishonesty of its treasurer and that the bank could sue on its bond without proof that it had then sustained some actual defined loss not merely nominal as the result of the transaction in question 1: holding that filing of litigation against the same defendant put a plaintiff on inquiry notice of the probability of fraud with another transaction involving the defendant where the complaints in both lawsuits involved similar allegations that defendant failed to disclose its inadequate loss reserves and did not sufficiently monitor its operations 2: holding once the plaintiff who had filed a fela claim concluded that he was injured and believed the injury was caused by his employment he had a duty to investigate the situation in order to confirm or deny his belief 3: holding in a case where it was not clear whether the plaintiff suffered prejudice from the lack of notice that a plaintiff could not obtain reinstatement based on lack of notice 4: holding that once plaintiff knew it had suffered a large loss caused by the wrongful conduct of another and had sued its fund manager it was on inquiry notice to investigate its auditor as well


Input: solely on theories of misappropriation or misuse of CDC's confidential information. In support of its breach of fiduciary duty claim, CDC avers that it provided Carsey "with access to [CDC's] confidential business information and Trade Secrets," and that Carsey owed CDC several fiduciary duties, including "a duty not to disclose CDC's Trade Secrets and confidential business information, a duty not to use CDC's Trade Secrets and confidential business information to compete un fairly with CDC, and a duty not to use CDC's Trade Secrets and confidential business information for the benefit of a new business." Accordingly, this claim is preempted by the UTSA in its entirety. See, eg., Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Equip. & Mfg., Inc., 649 F.Supp.2d 702, 724 (N.D.Ohio 2009) (<HOLDING>); Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455, 999 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty will not lie where the claim of breach is dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties 1: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it was solely dependent upon misappropriationoftradesecret facts 2: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it was completely dependent on the facts concerning misappropriation of trade secrets 3: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba 4: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because the factual allegations supporting that claim involved only the misappropriation of  information


Input: unnecessary.” Johnson v. Potter, 177 F.Supp.2d 961, 965 (D.Minn.2001); see also V[a.] v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 388, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 ... (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that “[i]n every culture, certain things [both “sacred” and “profane”] acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can comprehend” and discussing cross burning as an example). Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 520 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir.2008). A reasonable jury could discredit an employee’s race-neutral explanation for hanging a life-sized noose. Ibid. Here, all three plaintiffs witnessed a noose in their place of employment. Although there is evidence that the person who placed the noose did so for non-discriminatory reasons, a jury could reasonably find to the contrary. Ibid.; see also id. at 1162 (<HOLDING>). It is true that the noose by itself is not as Holdings: 0: holding that to find negligence jury need not find violation of federal motorcarrier regulation 1: holding that a jury could believe that a lifesize noose prominently suspended from a large industrial wall clock was meant to evoke a hangmans noose 2: holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff 3: holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that an oral agreement existed and that it was not modified 4: holding that a jury could easily find that the noose was an egregious act of discrimination calculated to intimidate africanamericans


Input: was proper, even though later events which developed led to remand. Amoco Petroleum, 964 F.2d at 708 (7th Cir.1992). 11 . The Seventh Circuit clarified its Amoco Petroleum reasoning in In re Shell Oil Co., 966 F.2d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir.1992) (granting mandamus in part and directing district court to explain why it remanded case). Judge Easterbrook stated as dictum in Shell Oil that the language of § 1447(c)—i.e., remand is permitted "any time before final judgment”—does not mean that changes after removal can eliminate jurisdiction and compel remand. Rather, "[njeither the text of the revised § 1447(c) nor its legislative history implies that Congress altered the traditional view expressed in St. Paul [Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938) (<HOLDING>) ] ... that jurisdiction present at the time a Holdings: 0: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 1: holding no jurisdiction to review order raising amount of bail and questioning jurisdiction to review denial of motion to reduce bond 2: holding events occurring subsequent to removal which reduce amount recoverable do not oust district courts jurisdiction 3: holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct 4: holding that events occurring subsequent to removal which reduce the amount recoverable whether beyond the plaintiffs control or the result of his volition do not oust the district courts jurisdiction once it has attached


Input: The sentencing court, however, is not required to articulate every factor provided in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 so long as the record reflects these factors were considered in particularizing the sentence of the defendant. State v. Morgan, 428 So.2d 1215 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983), writ denied, 433 So.2d 166. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the lack of compliance with the sentencing guidelines does not necessarily require sentences be set aside if the record otherwise clearly illumines the trial court’s sentencing choice and demonstrates the sentence is not arbitrary or excessive. State v. Martin, 400 So.2d 1063, on rehearing, 400 So.2 o.2d 831 (La.1992) (requiring an “articulated justification for the near-maximum sentence”); State v. Sanders, 542 So.2d 1134 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); State v. Jones, 537 So.2d 848 (La.App. 5 Holdings: 0: holding that the police have an automatic right to conduct a protective search of a burglary suspect because burglary is a crime for which an offender would likely be armed 1: holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary 2: holding that eighteen years for a second offender convicted of simple burglary was not excessive 3: holding that in california one may be convicted of burglary even if he enters with consent 4: holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary


Input: argument that first-filed qui tam complaints must meet a heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b) in order to bar later-filed complaints. C. Dismissal with Prejudice Batiste argues that because Zahara’s complaint was dismissed before Batiste’s complaint was dismissed, his complaint should not have been dismissed with prejudice (implying that Batiste would like the opportunity to amend his complaint and bring this case again). Batiste, however, waived this argument. Zahara was dismissed eighteen months prior to the Batiste dismissal. During that time, Batiste never asked for leave to amend his complaint in the district court; thus, he has waived his opportunity to file a new suit on these same grounds now. See Confederate Mem’l Ass'n v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion For the reasons set forth Holdings: 0: holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court 1: holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made 2: holding that although district courts have discretion to deny leave to amend they may only do so for a substantial reason 3: recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court 4: holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time


Input: Class claims, the definition of the Class and Subclasses, the terms of the proposed settlement agreement, and the class members’ right to object or request exclusion from the settlement and the timing and manner for doing so. The Notice also informed Class Members of their opportunity to be heard at the fairness hearing and to enter an appearance through an attorney, and stated that the settlement would be binding on Class Members who did not opt out of it. Furthermore, the extent of the Plaintiffs’ efforts to notify potential Class Members is adequate. The Notice was mailed to potential Class Members individually based upon consumer information provided by Sparboe and the other Defendants. See Larson v. AT & T Mobility LLC, No. 10-1285, 2012 WL 2478376, at *9 (3d Cir. June 29, 2012) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the parties published a notice Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice 1: holding that an absent member of a subsection 23b3 class can be bound by the results of litigation about which that member was notified and given an opportunity to be heard 2: holding that rule 23b2 calls for injunction as to all class members or to none of them and does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages 3: holding that a class plaintiff who seeks to assert statutory rights to protect a class of which he is a member is not asserting rights antagonistic to any members of that class 4: recognizing that  individual notice to identifiable class members is not a discretionary consideration to be waived in a particular case it is rather an unambiguous requirement of rule 23 accordingly each class member who can be identified through reasonable effort must be notified  quoting eisen v carlisle  jacquelin 417 us 156 176 94 sct 2140 40 led2d 732 1974


Input: her new family,” the guardianship is no longer necessary. We first address Susan’s parenting petition claim because it is dispositive of her other claims at this stage of the proceedings. Susan characterizes the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of her verified parenting petition as a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Kennedy v. Titcomb, 131 N.H. 399, 402 (1989) (noting that “[a] trial court has the discretion to dismiss an action sua sponte where the allegations contained in a writ do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted”). In essence, the trial court ruled that Susan’s petition failed to state a claim on any of her asserted bases for claiming to be a parent of Madelyn. Cf. In the Matter of J.B. & J.G., 157 N.H. 577, 580 (2008) (<HOLDING>). “[I]n reviewing the trial court’s order of Holdings: 0: recognizing the fundamental liberty interest a parent has in his or her child and concluding that the state must provide a parent with fundamentally fair procedures including a clear and convincing evidentiary standard when seeking to terminate parental rights 1: holding that petitioner could maintain his action seeking parental rights and responsibilities under rsa chapter 461a notwithstanding his lack of biological relationship to the child so long as he alleges sufficient facts to establish his status as a parent by other means 2: holding that if an unwed father promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities  emotional financial and otherwise  his federal constitutional right to due process prohibits the termination of his parental relationship absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent 3: holding that although samesex partner may have been able to prove her status as a de facto parent such status was not sufficient to establish parental rights to custody and visitation over the objection of the biological mother 4: recognizing that fathers parental rights were terminated based upon his incarceration and his behavior while in prison his history of substance abuse and the fact that his child support payments are in arrears


Input: were actual corporations.”); United States v. Coffman, 94 F.3d 330, 337 (7th Cir.1996) (“[E]ven if ... [Galbraith ] were decided correctly, [it] would not carry the day for the defendants[] [because it is a case] where the fraud would have done no harm even if the defendants had not been interrupted[ ] [whereas h]ere the fraud had a real victim in its sights but was interrupted before it could do any harm.”); United States v. Falcioni, 45 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir.1995) (noting Galbraith’s “limited exception to use of the intended loss figure” and stating that “Falcioni’s plan failed to result in loss, not because his victim was a non-existent entity, but rather because [an acquaintance] notified law enforcement authorities”); cf. United States v. Sheets, 65 F.3d 752, 753-54 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In sum, rather than implicitly criticize our Holdings: 0: holding that if federal income tax statutes are intended to benefit anyone it is the federal government to whom the withheld tax is to be remitted there is no indication anywhere in the language of the statutes that congress intended to confer rights on employees with respect to the withholding of tax 1: holding that information furnished to preparer of tax return is not privileged 2: holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others 3: holding defendant liable for intended loss created by filing false tax return for someone else even though intended victim demonstrated to irs that tax return was bogus 4: holding in tax case that the sophisticated means enhancement applied even when each step in the planned tax evasion was simple because when viewed together the steps comprised a plan more complex than merely filling out a false tax return


Input: over Lloyds. “As federal courts have held on many occasions, [ ] customer-initiated bank-to-bank wire transfers do not establish the ‘continuous and systematic’ purposeful presence necessary to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank.” Dtex, LLC v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A., 405 F.Supp.2d 639, 645 (D.S.C.2005) (and cases cited therein), aff'd. 214 Fed.Appx. 286 (4th Cir.2007) (affirming on basis of district court’s “comprehensive and exhaustive” opinion). The sporadic visits by Lloyds’ employees to Tennessee also do not support the exercise of jurisdiction. Again, this is not the type of “continuous and systematic conduct” required to support general jurisdiction over a defendant. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tryg Int’l Ins. Co. Ltd., 91 F.3d 790, 793-94 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Holdings: 0: holding that limited jurisdiction existed over foreign defendants given their intent to affect the forum their licensing agreements and coordination of release strategies noting that the three foreign defendants did more than merely have their music product end up in california by happenstance as tjhere were crosslicensing agreements between all of the members of the universal group and a coordinated plan existed among  all of the defendants to distribute the barbie girl song around the world including the united states 1: holding that foreign corporate defendants purchases and attendant activity in state were insufficient to confer texas with general jurisdiction 2: holding that a foreign defendants participation in a reinsurance pool as well as several prior reinsurance agreements with two local companies was insufficient to establish general jurisdiction 3: holding that evidence of outofstate defendants indirect ownership interests in the nursing homes operating and management companies insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in florida 4: holding that an interactive website allowing clients to bank online was insufficient to confer general jurisdiction over a foreign bank


Input: an indictment which tracks the statutory language is sufficient. Id. Here, manner and means was not included in the statute; therefore, it was not required to be included in the indictment. The indictment alleged the elements of the offense and was sufficient. See Flores, 33 S.W.3d at 919 (concluding an information was defective because while the statute set forth manner and means, the information did not). Appellant appears to argue here that the State did not sufficiently identify how he “held himself out as a lawyer,” rendering the indictment defective. We hold that the words of the statute itself are not of “indeterminate or variable meaning” and, thus, tracking the statute was sufficient. See Nix v. State, 401 S.W.3d 656, 663 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>); Cf. State v. Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d 248, 254, Holdings: 0: holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient 1: holding indictment sufficient where the crux of the offense was not being a physician licensed to practice medicine in the state because defendant could reasonably prepare his case without further description of how he handled the affairs of his medical clinic 2: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense 3: holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the state to amend its indictment because he had more than adequate time to prepare his defense 4: holding that it is elementary that an indictment under the us constitution shall advise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in order that he may meet the accusation and prepare for his trial and that after judgment he may be able to plead the record and judgment in bar of further prosecution for the same offense


Input: concealed a conspiracy, as would a letter on plain stationery meant to conceal the identity of its sender. Similarly, alleging that Defendants participated in “clandestine meetings,” (Id. ¶ 99), is not tantamount to representing to others that the meetings were valid trade association meetings when in fact they were meetings in furtherance of a conspiracy. See In re Aluminum Phosphide, 905 F.Supp. at 1470 (dismissing fraudulent concealment claim because plaintiffs failed to cite specific actions by defendants to keep meetings secret). Additionally, alleging that Defendants’ silence indicates acquiescence to a conspiracy, (see Pis.’ Second Am. Compl. ¶ 98), does not constitute an allegation of an affirmative act of concealment. See In re Aluminum Phosphide, 905 F.Supp. at 1470 (<HOLDING>). Merely claiming that “all conspiracies are Holdings: 0: holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence  that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions     and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise 1: holding that a duty of care may arise out of a contractual relationship between two parties 2: holding  1319a2 imposes mandatory duty 3: holding that silence or passive conduct is not fraudulent unless parties relationship imposes duty to disclose 4: holding that erisas duty of loyalty creates a duty to disclose certain information to beneficiaries


Input: Judge. Ramond L. Walker, Jr., challenges the ord computer printout, that Walker was arrested on May 14, 2005, and was entitled to 1379 days of credit on count one. Thus, the court awarded him an additional 3 days’ credit on that count. However, Walker correctly alleged that he is entitled to 1380 days’ credit on that count. The relevant portion of the trial transcript shows that he was arrested on the two robberies shortly after 11:00 p.m., on May 13, 2005. The State does not dispute this information. Thus, Walker is entitled to jail credit for that day because he was in actual custody. See Bronk v. State, 25 So.3d 701, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>). On remand, the postconviction court shall Holdings: 0: holding that a rule 3800a motion that does not allege that the court records show the defendants entitlement to additional jail credit is facially insufficient 1: holding that a trial court may not rescind jail credit previously awarded even if the initial award was improper 2: holding that jail credit may be granted for presentence custodial period spent under a civil commitment order at state security hospital and observing that denying credit for time relating to probationary conditions is not inconsistent with that holding 3: holding that the statutory entitlement to presentence jail credit starts with the initial arrest for a criminal offense 4: recognizing statutory credit


Input: 77p(f)(2). Id. § 77v(a). So understood, the Jurisdiction Provision vests the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over covered class actions asserting claims under the Securities Act (“Securities Act class actions”). As a result, if a Securities Act class action is initiated in state court, that action is not barred from removal; indeed, such action must either be removéd to federal court or dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because the instant action is a putative Securities Act class action, the New York state court was not a “court of competent jurisdiction” under the Anti-Removal Provision, and the action was therefore properly removed. In. so holding, this court joins a growing consensus among district courts in the Second Circuit. Compare Hung, 2016 WL 299034, at *4 (<HOLDING>); In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., No. Holdings: 0: holding that federal jurisdiction over rico claims is concurrent and not exclusive 1: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 2: holding that a state securities claim which alleged federal mail wire and securities violations as the predicate acts did not arise under federal law and thus did not create federal jurisdiction 3: holding that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over  1983 claims 4: holding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over securities act class actions


Input: Ins. Co., 255 A.D.2d 644, 679 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1998) (insurance agent listed parking lot owner as an additional insured on certificate of insurance on policy purchased by snow removal subcontractor; although insurance agent stated it was "routine procedure” to send a copy of certificates to the insurance company, coverage was not amended to add parking lot owner to policy); Zurich Ins. Co. v. White, 221 A.D.2d 700, 633 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1995) (insurance agent issued certificate of insurance to state department of transportation certifying that there were no deductibles to coverage provided to painting contractor for the state; insurance company later asserted a $500 per claim deductible for property damage claims caused by pain 43 Ill.App.3d 624, 2 Ill.Dec. 148, 357 N.E.2d 125 (1976) (<HOLDING>). A similar situation occurs in the context of Holdings: 0: holding that exclusions are invalid unless they are communicated to the certificate holder in writing 1: holding that because exclusion was not provided to certificate holder terms of the certificate controlled 2: holding that insurance certificate holder could not maintain negligence action against insurer when certificate holder was not insurers customer did not discuss insurance coverage with insurer and did not make any specific request to procure insurance coverage 3: holding that an insurance company that does not deliver a policy to a certificate holder is estopped from asserting exclusions contained in the policy but not revealed in the certificate 4: holding that the certificate of purchase is not a claim because it does not represent a right to payment


Input: a third-party tortfeasor for injuries to the employee holds the amount due to the employer in trust so as to ensure that the employer’s right of subrogation is protected pursuant to section 287.150. Id. at 386; Schumacher v. Leslie, 360 Mo. 1238, 232 S.W.2d 913, 919 (1950). Finally, SVC argues that its ability to protect its lien interest might be impaired or impeded without intervention because Kinney might settle with one or more of the Defendants and then execute a release absolving all Defendants of any other liability. While this could conceivably occur, the other enforcement options mentioned in Doss would still be available to SVC, not to mention the remedy discussed in O’Hanlon and Everard, supra. See generally Timmermann v. Timmermann, 891 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Mo.App. E.D.1995) (<HOLDING>). For all these reasons, we conclude that SVC Holdings: 0: holding that an action against an officer was not an action against the state because the relief sought would not take away any property of the state or fasten a lien on it or interfere with the disposition of funds in the treasury 1: holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action 2: holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel 3: holding that any remedy against the third party which may have been available to the wouldbe intervenors prior to the commencement of the plaintiffs action would still be available to them in the event of an adverse disposition which also would not in and of itself preclude a subsequent equitable action by the wouldbe intervenors 4: holding that to the extent plaintiffs present action is based on conduct subsequent to the original action it is not barred by the prior litigation


Input: whether a dispute over a side agreement that does not provide for arbitration falls within the CBA’s arbitration clause, is one that this court has not previously addressed. There is a split among the circuits that have spoken on this issue. The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits apply the “collateral” test in determining whether a dispute over a side agreement is arbitrable. Under the collateral test, courts consider the similarity of the side agreement’s subject matter to the subject matter of the CBA. If the subject matter is dissimilar, the side agreement is deemed collateral to the CBA. However, where the side agreement is “integral” to the CBA, courts permit arbitration of disputes over its provisions. See, e.g., Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2800, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, Holdings: 0: holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute  the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable 1: holding that an addendum to the cba was integral to it and therefore subject to the arbitration clause 2: holding that an aaa arbitration was a private proceeding and therefore that a decision by the arbitrator pursuant to the federal arbitration act did not constitute state action 3: holding that the best way to harmonize a choice of law clause and an arbitration clause is to apply the substantive case law of the named state to the entire agreement including the arbitration clause 4: holding that a letter of understanding was collateral to the cba and therefore not governed by the cbas arbitration clause


Input: Morrissey’s earlier services is clearly wrong in light of the court’s other findings. They include the findings (a) that “Sr. Mon[z]on had never agreed to any specific hourly rates and clearly none that approached or exceeded $200 per hour,” 782 F.Supp. at 905; (b) that Morrissey ha .S.2d at 382, 489 N.E.2d at 1284 (same). Based on Mar Oil’s rejection of the very first bill, sent in January 1981 and asking for $75,-000, Morrissey knew that, without specificity as to time spent, Monzon would not allow the bill to be paid. Statements made by an attorney to a client in such circumstances in order to induce payment of the attorney’s bills should generally be binding on the attorney. See generally Prager v. New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Insurance Co., 245 N.Y. 1, 4, 156 N.E. 76 (1927) (<HOLDING>); Finkelstein v. Kins, 124 A.D.2d 92, 95, 511 Holdings: 0: holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001 1: holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence 2: holding that an attorneys bills are high evidence as to the maximum value of the attorneys services 3: holding that beneficiaries could not sue attorneys of the trust for legal malpractice because beneficiaries are not direct recipients of the attorneys services 4: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees


Input: 5 The court, however, refused to abrogate the immunities that a landowner enjoys in relation to trespassers. Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 839, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975). 6 But see Johnson v. Blackburn, 227 Wis. 2d 249, 257-58, 595 N.W.2d 676 (1999)("As a general matter, a landlord owes a tenant, as well as guests of a tenant, the duty to exercise ordinary care. A landlord's duty to trespassers, however, is to refrain from willful and intentional injury."); Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 421, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995) ("Although individuals generally owe a duty of ordinary care to all persons, we recognize that limitations do exist with respect to the imposition of a legal duty in some cases.”). 7 Compare Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 445-46, 442 N.W.2d 24 (1989) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Pagelsdorf, 91 Wis. 2d at 745); Holdings: 0: recognizing that the court in pagelsdorf v safeco ins co of am 91 wis 2d 734 745 284 nw2d 55 1979 imposed a duty upon landlords to  exercise ordinary care in the maintenance of the premises 1: holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence  that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions     and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise 2: holding that under either theory the duty is the same ordinary care 3: holding that a railroad had a duty to exercise this level of care even in the absence of statutorily imposed duties 4: recognizing a landlords duty for injuries sustained on leased premises where the landlord is aware that the premises are leased with intent to admit the public


Input: by the FTCA, which only allows compensatory damages. St. John v. United States, No. CIV 97-3051 at 34 (citing FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2674); see 28 U.S.C. § 2674 n. 22 (“damages are determined by law of state where the tortious act was committed, subject to limitations that United States shall not be liable for ... punitive damages”). The district court awarded $3,000 in compensatory damages based on St. John’s discomfort and inability to sleep while in custody, even though bunks, a bathroom, and a sink were available in the cell. Id. at 35. The district court found no credible evidence of physical injuries and could not award damages for mental or emotional suffering under South Dakota law. Id. at 34 (citing Nelson v. WEB Water Development Assoc., Inc., 507 N.W.2d 691, 698-99 (S.D.1993) (<HOLDING>)). Nothing in the record suggests that St. John Holdings: 0: holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute 1: holding that act did not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 2: recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress 3: holding that under south dakota law compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires manifestation of physical symptoms and intentional infliction of emotional distress requires an extreme disabling emotional response 4: recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress


Input: EEOC and then GE waited for an opportunity to fire him.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576, 590 (6th Cir.2009) (“We explained [in Hamilton v. General Electric Co.] that because plaintiff alleged that his employer heightened its scrutiny and supervision of him following his filing of an age-discrimination charge with the EEOC to find a seemingly legitimate reason to fire him, he created a question of material fact as to pretext.... As in Hamilton, Upshaw has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ford’s proffered reasons for her termination were contrived following her many EEOC charges and the filing of this lawsuit.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397, 408 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Evans v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 286 Holdings: 0: holding that it is the very definition of pretext if the employer  waits for a legal legitimate reason to fortuitously materialize and then uses it to cover up his true longstanding motivations for firing the employee 1: holding that an employee may establish that the legitimate reason for an employment decision offered by an employer is pretextual by showing by a preponderance of the evidence either that the discrim inatory reason was the true reason motivating the employers conduct or that the profferred legitimate reason was false 2: holding that to determine whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee the court examines if there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the employers stated reason for the firing is pretext 3: holding that if the plaintiff makes a prima facie case the defendant employer must then articulate some legitimate nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action and the employee must then have a fair opportunity to show pretext that is that a discriminatory intent motivated the employers action 4: holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason


Input: attack. Rule 5-802(A). Being denied the right to vote is not part of a defendant’s felony conviction and sentence. It is simply a collateral consequence of that conviction and sentence. See N.M. Const. art. VII, § 1; NMSA 1978, § 31-13-1(A) (2005). Moreover, being denied the right to vote, even if the deprivation is wrongful, does not subject a person to custody or restraint. Cummings is not alleging that his underlying conviction and sentence is illegal or that he is being denied a right that would hasten his release from custody, but only that the district court made a clerical error, which wrongly denied him the right to vote. Relief for such an error cannot be had by way of a writ of habeas corpus. Cf. Canfield v. Bradshaw, No. 3:05 CV 2343, 2007 WL 397019, at *6 (N.D.Ohio 2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we dismiss this ease and affirm Holdings: 0: holding that because the real id act created a remedy as broad in scope as a habeas petition the act is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus 1: holding that active jurisdiction arose when the petitioner was detained for purposes of habeas corpus when the petition was filed 2: holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus 3: holding that a habeas corpus petitioner who did not raise an ineffective assistance claim in his first state habeas petition satisfied the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test when counsel on the first state habeas petition was also trial counsel whose performance was allegedly inadequate 4: holding that a habeas corpus petition was not a valid avenue for seeking a determination that the petitioner was erroneously classified as a sexual predator


Input: it cannot provide a basis for express preemption under” section 360k(a). Docket Entry No. 20 at 16-17. Numerous federal courts have rejected this argument on the basis that “requirements set forth in the premarket approval for the entire device are just as applicable to the components that together form the FDA-approved device as the device itself.” Hawkins v. Medtronic, Inc., 2014 WL 346622, at *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 30, 2014); see, e.g., Eidson v. Medtronic, Inc., 981 F.Supp.2d 868, 882 n. 3, 2013 WL 5533081, at *8 n. 3 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 3, 2013) (citing cases and noting that “the preemption analysis should not be applied differently to the component parts of a medical device and the medical device that received PMA”); see also Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 508 (5th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). This Court concurs with that analysis. Once Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not err in determining that device as a whole was subject to pma approval even though some evidence indicated only certain components of the device were at issue 1: holding that trial court did not err 2: holding that factors as a whole were not duplicative 3: holding that the district court did not err by refusing to allow the defendant to absent himself from the trial at which his identification would be an integral issue 4: holding that the district court did not err in determining that inadvertent disclosure did not result in waiver


Input: non-signing defendants’ consent, without more, is insufficient to satisfy the “rule of unanimity” under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). The removing defendants disagree, arguing that such a representation of consent satisfies their statutory obligation. Although no case in this district has addressed this precise issue, there is some limited support for the removing defendants’ position. See, e.g., Chrysler First Financial Services Corp. v. Greenfield, 753 F.Supp. 939, 941 (S.D.Fla.1991) (remanding the action because “[t]he other defendants ... have not joined in the United States’ petition for removal, nor has the United States indicated on the face of the removal petition whether the remaining defendants agree to removal”); Jasper v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 732 F.Supp. 104, 105 (M.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>); Mechanical Rubber & Supply Co. v. American Holdings: 0: holding that the question whether the defendants consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion express or implied is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances 1: holding that the trial judge must comply with rule 3172c8 and advise all defendants in all cases that the plea may subject him or her to deportation  2: holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served 3: holding that all facts that would enhance the defendants sentence above the statutory maximum must be found by a jury 4: holding that the petition must be signed by all defendants or the signer mustallege consent of all defendants


Input: rob him, and where the trial court permitted the State to call witnesses who testified that Mr. Brown was not a drug dealer. We agree. We are mindful that pursuant to section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes (2004), evidence of a victim’s character is “inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion.” In the instant case, however, the defense did not seek to introduce evidence that Mr. Brown was a drug dealer as an attack upon his character. The defense sought to elicit this testimony to corroborate the defendant’s testimony that he did not go to Mr. Brown’s home to rob him, but instead went there to purchase drugs, and while he was there, Mr. Brown attacked him after he rebuffed his sexual advances. See Villella v. State, 833 So.2d 192, 196-97 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)(<HOLDING>). Further, even if the evidence was Holdings: 0: holding that it was error to exclude corroborative evidence where evidence was vital to defendants defense 1: holding that it was harmless error for the trial court to exclude testimony regarding other insolvent companies 2: holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony 3: holding in all cases that where the evidence of guilt was sufficient any error in the exclusion of lastminute evidence and testimony was harmless error 4: holding impeachment evidence was not merely cumulative where the withheld evidence was of a different character than evidence already known to the defense


Input: of the Fort Worth Zoo Master Plan and the Forest Park Master Plan. Appellant’s point of error number one is overruled. By his point of error number two, appellant contends, even if the trial court was correct in its interpretation of Chapter 26, holding that it does not apply with respect to a change in the use of public land from one park use to another, that the construction of the Diorama in Forest Park constitutes such a substantial change in park use as not to exempt such construction from the provisions of Chapter 26. Appellant states that there are no Texas cases directly on point regarding the proper uses of parkland and cites us the following foreign cases in support of his position: Fairhope Single Tax Corp. v. City of Fairhope, 281 Ala. 576, 206 So.2d 588, 590 (Ala.1968) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Thomas, 166 La. 512, 117 So. 573, Holdings: 0: holding that despite moving mobile homes onto the property a mobile home park was not in operation since regulations required permits to operate such a park and the property owner had not applied for such permits 1: holding that rental value was properly included as part of damages on action for breach of building contract where contractor failed to complete building within contracted time 2: holding that a municipal corporation was forbidden to construct an auditorium in a park as such construction would practically destroy the lot as a park and convert its use into a public square 3: holding an initial four dollar fee allowing reentry during the course of the patrons stay permitted the use of a vehicle in the park and did not constitute a charge for the recreational use of the park 4: holding that a civic center building or recreational building on property dedicated to the city as park property was inconsistent with its use as a park


Input: if the jury again finds the defendants liable. V The judgment of the district court is reversed in part and affirmed in part. The case is remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the jury’s verdict and to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. 1 . Section 3730(b) of the False Claims Act provides that a "private person[,]” commonly known as a “relator,” may bring a civil action for a violation of § 3729 "in the name of the Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). Such an action is known as a "qui tam” suit. The statute permits the government to take over the action and conduct it itself, or to decline to do so, in which case the relator has the right to conduct it. See id. The relator is entitled to different S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 947 Holdings: 0: holding that the requirement of an offense committed willfully is not met  if a taxpayer has relied in good faith on a prior decision of this court 1: recognizing plaintiff met this burden 2: holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith 3: holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law 4: holding that it is not known legally that an offense has been committed until there is a conviction


Input: is not automatically qualified as a business record under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law. The reason for recognizing a business record as an exception to the hearsay rule is the presumptive verity of routine recording of business transactions done on a regular basis at times close to the transactions recorded. The foundation which warrants the presumption of verity must be laid to qualify the records for admission. “Albeit it is said that a trial court possesses wide discretion in determining whether the requirements of [section] 490.680 for admission are met, the trial record should reveal evidence of compliance with each requirement of the law before any deference be accorded the ruling of the court nisi.” Id,.; see Nickels v. Nickels, 817 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Mo.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). “Ere proper admission of records under Holdings: 0: holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint 1: holding that the burden of laying the proper foundation for the admission of the expert testimony is on the party offering the expert and admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence 2: holding the testimony of an accountant was insufficient to lay a foundation for the admission of certain tax and financial documents where inter alia there was no evidence the taxpayer prepared the supportive memoranda or notes in the regular course of his business nor did the record reflect the time of preparation of these documents 3: holding that in determining motion to dismiss on basis of res judicata the court could take judicial notice of all of the documents which are part of the record before it as well as the documents contained in the record before the state court without having to convert the motion to one for summary judgment 4: holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable


Input: "customers” of the bank. 15 . Va.Code § 8.3A-420(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows: The law applicable to conversion of personal property applies to instruments. An instrument is also converted if it is taken by transfer, other than a negotiation, from a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or a bank makes or obtains payment with respect to the instrument for a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or receive payment. An action for conversion of an instrument may not be brought by (i) the issuer or acceptor of the instrument or (ii) a payee or endorsee who did not receive delivery of the instrument either directly or through delivery to an agent or a co-payee. 16 .Cf. Stefano v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Virginia, 981 F.Supp. 417, 420-21 (E.D.Va.1997) Holdings: 0: holding that where bank account titled in the names of two married persons a presumption arises that both hold the funds in the account as a tenancy by the entirety 1: holding that plaintiffs common law conversion claim was displaced by  83a420a where bank deposited checks payable to plaintiff in another persons account without plaintiffs endorsement 2: holding the original notice and verified account did not substantiate plaintiffs claim and was insufficient for the court to enter a default judgment against the plaintiffs 3: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on claim of breach of fiduciary duty where underlying claim was a common law negligence action 4: holding a bank liable where a bank officer held checks that were intended to pay the irs for withheld taxes


Input: 1972 Comm. Note (directing courts to ask whether the finder of fact “would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute”). Although some judges may find expert testimony helpful, see, e.g., Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 584 (9th Cir.2005) (upholding denial of a Strickland claim where eight experts testified but none addressed “prevailing legal norms”), it is within a district court’s discretion to exclude proposed expert testimony concerning a legal standard of care and to rely solely on the briefs, see LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1271 n. 8 (9th Cir.1998); see also Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 613 n. 17 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Because the district court was in the best Holdings: 0: holding that denial of untimely request was not abuse of discretion 1: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify 2: holding that rejection of a proposed strickland expert was not a prejudicial abuse of discretion 3: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 4: holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony


Input: but simply raise the correctness of a discretionary administrative decision in the facts of a single claimant’s case.”). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to review the Appeal Panel’s determination that LTCF and Film Production Capital were the same entity. B. LTCF further argues that the CSSP chose an inappropriate NAICS code. However, the determination of the appropriate NAICS code for a single entity claimant is not the type of “pressing question” that warrants district court review. See Claimant ID 100212278, 848 F.3d at 410. Rather, it is precisely the type of discretionary factual determination that we have held the district court need not review. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 641 Fed.Appx. at 410; cf. Claimant ID 100212278, 848 F.3d at 410-11 (<HOLDING>). Even assuming that the CSSP’s determination Holdings: 0: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion 1: holding that district court did not abuse discretion by denying review of factual determination that claimants stores were not tourism businesses within the meaning of the settlement agreement 2: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form 3: holding that a sentencing determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the district court 4: recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard


Input: unconstitutional, should be exercised only in cases free from doubt.’” Milton Constr. Co. v. State Highway Dep’t, 568 So.2d 784, 788 (Ala.1990) (quoting 17 Am Jur.2d Contracts § 178 (1964)). “‘The courts are averse to holding contracts unenforceable on the ground of public policy unless their illegality is clear and certain.... [T]he courts will not declare an agreement void on the ground of public policy unless it clearly appears to be in violation of the public policy of the state.’ ” Id. (emphasis omitted). In Terry Cove North, Inc. v. Marr & Friedlander, P.C., 521 So.2d 22 (Ala.1988), the plaintiffs sued a law firm and its two attorneys, alleging, among other things, breaches of certain Disciplinary Rules (the predecessor to the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct). .2003) (<HOLDING>), and B.W.T. v. Haynes & Haynes, P.C., 20 So.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the disciplinary rules of the code of professional responsibility are not laws of the state of texas for purposes of statute which excludes the admission of evidence obtained in violation of law 1: holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability 2: holding that a breach of the rules of professional conduct would not justify setting aside a divorce judgment and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 3: holding violation of the rules of professional conduct does not create a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor constitute negligence per se although it may be used as some evidence of negligence 4: holding that the rules of professional conduct are selfimposed internal regulations and do not play a role in determining the admissi bility of evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures


Input: or reopen hearing on the motion. The record is incomplete, but it appears that the trial court had not yet ruled on the initial motion to suppress. As a result, the second motion presented the trial court with the opportunity to correct the alleged error and the State was also provided the opportunity to present the allegedly material witnesses. (See People v. Terrell (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 178, 202.) Accordingly, we conclude that defendant sufficiently raised this issue at trial so as to preclude application of waiver in this instance. (See People v. Harper (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 398, 402 (recognizing error despite the absence of a timely objection in light of the “peculiar circumstances” of case which suggested constitutional infringement); see also In re J.C. (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 289 (<HOLDING>).) We turn to consider whether the State met Holdings: 0: holding objection need not occur at suppression hearing 1: holding that claim was preserved for subsequent appeal by objection at original sentencing hearing 2: holding appellant waived argument by failing to assert it at suppression hearing 3: holding prosecutors withdrawal of standing objection at suppression hearing waived issue on appeal 4: holding representation at a suppression hearing by lawyer disbarred on final day of hearing not per se ineffective