Input: population. Cf. Shryock, 342 F.3d at 986 (“[T]he district court need not define common terms that are readily understandable to the jury.”). Even accepting the debatable proposition that “ad hoc” is beyond the understanding of the average juror, we conclude that the jury would have been able to understand what type of structure a RICO enterprise must have (i.e., one that provides “a mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the entity on an on-going continuous basis”) from the remainder of the instruction. Moreover, we have previously held that a district court is not required to define terms that would normally be beyond the general knowledge of jurors if the terms have been covered extensively during the trial. United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1486 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the structure of the alleged Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury on quantity was harmless in part because the testimony regarding quantity was extensive detailed and uncontroverted 1: recognizing that the term expense may be used to define disbursements even though the term is used in accrual accounting 2: holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it 3: holding that a district court properly denied the defendants request for a mistrial following a witness statement that the defendant had  an extensive criminal record  because the remark was isolated and the district court gave an immediate curative instruction 4: holding that the district court was not required to define pro forma because of extensive discussions regarding the term at trial


Input: probability that a randomly chosen person, other than the suspect, has the genetic profile of the evidence DNA?” The probability is, by the State’s expert’s own calculations, no more than one in 170. C. Even had the State used the correct figures in calculating the number of people who could have contributed to the DNA material found at the scene, the use of the unmodified product rule in making those calculations was erroneous. The use of the unmodified product rule in calculating population frequencies from DNA loci is unsupported by the scientific and legal authorities. While the product rule is clearly generally accepted as an accurate theoretical proposition, the issue is whether the product rule can be applied to individual DNA frequencies. See Cauthron, supra, 846 P.2d at 514-15 (<HOLDING>); State v. Carter, 246 Neb. 953, 524 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case 1: holding that there was no ineffective assistance for failing to hire a dna expert because the defenses theory was that the defendants dna was planted so the dna evidence would not seem to be an issue 2: holding in regard to admission of dna statistical evidence and product rule calculations that the expert must show more than the theory for the evidence to be admitted the theory must be valid in its application 3: holding that product rule method of dna statistical evidence is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community 4: holding that defensive theory must be submitted to jury when theory is raised by evidence from any source


Input: summary judgment on all claims by all eleven transitory employees whose contracts expired on or before April 30, 2013. (Docket No. 98 at 11-12.) Because Defendant Rodríguez-Díaz did not become the HR Director until June 5, 2013, Defendants argue it is impossible that he would have participated in the non-renewals of these employees’ contracts. Id Plaintiffs admit that those employees have no claims against co- Defendant Rodriguez-Diaz. (Docket No. 106 ¶¶ 3-10, 12-15.) Rodriguez-Diaz is not personally liable for those claims. 10 . Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Article 1802 claim, arguing that because Section 1983 already covers the conduct complained of here, the tort claims under state law do not stand. See Santini Rivera v. Serv. Air, Inc., 137 D.P.R. 1 (1994) (<HOLDING>). As in their motion for judgment on the Holdings: 0: holding that claims for relief premised on alleged negligent wrongful or unauthorized conduct by the irs are based in tort and not within the jurisdiction of this court 1: holding article 1802 claims only survive where the conduct alleged of is based on tortious or negligent conduct different from the conduct covered by other specific labor laws involved 2: holding no specific jurisdiction where alleged tortious conduct was not related to defendants contacts with texas 3: holding that where no wrongful conduct by the defendant was alleged ie a breach accompanied by violence intimidation defamation fraud or other tortious conduct other than the breach of its contractual obligation under its bylaws no claim for tortious interference can lie 4: holding that if the underlying conduct is wrongful only by virtue of the labor laws then the rico claim is preempted


Input: (7th Cir.2001). Nor must we consider the preliminary question of whether the Superintendent should be deemed to have waived any objection to that hearing by not raising the issue on appeal. See Aeid, 296 F.3d at 64 (declining, where this Court could dispose of the case on its merits, to address the argument that the respondent had waived any objection to an evidentiary hearing by repeated failures to object to the hearing); Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir.2003) (declining to address “what steps a respondent must undertake to preserve an objection, predicated on § 2254(e)(2), to a district court decision to grant a habeas petitioner an evidentiary hearing,” where the district court had not erred in holding the hearing); cf. Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 16 . In Sparman v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 51, 52 Holdings: 0: holding that a district court has the power to raise the aedpa limitations period sua sponte because the defense implicates values beyond the interests of the parties 1: holding that the court can raise res judicata sua sponte even on appeal 2: holding that a district court has the discretion to raise a  2254 timeliness consideration sua sponte 3: holding that a district court has the authority to raise the aedpa statute of limitations on its own motion 4: holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived


Input: underlying offenses were charged under different indictment numbers; and separate judgments were imposed as to each conviction. The district court also f he armed robberies occurred on different dates with different victims. Moreover, only one of those armed robberies involved an accomplice. Rather, as shown above, the gist of defendant’s argument for why these four cases are related under § 4A1.2(a)(2) is that they were consolidated for purposes of sentencing. However, the district court did not clearly err in finding that they were not so consolidated based upon the separate indictments under which the cases were charged, the trial court’s entry of separate judgments in those cases, and the lack of a consolidation order. See United States v. Carter, 283 F.3d 755, 758 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Odom, 199 F.3d at 324 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding same and citing cases 1: holding that order could be appealed because ajlthough the district court did not make an express finding there is no doubt that the district court intended its orders to be final judgments for purposes of appeal 2: holding that even though the state trial court rendered its judgments in the defendants prior cases on the same day with their sentences to run concurrently the district court did not clearly err in finding that those prior cases were not consolidated for sentencing due to cases separate indictments and judgments and the absence of a consolidation order 3: holding that although not essential to the outcomes of two previous cases the court of appeals should have followed the texas supreme courts statements in those cases 4: holding that trial court did not err


Input: access to firearms, “could be construed as conscience-shocking” behavior sufficient to render summary judgment inappropriate). As pled, Booker and Peagler ignored known or likely injuries and abuse to Chandler, chose not to further investigate such possible abuse, and ignored the danger posed by his continued residence in Jon Phillips’s home. See Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 920 (10th Cir.2001) (finding caseworker’s failure to investigate bruises and continued allegations of abuse, as well as responsibility for court order granting custody to caretaker, could be conscience-shocking behavior sufficient to survive dismissal). Of course, discovery may inform the context of Booker’s and Peagler’s actions such that their behavior was not conscience shocking. See Weise, 507 F.3d at 1265 (<HOLDING>). However, construing all inferences in Holdings: 0: recognizing that the denial of qualified immunity at the dismissal stage does not preclude a renewal of that defense at summary judgment after further factual development has occurred 1: recognizing that interlocutory appeals are permitted both at appeal of denial at dismissal stage and at later appeal of denial of summary judgment after further factual development 2: holding that factual disputes will result in denial of summary judgment only when they pertain to the qualified immunity defense 3: holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage 4: holding that an interlocutory appeal lies from a denial of summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim


Input: whom the estoppel is sought, and consequently changed its position to its prejudice. Id.” 758 So.2d at 555. Joe Jr. argues that the holding in Jin-right is limited to the situation in which a petitioner in bankruptcy omits a potential claim in his schedule of assets and then later sues on that claim. We do not read Jinright so narrowly, however, and we can find no indication that our supreme court, in outlining the elements that must be proved to establish judicial estoppel, confined its statements to the bankruptcy context. We hold that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable here for at least two reasons. First, Robert and Joe Jr., the parties asserting the estoppel, were not parties to the Florida divorce action. Cf. Singley v. Bentley, 782 So.2d 799 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). Second, the parties claiming the estoppel did Holdings: 0: holding that a farmer was not estopped to recover against a harvester for underpayment on 27000 bushels of sweet potatoes by the farmers claim in filing for federal cropdisaster benefits that his crop had produced only 15000 bushels the harvester was not a party to the farmers application for benefits 1: holding that a claimants failure to list an impairment either in her application for disability benefits or through her testimony disposes of the claim because the alj was under no obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability 2: holding that the mere application for other benefits is not fault 3: holding that disability benefits are not retirementtype benefits 4: holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits


Input: emphasizes, furthermore, “[T]he Lebron Court explained that while Amtrak is part of the Government for purposes of the constitutional obligations of Government — -such as the obligation to respect an artist’s First Amendment rights' — Amtrak is not part of the Government for purposes of the inherent powers and privileges of the Government.” Pl.’s Opp. & Reply at 8 (emphases in original). AAR’s due-process challenge plainly belongs in the former camp. Just as the Government is obligated to respect individuals’ First Amendment rights, see Lebron, 513 U.S. at 399, 115 S.Ct. 961, so too is it constitutionally required to respect their due-process rights. Consistent with the standard Plaintiff itself enumerates, then, Amtrak is a governmental entity in the context of this claim. See id. (<HOLDING>). Perhaps recognizing that Lebrón poses an Holdings: 0: holding that amtrak is part of the government for purposes of the first amendment because the government created amtrak by special law to further governmental objectives and retained authority to appoint a majority of amtraks corporate directors 1: holding a federal credit union not to be a government actor for constitutional purposes 2: holding that amtrak is an agency of the government  for purposes of the constitutional obligations of government 3: holding that where the government inter alia retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of a corporation the corporation is part of the government for purposes of the first amendment 4: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity


Input: find under the First or Fifth Amendments for discrimination in federal employment. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2406, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (refusing to find a cause of action under the First Amendment for a disciplined federal employee because of the remedies available from the Civil Service Commission); see also Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1483-1484 (10th Cir.1990) (applying Bush to First Amendment claim of teachers for the Bureau of Indian Affairs). Second, Mr. Belhomme’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails as a matter of law because this section applies to actions by state and local entities, not to the federal government. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 & n. 2, 83 S.Ct. 1441, 1444 & n. 2, 10 L.Ed.2d , 820 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (10th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of Holdings: 0: holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra 1: holding that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to prove discrimination in mixed motive cases under title vii 2: holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii 3: recognizing title vii does not provide the exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims even if the title vii and section 1983 claim factually overlap 4: holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment


Input: this standard is "much weaker” than that mandated by the patent law under 35 U.S.C. § 102. Softel, Inc., 118 F.3d at 969. In Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 380, 54 USPQ2d 1810 (2d Cir.2000), the Second Circuit held: New York law in submission-of-ideas case is governed by the following principles: Contract-based claims require only a showing that the disclosed idea was novel to the buyer in order to furnish consideration.... By contrast, misappropriation claims require that the idea at issue be original and novel in absolute terms. Id. at 380, 208 F.3d 368, 54 USPQ2d at 1817. While Nadel was an idea-submitter case, the New York courts have required an identical showing of "novelty” to support a trade secret claim. See Softel, Inc., 118 F.3d at 969 n. 11 Holdings: 0: holding that new york law applies to this matter 1: holding that new york law requires the same showing of novelty in trade secret claim as in submission of ideas claim and quoting murray v natl broadcasting co inc 844 f2d 988 994 2d cir1988 2: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york 3: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership 4: holding that new york law requires this same showing of novelty in a trade secret claim as in submissionofidea cases


Input: estoppel, breach of contract, conversion, fraud and misrepresentation, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with a business relationship, and tortious interference with a contract relationship) relate to the defendants not paying plaintiff for services preformed in the plaintiffs employment capacity. Since the Agreement defines or “pertains to” the employment capacity of the plaintiff, these common law claims fall within the scope of the arbitration clause. The Agreement states that arbitration is appropriate in “any dispute arising under this Agreement to the maximum extent allowed by applicable law.” That would include plaintiffs claim for defamation in violation of state law. See McGinnis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 812 F.2d 1011, 1013 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>) In this case, the alleged defamatory Holdings: 0: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 1: holding that a clause limiting arbitration to employment termination extends to a defamatory comment made after such termination about employees service 2: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable 3: holding requirement in contract to provide notice for termination but not limiting reasons for termination constitutes atwill employment relationship 4: holding that the close connection in time between the complaint and termination indicated that complaints could have been a motivating factor for employees termination


Input: issues touching upon Plaintiffs’ Count II, which count the Court has yet to rule upon. The Court will not presently rule upon Plaintiffs’ reconsideration request as it respects their Count III given that a future hearing has been scheduled and not yet held regarding the same. However, the Court will now enter its decision regarding Plaintiffs’ Count II. Because the Court’s decision regarding Plaintiffs’ Count III affects the Court’s decision regarding Plaintiffs’ Count II, the Court will first say a few words regarding such Count III. The Court ruled in the I.R.S.’ favor on Count III because the Court determined, in turn, that the I.R.S. is not bound by the terms of the Plan and the Confirmation Order. The Court held that the I.R.S. is not so bound because 23, 127 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1986) (<HOLDING>)), as well as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Holdings: 0: holding that the sec does not qualify as a creditor of the estate bound by the confirmed plan pursuant to  1141a and that therefore the sec would thus not be barred from enforcing the securities laws with respect to the violation arising out of the plan notwithstanding its confirmation by court order 1: holding that the power of any administrative agency to reconsider its final decision exists only where the statutory provisions creating the agency indicate a legislative intent to permit the agency to carry into effect such power 2: recognizing such an exception 3: holding that a government agency seeking to enforce a prior order regarding prepetition acts of a debt or is not bound by a confirmed plan a if such agency fails to participate in the confirmation of such plan b if the obligations that such agency seeks to impose upon such debtor do not constitute claims c notwithstanding that such plan purports to treat such debtors obligations to such agency and d since it thus is not a named entity within  1141a 4: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan


Input: WL 2063555, at *5 (E.D.Mich. Mar. 28, 2008); Burdett v. Harrah’s Kansas Casino Corp., 294 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1227 (D.Kan.2003); Conboy v. AT & T Corp., 84 F.Supp.2d 492, 504 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y.2000); Dewey v. Associated Collectors Inc., 927 F.Supp. 1172, 1174 (W.D.Wis.1996); West v. Costen, 558 F.Supp. 564, 584 (W.D.Va.1983). 8 . The Brushes (but not Wells Fargo) point to two default letters that were sent in February and March 2008. (Docket Entry No. 36-2, Exs. 3, 4). The August 2009 loan modification agreement that Wells entered into with Mrs. Brush modified the original promissory note and cured the prior default. As a result, Wells Fargo was required to send the Brushes new notices after Mrs. Brush defaulted anew under the loan modification agreement. See Gatling, 2012 WL 3756581, at *11 (<HOLDING>). 9 . The Brushes allege that as a result of Holdings: 0: holding that a debtor may not silently transform a health education assistance loan nondischargeable under 42 usc  292fg into dischargeable debt by entering into a settlement agreement that is approved by the court pursuant to which the debtor consents to judgment against him 1: holding that a mortgagee is required to send new legal notices if a debtor who had previously defaulted on a note defaults again after entering into a loan modification agreement 2: holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank 3: holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met 4: holding that where a mortgagee is acting on behalf of the note holder there is no disconnection between note and mortgage and the mortgagee may foreclose


Input: office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 [, 315 (1966)]; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563, 47 S.Ct. 746, 748, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [, 1204 (1927)]. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to t 7 S.Ct. 1737, 1740, 18 L.Ed.2d 943, 947 (1967) (“The agency’s particular demand for access will of course be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved”), and has relaxed the probable cause standard for searches, in others, see, e.g. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968) (<HOLDING>); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 Holdings: 0: holding that search of the passenger compartment of an automobile limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which taken together with the rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons 1: holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger 2: holding that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous  he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him 3: recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot 4: holding that a limited search of the outer clothing of a suspect for weapons is reasonable where the officer has a reasonable articulable basis for believing that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous


Input: forth a prima facie case of gender discrimination. IV. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 1 . Seibert’s PDA claim fares no better. Seibert alleged that she requested, but was denied, accommodation in the form of a reclining chair. Because this allegation was not asserted in Seibert’s EEOC charge, she has failed to preserve her claim and it must therefore be dismissed. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d). Seibert raised new claims in her response to Lutron’s Motion for Summary Judgment that she was "singled out and forced to use her vacation time simply because she was having post natal problems with her twins.” Even if these claims were timely raised, they lack merit. See Piantanida v. Wyman Center, Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir.1997) Holdings: 0: holding the confrontation clause of the united states constitution does not apply at sentencing under the us sentencing guidelines manual and the procedural protections afforded a convicted defendant at sentencing are traditionally less stringent than the protections afforded a presumptively innocent defendant at trial 1: holding that an individual charged with criminal contempt is entitled to the full procedural protections afforded the defendant in any other criminal proceeding 2: holding that presumption of regularity is afforded to clerks of court performing their official duties 3: recognizing similar duties 4: holding that postnatal childcare duties are not within the protections afforded by the pda


Input: 1015 (1893), where a landowner, the City of Anderson, granted contractors the right to construct a sewer along one of its streets and we held: "and if [the contractors], in the construction thereof, unlawfully entered upon appellee's property, to her injury, [the contractors] alone are answerable therefor."). The Neals rely on decisions from other jurisdictions that impose liability on landlords when the landlord acquiesced in the tenant's creation of a nuisance. See, e.g., Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F.Supp. 355, 360 (M.D.N.C.1997) (owner who knows about contamination on his land and does nothing to remedy the situation is responsible for the migration of that contamination to another's property); Reynolds v. Pardee and Curtin Lumber Co., 172 W.Va. 804, 310 S.E.2d 870, 876-77 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Sta ples v. Hoefke, 189 Cal.App.3d 1397, 235 Holdings: 0: holding landlord jointly liable when he knew of or acquiesced in the tenants trespass 1: holding tenants leasing house by oral agreement were coinsureds both landlord and tenants had liability insurance 2: holding landlord and tenants obligations mutually dependent 3: holding the landlord did not trespass when his agent entered the premises for the purpose of showing them to a potential tenant 4: holding that a landlord may have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its tenants in common areas


Input: Adversary Complaint, the Court concludes that under the law of either jurisdiction, Plaintiffs-Appellees have sufficiently alleged individual damages to state non-derivative claims. See e.g., Kramer v. Western Pacific Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del.1988) (recognizing that “the distinction between derivative and individual actions rests upon the party being directly injured by the alleged wrongdoing and holding that an individual action requires the plaintiff to allege either an injury which is separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders, or a wrong involving a contractual right of a shareholder which exists independently of any right of the corporation”); Bio-Scientific Clinical Lab., Inc. v. Todd, 149 Ill.App.3d 845, 103 Ill. Dec. 171, 501 N.E.2d 192 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Adversary Complaint Holdings: 0: holding that majority shareholders had legitimate business reasons for terminating a shareholder which included the reason that the shareholder was not working well with other employees 1: holding under maryland law that a breach of fiduciary duty claim alleging loss in share value shareholder must allege an injury distinct from an injury to the corporation 2: holding that shareholders claim is derivative if the alleged injury affects the shareholder indirectly in his or her capacity as a shareholder and describing the inquiry as whether the gravamen of the pleadings alleges injury to the plaintiff upon an individual claim as distinguished from an injury which directly affects the shareholders as a whole 3: holding that a shareholder lacks standing to bring a suit based on loss in value to his or her shares as this injury derives from and thus is not distinct from the injury to the corporation 4: holding that cause of action for injury to corporations property or for impairment or destruction of its business is vested in corporation as distinguished from its shareholders


Input: 2354, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004). Constructive discharge occurs when the working conditions deteriorate, as a result of discrimination or retaliation, “to the point that they become ‘sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her employer.’ ” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Turner, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d at 1026). These discriminatory or retaliatory actions are best handled within the employment relationship. Poland, 494 F.3d at 1184. The employee can recover for any additional acts of harassment suffered until he resigns. See Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. -, -, 136 S.Ct. 1769, 1782, 195 L.Ed.2d 44 (2016) (<HOLDING>). The First, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Holdings: 0: holding that rights accrue only when an employee vests 1: holding the claim of constructive discharge does not accrue until an employee resigns 2: recognizing that  1983 action does not accrue until conviction or sentence has been invalidated 3: recognizing that a constructive discharge claim and a hostile work environment claim are not equivalent because a constructive discharge claim imposes a higher standard 4: holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict


Input: and its companion, United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965), have since been extended to provide immunity to private efforts to influence courts, federal and state agencies. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972). The counterclaimants protest that this doctrine does not immunize an entire course of wrongful acts simply because Bristol requested government approval and licenses as part of its allegedly tortious scheme. They rely on Allied, Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. that the scope of antitrust protection depends on the “source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at issue.” 486 U.S. 492, 499, 108 S.Ct. 1931, 100 L.Ed.2d 497 (1988) (<HOLDING>). “An anticompetitive, private tortious scheme Holdings: 0: recognizing private right of action 1: holding that an antitrust injury is an injury that is attributable to an anticompetitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny 2: holding that anticompetitive actions of private standardsetting body could not be considered either valid governmental action or incidental to a valid effort to influence government action and thus were subject to antitrust scrutiny 3: holding that a private antitrust action for injury sounds in tort and is subject to a three year statute of limitations 4: holding that an acceleration clause is not subject to antitrust scrutiny where plaintiffs conceded that they could be procompetitive in some circumstances but noting that noag clauses are subject to antitrust scrutiny


Input: § 39.407(14); Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.250(b). The “in controversy” and “good cause” requirements are also included in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.360(a), which provides for mental examinations in civil actions. In a case involving a mental examination of a father in a dissolution modification action, this court explained the “in controversy” requirement under rule 1.360(a). See Williams v. Williams, 550 So.2d 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). For a parent’s mental health to be “in controversy,” “the condition must directly involve a material element of the cause of action.” Id. at 167. But see In re T.M.W., 553 So.2d 260, 262-63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (assuming the. parent’s mental condition was in controversy because custody was at issue); In re S.N., 529 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). In Gasparino v. Murphy, 352 So.2d 933 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that a proceeding under section 547 is a core proceeding 1: holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding 2: holding simply that padilla was not made retroactive to cases on collateral review without further analysis 3: holding that a witness who testifies in one proceeding may not be compelled to give further testimony in a different proceeding 4: holding that the mothers mental condition was implicated in a dependency proceeding without further analysis


Input: For this reason, the DHO’s failure to produce and review the work-crew log was not prejudicial to Mitchell, and the error, if any, was harmless. B. Failure to Provide a Written Statement of Reasons Mitchell’s second claim, that the DHO failed to provide a written statement of the reasons for her finding of guilt, is contradicted by the record. The DHO filled out a form titled “Disciplinary Hearing Report.” (R. at 33.) In a section labeled “Evidence relied on for finding of Guilt,” the DHO explained that she relied on the librarian’s description of the incident and the fact that Mitchell produced no evidence to the contrary. (Id.) We have no difficulty in concluding that this written statement meets the due process requirements announced in Wolff. See, e.g., Mitchell, 80 F.3d at 1445 (<HOLDING>)-, Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 703 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that a statement implying that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial was inadmissible hearsay 1: holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report 2: holding defendants statement that presentence report was correct did not constitute admission to the nature and cireumstances of the crime reflected in the report 3: holding that an officers hearsay statement was not cumulative to the eyewitnesss testimony where the officers statement provided the only evidence of a possible motive for the shooting and where the officers statement was based on his own observations not the eyewitnesss observations 4: holding that written statement that inmate was found guilty on the basis of officers report satisfied wolff


Input: after that, the State offered Exhibits 4, 5, and 6, and they were admitted over Orsag’s counsel's objection. Therefore, we disagree with Orsag that no testimony was elicited concerning State’s Exhibit 4. 3 . We note that Woodling did not specifically testify she was aware of prior “convictions" as the State asserts, but she testified she was with Orsag in 1995 when he was stopped for DWI in Harris County (Exhibit 5), and she "knew about” Orsag’s "DWI in Brazos County” (Exhibit 4). This, in conjunction with her confirmation that the prior judgments reflect Orsag's signature, is some evidence to support the prior convictions. See Thomas v. State, No. 2-08-125-CR, 2009 WL 2356891, at *6 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth July 30, 2009, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). 4 . As discussed below, we assume for Holdings: 0: holding that copies of defendants convictions contained in pen packet were admissible under public records exception 1: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 2: holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony 3: holding defendants brothers testimony that he knew the defendant had served time in the penitentiary for something happening at the mhmr home and his identification of his brothers photograph in a pen packet was sufficient to prove up the defen  dants prior conviction for sexual assault 4: holding that the officers had sufficient evidence to believe that the defendant was inside the residence to execute the arrest warrant because the officers relied on the anonymous tip given to the defendants parole officer the drivers identification of the defendant as meaty in a photograph and his assertion that meaty was in the residence at that time selling drugs


Input: indicated that the offense was sexually motivated and that the person who committed the offense did so for sexual gratification. Simmons argues that the trial court erred in admitting Neer’s testimony into evidence because, he says, the evidence was based on scientific analysis and did not meet the Frye standard. Initially, we find it imperative to note that the evidence offered through Neer’s testimony was not “profile” testimony. “Profile” evidence attempts to link the general characteristics of serial murderers to specific characteristics of the defendant. Such evidence is of little probative value and extremely prejudicial to the defendant since he is, in a sense, being accused by a witness who was not present at any of the crimes. See Pennell v. State, 602 A.2d 48, 55 (Del.1991) (<HOLDING>). Neer’s testimony did not accuse Simmons of Holdings: 0: holding that fbi agent was properly allowed to testify as expert on serial murders 1: holding that testimony of fbi agent regarding bank tellers out of court identification was properly admitted under 801d1c 2: holding that the trial court improperly allowed a hydrologist to testify regarding safe warehousing practices where he lacked the education employment or other practical experiences to testify as an expert 3: holding that an expert is not competent to testify as to statutory interpretation 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify


Input: F.3d at 282; compare Tilot Oil, 907 F.Supp.2d at 967-68 (rejecting groundwater contamination as ISE per se, but finding that “a lack of ongoing remediation might allow a finding of endangerment to the environment” even without any clear showing of threat to the nearby river). Since the Wellfield’s environment shows no overt signs of stress, and mere presence of C8 is not enough to show imminent and substantial endangerment, Defendant claims it is entitled to summary judgment on any RCRA environmental endangerment claims. Plaintiff responds that the uncontrovert-ed presence of C8 in the Wellfield’s groundwater, as well as complete absence of any remediation effort, is sufficient to show imminent and substantial endangerment to the environment. See Interfaith Cmty. Org., 399 F.3d at 263 (<HOLDING>). The Interfaith Court, relying on the New Holdings: 0: holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury 1: holding that coconspirator liability for a  924c offense may be established under pinkerton liability 2: holding no liability existed under the circumstances 3: holding liability under rcra for contamination to groundwater and rivers because the ise provision imposes liability for endangerments to the environment including water in and of itself 4: holding that clause eight imposes liability on time charterer for injuries to longshoremen


Input: that would provide [them] with a reasonable basis for a belief that the key representations in the statements provided to investors” were not misleadin ever, does not end the inquiry. Even though Plaintiffs were not the law firms’ clients, Kutak and Stinson cannot escape liability if, during the course of their work on the Official Statements, they knowingly or recklessly omitted facts that rendered these offering documents false or misleading. Under the Ninth Circuit’s substantial participation test, Kutak and Stinson, as the primary drafters of the language in the Official Statements, had a duty to exercise reasonable care and to disclose relevant facts that undermined the statements that they actually drafted or otherwise prepared. See Homestore.com, 347 F.Supp.2d at 800 (<HOLDING>). This is so because when Kutak and Stinson Holdings: 0: holding that statements which put the sources of the defendants revenue at issue gave rise to liability under section 10b because the company failed to disclose the improper conduct that generated that revenue 1: holding that puffing does not give rise to fraud liability under mississippi law 2: holding employer statements of policy can give rise to contractual rights without evidence of mutual agreement 3: holding that an auditor intricately involved in the creation of misstatements and omissions may be liable under  10b even if the statements could not be reasonably attributable to him 4: holding that the creation drafting editing or making of the statements at issue can give rise to liability under  10b


Input: consider whether this Court erred (1) by applying the “general rule” that suicide is an unforeseeable intervening cause of death, even though there was a special relationship between a detention officer and his prisoner, who committed suicide while in custody; and (2) in reversing the denial of the officer’s motion for summary judgment. 23 Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (punctuation omitted); accord Harvey, 260 G he exception to the general rule regarding proximate cause and suicide did not apply when there was no evidence that an inmate was in a rage or frenzy or had an uncontrollable impulse at the time when he killed himself and when the inmate appeared calm, controlled, and appeared to know what he was doing); Dry Storage Corp. v. Piscopo, 249 Ga. App. 898, 900 (550 SE2d 419) (2001) (<HOLDING>). 29 See supra footnote 27. 30 Although the Holdings: 0: holding petitioner cannot claim he was denied right to assistance of counsel when he knowingly and voluntarily decided to represent himself 1: holding that a suicide victim did not kill himself during a rage or frenzy or in response to an uncontrollable impulse when although his physical or psychological pain was obvious and he specifically attributed it to the alleged tortfeasors negligence he recorded a videotape just before he committed suicide in which he appeared to have control of himself and to have known exactly what he was doing 2: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 3: holding there was enough evidence to find the defendant abandoned his child when he claimed to have knowledge of cpss involvement he admitted that for periods of two years and six months he did not attempt any contact with his child and from the date he canceled a home study until the petition was filed he did not attempt to contact the child or cps or provide support even when he was out of jail 4: holding that an inmates suicide was an unforeseeable intervening act for which a detention officer was not liable when inter alia there was no evidence that the inmate was in a rage or frenzy or had an uncontrollable impulse at the time when he took his own life but was instead calm and controlled and appeared to have known what he was doing


Input: pleading, the defense was preserved and dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint was affirmed. Shotzman v. Berumen, 363 Ark. 215, 229, 213 S.W.3d 13, 20 (2005); Wallace v. Hale, 341 Ark. 898, 900, 20 S.W.3d 392, 394 (2000); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 315 Ark. 136, 140-41, 865 S.W.2d 643, 645-46 (1993). In contrast, where a party had knowledge of a pending action and did not raise the specific Rule 12(b) defenses in the responsive pleading, the defenses were waived. Posey v. St. Bernard’s Healthcare, Inc., 365 Ark. 154, 164, 226 S.W.3d 757, 764 (2006) (Defendant asserted a statute-of-limitations defense but failed to raise the defense of insufficient service of process in its responsive pleading.); Galley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 362 Ark. 568, 575, 210 S.W.3d 40, 44 (2005) (<HOLDING>); S. Transit Co., Inc. v. Collums, 333 Ark. Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant waived its impropervenue defense where its responsive pleading which asserted the defenses of failure to state facts to state a claim and failure to join a necessary party  did not assert the defense of improper venue 1: holding that state could not assert sovereign immunity defense where the state had waived immunity in state court and agreed to remove suit to federal court 2: holding that the failure of all defendant to join in the petition for removal mandated remand to state court 3: holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second 4: holding that defendant had waived any defense of improper venue when he made the argument only after filing a motion for summary judgment


Input: a separate motion. 7 . In referring to aliens entitled to voluntary departure as “favored,” we follow the same characterization as used by the Supreme Court in Dada which stated, “We must be reluctant to assume that the voluntary departure statute was designed to remove this important safeguard [motion to reopen] for the distinct class of deportable aliens most favored by the same law.” Dada, 554 U.S. at 18, 128 S.Ct. 2307. 8 . This case is distinguishable from cases where the alien filed a motion to reopen during the seven-month window, but explicitly requested a stay of the voluntary departure period pending adjudication of the motion indicating that the alien had no intention to relinquish the voluntary departure agreement. See Blackman v. Att'y Gen., 414 Fed.Appx. 415 (3d Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); see also Ramirez-Mena v. Holder, 324 Holdings: 0: holding bia did not err in determining request for stay of voluntary departure is not an implicit request for a withdrawal of voluntary departure 1: holding motion to reopen seeking adjustment of status constituted a withdrawal of the request for voluntary departure and the adjustment motion was therefore not barred based on failure to depart within the voluntary departure time allowed 2: holding the respondent  implicitly exercised his right to withdraw his voluntary departure request and instead  elected to remain to pursue his motion 3: holding the bia did not err in denying aliens motion to stay voluntary departure period pending determination on the motion to reopen 4: holding that bia did not err in denying motion to reopen that was filed after expiration of aliens voluntary departure period because alien had failed to depart


Input: 1998); Dixon v. Dixon, 747 P.2d 1169, 1175 n. 5 (Alaska 1987). 11 . 666 P.2d 438 (Alaska App.1983). 12 . See id. at 450. 13 . See id. 14 . Id. 15 . See id. 16 . Id. at 451; see also Jones v. State, 576 P.2d 997, 1001 (Alaska 1978) ("Having specified a particular purpose for the offer, Jones is not in a position to now claim error because the evidence might have been admissible on other grounds."). 17 . See, e.g., Trobough v. French, 803 P.2d 384, 385 (Alaska 1990) (where a litigant failed to object to her adversary’s conduct during trial and never requested a mistrial, the trial court abused its discretion in granting the new trial because the plaintiff did not "formally object to the questioned acts at the time they were committed"); Moss v. State, 620 P.2d 674, 677 (Alaska 1980) (<HOLDING>); Petersen v. State, 838 P.2d 812, 816 (Alaska Holdings: 0: holding that defendant waived his blakely claim as issue on appeal by failing to raise it in his initial brief 1: holding that defendant waived his confrontation rights by threatening witness not to testify 2: holding that it was incumbent upon counsel to renew his attempt to obtain the witness testimony and that by failing to do so defendant waived his request 3: holding that witness grand jury testimony was admissible when defendant waived his constitutional right of confrontation by making witness unavailable by threats to his life 4: holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief


Input: process expeditiously, § 1129(e) alone attempts to govern the court’s involvement in that process. 13 . Moreover, to have denied the Motion to Extend Time on November 5th because the Debtor at that point had not been able to make the requisite showing would have been tantamount to denying it due process — the right to be heard, to have all of its evidence on the issue considered, when it had done all it could do to timely put the issues and that evidence before the Court and when the hearing on the Motion to Extend Time had already been commenced. 14 . Section 1121(e)(3)(c) requires that a court sign the an order extending the time period to obtain confirmation before the existing has expired. See In re Caring Heart Home Health Corp., 380 B.R. 908, 910 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 2008) (<HOLDING>). The Court notes that the Debtor did submit a Holdings: 0: holding that if the attorney general issues a scope certificate the action must be removed to federal court and the united states must be substituted as the party defendant by the plain language of 28 usc  2679d2 no discretion is given to the district court 1: holding that where a defendant controlled the board of directors it is manifest then that there can be no expectation that the corporation would sue him and if it did it can hardly be said that the prosecution of the suit would be entrusted to proper hands 2: holding that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous no need exists for the court to examine the legislative histo ry and the court must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute 3: holding that statutes must be read so as to give effect to all statutory language 4: holding that the language of the third requirement in section 1121e3 is abundantly clear and must be read as conclusive  if no signed order exists prior to the expiration of the 45 day deadline then no extension can be granted


Input: planning issues.’’); December 31, 1986 letter from NRC to Edison ("The NRC is looking for strong evidence of progress at Pilgrim prior to restart.... Further, you should note that we plan to complete a SALP review prior to reaching a position regarding the restart of the Pilgrim facility.’’). SALP is an acronym for "Sytematic Assessment of Licensee Performance.” 9 . It does mean that there is judicial review of this action. See section IV, infra. 10 . The other grounds for a mandatory hearing set forth in § 2239(a) are not relevant to this case. 11 . Because we find that no hearing was required, we need not decide whether the Commonwealth is a "person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding" entitled to a hearing under § 2239. Cf. Belotti v. NRC, 725 F.2d 1380 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). 12 . To the extent that the Commonwealth is Holdings: 0: holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the commonwealth resulted from a mistaken view of the law by earlier courts 1: holding that school districts do not share in the commonwealth of pennsylvanias eleventh amendment sovereign immunity because they are not alter egos of the commonwealth 2: holding that the commonwealth cannot revoke a drivers license without due process required by the constitution 3: holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment 4: holding that the commonwealth was not such a person with respect to an earlier amendment of pilgrims license


Input: and other African-American students, to expel him from the school. This claim, however, is fatally flawed because the -Sixth Circuit has determined that a corporation cannot conspire with its own agents or employees. Johnson v. Hills & Dales General Hosp., 40 F.3d 837, 839-840 (6th Cir.1994); Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 509-510 (6th Cir.1991); Doherty v. American Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334, 339 (6th Cir.1984). As a result, plaintiffs § 1985(3) claim also fails as a matter of law. Furthermore, because the § 1986 claim is dependent upon establishing a § 1985(3) violation, plaintiffs’ § 1986 claim necessarily fails. Bartell, 215 F.3d at 560; Haverstick Enterprises, Inc. v. Financial Federal Credit, Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 994 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Browder, 630 F.2d at 1155 (same). The Holdings: 0: recognizing that it would be anomalous to find a violation under  41 without a prior finding of a violation of  431 1: holding that there can be no violation of  1986 without a predicate violation of  1985 2: holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation 3: holding no violation of the travel act 4: holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law


Input: States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 1982) (concluding that the “point of origin has no bearing on the reasonableness of a [border] search so long as a border crossing has been established”). Here, the Government does not dispute that D.E. did not cross the border and was not in the process of crossing the border when his vehicle was searched. C. Reasonable Suspicion Was Required for the Search of D.E.’s vehicle When CBP officials seek to search an item or person on the basis of general “contact with the border area,” without evidence that the item or person has crossed the border or is in the process of crossing, reasonable suspicion is required. United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1121, 89 S.Ct. 999, 22 L.Ed.2d 126 (1969) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75, 78 Holdings: 0: holding that certain police stops of limited duration that are reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation are legal 1: holding that lprs are entitled to full procedural due process at the border even when returning to the united states 2: holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983 3: holding that persons who have direct contact with a border area or whose movements are reasonably related to the border area are not subject to search absent suspicion 4: holding that claims are related if they involve a common core of facts or they are based on related legal theories


Input: dismissal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Up until recently, “[t]he Fifth Circuit [had] declined to address the ‘enigmatic question of whether motions to dismiss on the basis of forum selection clauses are properly brought as motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) [or] 12(b)(3).’ ” Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 961 (5th Cir.1997). Most district courts in the Fifth Circuit followed the direction of Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc. v. MIRA M/V, 111 F.3d 33 (5th Cir.1997), in which the Fifth Circuit, without commenting on the district court’s procedural choice, affirmed a district court’s granting of a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue based on a forum selection clause See Ambraco, Inc. v. M/V CLIPPER FAITH, no. 06-9966, 2007 WL 1550960 at *1 (E.D.La., May 25, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Very recently, the Fifth Circuit shed some Holdings: 0: recognizing circuit agreement that a motion to dismiss based on an arbitration clause is proper under rule 12b3 1: holding that a motion to dismiss based on a forumselection clause should be treated as a rule 12b3 motion to dismiss for improper venue 2: holding that a forumselection clause may be enforced under rule 12b3 as a motion to dismiss on the basis of improper venue 3: holding that since the fifth circuit has accepted rule 12b3 as a proper method for seeking dismissal for improper venue based on a forum selection clause the court need not decide whether a rule 12b1 motion  is appropriate 4: holding that when a forum selection clause designates  an arbitral forum  the proper remedy is dismissal


Input: a state treats a filing as timely and resolves it on the merits, the federal judiciary will not second-guess that action, for the grievance has served its function of alerting the state and inviting corrective action.”). Dr. Martinez also contends that even if the grievance process was unavailable during the 15-day filing period, Spada was required to exhaust his administrative remedies once he had access to grievance forms. But Dr. Martinez has provided no basis for concluding that Spada’s untimely grievance would have been accepted and resolved on the merits. Notably, there was no requirement that Spada utilize the grievance process after the 15-day period expired, which is the foundation of Dr. Martinez’s position. See, e.g., Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, some courts have held that in Holdings: 0: holding that an administrative remedy which is unknown and unknowable is unavailable 1: holding that there was no question that the full and fair opportunity element was met where there was no indication that such an opportunity was unavailable 2: holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners grievances 3: holding that an administrative remedy was made unavailable after correctional officers did not respond to a grievance and there was no regulation addressing such a situation 4: recognizing that officials failure timely to respond to grievance could be basis for prisoner to show he exhausted available administrative remedies


Input: at 1871-72 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)); see also Dunham, 967 F.2d at 1124; Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487, 490 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 595, 121 L.Ed.2d 533 (1992). The district court’s conclusion below was not clearly erroneous, as we are not left with the “ ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 370, 111 S.Ct. at 1872 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). We have in the past upheld as race-neutral peremptory challenges based on the failure to attain a certain educational level. See Marin, 7 F.3d at 686-87; United States v. Tucker, 773 F.2d 136, 142 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021, 1022, 106 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that age is an acceptable raceneutral reason for striking a prospective juror 1: holding raceneutral basis for preemptory challenge was pretext where stated reasons for challenge not supported by venirepersons statements 2: holding prebatson that challenge to africanamericans who had limited education was raceneutral 3: holding the prosecution to a higher burden of proof than the law required is a valid raceneutral reason for excluding a juror 4: holding that there was a raceneutral reason the states use of a peremptory challenge against a venireperson who had a very individualistic hairstyle


Input: an attorney in the circumstances of this case.” Nearly two years after first requesting relief from the Court of Veterans Appeals, Cox once again sought a writ from the court. This time, however, Cox’s request was more modest than the first. Cox sought a writ of mandamus only to compel the Board to issue a final decision on his petition for attorneys’ fees. The court acknowledged that pursuant to the All Writs Act (AWA), 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994), it had the power to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to issue a final decision. The court determined that such a writ would be justified “in aid of’ the court’s jurisdiction under the AWA because, absent a final decision by the Board, the court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (1994). See In re Wick, 40 F.3d at 373 (<HOLDING>). However, as before, the court declined to Holdings: 0: holding that a court of veterans appeals decision interpreting 38 usc  8713 overruling the secretarys prior interpretation and remanding back to the board was a final and appealable decision 1: holding that a board decision is required to vest the court of veterans appeals with jurisdiction over a claimants appeal 2: holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court 3: recognizing that failure by state to provide the required certification deprives appeals court of jurisdiction over appeal 4: holding that where the board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 usc  7104e the period within which to appeal to the court of appeals for veterans claims did not commence to run


Input: fear of cancer were not authorized. See id. 674 A.2d at 239-40. There are two ways to analyze the phenomenon of exposure-only causes of action. First is the monolithic view — i.e., that there is only a single cause of action based on exposure to asbestos, for which there are multiple remedies (some of which may not be available). Second is the “polylithic” view (for lack of a better word), that there are multiple causes of action for exposure to asbestos (some of which may not be available) — i.e., there is one cause of action for increased risk of cancer, one cause of action for medical monitoring costs, etc. It is largel (1989); DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604, 744 P.2d 705, 707-11 (Ct.App.1987) (same); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del. 1984) (<HOLDING>); Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the installation of asbestoscontaining materials caused immediate physical injury to the building because asbestos is ultrahazardous 1: holding that injury does not occur upon exposure to asbestos but rather upon development of disease 2: holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim 3: holding that present physical injury caused by exposure to asbestos is essential element of claims for mental anguish and medical monitoring costs 4: holding dollar amount is not an essential element


Input: in Los Angeles, it also existed in or had any effect on the Malibu area. Rather, the City uncritically adopted the findings of the Los Angeles County ordinance, an ordinance that applies not only to a much broader geographic area than Malibu, but also to all forms of rental housing. Thus, the City’s position is not based on actual facts, but instead on the notion that because other courts have accepted the monopoly argument in other contexts and other geographical areas, this Court is compelled to accept it as applied to mobile home housing in Malibu. See, e.g., Pennell, 485 U.S. at 12, 108 S.Ct. at 857-58 (accepting monopoly argument where plaintiffs did not dispute it); Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal.3d 129, 160-64, 130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 488-91, 550 P.2d 1001, 1024-27 (1976) (<HOLDING>). The difficulty with the City’s position is Holdings: 0: holding that findings made by lower courts showed rational basis for monopoly argument in the specific context of apartment rentals in alameda county 1: holding that a law survives rational basis review so long as there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification 2: recognizing that the specific argument regarding an issue must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for appellate review 3: holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction 4: holding that the lower courts findings were insufficient as a matter of law and remanding for the court to make the findings required under ars  25403


Input: EEOC charges on a deferral basis, the time for filing a charge of employment discrimination is 180 days of the alleged unlawful occurrence. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). The parties agree that the 300-day rule applies in Arizona, a deferral state. 8 . As an initial matter, we doubt that the EEOC is subject to the same strict timing requirements with respect to exhaustion of remedies in Title VII as a private party before bringing a class suit. "Title VII claimants generally establish federal court jurisdiction by first exhausting their EEOC administrative remedies.” Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir.1990). However, it makes little sense for an agency to exhaust remedies before itself. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 288, 122 S.Ct. 754, 15 -41 (9th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). 10 . The district court misconstrued EEOC v. Holdings: 0: holding eeoc could maintain an action alleging discrimination against women and minority groups although the original charge alleged only discrimination against males 1: holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex 2: holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc 3: holding eeoc could maintain action alleging discrimination against male employees in the administration of the retirement system although original charge was filed by female alleging discrimination on the basis of her sex 4: holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination


Input: provides that a business representative is not an officer, and leaves to the District Council the option of providing the local unions with business representatives or allowing them to either elect or appoint their own representatives. Given this grant of discretionary authority to the District Council, it cannot be said that individual local unions have a vested right to elect business representatives. 944 F.2d at 614-15. It will be observed that the 2000 Constitution, providing for the appointment of business representatives by the District Council, represents the exercise by the District Council of a discretionary authority which the Ninth Circuit held the earlier version of section 31B conferred upon it. See also Lathers Local 42-L v. UBC, 73 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Local No. 267 v. UBC, 992 F.2d 1418, 1424 Holdings: 0: recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it 1: holding that the remedies are exclusive 2: holding that bylaws granting exclusive control of business representatives to a district council did not violate the ubc constitution 3: holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution 4: holding authority to control limits duty to control


Input: successive. See ante, at 891-92. The Washington Supreme Court reached this conclusion, however, only after reviewing the merits of the petition: This petition is both repetitive and untimely. RCW 10.73.090, .140. The only possible basis on which Mr. [Dictado] could avoid both of these procedural bars is if this petition rested on newly discovered evidence, which would constitute both an exception to the statute of limitations and good cause for failing to raise the new issue earlier.... Although Mr. Guloy did not provide his affidavit until February 5, 1997, it ... does not qualify as newly discovered evidence. Mr. Guloy did not recently recant testimony he gave against Mr. Dictado. Mr. Guloy did not testify at all at that trial, nor were any of his hearsay statements admit iz.1998) (<HOLDING>); Galindo v. Johnson, 19 F.Supp.2d 697, 698, Holdings: 0: holding that seventh application for postconviction relief which was rejected because evidence on which it was based was not properly authenticated was properly filed 1: holding that because defendant did not raise a newly discovered evidence claim or amend his postconviction motion after the evidentiary hearing the issue was not timely presented to the trial court and was not cognizable on appeal 2: holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence 3: holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed 4: holding evidence was not newly discovered because the underlying facts were well within the partys knowledge prior to the district courts entry of judgment


Input: action). Nevertheless, insofar as the PHRA can be generally analogized to a combination of actions in tort and contract, pre-Seventh Amendment common law required a jury trial in such actions. C. Wright, supra, at p. 610. A far greater aid to this Court’s Seventh Amendment inquiry, and properly the crux of any Seventh Amendment analysis, is the nature of the remedy sought by the plaintiff. Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 438 (3d Cir.1990), citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 2793, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989). As made clear in her prayer for relief in Count III, plaintiff seeks remedies that are both equitable, e.g., reinstatement, and legal, e.g., compensatory and punitive damages. Protos v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 138 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Since the plaintiff seeks a determination of Holdings: 0: holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages 1: holding that punitive damages do not need to be proportional to compensatory damages 2: holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated 3: holding compensatory and punitive damages constitute legal remedies 4: holding that equitable relief under  502a3 does not include compensatory and punitive damages


Input: The Sales Associate acknowledges that he/she is not an employee nor a partner, but a Sales Associate with an independent contractor status, with no rights of [worker’s] compensation, salary, pension, sick leave, sick pay, or other attributes of an employee relationship. The Sales Associate will not be treated as an employee with respect to the services performed by such salesperson as a real estate agent for federal tax purposes. Finally, after the relationship ended, MacDougall could not use any remaining prospects, listings, or referrals. Nevertheless, several facts suggest that Weichert exerted substantial control over MacDougall. MacDougall worked in an office maintained by Weichert, a Weichert manager supervised MacDougall’s work, Weichert requir 1, 30, 539 A.2d 744 (App.Div.1988) (<HOLDING>); Giudice v. Drew Chem. Corp., 210 N.J.Super. Holdings: 0: holding that federal law can provide source of state public policy for determining whether discharge of employee violated clear mandate of public policy 1: holding that discharge of employee to avoid paying commissions on future transactions did not violate clear mandate of public policy 2: holding that the discharge of an employee hospitalized for illness did not violate public policy 3: holding that an employee has no right of action against an employer for wrongful discharge where no clear mandate of public policy is violated thereby 4: holding that discharge of employee for having distributed expired drugs at employers direction did not violate clear mandate of public policy because the discharge implicated only the private interests of the parties


Input: to § 1302(b)(1), which incorporates the duties specified in, among others, § 704(a)(9). These courts have held that because a trustee is required to perform certain statutory duties after conversion, other functions, such as the distribution of funds and the filing of claims objections, are a logical extension of the trustee’s authority to complete the administration of the chapter 13 estate. See In re Pegues, 266 B.R. at 334-35 (citing Hardin and Galloway). These decisions fail to distinguish between post-confirmation reporting duties and substantive administrative matters related to a chapter 13 trustee’ ude that the payments received by the Trustee are not held in trust pending distribution and that creditors have no vested interest in the funds held by the Trustee upon conversi (<HOLDING>); Calder v. Job, 973 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that payments made to a debtor from inter vivos trusts within 180 days of filing the petition are not interests by way of bequest devise or inheritance and are not part of the bankruptcy estate 1: holding that funds held by chapter 13 trustee become property of the chapter 7 estate upon conversion not subject to exemption 2: holding that the corpus of an inheritance is not included in a parents gross income but that the interest generated by an inheritance is 3: holding that income payment debtor received from spendthrift trusts or was entitled to receive by terms of the trusts within 180 days of filing of debtors bankruptcy petition constituted bequests and became property of debt ors estate under  541a5a 4: holding inheritance received by debtor more than 180 days after filing but before conversion is property of chapter 7 estate


Input: filed on June 7, 2007, we must resolve the ambiguity in favor of Anival. Vazquez, slip op. at 3 (citing Grey v. Grey, 111 Nev. 388, 892 P.2d 595, 597 (Nev. 1995) (“The testimony illustrates that the date of receipt... by the clerk’s office is, at the very least ambiguous. Accordingly, we are compelled to resolve the ambiguity in Roxanne’s favor.”)). 4 See Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 119 Haw. 1, 193 P.3d 839, 846-47 (2008); Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 868-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (noting “potentially devastating” collateral consequences for parent of expired “child in need of services” order, including impacts on future presentence investigations, in-court impeachments, and child custody determinations); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 700 N.E.2d 296, 298 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Piper v. Layman, 125 Md. App. 745, 726 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding expired domestic violence restraining order not moot because of collateral legal consequences such as consideration in custody determination and nonlegal collateral consequences such as reputational harm 1: holding expired child abuse protective order not moot because of possible effect on future custody determinations 2: holding appeal from abuse prevention order not moot due to orders expiration because of collateral consequences including effect in future proceedings and stigma 3: holding that revocation of parole does not create collateral consequences sufficient to extend standing beyond expiration of sentence and rejecting as moot a challenge to an allegedly erroneous parole revocation 4: holding drivers license revocation was not moot because collateral consequences of revocation may be substantial including higher insurance rates and adverse employment consequences


Input: we reach the obvious conclusion that vanity plates are an unlikely means by which to engage in meaningful “assembly and debate,” Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, or other expressive activity. Because vanity plates are physically restricted by size and shape and by the state’s interests, including that of vehicle identification, vanity plates are a highly limited and extremely constrained means of expression. The very character of license plates also suggests that they are not a designated public forum. In light of all of the circumstances described above, we hold that Vermont has not intended to designate, and has not designated, its vanity plates as a public forum. Cf. In re Denial of the Application for the Custom Plates, 170 Or.App. 542, 13 P.3d 531 (2000) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). But see Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: recognizing that government is not required to retain open nature of designated public forum 1: holding that a state statute authorizing the rejection of vanity plates deemed contrary to public policy violated the first amendment because it granted unfettered discretion to state officials 2: holding that a vanity plate is not a public forum 3: holding that a vanity plate is a designated public forum where a state allows groups to place various slogans and designs on license plates 4: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties


Input: guilty of some possession crime, the jury had a choice between convicting Hernandez of possession with intent to distribute or acquitting him. It is not possible to say with confidence that the jury chose the former option because the government met its burden. The jury may have decided that given the overwhelming evidence against Hernandez, it did not want to acquit him of that charge, and so chose the only other option available to it—conviction of intent to distribute methamphetamine. Eliminating the option of finding Hernandez guilty of simple possession from the jury’s province, under the circumstances of this case, substantially influenced the verdict and was not harmless error. The error of not giving the lesser included jury instruction on simple p Cir.1974) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that possession of the equivalent of 279 pounds of marijuana valued at 279000 dollars justified the district courts refusal to provide a lesser included instruction 1: holding that possession of more than seven tons of marijuana justified the district courts refusal to provide a simple possession instruction 2: holding that possession with intent to distribute and simple possession are the same offense under blockburger 3: holding that possession of more than thirtyfive pounds of cocaine valued at between 5 and 7 million ruled out a simple possession jury instruction 4: holding that jurys failure to find the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana could not be reconciled with a verdict of guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to purchase


Input: devoid of any meaningful difference; for the heart of our holding in Blow was a recognition of the “deeply-rooted legal and societal principle that the coveted privacy of the home should be especially protected.” Blow, 157 Vt. at 518, 602 A.2d at 555. This heightened expectation of privacy rendered it objectively reasonable to expect that conversations in the privacy of one’s home would not be surreptitiously invaded by warrantless transmission or recording. “[W]arrantless electronic participant monitoring conducted in a home,” we held, “offends the core values of Article 11. tution to hold that “the expectation that one’s conversations will not be secretly recorded or broadcast should be recognized as reasonable”); see also Commonwealth v. Brian, 652 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Both cases recognized the risk that Holdings: 0: holding that while an individual has a right to possess obscene material in the privacy of his home there is no corresponding privacy right to purchase such material 1: holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business 2: holding that an individual can reasonably expect that his right to privacy will not be violated in his home through the use of any electronic surveillance 3: holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right 4: holding that an individual using prescription drugs has a right to expect that such information will customarily remain private


Input: coverage. Id. at 238 (explaining that the plan participant was not covered at the time of the alleged misrepresentation). In holding that the plaintiffs claim was not preempted by ERISA, the court stated the “provider’s state law action ... would not arise due to the patient’s coverage under an ERISA plan, but precisely because there is no ERISA plan coverage.” Id. at 246. Further, the fact that the plaintiffs damages Am., 101 F.3d 600, 606 (8th Cir.1996) (declining to extend preemption to state law claims of a third party provider because it “would not further the Congressional goal of protecting the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans”); Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Ins. of Okla., Inc., 944 F.2d 752, 756 (10th Cir.1991)(<HOLDING>). As there is no binding Fourth Circuit Holdings: 0: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan 1: holding that plaintiff is a plan participant and he is seeking to recover for the plan as a whole these are the only requirements on the face of the statute itself 2: holding that an erisa insurers declaratory suit seeking a favorable interpretation of a standard policy clause against a party having no obligations under the plan was not an action to enforce the plan terms 3: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant 4: holding that an action by a health care provider to recover payment from an insurance carrier is sufficiently distinct from an action by a plan participant against the insurer seeking recovery of benefits due under the terms of the insurance plan and therefore preemption in the former case would stretch the connected with or related to standard too far


Input: *13-*14 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 30, 2014, pet. denied) (mem.op.).' Thus, a party is a prevailing party by “obtainfing] an award of specific enforcement of [a] settlement agreement and an end to the ongoing litigation in the case.” Id. at *14. Here, McCulley and TBW Development obtained specific performance of their settlement agreement with Palavan by having Palavan’s claims against them dismissed. McCulley and TBW Development were prevailing parties and were entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees. For the same reason, Palavan’s argument that the dismissal of his claims mooted McCulley’s and TBW Development’s breach of contract claims must fail. Dismissal of Palavan’s claims established that McCulley and TBW Development prevailed, not that their claims were mooted. See 3) Holdings: 0: recognizing that appellate court may reverse trial courts judgment when it is based on an erroneous conclusion of law 1: holding an appellate court cannot reverse a trial courts judgment absent properly assigned error 2: holding appellate courts cannot reverse judgment  on grounds not raised on appeal 3: holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal 4: recognizing appellate court may not reverse a summary judgment on a basis not raised by the appellant on appeal


Input: reading of the statute would defy the intent of the legislature in enacting the current version of section 115B.06. The purpose of the statute was to cut off liability for past actions. See Arkla, 1993 WL 61827, at *2; Werlein, 746 F.Supp. at 910. If the statute were construed to allow liability any time there is continuing migration of contaminants from one property to another after July 1, 1983, the statute would provide little protection for those whose actions occurred entirely before that date. Thus, in this context, the only reasonable interpretation of the “placed or came to be located in or on the facility” is that it refers to when Carney placed the hazardous substances or allowed the hazardous substances to be placed on the Walker site. See Arkla, 1993 WL 61827, at *2 (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed that Carney placed or put Holdings: 0: holding the relevant event under section 115b06 is when the defendant placed the hazardous substance on the source site 1: holding that the source of the federal funds was not a relevant factor in determining the number of violations 2: holding that sophistication of investor is relevant factor in determining when plaintiff placed on inquiry notice 3: holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint 4: holding that it was reasonable to conclude that a defendant intended to use a truck to facilitate the transportation of drugs when the defendant arrived at the site of drug activity in the truck and had no alternative means of leaving the site after obtaining the drugs


Input: reasonable doubt “without regard” to the historical practice of juries. To the extent the district court repeated the prosecutor’s statement in sustaining the defendants’ objection, it was to illustrate that the district court’s instructions would render the prosecutor’s remark irrelevant. And, as noted above, before the jury deliberated, the district court gave the jury detailed instructions on the meaning of reasonable doubt. Even assuming some residual prejudicial effect remained, the prosecutor’s statement did not affect Ortiz’s and Rolon’s substantial rights because — in light of the substantial independent evidence of their guilt — no reasonable probability exists that this statement altered the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1097 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). As we note elsewhere in our discussion, Holdings: 0: holding reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome 1: holding that to establish stricklandpierce prejudice in the appellate representation context the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding would have been different but for counsels deficient performance 2: holding that counsels failure to question the venire regarding the zehr principles did not constitute ineffective assistance where there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different 3: holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea 4: holding that improper prosecutorial references did not raise a reasonable probability that but for the remarks the outcome would be different due to sufficient independent evidence establishing guilt


Input: circuit court stated an incorrect reason for its denial.’ ” Long v. State, 675 So.2d 532, 533 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), quoting Swicegood v. State, 646 So.2d 159, 160 (Ala.Crim.App.1994). For the reasons that follow, we find that the circuit court was correct in summarily denying all but one of Bearden’s claims. I. Bearden contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment or to impose the sentence. He makes two arguments in this regard. First, Bearden contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because, he says, the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant for his arrest was not properly verified. Although couched in jurisdictional terms, this claim does not present a jurisdictional issue. See, e.g., Sumlin v. State, 710 So.2d 941 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we agree with the circuit court Holdings: 0: holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest 1: holding that a prosecutors preparation and filing of an information and a motion for an arrest warrant are protected by absolute immunity 2: holding that arrest warrant permits police to enter residence of person named therein to make arrest 3: holding that challenges to an arrest warrant are not jurisdictional 4: holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant


Input: to shooting Milem. He signed the statement at 8:20 p.m. The following morning, Norris was brought before a magistrate for a probable-cause determination. At trial, Norris’s attorney moved to suppress Norris’s confession on two grounds not at issue in this appeal. The Tennessee trial court held a hearing, denied the motion, and admitted the confession. A jury convicted Norris of second-degree murder in June 1999, and he was sentenced to twenty-one years of imprisonment. After the trial, Norris’s new attorney who would also be his appellate counsel moved for a new trial. At a hearing on the motion, he argued that Norris’s confession should have been suppressed because: (1) it was the fruit of an illegal arrest under Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (<HOLDING>); and (2) Norris was held for investigative Holdings: 0: holding that statements obtained following an illegal arrest are no less tainted than is physical evidence obtained after the same 1: holding that officers request for defendants name during an illegal entry constituted exploitation of the illegal entry under hall 2: holding that a confession obtained in violation of miranda was admissible for impeachment 3: holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  4: holding that a confession obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest is not admissible


Input: component of the res judicata doctrine. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the original criminal proceedings in Krahn were insufficient to invoke collateral estoppel in the later malpractice case because the claimed error by Krahn’s criminal lawyer in plea negotiations was not “ ‘actually and necessarily litigated and determined’ in the denial of her motion to vacate the criminal judgment against her.” Krahn, 43 Ohio St.3d at 108, 538 N.E.2d 1058, quoting Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 2 OBR 732, 443 N.E.2d 978. The Supreme Court by no means suggested that collateral estoppel was completely inapplicable in the context of a criminal conviction when, as here, matters genuinely were litigated and determined. Id. at 107, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (<HOLDING>). Decisions in Ohio other than Krahn relative Holdings: 0: recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings 1: holding that the facts prevent the invocation of collateral estoppel as a bar to krahns cause of action in this case 2: holding collateral estoppel elements met considering changed circumstances in the context of an exception to the general rule of collateral estoppel 3: recognizing the cause of action 4: holding that collateral estoppel applies to  1983 claims


Input: “actively endeavor[] to ensure compliance” with the FLSA. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 910 (9th Cir.2003), cert. granted on different issue, 2005 WL 405752 (2005); see also Herman, 172 F.3d at 142; Bankston v. Illinois, 60 F.3d 1249, 1255 (7th Cir.1995); Williams v. Tri-County Growers, Inc., 747 F.2d 121, 129 (3d Cir.1984). If the employer fails to show good faith, an award of liquidated damages is mandatory, even if the court finds that the employer did not act willfully. Cox v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir.1990). In Alvarez the court held that the employer’s “ex post explanations” for why it did not take affirmative steps to ensure compliance were insufficient to demonstrate good faith. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 910; see also First Citizens, 758 F.2d at 403 (<HOLDING>). In Bratt, by contrast, the employer had a Holdings: 0: holding that the employers bald assertions that the officers thought that they were in compliance with the act did not satisfy the good faith requirement 1: holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient 2: holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act 3: holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained a detailed description of the nature of the offense the premises to be searched the items for which they were searching and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment 4: holding that plaintiffs did not satisfy particularity requirement where plaintiffs assertions were based in part on the statements of unnamed former employees


Input: and thereby rendered him ineligible for long-term disability benefits. B. Watson’s Eligibility to Sue Under ERISA § 404(a) 1. Equitable Relief Sought ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), establishes that claims for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 404(a) are for the purpose of making “good to [an employee welfare] plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach” and “to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary,” id. Thus, compensatory damages are only available to restore a plan to its uninjured condition; individuals cannot obtain compensatory or punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 87 L.Ed.2d 96 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Degnan v. Publicker Indus., Inc., 42 Holdings: 0: holding compensatory and punitive damages constitute legal remedies 1: holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under  502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan 2: holding that a plan participant or beneficiary may not recover extracontractual damages in an erisa suit for breach of fiduciary duty under  502a2 and 409a only the plan may recover damages in such cases 3: holding that fiduciary could not be held personally liable to plan participant or beneficiary for extracontractual compensatory or punitive damages 4: holding that punitive damages do not need to be proportional to compensatory damages


Input: at least $300,000 because of injury to two or more persons in any one accident or, at the option of the insurer, up to at least $300,000 in a single limit for these coverages, except for policies issued under the Assigned Risk Plan. Also, at least $5,000 for damage to property of others in any one accident. Additionally, insurers may offer higher benefit levels than those enumerated above as well as additional benefits. However, an insured may elect to purchase lower benefit levels than those enumerated above. Your signature on this notice or your payment of any renewal premium evidences your actual knowledge and understanding of the availability of these benefits and limits as well as the benefits and limits you have selected. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1791. 2 . For example, compare Hughes, at 539 (<HOLDING>), with Brethren Mutual Insurance Company v. Holdings: 0: holding insureds failure to comply with notice provision in insurance policy resulted in no coverage for a newly acquired car 1: holding that insurance company could sue in insureds name following assignment of insureds interest against tortfeasor 2: holding insurance application containing umuim coverage limits and insureds signature was insufficient for  1734s purposes 3: holding that liability insurance policy that expressly excluded coverage for the insureds intentional acts did not cover punitive damages award assessed against the insured and stating in dictum that public policy forbids insurance coverage for punitive damages 4: holding insurance application with umuim coverage designation and insureds signature was suffi cient for  1734s purposes


Input: (1987) (noting that "where the employer effectively proves that a claimant's disability has been removed altogether, it is not required to prove that suitable work was available to the claimant because it can be presumed that employment is generally available to able-bodied persons.") 7 . Where the Board has not taken additional evidence, our standard of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, an error of law has been committed, or necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Haines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Clearfield County), 146 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 437, 606 A.2d 571 (1992). 8 . See Rite Aid Corporation v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Bupp), 112 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 548, 552, 535 A.2d 763, 765 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Economy Decorators v. Workmen’s Compensation Holdings: 0: holding that because a suspension admittedly is a concession that disability is continuing  claimant need only show that the work provided by the employer on which the suspension is based is no longer available to claimant whereupon total disability payments must be reinstated as of the date of termination of that employment 1: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 2: holding claimant suffered permanent total disability where functional disability was only twentyfive or thirty percent claimant was fiftynine years of age claimant had little or no education and the injury kept the claimant from performing physical work 3: recognizing that in suspension situations when a claimants lightduty job ends under circumstances where neither the claimant nor the employer bears any culpability the employer must either find other suitable and available work for the claimant or resume payment of benefits 4: holding that claimant moving for summary judgment on its claim must conclusively prove all the essential elements of the claim and that claimant has the burden to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that claimant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law