Input: requires proof of both knowledge and intent by any person who makes a “knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission...” N.J.S.A. 56:8-2; Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, supra., 148 N.J. at 607-608, 691 A.2d 350, Cox v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra., at 18, 647 A.2d 454, Varacallo v. Ma ndividual reliance, but does not require proof that such reliance was reasonable. Parks v. Macro-Dynamics, Inc., 121 Ariz. 517, 591 P.2d 1005 (1972). North Carolina requires proof of “actual” and “detrimental” reliance upon defendant’s misrepresentations, from which it may be inferred that such reliance need not necessarily be reasonable. Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc., 99 N.C.App. 587, 394 S.E.2d 643 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding consumer claims under the texas deceptive trade practices act nonassignable 1: holding that billings by the cruise line for port charges that were misrepresented as passthrough expenses but kept as additional profits is a deceptive practice under the florida deceptive and unfair trade practices act 2: holding that both punitive and treble damages were recoverable under the texas deceptive trade practices act because each of the plaintiffs claims resulted from a distinct act however because the plaintiff suffered only one compensable injury she could only be awarded one recovery for actual compensatory damages 3: holding that statutory damages were appropriate for each discrete violation of that states deceptive trade practices act 4: holding that recovery under the north carolina unfair and deceptive trade practices act  is limited to those situations when a plaintiff can show that plaintiff detrimentally relied upon a statement or misrepresentation and he or she suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendants deceptive statement or misrepresentation


Input: as "the Petitioners.” 3 . The policy originally was with CNA Personal Insurance, the predecessor in interest of Encompass. 4 . The numerical figures were apparently added by the insurance agent, per an instruction on the form. 5 . The General Assembly subsequently increased the minimum coverage amounts to their current levels. Chapter 441, Laws of Maryland 2010 (raising minimum personal injury liability coverage to $30,000 per person up to $60,000 per accident); Chapter 681, Laws of Maryland 1999 (raising minimum property damage coverage to $15,000). 6 . Even if a waiver is executed by the "first named insured,” it is ineffective if the insurer’s notice of the effect of the waiver is deficient. IN § 19-510(c); cf. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Powell, 292 F.3d 201 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, Petitioners apparently Holdings: 0: holding that in order for insured to qualify for uim benefits there must have been a liability policy in effect um coverage does not satisfy this requirement 1: holding public policy of um statute not violated by exclusion of um coverage for passenger of vehicle driven by excluded driver 2: holding that waiver of um coverage was ineffective under south carolina law because insurer did not adequately advise insured party about um coverage 3: holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee 4: holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy


Input: under the remainder aggregate rule, be deemed to have increased the sentence, the total time Weingarten will serve is the same under the new sentence as under the previous one. The district court’s conclusion that its initial aggregate sentence was still appropriate is understandable, given its finding that the factual mosaic and the “central factor[s]” that “[bore] on the imposition o[fj the appropriate sentence remained] the same.” While we can imagine a record that would support a finding of vindictiveness where the district court imposed the same total sentence after the reversal of certain counts reduced the extent of the harm legally attributable to the defendant, this is not that case. Cf. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 253-54, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008) (<HOLDING>). As “nothing in the record remotely suggests Holdings: 0: holding that states appeal of trial courts dismissal of first count in a four count indictment under cj  12302cl was not ripe until final judgment on the remaining counts pled in the guilty plea and noting that upon imposition of the sentences on the remaining counts the situation  was ripe for the state to appeal or to perfect its earlier attempt to appeal 1: recognizing with approval the practice following vacatur of some counts of conviction on appeal of increasing the defendants sentence on remaining counts to yield an aggregate sentence equal to the original aggregate imposed 2: holding that forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following conviction 3: holding that issues underlying all counts were sufficiently intertwined that the separate appeal of the summary judgment counts would complicate the trial of the remaining counts 4: holding that to compare severity of sentences the proper procedure is first to disregard the sentence originally imposed on the dismissed count and then compare the total remaining sentence imposed on the remaining counts with the petitioners present position


Input: claims, the subsection applicable to, the dismissal of his PCRA petition was Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(D)(1). (“Upon the conclusion of the hearing the judge ' shall determine all material issues raised by the defendant’s petition and the Commonwealth’s answer, or by the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss, if any-. (1) If the judge dismisses the petition, the judge promptly shall issue an order denying relief. The order shall be filed and served as provided in Rule [of Criminal Procedure] 114.”). 8 . Appellant concedes that his substantive due process, right-to-counsel, and right-to-appeal claims fail if we reject his facial challenge to the statute’s constitutionality. Appellant’s Brief at 34. Accordingly, in light of our disposition, we need not address these claims. See Turner, 80 A.3d at 764 (<HOLDING>). 9 . The PCRA court also attributes some blame Holdings: 0: recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection 1: recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim 2: holding that doctrine does not violate due process 3: holding that because process is not an end in itself once a court has found that the petitioner does not have a valid liberty interest a challenge to both procedural and substantive due process must fail 4: holding convicted sex offender had not been deprived of liberty interest for purposes of procedural due process challenge to sorp


Input: neither did Mr. Bowen. ¶ 30. Bowen does not require an independent action seeking partition. Mr. Myers already had a request for a sale properly before the chancellor. A remand in order to obtain another is superfluous. ¶ 31. Additionally, the majority suggests that to enforce a partition here would subvert longstanding public policy encouraging marriage. I do not find that the public policy arguments in favor of marriage impact on whether a spouse may seek the partition by sale of a financially burdensome marital home. Joint owners of property, even spouses not contemplating divorce, are entitled to seek partition of property. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-21-8 (Supp.2002), Trigg v. Trigg, 498 So.2d 334, 335-36 (Miss.1986). See also Miller v. Miller, 838 So.2d 295, 298 (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). ¶32. Trigg and Miller speak to the Holdings: 0: holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action 1: holding that denial of divorce and corresponding equitable distribution does not preclude a partition action by res judicata 2: holding res judicata does not preclude consideration of constitutional questions in postconviction proceedings which by their nature depended upon facts not found in record 3: holding that lear does not abrogate general principles of res judicata or the res judicata effect of a consent decree regarding patent validity 4: holding that a criminal statute does not provide a corresponding civil cause of action


Input: 545, 219 Ill.Dec. 823, 672 N.E.2d 331 (1996) (suppressing juvenile’s confession where his mother’s attempts to see her son “were clearly frustrated by the police so that they could create an intimidating atmosphere and obtain a confession”); People v. Montanez, 273 Ill.App.3d 844, 210 Ill.Dec. 295, 652 N.E.2d 1271 (1995) (same); In re J.O., 231 Ill.App.3d 853, 173 Ill.Dec. 406, 596 N. (1986) (same). The second approac ing that juveniles are not permitted to waive privilege against self-incrimination unless friendly adult is present and gives guidance); In re E.T.C., 141 Vt. 375, 449 A.2d 937 (1982) (interpreting Vermont Constitution to require presence of interested adult during custodial interrogation of juvenile); State ex rel. J.M. v. Taylor, 166 W.Va. 511, 276 S.E.2d 199 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Sevion v. State, 620 N.E.2d 736 Holdings: 0: holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights 1: holding that a federal criminal defendant may waive jury trial without advice of counsel 2: holding that juveniles may waive right to counsel only upon advice of counsel 3: holding that juveniles may not waive counsel unless parent or guardian also waives that right 4: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel


Input: The court then adjudicated his guilt, imposing a sentence of ten years confinement with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Di vision. Appellant subsequently filed a pr o be binding, stating, “Texas Code of Criminal Procedure ... expressly denies a defendant the right to appeal from a trial court’s determination to adjudicate.” 28 S.W.3d 627, 633 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi, 2000, no pet.). Article 42.12 § 5(b) expressly allows, however, an appeal of all proceedings after the adjudication of guilt on the original charge. Examples of proceedings after adjudication that may be appealed include the assessment of punishment and the pronouncement of sentence. Perez, 28 S.W.3d at 633; See also Jones v. State, 39 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Appellant does not complain of any error Holdings: 0: holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate 1: holding that the postconviction court erred in finding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim proeedurally barred because the courts opinion did not comment specifically on the ineffective counsel argument and the overall holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jurys verdict could not be viewed as an adjudication on the merits of the ineffective assistance claim 2: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record 3: holding that a court of appeals has jurisdiction to review claim of ineffective assistance of counsel occurring after the adjudication of guilt 4: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel


Input: misrepresentation claim against him fails because they have failed to allege that he made a representation to any plaintiff. Plaintiffs respond that Morrison is alleged to have made a representation in his written opinion regarding the reverse merger in which he opined that all the requirements and SEC regulations had been complied with and that good and valuable consideration had been paid by all the alleged purchasers of the Literary Playpen, Inc. stock. The court concludes that the alleged misrepresentations in Morrison’s opinion letter are sufficient for the purposes of a motion to dismiss. Such allegations are sufficient since under Iowa law fraudulent misrepresentation claims may be based on statements made to third parties. See Clark v. McDaniel, 546 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1996) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, this portion of Morrison’s motion Holdings: 0: holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties 1: recognizing that either party to a divorce action may bring in third parties who claim an interest in the property alleged to be community or third parties themselves may intervene and have their rights therein determined 2: holding that no direct contractual relationship is required between the alleged tortfeasor and the person who justifiably relies to his or her detriment on the alleged tortfeasors representations because under restatement second of torts section 533 1977 hereinafter restatement persons who fraudulently misrepresent the truth can be held liable to third parties if they have a reason to expect their misrepresentation will be communicated to third parties 3: recognizing the adoption of the restatement second of torts  552 1977 in boykin v arthur andersen  co 639 so2d 504 ala1994 and holding that a real estate appraiser had a duty to third parties that the appraiser intended to influence and to third parties that the appraiser knew his client intended to influence by means of the appraisal 4: holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party


Input: view of the sexual innocence inference theory. Thus, Oatts was required to show that the prior sexual act occurred and that the prior sexual act was sufficiently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the knowledge to imagine the molestation charge. Here, Oatts failed to show that the prior acts closely resembled those in the present case. Oatts’s attorney did not proffer any evidence that the prior molestation was similar to the current offense. Oatts’s attorney stated that the “similarities of the allegations are very, very close” and the current allegation “is that Mr. Oatts touched [A.S.] while they were in bed together, and in fact Tony touched [A.S.] while she was in bed.” Transcript at 120. However, Oatts did not offer sp c. 244, 683 N.E.2d 188, 192-193 (1997) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, appeal denied. II. The next Holdings: 0: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse 1: holding that the trial court did not err by excluding the victims earlier reports of sexual abuse because too many sexual details remain unaccounted for after consideration of what defendant hoped to prove with the prior sexual conduct 2: holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii 3: holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse 4: holding that evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct with the victim is admissible to corroborate the victims testimony


Input: establishes sufficient facts from which a jury could reasonably infer Davis had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” D.B. Davis met D.B. on the street. Davis then booked a room at the hotel and posted an ad to Backpage.com featuring a picture taken of D.B. in a room at the hotel — from this a jury could reasonably infer Davis spent time with D.B. that day taking her picture for the ad. And on the very next day, Davis brought D.B. to Rivera, introduced her to Rivera, and then drove the two to the hotel. Viewing this ■ evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude any rational jury could have found Davis had a reasonable opportunity to observe D.B. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781; see also United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 976-76 (11th Cir. 2017) (<HOLDING>). IV. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment Holdings: 0: holding the government proved the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the minor when among other things he spent twenty minutes taking pictures of her for her backpage ad 1: holding that in order to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under  1983 a plaintiff must establish among other things the absence of probable cause for the initiation of the proceedings against her 2: holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment 3: holding individual defendant liable where he among other things made inquiries into the business obligations under the flsa 4: holding the evidence sufficient to establish the defendants knowing possession of a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt when among other things the defendant admitted to a law enforcement officer that he had acquired the shotgun for his protection and that officers testimony went uncontradicted at trial


Input: request that they leave. See People v. Medrano, 78 Cal.App.3d 198, 144 Cal.Rptr. 217 (Cal.App.1978), disapproved on other grounds, Vista Verde Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 29 Cal.3d 307, 172 Cal.Rptr. 720, 625 P.2d 263 (Cal.1981). a. Was Blair Field open to the public for purposes of section 602(n)? California Penal Code section 602(n) defines refusal to leave property occupied by another as a form of trespass. The statute “envisions an originally innocent entry, followed by an unlawful sojourn after refusal of requests to leave.” Medrano, 144 Cal.Rptr. at 227-28. The location of Blair Field within a public park supports the plaintiffs’ contention that the property was open to the public. See Denney v. Takaoka, 1993 WL 96602, *5, C-92-0818 FMS (N.D.Cal. Mar. 30, 1993) (<HOLDING>). The defendants contend, however, that Blair Holdings: 0: holding that a universityowned land used as a park was open to the public for purposes of section 602n 1: holding section 625 only requires a showing that the conduct was done in a place that is open to the public or where the public has a right to be 2: holding that a municipal corporation was forbidden to construct an auditorium in a park as such construction would practically destroy the lot as a park and convert its use into a public square 3: holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees 4: holding that so long as seattle city light opened up the diablo dam to the public for recreation immunity applied despite a contractual provision compelling it to open land for public recreational purposes


Input: procedural default arguments are rejected and the Court finds the merits of the petition ripe for review. A status and scheduling conference will be scheduled to establish the further procedure of the case. An appropriate order follows. ORDER AND NOW, this 17th day of February 2009, it is hereby ORDERED that a telephone status and scheduling conference is SCHEDULED for Tuesday, March 24, 2009 at 10:30 a.m. Petitioner’s counsel shall initiate the call to Chambers at 215-597-4073 when all parties are on the line. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . In the imposition of the death penalty, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder victi osecutor’s argument did not violate Caldwell, and reinstated the death sentence. Commonwealth v. Beasley, 524 Pa. 34, 568 A.2d 1235 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Petitioner filed a timely petition for Holdings: 0: recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed 1: holding that for purposes of apprendi the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence that may be imposed based solely on the jurys findings 2: holding the prosecutions remarks did not lessen the jurys sense of responsibility as the ultimate arbiter of the sentence to be imposed 3: recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public 4: holding that the defendants sentence did not violate apprendi where the actual sentence imposed did not exceed the maximum penalty corresponding to the quantity of drugs for which the defendant acknowledged responsibility nor was the sentence at the bottom end of a higher statutory range of penalties


Input: by courts as “overbroad,” Kapeluschnik, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22883, at *18, and “frivolous,” Sturdevant v. Thomas E. Jolas, P.C., 942 F.Supp. 426, 430 (W.D.Wis.1996). At the same time, courts have noted that “in cases where the likelihood of legal action is not clear from the language, the letter’s source can be determinative, especially if it purports to be from an attorney.” Jenkins v. Union Corp., 999 F.Supp. 1120 (N.D.Ill.1998). “Because to most consumers, the relevant distinction between a collection agency and an attorney is the ability to sue,” a letter signed by an attorney signals to the unsophistcated consumer that legal action is at hand. United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d 131, 136-37 (4th Cir.1996); see Russey v. Rankin, 911 F.Supp. 1449, 1454 (D.N.M. 1995) (<HOLDING>). In addition to the source of the Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs failure to notify attorney of receipt of right to sue letter and failure to confirm that the attorney had received the letter did not warrant the application of equitable tolling 1: holding that the right to have counsel present means the right to have counsel physically present during the interrogation not merely the right to consult an attorney by telephone 2: holding that a letter clearly threatened litigation when it purported to be from an attorney and declared that we have the legal right to file a lawsuit 3: holding an arrestee has the right to contact an attorney but not a specific attorney who is unavailable when called 4: holding that district court could impose attorney fees where plaintiffs lawsuit patently had no legal merit


Input: have obtained it by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the taint of the initial police illegality. When applying that doctrine, we always must keep in mind two distinct policy justifications that bear on the answer to that issue. The first is that the predicate for Oregon’s exclusionary rule is the court’s responsibility to vindicate the invasion by the police of a defendant’s personal rights under Article I, section 9, in obtaining evidence. This court has held that an individual’s personal right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under that provision also embraces a right to deny the state any ability to use evidence obtained in violation of that right to convict the individual of a crime. See State v. Davis, 313 Or 246, 249, 834 P2d 1008 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Oregon’s rights-based exclusionary rule Holdings: 0: recognizing principle but finding evidence at first trial sufficient 1: recognizing this principle in the childpornography context 2: recognizing this principle as a settled rule 3: recognizing principle 4: recognizing this principle in the failure to hire context


Input: upheld a finding of liability against a chief operating officer and a chief executive officer where the officers had a “ ‘significant ownership interest with operational control of significant aspects of the corporation’s day-to-day functions; the power to hire and fire employees; [the power to] determin[e][] salaries;[and the responsibility to] maintain [ ] employment records.’” Lambert, 180 F.3d at 1001-02, 1012 (quoting the district court’s jury instruction). “The evidence, moreover, strongly supports the jury’s determination that both Ackerleys exercised economic and operational control over the employment relationship with the sales agents, and were accordingly employers within the meaning of the Act.” Id. at 1012. See also Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States Dep’t of Labor v. Cole Enters., Holdings: 0: holding president of corporation liable as employer where he inter alia maintained control over the corporations employment and pay practices and had the authority to make all major decisions regarding the corporations business affairs 1: holding that one who exercises daytoday control over the employee will be considered as the employer 2: holding that where daytoday operations were within sole control of the franchisee no agency relationship existed with franchisor 3: holding officer personally liable because he agreed to personally guarantee payment on an account 4: holding corporations president personally liable where he had ultimate control over businesss daytoday operations and was the corporate officer principally in charge of directing employment practices


Input: Marion Barry. Nevertheless, as the district court found, these desires do not constitute implied promises. Ahn acknowledges that a promise of secrecy was not expressed in the plea agreement. The agreement did, however, include an integration clause, which specifically stated that no other agreements or promises existed between the parties. Standing alone, such a clause would be strong evidence that no implied promises existed' — after all, integration clauses “establish that the written plea bargain was ‘adopted by the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.’ ” United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 210 (1981)); accord United States v. Hunt, 205 F.3d 931, 935 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alegria, 192 F.3d 179, 185 Holdings: 0: holding that a waiver of right to appeal contained in a plea agreement is enforceable 1: holding that where a criminal defendant has voluntarily and knowingly entered into a plea agreement in which he or she waives the right to appeal the defendant is not entitled to resentencing in light of booker  2: holding a party breaches a plea agreement by acting in a manner not specifically prohibited by the agreement but still incompatible with explicit promises made in the agreement 3: holding that promises made in a plea agreement could violate 18 usc  201c 4: holding that a merger clause normally prevents a criminal defendant who has entered into a plea agreement from asserting that the government made oral promises to him not contained in the plea agreement itself


Input: not, we believe, a factor that ought to have been eliminated from any consideration. Conclusion Because the bankruptcy court did not take into account all of the factors that it ought to have weighed and because it did not place the ultimate burden of establishing the § 523(a)(15)(B) exception on the debtor, we must vacate the decision of the district court and remand the case to that court with instructions to remand it to the bankruptcy court for new factual findings made under the proper burden of proof. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the district court with directions that the case be remanded to the bankruptcy court for further consideration consistent with this opinion. Vacated And Remanded. 1 . Cf. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Congress supplemented the reach of this Holdings: 0: recognizing the right of a former spouse to seek contribution for payment of community debts not allocated by the divorce decree 1: holding that a debtors ability to utilize  522f to avoid a judicial lien is not dependent upon the debtor receiving a discharge   2: holding that  522f doesnot permit a debtor to avoid a lien granted to the debtors former spouse under a divorce decree that extinguishes all previous interests the parties had in the property and in no event secures more than the spouses former interest 3: holding that in the absence of a hold harmless agreement a former spouse has no claim against the debtor to pay a debt listed on the divorce agreement as belonging to the debtor because such a debt is not incurred in connection with the divorce but was incurred in connection with the debtors and former spouses original transaction with the creditor 4: holding that the debtor must have had an interest in the property before the lien attached to take advantage of  522f


Input: citations omitted). Plaintiffs argue that the 2013 Agreement’s arbitration provision is unenforceable in its entirety because it is unconscionable under California law. The Court agrees. 1. Procedwral Unconscionability For largely the same reasons that this Court held the delegation clause in the 2013 Agreement was procedurally unconscionable, the entire 2013 arbitration provision is procedurally unconscionable as well. Under any standard, the 2013 Agreement’s opt-out provision was illusory because it was highly inconspicuous and incredibly onerous to comply with. Hence, the Court concludes that the arbitration provision in the 2013 Agreement was presented to drivers on a take-it-or-leave it basis, and was adhesive and oppressive. See Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 113, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 (<HOLDING>); see also Section III.C.1, supra. Similarly, Holdings: 0: holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract 1: holding that a standardized contract which is imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength and that relegates the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it is necessarily oppressive 2: holding contract not unconscionable where parties were of equal bargaining power plaintiff had opportunity to have an attorney review the contract the contract was clear and easily read the plaintiff had been a party to similar contracts in the past and was under no financial pressure to sign the con tract 3: holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff 4: holding that when a contract is signed by one party but not the other the manifestation of consent by the nonsigning party is sufficient to bind that party


Input: DANIELS, Chief Justice. {1} The plaintiff insureds (Plaintiffs) in these three consolidated cases were issued uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage in amounts less than the liability coverage provided by their automobile insurance policies. See Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Weed Warrior Servs., 2010-NMSC-050, ¶ 15, 149 N.M. 157, 245 P.3d 1209 (2010) (<HOLDING>). The Court of Appeals concluded that none of Holdings: 0: holding that a household exclusion in the policy was void insofar as it denied coverage in the amount required by  3031902 but it was valid as to any coverage exceeding that amount 1: holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage 2: holding section 3877160 clearly limits the amount of coverage which may be stacked from policies on vehicles not involved in the accident to an amount no greater than the coverage of the vehicle involved in that accident 3: holding that new mexicos uninsured motorist statute nmsa 1978 section 665301 1983 requires an insurer to offer um7 uim coverage in an amount equal to the liability limits of the policy and that the choice of the insured to purchase any lower amount functions as a rejection of that maximum amount of coverage statutorily possible 4: holding in a case involving a multiplevehicle policy that a new offer of uninsured motorist coverage was not required for the addition of a new vehicle which was comparable to the renewal or supplementation of an existing policy events that did not trigger the statutory requirement of a new offer the courts holding was based in part upon the principle that an insurance contract is personal to the insured because it insures the risk of loss to the insured and does not attach to specific vehicles


Input: tending to show that Bree-land’s weapon was manufactured as a shotgun and later altered, and he acknowledged at oral argument that the weapon had apparently been modified. The evidence at trial supporting this conclusion consisted of Officer Barnett’s testimony that the stock appeared to have been sawed off and filed down, and the weapon itself, the stock of which has been visibly changed into a pistol-grip. Viewing this evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn f 7, 124 (5th Cir.1995) (“To warrant reversal of a conviction, prosecutorial misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it casts serious doubts upon the correctness of the jury’s verdict.”). We similarly decline to reverse Bree-land’s conviction based on the allegedly erroneous admission of a (5th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). Ill For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Holdings: 0: holding that any error that court may have made in admitting inadmissible evidence was harmless because government presented overwhelming evidence establishing defendants guilt 1: holding any error in admitting eye witness testimony was harmless because it was cumulative to other overwhelming evidence that established defendants guilt 2: holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt 3: holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt 4: holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt


Input: while the opponents argue that, no matter under what guise an individual is deprived of his liberty, he should be afforded these rights. ‘ ‘Suffice it to say that the constitutionality of withholding from juveniles all the rights given criminals has been upheld by the courts in almost every instance where it has been questioned.” Holman, supra, 39 Or L Rev at 316-17 (footnote omitted). See also Report of the Legislative Interim Committee on the Judiciary, Proposed Revision, Oregon Juvenile Code (1976). 11 See also State v. Gullings, supra, 244 Or at 176-77 (“The procedure is civil, not criminal, and equitable in that the remedies may be flexible and based upon ‘conscience’ and judgment, rather than upon more or less rigid rules of law.”); Hills v. Pierce, supra, 113 Or at 390 (<HOLDING>); State v. Dunn, supra, 53 Or at 308-09 Holdings: 0: holding that although the juvenile restitution statute does not expressly require the juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to pay the restitution ordered as a condition of probation the policies underlying the adult restitutions command that a trial court make such an inquiry applies with equal force to juvenile courts 1: holding that the good faith requirement of the whistleblower statute was not met where the purpose of the employee at the time of the making of reports was not to protect the public but to protect the jobs of himself and his coworkers 2: holding that purpose of statute is to protect unwary consumers 3: holding that a statute is nonpenal if it imposes a disability not to punish but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose emphasis added 4: holdingthat purpose of juvenile court is not to convict or punish but to protect


Input: To datfe, however, Pacleb has not actually received complete relief on those claims. Thosé claims, therefore, are not now moot. In addition, because “a would-be class representative with a live claim of her own must be accorded a fair opportunit er of judgment, whereas Allstate purported to hold its Rule 68 offer open. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell-Ewald, however, Allstate has not continued to press that argument, and properly so. Under Campbell-Ewald, the key question is whether an offer has been accepted, regardless of whether it has lapsed or remains on the table. See Campbell-Ewald, 136 S.Ct. at 666 ("We hold today, in accord with Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that an unaccepted settlement offer has no force.” (emphasis added)); id. at 672 (<HOLDING>). 3 . We grant Allstate’s motion to supplement Holdings: 0: holding an unaccepted rule 68 offer does not moot a claim 1: holding that while rule 68 does not explicitly require that an offer of settlement under that rule be made in writing its requirement that the offer be served upon the adverse party implies as much 2: recognizing that settlement discussions do not constitute an offer of judgment 3: holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell 4: holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added


Input: order regular community supervision if the de fendant is adjudged guilty of aggravated sexual assault under section 22.021 of the Penal Code. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(l)(E). A trial judge also may not order shock community supervision if the defendant is ineligible for regular judge-ordered community supervision. See id. § 6(a)(1); State v. Posey, 330 S.W.3d 311, 315 (Tex.Crim.App.2011); State v. Dunbar, 297 S.W.3d 777, 780 (Tex.Crim.App.2009). Because imprisonment was the only punishment option, we hold that the trial judge did not err in failing to order a section 9 presentence investigation. Id. § 9(g)(3); see also Skinner v. State, No. 06-00-00184-CR, 2001 WL 193882, at *2 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Feb. 27, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). Jimenez further contends that the trial court Holdings: 0: holding that defendant whom trial court had adjudicated guilty of aggravated sexual assault after defendant had violated community supervision agreement was ineligible for judgeordered community supervision and thus fit within section 9g3 exception 1: holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault 2: holding that no apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range 3: holding that allegations of sexual assault by an employee of the church fell within coverage for sexual misconduct 4: holding criminal sexual assault and unlawful restraint included offenses of aggravated crimi nal sexual assault and vacating convictions and sentences on former offenses


Input: seat with his foot. Both defendants denied this. This testimony is not credible because a CB is not illegal, and there would have been no motivation to hide it under a seat. Instead, it was in front of the console on the floor where the documents were kept. Stark moved the CB when he went into the console to retrieve the papers. Finally, defendants gave a consistent story that they were traveling to Vermont to go mountain-biking and offered proof, including the mountain bikes. The government argues that th 1, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (expressing concern in the airport search context about a drug courier profile that would “describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers who would be subject to v ted States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1418-19 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 549 Holdings: 0: holding that defendant who was a passenger in a car had joint constructive possession of drugs found next to the defendants luggage in truck of car even where she disclaimed ownership of the drugs 1: holding that because the government was unable to prove that a truck in which illegal drugs were discovered was stolen the driver and passenger had standing to challenge the search 2: holding a driver had standing to suppress the drugs found in the underwear of the drivers passenger during an unreasonably prolonged roadside stop of both driver and passenger 3: holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile 4: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search


Input: on their face, were sufficient. Doc. Nos. 46 at 19-20 (“[T]he judgment already provides for exceptions, exemptions and means to further avoid its application to any person, ... and no person at this time is so situated that the disposition may as a practical matter impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest.”); 47 at 43-45 (distinguishing Vasquez as a case that dealt with the enforcement of a gang injunction order, rather than the facial validity of the order itself, and noting the “expectation that Los Angeles authorities will implement the injunction only lawfully and fairly”) (emphasis added). Here, however, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the City from enforcing the injunction against him by arguing th 91, (AFGE) v. Martin, 969 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if Plaintiffs prior arguments Holdings: 0: holding that random drug testing for student athletes did not violate their fourth amendment rights 1: holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment 2: holding that a us department of labor drug testing plan did not on its face violate the fourth amendment but emphasizing that the ruling did not preclude an as applied constitutional challenge 3: holding that a search of a students purse that was not based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 4: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment


Input: promotional and concealment money laundering require the government to prove that the defendant knowingly used the "proceeds” of an unlawful activity, Wilkes's analysis of Santos is applicable here. Cf. Dis, op. at 1100. 17 . The dissent’s reliance on the Fourth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396, 407 (4th Cir.2012) is also misplaced. In defining and applying "essential expenses,” Cloud relies on the Santos plurality’s reasoning that the term "proceeds” excludes any payout to a co-conspirator. Id. at 403-09. We have not interpreted Santos so broadly, relying instead on Justice Stevens’s case-by-case approach. See, e.g., Wilkes, 662 F.3d at 549. Other circuits have likewise refused to interpret Santos as broadly as the Fourth Circuit. See Kratt, 579 F.3d at 562 (<HOLDING>); Garland v. Roy, 615 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that facts that increase the maximum sentence a defendant faces must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that a sixfold increase in sentence involved no enhancement of sentence because harrisonphilpot was charged and convicted of conspiracy the extent of the conspiracy caused the tremendous increase in her sentence 2: holding that in pleading scienter arguing that the motive for defrauding investors was to increase the companys profits or to increase officer compensation is not sufficient 3: holding in the ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel context that any increase in a defendants sentence is prejudicial 4: holding that proceeds means profits only when imposing a money laundering count leads to a radical increase in the statutory maximum sentence and only when nothing in the legislative history suggests that congress intended such an increase


Input: (rather than an erroneous application m.App.2002) (same); State v. Mercado, 972 S.W.2d 75, 77-78 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). It is thus not apparent how decisions such as Allen, holding that an appellate court may not affirm a trial court's granting of a motion to suppress ruling on a ground not raised in the . trial court, conforms with the holdings in Mercado, Martinez and Hailey. See State v. Allen, 53 S.W.3d 731, 733-34 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). 4 .In addition to other considerations, such as that the suppression ruling in the DWI case was not a final judgment on the merits and that jeopardy had not attached in that case, that ruling did not reflect a finding of any particular fact. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)(<HOLDING>). In explaining its ruling in the present case, Holdings: 0: holding that collateral estoppel precludes future litigation between the same parties of ultimate facts that have been determined by valid and final judgments 1: holding that collateral estoppel applies to  1983 claims 2: holding that the debtor has the burden of showing that collateral estoppel applies 3: holding that collateral estoppel applies only where the antecedent judgment was a final judgment 4: holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when an issue of ultimate fact has necessarily been determined by a valid final judgment


Input: Cir.2000). Examples of BMPs that have been accepted as substitutes for effluent limits include: nutrient management plans for concentrated animal feeding operations, see Waterkeeper All., 399 F.3d at 497, 502, filtration of stormwater runoff from ditches before it enters rivers and streams (by timber companies), and constructing roads with surfacing that minimizes sediment in runoff (by timber companies), see Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1326, 1338, 185 L.Ed.2d 447 (2013). The narrative standard here is nowhere as specific as any of these examples. Indeed, it requires nothing more of a shipowner than to meet the TBELs. This interpretation is hardly consistent' with the regulations that require WQBELS to ensure compliance. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (<HOLDING>). Third, EPA claims that WQBEL standards will Holdings: 0: holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation 1: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation citation and quotation marks excluded 2: holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation 3: holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation 4: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference


Input: direct financial benefit from the infringing activity and ‘has the right and ability to supervise’ the infringing activity.” Id. (quoting Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.2004)). Bridgeport argues that Universal is liable for both vicarious and contributory infringement of Change Gone Come. The vicarious liability, it argues, arose because Universal “has the right to police the infringements” of T-Funk. It, however, has not supported this assertion with evidence. While Universal entered into an exclusive publishing agreement with Hutton, the agreement merely provides Universal with the right to own and exploit his works, not to control his song writing activities. Cf. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750-51, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989) (<HOLDING>). There is no vicarious liability because Holdings: 0: holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement 1: holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply 2: recognizing that copyright offices interpretation of copyright act should ordinarily receive deference 3: holding that a plaintiff may recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act provided the copyright damages serve a purpose other than compensation 4: holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession


Input: hearing “if the substance of the affidavit purporting to contain newly discovered evidence, when taken at face value, is insufficient to entitle the petitioner to the relief requested.” Scherf v. State, 788 N.W.2d 504, 508 (Minn.2010). To prove a claim by clear and convincing evidence requires a party’s evidence to be “unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.” Gassier v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 583 (Minn.2010). The innocence prong in subdivision 4(b)(2) requires “more than an uncertainty” about the petitioner’s guilt. Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 170. Instead, estab lishing “actual innocence” requires the petitioner to prove it is “more likely than not that no reasonable jury would convict.” Id; see also Miles v. State, 800 N.W.2d 778, 783 (Minn.2011) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Brown has failed to meet the Holdings: 0: holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied 1: holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence 2: holding that a petitioner must demonstrate that the newly discovered evidence on its face would prove the petitioners innocence by a clear and convincing standard 3: holding that a bad faith claim must be met through the clear and convincing evidence standard 4: holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed


Input: v. Norris, 96 F.3d 1085, 1088 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Brown, 921 F.2d 785, 791 (8th Cir.1990)). “Our function as an appellate court is not to reweigh the evidence. To the contrary, we must accord ‘great deference’ where a state appellate court has found the evidence supporting the conviction constitutionally sufficient,” as is the case here. Id. (citations omitted); see also Blair-Bey v. Nix, 44 F.3d 711, 713 (8th Cir.1995) (finding that, in evaluating claims that the evidence was insufficient to find guilt, courts must examine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”); Redding v. State, 881 F.2d 575, 578 (8th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). A Holdings: 0: holding that the relevant question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that in evaluating sufficiency of the evidence in habeas corpus petitions we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that when an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction the relevant question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that a reviewing court must determine whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime charged 4: holding that when conducting a legal sufficiency review the reviewing court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt


Input: the government and the recipient. In Jones, the Supreme Court emphasizes that the amount and nature of notice required by due process must take into account “unique information about an intended recipient regardless of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case.” Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1716. A fiduciary relationship between the government and the intended recipient certainly constitutes such “unique information” — especially in light of other relationships that have been consistently held to increase the government’s notice obligations. Where, for example, the notice recipient is a ward of the state (such as a prisoner), the government has been held to a higher standard of notice. See, e.g., Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d 791, 794-95 Holdings: 0: holding that burden is on government to show that error in failure to provide notice is harmless 1: holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner 2: holding that at a bare minimum the district court was required to provide a pro se prisoner with fair notice of the summary judgment rule requirements 3: holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice 4: holding that where the recipient is a federal prisoner the government is required to provide him with actual notice of a deprivation


Input: Intelligence Agency, 591 F.Supp. 60, 67 (D.D.C.1984), and judges “lack the expertise necessary to second-guess ... agency opinions,” Halperin v. Central Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C.Cir.1980) (deferring to the agency’s opinion and holding that certain CIA affidavits provided ample evidence to show potential harm under a limited de novo review). If the court finds that the agency’s affidavits are insufficiently detailed, it should deny summary judgment. Campbell, 164 F.3d at 31 (remanding to the district court to allow the FBI to further “justify” its Exemption 1 claim because its declaration failed to “draw any connection between the documents at issue and the general standards that govern the national security exemption”), remanded to 193 F.Supp.2d 29, 38 (D.D.C.2001) (<HOLDING>); Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 79 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that although the first amendment was implicated the regulation compelling disclosure of certain information in advertisements was constitutional as long as it was reasonably related to the states interest 1: holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant 2: holding that agency could not claim national security disclosure exemption where documents already released to the press 3: holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege 4: holding that a declaration was insufficient by merely concluding without further elaboration that disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security


Input: his marriage to Ms. Short, and that the loan therefore constitutes a separate property debt incurred by him prior to his marriage to Ms. Short. In the post-nuptial agreement, however, Mr. Short promised to repay his loan to Ms. Short “if the marriage lastfed] more than three years.” More significantly, the decree of dissolution of June 3, 1993, provided that Mr. Short “owed to [Ms. Short] $41,450” at 8.469% interest and that Mr. Short would “pay the sum of $600 per month to [Ms. Short] until such time as the loan [was] paid.” Mr. Short’s contention that his $50,000 loan from Ms. Short is not divorce-related, even though the terms of its repayment were expressly incorporated into the decree of dissolution, lacks merit. See, e.g., In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d 879, 881-82 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Ill Mr. Short next argues that the bankruptcy Holdings: 0: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or 1: holding nondischargeable a husbands debt to his wife where the husband had agreed to assume the debt under the terms of the couples divorce agreement and stating that  523a15 is intended to cover divorcerelated debts such as those in property settlement agreements 2: holding that in the absence of a hold harmless agreement a former spouse has no claim against the debtor to pay a debt listed on the divorce agreement as belonging to the debtor because such a debt is not incurred in connection with the divorce but was incurred in connection with the debtors and former spouses original transaction with the creditor 3: holding that the party challenging the dischargeability of a debt bears the burden of proving the debt nondischargeable by a preponderance of the evidence 4: holding nondischargeable a debtors obligation to his former spouse under a divorce decree to assume liability for two joint debts to a third party and stating that  523a15 is intended to cover divorcerelated debts such as those in property settlement agreements


Input: set aside and the charge dismissed. We disagree. Wharton’s Rule is a judicially created “doctrine of criminal law enunciating an exception to the general principle that a conspiracy and the substantive offense that is its immediate end are discrete crimes for which separate sanctions may be imposed.” Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 771, 95 S.Ct. at 1287. See generally Boyd, 236 Va. at 351, 374 S.E.2d at 303 (articulating the current law in Virginia that convictions may be had in a single trial for “both the completed substantive offense and the underlying conspiracy”). Under the rale, “[w]hen to the idea of an offense plurality of agents is logically necessary, conspiracy [to commit that offense] ... cannot be maintained.” Stewart v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 473, 478, 303 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1983) (<HOLDING>) (quoting 2 F. Wharton, Criminal Law § 1604, at Holdings: 0: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins 1: holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder 2: holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines 3: holding that whartons rule applies to the crime of pandering 4: holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings


Input: Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2002). A court lacks habeas jurisdiction to evaluate claims “grounded solely in the INS’s failure to exercise its prosecutorial discretion.” Id. Pure issues of law may be raised in habeas petitions. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (noting historical use of writ to challenge detentions based on “errors of law, including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes”); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003) (upholding use of habeas to challenge on constitutional grounds the “statutory framework” permitting detention without bail); Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 203 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir.1998)) (<HOLDING>). “[I]f a statute makes an alien eligible to be Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts possess habeas jurisdiction over claims arising under implementing legislation and regulations of the convention against torture 1: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 2: holding that the federal district courts dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims arising from the same incident 3: holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims 4: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute


Input: when he knowingly obtains or exercises control over anything of value of another without authorization, or by threat or deception, and knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the thing of value in such manner as to deprive the other person permanently of its use or benefit. With regard to both the Dunn and McCarthy funds, both parties initially authorized Rishel to obtain control over the funds for the express purpose of purchasing baseball season tickets. After Rishel failed to purchase the tickets, both Dunn and the McCar- thys attempted to reach Rishel to no avail, and thereafter withdrew their authorization. To constitute theft pursuant to § 18-4-401(1)(b), "[clontrol of the property need not be unauthorized from the outset." People v. Treat, 193 Colo. 570, 568 P.2d 473, 476 (1977)(<HOLDING>). "It is sufficient [for purposes of the Holdings: 0: holding evidence which established that use of property was permissive showed use of property was not adverse 1: holding that although authorization was initially given for property exercise of that control continued to be authorized only because the defendant deceived the rightful owner of the property into believing that a legitimate use was being made of the property 2: holding that because the property owner argued only a theory of taking that was no longer a valid theory property owner did not demonstrate his entitlement to relief 3: holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property 4: holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate


Input: (1997) (“An inmate shall be released on parole by the written order of the parole board if the board determines . . . there is a reasonable probability that the inmate can be released without detriment to the community or to the inmate; and . . . the inmate is willing and capable of fulfilling the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.”). 17 Without making a determinative decision, we note that the practical application of § 204b to plaintiff presents an instructive comparison to the case at bar. Unlike the current case, if § 204b’s seventy-percent rule had been applied to plaintiff, the statute’s plain terms would have retroactively increased the length of plaintiffs minimum sentence. This, presumably, would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 544, 133 S. Ct. at 2084 (<HOLDING>); see also Puckett v. Abels, 684 So. 2d 671, Holdings: 0: holding that the application of the guidelines in effect at sentencing rather than at the time of defendants conduct does not violate the ex post facto clause even if the current guidelines suggest a harsher sentence because the guidelines are only advisory not binding 1: holding that retroactive application of advisory sentencing guidelines violated ex post facto clause because guidelines increased minimum sentencing range 2: holding that district court did not violate ex post facto clause in sentencing defendant above guidelines maximum where district court assumed guidelines to be advisory prebooker 3: holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker 4: holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause


Input: punitive damages against Defendants Ekstrom, Sockwell, and Walker. “Punitive damages are available against individual [government officials] in a § 1983 claim only where the [officials’] ‘conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983)). As discussed above, Ekstrom, Sockwell, and Walker are dismissed from this action in their individual capacities. Plaintiff is therefore precluded from seeking punitive damages against them. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if Ekstrom, Sock-well, or Holdings: 0: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office 1: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state official sued in his or her official capacity 2: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state itself and not cognizable under  1983 3: holding that state and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages are not persons suable under  1983 4: holding state of north carolina and state official sued in their official capacity are immune from  1983 and  1985 actions in federal court


Input: tries to analogize its case to one considered by the Eighth Circuit in Frye v. Kansas City Missouri Police Department, 375 F.3d 785 (8th Cir.2004). In Frye, the plaintiffs demonstrated against abortion by standing on the side of a road holding signs, some of which contained pictures of mutilated fetuses. Id. at 788. Following complaints from drivers, the police gave the plaintiffs the choice of either relocating to a different portion of the road or taking down the graphic signs. Id. Several demonstrators were arrested under the loitering ordinance when they refused to obey. Id. The Eighth Circuit found no First Amendment violation. The court stated that the officers’ actions were not motivated by the content of the signs, but rather out of a concern for public safety. Id. at 790 (<HOLDING>). The facts in the instant lawsuit are Holdings: 0: holding that alleged whistleblowing action that took place five years before the plaintiffs termination was not close enough in time  to support a claim of retaliation 1: holding anticipatory warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause because at time warrant was issued the contraband was not on a sure course to the place to be searched and there was no assurance defendant would take contraband to that place 2: holding that the plaintiffs message was not suppressed but only regulated as to time place and manner 3: holding for purposes of a retaliation claim restricting  disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time place and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum 4: holding that as to each predicate act the plaintiff must allege the time place and contents of the misrepresentations


Input: Cincinnati, 622 F.3d at 534-35. After determining the type of forum, the Court addresses whether the limitations placed on Plaintiffs’ speech satisfy the constitutional standard applicable to that forum. Summum, 555 U.S. at 469-70, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Because Plaintiffs seek access to the Atrium’s Holiday Display, specifically the space next to the Nativity Scene, the Atrium is the space within which a determination of the relevant forum must be analyzed. United Food & Comm. Workers Union, Local 1099 v. S.W. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 352 (6th Cir.1998) (where plaintiff sought access to advertising space located on exterior of public bus, the advertising space was the forum at issue); Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Dep’t of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1151-52 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). See also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum 1: holding that phone and facsimile communications to the forum purchase orders and payments sent to the forum a choice of law clause within the contract regarding the forum state and delivery of the product within the forum state were not enough to satisfy minimum contacts 2: holding that where plaintiff sought access to display cases in ohare airport terminal the display case and not the terminal itself was the relevant forum 3: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties 4: holding that inquiring about whether the defendant was carrying narcotics as he was leaving the terminal building of the portland international airport was not a stop within the meaning of ors 131605 et seq nor did it violate the defendants constitutional rights


Input: and expenses incurred as a result of the wrongful removal or retention. 1988 WL 411501, at *7. ICARA, however, shifts the burden to a respondent to show why an award of fees, costs, and expenses would be “clearly inappropriately.]” [ (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3)).] The First Circuit has explained that under § 11607(b)(3), the district court “has a duty ... to order the payment of necessary expenses and legal fees, subject to a broad caveat denoted by the words, ‘clearly inappropriate.’ ” Whallon v. Lynn, 356 F.3d 138, 140 (1st Cir.2004). Such caveat provides the district court “broad discretion in its effort to comply with the Hague Convention consistently with our own laws and standards.” Id.; see also Chafin [v. Chafin], [— U.S.-,] 133 S.Ct. [1017,] 1022[, 185 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) ] (<HOLDING>). West v. Dobrev, 735 F.3d 921, 932 (10th Holdings: 0: recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs 1: holding that expenses refers to costs 2: holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan 3: recognizing that under  11607b3 a court ordering the return of a child generally must require respondent to pay the fees costs and expenses associated with the return 4: holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs


Input: the loss at issue here. Having decided that each policy provides pro rata coverage, we must address the issue of the first $200,000 of liability, as Payless’s policy with USF & G contains a self-insured retention of that amount applicable to this claim. The district court concluded that Payless was self-insured for that amount, and that the self-insurance was “other insurance” within the meaning of CU’s “other insurance” clause, such that Payless’s self-insurance was primary over CU’s excess coverage for the first $200,000 for which USF & G is not liable. Although Minnesota courts have found certificates of self-insurance to constitute “insurance” in the context of automobile insurance and compulsory liability insurance statutes, see McClain v. Begley, 465 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Mmn.1991) (<HOLDING>), we do not believe that those cases dictate a Holdings: 0: holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable 1: holding that selfinsurance does not constitute other valid and collectible insurance 2: holding that the certificate of selfinsurance filed with the commissioner is the functional equivalent of an insurance policy for purposes of minnesotas nofault statutes minnstat  65b49 subd 31 2002 3: holding that because the policy by its terms afforded the injured party no coverage neither does minnstat  65b49 subd 3a5 4: holding that there was no actual prejudice where the defendant has the functional equivalent of the notice required


Input: circumstances of each case. Dominguez, 149 F.R.D. at 168; Goldwater, 136 F.R.D. at 340. 1. Witness’ Area of Expertise, Education, and Training. Although it is uneontroverted that Dr. Golnick is a physician who specializes in neurology, the record is devoid of evidence that Dr. Golnick is a preeminent expert in his field or that he possesses knowledge or training unique from other neurologists. Even if the record did reflect that Dr. Golnick possessed unique expertise or training in the field of neurology, courts have been slow to award exorbitant fees based on an expert’s special abilities. See Anthony, 106 F.R.D. at 464 (denying fee request of $420.00 per hour by physician who was “one of only a handful of physicians” with expertise to testify on subject); Dominguez, 149 F.R.D. at 168 (<HOLDING>); cf. Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding physician employed by public medical school and removed as director of transplant program was not deprived of property interest when his salary was not decreased 1: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits 2: holding that physician who specialized in taste and smell taught medical school classes and conducted research in his area of expertise was not entitled to earn premium fee 3: holding physician entitled to recover attorneys fees actually paid by malpractice insurer because physician was personally liable in the first instance 4: holding physician in action based on illegal cavity search to standard of a reasonable physician


Input: attorney is considered a state official in Mississippi....”). Finally, even if Appellees’ failure to identify C.G. Smith and produce her statement was untimely, this conduct is not sanctionable, as the evidence is not germane to the merits of this case. As discussed above, because the evidence shows that C.G. Smith did not provide her statement to the District Attorney until after Ard’s assault, the statement has no bearing on whether Rushing or Lincoln County acted with deliberate indifference. “An appellate court need be involved [in discovery rulings] only when a party’s substantial rights have been prejudiced and the proceeding would have turned out differently had the evidence been disclosed.” Bass v. City of Jackson, 540 F. App’x 300, 302 (5th Cir.2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). For these same reasons, Ard has failed to Holdings: 0: holding that there is no indication that the district court abused its discretion in denying the discoverysanction motion 1: holding that district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs motion to file fourth amended complaint 2: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint 3: holding that district court abused its discretion in denying rule 60b1 motion without conducting equitable analysis 4: holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen


Input: adjudicative administrative proceedings,” we confirmed again that “under the general statutory authorizations for appeal, agencies are entitled to appeal from adverse circuit court judgments where the functions of the agencies ‘are so identified with the execution of some definite public policy as the representative of the State, that their participation in litigation affecting their decisions is regarded by the Legislature as essential to the adequate protection of the State’s interests.’ ” Id. at 294, 643 A.2d at 416 (quoting Consumer Protection v. Consumer Pub., supra, 304 Md. at 743, 501 A.2d at 54). That approach was followed as well in Board of Liquor v. Hollywood, 344 Md. 2, 684 A.2d 837 (1996), where we overruled Liquor License Board v. Leone, 249 Md. 263, 239 A.2d 82 (1968) (<HOLDING>) and found standing to appeal. We could have Holdings: 0: holding that a county liquor license board had no standing to appeal the reversal of its decision 1: holding that members of the board of trustees of an elementary school had standing to challenge the actions of the county board of education because they suffered an actual injury when the county board nullified their unanimous vote to reject a candidate for principal of the elementary school 2: holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board 3: recognizing that third class county assessment law establishes standing of board to appeal 4: holding that the county had no standing to sue the state to recover taxes illegally obtained from citizens unless the money belongs to the county


Input: will not be considered by the Supreme Court. If the Court of Civil Appeals did not decide all properly preserved and briefed issues, the Supreme Court may, if it should vacate COCA's opinion, address undecided matters. Hough v. Leonard, 1993 OK 112, ¶ 15-16, 867 P.2d 438, 445-46. 34 . Oklahoma statutes, 12 O.S.2001 § 551 et seq., provide a comprehensive scheme that governs trials. The terms of 12 O.S.2001 § 651 provide: "A new trial is a reexamination in the same court, of an issue of fact or of law or both, after a verdict by a jury, the approval of the report of a referee, or [a claim of fundamental prejudicial error in the verdict form] is insufficient to warrant reversal of the verdict and judgment of the jury.” LPCX Corp. v. Faulkner, 1991 OK 46, ¶ 32, 818 P.2d 431, 440-41 (<HOLDING>); In Nichols v. Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co., Holdings: 0: holding that appellants failure to have trial proceedings transcribed precluded appellate review of whether trial court gave jury improper instruction 1: holding that licensee was not estopped from challenging the validity of a trademark 2: holding defendants were precluded from challenging the validity of jury verdict forms for failure to have complained at trial 3: recognizing that verdict must be affirmed by jury in open court to have force and validity 4: holding bars failure to present evidence on an issue to which the parties had stipulated precluded the attorney from challenging the accuracy of the finding


Input: and exit. The employee’s actual knowledge of the dangerous condition is imputable to Hardee’s. Hardee’s also had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition because it knew that the par 14, 165 S.W.2d 390, 393-94 (1942) (whether condition was so obvious that plaintiff was bound to see it and whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent in not observing it were both questions of fact for the jury’s consideration); Turcol v. Shoney’s Enterprises, Inc., 640 S.W.2d at 507-08. However, the facts and circumstances in a particular case may be so one-sided that the trial court can say, as a matter of law, that a dangerous condition was so open and obvious that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the danger and assumed the risk. See, e.g., Harris v. Niehaus, 857 S.W.2d at 226-27 (<HOLDING>); Hokanson v. Joplin Rendering Co., 509 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that an obvious joke told during an obvious comedy performance was not defamatory as a matter of law 1: holding danger was so open and obvious to plaintiff that as a matter of law he knew or should have known of danger 2: holding danger was not so obvious to invitee as to relieve defendant of liability as a matter of law 3: holding that it may be decided as a matter of law 4: holding as a matter of law that natural condition present was open and obvious to all who would encounter it


Input: state’s argument is very persuasive. The Second Circuit has already held that Connecticut has a sufficient economic interest in the regulations and FMPs promulgated as a result of the Secretary’s actions under § 1854(f)(A) to challenge those regulations in its own right. Dep’t of Commerce, 204 F.3d at 415 n. 2. The Second Circuit declined to address the issue of Connecticut’s standing as parens patriae. Id. This court finds that the economic interest that provided the basis for standing in Daley is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a state have a quasi-sovereign interest apart from any private citizens in order to maintain a parens patriae suit against the United States. See, Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982)(<HOLDING>). Unlike in some cases where parens patriae Holdings: 0: holding that a state has a quasisovereign interest in the economic wellbeing of its citizens and in not being denied its rightful status within the federal system 1: holding that when a state sues on behalf of its residents without a sovereign or quasisovereign interest it is only a nominal party and thus not the real party in interest 2: holding that a state must articulate a quasisovereign interest in order to have parens patriae standing 3: recognizing as a quasisovereign interest that the state and its residents are not excluded from the benefits that are to flow fiom participation in the federal system 4: holding that the state would be the real party in interest with respect to its claim for restitution even under the claimbyclaim approach because it has a quasisovereign interest in seeking recovery on behalf of a wide range of consumers and aiming to deter future antitrust conduct by corporations in the state


Input: and In re Comer, 716 F.2d 168 (3d Cir.1983), the challenged order of the district court does not fully adjudicate a specific adversary proceeding between the parties. To the contrary, the district court’s ruling that the bankruptcy court’s September 30, 1993 disbursement order was a “money judgment,” and not a mandatory injunction, ensured continuation of the controversy, i.e., preserving the issue of whether the Government is entitled to set off the $8.36 million now in the registry account against the claims of the Government agencies. Even under the most relaxed concept of finality, the October 19, 1993 order of the district court granting the Government a Rule 62(d) stay pending appeal cannot be viewed as the equivalent of a final order. Compare In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1041 (<HOLDING>). An order granting a stay pending appeal is Holdings: 0: holding that where an adversary proceeding continues the order  is no more a final decision than an order denying summary judgment or denying a request for additional discovery the litigation proceeds and the issue will be reviewed if it turns out to make a difference to an order that is independently appealable 1: holding that a bankruptcy court order denying a trustees claim to immunity was final and appealable under the collateral order doctrine 2: holding that an order denying a motion to vacate a  1782 order and denying a motion to quash the subpoena was immediately appealable 3: recognizing that an order denying a motion to modify a family court order where the motion is based on changed factual or legal circumstances is appealable as a special order after final judgment 4: holding that order denying representation to class of future claimants in bankruptcy proceeding is equivalent to denial of request to intervene and order denying right to intervene is appealable final order


Input: User is the requisite element, and it may be by any who have occasion to travel over public lands, and if the use be by only one, still it suffices. (quoting Leach v. Manhart, 102 Colo. 129, 77 P.2d 652, 653 (1938)); accord, Barker v. County of La Plata, 49 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1214 (D.Colo.1999). See also Wallowa County v. Wade, 43 Or. 253, 72 P. 793, 794 (1903) (affirming R.S. 2477 claim’ despite the servient landowner’s showing that “the road over the land inclosed by him had never been worked or improved by the county authorities, or under their direction”); Fitzgerald v. Puddicombe, 918 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Alaska 1996) (“[n]or does the route need to be significantly developed to qualify as a ‘highway’ for RS 2477 purposes”); Ball v. Stephens, 68 Cal.App.2d 843, 158 P.2d 207, 209 (1945) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with our conclusion that Holdings: 0: recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions  1: recognizing rs 2477 right of way even though it was never improved or maintained by the county 2: holding that county commissioners court that had adopted order designating roads to be improved if bond issue carried could not designate other roads to be improved with proceeds of bonds after election contrary to the will of those having to bear the bond burden 3: holding that the grant county prosecutor had a statutory duty to be legal advisor to the county clerk even though she was not embroiled in litigation in which the county was the real party in interest 4: recognizing that the plaintiff has the right to file suit in any permissible county


Input: original sentencing hearing was legally insufficient to support such a finding. In Butler v. State, 46 Md.App. 317, 416 A.2d 773 (1980), we vacated an enhanced sentence, imposed under section 643B(c), based on two prior convictions for crimes of violence, because one conviction was not final and the other conviction, for robbery in the District of Columbia, may have been for a crime of violence bu 309 (2003) (“While we recognize that we have found New Hampshire’s Double Jeopardy Clause to provide greater protection than its federal counterpart in certain circumstances ... we are not persuaded that we should interpret the State Constitution differently than the Federal Constitution in this context.") (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 594 Pa. 106, 116 n.6, 934 A.2d 1191 (2007) (<HOLDING>). 6 , The defense maintained that the Holdings: 0: holding that under monge double jeopardy does not prevent retrial of an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes 1: holding that double jeopardy protections did not prevent the state from presenting evidence of youthschool sentencing enhancement when the original sentence was overturned on appeal 2: holding possibility of more severe sentence on retrial after appeal or collateral attack does not violate double jeopardy or due process protections 3: holding that the government could appeal a criminal sentence without violating the double jeopardy clause when congress expressly authorized such an appeal 4: holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar resentencing on counts that were affirmed on appeal when a sentence of imprisonment on another count was vacated


Input: Cir. Ct.2005) (quoting Padilla v. Silver Diner, 63 Va. Cir. 50, 57 (Va. Cir. Ct.2003)). Plaintiff alleges that Voorthuis Optician’s insistence that she report to work in the District of Columbia, where her medical malpractice coverage may not have applied, created an intolerable work condition that forced her to resign. Am. Compl. at ¶ 36. Even assuming that plaintiffs resignation was occasioned by conduct “so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” plaintiff failed to identify a specific statute which defendants violated by asking her to report to work in the District of Columbia. See Johnson v. Behsudi, 52 Va. Cir. 533, 538 (Va. Cir. Ct.1997) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, plaintiffs claim of Holdings: 0: holding that in order to sustain an action for constructive discharge the plaintiff must show that the conduct resulting in the resignation violated a virginia public policy embodied in an existing statute 1: holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine 2: holding that the mere fact of discrimination sans aggravating factors would not sustain a constructive discharge action 3: holding that federal law can provide source of state public policy for determining whether discharge of employee violated clear mandate of public policy 4: holding that an employee has no right of action against an employer for wrongful discharge where no clear mandate of public policy is violated thereby


Input: “subjects, or causes to be subjected,” a person to deprivation of a right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see, e.g., Board of County Com’rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402-03, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). As assistant coaches and an athletic trainer, Defendants Palladino, Mr. Ducar, Ms. Ducar, and Prentice were not Defendant Dorrance’s supervisors and had no authority over his behavior. In the absence of legal control over Defendant Dorrance, these Defendants’ reporting omissions cannot be said to have affirmatively caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Therefore, the § 1983, failure-to-report claims against Defendants Palladino, Mr. Ducar, Ms. Ducar, and Prentice must be dismissed. See Reid v. Kayye, 885 F.2d 129, 131-32 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch. Holdings: 0: holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc  1983 1: holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss prison inmates action under 42 usc  1983 as frivolous without consent of defendants because defendants had not been served yet and therefore were not parties 2: holding that a state university is not a person within the meaning of  1983 and therefore is not subject to suits brought under  1983 3: holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to liability under  1983 4: holding that defendants were not in control and therefore were not supervisors and not subject to liability under  1983


Input: that he acted in conformity therewith * * * [s]o, it’s not used to show the defendant committed this particular crime. He’s presumed innocent. [E]vidence of any other unlawful activity is not used to show that someone has the capacity to commit a crime.” Having withdrawn his objection to the admission of his prior-arson reference, defendant did not object to this instruction or request any supplementation or alteration to its wording. As a result, this instruction became the law of the case. See, e.g., State v. Giordano, 413 A.2d 93, 94 (R.I.1980). Hence we must not only presume that the jury followed this instruction, but also we will not allow defendant to complain about the adequacy of this charge on appeal when he failed to do so at the trial. See, e.g., Cardoza, 649 A.2d at 748 (<HOLDING>). However, notwithstanding this instruction, Holdings: 0: holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error 1: holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error 2: holding that when defendant argued on appeal that the trial justice should have given the jury a sua sponte limiting instruction regarding alleged rule 404b evidence defendants failure to object at trial constituted a waiver of that issue 3: holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver 4: holding that the defendant had waived any challenge to the district courts failure to give a limiting instruction addressing rule 404b evidence by failing to request one at trial or raise the issue on appeal


Input: contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of [the contract containing the provision for arbitration].” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). The complaint describes a controversy that did not arise out of the termite agreement. In their brief to this Court, the Orkin defendants argue that “the fact that the termite [agreement] [was] entered into after the ‘termite letter’ [was] prepared is of no legal significance.” We disagree. The Orkin defendants cite no authority for such a broad interpretation of the “thereafter arising” language of § 2 of the FAA, and we know of no authority that could provide such a broad interpretation. It would be a strained reading of the FAA as well as circuitous log 1255, 1258 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In the present action, the Lar-kins claim Holdings: 0: recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence 1: holding that that plaintiffs claims which accrued before he became bound by the arbitration rules of the pacific stock exchange were not arbitrable because the record contained little if any evidence to show that the plaintiff knew of the existing controversy when he became bound by the arbitration rules 2: recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence 3: holding membership in new york stock exchange with concomitant obligation to be bound by arbitration provisions of its constitution and rules sufficient to constitute consent to arbitration of covered disputes whether or not arbitration provisions are specifically incorporated in contract 4: holding that the plaintiff was required to arbitrate his claim which accrued before he became bound by the arbitration rules of the new york stock exchange because he was fully aware of the existing claim at the time he became a member of the exchange and became bound by its arbitration rules


Input: on to provide the court with authority to extend support beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday if there are physical or mental disabilities of the child or upon a showing of other exceptional circumstances. In light of the above statute, it would appear at first blush that the now appealed from family court order erred in requiring Mother to pay the full amount of support as noted in the Original Support Order until Daughter was almost twenty years of age. However, where one of multiple children reaches majority, a parent’s child support obligation will not be affected absent a family court order modifying the amount of support owed. Bull v. Smith, 299 S.C. 123, 126, 382 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1989). See also Stroman v. Williams, 291 S.C. 376, 380, 353 S.E.2d 704, 706 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Where one of multiple children becomes Holdings: 0: holding that an agreement between a mother and father to waive payment of child support and arrearages in exchange for fathers consent to the adoption of the minor children by the mothers husband was invalid because it violated public policy 1: holding that the order on the wifes petition for modification of child support was a final order because it disposed of all the issues except for the ancillary issue of attorneys fees 2: holding that where a support order provides for payments for the benefit of two or more children the marriage or emancipation of one minor child does not automatically affect the liability of the father for the full sum prescribed in the order  3: holding that the uccja applied to a california child custody order granting temporary custody of two children to their father 4: holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction may order one parent to pay the reasonable attorneys fees of the other parent as additional child support if the fees are necessaries for the benefit of the children


Input: court that his claims should survive because they involved continuing injuries that did not end until January 24, 2000. The district court construed this as an argument for the application of the continuing violation doctrine. The district court then rejected this argument because it concluded, based upon an unpublished decision of this court, that the continuing violation doctrine is not applicable to § 1983 cases. McCormick v. Farrar, No. 02-2037-GTV, 2003 WL 1697686, at *4 (D.Kan. Mar.20, 2003) (unpublished) (citing Rassam v. San Juan Coll. Bd., 113 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.1997)). This court has not, however, announced a precedential blanket rule that the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable to § 1983 suits. Cf. Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1513-14 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Rassam, the case relied on by the district Holdings: 0: holding the carew rule to be inapplicable to claims of insurer bad faith 1: holding confrontation clause inapplicable at sentencing 2: holding continuing violation theory inapplicable to  1981 claims 3: holding that equitable defense of laches is inapplicable to claims of fraud 4: holding frady inapplicable


Input: by double yellow lines on Salisbury Street. Although the two signs alerted motorists that there was a “K-9 CHECK POINT AHEAD,” in fact, there was no K-9 officer at the checkpoint. A K-9 officer was present and available to assist, however, in a vehicle parked near the narcotics officers who were observing the activities from Pelican Drive. The narcotics officers stationed on Pelican Drive observed a burgundy Pontiac Grand Am approach the checkpoint signs and then execute an illegal u-turn across the grass median after passing the first checkpoint sign but before reaching the checkpoint itself. Upon observing that conduct, the narcotics officers pursued the Grand Am and executed a stop. Three narcotics officers approached the stopped car. Narcotics officers Almeida and K Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Scott Brooks’s commission of a Holdings: 0: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 1: holding that where an individual voluntarily goes to the police station to discuss the commission of a crime that person has not been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment 2: recognizing that a person has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 3: holding that unless the law enforcement officers show of authority succeeds in restraining a person the person has not been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment 4: holding that a dog that was destroyed by the police department was obviously  seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment