Input: between the United States and the Iowa agents who spoke to Kozak’s counsel renders any cooperation agreement reached between the Iowa agents and Kozak unenforceable against the United States. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Long, 511 F.2d 878, supports this conclusion. In Long, the court held that the federal government was not bound by an agreement made by the defendant and state agents. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “the existence of an agency relationship was essential to support” the enforcement of the agreement made. Id. at 881. The court concluded that because the state agents acted without actual or apparent federal authority, their promise to the defendant did not bind the United States. Id. As in Long, the Iowa actors th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); cf. Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 633 Holdings: 0: holding that united states attorney was not required to abide by a secret service agents promise to a defendant to drop federal charges in exchange for defendants cooperation where the united states attorney never sanctioned the agreement and the promise was clearly outside the agents authority 1: holding that federal agents indication to defendant that his cooperation would be reported to the united states attorney did not make defendants confession involuntary 2: holding that county officers were neither agents of the united states nor did they have any duty to investigate federal consequences of actions before securing defendants cooperation 3: holding the rule 4 requirement of delivery to the appropriate united states attorney required personal service not service by certified mail 4: holding that agents promise to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation does not render a subsequent confession involuntary


Input: has entered a final order or judgment, then a motion for reconsideration is considered a motion to alter or amend the judgment under rule 59(e) if it is filed within ten days after the entry of judgment. See id. at 1296. If the motion for reconsideration is filed more than ten days after the entry of final judgment, it is considered a motion for relief from judgment under rule 60(b). See id. Rule 59(e) and 60(b), however, apply only to final judgments. See Raytheon Constructors Inc. v. Asarco Inc., 368 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir.2003); Bass v. Richards, 308 F.3d 1081, 1086 (10th Cir.2002); Anderson v. Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 1988). “Finality is judged by the standards applicable to determining [appellate] juri ., No. CIV 01-883, at 2 (D.N.M. May 25, 2004)(Brack, 'J.)(<HOLDING>); Ambrose v. White, Civ. No. 01-1263, at 3 Holdings: 0: holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable 1: holding that denial of motion for summary judgment is interlocutory even though trial judge had stated that there was no just reason for delay because denial of motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of defendants rights and the appeal did not affect defendants substantial rights 2: holding that a denial of a motion for partial summary judgment is interlocutory and subject to revision at discretion of the court 3: holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  4: holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable


Input: with the standards set forth in section 2 — 107.1 of the Code. C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 218, 641 N.E.2d at 353. Section 2 — 107.1(a) of the Code provides that "[a]ny person *** may petition the circuit court” for an order to authorize the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. (405 ILCS 5/2— 107.1(a) (West 1992).) In addition, section 2 — 107.1(b) requires that "[t]he court shall hold a hearing within 30 days of the filing of the petition.” (405 ILCS 5/2 — 107.1(b) (West 1992).) Thus, we hold that section 2 — 107.1 of the Code specifically contemplates the formal filing of a written petition seeking the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication before a trial court can issue such an order. See In re Robinson (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 126, 132-33, 601 N.E.2d 712, 716 (<HOLDING>). The supreme court essentially recognized this Holdings: 0: holding that statute of limitations for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code applies over limitations period for malpractice actions found in section 13  212 of the code where the plaintiffs complaint was based solely on contribution act ill rev stat 1985 ch 70 par 301 et seq section 13  204 is more specific than section 13  212 1: holding that railroad right of way under the act of march 3 1875 ch 152 18 stat 482 vested upon actual construction of the road 2: holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report 3: holding that section 3  810 of the code ill rev stat 1989 ch 9112 par 3  810 implicitly requires a written predispositional report 4: recognizing the creation of constructive employees under nmsa 1978 section 52122 1989


Input: before the child is four years old or the suit was barred. Act of June 1, 1981, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 674, § 2, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 2536, 2536-37. Although the J.A.M. court expressed no opinion on the constitutionality of the 1981 amendment’s four-year statute of limitations, see J.A.M., 631 S.W.2d at 732, the court of appeals in Smith v. Cornelius held that this amendment was also unconstitutional based on its analysis of Mills and Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 18, 103 S.Ct. 2199, 76 L.Ed.2d 372 (1983), in which the Supreme Court held that Tennessee’s two-year statute of limitations on paternity and child-support actions was unconstitutional. See 665 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1984, no pet.); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 464, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In 1983, chapter 13 was again amended to Holdings: 0: holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional 1: holding pennsylvanias similarly worded sixyear statute of limitations for paternity actions unconstitutional 2: recognizing a sixyear statute of limitations on claims filed under the coal act 3: holding latefiling penalty mandatory absent reasonable cause under a similarly worded predecessor statute 4: holding sixyear statute of limitations applies to adea actions involving federal employees


Input: be considered a system of records unless there is actual retrieval of records keyed to individuals” (emphasis added)); Baker v. Department of Navy, 814 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir.) (stating that “the definition of ‘system of records’ makes coverage under the Act dependent upon the method of retrieval of a record rather than its substantive content”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963, 108 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed.2d 390 (1987); Boyd v. Secretary of the Navy, 709 F.2d 684, 686 (11th Cir.1983) (finding that “a record must be maintained by the agency in a group of records cued to the requestor” (citations omitted)), cert. denied sub nom. Boyd v. Lehman, 464 U.S. 1043, 104 S.Ct. 709, 79 L.Ed.2d 173 (1984); Savarese v. United States Dep’t of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 479 F.Supp. 304, 307 (N.D.Ga.1979) (<HOLDING>), aff'd sub nom. Savarese v. Harris, 620 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that neither a reading file nor a program file since not keyed to retrieval by names or identifiers were systems of records under the act 1: holding that neither the ada nor the rehabilitation act applies to prison employment 2: recognizing the debtorinpossessions duty to file records and operating reports 3: holding that neither rule 18 nor section 30002 allowed the successor to an electoral loser to file findings when the transition did not happen during the period in which the trial court was obligated to file findings 4: holding reasonable an agency determination that a request for an investigative file did not include the employment file


Input: at O.C.G.A. § 10-7-20). Hendricks could have been decided solely on the Overcash ground that the creditor had released a co-surety; thus, the Hendricks holding that release of the principal also discharged the surety was at best an alternative ground for decision. Hardaway argues that the practical reasons underlying the rule of Overcash and section 10-7-20 of the Georgia Code do not apply to the creditor’s release of the principal and therefore the release should not discharge Amwest. When a co-surety is released, the remaining surety is prejudiced because he bears the full burden of liability. When a surety is not prejudiced by the release of a co-surety, the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that the surety is not discharged. Holcombe v. Eng, 163 Ga.App. 343, 294 S.E.2d 568 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Amwest was not prejudiced by the release of B Holdings: 0: holding that the court had no jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a plea agreement 1: holding no prejudice occurred because no new information was presented on the material matter in dispute 2: holding that release caused no prejudice because guaranty agreement had already allocated liability among cosureties 3: holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice 4: holding that trial courts witness interrogation did not cause defendant prejudice when there was already overwhelming evidence showing defendants guilt


Input: of alcohol or drugs, is "less able than the person would ordinarily have been, either mentally or physically, to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in the driving of a vehicle.” 21 Del.C. § 4177(c)(5). See also 21 Del.C. § 4177(a)(1) (stating that no person shall drive a vehicle when the person is under the influence of alcohol). 7 . Tr. at 44-45 (ruling from the bench). 8 . Ruthardt, 680 A.2d at 362. In Ruthardt, the Superior Court held an extensive evidentiary hearing and the issue was briefed by both parties. Id. at 352. The court concluded that the HGN test is scientific in nature and not based on common knowledge. Id. at 355. See also Cantrell v. Div. of Motor Vehicles, Del.Super., C.A. No. 95A-09-001, 1996 WL 453425, at *4 (April 9, 1996) (ORDER) (<HOLDING>), affd sub nom. Cantrell v. Sha-han, Del.Supr., Holdings: 0: recognizing that the governments failure to prevail is a factor that may be considered 1: holding that the hgn test may be considered as a factor in determining probable cause 2: holding that the death of a victim may not be considered an aggravating factor in a homicide sentencing 3: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same 4: holding that the areas propensity toward criminal activity is one factor to be considered in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion


Input: Head Start Fellow and Director, among other relevant professional experiences. See PX 18 (resume of Amanda Bryans). When considering a plaintiffs challenge to an employer’s non-discriminatory explanation for non-selection, the courts have “consistently declined to serve as a ‘super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.’ ” Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 897 (citing Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1346 (D.C.Cir.1999)). While there may be differences in qualifications between Ms. Simpson and Ms. Bryans, there is nothing that approaches the “wide and inexplicable” gulf between their qualifications that is required to rebut the defendant’s nondiscriminatory explanation. See Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d at 1091; compare Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d at 1299 (<HOLDING>). When the differences between candidates are Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to show she was similarly situated to her comparators without evidence that they shared the similar attributes experience education and qualifications relevant to the position 1: holding plaintiff with nineteen years experience as hospital assistant and bachelors and masters degrees to be significantly better qualified for pharmacy technician position than applicant with no college education and two months relevant experience 2: holding that expert was qualified to testify regarding sexuallyabused children based on witness education professional license and experience 3: recognizing that experience and practical knowledge as fully as formal education qualify one to make technical judgments 4: holding that better education work experience and longer tenure with the company do not establish that an applicant is clearly better qualified


Input: would turn into product specifications, which they were never intended to be.”); Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 586, 15 Otto 580, 26 L.Ed. 1177 (1881) (“That which is common and well known is as if it were written out in the patent and delineated in the drawings”). Therefore, the Federal Circuit has stated that “[a] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.” Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534 (Fed.Cir.1987). The statutory language of § 112, ¶ 6, however, requires the inventor to disclose “structure ... described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. As a quid pro quo for the' convenience of employing means-plus-function claim language, the inventor has a duty to c 1381-82 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Ampex Corp. v. Mitsubishi Elec. Corp., 966 Holdings: 0: holding that the specifications reference to commercially available vacuum sensors constituted sufficient structure as one skilled in the art would have understood the reference 1: holding that black box labeled purchase orders was insufficient structure to perform the generate purchase orders function 2: holding that a claim was not indefinite for using the term selector because it was a standard component and its structure was well known in the art 3: holding black box labeled sel was sufficient structure because it was a well known electronic structure and performs a common electronic function 4: holding that box labeled vacuum sensor and passage which notes that vacuum sensors were well known in the art at the time the patent issued sufficiently disclosed structure


Input: the trial court that res judicata bars the cloud on title count and with the grandsons that res judicata also bars the other two counts. There are three prerequisites to the application of res judicata: (1) identity of the cause of action; (2) identity of the parties or their privies; and (3) a previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. See Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 280 Ga. 545, 546 (629 SE2d 260) (2006). The plaintiffs acknowledge that there is an identity of the parties, and the Court of Appeals’ decision in the prior appeal upholding the trial court’s grant of summary judgment plainly constitutes an adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. See Summer-Minter & Assocs. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 604 (203 SE2d 173) (1974) (<HOLDING>). The only issue, then, is whether the causes Holdings: 0: holding that a motion for a summary judgment is an appropriate means of seeking an adjudication on the merits 1: holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits 2: holding that application of res judicata requires that a prior adjudication include a ruling on the merits 3: holding that review is de novo where there has been no adjudication on the merits in state court 4: holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata


Input: are most substantial. Rather, they seem concerned with whether each contributing cause, standing alone, is a substantial factor in causing the alleged injury. Id. at 424. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that a comparative approach to the substantial factor test would create the same inequities that result when applying the “but-for test,” previously rejected by Maryland courts for application in multi-defendant asbestos products liability cases. We hold that a decedent’s exposure to each defendant’s product should be evaluated independently to determine whether such exposure was a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s injury; evidence of exposures to other products is not relevant to such an inquiry. See Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1141 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). But see Laney v. Celotex Corp., 901 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that industrial wastes were not products under a products hazard exception because they were not intended for consumption sale or use by others  1: recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law 2: holding that evidence of gideons exposure to the products of two companies that had filed for bankruptcy was not material to the litigation so long as the jury found that the products of each defendant cast in judgment were producing causes of gideons condition 3: holding that when a plaintiff can establish that she was in the vicinity in which asbestos dust from defendants products was inhaled a jury can reasonably infer that plaintiff was injured by defendants products 4: holding that although the district court recognized confusion based on similarity of products it failed to give proper weight to the virtual identity of the parties products


Input: with the IJ’s conclusion that a petitioner is not credible,” we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.2005); see Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well-es tablished. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[ 9, 178 (2d Cir.2004) (“Although credibility determinations are entitled to the same deference on review as other factual determinations, the fact that the [agency] has relied primarily on credibility grounds ... cannot insulate the decision from review.”). Indeed, we have indicated in other cases that certain factors standing alone may not be sufficient to support an IJ’s denial of relief. Cf. Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Diallo v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody 1: holding that the mere fact that a petitioner took voluntary trips back to his home country standing alone does not suggest either any fundamental change in circumstances or the possibility of internal relocation 2: holding that perjured testimony standing alone does not constitute fraud upon the court 3: holding that a change in personal circumstances in the united states does not constitute a change in country conditions and therefore does not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen 4: holding relocation alone even if to another state was not a substantial change in circumstances


Input: for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence”). The record belies Cooper’s contention that the court failed to adequately consider the § 3553(a) factors and did not explain its rationale for the variance. The court specifically noted its consideration of all the § 3553(a) factors. Additionally, the court’s comments at sentencing, as well as the arguments that it heard, demonstrate the court’s consideration of many pertinent § 3553(a) factors. Although the court’s nine-month variance above the high end of Cooper’s guideline range was significant, the district court’s consideration of many of the § 3553(a) factors and its statements that the sentence was sufficient, but not greater than necessary, serve as sufficient justification. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (<HOLDING>). The record also demonstrates that the court Holdings: 0: holding that the court must consider the adequacy of the inquiry into the conflict the extent of the conflict and the timeliness of the motion 1: holding that the court must consider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third partys means of infringement 2: holding that a reviewing court must give due deference to the district courts decision that the  3553a factors on a whole justify the extent of the variance above the guideline range 3: recognizing that while our reasonableness review may take into consideration the extent of the district courts deviation from the guidelines range we must give due deference to the district courts decision that the  3553a factors on a whole justify the extent of the variance 4: holding that if a court decides that an outsideguidelines sentence is warranted it must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance


Input: is focused on whether, under the facts of this case, PECO interfered with, restrained, or coerced its employees in organizing, forming, joining, or assisting the BGC. PECO and the Board correctly argue that because the BGC has never been recognized or certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of PECO’s employees, PECO had no independent obligation to listen to or recognize the BGC for purposes of its members’ grievances. See, e.g., Morrisville Cotton Mills, 2 N.L.R.B. 952, modf'd and enf'd, 94 F.2d 61 (4th Cir.1938). They also correctly point out that the agreement with the IGA to accord its members privileged treatment for grievance purposes is not, standing by itself, unlawful under the Act. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (<HOLDING>). But the Board and PECO err when they conclude Holdings: 0: holding that membersonly agreements with nonmajority unions do not violate sections 8a2 or 8a1 of the act 1: holding that in the grievance representation context an employee must prove that the unions acts tainted the grievance procedure such that the outcome was more than likely affected by the unions breach internal citation and quotation omitted 2: holding that unions were not entitled to specific performance of collective bargaining agreements after employees voted in boardsupervised elections to decertify the unions 3: holding that the agreements made with the governments witnesses did not violate the antigratuity statute 4: holding that agreements which afford cooperating accomplices leniency in exchange for testimony do not violate  201c2


Input: in § 1B1.10 are binding on district courts and limit their authority to grant motions for reduction of sentences.” McGee, 615 F.3d 1287, 1292. Thus, in considering a § 3582(c)(2) motion, a district court must first determine whether the prisoner is eligible under § 1B1.10 for a sentence modification. See McGee, 615 F.3d 1287, 1291-92. If a reduction is not authorized by the applicable policy statement, the court does not proceed to the second step of determining whether, in its discretion, a reduct Cir.1993) (per curiam) (same); see also United States v. Horn, 612 F.3d 524, 527 (6th Cir.2010) (“Because Amendment 709 is not listed in subsection (c), the district court did not have the authority to resentence [defendant].”); United States v. Peters, 524 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Carter has not identified any error in Holdings: 0: holding that the act is not retroactive 1: recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary 2: holding apprendi is not retroactive 3: holding that the act is retroactive 4: holding amendment 709 is not covered amendment under  1b110 to which retroactive treatment may be given


Input: be induced to intervene as a matter of self-protection. Such protective intervention by class members might be compelled because those class members who have not intervened by the time the untolled statute of limitations runs would be unable to seek relief individually. The Court therefore reasoned that a rule which would result in the individual intervention of class members and which would “breed” needless duplicative motions was not in keeping with the objectives of the federal class action procedures. [Haas v Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank, 526 F2d 1083, 1097 (CA 3, 1975).] Therefore, the ng that when the district court determined that the class representative did not have standing it should have allowed a class member with standing to become the new class representative); Haas, supra (<HOLDING>). Simply stated, the American Pipe rule has Holdings: 0: recognizing that american pipe established that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the class 1: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members 2: holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory 3: holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity 4: holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint


Input: Record is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.” Orders issued by a trial court after this date generally are void. Id. “The policy underlying the rule is to facilitate the efficient presentation and disposition of the appeal and to prevent the simultaneous review of a judgment by both a trial and appellate court.” Id. There are exceptions to this rule, such as to allow a trial court “‘to reassess costs, correct the record, enforce a judgment, continue with a trial during an interlocutory appeal concerning venue, or preside over matters which are independent of and do not interfere with the sub ject matter of the appeal.’ ” Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 727 N.E.2d 18, 21 (Ind.Ct. App.2000), trans. denied); see also In re Marriage of Bartley, 712 N.E.2d 537, 547 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Notice of Completion of the Clerk’s Holdings: 0: holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions 1: holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce 2: holding trial court order which purportedly corrected divorce decree to alter marital property division was void because it was entered  after this court obtained jurisdiction 3: holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property 4: holding that the trial court had authority to enforce a marital property settlement agreement that had not been incorporated into the parties final divorce decree


Input: in the bankruptcy context also have distinguished between employees whose employment, although critical to the business, does not require judicial approval and those whose role is central to the administration of the estate and, therefore, requires judicial approval. See In re EMGE Aviation Marine Products, 1992 WL 108849 (E.D.Pa.) (president of Chapter 11 debtor which was liquidating was a professional and could not be compensated under section 503 without being appointed under section 327): In re Florida Airlines, Inc., 110 B.R. 570 (M.D.Fla.1990) (president of debtor-in-possession played central role in the administration of the debt- or, and thus, was “professional person” who required approval pursuant to 327(a)); In re Boston Shipyard Corp., 1993 WL 370629 (D.Mass.) (<HOLDING>); In re Madison Management Group Inc., 137 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding that 1 principal shareholder and chief executive officer of chapter 11 debtor in liquidation is not entitled to compensation beyond normal salary for performing duties required of the debtor 2 professional is a term which is not narrowly construed but applies to anyone the nature of whose services meet the criteria of a professional person 3 a professional license is not dispositive and 4 factors include form of compensation time of retention pre or postpetition and whether employment is full time or parttime 1: holding that a professional owes no duty to third persons unless the professional had actual knowledge that those persons would rely on his rendering of professional services 2: holding that financial gain from compensation for professional services is not a sufficient motive for purposes of pleading scienter 3: holding that professional defendants who merely perform their usual professional functions and receive their normal compensation are not liable under the draconian provisions of section 122 4: holding that as a general matter membership or shareholder status in a professional corporation does not shield an attorney from individual liability for his own mistakes or professional misdeeds


Input: violation would constitute a “lack of ordinary care in failing to discover” the presence of the dog, Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra, at § 79 at 565, rather than a voluntary exposure to a known risk. II Rossi argues that the trial court’s error in admitting into evidence prior incidents involving the dog “prejudiced the jury so as to taint the [damage] verdict.” We agree. As noted, the trial court permitted evidence that prior to plaintiffs injuries, Rossi’s dog had bitten Rossi’s sister-in-law, nephew, and had even bitten Rossi himself, requiring twenty- - seven stitches to the arm. In order for plaintiff to prevail under the “dog-bite” statute, she need not prove scienter; that is, that Rossi knew of the dog’s dangerous propensities. See DeRobertis, 94 N.J. at 151, 462 A.2d 1260 (<HOLDING>); see also Nicholes v. Lorenz, 396 Mich. 53, Holdings: 0: holding obscenity statute required proof of scienter 1: holding that a fact that the statutory elements obligate the government to prove is considered to be material 2: holding that when a complaint alleges defects involving common elements a home owners association has standing to sue for damage to noncommon elements as well 3: holding child molesting statute required proof of scienter 4: holding that under the dogbite statute even owners without scienter become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements


Input: 457 S.E.2d at 58). In doing so, the district court considered Evo’s potentially improper and personal motive as the dispositive factor in finding that Evo’s alleged actions fell'outside the scope of his employment. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia make it clear that an employee’s improper motive cannot be determinative; rather, it is merely a factor. Thus, the court’s analysis was erroneous. Nevertheless, when we analyze La-casse’s state.law claims under Gina Chin, it becomes clear that Evo’s alleged actions fell outside the scope of his employment with Didlake. The alleged sexual harassment deviated so significantly from Evo’s expected duties as a Project Manager that it could not have occurred in the ordinary course of Didlake’s business. See Blair, 386 F.3d at 628 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Evo neither gained nor possessed Holdings: 0: holding that a police officers rape of an arrestee was outside the scope of his employment 1: holding that a janitorial workers sexual assault of a student deviated from his duties and was clearly outside of the scope of his employment 2: holding that assistant principal could not use an immunity defense because his sexual advances and ensuing retaliatory conduct towards a teacher were outside the scope of his official duties of employment 3: holding intentional assault by coworker to be outside the course and scope of employment 4: holding that absolute immunity cannot attach to a quasijudicial officer if his actions are clearly and completely outside the scope of his jurisdiction


Input: 1298 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1127, 125 S.Ct. 2935, 162 L.Ed.2d 866 (2005). Under this standard of review, there must be (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Id. If these three conditions are met, we may notice the error only if “the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Williams’s methamphetamine conspiracy conviction carried a 40-year (480-month) statutory maximum and his marijuana conspiracy conviction carried a 20-year (240-month) statutory maximum. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1), 846. Williams was sentenced to 97 months’ imprisonment under the advisory Guidelines. The district court submitted the question of the amount of 1th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dulcio, 441 F.3d 1269, 1277 Holdings: 0: holding that if sentence does not exceed maximum authorized by facts admitted by defendant or found by jury there is no sixth amendment violation 1: holding that where the defendants sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum and the district court applies the guidelines as advisory the district court does not err by enhancing the defendants sentence based on facts not charged in the indictment or admitted by him 2: holding that the statutory maximum for apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant and without any additional findings by the court 3: holding nonconstitutional booker error occurs when the district court applies the guidelines in a mandatory rather than advisory fashion even though the resulting sentence was calculated based solely upon facts admitted by the defendant or found by a jury 4: holding that there is no sixth amendment error when the sentence does not exceed the maximum authorized by facts the defendant admitted


Input: 287 (2d Cir.1989)—“did not accurately represent the law in every respect.” United States v. Abelis, 146 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir.1998); see also United States v. Vasquez, 82 F.3d 574, 577 (2d Cir.1996) (“A conviction will not be overturned for refusal to give a requested charge ... unless that instruction is legally correct, represents a theory of defense with basis in the record that would lead to acquittal, and the theory is not effectively presented elsewhere in the charge.” (emphasis added)). The “single transaction rule,” set forth in Zabare, 871 F.2d at 287, has been invoked by this Court only in the context of a contraband purchaser’s alleged participation in the greater conspiracy of trafficking in such contraband. See, e.g., United States v. Zeuli, 137 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir.1943) (<HOLDING>). We have never extended it to a situation Holdings: 0: holding that the hobbs act jurisdictional nexus was met by the robbery of a delicatessen that sold goods produced out of state without mentioning whether the goods were purchased from outofstate or instate suppliers 1: holding that a buyer who purchases goods subject to an express warranty that the goods are free from all liens takes free of any unperfected security interest 2: holding that the single transaction rule protects a purchaser of stolen goods who by definition must know the goods to be stolen from being made party to the original theft via conspiracy 3: holding that a statement of conditional sale of goods can be filed with the state auditor before the delivery of goods where statute says the statement must be filed within ten days of delivery of goods 4: holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods


Input: Car means a car that is in the lawful possession of you or any resident relative and that neither: 1. is owned by: a. you-, b. any resident relative-, c. any other person who resides primarily in your household; or d. an employer of any person described in a., b., or c. above; State Farm Policy at 8. However, Plaintiffs do not argue that the above exclusion of an employer-owned car in the definition of “non-owned car” is ambiguous or confusing. Compare Haynes, 32 Cal.4th at 1211, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 68, 89 P.3d 381 (finding exclusion to not be plain and clear where an ambiguous term was left undefined). The “non-owned car” definition also does not use any complicated words that are outside “the vocabulary of average lay persons.” Compare Ponder, 145 Cal.App.3d at 723, 193 Cal.Rptr. 632 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the sentence structure is not so Holdings: 0: holding that where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation 1: holding that clause excluding coverage for temporomandibular joint syndrome without a definition for that disease was not plain and clear 2: holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts 3: holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious 4: holding that decedent employees common law negligence claim against employer was not barred when disease was not compensable under the wca or the occupational disease act


Input: Plaintiffs claims are based on the allegation that Defendant violated ERISA by changing its dividend policy in 1998. Compl. ¶¶ 45, 46. Thus, Plaintiffs claims are based on a distinct event and the limitations period runs from the original wrongful act and is not restarted each time a plaintiff suffers incremental, additional injury flowing from the same event. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 548 F.3d at 394; see also Miele v. Pension Plan of N.Y. State Teamsters Conference Pension & Ret. Fund, 72 F.Supp.2d 88, 102 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (“continuing claims doctrine does not apply to a claim based on a single distinct event which has ill effects that continue to accumulate over time”); see also Rabouin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 10 Misc.3d 1061(A), 2005 WL 3536441, at *9 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Nov. 23, 2005) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s analysis on this point is sound. Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims 1: holding that placement of a contractual limitations period in a section entitled claims was reasonable 2: holding that limitations period was not retriggered each time defendant calculated the dividend if any under existing dividend policy and that contract claims were timebarred 3: holding that either a fouryear or a twoyear limitations period applies to claims under the idea in ohio for tuition reimbursement either way the claims were timebarred 4: holding that one year limitations period in insurance policy was reasonable and therefore enforceable to shorten the fifteen year statute of limitations for breach of contract


Input: third proposed expert, the court held his knowledge and experience “crosses the threshold of admissibility.” Id. at 1567. Accordingly, the court found that any weaknesses in the third expert’s opinion and expertise went to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. Id. From Bolt’s depositions and QCBT’s arguments, the district court concluded Bolt “is not an expert who can determine whether or not an audit has been performed pursuant to some generally accepted auditing standard because he’s not a CPA.” While the district court’s reasoning was flawed, its conclusion was correct. The fact that Bolt was not a CPA did not disqualify him from testifying on the ultimate issue of whether Kireher violated generally accepted accounting standards. See, e.g., Hutchison, 514 N.W.2d at 886 (<HOLDING>). Rather, Bolt was unqualified to testify on Holdings: 0: recognizing that the dc circuit has stated that by attempting to evaluate the credibility of opposing experts and the persuasiveness of  competing studies the district court conflates the questions of the admissibility of expert testimony and the weight appropriately to be accorded such testimony by a factfinder  1: recognizing if a person is qualified by learning and experience the lack of board certification or licensure goes to the weight of the experts testimony not its admissibility 2: holding statistical conclusions admissible and questions regarding the size of a tests database goes to the weight not admissibility of the evidence 3: holding as to the admissibility of prior bad acts that allegedly took place fourteen and twelve years before the acts alleged in that case that the lapse of time between the defendants sexual acts    goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility 4: holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility


Input: 10 Ga. App. 818 (1) (74 SE 303) (1912). Accord, Murray v. State, 30 Ga. App. 373 (118 SE 62) (1923) (ruling that, on unspecified facts, the sheriff was not the prosecutor). But one who is merely heavily involved in the transaction out of which the prosecution flows is not a "prosecutor.” E.g., Prysock v. State, 44 Ga. App. 229 (161 SE 153) (1931). "It has been held that the fact that a juror is closely related to one acting as a partisan for the state in a criminal prosecution, even where such one actively assists in the prosecution by assisting in striking the jury, prompting questions, and suggesting witnesses, affords no ground of challenging such juror for cause. Harris v. State, 191 Ga. 243, 248 (12 SE2d 64) and cits.” Durham v. State, 129 Ga. App. 5 (3) (198 SE2d 387) (1973) (<HOLDING>). There are a few other circumstances, not Holdings: 0: holding that the debtors right to cure ended when the sheriff accepted the bid at the foreclosure auction even though the order confirming the sale had not been entered at the time of the bankruptcy filing 1: holding that seating arrangement in which the defendant sat in row behind counsel table did not impair the defendants presumption of innocence 2: holding that acts by a sheriff which gave rise to the plaintiffs claim against him were taken in the execution of his duties as sheriff and thus the sheriff was immune under  14 from an action seeking damages against him in his individual capacity 3: holding sheriff not a prosecutor even though he sat at counsel table with the district attorney 4: holding government agent to be an arm of the prosecutor where he 1 actively participated in the investigation 2 supervised a confidential informant and 3 sat throughout trial at counsel table with the prosecutors


Input: policy or procedure for diabetic detainees whose blood sugar was not being measured and who refused to eat.” Because the plaintiffs have sued Sheriff Walsh in his official capacity, they must show (1) that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether he “maintains a policy or custom that infringes upon the rights protected” by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; and (2) that “a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether [the death] was proximately caused by either an official policy of the municipality or from a governmental custom or usage.” Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Cnty. of Madison, Illinois, 746 F.3d 766, 780 (7th Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). A plaintiff can show that a municipality has Holdings: 0: holding that under  521 the coercive force applied against a plaintiff must result in an interference with a separate constitutional or statutory right and it is not sufficient that the right interfered with is the right to be free of the force or threat of force that was applied 1: holding that city may properly be held liable where policy is moving force behind constitutional violation 2: holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived 3: holding that public policy must be evidenced by constitutional or statutory provisions 4: holding that the policy or practice must be the direct cause or moving force behind the constitutional violation


Input: ("PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. Section 1997 e(a)")), the Court notes that an inmate's failure to exhaust may be justified where prison officials prevented him from filing or appealing a grievance. See, e.g., Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir.2011) ("A prisoner may invoke the doctrine of estoppel when defendants took affirmative action to prevent him from availing himself of grievance procedures.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (observing that an inmate's failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be justified where prison officials prevented him from complying with grievance procedures or “fail[ed] to timely advance the inmate’s grievance”); Ferguson v. Bizzario, No. 09-CV-8106, 2010 WL 4227298, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2010) (<HOLDING>); but see Rosado v. Fessetto, No. 09-CV-67, Holdings: 0: holding that trial court may modify sentence on the same day as the assessment of the initial sentence and before the court adjourns for the day 1: holding sua sponte dismissal of civil rights complaint was error where complaint was treated as habeas corpus petition and dismissed on nonexhaustion grounds although nonexhaustion was waivable defense and not jurisdictional 2: holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing 3: holding the plaintiffs allegation that correction officers either prevented or discouraged him from filing his complaint on the same day the event occurred  raises estoppel as a second potential excuse for nonexhaustion 4: holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court


Input: 727 N.E.2d 763, 768 (Ind.Ct.App.2000)). Thus, in Rexroot, we held that the probation condition prohibiting contact with minors was neither vague nor overbroad. Rex-roat, 966 N.E.2d at 178. Brateher's probation condition 15 is reasonably related to Bratcher's treatment and to the protection of public safety. Additionally, just as in Rexroat, we conclude that Bratcher's probation condition restricting his contact with minors is not vague or overbroad. See also Smith, 779 N.E.2d at 117 (upholding the defendant's probation conditions that restricted him from being alone with minors and from participating in activities involving minors where those conditions were reasonably related to the treatment of the defendant and protection of public safety and children); Stott, 822 N.E.2d at 179-80 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we conclude that the trial court did Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants probation condition that restricted his contact with minors was a protective measure for children and would assist the defendant in his rehabilitation 1: holding that warrantless search as probation condition was a valid limitation to the defendants fourth amendment rights when defendant asserted the condition was not reasonably related to rehabilitation 2: holding that probationer failed to satisfy the donaldson test for determining if a probation condition is not reasonably related to the probationers rehabilitation and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing random urinalysis as a condition of probation 3: holding that probationer failed to satisfy two of the three prongs of the donaldson test for determining if a probation condition was reasonably related to the probationers rehabilitation and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing random urinalysis as a condition of probation 4: holding that the defendantchild molesters probation conditionwhich restricted his internet access unless he had prior approval of his probation officerwas reasonably related to his reintegration into the community and to protecting the public


Input: 4 Oregon Laws 2013, chapter 649, section 6, provides: “(1) The amendments to ORS 137.717 by section 5 of this 2013 Act apply to sentences imposed on or after August 1, 2013. “(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, the amendments to ORS 137.717 by section 5 of this 2013 Act do not apply to persons who were originally sentenced before August 1, 2013, and who are subsequently resen-tenced on or after August 1, 2013, as the result of an appellate decision or a post-conviction relief proceeding or for any other reason.” 5 The state also argues that the judgment imposing the probation revocation sanctions is not appealable, and we must therefore dismiss this appeal. However, we recently rejected that argument in State v. Johnson, 271 Or App 272, 274-75, 350 P3d 556 (2015) (<HOLDING>). See also State v. Lane, 357 Or 619, 630, 355 Holdings: 0: holding that an order imposing sanctions against an attorney for one of the parties in a pending case is final and therefore immediately appealable by the attorney 1: holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings 2: holding that judgments imposing probation revocation sanctions are appealable under ors 138053le and ors 1382227b 3: holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence 4: holding probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution


Input: to later impose imprisonment and did not pertain to enhancement of the charge. Id. We reasoned that “[t]he lack of reliability in an uncounseled conviction that prevents the imposition of incarceration also prevents the enhancement of the charge.” Id. We concluded that “the reasoning of Baldasar and our own view of the importance of counsel preclude an enhanced conviction as well as a sentence of imprisonment.” Id. Ten years later the United States Supreme Court partially overruled Balda-sar. In Nichols, the Court held an un-counseled misdemeanor conviction could enhance a later offense so long as no incarceration was imposed in the first prosecution. 511 U.S. at 748-49, 114 S.Ct. at 1928, 128 L.Ed.2d at 755. But see id. at 748 n. 12, 114 S.Ct. at 1928 n. 12, 128 L.Ed.2d at 755 n. 12 (<HOLDING>); Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.28. We recognized this Holdings: 0: recognizing that under the act states are granted federal funds to provide disabled children with a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment 1: holding the states smv statute as applied to old order amish defendants unconstitutional because the states interest in public safety was not sufficiently compelling to override the right to free exercise protected by the first amendment of the united states constitution 2: recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights 3: recognizing states are free to afford more protections to defendants 4: recognizing appellate courts are not free to rewrite rules


Input: in the May 1990 BVA decision. Charging attorney fees for services related to those issues, after having provided representation before this Court, will be discussed in part II, B, infra, of the Court’s opinion. The Court recognizes that the Board, in a June 1995 decision, found (incorrectly) that the appellant had been retained within one year after the Board’s May 1990 decision. In the decision currently on appeal, the Board passed on deciding that question, but did find that the fee agreement had been entered into in July 1991. This Court is not bound by the Board’s 1995 determination if the conclusion at that stage of the fee-eligibility litigation was clearly erroneous. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also J.E.T.S, Inc. v. United States, 838 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a lower court cannot change the law of the case as decided by the highest court hearing a case 1: holding that a court is not bound by a lower tribunals decision under the law of the case doctrine 2: holding that while a decision of the court will not be disturbed because it is law of the case under res judicata the court is not bound by a conclusion stated as obiter dictum 3: holding that the court is not bound by the law of the case where an earlier decision of the us armed services board of contract appeals was clearly erroneous 4: holding that court is bound by prior panels interpretation of supreme court decision


Input: because Zadvydas construed § 1231(a)(6) to forbid the post-removal-period detention of an alien once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699, 121 S.Ct. 2491, and because the Government does not dispute that Thai’s removal is not reasonably foreseeable, we hold that Thai’s continued detention is not authorized under § 1231(a)(6). D. The Detention Regulations in 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) Having concluded that § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize Thai’s continued detention, we turn our attention to the civil commitment regulations in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.14(f), et seq. It is beyond dispute that a federal regulation cannot empower the Government to do what a federal statute prohibits it from doing. See e.g., Public Citizen v. Dep’t of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1031 (9th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 957, 157 Holdings: 0: holding that epa regulations do not allow the agency to act contrary to federal statute 1: holding that agency is bound by its regulations 2: holding that epa action initiating permitting proceedings was not final agency action 3: holding the epa has the discretion to consider an untimely certification by a state agency 4: holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it


Input: CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Westberry v. Moore, 772 So.2d 1208, 1209 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>); Bowles v. Singletary, 698 So.2d 1201, 1204 Holdings: 0: holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release 1: holding authority to control limits duty to control 2: holding that a defendant who accepts the benefits of control release waives any argument that application of the control release program in the form of the forfeiture of gain time was an ex post violation because control release was enacted after the date of his or her offenses 3: holding that state work release regulation was not an ex post facto law 4: holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release


Input: rather than the product itself.” Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 114 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When determining whether a trade dress has secondary meaning, courts consider several factors, including: (1) plaintiffs advertising expenditures; (2) consumer surveys linking the trade dress to a particular source; (3) sales success; -(4) unsolicited media coverage; (5) attempts to plagiarize the trade dress; and (6) the length and exclusivity of the use. See Urban Grp. Exercise Consultants, Ltd. v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., No. 12 CV 3599, 2012 WL 3240442, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2012). To meet the plausibility standard under Twombly, a complaint must include sufficient facts to support an inference of secondary meaning. See id. (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiffs allegations with respect to Holdings: 0: holding that proof of phenomenal sales success substantial advertising expenditures unsolicited media coverage requests from third parties to license the use of plaintiffs design and defendants deliberate attempt to imitate plaintiffs trade dress sufficed to create serious questions going to the merits even in the absence of consumer surveys 1: holding that inconsistent advertising of an alleged protected trademark for five years did not establish secondary meaning 2: holding that copying is only evidence of secondary meaning if the defendants intent in copying is to confuse consumers and pass off his product as the plaintiffs in that situation the defendants belief that plaintiffs trade dress has acquired secondary meaning  so that his copying will indeed facilitate his passing off  is some evidence that the trade dress actually has acquired secondary meaning 3: holding that plaintiff inadequately pleaded secondary meaning where it failed to allege facts relating to its advertising expenditures consumer surveys marketing coverage or prior attempts to plagiarize plaintiffs trade dress 4: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction


Input: On rehearing, the panel certified an issue related to its holding as one of exceptional importance that should be addressed by the supreme court, and also noted a possible conflict with Winter v. State, 781 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), disapproved on other grounds, Carbajal v. State, 75 So.3d 258, 260 (Fla.2011). The supreme court ultimately dismissed review of King as improvidently granted (by unpublished order). King v. State, 820 So.2d 941 (Fla.2002). 5 . We note that if the facts supporting OSP's authority are disputed, a pretrial evidentiary hearing may be required. Although the Flori da Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly provide for evidentiary hearings on motions to dismiss, the supreme court has authorized the procedure. See Dennis v. State, 51 So.3d 456 (Fla.2010) (<HOLDING>). SAWAYA, J., concurring in part, dissenting in Holdings: 0: holding that a hearing officer may not quash a subpoena for a fact witness pursuant to section 32226152 florida statutes and rule 15a60135 florida administrative code and the defense has the absolute right to subpoena other witnesses to testify as to whether or not the defendant exhibited any signs of impairment at or near the time of arrest 1: holding a trial court commits fundamental error by failing to follow florida rule of juvenile procedure 8150 the juvenile rule equivalent of florida rule of criminal procedure 3830 2: holding that a defendant claiming immunity pursuant to section 7760321 florida statutes must file a motion to dismiss pursuant to florida rule of criminal procedure 3190b and requiring trial court to address the motion at a pretrial evidentiary hearing 3: holding that pursuant to florida rule of criminal procedure 3050 the court may extend the sixtyday time limit for a motion to mitigate sentence as long as the motion to mitigate is resolved within a reasonable time 4: holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence


Input: of a defendant's waiver of rights, we will look to the totality of the cireumstances to ensure that a defendant's self-incriminating statement was not induced by violence, threats, or other improper influences that overcame the defendant's free will. Crain, 736 N.E.2d at 1230. The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights. Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 114-115 (Ind.2005), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 548 U.S. 910, 126 S.Ct. 2936, 165 L.Ed.2d 962 (2006). To the extent that Banks argued in his motion to suppress that his confession was not voluntary, we observe that Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides that "[nlo person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against 3) (<HOLDING>). Standard indicators for voluntariness include Holdings: 0: holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given 1: holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable 2: holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law 3: holding that admissibility of a confession is governed by determining from the totality of the circumstances whether or not it was made voluntarily 4: holding that the admissibility of a state ment is controlled by determining from the totality of the cireumstances whether it was made voluntarily and not induced by violence threats or other improper influences that overcame the defendants free will


Input: Colameta began to search for another job before Protégé changed his duties or reduced his compensation, Colameta attests — without contradiction from Protégé — to the importance of the increase in his compensation in remaining with Protégé after the expiration of his 2004 Employment Agreement, and he only left Protégé after his salary was reduced and his job duties underwent their second alteration, resulting in Colameta’s having more responsibilities for less pay. Viewing Protégé’s actions together, it was in breach of the 2007 Employment Agreement, at the latest, by January 2009, when it reduced Colameta’s salary by $40,000, eliminated Colameta’s commission plan, and had twice effected changes to Colameta’s job duties. See, e.g., F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 353 Mass. at 587 (<HOLDING>); Grace Hunt IT Solutions, LLC, 2012 WL Holdings: 0: holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract 1: holding that change in employees rate of compensation and sales area constituted far reaching changes that strongly suggestedl that the parties had abandoned their old arrangement and had entered into a new relationship 2: holding that an order requiring the agency to search the records did not constitute courtordered change in the relationship of the parties 3: holding that hearing officers noting the parties agreement did not constitute a change in the parties legal relationship 4: holding that agreement had been reached where the plaintiff had proposed terms for providing his services to the defendant and the parties then entered into a business relationship  despite defendants claim it never agreed to the plaintiffs proposed salary terms for that relationship


Input: Court had been apprised of the potential for a change of venue motion. 7 . The Court agrees with the general proposition of defense counsel Goldstein that the acts of counsel should not be held against the defendants. (12/13/96 Tr. at 85). A defense attorney, however, is a defendant's representative to the Court. Nevertheless, the Court has also taken action to alleviate a great deal of the burden on the defendants of the trial in New York. 8 . See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1806, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969) (stating in broadcast licensing case that "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 2581-82, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972) (<HOLDING>). See generally, Ian M. Rose, Note, Barring Holdings: 0: recognizing first amendment and fourteenth amendment interests in inmate correspondence 1: recognizing a first amendment right to receive mail subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security 2: recognizing first amendment retaliation right 3: recognizing the right of students to challenge on first amendment grounds actions of school officials which circumscribe the range of ideas to which students are exposed 4: recognizing in first amendment jurisprudence the right to receive information and ideas


Input: More recently, the Fourth Circuit characterized the limited application of Eastern Enterprises as follows: Eastern Enterprises can only be viewed as rendering a decision that Congress acted arbitrarily in imposing retroactive liability on a signatory to [National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements] in existence prior to those that promised lifetime health benefits to retired miners when that signatory made no promise of lifetime benefits, did not contribute to the problem that caused the funding shortfall for the promised lifetime benefits or to the need for such benefits, and was not put on notice by any governmental action during the relevant time period that it might be subjected to later liability. Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 606-607 (4th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). In this case, no doubts have been expressed Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute waives the issue on appeal 1: holding the failure to comply with the act does not bar defendant from raising a constitutional challenge to jury selection procedures 2: holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration 3: holding that any motion made within ten days of entry of judgment which seeks a substantive change in the judgment will be considered a rule 59e motion which suspends the finality of the judgment and tolls the time to appeal 4: holding that eastern enterprises did not constitute a change in the law sufficient to justify the raising of a constitutional challenge to the coal act in a motion for reconsideration after judgment under fed rcivp 59e


Input: of Hews, 108 Wn.2d 579, 589-92, 741 P.2d 983 (1987); CrR 4.2(d). The State contends, and we agree, that his argument is predicated on the mistaken belief that the connection between the gun, the crime, and the defendant is itself an essential element of being armed. ¶11 We take this opportunity to summarize our relevant holdings. “A person is ‘armed’ if a weapon is easily acces sible and readily available for use, either for offensive or defensive purposes” and there is a connection between the defendant, the weapon, and the crime. Valdobinos, 122 Wn.2d at 282; Barnes, 153 Wn.2d at 383. However, the connection between the defendant, the weapon, and the crime is not an element the State must explicitly plead and prove. See State v. Willis, 153 Wn.2d 366, 374, 103 P.3d 1213 (2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Gurske, 155 Wn.2d at 138-39 (same); Holdings: 0: holding that the district court correctly instructed the jury that there had to be a substantial similarity between the indictment and the proof in order to find the defendant guilty 1: holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used 2: holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense 3: holding that the jury need not be specifically instructed to find whether there is a connection between the defendant the weapon and the crime 4: holding that to find negligence jury need not find violation of federal motorcarrier regulation


Input: agencies). However, an otherwise-valid referral fee agreement does not violate public policy merely because of a minor technical deficiency with respect to the professional rules. Moreover, permitting Eggen to invoke the ethical rules as a defense to enforcement of the referral fee agreement would do a disservice to the intent of the rules. [T]he purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer’s self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Minn.R.Prof. Conduct scope; accord L & H Airco, 446 N.W.2d at 380 (<HOLDING>). These comments would hold less force if rule Holdings: 0: holding that rules 33 and 34 did not apply to ivys misconduct because these rules are intended to govern attorneys when they are acting as advocates and not in thelr personal capacities 1: holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability 2: recognizing professional rules are not intended to run to personal benefit of attorneys adversaries 3: holding that a breach of the rules of professional conduct would not justify setting aside a divorce judgment and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 4: holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures


Input: in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts"). For this exception to apply, one of the fora s the Labor Commission exelusive authority over employees' claims against their employers for injuries sustained in the workplace. Utah Code Ann. $ 34A-2-105 (Supp.2008). Agencies, in contrast, are limited to the adjudicative authority granted by the legislature. SMP, Inc., 843 P.2d at 533 ("As a statutorily created agency, the Industrial Commission has only those powers expressly or impliedly granted by statute.") For this reason, it is more likely that an administrative agency's subject matter jurisdiction will be limited than a district court's. Id. ("[AJgencies typically have limited subject matter jurisdiction."); see also id. at 533-34 (<HOLDING>); Nebeker, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 23, 34 P.3d 180 Holdings: 0: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 1: holding that the industrial commission only had subject matter jurisdiction over claims under the payment of wages statute and not contract claims 2: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 3: holding that court of claims has jurisdiction over actions for breach of standard contract 4: holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendants payments had gone to the states industrial commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction


Input: income. 2. The statutory child support guidelines provide that a trial court may deviate from the presumptive amount of child support in the event of special expenses incurred for child rearing, including school-sponsored extracurricular activities. OCGA § 19-6-15 (i) (2) (J) (ii). However, a trial court is free to reject a claim for a deviation from the presumptive child support amount. Turner v. Turner, 285 Ga. 866 (2) (684 SE2d 596) (2009). Here, the trial court “adhered to the child support obligation table (OCGA § 19-6-15 (o)) and enforced the presumptive amount of child support” and, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in declining to add the child’s cheerleading expenses to the child support calculations. See Johnson v. Johnson, 284 Ga. 366, 367 (1) (667 SE2d 350) (2008) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the trial court did not err in Holdings: 0: holding that a tuition waiver is not the same as income for child support purposes 1: holding that trial court did not err 2: holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement 3: holding trial court did not err in declining to apply the childrens private school tuition in child support calculations 4: holding that district court did not clearly err in declining to credit prisoners testimony about exhaustion


Input: following a state prosecution arising out of the same events.” Arena, 180 F.3d at 399; see also Heath, 474 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 433. Although Judge Calabresi invited the Supreme Court to re-examine the doctrine in light of increased instances of federal and state successive prosecutions, the doctrine remains viable. See United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Auto. Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 497-99 (2d Cir.1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring). Sewell’s double jeopardy challenge is without merit because his successive prosecutions involved separate sovereigns — New York State and the United States. It is immaterial that the proceedings stemmed from the same events and that the state prosecution ended in acquittal while the federal prosecution ended in conviction. See Arena, 180 F.3d at 399 (<HOLDING>). Sewell’s invitation to compare the state and Holdings: 0: holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation 1: holding that foreign states prosecution did not bar subsequent florida prosecution for same conduct 2: holding that state immunity agreement did not bind federal prosecutor 3: holding that a federal prosecutor may in deciding whether to pursue a subsequent prosecution take into consideration what he deems an inadequate result obtained in the state trial 4: holding that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages under  1988 in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the states case including deciding which evidence to present


Input: Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or .1998) (<HOLDING>). The court reviews the Magistrate Judge’s Holdings: 0: holding that district courts adoption of the magistrate judges report and recommendation one day after issuance did not constitute reversible error where district court conducted a meaningful review of the report and recommendation 1: holding that district court error was not clear error in denying petition for mandamus 2: holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings 3: holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error 4: holding that a partys failure to raise objections to the report and recommendation waives the partys right to review in the district court


Input: a claim upon which relief can be granted, we review the legal issues raised herein on the assumption that the facts, as alleged by plaintiff, are true. Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 150 N.J. 255, 263, 696 A.2d 546 (1997). With these circumstances in mind, we turn to the CFA to determine whether coverage pursuant to that Act exists. That Act, enacted by the Legislature fifty years ago, created “a powerful weapon to curb consumer fraud.” Lee v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 199 N.J. 251, 257, 971 A.2d 1054 (2009). “Its purpose is to ‘eliminat[e] sharp practices and dealings in the marketing of merchandise and real estate.’ Channel Cos. v. Britton, 167 N.J.Super. 417, 418, 400 A.2d 1221 (App.Div.1979); see also Real v. Radir Wheels, Inc., 198 N.J. 511, 514, 969 A.2d 1069 (2009) (<HOLDING>).” Lee, supra, 199 N.J. at 257, 971 A.2d 1054. Holdings: 0: recognizing that cfa represents a legislative broadside against unsavory commercial practices 1: holding that legislative immunity shields an official from liability if the act in question was undertaken in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity 2: holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law 3: holding acts of voting to be quintessentially legislative and the introduction of a budget to be formally legislative 4: holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission


Input: the bus’s lower luggage compartment constituted a seizure, we then could hold the district court did not commit clear error in finding Loos’s and Escobar’s consents to search did not purge the taint of the unlawful seizure. Such a holding is more faithful to the district court’s decision and the parties’ arguments on appeal. Deciding consent cases is a fact-intensive exercise, requiring district courts to “careful[ly] sift[ ] misrepresentation of legal authority and a misunderstanding of legal authority,” the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding Loos’s and Escobar’s consents to search, in light of the lie about the drug dog alerting, were insufficient to overcome the taint of an unlawful seizure. See United States v. Allison, 619 F.2d 1254, 1262, 1264 (8th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Because I would be Holdings: 0: holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept 1: holding that the question of whether police had a reasonable basis for finding that a third party had authority to consent to search is a question of law 2: holding threat to obtain a search warrant if individual does not consent to a search is just one factor in deciding whether the totality of the circumstances supports a voluntary consent finding 3: holding a search pursuant to the service of a subpoena duces tecum as in normal consent search situations involves a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances and recognizing a vast difference between a misrepresentation of legal authority and a misunderstanding of legal authority 4: holding that whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion express or implied is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances


Input: The definition is not useful in resolving whether residency is an employment qualification as opposed to some other type of employment requirement. 7 . In St. Louis Fire Fighters Ass’n, the City chose to make its firefighters’ salaries dependent on the salary given to police employees under state law. Because this was a decision by the City as to salary, it did not constitute an impermissible legislative arrogation of power or an improper delegation of city authority to set compensation to the legislature. The legislature, this Court stated, "has not sought to require that firemen be hired, or to provide their duties, or fix their compensation. The general assembly has done nothing to violate art. VI, s[ec] 22.” Id. at 461. 8 . See also Cohen v. Poelker, 520 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. banc 1975) (<HOLDING>). 9 . In situations in which the question of Holdings: 0: recognizing that intent of public records act is to provide all citizens with access to the records of all public governmental bodies 1: holding that chapter 610 rsmo which requires public governmental bodies to open their meetings to the public when conducting the peoples business does not violate the home rule law because it does not regulate powers duties or compensation 2: holding section 625 only requires a showing that the conduct was done in a place that is open to the public or where the public has a right to be 3: holding texas open meeting act prohibiting governmental body from conducting closed meetings during which public business or public policy over which the governmental body has supervision or control is discussed to be contentneutral because closed meetings 1 prevent transparency 2 encourage fraud and corruption and 3 foster mistrust in government 4: holding that motorcycle training course is not a matter of public necessity and release does not violate public policy


Input: may be required to meet a rigorous liability standard mandated by the First Amendment). In taking cases, like other cases, a “well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Franco, 930 A.2d at 172 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nevertheless, like evaluation of an affirmative defense that the claimed public purpose for a taking was pretextual, evaluation of a claim that the District abused the eminent domain process does not require us to stretch to draw dubious inferences that the executive branch acted improperly. Cf. Oh v. National Capital Revitalization Corp., 7 A.3d 997, 1002-03 (D.C.2010) (<HOLDING>). Even if discovery might reveal facts Holdings: 0: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 1: holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard 2: holding under lenient pleading standard that party failed adequately to allege that the taking was under a pretext of a public purpose 3: holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant 4: holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983


Input: 602 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). The Court’s decision does not bar all claims to enforce to such regulations, but only disparate impact claims brought by private parties directly under Title VI. Id. at 299-300, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Disparate impact claims may still be brought against state officials for prospective injunctive relief through an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce section 602 regulations. Id. The decision in Sandoval does not affect plaintiffs’ right to bring a disparate impact claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and defendants do not contend otherwise. See New Mexico Ass’n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 854 (10th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, Holdings: 0: holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the adea 1: recognizing cause of action under section 504 based on claims of disparate impact 2: holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea 3: recognizing the cause of action 4: recognizing cause of action


Input: to resolve cases on the merits requires both authority over the category pf claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction)- and authority over the parties (personal jurisdiction), so that : the court's decision will bind-them,”). 22 . Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, Abb U.S. 408, 426, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 23 . Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 318, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). 24 .See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952) (finding that "continuous and systematic” corporate activities with Ohio subjected a foreign corporation to general jurisdiction there); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (<HOLDING>); see also Monestier, supra note 1, at 1352 Holdings: 0: holding that the court must look for continuous and systematic general business contacts  ie general jurisdiction  if the causes of action do not arise from or relate to the foreign defendants contacts with the forum state 1: recognizing general jurisdiction where availment is systematic and continuous 2: holding that when determining whether a nonresident defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with texas sufficient to support general jurisdiction courts examine the defendants contacts and forumrelated activities only up to the time that suit was filed 3: holding that thirteen business trips of short duration over eighteen months was not continuous and systematic solicitation of business in the state to justify general jurisdiction 4: holding that a ceos trip to the forum state to negotiate a services contract did not constitute the continuous and systematic general business contacts required to subject the corporation to general jurisdiction in the state


Input: appeal following the trial court’s resolution of the remaining equitable counts. It has been noted that a “Rule 54(b) certification does not authorize the entry of a final judgment on part of a single claim.... ” Fullilove v. Home Fin. Co., 678 So.2d 151, 154 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (citing Precision American Corp. v. Leasing Serv. Corp., 505 So.2d 380 (Ala.1987)). We have also observed that “Rule 54(b) is properly applied in a situation where the claim and the counterclaim present more than one claim for relief, either of which could have been separately enforced.” Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So.2d 1373, 1374 (Ala.1987) (citing Cates v. Bush, 293 Ala. 535, 307 So.2d 6 (1975) (emphasis added)). See also Pate v. Merchants Nat’l Bank of Mobile, 409 So.2d 797, 800 (Ala.1982) (<HOLDING>). As the appellants correctly argue, Thom holds Holdings: 0: holding rule 54b certification appropriate under the facts because ejither of these claims could have been separately enforced 1: holding that dismissal of some but not all claims or parties not immediately appealable absent rule 54b certification 2: holding that rule 54b certification order should contain specific findings setting forth reasons for certification 3: holding that entry of final judgment on a claim in a multiparty action pursuant to rule 54b should clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying the decision to grant 54b certification 4: holding rule 54b certification invalid because unaccompanied by any statement of reasons and factors underlying trial courts decision to grant certification


Input: opposed the termination of the parents’ rights to the three children. Rather, the guardian recommended readjudicating the children dependent, retaining their placement with the maternal aunt, and permitting the parents to enter into a case plan with the Department with a goal of reunification. The guardian noted that the parents adequately provided for the children’s housing, clothing, health, and nutritional needs. The guardian was mainly concerned that the parents receive education and support regarding child development, i.e., help in determining what level of supervision and interaction was appropriate for children in different developmental stages. The guardian described the family as “close knit” and indicated that the children were very bonded wi So.2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). In the context of egregious conduct, this Holdings: 0: holding that an unborn child is not a dependent for purposes of the neglect statute 1: holding a woman may be prosecuted for child neglect and endangering a child for prenatal substance abuse 2: holding that social services attorneys were entitled to absolute immunity for actions related to the prosecution of child neglect and delinquency proceedings 3: holding egregious conduct occurred with oneyearold child who had broken arm skull fracture bruising healing rib fracture and other indications of neglect 4: holding that maternal grandmother had standing to intervene in pending sapcr to seek managing conservatorship of child pursuant to former section 102004b and section 102004a where she had substantial past contact with child there was evidence of abuse and neglect of child by mother and mother had been arrested and had subsequently engaged in bizarre and dangerous behavior towards child had attacked grandmother with frying pan and hedge clippers and had been involuntarily committed to psychiatric center all of which established serious and immediate concern for welfare of child


Input: could not be overemphasized. Id. (emphasis in original). Federico expressed the same sentiments. See Federico’s Commentary at 182-83 (explaining that while perhaps the word “invented” in the prior patent act may have been the source of judicial demand for more than just novelty, Section 103 replaced any requirement for “invention”). Contemporaneous commentators also recognized that any need for “invention” had been rejected in favor of nonobviousness. See generally, Karl B. Lutz, The New 1952 Patent Statute, 35 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 155, 157-58 (1953) (explaining that courts had long ago decided that novelty was not enough and had disagreed on how to determine how much more was necessary, but that that issue was now addressed solely by Section 103); Dean O.S. 50 (Fed.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Thus, any requirement for “inventiveness” Holdings: 0: recognizing that kotteakos sets out the harmlesserror standard for nonconstitutional errors 1: holding that defendant may not pursue interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial 2: holding in the context of the assertion of a qualified immunity defense that a trial courts summary judgment order that merely determines that the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial does not meet the requirements of the federal collateral order doctrine 3: recognizing that section 103 sets forth the standard and so synergism of a known combination is not required 4: holding that although the board set forth the appropriate standard of review at the outset of its decision in this case whether the bia properly applied that standard was a question of law


Input: outside of the Guidelines range. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 595, 597. Here, the district court faced an unrepentant defendant, who absconded from the United States within a month of commencing his term of supervised release with a history of failing to comply with conditions of parole and probation. The court justified its sentence based on Angelo-Guarino’s inability to comply with the conditions of supervised release, suspicions regarding his explanations for his conduct, and the need to deter further criminal conduct and protect the public from future criminal conduct. Considering the testimony, evidence, and record before it, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence that exceeded the Guideline range. See United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 799 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we affirm Angelo-Guarino’s Holdings: 0: holding that defendant should be resentenced where district court imposed a sentence under an erroneously calculated guidelines range  even where the sentence imposed fell within the correct range 1: holding statutory booker error was not harmless where district court imposed sentence in middle of guidelines range and there were no statements in the record reflecting that the court would have imposed the same or greater sentence under advisory guidelines 2: recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed 3: holding that waiver of right to appeal sentence unless its was an upward departure barred appeal of sentence within guidelines range 4: holding that the district court which had considered the guidelines but found an upward variant sentence necessary given the defendants previous violations did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a 24month sentence instead of a guidelines range sentence of 3 to 9 months incarceration


Input: statutory denial of its then pending motion for a new trial, their appeal must be dismissed. State v. Wall, Ala., 348 So.2d 482. Appellants’ alternative motion that this court grant them relief via Rule 2(b) and Rule 26(b), ARAP, must also be denied. Although appellants contend that Rule 2(b) and Rule 26(b) may be used to reflect that express consent to extend the 90 day time limit of Rule 59.1 was shown in the trial record, no such consent was given by appel-lee’s attorney. To grant appellants’ alternative motion under Rule 2(b) and Rule 26(b) would in effect extend their time for filing a notice of appeal — -a result which both of the aforementioned rules expressly -prohibit. APPEAL DISMISSED. WRIGHT, P. J., concurs. HOLMES, J., concurs specially. 1 . See State v. Wall, 348 So.2d 482 (<HOLDING>). 2 . Our supreme court has construed this Holdings: 0: holding that the 90 day period set out in rule 591 begins to run from the date of filing rather than the date set for hearing of the posttrial motion 1: holding the 90 day period begins to run the date the eeoc right to sue letter is delivered to plaintiffs counsel 2: holding that rule 6e is inapplicable where the time for filing begins to run on the date of mailing 3: holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made 4: holding that where the violation of the fdcpa was the filing of a lawsuit the statule of limitations begins to run on the date of filing


Input: are entitled. Although plaintiffs claim “the Court need not look further than the New York statute to conclude that this matter does not involve claims for benefits and does not fall , within ERISA” (Pis. Opp’n at 6), this is not true: as previously set forth, turning solely to N.Y. GOL § 5-335 will not assist either plaintiffs or this Court in determining the rights plaintiffs hold, the benefits they are entitled to, and any conditions attached to such benefits under the Plans! Indeed, the allegations here stand in contrast to those cases in which a court has held that the plaintiffs claim was better categorized as an “amount of payment” dispute, as opposed to a “right to payment” matter. Compare Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 943-44 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>), with Zummo v. Zummo, No. 11 CV Holdings: 0: holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator 1: holding that erisa did not preempt hospitals claims against erisa plan administrator for misrepresentation under texas insurance code because hospitals claims were not dependent on or derived from the beneficiarys right to recover benefits under the plan 2: holding that action against an erisa plan administrator based on his alleged oral promise to pay for the majori ty of beneficiarys medical expenses was not a colorable claim under  502a1b because dispute concerned the terms of the alleged oral promise not of the erisa plan itself 3: holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan 4: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant


Input: the greater complexity of many disputes resolved by arbitration, and the developments of the law in this area.” Prefatory Note to the RUAA. In other words, the RUAA is a “revision of the UAA.” Id. The Prefatory Note to the original UAA explained that “[t]he section on Appeals is intended to remove doubts as to what orders are appealable and to limit appeals prior to judgment as to those instances where the element of finality is present.” Prefatory Note to the UAA. It had been held that in order to ensure that the appeals section of the UAA has the intended effect of “remov[ing] doubts as to what orders are appealable,” that section must be read as an exclusive list of appeal-able orders. See S. California Edison Co. v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 194 Ariz. 47, 977 P.2d 769, 774 (1999) (<HOLDING>). If orders related to arbitration could also Holdings: 0: holding that the prefatory note indicates that the intent of the uaa drafters was that interlocutory orders including those compelling arbitration are not appealable 1: holding that notice of appeal from final judgment brought forward the entire case including earlier interlocutory orders that were not independently appealable 2: holding that orders compelling arbitration are not appealable not because of the uaa appeals provision but because it has been definitely settled by the supreme court of this state that an order compelling arbitration is not final and therefore is not appealable 3: holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final 4: holding that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable because it is not final and because it is not listed in the uaa appeals provision


Input: Absent a proper plea of title, we do not see how the trial court could have ordered an undertaking. Penny v. Penny, 565 A.2d 587, 589 (D.C.1989) ("[A] ... protective order is an equitable device of the court whereas a ‘Rule 5(c)' undertaking order is statutorily authorized.”). Moreover, to the extent the Trust or the trial court assumed there was no legal defense to an action for post-foreclosure possession that would not rise to a plea of title, they were mistaken. See Lindsey v. Prillman, 921 A.2d 782, 786 (D.C.2007) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to order either a protective order or an undertaking where the person in possession merely alleged a contractual opportunity to purchase); Mahoney v. Campbell, 209 A.2d 791, 794 (D.C.1965) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Crockett does not argue that the trial Holdings: 0: holding that proof that the person has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located is sufficient to establish constructive possession citation omitted 1: holding that a past arrest for possession without more is simply not enough to provide reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is currently in possession 2: holding that a plea of title was not interposed where the person in possession answered that the party suing for possession was not the established owner of the premises 3: holding that the defendants possession of the firearm was not so fleeting as to warrant an instruction on temporary innocent possession 4: holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession